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HISTORY HAS NO SUBJUNCTIVE MOOD

President of the Republic of Tatarstan

The history of Russia as a great Eurasian superpower founded by the collective efforts of many peoples and embodying the unity of Slavic and Turkic civilizations is a subject of growing interest among domestic and foreign researchers. The realization of the special role the Russian state plays in current global processes, which is rooted in centuries-old traditions and a rich history, calls for the study of the previously unknown and unexplored pages of the country’s past and peoples.

In the previous decades the history of the Tatars—the second-largest ethnos in Russia—often happened to be the subject of disputes and deliberate or inadvertent distortion, which adversely affected the spiritual health of the general public.

The reconstruction of historical truth in its entirety therefore became a topic of interest to various scientific centres.

The major outcome of their activities was preparing and publishing this seven-volume academic work titled ‘The History of the Tatars from Ancient Times’. This treatise was produced under the scientific and methodological guidance of the Sh. Marjani Institute of History of the Tatarstan Academy of Sciences, with the participation of specialists from leading scientific centres in the Russian Federation and countries both near and far abroad. It incorporates modern approaches to the historical, socio-economic and cultural development of the Tatar nation, the entire multi-ethnic population of Tatarstan. Of primary importance is, to my mind, the integrated and unbiased approach of the authoring team as they assess the formation milestones of the Tatar ethnos in the context of global processes.

The 20th century was a time of revival for the culture, economy and ultimately the national identity of the Tatars rooted in the times of the Turkic, Kimak, Khazar khanates, Great and Volga Bulgaria, the Golden Horde, the Kazan and other khanates of the Middle Ages, as well as the Russian state.

Modern Tatars are direct heirs of the Eurasian civilization, which integrated in itself the most varied cultural elements of Turkic peoples. In May 922, an embassy of the Baghdad caliph arrived to the town of Bulgar on the Volga. This event was the official recognition of Islam as the state religion, which signified the accession of the Bulgar state into the family of Muslim countries and Islamic peoples, and contributed to expanding its international contacts.

The spiritual world of the Tatars' ancestors based on humanistic traditions of Islamic civilisation was characterised by tolerance towards the religious beliefs of other peoples.

The Bulgars founded a developed state where crafts, trade, science, and culture blossomed. The Volga Trade Route, just as the Northern Fur Route through the Kama basin, connected different countries based on trade interests and facilitated the formation of many modern peoples of Russia.
The Tatars called the Volga 'Idel-Yort'. The hero of the epos Edigü addresses Idel-Volga with the words:

'Hello, Idil, Motherland and Home!
May peace be upon thee, sweet Home!
Therein, in this house, my father
Became happy as a fiance and son-in-law.
Having married, herein my mother
Became a daughter-in-law, became a wife.
Hello, Idil, my sweet Home!
Where my being has begun.'

The Russians, Chuvashes, Maris and representatives of other peoples of the Volga region may and do address similar words to the Volga. Over time the Volga became the most important link in the trade chain, one of Russia's essential vertebrae. Locals were known to say 'Ili koche—Idel koche' (the power of the Volga is the power of the country).

The first capital of the Ulus Jochi (the Golden Horde) was founded here, on the Volga, on the land of the 'Holy Bulgar'. National history often gives contradictory evaluations of the role of the Golden Horde, focusing on the negative aspects of the 'Mongol yoke'.

Certainly, in the Middle Ages wars were continuously being fought, and feudal conflicts which sowed discord and destruction were on the rise. Wars between Russian princes were no less devastating than those with the external enemies of Rus'. But history did not consist exclusively of wars, destruction, and violence. The exchange of cultural accomplishments and trade played a more significant role in life, as demonstrated by the numerous monuments of archaeology and architecture.

In the times of the Golden Horde, many cities sprang up on the territory of modern Russia. The creative potential of this state should be noted carefully, as it connected the West and East by trade routes and played a role in the formation of the Great Russian statehood.

It is difficult to overestimate the significance of the Golden Horde in the formation of the Tatar ethnosc. Today there are a lot of arguments over the ethnogenesis of our people and whom we should consider our ancestors—the Bulgars or the Tatars. I believe that the complex and contradictory history of our ancient ethnosc provides a decisive answer to these questions. There have been various cultural components with a common Turkic basis since the times of the first Turkic Khanate, and they continued to develop in the period of Volga Bulgaria, eventually melding into one culture and mentality during the epoch of the Golden Horde and Kazan Khanate. No culture and no nation ever just stands in one place. Therefore, while evaluating the time of the Bulgars on its merits, we must not forget about the role of the Golden Horde and the subsequent periods of our history, including the 20th century.

Cultural heritage, despite historical conflicts, continued to shape the life of the Tatar people even after our country was incorporated into the Russian state, and allowed us to not only retain our identity but also achieve impressive progress in trade, industry and science.

The reforms of Catherine the Great were of great importance for the Tatar people. After visiting Kazan in the spring of 1767, she both stopped the practice of open religious discrimination and also recognised the spiritual rights of her subjects of Muslim origin and duly appreciated their passionate patriotism. The reforms of ‘Granny Tsarina’—this is how our ancestors warmly referred to Catherine II—contributed to the enlightenment of education, the construction of new large mosques, and the development of trade and crafts.

The spread of capitalist relations in the Tatar community resulted in the rise of the national bourgeoisie, which made great strides in commerce and production, and largely shaped the nature and content of the social life of Russian Muslims.
In the latter half of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries, the Tatars experienced a reform movement—Jadidism—which ensured the dignified existence of their people under the new, constantly changing conditions of capitalist reality. Tatar illuminators and theologians made a decisive contribution to these reforms, including Gâbdennasir Qursawi, Kayyum Nasyrî, Hussein Faiskhanov, Şîhabetdin Marjani, Rizaeddin Fakhrutdinov, Galimdzhăn Barudi, Ziya Kamali, Musa Bigiev, and other representatives of the academic and pedagogical community.

In the beginning of the 20th century, the Tatars began a modernised system of Islamic and secular education, and started working with an elaborate periodic press. Tatar public figures took active part in the activity of political parties. The Muslim fraction actively worked as part of the pre-revolutionary State Duma.

This time period was also the golden age of all the cultural achievements of the Tatar people. Professional literature, theatre, music and visual art enjoyed immense popularity not only with the Tatar people, but also all the Muslim peoples of Russia. The history of domestic culture will forever remember the names of Gâbdulla Tukay, Gayaz Ïsxaqy, Gâbdulla Kariev, Gâliäsgar Kamal, Salix Säydiș, Baqi Urmanche and other ascetics of Tatar art.

The formation of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (TASSR) in 1920 became one of the decisive historical milestones preceded by the vigorous actions of the Tatar public in creating the 'Idel-Ural' State, a Tatar-Bashkir republic.

The emergence of the TASSR, which reflected the desire for national self-determination, was at the same time an important step towards the formation and development of multi-ethnic state formations in Russia. There is no doubt that Tatarstan's progress in culture, production, and agriculture would not have been possible without the reinforcement of the unity of the Tatars, Russians, Chuvashes and representatives of other peoples who live in our republic.

All these factors gave reasonable enough grounds to proclaim the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Republic of Tatarstan in 1990. As a result of political and socio-economic reforms in the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, the Republic reached a new level of development in politics, economics, culture and international ties.

A multi-ethnic and multi-religious society with a unique history of cooperation and tolerance was formed in Tatarstan. It should be noted that due in large part to the policies and multifaceted activities of the first president of the Republic Mintimer Shaimiev the entire world learned about the 'Tatarstan model'—a successful region in the Russian Federation that addressed even the most complex socio-economic and cultural issues in a consistent and balanced way.

The key conclusion that follows from the logic of historical development is, I believe, that the Tatars who preserved their national and cultural identity played a vital role in establishing the power of the Russian state.

The fact that the majority of Russian Tatars live outside the administrative boundaries of the Republic of Tatarstan authoritatively dictates their vested interest in strengthening the Russian Federation and in the overall development of integration processes between its regions.

The Tatar people have always served their Motherland faithfully and loyally: in Minin and Pozharsky's militia they liberated Moscow, built Russian navy, fought against Napoleon on the battlefields of the Patriotic War of 1812 and battled against German fascist invaders during the Great Patriotic War. It was perfectly natural that Musa Džhalil became a symbol of courage and tenacity for all the peoples of the former USSR.

Today, the multiethnic population of Tatarstan has set itself the goal to further refine all sides of life of the republic and increase its role in the Russian Federation.

In terms of key economic indicators, Tatarstan is a leading force in the country. In terms of gross regional product, the Republic is comparable to such countries as Slovakia or Bulgaria. In 2011, we produced as many goods as the Novosibirsk and Nizhny Novgorod oblasts combined.
This convinces us that we can correctly address issues of socio-cultural development. The island-town Sviyazhsk, the city of Bulgar and the historical centre of Kazan are being revived. Many other settlements are also being transformed. Museum expositions are getting better and numerous tourist routes are being created.

But at the same time it is quite obvious that without knowledge of the past and an objective analysis of the historical experience of our ancestors, it is impossible to plan for the future.

The significance of this publication is defined by this very fact. I believe that the academic ‘The History of the Tatars from Ancient Times’ will make a contribution to developing and popularizing the objective history of the peoples of the Russian Federation, and open up its readers to the exciting world that is the thousand-year history of the Tatars.
INTRODUCTION

The Development of Tatarstan and the Tatars in the 20th and beginning of the 21th centuries

Radik Salikhov

Writing the multi-volume treatise 'The History of the Tatars from Ancient Times' based on a body of newly revealed sources and recent scientific discoveries certainly requires novel creative and methodological approaches. The challenge here is not only in the activity of a researcher on the front lines, but also in the different views and theories of the processes spanning the life of Tatar society through the milestones of its development. This problem concerns the writing of the 7th volume to a great extent, as it describes the story of Tatars in the early modern and modern periods. In the edition adopted by the Editorial Board, this volume covers the epoch from the beginning of the 20th century, or the Soviet and post-Soviet era as it concerns the development of the Tatar people and Tatarstan. A highly challenging task for modern historians is the obvious burden related to the theories, sources, and authorship that is included in the final installment of this multi-volume work, for it comprises three different socio-economic formations which are very tough to unite in an integrated manner. The core message of this concept lies in the emergence of the political history of the Tatars in the beginning of the 20th century, which then shaped the direction of the nation's development throughout the century.

The first section covers the main processes of jadidism—a powerful ethnic cultural revival that made its first splash after the Manifesto of 1905, when the Tatars had succeeded in building a network of modern innovative educational institutions, a secular intelligentsia had begun to form, and book houses, a national press, large charities, and cultural/educational organisations were starting to emerge. The intensive development of the Tatar bourgeoisie in the midst of the industrial revolution, which exhibited a high ethno-political consciousness, was an important factor in this period. The section's first chapter focuses on the key features of the commercial and industrial life of the country, its commercial activity and peasant agriculture, and is framed by the socio-economic development of Kazan guberniya and the Tatar world in the beginning of the 20th century. The intense business activities of the Tatar bourgeoisie enabled them to accumulate considerable material and financial resources, a significant part of which were allocated for social purposes: charity, a reform of the confessional school, founding various public institutions.

Both the Jadid movement, which shook every aspect of Tatar lives, and the hasty growth of national identity, contributed to the intense struggle of Russian Muslims for civil rights as well as their organic interaction with the main political forces of the empire. Accordingly, the second and third chapters explain the complex picture of the formation of the first Tatar political parties, which claimed leadership in the entire Turk-Islamic community, as well as the ethno-confessional policy of a state faced with a large and full-scale liberation movement. Despite serious ideological contradictions in the Islamic environment itself over socio-cultural transformations and paths for the further development of the nation, the Tatar elite managed to hold three all-Russian Islamic conventions in 1905–1906. Their decisions charted a single course for the achievement of national cultural autonomy, which was the first crucial step towards the Tatars' self-determination.

A notable feature of this volume is the combination of territorial and extraterritorial approaches. The Tatars occupy a vast area over the entire Eurasian continent, thus they cannot be limited to Tatarstan only. At the same time, as the traditional political, economic and spiritual centre of the Tatar people, Kazan played the role of the chief city for many centuries in the multi-national
Kazan region and guberniya, both of which bore a vividly expressed multi-religious and multi-cultural character. The world-famous Kazan University, Kazan Spiritual Academy, Kazan Foreign Seminary and many other educational institutions were educational and spiritual centres for the Russians, Chuvash, Mordvins, Maris and many other peoples of Russia. The unique international environment created by strong economic and social relations and traditions of good-neighborly cooperation, in many ways determined the nature of the development of the Tatar nation, its openness and desire for reforms and progress. Therefore, the fourth chapter of the first part of the volume, which highlights the educational and cultural achievements of the Tatars in the beginning of the 20th century, simultaneously casts Kazan guberniya as an important scientific and cultural region of the Russian Empire that had a tremendous impact on the fates of not only the peoples of the Volga region but also the entire multi-national state.

The revolutionary events of 1917 and the civil war that followed changed the political landscape of Russia in a radical way. The cruel class struggle was accompanied by a powerful national liberation movement seeking to capitalise on the historical chance for the self-determination of peoples of the former empire. For the first time in several centuries the Tatars had the opportunity to revive their own statehood and determine their place in a rapidly changing world. The sixth and seventh chapters of the section explore the participation of the Tatars in the revolution, the race for power in Kazan guberniya, and the unity of the Tatars behind the idea of territorial independence. The proclamation in 1918 of the Idel-Ural State was the first step towards nationhood. Despite the failure of this movement due to the counter-measures of the Bolsheviks, the ideological struggle and organizational work of these Tatar political leaders led to the formation of the TASSR.

The second part of the seventh volume focuses on the development stages of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. This event was preceded by long years of tireless activity on behalf of the national intelligentsia, business leaders and clergy that resulted in the Idel-Ural State, the Tatar-Bashkir Republic. The first, second, third and fourth chapters note that the formation of the TASSR was the realisation of a century-long Tatar aspiration and an important step towards national self-determination. It contributed to the emergence of the phenomenon of a multi-ethnic state formation within the RSFSR. One of the leaders and theorists of the national liberation movement, Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev, played one of the most influential roles in this process. His ideas combining principles of class and anti-colonial struggle, a kind of 'Islamic socialism', did not find support with the Bolsheviks, but in the 20th century became a flag for the liberation struggle of nations that were held under colonial rule.

The inconsistency of Soviet Tatarstan's statehood on the one hand, which had already manifested itself in the 1920s, in the formation of its own government institutions, indigenisation of the apparatus, development of national education and culture, the strengthening of its economy, and on the other hand regarding political repression, emigration of old-regime intelligentsia, elimination of the national bourgeoisie as a class and the struggle with clergy and religion reflected the forced, artificial disruption of ideological and cultural traditions which inevitably led to the gradual 'erosion' of the national component of statehood. The further tightening of the policy bent on the destruction of Tatar schools, publications and cultural institutions within the USSR limited the spiritual life of the Tatar people in the republic, with Tatarstan itself being granted less and less opportunities for its development.

Even though the industrialization of the economy and the collectivisation of agriculture transformed Tatarstan into a developed industrial and agricultural region, the tight centralisation of economic power, absence of economic rights and Republic property as well as the humanitarian costs of peasant rights also negated the status of its autonomy and brought about intense social protests.

Among the positive factors in the formation of the TASSR was the development of the
numerous talented scientific and creative intelligentsia. The golden age of Tatar professional soviet literature, music, drama, visual art, academic research and science contributed, under difficult state policies, to maintaining national identity, native languages, culture and staying on top of the advances of world civilization.

One of the key challenges facing modern historical science is unbiased and comprehensive coverage of World War II, which is a topic that easily becomes the subject of political speculation in foreign historiography. The Soviet Union's decisive role in the victory over Fascist Germany is not subject to any doubt. The fifth chapter of this part of the volume covers the outstanding contribution of the Tatar people and peoples of Tatarstan in the struggle against fascism. Starting in the first months of hostilities, the most important rear military-industrial base and knowledge-intensive industries began to form in the TASSR, and the aircraft industry also began to improve. In Kazan, the eminent Soviet constructors A. Tupolev, S. Korolev, V. Petlyakov, V. Glushko and others, who created the famous divebomber Petlyakov Pe-2, conducted research on jet engines that afterwards provided the basis for the space industry in the USSR.

Around 700 thousand people were conscripted from Tatarstan into the operating army. The names of Tatarstan citizens who exhibited unparalleled courage and heroism have earned an inscription in the history of battles in golden letters: P. Gavrilov, M. Devyatayev, G. Gafiatullin, G. Zagitov, M. Syrtlanova, and many others. Out of 11,519 Soviet warriors honoured with a Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union, the Tatars rank fourth after Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians. The unfadable courage of the hero poet Musa Cälil and his fellow soldiers who organized stalwart anti-fascist resistance among war prisoners in Germany embodies the high civil and fighting spirit, steadfastness and patriotism of the Soviet people.

The sixth, seventh and eighth chapters of the second part explore the history of post-war Tatarstan characterised by a rapidly evolving modernization and steady increase in scientific and cultural potential. The formation and development of the oil and petrochemical industry, aviation, automobile manufacturing, agriculture and other industries, coupled with the progress of academic and institutional science, transformed the republic into one of the most advanced regions of the Soviet Union.

However, it was obvious that the truncated autonomy of Tatarstan defined by the principle of political segregation heavily stifled possibilities for further advancements in the economy and culture. As the ethnic crisis triggered by the artificial ideological restrictions of culture, language and humanistic research mounted, there was a breakdown of traditional links among Tatar communities in the USSR as well as a declining capacity to endow traditions with new meaning and realise the spiritual rights and achievements of the Tatar people in the republic itself. The idea of enhancing the official state status of Tatarstan gained increasing popularity in the collective consciousness of the peoples of the republic.

The third part of the volume addresses the modern period of Tatarstan political history. The proclamation of the Declaration on State Sovereignty in 1990 was a natural extension of the reconstruction of statehood put forth originally by the Decree on the Formation of the TASSR of 1920. In the aftermath of perestroika and the socio-economic reforms of the 1990s, the republic gained independence in politics, economic matters, culture, and international ties. In other words, it now had its own logic of historical development. A multi-ethnic and multi-religious society with a unique history of cooperation and tolerance emerged in Tatarstan.

The long, successful years in power of first president of the republic M. Shaimiev introduced the whole world to the successfully tested 'Tatarstan model' as an example of a unique regional state construction within the Russian Federation, effective interactions with the federal center, a deliberate economic strategy and a place for social and interethnic stability.

All of these crucial and for the most part new problems for domestic science are consistently developed in the chapters of the third part of the volume. The first and second
chapters provide a historical assessment of perestroika processes both in the country and republic, the complex socio-political situation in the USSR, and other factors that paved the way for the proclamation of Tatarstan's sovereignty. The third chapter of the third part focuses primarily on the establishment of new relationships between the Republic of Tatarstan and the Russian Federation, which is a complicated period in the development of the republic's statehood. The researchers address political milestones in the 1990s: the Referendum of 1992, agreement 'On the delimitation of subjects of jurisdiction and mutual delegation of authority among government bodies of the Russian Federation and of the Republic of Tatarstan' dated 1994, the adoption of the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan, the implementation of national policy in the Russian Federation and the development of inter-ethnic relations in Tatarstan, etc. By signing the bilateral treaty, the Russian Federation de jure recognised the act of self-determination of the peoples of Tatarstan.

The vigorous external activity of the republic, its cooperation with international organizations contributing to the enhancement of the authority of Tatarstan on the world stage were some of the major achievements in this period. The history and priorities of the external affairs of Tatarstan are covered in the forth chapter of the third part of the volume.

The advances in state-building, the economy and culture played a fundamental role in consolidating the Tatar nation not only in the Russian Federation, but in the world as a whole. Tatarstan turned into the spiritual centre of gravity for a nation with millions of residents dispersed as a result of historical destiny across every continent. At the same time, in the Tatar communities developing as cultural and national autonomies, they had their own possibilities for conserving and reviving native language, culture, and identity. The fifth chapter goes into detail on the ethnic and cultural status of the Tatar world and the role of the world Tatar congress in expressing the interests of the Tatar people; it characterises the increasing influence of the Tatars within the Russian Federation and the CIS.

The new status of Tatarstan opened significant prospects for the development of culture and the education of the Tatars and other peoples of the republic. The doubtless achievements in this field have received high recognition in the global community. Tatarstan became a hotbed of innovation, pilot projects in national education and professional art and international forums on the most topical issues of the day. The celebration of the 1,000th anniversary of Kazan not only radically changed the face of the capital and its infrastructure, but was also a turning point in the historical identity of the Tatar people. Recognised as one the most ancient cities on Earth, and with a high level of military, city planning and manufacturing culture, an organic mix of Islam and Orthodoxy as well as Turkic, Slavic and Finno-Ugric populations, Kazan strengthened its status as the third capital of Russia and a major centre of the world's cultural heritage.

In 2004, Kazan State University celebrated its 200th anniversary. This glorious educational institution established special traditions in the academic science and education of Tatarstan. The creation of the Tatarstan Academy of Sciences gave a new impetus to basic research in a variety of subject areas and became one of the most crucial conditions for modern economic and cultural development. The sixth chapter analyses the logic of cultural processes in the republic, which allows us to situate the role and place of Tatarstan on a better footing in Russian and world history.

The independent socio-economic policy of Tatarstan was designed to increase the living standards of the population, and moving it closer to European standards dictates new approaches in strategy and tactics. Breaking the chains of commodity dependence and creating innovative plants on the basis of available progress in science, technology and production in the republic are key to its economic viability. The seventh chapter of this part of the volume explains the priorities of the socio-economic development of the Russian Federation under market-oriented reforms. It is worth noting that the independence of Tatarstan has allowed and continues to allow for
the implementation of large-scale social projects, such as the Slum Dwelling Elimination Programme, Social Mortgage Programme, Gas Provision for all Inhabited Areas Programme and others.

Today this course remains unchanged in the context of a new socio-political situation in the country. In 2010, an experienced politician and economist named R. Minnikhanov became the new President of Tatarstan, under whose leadership the petrochemical complex, construction, automobile and aviation industries, agriculture and culture continue to efficiently develop, and the republic is preparing for the 2013 Universiade, 2018 FIFA World Cup and other events on the international level. In other words, Tatarstan is entering a new phase in state-building, which is addressed in the third part of the volume.

The peoples of the republic feel confident about the future. The path they took in the 20th century, despite its complexities and contradictions, turned into a story of state renaissance, a restoration of traditions and the Tatars' discovery of their unique place in world civilization.

* * *

Experts from leading scientific centres in Kazan and other cities across the Russian Federation contributed to this volume. Doctors of Historical Sciences R. Xakimov, I. Tagirov, R. Salikhov, A. Xabutdinov, and Candidate of Historical Sciences A. Bushuev contributed greatly in determining the structure and concept of the volume.

The documents contained in supplements to the volume were provided by A. Bushuev, L. Gabdrafi kova, A. Gallyamova, Z. Garipova, I. Zagidullin, A. Kabirova, I. Minnullin and selected by A. Bushuev, L. Gabdrafi kova, I. Xanipova.

The volume's photographic materials were found and pre-selected by B. Izmajlov, R. Salikhov, and I. Xanipova. A. Bushuev, B. Izmajlov, and R. Salikhov selected the photographic materials.

The literary references and abbreviation list were prepared by A. Bushuev, L. Gabdrafi kova, B. Izmajlov, and E. Mironova.

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Illustrations in the volume include photographic materials preserved in the funds of the National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, the Central State Archive of Historical and Political Documentation of the Republic of Tatarstan, the National Museum of the Republic of Tatarstan, the Kazan National Cultural Centre, I. Tagirov's personal archive, and those published in the photo album 'Tatarstan: Historic Milestones. 1920–2010' (Kazan, 2010) and in the book 'Republic of Tatarstan: Nature, History, Economy, Culture, Science' (Kazan, 2010) and posted on the website of the RT President (www.president.tatarstan.ru), the RT Cabinet of Ministers (www.prav.tatarstan.ru), the RT State Council (www.gossov.tatarstan.ru), and OJC TANECO (www.nnpz.ru).
HISTORIOGRAPHY AND SOURCES

Radik Salikhov, Aleksej Bushuev, Al’fiya Gallyamova, Ajslu Kabirova

The recent 20th century was an era of great upheavals and global political and socio-economic changes for Russian society. The state’s radical transformations aroused a profound interest in its history. As long-present myths and stereotypes were busted, science was liberated from hackneyed phrases and shibboleths and enjoyed a extensive growth in research areas. In an effort to put the historical record straight and fill in the gaps for certain subjects, experts had to dig down to the very basis of historical science, thus starting from a fundamental reconsideration of the entire historical legacy.

It is therefore essential to perform a historiographic analysis before analyzing the events and processes constituting the history of the Tatars and Tatarstan historically. Without historiographic research it would be impossible to cover all the literature available, assess its progress, and determine the controversial or unresolved issues and approaches to studying them. The purpose of historiography is to compare and contrast historians’ works and ideas at different stages of the historical progress to discover trends and patterns in the development of historical thought as well as assess the contribution made by each generation of scientists to progress over a certain period of time.

The contemporary analysis of the history of the Tatars and Tatarstan in the 20th-early 21st century would be impossible without assessing historiographic knowledge on key historical sources. However, the conceptual complexity of the volume, which presents the history of the Tatars and Tatarstan over three controversial and diverse stages of historical progress (pre-Soviet, Soviet, and post-Soviet), prevents the authors from making a point to provide an exhaustive analysis of the entire set of sources and historical works on all the issues that the volume addresses. To do so would be not only difficult due to the enormous array of sources and published works in history, but pointless because of its potential to turn this section into a list of bibliographic references.

The authors believe a summary of the historiographic situation in terms of the contemporary history of Tatars and Tatarstan to be a sounder solution. It is thus reasonable to restrict the volume to a general assessment of the most important works from a factual and conceptual perspective. It is also essential to provide a general account of major groupings of historical sources with significant materials important to the study of the history of the Tatars and Tatarstan in the 20th–21st centuries, not just large in volume.

The History of Studies on the Tatars and Tatarstan in the 20th and Beginning of the 21st Centuries

The first steps towards studying Tatar society in the early 20th century date back to pre-revolutionary publications. Pre–Soviet literature on social processes in the Tatar community of the early 20th century demonstrate a pronouncedly ethnographic approach. Works of that period emphasise the lifestyle, household activities, education system, and culture of the Tatar population presented as a tight-knit, secluded ethno-confessional group reverencing Islamic custom and law [Pinegin, 1890; Rybakov, 1900; Sukharev, 1904; Alekterov, 1906; Znamensky, 1910; Nedzhib, 1911, p. 169; Katunov, 2001, p. 182; Mashanov, 2002; Koblov, 2007].

However, it was in the late 19th–early 20th century when national historiography began to take shape that wanted not only to shed light on events in the distant past but assess key trends in contemporary national development
and activities of prominent representatives of the clergy, business community and intelligentsia [Battal, 1912; Shkol'ny'j vopros v russkom musul'manstve, 1913, p. 515; Gaziz, 1994; R. Fäkretdin, 1995; Akchura, 1997 a; Akchura, 1997 b].

Despite being at the initial stage of its development, Tatar historiography has been able to accumulate a considerable amount of factual resources, thus forming the basis for further studies on the past of the Tatar people and other peoples in the Kazan region.

The power shift in the country triggered dramatic changes both to the development of historical science as such and to historical studies on the peoples of the Volga region. History saw a spike in attention from the first days of the Bolshevik regime. With no stable support of the masses, the party leaders wanted to assure people that their victory was natural not only by raising their weapons and establishing a dictatorship, but also by introducing a historical perception based on a rigid ideology.

From the very beginning of the Communist regime the history of the Russian revolutionary movement, the Russian revolutions, primarily the Great October Socialist Revolution, the class struggle and the Bolshevik Party became subjects of great interest in national historical research. Global historical issues and certain aspects of Russia's history, such as religious history, issues pertaining to the history of ethnic groups and their culture, and early periods of political history were declared irrelevant and remained largely unexplored.

The promotion of the Communist ideology was realised in two major ways. On the one hand, what was known as 'old' historical science was subject to eradication. Pre-revolutionary research institutions and associations were eliminated, the established system of higher education underwent a radical and violent transformation, and 'bourgeois' scientists were excluded from the scientific community. On the other hand, new and thoroughly Marxist academic research centres were established and censored by party bodies.

The situation was identical in the Soviet Tataria. Numerous experiments in the scientific sphere shifted the republic's balance of power dramatically. The policy of socialisation and Bolshevisation of all institutions employing historians had already been completed by the early 1920s. The Tatarstan Office of the Istpart (the Committee for the History of the October Revolution and Russian Bolshevist Communist Party), established on 16 October 1920 soon after the central organisation was founded, contributed the most to mainstream research. Its most active employees were S. Livshic, N. Znamensky, R. Tagirov, M. Borisov, E. Medvedev, and others. Members of the Central Committee of the Istpart S. Piontkovsky, A. Arosev, and V. Adoratsky were responsible for censorship over the employees [Litvin et al., 1972].

Historians' first works were dedicated to studying and determining the 'leading role' that the Bolshevist Party was to play in the revolutionary movement according to the Marxist-Leninist concept. For the most part, these were mostly memoirs. Such works by witnesses to or participants in the historical events were largely subjective. However, even works dating back to the early period of historiography are marked by the author's willingness to present the history of the Bolshevist Party from the 'right'—that is, a politically thought-out standpoint 1.

Some Tatar authors demonstrated a keen interest in the October Revolution. Among them were G. Ibragimova 2, M. Sultan-Galieva, and M. Sagidullina. G. Ibragimov's most influential work on this topic is titled 'The Great October Socialist Revolution and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat' [Ibragimov, 1922]. He presented it in February 1920, but it was not published until 1922. The book presents a detailed account of the revolutionary experience, the nature and driving forces of the revolution, the stages of the proletariat's revolutionary struggle from February to October 1917, and

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1 The written regional history of the Bolshevik Party as a part of the sociopolitical movement in the Volga region is presented in detail in special works. See: [Litvin, 1982; Litvin, 1985; Litvin, 2003].

2 For details of the historical heritage of G. Ibragimov see: [Khasanov, 1977 a; Khasanov, 1987; Alishev, 1986; Mukhametshin, 1987; Khakimova, 2004].
demonstrates the significance of the October Revolution. The work relies on a large number of literary and archival sources. It explains essential issues related to the dictatorship of the proletariat, the transformation of the state apparatus, and the elimination of the exploitation of man by man in a way understandable for the masses and, most importantly, consistent with Marxist theory, which ensured the patronage of the new authorities for G. Ibragimov.

The story of M. Sultan-Galiev and M. Sagidullin and their works is different. M. Sultan-Galiev's presentation of the Tatar revolutionary movement in his article 'The Tatars and the October Revolution' was met with bitter criticism [Sultan-Galiev, 1921]. The main reason for these remarks was the author's denial of well-marked class differences in the Tatar community, which Istpart censors interpreted as a denial of the Tatar proletariat. The author's rejection of the classic Bolshevik presentation of the proletarian revolution, to which class struggle was essential, coupled with a number of other statements brought about tragic consequences. M. Sultan-Galiev was convicted several times and executed by shooting in 1940 [Sultanbekov, 1991 a].

M. Sagidullin was M. Sultan-Galiev's uncompromising opponent as a representative of the republic's radical left political force. Any sedition was seemingly impossible in his book 'Tatar Workers on the Way of the Great October' [Sagidullin, 1927], prepared on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the Socialist Revolution. In fact, it was written to once again pin down the Tatar perception of the Marxist 'undeniable truth', which G. Ibragimov had presented in a most understandable way. Yet M. Sagidullin failed to meet the expectations of the party leaders, perhaps unintentionally, as he gave a positive assessment of the role the Islamic Socialist Committee, established in Kazan in March 1917 and headed by V. Vakhitov, played in consolidating the region's diverse political forces. The book contained a number of other 'incorrect statements'. Both what was known as the right opposition and the left adherents of the new regimes were to fall out of favour with the Soviet Command and Administration System. M. Sagidullin was arrested in 1932, convicted and consequently executed by shooting, just like M. Sultan-Galiev in 1938 [Sultanbekov, 1991 b].

The preparation and course of the October Revolution were also central to the anniversary compilations of 1940 and 1945, celebrating the establishment of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic [Zaycev, edit., 1945].

The focus of the 1940s was not restricted to studying the historical events of various periods; it also included the assessment of personal contributions to such processes. Historians were largely occupied with the lives and military records of prominent revolutionaries whose biographies were connected with the republic. The two-volume book 'Life of Outstanding People in Kazan' (1940–1941) is representative of the trend of the time [Azovsky, edit., 1940–1941]. The compilation contains the articles 'Mulannur Vakhitov' by Sh. Mannur, 'Yakov Sheynkman' by M. Bubennov, 'Abram Komlev' by A. Lebedeva, and 'Viktor Tikhomirnov' by N. Gusev. Other researchers continued to work on this topic in the following years. The trend peaked in the late 1950s, when detailed essays on the revolutionary and personal lives of M. Vakhitov, X. Mavlyutov, Sh. Usmanov, etc. were published [Iskhakov, 1958; Iskhakov, 1960; Yakhin, 1963].

The historiography pertaining to the Great October Revolution and the party bodies' role in it had become well-established by the early 1950s. The first serious generalising works in the form of graduate theses relying on local material started to crop up in Tataria [Tarasov, 1950; Karimova, 1950; Daminov, 1953; Ananyev, 1950; Shishkin, 1954; Ionenko, 1955]. According to the tradition of that period, they all focus on the party's history. Some of the works were subsequently published as monographs [Tarasov, 1956; Zalyalov, 1957; Ionenko, 1957; Litvin, 1957; Smykov, 1958]. The history of the Civil War was another area of focus for Tatarstan researchers.

Studies on the 'advance of socialism along the whole front' were key to research in the 1920s–1950s. That is, historical works provid-

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3 For details, see: [Litvin, 1988].
ed an account of how the three-link Marxist-Leninist programme (progressive industrialisation, enhancement of the kolkhoz and sovkhoz system, and a cultural revolution embodied by radical cultural and ideological transformation) should be implemented.

In Soviet Tartaria, with nearly half of its population being Tatar, issues regarding national and state building were pressing. The establishment of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in 1920 was a restoration, albeit limited and incomplete, of Tatar national independence, which triggered enthusiastic research by the intelligentsia. The issues of national development, linguistic and cultural revival, and specifics related to the formation of a national policy within the Republic’s multi-ethnic environment appealed to professional historians and philologists as well as politicians.

G. Ibragimov addressed these issues extensively in his works. He initiated the collection of documentary materials pertaining to the history of the establishment of the TASSR and the first years of its development. The first collection of works on Soviet construction appeared in 1922, prefaced with the author’s article on the historical past and present of the Tatar people [Sovetskoe stroitel’stvo v Tatrespublike za god, 1922]. He also coordinated the publication of ‘Materials on the History of the Organisation of the Tatar Republic’ [Ibragimov, 1925 a]. Party officials of various ranks were willing to study issues of national policy in Tartaria. For instance, the historical journalistic works of M. Sultan-Galiev, I. Kazakov, Kh. Gabidullin, M. Sabidullin and others present the regional history of the establishment of the Soviet state as a valuable historical source for those interested in the initial stage of Soviet historiography in the republic [Sultan-Galiev, 1921; Kazakov, 1923; Gabidullin, 1927; Sagidullin, 1927].

The ideological struggle between the ‘right’ and the ‘left’ in the republic was still the focus of the vast majority of works published in the 1920–1930s. Issues related to national and state construction were burning at that time, and those in opposition to the government’s official position were putting themselves at risk. It was Tartaria where the central party authorities chose to conduct the first demonstrative political trial of M. Sultan-Galiev, who rejected many aspects of J. Stalin’s theory. Ideological and organisation criticism of what is referred to as nationalist deviationism in the republic lasted for a decade. Journalistic and historical literature played a serious role by carrying out the orders of the political system.

L. Rubinshtejn, G. Kasimov, A. Arsharuni, Kh. Gabidullin and Kh. Khasanov wrote the first studies on the issues of ideological struggle in the TASSR [Rubinshtejn, 1930; Arsharuni et al., 1931; Kasimov, 1931; Khasanov, 1931]. They all were published in the 1930s, following robust anti–Sultan-Galiev campaigns in the Tatar Republic. This was the beginning of dogmatic clichés and ideological guidelines for studying the theory and practice of national and state construction.

The subject had little, if any, scientific coverage during the subsequent period, which was marked by cultic social practices. Only a few graduate theses shed light on certain aspects of the republic’s national policy during the first years of its existence [Bulatov, 1947; Valiulina, 1948; Enaleev, 1950; Valeev, 1955]. The works could not avoid the influence of the time, which was primarily expressed in apologetic terms for J. Stalin’s national policies. The works were united in their shared underestimation of the difficulties and hardships of solving the national problem in Tartaria.

Historians were unable to study the entire range of issues related to the TASSR’s experience during the first years of its existence until the historical crisis of 1956. A wide source base was utilised in the second half of the 1950s to address national issues. Studies by M. Mukharyamov contributed to the research on the subject more than any other work published. He authored and co-authored a large number of articles and books. For instance, M. Mukharyamov’s work ‘Soviet Tartaria in the Brotherly Family of the Peoples of the USSR’ appeared in 1955, followed by ‘Soviet Tartaria: A Child of

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4 Several works are devoted to the questions of ideological and political struggle in Tartaria in the 1920–1930s. See: [Belyakov, 1988; Sulima, 1996].
October' co-authored by M. Muxaryamov and X. Gimadi [Mukharyamov, 1955; Mukharyamov et al., 1957]. These works presented an account of how the Bolshevik national policy had been implemented. The authors described national and state construction in the TASSR as a component in the general development of the multi-national Soviet Socialist state.

Another book by M. Mukharyamov, 'October and the National Question in Tataria', which appeared in 1958, was also of great importance at that time [Mukharyamov, 1958]. The author analysed numerous sources and brought new materials into scientific consideration to present a non-prejudiced depiction of the national liberation movement in the region, as well as an unbiased evaluation of Tatar revolutionaries' activities and the part they played in the October Revolution and in the protection of socialist achievements, which were subject to the ideological censorship of the time.

Works by I. Klimov are also of great interest [Klimov, 1957; Klimov, 1960; Klimov, 1962]. The author relied on new archive documents to pioneer research on national and state construction during the TASSR's recovery period. I. Klimov relied on official statistics to present a practical solution to the republic's national issue during the New Economic Policy.


Problems related to the foundations of a socialist economy were closely connected with issues of national and state construction in the republic. The history of Tataria's industry became a focus of research as soon as a programme was introduced for building a new society. Most of the original articles by the republic's scientists on the history of industry appeared in the publication 'Trud i Xozyajstvo' ('Labor and Economy'). The most fecund authors included D. Arcybash, I. Pobedonoscev, A. Afanasiev, and V. Ermolayev [Sitnov, 1923; Arcybash, 1925 a; Arcybash, 1925 b; Afanasiev, 1925; Ermolaev et al, 1926]. They studied nearly all the branches of Tatarstan's industry—domestic, craft, rental and trust companies. Many projects were focused on electrification and plant nationalisation.

Research on the workers movement both across the country and within the republic was closely associated with the history of industrialization, but it was not restricted to the Soviet period. According to Marxist-Leninist theory, the development of the Russian revolutionary movement in the 19th–early 20th century was directly connected with the awakening of the proletarian consciousness. It was thus critical to depict the social and economic situation of the working class, its rising discontent, and more importantly, its predictable engagement in a struggle against its oppressors. The magazines 'Proletarij Tatarstana' ('Proletarian of Tatarstan'), 'Socialisticheskoe xozyajstvo Tarastana' ('Tatarstan's Socialist Economy'), and 'Revolyucija i nacional'nost' ('Revolution and Nationalities') published all kinds of works on the most prevalent issues of the labor and trade union movement.

Scientific studies on the subject in question began to appear in the mid-1920s–early 1930s. G. Zalkind was a prominent author who studied the development of the republic's mining industry [Zalkind, 1930], and M.Borisov is famous for his works on the history of labor organisations and the trade union movement [Borisov, 1923; Borisov, 1927; Borisov, 1930]; E. Medvedev addressed issues related to the formation of Tataria's proletariat [Medvedev, 1930 a; Medvedev, 1930 b; Medvedev, 1931 a; Medvedev, 1931 b]; M. Koburt analysed labor legislation [Korbut, 1925; Korbut, 1926; Korbut, 1927, Korbut, 1928].

The history of plants and factories became a research focus in the 1940s, with A. Klyuchevich, Ya. Vinecky, V. Nikol'sky and N. Sokolov at the helm [Nikolsky et al.,
Research on peasants was directly related to the history of the working class. This issue was especially important in an agricultural area like the Volga region\(^1\). The founders of Marxism believed that the poorest peasants were to become the proletariat's most important ally in the revolutionary struggle against the exploitative class. Historians were therefore obliged to produce works that would demonstrate the ironclad unity of that alliance based on shared goals. N. Firsov [Firsov, 1922]\(^2\) and E. Chernyshev were the most famous experts in the agricultural history of Tatarstan [Chernyshev, 1925; Chernyshev, 1926].

As the ruling party established itself, Soviet historians were faced with new tasks. It was important to provide a theoretical basis for the construction of a new socialist state. In terms of agriculture, they had to prove that mass collectiveisation was necessary. V. Ermolaev and M. Khasanov provided the most 'convincing' representation of the 'achievements' in recovering and developing the republic's agricultural production [Ermolaev, 1925; Ermolaev, 1927; Khasanov, 1928]. A selective approach to statistics enabled them to infer that the republic's agriculture had been growing at an increasing rate, in contrast to I. Shtucer and A. Berger, who rejected the idea of forced cooperative kolkhoz and sovkhoz rural construction, which they stigmatised as 'petit bourgeois' and promoted by Chayanov and Kondratyev [Shtucer, 1924; Shtucer, 1926; Shtucer, 1927; Berger, 1928].

The consequences of deviating from the compulsory conceptual framework were tragic. Such historians were repressed. However, party authorities did not confine themselves to punishing the authors of seditious works, instead sparing no effort to dismiss their ideas. A dedicated compilation titled 'Kondratyevshina in Tartaria' (Kondratyev's policy in Tataria), was published to this end in 1931 [Vintaykin et al., 1931]. Its authors Z. Vintaykin, F. Medvedev, A. Berger, who rejected the idea of forced cooperative kolkhoz and sovkhoz rural construction, which they stigmatised as 'petit bourgeois' and promoted by Chayanov and Kondratyev [Shtucer, 1924; Shtucer, 1926; Shtucer, 1927; Berger, 1928].

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and G. Shheperin tried to provide an economic justification for mass agricultural collectivisation, at the same time criticising the opinions of 'petit bourgeois' authors.

Any discussions on agricultural development trends seemed to have ended by late 1920, and the Leninist concept was declared the only correct approach. Historiography on this subject contains a large number of works dating back to that period that tried to prove that the Marxist-Leninist programme of socialist agricultural transformation had been completed successfully [Bajrakov, 1926; Gusev, 1929; Paperny, 1929]. Historians tended to emphasise the positive changes by demonstrating the growth and reinforcement of the kolkhoz network and the entire agricultural cooperation system, as well as the improved social status of kolkhoz workers with no more than a passing mention of the drawbacks.

Few works pertaining to agricultural issues appeared in the 1940s; they mostly promoted the 'achievements' of collectivisation [Savostin, cr., 1940; Ilyin, 1947; Nefedov, 1950]. Serious studies on this subject did not appear until L. Ili'ina, L. Kulikova, E. Matveeva and others presented their Candidate's theses in the 1950s [Ilyina, 1952; Kulikova, 1953; Bajramov, 1954; Matveeva, 1955]. E. Ustyuzhanin had his first work published in 1954 as the main contributor to the agricultural historical research of that period [Ustyuzhanin, 1954; Ustyuzhanin, 1956; Ustyuzhanin, 1957; Ustyuzhanin, 1959]. Apart from retelling the history of kolkhozes with interesting facts and examples, the author provides statistics on the number of various forms of collective farms and uses archive sources to infer that kolkhozes could be found in the country back in the first half of 1918. E. Ustyuzhanin elaborated on these statements in his later work and in chapters from The History of the Tatar ASSR' and presented a large-scale coherent narrative on the republic's history of collectivisation from the first joint farms to the 'final and complete victory of the kolkhoz system'.

Agricultural reorganisation began to attract more historians after 1956. Apart from the questions already raised, those related to rural productive forces and equipment, principles of social income distribution and training for various categories of agricultural experts, the assistance to be provided by the working class (twenty-five-thousanders) in the establishment of the kolkhoz system, etc. became a scientific focus [Vakhitov, 1955; Vostroknutov, 1958; Dyuvbanov, 1958].

Cultural revolution was another anticipated element of the socialist construction in the new society. Every educational, scientific and cultural institution worked to inculcate the communist ideology. The Soviet government would not tolerate non-conformism. The raising and upbringing of society's new type of person was a high priority issue into which both the machinery of the ruling party and the entire state hurled all its efforts. This explains the publication of a large number of works on the role of educational establishments and the formation of a unified national training system in the 1920–1930s. These addressed a wide range of issues: from teacher engagement in the elimination of illiteracy and attempts at reforming the education system, to various ways of involving 'old' bourgeois experts7.

The issue of university-level educational development was being studied on a large scale. Higher education institutions were facing two major goals in front of them: to provide widespread access for working-class members of society and peasant youth, and to attract new teaching staff capable of working in line with the government's tasks. The first newspaper announcements on the development of Soviet university-level education in the republic in the form of new university preparation courses or workers' faculties date back to the Civil War [Znamya revolyuczii, 1 November 1919; Firsov, 1922; Korbut, edit., 1924; Na putyax k vy'sshej shkole. 8 let raboty' (1919–1927), 1927]. Most of the authors were teachers and students of workers' faculties. This fact largely determined the personal nature of their articles, which mostly presented their own memories and ideas. Articles by M. Korbut, A. Dikov-

7 For details, see: [Garipova, 1978; Semenikhina, 1987; Galeyeva, 1994].
Among such works, the monograph ‘The Development of Public Education in the Tatar ASSR’ by Yu. Tuishev and the somewhat more recent brochure of the same name by V. Gorokhov and B. Rozhdestvensky deserve a special mention [Tuishev, 1950; Gorokhov et al., 1958]. Other works raised education-related questions as well, such as those dealing with the history of public preschool education, the introduction of compulsory seven-year education, the development prospects of Tatar schools, etc. [Azovsky, 1958; Korneeva, 1958; Shirkevich, 1958; Makhmutov, 1959].

Articles covering the history of the republic’s developments in science starting popping up in the 1940s–1950s. They naturally lacked quality research; many were written to celebrate anniversaries. However, the very fact that historiography was addressing such issues was of great importance. A. Arbusov, B. Gagaev, N. Lozanov, G. Salexov, G. Palkin and N. Sokolov study the establishment and development of Kazan mathematical, chemical, otolaryngological, surgical, livestock and other schools [Arbusov, 1941; Gagaev, 1946; Lozanov, 1946; Salekhov, 1948; Palkin, 1952; Sokolov, 1957].

Among other issues related to the republic’s cultural development, studies of the collected works of writers and artists were also quite popular. The 1920s–1930s were productive in terms of published works on literature and art. Books rushed onto the literary scene in torrents. The social shift of October 1917 and the preceding and subsequent events caused certain literary and artistic traditions and trends to emerge, re-emerge or gain momentum, while others declined [Ibragimov, 1924; Nigmati, 1925; Sagdi, 1926; Tulumbaysky, 1926; Saadi, 1928; Nadzham, cr., 1930].

The situation changed drastically in the 1940s–1950s. Socialist realism, which had come to dominate Soviet culture, made any ideological pluralism impossible. Considerable effort was taken to determine the influence that Russian literary traditions had on the development of national art in the formation and development of a new Soviet literature. Many authors emphasized the continuity of multi-ethnic Soviet literature, which had encompassed the legacy of A. Pushkin, M. Lermontov and M. Gorky in fiction prose and drama, and that of V. Mayakovskiy and D. Bedny in poetry. Books that were being written during that period were rather one-dimensional. A. Glebov, X. Xajri, G. Kashshaf and M. Gaynutdinov wrote articles on works by Tatar writers Sh. Kamal, G. Tukaj, X. Taktash and others [Kashshaf, 1941; Gaynutdinov, 1944; Glebov, 1950; Agishev, 1954; Khayri, 1954]. No large-scale research was conducted to analyse the literary works of Tataria.

P. Dulsky was a major contributor to studies on the republic’s artistic legacy. He was one of the founders and the first Director of the Artists’ Union of the republic, and is regarded as a pioneer of Soviet art criticism in Tatarstan. He wrote works tracing regional art history, in particular the formation and development of Tatar popular art [Dulsky, 1925; Dulsky, 1929a; Dulsky, 1929b; Dulsky, 1930; Dulsky, 1931; Dulsky, 1945; Dulsky, 1946]. P. Dulsky patriotically appreciated the mastery of local art-
ists. In his works he often emphasised the fact that, even though some artists from the capital were engaged in designing certain Kazan public buildings (Ginzburg, Golosov, Guryev-Guryevich), it was authentic painters, sculptors, and architects residing in the republic who ensured the general artistic boom in Tataria during the Soviet period.

P. Kornilov, V. Egorov, N. Kalinin, and M. Khudyakov also studied the condition of ancient buildings and constructions in the republic [Dulsky, 1920; Khudyakov, 1920; Kalinin, 1926; Egorov, 1927; Kalinin, 1927; Ado, 1927; Kornilov, 1927]. The republic's historiography covered theatre and music, too. Newspapers were publishing news on the establishment and activities of people's theatres, the founding of the Central Easter Music School of Kazan, services provided by artists to workmen, peasants, and Red Army soldiers during 1917–1920 despite the civil war, famine and general destruction [Znamya revolyuczii, 5, 6, 21 November, 2,17 December 1919; Linser, 1925; Polyansky, 1930]. However, such printed matter merely provided information rather than focus on the development of popular arts.

The first research works on the development of the republic's theatre and music cultures appeared in the 1930s. G. Polyanovsky wrote a note to comment on the staging of the second Tatar play⁸, 'Eshche', praising the revolutionary sentiment embodied in the new musical work. No works ever analysed the formation and development of the artistic education system, the methods of and approaches to knowledge transfer in this sphere or was done in a creative atmosphere among team members, which is in fact what shapes an artistic perception.

The first thesis on the history of the Tatar theatre by R. Usmanova as a summary of material previously available to scientists was presented in Moscow in 1954 [Usmanova, 1954]. The author relied on information from periodicals, museum expositions and archive sources to describe key periods of the development of the national theatre. R. Usmanova concluded that Soviet theatre had always been critical to the programme of national and state construction in Tatarstan as an important element of the cultural revolution implemented across the country.

Cultural and educational establishments also became a subject of research, though such historical works were very few. Museum and library measures to improve the population's cultural level were subject to more extensive analysis. This issue was studied by E. Bushkanec, V. D'akonov, M. Elizarova, M. Andreev, and A. Karimullin [Andreev, 1951; Bushkanec, 1953; Karimullin, 1954; Dyakonov, 1955; Elizarova, 1958]. Their works are largely annotative, and they do not analyse any complex problems. The authors confined themselves to affirming 'the time and effort-consuming but efficient work of cultural establishments undertaken to teach and educate the broader population'.

The Great Patriotic War is a special subject in the historiography of the 20th century. The first attempts at studying this subject were made even before the military action was over. However, they are not purely historical works but rather essays, articles, and short stories on the heroic deeds of the Soviets at the front lines and in the rear [Anisimov, 1941; Burdzhalov, 1942; Kufaev, 1942; Pospelev, 1942]. Professional research on the history of the Great Patriotic War and the part the peoples of Soviet Tatarstan played in it was initiated only later. However, the materials collected during the war largely underlay the first general works on TASSR workers' contribution to the final victory.

The regional historiography on the Great Patriotic War in the 1950s was mostly represented by articles on various issues of Tatarstan's history during wartime [Kalishenko, 1950; Lyushin, 1952; Gayfullin, 1954; Polovnikova, 1954]. An especially large number of works dealing with the military prowess of our compatriots against the Nazi invaders were studied in many works [Absalyamov, 1946; Ishmuratov, cr., 1946; Mudarris, 1946; Kniga

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⁸ The first Tatar opera was ‘Saniya’ staged in 1925 (during the 5th anniversary celebrations of the TASSR). Its authors are: Sultan Gabyashi, Vasily Vinogradov, Gaziz Almukhametov.
geroev, 1946]. Such works shed light on the contribution of the republic's residents to the crushing defeat of the Nazi troops near Moscow, Stalingrad and the Kursk Salient during the defense of Leningrad, and in operations liberating other peoples and countries. They emphasised the importance of Tatar military patriotic traditions in encouraging soldiers on the battlefield.


The development of a regional historiography acquired momentum as well. In their theses, Z. Akhmetshin, G. Vovchenko, M. Zarecky, L. Khanin, and Z. Gilmanov studied the socio-economic and ideological issues of Tatarstan's homefront during war times. Some of these works later appeared as monographs [Akhmetshin, 1961; Gilmanov, 1963; Zarecky, 1963; Khanin, 1966; Gilmanov et al., 1967]. The main driving force that it was primarily the Soviet planned economy and the devotion of citizens 'of the world's first socialist state' which ensured the victory over fascism is ubiquitous in works dating back to that period. That is, historians gave priority to the political system over the human factor.

The stagnation of the 1960s–1970s did affect historical science—despite the demagogic slogans encouraging people to foster the development of historical science by ensuring favorable research conditions, ideological pressure grew heavier. Changes were introduced to the well-established governmental concept of the history of the Great Patriotic War, although to quote V. Kulish, 'it hardly differed from the previous version except the names of Stalin and his adherents were less frequently mentioned, and praises of the people were more ubiquitous' [Kulish, 1996]. This newly refined concept was now underlaying the following fundamental works: 'The History of World War II' in 12 volumes, some volumes of the Capital History of the USSR, and that of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union describing the war period [Minasyan, edit., 1965; Istoriya Kommunisticheskoj partii Sovetskogo Soyuza, 1970; Minasyan, 1970; Grechko, edit., 1973–1982; Istoriya Soyuza Sovetskich Sozialisticheskikh respublik s drevnejsikh vremen do nashih dnep, 1973; Sovetskij ty'l v Velikoj Otechestvennoj vojne, 1974].

Informative monographs exploring various issues of the activities of the Soviet party state apparatus as well as various aspects of the country's economic, social, and cultural life during wartime completed the historiography of the Great Patriotic War in the 1970s–1980s [Krvchenko, 1970; Mitrofanova, 1971; Aniskov, 1975; Deborin et al., 1975; Sinitsin, 1975; Kumanev, 1976; Kolesnik, 1982; Kondakova, 1982]. Apart from the subjects studied previously, the regional historiography tackled a number of new issues, including the development of Tatar front periodicals, the state of hospital institutions, the activities of TASSR trade unions, military training, etc. [Khudyakova, 1970; Tsirkov, 1970; Sharonov, 1970; Ajnudinov, 1971; Khramkov, 1974; Grinev, 1978; Karmanov, 1978; Ibragimov, 1979; Pyanov, 1979; Vanchinov, 1980; Machnev, 1981].
Extensive research on the wartime history of Tatarstan and the impressive factual materials accumulated over the years prepared the ground for more comprehensive studies. In 1977, the first general monograph on the republic's history in 1941–1945 by Z. Gilmanov was published [Gilmanov, 1977; Gilmanov, 1981]. It presents a cohesive account of the organisational and ideological activities of the republic's governmental and party bodies regarding the military transformation of all areas of the economy, and describes the contribution of Tatarstan and its population to the final victory. Despite the political restrictions inherent to the Soviet epoch, which did have an effect on the presentation of certain events, the author's observations and findings remain valuable for scholars.

Z. Gilmanov's book triggered a bout of active research in the republic. The TASSR's most important scientific centres for the history of the Great Patriotic War were Kazan State University, the G. Ibragimov Institute for Language, Literature, and History, and the Kazan Branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences (Sh. Marjani Institute for History under the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Tatarstan since 1997). New theses written at the time filled in the blanks of the republic's historiography of the war period. They studied the notion of peoples' friendship as a reason why victory was upheld [Buzyakov, 1987], issues of periodical presentations of wartime history [Khayrutdinov, 1989], the historiography of the contribution of the working class in the Volga region to the defeat of fascism [Khramkova, 1987], wartime activities of the artistic intelligentsia of Tatarstan [Mazitova, 1990], and women's role in various spheres of the republic's life during wartime [Asylgaraeva, 1991]. Many books on the heroic deeds of the Tatarstan people were written [Ajnutdinov et al., cr., 1986]. The summary monograph 'Workers of Tataria on the frontline of the Great Patriotic War' by Z. Gilmanov was completed in 1981 [Gilmanov, 1981], in which the author traced the heroic path of the people of Tatarstan in all major military operations.

When speaking of the post-war period in the development of historical research on the history of the Tatars and Tatarstan, two aspects should be noted. Firstly, a rigid ideological framework restricted the potential research field dramatically. Secondly, regional historical works fit in the generally accepted patterns of Russian historiography, according to which the post-war decades were generally interpreted as a triumph of the Leninist economic, social and cultural policy in the republic.

Three summary works presented a comprehensive history of the Tatar ASSR. The first of them, Volume 2 of 'The History of the Tatar ASSR', was published in 1956 [Gimadi et al., edit., 1956]. It was created predominantly through the effort of historians from the Galimdzhan Ibragimov Institute of Language, Literature and Art: X. Gimadi, X. Xasanov, M. Mukharyamov, I. Klimov, A. Tarasov, E. Ustyuzhanin, G. Xisamutdinov, and G. Plotnikova. The preface to the volume described it as material for discussion. This disclaimer must be attributable to the changing political situation at the time the book appeared, which can be no means be found in the volume, except that it did not mention J. Stalin. Chapters 9 and 10 of the book, which described the post-war decade, referred to materials obtained from the current archives of various institutions and a wide range of periodicals to expound upon the status of the entire Soviet Union, the international situation and plans for the fourth and fifth five-year plans. When describing the industrial and urban standing of the Tatar ASSR, it mentioned predominant success in the oil industry and residential construction. Labor enthusiasm and the most highly productive workers were the main focuses of these sections. Agriculture was covered through the lens of individual examples of successful kolkhozes. The drought of 1946 was mentioned as the main reason that prevented agriculture from overcoming wartime hardships. The cultural aspect was centered on positive trends in the development of education, new works of art and literature praising Soviet reality.

The following generalising work on the history of the Tatar ASSR was written in 1968
Mukharyamov, ed., 1968], and its final four chapters deal with the period in question. Chapter 20 by I. Georgievskaya puts forth a comprehensive analysis of the post-war five-year plan. It provides more information on the drawbacks of economic development attributable to post-war hardships when compared to previous collective works. This is especially true when it comes to agriculture. At the same time, the achievements of advanced farms are a major focus of the book as well as the period of the mid-1950s. The agricultural backwardness of the area is described in detail in terms of electrification. On the contrary, the industrial section largely focuses on technological advance and innovations. Just as in the previous edition, the book describes the development of the oil industry, which was thriving as never before, in detail. The republic's success was also documented in the production of consumer goods. The author did pay some attention to agriculture, though that was largely confined to the resolution of the September (1953) Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Its correlation with the republic's situation was not described in proper terms. The book also contains positivist praise of the labor enthusiasm of workmen and kolkhoz members during the post-war seven-year plan, which is referred to as the communism construction period. The cultural section focuses entirely on achievements; there is only a passing declarative mention of post-war violations of the principles of democracy, and hardly any information on the Thaw are present. Nonetheless, the work is still considered to be the most fundamental of all studies on the topic. One reason is that the co-authored monograph 'The History of the Tatar ASSR', which was written ten years after (in 1980), in fact paralleled the previous edition without making any significant contribution to the development of history and research on the history of the Tatars and Tatarstan.

Generalising works prepared for anniversaries, e.g. the 50th, 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, the centenary of Lenin's birth, the 40th, 50th, and 60th anniversary of the TASSR, were also flawlessly adherent to ideology. Their titles are representative of the content: 'Tataria on Its Way to Communism', 'Under the October Sun', 'The Triumph of the Leninist National Policy in Tataria', etc. [Mukharyamov, ed., 1965; Mukharyamov, ed., 1968; Belyaev, Mullayanov, etc., 1980; Ziganishin, ed. 1980]. According to official demands, they presented the history of the Tatar ASSR as a chain of continuous victories and conquests of the peoples of the USSR.

Monographs on the history of the regional communist organisation provide comprehensive coverage of the republic's socioeconomic, political and cultural life [Lifshitz et al., 1962; Lifshitz et al., 1973]. Apart from these co-authored works, a number of individual studies dated 1960–1980 also contributed significantly to the research on various aspects of the history of the Tatars and Tatarstan in the 20th century. I. Tagirov's works became a milestone in research on the participation of the Tatars and other peoples of the region in the national liberation and revolutionary struggle as the first large-scale and more or less unbiased account of the part the national factor played in the country's shift in power [Tagirov, 1977 a, Tagirov, 1977 b]. Books by P. Abramov, A. Zaycev, A. Sereda, F. Gazizov, and V. Starikov [Sereda, 1950; Gazizov, 1956; Zaycev, 1957; Abramov, 1960; Abramov, 1967; Starikov, 1967; Abramov et al., 1970] are also of interest, as they contain numerous statistical tables on the economy, demography, employment, education and other issues with material valuable for re-analysis from modern standpoints. Issues related to the social and economic history of the Middle Volga region in general and Tataria in particular remained the focus during that period. For instance, the most exhaustive work on post-war industrial history was B. Tokarev's monograph 'The Party Management of the Industrial Development of Autonomous Republics in the Middle Volga region' [Tokarev, 1963]. What makes it valuable is its comparative approach to the industrial development of the autonomous republic of the Volga region. U. Belyalov, G. Gornik, T. Sagitov, Sh. Valeev, N. Pushkarev and others.
made significant contributions to research on the republic's industrial development [Menshikov, 1956; Valeev et al., 1975; Belyalov et al., 1976; Voronin et al., 1980; Belyalov, 1982; Gilmanov et al., edit., 1984]. Among the works containing a profound analysis of information obtained from the current archives of statistical bodies and plants, those by economist K. Azizov (and co-authored books prepared under his auspices) are outstanding, as they not only explore the current value and changing trends of the key indicators of the republic's economic development, but highlight a number of industrial shortcomings, which does not quite fit in with the historiographic framework of that period [Azizov, 1973; Azizov, 1977; Azizov, 1979; Azizov, edit., 1983]. The Middle Volga Expedition of Moscow University's Geography Department carried out a scrupulous analysis of the structure and specialisation of the republic's industry in the late 1960s and noted the transitory nature of most of the republic's sectors as well as poorly developed production communications between them [Koval'skaya, edit., 1969]. S. Knyazev made an enormous contribution to illuminating the history of the oil industry of Tatarstan and the country by authoring three monographs. Apart from analysing an impressive range of unique documents, he shared his personal memories as a person whose career was connected to the industry [Knyazev, 1981; Knyazev, 1984; Knyazev, 1990].

The collective monograph 'The Working Class of Tataria' summarised the republic's industrial history and that of the working class over the Soviet period as well as the historiography behind the subject. Volume 2 of 'The History of Kazan', which appeared during Perestroika, also deals with industrial history [Gilmanov et al., edit., 1991]. It is free of political cliches that were ubiquitous in Soviet historical literature, but still formulates key statements in a Soviet manner. For instance, it is largely focused on a 'creative attitude' towards work, labor enthusiasm, and a growing communist consciousness as important markers for socialist industrial production, while leaving gravely negative trends in its development uncovered.

At the same time, it has a bolder, though fragmentary, presentation of the negative developments in urban infrastructure.

E. Matveeva, Z. Puckova, A. Shajdullin, M. Kurkin, and V. Kuz'min authored works on the history of Tatarstan's agricultural development and peasantry in the 1960s–1980s [Shaydullin et al., 1960; Kuzmin, 1975; Matveeva, 1980; Putskova, 1973]. The republic's most important work on agricultural issues is the collective monograph 'Lenin's Cooperative Plan and Its Implementation in Tataria', which analyses all the works on the republic's agricultural history written prior to that time [Dyuvbanov et al., 1970]. The Soviet research on this subject was summarised in the joint report by the republic's leading scientists at the 21st Session of the All-Union Agricultural Symposium, which was held in Kazan in 1986 [Abdullin et al., 1986]. Works by the republic-famous agricultural economist M. Kurkin and other economic experts write about the republic's agricultural development in the most adequate and profound way [Kurkin, 1956; Kurkin, 1968; Kurkin, edit., 1968; Kurkin et al., 1969; Kurkin, 1986].

Research on sociocultural development and national relations in Soviet Tataria continued, albeit less intensely, during that period. These issues are covered mostly by the scientific literature on the development of specific areas of culture [Valeev, 1975; Gafurov et al., 1977; Aydarov, 1978; Ilyalova, 1986]. M. Musin and M. Mukharyamov shed light on issues related to the implementation of national policy and the way it influenced the republic's spiritual life [Mukharyamov, 1955; Musin, 1964].

Apart from Soviet historiographers, foreign authors also covered the history of the TASSR. The most exhaustive of their works was 'Soviet Tatarstan: The Theory and Practice of Lenin's National Policy' by T. Davletshin. The scientific community recognised the book, which was published in London in 1974, as one of unprecedented depth in its coverage of the Soviet history of Tatarstan. The author used the periodicals and published statistics available to address issues related to the development of national culture and education until the early
1970s. The author's freedom from any ideological restrictions enabled him to formulate an adequate depiction of the history of Soviet Tatarstan and the Tatar people, though it was largely fragmentary due to a lack of representative sources.

As the Soviet Union disintegrated and its regions experienced sovereignisation in the 1990s, radical changes as concerns historiography paralleled the collapse of communism. Science is witnessing a growing pluralism of approaches, methods and subjects. And on a particularly crucial note, research is becoming increasingly regionalised. When ideological barriers were removed during the 'Archive Revolution', domestic studies grew progressively more unbiased and comprehensive as their authors tackled new areas of research or referred to previously secret documents that had now become available in order to reconsider old ones. This could not help but affect the research on the history of the Tatars and Tatarstan in the 20th–21st century.

I. Alekseev, L. Ajnutdinova and others focus on the growing social and political involvement of the population of Kazan and the Kazan guberniya, and the formation and activities of political organizations from liberal to royalist [Alekseev, 2001; Ajnutdinova, 2003]. Among recent works on the history of Tatar political movements, D. Usmanova's monograph presents the most complete and unbiased account of bourgeoisie involvement in social processes. The study, which relies on a large array of sources, introduces new facts on the active part played by the Muslim intellectual class and entrepreneurs in the establishment of the first political party Ittifaq al-Muslimin, the formation of Muslim fractions in the State Duma, and the protection of the spiritual, cultural, and economic rights of their fellow believers [Usmanova, 2005]. L. Yamaeva's study on the liberal Muslim social and political movement mentions the business people of the Ufa guberniya as the social basis of Islamic liberalism, but also emphasises the narrow spectrum of their social and political activities [Yamaeva, 2003].

Expert studies analysing the legal, social, economic and political conditions of reformation in Tatar communities and exploring the social situation that favored Tatar consolidation, the formation of a national ideology, and the development of new civil institutions also deserve due attention [Mätdiev, 1989; Zagidullin, 1992; Litvin, 1993; Sultanbekov, 1994; Sultanbekov, 1995; Gilyazov, 1995; Tagirov et al., 1995; Väliev, 1996; Iskhakov, 1997; Mikhaylova et al., 1997; Fakhruddinov, 1998; Gafgarova, 2001; Nogmanov, 2002; Volxonsky, 2003; Makhmutova, 2003; Yusupov, 2003; Khabutdinov, 2004; Amirkhanov, 2005; Mukhametshin et al., 2005; Senyutkina, 2005; Amirkhanov, 2005].

A number of works appeared in 1990–2000 to shed new light on the history of Soviet Tatarstan and today's Tatarstan, as well as its peoples. The new tendencies of opinion encouraged a more unbiased approach to political history; several works encompass various aspects of the political development of the Republic of Tatarstan at the present stage. Of special importance are the works by K. Idiatullina and B. Sultanbekov, which address the evolution of the republic's political elite and governmental agencies. They provide a sincere account of the activities of the republic's first secretaries of the Soviet period Z. Muratov, S. Igнат'ev, F. Tабеев, R. Musin, and M. Шаймиев, as well as its outstanding politicians and social activists S. Бат'ев, F. Фазееv, M. Кхасанов, and I. Тагиров [Idiatullina, 1997; Sultanbekov, 2003].

The fundamentally new situation that emerged in the country in 1991, following the dissolution of the USSR, the collapse of the CPSU's monopoly and archive disclosure, created the conditions for a new research on the participation of the Tatars and other peoples of Tatarstan in the Great Patriotic War. Among the fundamental works on this subject dating to this period, the 4-volume history of the Great Patriotic War deserves a special mention for its most unbiased depiction of the past [ Velikaya Otechestvennaya, 1998–1999].

New approaches to the war-related issues in Tatarstan in the 1990s were initially applied to general works. For instance, I. Tagirov's monograph raised important questions concerning the war period. In his essays on Tatarstan's so-
cial, economic, and cultural development, the author presented an unbiased account of the economic conditions of the republic's everyday life, demonstrated the connection between the front and the rear, mentioned not only positive but also negative chapters in the military history, and highlighted the national aspects of the events in question [Tagirov, 1999]. Nowadays, experts have a more multidimensional, pluralistic approach to the history of the War and a wider set of research methods. Many studies aimed at determining the human factor in terms of demography, psychology, and the history of everyday life have been undertaken. A. Kabirova, E. Krivonozhkina, and others are major contributors to the study of these issues. A. Kabirova has spent a long time studying wartime problems by analysing the situation experienced by various social groups, the social sphere state, the way in which the republic's general sentiment was manifested, the tighter labor relations, etc. [Kabirova, 2005; Kabirova, 2011]. E. Krivonozhkina carried out a detailed analysis of the wartime situation of the TASSR's rural population by studying a set of demographic processes, demonstrating how the republic's citizens developed new mind-sets in case of emergencies, determining the role of religion, and assessing the rural population's state of health [Krivonozhkina, 2001; Krivonozhkina, 2011]. V. Sakaev followed Krivonozhkina in his thesis on the demographic aspects of the development of the TASSR's urban population during the war, which filled a historiographical gap that existed to that point [Sakaev, 2008].

Frontline problems are another popular subject today. In this respect, of special importance is the immense work by the editorial office of the Book of Memory, headed by A. Ivanov, whose coworkers prepared the fundamental work Memory that immortalised the names of all the soldiers and officers who fell on the front line during the war—natives of Tatarstan and conscripted by the republic's military committees [Pamyat' , 1993–2010]. It clarified some key information regarding the involvement of Tatars and citizens of Tatarstan in the military struggle against fascism, thus shedding a new light on the republic's contribution to the Victory. In 1998, A. Ivanov presented the key findings of his studies in the form of a monograph called 'Combat Losses of the Peoples of Tatarstan During the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945,' followed by a thesis [Ivanov, 1998; Ivanov, 2001]. In addition, the republic's search organizations prepared a three-volume edition called 'Names on Soldier Lockets,' which contains information about 6,410 military servants who fell at the fronts of the Great Patriotic War and whose names search organizations found out during field studies [Konoplev et al., cr., 2005–2008]. Studies by I. Gilyayzov are outstanding among other works about the war as they speculate on the nature and causes of collaborationism [Gilyayzov, 1998; Gilyayzov, 1999, Gilyayzov, 2005].

The history of the Great Patriotic War and the involvement of the Tatars and other peoples of Tatarstan in it generally remains an important study area.

A number of issues related to the history of the Tatars and other peoples of Tatarstan in the 20th—early 21st century are addressed in the fundamental studies by Member of the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Tatarstan I. Tagirov called 'Essays on the History of Tatarstan and the Caucasian Peoples (The 20th Century)' and 'History of the National Statehood of the Tatar People and Tatarstan' [Tagirov, 1999; Tagirov, 2000; Tagirov, 2005; Tagirov, 2008 b]. The author focuses on the history of nationhood of the Tatars and Tatarstan. Therefore, the works provide an extensive analysis of the establishment of the Tatar ASSR, as well as Perestroika and the acquisition of sovereignty by Tatarstan. I. Tagirov discusses the development issues of the Republic of Tatarstan at the turn of the 1980s–1990s from the standpoint of a direct participant in the events of that period and the negotiations with the Russian Federation. He also evaluates the role of the Declaration on State Sovereignty of the TSSR of 1990 and the 1994 Treaty 'On Delimitation of Jurisdictional Subjects and Powers between Bodies of Public Authority of the Russian Federation and Bodies of Public Authority of the Republic of Tatarstan' in the development of political
interactions between Tatarstan and the Russian Federation, as well as in the establishment of agreement-based federal relations.

The collective monograph on the Tatar history and culture from ancient times to the present, titled 'Tatar History and Civilisation', published in English, became an important milestone in Tatar and Tatarstan studies [Tatar history and civilization, 2010]. This fundamental work was prepared by Tatarstan scientists under the supervision of R. Khakomov and M. Usmanov. The Research Centre for Islamic History, Art, and Culture ensured its publication and translation into English. The edition has a holistic approach to many issues of the Tatar history—from Jadidism and religious reform in the early 20th century to the formation of an ethnic, cultural and political nation, of a statehood. It also traces the development of the Tatar language, literature, education, science, and arts. This collective work made a significant contribution to rising global awareness of the Tatar history and culture, stimulating further research in this area.

Research projects carried out under the supervision of L. Drobizheva provide a thorough and detailed analysis of many components of the ethnopolitical development of the Republic of Tatarstan. The author used an interdisciplinary approach to empirically study the phenomenon of cultural distance and ethnic borders in terms of ethnic differences in social and professional activities, ideological orientations, and perception of normative values. She studied the ideology of national and ethnopolitical identity along with the relations between democracy and nationalism within the context of political, social, and economic changes and the historical background of the peoples of Tatarstan, Tuva, North Ossetia, and Sakha (Yakutia) [Drobizheva, edit., 1996; Drobizheva, edit., 2000; Drobizheva et al., edit., 2007].

Characteristically, a number of works analyse various methods of and trends in the implementation of popular political involvement in the republic's social and political movements, organizations, election campaigns, etc. Works by R. Gibadullin, R. Yuldashev, and D. Iskakov contain an informative material on the development of the Tatar national movement and its role in the social and political life of the republic and the Tatar people [Iskhakov, 1991; Gibadullin, 1998; Yuldashev, 1998]. O. Krasilnikova, M. Kildeev, V. Nemirovskiy, and A. Bushuev studied the development of social and political movement along with trends in the social and political activities of various social groups, etc. [Kildeev, 2002; Krasilnikova, 2002; Nemirovsky, 2003; Bushuev, 2009]. Findings of theoretical and applied studies, republic-wide surveys on various issues related to various aspects of the social and political system and electoral sentiments constitute a large group of literature [Mukhametshin, 1998; Vyuzhanina, 2002].

Studies of Tatar and Russian entrepreneurs that made a significant contribution to the region's development in the early 20th century have become an important area of today's historical research. Works by R. Salikhov, L. Sverdlova, N. Tairov, and other authors analyse the national business community's role in the country's economy, the characteristic aspects of its professional activities and structure, social, political, and philanthropic activism [Sverdlova, 1991; Sverdlova, 1993 a; Sverdlova, 1993 b; Sverdlova, 1994 a; Sverdlova, 1994 b; Amirkhanov, 1995; Amirkhanov, 1999; Amirkhanov, 2005; Nigamedzinov, 1999; Nigamedzinov, 2003; Filippov, 1999; Gibadullin, 2001; Khayretdinov, 2001; Abubakirova et al., 2002; Senyutkin, 2002; Yamaeva, 2002; Tairov, 2002; Tairov, 2004; Zagitullin, 2003; Salikhov, 2004]. A number of contemporary scientists study various aspects of the social and economic development of the Soviet Tatarstan. Studies related the TASSR history during the New Economic Policy and collectivisation periods have also become an important sphere of research. These are represented by R. Shaydullin, who studied the issue of peasant households in the TASSR [Shaydullin, 2000], I. Gataullina, who explored the social and economic processes in the Middle Volga region [Gataullina-Apaycheva, 2007], L. Kuznetsova, who dealt with the development of social policy for workers and officials [Kuznetsova, 1996], and D. Davydov, who studied the...
peasant population of the TASSR in terms of its size, age, gender, and ethnic composition, along with natural and mechanical migrations [Davydov, 2010]. Besides, a series of scientific articles appeared in the 1990s–2000s to shed light on various aspects of the social and economic development of that period. The period from the 1920s to the 1930s is thus being intensely explored by historiographers.

Works dealing with the post-war history of the Soviet Tataria are much fewer. The most prominent experts in the study of the post-war four decades are Y. Smirnov, who studied the industrial development of autonomous units in the Volga region during the post-war period [Smirnov, 1998 b], and A. Gallyamova, who explored the achievements and controversies of the TASSR's social and economic development during the four decades following the war, which were characterised by intense modernisation [Gallyamova, 2010]. The TASSR's industrial development in the latter half of the 20th century is being studied within today's evaluative framework by A. Kalimullin [Kalimullin, 1995; Kalimullin, 2005; Kalimullin, 2011], S. Belov [Belov, 2003; Belov, 2007; Belov, 2010], K. Faskhutdinov [Faskhutdinov, 2007], and other authors.

A number of contemporary authors deal with the social and economic development of Tatarstan in the post–Soviet period. These include F. Khamidullin, D. Xayrullov, V. Xomenko [Khamidullin, 1995; Khayrullov, 1997; Analysis and the main dimensions of development and placement of labor resources of the Republic of Tatarstan, 1999; Khomenko et al., 2006; Khomenko, 2007; Khomenko, 2011; Khomenko et al., 2011]. Though most of their works are not considered to be historical studies, they contain very valuable factual material that provides an insight into various areas of the republic's social and economic development at the present stage of its historical progress. Studies by F. Gaynullina, T. Mirsiyapov, A. Fomin, and R. Ahmetzyanov analyse the 90s experience of forming social protection mechanisms for the population of the post–Soviet Tatarstan [Gaynullina et al., 1996; Gaynullina, 1998; Fomin, 1997; Akhmetzyanov, 2000]. The book 'Under the Aegis of Mercury', published by the RT Ministry of Trade and Economic Cooperation, deals with the economic activities of the Republic of Tatarstan [Salikhov, edit., 2000]. It provides a detailed analysis of the Tatarstan's foreign economic relations and inter-regional activities in the republic in the 1990s. Additionally, I. Galiev's thesis traces the development of the republic's foreign economic relations [Galiev, 2006]. In general, the historical research about the social and economic development of the post–Soviet Tatarstan only recently has started gaining some momentum, and a number of issues remain unexplored.

The modern historiography of the cultural development of the Tatar society and Tatarstan formed during the latter half of the 1980s to the 2000s and was influenced by the publicity and democratisation of the society. The burning ethnic issue triggered a surging social, political, and civil activism after the USSR was dissolved, which resulted in important national and governmental reforms. After the Republic of Tatarstan declared its sovereignty in 1990 and adopted the RT Constitution in 1992, the cultural and linguistic revival of the nation became its top priority. It largely determined the contemporary focus on issues related to the development of the culture of the Tatars and other peoples in Tatarstan.

The reformation process in the Tatar society of the early 20th century is of special interest for today's scholars. The most recent historiography of the Tatar Islam, Jadidism, and policy, which is representative of new concepts of the nation's social history, is essential in this respect. It is primarily represented in the works by D. Iskhakov, R. Mukhametshin, R. Salikhov, F. Sultanov, D. Usmanov, A. Xabutdinov, R. Khakimov, A. Yuzeev, and L. Yamaeva [Khabutdinov, 2000 c; Khabutdinov, 2001; Ibragim et al., 2002; Iskhakov, 2003; Khayrutdinov, 2003; Yamaeva, 2003; Salikhov, 2004; Usmanova, 2005; Khakimov, 2005].

R. Khakimov views reformism as the inexhaustible potential of Islam that develops according to its own patterns in spite of the pressing circumstances. Jadidism as the true 'Islamist reformation' that addressed issues of
history, ethnogenesis, education, and economy, was a historic deed of the Tatar bourgeoisie and intelligentsia [Khakimov, 2005].

R. Mukhametshin believes that Jadidism, which determined one of the most influential trends in the Tatar social thinking, emerged as a reform in popular education but was initially meant to address broader issues. One of its consequences was the implementation of elements of the secular world perception based on the principles of rationality, universalism, and objectivity [Mukhametshin, 2003].

According to A. Khabutdinov, at the first stage of the bourgeois reforms in the 18–19th centuries the Tatars interaction with the Russian government brought about a Millet—a unique religious union established in the early 20th century, when Jadidist transformations had caused ethnic secular intelligentsia to form, and a Turkic–Tatar nation to take the European pattern of development [Khabutdinov, 2000 c]. The majority of the big bourgeoisie welcomed the innovations [Khabutdinov, 2001 b].

The discussed literature is generally characterised by a diversity of approaches to defining the Tatar reformism, its sources and course of development.

Few as they are, contemporary studies on the history of the religious development of the Tatar community in the Soviet Tatarstan are very important in terms of both the amount of materials collected and analysed and the level of generalisation. Among them of special importance are works by I. Minnullin, A. Mukhametzyanov [Minnullin, 2006; Minnullin, 2007; Mukhametzyanov et al., 2008], and R. Ibragimov [Ibragimov, 2005], which present an exhaustive account of the relations between the authorities and religion, as well as the life of Tatarstan's Muslim community during the Soviet period.

Folk artistic traditions in monumental and decorative arts are studied in the works by G. Valeeva-Suleymanova [Valeeva, 1999; Valeeva-Suleymanova, 1995]. Her monograph on Tatarstan decorative arts from the 1920s to the early 1990s is of great interest in terms of professional art. It was the first work to present a systematic history of the Tatar decorative arts in the 20th century, tracing the development of key art forms stage by stage and demonstrating stylistic trends represented by professional artists and masters of decorative arts.

Speaking of research on cultural processes in the post–Soviet Tatarstan, it should be noted that the historiography of that period is marked by a pluralism of opinions, approaches, and judgments, as well as reliance on international practice and a general lack of domestic historical studies that would adequately represent the current cultural trends. The reasons include the events in question being relatively close in time and the crisis of social studies of the late 1980s to the early 1990s, a lack of adequate methodological procedures, and the predominant focus on earlier stages of the society's cultural development. A conceptually new approach to studying the national history in general and that of the culture in particular formed in the latter half 1980s. It is all the more relevant because scholars wanted to find the causes of the general crisis by studying issues related to the history of the culture.

At the same time, masterminds of social and political organizations, political analysts, ethnographers, and historians strove to solve problems of Tatarstan’s cultural development. Reviving the Tatars’ national language and culture was of utter importance in this respect. In his works, R. Khakimov studied issues of cultural construction and the problem of Tatar cultural borders [Khakimov, 2002]. He believed that the status of Tatar, as the key language in the Turkic group enabled the Tatar culture to enter the global stage within the general Turkic culture.

Works reflecting the interim results and celebrating the republic's cultural achievements began to appear in the 2000s. R. Valeev's 'The Culture and Art of Tatarstan at the Turn of the Millennia: The Key Development Trends from the 1990s to the early 21st Century' presents the most exhaustive description of the post–Soviet Tatarstan culture [Valeev, 2008]. The reason why the study is of interest is its dealing with a number of issues related to the implementation of the cultural policy within the republic. It was the first work to analyse
the legal and economic aspects of the issue. The author explains the reasons behind the cultural controversies at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s. The work also sheds light on the governmental support of cinema, personnel policy in musical and art education, the development of poplar arts, museums, and libraries in the Republic of Tatarstan. Besides, R. Valeev took a holistic approach to the issue of protection of the RT cultural legacy [Valeev, 2007 a; Valeev, 2007 b].

Intercultural interactions in the Republic of Tatarstan is a popular and well-explored area of study with regional historiographers. Studies by G. Gornik are central to the trend [Gornik, 2000; Gornik, 2002]. His monograph 'Bridges of Culture: On the History of Tatarstan's Cultural Relations with Foreign States' analysed a material on Tatarstan's cultural relations with foreign countries. The author focused on works of professional and popular amateur art, paintings, international art festivals and competitions held both abroad and in the republic. Apart from using archive materials, the author interviewed famous solo performers of theatres and ensembles, as well as directors, which suggests that G. Gornik's study is a major factual contribution.

L. Ashrafullina's thesis also represent Tatarstan's intercultural relations with foreign countries in terms of activities carried out by civil society institutions [Ashrafullina, 2004]. The work highlights sociocultural trends in the development of the cultural connections of the Republic of Tatarstan with foreign countries and their implementation mechanisms. L. Ashrafullina described the activities of governmental structures and social institutions in the sphere, determining the problems that they had faced.

The international Tatar organisation known as the World Tatar Congress is responsible for reviving the Tatar culture outside of Tatarstan. One of the founders of the Congress, its first Executive People’s Commissariat Chairman I. Tagirov made an attempt at describing the history of the Congress and summarising its diverse activities [Tagirov, 1992; Tagirov, 1997 a; Tagirov, 1997 b; Tagirov, 1999; Tagirov's Interview, 1993; Tagirov's Interview, 1994 a; Tagirov's Interview, 1994 b; Tagirov's Interview, 1996 a; Tagirov's Interview, 1996 b; Tagirov's Interview, 1997], which was continued by the current Executive Committee Chairman R. Zakirov [Zakirov, 2006]. These works reflect the Tatars' status in Russia's regions, in other CIS and non-CIS countries, and analyse the WCT's activity areas in terms of ethnic consolidation. It was the first work in domestic historiography to determine the forms and principles of Tatar social organisations' activities aimed at reviving the ethnic culture in areas with dense Tatar population.

A number of works by contemporary authors analyse modern paintings in terms of art criticism [Gaynutdinova, 1995; Pashkova, 1995; Pashkova, 1997; Tsyo, 1995; Tsyo, 1996; Polyakova, 1998; Razumeychenko, 2000]. S. Chervonnaya was the first to mention a cultural and geographical decentralisation of Tatarstan's art and suggest that the republic's culture is incomplete without the industrial eastern part and unintelligible without an understanding of the unique Tatar ethnic school [Chervonnaya, 1988]. In her further studies S. Chervonnaya explored the post-Soviet specifics of the visual arts of the Republic of Tatarstan in terms of the religious and ethnic tradition [Chervonnaya, 1999; Chervonnaya, 2008]. Analysing works by individual artists of the former autonomous republics of the Russian Federation in terms of religious influence, the author emphasises the Islamic context of contemporary visual arts. R. Sultanova studied the formation and development of visual arts in new industrial cities of Tatarstan (Naberezhnye Chelny, Yelabuga, Nizhnekamsk) during the post-Soviet period [Sultanova, 2000]. A. Akhmetshina's thesis is focused on the ethnic authenticity of Tatar arts, emphasising the currently revived sacral art that dates back to ancient times and is based on the idea of Tatar ethnos to Turkic peoples and its connection to the Muslim world [Akhmetshina, 2000].

Music scholars G. Kantor, Z. Saydasheva, R. Iskhakova-Vamba, V. Dulat-Aleev, and A. Maklygin have studied the Tatar musical art within the development of the Tatar culture...
In spite of numerous works that have appeared since the mid-1980s, the historiography of the issue in question is rather ambiguous. Even though representatives of a number of science branches have been involved in the research, a comprehensive historical depiction of the development of sociocultural processes in the post–Soviet Tatarstan remains to be provided.

To sum up the state of knowledge on the history of the Tatars and Tatarstan in the 20th–early 21st century, the analysis of that complicated and controversial period has undoubtedly been successful. Yet, the coverage of certain stages and aspects of this period is erratic. The Marxist-Leninist ideological framework that restricted research almost throughout the 20th century has ceased to exist. The contemporary historiography is thus pluralistic in terms of approaches and research methods. Its interdisciplinarity is also increasing, especially when it comes to exploring the current social development. The materials collected by pre-revolutionary, Soviet, and contemporary researchers over years provide a new insight into the long historical way that the Tatars and other peoples of Tatarstan had to walk from the 20th to the 21st centuries.

Source Material on the History of the Tatars and Tatarstan in the 20th–Early 21st Century

The basis of the source documents for the research on the modern and contemporary history of the peoples of Tatarstan is a set of materials, both published and unpublished, which includes legislative, regulatory, clerical documents, formal correspondence, personal documents, and periodicals.

Over many years of research, historians and archivists have discovered, edited, and published an enormous collection of documents on the history of the Tatars and Tatarstan in the 20th century. Without doubt, the Soviet and post–Soviet periods have produced the largest number of published documents. As a general rule, when documents were published in the Soviet era, ideological reasons meant more attention was paid to those that were representative of a long, hard road, from the proletariat and peasantry of Tataria, to the overthrow of the ruling bourgeoisie, and the establishment of a new state in which a truly socialist society was to be built.

Collections of works representative of the activities of administrative bodies in various aspects of economy and culture [Zasedanie verxovnogo soveta TASSR, 1947–1987; Yudin, 1978; Deyatel’nost’ sovetov Tatarii, 1983; Komsomol Tatarii v czifrax i faktax, 1974] and dedicated to certain areas of domestic and spiritual life [Promy’shlennost’ i rabochij klass Tatarii, 1986; Kochurova, 1964; Knyazev, edit., 1978–1979; Mukharyamov,..]
edit., 1976] appeared in the republic during the Soviet period. These publications give an insight into governmental policy with regard to the region's development as a society in diverse areas. However, publications of this kind are biased and proclamatory as a result of their politically circumspect nature. As they had to meet requirements of ideological 'purity', they were restricted to documenting positive trends in national and social development. Therefore, it is not possible to use these documents as a basis for a complete and non-prejudicial study of modern and contemporary Tatar and Tatarstan history.

Major efforts have been made in the post–Soviet Republic of Tatarstan to publish and promote documents dating back to the Soviet period. One example of a fundamental and unbiased approach to document publishing is 'The History of Kazan in Documents and Materials. 20th Century', which was published to celebrate the 1000th anniversary of Kazan by the Department for Modern and Contemporary History, Sh. Marjani Institute of History of the Tatarstan Academy of Sciences [Amirkhanov, edit., 2004]. This comprehensive study covers the entire 20th century and refers to documents that had never been used in previous research. They fall into three categories: economy, politics, and culture. Free of any ideological restrictions, it contains an impressive number of documents that present an objective picture of the history of the republic's capital over the contradictory and troubled 20th century. The book is outstanding in its thoroughness, in the breadth and depth of its coverage of the issues, and in its use of a new conceptual approach, which sheds light on the history of the republic's capital from all angles.

A number of dedicated collected studies present a wealth of documentary sources on certain issues of contemporary history: the history of 'korenization' (indigenization) in the Tatar ASSR [Garipova, author and compiler, 2009], the Great Patriotic War [Kabirova, cr., 2011], the development of the Tatarstan oil industry [Knyazev, edit., 1993], municipal construction and Tatarstan's attainment of sover-}

The social and political situation, ethnic policy, and cultural development of Tatarstan over the period are also the focus of documentary works published in the journal 'Gasy'rlar avazy = Echo Echo Vekov' [Dokumenty' aktual'nye i sejchas, 1996; Piskarev, 1996; Piskarev et al., 1997; Valeev, 2004; Galiullina, 2004; Gallyamova, 2007 a; Tagirov, 2010; Tagirov, 2011].

Having mentioned the improved quality of published materials during the post–Soviet period, which put at the disposal of researchers a diverse source base which reflects the realities of the recent past, we should note that unpublished archive documents are still the main source materials for the study of Tatar and Tatarstan history in the 20th–21st centuries. The majority of these unpublished materials are kept in central and regional Russian Federation archives.

Documents held in the Russian State Historical Archive, St. Petersburg, are important for studies of the pre–Soviet period. They are a source of information on the political, social, economic, and cultural life of the Tatar population in pre–Soviet Russia. In particular, the fund of the Department of Spiritual Affairs For Foreign Confessions (Fund 821) provides documentary data on the social and political situation in the Islamic community in the Russian Empire and its reformist movement in the latter half of the 19th century–early 21 century. Reports and analytical notes by officials from this department based on findings send from the field give a clear insight into the Tatar bourgeoisie's activities regarding financial support to mosques, new-method maktabs and madrasahs, and the establishment of community guardianship and charitable organizations. They describe the political activities of the Islamic elite, its ideology, and assess its role in the Islamic renovation movement. An analysis of these reports paints a picture of the extent to which the authorities understood the nature of the Jadid transformation, including the participation of the Tatar commercial and industrial class. Sources in the Fund of the Police Department (Fund 102) in
the State Archive of the Russian Federation, are consistent with these materials. In the present context, cases pertaining to the so-called pan-Islamist movement are of interest. These include information provided by agents and correspondence with gendarme offices, which reflect the active social involvement of the Tatar bourgeoisie. They also give an insight into the principles underlying political investigations among the Islamic community. The Fund of the Office of the Special Corps of Gendarmes (Fund 110) provides important information on officers and secret agents directly engaged in investigating pan-Islamic cases. As Tatars resided in various governorates within the Russian Empire, regional archives are an essential research source. Materials provided by the National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, the Central State Historical Archive of the Republic of Bashkortostan, the State Archive of Kirov oblast, the State Archive of Orenburg oblast, the State Archive of Ryazan oblast, the Central State Archive of Samara oblast, the Central State Archive of Ulyanovsk oblast, and others, proved to be of value for the research. The set of archive funds that are important for studies on Tatar history is largely homogeneous and representative of the development of Islamic communities in specific governorates.

For ease of description, the entire array of published and unpublished sources kept in governmental and agency archives can be divided into several groups.

Laws and regulations. Laws and regulations are an important part of the documentary basis for studies of the modern and contemporary history of the Tatars and Tatarstan. Essential for the pre-revolutionary period are the laws of the Russian Empire. They are indicative of governmental policy with regard to Muslims, their legal status, and regulations that applied to confessional communities [PSZ, 1830–1884; PSZ, 1885–1916; Sbornik zakonov o musul’manskom duxovncestve, 1898; Arapov, author and compiler, 2001]. Among materials published by higher governmental bodies, journal resolutions by the Ministry of National Education are of value as they elucidate the essence of the new policy with regard to post-reformist Islamic education.

It is well known that the our country’s legislative system changed dramatically when the Bolsheviks came to power. An enormous documentary array of various laws and regulations accumulated over many years of Soviet rule. Among them are decrees by the new authorities, USSR, RSFSR, and TASSR Constitutions, laws, orders, resolutions, and instructions by executive governmental agencies and the ruling party—the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Documents drafted by governmental bodies of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan were added in the post–Soviet period. By analyzing this group of sources, experts can study the social and political atmosphere of the period, understand how the authorities interacted with the society in terms of social, political, economic, and cultural development, and determine many other factors and conditions that had a tangible effect on the society. Constitutions and laws establish the procedures and general principles behind governmental policy in all spheres, regulate the formation of governmental agencies and citizen involvement in it [Konstituciya TASSR, 1984; Konstituciya SSSR, 1988; Konstituciya RF, 2002; Konstituciya RT, 2004; Zakon SSSR, 1988; Zakon TASSR, 1989; Zakon RT, 1994].

Edicts by the Russian Federation President, resolutions by the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet, Republic of Tatarstan Supreme (State) Soviet, and Republic of Tatarstan Cabinet of Ministers regulate the key aspects of governmental policy implementation in the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan and represent the specific nature of events and campaigns held by governmental agencies in relation to various issues.

Similar to, but separate from laws and regulations, is a documentary array that includes statutory, policy, and other types of documents (addresses, decisions, resolutions adopted at meetings, etc.). These were made by various social and political movements, parties, and unions which were active in the country and the republic at different times, including those published as supplementary material to studies
by other authors [Ustav VLKSM, 1989; CPSU Program. CPSU Charter, 1989; Proceedings of the Founding Congress of the Sovereignty Committee, 1990; Platform of the Tatar Social Centre, 1991; Program of the Ittifaq Party for Tatar National Independence, 1991; Yuldashev, 1998]. The documents are a living testimony of the time and the socio-political changes that occurred, which makes them interesting analysis material. However, once again, they are not free of a certain bias. Analyzing such documents, from those by the CPSU and the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League to documents by contemporary social and political forces, researchers can gain a clearer insight into the republic's political and social atmosphere, certain aspects of the political consciousness of their adherents and participants (such as their values, orientations, etc.) and reflect on the reasons of public involvement or non-involvement in them.

Clerical documents. The second group consists of clerical documents: protocol documentation (minutes and shorthand records of meetings, congresses, conferences), official correspondence of central and local governmental agencies, reference and information documents on various subjects, and reports. Reports by public administration bodies: minutes, shorthand records, and resolutions of meetings that describe how Tatars participated in the activities of municipal councils and worked to protect Muslims' economic, spiritual, and cultural rights.

Reports by charitable, cultural, and educational organizations, which were widespread in the late 19th–early 20th century, shed light on the transformation of the traditional Islamic charity system, its history, and specific features of the specialized social security organizations that covered much of the Tatar population. Figures on the income and expenditure budgets, investment allocation, as well as the composition and management of such institutions are of interest. Charters of social and philanthropic organizations established and patronized by the ethnic bourgeoisie form a meaningful supplement to such documents. Unfortunately, materials belonging to this source group as well as reports by autonomous public bodies for some governorates of the Russian Empire are missing; only certain years are covered.

The Gasyr Publishing House has recently published archive documents on the charitable activities of regional entrepreneurs and the history of the formation and development of Muslim state-funded education [U miloserdiiya drevnie korni, 2002; U miloserdiiya drevnie korni, 2003; Kazanskaya tatarskaya uchitel'skaya shkola, 2005]. Of special importance is the series of scientific biography collections 'Shäx-eslavbez' ('Our Personalities') by the Ruxiyat Publishing House, which contains various documents that give accounts of the lives and public activities of prominent representatives of the Tatar bourgeoisie, clergy, and intelligentsia [Bertugan Rämiyvlär, 2002; Gobäy dullin, 2002; Gomäri, 2002].

Clerical documents generated by Soviet and party bodies are essential to research on the history of the Tatars and Tatarstan during the Soviet period. Proceedings of congresses of the CPSU and the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League, their regional conferences and plenary sessions, resolutions by central and local party branches are indicative of their ideological course for ideological and political (communist) youth education, value system formation, etc. [Materialy' XXVII s`ezda KPSS, 1986; Materialy' XIX Vsesoyuznoj konferencii KPSS, 1988; Dokumenty` i materialy` XX s`ezda VLKSM, 1988; Materialy` XXVIII s`ezda KPSS, 1990; Central State Archive of Historical and Political Documentation in the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 15, Inventory 14, File 1; Inventory 15, File 149, File 169, File 770, File 599, File 1865; File 4034, Inventory 47, File 1, File 2; File 48, File 1; Inventory 49, File 1, File 130; Zasedanie verxovnogo soveta TASSR, 1985; Zasedanie verxovnogo soveta TASSR, 1986a; Zasedanie verxovnogo soveta TASSR, 1986b].

Documents by the Tatar CPSU Regional People’s Commissariat kept in Fund 15, RT Central State Archive for Historical and Political Documents, are of great interest in this respect. As real authority in the republic was exercised through the activities of the party's
regional committee, it provided practical government in every sphere of social life, thus generating a mass of clerical documents. Among them are shorthand records of regional party conferences, plenary sessions of the CPSU regional committee, meetings of the key party and economic figures, minutes from regional party office meetings and their pre-materials—field information, reports to the CPSU Central Committee, replies to queries by the CPSU Central Committee, etc. The fund provides extensive information on every aspect of the subject, both positive and critical in nature. Of great importance are documents of personal origin: letters of complaint and field note musings, which give a fragmentary but unembellished account of the real situation.

Materials from the Kazan City Committee of the CPSU (Collection 26) are of a similar nature. Of special interest are materials by the Baumansky District Committee of the CPSU (Collection 19), which controlled all institutions and organizations in the centre of the republic's capital. It was the institution responsible for 'sobering' the artistic intelligentsia during the post-war period of ideological dictatorship. The materials give a good insight into the intelligentsia's position during the thaw period.

Also of interest are materials contained in the funds of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the TASSR Council of Ministers, and individual ministries, which are kept in the National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan. Especially important and relatively well-structured information is contained in the introductory clauses of resolutions by the republic's government, where often a summary analysis of various issues relating to the society's activities is laid out. In spite of the many drawbacks of unpublished sources, including those determined by the nature of the Soviet period, and their fragmentary content that lacks cohesion, through an overall analysis, experts can explore processes that were underway in the republic.

The most valuable information in the Russian State Archive for Social and Political Information is contained in the funds of the Agency for Party Body Control (Fund 17) and the Office of the CPSU Central People's Commissariat for the RSFSR (Fund 556) for 1946–1958. The most interesting fund in the Russian State Archive for Contemporary History is that of the Office of the CPSU Central People's Commissariat for the RSFSR (Fund 5). The above funds are indicative of central policy for the republic. Of greatest interest in this respect are minutes of the Office's meetings which contain discussions of reports by chairmen of Tatarstan offices, and report notes by officers in charge and inspectors of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) who traveled to check the regional situation. The following documents are of special interest: a translation of the brochure sent by the Tatar Regional Committee of the CPSU, which expressed dissatisfaction with national policy, and Sh. Mannur's letter on the republic's deprivation. A memorandum by a KGB officer on the activities of the artistic intelligentsia, mostly writers, is also valuable. Of special interest is an analytical note on Kazan students.

For the study of the history of the republic, the most valuable collections of the RF State Archive are those of the Administration Department of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR (Collection A-259). Here, materials contained in correspondence between the Council of Ministers of the TASSR and central governmental bodies, primarily the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR, are of greatest interest. Of certain interest are materials in the fund of the Migration Department, Council of Ministers (Fund A-327). They contain valuable information on planned migration. Interesting documents on errors, difficulties and failures in various spheres of the republic's socio-economic and socio-cultural development were found in the fund of the People's Commissariat for Soviet (State) Control of the RSFSR (Fund A-340), that of the USSR Ministry for State Control (Fund P-8300), and that of the USSR Commissariat for People's Control (Fund R-9477). Of great interest are materials from the Correspondence Department of the USSR Council of Ministers (Collection R-5446).
Important information on the ideological and cultural aspects of social life has been found in the fund of the General Directorate for the Protection of State Secrets in the Press under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, also known as Glavlit (Fund R-9425), which contains annual reports by the TASSR Glavlit for 1946–1973. Those dated before 1970 contain interesting information that clearly indicate that ideological control over the activities of the artistic intelligentsia through censorship was fully maintained during the implementation of liberal concessions under the resolutions of the 20th CPSU Congress.

A vast majority of the archive materials from the Soviet period contain ideological clichés and myths praising the existing system and failing to adequately represent ongoing societal development.

Clerical documents in the Current Archive of the Ministry of Trade and External Economic Cooperation also contain valuable information on Tatarstan's economic development. It is mostly found in analytical reports and references for meetings of the RT Cabinet of Ministers, ministry boards, etc.

The correspondence between the TASSR Council of Ministers or the RT Cabinet of Ministers and various (in particular central) ministries and agencies regarding cultural construction, public education, artistic development, activities of artistic unions, the protection of historical and cultural monuments, etc. was intended 'for office use'. Many of these documents had been marked 'confidential', 'top secret' or 'restricted use' and were declassified only in recent years. These documents tend to be dry and to the point in character, but are also credible as they mostly contain reporting information not intended for public disclosure. However, the time and conditions under which the documents were created mean a well-balanced critical approach is required, as many of them omit or downplay certain negative aspects. This applies both to Soviet formal documents and to some contemporary materials. The clerical documentation gives an insight into many specific aspects of the interaction between the government and society, as well as that of governmental institutions and individual citizens with each other, and provides a deeper understanding of this interaction.

Periodicals. Materials in Tatar and Russian periodicals of the latter half of the 19th–early 20th century also constitute a significant group of sources, which can shed light on the study area. Products of the spirit of the age and the social atmosphere in Russian and Tatar communities of that period, they present subjective contemporary assessments of the most important events, at the centre of which were the reformist Tatar bourgeoisie and clergy. Newspapers and magazines such as ɬɪáðKazan Mox-bire (1905–1911), Yulduz (1906–1918), Vakyt (1906–1918), Bayan el'-xak (1906–1914), E'xbar (1907–1908), Koyash (1912–1918), Şura, İktisad, and many more Islamic liberal and Jadid periodicals formed an important information hub, clarifying and promoting social innovations. Socialist revolutionaries and social democrats both read the following left-wing Tatar periodicals: newspapers and magazines Azat (1906), Azat Xaly'k (1906), Tang Mazhmugasy' (1906), Ural (1907), El'-Islax (1907–1909), Yashen, and others, which were pronounced in their opposition to the bourgeois press, thus fostering the conditions for public discussions on the key areas of Jadid entrepreneurs' and the clergy's activities.

The Orenburg-based conservative magazine 'Din ve' magy'ʃhat' was a harsh critic of both the reformists and the secular intelligentsia, rejecting any reforms or direct involvement of the Islamic community in politics. Russian periodicals that published meaningful works on the life of the Tatar population also based their interpretation of events on their own political leanings. For instance, the newspaper Kazanskij Telegraf (1893–1917) initially favoured cultural and educational renewal in the Islamic community. However, as the editorial office adopted a pronounced right-leaning position in the early 20th century, it began to describe the same changes as a threat to the Russian Empire's political system. Liberal periodicals such as Kam'sko-Volzhskaya Rech' acted as a platform for prominent Jadid leaders who wanted to stand their ground.
Soviet periodicals are of interest, too. It is worth noting that materials differ depending on the period when they were printed. Soviet journalism had to put up with ideological restrictions just as Soviet historiography did. Thus, periodicals were less efficient as information providers in 1946–1985 than they were during perestroika and glasnost. Even in the latter half of the 1980s, emotional evaluations tended to overpower the factual content of retrospective periodical materials. In terms of depiction of the past, the period was marked by a focus on the stressful political events of the early 20th century, as well as the establishment of the TASSR, the struggle around the national issue, and repressions of the national intelligentsia. In any case, the periodicals are valuable as they present a chronicle of events and the spirit of the age, though in a way not free of embellishment and bias.

A large amount of source material on contemporary history is also concentrated in periodicals. Central and local newspapers provide broad coverage of various issues related to the political, socio-economic and cultural development of the Tatars and other peoples in Tatarstan.

Sources of personal origin. Of no less value are sources of personal origin that are specifically suggestive of the public political sentiment of the Jadidist clergy and the ethnic intelligentsia [Iskhaky, 1991; Barudi, 2000]. For instance, the diary of G. Barudi, the leader of Kazan bourgeois reformists and a prominent clergyman and social activist from a rich merchant's family, reflects profoundly on the history and future of the Islamic world and the necessity of transformations to ensure the preservation of faith and social progress. The diary dates back to 1920, when Barudi was Mufti of the Orenburg Mohammedan Spiritual Assembly. Quite naturally, he often addressed in his notes the issue of the interaction between the Russian ummah and the new Soviet government as well as that of the existence of Islam in the context of class and atheist propaganda, which was gaining momentum.

Memoirs which are representative of various stages of the history of Soviet Tatarstan are also of interest. The collection of memoirs compiled by V. Yakupova to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the Republic of Tatarstan's sovereignty reveal the previously unstudied problems of social, economic, and cultural development during that period. Memoirs by the republic's top officials, F. Tabeev, G. Usmanov, M. Shaimiev, and M. Sabirov, as well as writers R. Valeev and R. Mustafin contain intriguing information on the history of the oil industry, the construction of KamAZ Factory, and Tatar culture.

The memoirs by the first RT Prime Minister, M. Sabirov, 'Three Season', contain interesting data on the industrial development of the oil-producing southeastern region and the engagement of the local population in industrial development (Sabirov, 2006). He also edited a book of memoirs by managers and employees of the Tatneftegazstroy Company, which relates the accounts of people who directly contributed to the creation of the country's fuel and power sector [Sabirov, 2008]. Valuable information on the fledgling period of the republic's oil industry can be found in memoirs by employees of the Minnibayev Oil Company, which was subsequently transformed into Almetyevneft Trust Company (The History of the Minnibayev Oil Company, 2000). The book, compiled by famous local historian R. Amirkhanov, describes the strenuous working conditions of the region's oil pioneers.

Memoirs by colleagues of P. Tunakov, the famous economic leader of Kazan and the republic during 1950s–1960s, published to celebrate his 90th birthday, contain valuable data on the social infrastructure of Kazan [Abdushev, edit., 1999]. The book by E. Bogachyov, the pioneer of the republic's modern public utility services Chairman of the RT National Bank, gives an insight into the everyday atmosphere of the 1950s–1960s, important details of the life of dormitory students and representatives of the technical intelligentsia, and manifestations of the public stance of Kazan's Sixtiers (Bogachyov, 2001).
partly, industrial history (Sadykov, 2001). The book by the republic's legendary kolkhoz chairman, F. Galiev, is rife with interesting details about rural history, the republic's agricultural history during the difficult post-war period, the development of a stable kolkhoz system and its troubled relations with various governmental agencies (Galiev, 1987). Personal impressions, evaluations, and speculations can be found in essays on post-war rural history and Khruščev's reforms in the Tatar ASSR contained in the book by the former TASSR Minister of Agriculture (1959–1962), U. Biktimirov (Biktimirov 1992). Agricultural subject matter is generously covered in a book by prominent RT politician R. Muratov (Muratov, 1996). It provides interesting information on the troubled post–WWII decade (famine, impoverished countryside, persecution of individual part-time farmers, tax burden).

Writers and humanitarian scholars from the republic have created a number of well-worded memoir accounts. The book 'Children of Their Time' by T. Galiullin provides a bold critical evaluation of the social and cultural policy implemented by the republic's government while depicting the morals of the local establishment during the so-called Tabeev epoch (Galiullin, 1993). Interesting information on the intelligentsia's attitude to the government can be found in the journalistic book by A. Eniki (Eniki, 1996); the literary community was depicted by T. Minullin (Minullin, 1994); repressions and the repressive policy for Tatar culture are the focus of A. Gilyazov's book (Gilyazov, 1997).

G. Valeeva-Sulejmanova describes the ostracism of the ethnic culture and her father F. Valeev's attitude to it in the essay 'The Golden Apple of Truth' (Valeeva-Sulejmanova, 1995). S. Shamov recalls the persecution of Tatar composer S. Saydashev in his memoirs (Shamov, 2004). In his book, he cites from memoirs of other friends of prominent artists. Memoirs of colleagues contained in collections dedicated to the memory of two prominent Soviet researchers, Z. Gil'manov and M. Mukharyamov, depict the atmosphere in which historians had to work during the Soviet era (In Memory of M. Mukharyamov, 1995; In Memory of Z. Gil'manov, 2000).

Journalistic works, mostly dedicated to well-known people, usually managers of different levels, provide extensive and interesting information for analysis. For instance, the book by R. Mustafin and A. Khasanov on the first President of the Republic of Tatarstan contains meaningful supporting data on the difficult post-war period and the republic's agricultural history in the 1950s–1970s (Mustafin, 1995). Y. Shafikov's book on the life of Secretary of the Tatar Regional Committee of the CPSU, F. Tabeev, contains entertaining vignettes about the republic's social, political, and economic life in the 1960s–1970s (Shafikov, 2001).

Of certain interest are journalistic summaries which bear a kind of eyewitness nature. This is true when their authors do not confine themselves to their lives but describe the activities of institutions within their professional competence. Among such works is the book 'Fifty Years in the Vineyards of Culture' by M. Nizamiev. It provides information on the activities of various cultural institutions, museums, libraries, mostly in the countryside (Nizamiev, 1998). What makes such materials valuable is their revelation of the republic's political machinations for HR matters and important decisions to create large industrial facilities during that period. Most frequently, however, the message of such journalistic works is to praise the organization to which it is dedicated.

T. Minnibaev's 'Political Career of Provincials', which was written during the glasnost period, is an exception (Minnibaev, 1991). The author studies deputy candidates' biographies and election programmes published in newspapers from 1959 to 1990 to shed light on the problems of a political career in Soviet society. He demonstrates the safety mechanisms that secured long-term political welfare. The author raises burning questions about the lumpenized consciousness, as well as the clan hierarchy of provincial political leaders and shares anecdotes about the republic's political figures, whom he avoids to name directly. He did mention the names of those whose actions had not
always afforded them a quiet life and whom he respected, though. These are N. Kady'remetov, K. Faseev, philosopher V. Lukashov, eccentrics I. Gimatov and T. Nazmiev, and several other journalists and social activists.

Dozens of journalistic works appeared in the Soviet and post–Soviet period to shed light on the history of certain enterprises and institutions in the republic (Bukharin, ed., 1957; Anisimov, 1960; Belokopy'tov, cr., 1993; Zari'pov, 1998; Pechilina et al., 1998; Abyazova et al., 2001; Frolova, 2001; 50th Anniversary of OAO 'Kazancompressormash', 2001; Dronova, 2002; Bury'lina, Project Manager, 2005), mostly to celebrate their anniversaries. Collections of works on the entire republic's history and also of its individual regions, mostly written by journalists, were also numerous (Alekseevsk district, 2000; Yakovleva, 2004; Nasretdinov, Minikhanova, Project Manager, 2005; History of the TASSR in One Journal, 2010; Our Home Tatarstan, 2010). Most of these works are written in an inflated language which fits their cut-to-measure nature. However, they often present interesting details that shed light on the difficulties of the fledgling period and add a personality-centered dimension to the republic's history.

The collection 'Tataria: a New Line in Its Biography', authored by prominent social activists, journalists, and editors of publishing houses, presents the achievements of the Tatar ASSR during the Soviet period as exclusively positive, which is typical of Soviet books (Belokopy'tov, ed., 1981). Authors of 'The Steps of the Batyr' made a panegyric to the construction of the Kama Automobile Plant by romanticizing the overcoming of fledgling stage difficulties (Musin, ed., 1973).

A racy description of the industrial development of new regions can be found in journalistic works by prominent journalists of the republic M. Zari'pov, R. Zari'pov, R. Mustafin, and Moscow journalist L. Zhukhovitsky (Zhukhovitsky, 1976; Mustafin, 1981; Zari'pov, 1986; Zari'pov, 1987). Though most of their essays deal with the Soviet period, they took an unusually harsh critical approach to the negative aspects of the republic's economic life.

While recognizing the value of literary sources, including memoirs, we still have to take into account their possible bias. Firstly, the human memory is limited. Secondly, deliberate corruptions can occur in memoir texts for many reasons. It is not necessarily a intentional fabrication, although still possible, but rather overdrawing some events and downplaying others that the author finds unfavorable. Thus, memoir documents pertaining to the epoch should only be used in combination with other sources.

Statistical sources. Mass statistic sources represent another important source group. It includes table statistics for a wide range of indicators provided by various institutions and organizations, published and preserved in archives, which deal with the size, age and gender composition, and migration of the republic's population, social and economic figures, etc. (Population Size, Composition, and Migration in the RT, 1992; Population Size, Composition, and Migration in the RT, 1993; Population Size, Composition, and Migration in the RT, 1994; Population Size, Composition, and Migration in the RT, 1995; Population Size, Composition, and Migration in the RT, 2001; Population Size, Composition, and Migration in the RT, 2002; Findings of the All-Union Census, 1990; Findings of the All-Russian Census, 2004; Age and Gender Composition of the RT Population, 2004; Age and Gender Composition of the RT Population, 2005; Republic of Tatarstan, 1998; Republic of Tatarstan, 1999; Republic of Tatarstan, 2004; National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund P-3610, Inventory 1, File 1824, 1886a; RT Central State Archive for Historical and Political Documents, Fund 15, Inventory 12, File 230; Inventory 13, File 272; Inventory 14, File 377; Inventory 15, File 228, 886, 1656, 2527; Fund 4034, Inventory 46, File 26; Inventory 47, File 23; Inventory 48, File 21; Current Archive of the State Council of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund P-3610, Inventory 1, File 1930, 2017, 2146; Fund P-6004, Inventory 1, File 42, 134, 235, 365, 510, 913; Statistics on the Treatment of Oral and Written applications to the State Council of the Republic of Tatarstan from 01.01.2002 to 31.12.2002.
etc.). They are representative of the changing social and demographic situation, the status of the population, and the development of the republic's infrastructure of social institutions, indicating objective changes in the social and economic life of the peoples of Tatarstan. The statistic material available gives insight to various processes, in particular those which are expressly negative.

Of special importance among published sources are official published documents by the TASSR Statistical Agency covering a period of five years with extraordinary releases to celebrate the republic's and the country's anniversaries. They are hard to analyze, however, being inconsistent with each other and incomplete for lack of transparency during the Soviet period. Public editions never contained information on the condition of military industrial plants or other similar data. Besides, the values presented in them do not fully reflect the state of production, its profitability, the financial situation in certain branches of economy, economic relations, the allocation of national income, financial wealth by social strata, and many other aspects indicative of the real situation.

However, published statistics are quite representative and rich in content that enables researchers to trace transformation processes and determine the dominant trends. It is especially true with the statistic collection published to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the TASSR (Belova, edit., 1990). Being published in the context of glasnost during the struggle for sovereignty, it contains much more data as compared to previous editions, thus providing a multi-dimensional insight into ethnic considerations.

Dedicated collections of works dating back to the perestroika period contain information that traditional collections published before 1985 did not include and are statistically valuable. For instance, they present data on housing per capita, housing quality, the amount of telephones and private automobiles per capita, and the development of social infrastructure in the RSFSR, TASSR, and Kazan. In terms of industry, statistics were published on personnel turnover, loss of working hours, changes in yield on capital investment, etc. (Social and Economic Development of the Capitals, 1989; Social Development and Living Standard of the RSFSR Population, 1990; Social Development of the Country in the RSFSR, 1990).

At the same time, a number of things impede analysis of the statistics for the transitional period in history. These are primarily the constant changes to the list of indicators taken into account, leaving certain indicators partially covered or uncovered because of social and political changes that were being introduced in the country during that period.

Data of sociological studies carried out in the republic in different years form a separate subgroup of sources on contemporary history (Perestroika, 1987; Mukhametshin et al., 1998; Musina, ed., 2006; Musina, ed., 2011; et al.). Findings of surveys are an essential source due to the specific conditions of that period. Data obtained in representative mass surveys fill some gaps in the archive information on contemporary history.

Therefore, the range of sources described above presents the critical documentary basis for studying the complex processes within the modern and contemporary history of the Tatars and Tatarstan. They are representative enough to give an insight into all aspects of the society's political, social, economic, and cultural development in the 20th and early 21st century. Importantly, the above source groups often complement each other and suggest viewpoints for a critical analysis of literature on the research subject.
Section I

Kazan Guberniya and the Tatar Community of Russia at the beginning of the 20th Century
CHAPTER 1
The Social and Economic Development of Kazan Guberniya in the Tatar Context in the Early 20th Century

§ 1. The Economy of Russia During the Imperialist Period and the Development of Tatar Entrepreneurship in Kazan Guberniya

Lyudmila Sverdlova, Marat Gibadullin

A complicated economic situation had developed in Russia by the beginning of the First World War. Russia's general economic performance was impressive. The average growth of industry production exceeded 11% in 1910–1914. Producers' goods industries increased their production by 83% over the same period, while consumer goods production increased by 35.3%. The previously initiated monopolization progressed rapidly: higher-type monopoly associations, such as trusts and concerns, appeared. However, industrialization had a long way to go in 1913—Russia's economy remained predominantly agricultural, foodstuffs, semi-finished goods, and raw materials accounting for over 90% of Russia's export. At the same time, Russia's import of industrial goods was large enough to cause concern about the country's growing dependence on industrial import in the upper strata of the bourgeoisie.

Among pre-war influences, Stolypin's agricultural reform facilitated agricultural modernization and brought about a considerable growth of agricultural production, to which favorable weather conditions during the antebellum period and increased prices for agricultural produce in the global and domestic markets also contributed.

The country's rapid economic development caused the population's living standard to rise from 1908 to 1913, which took the form of an increase of national income per capita by 17%. It brought about a considerable growth in the domestic commodity turnover, of which the trading volume of Tatar-owned commercial enterprises in Kazan as of 1904 and 1913 are suggestive (Table 1.1).

The number of Tatar-owned trade enterprises increased by 12% over nine years, while their commodity turnover surged by 47%; the commercial capital of the national bourgeoisie tended to grow.

Table 1.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Number of businesses</th>
<th>Annual turnover</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>total</td>
<td>increase (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>122.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 It covered approximately 1/3 of the number of commercial enterprises that were in the hands of the Tatar capitalists. Small establishments (with a turnover of less than 10 thousand roubles per year) were not taken into account as their proportion of the total turnover did not exceed 3%–4%, although numerically they ranged from 78% to 86% of all enterprises.
However, the data on patterns in retail turnover does not fully reflect the real situation in the national trade entrepreneurship. The nominal turnover in current prices is a point-in-time indicator of the state of the commercial capital. In order to get a more objective idea of the dynamic patterns we have to adjust the nominal turnover to the increased price level. For this purpose we can use the price index as the ratio of the current price of the commodity bundle of the base period to its price of the base period [Torvey, 1993, p. 17].

Having compared the commodity price levels of 1904 and 1913, we can infer that commodity prices for raw materials, flour, sugar and other commodities traded by Tatar entrepreneurs increased by 30.9% over the period in question (calculated in accordance with: [Svod tovarny'x cen, 1914]). Thus, the real commodity turnover, or the 1913 turnover in 1904 prices, was 11.5 million rubles. That is, it had increased by 12.7% over 9 years. The growing commodity turnover of Tatar-owned commercial enterprises in Kazan is largely attributable to the increased price level. It should be mentioned, however, that inflationary domestic trade was an essential trend of Russia's economic development in the 20th century.

Characteristically, the development of the Tatar bourgeoisie's commercial capital in the early 20th century was slower than when compared to Russia, though a certain growth was witnessed. The peculiar structure of the domestic market was one of the reasons.

The capacity of Russia's market of produced goods expanded steadily in the early 20th century. The demand for cast iron, steel, energy commodities, and construction materials surged, which brought about an intense capital growth in the respective industries and trade spheres. At the same time, the consumables market expanded at a slower pace as it faced the low level of the population's material welfare. Tatar tradesmen mostly strove to meet the population's needs and largely depended on the consumables market.

Another reason why the Tatar bourgeoisie was accumulating commercial capital at a slower pace might be the fact that Russia's transition to imperialism was marked, among other things, by a dramatic aggravation at competition in the domestic market, which now involved not only local entrepreneurs but large-scale capitalists from Moscow, Saint Petersburg, and other trade and industrial centres. The rivalry for market outlets caused an influx of large capital to provincial areas, where competition was less and opportunities of profitable investment far wider. The migration of capital from areas of surplus to areas experiencing a shortage is a regularity for a market economy.

This pattern emerged in Russia in full measure. In Kazan alone, the large stock companies of V. Vysotsky, A. Kuznetsov, V. Aratsky, Joint-Stock Company 'Treugolnik', and others, established branches in the beginning of the century. [Khalikov, 1988, p. 255]. Possessing enormous, by provincial standards, capital of ten and more million rubles and enjoying far more opportunities to purchase goods at favorable prices, raise credits, etc., these firms seriously challenged provincial entrepreneurs in local markets.

As commercial capital grew, its concentration and centralization increased (Table 1.2).

Large capital came to dominate the market by forcing not only small entrepreneurs but also some of the medium ones out of the market. Owning an insignificant part of commercial enterprises, large businessmen concentrated about 57% of retail commodity turnover in 1913 as compared to 50% in 1904, their share of the total number of commercial enterprises remaining almost unchanged. The percentage of small and medium businesses remained large (over 96% of all enterprises), but their share of the total commodity turnover decreased by 7% over the period in question.

All of the large commercial capital of the national bourgeoisie in the territory of Kazan province was primarily concentrated in Kazan. Small and medium trade companies dominated other locations within the province.

The second most important city in terms of trade in the Kazan Volga region was Chistopol. It became even more significant at the end of
the 19th and early 20th centuries as the region's major centre of crop trade, in which Tatar entrepreneurs actively participated. According to the 1913 data, there were 33 Tatar-owned institutions in Chistopol and the uyezd, having a total annual turnover of over one million rubles [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 3, Inventory 1, File 7493].

When Russia entered the imperialist stage, it witnessed a growth of commercial capital and an expansion of the trade entrepreneurship sphere. It was reflected both in the growing number of trading houses and in the increased size of their authorized capital. For instance, in Kazan from 1892 to 1913 the number of trading houses increased from 20 to 87 (or 4.3 times), while the amount of capital went from 2.5 to 4.9 million rubles (doubling) (calculated according to: [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 98, Inventory 5, File 2374]). Tatar capital grew and strengthened its position during these years. Tatar entrepreneurs had opened as many as 154 trading houses having a total capital of 4.9 million rubles by 1913 [Khasanov, 1977 b, p.223].

However, major structural shifts happened in spite of the general capital growth. They were related to the fact that the growth in the number of trading houses was mainly attributed to small and medium capital, for which the problems of survival under conditions of fierce market competition held actual meaning. For example, in Kazan the number of small and medium sized trading houses, having capital of up to 100,000 rubles, increased 6.3 times, but for large ones only 1.3 times. For Tatar entrepreneurs, these indices changed by a factor of 20.8 and 2.6, respectively (calculated according to: [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 98, Inventory 5, File 2374]).

Such changes resulted in a general reduction in size of trade capital. Their average capital became smaller. While the average trading house in Kazan had a capital of 125,000 rubles in 1892, the value had decreased to 60,000 by 1913. The figures for Tatar entrepreneurs are 147,000 and 32,000 rubles, respectively.

Some trading houses were notable by the size of their commercial operations. For instance, the trade house 'Khalfin Brothers' was notable by its large capital and extensive commercial activities. It was established as an unlimited partnership by burghers from Menzelinsky uyezd, the Khalfin brothers in 1910. The trading house specialized in the sale of grain. A large network of branches in 15 localities across Ufa guberniya was indicative of large-scale commercial activities. The trading house had a total of 34 shops and 2 warehouses, with a total annual turnover of its enterprises exceeding 1.2 million rubles. [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 551, Inventory 1, File 65, Sheets 36–37]. The trading house even exported some goods abroad.

The trading house 'V. Ibragimov and Brother' played a significant role in Kazan's commerce. It was established in 1912 by local merchants Valiulla and Usman Ibragimov to trade tea both within and beyond the city. The trading house had an authorized fixed capital of 75,000 rubles [National Archive of the Rep-
public of Tatarstan, Fund 98, Inventory 5, File 1212, Sheets 19–20]. The firm's office was situated on Sennaya Street, where there were also 3 trading and as many storage facilities. It employed 9 people. The company's turnover was 1.3 million rubles in 1913 [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 3, Inventory 1, File 7699, Sheets 43–44].

Gradually, the role and importance of capitalist associations in commerce increased. So, if in 1904 Tatar capitalist trading houses belonged to 3 commercial establishments (2.5% of the total number), in 1912 it was 19 (17%), and by 1913 it was already 24 (18%). During these years, the turnover of these enterprises increased as follows: 380,000 rubles (3.7% of the total turnover), 1,113,000 rubles (17.3%) and 3,420,000 rubles (24%).

It is important to note that at the beginning of the 20th century, as in the mid-19th century, some trading houses were established for the development of industrial production. For example, the 'I. Arslanov Soap and Glycerin Factory Partnership' with a capital of 50,000 rubles, was established in Kazan in 1900. The company included a soap factory founded by Kazan merchant Iskhak Arslanov back in 1870 and several other enterprises. The founders were the first guild merchants S. Aitov and G. Gizhatullin, each of which contributed half of the fixed capital [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 98, Inventory 4, File 35, Sheets 14, 16]. The partnership enhanced the plant's production capacity significantly. While in 1900 the plant produced a 21,000 pounds of soap of various types, having total value of over 75,000 rubles [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 908, Inventory 7, File 354, Sheet 31 reverse—32], in 1905 the values had increased to 40,000 pounds and 210,000 rubles, respectively [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 685, Inventory 1, File 5, Sheets 117–118]. It is noteworthy that S. Aitov initially raised capital through commerce. He was one of the largest traders of raw materials in Kazan. At the beginning of the century, his company had a turnover of over 1 million rubles [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 98, Inventory 7, File 441, Sheets 55–56].

Tatar entrepreneurs also established industry-oriented trade houses in other governorates in the Volga region and the Urals. Yet, X. Khasanov estimates the number of trading houses owned by Tatar capitalists which carried out full-scale industrial activities in 1913 as 18 out of 154 [Khasanov, 19776, p. 220].

Therefore, commercial capital remained important to the development of Tatar ethnic industry.

Trade joint stock companies established by large-scale entrepreneurs also contributed to the mobilization of funds. Tatar businessmen also founded such companies.

'D. Izhboldin and Sons' was registered and began to operate as a joint stock company in 1913, its board was located in Moscow. The company's fixed capital amounted to 3 million rubles. The partnership was able to raise a profit of 11,000 rubles over 6 months in 1913. Its balance as of January 1, 1914 was 5.3 million rubles. The Izhboldin Company carried out large-scale commercial activities in Sarapul, Yekaterinburg, and Shadrinsk, where its wholesale stores and warehouses were located, as well as Nizhny Novgorod, Irit, and Menzelinsk fairs. They mostly sold dry goods [Joint stock and share enterprises of Russia, 1915, p. 602; Izhboldin, New Delhi, 1963, p. 125].

The total number of partnerships held by Tatar entrepreneurs increased 3.5 times from 1900–1916 as compared to the 1880s–1890s, that is, from 16 to 57. However, most of the share capital (73%) was invested in trade, while trade houses had a very small authorized capital. 72% of all partnerships in the early 20th century had a fixed asset of 2,000 to 10,000 rubles (calculated in accordance with: [Salikhov, 2002, pp. 220–249]). Not only merchants but also burghers and even peasants could be co-founders of a partnership. It was not impossible for a co-founder to contribute as little as 300 rubles. A large number is family enterprises characterized the Tatar business community.

Noteworthy, Muslim women, mostly relatives of other shareholders, are mentioned as
shareholders and even co-founders of some companies. Women founded joint stock companies in isolated cases. In 1915, Kazan burgher women Fatika Sabotivna and Khalifa Mukhametshevna Sabitova contributed 2,000 rubles each in cash, goods, and property to establish an unlimited partnership, the Trading House of 'F. and G. Sabitova', which was engaged in crop trade [Salikhov, 2002, p. 237].

Thus, the Tatar commercial capital had developed to an impressive extent by the beginning of the 20th century. Capital concentration and centralization were well under way; the scale and rate of accumulation increased. Tatar merchants continued to play a central part in the formation of the ethnic industrial capital. It was they who mostly initiated the establishment of new industrial enterprises. It is safe to say that the ethnic trade capital was crucial to the development of market relations in the Tatar society.

Reforms in Russia served as a powerful impulse for the deep transformation of social and economic relations in Tatar society. The process largely consisted in the gradual involvement of the Tatar population in the functioning of the market economic system and its integration to the general Russian market.

As everywhere else, market relations in the Tatar community followed the intrinsic economic patterns common for all peoples in Europe and Russia. The Tatars, just as with other peoples in the Russian state, travelled a long path to formation and consolidation, that included such stages as initial capital accumulation, industrial revolution, the transition from free competition to monopoly capitalism, etc.

On the eve of the First World War the national bourgeoisie had achieved a relatively high level of maturity. By this time, a number of modern businesses and several joint stock companies had been opened by Tatar entrepreneurs. Market social reproduction had become the economic basis of Tatar existence. The institutional framework of market economy and, most importantly, ethnic entrepreneurship, had developed. In competing against each other and against wealthier Russian and foreign capitalists, they had to exercise ingenuity and initiative, and adopt non-traditional approaches to finding capital application and market outlets. At the same time, fierce market competition motivated Tatar entrepreneurs to join their efforts with capitalists of other ethnicities and regions of Russia. As a result of the integration and internationalization of economic life, the entire Tatar nation became actively involved in the unified economic expanse of the country, facilitating their access to scientific and technical knowledge and achievements, to domestic and global economic practices.

However, Tatar entrepreneurs did not restrict themselves to purely economic activities. They created the material background to ensure a full-scale and all-round development of the Tatar people. They did a lot for the support and development of national culture, science, and education. Due to this, at the beginning of the 20th century the Tatar people experienced a spiritual and moral upsurge, a break in their national insulation and isolation occurred, and the interaction between Tatars living in different regions of the country strengthened. All this contributed to the increased role and strengthened authority of business structures.

§ 2. Main Spheres of Activity of the Tatar Bourgeoisie

Radik Salikhov

Social activeness and the efficiency of Tatar entrepreneurs in the early 20th century were largely determined by the results of their professional activities. Successful businesses concentrating large financial and physical resources, as well as the rapid development of commodity-monetary relations and modern industry were a locomotive for progress for only yesterday's patriarchal Tatar communities.
The establishment of capitalistic relations within the Muslim community of the Volga region and Cis-Ural region throughout the 19th century determined the formation of large centres of Tatar entrepreneurship in Kazan, Orenburg, Saratov, Simbirsk, Ryazan, and other Guberniyas of the Russian Empire. A number of essential political and economic influences, such as the abolition of serfdom, the governmental reforms of the latter half of the 19th century, and the beginning of the industrial revolution that triggered rapid industrialization in previously existing manufacturing, and the appearance of new sectors of production.

The size of Russia's Tatar bourgeoisie and its actual contribution to the country's economy is an issue still important and underexplored. For instance, according to the statistics provided by X. Khasanov, the Tatar bourgeoisie consisted of 7,565 people (including family members), i.e. 0.41% of the total in the Tatar social structure at the end of the 19th century. In 1914, Tatar capitalists owned 141 industrial enterprise having an annual capacity of over 10 million rubles and 154 trading houses having a total authorized capital of over 9 million rubles [Khasanov, 1977 b, pp. 218–219, 223, 229]. M. Gibadullin analyzed the records of the 1897 First General Census of the Russian Empire and estimated the number of Tatar entrepreneurs in 10 governorates at 13,892 people. According to the researcher, in Kazan guberniya there were 2,818 in commerce and 2,988 in Orenburg guberniya. He does not provide any concrete figures on the number of Tatar businesses and their total capital against the general Russian backdrop and often relies on the statistics of X. Khasanov and fragmentary information from statistical records collections.

It must be admitted that the poor source base, weakened by its class orientation and a certain disregard of the ethnic and confessional aspect of Russian entrepreneurship does impede both quantity and quality analysis of the key spheres of the Tatar bourgeoisie's commercial and industrial activities. It seems that only a rough solution can be provided by sources of different types and different statistical methods. In general, M. Gibadullin's calculations are more representative of the count of the Tatar bourgeoisie than similar statistics of X. Khasanov. However, it is also obvious that the contemporary literature on the information of the number of Tatars engaged in entrepreneurship in the late 19th–early 20th century is understated.

The city of Kazan was one of the largest centres of the ethnic commerce and industry in the Volga region and the Cis-Ural region, as its history and geographic position had determined its great importance for the consolidation and development of the Tatar ethnic group. According to the First All-Russian Census of 1897, the Tatar share of Kazan's population was 22% [Khalikov, 1988, pp. 199, 213–214], while the Tatar bourgeoisie, being the second largest after the Russian one, exerted serious economic, social, and political influence on the governorate centre. For instance, the 1900 statistics by the Kazan City Duma (Council) mention 19 Russians, 7 Tatars, and 6 Hebrews among persons with 1st guild authorized capitals and 188 Russians and 52 Tatars in the 2nd guild.

At the same time, the city's Tatar bourgeoisie was by no means limited to people belonging to this or that guild. We think that the rough average number of urban Tatar tradesmen and manufacturers—that are, those who had a business, large or small, and had a profit, correlates to the number of householders in the sloboda mahallahs of Kazan. Here in 1909 there were 1281 people (calculated according to: [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 2, Inventory 2, File 8464, Sheets 1–18, 76, reverse–77]). Taking into account the fact that the average Muslim urban family consisted of 5 and more members, the Muslim business community of Kazan included approximately 6,400 people, which is about 20% of the total Tatar population of the governorate centre.

According to D. Iskhakov, the number of urban dwellers of Volga-Ural Tatar origin that lived in Russia in the late 19th century was 160,000 [Iskhakov, 2002 a, p. 65]. By analogy, at least 20% of them were actively engaged in commerce or production, which is 32000
people if we count family members. We should clarify once again that these figures are approximate and, in our opinion, are not representative of all quantitative parameters of the Tatar bourgeoisie. It is all the more so because all urban Muslims were to some extent engaged in active market relations through small-scale retail, crafts, and servicing the commercial infrastructure.

We find it obvious that the ethnic bourgeoisie, though it remained a small social group not only as part of the Russian society but within the social structure of the Tatar ethnic community, still preserved its ethnic and confessional identity as well economic independence, acting as the key, and very efficient, coordinating force for Russia's Muslim ummah.

Kazan had the advantage of having the highest concentration of ethnic capital and diversity of commercial and production activities over other cities in the country with a dense Muslim Tatar population. The principal business activities were confined to the Old Tatar and New Tatar Slobodas, which were in fact special ethnic urban units guided by Sharia in their everyday life. The main commercial centre of Muslim Kazan during that period was the 2nd Police Neighborhood, which covered several quarters of the Old Tatar Sloboda, in which a large Eastern bazaar known as the Hay Market existed from the late 18th century. That was a neighborhood of tenement building, hotels, restaurants, inns, hundreds of shops and stores, mostly belonging to Muslim entrepreneurs. According to the statistics provided by the Kazan Treasury Chamber, it contained 334 officially established Tatar-owned commercial and industrial enterprises having a total annual turnover of 14.6 million rubles from 1914–1916. By comparison: merchants and tradesmen of other ethnic and confessional groups who traded in the Hay Market and streets adjacent to it only owned 87 businesses having a total turnover of 2.2 million rubles (calculated according to: [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 3, Inventory 1, File 8020; File 1479, Sheets 1–23; File 11481, Sheets 1–22]).

Practically all Muslim institutions of that district specialized in trade. The largest turnover was associated with crop retailers and groceries (66 businesses having a total turnover of 4.4 million rubles), dry goods shops (20 businesses having a total turnover of 2.4 million rubles), shoe shops (55 businesses having a total turnover of 1.6 million rubles), raw material shops (9 businesses having a total turnover of 1.2 million rubles), tea shops (1 business having a turnover of 1 million rubles), and haberdasheries and stores (9 businesses having a total turnover of 560,000 rubles, etc.

Tatar industry in Kazan was traditionally concentrated in the 5th Police Neighborhood, which included several streets of the Old Tatar Sloboda and the entire New Tatar Sloboda. According to the statistics for 1912, it contained 116 active Muslim-owned businesses having an annual turnover of 2.4 million people, 34 of which were production plants having a total turnover of 1.2 million rubles.

Soap making dominated the city's Tatar industry. One of the largest and most successful enterprises in this industry was 'Iskhak Arslanov Soap and Glycerin Factory Partnership', founded by 1st guild merchant S. Aitov and 'merchant's son' Kh. Gizzatullin in 1900. They acquired the factory from the merchant I. Arslanov [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 98, Inventory 4, File 35, Sheet 16]. In 1912, S. Aitov and Kh. Gizzatullin’s plant had an output of 49,130 poonds of various kinds of soaps and 173 poonds of tallow candles. 50 workers laboured here and the annual turnover was 200,000 rubles [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Collection 757, File 2a, Sheet 195].

Another important area of Muslim industrial activities was coarse calico production and dyeing. Two coarse calico dyeing plants owned by Tatar capitalists produced 600,000 arshines of coarse calico per year and had a turnover of 450,000 rubles. They employed a total of 92 people. The largest enterprise here was the 'Utyamyshev Coarse Calico Dyeing Plant Partnership'. It had an annual turnover of 217,000 rubles [National Archive of the Republic of
The foodstuffs industry, mostly represented by confectionery shops and bakeries, was a flourishing Tatar sector at the beginning of the 20th century. A total of 7 businesses having an annual turnover of 91,200 rubles and employing 95 workers were active in Kazan.

Apart from coarse calico, soap, and foodstuff production, a traditional industry of the early 19th century, tanning, had been to some extent preserved in Kazan. For instance, burgher Yakub Ibragimovich Kozlov ran a Russian leather tannery in Bolshaya Simbirskaya Street, New Tatar Sloboda (now Mekhovshikov Street), at which 32 workers processed high quality leather that was popular far beyond Kazan. The business had a turnover of 120 rubles [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 3, Inventory 1, File 11483, Sheets 10–11]. A network of trade companies and tradesmen formed around numerous efficient plants to provide the raw materials that they required.

Thus, numerous branches of trade and industry flourished in the ethnic neighborhood of Kazan in the early 20th century. Muslim entrepreneurs were actively involved in various spheres of production except for metal processing, alcohol and tobacco production and trade. The 5th Police Neighborhood contained 188 trade and industrial enterprises in 1916, of which 116, having a total annual turnover of 4.4 million rubles, were owned by Tatar manufacturers and tradesmen. Again, over 30 out of 50 industrial plants within the neighborhood were owned by Muslim entrepreneurs. The 19 largest plants and factories had a total annual turnover of 1.2 million rubles (calculated in according to: [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 3, Inventory 1, File 11483, Sheets 1–33]). In the Old and New Tatar Slobodas in Kazan together, a total of about 500 Tatar-owned commercial and industrial enterprises having a total annual turnover of 19 million rubles were active in 1914–1916 (calculated according to: [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 3, Inventory 1, File 8020; File 11479, Sheets 1–23; File 11481, Sheets 1–22; File 11483, Sheets 1–33]).

The success and stability of Tatar trade and industry in the context of fierce competition suggests that the ethnic business had some special economic coordinates, a firm customer of its own, a raw materials base, and labor resources and practiced business cooperation. That is, several elements had formed within the specific Tatar Muslim economy as the key sphere of activity for Russia’s Tatar entrepreneurs, who shared no interests with the Russian bourgeoisie or at least did not have any interests inconsistent with the latter’s professional ambitions.

There is historical evidence that special branches of the ethnic commerce and industry supplied the religious needs of the Muslim population; their production and offers enjoyed a stable high demand in areas with a dense Muslim population. These were primarily the production and trading of ethnic clothes, sacred objects, spiritual literature in the community's native language, foodstuffs, etc. Such businesses can be termed Islamic-orientated. For instance, 104 businesses of the kind were active in the district of the Hay Market in Kazan, which made up 31% of the total number of Tatar-owned shops and factories in the neighborhood. They had a total annual turnover of 2,460,000 rubles, i.e. 17% of the total annual turnover of all Muslim-owned businesses (calculated according to: [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 3, Inventory 1, File 8020; File 11479, Sheets 1–23; File 11481, Sheets 1–22]).

Besides this, another important sign of the special economic relationship in the Muslim Tatar community was self-reliance, a pronounced ethnic and confessional solidarity. A majority of Tatar-owned commercial manufacturing businesses relied on the handicraft of Muslim auls, being their chief consumer of animal breeding and agricultural production. This determined the specific personnel policy and labor organisation as well as tight professional connections between Muslims, residing in different regions of the state. As missionary V. Doronkin noted:
For Tatars engaged in seasonal work and trade, it is difficult, even impossible, to find good employment or trade without "protection", a "mutual support" from Tatars, without 'kinship'. Tatars tend to trade exclusively with Tatars' [Kasimovskaya pravoslavnaya magometanskaya missiya, 1909, p. 171].

Apart from Kazan, a significant trade and commercial centre for the Tatar people was Orenburg guberniya, which had been acting as a trade mediator between Russia and Middle Asia since the 18th century. Tatar business was concentrated in the cities of Orenburg, Troitsk, Seivot sloboda, and other localities. According to the statistics of 1872, in Orenburg the local first and second guild merchant community consisted of 158 Orthodox Christians, 15 Schismatics, 20 Muslims, and 5 Hebrews [State Archive of Orenburg oblast, Fund 41, Inventory 1, File 107]. As in Kazan, the number of entrepreneurs is unlikely to have been limited to the figures above. According to the 1897 census records, 11,321 Tatars resided in Orenburg, and about 13,000 in Seivot township [Ishkakov, 2002 a, p. 65; Bakirova, 2004, p. 221]. Approximately a quarter of them were engaged in entrepreneurial activities.

In spite of its relatively small Muslim population, Troitsk was clearly dominated by the Tatar bourgeoisie, represented by such influential trading families as the Yaushevs, the Bakirovs, the Valiev, the Idrisovs, the Urazaevs, etc.

The main commercial sphere in which the region's ethnic business community was active in was purchasing fabric, raw materials, peltries, leather, animal fat, and livestock for further sale in Russia's domestic markets and fairs. In the late 19th–early 20th century, the Khusainov brothers from Seivot township, 1st guild Orenburg merchants, controlled a major sector in the trade with Turkestan. The family's undivided capital amounted to approximately 4 million rubles in the last quarter of the 19th century. The founder of the family business was Akhmed Galeevich Khusainov (1837–1906), who while still a young man, opened his own store in Orenburg, trading small commodities and raw materials, to which his brothers, Makhmu (1839–1910) and Gani (1839–1902) later joined. Together they formed the company 'Akhmed Khusainov and Brothers', which carried out trade mediation between European Russia and Middle Asia. The general sales of all the Khusainov Brothers' enterprises amounted to several million rubles.

Significant indicators showed that there were many notable entrepreneurs from Orenburg guberniya, mostly animal raw material merchants or owners of agricultural and livestock processing plants. Fur and leather, dry goods, and foodstuff traders, such as 2nd guild merchants Abdulla Kinikeev, Khusain Gubaydullin, Gimadutdin Khalilov, honorary citizen by birth Mukhametsabir Adamov, the peasant Mukhammadi Ayupov, and many more enjoyed success in Orenburg.

The 'Yaushev Brothers' Trading House was one of the governorate's largest commercial and industrial companies with an annual turnover of 1.1 million rubles. They owned a tannery, a soap factory, grain mill, tea plant, retail and wholesale stores for the sale of dry goods, haberdashery, hardware, groceries, and other goods in the city of Troitsk. Besides this, the trading house owned two ginneries and cotton plantations in Tashkent and had its own branch offices in Chelyabinsk, Kochkar, Kustanay, Tokmak, and other localities [Central Historical Archive of the Republic of Bashkortostan, Fund 1—295, Inventory 6, File 1459, Sheets 3–4].

However, the majority of Troitsk businessmen restricted themselves to a narrower sphere of trade in raw materials and the processing industry. It was not coincidental that, among Tatar industrial institutions, apart from the Yaushev factories specified above, only 3 wool-scouring plants and 11 slaughterhouses with tallow boileries were mentioned. [List of Owners of Industrial Facilities Located in Orenburg guberniya, 1900, pp. 81–82}. However, they remained the indisputable leaders in the tanning industry. According to the statistics of the Troitsk City Duma, in 1917 the uyezd centre had 5 large tanneries that processed a total of 96,000 skins per year. Three of them
belonged to Tatar capitalists: the Yaushevs (annual output of 60,000 skins), the Valeeves (annual output of 15,000 skins), and the Idrisovs (annual output of 5,000 skins) [State Archive of Orenburg oblast, Fund 15, Inventory 1, File 348/1, Sheet 50].

In the latter half of the same century, Tatar entrepreneurs Shakir and Zakir Rameev, having accumulated start up capital from trading dry goods, opened several dozen gold fields in which thousands of workers laboured. In 1902–1904, they owned 79 gold fields having a total annual output of up to 50 poods of gold. On the whole, in terms of the numbers of Tatar commercial and industrial enterprises, in terms of their gross turnover, Orenburg guberniya was in no way inferior to Kazan. According to some figures, it reached 16 million rubles a year [Amirkhanov, 2000, p. 233].

The territory of the following three governorates in the Volga region was a major Tatar industrial area: In Saratov, Samara, and Simbirsk large Muslim-owned textile factories emerged from the 19th to the early 20th century. Among these were Ishmuxamet Deberdeev’s cloth factory in the village of Verkhozima, Kuznetsk uyezd, Saratov guberniya, and similar ones in the village of Pendele of the same guberniya, owned by Mustafa and Yakh’ya Deberdeev. The plants produced army broadcloth. The former employed 600 workers and the latter two 900. The Deberdeevs’ factories were regarded as the largest plants in the Saratov Volga region. While at the neighboring plant of Rabotkin one worker produced an annual amount of goods having a value of 357 rubles, the same at the Deberdeevs' factory yielded 414 rubles 70 kopecks [Grigoriev, 1974, p. 5, 6]. The cloth factory of Khamid Aleev from the village of Mullovka, Stavropol uyezd, Samara guberniya also supplied the Russian army. The Aleev brothers established a cloth plant with steam equipment in the villages of Bobylevka and Lyakhovka, Simbirsk guberniya, in the mid-19th century. However, the most important textile plants in Simbirsk guberniya belonged to the Akchurins. For instance, merchant Sulejman Akchurin established a cloth plant in the village of Staroye Timoshkino, Sengiley uyezd, in 1849. It employed 200 workmen and 15 experts and had a turnover of 60,000 rubles in 1855. Its staff had increased to 1,423 workmen in 1861 to produce 255,000 arshin of cloth having a total value of 204,000 rubles. After the businessman’s death, his sons continued to run his business, first as the Akchurin’s Widow and Sons Trade House (‘Vdova Akchurina s synov’yami’ and, from 1874, as part of the Brothers Akchurin Trade House (‘Brat’ya Akchuriny’), members of the 1st Simbirsk Merchants Gild, honorary citizens by birth A. Akchurin, Ya. Akchurin, Sengileyevskoye 1st guild merchant, honorary citizen by birth Yu. Achurin [Tairov, 2002, pp. 19–25]. They had two factories in Staroye Timoshkino outfitted with the latest equipment. The plants produced various types of cloth from 1876 to 1877: army, guard, napless, camel hair, etc., both for public use and for private trading at a volume of 700,000 arshin having a value of 85,000 rubles, which amounted to 38.3% of the governorate's cloth production [Sverkalov, edit., 1989, p. 91]. The trade house employed a total of 1,450 people in 12 buildings. The plant also prepared the necessary raw materials. The Akchurins bought wool in Middle Asia to scour over 100,000 pood of it at the plant each year [State Archive of Ulyanovsk oblast, Fund 76, Inventory 8, File 297, Sheet 44]. Another large capitalist from the Akchurin family, Timuralat Akchurin, became the owner of a cloth plant in the village of Guryevka, Karsunsky uyezd, Simbirsk guberniya, in 1862; the plant employed 1,200 workers and produced up to 1 million arshins of army cloth in the late 19th century. He also owned the Samaykino Plant, Syzran’ uyezd, which employed 800 workers producing 500,000 arshins of cloth.

The Gur’yevka plant alone had a turnover of 2,293,886 rubles in 1914. At the same time, the annual production capacity of 7 Tatar-owned industrial associations in the Volga region amounted to 765,000 arshins of cloth, i.e. 35% of the total production potential of the region’s 24 largest plants (calculated according to [Tairov, 2002, pp. 87–88]).
Fur and tanning industries were traditional among Tatar entrepreneurs from the city of Kazimov, Ryazan guberniya. Back in 1830, a tannery ran by the honorary citizen by birth Xamza Sayyid Shakulov with 180 vessels and an output of 45,000 skins having a value of 140,000 rubles enjoyed success there. However, during the post-reform period the Merlushka lamb skin industry became better developed. The Kastrovs became actively engaged in sheepskin tanning and the sheepskin coat trade in the 1860s. All small plants ran by Kazimov businessmen were processing and dyeing a total of 120 Bukhara and Kirghiz merlushka lamb skins, which they primarily purchased from Tatar merchants in Orenburg and Astrakhan [Materialy dlja geografii. Ryazan guberniya, 1860, pp. 274–276]. The industry gained momentum in the early 20th century. For instance, Xabibula Musyaev ran a fur factory in Kazimov, which employed 60 workers and had an annual output of 50,000 rubles. Plants owned by Kh. Taneev, M. Devishev, Vergazov Brothers' Trade House, etc. were also active in the city. In 1913, A. Kastrov's merlushka lamb skin plant alone had an annual output of 1.5 million skins. 9 large Tatar-owned fur plants having a total turnover of 3.6 million rubles operated in Kazimov uyezd [Filippov, 2001, pp. 67, 98]. Yet, like in other regions, the ethnic business in Kazimov was not purely industrial but also commercial. Many famous Tatar families from Kazimov—the Akbulatovs, the Kastrovs, the Ishimbayevs, the Shakulovs, the Tubkaevs, and others carried out intense commercial activities, mostly outside of their governorate, at the Nizhny Novgorod Fair, in Moscow, Saint Petersburg, and Little Russia.

Kazimov Tatars were largely engaged in small-scale service provision, catering, and retail trading in capitals and on stations along the Nikolayev Railroad. They eventually formed influential and rich local communities in the late 19th and early 20th century.

Speaking of the nature of Tatar bourgeoisie's entrepreneurship in the post-reform period, we should place special emphasis on the further development and growth of capital from infra-ethnic mediated trade. This was attributable to the commodity production of that period which had a tendency to establish joint ownership trading houses. As the ethnic economic system was formed and tight, deep trade and economic relations were established between regions with dense Muslim populations, capital became extremely concentrated, and new advanced business forms were introduced. It was consistent with Sharia, which favored cooperation and equal partnerships. The above mentioned trade house of Akchurin's Widow and Sons, which disposed of the assets of the Staroye Timoshkino cloth plant in 1870, was one of the first Tatar joint ventures. It was in Simbirsk guberniya where the first Tatar joint stock company ever, the Partnership of the Akchurins' Staroje Timoshkino Cloth Plant ('Tovarishestvo Staro-Timoshskinskoj sukonnnoj manufaktury' Akchurin'y'), was established in 1891 [Rossijskij Gosudarstvennyj Istoricheskij Arkhiv, Fund 22, Inventory4, File 28, b. Sheet].

The economically well-developed city of Kazan also witnessed a quantitative growth of the partnership sector. The incomplete official statistics for 1877–1900, mention 15 Tatar-owned trade houses. 68 more partnerships were reportedly registered from 1900 to 1916 (some were co-founded by Russian and Jewish merchants). Over 300 trade houses and joint stock companies were recorded in the city from 1872 to 1916, Tatar merchants and entrepreneurs being the founders of 28% of them [Khayrutdinov, 1996, pp. 48–49].

As reported by X. Khasanov, 154 Tatar trade houses having a total fixed capital of 4.9 million rubles as of 1914 existed in Russia [Khasanov, 1977b, p. 223].

Thus, Russia's Muslim Tatar economy was concentrated in certain economic regions with certain commercial and industrial specialization and characterized by intense capital concentration in industries of high priority to the Muslim community1. The Orenburg region

1 Detailed information on the regional groups of Tatar business activity is given in: [Amirkhanov, 2000, pp. 228–249].
and Middle Asia were the primary raw material base for the soap, cloth, and fur industries, which were largely concentrated in the Middle Volga region and Central Russia.

Nizhny Novgorod Fair came to act as the country's an essential ethnic commercial centre in the 19th and 20th century by hosting major trade operations, commodity exchange between businessmen from across the empire, and mutually beneficial interactions with the Russian provincial and capital bourgeoisie. Nearly all famous Tatar commercial families owned real estate and large-scale businesses there. The latter included wholesale and retail shops of dry goods, soap, cloth, raw materials, fur, Asian clothes and footwear, and literature [Tairov, 2004, p. 260–264; Zagidullin, 2006 b, pp. 74–95]. In fact, every summer Nizhny Novgorod Fair turned into a large Oriental Tatar-speaking city, attracting the ethnic commercial and industrial elite. It is no coincidence that the most important institutions of the Tatar bourgeois community were established or promoted there. The Nizhny Novgorod Fair provided a stage for the first professional actors of Tatar origins, offered subscription for the general Turkic newspaper Terdzhiman, and hosted serious social and political events, including the establishment of the first Islamic party It-tifaq al-Muslimin.

The actual Muslim economy with its rapid development of capitalist relations provided support for the theory of prominent bourgeois ideologists, who viewed Islam as an economic religion [Mukhametshin et al., 2005, p. 116]. Apart from special Muslim-oriented consumer industries and a close cooperation within the ethnic business community, Tatar entrepreneurs clearly tended to observe the moral and ethical rules embodied in religious laws. Tatars were unlikely to manufacture and sell alcohol and tobacco products as well as foodstuffs not permitted in Sharia, or run gambling centres, or other illicit entertainment facilities. This surely restricted the range of activities in which the ethnic business community could participate, which cost it to forego enormous profits. However, it is again suggestive of its primary aspiration to meet the basic needs of the Muslim community.

Yet, the Tatar capital in the post-reform period had grown enough to not only satisfy the Islamic ummah, but to sell large amounts of production outside of Russia– in Germany, Turkey, the USA, Great Britain, and other powerful countries. Thus, the Muslim business community faced the increasing challenge of raising large funds and establishing cooperation with banks. It is a common fact that Sharia prohibits faithful Muslims to borrow and lend money at interest. However, Russia's developing economy laid Muslim entrepreneurs under a necessity of accepting a compromise and using the popular financial instruments. Otherwise they were doomed to ruination. The clergy and businessmen usually deposited even waqf and other charity money in banks at a certain interest.

Taking into account how active the Tatar bourgeoisie was, the government encouraged its representatives to work as experts in loan and discount committees of various banking authorities. As the Muslim business community was growing in strength, it was regarded as a major consumer of bank loans for commercial transactions and industry production.

For instance, merchants S. Aitov, M.-S. Burnaev, M.-S. Galikeev, and G. Ishmuratov were members of the loan and discount committee of the Kazan branch office of the State bank in the late 19th–early 20th century. Merchant M. Galeev was member of the loan and discount committee of four banks: the Volga Kama, Kazan Merchant, Kazan City Public, Nizhny Novgorod Fair, and Menzelinsk branch offices of the State Bank [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 98, Inventory 3, File 3195; Fund 1, Inventory 6, File 505, Sheet 160]. The situation naturally caused certain anxiety in Muslim lawyers and journalists, who initiated a discussion of the issue in the early 20th century by suggesting that a dedicated Muslim bank should be established in Russia. To quote the Iktisad magazine, 'if there existed a separate Muslim bank, the interest paid my Muslims would be covered
by the interest they receive. Muslim wealth would thus remain in our pockets’ [Xismátova, 2002, p. 50]. Another suggestion was to develop mutual loan societies, that would use no bank interest. However, such organisations were perceived as dubious, since they were not mono-confessional and thus did not favor financial relations in strict accordance with the Sharia. Due to a number of circumstances, these ideas were no instant solution to the most serious problem of bringing contemporary market activities in line with the Islam law. Therefore, the integration of the ethnic business into the country's economic system did not mean a loss of autonomy and independence. In fact, it would create favorable conditions for the development of certain elements of the specifically Muslim economy with its special branches, ethnic and confessional cooperation, and strive for financial independence. It was during that period when the concept of ethnic wealth, which Muslims expect to primarily serve the entire Islamic community, entered into public consciousness. It is obvious that the Tatar bourgeoisie owed its success, competitiveness, and stability, which it had achieved in a foreign religious environment as a social minority, to Russia's Islamic ummah. The latter was the only consumer of its commodities and services and the primary supplier of workforce and physical resources.

Therefore, the Tatar business community was vitally concerned with keeping Muslim mahallahs united and protecting them from both governmental missions and Europeanization, to which assimilation is inherent.

§ 3. The Social and Occupational Structure of the Population of the Kazan Region and the Tatar Community: Similarities and Differences

Nail’ Khalikov

The first years of the 20th century were a milestone in Russia’s historical development. At the turn of the century the country entered the imperialist era, which, in particular, brought about material social, economic, and class changes. The processes had begun and gained momentum previously and developed rapidly in the post-reform capitalist Russia (the industrial revolution, the development of capitalist production relations, etc.) to peak in the early 20th century.

Russia’s social structure and the social status of its population generally matched social class divisions until 1917. The society was still officially classified into: noblemen, clergymen, merchants, peasants, and meshhanstvo (townsfolk). Other social groups were not formalized as classes, but bore the marks of belonging among them: cossacks, workers, entrepreneurs, industry manufacturers, factory owners, etc. The class division developed during the feudal period and was established in the 18th century to persist in times of capitalism. This is vividly witnessed by the records of the First General Census of the Russian Empire of 1897, which relied on this classification of the country’s population.

According to the census records, the population of European Russia at the turn of the 20th century was 84.1% peasant, 10.6% burgheis (meshhanins), 1.5% noblemen and officials, 0.6% honorary citizens, and others. [Dubrovsky, 1975, p. 43, Table 3]. Of Russia’s Tatars, 93.0% were recorded as peasants, 3.68% as workmen, 1.75% as burgheis (meshhanins), 0.59% as clergymen, 0.48% as noblemen and officials, and 0.41 as bourgeoisie (merchants and industrial manufacturers) [Khasanov, 1977 b, p. 229, Table].

Agriculture was formally the primary and traditional economic activity and source of

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2 We widely use the Census data compiled in the 1890s but which has not lost their informational value, and this may be extrapolated more or less accurately to the first years of the 20th century.
sustenance and income for the vast majority of Tatars in the Volga region. Of primary importance was arable farming (86.7% of all Volga region Tatars registered by 1897 in ten governorates of European Russia). They were recorded as belonging to the peasant class. Yet not having land, herds, hands to put to work, and under the burden of inordinately high taxes, a large part of them had to raise profit from something other than agriculture. It was not infrequent for a recorded peasant to have been long engaged in seasonal non-agricultural work, mill work, and the like, thus being in essence a member of the labouring class. A special term was coined for them: 'landed hired workers'.

The largest percentage (over 90%) of Tatars, who named arable farming as their main occupation during the 1897 census, lived in the Penza, Nizhny Novgorod, Kazan, Ufa, Samara, and Saratov guberniyas. This was not a coincidence. These governorates lay primarily in wooded steppe, which offered the most favorable conditions for arable farming. Orenburg guberniya had the smallest percentage of Tatars engaged exclusively in agriculture (64%). It was a region of well-developed business and agricultural capitalism, where many found employment in various production and service industries. The governorate, which had long been a centre of commerce between Russia, Middle Asia and the Orient, had about 12% of the Tatar population engaged in trade.

According to 1897 statistics, 96% of the Tatar population of the Kazan guberniya and 85% of Russians were engaged in arable farming [The first total census of the population of the Russian Empire, 1897]. XIV. Kazan guberniya, 1904]. This is attributable to more stable community traditions in the Tatar countryside and the population's devotion to its land. This is why Tatars in Kazan preferred local handicrafts. This does not apply to Mishar Tatars in the western governorates with their fourfold system of land tenure (service class, petty bourgeois, and private land use). The restrictive role of their community, poorly developed domestic handicrafts, along with other reasons, led them to prefer seasonal work in distant areas.

Petty bourgeoisie: house-owners, bakery and inn owners, small-scale tradesmen and entrepreneurs, low level employees, artisans, servants, and horse-cab drivers constituted the social category (along with tax-payers) of meshhanins, a major part of the urban population.

The proportion of meshhanins differed widely depending on the city of the region. Somewhere it exceeded half of the total population (Mamadysh, Kazan guberniya), but Tatar urban dwellers were always (much) fewer than Russian meshhanins. In 1897, the ratio for Kazan guberniya was 19% and 72% respectively. Only in Chistopol Tatars accounted for a quarter of the town's population, one fifth in Kazan, and, in other uyezd centres, the percentage was even smaller. About one third of meshhanins in Buinsk, Simbirsk Guberniya, and Malmyzh, Vyatka Guberniya, were of Tatar origin. During the post-reform period, the meshhanin class grew primarily due to an inflow of peasants. In particular, Kazan guberniya had over 11,000 meshhanins (1897), while Orenburg guberniya had as many as 22,600 [Khasanov, 1977b, pp. 231–232], among whom many were Tatars.

In the post-reform period, especially in the first years of the 20th century, the spreading of capitalism, the developing factory industry\(^3\), and new production relations prompted the formation of two new classes, the proletariat and the industrial bourgeoisie, to form. Im-poverished peasants became proletarianized as labourers. The working class also experienced an inflow of former handicraftsmen, whose domestic production decayed because of the insufficiency and high prices of raw materials and competition with cheap manufactured goods.

\(^3\) At the end of the 19th century there were over 200 factories and plants with around 12 thousand workers in the Kazan guberniya, in 1904 the number of enterprises increased to 326, and the number of workers employed in them reached 15 thousand people [Gilmanov, eds., 1968, p. 248]
Russia's working class fell into the following categories depending on their economic activities: 1) agricultural workers, 2) factory workers, 3) miners and gold field workers, 4) construction workers engaged in logging, earthwork, railroad construction, etc. 5) ship service workers, mostly dock loaders in Kazan, Nizhny Novgorod, etc., on the rivers Volga, Kama, Vyatka, Belaya, railroad workers, 6) unskilled labourers, 7) workers at local centralized and decentralized manufacturing works.

Tatars accounted for 10 to 12% of workers in the Kazan guberniya in the early 20th century; their percentage reached 30% at large plants in Kazan and could be as high as 50–60% at factories in the Kama River region [Gilmanov, ed., 1968, p. 250].

Tatar workers in the Middle Volga region and in the Kama river region at the turn of the 20th century were concentrated at the Krestovnikovs' works, the Alazufovs' factories, and others in Kazan. The Zakazanye became a major industrial centre back in the 18th century. It included the Kukmor felt and fur factories in the village of Shemordan and in nearby villages. Ushkov's Bondyuga and Kokshaysk Chemical plants in the Kama river region, cloth factories owned by the Akchurins' commercial and industrial partnerships in Korsun, Sengiley, and Syzran' uyezds, Simbirsk guberniya, the Deberdeevs' plants in Saratov guberniya, the Saydashev's and Subaev's glass plants in Tsar'evokokshaysk uyezd, Kazan guberniya, and other plants employed many Tatar workers.

Plants were often established in settlements and villages with long traditions of handicraft. Dense population, scant and infertile land, and excess of workforce favored their preservation. Manufacturing plants, first scattered and later centralized, appeared in such villages back in the 18th century. Factories began to develop in the mid-19th century (Shemordan, Kukmor, Staroye Timoshkino, etc.). These centres attracted seasonal workers from the country on a large scale in the latter half of the 19th century–early 20th century. This was the case with Mamadysh uyezd, Kazan guberniya.

Tatars worked at metallurgical plants in St. Petersburg, Yekaterinburg, and other cities, in the Rameev's gold fields in Verkhneural'sk uyezd, Orenburg guberniya, which employed a total of 1200 workers with a large percentage of Tatars. The Kushva Iron Foundry in the eastern branches of the Ural Mountains (Verkhotursk uyezd, Perm guberniya) attracted about 10,000 workers of Tatar and Russian origin. There was a mosque in the plant settlement [Spisok nasel'yonyx mest, 1909, p. 30]. Approximately 2,000 Tatars were engaged in hard coal production on Perm guberniya in the late 19th century [Gavrilov, 1985, p. 107].

According to the 1897 census record for ten governorates of European Russia, 86.7% of the Tatar population was engaged in farming; 1.2%, in livestock breeding; 0.26%, in timber trade; 0.6%, in ore mining; 0.4% processed fibrous material; 0.15%, wood; 0.34%, metal; 0.18% worked in chemical production; 0.3%, in plant and animal produce processing; 0.8%, in production of clothes; 0.36%, in house maintenance and construction; 0.5%, in hauling; 3.2%, in trade (agricultural produce, fabric, clothes, fur, etc.); 1.3% were administrative and public officials; 2.3% carried out private activities and worked as servants. The clergy accounted for 0.5%. No data is available on workers due to the limitations of the census taking method use. However, the occupations of factory workers matched the plant's specialization. Our knowledge is limited to the fact that Tatar workers tended to do hard, unskilled, and badly paid factory work.

Many Tatar peasants did handicrafts. Contemporaries noted in the early 20th century, '... not all Tatar peasants are farmers; many of them... earn their living as seasonal workers at Russian and Tatar owned soap factories and tanneries in Kazan, horse cab drivers, etc.' [Speransky, 1914, p. 12]. Or, 'Because of the decay of arable farming in Tatar villages, thousands of rural dwellers go to nearby cities in the Volga region to do seasonal work. Poor Ta-

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4 The Tovarishchestvo (Partnership) had a weaving section in the Tatar village of Pendelka in the Kuznetsk uyezd.
In Kazan clean streets, work as porters on quays, watchmen, day laborers, and watermen.’

Diverse as they are, peasant commercial activities (except for handicraft) fall into two categories: workforce trade and commercial and industrial entrepreneurship. The first category was represented by the rural proletariat, wage workers with land lots. They were impoverished or disadvantaged peasants with insufficient land lots (2–4 desyatinas, the standard being 8–16 desyatinas), possessing one horse, or none at all (which was pretty much the same economically). They could not live from their land and had to hire out their work force. These included farm servants, day laborers, woodcutters, miners, constructors, unskilled laborers, etc. For instance, the percentage of poor wage laborers in the congested Menzelinsk uyezd, Ufa guberniya, which had a large Tatar population, at the very end of the 19th century was 60%: ‘...the percentage of rural proletariat correlated with the amount of land available to peasants. It was much higher in uyezds that lacked land as compared to those rich in it’ [Usmanov, 1981, pp. 274–275]. In Buinsk uyezd, Simbirsk guberniya, large numbers of Tatars engaged in local and distant seasonal work lived in villages and volosts with the smallest land lots [Census of homesteads of Simbirsk Guberniya, 1910–1911, Buinsk uyezd, 1914, p.43]. The percentage of peasants engaged in such commercial activities in Tatar-populated volosts was as follows: Drozhzhanyoe volost—about 60%, Novo-Kakerlinsk volost—80%. For example, in Drozhzhanyoe volost, factories and other plants employed the largest number of seasonal workers (over 500); 400 were unskilled and day laborers [Census of homesteads of Simbirsk Guberniya, 1910–1911, Buinsk uyezd, 1914, Table].

Tatar peasants worked at factories, in coal and ore mines and fields in the Urals, Siberia, and the Donbass, oil fields in Baku, fisheries in Astrakhan, and others. Many of them worked as laders on rivers. Such works remained seasonal for many Tatars even in the early 20th century, as they had to return home for summer agricultural activities. Craftsmen also did seasonal work as board sawyers, carpenters, stave setters, furriers, wool beaters, tailors... Some became shepherds. Others worked in town as salesclerks, street cleaners, servants, bath attendants, etc. Many Kasimov Tatars were waiters, inn servants, even ran refreshment rooms at railway stations. The list goes on.

The number of passports and tickets (permission to leave one's place of residence on a temporary basis) suggests that seasonal work was extremely popular: up to 150,000 in Kazan guberniya and up to 140,000 in Simbirsk guberniya in the late 19th century [Smykov, 1973, p. 91].

The second category is the rural petty bourgeoisie, wealthy peasants who carried out entrepreneurial activities in arable farming and livestock breeding, for which purpose they bought and rented land on a large scale and hired workers. They also owned small industrial plants, mills, tallow boilers, fur and leather tanneries, tar distilleries, and other 'industries'. Such peasants acted as subcontractors for home industry as small-scale tradesmen, purchasers (cattle dealers), etc. They were especially numerous in Orenburg guberniya, where land was abundant and capitalism was developing rapidly [Usmanov, 1981, pp. 273–274].

The population was engaged in local and seasonal work in arable farming and in other sectors. Home industry belonged to the latter category. Land use (agricultural) work included work for rich fellow villagers, often to pay for arable land, horses, seed grain, and food borrowed from them. Masses took in the summer harvest and hay making in the 'steppe' in the southwest uyezds of the region where entrepreneurial farming and livestock dominated. By the beginning of the 20th century the non-agricultural sector began to grow as compared to agricultural seasonal work [Smykov, 1965, p. 44], an effect of the development of capitalism in industry and transport.

While Kazan Tatars in the Kazan guberniya preferred non-agricultural seasonal work in the nearby country and towns, Kasimov Tatars and Mishar Tatars in Penza, Tambov, Simbirsk, and other Guberniyas tended to undertake long trips for seasonal work—to Moscow, Saint Pe-
Tatars from the Volga region were actively involved in cottage industry. Russian statistics uses the term ‘home (small-scale rural) industry’ to denote various types of manufacturing business and the social class relations associated with them. Cottage industries included wool beating, furriery, tailoring, cobblerly, etc., as well as small-scale production of such goods as mats, woodwork, carts, and the like, supplied either to a market or to a supplier who also provided raw materials. As industry progressed to cheap mass-scale production, many cottage industries decayed: weaving, potters’ wheel and dishware production, and others. [Dubrovsky, 1975, pp. 353, 357].

The following cottage industries were especially common in Tatar villages of the Kazan guberniya: cart production in Kazan and Mamadysh uyezds, mat and sack weaving in Kazan, Mamadysh, Spassk, and Chistopol uyezds, felting, primarily in Mamadysh uyezds but also in Tatar villages in Kazan, Laishevo, and other uyezds of the Guberniya; tailoring in Laishevo, Mamadysh, Kazan uyezds, mostly among Kry-ashen Tatars, ichigi boot production in Kazan, Tetyushi, and Chistopol uyezds.

Principally the same social and occupational structure of the Tatar community also existed outside the Middle Volga region and the Urals. For instance, Siberian Tatars in Tobolsk guberniya were engaged in farming, livestock, fishing, and hunting; Sarts (Bukharans) and Volga Tatars tried their hands at farming, home industry, and trade.

Tatar tradesmen and peasants came to the north of Kazakhstan in the mid-18th century after the sentry line was built and the town of Petropavlovsk was founded. Initially, such peasant migrants were primarily engaged in livestock breeding, but farming became increasingly important with time. The territory began to attract Kazan and Kasimov Tatar merchants in the mid-19th century due to the incentives offered by the government. The Tatar population of Petropavlovsk amounted to almost 9,000 in the first decade of the 19th century. Most of the local trade live animals and animal products, down and leather passed through the hands of Tatar merchants. From Petropavlovsk goods were transported to the markets of Vienna, Paris, Boston, Berlin, Hamburg, and, via Odessa, to Turkey.

§ 4. The Stolypin Agrarian Reform and Tatar Peasants

Rafail` Shaydullin

The social and economic development of Russia’s agriculture in the early 20th century clearly indicated that the Tatar peasantry had broken away from feudalistic production to commit itself increasingly to a capitalist economy. The construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway and the Moscow-Kazan railway network, booming commercial steam navigation along the Volga and the Kama rivers, the material growth of the urban population, rapidly increasing demand for agricultural produce on the Russian and West European market caused the marketability of peasant production to increase. As bourgeois entrepreneurial relations were introduced into the Tatar community, the development of commercial farming in the country expanded significantly. Its consequences were not limited to dramatic social changes in the peasant community; qualitative shifts in the development of agricultural production were also noticeable. Most importantly, these included an improved farming practice using better agricultural tools and machines on larger areas for commercial and industrial crop production.
The market caused a clear transformation of the rural Tatar economic system. Its influence brought about major changes to the structure of crop acreage. ‘Grey’ grains such as rye, oats, barley, and millet were known to have dominated the Tatar country economy for many years. However, they better fit into a subsistence economy and were a market product of the lowest variety. They enjoyed no considerable demand on international markets and were mostly for an internal consumption. Though the total yield of rye and oats in the Tatar countryside did not decrease, their percentage, as compared to other crops, diminished. At the same time, the influence of capitalist commodity market relations on the Tatar peasant grain farming was not limited to quantitative changes. The most essential qualitative shift was a significant increase in the percentage of the most intensive crops; that is wheat and potatoes. Another positive change was the introduction of grass cultivation, especially of permanent grass. The increased acreage devoted to industrial crops, wheat, potatoes, and feed grasses was a major step toward the progressive transformation of the Tatar country farming.

Thus, the turn of the 20th century was marked by a boom in the Tatar rural economy, which witnessed dramatic industrial changes. The area under multiple crop rotation, and especially that under intensive commodity and industrial crops was increasing year by year, as was the quantity of agricultural equipment and instruments. In that period, zemstvo and industry-sponsored agronomic services and private individuals began to establish agricultural equipment rental stores and breeding centres for peasant livestock improvement, hold agronomic fairs, and publish agronomic literature in various local languages. These activities gained momentum during the Stolypin agrarian reform. The introduction of various agricultural machinery and improved tools as well as new approaches to farming was thus accelerated.

The advancement of new forms of labour division was no less crucial to the development of the Tatar countryside. It primarily consisted of an expansion of the area where peasant wage labour could be applied to commercial businesses, workshops, etc. However, arable farming remained the economic basis for entrepreneurship in the Tatar country. Yet, small plots and wages in field husbandry and animal breeding, as well as the poorly developed factory and plant infrastructure in areas with a dense Tatar population (especially the Volga region and Cis-Ural region) motivated the ethnic peasantry to find new spheres of work by processing plant, animal, wood, and other local raw materials. Sack weaving, felting, tanning, and mat production were the most popular home industries among Tatar peasants. In some regions of Russia, up to 40% (or even more) of the Tatar population occasionally had to abandon their agricultural activities for a long-term seasonal agricultural work in towns and in southern governorates. Many Tatar peasants worked in large cities (Moscow, Kazan, Samara, and others), in Donbass mines, Ural gold fields, Baku oil fields, and the like. [Vorobyov, 1953, p. 62].

At the beginning of the 20th century, among the general complex of the Tatar peasantry’s socio-economic problems, the issue of land was the most painful and vulnerable. It touched not only landless and land-poor peasants, but also those who were not in an utter need of land. A considerable majority of the Volga Region peasantry, especially in Kazan guberniya, experienced land tightness. The so-called ‘agrarian overpopulation’ was felt everywhere, where Tatars lived densely, especially in the Middle Volga Region. There existed excessive working force which landowners, rich villagers, percenters and all kinds of buyers squeezed dry. Land scarcity of peasants’ farms was one of Kazan guberniya’s curses: 91.2% village commoners had tiny land allotments. Undoubtedly, it doomed the major part of peasant families to hunger and poverty. Back in 1884, an official of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Empire baron A. Ikskul von Üxküll-
Gyllenband reported to St. Petersburg that in many ways the poverty of Kazan guberniya’s peasants depended upon ‘insufficient provision of lands’ [Daishev, 1958, p. 7].

Of special interest in terms of land management is access to land for the key ethnic groups of Kazan guberniya. An analysis of the governorate’s statistics for ethnic groups within the country population suggests that 29.8% of Russian and 24.8% of Tatar peasants had up to 2 desyatinas of land; 53.9% and 72.3% had up to 4 desyatinas; 16.9% and 2.9% had 4 and more desyatinas [Krest’yanское землевладение в Казанской губернии, 1909, p. 56]. The statistics are clearly indicative of the Tatars’ disadvantaged position when compared to Russians. According to 1907 statistics, the majority of Tatar peasants in Kazan guberniya had an average of 7.2 desyatinas of land per family, while the figure for Russian peasants is 7.9 desyatinas. The situation resulted from the colonial policy implemented by the tsarist government, which was especially harsh to Muslim Tatars [Vorobyov, 1953, pp. 62–63].

However, the most dangerous trend was the dwindling of per capita lots and loss of land by Tatar peasants. The number of landless peasant families was increasing in Kazan guberniya year by year. The percentage of landless families increased by 1.1% from 1891 to 1907 [Krest’yanское землевладение в Казанской губернии, 1909, p. 66]. The number of landless families in 1907 was estimated at 20,323 (4.9% of all peasant families) [Krest’yanское землевладение в Казанской губернии, 1909, p. 66], 4.3% of Tatar households had lost their land lots by that time [Vorobyov, 1953, p. 63]. It was caused not only by the natural increase of the rural population but by the intensified fragmentation of peasant holdings.

This clearly suggests that by the beginning of the 20th century a large part of peasant workers had been deprived of the main application of their labour—land. That is why many areas with a dense Tatar population, especially in the Middle Volga region, suffered an extreme lack of land. Both poor and medium-income peasants who owned tiny land lots complained about the problem. Even peasants who had 20–30 desyatinas of land per household mentioned it. This was the outcome of the social and economic reforms of the 2nd half of the 19th century. Their social nature gave birth to a troublesome child known as ‘the land question’. It was a burning issue that ignited the country’s social life to its limits, kindling the first Russian revolution and leading many thousands of peasants to rise up.

The national agricultural crisis was attributable not only to the tsarist government’s policy, aimed at preserving the nobility-based system of land ownership but to surging taxes, inflating rental payments, primitive tools, and the dominance of the obsolete (three-field) system of arable farming. Besides, areas with a dense Tatar population were marked by a severe shortage of draft animals. The economist P.Lyashchenko estimated the number of horseless peasant households in ethnic-populated areas to have exceeded the general Russian average. In the 1890s, 34.8% of Tatar, 14.1% Mordovian, and 11% of Chuvash households were horseless [Lyashchenko, 1948, p. 503]. This all prevented the peasant economy from progressing and doomed the majority of the rural population to poverty and extinction.

Many peasants lived in small single-room log houses with thatched roofs (it was not uncommon to keep livestock in the house during the cold season). They wore home-made clothes and woven bast shoes. Izbas without chimneys and with a dirt floor could be found in some areas with a dense Tatar population. Besides, a large part of the peasantry led a half-starved existence and often fed on orach and other surrogate products. The struggle for food was very effort-consuming in many places, peasants always had to think of new ways to survive until the next harvest. Chronic undernourishment and unbearable living conditions caused thousands of Tatar peasants to die of dystrophy and in various epidemics; especially in years of poor crop harvest, which became increasingly frequent at the turn of the 20th century. According to A.Kaufman, 26 people per 1,000 urban dwellers and 19 per 1,000 rural dwell-
ers died in Great Britain; the figures were 30 and 23, respectively, in France. The ratio was reversed in Russia—35 in the country and 30 in town [Kaufman, 1918, p. 58]. We estimate the death rate of Russia's Tatar population to have been up to 40 people. As the result, Tatar farmers in many areas with a dense Tatar population abandoned their households and fled wherever they could.

During the revolutionary events of 1905–1907, not only the ruling elite but the lower level noble administration changed their opinion on the peasant issue radically. The intensified social and political peasant activities, which posed the threat of a new class war in the country, threw the tsarist government into a dilemma: it had to choose between the existing agricultural system and a dramatic shift in arable farming to clear the way for agriculture. It was natural that the peasant struggle was primarily aimed at eradicating the medieval relations in the country that had been impeding the economic development of agricultural production. The struggle determined one of the main features of the development of the half-patriarchal Tatar countryside—a clash between feudalistic relations and expansive capitalism in agriculture. When the peasant movement gained momentum in the spring and summer of 1905, the tsarist government finally realized the necessity to take measures to relieve the multi-ethnic peasantry. In order to appease the latter, it abolished the redemption payment (the Manifest of 3 November 1905) and adopted new land management regulations (the Edict of 4 March 1906). Besides, it introduced new regulations on the Peasant Land Bank and transferred allotments to it (the Edict of 12 August 1905) and state-owned land (the Edict of 27 August 1905) for further sales to landless and land-poor rural dwellers. The annual redemption payments of former serfs as well as state, and allotment peasants were to be halved on 1 January 1906 and abolished on 1 January 1907. A little later, the Edict of 4 March 1906 was adopted to establish the Committee for Land Management and Land Boards, which was to play a core role in the forthcoming land reform. Local governorate and uyezd land boards were established. They had a number of important responsibilities: ensuring more favorable conditions for landless and land-poor peasants to migrate to vacant land and improving rent relations in the country, assisting rural communities in improving their use of allotments, amicable allotment of alternating strip lots and other kinds of public arable land; dividing large rural communities into smaller economic units and fostering peasant dispersion.

When the Saratov landowner P. Stolypin was appointed Minister of the Interior Affairs of Russia in April 1906, the peasant community felt the crushing power of the state apparatus. Every political and economic lever available to the government or local governorate administrations was used against it. A large army of journalists, writers, economists, and lawyers joined the anti-communal war to lambast the communal system of land management.

Stolypin's reform provided for a new land management system based on capitalist farms, known as khutors and otrubs. The social and economic basis of the reform was the expectation that the new rural household forms would absorb at first peasant allotments and eventually landowners' latifundia. Two solutions were suggested: to divide community allotments into khutor and otrub lots and to establish khutors and otrubs in land provided by the Peasant Land Bank. Thus, land boards were mostly responsible for promoting khutor and otrub farms in allotments, bank- and state-owned land.

It should be noted, however, that to establish the new land management system in areas with a dense Tatar population would require enormous capital investment and considerable organizational and agricultural efforts involving agronomists, engineers, technicians, land surveyors, and economists, none of which neither the tsarist government nor local governorate administrations had. Suffice to say, it is not only the inflexibility of the majority of peasants but 'inert permanent members and low level of education in most of the boards' that impeded
the organization of land management in Tatar rural communities [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 256, Inventory 1, File 1, Sheets 91–94]. Many agronomists, surveyors, and technicians lacked knowledge and expertise in land management organization in the country. Their unawareness of the ethnic features of the Tatar peasantry also contributed to the failure of the land management undertaking. They often took a red tape approach to their work. Finally, the introduction of new land management forms required active involvement of the peasant masses. It was very hard to radically transform the old practice without their creative energy.

Evidence of the poor performance of local land boards proved to be a very small number of applications by peasants for land formalization as private property was registered. For instance, in Kazan guberniya 2,910 applications for land allocation were submitted to land boards from the date of the edict on 9 November 1906 to the end of 1907. The same year, the Kazan Branch Office of the Peasant Land Bank effected transactions to acquire a total of 34,147.5 desyatinas of land (having a total value of 34147.5 million rubles). The land was transferred to 39 rural communities, 58 partnerships, and 9 individual households [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 1, Inventory 4, File 4451, Sheets 10–12]. The situation was similar in other areas with a dense Tatar population, which is attributable not only to the inertness of Tatar peasants, who were determined to uphold obsolete farming traditions, but to a lack of public access to the government's Edict of 9 November 1906. The Tatar peasantry, just as other ethnic groups, had a very superficial idea of the primary purposes of Stolypin's land management policy. Therefore, authorities had to provide extensive clarification on the objectives of the new agrarian reform not only to Russian peasants but also to those of Tatar, Chuvash, Mari, Udmurt, and Mordorvian origin. Somewhat later, local governorate and uyezd land boards prepared and published dedicated brochures on the objectives of the Edict of 9 November 1906. Those were later translated into Tatar and distributed among the rural population.

All these drawbacks in the work of land boards can be attributed to local governorate officials' aloofness to the problems faced by the country's multi-ethnic peasant population. Besides, local throwbacks in the course of the implementation of the new land reform and land management in ethnic villages always caused hesitation and confusion among governmental officials, forcing them to manoeuvre among different peasant groups and strata of Russia's multi-ethnic society. The chief initiator of the land reform P. Stolypin was, naturally, dissatisfied with the situation. For instance, he addressed the Governor of Kazan M. Strizhevsky to demand 'continuous and assiduous supervision over and persistent guidance of the governorate's land management' [Kobytov, 1977, p. 17]. The Governor of Kazan followed officials of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in demanding that land boards accelerate their land management measures in rural communities. For instance, in an instruction to uyezd boards Strizhevsky noted that '...from now on I shall assess the performance of police officials in terms of successful enforcement of the law of 9 November 1906 in each uyezd' [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 1, Inventory 4, File 5251, Sheet 3].

However, the land management campaign was not as fast as governmental and governorate officials had expected it to be. The mass anti-community campaign that spread across the country failed to eradicate century-old peasant land institutions. The Russian common practice of large-scale peasant coercion was unable to ensure a smooth implementation of the agrarian reform in the Tatar countryside. An active campaign was initiated to protect the interests of the peasant land community in the very first days of the land reforms. As the result, the peasantry was rather reluctant to adopt new forms of land use, which greatly bothered governorate administrations. M. Strizhevsky wrote in his report to Emperor Nicholas II (1910): 'We are witnessing a serious crisis in the peasantry's transition from community land
use to private land ownership in the form of a drastic reduction in the number of applications by individual householders to leave communal holdings' [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 1, Inventory 4, File 4875, Sheet 41].

The sluggish land management in Kazan guberniya is undoubtedly attributable to the compulsive nature of the governmental campaign. The procedure for registering allotments as private property is indicative of it. According to the 1906–1910 statistics, 17,097 (77.7%) of 21,998 householders that registered their land as private property became owners of private land lots under resolutions by zemstvo administrators and only 4,901 (22.3%) under the decisions of village meetings [Registration of Land Lots as Private Property in Kazan guberniya, 1911, p. 21]. Thus, a large part of peasant households registered their land as private property under the pressure exerted by zemstvo administrators and not according to a mutual agreement of community members.

It is also essential that the rate at which the governmental land management campaign progressed was indicative not only of the peasant's negative perception of the new agrarian law but a number of natural, climatic, economic, ethnic, household, and other factors. When analyzed in terms of registration of land lots as private property by ethnic peasant groups, the changing figures suggest that Tatars were far behind Russians. The average total number of householders that had registered their land as private property in Kazan guberniya in the early 1911 was 4.5% (of which 0.5% were khutor owners). By that time only 3190 Tatar peasant households, i.e. 2.5% of the total number of peasant households, had registered their land as private property. At the same time, the total land area registered as private property was 7.5% for Russian peasants, 2.2% for Tatars, and 2.1 for Chuvashes [Registration of Land Lots as Private Property in Kazan guberniya, 1911, p. 28]. The khutor form of farming was very uncommon among Tatar peasants. Russian householders reportedly owned 4,559.1 desyatinas of the total khutor land (59.4%); Tatar owners had 935.4 desyatinas (12.2%), and those of Chuvash origin 664.7 dessiatins (8.7%) in 1910 [Registration of Land Lots as Private Property in Kazan guberniya, 1911, p. 32]. The statistics are indicative of the low popularity of the khutor system among the Tatar peasantry.

The small percentage of land registered as private property by Tatar peasants is probably attributable to a relatively weak social differentiation in rural society, which was dominated by vestiges of patriarchal traditions. Rich and partly medium-income peasant strata supported the community system of the Tatar countryside, as they would rather benefit from preserving certain traditional economic forms than from replacing them with the otrub or khutor system of land use. The poor progress towards privatization of land among Tatar peasants is also attributable to the proliferation of usury in the country, which often assumed the form of reciprocal services. It undoubtedly impeded the development of productive efforts in Tatar agriculture under these new conditions. The Muslim clergy also contributed to the trend as the primary preserver of the traditional community (djien) custom. Therefore, it protected its flock from Orthodox Christian intrusion. This all served to slow the decay of the Tatar community and the individualization of peasant households.

Statistical and factual evidence shows that in the active period of Russian agrarian reform, despite all the 'attempts' of government officials, traditional community land ownership was not eradicated in areas with a dense Tatar population in order to clear the way for a unified and harmonious land use system. Otrub and khutor land allotment was imperfect even in lots directly supervised by governmental agencies and zemstvo administrators. The division was largely formal and not representative. The fact is that many khutors remained unpopulated, while their owners preferred staying at their former places of residence owing to organizational, social, and economic difficulties. Even the basic utilities for khutor households were often absent—
water supply, roads, and other infrastructure communications. It was impossible to transfer even strong households. Besides, the rural population did not seem to share any interests with the ruling elite, which embarked on an official policy to eradicate peasant freethinking by establishing an isolated and confined rural economic system.

Of course the process of economic development itself had decided the fate of the Tatar community, yet at the same time it is worth noting the fierce resistance with which it met the governmental officials who would destroy it with the wave of a hand. It was the violent intrusion of new economic forms in the country without any practical material or agrotechnical aid from the tsarist government that undermined the trust of Tatar peasants in the agrarian reform, motivating them to turn to the country's diverse political forces for support and protection of their violated land rights. The struggle between adherents of the communal system and those who advocated transition to khutor and otrub households was acute and peaked in 1917.

The Stolypin agrarian reform not only failed to ruin the peasant community but brought about a revival. This is obvious if we know what social groups quit the community and what forces prevented its dissolution. Statistics indicate that the largest quitting category was represented by land-poor, impoverished peasants, many of which had long broken their connection to the land. These were largely handicraftsmen, seasonal workers, unemployables, and others who had nearly severed their connection to the land and now conclusively cut away from their holdings, and the wealthy country elite, which had long felt the congested, isolated, and inert community rather as a burden. The former quit the community to fully liquidate their households, while the latter wanted to expand their households and, most importantly, their land lots. It is no wonder that their cessation of membership in the traditional Tatar community by no means affected its status.

Hardly had the Tatar peasantry overcome the agricultural crisis of the early 20th century when it found itself facing even deeper destructive perturbations caused by the First World War. The tsarist government initiated a number of mobilization measures that affected above all the human and physical resources of the country. The enormous outflow of human force, draft animals, food and raw materials as well as the increased tax burden and many newly introduced labor duties strangled the economic life of the countryside.

The war devoured men of health and in their prime, thus impoverishing the country of even the minimum of productive force. Suffice to say, the Kazan Military District sent as many as 7,950 march squadrons (about 2.4 million soldiers and officers) to the Russian army from 1914 to 1917, of which Kazan guberniya provided over 290,000 people [Tseytin, 2006, p. 80], most of them from rural areas. G.Iskhaki roughly estimates the Muslim (including Tatar) share of the Russian army as several hundred thousand people. To quote the author, 'the first general conscription in Russia in 960000 affected a
surprising number of Tatars; the percentage of Tatars that went to the front exceeded that of the Russians. The total number of conscripts was approximately 960,000.' [Ishkaki, 1932. p.18]. Many Muslim conscripts, especially representatives of Middle Asian peoples, were engaged in logistical activities for the Russian army. Dedicated Muslim military detachments consisting of Tatars, Bashkirs, Chechens, Ingush and other people were formed during the First World War. For instance, the Kazan Military District formed the 94th and 95th Muslim reserve infantry regiments and other military detachments. Unlike Middle Asian Muslims, Tatars were mostly sent to the field army on the Western Front to actively participate in military operations against the troops of the Triple Alliance. This is evidenced by the contingent of German prisoner of war camps. 'Notably, their number in the camps of Sossen and Wongedorf, Germany, was up to 57 people' [Ishkaki, 1932, p. 18].

Most of the rural conscripts represented the low to medium-income social group; wealthy households that could pay their way out of military service were hardly affected. Continuous conscription to the military bled the governorate's rural peasantry dry. Women, teenagers, and wounded soldiers were unable to compensate for the conscription of peasants. Most of peasant households suffered a bitter lack of workers. The 1917 census records give a clearer insight into the availability of workforce in the countryside. In Kazan guberniya, 44.9% of all rural workers had been conscripted, leaving 24.1% of all households without any workers [Sirinov, 1923, pp. 397–398].

The enormous outflow of workers from the multi-ethnic country, especially from Tatar villages, affected the small peasant household dramatically—they were often doomed to ruination and self-liquidation. Impoverished peasant families enlarged the reserve labour army. Suffice to say that the number of farm laborers willing to work for food surged during wartime. Cheap women's and children's labor grew common in the countryside.

Apart from human resources, the war claimed other material sacrifices. The mass withdrawal of horses, which were the primary driving force in arable farming, from peasant economy was a heavy blow to the multi-ethnic rural population. While in West Europe and, especially, in the USA, mechanical motors were already wide-spread and horses had ceased to be crucial to the household, in Russia the horse remained a draft animal and a means of transport. The countryside had lost a large number of draft horses by the latter half of 1917, which affected small peasant households dramatically. A total of up to 2.1 million horses had been mobilized by the latter half of that year. Statistics for 50 governorates in European Russia, including Kazan guberniya, reports the total number of horses to have reduced from 17.9 million to 12.8 million from 1914 to 1917 [Lyashchenko, 1948, pp. 643–644]. It should be emphasized, however, that in Kazan guberniya the total number of horses had increased by almost 10.5% by 1917 as compared to 1916 (from 485,800 heads [Fazulzyanov, 2005, p. 380] to 571,500 heads [Fazulzyanov, 2006, p. 387]). We are not inclined to believe that the increased number of horses was important as such. It must be attributable to the specific development of Tatar horse breeding as the main branch of animal breeding, which was marked by intense production during that period. Besides, Kazan guberniya was central to the military district, which eventually caused a large inflow of horses from other regions to Kazan. Moreover, horses unfit for army use were rejected and sold to peasants. Apart from the heavy damage to human resources and draft animals, peasant households lost their agricultural tools. Scant as it was before, the supply of agricultural industrial goods nearly stopped during wartime. Factories producing agricultural tools were paralyzed in the first year of the war. Some of them stopped production or did not operate at full capacity for lack of metal, fuel, and workforce; some switched to munitions production. Large agricultural machinery works had reduced their output to one third of the antebellum value by the end of 1914; the total output of 173 largest plants amounted to only 25% of the pre-war agricultural machine production in 1916. Most of
these factories shifted over to military production. The remaining ones severely lacked metal and fuel. For instance, only 1.3 million pood was supplied to them instead of 15 million pood metal as required [Lyashchenko, 1948, p. 644]. Moreover, the import of agricultural machines and tools, which yielded up to 9.7 million pood and covered up to 50% of Russia's demand before the war, was reduced to as little as 196,000 pood in 1915 and 391,000 pood in 1916 [Lyashchenko, 1948, p. 644].

The country could not rely on small repair and other metal workshops, cottage industries, and village blacksmith's shops, which were left in a catastrophic state. When war was declared, some part of artisans and blacksmiths were conscripted; others had to give up agricultural tool repair and production for lack of metal and fuel and go to town to earn a higher salary. Village blacksmiths closed their shops, so there was nobody to repair ploughs, sokhas, or harrows, hammer scythes and adjust reaping hooks, or to repair harness and carts. A large part of the peasantry was deprived of the most primitive agricultural tools.

In a chain reaction, the peasant economy in Russian provincial territories began to decay. The whole body of the countryside fell apart link by link in areas with a dense Tatar population. The size of farm land and livestock dwindled in households; land productivity and total crop yield were diminished resulting in a severe shortage of food and a distress within the financial system. The credit and banking activities went out of control. A dramatic inflation of the Russian ruble as well as growing prices for bread and those for agricultural tools and essential manufactured goods, which were growing even more rapidly, aggravated the situation for Tatar peasants. The war paralyzed the Tatar country economy. To put it differently, the war devoted all human and material resources to the useless marauding of the fruits of human labor.

Thus, the agrarian transformations of the early 20th century caused no significant improvement of the social and economic situation in the Tatar countryside. They complicated the land relations in the country's agricultural sector. The natural increase of the Tatar population and shrinking lots caused an intensification of peasant labor. On the one hand, the area in peasant field under labor-consuming industrial crops, primarily potatoes, expanded. On the other hand, an increasing number of peasants became seasonal workers and artisans. For some part of the Tatar population, non-agricultural wage work gradually became the main means of subsistence. Liberal bourgeois reforms did cause a stirring among the Tatar peasantry, changing not only its social and economic role but its political outlook.
CHAPTER 2
The Formation of the Turkic-Tatar Political Movement in Russia
(the Beginning of the 20th Century)

§ 1. The Pre-Revolutionary Situation and Revolutionary Events in Russia
and Kazan guberniya

Dilyara Usmanova

The first years of the 20th century were characterized by a pre-revolutionary situation in Russia, when a deep popular discontent became obvious and revolutionary organizations in opposition to the government were constantly propelling discontent, while the traditional authorities were clearly incapable of controlling the country. A heavy financial and industrial crisis intensified the strike movement, which is proved by the fact that over 500,000 strikers were registered in the country from 1901–1904. Political demonstrations under the slogan 'Down with autocracy!', which contemporaries termed a vulgar saying, followed strikes increasingly often. The peasant movement gained momentum during that critical period. It covered most of the governorates of European Russia in 1902. Russia's failed war with Japan in 1904–1905 brought even more popular discredit to tsarism in terms of international relations.

In the early 20th century Kazan guberniya was a provincial region with clearly prevalent agriculture and predominantly peasant population. Therefore, the discontent of the governorate's rural population was as intense and as powerful as in other areas of the country. From 1901 to 1903 alone, over 15 peasant riots took place in the governorate. The most dramatic disturbance affected Laishevo, Spassk, and Sviyazhsk uyezds. Those were largely spontaneous and included unauthorized appropriation and plowing of landlords' fields, arson and plunder of their estates. In some very rare cases, peasants refused to provide outstanding amounts of redemption payments or even laid down a programme of demands.

Industrial disturbance also began in the first years of the 20th century, which is also attributable to the heavy industrial crisis that left tens of thousands of people unemployed. However, the root cause of industrial workers' discontent was subhuman, enslaving working conditions, extremely low salaries, deprivation of any social guarantees and insurance, and household conditions beyond endurance. The only governorate centres with well-developed industry were Kazan and partly Chistopol, where the disturbance was the most intense (it mostly affected such enterprises as Alafuzov's Plant, the Paratsk Mechanical Plant, and others.) During the revolutionary period, disturbances and strikes also occurred at most small-scale tanneries, soap plants, and stearin factories. Printers, tailors and bakers joined the movement. The workers of Kazan's two largest plants, the Krestovnikov's Factory and the Gunpowder Factory, tended to avoid active striking, which is partially attributable to a stricter workplace morale (the Gunpowder Factory was a military plant that supplied state orders and practiced military discipline), as well as somewhat better working conditions.

The territory of Kazan guberniya was generally underdeveloped industrially and marginal to the revolutionary movement as compared to the country's industrialized centre and south (both revolutionaries and liberals described it as a 'sleepy city', 'a Vendée').
The first Russian revolution began on 9 January 1905, when peaceful demonstrators were shot in the capital, which was a powerful revolutionary trigger that affected the entire country. The cruel and pointless punishment, provocations by key participants in the demonstration and the police broke the camel’s back. Clamor and disturbance erupted across the country, Kazan guberniya included.

A new wave of the striking movement that raised the banner of solidarity with the capital’s executed demonstrators and with economic demands broke out on 20 January, when Alafuzov’s workers threw down their tools. The striking had engaged over 4,600 workers by 21 January, making it an event of unprecedented scale for Kazan. It resulted in a temporary capitulation of factory owners [Amirkhanov, 2005, p. 14]. The January strike in Kazan lasted for 4 days, spreading to a whole network of small and medium businesses apart from Alafuzov’s Factory (it involved loaders, tailors, printers, bakers, and the like). The strike movement in the spring-summer of 1905 was poorly coordinated in spite of powerful agit-prop from the social democrats and consisted mostly of economic slogans. The strikers succeeded in a number of cases. Some plants introduced a 10 hours work day, increased salary, and abolished the penalty system.

As revolutionary movements gained momentum and the public developed protest sentiment, various political groups and parties became active. Back in the pre-revolutionary period, branch departments of socialist parties were active in Kazan and a number of uyezd centres: the Kazan Committee of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party and the Kazan Socialist Revolutionary Group. The student movement was rather active, though not expressly political. Liberal parties—the Party of Popular Freedom (the Cadets) and the Union of 17 October (the Octobrists) were not established until the Manifesto of 17 October that stipulated inviolable civil rights for the population and vested legislative rights in the State Duma, which was to be established under it. Monarchists took the opportunity to establish the so-called Tsarist People’s Union, headed in 1905 by V. Zalessky, in Kazan [Alekseev, 2002 a; Alekseev, 2004]. The Cadets were the dominant liberal party which had local departments in Kazan and a number of uyezd centres (Chistopol, Laishovo, Tsivilsk, Yadrin). Its leaders were university professors (A.Vasilyev, G.Shershenevich, N.Zagoskin) and lawyers (M.Mandelstam, A.Bat’, I.Babushkin). Octobrist masterminds were members of the university community (M.Kapustin, A.Smirnov), large businessmen (V.Karyakin), and officials of local authorities (N.Melnikov) [Ainudtinova, 2003; Usmanova, 2006]. From the autumn of 1905 to the spring of 1906, regional departments of such parties were primarily engaged in the coordination of and participation in the election to the First State Duma.

The so-called October Rebellion was one of the most important events in the region in the autumn of 1906. A political meeting of many thousands of people took place near the building of the City Duma of 19 October. Radical speakers (the Bolshevik S. Lozovskiy, Socialist Revolutionary P.Dravert, and others) encouraged the public to fight it out in spite of the Manifest of 17 October. They instigated the crowd to disarm the police; people tried to set free political prisoners, etc. Another large political meeting took place in the city theatre that evening. The speakers advocated insubordination to the city administration and dissolution of the police, instead of which a militia was to be created. The militia consisted of university and gymnasium students, a few young workmen and craftsmen, and representatives of the radical youth. A united part committee named the City Commune was established on the night of 20 October 1905. It included representatives of various parties (Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, Socialist Revolutionaries, and Cadets). The rebels were unable to maintain control over the city for a long time. The local administration regained control over the situation as soon as they overcame their startle response on 21 October. Government troops occupied the City Duma
building, where the communist command staff had convened; about 130 militia men were arrested and were sent to the city prison. Some local Bolsheviks (S. Lozovskiy, I. Sammer) and Social Revolutionary leaders (in particular, members of a Tatar pro-Social Revolutionary organization F. Tuktarov, Sh. Mukhamedyarov), and others were arrested.

§ 2. Tatar's Contacts with All-Russian Political Parties and the Establishment of the First Islamic (Tatar) Political Organizations

Dilyara Usmanova

The non-Russian political movement in Russia in the early 20th century was influenced by all-Russian political parties. The percentage of members of political parties across Russia fluctuated from 0.5% in 1905–1907 to 1.2–1.5% following the February Revolution [Shelokhaev, 1997, p. 20]. The figures are much smaller when it comes to the Tatar population of the country. Tatar involvement in all-Russian parties was uncommon and limited to a narrow group of people.

The first Tatar political group in the Volga region was founded around 1895 by students of the Russian-Tatar Teachers’ School in Kazan. Yet it was unpopular and did not find any significant resonance with the Muslim community. The group published the hand-written or hectographic magazine ‘Tarakki’ (‘Progress’). In 1901, it was renamed to ‘Shakirdlyk’, and later to ‘Xorriyat’ (‘Liberty’), also after its handwritten periodicals. Many members of the group joined the Islax (Reform) Movement, which gained momentum shortly before and during the revolution. Thus, the radical Tatar movement in the region in the early 20th century was predominantly represented by active shaqirds (madrasa students) who advocated a reform of the Muslim education system (the Islax Movement)⁶. Islax’s most prominent masterminds were Yusuf Akchura, Gayaz Iskhaki, Fathy’ Amirkhan, and Gabdrafkhman Mustafin.

As radical political sentiment spread to wider social strata, the Islax movement was transformed from a purely Jadidist initiative for an education reform to a politically motivated revolutionary democratic movement.

The Muslim community also adopted Socialist ideas in the early 20th century, when Russian socialist parties were being formed, which is largely attributable to students’ activities. The first socialist democrats of Tatar origin were brothers Ibragim and Ibniyamin Akhtyamov⁷, who studied at the universities of Kazan and Saint Petersburg at the beginning of the century. It was very uncommon, however, for Tatars to be members of political associations shortly before the first Russian revolution. In fact, the Russian political movement (especially its liberal and socialist trends) was in an inchoate stage and could function on a more or less legal basis abroad. The Russian government did not liberalize its international policy until the autumn of 1904 (‘the Spring of Sviatopolk-Mirsky’), but no legal framework was present for political parties before the October Manifest of 1905.

The social and political activities of Russia’s Islamic community generally gained momentum during the first Russian revolution of 1905–1907. It was the period when more or less expressly party-oriented political groups began to form among the Muslim population. Tatar social revolutionaries united as the

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⁶ One of the most important sources on the activities of the pre-revolutionary Muslim congresses and the formation of the Tatar political movement is the book ‘Fundamentals of Reformation’ by Musa Bigiyev, who himself played an active part in their work and in some cases carried out secretarial functions [Bigi, 1917, 289 b].

⁷ Later Ibrahim Akhtyamov became a lawyer and the leader of the Mensheviks in Ufa, and Ibniyamin Akhtyamov, an active figure in the national movement.
Tanchy'lar Group, while Tatar social democrats established a group known, by analogy, as Uralchy'lar. The groups were named after their two official newspapers—Tang Yulduz' (Morning Star) and Ural. Among their prominent activists there were former students of the Kazan Tatar Teachers' School Gayaz Ishkahi, Fuad Tuktarov, and Shakir Mukhamedyarov; Khusain and Khadicha Yamashev, Gumer Teregulov belonged to the latter group. The Tang Group was active in Kazan and maintained intimate relations with local Socialist Revolutionaries (in particular, Fuad Tuktarov was a member of the party's regional department), while the centre of Yamashov's group was Uralsk. However, they only remained active for a short time and had a limited influence on the Tatar community. Both groups stepped off the public stage until the end of 1907 without even developing into a political party, which is partly attributable to governmental repressions and partly to the extremely small size of their target audience.

The ethnic liberal movement was represented by a group of adherents of the Constitutional Democratic Party (the Cadets). In this case too, liberal ideas were initially promoted through a network of personal contacts and relations as well as through Muslims’ contacts with representatives of Russian society in the higher education establishment or imperial social institutions. Local self-government agencies, especially zemstvos, city dumas and boards acted as an important social and political ‘school’ for Muslim liberals.

Of no less importance for the promulgation of liberalism were creative individuals who could not only perceive but also generate ideas, thus founding a socially and politically active environment. Gabdrashid Ibragimov was among such participants in the Islamic political movement. Having returned from abroad in 1904, he did not hesitate to get involved in politics as a ‘clarion’ for the Volga Tatars to awaken the politically inert Muslim community [Validi, 1924]. G. Ibragimov resided in Saint Petersburg to bridge the capital’s political community and the Muslims. As the editor of the Tatar Ul’fyt periodical he attended the Convention of the Union of Autonomists and Federalists, chaired by famous professor Jan Baudoin de Courteny, which took place in the capital in November 1905. The delegates, who came to represent the ethnic interests of the Polish, Ukrainian, Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Hebrews, Armenians, Caucasian Muslim, Volga Tatar, Kirghiz (Kazakh), and other non-Russian communities in Russia, formulated the following objectives for the Union: to declare and establish real equality of all peoples within the Russian empire; to secure the cultural and ethnic rights of all ethnic minorities both across Russia and in its autonomous peripheral areas; to transform and decentralize the ethnic periphery according to the principles of democracy, and the like. With the Union’s first objective being ‘self-determination of peripheral regions in the form of regional autonomy’, its long-run goal was viewed as widely transforming Russia within a federative framework. Delegates to the conference elected a Central Committee of 20 people, among whom was G. Ibragimov. Established in the autumn of 1905, The Union of Autonomists and Federalists prefigured the Autonomist Union [Usmanova, 2005; Tsiunchuk, 2006b, pp. 245–255] founded by members of the First State Duma. Even though the two unions were short-term and inefficient undertakings, their very appearance is indicative of how popular autonomism was in Russian society.

For the empire’s Muslim population, especially for the Tatars, the involvement of Muslim activists in an all-Russian convention was a major mobilizing factor. R. Ibragimov is deservedly renowned as an originator of the idea of ethnic autonomy. His contribution to the institutionalization of the Islamic political movement is also significant. The first flagship articles in his Ul’fyt newspaper [Ibragimov, 1905b] suggest that awareness of a number of non-Russian ethnic programmes encouraged the Muslims to realize their own ethnic interests and embody them in a political programme. In his front-page article of the first issue, titled ‘Autonomy’, G. Ibragimov wrote, ‘News is arriving from different sources that unions, parties,
organizations, associations are being created. Every ethnic group thus tries to assert its interests. Only the Tatars seem to have no force to lead such a movement. We have nothing. Why so?.. Many of the races get what they are given and, as they say, conquer what is not. What is the future status of our Tatar race? What do we Tatars know what they need?.. These are questions of utter importance, and we have to think them over and try to provide answers' [Ibragimov, 1905b]. G.Ibragimov’s speculations on the ethnic vector of development as well as state- and governmental transformation of Russia and the political future of Muslim peoples in the empire [Ibragimov, 1905 a].

Yusuf Akchura was a vivid example of personified promotion of liberal ideas in the Muslim community. He had an extensive network of contacts with the Russian intelligentsia which enabled him to enter the liberal community and attend the earliest (2nd, 3rd, and 4th) Cadet conventions to represent the country's Muslim population [Ty'r'kova-Williams, 1998]. The 2nd Convention of the People's Freedom Party (January 1906) even elected Yu. Akchura a member of the Central Committee of the People's Freedom Party, which suggested that representative of the Islamic political elite wanted to be seated as unelected members with the Cadets.

However, the interaction was largely limited to unconnected personal contacts. Yu.Akchura entered the Cadets' administrative body in a way which is most spectacular. Though Muslim names are on the lists of delegates of both the Second (5-11 January 1906, S.-G.Alkin and S.Galikeev from Kazan) and the Third (22-25 April 1906, Yu.Akchura from Kazan and D.Sheikh-Ali from Ufa) Conven- tions of the Cadet Party, the representa- tion of the country's Muslim community was marginal to Cadet activities. Noteworthy, it was D.Sheikh-Ali who raised the question of Muslim representatives in the party's Central Committee. Even though the convention moderators explained that the issue could not be addressed according to the procedure, most of the delegates agreed to the suggestion, surprising the party's leaders. Yusuf Akchura was subsequently elected a member of the Cadet Central Committee, which certainly facilitated the further attraction of Muslim members of the First State Duma to the Cadet fraction\[4\]. The very situation in which the decision was made indicates that the Cadet management had no preconceived strategy for interaction with the ethnic movements. The Muslim initiative just chanced to come useful for Russian liberals' image in that context.

§ 3. All-Russian Muslim Congresses dated 1905–1907.
The Formation of the Muslim Union 'Ittifaq al-Muslimin'

Dilyara Usmanova

All-Russian Muslim Congresses (1905-1907) played a key role in the formation of the Muslim political movement. They became quite a popular phenomenon in the political life of the Russia's Muslim peoples in Russia. The very fact of their holding was made possible only due to the liberalization of the Russian Empire's domestic policy. However, even earlier, in the conditions of absence of democratic freedoms, Russian citizens found various ways to hold public meetings. For Russian liberals, these were all kinds of 'banquet campaigns' or congresses held outside the Empire (in Vyborg, Finland, etc.). Muslims often used as an offi-

4 Yu. Akchura was with the the Central Commit- tee of the Cadet Party only briefly—after a year he left the all-Russian liberal party to take up the leadership of the Muslim party.
cially cover the Nizhny Novgorod market fairs or even weddings. For example, the first such meeting was held in the spring of 1905, when guests who had arrived to attend (M. Bigiev’s) wedding ceremony in Chistopol, according to the memoirs of contemporaries and police agents’ reports, were more engaged in discussing public needs and problems rather than in congratulating the newlyweds. It was very convenient to use the Nizhny Novgorod fairs to hold such events, because they were attended by Muslims from all over the empire. Initially, Nizhny Novgorod Fairs were used by the Muslim clergy to raise funds for their madrassas from wealthy merchants. Before the beginning and during the first revolution, the crowded Nizhny Novgorod fairs became a convenient place for public events. However, All-Russian Congresses were preceded by regional meetings. Some of them were held in Kazan.

At the beginning of 1905, two major meetings were held by the Kazan Tatars. The first of them took place on 23 January in a house of the merchant Khusainov, under the control of G. Ibragimov. At the meeting, it was decided to start a petition campaign aimed at determining the needs of Muslims and elect deputies for a trip to St. Petersburg. On 29 January the second, a more populous meeting (about 200 participants) was held, where a detailed petition was adopted to be submitted to the Tsar. Principal attention was paid to elimination of all national, religious and class limitations, and to provision to Muslims the rights, equal to those exercised by other nations living in the country. The congress was attended by about 120-150 representatives of Muslims, including leading representatives of the religious and secular intelligentsia, national leaders, as well as representatives of the Tatar upper bourgeoisie. Congress organizers failed to obtain official permission to hold the Congress, and therefore the main meeting (15 August 1905) was held illegally under the guise of a river trip down the Oka river. G. Ibragimov, Yu. Akchura, and A.-M. Topchibashev, the ideologists of the Muslim liberal movement, were the main organizers of the Congress. I. Gasprinsky was unanimously elected to the position of the...
Congress chairman. An attempt to prevent the radical left youth from participating in the organizational meeting failed. (A group of Tatar socialist revolutionaries headed by G. Iskhaki and F. Tuktarov had been told the wrong time of the ship's departure to prevent them to attend the meeting.) Left radicals brought some discord into the Congress' proceedings insisting that it was impossible to create a single Muslim political party, which would unite workers, peasants and bourgeoisie which were socially alien to each other. Their political opponents, namely liberal-minded people (Yu. Akhura, A.-M. Topchibashev, and others), believed that the party being created was to be based, first of all, on ethnic principles, and not on the principle of class discord and misunderstandings. The Congress participants discussed urgent problems facing Muslim population of the country. They argued for the proposition 'that Muslims from all over Russia on the basis of socio-cultural and political demands and problems of current Russian life should band together'; for the establishment of a legal regime based on participation of freely elected popular representatives in lawmaking and state management' and the complete 'equalization of political, civil and religious rights of Muslims with the rest of the Russian population'. After a number of illegal meetings and unofficial discussions, the delegates went home on 20 August 1905.

The 2nd All-Russian Muslim Congress (13-22 January 1906, St. Petersburg), which had no legal status as well, played a major role in establishing the party, as well as in determining the position of Russian Muslims before the elections to the first Russian parliament. A petition filed by a capital merchant Muhammad-Alim Maksudov and Rashid Ibragimov to a St. Petersburg governor stated the Muslims' intention to hold a series of meetings from 25 to 25th of January, to consider the following range of problems: 'discussion of various applications for religious and spiritual management filed by Muslims from all over Russia, as well as prior petitions to unite and summarize them; explanation of the highest manifesto dated 17 October 1905 in relation to the spiritual, political and economic life of Muslims; clarification of the Muslims' attitude to the State Duma and discussion of the announced programs of various political parties'. Similar petitions were filed by S.-G. Alkin and Sh. Syrtlanov [Rossijskij Gosudarstvennyj Istoricheskij Arkhiv, Fund 821, Inventory 8, File 1198, Sheets 6-7]. As St. Petersburg was subject to a regulation of the Minister of Internal Affairs on the prohibition of any public and private meetings of political and economic nature from 19 December 1905, the Congress was not permitted by the authorities. The Minister of Internal Affairs justified his refusal, in particular, by the desire not to create a precedent: 'If we allow a Muslim Congress, there will not be grounds to deny Hebrews, Poles and others living in Russia'. Therefore, the authorities did not want to create a precedent and allow major public events. Near the building, where the Congress was to be held, the delegates were met by a police squad on duty with a prohibition of the city authorities to convene and a prescription for the delegates to go home ['Novoe vremya', 1906, January 21; Akhverdov, 1906]. Therefore, the Congress consisted in illegal private meetings held by the delegates who had arrived in the capital. The approximately 100 delegates from various Islamic regions of the country—Turkestan, the Caucasus, the Crimea and the Volga-Ural region—the greatest influence was exercised by an Azerbaijani lawyer A.-M. Topchibashev, a Mullah G. Barudi and a lawyer S.-G. Alkin as representatives of the Kazan Tatars, an Akhun A. Bayazitov and a publicist G.-R. Ibragimov as capital residents, Orenburg delegates F. Karimi and Sh.Tukaev, and others.

The first edition of the future party’s charter (§§ 23) and probably a temporary program were adopted at those meetings. Both documents were written in the Russian language by A.-M. Topchibashev and then translated into Tatar by M. Bigiev. According to the charter, the Russian territory was divided into 16 regions populated by Muslims: the Caucasus (with a center in Baku), Crimea (Simferopol), St. Petersburg (St. Petersburg), Lithu-
ania (Minsk), Lower Volga (Astrakhan), Upper Volga (Kazan), Ufa (Ufa), Orenburg (Orenburg), Simbirsk (Irkutsk), the Steppe (Ural), Omsk (Omsk), Semipalatinsk (Semipalatinsk), Akmola (Petropavlovsk), Transcaspian area (Ashgabat) and Semirechensk (Verkh). Local committees (Mejlis) were established in all regional centers that were to be elected by a general meeting of these regions. It was also decided that the All-Russian Muslim Congress was to be the party's supreme governing body.

In addition, the participants of the meetings decided to act in solidarity with constitutional democrats during the election campaign and to try to have Muslim representatives in the Duma in a number proportionate to the number of the Muslim population in the empire. When most of the Congress delegates had left, Muslims remaining in the capital began to seek an audience with the head of the government. On 29 January 1906 a delegation of seven people (including Mullah Z. Kashaev, A. Shagidullin, Sh. Tukaev, as well as Z. Rameev, D. Sheikh-Ali and Yu. Akhura) was received by Count S. Vitte. The Muslim representatives filed a note to the head of the government outlining the wishes of the Muslim community regarding the work of Ignatyev’s meeting, as well as expressed their concern that elaboration of the ‘Muslim issue’ had been entrusted to V. Cherevansky, who was known for his anti-Muslim views.

If we talk about the ‘party formation’, the most important role in the organization of the Union was played by the 3rd All-Russian Muslim Congress (16-22 August 1906, Nizhny Novgorod). The Congress organizers managed to implement their plans. A petition signed by G.-R.Ibragimov, Kh. Maksudi and G. Iskhaki was granted by the authorities two days after its submission. The permission was granted provided that the Congress would be closed for the public, would take place outside the fair and strictly according to the approved programme. And the Congress programme attached to the request was formulated quite evasively and consisted of the following items: (1) ‘on the need to counteract teachings not corresponding to the true teachings of our prophet Muhammad by propagation and publications’, (2) on the need for complete transformation of primary Muslim schools, maktab and madrassas and transferring their control to the society instead of the Muslim clergy, (3) on the development of a programme of reorganization of the spiritual administration and on the means of its establishment based on Islamic cultural fundamentals, progress and tolerance, (4) the issue of financing (waqfs, etc.) required for reorganization of schools and the clergy. In their petition, the style of which is very interesting, the petitioners emphasized the need to combat ‘utopian ideas of Pan-Islamism’ and destructive ideas of socialism and anarchy, which contradicted the spirit of Islam and negatively affected the unenlightened Muslim masses. Moreover, the authors of the petition pointed to the undesirability for Muslims to study abroad, especially in Constantinople, where young people got inspired with either teachings of west-European revolutionaries or eastern intolerance; they wrote about the need to advocate true Islamic principles among the population. The style of the petition evidenced that it had been written by a person, who not only knew the mood of the upper bureaucracy, but used the very sorts of arguments and expressions that could reach the hearts of the adherents to ‘the public interest’.

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9 The Charter of the Union of 23 paragraphs, compiled by A. Topchibashev, was printed on 8 March 1906 in the capital’s Antakolsky printing house. The text of the Charter was preceded by a brief pre-history of the Union from 1904, composed by M. Bigiyev [Russian State Historical Archive, fund 821, inv. 133, file 473, sheets 239–242]. The programme was printed a little later—on 10 April 1906 by the same Antakolsky printing house. Only ten years after the programme was published, in the summer of 1916 the Police Department entered into correspondence with the explanation, ‘does this pamphlet not apply to those prohibited from making public addresses, and has prosecution not been initiated by the authorities for the compilation or distribution of the aforementioned brochure’ [RSHA, fund 776, inv. 9, file 265, sheet 2].

10 For the original of the petition by Ibragimov-Maksudov-Iskhakov and the programme of the future congress, see: [RSHA, fund 821, inv. 8, file 1198, sheets 8–10].
However, already at the first meeting, G.-R. Ibragimov had to explain the delegates the wording of the petition submitted to P. Stolypin, the Minister of Internal Affairs. The delegates were indignant not only at the fact that he had filed the petition in violation of the decision of the 2nd Muslim Congress regarding voting by present participants, but rather at the very wording of the petition, which ‘in no way corresponded to the wishes of progressive Muslims’. G.-R. Ibragimov took the blame on himself explaining his actions by a desire to contribute to the common cause. However, not wishing to limit the work of the Congress by those restrictions imposed by the programme’s wording, the Conciliation Committee prepared a resolution that ‘the motivation of the petition by Ibragimov is excessive for the Congress’ [A. Sh., 1906]. The conflict was over, but complaints against Ibragimov appeared in many Tatar publications. This story was far from being accidental. On the one hand, this was very typical for Ibragimov as a personality prone to achieve a goal employing a flexibility bordering on unscrupulousness, and sometimes even exhibiting adventurist traits. At the same time, it was his efforts and ability to make concessions that allowed for the first and only Muslim Congress in pre-Revolutionary Russia to be held that had been organized not by the authorities but by the Muslim community.

The Congress opened with 800 delegates present, and completed its work with 1200 participants representing all Muslim regions of the country. A.-M. Topchibashev was elected to be the Congress chairman, and I. Gasprinsky, Sh. Syrultanov, G.-R. Ibragimov, S.-G. Alkin, G. Barudi and A. Apanayev were elected as his deputies. Secretarial functions were performed by Yu. Akchura, M. Bigiev, S. G. Dzhantyutin, A. Gismatullin and M. Shivransky. At the request of Turkestan Muslims, Sh. Koshcheugulov and A. Ilkhamdzhanov were additionally elected to the panel. The Congress agenda included four issues that were the most important for Muslims: on the struggle against missionary advocacy, on the reorganization of the Muslim clergy, on waqfs and, finally, on the reforming primary education. All the meetings and discussions were held in the Tatar language. The work of the Congress was watched by 16 correspondents from Russian and Tatar newspapers, and Congress decisions were sent by telegraph to major capital editions (the ‘Rech’, the ‘Oko’, the ‘Strana’, the ‘Tovarisch’, the ‘Russkiye Vedomosti’, the ‘Russkoje Slovo’, the ‘Novyi Put’). Congress Resolutions were published by almost all Muslim periodicals and published as a separate booklet in Russian and Tatar [Tretij vserossijskij musul’mansij s`ezd v Nizhnem Novgorode, 1906]. The most important decisions of the Congress touched upon such issues as reforming the Muslim education system and establishing public control over it, reorganizing the spiritual administration and introducing the principle of election, and transforming the Union into a political party. Finally, a party programme was adopted, and governing bodies were established: the Central Committee and the Central Bureau (headquartered in St. Petersburg). Further development of a number of issues (on waqfs, etc.) was transferred to the Central Committee of the newly formed party. The Congress delegates supported actual exercise of the freedoms granted by the Manifesto dated 17 October 1905, forthcoming convening of the second State Duma, and opposed to consideration by governmental institutions of the ‘Muslim issue’ before the Russian parliament started its work. The next 4th Congress was scheduled for August 1907, but it could be held neither in January, nor in August 1907.

The programme adopted by the 2nd and approved the 3rd Congress was developed on the basis of a programme of constitutional democrats adapted taking into account the interests and the needs of the Muslim population. The first paragraph of the programme declared that ‘the party’s task was to unite in a common practical activity all Muslim citizens of Russia having similar political views to implement a number of political, economic, social, religious and other reforms’. The major provisions of the programme were as follows: constitutional and parliamentary monarchy; an update of the whole ‘regime of civil and political life...
on the principles of freedom, truth and humanity; democratic rights and freedom, equality of all Russian citizens before the law ‘without any sexual, religious, racial or national distinctions’; preservation of private property; granting land to peasants from the state fund; partial forced alienation of estates for a ransom; return to Muslims of waqf property and land confiscated by the state for migrants’ needs. The most thorough requirements formulated in the programme were the religious ones: Muslims must be granted the right to found religious, collective and sole institutions, the right to freely choose all officials of the Mohammedan clergy, the right of public control over activities of religious institutions and clergy, the right of disposal of all waqf and other property belonging to mosques, educational and charitable institutions [Iskhakov, 1997; Usmanova, 2010, pp. 376–378].

The Central Committee was entrusted with control functions and granted the right to change the programme if necessary without convening the Congress, management of the local committees, coordination of the election campaign in the State Duma, and given control over the party finances. The Central Committee consisted of 15 people: Yu. Akchura, brothers A.-X. and S. Maksudi, S.-G. Alkin, A. Apanayev, G. Barudi-Galeev (Kazan), R. Ibragimov, M. Bigiev (St. Petersburg), G. Bubi (Vyatka); Sh. Syrtlanov, S.-G. Dzhanligov (Kazan Bulletin’) and ‘Akhbar’ (News).

When the Union was just created, the radical national youth ignored it considering it to be only a cultural and educational, and not a political organization. Many ‘Tangists’ (F. Tuktarov, G. Iskhaki, etc.) believed that it was impossible to unite socially alien elements in the condition of a class struggle. Moreover, in the conditions of the first Russian revolution, a view was quite widespread among the radical Tatar youth that Muslims should not create an independent political party. This view was most clearly expressed by M.-F. Tuktarov in his famous book about Muslim deputies. Characterizing Muslim deputies, M.-F. Tuktarov spoke of the current uselessness of an independent Muslim group due to the ‘ignorance’ of
the Muslim population and a lack of traditions in the political life. Consequently, it was much more important for Muslims to work together with all-Russian factions and groups at that time and to obtain their parliamentary and political experience, while the creation of an independent Muslim faction as well as a Muslim political party could happen only in the distant future [Usal, 1909, p.55].

Similar conclusions were made by Mamed-agha Shakhtakhtinsky, a deputy of the 2nd State Duma, although on quite other grounds. Addressing the history of the Muslim Union and then analyzing the denial of the party’s legalization, M. Shakhtakhtinsky considered the very idea of creating a party as absolutely tactless and inappropriate. According to an Azerbaijania public list, the Muslims’ claims to participate in the transformation of Russian supreme power on constitutional principles, were the cause of a colossal scandal. If Muslims wanted to participate in political life, they had to act only within the framework of political associations of like-minded Russians. And in fact, high politics was not the Muslims’ cup of tea. According to M. Shakhtakhtinsky, the reason of all problems of the Muslim population lied in prevalence of the antisocial Islamic teachings, which were a major hindrance to progress. Blaming Muslims for many troubles and sins (absence of pragmatism and curiosity, indifference to everything, inertia, apathy, lack of knowledge and skills, inability to work and disbelief in the sanctity of labour, etc.), Shakhtakhtinsky expressed the greatest anger regarding polygamy [Shakhtakhtinsky, 1907].

Even later, many of the radical-minded Muslims believed that creation of a genuine Muslim political party was impossible: ‘As shown by the political experience during the existence of the third Duma, Muslims do not have a party in the strict sense of the word, but have only one progressive political movement’, a deputy of the third Duma I. Gaydarov wrote on the eve of elections to the last pre-revolutionary Duma [Seid-Zade, 1991, p. 94]. Indeed, even the Cadets were called a party of leaders without an army, not to mention political associations of non-Russian nations that were not so rich in ideological or organizational forces.

Although the Central Committee announced self-dissolution of the party in 1908, some of its subdivisions continued work. In fact, the functions of a coordinating body were undertaken by the Muslim faction; the majority of Muslim deputies called themselves members of the Muslim Union. At the 4th All-Russian Muslim Congress (June, 1914), it was announced that the ‘Ittifaq’ continued its functioning. Some liberals believed that the Muslim Union was a ‘national and political union uniting nationally like-minded, but politically different people’, rather than a political party (Ibn. Akhtyamov) [Millet, 1914, March 6].

The paradox of history lied in the fact that after 1908 neither the conservatives, nor the radical youth, nor the liberal Muslim political organization criticized by them were actually able to exist legally. And while the conservatives represented a marginal layer in the Muslim political movement, and the radical youth underwent a kind of evolution of their ideological views over the period from 1907 to 1908 (this evolution is most evident if you see the fate of G. Iskhaki and F. Tukhtarov), the ‘Muslim Union’ experienced a different kind of transformation. From an organizational and political point of view, it soon ceased to exist, having not become a real political party. A certain disorganizing role was played by the fact that after 1908 two of the most active and initiative Union leaders, G.-R. Ibragimov and Yu. Akchura were in exile, and a number of Central Committee members were subject to represions for their political activities. In particular, S.-G. Alkin, S. G. Dzhantyurin, A.-M. Topchibashev, and others were deprived of political rights and excluded from public activities for signing the Vyborg Manifesto; A. Apanayev, G. Barudi and G. Bubi were subject to represions for their cultural and educational activities and were in exile.

After the February Revolution, there appeared suggestions in Tatar publications to revive the ‘Ittifaq Al-Muslimin’, but the majority of the population negatively treated the
cadets, and therefore the leaders of the Muslim political movement opposed the revival of the Muslim 'cadet' party. In 1917-1918, almost all most influential party members headed national movements in their regions.

The most active members of the 'Muslim Union', who had founded it, were somehow linked with the Russian parliament, whose walls concentrated the entire legal political life of Russian society. As to the non-political activities, they took place predominantly within numerous cultural, educational and charitable organizations, as well as Zemstvo institutions. Consequently, beginning from 1907, virtually all Russian Muslims' legal and political life was concentrated around Muslim factions of the State Duma, which soon turned into a kind of a national political center.

§ 4. Muslim Representatives in the Russian Parliament:
General Characteristics of the Muslim Faction of the State Duma and the Role of Tatar Representatives in its Activities

Dilyara Usmanova

Due to a relatively late entry of the country into the era of political modernization and insufficient development of the political sphere, there were just a few institutions in imperial Russia, which could act as an all-Russian political tribune. They included the State Duma of the Russian Empire established in the period of an acute political crisis of 1905 and functioning during eleven years with short breaks from 1906 to 1917 (see more information about the State Duma of the Russian Empire: [Demin, 1996; Smirnov, 1998 b; Lukoyanov, 2006]).

The question of whether one can consider the Duma as a parliament in the strict sense of the word is controversial and debatable because of the known considerable limitations of its power. The law-making function of the Duma was considerably limited by the moderate upper chamber (the State Council), where many legislative initiatives of the deputies were doomed to certain death. The State Duma was not a full-fledged regulatory body, since in reality it did not affect formation of the government or the country management system. Finally, the Duma’s representative functions were greatly cut by the elections law dated 1907 in relation to both individual strata of the population and entire regions, and a number of nations. Despite all the limitations and reservations, the State Duma may be called a parliament. This was a specific feature of modernization of the Russian political system, which was already inconceivable without a representative body such as the State Duma since 1906. Similarly, with historical retrospection, the Russian State Duma would be inconceivable without its national and religious factions and groups, among which the Muslim faction played an important role [Yamaeva, 2002; Tsiunchuk, 2004; Usmanova, 2005; Iskhakov, 2007].

Numerous legal restraints and infringement on religious grounds that took place in the Russian Empire provoked protests of the Muslim population, dissatisfaction with the existing position and longing for feeling themselves equal citizens of the country. This was a legal background for forming an independent Muslim faction in the Russian parliament, which aimed at fighting the existing ‘injustice’ in relation to Muslims.

It was extremely important for the Muslim population of the Empire to participate in the work of the State Duma in terms of forming and developing political culture, namely learning the basics of political and parliamentary activities, including the ways of how to use an all-Russian platform to present and protect national interests, and how to enlist the corridors of power to lobby for Muslims’ interests and needs in the bureaucratic environment. Muslim deputies used various arguments depending on whom they were appealing to. Appealing to
representatives of the ruling bureaucracy, Muslim representatives (G. Enikeev, S. Maksudi, etc.) insisted on unchanging loyalty and fidelity of the Muslim population to the throne, and asked for mercy in exchange for that loyalty, namely for revocation of existing restrictive and limiting statutory provisions. When Muslim speakers delivered a speech from a Duma platform to the members of other Duma factions, they changed the tone of their statements and the arguments emphasized. In this case, they insisted on the legality of their requirements, on the need to introduce civil equality in the country.

The political experience of the Muslim deputies was based primarily on religious, ethnic and regional identity. Religious identity was especially predominant, which led to the creation of an independent Muslim faction uniting most of the Muslim deputies of all the four of pre-revolutionary Dumas. At the same time, in practice, the problems addressed by certain Muslim deputies, first of all, the way they developed their factional and external activities, were also affected by other ethnic, regional, social, professional and cultural factors.

Objective factors of forming the Muslim deputy corps include the laws on elections dated 1905-1907 that limited the number of representatives of non-Russian nations and provided advantages to one or another social groups or nationalities. The objective factors also include the social structure of the Muslim population, in particular, the prevalence of rural and the lack of urban population among Muslims. A significant number of noblemen among the elected Muslim deputies, especially representatives of ancestral aristocracy, which was typical for Caucasian and Kazakh deputies, also reflected specific features of the social structure of the population in these regions. The composition and nature of the Muslim deputy corps was also influenced by such factors as a lack of party structures and political experience, inability to carry out electoral campaigns, presence of many groupings competing with each other, personal ambitions and errors of individual political figures.

In total, 25 Muslim deputies were elected to the first State Duma (27 April—9 July 1906), who represented the main ‘Muslim’ regions of the country: the Volga-Ural region, the Caucasus, the Semirechye region and Turkestan. The idea to create an independent Muslim faction emerged almost immediately (initiated by S.-G. Alkin), but it took some time to implement. Only on 21 June the first general meeting of the Muslim group was held, where the creation of a faction was announced. A.-M. Topchibashev, an Azerbaijani deputy, was the group leader. The faction being created aimed at preliminary discussion of issues on the agenda and preparation of speakers, coordination of all Muslim deputies’ positions and help in writing petitions. In addition, active agitation and explanatory activities were planned. These included meetings and interviews with Muslims living in St. Petersburg, going around the Muslim territories by deputies to let the population get acquainted with the Duma’s work, publication of reports on the Duma activities in the Tatar language and release of a Muslim newspaper in St. Petersburg. A speech about the faction’s aims and composition scheduled for 14 July did not take place due to premature dissolution of the Duma. Therefore, all official documents name Muslim deputies in the Cadet faction or (a smaller part) among in the Trudoviks (labour) faction. Six out of nineteen Muslim deputies being in Moscow at the moment of Duma dissolution joined the ‘Vyborg Manifesto’ (A. Akhtyamov, S.-G. Alkin, A. Ziatkhano, S. G. Dzhantyurin, A.-M. Topchibashev and A. Bukeikhanov). All of them (except A. Akhtyamov) were later deprived of their political rights after having been imprisoned for a period of three months.

The Second State Duma of (20 February—2 June 1907) existed for only one hundred and three days and was also dissolved before the end of its term. What was the second Duma for Muslims? In quantitative terms, it turned out to be the most favorable, all Muslim regions were represented in the Duma by people’s chosen deputies. In total, 37 Muslim deputies were elected, who organized two factions and sent one representative to the governing bod-
ies. Stormy political events in the country and polarization of Russian society resulted in the unstable unity of Muslim deputies being broken. Splits in the faction had already appeared by the end of February. Most of Muslim delegates (their number had exceeded 30 by the end of the Duma’s work) organized a Muslim faction. A minority in the amount of six people formed a separate block called the ‘Muslim labour group’ and officially joined the Trudoviks (labour faction). They jointly solved the main purely ethnic problems.

M.-A. Biglov, an Ufa deputy, became an official chairman of the Muslim faction, and R. Mediev, Kh. Usmanov, M. S. Khasanov and F. Khankhoysky became Bureau members. Several commissions were formed in the faction. One considered draft laws concerning the position of the Muslim population of the empire, as well as legal and economic matters. As to general political matters, the Muslim programme (remade from the Muslim group’s programme by the end of March) was in many ways close to the Cadets’ provisions. They advocated, among other demands, single-chamber parliamentary system, a ministry of the Duma, universal, direct, equal and secret voting, equality of all citizens irrespective of nationality or religion, universal free and compulsory primary education, an elected inferior court. The national factor became apparent in the fact that the Muslim deputies insisted on using the ‘Tatar language in local government bodies, the inferior court, as well as the primary school, because it was native for most of the population of these regions. The Muslims’ position also differed when it came to the issue of the people’s courts—given their history and popularity among the local population, the question about their preservation was solved affirmatively. Moreover, the agricultural issue was also interpreted somewhat differently. In general, the members of the Muslim faction agreed with the Cadets in their wish to confiscate landowners’ property for a fair compensation (while the Muslim Trudoviks insisted on non-reimbursable confiscation). However, Muslims had a special interest regarding the issue of waqf lands, which was reflected in a special draft law on waqf lands (primarily applying to the Crimea), which was prepared by the members of the Muslim fraction for submission to the Duma for consideration. This is the question of waqf property that led to a split between the majority of the Muslim deputies and the minority represented by the Muslim Trudoviks (labour faction). The latter considered it possible and even necessary to confiscate the waqf property and to distribute it among land-poor peasants. Another issue that caused lively discussions in the faction concerned women’s equality. The final liberal wording of this programme item required an explanation of the most influential ulamas of Troitsk, Orenburg and Kazan that the Quran contains no provisions speaking against political equality between women and men. However, the work of the Muslim parliamentary group was influenced by a number of adverse factors. There was no single leader, an insufficient number or even lack of hard-working faction members (both draft laws were a result of the activities of the former deputies A.-M. Topchibashev and S.-G. Alkin). Muslim deputies’ activities were often discordant (conflicts of local and group interests), there was also financial indiscipline among faction members, and other issues.

Upon dissolution of the Second Duma, the election was also changed (3 June 1907), which deprived such Muslim regions as Turkestan and the Steppen district of their representatives, as well as sharply reduced the number of deputies elected in the Caucasus. An increase in the voters’ qualifications led to a significant reduction in the number of Muslim voters, and hence the possible maximum quota for non-Russian deputies. In general, according to the new elections law, the population of the regions with predominant foreigners (Poland, Baltic Countries, the Caucasus, and partially the Volga-Ural region) could elect only twenty-five deputies. The electoral campaign of autumn 1907 included a new feature, namely the general division of electoral forums into Russian and foreign ones. All this, along with active use by the administration of the so-called ‘administra-
The work of the commissions formed in the Muslim faction (that on religious affairs, education and verification of old laws concerning the life of the Muslim society) actively involved deputies of the former Dumas—S. Karataev, S.-G. Alkin, A.-M. Topchibashev, F. Khankhoysky, etc. Those Muslim deputies who were really involved in the law-making activity, first of all included G. Enikeev, who was a member of the Commission on popular education and worked on the development of the corresponding project. The formation of the Muslim faction’s political image was strongly influenced by G.-O. Syrtyanov and S. Maksudi, whose moderate views and cautious tactics contributed to some ‘right focus’ of Muslims. Almost all members of the faction spoke from the Duma’s rostrum, but Caucasian deputies Kh. Khasmamedov and I. Gaydarov should be marked out. S. Maksudi delivered the most impressive speeches of all the representatives of the Volga-Ural region. Duma activities contributed to the transformation of a young lawyer and recent graduate into an influential and experienced politician with a promising future. S. Maksudi’s speeches made him widely popular in the Russian Muslim world. Especially wide resonance in Tatar society was drawn by S. Maksudi’s speech dated 6 March 1912 about the government’s struggle against the so-called ‘pan-Islamic threat’, which was translated into Tatar, published in the Yulduz newspaper and cited by quotations in several leading Tatar editions. However, as assessed by contemporaries, the Muslim faction, which had to become a centre of the Islamic movement, could not always manage to achieve its task, because it was ‘small in number, weak and not very active’. The Tatar print media spoke very critically about the political image of Muslim deputies.

Elections to the Fourth State Duma (15 November 1912—5 February 1917) were held in autumn of 1912. In addition to the election law, the government and the local administration used all available administrative resources. This included a system of mass ‘clarification’ against undesirable candidates, judicial punishment for frivolous reasons to eliminate potentially hazardous and patently successful candidates, division of electors into divisions and sub-divisions and use of the Orthodox clergy. As a result, the Muslim population of Kazan guberniya, for example, which was one of the most important and significant Muslim centers in Russia, was left without a representative in the Russian parliament. However, the failure of the Muslim election campaign of 1912 was due not only to repressions of the authorities.
Muslim liberal politicians did not manage to arrange a single center, which was to direct and coordinate activities of Muslim electors, and the Muslim population did not have a clear idea of the election campaign strategy.

The Muslim faction of the fourth State Duma consisted of 6 members headed by K.-M. Tevkelev. I. Akhtyamov was a secretary. One of the Muslim deputies (Mohammed Dalgat) joined the Progressive Party. Muslim representatives did not prefer a single political group, but were ready to cooperate with any Duma group (especially national ones), always remaining within a block of opposition parties and factions. However, the small number of its members deprived the Muslim faction of any opportunity to act effectively.

Thus, only 79 Muslim deputies were elected to all four Dumas. As some of the deputies were elected for a second term (K.-M. Tevkelev was elected four times), only 67 Muslims worked in all four Dumas. The class and national identity of Muslim deputies was somehow determined by the election laws of 1906 and 1907, which generally limited representation of non-Russian nations in the Russian parliament. According to the national indicator, Muslim deputies represented the main ethnic groups of the country as follows: most of them were Tatar (25), who were followed by Azerbaijanis (11), Kazakhs (9), Bashkirs (7 11), Lezghins (4), Uzbeks (3), Crimean Tatars (2), Turkmen and Chechens (1). Most of the Muslim deputies were representatives of the nobility (19 members, including six representing the ancestral aristocracy, who were the descendants of ruling Khans) and peasants (at least 20-25 members). Such classes as the petty bourgeoisie, merchants and officials were also represented among the Muslim deputies, although to a lesser degree. A considerable group of the deputies was formed by the Muslim clergy—15 seats (or 13 people, as two mullahs were elected twice). But as the Muslim clergy

was not a separate class, almost all mullahs belonged to the peasantry. As to regional specifics, all Mullah deputies were sent to the parliament by the population of the Volga-Ural region (10) and Turkestan and the Stepnoy district (3). Of 67 Muslim deputies, 33 people had a higher and secondary education (21 and 12 respectively). The educational level of Muslim deputies is comparable to that of all Duma deputies on the whole. The greatest share of those well-educated was among the deputies from the Caucasus. Most deputies, who did not have a European education and poorly knew the Russian language, were sent by the population of Turkestan and to some extent the Volga-Ural region.

Religious issues, the public education, the immigration policy, the status of ethnic outskirts, and finally, the issue of holidays were perhaps the most important for Muslims of all the issues discussed in the Russian parliament. It was while considering these issues in the commissions and especially during general Duma debates, when the members of the Muslim faction were the most active. As to fundamental issues, Muslim deputies usually took a consolidated position and usually tried not to expose underlying disagreements outside the group. This tendency was caused, in particular, by the following circumstance. Due to the discriminatory nature of the election law dated 1907, representation of individual Muslim regions in the Duma was disproportionate if compared with the census data of 1897: the Volga-Ural region was represented by 23 deputies in all the four Dumas, Turkestan and the Stepnoy district—16, the Caucasus and the Crimea—23. In the circumstances when certain Muslim regions were prevented from sending their deputies to the Duma, the mission to protect their interests and announce their wishes and demands was undertaken by Muslims from other regions and areas of the Empire, primarily the Volga-Ural region and the Caucasus. A number of issues (religious freedom, public education, the use of national languages in litigation and by local authorities) were discussed by the members of the Muslim faction in alliance with other ethnic groups, especially members of the Polish Kolo.

11 It should be noted that the nationality of some members was ‘borderline,’ which is reflected, for example, in the differences between their official nationality, as stated in documents, and nationality according to ‘the native language.’
Of course, internal discrepancies and contradictions within the Muslim parliamentary group were caused by the presence of specific regional or national interests. Nevertheless, the main watershed, which led to a split of the Muslim deputies into the Muslim faction and the Muslim labour group, lay in the social sphere rather than the sphere of religious and cultural issues, and was based on the radical positions held by some Muslim deputies regarding the agrarian question. The radical position of some Muslim deputies on this issue reflected its acuteness for most of the population.

A complex of issues relating to the confessional sphere and public education was the most important for Muslim deputies out of all other issues. The issue of reforming the management of ecclesiastical (religious) regulatory bodies in the post-reform era can be divided into three major periods when the issue was most actively discussed and was, as it seemed at the time, closest to its resolution: the first stage chronologically dates back to the period from the mid-50's until the mid-70's, and the second from the 90's of the 19th century. The third stage began between 1904 and 1905. It ended only after the February Revolution of 1917, which created conditions for implementing transformations that had been planned in the pre-revolutionary period. The third stage witnessed some new trends, the problem had a wide public resonance and became openly discussed. Finally, its development involved new legislative bodies, namely the State Duma as a whole, and in particular, the Muslim faction. In terms of the content, the matter was not already in the elimination of spiritual administrations or derogation of the rights of the Muslim clergy. At the same time, governmental authorities responsible for implementing the reforms insisted on decentralizing religious centers and splintering existing religious institutions into smaller and therefore less influential and vigorous ones. The plans of the capital’s bureaucracy and the Muslim projects irreconcilably confronted each other on this issue, which made it practically impossible to achieve an agreement on this issue under the conditions of the existing political system.

The issue of public education was connected with religious issues. As to the governmental policy in the field of foreigners’ education, the Muslim deputies’ positions were close to those of non-Russian deputies in general. Like other deputies representing non-Russian population of outlying districts of the empire, Muslims flatly opposed transformation of the state primary school into an instrument of Russification, insisted on ousting this policy from the school and adapting the school system to the needs and interests of members of ethnic minorities. The latter could be achieved only by permitting the usage in state schools of national languages, ethnic teaching staff and by taking into account national, cultural and linguistic features of studying children while developing a curriculum. The study of materials taken from Muslim periodicals shows that the future of confessional schools was a very acute issue for Muslims in the pre-revolutionary period. Due to the fact that the draft reform of religious institutions in charge of confessional schools de jure and de facto was not placed for consideration by the State Duma, the issue of a Muslim confessional school did not draw the expected resonance in the Parliament. It did not occupy a place in the activities of the Muslim faction members to the extent it should have according to its importance for the Muslim community as a whole.

Despite minor results of the law-making activity of both Muslim deputies and the Duma as a whole, participation of Muslim representatives in the Russian Parliament was of great importance for the formation of a political movement of Muslims in general and, in particular, the Tatars. The State Duma was the only all-Russian political platform in imperial Russia, where representatives of the Muslim ummah could publicly and legally protect their national interests, learn to express their demands, find the right political allies, and get used to inevitable price of compromise and balance of interests. At the same time, the Tatars played a key role within the Muslim faction directing their efforts to protect the interests of the entire Muslim community, regardless of region or national origin.

Dilyara Usmanova

The general revival of social life observed in the period of the first Russian revolution (1905-1907) that was accompanied by the emergence of parties and party groups was followed by a period of political 'frost' after the recession of the revolution. Most of the Muslim political associations that emerged at this time were not legalized and eked out a nominal existence ('Ittifaq al-Muslimin'), or ceased their activities entirely (the 'Tangists', and others). A more or less active social life of Muslims was around the Islamic faction of the State Duma, as well as charitable, cultural and educational organizations. Moreover, many representatives of the politicized and very radical youth, who had shown themselves recently or during the first Russian revolution (F. Tuktarov, Ibn. Akhtyamov, G. Iskhaki, etc.) preferred not to interfere with the political sphere grouping mainly around the magazine 'Din Va Magy'yshat'. There were many people with moderate views among the merchants.

The so-called Vaisov Movement ('Vaisov God’s Regiment of Muslim Old Believers') was a variety of the Muslim conservatism, which became more and more political in nature after 1905. This quite obvious trend to the political side was observed namely at the beginning of the 20th century, when the community was headed by Ginanudtin (Gaynan) Vaisov, one of Bahawetdin's sons (08.11.1878—28.02.1918), who headed the movement up to his death in March 1918.

The image of the new movement leader Gaynan Vaisov reflects some traits of a man of the new era. He not only resumed functioning of the community during the first Russian revolution, but gave a powerful momentum to the movement and brought a new essence thereto. With all his desire to outwardly remain a leader of a religious community and to continue his father’s cause, Gaynan was a secular man, a model of secular thinking and secular way of life. He quite successfully adapted to the politicized Russian community of the beginning of the 20th century and integrated therein to a greater extent than his predecessors. Under Gaynan’s leadership, the movement was transformed from a religious community with an obvious religious, social and cultural doctrine, into a kind of a political community, in which the religious component ceased to be predominant.

As a young man, G. Vaisov was involved in retail trade, lived in Kazan, Simbirsk and Middle Asia (Merv). In 1903, he was sentenced to one year in prison for resistance to the police.

12 The history of the emergence of the Vaisov community, the fate of its first leaders, and the details of its movements in the second half of the 19th century are described briefly in the 6th volume of ‘History of the Tatars from Ancient Times.’ This also includes the most important literature on the history of its movement. For more details, see: [Usmanova, 2009 b].
which he served in the Ashgabat prison. From late 1904 to early 1905 Gaynan returned to Kazan, revived the community on the wake of the revolutionary upsurge and proclaimed himself a ‘sardar’. The peak of the Vaisov’s activities fell between 1905 and 1909 when, headed by a new leader, the Vaisov’s restored a prayer house in the New Tatar sloboda, attempted to establish an autonomous religious community independent from the OMSA and founded a chancellery with their own parish registers and a treasury.

Already in the first months of the revolution of 1905, G. Wäisev, who accepted the title of ‘sardar’, applied to the highest bureaucratic authorities. The first petition sent by him to the Council of Ministers dates back to 23 February 1905. After G. Vaisov received a formally benevolent reply from the Department of Religious Affairs for Foreign Faiths, he wrote a new detailed petition to the Prime Minister (26 March 1905). This and numerous other petitions included the Vaisov’s fundamental requirements: recognition of autonomy of their religious community, exemption of Muslim Old Believers from the military duty on religious grounds, renunciation of the name ‘Tatar’, exemption from paying the majority of taxes and tributes (except for the land tax), provision of cultural freedom (publication of books, magazines, etc.). G. Vaisov also republished a part of his father’s poetic heritage, having added some of his own poems [Vaiszade, 1907]. In the early 20th century, the Vaisov’s still sought to appeal directly to the supreme bodies. Wishing to receive the Emperor’s audience, G. Vaisov went to St. Petersburg in 1908.

With the emergence of new regulatory authorities including the State Duma, the community leaders began to address their appeals to this institution. The first appeals to the Parliament belong, in particular, to Shigabutdin Sayfutdinov, one of the community leaders, who was in exile on the Sakhalin at this time (spring 1906). The reason that inspired the exiled Vaisov’s to appeal to the members of the State Duma, lay in the usual oppression from the side of the local (Sakhalin) administration. The few of Vaisov’s appeals to the State Duma that survive, known thanks to archival documents, evidence their recognition of the Duma as a legitimate institution de facto, and its members as the people’s representatives. Perhaps, it was important for the Vaisov’s, who consistently stressed their loyalty and allegiance to the supreme power, to realize how the new institution corresponded to the will and the wishes of the Emperor.

During the third Duma’s work, Sh. Sayfutdinov wrote several times to S. Maksudi, a member of the Muslim faction and a deputy from Kazan guberniya, and appealed to such deputies as N. Shubinsky, A. Selivanov and D. Gul’kin. A number of indirect pieces of evidence indicate Wäisi’s attempts to establish direct contacts with faction members. Articles seized during searches of 1908-1909 and filed together with the indictment, included business cards of the third Duma member, G.-O. Syrtlanov [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 41, Inventarioy 13, File 3]. At the same time, the Wäisi did not consider the State Duma to be a new, modern political body so much as one of traditional bureaucratic institutions to which they could address their appeals and petitions.

The Wäisi community leaders alleged that they did not recognize political parties and organizations, considering them unnecessary novelties. Let us note a speech by Sh. Sayfutdinov delivered at a city-wide assembly of Kazan Muslim electors held on 9 January 1907, where he expressed his opinion against joining any political party. ‘Muslims’, said Sh. Sayfutdinov, ‘do not need political parties. The Quran is enough to guide Muslims in their actions and their lives’ [Yulduz, 1907, 12 January].

Nevertheless, the general politicization of the Russian society affected the Wäisi as well, and the new political realities brought inevitable tactical changes in their actions. In order to officially legalize their movement, community leaders developed the so-called ‘Charter Related to Military Prayer Books’ between 1908 and 1909, discussed a possibility of holding in 1910 of a Muslim Old Believers Con-
gess, planned to publish their own magazine to promote their ideas, appealed to political institutions and even participated in election campaigns, as was mentioned above. Although the Wäisi were not capable to fully master the current political ideas, they were at least trying to adapt to the modern political institutions and use political tools.

Many requirements and actions of the Wäisi in between 1905 and 1908 were assessed by the authorities as a clear political challenge, and sectarians’ actions raised serious concerns regarding emergence of a new alternative and uncontrollable society. In 1909, an investigation was launched against the Wäisi, which ended in judicial proceedings in 1910. Eleven out of fourteen defendants were found guilty and sentenced to between two and four years of prison for establishment and membership in a criminal organisation, ‘which set the task of disobeying orders of the Government’. Having served his term in prison, G. Vaisov, the head of the movement was exiled to Siberia, he could return to Kazan only after the February revolution.

Over the entire existence of the Wäisi community of Muslim Old Believers, its members were constantly prosecuted for their ideas and actions logically following from them. But the authorities always attached the nature of a punishment for a particular criminal offense to such a persecution, irrespective of the true motivation. The proceedings of 1910 was the first to have a clear political nature. After another defeat, there started another period of calm in the community’s life (1911–1916), disturbed only by episodic conflicts of individual Wäisi with the authorities. However, the pre-revolutionary decade was generally a logical step in the development of the Wäisi movement, when it underwent a clear evolution towards gradual secularization of the ‘sectarian’ consciousness and lifestyle, emergence of new aspects and strengthening of the political component. During the revolution of 1917, the Wäisi community finally assumed a political character. This was reflected, among other things, in a name change (from the ‘Wäisi God’s Regiment of Muslim Old Believers’ to the ‘Party of Wäisi Communist Revolutionaries’ at the beginning of 1919), in the leaders’ obvious political ambitions, as well as in establishment of an essentially unnatural alliance with the Bolsheviks.

However, political conservatism in the Muslim environment still seemed nonsense, which is proven by formation of so-called Tsarist-People’s Muslim Society [Alekseev, 2001; Alekseev, 2002a, Alekseev, 2004] and the Muslim People’s Union ‘Sirat Al-Mustaqim’ [Rossijskij Gosudarstvennyj Istoricheskij Arkhiv, Fund 821, Inventory 133, File 474; Iskhakov, 2001, Sheets 362–370; Fakhruddinov, 2004, p. 292; Usmanova, 2009, pp. 56–57].

The Tatar (or in fact pseudo-Tatar) socio-political organisation ‘Tsarist-People’s Muslim Society’ was established in December 1908 in the Chistopol uyezd of the Kazan guberniya. Khayrulla Fayzullin, a Chistopol peasant, was its nominal head (other Tatar names can be also found in this organisation), but V. Zalessky, a Kazan professor and a rightist leader, was the initiator and the instigator of the whole campaign. He developed the charter of the organisation and lobbied for obtaining the necessary decision from the appropriate authorities. According to V. Zalessky, the creation of right monarchist organisations in the Islamic environment was to promote the ‘political separation of foreigners’, to stop the spread of separatist ideas among the Tatars and prevent their participation in the progressives movement. According to the charter of the Royal–Popular Islamic Society, it aimed at ‘preservation among the Tatars of loyalty to an oath sworn on the Quran to keep loyal to the Autocratic Unlimited Tsar and at establishing a strong union with Russian patriotic society’. Like all Black-Hundred (far rightist) organisations, the Tsarist-People’s Muslim Society had its own flag, seal and lapel pin, had the right to build schools, open hospitals and shelters and possessed broad legal rights. The organisations’ charter was approved by the governorate’s prisutstvie (commission) on 9 December 1908, and during the spring (April–May) of 1909, some branches of the Royal–Popular Islamic Society were established in a number
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of settlements of the Chistopol uyezd. The total number of the society members ranged from between 240 and 250. However, the liberal press quickly began a revelatory campaign, and the subsequent investigation on the part of the local administration showed that the so-called ‘Pan-Islamic propaganda’ and anti-government agitation were carried on under the guise of a monarchical organisation, and some of its members were ‘not always decent in terms of morale’. As a result, on an order of the governorate authorities, the activities of local branches of RPIS were suspended in autumn of 1909, and in December of the same year a decision was taken to close all of its offices.

Another attempt to create a conservative pro-monarchist Muslim party ‘Sirat Al-Mustaqim’ at another, all-Russian, level was undertaken from late 1913 to early 1914. The Union was founded by Fatykh Bayrashev, a major capital trader, a St. Petersburg Akhun Muhammad-Safa Bayazitov, an Akhun of the 1st Troitsk cathedral mosque, Akhmad Hajji Rakhmankulov and a merchant Habibullah Yalyshev.

The relevant documents (namely a petition to establish Sirat Al-Mustaqim and a draft charter signed by the above four persons) were submitted to the DRAFF of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in November 1913. The charter was based on similar documents of other Black-Hundred organisations such as the Union of Michael the Archangel and the Union of Russian People. The text of the charter did not undergo principal changes in the process of its agreement with the authorities, although it was edited to some extent by the employees of the above DRAFF. According to the charter, Sirat Al-Mustaqim aimed at ‘uniting all Russian Muslims to study Islam in its past and present, to educate and fundamentally improve the well-being of brothers in faith on a basis of strict compliance with law, loyalty to the Monarch, the unity and integrity of Russia’ [Rossijskii Gosudarstvennyi Istoricheskii Arkhiv, Fund 821, Inventory 133, File 474]. As intended by the founders, this Union was to unite the conservative part of Muslims in order to counteract modern trends in the Muslim ummah. The Union’s activity extended to the whole territory of the Russian Empire, except for the western, southern and far eastern outskirts (that is Poland and the Western region, the Caucasus, Turkestan and the Far East), which in fact means the area covered by the OMSA.

All major affairs were to be supervised by the Chief Council consisting of 12 members. As to its practical activities, Sirat Al-Mustaqim Union set a wide range of tasks. As to the religious sphere, they provided for assistance in organizing the hajji, and constructing mosques; as to the sphere of education—opening general education and vocational lower and secondary educational institutions, national maktabs and madrasahs, organizing libraries, and publishing books. The charter stipulated provision of various kinds of charitable help to those in need, including medical services. It would seem that it was a typical charitable organisation if we consider its tasks. However, it was no secret that formation of a pro-monarchist Muslim organisation ‘Sirat Al-Mustaqim’ was a political project. It was a kind of a conservative political alternative to the liberal party ‘Ittifaq Al-Muslimin’ that was not legalized, an answer of conservatives and traditionalists to their political opponents—Muslim (Tatar) liberals. This is noteworthy, that both organisations, although called Islamic, were to a great extent a result of the activities of the Tatar community. At the same time, although there are no documents supporting this assumption, it is obvious that this project was partially initiated by some members of the government, just as many Russian pro-monarchist parties were created from above.

The process of legalization of Sirat Al-Mustaqim was completed. Probably, the failure was due to the negative attitude to the project of an all-Russian Islamic organisation from the part of most governors, as well as concerns among the upper capital bureaucracy. The issue of establishing the Union was raised on 16 May 1914 at a Special Council on Muslim affairs. Members of the meeting saw the danger of uniting Muslims (traditional concerns about Pan-Islamism) and the possibility of penetration therein of ‘unreliable elements’. Moreover,
legalization of Sirat Al-Mustaqim would create a precedent giving other foreigners a reason to ‘solicit’ similar rights. Guided by these considerations, the meeting unanimously acknowledged the unconditional undesirability of ‘approving the Sirat Al-Mustaqim project from the point of view of Russian statehood’, since this was an organisation uniting Muslims from all over the Empire irrespective of their nationality [Rossijskij Gosudarstvennyj Istoricheskij Arkhiv, Fund 821, Inventory 133, File 474, Sheets 376–376 reverse].

The project of the Sirat Al-Mustaqim party and its founders personally suffered sharp attacks from the Tatar liberal press, which named this union Black-Hundred and appealed to Muslims not to support its organizers. Only the Din Va Magishat magazine supported Sirat Al-Mustaqim. Upon approval of M.-S. Bayazitov as a mufti of the Orenburg Muslim Spiritual Assembly in July 1915, the idea of establishing a Muslim conservative party ceased to be relevant: the conservative part of Muslims was now attracted by the management of the OMSA.

§ 6. Major Characteristics of the Islamic (Tatar) Political Activities in Russia of the Late Imperial Period: General Conclusions

Dilyara Usmanova

Thus, we can say that the Muslim community passed the same way as the whole of Russian society in its political development within the period from the beginning of the revolution (January 1905) and to spring of 1906, to the start of the first Russian parliament’s session. The period from autumn of 1904 to spring 1905 was a time of the Muslim population’s awakening (as G. Tukay later wrote, ‘we woke up with the revolution of 1905’) and the formation of the first political associations. At that time there were primarily local associations of Russian Muslims (in the Volga region, the Crimea, the Caucasus and capital cities), whose leaders tried to solve their problems in a traditional Russian way by holding meetings and the so-called ‘banquet campaigns’, writing petitions and requests, sending deputations to the capital. The second characteristic feature consisted in the formation of political groups and unions on the party principle. At that time, left movements prevailed among Muslims: groups of various socialist nature (Social Democrats and Social Revolutionaries), as well as liberals. It is noteworthy that it was the liberal wing of the politicized Muslim community that was the first to try to organize and create an all-Russian Muslim political party. Finally, the third characteristic feature of the Muslim movement lied in its wish to act as a single political movement, without division on any national or regional basis. Therefore, despite the predominance of Kazan (Volga-Ural) Tatars among managers and ordinary party members, they never tried to create a separate Tatar political party. The fourth characteristic feature consisted in the political, ideological, personal and partially financial dominance of representatives of the Tatar community in the general Muslim political movement, which allowed the upper bureaucracy to blame the Kazan Tatars in their striving for ‘Tatar hegemony’.

The peak of the political activities of the Muslim (Tatar) liberals came during the period of the first Russian revolution (1905-1907). It was then that the major congresses were held, all-Russian and regional structures of the Muslim party were created, and the greatest political activity of individual politicians could be observed. After the recession and end of the revolution we note a decline of political activity of Russian Muslims, as of all other parties in Russia in general. This was partially due to...
repression on the part of the authorities, partially due to the general tiredness of the population from rapid political activities, revolutionary shocks, and partially due to a spread of such moods as apathy and frustration following the euphoric period of 1905 to 1907. From 1907 to 1914, the political activity of the Russian Muslims was mainly concentrated around the Islamic faction of the State Duma.

It should be noted that Russian Muslims had not only radical movements (socialists and liberals), but also quite a strong moderate-conservative movement that attempted to organize a political force. Despite the fact that the conservative wing of the Muslim community should have enjoyed the sympathy and support of the authorities, it nevertheless caused concerns on the part of the government. No rhetorical words about the loyalty of conservatives and traditionalists could remove traditional concerns of the authorities, who saw a threat in any political activity among the Muslim population. Therefore, despite the absence of repression or persecution of the conservative elements of the Muslim community, its representatives did not manage to create a worthy alternative to liberal and modernist (Jadid) projects. Another conservative (traditionalist) alternative, namely the Vaisov’s movement, despite the activity of its leaders, played even a more marginal role in the Tatar public movement and could not offer the population a positive program corresponding to the requirements of modern life.

In general, Muslims underwent an evolution in the late imperial period, which was characteristic of the whole of Russian society. This ran from the first timid attempts to express their needs and wishes to the development of a political program and attempts (although not very successful) to create political structures capable of conducting modern political activities. The Volga-Ural Tatars played a key role in this process, seeking to head and lead the emerging political movement of a ‘single Muslim nation’.

§ 7. Liberal Parties of the Kazan Guberniya during the First Russian Revolution of 1905–1907

Larisa Ajnutdinova

The sharp aggravation of social class contradictions in the course of the Revolution of 1905–1907 served as a kind of catalyst for the formation of political parties. Besides the already existing revolutionary and democratic parties, there appeared monarchist, liberal and national parties, blocks and alliances on the political stage. And while social democrats and socialist revolutionaries came to the Revolution with a well-established institutional system, Russian liberals had only some experience of working in Zemstvo and in organisations with rather amorphous structure, such as the Union of Liberation and the Union of Zemstvo Constitutionals. Assuming that the form of organisations such as those of the aforementioned unions, was the most acceptable one, liberal leaders tried to unite people, who shared the idea.

The process of structuring liberal parties in Kazan was greatly influenced by the events of October 1905, when the revolutionary mood became the most acute. On 16th October there was a fierce collision between demonstrators and the mounted police in Kazan. Spontaneous skirmishes grew into an open beating of innocent residents, which shocked the civilians and caused the indignation of the City Duma. Despite the savage reprisal with the demonstrators, students, workers and ordinary residents again gathered on the streets of Kazan near the Kazan University on 17th October. This time, the police opened fire. As a result of the massacre, 40 people were killed and wounded [Khasanov, 1965, p. 132]. This night made many people reborn. Peaceful residents, who previously avoided revolutionaries, themselves became
revolutionaries on the next day. They included many liberal-minded individuals, who led by members of the Kazan City Duma accepted the Tsar’s manifesto of 17 October, published the next day, with a special triumph. It was then, when legal political parties began to emerge in the governorate.

The Kazan Committee of the Constitutional Democratic Party (People’s Freedom Party) appeared in October of 1905 [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 199, Inventory 1, File 736, Sheet 6]. Such committees appeared in a number of uyezd centres of the Kazan guberniya in 1905–1906, including Laishevo, Yadrin, Chistopol, and Tsivilk. These committees had to work in difficult conditions. Constant harassment on the part of the local authorities was accompanied by a certain absenteesism of people. Thus, the Chistopol branch of the party had to operate even under the guise of the local department of the Kazan Protectorship of the People’s Sobriety [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 199, Inventory 1, File 445, Sheet 172–reverse]. Such an example was not an exception. At the beginning the Cadets were often forced to hide their political orientation under the shade of such organisations. Local authorities, especially provincial ones, had a negative attitude towards any innovation, such as parties or elections, and considered them to be a temporary concession to the rebelling people. Moreover, the local authorities had various levers of pressure on the public, from administrative to moral ones. Therefore, the information about the activities and number of members of provincial branches of opposition political parties is sometimes so fragmentary and incomparable. Nevertheless, even in accordance with incomplete data, there were more than 700 members of the Constitutional Democratic Party from 1906–1908 in the Kazan guberniya. There were even more proponents of the party, but many of them did not dare to openly declare their affiliation with the opposition party, which was called a left one in official police reports, and everyone, who were somehow involved in it, immediately fell under suspicion.

The number of the party members was rapidly growing. Already at the end of December there emerged a need to structure the organisation within the whole governorate. At the general meeting of the Kazan Cadets held on 31 December of 1905 it was decided to establish a governorate party committee consisting of 20 people (Yu. Akchurin, S. Alkin, I. Babushkin, A. Bat’, M. Venetsianov, A. Vasilyev, A. Simolin, M. Khvostov, G. Telberg, A. Chernoyarov, etc.) [SA RF, Fund 523, Inventory 1, File 214, Sheets 27–28], as well as some delegates from the Kazan guberniya committee were selected to attend the 2nd All-Russian Congress of the Constitutional Democratic Party held in Moscow from 5–11 January 1906 (Y. Akchurin, S. Galikeev, A. Vasilyev, G. Shershenevich). The presence of representatives of the Tatar people in the governorate committee and the delegation to the Congress proves the fact that the local Cadet organisation tried to take into account one of the main characteristics of the governorate, since its very emergence, namely, the multinational structure of its population. Since the very beginning of its activities, the governorate committee tried to unite the proponents of the All-Russian liberal and national movements.

The same meeting adopted a resolution, determining the tactics of Kazan delegates at the party congress. They would have to act as follows: to support the participation of the party in the elections to the 1st State Duma; to announce that the Kazan Cadets considered it necessary to create a subtitle or a motto for the party like those of extreme parties for a more successful campaign among the general population, which would transmit the idea of the party more clearly than the words ‘constitutional and democratic’ did; to declare the desirability of adding a special item into the programme, following the item on the revision of the criminal and civil codes and taking into account the legal characteristics of individual nations related to their religious beliefs (for example, the Islamic order of succession); to report to the Congress that item 1 on the main rights of citizens should have included the words ‘the Tatars, Sarts and others’ after listing
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the nationalities (Poles, Hebrews); to draw the attention of the Congress delegates to the procedure of elections to the representative assembly, ‘in case of a spread of the women right to vote, Muslim women should have been entitled to participate in the elections without violating their national customs’; to offer the Congress that item 7 of the programme ‘on detention of citizens’ should have been formulated according to the British pattern, that is every citizen should be able to report on the illegal arrest of another citizen; to achieve adding a special item providing that the party accepted the principle of minority representation in the elections; to speak for the political responsibility of ministers and to include an item into the programme, providing that the Cabinet of Ministers would be relied upon by the majority of the Legislative Chamber members, etc. [SA RF, Fund 523, Inventory 1, File 72, Sheet 1–reverse].

This resolution shows that during its formation, the Kazan Guberniya Cadet Organisation had a radical viewpoint regarding many national issues. The desire to acquaint the Congress with the problems of other peoples, inhabiting the Russian Empire, primarily the Tatars, demonstrates the growing power of the national liberation movement in the region.

The social composition of the Constitutional Democratic was uneven. To attract new members, its leaders proposed to accept members not based on recommendations, and by filing a conventional note or even a verbal statement to one of the Committee members. Thus, any person could become a party member, if they accepted its programme completely or partially [Istoriya politicheskix partij Rossii, 1994, p. 114]. Speaking of the social basis of the Kazan Guberniya Cadet Organisation during the First Russian Revolution, it should be borne in mind that it was dominated by the intelligentsia: teachers of higher and secondary educational institutions, lawyers, newspaper editors, officials, etc. Moreover, there were many representatives of the middle urban class and liberal landlords. People with a higher legal education made up a large share of the party members. Based on the analysis of the list of electors from the Kazan Guberniya Cadet Party to the State Duma, it is clear that the intelligentsia amounted to about 60% of the total number of the party members, the bourgeoisie—25%, burghers—11%. 90% of the Governorate Committee management consisted of intellectuals, 50% of whom had a legal background.

By this time, the Constitutional Democratic Party had been joined by a significant part of professors and teaching stuff of Kazan higher educational institutions, who wished to transform the society by legal means. According to some reports, in 1905–1908 the ideas of the Constitutional Democratic Party were supported by 22 professors and 10 freelance university lecturers of the Kazan University, 1 teacher of the Veterinary Institute, and 8 teachers of Higher Courses for Women [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 199, Inventory 2, File 200, Sheet 1; File 1273, Sheet 7]. In addition, Zemstvo employees were an active element of the Constitutional Democratic Party. Besides them, the Cadets were supported in Kazan by some representatives of wealthy merchants, in particular, by such merchants as I. Stakhee, brothers A. and D. Chernoyarovs, brothers I. and P. Aleksandrovs. There were also representatives of Tatar businessmen and landowners, including I. Kazakov, B. Apanayev, M. Galeev, S. Aitov, etc. On 4 June 1906 at the meeting of the Central Committee on the financial support of the organisation, G. Shershenevich specifically spoke about this [Protocoly‘ CK, 1990, pp. 142, 149], noting that the Tatars were especially attracted in the party programme by the item on cultural and national autonomy.

The local Cadet organisation was also supported by some students of the Kazan University and the Veterinary Institute. They usually united in various legal study groups. Thus, the university law circle almost fully consisted of Cadets [Volzhskiy listok, 1907, August 19].

One of the main practical tasks in the activities of any political force during the First Russian Revolution lied in the development and promotion of their ideas. This work was of particular importance for those parties and
movements, which did not fix rigid organisational requirements in their charters. Therefore, the publishing activity became one of the main forms of propaganda for the Cadets. The Constitutional Democratic Party management was always particularly interested in the state of its local committees in terms of availability of promotional literature therein and establishing of their own publishing activities. At one of the first meetings, the Kazan Committee raised a question of the need to work out and publish popular leaflets about the programme and the current issues. Therefore, already on 11 November 1905 they appealed to the Central Committee of the Party with a request to send them literature and instructions. In response, the Central Committee immediately sent them 100 copies of all the party publications, 100 copies of the party programme, 25 copies of the charter, a list of the Central Committee members, and 1 copy of each circular [SA RF, Fund 523, Inventory 1, File 214, Sheets 26–27].

Immediately after its formation, the Kazan Guberniya Committee established permanent contact with the Central Committee. Agitation literature was constantly sent to Kazan to the address of Bashmakov brothers’ store. N. Bashmakov, the owner of the store, was a party member and agreed to help in disseminating the party literature by selling it in his store and sending it to other book sellers. The members of the governorate organisation purchased books in his store at the expense of the electoral committee for subsequent free distribution in the city and uyezds [SA RF, Fund 523, Inventory 1, File 214, Sheets 27–27 reverse]. The Cadets managed to quickly solve the issue of periodical publications. Reporting on the All-Russian Party Congress on the affairs of the Kazan Guberniya Organisation in January 1906, professor G. Shershenevich noted that there was a party newspaper in Kazan, published in the Tatar language and called the ‘Kazansky Vecher’ (it was assumed that it would be published in two languages—Russian and Tatar, but they managed to publish only the first issues in such a way) [S‘ezdy’ i konferencii, 1997, p. 57]. S. Alkin, a member of the Cadet Party Guberniya Committee, was the publisher of the newspaper. In addition, already in December 1905 the Vecherneye Ekho newspaper was published in Kazan, which was definitely related to the Cadets, if we judge by the topics of the articles: the list of its regular authors included members of the governorate party organisation, such as I. Mandelstam, V. Ivanovsky, N. Gusev, and G. Telberg, etc. Thus, already at the end of 1905 local Cadets established publishing activities and communication with the centre.

Once the Vecherneye Ekho newspaper was closed in July 1906, the Kazan Cadets began publishing the Kazansky Vecher newspaper, which was officially considered a party body. Its publisher was N. Gusev, a secretary of the party governorate committee. Thanks to his activities, the Cadet Party publications under various names (‘Kazansky Vecher’, ‘Volzhsko-Kamskaya Rech’, ‘Kamsko-Volzhskaya Rech’) were constantly published until December 1917. The governorate authorities twice tried to get rid of this man, sending him beyond the Kazan guberniya. However, despite this, N. Gusev returned and continued leading the publication of the party press [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 1, Inventory 6, File 767, sheets 33–reverse, 35].

Furthermore, the most active members of the local Constitutional Democratic Party, who included such outstanding figures as G. Shershenevich, M. Khvostov, I. Mandelstam, A. Zavadsky, A. Bat’, S. Alkin, Y. Akchurin, I. Babushkin, N. Gusev, worked directly with people at election rallies, meetings, lectures, etc. The Guberniya Committee arranged lectures on acute problems of the modern time, which were mainly read by professors and university lecturers. The party members were actively involved in election meetings both in Kazan and in uyezds. They also frequently attended public meetings.

The process of forming the ‘Union of 17 October’ in Kazan was going simultaneously with organisations in the capital. On 10 November 1905, the governorate zemsky uprava held a meeting with the participation of representatives of Zemstvo Assemblies voting members,
lecturers, etc., including M. Kapustin, I. Praksin, V. Razumovsky, K. Zakroev, L. Okhromenko, P. Belkovitch, I. Petyaev, P. Gerken, M. Depreys, A. Boratynskly, F. Butenin, E. Sofronov, etc. After discussing the political situation in the country and the region, they decided to unite in an organisation, called the ‘Kazan Party of the October Manifesto’, proclaiming ‘the termination of anarchism in Russia, transition to creative activities, pacification of the country and support of the government in its intention to implement the freedom and reforms provided in the October Manifesto’ as its fundamental task. At the same time, they noted that they were an independent organisation intending to ‘join the Union of 17 October’, according to the major foundations of their program [Kazansky Telegraph, 1905, 19 November].

Assuming that the Union of 17 October did not take into account the characteristic features of the local population in its programme, the Kazan Octobrist Party developed its own version involving a number of Tatar activists headed by merchant A. Saydashev [Obnovlenie, 15 March 1906]. On 13 December 1905, the Party’s general meeting approved the final version of the programme; M. Kapustin, a professor of the Kazan University, was elected to the position of the Party Chairman, while merchant S. Aitov and nobleman V. Markovnikov were elected to the positions of Deputy Chairmen; a governorate committee consisting of 18 people was formed. It should also be noted that the members of the ‘Kazan Party of the October Manifesto’ managed to open a party office in Chistopol in January 1906, chaired by A. Logutov, a mayor and a merchant, with V. Goppe, an agronomist of the Chistopol uprava, being the secretary [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 199, Inventory 1, File 445, Sheets 172, 229 reverse, 230]. They did not manage to create local party offices in other uyezds of the governorate, although there were many noblemen, landowners and entrepreneurs supporting the party. The number of members of the governorate organisation amounted to 540 people at this time [Kazansky Telegraph, 17 January 1906].

The core of the party was formed by professors and the Zemstvo intelligentsia, thanks to whom the programme of the Kazan Octobrist Party differed from the programme of the 'Union of 17 October' by its more democratic nature. This led to the fact that the Kazan Octobrists found themselves on the left wing of the All-Russian Octobrist Movement. Despite this, the party reflected the political and economic interests of upper and medium landowners and commercial and industrial classes, which reduced its popularity almost to zero in the conditions of a continuing revolution and fierce competition on the part of socialists and Cadets. In Kazan guberniya, as in the whole country, the party was socially based on noblemen and representatives of the commercial, industrial and financial bourgeoisie, whose number in the governorate was insignificant. Interest in the party was initially shown by representatives of the Tatar bourgeoisie. According to the Kazansky Telegraph, the party meeting dated 13 December 1905 was attended by Muslims, who, having listened to speeches of speakers, noted that the Cadet programme reflected their hopes and aspirations better and therefore they left the meeting [Kazansky Telegraph, 15 December 1905]. Most Tatars were deterred from the Octobrist Party by the lack of a real programme for the solution of the national issue. Therefore, the Octobrist Party did not become popular among the Tatars. And due to the fact that its programme primarily represented the rights of upper classes of the population, it was not supported by the peasantry, and thus remained a purely urban party.

The leaders of the ‘Kazan Party of the 17 October Manifesto’ paid much attention to the arrangement of agitation and publication activities. The Obnovlenie newspaper was the party publication of the Kazan Octobrists, for which B. Varneke, a professor and one of the most active party members, was an ideological leader. Employees of the newspapers were mostly professors and lecturers, including V. Gruzdev, P. Krotov, S. Shestakov, A. Bogoroditsky, and N. Petrovsky. In 1905–1907, the
ideas of moderate liberalism were also reflected in the Kazansky Telegraph newspaper.

The peak of the activity of local liberal parties falls on the time of the election campaigns to the 1st (February–March 1906) and the 2nd (January–February 1907) State Dumas. These months are marked by the activity peak of the liberal parties, especially in the province.

The Kazan guberniya Committee of the Constitutional Democratic Party had to conduct the election campaign in conditions of repressions that struck its members in the period of winter-spring 1906. So, the Chistopol office reported about the arrest of the candidates planned unofficially for the State Duma. Besides, ‘2 doctors, 12 teachers of zemsky schools and 2 teachers of a city school’ were dismissed for propaganda in their favour [Bulletin of the party of national freedom, 12 March 1906, pp. 161–162]. A similar situation also arose in Kazan. On 5 March one of the most active members of the committee, Y. Akchurin, was arrested here [Bulletin of the party of national freedom, 19 March 1906, pp. 207–208]. In such a way the authorities tried to undermine the authority of the Constitutional Democratic Party in the Governorate and not to let their candidates into the State Duma. Such incidents took place in other cities of the region, too.

A partial solution to this problem for the liberals, especially for the Cadets, became their participation in the electoral assemblies, which the local authorities couldn't forbid because of their legitimacy and commitment. For almost all the social and political forces participating in the election campaign, they became not only a serious challenge for their political maturity, but also an indicator of their popularity rating among the masses. The leaders of the Governorate Committee of the Constitutional Democratic Party understood it well, and therefore, sent the most popular propagandists to the assemblies. Such members of the Guberniya Committee as A. Bat', G. Telberg, A. Vasilyev, M. Khvostov, S. Alkin were the most prominent figures there. The local periodicals repeatedly reported about the animated debates at these meetings, success and failure of their opponents. During the election campaign to the 1st State Duma the main struggle for votes took place in the Kazan guberniya, between the Cadet parties in alliance with ‘Ittifak al-muslimin’ and the Octobrist Party.

The local Cadets, aiming at getting the support of the Tatar national movement at pre-election assemblies, especially where the Tatar population prevailed, actively criticised the autocracy for the policy of oppression of the non-Russian peoples. So, the Kazan Chief of Police, reporting to the Governor about the meeting of the employees of public and government agencies concerning the State Duma elections, which had taken place on 9 January 1906 in Kazan, noted that the representative of the Guberniya Committee of the Constitutional Democratic Party A. Bat’, speaking at the meeting, criticised the government, saying: ‘What kind of law it is, if, giving freedom and equality, it at the same time makes the Tatars write the Tatar words in the Russian alphabet at school’ [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 1, Inventory 4, File 2107, Sheet 138]. After his speech a police officer, having seen a revolutionary sedition in it, considered it necessary to close the meeting. The repressive policy of the authorities towards the Constitutional Democratic Party during the 1st State Duma election period increased their popularity in the region even more.

During the election campaign to the 1st State Duma in the Kazan guberniya, the moderately liberal parties created an electoral alliance, which included the Kazan Octobrist Party, ‘The union of pastors …’ and the Commerce and Industry Party. The leading position in the alliance belonged to the Octobrist Party. Thus, the number of their active supporters increased to 1200 people. Despite the growth in number and the financial support from the commercial and industrial part of the population, the influence of the Octobrist Party in the Kazan guberniya was less significant, than that of the Constitutional Democratic Party. And except for the support of the local authorities, their
situation could have become even less stable. The formation of the pre-election alliance predetermined the final merging of these parties into ‘The Kazan Party of the Manifesto of 17 October.’

It should be emphasized, that the Constitutional Democratic Party and ‘The union of 17 October’ were interested in the support of ‘It-tifaka al-muslimin’, as there were several millions of real voters. It was especially true for such regions as the Kazan guberniya, where the Tatars made up the 31% of the population. To win over the Tatar population, the Kazan Committee of the Constitutional Democratic Party purposefully pursued their interests before the party leaders. As a result, some changes were made even to the party’s programme. The actions of the Kazan Committee of the Constitutional Democratic Party led to almost absolute support of the Tatar population of the Kazan guberniya at the elections to the 1st State Duma. The Kazan Octobrist Party, having realised after their defeat at the elections, that the Tatar people’s support was one of the key factors promoting the victory of the Cadets in the guberniya, noted that ‘The union of 17 October’, would have probably appointed not one, but ten, twenty worthy Mohammedans as candidates if there had been any Mohammedans among its members. But the union didn’t manage to attract them, despite all the efforts [Obnovlenie, 1906, 15 May].

As a result of the 1st State Duma election campaign, the Cadets won with advantage in the Kazan guberniya. Among those, who became the deputies of the 1st State Duma from the Kazan guberniya, we would point out the members of the Guberniya Committee of the Constitutional Democratic party G. Shershenevich and A. Vasilyev, who actively worked in the Duma commissions on various draft laws. So, A. Vasilyev actively participated in the elaboration of the draft law on the agricultural issue, while G. Shershenevich worked on the draft law on the freedom of assembly. Besides, A. Vasilyev was elected the secretary of the Duma Food Commission for Famine Elimination, created in June 1906.

After the defeat at the elections the activity of ‘The Kazan Party of the Manifesto of 17 October’ almost stopped. The Committee was disorganised. Out of the six offices of the party in Kazan, which had emerged during the election campaign at the polling stations, only the office of the 4th polling station operated. Here the best forces of the organisation were concentrated under the chairmanship of university professor P. Krotov. Since the 3rd of September 1906 it was headed by professor B. Varneke [Kazansky Telegraf, 1906, 7 September]. This office actually took the lead in the entire organisation. The membership of the party also considerably decreased: first of all, it was left by the come-and-go people. The gendarme department estimated the membership of the organisation at that time as 22 people [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 1, Inventory 6, File 414, Sheets 18, 22–reverse].

The activity of the Guberniya Committee of the Constitutional Democratic Party considerably decreased. Having linked their fate with the activities of the State Duma, they patiently waited for the outcomes of its work. Many of the party members at that period focused on working in public organisations, which aimed at the development of education and culture. Here we can point out the aforementioned Legal Society, and also the Kazan Society of Public Universities, established in 1906 on the initiative of N. Zagoskin. Besides, there appeared the Kazan Society of Education Promotion and many others. Under the auspices of these organisations, educational courses, lectures, excursions were being organised, as well as libraries, reading rooms, bookstores and shops were being opened [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 199, Inventory 2, File 907].

After the dissolution of the 1st State Duma, in connection with the forthcoming election campaign to the 2nd State Duma in the autumn of 1906, the activities of liberals revived in Kazan. At the initiative of the Samara and Kazan guberniya Committees of the Octobrist Party, the Volga Region Congress of the Octobrists was held in September in Kazan (10–12 Sep-
tember). The congress was attended by delegates from Samara (S. Bogushevsky and T. Shishkov), Simbirsk, Maloga (prince I. Kura-kin), Nizhny Novgorod (A. Stanovoy), and Moscow. There were also A. Guchkov and A. Belkin from the Central Committee [Pervyj Povolzhskij s’ezd, 1906, p. 7]. The congress participants discussed the party program, its charter and further tactics. The resolutions of the congress reflected the attitude of the Volga Region Octobrist Party’s organisations towards the existing political landscape in the country and in the region. ‘The brief political program of the Union of 17 October’ became the result of this work.

In November 1906 a student (university) fraction was formed at the Guberniya Committee of the Constitutional Democratic Party, which was headed by students K. Belilin, N. Klyuchnikov, N. Utekhin, etc. [Bulletin of the party of national freedom, 30 November 1906, p. 2111]. The fraction’s position at the university was modest, it took the third place by the number of its supporters. So, at February elections to the Central University Body of 1906, out of 1056 votes cast only 93 votes were given to the Cadets, which allowed them to nominate one deputy (459 votes were given to the Revolutionary Socialists and 410 votes to the Social Democrats). The position of the Octobrist Party in the university was even more deplorable: they got only one vote [Kazansky Vecher, 12 January 1907]. A small Cadet group was also formed at the Veterinary Institute.

The Kazan Office of the Constitutional Democratic Party during this period was not only suppressed by state authorities, but also torn by the internal controversy. So, in January 1907 some more moderate liberals left it and founded the office of ‘The Party of Peaceful Renovation’ in Kazan. However, owing to its small number, it did not play any significant role in the social and political life of the Kazan guberniya. It was headed by the lieutenant general I. Pankratov, a former member of the Constitutional Democratic Party. Despite the withdrawal from the Constitutional Democratic Party, they couldn’t get rid of its ideological influence. At one of their meetings in January 1907, the members of the ‘Peaceful Renovation’ discussed the issue of the relations with other parties. By a majority vote, they decided not to establish any relations with the Octobrist Party and the parties of greater left-wing orientation than the Cadets [Kazansky Vecher, 12 January 1907]. And up to its voluntary dissolution during the election campaign to the 3rd State Duma, the Kazan Office of ‘The Party of Peaceful Renovation’ was completely under the influence of the Guberniya Committee of the Constitutional Democratic Party.

During the pre-election struggle to the 2nd State Duma, the Cadets in the Kazan guberniya once again managed to leave behind their main opponents, the Octobrist Party. However, the course of the last pre-election campaign in the capital of the Guberniya—Kazan—delivered absolutely unexpected results for the Cadets. At the city electoral assembly the Octobrist Party managed to create a decisive advantage and nominate 46 candidates as electors, while the Muslims nominated 27 candidates and the Cadets—only 7. A university professor, the leader of the Kazan Octobrist Party M. Kapustin was elected the Deputy from Kazan. In spite of the fact that from 10 deputies from the Kazan guberniya it was the only deputy from the Octobrists’ Party, the victory won in Kazan became a real breakthrough for them. The Kazan Octobrist Party played a significant role at the elections in Samara, where the professor B. Varneke was sent on a mission. Due to his efforts, the local Octobrists also managed to get their deputy from Samara to the State Duma.

The defeat of the Cadets in Kazan was caused by a variety of reasons: first, unlike the Cadets, the Octobrists, like during the previous campaign, had concentrated all the forces only in Kazan; secondly, the Cadets had to act semi-legally, being under the threat of repressions by the local authorities; thirdly, the population became disappointed in the parliamentary system itself, in connection with the tsar regime’s disrespect for it and the absence of any real
results; fourthly, the Cadets, having made the Vyborg Proclamation, frightened off a considerable part of moderate city electorate.

It should be noted that professor M. Kapustin represented the left flank of the Octobrist Party in the Duma, which was closer to the Cadets. In the Duma he was distinguished by his activity, which earned him a great popularity in the liberal environment. He was elected the chairman of the Octobrist Party’s fraction and, being its leader, tried to lead the fraction in the way of cooperation with the Cadets. V. Purishkevich even made up an expression as ‘an Octobrist of the Kapustin brand’, characterising those members of the union who stretched the constitutional principles ‘like rubber, infinitely to the left’[Purishkevich, 1907, pp. 5, 9].

After the end of the election campaign to the 2nd State Duma, all the attention of the political life of the liberals, like the first time, was turned to the activities of the deputies in the State Duma. The periodicals quite thoroughly covered all the issues, which were discussed in the legislature. The local activists tried to give detailed explanations to those projects, which came from the deputies of their party fraction.

The hopes of the government that the second Duma will be more obedient, than the first one, did not come true. The oppositional majority did not accept the government declaration on the reforms, that the new State Duma had to deal with. Like in the previous Duma, the agricultural question became the centre of attention of the deputies, and its discussion dragged on for several months. In the conditions of the revolutionary movement recession, on 3 June 1907 Nicholas II issued a decree about the Duma dissolution and the change of the electoral law. The true reason of the Duma dissolution consisted in the impossibility of cooperation, both for the government and for the body of popular representation, in particular, on the issue of the agrarian reform implementation. So ended the most significant activity period of the political parties of the Russian Empire.

Thus, in the years of the First Russian Revolution, the main liberal parties were institutionalised in the Kazan guberniya. The events of the revolution of 1905–1907 served as a catalyst for the formation of these parties, and the reforms of the existing regime according to the liberal program became the purpose of their activities. The radical wing of the liberal movement in the Kazan guberniya was presented by the Constitutional Democratic Party centred around the Kazan intellectuals. Despite being small, it managed to quickly organise the propaganda, which resulted in the formation of numerous offices of the party in uyezds. The moderate wing of the liberal movement was presented by ‘The Kazan Committee of the Manifesto of 17 October’ which, despite being close in program with ‘The Union of 17 October’, claimed its independence and adopted its own program and charter. The region was peculiar by the formation of a national party on a confessional basis ‘Ittifak of al-muslimin’, which, having found that the Constitutional Democratic Party had a like spirit, fully supported it at the State Duma elections. Besides the political parties, the liberals took an active part in the activities of public organisations, formed in abundance during the revolution of 1905–1907. Here they actively engaged in charity work and the promotion of their ideas.

The revolution of 1905–1907 enabled the liberals to go beyond the economic problems they had to deal with in the bodies of the local self-government and come out with political demands. The liberal movement expanded beyond the narrow borders of Zemstvo, entered the political arena and declared about its determination to struggle for the power within the existing legislation for the purposes of reformation.
§ 8. The right-wing monarchic (Black Hundred) movement in Kazan and the Kazan guberniya in 1905–1917.

Igor Alekseev

The right-wing monarchic (Black Hundred) movement in Russia: entry into the political arena. The right-wing monarchic movement in the Russian Empire emerged in 1905–1907, as a reaction to the attempts to perform the revolutionary and liberal modernisation of Russian society. The political crisis of the beginning of the 20th century, which created a real threat to the existence not only of the autocratic regime, but also to the monarchist system in general, was the main prerequisite for the appearance of right-wing monarchic organisations both in the centre and in the regions. In response, representatives of various social, national, religious and professional groups in the Russian Empire, interested in the ongoing preservation of the traditional institutes of state power and social order, started to unite. Due to this the right-wing monarchic (Black Hundred) movement became widespread and involved all the classes.

The right-wing monarchists Chernosotentsy (Black Hundreds) were guided by the triune conservative principle ‘Orthodoxy. Autocracy. Nationality’. Their ideology united the right-wing traditions of Slavophilia, official patriotism, a conservative movement of Orthodox Christian and religious thought, and also some elements of political populism. The right-wing monarchists supported: the restoration of the pre-imperial autocratic form of rule (which they partly idealised, opposing Western European absolutism, constitutional monarchism and the republican form of rule, and partly modernised, bestowing anti-bureaucratic and anti-bourgeois properties to it), limited only by the ‘moral and compulsive’ regulations of the Zemsky Sabor, a body of discussion of bills, consisting of all classes. They also advocated the preservation and the maintenance of the position of the Orthodoxy and conservation of the unitary structure (‘unity and indivisibility’) of Russia by means of granting exclusive rights to the Russian people and gradual assimilation of foreigners (except the Hebrew Jews, whom they offered first to take beyond "the habitat border", and then to resettle them all beyond the borders of the state).

The right-wing monarchic movement obtained its second, everyday name from the phrase ‘Black Hundred’ (an ancient form of self-government of the Russian people in a community, in a broad sense it is the tax-paying (tyagly) town population in Rus’ (Ruthenia)), to which the autocracy’s opponents—the liberals and socialists—viewed as pejorative. At the same time not only representatives of the right-wing monarchic social and political organisations were often called Chernosotentsy (Black Hundreds), but also all those who adhered to conservative, anti-revolutionary and anti-liberal views.

Most historians consider the ‘Russian Assembly’ to be the first right-wing monarchic (Black Hundred) organisation, created in St. Petersburg at the end of 1900–beginning of 1901, which united, in the main, representatives of the Russian intelligentsia, noblemen, officials and the Orthodox clergy of the capital. The largest and most well-known Black Hundred organisations of the Russian Empire were: ‘The Union of the Russian People’ (created in March-April 1905; the first chairman of the Executive Council was the count P. Sheremetev), ‘The Russian Monarchist Party’ (created in spring 1905, from 1907 it was called ‘The Russian Monarchic Union’, the first chairman was V. Gringmut), ‘The Union of the Russian People’ (URP) (created in November 1905, the main organiser was V. Gringmut), ‘The Russian Monarchic Union’, the first chairman was V. Gringmut, ‘The Union of the Russian People’ (URP) (created in November 1905, the first chairman of the High Council—A. Dubrovin, also a Zemsky activist from the Kazan guberniya N. Yazykov was included into the first membership of the High Council), ‘The Russian National Union of Mikhail Arkhangels’ (RNUMA) (created at the beginning of 1908, the chairman of the Main Chamber was...
V. Purishkevich) and the ‘All-Russian Dubrovin Union of the Russian People’ (ADURP) (created in August 1912, the chairman of the High Council was A. Dubrovin).

In different parts and governorates of the Russian Empire the process of forming the right-wing monarchical organisations was taking place with varying intensity, which was, as a rule, caused by their internal characteristics.

**The emergence of the right-wing monarchical (Black Hundred) organisations in the city of Kazan and the Kazan guberniya.** Kazan department of ‘The Russian Assembly’. In the Kazan guberniya, where the national, religious, social and economic contradictions had rather deep roots, the process of forming the right-wing monarchical organisations was performed almost simultaneously with the process in the capital. The following factors had the most notable influence on their political shape and programme requirements: firstly, and to a large degree, the agrarian character of the Kazan guberniya (with the prevalence of a communal form of land tenure, more than a sixfold predominance of peasants, as well as frequent crop failures and problems related to peasant landlessness and land scarcity). Secondly, the ethnic and confessional characteristics (characterised by the relative quantitative balance of the Russian, Tatar and Chuvash population, the growth of national consciousness of the Tatar people and its bourgeoisie, creating ever more considerable competition for the local Russian capital and also the existence of the implicit and explicit confessional, cultural and religious contradictions between the Muslims and the Christians).

At the end of 1904, on the wave of escalating confrontation in society, it was decided to create in Kazan, on the basis of Kazan Association of Sobriety ‘(KAS) (formed on 30 July 1892; the chairman of the Committee was the treasurer and the printer of the Imperial Kazan University A. Solovyov) the governorate's first right-wing monarchical, national Russian political organisation—the Kazan department of ‘The Russian Assembly’ (KDRA), the final official registration of which for a number of reasons took place only in November–December 1905. In the collection of works under the name ‘The Materials to the History of the Kazan Temperance Association and Other Associations’ which was issued in 1911 in Kazan, it was reported that: ‘As early as 1904, being aware of the preparation for the unrest in which mainly Hebrews were involved, ‘The Kazan Temperance Association’ decided to found in Kazan ‘The Russian Assembly’. In 1905, in order to influence Russian society, carried away by the Jewish movement, it increased the number of copies of the magazine ‘Deyatel’ and began to issue the newspaper ‘Rus’ Pravoslavnaya i Samoderzhavnaya’ (‘Orthodox and Autocratic Rus’).

The first general meeting of the members of ‘The Russian Assembly’ in Kazan, which announced the official opening of the KDRA, took place in a festive atmosphere on 6 December 1905—on the day of the Name Day of Emperor Nicholas II. The members of the Council were chosen there, and they included: the chairman of the Council—A. Solovyov, his comrade (deputy)—S. Babushkin and the secretary—V. Belilin. A. Solovyov remained as chairman until the cessation of the KDRA’s activities. His comrades at different times were: member of the Chamber of Appeals S. Babushkin, professor P. Znamensky, custodian of the Kazan city museum R. Rizpolozhensky and professor N. Katanov. The secretaries of the department, apart from V. Belilin, were: the people’s educator V. Sukhanov, the priest N. Troitsky and the merchant F. Grebenshchikov. The treasurer was the honourary citizen by birth A. Tyufilin.

Apart from them, at different times, the following people were elected to the KDRA Council: the rector of the Kazan Spiritual Academy (KSA), the bishop from Chistopol Anatoly (A. Grisyuk), the associate professor of KDA Varsonofy (A. Luzin), N. Galkin-Vrasskovy, archimandrite Gury (A. Stepanov), the hegumen of the Kazan Spaso-Preobrazhensky monastery (I. Udalov), P. Kuvshinov, L. Losev, priest P. Rozhdestvensky, E. Frishman and others. Honourary members of the KDRA were archbishops from Kazan and Sviyazhsk Dimitry (D.
Sambikin) and Nicanor (N. Kamensky), the archbishop from Volyn and Zhitomir Anthony (A. Khrapovitsky), the bishop from Vologda and Totemsk Nikon (N. Rozhdestvensky), the bishop from Chistopol Alexy (A. Dorodnitsyn), the bishop from Mamadysh Andrey (A. Ukhtomsky) and the Kazan merchant V. Bulygin.

The KDRA was considered one of the most influential and reputable departments of ‘The Russian Assembly’, though its membership was always small; from 20 to 60 members. However, at different times, it directly controlled and supervised about ten public and socio-political organisations (including ones with a very branched structure), some of which united several thousand members. The best known and biggest of organisations, de facto subordinate to the KDRA, was KAS. Its members were informed at the suggestion of its Committee that they had to join either ‘The Russian Assembly’ or URP. As a result, a peculiar hybrid of a political right-wing monarchic (Black Hundred) organisation and religious, educational and charitable society was formed.

In 1905 The KDRA began to publish active counterrevolutionary right-wing monarchic propaganda in its periodicals and KAS editions (magazine ‘Deyatel’, newspaper ‘Rus’ Pravoslavnaya i Samoderzhavnaya’ (“Orthodox and Autocratic Rus”), but being criticised by the liberal and left-wing newspapers (‘The Volga Leaflet’, ‘The Russian Word’ and others), initially it strongly refused to acknowledge that it belonged to the ‘Black Hundred’. Up to October 1905 the confrontation between the right-wing monarchists and their political opponents took place in Kazan via newspaper and magazine polemic. The liberal and left-wing press attributed the beating of students in Kazan in February 1905 to the ‘Black Hundred’. However, there is no documentary evidence about the organisation and participation of the KDRA members in this incident.

The participation of the right-wing monarchists in the October events of 1905 in Kazan. The Kazan ‘Royal-Popular Russian Society’: ‘The Society of churchwardens and parish trustees of the city of Kazan’. The history of the right-wing monarchic (Black Hundred) movement in Kazan and the Kazan guberniya can be divided into five time periods: ideological and preparatory (the end of the 19th century–the first half of October 1905), organisational (the latter half of October 1905–the beginning of February 1906), united (February 1906–November 1907), confrontational (November 1907–October, 1912) and destructive (October 1912–February 1917).

The immediate impetus for the institutionalisation of the Black Hundred organisations was the publication of the Imperial Manifesto on 17 October 1905, followed by the revolutionary events in Kazan, which ended with an open confrontation on 21 October 1905 between the representatives of the socialist and liberal parties and their "militia", controlling the Kazan City Council, and the ‘patriotic demonstration’, junkers and police. As a result of the mass rising of the right-wing monarchists, supported by the governorate administration, a so-called ‘Kazan republic’ in the city was liquidated and the old order was restored.

These events were followed by a new ‘patriotic demonstration’ of thousands of people which took place on 22 October 1905 (on the day of celebration of the Kazan icon of the Mother of God), where the active role belonged to the local Tatar population led by the Islamic clergy (headed by the mullah G. Barudi), the merchant A. Sadishev and other famous people. When the demonstration dispersed, on the streets of Kazan a crowd gathered, mainly consisting of teenagers, who, on 23 October 1905 broke into the warehouses and religious buildings belonging to the Hebrews. In the first half of November 1905 there were some incidents of reprisals against the revolutionary propagandists in the city of Arsk and in the Chistopol uyezd.

The union of all the counterrevolutionary forces of Kazan led to the creation of the ‘Committee for the protection of legal order’ (‘Party for the protection of legal order’), which soon produced the moderate monarchists who formed ‘The Kazan Party of the Manifesto of 17 October’. On the basis of the
remaining right-wing element the independent Black Hundred organisation—‘The Kazan Royal-Popular Russian Society’ (according to the charter—‘Kazan Royal–Popular Russian Society’) (KRPRS) was created, the decision about the ‘renaming’ was taken on 4 December 1905 at the third meeting of a ‘group of united house owners and residents of Kazan’, which took place in the arena of the Kazan Infantry Junkers’ School under the chairmanship of professor V. Zalesky of Imperial Kazan University. From the very beginning of its existence the KRPRS asserted itself as a right-wing monarchical organisation, one of the first (according to its own version—the first) to decide ‘to take on the Black Hundred terms and to recognize them as honourable’.

At the same time the KRPRS made a number of statements, including on the desirability of keeping the autocracy of the imperial power in all its integrity and the inexpediency of conducting popular and direct State Duma elections. Besides, the resolution which acknowledged the need to legalise and take under control ‘the economic strikes and labour troubles not accompanied by violence against the character and property of both owners of companies and their administration and the workers who don’t sympathise with the strikes’, and the closure of both state and private railroads and postal and telegraph offices. They should be recognised as a ‘a criminal act, high treason, requiring strict measures of prosecution’. This event served as the reason for the KRPRS to address the acting Kazan governor A. Reinbot on 11 December 1905, offering to render active assistance to the administration in stopping revolutionary propaganda. After that the leaders of society were invited to have a private talk with him.

The main initiator and inspirer of the creation of the society was professor V. Zalesky, a nobleman by birth, who was elected on 4 December 1905 to chairman of the Board of the KRPRS, and who headed the society for its entire existence. The Council, elected by the society, which nominated the chairman, the secretary and the treasurer from its members, administered the affairs of the KRPRS. 9 people—representatives of various classes and professions—were the first members of the Council: professor V. Zalesky (chairman), private lawyer S. Sokolovsky (secretary), secretary of the Kazan guberniya nobility assembly A. Dubrovsky, I. Panfilov, teacher and house owner P. Moykin, peasants P. Maksimov and M. Saza- nov, priest N. Troitsky and merchant A. Kalyagin. The honorary members of the KRPRS were: the Kazan governor M. Strizhevsry, the Ufa governor A. Klyucharyov, the Kazan vice governor D. Kobeko, the bishop from Chistopol Alexiy (A. Dorodnitsyn), prince A. Sheherbatov and others.

The social and class composition of the members of the society varied from noblemen by birth to peasants and workers. The number of KRPRS members was determined by its leaders according to two indicators—the number of ‘listed’ and ‘unlisted’ members: as a result, the number of society members is estimated in various sources from 1.5 to 15 thousand people. At the same time, indirect data shows that the number of ‘listed’ society members at the peak of its activity did not exceed two thousand people, which anyway made the KRPRS one of the largest Governorate right-wing monarchical (Black Hundred) organisations in the Russian Empire.

The peak of the social and political activity of the KRPRS was in 1906–1907. The KRPRS meetings which mostly demonstrations regularly took place in spacious rooms (mainly, in the arena of the Kazan Infantry Junker’s School located in the Kremlin), that enabled them to attract the general public and choral groups, and also to arrange mass processions. In January 1906 ‘The Astrakhan National Monarchist party’ claimed its intention to join the ‘like-minded’ KRPRS (the chairman of the Council was the merchant N. Tikhonovich-Savitsky). On 11 February 1906 at the meeting of monarchists of Ufa it was decided to create ‘The Ufa Royal-Popular Russian Society’ (the chairman of the board was the merchant K. Laptev), which entirely accepted the KRPRS programme and ‘united’ with it.
On 1 (or 4) December 1905 one more independent organisation—the ‘Society of churchwardens and parish trustees of the city of Kazan’ (SCPT) was created. The society was formed according to a resolution adopted at a meeting which took place on 1 (according to other sources—4) December 1905 in Kazan, with more than twenty churchwardens, parish trustees and honourable parishioners of the Kazan churches, ‘for the peaceful realisation of the great beneficence granted by His Majesty the Emperor to the Russian people and for the restoration of peace in our troubled and difficult time’.

The Council administered the affairs of the SCPT, and from the day the society was created until his death in April 1910, its chairman was the merchant A. Kukarnikov. In November 1906 he was also elected to chairman of the board of the department of URP in Bogolyubov, operating in the Admiralty Sloboda of Kazan. In June 1910 L. Matveevsky, an honourary citizen by birth, was elected to this post. The first membership of the Council of the SCPT, besides A. Kukarnikov, included three more merchants, famous in Kazan—V. Bulygin (‘taking the place of the chairman’), I. Perov and E. Sofronov (treasurer), and also the Kazan theological seminary teacher A. Kalinovsky (secretary). Some SCPT members joined at the same time Kazan moderate and monarchic organisations (‘The Kazan Party of the Manifesto of 17 October’ or the Kazan guberniya department of the ‘Commerce and Industry Party’).

The first resolution and the manifest of the SCPT appealed to all Russian people (‘and first of all, to the churchwardens of the uyezd cities and settlements of the Kazan guberniya’) to join the union ‘for the protection of the Holy Church, the adored Monarch and the government for the fastest and most peaceful realisation of the Most Gracious manifestos of 17 October and 3 November’. In the next documents (including the programme adopted by the SCPT) the ideological assumptions of society acquired a complete right-wing monarchic (Black Hundred) orientation. The main goal of the SCPT was to revive the Orthodox parish organisations and turn them into the All-Russian ‘church and state’ unit (by changing the system of elections, conducting them in parishes). From 5 December 1905 to 25 August 1906, 153,000 copies of manifestos and resolutions of the society were circulated (in the south of the country too).

The SCPT sharply condemned the revolution, the republican form of rule, the strikes and labour troubles (especially on the railroads, post and telegraph offices), having emphasised its favourable attitude towards the army. It also called on all the Russian people (and also the Old Believers and Muslims) to gather in their parishes (respectively—in the houses of worship under the leadership of mullahs) and to form local committees of the society. However, due to the creation of the moderately monarchic ‘Union of pastors and churchwardens of Kazan’ as a counterweight to the SCPT, the efforts to attract representatives of the local Orthodox clergy and to revive the parish organisations did not yield the expected results. Nevertheless, in the first year of the SCPT its ranks included: 29 churchwardens, 17 parish trustees, 74 authorised representatives from 22 city parishes of Kazan, and also ‘by public decision’ there were the parishioners of 11 settlements and 7 villages of five uyezds of the Kazan guberniya, the servants of ‘the Usady manor of the Zhuravlyovs’ (the settlement of Usady of the Kazan uyezd of the Kazan guberniya), ‘the Cheremyshevo manor of the baroness Buksevyden’ (the village of Cheremyshevskii of the Laishevo uyezd of the Kazan guberniya) and other people. According to the estimates of the Kazan chief of police, on 10 October 1906 the number of SCPT members was ‘up to 500 people’, however, later it dramatically decreased. Shortly, thanks to the similarity of policy guidelines and the friendly contacts of many members of the SCPT and the KDRA, these two organisations became closer, and then the former, while formally remaining independent, turned into some kind of "appendage" of the latter.

In total, in the first year of its existence there were about 2,7 thousand people in the
Kazan right-wing monarchical organisations (not to mention so-called 'unlisted people' and sympathisers), mainly consisting of Russians and Orthodox Christians, with few exceptions.

The main policy guidelines of the right-wing monarchists (Black Hundreds) of the city of Kazan and the Kazan guberniya. The national question. 'The Royal-Popular Islamic Society'. One of the determining factors behind the creation of independent socio-political organisations (with their own programmes and charters) by Kazan right-wing monarchists (the Black Hundreds) was the need to take into account the peculiarities of Kazan and Kazan guberniya in their activities, which was not reflected in the programme and charter documents of the Black Hundred parties and alliances.

In the agrarian question this resulted in clearer and more realistic requirements with regard to the solution to the problem of landless and near-landless peasants and the precautionary approach to the elimination of the peasant community. In particular, KRPRS recognised the possible alienation of the determined price for up to one third of land from large and middle landowners, who will not want to sell it willfully, and also suggested a particular 'communal-farm' model of land tenure.

In national and religious matters local specificities were reflected in the application of more flexible and differential tactics towards different categories of non-Russians and non-Christians. For example, from the very beginning of its activities the KRPRS demonstrated particular sympathy towards conservative Tatar-Muslims, trying to bring as many of them as possible into the ranks of followers of unlimited Russian autocracy. So, against the backdrop of the rapid liberalisation of the national movement, it tried to initiate, as V.F. Zaleskij expressed, 'the political disengagement of non-Russians', to stop the process of disseminating separatist movements among Tatar-Muslims and to prevent them from participating in the 'progressive' movement. With this aim, the Black Hundreds took a series of concrete steps towards rapprochement with the conservative-monarchical circles in the Tatar-Muslim movement.

On 29 January 1906 the assembly of the KRPRS, 'recognised that it was fair that the Muslim population (of the former Kazan Tatar Tsardom) should have its own representative in the State Duma', resolved to 'launch by telegram before His Imperial Highness a motion to appoint a second deputy from Kazan especially for Muslims'. A second telegram with a similar request (with the signatures of: V. Zaleskij, A. Solovyov and A.I. Kukarmikov) was sent to the Minister of Internal Affairs. But the Tatar-Muslims themselves perceived this gesture by the right-wing monarchists with caution, because they saw in it a political 'trick', which actually was not without foundation: the Black Hundreds believed that, if the Tatar-Muslims united in elections and operated on the basis of 'the worst Tatar is better than the best Russian', then they put forth a Muslim for election, and they were strongly opposed to this. An additional ('special') deputy automatically resolved the problem of the national and religious competition in the elections for Kazan.

The Kazan Black Hundreds made more candid 'overtures to the Tatar-Muslims in relation to enhancing their economic status within the Russian Empire. So one of the ideologues of the Kazan Black Hundreds R.V. Rizpolozhensky in his report at the meetings on 7 and 15 November 1906 declared, inter alia, that: 'In relation to the Tatar group of nationalities that professes Islam, with respect for this venerable religion and the deeply laid foundations of nationhood in it's confessors, it is preferable to eliminate the development of Christian missionary work among these peoples on the precondition that the missionary work of Mohammedans among Christian communities will not be allowed. In particular, in relation to the Kazan Tatars, in view of their particular trading talents, it is necessary to take care of the further development of their commercial activities in the Middle East and on the establishment of trade ties with India, for which the immediate concern should be the organisation of the rail-
V. F. Zalesky tried to establish a right-wing Tatar population and strong unity with Russia. Carson Maina, the Yuzeev brothers, were active in the village of Karamyshevo in Kutyomino volost, which was temporarily (until the anticipated 25 November 1908, it was stressed that the opening of the RPIS in Kazan) located in the villages of Ibrayevo Karkali, Nizhnyaya Kaminka, Novoe Demkino, Novoye Ibraikino, Novoye Kadeevo, Novoye Uzeecho, Sluzhiliya Eltan', Staroye Ibraykino, Staro-Tatarskaya Keremet and other), whose members, with few exceptions (village chief Kh. Sirazetdinov, mullah G.G. Timbulatov and others), consisted of simple peasants.

At the same time, the activities of the RPIS were mainly limited to political statements of an anti-revolutionary and anti-liberal nature, and also the rallying call to the Russian people 'under the rule of the Great Russian Tsar'. From the very beginning, the RPIS made a high-profile announcement on the creation of a propaganda counterbalance in the fight with the 'progressive' movements in the Tatar-Muslim community. 'While the Islamic faction of the State Duma fraternises with the opposition,— it was written, for example, in the newspaper 'Moskovskiye Vedomosti' on 4 January 1909,— among the Kazan Tatars… there are apparently opposing movements'. However, the process of disseminating the ideas of the Black Hundreds among rural Tatars was soon interrupted by administrative proceedings, which began after the publication in the cadet newspaper 'Rech' from 9 April 1909 entitled 'Rescue the Fatherland', which revealed that in the ranks of the RPIS, there was a large percentage of persons with deviant behaviour. Despite the fact that many of the pressed charges were unsubstantiated, it revealed, among other facts, that under the cover of the monarchical 'signage', the President of the Council and members of the Society department in the village of Upper Tatar Maina, the Yuzeev brothers, were active in Pan-Islamic propaganda, and the comrade (deputy) of the High Council of the RPIS S. Khisamutdinov in due course was prosecuted.

way links to India's road network'. In one of the resolutions of the First Volga-Kama Regional Patriotic Congress, held in Kazan from 21 to 25 November 1908, it was stressed that the number of lawyers should be limited to three per cent—'Jews by belief or blood', who 'regularly ruin Russian and Islamic trading and industrial companies and thus create significant opportunities for the development of Jewish companies'.

However, despite all this, the attempts of Kazan right-wing monarchists (The Black Hundreds) to find common ground with conservative Tatar-Islamic groups in Kazan did not produce the desired results, and therefore V.F. Zalesky tried to establish a right-wing monarchic Tatar-Islamic organisation in a rural area—in the Chistopol uyezd of Kazan guberniya. Parallel to this, the local Black Hundreds voiced strong criticism of the liberal and socialist movements in the Tatar community, members of the Islamic faction of the State Duma and democratically oriented community leaders from among the Tatars.

On 9 December 1908, the Kazan guberniya department for the affairs of public organisations accepted the charter of the 'The Royal-Popular Islamic Society' (RPIS), according to which the goal of the newly established organisation was 'to preserve the faithfulness of the pledged allegiance to the Quran to the Autocratic Unrestricted Tsar among the Tatar population and strong unity with Russian patriotic societies'. Members of the Royal Popular Islamic Society, with very few exceptions, could only consist of 'natural Tatars of both genders, all classes and conditions'. In the Royal Popular Islamic Society charter, it was stated that Jews can never be allowed to be members of the Society, even if they convert to Islam'.

The Higher Council dealt with RPIS affairs, which was temporarily (until the anticipated opening of the RPIS in Kazan) located in the village of Karamyshevo in Kutyomino volost, Chistopol uyezd. At the head of the Higher Council was the chairman, who had two comrades (deputies). The chairman of the Kar-

mysh RPIS department (and also of the Higher Council) was a peasant Kh. Fayzullin, his comrades were S. Khisamutdinov and G. Muzinov, Sh. Rakhmetullin was the secretary, and the treasurer was M. Afluatunov. From 9 December 1908 to the beginning of July 1909, the High Council of the RPIS opened eighteen departments with a total of more than 240 people (in the villages of Ibrayevo Karkali, Nizhnyaya Kaminka, Novoe Demkino, Novoye Ibraikino, Novoye Kadeevo, Novoye Uzeecho, Sluzhiliya Eltan', Staroye Ibraykino, Staro-Tatarskaya Keremet and other), whose members, with few exceptions (village chief Kh. Sirazetdinov, mullah G.G. Timbulatov and others), consisted of simple peasants.
for campaigning for the resettlement of Tatars to Turkey.

As a result, on 23 June 1909 a district police officer from the Chistopol uyezd arrested the Yuzeev brothers and closed the department of RPIS in the village of Upper Tatar Maina. In October 1909 the activity of all RPIS departments was suspended, and after that—on 30 December 1909 they were shut down. RPIS formally ceased to exist on 20 September 1914 after the reference check. The attempts of V.F. Zalesky to continue working to establish the Tatar-Islamic right-wing monarchic organisations produced no tangible results. Meanwhile, in the report of the district police officer from Laishevo uyezd from 6 February 1916 three departments of the 'Royal Popular Society' were mentioned, that functioned in the villages of Malye Nyr'sy (under the chairmanship of M. Galyazetdinov), Saushi (under the chairmanship of Z. Khisamutdinov) and Balykly (under the chairmanship of Y. Khalikov) of the Klyuchishchy volost in Laishevo uyezd (16, 11 and 11 people respectively).

Much greater success was achieved by the Kazan right-wing monarchists (The Black Hundreds) among representatives of the Chuvash population and other peoples, who inhabited the territory of Kazan guberniya. An approximate count shows that the departments of right-wing monarchic organisations on its territory, which were opened and operated in the places with a uniform and mixed Chuvash population (in the villages and settlements of Novy Chuvash Adam and Chuvash Cheboksarka in Chistopol uyezd, Shor-Kasy and Yanglich in Tsvilisk uyezd, Kyumel'-Yamashi, Malaya Shatma, in Sarchak Yadrin uyezd and others), accounted for about 15 percent of their total number.

Simultaneously, the Kazan right-wing monarchists (The Black Hundreds) were characterised, in general, by their extreme approach to the problem of the 'European question', that has in some cases (inter alia, in the interpretation of professor V.F. Zalesky) racial connotations. Meanwhile, the same V.F. Zalesky was strongly sympathetic to the idea of an all-Slavic community and as such offered unconventional ways to address the 'Polish question', which was not always understood by the Black Hundreds.

Increased attention on the part of the Kazan right-wing monarchists was paid to the creation of Russian national artisans and charitable associations. The largest public outreach charitable organisation, which they controlled, was KAS. On 16 July 1908 the 'Artisan Society of Construction Work' was opened by the KDRA (the chairman was an honorary citizen by birth, A.M. Tyufilin), and on 21 October 1908—a general education school with a tailor department of the KRPRS (the leader was craftsman N.A. Petrov). In 1908 under the auspices of the KDRA the 'Kazan Society of Orthodox Russian Women' (KSORW) was established (the committee chairwomen were M. Sokolova, V. Bulygina, O. Ternovskaya), and in 1912 the 'Kazan Society in the name of the Most Merciful Savior for the care of the juvenile weak-minded and cripples' was established.

The right-wing monarchists of Kazan and Kazan guberniya also attached great importance to the development of national education, which they demanded to be provided in a conservative, traditionally Russian spirit. They expressed strong dissatisfaction with the introduction of autonomy for the universities, and fought for the eviction of the liberal and left-wing professors from universities, and also for the strict ideological, political and national selection of students. The student community included: from December 1907—the 'Russian Club of Monarchic Youth' (from 1908—'Kazan Society of Russian Monarchic Youth'; the Chairmen of the Council—P. Poletika, N.I. Mamontov, N.V. Sergievich, N.A. Aleksandrov), from February 1912—the 'Club of Non-Partisan Student Academics of the Kazan Higher Education Institutions', whose aim was to normalise education, combat the manifestations of revolutionary activity and liberalise higher education. In 1908 the 'Kazan Society of Russian Monarchic Youth' opened the gymnastics and sports lovers club 'Berkut' (from 1913—the gymnastic society 'Sokol'). From 1907—
1908 the 'group of right-wing professors' was active at the Imperial Kazan University (the leaders were the professors N.A. Zasetsky and N.F. Vysotsky), which included right-wing and moderate monarchists.

The peak of political activity of the right-wing monarchists (The Black Hundreds) of the city of Kazan and the Kazan guberniya. Establishment of URP departments. The peak of political activity of the local Black Hundreds was seen when they united their activities.

In early November 1906 the Kazan guberniya Department (KGD) of the URP was opened, which was chaired by the President of the Council of the KRPRS, Professor V.F. Zalesky. Formally, the department was guided by the charter and programme documents of the URP, but in practice it had broad autonomy and pursued its involvement in a manner that was beneficial, in particular for its leader. The KGD of the URP participated in election campaigns, the organisation of meetings and demonstrations, and opened URP departments in towns and uyezds across Kazan guberniya. According to information provided by the Kazan Chief of Police, as of 4 December 1907 the KGD URP amounted to 'about 500 people'.

In the second half of November 1906 in the Admiralty Sloboda of Kazan, the Bogolyubovo (Admiralty) department of the URP was also opened, and presided over by the President of the SCPT Council, merchant A.I. Kukarnikov (from May 1910 the priest N.M. Troitsky was the President of the Council department). According to various estimates, the Bogolyubovo department of the URP contained from a hundred to two hundred people.

In December 1906 the 'Regional Town Council of the United Russian People' (under whose jurisdiction all the governorates of the Volga-Kama region were supposed to be) was established in Kazan consisting of V.F. Zalesky, A.I. Kukarnikov and A.T. Solovyov, who had chosen archimandrite Andrey (Prince A.A. Utkhomsky) as its fourth member. However, soon after the town council status was lowered to governorate level, and its establishment remained on paper only.

Soon (thanks mainly to the work of V.F. Zalesky and A.T. Solovyov) the entire Kazan guberniya was covered by a network of URP departments. According to the Kazan Governorate, as of 18 December 1907, 97 URP departments operated in the Kazan guberniya (totaling about 7 thousand people), including seven departments (totaling about 1.2 thousand people) in six towns—Arsk, Kazan, Sviyazhsk, Tsarevokokshaysk, Tsivilsk and Chistopol.

The Kazan right-wing monarchists actively participated in the elections to the State Duma of all four convocations, but were unable to bring in a single 'listed' candidate. During the elections to the State Duma of the first and second convocations, they were united blocs, accordingly nominating the general list of electors from the United Council of the RPRS, KDRA and SCPT and a 'copy of electors to the State Duma from the Russian people'.

The right-wing monarchists (The Black Hundreds) of Kazan and the Kazan guberniya were indispensable participants in monarchic forums, and also activities related to the celebration of the main anniversaries in the history of the Russian State and Russian Orthodox Church. The Kazan right-wing monarchic (Black Hundreds) movement was, in particular, represented by different individuals: At the Third 'All-Russian Congress of Russian People' (Kiev, 1—7 October 1906), Fourth 'All-Russian Congress of Russian People' (Moscow, 26 April—1 May 1907), All-Russian (Vostorgov's) 'Congress of Russian People' (Moscow, 27 September—4 October 1909), 'Congress of Right-Wing Professors' (Saint Petersburg, December 1911), Fifth 'All-Russian Congress of Russian People' (Moscow, 21 November—1 December 1911) and at a meeting of monarchists on 21–23 November 1915 in Petrograd (Saint Petersburg.) On 11 March 1906 those elected from the Kazan right-wing monarchic organisations were introduced to the Emperor Nicholas II in Tsarskoye Selo. Furthermore, on 10 September 1910 the KRPRS delegation had a meeting with the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Empire P.A. Stolypin, who was in Kazan.
Chapter 2. The Formation of the Turkic-Tatar Political Movement in Russia
(the Beginning of the 20th Century)

Informational support for the Black Hundreds at different times was provided by such periodic publications as: the magazines 'Deyatel' (published from January 1896 to April–May 1917; editor-publisher—A.T. Solovyov) and 'Kazan Raeshnik' (published in 1907; editor-publisher—N. Prokofiev), newspapers 'Gazeta "Pravykh" (published in 1906–1908; editor-publisher—N.O. Prokofiev), 'Kazansky Telegraph' (published from April 1893 to March 1917; editor—N.A. Ilyashenko, publisher—A.G. Ilyashenko), 'Rus' Orthodox and Autocratic' (issued from 1905 to 1916; editor-publisher—A.T. Solovyov), 'Soshniki' (published from December 1906 to January 1907; editors—P.K. Kuvshinov, V.F. Zalesky, who was a publisher too), 'The Black Hundreds' (published from November to March 1907; editors—P.K. Kuvshinov, V.F. Zalesky, he was the publisher).

The schism in the right-wing monarchic (Black Hundred) movement. The establishment of the RPUAM and ADURP departments. 'The First Volga-Kama Regional Patriotic Congress'. Already by 1907–1908, mainly because of subjective contradictions, the URP was embroiled in strife and division between its leaders, which also affected the departments that had been operating in Kazan and the Kazan guberniya.

The negative impact of this manifested itself during the time of preparation and immediately after the unsuccessful elections for the local Black Hundreds to the State Duma of the third convocation, when the serious contradictions between the main Kazan right-wing monarchic organisations and their leaders emerged. The intensified opposition of A.T. Solovyov and V.F. Zalesky kicked off the ideological and political institutional disengagement process within the entire movement. At the end of 1907–the beginning of 1908 about a hundred people resigned from the KGD URP, who were displeased with V.F. Zalesky's actions, and they organised an alternative second Kazan department of the URP in the Pyatnitsky parish (chaired by the hieromonk of the Kazan Saviour-Transfiguration monastery Sofronij), united with the Bogolyubovo (Admiralty) department of the URP, KDRA, SCPT and a number of other URP departments, opened in the Kazan guberniya by A.T. Solovyov and his like-minded colleagues. In the end, the KGD URP, together with the KRPRS and URP departments faithful to V.F. Zalesky were in the 'competing' camp.

In November 1907, V.M. Purishkevich and his followers, who had left the URP, created the RPUAM. Less than a year later—in October 1908—the RPUAM Kazan department was opened (in other sources—office, house) chaired by a Kazan homeowner and teacher P.F. Molykin (former member of the Council of the KRPRS, SCPT and URP). Subsequently, the RPUAM departments were opened in a large number of uyezds in the Kazan guberniya, including those based on the URP departments.

21–25 November 25 The KGD URP and KRPRS, whose leadership shortly before that demonstratively split from the chairman of the High URP Council A.I. Dubrovkin, held in Kazan the 'First Volga-Kama Regional Patriotic Congress' with representatives of 57 'provincial' URP departments, and other right-wing monarchic organisations from Kazan and other governorates (the Honourary President of the Congress—Prince A.G. Shcherbatov, Chairperson—V.F. Zalesky). In light of the proceedings of the Congress, eight resolutions were adopted (including on the reports 'Clergy and parish', 'The Issue of Land Management', 'The Non-Russian issue' and others), and two loyal addresses and a telegram in the name of Emperor Nicholas II were drawn up. The URP departments (KDRA, SCPT) that were removed from the Congress by V.F. Zalesky, and those, controlled by A.T. Solovyov (which entered the so-called 'United Monarchic Societies and Unions in the Kazan Department of the Russian Assembly') held their alternative 'general assemblies' in Kazan on 21, 23 and 25 November 1908.

At various times I.I. Vostorgov, A.I. Dubrovkin, and V.M. Purishkevich were involved in the perennial disputes amongst the Kazan Black Hundreds. As a result, from 1908 to 1911 the ongoing confrontation between V.F. Zalesky
(who adhered to an independent policy) and A.T. Solovyov (who supported A.I. Dubrovin) the KGD URP declined and lost its leading status. In 1910 the following decisions were adopted: at first on the dissolution of the KGD URP, the withdrawal from the post of President of its Council V.F. Zalesky and the election of A.T. Solovyov, and later, the reinstatement of the former and removal of the latter.

In March 1911, the Kazan guberniya department for the affairs of public organisations registered two formally separate organisations: The 'Kazan Union of Russian People' (founders–V.F. Zalesky, S.T. Golubev and A.E. Dubrovsky) and the 'Kazan Russian People Union named after Saint George' (founders–A.T. Solovyov's followers led by the merchant F.S. Grebenshchikov). There was not much organisational difference between these unions. Their affairs were managed by the Councils, led by their respective presidents. At the same time in the 'Kazan Union of Russian People' the Council was called 'Main (Governorate)', it originally comprised three people (former founding members of the union), and it was entitled to open and close departments of the organisation in uyezd towns, villages, suburbs and other areas. The Council of the 'Kazan Russian People Union named after Saint George' held similar rights.

The two officially established centres led to the effective elimination of the former governorate department and the final decentralisation of local right-wing monarchic (The Black Hundreds) movement. Gradually, most of the other right-wing monarchic (The Black Hundreds) organisations and their departments that operated in the Kazan guberniya declined too.

In August 1912 the ADURP was officially established, created by the split in the URP in 1909–1911 (one of the candidates for the High Council of the province was elected A.T. Solovyov). As a result, the URP departments with a pro-Dubrovin orientation which operated in the Kazan guberniya and were under the control of A.T. Solovyov, were re-registered as ADURP departments. Meanwhile, often in one municipality there were departments of more than one 'allied' organisation.

In the lead-up to the State Duma elections of the third convocation some of the Kazan right-wing monarchists (The Black Hundreds) transferred to the 'Russian Election Committee of Kazan' and the 'Kazan Russian National Club'. However, V.F. Zalesky and some members of the KRPRS spoke out against the 'nationalists' and nominated their own candidates. Moreover, A.T. Solovyov and his followers distanced themselves from the nationalists, and this was one of the reasons for their defeat in Kazan. Only one deputy was elected to the State Duma of the third convocation from the Kazan guberniya—a nominated person from the Congress of large landowners from the Laishuevo Uyezd, a nobleman by birth F.N. Kazin, and entered a right-wing fraction.

**Termination of activities.** A severely negative impact on the status of the Black Hundred movement in Kazan and the Kazan guberniya was caused by the general crisis of the official monarchic idea, which intensified during the First World War.

In January–March 1916, the Chief of the Kazan police and district police officer mentioned in their reports about 66 right-wing monarchic (The Black Hundreds) organisations and their departments (totaling about 2.7 thousand people), which were listed in eight uyezds of the Kazan guberniya (excluding Mamadysh, Sviyazhsk, Tetyush and Cheboksary). Besides, 11 of them (totalling about 1 thousand people) had already 'de facto' and 'de jure' ceased to exist two to four years ago, or did not hold a single general assembly in this time, which is essentially the same thing. By the end of 1916, out of the other 55 organisations and their departments which still operated, 50– except the KDRA and two its 'satellites' (about 500 members), the KRPRS (about 200 members), and the department of RPUAM in the village of Tankeevka in the Tryokh-Ozyorsk volost, Spassk uyezd (40 members)– barely functioned and did not have any influence on the local population.
The main activities of the right-wing monarchic organisations in Kazan and the Kazan guberniya at the outbreak of the First World War were 'work for defence', rehabilitation and charity work. The KDRA and KAS were actively engaged in the 'dry law' enacted in Russia. They opened an infirmary for wounded warriors (No. 38) in Kazan, which included a club 'Vera, Nadezhda, Lyubov' (chaired by S.K. Shtenger), and also provided assistance in their shelter to refugees who passed through the city. The KSORW collected warm clothes, tobacco and other basic necessities for the front.

After the victory of the February revolution in 1917 the activity of the right-wing monarchic organizations (The Black Hundreds) finally came to an end, their members were harassed and persecuted, and periodical publications which supported the Black Hundreds were closed or ceased to exist due to the revolutionary circumstances.

On 4 March 1917 'A letter to the editor' was published in the newspaper 'Volga-Kama Rech' signed by V.F. Zalesky, where he claimed that: 'The small group of rightists, who united around the tailor school (that had long worked for the defence), decided beforehand to refrain from political discourse until final victory was gained over the external enemies and full internal peace was reached. With the restoration of normal political life, members of this group are using the rights that belong to all Russian citizens to join legitimate political parties, whose programmes align with their convictions. Soon he also announced that 'there are no right-wing organisations in Kazan', and his acceptance of the 'new order', but despite this, on 17–19 March 19 he was arrested.

On 11 March 1917 the last issue of the rightist newspaper 'Kazan Telegraf' was published, and in April–May 1917—as was the last (No. 4–5) issue of 'Deyatel' magazine. On 28 April 1917 in the 'Volga-Kama Rech' newspaper an article entitled 'The termination of the association of sobriety' was published, where it was reported that: 'The Executive Public Safety Committee addressed the issue of the work of the local association of sobriety, founded and led by the 'well known' A.T. Solovyov stated: 'In light of the highly undesirable direction of this society, it should be closed down, and all its affairs entrusted to the city directorate'.

Presumably, by mid-1917 the right-wing (Black Hundred) movement in Kazan and the Kazan guberniya was completely suppressed and never revived in its previous form.
CHAPTER 3
The Ethno-Confessional Policy in Russia at the Beginning of the 20th Century

§ 1. The Ethno-Confessional Policy of the Russian Government Towards the Tatar Population

Dilyara Usmanova

The main directions of the state-wide national policies, an integral part of which was the policy towards the Islamic population of the Empire, were formulated in the latter half of the 19th century [Kappeler, 1997; Dyakin, 1998; Vorobyova, 1999; Karpenkova, 2005; Tikhonov, 2007]. At the turn of the 19th–20th centuries they did not change radically, although the political modernisation, which began during the first Russian revolution (1905–1907), forced the government to make certain adjustments to its policies. The so-called 'Islamic question', which should include a consideration of the government's attitude towards the Tatar population, was subject to change in accordance with the changes and fluctuations in the policies as a whole. Ultimately, it was about the different scenarios of 'integration' of Islamic subjects into the Empire.

The position of the public authorities on the religious ideology of Muslims was based on the doctrine of 'limited religious tolerance', that allowed the profession of Islam, but prevented its distribution and strengthening [Alekseev, 2002b]. In this system the State bodies of the Muslim Spiritual Board (Orenburg Muslim Spiritual Assembly and others), dating back to the late 18th century, were considered a government regulatory body. But even in such a truncated version, the muftiat looked like 'a form of Islamic self-organisation not only in the eyes of the Muslims themselves, but also in the eyes of the Russian church-state elite', and therefore was not credible [Alekseev, 2002]15. In general, the 'mistrust' and 'suspicion' towards Islamic subjects, which in large part replaced the disparaging and paternalistic attitude, that especially characterised the beginning of the 20th century on the part of both governmental circles and broad sectors of Russian society.

In the government policy we can see the simultaneous liberal aspirations and strengthening of nationalistic tendencies that were especially evident after the defeat of the revolution, at the final stage of P.A. Stolypin's Prime Ministership (head of government from 1906–1911).

The ethno-confessional policy of the government towards Muslims (in particular, Tatars) at the turn of the 19th–20th centuries was defined by such factors as:

– the quest for the cultural and administrative unification of the country in order to create a 'united' Russia;

– the shift in emphasis in the legislation from 'spiritual' to 'national' motives, which was apparent after the beginning of the 20th century;

15 At one of the interagency meetings on Muslim affairs (1910) the Head of the Department of Religious Affairs of Foreign Confessions explicitly stated that the Orenburg Muslim Spiritual Assembly 'does not have the full confidence of the government,' and the loyalty of Muslims was external, ostentatious.
– a mounting fear of Islamic fanaticism and that other non-Russians would be assimilated as Tatars;
– the persistence of the perception in Russian society and in government circles, that Muslims were ignorant and fanatical, and of the superiority of the Russian-Christian culture, which encouraged various programmes for their (Muslims) 'enlightenment';
– the need to provide more liberal policies and to undertake political modernisation of the country, meant the equivalence of civil and national rights for all the subjects of the Empire, the provision of more rights and opportunities of society for self-expression and self-organisation.

As we can see, there were push and pull factors, which taken as a whole contradicted the ethno-confessional policy in the Russian Empire during the late Imperial period. In the beginning of the 20th century the 'Islamic question' posed a range of issues related to the Islamic nationalities of the Empire, which included the key issue of the widely ensuing cultural-national movement amongst Tatars and the risk it posed to Russian statehood.

The Islamic population in the legal space of the Empire. The most fundamental changes across the entire civil and criminal law system were made during the bourgeois and democratic reforms in the 60s–70s. XIX century [Mironov, 1999 Vol. 2, chapter 8]. In the civil law system the Code of laws of 1832 (which was introduced in 1835) continued to be in effect until the end of the imperial period (1917). While some specific changes were made later, the request to draw up a new set of civil laws at the beginning of the 20th century was rejected. The majority of legal writers recognised the undesirability of the codification of legislation in the midst of the revolution, and the Government was determined not to make any profound changes. More serious changes affected criminal law: in 1903 a new criminal Code was adopted, which gradually came into effect from 1904. In particular, on 14 March 1906 the law implemented sections of the Criminal Code related to religious crimes\(^ {16}\). However, by the time of their implementation they had already become hopelessly out of date: given the degree of liberalisation of religious policies in 1904–1905, these crimes were a significant anachronism. The Criminal Code of 1903 with some amendments existed up to the end of the imperial regime, and thus preserved old severe penalties for religious crimes (for example, the 'apostasy from Orthodoxy', 'defilement' and others), although religious tolerance was declared, and religious legislation in general, evolved over time towards the recognition of the freedom of conscience.

In relation to the Islamic population of the country a general civil law was in effect (volume XI of the Laws), but with respect to marriage and family-inheritance matters, Islamic law (Sharia)\(^ {17}\) was also recognised. According to some studies, the introduction of certain provisions and institutions of Islamic law into general imperial legislation for the eastern outskirts and in the judicial institutions of Russia was 'a well-considered step taken by the Government that facilitated the harmonisation of relations in a multi-ethnic society' [Bekmakhanova, 2003, p. 48]. Without denying the positive effects of these steps taken by the authorities, it is believed that there was much less planning and forethought put into such policymaking, than there was spontaneity and actions, that emanated from immediate practical reasons. Since the Tatars were the first to be part of the Russian state, there were less exemptions and exceptions from general imperial legislation in relation to them (as compared to other outlying Muslims).

\(^ {16}\) The issue of religious crimes under Russian law has been thoroughly developed by Russian law scholars and has an extensive historical and dogmatic literature. Among pre-revolutionary authors were such luminaries of Russian criminal law as N. Tagantsev, A. Kistyakovsky, A. Zhizhilenko, V. Shiryaev, S. Poznyshnev, N. Timashev, and others. For further details see: [Usmanov, 1999; Safonov, 2007].

\(^ {17}\) Some of the most important pieces of legislation in respect of the Muslims have been reissued in the last decade [Yunusov, edited 1999; Arapov, compiled 2001].
Taking into account the preservation of the principles of Islamic Law and legislative reform plans towards Muslims, at the beginning of the 20th century the Department of Spiritual Affairs was entrusted with establishing a special compendium, which would comprise a summary of Sharia regulations, determining the order of inheritance by law and spiritual testament for Sunni Muslims, with a parallel text in Russian and Arabic. The compendium, first of all, was intended for judicial personnel involved in proceedings for cases of this type to familiarise themselves with the principles of Islamic Law. The respective articles were translated by the DRAFF workers P.V. Antaki and G.N. Taranovsky, and passed examination in the Orenburg and Taurian Spiritual Assemblies. The first issue of the 'Compendium of Sharia regulations of Family and Inheritance Law' with rules of inheritance was published in the autumn of 1912. It was sent out to the governorate regional administrations with a significant Islamic population, and also to the largest libraries and academic institutions in the country. On the recommendation of P.V. Antaki, the compendium was also sent to the famous Russian scientists (professors V.V. Bartold, and V.A. Zhukovsky) and Islamic public figures (I. Gasprinsky, the Rameev brothers, F. Karimi) [RSHA, Fund 821, Inventory 133, File 604, Sheets 54, 58–59; 67; Law, 1912, No. 30, 42, 44]. Simultaneously the second part of the compendium, concerning 'Individuals under guardianship and their rights' was prepared. Finally, the third edition of the compendium, which included Sharia regulations on marriage, was prepared by P.V. Antaki by spring 1914 [RSHA, Fund 821, Inventory 133, File 604, Sheets 110, 114, 118.]\textsuperscript{18}, but was not published until the revolution of 1917. An interest in the legal regulations that were in effect in the Islamic society was expressed by governmental leaders in terms of the practical implementation of 'legal pluralism', with what the authorities had to contend with because of the vastness of the Empire and heterogeneity of its population. The preparation of similar compendiums was a compulsion, derived by an awareness of the insufficient capacity of government officials in the area of Islamic Law.

It must be said, that up to the February revolution in the capital and on the outskirts there were very few experts on Islamic law, and the main experts on the 'Muslim question' up to the end of the 19th century were educated in spiritual academies and seminaries, and primarily in the Kazan Spiritual Academy, where in 1854 the so-called 'Anti-Muslim Missionary Division' was opened. Naturally, their purpose was missionary activity. Significantly, a course on Islamic law was absent in the majority of law departments of Russian universities. Even at Kazan University, whose purpose was to train specialists for the easternmost regions of the country, such a course was only introduced during the 1916/1917 academic year, when P.K. Zhuze, a lecturer of the French language in Kazan Spiritual Assembly, was entrusted to provide an 'optional, but recommended in connection to Islamic Studies' course on Islamic Law to jurists. In the course, considerable attention was paid not only to dogmatic issues regarding Islamic Law, but also to raising awareness of the situation of the Islamic population in the Empire with respect to Islamic and general Russian law [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 977, Inventory Council, d. 13224, p. 1–6; RSHA, f. 821, inv. 133, d. 630, 4 p.].\textsuperscript{19}

It is noteworthy that interest in legal matters by representatives of the Tatar population of the Empire, who became aware of the lack of Muslims' knowledge about their legal situation was expressed. In particular, in 1913–1914 the Kazan legal agent Sh.-G. Imanaev undertook a barely successful effort to publish a Tatar language magazine 'Khokuk

\textsuperscript{18} The compilation of the Arabic text of the collection was entrusted to the Mufti Safa Bayazitov. See: [RSHA, fund 821, inv.133, file 606, sheet 43 reverse].

\textsuperscript{19} The full programme of Assistant Professor P. Zhuze was published in 1916 [The Review of Teaching at the Imperial University of Kazan. Faculty of Law, 1916, pp. 15–16] and reprinted by I. Yemelyanova. See: [Yemelyanova, 1998, pp. 137–138].
va khayat' ('Law and Life'), which specialised in legal problems. A yet more significant example—imam-mudarris madrasah in the 1st central mosque of Ufa Dzigangir Abyzgildin along with traditional courses (interpretation of the Quran, sayings of the prophet, history of the prophet, tenets of Islam and others) taught a class 'lawmaking in the Russian Empire, which was related to mullahs' [RSHA, Fund 821, Inventory133, File 466, Sheet 477]. Finally, during the Duma pre-election campaign of the first convocation the candidacy of an Ufa Tatar, lawyer Abusgud Akhtyamov, was promoted as an example of a successful model of an Islamic scholar with higher legal qualifications, who was familiar with the legal provision of Muslims (in 1890s he served in the Orenburg Muslim Spiritual Assembly).

Restrictive standards of Russian law in regard to Muslims. The development of religious law by the State Duma of the Russian Empire (beginning of the 20th century). Russian legislation laid down regulations according to which the religious and national identity of the legal entity initially gave certain advantages in civil rights or were the basis for restrictive regulations. A strengthening of the restrictions on the grounds of religion or nationality was observed in the 80–90s of the 19th century. It stems from a deviation from the policy of liberal reforms of the Epoch of Great Reforms and also from the fact that the main guideline for imperial policy became the ideal of a 'united' Russia headed by the Russian people. This ideal was strived towards through cultural and administrative unification based on the Russification of the society. That is why terms such as ‘alien’, ‘aboriginal’, ‘persons of Russian origin’ and other words, the legal sense of which was uncertain and often changeable depending on the internal policy, were widely used in Russian law at that time. The plurality of interpretations of these terms, shortcomings of legislation and its contradictions led to the issue of multiple ‘by-laws’ (Circulars issued by the Ministry of Justice and Internal Affairs, remarks and ‘interpretations’ made by the Senate and others) which often changed the essence of the law beyond recognition.

The restrictive legal regulations on the grounds of religion and nationality can be divided into several groups: the first group referred to the entire non-Russian population of the country, the second was based on the limitations of rights of Non-Christians (mostly Hebrews and Muslims) and finally the third group referred to the regulation and elimination of rights of certain nationalities (mostly Hebrews). The restrictive component underwent significant evolution: from the prevalence of religious motivation in the beginning to the gradual domination of national motives at later stages of the development of Russian statehood. At the same time their analysis highlights the binding force of religious and ethnic components of the restriction motive. Protective tendencies in religious legislation are more evident especially in regard to the Tatars. This demonstrates a differentiation of national religious policy and also the fears and phobias which tsarist officials had about the real and supposed 'Tatar threat'.

One of the most important restriction was related to the right of persons of non-Christian origin to purchase and own immovable property. According to Article 262 of the ‘Regulation on the governance of the Turkestan krai’ and Article 136 of the ‘Regulation on the governance of the regions’ non-Christians were prohibited from purchasing land and owning other immovable property in the Turkestan and the Governor-Generalship of the Steppes. The economic motive and national character of the problem are evident. This restrictive measure was against the Hebrews first of all and also against the ‘Muslims of Inner Russia’, in other words the Tatars who were extremely active traders and business people in the regions. It is not a coincidence that the authorities were seriously concerned about the danger of the extension of Tatar influence in the Middle Asian

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20 The magazine was published during the course of the year—from 20 January 1913 to 20 January 1914. There were 10 issues in total. For more details see: [Usmanov, 2009 v, pp. 100–105].
region, and combated ‘Pan-Islamism’ and ‘Pan-Turkism’ whose ideologists and guides were Tatars of the Volga region. The numerous demands from Muslims to remove those restrictions were left without response, as they affected the interests of border region officialdom and Russian merchants.

The reasons for another restrictive regulation—namely *the prohibition for non-Christians on trading on Sundays and on Christian holidays*, apart from the apparently religious one were economic, which was demonstrated at the discussion in the State Duma of the draft law *On proper holidays for commercial workers*. The proposal to make Friday and Saturday days off for Muslims and Hebrews respectively was rejected by most members of the Duma. Opponents of this amendment were afraid of the expansion of the Tatar merchant class. As a result the concession from the government to grant local authorities the right to set the day off taking into account religious and local traditions was declined by most members of the State Duma, having joined the right-wing and left-wing fractions together.

*The restrictive law for Non-Christian attorneys at law* (1889) initially related to the Hebrews. However, in the beginning of the 20th century, with the increasing number of Muslim students in Russian institutions of higher education together with the beginning of the formation of high society it affected the interests of the Islamic population of the country. During the modernisation of the legal and political system in 1905-1906, liberal-minded lawyers repeatedly raised the issue of the removal of such restrictions. The draft law (*On the removal of restrictions of the rights of Muslims to become a member of the class of attorneys at law*)\(^{21}\) drawn up by Muslims and progressives and approved by the majority of the Fourth Duma was considered by the government as ‘improper’ (20 March 1914). Only in the end of 1915 did the authorities make some concessions: at the meeting of the Council of Ministers on 29 December a decision was adopted of the Interagency committee on the free inclusion ’of the Karaims and Mohummedans as attorneys at law and their assistants in the absence of discrediting facts’ [Pravo, 1916, 10 January]. This government decision was a concession of sorts to the Islamic population as the number of Muslim lawyers was so small that it did not ‘endanger’ the authorities.

Starting from the 80s of the 19th century Muslims were deprived of their right to teach in higher and secondary education state institutions and could work as private tutors only for their fellow believers. In 1911 the Ministry of Internal Affairs issued a circular which forbade the approval of the title of Mullah for persons who obtained theological training abroad (especially in Turkey or Egypt) even if they were Russian subjects. However, while insisting that this circular was followed, the authorities did not intend to make it an amendment to the law as ‘the law does not prescribe any limitations on the rights of persons who have studied in foreign educational institutions’ [RSHA, Fund 821, Inventory 133, File 576]. Together with the fight against Pan-Islamism, the approval of persons graduated from New Method Madrasahs to the position of Mullah could only be done if information was available on ‘one’s non-participation in religious tribal propaganda’.

On the whole we can say that at the turn of the 19th-20th centuries restrictive laws against non-Christians dominated in Russian law. Though the emergence of these laws was directly connected with the tightening of the policy towards Hebrews, as a result they affected the interests of the Islamic people of the country. These numerous restrictive laws were particularly painful for the Tatars. This fact allows us to differentiate the government policies towards the Islamic population of the country. The second important feature of the restrictive laws towards Muslims especially in

\(^{21}\) The bill was initiated by the progressives, but among the 54 deputies signing it were members of the Muslim faction—that is, I. Ahtyamov, M. Dzhafarov, G. Enikeev, G. Bayteryakov, and M. Minningaleyev. The text of the legislative proposal was republished with an explanatory note: [Muslim Deputies, 1998, pp. 231–233; Usmanov, 2005].
contrast with 'Jewish legislation' was its by-law nature. The restrictions and bans were more often worded in numerous 'circulars' and 'explanations', rather than approved as real acts of the Legal Code of the Russian Empire. That is why they were not so evident, though no less painful. It is not a coincidence that demands to remove the religious and national restrictions was typically given in all petitions and applications submitted by Muslims and that it also was a matter of high priority for Islamic liberal parties and the Islamic delegates of the State Duma [Usmanova, 2005].

There is doubt that from the end of the 18th century Russia was 'a tolerant country', but this was 'a policed tolerance'. The principal turn of religious policy started in the winter of 1904–spring 1905 with the publication of the decree 'On the strengthening of religious tolerance' (17 April 1905), which granted... the freedom of belief and prayer to everybody for the sake of conscience. Although the decree was based on the principles of religious and administrative privileges and somewhat extended the rights of non-Christians and partly confessions of a different faith, its consequences turned out to be much more significant. Perhaps surprisingly for the drafters of this law it became a prologue to the declaration of freedom of conscience. In respect to the Islamic population of the country the edict stated: 'to accept the regulations to be reviewed which concern the most important aspects of the way of life of persons of Mohammedan faith'. The duplicate main regulations of the edict 'The highest provision of the Ministry Committee, approved on 17 April 1905' defined the principal range of issues related to Muslims. The organiser of the 'Special meeting on religious tolerance' (under the guidance of Count Ignatyeyev) was authorised to develop and submit for consideration to the Council of State the following draft laws:

- on the construction of meeting-houses of non-Christian faiths;
- on the procedure for the election and appointment of religious officials of the Mohammedan clergy, parish or higher institutions;
- on exemption from conscription for military service for certain persons of the Mohammedan clergy;
- on the opening procedure of Mohammedan spiritual schools (maktab and madrasah);
- on the establishment of Spiritual Directorates for the Kirghiz in the Akmola, Semipalatinsk, Ural and Turgay oblasts and also for the Mohammedan communities in the North Caucasus in the Stavropol guberniya, the Turkestan krai and Transcaspian oblast;
- on the possible permission to bring up abandoned children in the religion of their foster parents'.

On the 25th of June of the same year the provision of the Ministry Committee was approved, which determined the conversion procedure from Orthodoxy to another faith before the respective law is issued: persons wishing to leave the Orthodoxy had to submit an application addressed directly to the governor or other police officials of the uyezd; having verified them the local authority represented by the governor issued the respective order. That 'transitional provision' was valid at least until 1912.

The October Manifesto dated 1905 was a big step forward as it established the foundations of constitutional order and the declared freedom of conscience was a part of democratic freedoms and appeared to be a prerequisite for the 'transition to the rule of law'. However, this transition was carried out on a 'one step forward, two steps back' basis. The reason was that all the above-mentioned documents were drafted by officials, who were 'adherents of the policy of state principles'. So the issues of the edict of 17 April 1905 and of the October Manifesto were very important but only the first step forward the transformation of the whole system of interrelationships in the Empire in respect of different faiths and the State. Moreover, liberal edicts caused certain confusion in the current law.

The State Duma, being the lower house of the Russian Parliament, played an important role in the development of religious legislation in the beginning of the 20th century (1906–
On the attitude of the State to certain faiths'.

The Russian Parliament, which began functioning in April 1906, had to take on most of the hard work in removing those contradictions and bringing the law in accordance with the principles declared in the mentioned edicts. During the short working life of the Duma of the first convocation (26 April–9 July 1906) its members only introduced a draft entitled 'General provisions of the draft law on freedom of conscience signed by 50 deputies of the first convocation, mostly Cadets on 12 May 1906. The basic principles of the freedom of conscience declared in the Manifesto of 17 October 1905 were formulated under seven points of the draft law. The draft corresponded to the radical public feelings which prevailed during that period.

The government supposed that it was less convenient and practical to draw up a general draft law on the freedom of conscience than to prepare and enact specific draft laws. That is why it favoured the path of the submission of particular draft laws to the State Duma of the second convocation. Out of the more than ten religious draft laws introduced by ministries to deputies, the most important for the Muslims were: 'On amendments to the regulations concerning the conversion from one faith to another', 'On non-Orthodox and gentile religious society groups', 'On amendments concerning family rights in respect of the declared freedom of conscience on 17 October 1905', 'On the removal of political and civil restrictions dependent on belonging to non-Orthodox and gentile faiths that were provided in the current law...'

The government's intentions to reform the religious law characterises well the draft law 'On the attitude of the State to certain faiths'. This key draft within the group of religious laws according to the contemporaries was 'an extraordinary document created by the bureaucracy and woven with contradictions' (S. Melgunov). The government intended to favour the path of small concessions while not changing the essence of its religious policy: 'non-Orthodox persons' faced numerous obstacles.

The religious commission 'unanimously and without debate decided to adopt essential regulations on the freedom of conscience submitted by the People's Freedom Party to the State Duma of the first convocation' as the key guideline for further work. In 13 meetings the members of the religious commission (including tree Muslims S.-B. Karatayev, S. Maksudi and M.-Sh. Tukaev) only had time to consider the regulation 'On non-Orthodox and gentile religious society groups'. However, that work was also not completed.

The State Duma of the third convocation (1907–1912) established three separate Commissions instead of one: for the affairs of the Orthodox Church, old-believer issues and religious matters (including two Muslims, namely I. Mufti-Zadeh and M.-Sh. Tukaev). The last one had to 'prepare draft laws related to non-Orthodox and gentile faiths being considered in our legislation as the beginning of the declared freedom of conscience'. The change of name and subdivision of the commissions into three was caused by a number of factors: an attempt to avoid the use of expressions such as 'constitution', 'parliament', and 'freedom of conscience', as they were severe irritants for conservative government circles. Besides the creation of independent commissions for Orthodox and old-believer church affairs, possible situations in which 'non-Christians' became 'arbiters of purely Russian issues' were supposed to be prevented. It was also widely believed among deputies that the Orthodox church should have no influence on the Duma.

The draft laws submitted for consideration to the religious commission were prepared by the respective department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Being the initiator, the Ministry could withdraw the submitted draft law. That was done in October 1909 when the Ministry of Internal Affairs withdrew two extremely fundamental draft laws which most irritated the right hand of the Duma. The most important for the Tatars was the draft law 'On changes to the regulations concerning the conversion from one
faith to another'. Its was discussed in detail by the Commission in 1908–1909 and a report was submitted to the General Meeting on 22 May 1909. The discussion took several days from 22–26 May to 1 June and it finished with the adoption of a slightly amended draft law dated 30 October 1909. The amendments submitted by the commission and approved by the State Duma changed the draft law in a liberal manner. The biggest debates were caused by the discussion of issues on freedom of faith and on the legalisation terms of the conversion from one faith to another. The right nationalist wing of the deputy corps viewed freedom of faith as an inadmissible humiliation for the Orthodox church, considering that 'the idea of equality between all the subjects of the tsar regardless of religion and tribe is immoral, non-state, destructive and fatal for the country' (Markov The Second). The restrictions also had to affect the freedom of religious conversion. According to the governmental plan 'converters or their ancestors (predecessors—D. U.), but not more distant than their grandfather and grandmother, who belonged to a non-Christian faith' possessed the right of religious conversion. The members of the Commission and the majority of the deputies moderated that law, having granted the right of conversion to all adults (over 21 years old). Another principal amendment submitted by the liberal part of the Commission and approved by the Duma related to the religious conversion of minor children (from 14 to 21 years old) which were granted that right with the permission of their parents, adopters, guardians and others. The State Duma granted parents the exclusive right to determine the religious belonging of minor children (under 14 years old), based on the principle that the 'conscience of the parents replaces the conscience of the children'. Muslim deputies favored the legalisation of that conversion, pointing to the hardships and misery felt by those who wanted not just to renounce Orthodoxy but to return to the religion of their ancestors (from the speech of K.-M. Tevkelev, I. Mufti-Zadeh, Kh. bey Khasmamedov and I. Gaydarov) [State Duma. Stenographical reports].

The State Council was a considerable obstacle to converting the draft law into the law, having rejected all amendments submitted by the Duma. The work of the special Conciliation Committee (24 January 1912) did not produce the desired results: no agreement was reached on any of the disputes. The deputies preferred to give the government 'an opportunity to preserve the current law issued in accordance with Article 87 of the Constitution as early as in 1906' which made the possibility of conversion contingent upon the will of the local authority. So the draft law, which was extremely important to the Tatars, and which regulated the ability to convert from Orthodoxy to another religion, and in fact legalised the process of baptised Tatars returning back to Islam, did not enter into force and therefore granted all the power to the local administration.

During the work of the last pre-revolutionary Duma (1912–1917) the government favoured the path of submission of secondary draft laws to the Parliament which related to private issues (the so-called 'legislative vermicielli'). Some of the religious draft laws considered and approved by the deputies were withdrawn by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the remaining ones in the Duma portfolio were mostly secondary draft laws. During the work of the Duma of the fourth convocation the legislative proposal on 'Freedom of conscience' (3 December 1912) was submitted by 32 members of the fraction Narodnaya Svoboda (People's Freedom). In February 1916 a group of liberal deputies spoke in support of the abolition of all national religious restrictions. However, all the ministers without exception spoke against such a draft law and proposed to postpone any resolution to the problem until the end of the war at best.

To sum the things up, we can say that the tolerance of the Russian State during the pre-revolutionary decade (1905–1916) on the whole was limited in character as the Orthodoxy, which maintained its position as the predominant Church, was the prevailing confession and the basis for the state ideology. Religious legislation, based on the principle of confessional
'ranking' granted the predominant church the exclusive right to proselytism, preventing the conversion from one region to another while at the same time rejecting the possibility of the out of religion status. Religious tolerance was declared in regards to the Muslims but in practice it was strongly limited and restrained by all possible by-laws and circulars.

The State Administrative System on Muslim Spiritual Affairs. The Department of Religious Affairs for Foreign Faiths (DRAFF). Since 1832, all religious affairs of the Russian Muslims were under the supervision of the Mohammedan branch of the Department of Religious Affairs for Foreign Faiths (DRAFF).

In the beginning of the 20th century, its composition often changed and consisted of the following figures: M. Yachevsky (1904–1905), V. Vladimirov (1905–1908), A. Kharuzin (1909–1911), E. Menkin (1912–1915), G. Petkevich (1915–1916), N. Kharlamov (1916–1917) [Vitenberg, 2001, pp. 36–38]. The DRAFF was a part of the MIA (the Ministry of Internal Affairs) and was the higher authority in the Muslim Spiritual Board of the Empire. Its sphere of competence was determined by the Charter.

The February Revolution caused a sequence of reforms: on 5 August 1917, the Department was incorporated into the newly-created Ministry of Confessions, which ceased to exist after the October Revolution.

Among seven branches of the DRAFF which existed in 1917, the fifth branch administered the affairs of the Islamic, Lamaistic and pagan faiths. The Islamic branch of the department managed the following affairs: conferment of spiritual ranks to clergymen and affirmation of consistory membership, rewarding clergymen with marks of distinction, control of the establishment and activities of religious educational institutions, and record-keeping on the number of parishes and parishioners. Other aspects that were part of the competence of the DRAFF included the building of new mosques on behalf of a parish, and the formation of religious societies. Additionally, the members of the Department prepared different draft laws related to foreign religions and reviewed draft laws on religion which were prepared by other departments. Since the end of the 19th century and during the first decades of the 20th century, the activity of the Islamic branch of the DRAFF was largely bureaucratic. The work was directed towards supervision of the Muslim population. Information was provided to the office in the form of responses made by governorate institutions to the inquiries of the Department. Much attention was paid to the preparation of analytical surveys and records on the most significant problems in any given period. Work with information collected from Muslim newspapers and magazines, analyses of the content of the Tatar periodical press, and data provided by police supervisory bodies were also considered as an effective means of response to the situation in Muslim communities and regions.

Apart from the DRAFF, there were also other state institutions which were involved in the affairs of the Muslim peoples of Russia. Issues related to the organization of school education for non-Russians were resolved in the Ministry of National Education, which strove to monitor the activity of Islamic religious schools (Maktabs and madrasahs) and to carry out national policy in the field of education for non-Russians. The Russian Orthodox Church developed missionary practices with respect to Muslims. The Main Directorate for the Press monitored Islamic publications. In the beginning of the 20th century, the police department of the MIA started to become involved in Muslims affairs. Ultimately, at the beginning of the century, special inter-agency committees within the MIA were convened for developing a general policy towards Muslims.

Bodies of the Department of Muslim Religious Affairs were also represented by spiritual assemblies. In most of the territory of the Russian Empire, Muslim clergymen were subordinate to Muslim Spiritual Directorates (Orenburg, Taurida and two Transcaucasian directorates). The territory within the competence of the Orenburg Mohammedan Spiritual Assembly (OMSA) was limited to the European part of Russia and Siberia. In honor of the
centenary of OMSA in 1889, a report was published where the following data was recorded: by 1889 there were approximately 4222 communities and 7203 clerical ranks including 60 akhoonds, 2734 imam khatibs, 2621 imam mudarris and 1873 muezzins in the region under the competence of OMSA, with a population of 3,5 million people. In the beginning of 1911, there were 5771 parishes with 5409 cathedral mosques in the region of OMSA, in which 3946 khatibs, 3696 imams, and 691 mullahs conducted services [Farkhshatov, 1999, pp. 67–72].

The authorities demonstrated consistent indecisiveness concerning the issue of restructuring the bodies of the Muslim Spiritual Board, despite having announced that the revision of legislation related to Muslims was long overdue (Vol. XI of the Code of laws). Projects for the total or partial reformation of OMSA were developed in governmental circles since the mid-60s in the 19th century. Their main goal was weakening the influence of the mufti and muftiye, strengthening the role of the Russian language in records management, limiting the sphere of competence of the religious authorities, and the fragmentation of the OMSA with subsequent abolition. However, practically all of the proposals were left unimplemented due to the indecision of the authorities and reluctance to aggravate contradictory and painful issues. In the mid-70s, the head of OMSA, S. Tevkelev, suggested to reform and regulate the activity of religious authorities [Usmanova, 2005; Zagidullin, 2007]. The project of Tevkelev was directed towards the following: determining the precise number of mosques which can be built, creating an intermediate position between mullahs and the muftiye—a district akhun who would control the activity of mosques and schools, and setting an election procedure for Assembly members [RSHA, Fund 821, Inventory 8, File 616, Sheets 1–48]. However, it was not carried out either.

In the beginning of the 20th century, projects were developed once more in the bureaucratic apparatus, related to the fragmentation of territory under the control of OMSA into smaller pieces in order to weaken the organization. One of the creators of the project was V. Cherevansky (1836–1914), a member of the State Council. In his work entitled ‘Statement on the religious affairs of Sunni Muslims’, prepared for the Special Meeting on religious affairs headed by A. Ignatev (1906), he proposed dividing Orenburg Muftiate into areas and nationalities, thus creating a range of smaller spiritual administrations: Saint Petersburg, Crimea, Caucasus, Orenburg, Steppe and Bashkortostan [Rybakov, 1917]. In that way, the territory under the control of OMSA significantly decreased due to the loss of such regions as the North-West, Siberia and the Cis-Ural. It was proposed to join the North Caucasus with the Transcaucasia district. Additionally, the creator of the project proposed to withdraw the title of ‘Mufti’ and to gradually replace it by ‘chairman of the board’. Though agreeing with the main idea of reducing the OMSA into smaller districts, firstly to weaken the influence of the Tatar clergy, and secondly to decentralize the spiritual life of Muslims within the Empire, the critics made several remarks. Particularly, the chairman (since 1905) of the Special Meeting on the Education of Oriental foreigners, A. Budilovich, proposed for the newly-created regional spiritual administrations to be characterized by regional rather than tribal affiliation. According to A. Budilovich, it was also extremely dangerous to establish spiritual administrations in Orenburg, Troitsk and Petropavlovsk due to their proximity to the eastern border and the possible strengthening of Tatar influence.

Simultaneously, representatives of the Muslim community developed their own projects on the reform of spiritual administration bodies. In the beginning of the 20th century, the question grew in public importance due to the press and the activity of the Islamic fraction in the State Duma. The first time that the question was widely discussed was at the All-Russian Muslim Congresses in 1905–1907 which, inter alia, adopted a wide reform program of the Muslim Religious Affairs administration. Some of the principle points of the program...
were the issues of the electivity of muftis and equality of status between Muslim and Orthodox clergy. In 1907–1908, Yusuf Akchura developed a draft law on parish reform [Millyat, 1914, 17 May]. In 1906–1914, members of the Islamic fraction focused on that problem [Usmanova, 2005]. The reactionary turn in government policy, which became evident from 1908, made their full realization practically impossible. As the government ‘tamed the country’, all the projects were postponed and the petition of the Muslims was considered to be ‘illegal solicitation’. Due to the specificities of the political system of the country, the realization of any projects initiated by Muslims themselves was practically impossible without appropriate approval by governmental authorities.

The governmental authorities, as we can see in the projects of the Commission of Count Ignatyev, A. Budillovich and others, had their own opinion on how the Islamic question was to be solved. The most prevalent threats were thought to be pan-Islamism, ‘Tatarization of the foreigners’ in the Volga region, and spreading Islamic fanaticism by the Tatars among the Kazakh population of the steppe regions. The tendency was especially evident during the sessions of two important anti-Muslim meetings in 1910 and 1914 [Makhmutova, 1998; Vorobyova, 1999].

The first of the two 'Islamic' meetings was held in January 1910 (12–29/01/1910) and was led by P. Stolygin, under agreement with the Synod and the MPE headed by A. Kharuzin, the head of the DRAFF. The expressive title of the Meeting is evidence of the direction of its activity: ‘Extraordinary meeting on the development of measures against the Tatar-Islamic influence in the Volga region’. However, the key subject of the meeting was the Tatar movement and the system of Islamic education. When making their judgements about the situation, the members of the meeting agreed with the governor of Kazan guberniya M. Strizhevsky, who stated the following: 'in the last years it [The Tatar movement] became more pronounced and definite under the influence of important events in the life of Russia. The movement is undoubtedly Pan-Islamic and is based on both cultural and political ideas. One characteristic of the Tatar movement is that it not only tended to bring the Muslims Tatars together in a single united whole, but at the same time to conquer other nations' [Makhmutova, 1998]. Practically all of the members of the meeting speaking after the Kazan governor reiterated the threat and serious danger stemming from the activity of the Tatar population to the Russian state. The chairman of the meeting (the head of DRAFF) was convinced that 'the loyalty of Muslims was merely formal and not real. (...) The confirmation of their superficial loyalty is the fact that they strive for cultural consolidation in a fight against Russian origins, and try to lull the government authorities using their seeming loyalty' [Makhmutova, 1998]. The members of the meeting considered the following possible countermeasures against the threat: the prohibition on reforming Islamic confessional schools, the prohibition on creating a national educational system and the establishment of schools taught in native languages. All suggested countermeasures in this sphere were directed

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23 The last of the major pre-revolutionary events, which took place to discuss ways of reforming the OMDS and the entire system of spiritual administration in the country, was the congress of representatives of Muslim public organisations, which was held on 15–25 June 1914 and was recognised as the fourth Muslim congress led by the chairman of the Muslim faction K. Tevkelev. The main speakers at the congress of deputies of the Duma were I. Akhtyamov (giving reports on the Orenburg Muslim Spiritual Assembly and the administration of the Siberian Muslims as well as an overview of the main projects being carried out) and M. Dzhafarov (on the Caucasian Muslims); editor of the ‘Millyat’ newspaper I. Lemanov (on the Tauride spiritual administration); former deputies S. Maksudi (on the main provisions of the administrative reform of the spiritual affairs of the Russian Muslims); S. Karamatayev (on the position of the Kazakhs); A. Topchibashev, and others. The work of the meeting of the congress had three essential aspects: organisational, spiritual, and educational affairs, and waqt (mortmain endowment). And although many of the issues raised were not fully developed, the draft ‘Provisions on the Administration of the Spiritual Affairs of the Muslims of the Russian Empire’ was adopted as a result of the congress (from ten resolutions). For more details, see: [Millyat, 21 August 1914; Usmanova, 2005].
towards making Islamic schools noncompetitive and to force the Muslims themselves to attend Russian schools through the system of prohibitions and restrictions. They were supposed to eradicate all secular subjects in maktabas and madrasahs, including Russian classes, and to forbid the teaching of the Russian language. This was steadily implemented from the 1870s. The school itself was 'a property of the government' and could only be of Russian nationality. Children 'who received their primary education in foreign language schools were cut off from the Russian public spirit'. Thus, it is evident that the discussion of national cultural issues conflicted with the liberal educational reform projects being discussed in the Russian parliament, which helps explain their ultimate failure. Among the proposed countermeasures against the Tatar threat was the regulation of the state-legal position of Muslims with enhanced control over them [RSHA, Fund 821, Inventory 133, File 573].

It is known that the prime minister was not only the initiator of the meeting but also controlled the preparatory activities and work, and was well-acquainted with its conclusion. It appears that they could not but substantiate the belief of the government executive that it was necessary to continue the reform program, grounded in the conception of 'a united and indivisible Russia'.

In May 1911, P. Stolypin developed a reform project of the public administration system of the country. He anticipated the establishment of two ministries in the new government system: on nations and religions. The Ministry of Nations, according to the conception of P. Stolypin, should meet the religious and cultural needs of every nation in the Empire by carefully studying the cultural, religious and social life of the nations in order to create conditions for loyal attitudes among them. Two theses of Stolypin's project on the establishment of the Ministry of Nations are notable. They were repeatedly and strongly emphasized, namely: the necessity of abolishing all restrictions of a national nature (likely including the shameful Pale of Settlement in regard to the Hebrews), and the existence of numerous external and internal enemies of Russia who did nothing but weaken and divide it [Zenkovsky, 1956, pp. 79–81]. The Ministry of Religions should not only monitor the activities of the Orthodox church but also look carefully at the activities of other religions. At the same time, all the members of the Ministry had to have a proper spiritual education (Orthodox) and to be 'deeply committed to the Orthodox Faith' [Zenkovsky, 1956, pp. 82–83].

Thus the reform project being developed by P. Stolypin preserved and was even called upon to strengthen one of the basic principles of imperial ideology—the predominant position of Orthodoxy.

A new special inter-agency meeting on Muslim affairs was held in April–May 1914 under the chairmanship of the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs N. Zolotarev. In spite of the request of the Muslim members to postpone the meeting until the Islamic congress, it nevertheless started on 29 April 1914. The main aim of the meeting, as the previous one, was to discuss 'the Tatar domination', as 'the Islamic question' was primarily considered to be 'Tatar-Muslim'. The discussion was about the danger of the propagation of Tatar national culture among neighboring Muslim and pagan peoples. As Islam was considered to be the guide of Tatar ideas, the fight against 'Tatarism' was accompanied by opposition to both Islam and Islamic religious structures. After a fortnightly discussion, the meeting retracted its previous promises about reforms of the administrative system for Muslim affairs and the liberalization of the law on Muslims, thus taking a stand for preserving the status...
Afterwards, government experts came to the conclusion that the reform of OMSA, as the establishment of new muftiates, would be contradictory to state policy directed towards the gradual weakening and elimination of the Institute of Muslim affairs (1914) [RSHA, Fund 821, Inventory 133, Sheet 566]. Soon the beginning of the world war made the resolution of the planned issues impossible both in accordance with the government plan and with the preferred plan of the Muslims themselves. Radical reform of the entire system of relationships between the state and the Muslim population became possible only after the February Revolution.

§ 2. The Ideological Struggle among Russian Muslims

Rafik Mukhametshin

Tatar social thought at the beginning of the 20th century, the whole of its problems and their tendencies and trends, was generally directed towards the formation of a national ideology and determination of basic ideas of the national liberation movement and national identity. This period heralded the rise of the new forces to the public stage and a high-grade change of the public conscience: on the basis of the religious reformism, enlightenment and liberal ideas, the principal tendencies of the social thought were developed. This made a theoretical basis for the strong rise of the national movement that followed among Tatars on the way to progress and to the creation of their own history. It was exactly during this period that basic principles of traditional values were weakened and the bases of the secularization of theoretical thought were established. Those tendencies were especially clear after the revolution of 1905–1907 when periodicals and secular education were widely spread, interest in the advances of modern research was aroused, political parties and associations were established, and the relative freedom to express own political views became possible.

The printing industry played a great role in familiarizing new theories and ideas of crucial importance for Tatar social thought during that period. Tsarism, which perfectly understood the role and significance of the printing industry, especially of periodicals, for spreading new ideas and information that were not always kind to the official authorities, did not permit printing newspapers and magazines for almost a hundred years. On this occasion, the Trustee of the Kazan Educational District of the Main Directorate of Press in 1903 directed his attention to the fact that 'newspapers in the Tatar language satisfying the natural curiosity of the Tatars and providing them with all necessary information on the public and every day life would eliminate the need of the Tatar to study the official language and, in any event, would contribute to national separatism rather than to cultural integration of the Tatars with the Russian population...' [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 92, Inventory 1, File 21132, Sheet 5]. Only during the years of the revolution of 1905–1907 did the Tatars get the permission to publish newspapers and magazines. Thus, only in 1905–1907, 33 editions were legally published in the Tatar language (21 newspapers and 12 magazines) [Amirkhanov, 1986, p. 10]. After 1906, about 8,000 books in an edition of 5.6 million copies were published annually in Russia [Karimullin, 1974, pp. 21, 185]. There is no
doubt that in this case it is necessary to pay attention not only to quantitative measures, but also to the trends which were outlined in the printed products in the Tatar language. Thus in the Circular sent to the governor of the Russian Empire it was noted that 'recently, completely new currents could be seen in Tatar literature which threaten to impair the centuries-old way of life of the 14 million Muslims of the Russian Muslim religion and give the opportunity to assume an oncoming serious turning point in the life of the population' [Karimullin, 1974, pp. 187–188]. At the same time it is impossible not to pay attention to the fact that in the beginning of the 20th century the circulation of secular literature increased up to 83–85% of the total and, per edition, up to 70–75% of the total number [Karimullin, 1974, p. 291]. Newspapers and magazines informed the Tatar reader of up-to-date currents in philosophical and social thought and the literary life of the West and Russia. The press revealed to the reader all the troubles of the fight between the old and the new, practically becoming a powerful means for formation of the social conscience. M. Pinegin, Kazan press inspector, directed his attention to the fact that 'The Tatars certainly did not lose the capability to assimilate new ideas due to schools and young mullahs and perhaps mostly to the Tatar newspapers and magazines which penetrated the population, 80% of whom are literate in their own way' [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 420, File 258, Sheet 5]. In this connection the important fact was that 'the striving for making literary language spoken especially strengthened after 1905 when the Muslim writers felt more need to address not a group of scientists and well-educated people, but the general public. At that period of time a great number of editions in language very close to the people's one was published' [Journal of the Ministry of National Education. Novaya seriya, 1917. Part 59, p. 67]. N. Bobrovnikov further states that 'this reading which was very favorable to the development of the deep layers of society is intensified day by day: strange languages are gradually replaced with the derivatives from Turkic roots and are widely used in numerous newspapers and magazines, through textbooks, schools and theatres. It can be stated that now, out certain Tatar newspapers, for example "Vakyt" (Orenburg) and "Yulduz" (Kazan), are clearer to an uneducated Tatar then our newspapers are to a Russian peasant educated in a two-class school' [Novaya seriya, 1917. Part 59, p. 68]. Also, 'the mektebs are being transformed all over into secular educational institutions with the real Tatar and not teaching jargon' [Novaya seriya, 1917. Part 59, p. 68].

The role of Tatar educational establishments that had previously played a defining role in forming social awareness grew even more in the new conditions. It is no coincidence that the main task was to educate people, as without education the possibility of social and national progress was unthinkable. That is why it was quite natural that 779 madrasahs and 8,117 mektebs in Russia, where education was provided for 267,476 students [Amirkhanov, 1986, p. 82], were founded in the epicentre of a quite severe ideological struggle for the minds of the growing generation. However, this field was also noted for its certain tendencies. As it was stated in the circular to the governors of Russia in 1900, the supporters of a new method 'urge the Tatar population of Russia to education, to acquisition of practical knowledge in crafts and industry as well as in foreign languages, in order for it (the population—R.M.) to be civilized and rich' [Karimullin, 1974, pp. 187–188].

The artistic culture at the beginning of the 20th century was also clearly noted for its growing self-awareness. This period faced a huge interest in the legacy of the past, national roots, spiritual, religious and ethnic traditions. At the same time, the literary, cultural and political relations with the West and the Orient were studied and thought over. The pages of the periodicals contained the discussions about the interpretation of the cultural legacy of the past and the attitude towards the problem of 'West-East' and Western civilization, in general. Within this context, a special importance belonged to the issues of the society's political establishment. The people's
dissatisfaction with living conditions aroused a special interest among Tatar intellectuals in the issues of state governing. The ideas of freedom, constitutionalism and parliamentarism were widespread at the beginning of the 20th century. In an attempt to solve pressing societal issues, Tatar thinkers demonstrated a conscious intention to adopt the achievements of Western culture and European forms of political organization. The majority of the Tatar intelligentsia regarded the constitution and the parliament as political leverage that was able to turn Russia to progress, and it would allow for a possibility to use more realistic means for the political re-organization of Tatar society. These tendencies in social thought, establishing the synthesis of elements of traditional and European cultures as the main problem, did not eliminate the conflict between the new and the old in all fields of ideological life. On the contrary, the struggle between the old and the new in social awareness became unusually intensive as the fight embraced almost all the antithetical powers leaning upon the institutions, criteria, and the behavioural sets of traditional and modern society. This struggle brought about a lot of paradoxes in Tatar society, complicated world-view and moral clashes, social commotion due to the changes, and giving birth to new concepts and new ideas. At the same time things trended in the opposite direction, preparing the ground for the preservation of traditional tendencies. The point is that social thought appealed to Western ideas and values in search of solving the problems related to the modern aspects of political, economic, social and cultural life, and leaned upon the traditional past in search of the pillars for national self-identification.

Social awareness in Tatar society was formed with the influence of social and economic factors. That is why it was quite natural that the attempts to think over these factors were characteristic of the Tatar social thoughts at the beginning of the 20th century. This period is characterized by a high interest in economic issues. The Tatar thinkers tried to distinguish the general tendencies in the development of economic relations by taking into account national characteristics. The journal 'Iktisad' (1908–1913), the first professional economic publication in Tatar, paid much attention to different economic theories, scientific assessments of economic situations, ways of form to obtain benefits and profits, and the abolition of poverty in Tatar society. The interpretations offered by the journal are interesting by virtue of their attempts to deal with the economic issues by taking into account the admittedly ethnic peculiarities of the Tatars. It is logical that the journal, by explaining the subject and matter of economic studies, underlies that this is 'a science studying business patterns and showing the ways of the successful existence of a separate nation, people, and state. It is divided into economic politics and political economy. The first one explains the reasons for economic changes, and the second one deals with the rules of the changes in economic relations' [Iktisad, 1908. No. 1, p. 2].

In its programme article, the journal also highlights that 'all problems are considered through the canons of Islam' [Iktisad, 1908. No. 1, p. 1] as 'Islam is an economic religion' [Iktisad, 1909. No. 1, p. 1] and these ideas are supported by the Hadiths of the Prophet Muhammad, for example, 'the one who cares about his economic state will not become poor' [Iktisad, 1909. No. 1, p. 1] and others. According to F. Murtazin, the journal's Editor in Chief, first of all, it underlines the interconnection and complementarity of economy and religion [Iktisad, 1908. No. 1, p. 2]. That is why the journal by comparing Marx's economic conception with the zakat doctrine proves a doubtless advantage of the zakat in solving the problems of the society welfare: 'In any case, the Europeans will accept the zakat and solve the problems of the treasury and budget this way' [Iktisad, 1908. No. 4, p. 97].

Agreeing with the social democrats, the journal places their statements about the necessity to rethink radically Marxist doctrine [Iktisad, 1908. No. 4, pp. 97–99]. From the point of theoretical thinking and its practical application in Tatar society, interesting were the statements concerning the improvement of
production and increasing of labour efficiency. The journal singles out five conditions that can facilitate this process: 1) free labour; 2) private ownership of the means of production; 3) professional level of workers; 4) labour division; 5) united efforts [Iktisad, 1908. No. 3, pp. 79–80].

Revealing different aspects of these conditions, the journal strongly underlines their importance also for the Tatars. Thus, monopoly in different industries is regarded as the factor that slows down free entrepreneurship [Iktisad, 1909. No. 7, p. 198]. Dealing with the issue of professional staff training, the journal highlights its urgency for the Tatar workers, who unlike the Western European workers 'approve themselves mostly in unskilled labour' [Iktisad, 1908. No. 3, p. 79]. The journal underlines that increasing the professional skills of Tatar workers is necessary together with the implementation of their right for labour, and to follow it is one of the principles of Islam [Iktisad, 1910. No. 10, p. 258].

In the implementation of the latter, it is important to take into account the interests of the family, mahallah, nation and state [Iktisad, 1910. No. 10, p. 290]. Within the context of the above-mentioned problems, the journal also considers the question of the poverty and wealth of the nation. The position of the journal in this question is quite interesting as by avoiding simplified ideological assessments, it tries to discover economic mechanisms of the given phenomenon. Distinguishing that 'the reasons for poverty are numerous but the main reason is legal ignorance and inability to make use of laws... there are requirements that must be met by every nation and by the population of every state: first, every nation and every government must take care of their wealth; second, they must be able to multiply it' [Iktisad, 1908. No. 1, p. 8]. The journal's conclusions in this regard are distressing for the Tatars: 'Do our Russian Muslims make use of these economic laws?... No, that is why the poverty of the nation is natural and easy to explain' [Iktisad, 1908. No. 1, p. 8]. Highlighting the general theoretical character of these reasons, the journal also analyzes the other reasons for poverty: breaking the balance between production and consumption [Iktisad, 1909. No. 10, p. 290], changing demographic processes [Iktisad, 1909. No. 12, p. 357] and others. The journal tries to define the way to break out of this miserable situation: 'For this, attention must be paid to the following: 1) it is necessary to keep in the hands of the nation such types of wealth as land, water, and forests and to try to be their owners as much as possible; 2) what the nation possesses should be used for its interests; it is required to study the ways of using natural resources. Otherwise, the benefits will be acquired by those, who are able to make use of them; 3) education and vocational training. And our Prophet said: "Vocation is a way to get rid of poverty"; 4) developing different types of trade; 5) improving the current ways to do farming' [Iktisad, 1908. No. 1, p. 10].

The general theoretical aspects of preserving and multiplying national wealth, fighting against poverty, according to a lot of the journal's authors, certainly do not contradict Islamic canons. On the contrary, Islam contains measures that do not permit poverty as a social phenomenon. Among them, the journal's editor-in-chief F. Murtazin, the author of the article series 'Misery and Islam', pointed out the following ones: 'Any healthy adult must perform their duties. It is not mandatory to give sadaqah (alms) to such people' [Iktisad, 1909. No. 7, p. 193]. Quite thoroughly considering the moral and individual aspects of this problem (about the debt of children to parents, of parents, of close family members, etc.), the author noted that the Islamic canons pay a lot of attention to the necessity of setting up charity organisations" [Iktisad, 1909. No. 7, p. 195].

In general, it can be said that the journal 'Iktisad' is a specific reflection of new tendencies in Tatar social thought at the beginning of the 20th century. Highlighting economic theoretical questions, the journal detailed the actual problems of Tatar society. It is no coincidence, although the programme article underlines that 'the journal is not limited to a point of view of some party, it will adhere to cen-
trism in every case and in every thought, and everything will be considered from the point of view of the economy" [Iktisad, 1908. No. 1, p. 1]. However, it had an intention 'to get the Muslims familiar with the economic state, to arm them with scientific knowledge in trading, agronomy, crafts and industry and to demonstrate economic ways of using the national wealth' [Iktisad, 1908. No. 1, p. 1]. Although it should be noted that the journal practically does not contain references to the 'Tatars' or 'Tatar society', but all the theoretical issues are regarded within the context of general Islamic values, and a range of the journal's issues are of clearly-defined national shade. Considering the ways to preserve and multiply national wealth, criticizing monopoly, defending private property and free entrepreneurship, paying attention to training highly-qualified specialists and to setting up social and charity organizations that, to some extent, are able to accumulate and reasonably distribute, at least, a part of the national wealth, etc.—all of these issues prove that the journal managed to attract the representatives of the Tatar intellectuals, who clearly understood processes in Tatar society. Indeed, a lot of problems discussed by the journal authors were the centre of attention for all Tatar intellectuals. Thus, the issues of establishing Islamic charity organisations, about the need of which the 'Iktisad' wrote so much, had not only economic but also political aspects. That is why there could be different points of view, and sometimes opposing.

At first sight, Tatar society was supposed to be free from an ideological discordance of opinion concerning charity organisations. As R. Salikhov justly noted, 'since the collapse of the Kazan khanate, in the conditions when the Russian state treasury totally ignored the interests of the heterogeneous population in the region, charity was the only source for Tatars to finance their social, spiritual and educational needs' [Salikhov, 1998, p. 87].

Step by step, by the end of the 19th century, the idea of concentrating the national charity capital under the aegis of the charity organisations had acquired another incarnation. The developing national bourgeoisie also made use of these organisations to set up cultural and educational institutions, modern madrasahs that could found the ideological basis. It is no coincidence that the Kazan Governor in 1912 paid attention to the mahallahs, where the trustees were "often the initiators of the reforms in the confessional school on the principiums with new methods" [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 2, Inventory 2, File 8961, Sheet 52] (detailed see: [Salikhov, 1998, pp. 134–149]). The conservatively tuned part of Tatar society were obviously dissatisfied with these changes in the activities of charity organisations. Their point of view was clearly defined by the journal 'Din Va Magishat': 'The reformers opened... different communities called "Muslim charity communities... " They spend money on setting up the mektebs to teach common people to read and write and arithmetics... The communities give preferences to those mektebs where education is carried out with sound method but at the same time they categorically refuse to give money to the old mektebs and try to get rid of them in this way... If the children are asked now about main Muslim fundamentals, they will answer that they do not know as they have not been taught them... And, all in all, they completely ruin the words "charity" and "Muslim", and they keep only one word "society"' [Mir islamia, 1913. Vol. 2, issue 9, p. 626].

There were also furious discussions about the problem of poverty, which was thoroughly covered on the pages of the journal 'Iktisad'. Although, in this case most of the discussions were caused not by a social perspective but by a theological interpretation. For example, Z. Kamali in his book 'Religious Structures' considered that the condition of the faithful Muslim was his material welfare (detailed see: [Kamalov, 1994, pp. 40–49]).

The Hadith, famous but not recognized by all the Islamic legal scholars, about poverty being a point of praise for a person, was explained by him as a need for Allah's mercy. M. Bigiev thought that 'poverty in its specific meaning is not unbelief (qurfy)' [Şura, 1914. No. 4, p. 108]. However, to perceive the social and
political background of such approaches is not complicated.

The problems of economic development in Tatar society were quite naturally in the center of attention among the representatives of the newly-born national bourgeoisie. Those phenomena, which were the obstacles for the society to function, were negatively accepted, and they were looking for ways to eradicate them. Within this context, the attitude of some Tatar bourgeoisie representatives towards the ancient holiday Djien is quite interesting. In 1887, the members of the district council, famous Tatar merchants A. Saydashev and M. Galeev at the following meeting introduced a proposed petition for the Minister of the Internal Affairs 'about eradicating the Islamic celebration of the "Djiin" as it had a harmful influence upon the economic state of the Mahomeddan population and was strictly revived by the Sharia law' [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 1, Inventory 3, File 7233, Sheet 1]. The district meeting, where there were 16 representatives of the district Muslim population out of 52 members, in actuality passed a resolution 'to initiate a petition about eradicating the Islamic custom "Djiin" by governmental measures' [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 1, Inventory 3, File 7233, Sheet 1]. Pointing to 'the huge damage from this popular Muslim custom', Saydashev and Galeev highlighted that 'urban peasants, mainly the most poor from hand-workers and time-workers try to do their best to earn or, if there is no wage, to pawn anything in order to join common celebrations. Rural peasants also prepare to receive expected guests. But as "Djiin" coincides with the most destitute period among the peasants, ... the peasants sell sheep, or calves, or the last cow or horse. In case of no cattle, they even sell their own clothes. Lacking this or that, they sell land, bread, firewood, even the last of their farming tools' [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 1, Inventory 3, File 7233, Sheet 2]. During the holiday, both adults and children crowd the fields, make up a kind of fair, spend time in amusements... 'it is especially harmful to the young generation, who shake off the habit to work and get addicted to indolence and laziness' [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 1, Inventory 3, File 7233, Sheet 3]. Social aspects of societal functions were also of importance to the Tatar thinkers. Thus, the famous Tatar lawyer S. Mukhammedyarov, by underlining the importance of class division in society, highlighted that 'as the history of any people shows, it is divided into three or four classes' [Mukhammedyarov, 1914, b. 7]. However, at the same time, the Tatar thinkers emphasized the specific conditions of Tatar society. In the appeal to the Muslims, accepted at the meeting of the executive committee of the All-Russian Muslim Council in June 1917, it is noted that 'among the millions in the Islamic world the social differentiation and, thus, class struggle as its result do not play the role that they play among the European nations. That is why the All-Russian Muslim Congress, consisting of 900 delegates, the representatives of all the layers of the Muslim population from different places and ethnic groups, did not get divided into constituent parts: neither into classes, nor into any other aspects but kept its cohesion' [Fakhirutdinov, comp., 1992, p. 80]. The first All-Russian Muslim Congress (1–11 May 1917) highlighted that the Muslim peoples 'have extremely few representatives of capital and huge land ownership; our proletariat has just started to become educated. Class differentiation in Islamic surroundings was weak. This is our advantage and also our disadvantage. Class differentiation leads to intensive political life and this is its advantage, but it decreases the general energy of a nation and this is its disadvantage. Let's weaken the disadvantage and strengthen the advantage' [Fakhirutdinov, comp., 1992, p. 63]. G. Gaziz claims that 'our century is an epoch of national relationships and class struggle' [Gaziz, 1913, b. 22]. Dzh. Validi thinks that 'today, practically in all the states, policy is built upon national principles. Policy and national character are tightly interconnected' [Validi, 1912, b. 23]. Though, this issue among thinkers was not understood
in the unanimity of opinions. For example, F. Karimi was sure that 'peoples are divided into classes, and they have different economic interests. But among people of the same nation and faith, ideological and spiritual kinship is so strong that all the material interests of the world are not able to overcome them. Though, class interest is quite natural. Yet, the Russian Muslims cannot ignore this unity and orient themselves only to class interests. During the formation of independent nations and their development, it will be time to define their own attitude towards class interests. However, it mustn't be done yet' [Karimi, 1906]. By this, F. Karimi and other Tatar intellectuals admit the priority of the national interests. From this point of view he criticises G. Iskhaki, F. Tukhtarov, and S. Mukhamedyarov for urging the peasants and workers to a class war (like the Russian socialists did) and for not being satisfied with spreading the education and introducing ideas from Western Europe in the field of organizing an economy or making use of scientific achievements according to the spirit of Islam. In this issue, Yu. Akchura highlighted another aspect. He thought that 'every society is in need of class opposition. Classes cannot be socially balanced' [Akchura, 1911, b. 48]. That is why, according to Akchura, 'across Russia, there is a spirit of revolutionary sentiment, which logically leads to revolutions' [Akchura, 1911, b. 48].

As mentioned above, at the beginning of the 20th century, new forces appeared in the social arena and qualitative changes occurred regarding social awareness. On the basis of education, religious reformation, jadidism and other liberal movements, the main directions of social ideas were being formed. It was the period when new social forces became aware of national ideas, the politicalisation of religious ideas and the radicalisation of political ideas.

At the beginning of the 20th century, Tatar social thought was combined with the entire trend of political radicalization, which manifested itself in different aspects: from revolutionary democratism and late populism (socialist revolutionaries) to Marxism (bolsheviks and mensheviks). Although these directions in scientific literature are studied quite thoroughly (mostly, with ideological distortions towards bolshevism) (see, for example: [Nafigov, 1964; Faseev, 1971 and others]), it is necessary to draw attention to some principal methodological features. First, it should be taken into account that they considered themselves as a movement of intellectuals. Second, despite the apparent integrity of the perception of the social ideal, they had a quite blurred philosophical orientation and overemphasized the necessity of grounding and propagandizing revolutionary ideals. That is why it can be reasonably stated and verified with regard to cosmopolitanism that, in relation to philosophy, these trends did not take precedence over the the enlightenment ideology of the 18th–19th centuries. It is pointed out by researchers claiming that 'the theoretical basis in the historical development of revolutionary democratic ideology in general and the Tatar case in particular was rationalist philosophy and the humanistic culture of the Enlightenment' [Abdullin, 1991, p. 125]. That is why political radicalism in the Tatar social thought, without having its own philosophical basis, quite freely evolved either to the right or to the left. It can be seen in the example of the Tatar socialist-revolutionaries—the 'tangists’, G. Ibragimov and other thinkers at the beginning of the 20th century. As for the fate of Marxism in Tatar society, it can be said that the political awareness of the few Tatar Marxists did not carry any trace of philosophical creativity and only used the prepared philosophical systems, unsuccessfully trying to employ them for ideology. By A. Rorlikh, the Tatar bolsheviks and their supporters, 'despite their continuous propaganda', did not have noticeable success. Moreover, the tsarist government did not see them as a political danger to Russia anymore. In the opinion of the inspector of people's colleges, Ya. Koblov, 'if the Muhammadans side with left-wing parties, it is again because of their national aspirations. Some committed Mahommedan social democrats or socialist revolutionaries get lost in the general mass and do not play a signifi-
Within this context a huge interest is presented to Tatar social thought at the beginning of the 20th century did not share new ideas that were truly widespread in this period, including the ideas of socialism. Within this context, a huge interest is presented to Tatar social thought at the beginning of the 20th century did not share new ideas that were truly widespread in this period, including the ideas of socialism. Within this context, a huge interest is presented to Tatar social thought at the beginning of the 20th century did not share new ideas that were truly widespread in this period, including the ideas of socialism. Within this context, a huge interest is presented to Tatar social thought at the beginning of the 20th century did not share new ideas that were truly widespread in this period, including the ideas of socialism.

Obviously, it does not mean that Tatar social thought at the beginning of the 20th century did not share new ideas that were truly widespread in this period, including the ideas of socialism.

Within this context, a huge interest is presented to Tatar social thought at the beginning of the 20th century: I admired ideas about the necessity of the critical study of the historical events of our century, about the harm of theocracy, about the importance of national principles in history... another approach to life and today's scientific research became hopelessly outdated... Having acquainted myself with the works of the social democrat Plekhanov ("About a materialistic understanding of history" and "To the question the role of personality in history"), I saw that it is exclusively useful to study history from the point of view of economics... Having read Plekhanov, I became infused with the idea of socialism, to which I was prone before!... However, I totally shared... the point of view that materialism is a method to study history and an ideology that is in Western countries with a developed industry, that is why the materialistic method is very difficult to apply in the Orient [Togan, 1997, p. 65]. Perhaps this is why ideas of socialism were perceived by the Tatar national intellectuals, first of all, not as a mainly class ideology of the proletariat but as a part of the idea group of the national movement. That is why the main conceptions of socialism were based on the postulate about the integral connection between social principles and national values. Dzh. Validi points out that 'socialism, which has recently strengthened its positions in Europe, is not directly related to the national. Its main aim is to ruin the basis of capitalism and exploitation, and to eliminate classes. However, it creates new conditions to develop a national language and school, and opens new possibilities for progress in the national sphere' [Validi, 1914, b. 45]. The admission of socialism of the 'national' sort presupposed the union of political, social, national and religious perspectives. Islam was given a special role in reflecting a new social ideal as, by numerous Tatar thinkers, from the beginning its principles correspond to socialist ideas. Within this context, Karimi points out that 'in Europe, welfare from day to day comes into the same hands, and the number of poor is increasing'. Thus, the social economic base for spreading socialism was expanding.

'But for Muslims, if they consciously follow the fundamentals of their religion, there is no danger of socialism invading their surroundings. This is because fundamental Islamic principles such as equality, justice, mercy are the main principles of socialism and democracy' [Karimi, 1906]. At the same time, Karimi warns against blindly following the Russian socialists [Karimi, 1906]. This point of view was quite widespread among Tatar intellectuals. Even representatives of the radical wing of social ideas such as G. Tukay and Fattykh Amirkhan related their ideas about socialism to religion. In this regard, Tukay wrote the following: 'Until the capitalist system collapses and socialist reorganization sets itself up and capital stops being the curtain of truth, I see no sense in considering myself a Muslim. I would like to say that the one who is truly satisfied with this reality, is neither a true believer, nor a Muslim nor a human being' [Tukay, 1961, pp. 37–38]. This period is noted for a certain transformation of social and valuable criteria and of Tatar psychology, especially among the youth. In their surroundings, the weakening of the nuclear family became noticeable. Daily life affairs and the events of the political and national significance attracted more attention than traditional and religious rituals. The main emphasis was placed on studies and work. The youth tried to make plans for the future in accordance with their own intentions but not taking into account the opinions of their relatives. The demonstration of the elements of this rationalisation in worldview and psychological attitude was undoubtedly a result of fundamental changes in social life.
As it is seen, the social and economic changes at the beginning of the 20th century, especially the Revolution of 1905–1907, accelerated the development of Tatar political awareness and facilitated the birth and strengthening of national self-identification and adherence to democratic principles. The orientation of Tatar social thought was more than ever defined by the correlation and interaction of national and international factors on the basis of a specific group of ideas inherited from the past and behavioural adjustments. Tatar social thought developed its attitude towards its national cultural legacy and traditions as well as to values of other nations. Typical of it is the union of different and contradictory ideas reflecting the movement on the ways of the reeneration of society, which in its turn sped up the process of secularising of social thought. Social awareness can be ascertained as a weakened influence of religion. However, it should be taken into account that social awareness always, to a greater extent, depends on ideas, cultural values and traditions inherited from previous epochs. Society makes use of ideological material from the past as the basis for rethinking over life circumstances by exploiting them to support ideological positions.

§ 3. The Movement of Converting Baptised Tatars to Islam in the Beginning of the 20th century

Ildus Zagidullin

Legal principles of the conversion from Orthodoxy to Islam. The Imperial edict ‘On the strengthening the principiums of tolerance’ from 17 April 1905 marked a new epoch of interfaith relationships in Russia. For the first time in the history of the Russian Empire, granting freedom of religion to every Russian citizen was publicly affirmed [O veroterpimostii, 1905, p. 7]. The conversion from Orthodoxy to Islam was permitted to the nominal Christians, officially considered Orthodox and actually practicing Islam, which they or their ancestors had belonged to before being converted to Orthodoxy (Art. 3). This provision by Senate edict no. 5982, from 2 June 1906, was also spread to those, who wanted to come back to non-Christianity from Heterodox faiths, and the MIA—on those, who wanted to convert from Christianity to paganism [Spravka o svobode sovesti, 1906, p. 5]. As it is seen, the indigenous peoples of the Middle Volga region obtained a possibility to return to the faith of their pagan ancestors one year later.

According to the MIA circular from 18 August 1905, those who wanted to convert from Orthodoxy to another faith, applied to the governor, who confirmed the fact that these people or their ancestors are Muslim. In case of any difficulty precisely to define this circumstance, the administration was obliged to be limited to the revision of whether the applicant used to weasel out of the Orthodox rituals before the edict from 17 April 1905 (one was not at confession, etc.). After clarifying this issue, the governor notified the religious authorities for conditional directives about excluding the applicant from the Orthodox parish registers [RSHA, Fund 821, Inventory 8, File 797, Sheet 5].

22 March 1906. The MIA informed the local authorities that according to point 4 of the circular from 18 August 1905, the solution about excluding one from Orthodoxy totally depended on the governor, without waiting for the report from the clerical authorities [Kobzev, 2007, pp. 210–211].

Specific details of the movement of converting to Islam in the Kazan guberniya. The work of the institutes of the religious anti-Islamic and anti-pagan missionary, district missionaries and 'St. Guria Brotherhood' introduced some peculiarities in the review order of the questions about being excluded from the church documents at a local spiritual consisto-
Chapter 3. The Ethno-Confessional Policy in Russia at the Beginning of the 20th Century

A regular review of the applications started at the end of 1905. The requests were directed by the consistory to the diocesan missionary, who went to these settlements, engaged district missionaries for admonition and local clergy, and, according to the results of the missionary admonishment of the 'departed', Ya. Koblov presented his conclusion for a final decision. In 1907 Koblov went to serve in the educational department. That is why the drawing of conclusions was given to the Council of the 'Brotherhood of St. Guria', which held meetings with long breaks, and it slowed down the review and the acceptance of the final decision.

'New Muslims' notified the OMSA about their dissatisfaction, caused by slowing down the life-changing issue. On 11 November 1905, the Orenburg mufti M. Sultanov appealed to the Kazan and Simbirsk governor with a request for reviewing the petitions sent to the province administration by the 'Orthodox Christians and pagans'. In his opinion, at 'the present anxious time', the inertia of the authorities affected the Muslim population in an especially annoying way. It was undesirable and may 'encourage unrest and riots' [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 4, Inventory 1, File 120758, Sheet 21; Iskhakov, 2008, p. 184].

In its turn, the Synod with its decision on 30 January 1906 instructed the clergy to take steps for strengthening Orthodoxy in the 'heterogeneous dioceses' of Eastern Russia and "for improving missionary work, in general"[National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 4, Inventory 1, File 122760, Sheet 48–reverse].

After the declaration of the edict of 17 April 1905, at first the 'departed' did not believe the intentions of the government. Only after seeing that they were not persecuted either by the spiritual authorities or by the police, they started fulfilling the Muslim rituals in public, making secret schools legal and open new mektebs [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 4, Inventory 1, File 122760, Sheet 37–reverse].

The first and main wave of the applicants in 1905–1906 was presented by the children and grandchildren of the 'departed' in the 19th century. The legal part of the issue for them was just their official exclusion from the church documents, where they were already unregistered, and official acquisition of Muslim rights.

The anti-Muslim missionary S. Bagin pointed the second group of the 'departed' in 1910, the residents of the settlements where there were no Muslims, who had started applying for conversion to Islam at the end of the 19th century. In 1908, the Mamadysh uyezd obtained the 'new Muslims' from the residents of the following settlements: Bolshiye Savrushi (266 people), Staraya Ikshurma (379 people), Yanyl (145 people), Tri Nosy (246 people), Verkhnye Otary (526 people), Zhuvut-sebe-Usadom (73 people) and Satlygan Klyuch (85 people). In the Kazan uyezd, they were from the settlements of Apazovo (599 people) and Kreshcheny Yanasaly (24 people). In five of the named settlements, there were churches, an Orthodox clergy and obviously a missionary school. It caused some tension between the clergy and the fellow remaining Orthodox settlers, on the one hand, and the 'departed', on the other hand [Babin, 1910, pp. 10–11].

The third small group of the applicants was presented by those, who felt likings for Islam and practiced the Islamic rituals secretly but were forced to support contacts with an Orthodox clergy and formally carried out the church rituals until a certain time. In new social conditions, they applied for conversion to Islam.

The official statistics reflect the total number of people, converted to Islam, the year of registering them as Muslims and their assignment to the nearest mahallah. In 1910, in the Volga-Ural governorates, about 50,000 people converted to Islam: 'newly–baptised' Tatars, who were the majority among 'new Muslims', local groups of 'old–baptised' Tatars as well as pagans and Christians from the Chuvash, Udmurts and Mari. The percentage of 'departed' in 1905–1909 was about 40–45% of all the baptised Tatars [Iskhakov, 1993, p. 97].
Table 1.3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governorates</th>
<th>The number of the 'departed' (both genders)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kazan guberniya</td>
<td>38,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ufa guberniya</td>
<td>4505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simbirsk guberniya</td>
<td>4360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penza guberniya</td>
<td>866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orenburg guberniya</td>
<td>539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vyatka guberniya</td>
<td>427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samara guberniya</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saratov guberniya</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tambov guberniya</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Astrakhan guberniya</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ryazan guberniya</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nizhny Novgorod guberniya</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL:</strong></td>
<td><strong>49,839</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: [Iskhakov, 1993, p. 97, table No. 29]

Missionary activities of Muslims. The Muslim Tatars provided the moral and material support for their brothers who returned to Islam. Analyzing the faith situation in the 'old-baptised' settlements of Satlygan Klyuch, Staraya Ikshurma, Yelyshevo, and Savrushi, the clerical missionary Koblov wrote as early as 1902: "the reasons for the secession of the baptised Tatars to Islam are hidden in the intention of all the Tatars to become united" [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 4, Inventory 134, File 4, Sheet 4–reverse]. The residents of the mentioned settlements literally announced the following to him: "If we remain Christian, without wearing taqiyahs, the Tatars will not give us work, and we can't do anything else but tailoring. We have the same language and tribe with Tatars; it seems that God orders us to go there" [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 4, Inventory 134, File 4, Sheet 4–reverse].

Muslims spread the lithographic sheets where it was claimed that 'everyone must follow the faith of their ancestors', and the printed sheets of the request to be excluded from Orthodoxy into Islam [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 4, Inventory 1, File 122760, Sheet 48–reverse]. The application was added with a form to write a list of people (family members), who were going to be converted into Islam and assigned to a certain mahallah and a mullah [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 4, Inventory 138, File 12, Sheets 150, 157 and others].

In 1906, in Kazan, the publishing house of the Karimov brothers issued the leaflet 'Islam Dine' ('Religion of Islam') in Tatar in the Russian transcription, developed by N. Ilminskey, which contained an appeal to the brothers, 'who had been forced to leave Islam'. It explained how to behave after coming back to Islam, provided a short overview of Islamic doctrine and the main Muslim responsibilities. The recommendations of arranging religious and ritual life in small communities, which were the majority among 'new Muslims' also attracted attention. In particular, it was advised to invite a shakird before building a mosque and registering a mahallah, and to hold prayer meetings after learning prayers from him. After learning their religious responsibilities, men were obliged to teach their wives. After electing a shakird for being a public mullah and getting a girl who one could teach, it was advised to involve her in teaching other girls to read and write [Bagin, 1909, pp. 11–14].

Thus, owing to the given instruction, 'new Muslims' became familiar with the ways to arrange the religious and ritual life in small communities.

Besides the confessional aspect of the issue, there were a set of social and economic factors, which sufficiently influenced their decisions. The crucial one was seasonal work to sew clothes in the guberniyas of Ufa, Orenburg and others, their living from autumn till spring in Tatar and Bashkir settlements, the residents of which thrived on ordering clothes from tailors who practiced Muslim rituals.
Thus, the success of earning money was determined, to a large extent, by the faith of the tailor. The other important factor was the possibility of getting divorced and married to another woman, which was practically impossible for Orthodox Christians. Then, there was a possibility to gain a loan at any time from fellow villagers or from the Tatars of neighbouring settlements and to be in hospitable relations with them, which was important to the 'departed' [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 4, Inventory 138, File 12, Sheets 40–40 reverse]. The reasons of the 'departure' by the priests were, as well: 'common ethnicity with the Muslim Tatars, their conversational language and their world view'; propaganda by the Tatar mullahs and Muslims in general, close distances between their settlements, etc. [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 4, Inventory 1, File 122760, Sheets 48–reverse].

The senior lecturer of the Moscow Archaeological Institute, S. Kuznetsov, visited the guberniyas of Vyatka, Kazan, Perm and Ufa by order of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 1911–1912 in order to study the religious and everyday conditions of the local peoples influenced by the Muslim Tatars, and pointed out: 'Every Muslim tries somehow to expose their affection and love to the proselytes; they are gifted with presents and are constantly invited to the houses of rich Tatars; and sometimes it happens that the guest reception lasts weeks. If the recently converted is in need, the Muslims help him with the cattle, poultry, bread and even money. A lot of Tatars try to give some help secretly, and then they deny admitting anything as theirs when it is introduced to them. This is the so-called 'secret alms', to which the Muslims give an important meaning. The Tatars also vigilantly keep an eye on the recently converted in order for them to strictly follow the Mahomeddan rituals and not to remind others by their appearance of their origin from another tribe' [RSHA, Fund 821, Inventory 133, File 576, Sheets 235–235 reverse].

As a rule, in case of the family head's decision, the other family members turned to Islam, although in a number of cases, as the priests pointed out, their wives wanted to stay in the previous faith. Their behaviour was explained by the fear of being abandoned by their husbands and the risk to stay alone with young children without a piece of bread to their name [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 4, Inventory 138, File 12, Sheet 40–reverse]. Islam was often accepted by the parents, brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the teachers from fraternal schools and of the priests [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 4, Inventory 1, File 121818, Sheet 5–reverse].

Some conflicts between family members or settlement residents were pointed out by the missionaries in: Verkhnye Otary, Savrushi, Yelyshevo, Satlygan Klyuch, Tri Sosny, Staraya Ilkshurma, Zhuvut-sebe-Usadom, Yanyl, Vazheshur and Bier (Mamadysh uyezd); Apazovo and Kreshchenye Yanasaly (Kazan uyezd); Kiyazly, Chuvash Maina, Novo-Chuvash Adam, Shama and Saltakayevo (Chistopol district), etc. [Bagin, 1910, p. 27].

The ethnic make-up of 'new Muslims'.
The majority of the 'departed' movement were 'newly–baptised' Tatars, the ancestors of whom got baptized for different reasons and causes, mostly in the second third of the 18th century or the following decades. The main part of the 'old–baptised' Tatars, who had accepted Christianity before Peter I, owing to the successes of Ilinsky's missionary system, kept their confessional identity.

In an ethnic aspect, the 'new Muslims' included local groups of the Tatarized Chuvash and the representatives of the Finno-Ugric peoples. During the Kazan Khanate, in the Middle Volga region, the Tatar language was a means of international communication for indigenous peoples of the region. From the 19th to the beginning of the 20th century, to a larger extent, this tradition was preserved. Islamification continued during the 19th century. They themselves called the conversion to Islam as the 'exodus to Tatardom' [Bagin, 1909, p. 21]. Among them were two groups: pagans and nominal Christians. Intensive Islamifica-
tion was carried out among the residents of the following Chuvash settlements: Kukskham, Belaya Voloshka, Utevo-Bikovo, Suguty (Tetyushsi uezd), Tatarysk Sancheley, Salda-
kayevo (Chistopol uezd, Kazan guberniya); Staroye and Novoye Surkino, Kazymbash, No-
voye Serezkhino, Alekseevka, Abdikeyevo, Rysaykino, Staroye Gankino, Nikolkino, Bu-
lantamak, Sumel Stepankovo, Nizhny Nur-
lat, Vorony Kust, Iglaykino, Sabakeevo, and
Kalmayur (Samara guberniya) [State Archive
of Saratov oblast, Fund 32, Inventory 1, File
3243, File 3257; Inventory 3, File 36; Samar-
skie eparkhial’nye vedomosti, 1906. No. 17,
p. 790–798]. The Chuvash of the following
villages 'departed' to Islam: Tenevaya (with
a constructed mosque), Polevaya Baybakh-
dina, Vodoyal (Uty) (Tsivilsk uezd, Kazan
guberniya) [Koblov, 1910, p. 370], Staroye
Afonkino, Artemyemka (Bylantamak) (Sama-
ruga guberniya), the Besermens of the following
settlements: Yukamen, Dosase, Imanayev, and
Kashchur (Glazov uezd, Vyatka guberniya)
[State Archive of Kirov oblast, Fund
237, Inventory 222, File 463, Sheets 92–92 re-
serve]. In 1905–1913, Islam was accepted by
the Udmurts in Novy Kumor, Maly Yum, Ish-
tuganov, Souther, Vezheshur, Nizhnyaya Rus,
and Lyya Poikino (573 people) (Kazan guberniya)
[National Archive of the Republic of Ta-
tarstan, Fund 2, Inventory 2, File 3960, Sheets
25, 36]. In the first decade of the 20th century,
Islam was officially accepted by 702 Chuvash
from the Ufa guberniya, 574 from the Samara
guberniya, 305 from the Penza guberniya, and
187 from Saratov guberniya [Yagafova, 2009,
p. 55]. In 1911, in the Simbirsk guberniya,
the number of the Muslim Chuvash, settled in 16
villages, reached 600–800 people [Kobzev,
2007, pp. 278–281].

The conversion of Russians to Islam was a
very rare case [RSHA, Fund 821, Inventory 8,
File 801, Sheet 165].

Organization of religious and ritual
life. Owing to the caution of the OMSA and
its circular from 12 September 1905 under
No. 5017 in the petition about converting to
Islam, the 'departed' pointed out the precise
mahallah and the surname of the imam of that
mosque and attached the list with the names
of the members of all the families and their
ages. In fact, since official conversion, all the
'new Muslims' found themselves as the mem-
bers of the current mahallah in a religious and
administrative aspect. Several types of their
organization of religious and ritual life should
be pointed out.

1) Assignment to the mosque of their native
settlement. In case there were several Islamic
temples, they became members of a congrega-
tion of the mosque which was most convenient
for them to attend. The qualities of the imam
and the relationship formed with them earlier
were also taken into account. In the communi-
ties, where villagers increased the number of
people in the mahallah, there was a later 'wave'
of constructing new mosques with a new ma-
shallah. For them, the most important factors
were to follow the norm of 200 men per each
new meeting house and to possess the means
for constructing a temple.

2) Assignment to the mosque of the neigh-
bouring village, in case there was no mosque
in their native settlement. The authorities did
not interfere in this problem, did not pay at-
ention to the distance for the mosque chosen
by them, and that's why the petitioners made
their choice quite independently, although
sometimes it was forced. The location of the
mosque in the neighbouring settlement meant
going there for a Friday afternoon service,
bringing a mullah every time for naming a
newborn baby, carrying out marriages and
funerals and other needs, and having prob-
lems in the organization of children's educa-
tion. In the settlement with multi-confessional
residents, the main obstacle in setting up new
Islamic meeting houses was a lack of people
in the religious community that did not corre-
spond to the normal requirements (200 men).
In particular, as an exception, on the basis of
the 'highest' permission from 18 April 1907,
the right to build a mosque was granted to the
Muslim returnees from the newly–baptised
Tatars in Yangildino village in the Sviyazhsk
uezd (160 men) [RSHA, Fund 821, Inven-
In the Kazan guberniya, the only case of constructing a mosque in a settlement where there was a church happened with the 'highest' permission from 4 December 1907 in Krechenye Yanasaly of the Kazan district, where the departed (112 householders) were earlier assigned to the mahallah in Kainsar village, 4 verst away [RSHA, Fund 821, Inventory 8, File 703, Sheet 58].

The following years, the attitude of the authorities towards religious problems of the 'new Muslims' toughened. The pretext of 'the danger of temptation' was made use of to reject the petitions of the returnees to Islam in Staraya Ikshurma (162 men) living side-by-side with Christians (1908, 1909), and in Satlygan Klyuch (100 men), who wanted to set up a mahallah together with the residents of Nizhny Shittsy (104 men), because in the latter settlement there were 29 men and 27 women in Orthodoxy, 'hesitating to the ones prone to change' the confession of the baptized Tatars, in Tokhtamyshevo (1908), and in Sosnovy Mys in the Mamadysh uyezd (1909)[RSHA, Fund 821, Inventory 8, File 704, Sheets 27–27 reverse, 144–145, 156], etc.

In such settlements, children's education was carried out by an educated Muslim (a man or a woman) from a neighbouring settlement, and the classes were given in the houses of the residents.

**Conclusions.** In summary, the main part of the returnees to Islam were the 'newly–baptised', the parents of whom split with Christianity in the 19th century and the majority lived together with Muslims. That is why this act for them meant the legal acquisition of the the rights of Muslims, the members of mahallas. The main part of the 'new Muslims' managed to align themselves with the religious and ritual life by Islamic canons within a short period of time. When there
were no Orthodox residents in the settlement, they managed to get an autonomous mahallah registered much faster.

They were accepted by the Muslim Tatars as their brothers in faith and members of the integral part of the Tatar society, and they received moral and certain material support. At the beginning of the 20th century, the official change of faith, together with the religious aspect, acquired a clearly defined ethnic context and was associated with the record 'in Tatars'. The movement of the official conversion into Islam became a part of socio-cultural processes within the formation of the united Tatar ethnicity.

The beginning of the 20th century saw the ethno-faith identification of the 'old-baptised' Tatars. In the Kazan guberniya, over ten settlements went through the conversion to Islam. In these settlements, the presence of churches and/or missionary schools and the preservation of Orthodoxy by part or most of people brought about serious obstacles in arranging a traditional religious way of life for 'new Muslims'.

Section I. Kazan Guberniya and the Tatar Community of Russia in the Early 20th Century
CHAPTER 4
Education and Culture in the Kazan Guberniya
and of the Tatars of Russia

§ 1. Kazan Guberniya as a Region of Education, Culture and Science
in the Russian Empire

Lyudmila Bushuyeva

The Kazan guberniya at the beginning of the 20th century was one of the largest regions in the Russian Empire. The location between the East and the West of the Imperial space and the complicated ethnic structure determined the uniqueness of its cultural life. The first decades of the 20th century for Kazan guberniya were an important period of educational, scientific and cultural development. The processes and changes in these fields were tightly related to the social changes in the country, caused by the Revolution of 1905–1907.

The first decades of the 20th century were a dynamic period in the history of educational development in the region. Kazan was the centre of a huge educational district, which includes the governorates of Kazan, Samara, Saratov, Astrakhan, and Viatka. The centre of the educational district was Kazan University, one of the oldest higher educational establishments in the country, a recognized centre of science and pedagogy. For a long time, it was the only higher education institution and scientific centre in the entire Eastern part of the Russian Empire, coordinating the studies of the region. Thus, Kazan University enormously influenced the intellectual and daily life of residents in the governorate. At the beginning of the 20th century, it continued successfully developing scientific schools, established prior in the 19th century. Social changes in the country, changes in the structure of the university management, the liberalization of the university life, and the inflow of young staff helped in setting up and developing new scientific approaches in Kazan University [Ermolaev, edit., 2004, pp. 226–253; Korbut, 1930].

The beginning of the 20th century was a blossoming period of the humanities in Kazan University. In that period, such famous historians as D. Korsakov (the author of works on Russian history in the 18th century), N. Zagoskin (a researcher of the history of Russian law and the author of works on the history of Kazan University), N. Firsov, M. Khvostov, and V. Piskorsky all worked here. N. Petrovsky, a researcher of the history and culture of the southern Slavs, also worked in Kazan. A. Selishchev, obviously influenced by N. Petrovsky, made his first forays in science. Later, he became a well-known Soviet Slavic specialist [Ermolaev, edit., 2004, pp. 226–228]. The beginning of the 20th century was marked by the activities of N. Katanov, a historian, Orientalist, ethnographer, and linguist [Ivanov, 1973, pp. 62–63]. He studied a lot of Turkic languages [Katanov, 1899], took part in a set of expeditions to Eastern and Western Siberia and Mongolia [Information about Kazan university condition in 1906 and the first half of 1907 (Extract from the report), 1907, p. 51], and was an author of works on the history of Kazan and the Kazan Khanate. N. Katanov fruitfully worked as the chairperson of the Society of Archaeology, History and Ethnography and the Head of the Kazan city scientific-industrial museum [The yearly record, 1909, pp. 32–34].

The Kazan linguistic school also actively developed and included the work of one of its
brightest representatives, Professor V. Bogoroditsky, a follower of the well-known Russian linguist I. Baudouin de Courtenay. A bright philologist at the end of the 19th to the beginning of the 20th centuries was E. Budde, known as a founder of the historic dialectal studies of the Russian language in the history of domestic linguistics.

At the beginning of the 20th century, the University also successfully developed other scientific fields. The representatives of the Kazan chemistry school, the followers of the famous chemist A. Butlerov, went on with their active research. That period is related to the beginning of the professional work of the famous chemist, the founder of the school of phosphorus organics, A. Arbuzov (a student of A. Zaycev and F. Flavitsky). During World War I, the Kazan chemists played an important role in the activities of the Kazan military industrial committee [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 977, Inventory Council, File 1204, Sheet 116]. Under the supervision of Professor A. Bogoroditsky, the chemical section of this organization worked on the means against asphyxiating gases [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 977, Inventory Council, File 1204, Sheet 118].

The Kazan geography school continued its successful research and pedagogical work. One of its outstanding representatives was P. Krotov, who was widely recognized as a researcher of East European Russia, the Urals, Kazan, Vyatka and Simbirsk guberniyas [Information about Kazan university condition in 1900 and the first half of 1901 (Extract from the report, 1901, p. 62; Dedkova, 2002, pp. 1–10]. The medical department of Kazan University was one of the strongest medical centres in Russia. It trained medical workers in a vast region of the country, including the Volga and the Ural regions. Many renowned scientists worked in the department: physiologist N. Mislavsky, surgeon V. Razumovsky, surgeon A. Vishnevsky, neuropathologists L. Darkshevich and A. Favorsky. At the time, mathematicians and mechanics, such as F. Suvorov, D. Zeylinger and A. Kotelnikov, taught in the physics-mathematics department at Kazan University. One of the renowned physicians of the late 19–early 20th centuries and the first Russian researcher of the electromagnetic theory of light, D. Goldgammer, continued working in Kazan, as well as A. Vasilyev, a famous public figure who initiated publication of the first complete collected works on geometry by the prominent mathematician of the 19th century, N. Lobachevsky.

The scholars of the law department at Kazan University had a well-marked place among the jurists of Russia. That included V. Ivanovsky, one of the premier researchers of criminal law, and A. Piontkovsky, author of works on the issues of probation and abolition of the death penalty. One of the activists in the Kazan law community was the authoritative scholar of civil law, senior lecturer A. Zavadsky. Kazan University was a starting platform for the pedagogical and scientific work of the famous researcher of administrative law, A. Yelistratov [I. Ermolaev, edit., 2004, p. 249].

While Kazan University taught in Russian and primarily targeted the Orthodox youth, the students of Turkic origin were also studying there, including Tatars, Bashkirs, Azerbaijanis and Kazaks [Mikhaylova, 2006, p. 206]. The potential in the Russian market and the striving to be represented in the elective agencies and governmental institutions required from a high level of education from the Tatar intelligentsia. While in the 19th century, young people from Tatar families could receive higher education only abroad (Turkey, Egypt, European countries), in the early 20th century they had an opportunity to study in Russian educational institutions. The 1905–1907 Revolution brought about a slight increase in number of Muslim students. Thus, in 1908, the number of Tatar students receiving education in various departments at Kazan University came to 13 people. In 1913, their number increased to 27 people. In 1912 A. Teregulov graduated from Kazan University with honours. As a result, a medical faculty graduate and a student of famous medical Professors S. Zimnitsky and A. Kazem-Beg, A. Teregulov became the first Tatar Doctor of Medical Sciences and Professor.
After the Revolution of 1905–1907, Kazan University contributed to the development of higher education for women in the governorate. It was a sign of the times, a kind of symbol of social liberalization. A new educational institution was created on the initiative of university professors K. Arnstein, A. Vasilyev, N. Sorokin, M. Khvostov, and G. Shershenevich, which was called Higher Courses for Women, where young women could receive higher education. The coursework followed the programs of the historical and philological university departments in ‘history’ and ‘Russian philology’ specialties. The graduates of the Courses were able to teach in secondary educational institutions for women and, starting from 1911, in secondary educational institutions for men. Most of the teachers of this educational institution were the Kazan University professors, such as A. Aleksandrov, V. Bogoroditsky, D. Naguevsky and N. Petrovsky, to name a few [Spravochnaya knizhka, 1910, p. 35]. It conditioned the high level of education received in the Higher Courses for Women. In 1911–1917, 19 young Tatar women were studying there, including M. Gubaydullina, A. Mukhitdinova, Z. and R. Gabitovs.

The level of interrelation between the university and cultural life of the region was not determined merely by the development of science and education. Kazan University was the centre of social life in the region. At the time, the scientific societies of the university, formed back in the latter half of the 19th century, were successfully continuing their work. The representatives of the national intelligentsia of the region were actively involved in their work. In the early 20th century, the Society of Archaeology, History and Ethnography collaborated with 30 Tatars. One of the members of the society was a prominent Mordovian educator and linguist, M. Evsevyev. The Society of Archaeology, History and Ethnography contributed to the collection and research work not only in the Kazan guberniya. In their ‘Izvestiya’ (Journal), the Society published methodical guidelines on conducting archaeological and other kinds of research. Being influenced by such guidelines, the members of the national intelligentsia started their own regional associations in the Vyatka, Samara and Simbirsk guberniyas [Sidorova, 2008, p. 11].

The work of the professors from Kazan University led to Kazan becoming one of the most important museum centres of the country. The professorial community created the Kazan Municipal Museum, which became one of the biggest regional museums of Russia, both in quantity of exhibits and the contents of collections.

One of the four Spiritual Academies of the Russian Empire was based in Kazan, which was opened there in 1842. This educational institution had a high scientific potential in theology, philosophy, linguistics, oriental studies and ecclesiastical law. In the early 20th century, the Academy was a working ground for the prominent specialist on ecclesiastical law, Professor I. Berdnikov, and the famous orientalist, Professor N. Katanov [Maurer, edit., 2009, p. 461].

The system of secondary education was based on gymnasiums, and mektebs and madrasahs for Tatar children. In the beginning of the 20th century, the Tatar community were coming to the realization of the importance of secular education. For that matter, one of the important changes in this area was the development of new-method (Jadid) schools [Amirkhanov, 2002, p. 146]. The majority of the subjects offered was of secular nature. They taught such subjects, as arithmetic, geography, logic, geometry, Russian history, the Russian language, jurisprudence, pedagogy, psychology, Oriental languages, medicine, and ethics. Some madrasahs had drama and literature clubs and published handwritten newspapers. In the early 20th century, especially after the 1905–1907 Revolution, the period when the restrictions were being eased by the authorities, more and more Tatar children were studying in Russian gymnasiums, as the number of Russian-Tatar training schools, Russian-Tatar schools and Russian classes in madrasahs was increasing.

The 1905–1907 Revolution had a positive impact on the development of secondary education for Tatar women. Girls from the Tatar intelligentsia families had an opportunity to
study in Russian educational institutions, such as Mariinskaya Gymnasium for Girls, and the gymnasiums of Shumkova and Kotova.

A whole range of Tatar educational institutions started flourishing under the impact of social changes. The most well-known among them were schools of L. Khusainova, F. Aitova in Kazan and of F. Adgamova in Orenburg, as well as the schools of F. Gainutdinova, which were successfully functioning in Orenburg and other cities of the governorate. They taught secular subjects, such as Tatar literacy, arithmetic, geography and history.

However, regardless of its explosive development, the Tatar school system was still challenged, as it was opposed by Kadimists, protagonists of the scholastic system in education and upbringing, local authorities and officials who were responsible for approving school programs and teacher staff [Amirkhanov, 2002 a, p. 148]. A big part of the Tatar population, primarily rural, did not have access to education [Rustyamova, 1957, p. 421].

As the socio-political situation in the country was changing and the level of education was increasing, the national intelligentsia of the region was progressively showing interest in European culture. It is proved by development of various types of art, namely literature, music and theatre.

The beginning of the 20th century marked an important stage in the development of Tatar literature. This period was a productive time for many Tatar writers. The first decade of the century witnessed a peak in the careers of many renowned wordsmiths and the emergence of new young writers. As a result, many of them became classics of Tatar literature. The work of Tatar writers vividly showcases the introduction of national literature to the worldwide literary movement.

It was the time of transformation for the traditional genres and of emergence and development of new literary movements and artistic methods. The Tatar writers and poets actively used the experience of Eastern, Russian and West European literature. The Tatar literature featured schools and movements of world literature, such as realism, romanticism, naturalism and modernism. The tradition of enlightenment and critical realism was supported by G. Tukay, G. Iskhaki, G. Kamal and M. Gafuri. Romanticism was embodied in the works of G. Ibragimov and dramaturgy of M. Fayzi. Along with realism and romanticism, the Tatar literature of this period features lineaments of modernist art as well. For instance, symbolism had a great influence on the poetry of Dardemand and works of G. Gubaydullin [Minnegulov, 2006, p. 618].

The essential part of the literary movement of the 20th century was Tatar literary criticism. It was formed and separated into a stand-alone scientific field after the 1905–1907 Revolution with the emergence of Tatar printed media. G. Tukay, R. Fakhretdin, F. Amirkhan, and G. Iskhaki played a huge role in the development of Tatar literary criticism. Their manuscripts and reviews disclosed its theoretical bases, discussed the issues of national identity in Tatar literature, and defined and consolidated the principles of critical realism methods.

The period of the 1905–1907 Revolution was also the time of the explosion of Tatar printed media [Amirkhanov, 1988, p. 3]. In 1905–1907, all over Russia: in Kazan, St. Petersburg, Moscow, Orenburg, Ufa, Simbirsk, Astrakhan and other cities, there were 33 periodical publications in Tatar, 21 of which were newspapers and 12 which were magazines. It included the newspapers 'Fiker' ('Thought') and 'Azat' ('Freedom'). Tatar printed media played a crucial role in establishing the general norms of the Tatar literary language. The credit for development and establishment of these norms goes to Tatar illuminators K. Nasyri, G. Ilyasi, G. Tukay, G. Iskhaki, G. Ibragimov and others [Khakov, 2006, p. 621].

The early 20th century was the time of development for Tatar book publishing. The centre of Tatar book printing was Kazan. During that period, the number of typographies in Kazan grew bigger and there were even whole companies specializing in publishing and selling books. For instance, the Karimovs book-trading company, 'Sabakh' and 'Magarif' ('Enlightenment'). The typographies printed lit-
The musical culture of the new European type was formed in Kazan in the late 19th–early 20th centuries. It is witnessed in the numerous performances of concert-philharmonic and opera combination companies, the opening of musical schools for professional music education, as well as in the work of musical social organizations. The active concert life of the governorate's capital featured tour performances of outstanding musicians such as S. Rakhmaninov, A. Skryabin, L. Sobinova, A. Nezhdanova and others. Kazan was the starting point of the artistic career of the famous opera singer, F. Chaliapin.

The development of Tatar national music in the early 20th century was in many ways connected to the formation of professional Tatar theatre. At first, Tatar music was performed by instrumental groups during the entr'actes in the productions of the theatre troupe 'Sayar'. Soon enough, Tatar music concerts were included in the programs of literary evenings of the 'Vostochny club' in Kazan and performed in Moscow, Saint-Petersburg, Ufa, Orenburg and Saratov as well. The first professional Tatar musicians were Fatakh Latypov, F. Gumerova and Kamil Mutygi. S. Gabyashi, one of the first Tatar composers, who wrote amazing instrumental, vocal and musical theatre pieces, was actively promoting the musical enlightenment. Russian musicians were also interested in Tatar music, for instance, violin player I. Kozlov and conductor A. Eichenwald performed original adaptations of Tatar folk songs at their concerts.

The formation of the artistic culture in the region featured new tendencies compared to previous periods. The visual arts had an important place in the artistic culture of the region. Its growth was conditioned by the long-term successful functioning of the Kazan art school, founded in 1895 with the support of the Academy of Arts [Rosenberg, 2001, pp. 122–155; Klyuchevskaya, 1990, pp. 36–40]. The school trained professional painters, graphic artists, architects and specialists of decorative and applied arts. The institution of the provincial art school provided the opportunity to involve wide social and national categories of the population in artistic education. The student body
of the school covered different nationalities, including Udmurts, Mari and Chuvash. The diverse environment encouraged the invention of new styles in visual arts. The main movements, that influenced Kazan artists of the first decade of the 20th century, were the late Peredvizhnik's art and 'Mir iskusstva' ('World of Art').

Kazan was a place where at the time new artists such as N. Feshin, A. Rodchenko and D. Burlyuk evolved into famous, outstanding artists [Rosenberg, 2001, p. 130].

The cultural needs of the governorate's educated citizens were also satisfied by the development of various forms of intellectual socializing. 1907 marked the opening of the Vostochny (Eastern) club in Kazan. The chairman of the club, I. Teregulov, and other initiators established it to 'organize musical and literary evenings and dramatic performances' [Mikhailova, 2006, p. 176]. The club became, in a way, a cultural headquarters for Kazan's Tatar intelligentsia. It had a functioning library and a reading room, it started a string orchestra and carried out literary evenings with performances by G. Tukay, F. Amirkhan and G. Kamal. The establishment of musical social life was greatly influenced by the Kazan branch of the Russian intelligentsia from Russia, but from other Islamic countries as well [Validov, 1986, p. 26]. Second, by that time, Tatar merchants were gradually restoring their trading relations with Middle Asia. They brought in many manuscripts and books that were then highly regarded among the Kazan Tatars. The merchants witnessed how

Thus, in the early 20th century the culture of the region went through serious growth and changes. The development centre of its cultural life has always remained the capital of the Kazan guberniya. Being the biggest educational and scientific centre in the country, Kazan University continued playing a crucial role in the educational, scientific and social life of the region. The cultural development of Kazan guberniya was heavily influenced by the 1905–1907 Revolution. The liberal reformations in the country encouraged the evolution of literature, printed media and different types of art in the region. The national educational system changed its course towards a secular approach, as the higher education institutions became more accessible to Tatar youth. The national literature rose to a new height, whereas the national printed media and the Tatar professional theatre were first brought into the picture. The early 20th century became the time of active introduction of the Volga River and Cis-Ural regions intelligentsia to the European cultural space.

§ 2. Tatar National Education

Rafik Mukhametshin

The Tatar national education, as a network, was formed back in the Volga Bulgaria, the traditions of which were further developed during the periods of the Golden Horde and the Kazan Khanate. As Tatars had lost their sovereignty, they lost all the factors for a highly developed culture. It involved national education as well, which was left with no state or financial support. The chances for its restitution appeared only in the late 18th century. While there was a lack of educators and people were losing their local traditions, the educational institutions were revived from an analogue of the Middle Asian ones. First, the reasoning behind it was that by that time, Middle Asia, composed of several independent khanates, was one of the main centres of Islamic education, with the epicentre of it being in Bukhara. Although the scientific ideas within the Islamic world had already lost their progressiveness and were stuck in clerical and scholastic exceptionalism, "the hunters for Islamic light and Eastern philosophical wisdom" were coming here not only from Russia, but from other Islamic countries as well [Validov, 1986, p. 26]. Second, by that time, Tatar merchants were gradually restoring their trading relations with Middle Asia. They brought in many manuscripts and books that were then highly regarded among the Kazan Tatars. The merchants witnessed how
highly knowledge was valued in the Islamic countries and how respected scientists were by the society. So they essentially became the first patrons of Tatar educational institutions. A person who received education in Bukhara was held in high esteem, was granted a large mahallah (parish) and given the title Damullah, which means Great Mullah. The Bukhara madrasah graduates did not just fulfill the duties of imam in mahallah mosques, they opened madrasahs, gathered students, shakirds, and trained common clerks for mahallahs, while some shakirds of these madrasahs continued their education in Bukhara. As early as the end of the 18th century, I. Georgi noted that every Tatar village had 'its own prayer house and school, and the large villages even have girls' schools of this kind'.

The Tatar educational institutions were divided into two types: maktab (primary) and madrasah (secondary and higher). Every mosque had a maktab, similar to a primary school, which was managed by the mullah of its mahallah. There were no classes or departments or any specific curriculum in a maktab. The teacher taught each pupil individually from books composed of religious articles and moral tales, usually from the life of holy prophets. The term of study was also not specified. The majority of pupils were boys from 8 to 14 years old. Girls studied in the mullah's house, where they were taught by his wife, who was called ostabika or abystay. The teaching methods were the same as in maktab, but it was forbidden to teach writing to them.

Maktabs were funded by the residents. The buildings were just ordinary village houses with one or several rooms, which served as both classroom and dormitory for many students. They cooked for themselves, did the housekeeping, slept and spent their free time there. The mullah and the main khalifa teachers did not receive any payment. They lived off students' donations and offerings.

Madrasahs, like maktabs, were attached to mosques and managed by mahallah clergy. But not every mahallah had a madrasah. They were opened only in cities and villages with rich residents capable of and willing to maintain them, as well as an educated mullah capable of organizing such an educational institution. For instance, every mahallah in Kazan had its own madrasah; however, not all of them were regarded as highly. In the late 18th to early 20th centuries, the most popular one was Apanay madrasah. Large educational institutions were opening in villages as well, and were as popular and qualified as the ones in the city. This was the case with madrasahs in the villages of Kshkar, Bolshiye Saby, Satysh, Asan Ile, Tumutuk, Urussu, Bajryaka, Nizhniye Chershily and others.

The majority of shakirds were boys from 10 to 20 years old. Similar to maktabs, madrasahs had neither a strict curriculum nor a specific term. The subjects and teaching methods in madrasahs were purely confessional up to the middle of the 19th century. However, along with theological disciplines, students learned the basics of arithmetic, geometry, and gained some knowledge of geography, astronomy and medicine. But the level of teaching secular subjects did not go beyond the Medieval theological perception of the world, and the latest scientific and technological discoveries were virtually ignored.

The teachers, as in maktabs, were mainly khalfas. The head of a madrasah was a mudarris, who usually had substantial theological education in Eastern countries.

The financial situation of madrasahs was difficult. The ill-equipped rooms often served as both as classrooms and a dormitory. The situation was worsened by the fact that zakat (one fortieth of the wealth of rich people, allocated for charity according to Sharia law), as it was explained by scholars, was considered genuine only when it was given to poor individuals in need. Since social welfare was not considered a type of zakat, wealthy people gave their zakats to poor people and allocated only modest amounts of money to madrasah maintenance. Although a madrasah was never left without zakat, it was given to shakirds, not according to their needs, but by course year, meaning the higher it was, the more zakat a shakird was paid. Hence, the Tatar intelligentsia had good reason to be interested in establishing chari-
able organizations that could somehow accumulate and rationally distribute at least some of the national wealth belonging to the people, including zakat. In fact, starting in the latter half of the 16th century, when the state practically ignored the interests of the country's non-Russian population, charity was the Tatars' only source of funding for their social, spiritual and educational needs. The social life of Tatars started changing in the latter half of the 19th century. But before that, the Tatar madrasahs were traditional Islamic educational institutions of the Bukharan type. This type of educational institution played a crucial role in the formation of the educational system for Muslims in the Volga River and Cis-Ural regions. Especially when there was no national identity, educational institutions of the Islamic Orient to some extent encouraged a regeneration of the intellectual foundations of Tatar society. Graduates of these institutions brought Islamic learning in its classical form to the region. It did not meet the requirements of the new reality, but it maintained the Islamic identity of the Tatars. The authorities had a good reason to believe that 'mullahs with Asian education were the most harmful factor for Russification of Tatars' [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 92, Inventory 2, File 8777, Sheet 74]. Since Bukhara, Samarkand and Cairo were sacred sites for Muslims: they had the oldest madrasahs, many Muslim scholars lived and created their theological works in those cities, and their names are associated in the Muslims mind with the glorious era of Islam and theological philosophical Arabic science. That is why Tatars, who studied in those places, were valued so highly [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 92, Inventory 2, File 8777, Sheet 74]. However, 'when Russia conquered the Islamic centers in Middle Asia, the number of Volga Tatars going there to improve themselves decreased somewhat, but the allure of former glory and traditional striving of intellectual views toward the Orient was far from disappearing in Russian Islam' [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 92, Inventory 2, File 8777, Sheet 74]. By the middle of the 19th century, there were 430 maktabs and 57 madrasahs in the Kazan region, while in the Volga–Ural region, there were already 1482. These educational institutions 'were attended almost all (up to 80%) Islamic youth..., where they developed not only their religious views, but also their views on life and the world around them' [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 92, Inventory 2, File 8777, Sheet 68]. Students of maktabs and madrasahs 'asserted their belief that there is nothing better or higher than Islamic science, that a Muhammadan school is superior to any others..., all aspects of the cultural life of a Muslim were directed and regulated by clearly formulated rules and laws of Shiria' [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 92, Inventory 2, File 8777, Sheet 68].

By the middle of the 19th century, the educational institutions of the Bukharan type no longer suited the needs of Tatar society. They had to adapt to the new Russian reality and ideological needs of the Tatar community, first and foremost, of the incipient bourgeoisie. The old method (Kadimist) school could no longer remain the same, because it had to improve the quality of education in secular sciences in order to prepare the new generation for the world. Thus, the main objective of national educational system reform was to find a solution to this problem. The new method ('Jadid') madrasahs first of all aimed at using a new teaching method (phonics) and giving adequate knowledge of secular subjects. But it must be acknowledged that although the new method educational institutions initially had ideological functions that were different from the Kadimist ones, they cannot be contrasted, because they had become parts of a single national educational system. It must also be kept in mind that the rural Tatar communities that nearly 95% of all religious educational institutions were focused on, remained a pillar of traditional Islamic society. Moreover, it cannot be forgotten that a community, according to Ismail Gasprinsky, 'is a miniature state, where all of its parts are strongly connected as one, and it has its own laws, customs, social orders, establishments
and traditions, supported by the constant power and spirit of Islam. Such a community has its own authorities represented by elders and the entire parish, which does not need acknowledgment from above, because their authority is religious and moral... This community has fully independent clergy, who do not need any sanctions or ordinations. Any trained Muslim can become a teacher, muezzin, imam, akhun or other, when approved by the community' [Gaspinsky, 1881, pp. 25–26]. Hence, the educational institutions found themselves in the epicenter of quite a tough ideological battle for the minds of the new generation, as they were the most effective (almost the only, up to the beginning of the 20th century) leverage on social conscience. In 1912, there were 779 madrasahs and 8,117 maktabs in Russia with 267,476 students [Amirkhanov, 1986, p. 82] and fairly definite trends appeared in this environment. For example, by 1910, up to 90% of all maktabs and madrasahs of Kazan guberniya were using phonics, thus opting for not only a new educational system, but also the ideology of national social renewal. As noted in a government form letter to governors of Russia back in 1900, supporters of the new method encouraged 'the Tatar population of Russia to get an education and gain practical knowledge in crafts and industry, as well as in learning foreign languages, so it (the population—M.R.) would be cultured and prosperous' [Karimullin, 1974, pp. 187–188]. N. Bobrovnikov, a government official and well known specialist in the national educational system for non-Russians in Russia, pointed out that official reports refer to 'maktabs and madrasahs as religious schools... This qualification is not accurate today; I dare to say, that there are probably no strictly confessional schools left now. Even the most backward, remote maktabs always teach at least the alphabet by the phonics method... almost every school teaches arithmetic and elements of geography, sometimes Tatar history, music and so on... thus, maktabs to some extent come close to Russian secondary schools... We can call such madrasahs confessional only if we start calling all the educational institutions under the Orthodox clergy confessional as well' [Journal of the Ministry of National Education, 1917, May, p. 62].

Large Jadid madrasahs were opened in almost every region with a Tatar community, and they became the centers of Tatar culture: 'Galiya', 'Usmaniya' (Ufa), 'Khusainiya' (Orenburg), 'Rasuliya' (Troitsk), 'Muhammadiya', 'Marjani', Apanay (Kazan), 'Bubi' (Izh-Boby) and others. These educational institutions were mainly opened with the help of the Tatar upper class, as it was concerned about the education of youth and perceptive of the changes occurring in Tatar and Russian reality. For example, Akhmat Khusainov, a prominent Tatar industrialist and philanthropist, built a new type of madrasah, 'Khusainiya', in Orenburg for 100,000 rubles that provided education for 200 students, 100 of whom were fully dependent on the madrasah. At the same time, he annually allocated scholarships for Tatars studying in Kazan teacher's school (for 2 students), Kazan and Orenburg vocational schools (for 6 students from each) and Kazan business school (4 students) (for details see: Şärif, 1913; Fäxretdinov, 1911).

The establishment of the 'Galiya' madrasah in Ufa was largely funded by large Tatar merchants and industrialists, such as the Khakimovs, the Nazirov brothers, the Yagudins, Giba-dulla Usmanov, Suliya Tvekeleva and others. The Troitsk madrasah was supported by merchant L. Yaushev, the one in Yekaterinburg by merchant Agafurov, and the 'Muhammadiya' madrasah was funded by the Galeev brothers.

Meanwhile, implementation of the Russian national policy and missionary plans included opening schools for baptised Tatars and the non-Russian population, in general. The old system built on the principles of forced Christianisation did not prove itself. The system developed by N. Ilminsky was focused on promoting Orthodoxy among the non-Russian population in their own language. Therefore, they published textbooks and religious books in the students' native languages based on the Russian alphabet. The ultimate goal, according to N. Ilminsky, was 'Russification of foreigners and their complete integration with Russians by faith and language' (quoted from:
Nonetheless, in the early 20th century the education system required some serious changes that were driven by many factors. The new method madrasahs, which by this time were the basis of the system, were also in need of improvement. It was necessary to define the main principles that would determine the prospects of the educational system. First of all, this concerned the status of Tatar educational institutions. Were they strictly confessional, or did new method educational institutions change into something secular? This problem was not as simple, as it would seem. Although the legal status of Tatar madrasahs only fit into the system of confessional educational institutions, the reality was much more complicated. The opinions of authorities were also divided. As N. Bobrovnikov noted, reports on the Kazan educational region refer to maktabs and madrasahs as confessional schools. But ‘today this qualification is inaccurate;... I dare to say, that right now there are probably no strictly confessional schools left. But ‘this qualification is not accurate today... I dare to say, that there are probably no strictly confessional schools left now. Even the most backward, remote maktabs always teach at least the alphabet by the phonics method and have a reader containing secular articles... Along with Islamic subjects, madrasahs teach many secular sciences; thus, maktabs to some extent come close to Russian secondary schools’ [Journal of the Ministry of National Education, May, 1917, p. 62]. Tatar maktabs and madrasahs were all opened as confessional educational institutions in parishes (mahallah) without exception. If the state gave permission to establish a parish, opening both a madrasah and a maktab was also allowed.

This situation suited the Muslims of Russia quite well, as they could open new educational institutions quite easily. But their confessional nature undoubtedly restricted the process of their modernization. Perhaps that is why, in the early 20th century, the Tatar print media launched a full discussion on defining the content of confessional education. One of the reasons for this controversy was an inquiry...
of the Department of Foreign Confessions to the Orenburg and Tauric Spiritual Directorates in October 1913 on the view of the Sharia law regarding maktabs and madrasahs. The Department's inquiry received responses from all Tatar newspapers. The main message in the publications was that Islam does not divide educational institutions into confessional and secular: while being essentially confessional, throughout the entire history of Islamic civilization, Islamic educational institutions did not limit the curriculum they were teaching, as long as they did not contradict the main canons of Islam, of course. The newspaper Koyash (Sun) noted that 'Our religion is not a religion expressed only in prayers; it instructs us to acquire the knowledge that is necessary in life' [Koyash, 11 October, 13 October 1913]. The newspaper Vakyt (Time) commented on this, saying that 'our notion of science means secular and religious knowledge', which is why 'our maktabs are not divided into confessional and non-confessional categories' [Vakyt, 2 November 1913].

The answers prepared after a preliminary discussion, basically showed the general feelings of Tatar society. As the newspaper Bayanelkhak (Journal of Truth) noted, 'All imams who were on the council acknowledged the importance of teaching secular subjects in our maktabs and madrasahs' [Bayanelkhak, 27 December 1913]. To the question of 'what are Islamic confessional maktabs and madrasahs, according to Sharia?' the council formulated the following response: 'They are institutions that teach the laws and canons of Islam and give the knowledge that is needed for earthly and heavenly well-being' [Bayanelkhak, 27 December 1913].

This unanimity in the ideologically diverse Tatar community was a sign that different strata of Tatar society were concerned about the fate of the educational system. On the one hand, everyone was fully aware of the need for, if not drastic, at least significant changes in this area. On the other, they were wary of the fact that it was the government that was attempting to reform the educational system. Tatar intellectuals were fully aware that the education system for Tatars was the main source of keeping spiritual values in society, which is why drastic transformations in this area required heavy responsibility and caution. As the newspaper 'Yulduz' (Star) pointed out, 'neither the state, nor society has created anything that could replace Islamic educational institutions. So the matter concerns not only members of the clergy, but the entire educational system as a national problem. That is why Muslim society emphasizes the importance of reforming confessional educational institutions' [Yulduz, 3 January 1914].

The changes that occurred in the educational system were undoubtedly positive. The reforms '10–15 years ago were only on people's minds, as these plans were suggested only by progressive people of the nation. At the time, it seemed that implementing these alterations could lead to quite substantial changes in Tatar society' [Koyash, 29 September 1913]. But 'partial transformation of our madrasahs could not change our life significantly. Our previous madrasahs were behind the times, and so are the madrasahs today; previous madrasahs graduated people as unprepared for life as those graduating from modern madrasahs. Madrasahs and life go their own separate ways. The graduates of our madrasahs, like commoners with no madrasah education, can comprehend neither the outer world, nor the spiritual world. Our madrasahs continue to graduate a special type of people, called shakirds' [Koyash, 29 September 1913]. According to representatives of the progressive intelligentsia, even the new method educational institutions were unable to meet the demands that the world set for Tatar society, especially youth, either by their status, legal position or organization. The fact is, there actually 'was an attempt to introduce secular studies to the reformed spiritual educational institutions. But then they appeared to be on the borderline: they had almost lost their former role as confessional schools, but had not yet received the status of secular schools. The students entering were not interested in becoming members of the clergy or studying theological laws. They wanted to find their way into secular professions though madrasahs. Whereas society mainly wanted to gain well-educated,
theologically trained clergy from the reformed madrasahs’ [Mektep, 1913, No. 3]. Eloquent proof of this is the fact that in 10 years of existence of the Galiya madrasah, only 38 out of 950 graduates become mullahs, while the rest of them mainly became teachers\(^{25}\).

Thus, it is safe to say that by the 1910s, the Tatar intelligentsia’s perception of the potential for national system reform underwent drastic changes. The illusions about the possibility of implementing it within confessional schools faded away. A confessional school, as implied by its status, could train only clergy capable of serving the needs of the Muslim community, as well as educated people who could navigate through the twists and turns of their modern life, but not specialists capable of finding their place in different sectors of society and with the ability to blend easily into one social group or another. The intelligentsia were concerned that Tatars, who were quite highly educated people compared to other Russian nationalities, continued to end up in the most unskilled and underpaid groups of society. A certain Iskander al-Khamzavi drew attention to this problem in the newspaper ‘Vakyt’ (Time), saying that ‘it is now commonly believed that madrasahs have to provide education for the nation by training mullahs and mugalims suffused with ideas. The madrasah reforms were implemented within this perspective. The programs of large, successful madrasahs such as ‘Galiya’ and ‘Muhammadia’, were developed along this very line. But today the programs and objectives of madrasahs are no longer satisfactory, because national life itself is now far ahead of them’ [Vakyt, 24 August 1914]. This is why, according to the author, ‘it is not enough just to be a committed and educated mullah and mugallim. To become a leader of the nation, it is also important to be a person of action (my emphasis—R.M.). At one time, having ideas was the most important thing, but now it is useful only for philosophizing. Today, a person who wants to be useful and become a role model for his nation, besides having ideas, has to actually do something to help it’ [Vakyt, 24 August 1914].

In this case, relying entirely on the Russian state educational system could have some unwanted consequences: the intelligentsia did not rule out the possibility of losing the most educated class of the nation, who would not care about its people’s interests. There were certainly some reasons for these concerns. The ‘Rules on Education for Foreigners Living in Russia’ of 1870 made it clear that ‘Muhammadan Tatars... are a tribe, fanatized by numerous clergy, with a lot of mosques and Muhammadan schools, and it is strong in its faith. Therefore, Russification of Muhammadan Tatars can be carried out only by spreading the Russian language and education’ [Mir islama, 1913. Vol. 2, Ed. 4, p. 260]. At the same time, it was no secret that ‘the ultimate goal of educating all the foreigners, living in our country, is clearly their Russification and merger with the Russian people’ [Mir islama, 1913. Vol. 2, Ed. 4, p. 261]. The government attempted to use the part of the national intelligentsia that could be its ally in this issue as well. As noted by censor M. Pinegin in 1905, ‘recently, when the Tatars started their intellectual awakening and when they divided into two parties: the young, dreaming about some kind of national identity, and the old, only fighting for equality in religious and social rights’ [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 1, Inventory 1, File 1649, Sheet 7]. Government officials were fine with the second movement, as they focused their efforts ‘mainly on improving the religious situation, equal rights and promoting education, rather than supporting national identity’ [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 1, Inventory 1, File 1649, Sheet 7]. Most importantly, many members of this group support the idea of teaching Tatars ‘the Russian language in common educational institutions as well’, and believe that 'knowledge of the official language is what will allow Tatars to gain the required real knowledge and a European education as

\(^{25}\) Madrassa rector Zia Kamali wrote about this in his report on the activities of the institution over 10 years. See: [Tormyskh, 1916, Nos. 566, 567].
a guarantee of their further cultural development’ [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 1, Inventory 1, File 1649, Sheet 7]. However, the Russian government did not abandon its initial goal and occasionally called meetings of the highest level, where it made numerous, but compromise decisions. During the council meeting on 1 June 1913, State Duma member Enikeev addressed this problem quite harshly: 'Restrictions and tyranny towards foreigners have reached the utmost limit. The right to control schools has been turned into an instrument of continuous and harsh repression... The Ministry is pursuing a policy of Russification against foreigners, because they raise a specter called foreign separatism... For the sake of the state's interests and dignity, we must demand the banishment of this policy from the sphere of national education' [Mir islama, 1913. Vol. 2, Ed. 5, p. 303–304].

In this case, it was clear that the reformation of education needed a radically new approach. As time has shown, the confessional school reform planned as an optimal and effective solution for all the problems accumulated in this sector turned out to be only the first stage of major transformations. It was important to move forward and take other steps. But Tatar society, which still functioned on the principles of a confessional community, had almost no financial or intellectual means, and most importantly, no legal framework for creating a completely new system of secular education. In turn, the Russian state understood the risks of drastic measures from Muslims, who seriously endangered the ideological integrity of Russia.

Reformation of the educational system had to be in the empire's interests. The noticeable revitalization of Russian official circles in 1910 is evidence that the state had outlined a specific development model of the educational system for foreigners: primary school was supposed to be separate and confessional, whereas secondary and higher education had to be universal for the whole empire. The Tatar intelligentsia considered such prospects to be very dangerous for the integrity of the nation.

As Kh. Atlasi noted, nations that have schools win the worldly battle for existence, as every individual is armed with knowledge, while nations that have no schools have no power, due to the ignorance of its compatriots. A search for the reasons for the defeats inflicted upon the Islamic world by other nations in the last few centuries comes down to the fact that Muslims had no knowledge and no schools, whereas their rivals had knowledge and schools' [Mektep, 1913, No. 1, p. 19].

This problem was constantly and seriously discussed in the Tatar community. There was no unanimity of opinion, but they realized the need for reforms in this area: 'some claim that maktabs and madrasahs must be strictly religious educational institutions, while others argue that they must be purely secular or mixed, and still others write that maktabs should not be separated from madrasahs and both of these divisions... are parts of the same educational institution; some others argue that maktabs, along with religion, must provide basic knowledge of general subjects and so on' [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 420, Inventory 1, File 297, Sheet 13]. But they were all united by the idea that state education for them had to conform with religious and social specifics of Muslims. That is why they strongly insisted on introducing the subjects of native language and Tatar literature in schools for Muslims' [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 420, Inventory 1, File 297, Sheet 13]. According to N. Katanov, the Russian intelligentsia did not have a clear idea about which language would be used in educational institutions for Muslims: 'some of them believed that by establishing European-style institutions, even with the Tatar language, Muslims would stop avoiding European knowledge and might eventually stop being Asians at all' [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 420, Inventory 1, File 297, Sheet 13]. Others 'did not share those hopes and assumed that after getting out from under government control, Muslims, supported by Islam and European knowledge, would become even worse enemies of European Christians than they were before' [National
Educational system reform had indeed become one of the major problems of Tatar society. The Bureau of the Muslim Faction of the State Duma had a good reason for issuing a special decree stating that 'Muslims need new types of educational institutions that could be established on the general basis suggested by the educational committee of the Third State Duma. But the decree emphasized that it would be possible only when 'the amendments demanded by Muslim deputies are passed' [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 1, Inventory 4, File 4485, Sheet 1]. Those demands included: 1) primary schools in the Muslim occupied regions must teach in the language of Muslim children studying in school. 2) Primary schools must meet the interests of the state, but at the same time satisfy the religious and national interests of local population, their traditions and rights. 3) Teaching the Russian language in schools of areas with a Muslim population must start only at the beginning of the third year of education' [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 1, Inventory 4, File 4485, Sheet 1]. Since Islamic educational institutions essentially remained religious even after reformation, the decree noted that 'they have to be excluded from the sector of the Ministry of National Education and be under the control of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the oversight of the educational process and internal regulations, as well as the management of teachers has to be assigned to spiritual assemblies' [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 1, Inventory 4, File 4485, Sheet 1]. However, members of the Islamic faction were no longer satisfied with the existing system of technical subordination of Islamic educational institutions to spiritual assemblies. Hence, the decree specified that further subordination would be possible only by reforming the spiritual assemblies, which would assign teachers and at the same time their responsibilities and rights would be defined and they would be paid' [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 1, Inventory 4, File 4485, Sheet 1]. The members of the Islamic faction were implying financial support for primary educational institutions as well, 'because Muslims are generally poor... This help is especially needed where there are no vakufs or the income from a vakuf is not enough' [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 1, Inventory 4, File 4485, Sheet 3].

The situation in the religious educational system revealed many problems inherent in Tatar society. A society that turned towards secular values was unable to create an intellectual base for introducing and spreading it. The educational system, which was designed to consolidate the intellectual power of society, was restricted to confessional education. On the one hand, this position had some positive aspects: it consolidated the Tatar society around the Islamic ummah. On the other hand, a lot of opportunities for creating a civil society could not be turned into reality.
§ 3. National Press and Book Publishing

Alsu Akhtyamova

The beginning of the 20th century marked a critical stage in the formation of the Tatar nation and development of the national culture. The national press, that is book publishing and the press, which was an integral part of Tatar culture, had an essential role in the spiritual life of Tatar society. When distinguishing several stages in the development of Tatar book publishing, D. Iskhakov defines the period from 1901 to 1917 as the final one, when the formation of the national book publishing industry was completed [Iskhakov, 2010 b, p. 44]. Meanwhile, the establishment of the Tatar print media started only as a result of the 1905–1907 Revolution.

Due to increasing demand for printed products, book publishing was becoming an important industry. Remarkably, Tatar businessmen achieved great success in this field as well.

Kazan was still the main center of the Tatar book publishing industry in the early 20th century. The leading book publishers were the printing house of Karimov brothers, Kazan University and I. Kharitonov (Table 1.4); from 1901 to 1917, Karimov brothers published half of the entire editions of Tatar books printed in Kazan, and one-third of the number of publications.

It should be emphasized that the opening of the Karimov brothers printing house early in 1899, which started operating on 1 March 1900, marks a new page in the national book industry, characterized by an increase in Tatar publications and a decrease in their production cost and selling price, which made printed goods more affordable to the general public [Karimullin, 1974, pp. 27, 42]. The company not only printed books, but also did typesetting, issued publications by lithography and had multicolor printing [Karimullin, 1974, p. 28]. National book printing made even greater gains during the years of the First Russian Revolution. For example, the printing house of the Sharaf brothers started operating on 1 November 1906 (opened in the house of V. Kazakov, in rooms of the 'Bolgar'), but in mid-1908 it was closed down by order of the Kazan governor out of court and without an investigation. After G. Sainov 'purchased' the printing establishment, it was called Sainov's Printing House, and it was soon given the name 'Urnyak' (Example) (1908–1911). By an unspoken agreement, 'Urnyak' was acquired by V. Kazakov, who received a license to open a printing house on 29 March 1911. However, it was able to operate only until 26 June. Starting in 1913, 'Magari' (Education) became the legal successor to the Sharaf brothers printing house ('Urnyak', Kazakov).

The printing house of the Idrisov, Galileev and Co. Trading House partnership was opened in September 1908, and, from then on, it operated in the publishing and bookselling business as the company Millyat (Nation) (license dated 25 November 1908). The 'Umid' printing house and type foundry was officially opened on 8 June 1911. These printing institutions, as well as Kasimov brothers printing house, played a crucial role in improving the artistic design and polygraphy of Tatar books [Karimullin, 1974, pp. 42, 119–125]. The significant contribution of I. Kharitonov, G. Kamal, M. Idrisov and I. Yuzeev to the development of Tatar typeface must be emphasized [Karimullin, 1997, p. 122]. In 1907–1912, Tatar books were also printed in the 'Bayanel-khak' printing house of A. Saydashev (license dated 17 March 1906) [Karimullin, 1974, p. 130].

Along with Kazan, Tatar books were published in other cities of the Russian Empire as well. Orenburg had printing establishments that were quite large for their time: F. Karmi's printing house (1917–1922), and printing houses of the 'Karimov, Khusainov and Co.' (1907–1915), 'G. Kusainov and Co.' (1915–1917) partnerships that often functioned both as editors and publishers. Within these companies, there were independent publishing companies, namely 'Belek', 'Khezmet' (Work) and 'Faida' (Benefit). According to A. Karimullin,
in the early 20th century, Orenburg had published about 400 Tatar books with a circulation of around one million copies, in addition to orders in the Kazakh and Russian languages [Karimullin, 1999, pp. 235–236]. The smaller towns of Orenburg region were also involved in the Tatar printing industry. In Troitsk, Tatar books were published in a printing house that belonged to F. Selyanikin, which was later acquired by the 'Khezmat' ('Work') partnership. There are some known cases of Tatar books printed in Uralsk.

Semipalatinsk had the 'Yardam' ('Help') partnership that was first involved in selling Tatar books, and later started publishing them as well. We note that the 'Yardam' publishing was organized by the Nigmatullin brothers in 1911 [Karimullin, 1974, p. 160].

In late 1905, the Tatar typefaces were acquired by the printing house of the Ufa guberniya administration. The first Tatar printing house also appeared in Ufa: the division of the Orenburg 'Karimov, Khusainov and Co. Partnership', known as 'Sheryk Matbagasy' ('Eastern Print', 1908–1917), and 'Tormysh' ('Life', 1914–1916). A publishing and printing company named 'Nur' ('Light') was founded in Sterlitamak. There were partnerships that were only publishing and bookselling businesses, such as 'Akhha', 'Ishhad', 'Kitap' and 'Chulpam'. They placed their orders in the printing houses mentioned above. Altogether, according to Karimullin, Bashkortostan published 260 Tatar books with circulation of more than 725,000 copies [Karimullin, 1999, p. 226].

In Astrakhan, from 1908 to 1914, the publishing house of 'G. Gumerov and Co. Partnership' published 58 Tatar books (total of 123,400 copies). The Tatar printing industry regained its momentum only after the February Revolution, as Tatar print found its polygraphic base in the 'Nashriyat' printing house established on the basis of the 'G. Gumerov and Co. Partnership' printing house. At the start of the new century, the 'Type Foundry Printing House of I. Boragansky and Co.' continued publishing Eastern books (including Tatar books) in St. Petersburg. During the First Russian Revolution, Boragansky became partners with St. Petersburg Akhun G. Bayazitov, who then founded the Nur printing house. The total number of Tatar books, estimated by A. Karimullin, printed in both printing establishments in 1901–1910 came to 148,400 copies [Karimullin, 1974, p. 179]. Another Eastern printing house opened in the capital in 1906 was known as 'Ufva' ('Friendship'), which also printed a newspaper. A third Tatar printing house belonging to Usmanov appeared in 1909, and according to A. Karimullin, its legal successor was the Tatar printing establishment of M. Maksutov, founded in 1914 [Karimullin, 1999, pp. 183–184]. Moscow printing houses, such as those of O. Gerbek, the Lazarev Institute of Oriental Languages and M. Attay, printed single editions in Tatar. Some of the orders of Tatar editors were printed in other Moscow printing establishments as well, mainly by lithography. According to A. Karimullin, 14 books with total run of 28,000 copies were published in the city [Karimullin, 1974, p. 184]. But as a whole, according to a bibliographer, in the early 20th century, Tatar books were in third place after Russian and Latvian books in the number of publications and in second in circulation among national books of the peoples of Russia. He believes that such extensive development of the Tatar book industry was encouraged by the demand from other nations and publishers of Kazakh and Uzbek books, who joined Tatar printing houses at that time [Karimullin, 2005, p. 205].

Tatar publications included a wide range of literature, both by content and by the type of polygraphic design. They included were reference books, calendars, dictionaries, encyclopedias, the Nations of the World series (translation), textbooks, and works of philosophy, linguistics and other topics. However, literary works, including translations of works Russian and Western European classics, were one of the main components of the Tatar book collection. Books in Arabic published by Tatars not only displayed traditional texts of canonical literature (the Quran, Hadith and others), but also presented a large number of religious and social debates on particular local issues [Saiful-
There is no doubt that Tatar businesspeople saw the national book publishing industry not just as a source of income but also as a canvas for educational and reformist ideas. As national book publishing developed, the significance of Tatar periodical print media as a kind of printed source of the latest information became increasingly obvious. At the start of the century, the initiatives for establishing print media in the native language were first expressed by members of the Tatar intelligentsia. Notably, at that time, publication of the Turkic newspaper 'Tardzhem'an' ('Translator', 1883–1918) continued in Bakhchisaray. In St. Petersburg, a prominent social activist, R. Ibragimov, published the almanac Miryat (Mirror, 1900–1909) in Tatar [Battalov, 1996, p. 133]. The first newspaper in Tatar called 'Nur' ('Beam') was published on 2 September 1905 in St. Petersburg by the above-mentioned Akhun of St. Petersburg garrison, G. Bayazitov. The second by time of foundation in Russia was the Tatar newspaper 'Kazan Mokhbire' ('Kazan herald'), published in Kazan on 29 October 1905. Permission to publish it was issued to an attorney at law, member of the Kazan City Duma, S. Alkin, and at first, the newspaper was published in two languages, according to order, but later only in Tatar. Two more newspapers in Tatar appeared in the same year. On 27 November, K. Mutygi-Tukhatullin from Uralsk published the first issue of 'Fiker' ('Thought') newspaper, and on 11 December, the above-mentioned R. Ibragimov published 'Uflat' ('Friendship') newspaper in St. Petersburg [Gaynullin, 1983, pp. 12–13; Amirkhanov, 2005, pp. 121–122].

By the end of 1906, the national press was represented by twenty publications; hence, the plans of the establishment, who discussed the possible number of Tatar newspapers and magazines at the turn of the 19–20th centuries did not come about, and they came to the conclusion that there would be no more than 3 or 5 [Karimullin, 1983, p. 232]. It should be emphasized that Tatar print media had its ups and downs from the time it was established. For example, in 1907 there were 28 Tatar periodicals, while in 1908–1909 their number decreased to 19, whereas in 1910–1912, there were no more than 15 of them. There were 24 Tatar newspapers and magazines in 1913, and 25 in 1914. There were 19 operating Tatar print media outlets in 1915, and 18 in 1916, while magazines dominated (11 and 12, accordingly). After the February Revolution, Tatar newspapers were announcing their opening one after another, so in 1917, there were at least 50 publications, including 14 magazines [Amirkhanov, 2002b, p. 15; Karimullin, 1983, p. 233]. Thus, according to R. Amirkhanov, Kazan had 29 print media outlets (including 11 magazines), Orenburg had 15 (10), Ufa 14 (5), Astrakhan 13 (4), Uralsk 6 (2), St. Petersburg 6 (1), Moscow 6 (1), Troitsk 2 (1), Petrozavodsk 2 (0), Tashkent 2 (0), Samara had 1 magazine, and Tomsk, Menzelinsk, Semipalatinsk, Kokand, Saratov and Simbirsk each had one newspaper [Amirkhanov, 2002b, p. 52].


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26 This was published in Kazan, and there were 22 issues in total starting from No. 17 (1903).
the characteristics of print media, their professional orientation was an important aspect. Tatar newspapers and magazines included socio-political, religious, satirical, literary, pedagogical, children's, business and economics, legal, women's and other publications.

It is also very important to define the ideological focus of print media. Analysis of literature shows that there are several classifications of the national press. In particular, in his latest works R. Amirkhanov suggests a differentiated approach (classification according to periods connected with the history of development of the entire Russian society): 1) years of the First Russian Revolution, 2) before the February Revolution, 3) before the October revolution [Amirkhanov, 2002 b, p. 59].

The researcher roughly divides Tatar print media of the 1905–1907 Revolution period into the following movements: 1) social-democratic (newspaper 'Ural'); 2) revolutionary democratic (newspapers 'Tang Yulduzy', 'Azat khalyk', 'Karchyga' magazine etc.); 3) radical democratic (newspapers 'Fiker', 'El-islakh', magazines 'Tup', 'Uklar', 'El-gasr el-Jadid' etc.); 4) liberal democratic ('Idel' newspaper, magazines 'Chukech', 'Tarbiya-i etfal', 'Chikertke', 'Islakh'); 5) liberal bourgeois (newspapers 'Kazan mokhbire', 'Yulduz', 'Vakyt', 'Ekhbar', 'Burgany Taraki'); 6) moderate conservative (newspapers 'Nur', 'Ulfat', 'Bayaneli-khak', 'Nezhat' magazine); 7) conservative (clerical monarchical) ('El-galyami el-islami' newspaper, 'Ed-din ve Eledep' and 'Donya ve Magishat' ('Din ve Magishat') magazines) [Amirkhanov, 2002b, pp. 60–62].

As we can see, Tatar newspapers and magazines covered a wide spectrum of ideological views. Notably, the turn of the 19–20th centuries featured a sharp upturn of activism of the Tatar nation in social life and, consequently, polarization of the community. The ideological battle between two Tatar social movements, Kadimists and Jadids, was building. During the years of the First Russian Revolution, Jadidism acquired a political tone, and the movement was developing in two directions—liberal and socialistic. The liberal political party of Russian Muslims Ittifak el-muslimin (Union of Muslims), where Tatars had great influence, was established as a result of three All-Russian Congresses of Muslims (1905–1906). The period also featured the establishment of political organizations of Tatar socialist revolutionaries, such as Tangychlar (led by G. Iskhaki, F. Tuktarov) and social democrats Uralchylar (headed by Kh. Yamashev), while the mass radical democratic movement of Tatar youth El-islakh (ideological leader F. Amirkhan) was gaining momentum. Tatar print media had become an important center of consolidation of all these socio-political forces. In particular, 'Din ba Magishat' magazine was the mouthpiece of Kadimists. The members of the Central Committee of the 'Ittifak' were in charge of the following newspapers: 'Ulfat' (editor R. Ibragimov, founder and employee M. Bigiev), 'Kažan Mokhbire' (editor S. Alkin with the involvement of Yu. Akchura) and 'Yöldiz' (editor K. Maksudi). For instance, 'Tan Yoldyz' covered the strategies of Tatar socialist revolutionaries (see for example: [Tan Yoldzyz, 1, 15, 27 June 1906]). During the period of the first State Duma, 'Tan Yoldyz' politically leaned towards the labor faction. The newspaper criticized the work of Muslims and Tatar liberals, in general, emphasizing the impossibility of uniting all Muslims into a single union, primarily due to incompatibility of the political and economic interests of the bourgeoisie and working class [Tan Yoldzyz, 1906, 23 June]. Thus, the pages of these newspapers and magazines quite clearly expressed the political leanings of the publishing staff.

R. Amirkhanov characterizes the second period with the same list of publication types, except for the social democratic movement. The list is completed by another movement. He describes the newspapers 'Il', 'Syuz' and 'Beznii il' published during this period as media 'with a strongly pronounced national patriotic approach'. According to him, they denounced the colonial policy of tsarism towards non-Russian nations, and in opposition to this, advocated slogans of national and religious
Chapter 4. Education and Culture in the Kazan Guberniya and of the Tatars of Russia

Distinct feature of the Tatar press of the period from 1908 to the February Revolution was the explosive development of liberal bourgeois printing establishments, as well as revival of the notion 'liberal' had been somewhat transformed; hence, the boundary between these two directions was quite transparent [Amirkhanov, 2002 b, p. 74]. R. Amirkhanov roughly divided the press of the post-February period into six movements: liberal democratic; national religious; national patriotic; military national (military press); revolutionary democratic; social democratic [Amirkhanov, 2002 b, p. 69].

Here we see the return of the social democratic movement represented by only a single publication, Alga newspaper. But at the same time, it featured diverse political reporting; for instance, the newspaper supported implementation of the principles of federalism in combination with national cultural autonomy [Amirkhanov, 2002 b, p. 74]. New ideological movements appeared: national religious ('Mokhtariyat' magazine, 'Kher Millet' newspaper, etc.) and national military (newspapers 'Beznen Tavysh', 'Soldat Telege', 'Soldat Yalkyn', etc.). The defining attribute of the first type of press was natural coexistence of national and religious ideas; for example, 'Mokhtariyat' magazine published in Ufa advo-

### Table 1.4

<table>
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<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Printing house</th>
<th>Total print, pcs.</th>
<th>Share of the total print, %</th>
<th>Number of publications, pcs.</th>
<th>Share of the total publications, %</th>
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<td></td>
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Compiled by: [Karimullin, 1974].
cated the religious autonomy of Muslims and national unity under the auspices of Islam. The military press pursued the objectives of mobilizing soldiery to solve national problems with military actions. When analyzing this body of publications, the researcher noted the closeness of their positions to various other movements of national print media [Amirkhanov, 2002 b, p. 72].

Thus, all of the above proves that the Tatar book industry in the early 20th century was mainly in the hands of Tatars themselves. The establishment of new national printing institutions in a competitive environment reduced the production cost of Tatar books, and therefore, reduced their selling price, making them more affordable.

Along with the growing quantity, the quality of Tatar books had also improved, which is expressed in expansion of the collection and sophistication of the polygraphy and artistic design.

The rise of the national press was a new phenomenon and a major achievement in the spiritual life of Tatar nation. This abundance of print media in the Tatar language of various professional directions was proof of the high level and maturity of Tatar journalism in the early 20th century. The ideological diversity of the national press was a result of political activation of the Tatar bourgeoisie and intelligentsia and the development of a national movement.

Thus, the early 20th century marks the final formation stage of the national printing industry.

§ 4. The 'Golden Age' of Tatar Culture: Tatar Literature at the Beginning of 20th Century

Daniya Zagidullina

The early 20th century can be rightly considered as a time of the rise of a new Tatar literature, rapid development of Tatar culture and a 'Golden Age' in the national literary movement. The explosive development of Tatar print media, the publishing industry, a new course towards secular education, and change of cultural focus from East to West all gave momentum to the formation of new cultural tendencies.

Tatar secular literature of enlightenment, which formed relatively late, only in the latter half of the 19th century during the rise of national self-awareness, was focused on the need for reform of a specific national society. The enlightenment movement coincided with the secularization process, which is why the genres and styles went through changes towards European culture. As a whole, it was dominated by enthusiasm, motivation of the aspirations and actions of the central figures, themes of interrelation between moral perfection and enlightenment, the importance of family in social reforms, emancipation of women from the family and spiritual oppression and so on. These features did not contradict one another, but rather were in sync with the aspirations of the young Tatar intelligentsia who appeared on the literary scene in the early 20th century.

The literature of enlightenment was developed and enriched in the early 20th century: in drama with the first plays of G. Iskhaki and G. Kamal; in poetry by M. Gafuri, young G. Tukay, S. Ramiev, G. Iskhaki, G. Chygay, Z. Khadi, Sh. Mukhamedov, and so on. Research of recent years has proven that the enlightenment paradigm did not lose its role in Tatar literature in 1905, but remained relevant up to 1917 and maintained its importance in the national culture of the entire 20th century. This explains many features of the literary movement.

Tatar literature of the early 20th century can be divided into two periods: 1905–1911 and 1912–1917. Up to 1912, the enlightenment paradigm remained central, and G. Ibragimov called this period the 'period of first steps' [Ibragimov, 1910]. The general formula of
progressive enlightenment was expressed in opposition between educated and moral characters and uneducated and immoral characters ('Eternal Mosque' ('Mangelik Mâchet', 1901) Ya. Vali) in order to promote the idea of the importance of education, becoming an educated and harmoniously developed individual ('Love is Gone' ('Ütkän Mâxebbât', 1905) by A. Biktimirov), and portraying an ideal role model ('Excellent Education' ('Yaxshi Tärbiya', 1909) by Ya. Moradi). The literary works take on the theme of a battle between new and old (Jadid and Kadim), where good is usually represented by a supporter of the new and in a tough battle defeats evil. For instance, Rîza Fakhretdin (1858–1936), a notionalist, social activist and writer, suggested an ideal of a Muslim woman with a European education, who could become not only the mother of a family, but of a whole nation.

Sentimentalism was the category that gradually led the literature of enlightenment away from didacticism, improving its accessibility and guiding the national literature towards psychology. The dramas 'Poor Child' ('Kizganich Bala', 1898) by G. Kamal, 'Pity' ('Kizganich', 1913) by M. Fayzi, 'The Last Hello' ('Soñ ghi Sâlam', 1917) by K. Tinchurin; short novels 'Meeting, or Gulgizâr (Oçraçu, yaki Gölgiyzar', 1902–1903) by G. Ishkhâ, 'Life Passed in Poverty' ('Fâqiyrlek belin ûtkän Tereklek', 1902–1904), 'Lean Year, or A Corrupt Girl' ('Açlıg Yel, yaki Satlík Qız', 1907), 'The Poor' ('Yarlılar, yaki Ùydiş Xatin', 1909), and 'Love Letters' ('Mäxebbât Xatlar', 1912) by M. Gafuri represent individual subjective forms of the psyche and conscience, thus broadening the axiological and aesthetic boundaries of the pieces.

While pointing out the strengths and weaknesses of the enlightenment literature, G. Sagdî wrote that those ideal images, which were supposed to awaken new thoughts and ideas in the people, 'resembled celestial rather than worldly characters' [Săgdi, 1926, p. 113]. The most true to life were negative characters, because they 'embody the most negative aspects of Tatar society' [Săgdi, 1926, p. 112]. It also explains the increasing criticism of the existing order: novelists draw attention to the poverty of ordinary people ('Life in Poverty' ('Fâqiyrlek berlä Tormış', 1902) by M. Gafuri), judge the irrational actions of uneducated mullahs ('Miserable Girl' ('Baxetsel Qızı', 1905) by Z. Khadi), describe old method madrasahs as a place of degradation ('Mâsum' ('Mâşüm', 1906) by Z. Khadi, 'Expulsion of Zakâ Shakird from Madrasah' ('Zâki šâkertne Mâdræsæän Qulü', 1907) by G. Ibragimov). This holds true to the publicistic and moralising pathos. Satire gained unprecedented popularity, as it served as a basis for critical realism. These processes are clearly showcased in the works of Sh. Mukhamedov.

Shakir Mukhamedov (1865–1923) was a writer, illuminator and journalist. His first short novels 'Ignorance, or Uncle Galaibker' ('Câhalât, yaxud Galîaebker ağay', 1901), 'Under the leaf, or Makaryevskaya market' ('Yafraq asti, yaki Mäkarçä yarmünkäse', 1901) describe the lives and morals of Tatar merchants. While criticizing them for their ignorance and greediness, Mukhamedov promotes educational ideas. He compares the records management of his characters with the order in the offices of merchants of other nationalities, and encourages readers to get educated and master the fundamentals of the profession. The topic of enlightenment is particularly prominent in the didactic poem 'New Badavam' ('Yañâ Bâdâvam', 1903), in the short introduction to which the author writes 'Our nation is ill... Our illness is ignorance. And ignorance can be cured only with knowledge and education'. While his first short novels earned Sh. Mukhamedov respect as an excellent satirist, in the famous short novel 'Japanese war, or Volunteer Batyrkali ağay' ('Yapun şuşiçi, yaxud Dobrovoleç Batirğali ağay', 1905) satire intersects with a laments humour that often turns into cutting irony. The tale ridicules the printed media industry that was driving people crazy with its political slogans and clamour, and the false patriotism of Tatar and Russian merchants during the Russian-Japanese war. By juxtaposing the 'volunteers' Batyrkali and Shubin to the real heroes of war from the peasantry, the author exposes the anti-humanity of military operations. The engaging storyline, accurate characteristics, an understanding of
the human mentality and techniques taken from adventure fiction made this short novel so popular. His pen was known to create romantic pieces as well. One of the writer’s last short stories was ‘The Khan’s daughter’ (‘Xan qizi’, 1908). It focuses on a love story between the Khan’s daughter, Fatima, and the Khan’s prisoner, the son of the Iranian Shah, Shirin. The name of the young man, the way the character meets and their escape all resemble the storylines of Medieval Tatar literature (‘Khosro and Shirin’, ‘Sukhajl and Guldursen’). In his story the author created the ideal of a strong and freedom-loving woman. The original ending of the story, the cowardice of the prince, and the allegorical image of the dragon that ate the brave girl, makes the story work in two levels: traditional, as in how the ‘disobedience of children leads to fatal ending’, and philosophical, as in how ‘human flaws can spoil happiness, end love and lead to death’.

Satiric literature gradually transformed into conditional allegorical imagery. For instance, the central image in the poem ‘Bedbug’ (‘Kandal’, 1916) by Sh. Babich is created in the symbolic allegorical key: the author uses the image of a bedbug to show his attitude towards the initiators of World War I. Another poem by Babich ‘Gazazil’ (1916), written as a parody of Medieval stories about prophets, using detailed stylisation rejects the value system of didactic literature and indicates the emergence of a secular poetic genre.

The formation of critical realism was greatly influenced by sayakhatname (travel notes), which vividly reflect the radical reformation of the national genre system. At that time, Tatar literature witnessed the emergence of travel notes that combined historical and biographical time in equal parts, where the synthesis of literary and publicistic elements was supported by author reflections on the burning issues of Tatar society or human values in general. Usually a romantic protagonist-traveler told about distant countries, the nature of foreign lands and the life of people living in those lands. But in addition, the retrospect of historical events in the past enriched the story with mythological, philosophical and specific historical details that increased the emotional allure of travel essays. Sayakhatname started losing its integrity as a genre by turning more into a literary than a publicistic endeavor. Along with the description of a journey, these pieces often narrated a tragic love story or a story about untimely death, etc. Nonetheless, the position of the author-illuminator was crystal clear in his aspiration to enlighten Tatars. After studying violations of the canon in the works of G. Rafikyi, G. Monasypov, Sh. Akhmadiev, A. Biktimirov and other novelists of the early 20th century, we came to the conclusion that the reason for the changes in the nature of sayakhatname was the tendency to mythologise the history of Turko-Tatars [Zahidullina, 2003, p. 178 b.].

The work of one of the founders of the Tatar professional theatre, dramatist G. Kamal was developing towards the incrimination of the moral state of some members of Tatar society. Galiasgar Galiakberovich Kamal (1879–1933), dramatist, publicist, theatre and social activist, against his father’s will chose the path to serve the enlightenment of his nation. In his first literary works ‘Miserable lad’ (‘Bäxsetze yeget’, 1900), ‘Three villain’ (‘Öç bädbäxet’, 1900) and others, the dramatist criticises the patriarchal structure of Tatar families. The following years discovered his talent as a comedic dramatist. In his comedies ‘The first performance’ (‘Berençe teatr’, 1908), ‘For a present’ (‘Bülük ölçen’, 1909), ‘Bankrupt’ (‘Bankrot’, 1911) and ‘Secrets of our town’ (‘Bezneş şähärneş serläre’, 1911) he satirically recreated the lives of some Tatar social categories of the early 20th century and touched upon issues of fathers and sons and general familial relationships. The comedies of G. Kamal brought about an entire incriminating movement in national dramaturgy. By ridiculing certain aspects in the lives of some social categories, authors sought for affirmation through negation (comedies ‘Fight’ (1907) by G. Iskhaki, ‘Model madrasah’ (‘Nizamli mädräsäi’) by S. Ramiev, ‘Lipstick issue’ (‘Pomada mäsäläse’, 1908) by I. Bogdanov etc.); short novel ‘Fatxulla xazret’ (1909) and dramas ‘Youth’ (‘Yäślär’, 1909), ‘Unequal’
('Tígeszezlár', 1913), short story 'Samigulla abzyj' (1916) by F. Amirkhan; plays 'Hell' (1909–1910), 'Society' ('Cämiğiylät', 1909–1910) by G. Iskhaki etc.) by making the social and moral ideological diseases of society a part of an artistic idea. In the drama 'Teacher' ('Möğallim', 1908) by G. Iskhaki, the comedy 'Live, Zubaida, I live' ('Yäšä, Zöbbäydä, yäšım min', 1907) by S. Ramiev and others, the authors did not just show their attitude towards the characters, but didactically revealed the harmfulness of the old order.

During this period, Tatar dramaturgy developed new genres: tragedy ('Zulexja' by G. Iskhaki), historical drama ('Homeland Heroes' by F. Tuikin), melodrama ('Teacher' ('Möğallim') by G. Iskhaki); touched upon new themes: the intelligentsia's attitude towards revolution ('Two opinions' ('Ike fikër') by G. Kulakhmetov), the moral and intellectual freedom of the young generation ('Youth' ('Yäšlär') by F. Amirkhan) and others. The prose vividly featured publicistic works (short novels 'Prison' ('Zindan', 1907) by G. Iskhaki, 'Prison memories' ('Mäüşquíyätat xatiräläre', 1907) by Y. Akchury); nominal symbolic (the drama 'Two opinions' (1906) by G. Kulakhmetov) and existential ('World book' (1910) by N. Dumavi) aspects. The short story was starting to become a separate genre: authors were writing social, socio-political, historical, satirical, psychological and romantic short stories. The growing interest in Western culture made them experiment with the genre's subject matter and forms. People were interested in the social status and personal qualities of human beings, for which authors found new forms, for instance, short stories/naizres, which were parodies of Medieval literature ('Yaña äxsebe qäxäf' ('New cave-men' (1908) by Z. Khadi). On the one hand, the publicistic and satirical paths was being reinforced ('Holidays' ('Bäyärömnär', 1909) by F. Amirkhan, 'Simurq' ('Sämrug koş', 1910), 'Deputy' ('Deputat', 1910), by Sh. Kamal). Some short stories that were based on true life events were presented to readers as essays. The new themes of, for example, provocation ('Black spot' (1912) by K. Baker, 'Great curse' (1912) by Gubaydullin); 'little man' ('Kalosh' (1909), 'Bashkir's happiness' (' Başçört bäxete', 1909) by G. Iskhaki, 'Old farmworker' ('Qart yalçı', 1912) by G. Ibragimov); 'superfluous people' ('Extinct hell' ('Üti sünğän cähänäm', 1911), '... from the deceased's notebook' ('... Märxümäneñ däftärennän', 1914) by G. Ibragimov, 'Life of Khamit' ('Xämîtnën xäyäti', 1911) by M. Gafuri) and war ('Victim of the weak grandam' ('Zägiýf qarçiqnät qorhàn', 1914) by F. Amirkhan, 'Wooden leg' ('Ağac ayaq', 1916) by N. Dumavi, 'Uncle Khakimdzhan' (1916) by K. Tinchurin) appeared through an understanding of the escalating contradictions between an individual and society, material and spiritual aspects of the world, and the real and ideal intelligentsia of the early 20th century, and gave Tatar literature a great social edge. On the other hand, the growing interest in human psychology ('In the blizzard' ('Buranda', 1909), 'Tramp' ('Suqbay', 1909), 'Awakening' ('Uyän', 1909), 'In the crow's nest' ('Qozğınmar oyaśinda', 1910) by Sh. Kamal), including the inward feelings and emotional struggles of characters so accurately described by authors, marked the emergence of the psychological short story. Sh. Kamal, Sh. Mukhamedov and F. Amirkhan created stories that were composition-wise suitable to be novellas. This phenomenon was continued in the 1930s as well (collection of novellas 'Pearls' ('Märçännär', 1936) by K. Tinchurin).

In the beginning of the 20th century prose was gradually getting closer to the real everyday life of Tatar society, but was also changing its aesthetic direction. Socially and nationally accentuated and focused on the main problem of Tatar reality (the fate of the nation), the short novel by G. Iskhaki called 'Disappearance two hundred years later' ('Ike yöz yeldan soñ inqiýraz', 1902–1904) with its fantastic publicistic form, playful elements and symbols is an example of a nominal metaphoric prose piece, which allows for socio-cultural generalisations. The author explains the fall of the Bulgars to be the result of fogyism and fanaticism, and blames it on uneducated mullahs.

The first literary pieces that featured marks of this ideological aesthetic switch could be the
novel 'Beggar girl' ('Telânce qız', 1901–1908) and short novel 'Is this life?' ('Tormişmi bu?', 1909) by I. Iskhaki, the short stories 'Sleep on the holiday's eve' (1907), 'I grew old' ('Qart-taydïm', 1909) by F. Amirkhan; 'Awakening' ('Uyanu', 1909) by Sh. Kamal and others. They carry a new aesthetic system oriented towards psychologism. The social/psychological novel 'Beggar girl' by Iskhaki for the first time follows a Tatar woman in her battle for the nation's future, and brings up the issue of social equality. The psychological novel written in the form of a diary 'Is this life?' (1911) by Iskhaki from a position of self-irony unfolds the entire tragedy of the blind imitation of out-dated obsolete religious canons and dogmas in the education of the younger generation. Another remarkable theme is the fate of the national intelligentsia, where a Muslim protagonist is portrayed in search for beauty and perfection and his place in life (F. Amirkhan 'On the crossroad' ('Ur-talîqta', 1912); G. Ibragimov 'Young hearts' ('Yâş yöriklär', 1912) etc., and in search for happiness ('Country teacher', 'Seagulls' by Sh. Kamal). The life of seasonal workers 'travelling' in pursuit of earnings has become a background for portraying spiritual contrasts and the complicated emotional struggles of Sh. Kamal's characters ('Father', 'In the crow's nest', etc.) The works of G. Ibragimov and M. Gafuri feature heavy social themes ('Old farmworker', 'Shepherds' by G. Ibragimov; 'The poor...' by M. Gafuri) and an ambition to depict an ideal harmonious image of a common person. One of the central themes remains the life of a Tatar woman diligently striving for freedom ('Beggar girl', by G. Iskhaki), whose inner soul is full of the romantic dreams of a happy and free life with her loved one ('Khayat' by F. Amirkhan and others).

The writer who led the ideological aesthetic search in Tatar literature was Fatikh Amirkhan (1886–1926). His works combined national artistic tradition with the achievements of Russian and European verbal art. Along with all Tatar literature of the early 20th century, the writer switched to realism through a deepening of the psychological line, as the origins of romanticism and modernism intersected with the aspiration to comprehend the individual and general in one single key.

The contrast between the real and the ideal, the old and the new, the beautiful and the ugly in the short stories 'Holidays' ('Bäyrämmâr', 1909), 'Lunch during uraza' ('Köndezge säxär, yaki ruzasizlar', 1911), 'How to contribute to the progress of the nation' ('Millätne täräqqiy itterû', 1908), 'Blissful day' ('Räxäät kôn', 1910), 'Mullah came to preach' ('Xäzräät ügetlärgä kil-de', 1912) and others reflects the writer's dream of reforming the old social order of everyday life, and his resentment at ignorance, fanaticism and all that stands in the way of the social, cultural, spiritual and moral progress of the nation. In this regard, the author has a remarkable satirical short fantasy tale 'Fatxulla xazret' (1909), where he brings the protagonist, Kadımist Fatkhulla, back to life in the Kazan University laboratory 40 years after his death. The fantastic elements of the plot allow the author to grotesquely show the aspects of his current reality opposed to the ideal future. In the enlightened utopia created by the author, the Tatar people are shown to be civilized, possess high morals, and are financially and spiritually wealthy: Kazan has 20-storey buildings and mosques that can fit 200 thousand people at once. People are served by robot machines, they use wireless phones with displays, automatic cooks, air ships with a capacity of 700 people, doctors can bring the dead back to life, and so on. 'Similar to how a dark spot seems even darker on a white background, the background of a highly civilized world makes the retrograde image of Fatkhulla khazret even more accentuated, more visible' [Nurullin, 1971, p. 133].

In the short story 'Humiliating love' ('Xäkarät sanalğan maxäbbâbâ', 1908), the author focuses on the analysis of the protagonist's mental state, whose love interest confessed to him that his love is nothing more than shameful for her. The feelings of bitterness and humiliation lead him to a deeper conscious understanding of himself and the ones around him. At the same time, while describing the protagonist's emotions the
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author shows how the highest meanings and eternal values become a part of human life: they have to do with youth, the aspiration to be happy and the capability to love. These categories reconcile and generate opposite spectrums of human life, happiness and suffering, joy and despair. The main protagonist of the short story 'I grew old!' ('Qartaydim!', 1909), a 29-year-old man named Mustafa, seems to have achieved everything he wanted: he earned his high school diploma and was accepted to university. But Mustafa is depressed, he is far from feeling happy and is disappointed and unsatisfied with his life. The reasons for the protagonist's mental crisis are complicated and diverse. They are obstacles that were in the way of his goals; the stress over the fact that he does not have a real job he could dedicate himself to, the realisation of how short human life and happiness in this world are, and his doubts on the absoluteness of supreme moral and spiritual values and social ideals. Mustafa is almost in despair because of how old he feels: 'Give me back my youth, my innocent youth! I will give up everything I have achieved in return!' [Amirkhan, 1984, p. 45], the protagonist cries. Thus, the writer integrates different levels of motivation, from mundane and social to the transcendental.

But the highest peak of F. Amirkhan's prose and of all Tatar literature of the early 20th century is the short tale 'Xäytät' ('Khayat', 1911). The writer focuses on the psychological drama of a young girl torn apart by two opposites: her brain and heart, her awakening sense of self, new attitude to the world and moral commandments of the old Tatar society. The internal struggles come from Khayat's external relationships with her closest surroundings and, first and foremost, her family. Khayat's parents try to raise their daughter according to traditional religious views on the behavior of a Tatar girl: she has to read Namaz and religious books and is not allowed to meet men on her own (even when it is an accidental encounter, she has to cover her face). At the same time, Khayat has been friends with Lisa Myasnikova since she was a child, she knows her family and her brother Mikhail. The life of the Myasnikovs is a lot different from her family's: Liza and Mikhail, unlike Khayat, receive a secular education and they often throw dance parties with a lot of guests at their house. Her interaction with the Myasnikovs does not go unnoticed for Khayat. She learned to read in Russian, which broadened her mind, and she is quite confident when speaking with Russian students. Yu. Nigmatullina calls F. Amirkhan a founder of the socio-psychological short tale in Tatar literature: 'His heroines stand up to their surrounding world not with their social aspirations or the breadth of their views, but with the integrity of their character, nature and pursuit of happiness' [Nigmatullina, 1970, p. 67].

The inward emotional arc of the short tale is the heroine's pursuit to harmonise her surrounding reality. Khayat finds this harmonising instrument in love, which is shown in her last call to God: 'God, give me love! Oh God, I'm begging you, give me love for my whole life!'. Each event that holds subjective meaning for the heroine, such as Mikhail's love confession, meeting a student from Moscow named Gali Arslanov, being matched with a young bay, Salikh Fatykho, cause contradicting thoughts and feelings in her soul, which turn into agonising sorrow and anxiety. The emotional outbursts and desire to make her own decisions transform into a rational realisation that she will never be happy and free. The principles and devices of literary generalisation used by F. Amirkhan make Khayat's story a reflection of the life of the entire Tatar youth and nation in general.

In his novel 'On the crossroads' ('Urtalykta', 1912), F. Amirkhan unfolds the mentality of a person in the transitional era who is torn with doubts and cannot find his place in the world. The writer synthesises principles of typification that are characteristic of the literary epic and lyrical genres. He presents a wide panoramic picture of the national historical reality of the early 20th century, including urban life, Kazan cultural life and the environment of democratic intelligentsia and students. Khasan has a reflective analytical way of thinking, which is why the main features of the protagonist are self-contemplation, self-analysis and self-cognition. The subjective inner world of the character is
displayed in direct confessional form. Khasan has broken up with his past, does not accept the old life, contemplates on the future of the nation and its culture, tries to figure out the reality surrounding him, dreams of a reformation of the Tatar nation's life geared towards joining the Russian-European enlightenment. At the same time, he finds a lot of weaknesses and faults within himself, such as the incapability of focusing on achieving his goals, and no will power and self-discipline that could help him to make up for gaps in his education, etc.: '... through picturing the everyday life of the protagonist, through his emotions, Fatih Amirkhan tries to unfold something deep, something of social significance: the search of the Tatar youth in 1906-1911 for ideals that can transform the Tatars' social and spiritual life' [Ganieva, 2002, p. 92].

The prose of F. Amirkhan, along with the devices of realistic literary writing, also has various forms of symbolisation, nominal metaphorical imagery and poetics of antinomies and contrasts, which allowed him to expose the disharmony of national existence, its tragic contradictions and conflicts. His short story 'Tatar girl' ('Tatar qizi', 1909) was perceived by contemporaries as a new phenomenon in the Tatar literature [Amirkhan, 1984, p. 428]. Later, G. Tolymbai would refer to this piece and the short story 'Among the ruins...' ('Ber xarabâdî...', 1913) as the appearance of symbolism in the Tatar literature [Tolymbai, 1936, p. 81]. Indeed, the writer builds in 'Tatar girl' a system of images that answers to the aesthetic of symbolism. In picturing the fate of a Tatar woman, the writer calls for the universalism of generalisations. The story of the Tatar woman is not just an allegorical portrayal of the lives of all the Tatar Muslim women; the image symbolises Life, Sincere Dreams, Beauty, Holiness. The Dark Power is a symbolic model of the typical widespread circumstances that fetter life, that are the evils of social reality. It strips humans of their freedom and kills beauty, dreams and hopes.

The author consequently follows the process of 'burial', or the transition into a living doll: the girl had lived freely until she turned 7, which is when her isolation starts. From then on her life at home is associated with the fate of a prisoner, and there is only one way to escape: marriage. However, family life is also portrayed in a context of captivity. The Tatar girl is destined to become a toy for her husband, his slave. The Tatar girl finds herself locked away in 'four walls'; the sphere of life turns into the sphere of oblivion, death.

The writer juxtaposes fatal generalities to the phenomenon of life as the supreme value. His hope and faith in the possibility of bringing the 'living doll' to life and transforming the Tatar girl's personality is linked with the girls of the Islamic Orient who do not want to be buried alive. This literary piece is dedicated to the 'girls of the Islamic East who do not want to be buried alive'.

Modernism was developing forms of exchanging and blending different forms of art, which has been expressed by the notion of artistic fusion. One example of the dialogue between literature and plastic arts is Lecomte du Nouÿ's picture 'A Eunuch's Dream', a reproduction of which was published in the first issue of 'Soznanie' magazine (1912) as an illustration to the 'The East sleeps' näser by F. Amirkhan. The picture shows a peacefully sleeping man from the East. He lies on a luxuriously soft bed in a shabby hovel with a hookah beside him, waiting for him to wake up. The picture has been interpreted the following way: the sleeping man is the Islamic East dreaming of paradise and hours. Meanwhile, the ones who are awake are dividing his country, stealing its treasures and planning to enslave it. They long for knowledge, engage in trade and confidently put all their plans into practice. The opposition of two allegorical images (sleeping and wakeful) expresses the author's worries and anxiety about the fate of his nation.

In an attempt to make sense of the current events in their historical perspective and in their projection on the past and future, the writers of the early 20th century turn to mythological images and plots. In 1913 F. Amirkhan created a series called 'Tatar qizlari' ('Tatar girls'), which
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included three short stories: 'Zuhra girl on the Moon', 'Syuyumbeka' and 'Gambled away Zulkhabira'. The plots from mythological traditions change their nature and content and unite into a new individual and original mythopoetic idea. The writer assumes that a certain distance in space and time gives the opportunity to unite opposites and overcome antitheses.

In search for the new artistic devices to intensify the expressiveness of written words, the Tatar writers of the early 20th century turned to impressionistic devices. The elements of impressionism in the works of F. Amirkhan are not only a stylistic phenomenon, but also a part of his general artistic world view. Amirkhan The orientation towards recognising the substantial basics of existence manifested in the empiricism of life, conjoins with such an inherent urge to capture the outside world with its inconsistencies and record the colours of a unique momentary impression (short story 'Intoxicated by spring' ('Yaz ısereklegendii', 1916).

There are some significant elements of typological similarity between the plays of F. Amirkhan and West-European and Russian dramas of the early 20th century, nominally referred to as 'new drama'. In his play 'Youth' ('Yâşlär', 1909), F. Amirkhan, continuing the traditions of I. Turgenev, portrays a conflict between 'fathers' and 'children', an ideological opposition between the members of two generations. But the young characters of the drama often have arguments about the historical fate of the nation, social progress and the paths leading to it as well. By juxtaposing the ideological positions of the characters regarding the old and the new, F. Amirkhan shows the inconsistencies of the young generation, turning the dramaturgical action into a line outside of events. The subject matter is ideological battles that showcase the dramatic dissociation of the main socio-historical forces of the era. The distinctiveness of theatre as a drama of ideas determines the ways the author expresses his position. The questions of how to change life and who carries the ideal of national progress remain unanswered. But the collision of different points of view, the 'voices' and 'truths' of the characters, unravel the author's belief that only the younger generation is capable of rebuilding the old world, stagnated in its habits and prejudices.

F. Amirkhan turns to the traditions of the Russian literature in his other play 'Unequal' ('Tigezsezlär', 1914), subtitled 'New people'. The drama follows two central conflicts. The first one is the conflict between the old and the new, between parents and children, between Safyi Nasybullin and his son Gumer, who are members of the Tatar trading bourgeoisie of two generations. Another conflict involves two types of the Tatar national intelligentsia, the new one, pursuing all progressive things but not denying the Tatar national culture and their origins (represented by Suleiman, Salime, Rakiya), and the 'westernists', for whom progress means giving preference to all Russian things and despising everything that is native (Zakir, Gabdulla). The theme running through the entire play is the author's idea that the basic premise for true progress and prosperity in the Tatar nation is not the absolute denial of everything native and favouring all Russian, but combining and choosing the best out of the both cultures.

Thus, in the Tatar literature of the early 20th century, romanticism established itself as an independent movement in the works of F. Amirkhan ('Precious minutes', 1912, 'On the crossroad', 1912); G. Ibragimov (novel 'Young hearts', 1912, short stories 'In the sea', 1911, 'Love-hapiness', 1912, 'Mullah-thief', 1911); M. Fayzi (dramas 'Fate's joke', 1913, 'Galiyabarı', 1916); Sh. Mukhamedov (short story 'Khan's daughter', 1908), and in the poetry of S. Ramiev, G. Tukay, N. Dumavi, S. Sunchali and others. The main theme of the romantic literature and the Tatar literature in general, was the nation's fate. Works of that period are suffused with dramatical contemplations about the future of the Tatar people, about the nature of the Tatar character developed through national history. In order to awaken national self-consciousness, authors turned to history ('Zuleikha' (1912) by G. Iskhaki), legends ('Bulgar girl Ay slu' (1910), 'Khan's daughter Altynechech' (1914) by M. Gafuri, 'Daughters of the nation' (1912) by F. Amirkhan, 'Khan's
daughter' (1914) by Sh. Ahmadiev, etc.), and symbolic images of dreams ('Let it disappear' (1911) by Sh. Sattarov). The main tendency was the attempt to reproduce an entire picture of the time period. The long forms of romantic prose ('Young hearts' (1912) and 'Our days' (1914-1920) by G. Ibragimov) are full of dramatic feelings of worry caused by reality and feature deep psychological analysis. The idealisation of the nation's life, of the canons of Islam, of the religious figures and their wives, praising family happiness and love for children added up to an idyllic picture in the novel 'Mullah babai' (1910) and in the tale 'Osatzbike' (1910) by G. Iskhaki. Historical short stories return to the literary scene in the form of historical episodes or biographical stories of famous figures, such as Idgei, Chinggis Khan, Chura Batyr, Nurutdin and others ('Warrior Satysh efendi' (1912) by F. Tuykin, 'Tatar people' (1911) by Sh. Sattarov, 'Chinggis' (1911) by A. Tangatarov). The main themes of the historical pieces were the ruthlessness of the past and the fatal predetermined nature of history.

Tatar literature of the early 20th century is abundant in philosophical short stories based on the degradation of the world and humanity that has lost its understanding of the meaning of existence. They evoke a range of associations ('Bulgar girl Ayslu' (1910) by M. Gafuri, 'In a slum...' (1913) by F. Amirkhan, 'Therefrom' (1913), 'In the flower garden' (1913) M. Khanafi, 'My fantasy' (1913), 'In search for a companion' (1916) by G. Gazziv, 'In the cemetery' (1916) by N. Gasryi). The elements of the Tatar romantic literature are the elements of perfection, beauty and harmony (short stories 'Hope' (1914) by A. Tangatarov, 'Mysterious-mysterious fairytale' (1913) by G. Rakhim). The romanticists picture love as a power that brings people together and is capable of standing up to war and violence ('Magical drops' (1914) by N. Dumavi). Love elevates people, inspires them (short stories 'Two good people' (1910) by Sh. Kamal, 'Iskander' (1915) by K. Tinchurin, etc.).

The opposition of perfection and life is reflected in the ambivalence of the protagonist's soul and conscience. The genre of the Tatar short story develops a special way of portraying the phenomena of the world and the spiritual movements of a person through contrasting comparisons. The sorrow of loneliness and the longing for perfection expressed through the romantic protagonist intensify the eschatological orientation of the Tatar literature (poems 'We' (1908), 'Hopes' (1912) by Dardmend, 'I am dying' (1908) by S. Ramiev, poem 'Korkut' (1916) by F. Burnash, short story 'Therefrom' (1913) by M. Khanafi, etc.), which is wrapped up in a unique philosophy of death.

Salvation from hostile reality is found in an escape to nature and exotic lands ('In the sea', 'Children of nature' by G. Ibragimov), childhood memories ('Old days' (1903) by Dardmend), the imaginary world of utopia ('Village' by S. Ramiev), one's inner world ('Soul' (1909) by G. Tukay), death ('Therefrom' (1913) by M. Khanafi), love ('Love-happiness' by G. Ibragimov) and faith (religious poems by G. Tukay, etc.). For instance, G. Tukay sees childhood as a time of innocence, purity and freedom for not just the period in the life of a person, but for humanity in general ('Time of celebration and childhood' (1908), 'I remember' (1909), 'I stopped wishing' (1909). Poets animate nature and find harmony for their feelings and emotions within it. People who live with strong connections to the nature are idealized as well ('Children of nature' by G. Ibragimov).

The unique romantic protagonist, crafted according to the Eastern traditions, including Medieval Tatar poetry, and attempts to poetise the protagonist's idea of reviving the nation contributed to the formation of a special movement in the Tatar romantic literature called gisyanizm. The origin of gisyanizm goes back to the phenomenal philosophy 'Ana-al-khak', which promotes the divinity of the human beings expressed in Sufi poetry, and declares that every person's soul has a bit of Divinity in it that keeps harmony and improves the person and society, as well as to one of the main doctrines of Sufism, asceticism, which is interpreted as a way of saving humanity and finding salvation from the imperfections of worldly ex-
istence. The cornerstone of gisyanizm is a rebel protagonist who raises his voice against worldly laws, God and religious canons for the sake of individualism. The protagonist considers his goal to destroy material and spiritual values, to destroy ideals and even to destroy the world, as he acknowledges only one true value: spiritual freedom. He rebels against all the constraints of personal freedom.

The enlightenment poems of M. Gafuri feature the first indications of gisyanizm. The author encourages the reader to be proud of being human and tries to bring out the reader's faith in the self ('If everyone will win...' (1907), 'On the roads of existence' (1913), 'Power' (1916), 'You are human!' (1916), etc.). Similar exhortations appear in the poems of G. Tukay, for example, 'Sin' (1911). The movement finds its ideological and aesthetic basis in the works of S. Ramiev. His poems focus on the conflict between perfection and reality: having experienced the injustice of worldly life, the protagonist longs to reach heaven ('I see: divine...', 1908). He is irrevocably alienated from the world and declares the falseness of worldly existence ('Decieved', 1908), but does not find peace in heaven as well, so he is angry both at heaven and earth as he realizes the irreconcilable contradictions within himself ('Prophet', 1909). The ambivalence of reality on a metaphysical level leads to an understanding of the world as a single living organism, where the skies and the earth, humane and divine, good and evil are intertwined, and the only way to salvation is the fight against it all.

The protagonist who took the path of gisya has to be incredibly bright and passionate: the elevation of a human leads to the conflict between human and society, which allows him to escape from the ambivalent world. S. Ramiev removes the distance between human and God, and emphasises his right to be a master of earth and heaven ('I', 1907). His traditions are continued in the poetry of Sh. Babich ('Pities', 1912, 'I want', 1916). In some ways, the riot is considered a self-sacrifice for the sake of the nation, but the irrational perception of existence in the works of Babich is carried from the tragic point of view to the ironic one. The grotesque aspiration of the protagonist to 'clean' the world in just one minute ('One minute', 1914), for instance, seems like an exercise in fantasy. The denial of worldly (social) canons and rules is explained as a state of mind ('To the world', 1915, 'Live your short life fighting', 1915). He states that only soul and mind can lead to happiness ('In the dark', 1916). These themes are strongly accentuated in the poetry of M. Gafuri, N. Dumavi, B. Mirzanov and in the prose of Sh. Akhmadiev ('Human', 1913).

The structural semantic elements of the Eastern genres of the early 20th century poetry, such as ghazal, madhia, marcia and qasida, limited to the expressing of the civil emotions of the protagonist, lose their relevancy, and poets are gradually switching from arud to sylabic verse. The genre system of the western literature is heavily favoured. Poets are seriously interested in folk verses and folk traditions, as the alignment of the national poetry with folklore made the language of literary pieces pure, and poems began to 'get rid' of excessive Arab-Persian and Turkish loanwords. The great example of that are the works of one of the founders of the new Tatar literature, poet Gabdulla Tukay (1886-1913), who formed the basis of the new national poetry and created its classical style. While studying the role of G. Tukay in the history of the Tatar poetry, G. Khalit came to the conclusion that he aligned poetry and its function with the essence of the artistic subject: 'Tukay's poetry was the first to strip the Tatar word from its national colouring. The poetic speech of Tuqay gives the words freedom to transform from one key to another, so they are no longer the attributes tied to a certain theme or image. The emotional potentials and musical nuances of the native word have broadened and enriched. The poet put a lot of effort into his poetical plasticity. <...> Tukay's poetry was the first where intimate lyrical, socio-publicistic and the exposing satirical edges of the national poetic style sparkled together as one' [Khalit, 1990, pp. 66-67].

The central themes of Tukay's works are the nation's fate and serving for its good, which were the main ideologies of the national conscience for those years. They became crucial
in the value system of the social ideology, and their priority above other interests was unshakable. An individual was able to fulfill his potential only as a servant of the nation. They captured the idea of the necessary development of the Tatar society through introducing itself to the experience and achievements of the European culture, and the realisation of the importance of national traditions, as well as the brutal truth of reality, utopian hopes and historical experience. The paradigm of enlightenment was a push towards the reformation of the traditional picture of the world found in national literature where the dominating opposition was 'God vs. human'. For instance, one of the first poems of G. Tukay 'Alla ğiyüşqina' ('Out of love for God', 1905) uses a modification of this dichotomy: 'God vs. nation'. Traditional oppositions are used to express a new meaning: the speaker encourages his people to live by God's canons. They contain a high morality, thirst for knowledge, education, the supreme idea of human beings and their duty in life and society. Thus, Islamic philosophy becomes redefined from an ethnocentric position: serving the nation is perceived as a necessity for Muslims (farz). A person's character is constructed by the logics of enlightenment. Such qualities as arrogance, adulation, conservatism, ignorance, resistance towards enlightenment and an adverse attitude towards other people are valued negatively and acknowledged as harmful for the nation's future, thus apostatical. The opposite qualities lead to the nation's progress, and are therefore considered pious.

Traditional structures appear in a new way in romantic poems as well, being generally the motive of creativity. In the poem 'Xäzerge xalemezä dair' ('Regarding the current situation', 1905) the author consolidates the divinity of the literary word and builds a chain of associations: the author's pen is a guide for the words of God to the people, the Quran was written with it; writers are pillars of Islam showing the path to perfection. The protagonist explains his questioning attitude towards Tatar society by the fact that it is contaminated by ignorance, envy and a hunger for revenge, and he sees the 'cure' in honouring God, which is equal to honouring the art of declamation. In the poem 'I qalām!' ('Oh, quill!', 1906), written in the form of a prayer, the protagonist, full of hopes, addresses the quill: he believes that the power of the art of declamation is the only thing that can cure the nation, save it from humiliation and destruction, lead it to the path of happiness, and establish the borders between good and evil, truth and lies; the rhetorical address to God is replaced by an address to the quill. In the poem 'Millâükä' ('To the nation', 1906), the famous Sufi theme of madness from love transformed into the theme of love for one's nation, emphasises the level of emotional intensity: this love can drive people to madness. This feeling is the highest value in the world, and serving one's nation is the highest joy and happiness. So in his first poems, young Tukay decodes the traditional images, and starts a conversation about the nation's problems from the position of an illuminator and Muslim, a poet and an empathic human being. The same ideas appear in his publicistic writings as well.

Tukay's satirical works of the period are aimed against ignorance ('Yaponiyane möselman idäçük gölyama nàràdä?—'Where are the scholars who want to islamise Japan?', 1906), immorality ('Keçkenä genä ber köyle xikï yüll—'A short rhythmic story', 1906, 'Xärirä Baqirgan—'Reminiscing Bakyrgan', 1906), religious fanaticism ('Mörtîlär qaberstanyynan ber avaz—'Voice from the Murid cemetery', 1906, 'Soriqortlarğa—'To parasites', 1906, 'Piyala baş—'Glass head', 1906). Moving forward, his poems start to express his social and political position more intensely as a supporter of democratic reformations ('Gosudarstvennaya Dumağä' ('To the State Duma', 1907); 'Kîtmibeż!' ('We will not leave!', 1907). G. Tukay contemplates on the tragedy of a nation that does not have present, and where its future depends on the firmness and commitment of its people. The majority of his poems are dedications, in which the main idea is formulated as a rhetorical message for members of the different categories of the Tatar society, and the overriding theme remains the fate of the nation.
The poet effectively uses the romantic style, fantastic and allegorical devices of the Medieval Tatar literature, and such devices as sarcasm, hyperbole, irony, parody and grotesque. Tukay proved himself a master of the nazyire, a variation on a given storyline. Tukay's most satirical work is a poem called 'Pechen bazary, yaxud Yana Kisekbash' ('Sennoy Bazaar, or New Kesekbash', 1908), and was also conceived as a parody on a 13th century literarywork called Tukay 'Kisekbash' ('A cut-off Head'). The poem's nature is mostly epic: it has a plot describing events presumably taking place at the Sennoy Bazaar in Kazan. The cut-off head, whose body was eaten, son swallowed and wife taken by Div, tells the story of its misfortunes. The fantastic plot based on a repetition of similar, typical images, makes it possible for the author to recreate an image of the Tatar society that is far removed from reality, and which lives only to expect miracles and spectacles, 'circus entertainment'.

In the works of the Tatar writers of the early 20th century, the birth of the new form of authorship characteristic of the poetics of the artistic modality, coexists with the elements of a traditional artistic consciousness, which manifests itself in the domination of the objective beginning over the subjective in the structure of the artistic image. The admission that the 'Self' as an autonomous and independently valuable subject can possess the truth, is supplemented by the idea of the intermediary function of the author, where the individual creative beginning interacts with the traditional, canonic one. For example, in the poem 'Ike yul' ('Two Paths', 1909), the traditional antonymy of 'Enlightenment vs. Ignorance' acts as the mean of interpretation of two options of human life: the path to spiritual perfection and the path to stagnation. The paradoxical idea that the aspiration for enlightenment makes a person unhappy completes the creative concept of the literary work: the enlightened people, fighters for the future of their nation, are doomed to live for other people, for their problems and cares. Their lives are shown as eternal strife, but even the sufferings of a poet are full of light: the feeling of hopelessness, despondency, loneliness, the acute understanding of the transience of life are overcome by faith in the bright future of the nation. Or, in his poem 'Omid' ('Hope', 1908), the poet, while building up the oppositions of light and darkness, sunrise and dusk, future and present, friend and enemy, desperation and optimism, reaches the conclusion that life is the victory of 'the sun of the mind' over 'the darkness of ignorance' ('Pray, rise, the beacon of thought! The cloud, leave at once!/ Oh sun, do resurrect the dead conscience, and warm it with your rays!', translated by A. Akhmatova). 'The sun of thought' is opposed by 'the dead conscience', or the darkness of false concepts, beliefs, ideas. Even 'the light of the universe' cannot be compared to what offers hope: 'No, the soul cannot be low—its destiny is height'. In the poem 'Kunel' ('Soul', 1909), the protagonist turns to his soul, encouraging it to suffer and live through the grief and problems of others. The reason for his existence is to devote himself to others. Only the ultimate descent into darkness and despair, cold and emptiness, pain and suffering can lead one back to light and to the feeling of harmony with the universe.

The poetic idea of many other poems develops based on the same principle: 'Serleuxesez' ('Without a title', 1909), 'Milli monnar' ('National melodies', 1909), 'Ometsezlek' ('Without hope', 1910), etc. In them, the dramatic and sometimes even tragic feelings of the main character are related to the lives of people and history of the nation. In the poem 'Serleuxesez' (1909), while highlighting the need to sing 'a song of woe': 'Kuzgatmakchy bulsan xalyk kunelleren, / Tibiremekche bulsan in nechke kyllaryn, / Kejleu tiesh, elbet, achy xesret keen, / Kirek tugel meg'nese yuk kelke, uen', the poet offers a philosophical assessment of the basics of existence: the imperfection of existence gives rise to the feelings of bitterness, dissatisfaction and hopelessness in a person.

In the philosophical lyrics of the poet, overcoming the tragic nature of life is irrevocably connected with an affirmation of the ideal and the ideal's category. This is what Tukay uses to assess all the events of the contemporary life. In poems where the motif of yearning for the past dominates, life is divided into two
The truth juxtaposed to the material values is read as both the state of the soul of a person who 'has left in search of fire to light the living world' and the longing for spiritual freedom ('Daxige'—'To the genius', 1913). Truth is compared to the brightest star ('Kunel joldyz' – 'Star of the soul', 1909) supporting a person during the hardest moments in life and allowing him to help others:

I feel the heaviness of hands,
the touch of dark forces,
But my enemy has not managed to extinguish

the holy star in my heart.
No, no, my star is still ablaze,
and its golden gleam does not dim,
And, undoubtedly, at least a single lost one
has been saved by that star.
(Translated by V. Tushnova).

In G. Tukay's love poetry the feeling of infatuation is interpreted as a sublime category, as a source of poetic inspiration ('Mexebbet'—'Love', 1907), happiness ('Kulyn'—'Your hand', 1908), and a stimulus for self-improvement ('Ge'—'Dedication', 1908), as an unreachable ideal ('Ber resemge'—'To one portrait', 1908), and as the meaning of life ('Ixtida'—'Comprehension of truth', 1911). The motif of love is intertwined with the motif of creative activity, where a semantic equivalence is established: according to Tukay, love and creativity are both of a heavenly origin and are pre-determined.

In his landscape lyrics, where the motif of enjoyment of beauty prevails, the nature of his native land is idealised, and beauty is seen in simple occurrences, the national identity of Tukay's poetry comes forth clearly. He was able to communicate the perception of nature typical of the Tatar people ('Ay xem koyash' ('Moon and Sun'), 1909, 'Kyshka ber suz' ('A word on winter'), 1909, 'Zhejge tan xatirese' ('Remembrance of the summer dawn'), 1910, etc.). The 'unspoiled' beauty of nature in verses and poems is matched against the 'cruelty' of historical development. Moreover, the duality of existence is expressed in the antithesis of the heavenly and the earthly, nature and man ('Doshmannar' ('Enemies'), 1912).

Hope is another vestige of the ideal in Tukay's lyric poetry. Whereas the past is a happy time, the gloomy present is a time of lost hope; it is associated with Hell and with death ('Omidsezlek' ('Without hope'), 1910, 'Telej bette' ('The time for hope has gone'), 1909). Mercy, as well as hope, is able to support a person during the most intense trials of his life ('Katile nefeske') ('To the self-killer'), 1910). The imperfection of existence is explained by the inability of man for compassion. However, when speaking of the il-
The illusionary nature of expecting assistance from others, the poet insists that when speaking of his grief, man overcomes the feeling of loneliness. Communication purifies the soul and thoughts ('Achy tzehrile avazy' ('Voice of bitter experience'), 1910). For example, Tukay's most tragic poems express faith in the high ideals of love, mercy, beauty and hope for their consummation.

Philosophical lyric poetry forms one of the central motifs of Tukay's poetry—the motif of tragic loneliness and alienation. This is primarily represented as loneliness among an indifferent crowd, the cause of which is the devotion to the fight for the freedom of the spirit, for a better future for the nation, for the change of the world. In his poem 'Kyjitga' ('Fragment', 1913), the feeling of regret of the protagonist, whose life contained 'black days' and the fight to 'whiten, cleanse the world', arises as a result of the comprehension of the unattainability of this goal. However, loyalty to the ideal and the perseverance of the human spirit prevail: despite loneliness and despair, the protagonist stays true to his endeavor to change society and the world for the better.

The confessional nature and the longing for internal self-analysis in such poems are united with the feeling of crisis, of drama of personal destiny, the loss of friends, destruction of everything of value, and the comprehension of the unattainability of life most important goal. For example, in the poem 'Ozelgen omid' ('Broken hope', 1910), the life-long tenet of the poet is to 'bring life to the national trees' with his song and creative works, to 'wake up the nation, to change the world and to find light and warmth along the way. The poem is set against the tombstone of his mother's grave, an image that adopts a symbolic meaning. When the unattainability of the ideal is finally realised, the sole value for the protagonist is the stone that symbolises the succession of generations, perpetuity of existence, traditions of his people, and the meaning of life related to this succession that is common for all of humankind. Thus, alienation and immersion inside oneself discloses the innermost secret of a person's purpose in the world.

The motif of prayer, the motif of love for God pierces through many poems focusing on moral questions related to the fate of man ('Mig'razh' (1910), 'Kader kich' (1911), 'Tefsirme? Merzhemetery' (1913)). Prayer as a sacrament through which a person expresses his inner world acts not only as an appeal to God, but also as a 'conversation' with their soul, their own selves ('Ana dogasi' ('Mother's prayer'), 1909). 'There', where the Almighty resides, a man can always find peace, support ('Kinesh' ('Advice'), 1909), purity and truth ('Tanay Allaga', 1909), since a man carries a piece of the divine within himself ('Nesyjxet' ('Edification'), 1910).

Tukay was one of the first authors in the Tatar literature to specifically study the aesthetic principles of folklore and its relation to written literature. In 1910 at the famous Oriental Club, the poet delivered a lecture entitled 'Xalyk edebiyaty' ('Folk literature') after proclaiming the motto: 'Hail to folk literature, hail to the popular language!'. In his creative work, he used the plot structure of fairy tales, such as in the poems 'Shurele' ('Shurale', 1907), 'Su anasy' ('Water nymph', 1908), 'Kezhe belen saryk xicyayase' ('Tale of a goat and sheep', 1910). He also communicated the characteristics of the folk world's perception and world reflection, like in 'Milli monnar' ('National melodies', 1909), the images, details and creative expressive means typical for the Tatar oral folk tradition: 'Par at' ('A pair of horses', 1907), 'Eshhen chyglygan tatar kyzyna' ('To a humiliated and offended Tatar maiden', 1909), and wrote pastiches of folk songs: 'Avyl zhylary' ('Village songs', 1908). Relying upon the traditions of the oral folk tradition, G. Tukay achieved a complete transformation in the phraseology and form of the Tatar poetry and was crowned the creator of the national literary poetic language 'free from any foreign influence of Arabic, Turkish or Uzbek' ('Folk literature'). In Tukay's creative works, ancient traditions are correlated with his contemporary artistic consciousness, its criteria and orientations. At the same time, the traditional structures and images, motifs and details recognisable and readable in the
context of the Eastern literature, became tools for enlivening the creative memory, including as it concerns genre. The civil, love and landscape lyric poetry of Tukay preserved the memory of the Eastern genres, such as the ghazal, qasida and marcia, but made them relevant for the expression of the national idea formed in the early 20th century.

Tatar poets and writers of the early 20th century strove to transform the Tatar literature in the footsteps of the European and Russian literature, but at the same time wanted to preserve their national verbal identity. The problem of the preservation, development and improvement of the nation became a key trend in the new secular literature.

§ 5. The Rise of the National Theater

Aygul Salikhova

The development of the capitalist relations caused material changes in the political, economic and spiritual spheres of the Russian state. In the late 19th—early 20th centuries, the entire public life of the country acquired characteristic dynamics that could not but influence the traditional mode of the Turkic peoples in the Empire. The national capital grew and consolidated, and the economic and cultural links of the Tatars with other peoples strengthened. A new, progressive national ideology was proving itself; proprietary public institutions started to pop up, including political parties and the press. Secular forms of culture, literature and art started to develop.

The birth of national theatrical works was also a result of the uprise of the Tatar dramaturgy. The first Tatar plays appeared in the final quarter of the 19th century: 'Unhappy girl' by G. Ilyasi dates back to 1887, while the play by F. Khalidi entitled 'Against the unhappy girl' was published in 1888. The earliest dramatic works also include 'The comedy in Chistopol' (1895) and the first version of the play by G. Kamal 'An unhappy youth' (1898). Translations of plays (primarily from Russian and Turkish languages) were published at approximately the same time.

The first Tatar performances were played on stage in rich private houses by amateur groups as well as by the students of advanced madrasahs, such as 'Muhammadiyah' in Kazan, and 'Usmaniyya' and 'Galiya' in Ufa. However, as early as at the beginning of 1907 in Orenburg, the 'First Russian troupe of Muslim dramatic actors under the management of Ilyas Kudashev-Ashkazarsky' came on the scene. In this troupe, many actors who later became famous—Vali Murtazin-Imansky, Akhmet Kulalaev, Bari Bolgarsky, etc.—first started their creative careers. In the summer of 1907, the company went on its first tour around the towns of the Volga region, during which the first female actress, Sakhibzhamal Gizzatullina-Volzhskaya, joined the troupe, followed by Gabdulla Kariev. The troupe's repertoire included such works as 'Morat Salimov' by F. Khalidi, 'The proposal' by A. Chekhov, 'Hangover at Somebody Else's Feast' by A. Ostrovsky, etc.

The manager of the company, I. Kudashev-Ashkazarsky, was known for his energy and outstanding artistic talent, though evidently he lacked a liberality of views and simple organizational abilities. It was not long before he left the company and started other independent creative work. The company was then headed by a young, talented individual utterly devoted to the art named Gabdulla Kariev. The multifaceted personality of G. Kariev had such a great impact on the subsequent development of the Tatar scenic art that the national artistic school is even now still known as 'the Kariev school'. He served as the creative manager, director and theatrical pedagogue all at once. At the same time, the organisation of the activities of the troupe was collegiate by nature. Each of its members was responsible for a specific sphere of matters: Kariev handled general...
management, Murtazin and Gizatullina were directors, Kulalaev drew and posted the posters, and Khayrutdinov copied down the roles and prompted. All this indicates that a spirit of solidarity, mutual help and equal partnership reigned in the company.

In the spring of 1908 when on a tour in Tiflis, the Tatar actors were joined by the Azerbaijani actors, the fact of which was mentioned in the city’s press: 'A Tatar troupe has arrived in Tiflis. Mr. Arablinsky and the Tatar actors met in the editor’s office of Molla Nasretdin newspaper and decided to go on a tour after uniting the troupes' [Letopis azerbajdzhanskogo teatra, 1975, p. 163]. For their collective performances, they selected plays by both the Azerbaijani and Tatar playwrights—the tragedies 'Nadir Shah' by N. Narimanov, 'Fakhretdin's Youth' by G. Kamal, etc. The joint work of the Tatar artists demonstrated the little-known work enriched the repertoires of both national companies. Starting from December 1911, "Sayyar" company was included in the staff list of the Oriental Club [Yöldiz, 1911, November 1]. This meant regular pay to the entire creative team during the winter season, as well as a permanent facility. At the same time, the troupe hired an artist, S. Yakhshibaev, who was placed in charge of scenery. All this signalled the commencement of the second stage in the development of the dramatic arts [Makhmutov, 1988]. Nevertheless, it was fruitful in its own way. The repertoire was enriched by works of the different genres and styles—the actors performed domestic comedies and vaudevilles, dramas and high tragedies, works by Russian, Azerbaijani and Turkish authors as well as new, original plays by the Tatar authors I. Bogdanov, G. Kamal and G. Iskhaki. Therefore, the Tatar actors accumulated life and creative experience, built up their skills, and expanded their worldview.

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In 1912 the second professional troupe known as "Nur" started its operations in Ufa under the management of S. Gizatullina-Volzhskaya, and in 1915 V. Murtazin-Imansky formed the "Shirkyat" troupe in Orenburg.

Speaking of the characteristics of the national performing school, it is worth mentioning that Tatar actors were pioneers of the art who did not have any special education; they studied the basics of the profession on the job in the process of day-to-day acting. They received tremendous support from the plays of other troupes, in particular, those of the Russian urban theaters of Kazan and other cities. They frequently used the device of imitation and copying when a true, living prototype was found for a stage character, in order to completely transfer them to the stage while preserving the minute details of external characteristics. Evidence of the above can be found in the memoirs of Z. Sultanov, G. Bolgarskaya and others. The researcher of Tatar stage direction
M. Arslanov offers a description of the artistic method of G. Kariev: 'For him, life was an irreplaceable inventory, a source of untold wealth and creative potential. If his emotional memory did not contain the necessary materials to work with, he visited the places where the people of the class depicted in the play could be found. Only after a careful study of the realistic prototypes of characters did he continue his work again, teaching what he learned to his actors. Since the theater was continuously on the road, and as a result of the lack of a well-equipped stationary stage, Kariev was unable to see his ideas completely through to the end. This is why he devoted all his strength and attention to working with the actors. Kariev would tell interesting anecdotes from his personal life, offer literary parallels in attempts to arouse the creative fantasy of his actors and, lastly, used demonstrations when a performer was struggling with some part of their role. G. Kariev, a realistic director, aimed to recreate "slices of life" in their completeness while on stage' [Arslanov, 1992, p. 61]. Despite the naiveté and certain primitivism of such an approach, it was extremely beneficial for beginner performers and became a solid step in the development of scenic realism.

Some researchers delineate two schools in the art of acting—the genre/domestic school and the lyrical/romantic school—represented by the names of G. Kariev and S. Gizatullina-Volzhskaya [Iyalova, 1981, pp. 25-26]. In our opinion, one can only speak of the individual characteristics, personal preferences and creative tendency of any performer. In fact, pre-Revolutionary Tatar theater brought together very different actors, each of whom was known for their strong personality and shining individuality, which was undoubtedly reflected in their performances. It is interesting that even in 1910 theater critic G. Karam pointed this fact out in his articles. In particular, he wrote that G. Kariev is a 'reasoner and domestic performer' and 'cannot play the roles of lovers' [Ang, 1913, June 1], and K. Tinchurin 'performs well in the translated works and achieves the desired results, but he does not demonstrate any particular talent in national plays'. While he valued and sincerely admired the first Tatar actress, S. Gizatullina-Volzhskaya, Karam still remarked that her true stock character is the dramatic heroine, and 'her performance in comedies frequently reminds of a drama, so the spectator's impression is not always correct' [Yöldiz, 1910, December 23]. The same critic mentioned the amazing vastness of the artistic range of G. Bolgarskaya: 'There are no stock characters she has not mastered... Undoubtedly, Ms. Bolgarskaya is capable of playing the entire repertoire alone—she has enough of both experience and master' [Yöldiz, 1913, April 4]. All in all, it can be said that even before the Revolution of 1917 the Tatar theater boasted a group of bright, original, talented actors who went from amateur imitation to independent, full-blooded creativity, from enthusiasm about the superficial, external characteristics to a psychological depth, and from specific, detailed plausibility to poetic and social generalisations.

This was to a great extent promoted by a rich repertoire with varied styles, genres and trends. Since it was difficult to change the opinions of the deeply and sincerely spiritual Muslims, the attempts of the theatre enthusiasts were first met with caution. The decisive argument in favor of the new innovation was the recognition of its positive educational role. In fact, the early Tatar plays by G. Ilyasi, F. Khalidi, G. Kamal, G. Iskhaki fully conformed to the spirit of Islamic enlightenment in their condemnation of vices, ignorance and immorality. Muslim works also at first held a dominant position among translated plays, mostly by Turkish and Azerbaijani authors. Gradually, the nation was becoming more open and dynamic, and interest in Western, European and Russian culture was on the rise. This also had an influence on the repertoire. Similar to the way Tatar newspapers published examples of foreign literary works and reproductions of international masterpieces of fine arts, the theater troupe was introducing the public to works by Moliere, Heine, Gogol, Ostrovsky and Chekhov. By enlightening their spectators, the actors also understood themselves as students as well.
Every staging of plays by a national playwright was a joyous, long-awaited event. The comedies of G. Kamal were particularly popular. Later, Soviet scientists would call them stinging social satire of the rich, exploitative upper class. In fact, the nature of this satire was purely domestic in nature—he composed small, humorous sketches, where he merrily and easily described the merchant world so well known to him and scoffed at human vices like greed, stupidity and artifice.

F. Amirkhan wrote only two stage plays, the dramas 'Young People' and 'Unequal Ones'. They amazed contemporaries with their artistic perfection, richness of ideological content and beauty of language, and became instant classics. S. Ramiev, I. Bogdanov, F. Saifi-Kazanly and others also wrote for the theater.

However, the brightest and most diversely talented playwright of them all was, without a doubt, Gayaz Iskhaki. The path he covered in the course of his artistic evolution is truly revealing. His enlightening drama 'Life with Three Wives', published before 1900, was successfully staged on the Tatar stage until 1916. His later dramas and comedies touched on the urgent problems of the time and could be classified as works of critical realism. However, his tragedy 'Zuleykha' can rightfully be considered the zenith of his creative work. Its epic scope, depth of philosophical generalisations and strength of emotional impact have no equals in Tatar dramaturgy even now. It is not surprising that its staging in March 1917 was met with an unprecedented rapturous welcome, with aftershocks being felt even abroad. However, after Gayaz Iskhaki, who was unable to accept Bolshevik rules, immigrated to Turkey, he was stigmatised as a 'bourgeois nationalist' (which is a paradox, as before the Revolution he was exiled and imprisoned as a 'socialist'). The new ruling regime declared that 'Zuleykha' was a mystical, anti-Russian, ideologically harmful work and prohibited it. In fact, this masterpiece, which was created over the stretch of many years, based on true historic events and characterised by its extremely complex and serious nature, does not contain a shred of domestic, vulgar nationalism, which is further supported by the presence of several positive Russian characters. When speaking of the fate of forcibly baptised Tatars, the writer broached the issue of not only physical suppression, but that of the more horrible, spiritual kind; he portrayed the suffering of people beaten down to the state of powerless cattle, as if they had no souls, feelings or minds. With pain and suffering he writes of his fellow believers who endured enormous grief and deprivations. Apart from the scale and epic nature of the work, the depth and originality of its ideas, and the fact that the dramatic fabric of the play for the first time organically includes the folk songs and dances, the scene of the folk wedding deserves particular attention. For the first time ever music was written specifically for a stage play by a composer named Sultan Gabashi. It is safe to say that the tragedy 'Zuleykha' cleared the way for a new scenic genre—musical drama.

The pre-Revolutionary history of the Tatar theatre spans a little over ten years. However, even this small period of time was enough to make enormous progress not just concerning the mastery of the art of acting. Aside from specific commercial goals (the attraction and entertainment of the audience), actors also established more important, significant, noble goals, such as promoting the distribution of culture and education, developing literature and art, and increasing national self-awareness. The theatre itself was considered to be a symbol of progress and united a wide swath of the young Tatar intelligentsia.
§ 6. Development of Tatar Music and Fine Arts before 1917

Lilia Gabdrafikova

Tatar fine arts is a comparatively new artistic phenomenon. The development of Tatar pictorial art is impossible to imagine without a secular background. It was the withdrawal from religious values, the establishment of an atheistic world-view and new possibilities in the educational sphere that promoted growth in professional artistic culture.

Nevertheless, an interest in fine arts, amateur artists and the first professional painters first appeared in the Tatar community long before 1917. At the turn of the 19th—20th century, young Muslims started taking a particularly keen interest in Russian culture, including its pictorial art. For example, the curriculum of the Kazan Tatar Teaching School included draftsmanship and drawing, where in addition to rudimentary knowledge, the students were taught about perspective and the effects of light and shade [Goritskaya, compiler, 2005, p. 63]. For many years, these subjects were taught by Shakirjan Tagirov, an alumnus of the school himself.

A certain influence over the young generation of the Tatars was also exerted by the culture of the Ottoman Empire, where fine arts had been developing since the Middle Ages in the form of miniatures. Starting in the middle of the 19th century a number of Turkish artists received training in Europe, the first artistic exhibitions were held in Istanbul, and in 1882 the School of Fine Arts—Sanayii Nefise Okul (currently known as Mimar Sinan's University of Visual Arts)—was opened. The first Turkish paintings were mostly landscapes that were as often as not copied from photographs. Images of people were also representative of the time. For example, the works of artists Osman Hamdi Bey and Şeker Ahmed Pasha [Çağdaş Türk resmi].

The first forays into the fine arts in the Tatar community at the turn of the 19th–20th century acted as a supplement to the publishing business and theatre performances. The designs of Tatar books (and newspapers and magazines after 1905) first used ready-made Russian stamps, and later original artistic samples were created. In the pre-Revolutionary periodical press, the caricature genre enjoyed particular success. Critical, emotional articles of the time were augmented by witty images. A recognised master of the caricature genre was a writer by the name of Galiaskar Kamal. He also designed stage sets for theatrical performances [Cher- vonnaya, 1987, p. 288]. However, book illustrations and play backdrops were only a remote approximation of visual art itself, as landscape drawings did not include people, and portraits were out of the question.

The attitudes of Tatar Muslims towards images of living creatures, primarily people, changed after the widespread popularity of photography. Among city dwellers, photographic services became particularly popular in the latter third of the 19th century. This was related both to the delayed development of this market segment in provincial regions of Russia and to the specific characteristics of the Muslim worldview. Still, almost every well-to-do Tatar family owned photographic images. 'Some people have their own portraits in their homes, but they never hang them up on the walls', remarked Kayum Nasyri [Nasyri, 2005, p. 232]. In the early 20th century, when portable cameras first appeared and the popularity of photography reached a fever pitch, Tatar families started compiling photographic albums.

The popularity of photography in the Islamic environment was connected not only to people's natural curiosity: it had turned into a practical necessity. Photographs were now taken for service documents. For example, when taking their Russian language examinations, the mullahs also provided their photographs [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 2, Inventory 2, File 6081, Sheet 8]. Examinations for the imams had been being held since early 1890s, and photographs in their per-
sonal files first appeared a little later. Therefore, even the most orthodox classes of Islamic society were involved in this new form of visualization. This was perceived as a permission of sorts for the rest of the population, a certain portion of which was still avoiding cameras for religious reasons. Sometimes, views on photographic art differed even within the same family. In the early 20th century, photographic images of a person were also necessary for travel documents and diplomas at certain educational institutions [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 142, Inventory 1, File 338, Sheet 2].

The development of photographic services promoted the occurrence of new variations in 'visual' business. For example, even before 1917, masters of photograph enlargement had established their businesses (this service reached its popularity peak during Soviet times). For instance, Sabit Yakhshibaev, an amateur artist and decorator for the 'Sayyar' troupe, was fascinated with photography during the Kazan period of his life (from 1912 to the 1920s) and drew portraits at his home [Rami, 2001, p. 325]. In the article entitled 'Muslim Artist', published in the Yulduz newspaper in 1912, Galiagiar Kamal wrote that Sabit Yakhshibaev, 'a Katay Bashkir' (the Katay is one of the Bashkir clans), had arrived from the Verkhneuralsk uyezd of the Orenburg guberniya to join the Kazan School of Fine Arts. Yakhshibaev however, he was too late to take the entrance examination. 'Sabit efendi is very poor and needs material support', the playwright appeals to readers of the newspaper. 'If there are people among our compatriots who are not indifferent to art, they ought to provide him even moderate assistance' [Kamal, 1981, pp. 263-264]. Sabit Yakhshibaev never managed to enroll in a fine arts school; he languished in poverty, and in the 1920s created the paintings 'Village', 'Tatar Peasant Woman', 'Tatar Man' and 'Izba' in Kazan, but later returned to his native land and worked as a theatrical artist of the Bashkir Theatre of Drama in Ufa.

Development of national fine arts in Bashkiria is connected with the name of Kasim Devletkil'deev. This native of the Kugul (Maryino) village in the Ufa uyezd (currently the Blagovarsky region of the Republic of Bashkortostan), according to Soviet tradition, is referred to as the first Bashkir artist. Although in the 1877 reference book 'List of Residential Communities' for the Ufa guberniya, the residents of Kugul are recorded as Tatars [Bashkortostan settlements, 2002, p. 149]. Kasim Devletkil'deev descended from a family of impoverished Tatar nobility. His elder brother worked as a teacher in Ufa, and Kasim's adolescent years were spent in the centre of the governorate, where he graduated from Ufa Male High School. After a brief period of study at the Kazan Tatar Teaching School, in 1908 he departed for St. Petersburg. This was a bold act for that period of time—the Devletkil'deev family was against the enterprise, and some relatives (for example, those residing in Kazan) renounced him. His dream was to study at the Academy of Arts, but in 1914 he graduated from Baron Stieglitz's St. Petersburg School for Technical Drawing. Family circumstances and material difficulties did not allow Kasim Devletkil'deev to continue his education with the Academy, and he returned to Ufa [Bondarenko, 2002, pp. 158-167]. Khusain Badaninsky and Mirzajan Baykiev (for many years he worked as a sculpture restorer at the Hermitage) also graduated from the Stieglitz School. On the eve of World War I, Khadicha Akchurina studied at the Stroganov School for Technical Drawing in Moscow. Her first engravings were published in the children's magazine 'Ak yul'.

However, by 1910 the day-to-day perception of the world by Muslim Tatars changed drastically, a statement that can be proven by photographs, illustrations of books and periodicals and theatrical decorations. The attitude towards professional employment in the fine arts remained critical. In fact, almost no parent wished an artist's destiny for their children. Still, according to the newspaper 'El Islakh', in 1908 two Tatar students in Kazan were enrolled in the art school for that school year [Amirkhanov, 2004, p. 536]. With the exception of these singular cases of professional artistic educa-
tion, this niche in general continued to get narrower and narrower. According to G. Kamal, even in 1912 the Kazan School of Arts did not have a single Muslim student. Moreover, there were none willing to enroll in this educational institution. As early as in 1909, members of the Tatar intelligentsia decided to establish a scholarship for one Muslim student. The office of the Yulduz newspaper offered 50 rubles for the purpose, and the Orenburg newspaper Vakyt allocated the same amount. Attempts to amass the needed sum were unsuccessful, and no applicants came forward either.

In 1912-1913 the first small artistic exhibit was held in the Shary Kazan library, showing portraits of Tatar writers (G. Tukay, F. Amirkhan, etc.). One of the sponsors of the exhibit was Sabit Sabit Yakhshibaev [Urmancihe, 1960, pp. 138-142]. Tatar magazines and newspapers also performed significant support work for the promotion of visual arts. Ang magazine holds a prominent place among them. In 1915 it published an album with examples of world art as a supplement to the magazine. In 1916 its publisher Ahmetgarey Khasani also published and distributed an image of Queen Sütümibe (reproductions of the 19th century painting). In the Kazan Gendarmery this fact was interpreted differently: if he distributes the images free of charge, it means that his aim is 'to prepare the masses for the idea of a possible recreation of the Kazan Khanate' [Amirkhanov, 2005, p. 70]. Even though the publisher was driven only by the idea of 'national progress'. The Yulduz and Koyash magazine offices also promoted an interest in fine arts, as they were always searching for talented artistic youth and providing them with financial support [Mähdiev, 1987, pp. 52-54]. The trends of the new times, as well as constant agitation in the national press, also influenced the curriculum of Tatar madrasahs. In the early 20th century, they started paying more attention to drawing [Vakhapov, 2010, p. 121].

Therefore, due to a number of factors, the attitude towards fine arts in the Tatar community had changed even before 1917. The development of bourgeois national culture—publishing books, newspapers and magazines—required new forms to present the material. The competition caused the proposed publications to take a step back from earlier minimalism and supplement their pages with the latest artistic fads. However, the arrival of photography to the day-to-day lives of Tatars played a significant role in the depiction of a Muslim person. While in world history photography developed under the influence of painting, in THE HISTORY OF THE TATARS the reverse was true: the spread of photographic services influenced the development of fine arts. Thanks to photography, certain stereotypes of the visual perception of the world disappeared. Images of Tatar public figures were published in books, magazines and certificates of graduation from madrasahs; the Tatars were enlarging their own photographs for domestic use, painting their first portraits and arranging for their public exhibition. Some young Tatars in the early 20th century enrolled in higher artistic schools. Among their number were K. Devletkil'deev, Kh. Badaninsky, M. Baykiev, Kh. Akchurina, etc.

The musical culture of the Tatars remained private for many years, as the public performance of melodies was frowned upon by Islamic spiritual leaders. However, even in the late 19th century there were musical clocks in private houses, and in the later years various music boxes, with the Stella and Ariston models being the most popular. At the turn of the 19th-20th century two repair specialists for musical mechanisms were particularly known in Kazan, Garif Minkin and Gilyazutdin Sayfullin. They not only fixed boxes, but also recorded Tatar folk melodies on copper plates [Rami, 2001, pp. 179, 229]. The catalog of master Sayfullin's music included over 200 titles of Tatar songs. Residents of the New Tatar sloboda called him 'ergen Gilyaz' (Pipe Organ Gilyaz). Certainly, the mullahs approved little of the activities of Gilyazutdin Sayfullin, and still less of that of his predecessor, Garif Minkin. They were boycotted and cursed [Gabyashi, 1994, p. 50].
In the early 20th century, music boxes with their metal disks were being replaced by the radically new sound-recording equipment appearing around the time. Gramophones came into daily use. They had been known since the late 19th century, but became widely spread only some time later. Amateur Tatar singers started recording their songs for gramophones. For example, in 1910 the Orenburg newspaper 'Vaky!' reported that a singer named Muhammedjan Gabidullin recorded his songs in Moscow with the Grammofon company [Gafuri, 1983, p. 348]. In addition to his work, the gramophone records of Maryam Iskandarova, Nafisa Pozdnyakova, Khusain Yusupov, Mirfayza Babadzhanov, Kamil Mutygi, Ibragim Adamantov, Khadicha Gambitkaya, and anonymous female solos and duets became popular during that period. The new Tatar urban culture was essentially imitative because it included Russian songs re-sung in Tatar style. Apart from vocals, the gramophone records also contained instrumental compositions. They enjoyed particular popularity. One of the leading recording firms, Grammofon, as early as in 1910 published a catalogue entitled 'A Complete List of Kazan-Tatar Zonophon Records, Old and New, by Grammofon'. Therefore, this market segment was rather well-developed.

According to modern music researcher Idris Gaziev, 'the records of some Tatar singers demonstrate the unusual timbre of performers characterised by a certain artificiality, the shrill, semi-falsetto sound in the high tessitura reminiscent of a female voice' [Gaziev, 2009, p. 178]. For example, such a shrill manner of performance was typical for Khusain Yusupov. He was one of the Pate company's most frequently recorded performers. Mirfayza Babadzhanov sang in the same style. Kamil Mutygi stands out in this list: he possessed a low voice timbre and performed songs in the modern style, without artificially high notes.

The quality of gramophone records of Tatar performers was subject to continuous criticism on the pages of the national press in the early 20th century. Sagit Suncheley, Shagit Akhmadiev, Gabdulla Tukay and other authors mentioned this phenomenon. For the most part, male and female singers were chastised for corrupting songs, as their somewhat vulgar manner of performance was not to everyone's taste. Moreover, their musical material was mostly comprised of folk songs, while the listeners, especially the progressive audience, wanted to hear original songs and works by Tatar composers [Sûncâlêy, 2005, pp. 235-238; Tukay, 1986, pp. 53-54].

It is a well-known fact that at the turn of the 19th-20th century Tatar amateur musicians were only able to demonstrate their art at restaurants and inns, as well as at other entertainment establishments. Even when they performed at public gardens or more respectable places they were stigmatised as tavern singers. The same attitude was applied to the discussion of gramophone records.

The low quality of performance widely criticised in the press was not always such during live performances. The very technique of sound recording was actually to blame, as it distorted sound even at the tiniest wrong movement. Microphones that could adjust vocals did not exist at the time. The singer sang into a mouthpiece connected to a membrane that made a groove on a wax plate using a needle. The plates were then used to make impressions and print real records. If there were strong sound vibrations, the membrane rattled so badly that it made the song sound like 'mating cats', as Gabdulla Tukay put it. It is possible that so soon after the appearance of gramophones not very many people knew about the deficiencies of this equipment, making the performers subject to a storm of criticism. It is not surprising that after a while the word 'gramophone' became synonymous with any bad singer [Kolbasiev, 1931, p. 109].

The distribution of music media and the ongoing discussion of all the pros and cons of this type of recreational activity coupled with the development of stricter demands for them create a united cultural environment that undoubtedly played a significant part in consolidating the Tatar nation. Gramophone records became an alternative that united public performance with private listening. For example, not all
Tatar women could afford to visit restaurants and taverns or public gardens. Thanks to sound recording, this type of cultural recreation that was previously accessible only to men, seeped into the domestic environment as well.

According to Sagit Suncheley, while the entirety of the 19th century was spent under the oppression of folk music, in the beginning of the following century gramophones were available 'in every village, and everyone from peasant to mullah had one' [Sünçälây, 2005, p. 236]. The impersonal, 'mechanised' performance was considered by Muslims admissible according to the Quran, so the number of people interested in these 'boxes' and, consequently, music itself increased exponentially.

Early 20th century Tatar society is characterised by an unprecedented interest in music. This is supported by the profusion of literary and musical soirées, the popularity of gramophone records and discussions on the pages of national periodicals. Most authors held the view that Tatar songs had lost their uniqueness and were vastly inferior to the folk art of the Bashkirs and Nogais. The originality of their musical culture was explained by the relative isolation of their domestic lives from foreign influence and a semi-nomadic lifestyle. In the opinion of writer Gayaz Iskhaki, not only the melodies, but the very national spirit of Tatar and Mishar songs had been forgotten. The entirety of our musical strength now lies in singing Russian couplets in Tatar style. Bashkir melodies are the sole outlet for us. The Kazan songs that had been passed down from khan times had either been forgotten or are already disappearing', he wrote in the article 'Our national melody and music', published in Mektep magazine in early 1914 [Iskhaky, 2005, pp. 279-281]. The impact of Russian music on Tatar folk art was also noted by other authors. Another researcher of the issue—historian Gali Rakhim—attributed the separation of Tatars from folk music to the development of their urban culture. 'These days, there are few among us who sing beautiful ancient melodies. Now the people prefer new songs, without deep meaning, and those are being written one after another', he said regretfully [Rakhim, 2008, p. 76]. It was at the turn of the 19th-20th century when the Tatars started separating country ('avyl koe') and urban ('shekher koe') motifs.

Heated discussions, to a certain extent provoked by gramophone records, caused the change in the general attitude towards music. For example, in 1908 Tatar youth created a 'Music Society' in Kazan, whose goal was 'to advance national music among common people and create a national orchestra' [Amirkhanov, 2005, p. 134]. Young Tatar men and women enrolled in musical schools, and Muslim educational institutions had their own choirs and orchestras. People from a very wide social spectrum were all becoming singers. For example, one of the famous performers of the time, Kamil Mutygi, was the son of an influential religious figure named Mullah Mutygulla Tukhvatullin from the town of Uralsk.

In fact, after 1905 madrasahs following the new method and the liberal clergy demonstrated a stronger loyalty to music. Madrasah Galiya opened in 1906 in Ufa and stood out among them in particular. This educational institution allowed for various musical instruments to be played, and what is more, students created their own orchestra. The head of the madrasah himself, theologian Ziya Kamali, also loved singing. However, only his nearest and dearest were ever aware of this fact. In his memoirs, his son mentioned that his father sometimes used to perform old Tatar songs such as 'Kara urman', 'Zilyaylyuk' and other melodies, and his children joined him [Central Historical Archive of the Republic of Bashkortostan, Fund R-4767, Inventory 1, File 2, Sheet 71]. There was also an active musical society in the Orenburg madrasah Khusainiya [Rakhimkulova, 2010, p. 153].

In the collection devoted to Shigabutdin Marjani (1915 edition), former pupils and other researchers of the legacy of this outstanding theologian explain his opinions on poetry and music in detail [Marjani, 2001]. Even in the middle of the 19th century, Shigabutdin khazrat became one of the pioneers of reformed Is-
lam, and he promoted his idea that music does not contradict Sharia. 'He insisted that there was no difference where the sound came from, be it from a nightingale or an inanimate object', his student Gabdrakhman Gumari wrote about him. 'It is another matter if actions that do not conform to the norms of Islam take place at literary and musical evenings. This, however, does not concern the poems or music proper' [Mârjani, 2001, p. 55]. Hasan-Gata Gabyashi also stressed the special attitude of Marjani towards music. It is worth noting that both authors, representatives of the leading Islamic clergy, did not just protect issues related to music and Sharia in a theoretical sense, but faced them in their day-to-day lives as well.

For example, the Astrakhan imam and publisher Gabdrakham Gumari published the collection 'Nogai Songs' in 1912. The qadi of the Orenburg Mohammedan Spiritual Assembly and historian, Hasan-Gata Gabyashi allowed his son to learn how to play piano. Later, Sultan Gabyashi became one of the first Tatar composers. He took lessons at home, in Ufa, from his teacher Nina Sokolova. The teacher was encouraging her student to continue his education at a music conservatory. 'But my father could not allow that, and he cannot be blamed', the composer wrote in his autobiography. 'At the time, it was not customary for Tatars to study music and become professional musicians, since there was no such profession, nor a demand for it' [Gabyashi, 1994, pp. 33-35].

Thanks to the literary and musical soirées and clubs, it had become popular for Tatars to form orchestras and choirs, and these types of events started happening on a wide scale after 1905. They were principally arranged by young people. The Tatar intelligentsia was gradually introducing the idea that the literary and music soirées, or 'Edebiyat akhshamy', offered the possibility of listening to national music not just at some dubious place, but in respectable halls. 'While music invoking adultery is haram, music calling for progress is mandatory', Gabdulla Tukay wrote about literary and musical evenings [Tukay, 1985, p. 225]. Such events largely promoted the increase of positive attitudes towards music. For example, the 'Oriental Club' in Kazan (in operation since December 1907) had its own orchestra including such talented musicians as I. Galiakberov, G. Zaypin and V. Apanayev. The group mostly performed Tatar folk works, meaning that they attempted to develop good musical taste in the public.

The promoters always stressed the confessional nature of these events. Obviously, this was done to somehow rehabilitate this new cultural occupation in the eyes of the older generation as well as the more religious public. In the Tatar press, many authors spoke in favor of the Muslim evenings, pointing to their educational nature.

Soon, orchestras and choirs were being put together at educational institutions. For example, in 1914 in the town of Buguruslan of the Samara guberniya, the town's Muslim community founded a music school for children. At first it operated in the building of the madrasah, but later was transferred to a separate facility. There, twenty pupils were taught how to play the mandolin, violin and guitar [Gibadullina, 2009, pp. 173-175].

The girls school of Fatykha Aitova in Kazan (opened in 1916) had a choir made up of its pupils. Apart from singing, they were also allowed to dance and play musical instruments. The pupils arranged concerts at the school, visited the city theater and went to other performances together [Yavgildina, 2007, p. 205]. However, a democratic attitude towards the musical past-times of pupils was not established overnight. This fact is obvious enough if one considers the example of one of the school's pupils, Sara Sadykova. 'Friends liked the voice of young Sara, and they brought her to the children's choir under the management of the editor of the children's magazine Svetliy Put, Fahrelislam Ageev (at the Oriental Club—A.N.). While in the choir, she sang the folk song Rokiya gul'keem, which was well known at the time. After hearing her performance, the director of the school Fatykha Aitova became very angry since she believed the collective singing of girls and boys together indecent. She even expelled the girl from the school', her
daughter, Alfiya Aydarskaya, recalled. 'However, later she had a change of heart, and she invited the "singer" back to the school because Sara had been an excellent pupil' [Aydarskaya, 2002, p. 175].

Therefore, starting from the latter half of the 19th century until 1917, the Tatar community underwent such a massive change of attitude towards music that what was at first an intimate event blossomed into the province of the public. New sound-recording technologies, the educational activities of the Tatar intelligentsia, and the literary and musical soirées of the time played an important part in this phenomenon. The cultural potential amassed before 1917 proved an excellent starting point for the development of Tatar musical art during Soviet times.
CHAPTER 5
The Kazan Guberniya and Tatar People in the Years of World War One

§ 1. The Socio-Economic and Political Situation in the Kazan Guberniya in the War Years

Aydar Khabutdinov

When World War One began in August 1914, there was an uprising of patriotic sentiment in all classes of society, but it was rather short lived. The Orthodox clergy and the imams led prayer services, and patriotic telegrams were sent [Medvedev, 1948, pp. 6-7]. Tatar society also reacted loyalty to their general civil duty. The elite considered the entrance of Turkey in the War as a sign of its government's inability to assess the geopolitical situation. The Tatars of Kazan marked the beginning of the War by a mass patriotic demonstration in which more than 500 people took part. Telegrams were sent to Emperor Nicholas II and the High Commander-in-chief Grand Duke Nikolay Nikolaevich [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 1, Inventory 6, File 862, Sheets 26-28, 36-37].

On behalf of the Islamic faction, its chairman, a delegate from the Ufa guberniya named K-M. Tevkelev stated in connection with the start of World War One on 26 August 1914: 'The Muslims of the Russian Empire considered and consider themselves Russian citizens not only when they fight for their rights, but also when they have to carry out their duty to their country'. At the same time he pointed out that 'the Muslims cannot assert that their civil sentiments have always been justly evaluated by Russian state power. They cannot conceal from themselves that even now, in such a serious moment, the government sometimes strikes very sensitive blows at their religious and national feelings' [State Duma, 1915a, col. 34]. It was this political and civil inequality, aggravated by anti-Turkish and generally anti-Islamic sentiments, that would later create an environment for the development of oppositional feelings among Russian Muslims. The Tatars of the Kazan guberniya were not represented in the Fourth State Duma. This is why the patriotic feelings of the region's population were expressed by a deputy of the Governorate, Octobrist I. Godnev: 'all non-Slavic people of the region, like all of us, Russians, being completely united with them, are ready to sacrifice our lives and all our possessions, if necessary, to defend our homeland' [State Duma, 1915a, col. 35].

The militarization of the region's industry started with the beginning of the war. The Governorate's industry was almost entirely concentrated in one centre, Kazan. According to the data of a factory inspection, there were 388 factories and plants with a total of 18,300 workers in the Kazan guberniya in 1914. The shoe and garment factories of the Alafuzov Factory Company were the biggest, with 8,800 workers. On 1 January 1916, there were 19,900 workers in the Kazan guberniya. Forty-three factories with 43 workers were engaged in defense jobs in Kazan alone. Due to the mass conscription of men, 59.4% of the workers in the Alafuzov factories were women, children, and teenagers [Medvedev, 1948, p. 5].

For the bourgeoisie, the war meant super-profits. If in 1914, the profits of the Volga-Kama Bank came to 4.3 million roubles, in 1916, they amounted to 7.6 million roubles. The manufacturer A. Shabanov received 185,000 roubles in 1915, but 817,000 in 1916. The factories and plants working for the army gained the big-
gest profits. The Alafuzov factories occupied first place [Amirkhanov, ed., 2004, p. 65]. The above-mentioned A. Shabanov, who owned only a sheepskin-coat making shop before the war, managed to set up a military uniform factory in Sukonnaya sloboda in Kazan, and opened 15 branches in different parts of the city. At times, the number of workers he employed reached 8,000. In 1916, because of the difficulties in the supply of materials, fuel, and workers, production volumes started to decrease, and some factories, working to provide for the needs of the population, ceased operations. Thus, by 1917, the Krestovnikov soap factory had cut its production by 65% [Khalikov, 1988, p. 331-332].

The war was most unpopular among the vast layers of the common workers, for whom it meant mass conscription, death on the front lines, lower living standards, worse working conditions, and uncontrolled actions of management and factory owners. As early as August 1914, a large strike took place at an Alafuzov factory, and the protests by Kazan workers continued in 1915. The factor which strengthened the influence of radical activists, was the evacuation in 1915 of the population from western regions occupied by the Germans. Natives of the Polish territories played a big role, both in the workers' movement and in the general revolutionary movement in Kazan. Workers were inevitably pushed to strike by a continuous rise in prices. Some help was offered by consumer shops and consumer societies, the most developed of which were at the Alafuzov and Krestovnikov factories. They baked bread and sold flour and sugar at near-cost [Amirkhanov, ed., 2004, p. 64]. However, these measures were evidently insufficient. An economic strike took place at the Alafuzov factory in January 1916, and the next big walkout started the following September. Kazan Governor P. Boyarsky assessed the situation accurately, pointing out the direct animosity of the population towards governmental bodies, which 'under favourable conditions will immediately take the form of such large-scale complications that the events of 1905 will seem insignificant.' [Medvedev, 1948, p. 9].

Autonomous agencies and charities introduced activities to help families of front-line soldiers, the wounded, and the disabled. The Kazan City Duma allocated 400 000 roubles only for the support of families of reservists, those mobilized from the reserve forces, for the two years of the war. Under the chairmanship of the city of Kazan's leader, V. Boronin, operated a city committee for assistance of sick and wounded soldiers and a committee to equip hospitals. Besides money and ration benefits, the former committee also engaged in arranging canteens and day nurseries, collecting warm clothes and other items, and buying firewood. On 14 August 1914, the Kazan guberniya committee for the assistance of sick and wounded soldiers opened at the Governorate's zemstvo board. In all, more than 150 charities operated in Kazan. In only one year of the war, over 50 wounded were brought there.

By the summer of 1915, the issue of accepting evacuated refugees, first from the Polish territories, had arisen. A city committee to help them was organized in Kazan that August. It consisted of representatives of the Polish, Jewish, Latvian, and Muslim national committees. By January 1916, the committee had over 80 shelters for refugees, five food stations, and several special hospitals, and had given them about 30,00 items of clothing and shoes. [Dimitrieva, compiler, 2003, pp. 4-7]

Public activity of the Tatars was concentrated on establishing field hospitals and gathering funds for wounded Muslims. The Muslim field hospital opened on Moskovskaya Street in Kazan on 2 November 1914. Governor P. Boyarsky, city leader V. Boronin, and the chairman of the committee organizing the hospital, Imam G. Galeev (Barudi), attended and spoke at the ceremony. Of Kazan's Muslim public figures, S.-A. Alkin and S. Maksudi also spoke [Yöldiz, 1914, 5 November].

The All-Russian Congress of Islamic Charities took place in St. Petersburg on 6-11 December 1914. It was the first congress after the death of I. Gasprinsky and the last one
before the revolutions of 1917. Despite the fact that invitations were sent to 87 organizations, 35 representatives of 20 organizations participated in the congress. Ibn. Akhtyamov was elected chairman of the congress. The Central Committee of Russian Islamic Social Organizations, which was charged with ‘the management of the work of Islamic social organizations in helping wounded soldiers’, was elected. Despite a series of behind-the-scenes discussions, the congress refrained from taking political decisions. Not a single prominent national leader served on the Central Committee. [Arsharuni, 1990, pp. 91-92; Teregulov, 1926, p. 52, manuscript 3881 from the Manuscripts and Rare Books Department of the Kazan State University Lobachevskiy Scientific Library; Khabutdinov, 1997, Part 2, pp. 36-37].

In accordance with the decisions of this congress, the Temporary Islamic Committee on Helping Wounded Soldiers and Their Families was established in Petrograd. On 28 February 1915, it was allowed to establish a central body and local branches. General Gabdulgaziz Davletshin was the committee’s chairman [Vakyt, 1915, 24, 25, 27 February; 3 March]. On 9 May 1915, a meeting of the members of its Kazan branch took place, which elected S.-G. Alkin as chairman [Dimitrieva, compiler, 2003, p. 94].

In January 1915, the representatives of the Transcaucasian Muslims addressed the Muslims of the Volga-Ural region with a request for help. On 25 January, the Kazan newspaper Yöldiz published an open letter to the board of directors of the Society for Benefits to the Poor Muslims of Kazan, describing the dire situation of Muslims in the Karsk region, where military actions were taking place. This question was considered during a 29 January meeting of the board, held in the house of its chairman, B. Apanayev. The board decided to organize a performance and send the collected money to the Muslims of the Karsk region [Dimitrieva, compiler, 2003, pp. 80-84]. The Committee on Helping Muslim Russian Citizens Suffering from the War was established in Orenburg on 24 February 1915. The main goal of the committee was to collect funds for the Muslims of the Karsk region [Vakyt, 1915, 3, 6, 8, 10, 14 March, 10, 17, 19, 24 April].

The Committee to Help Muslim Refugees was organized in Kazan in August 1915. Its initiators were S.-G. Alkin and V. Tanacheev. On 6 September, the committee held a meeting with the Muslim youth of Kazan, where 14 people were elected to assist it. In September, the commissions of the committee on hygiene (A. Teregulov), reception of refugees (S. Gabyashi), and food and clothing supply (S. Akhmerova) were organized [Dimitrieva, compiler, 2003, pp. 111-112, 115-117].

In 1915, due to increasing losses on the front, especially after the loss of Poland in the summer, the activity of different social and political groups intensified. According to the data of the chief of the Kazan guberniya’s Gendarme Administration, Colonel K. Kalinin (22 August, 12 September 1915), the idea of the ‘Ministry of Public Trust’, responsible to the State Duma, got unanimous support from the Kazan intelligentsia. At the same time, there were no clandestine party groups after the April 1915 defeat of the Coalition Committee of Kazan University students, which united the Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, and the SRs [Amirkhanov, ed., 2004, pp. 352-353]. In September 1915, the Military-Industrial Committee was established and its working group elected. Part of the workers called to boycott these elections, which led to arrests at the Porskhov, Krestovnikov, and Alafuzov factories [Medvedev, 1948, p. 9].

In the autumn of 1915, the revolutionary society was organized again, augmented by Warsaw University students evacuated to Kazan. Warsaw student G. Olkenitsky played an important role in restoring Bolshevik orthodoxy in Kazan. In February 1916, a proclamation was issued announcing the organization of a new Coalition Committee, which started to regularly distribute leaflets of revolutionary content [Medvedev, 1948, p. 13]. In September 1915, the first student meeting with anti-war slogans during the war years took place [Khakilov, 1988, p. 336]. A general student meeting against conscription of students into the army was held on 18 March 1916 [Medvedev, 1948,
A new student meeting was held on 5 November 1916. In its resolution, the students demanded the establishment of a 'responsible ministry' and the introduction of political freedoms [Amirkhanov, ed., 2004, pp. 360-361].

In the summer of 1916, three members of the Coalition Committee travelled to Ufa, where they established a connection with the Bolsheviks of Samara and Orenburg. That same summer, two prominent Bolsheviks, V. Tikhomirnov and V. Molotov, arrived in Kazan. They promoted Bolshevism among the workers of V. Tikhomirnov supplied the Kazan Bolsheviks with the Social Democrat newspaper, published in Geneva [Medvedev, 1948, p. 15]. By the beginning of 1917, the students, workers, and Kazan Garrison soldiers had been gripped by revolutionary propaganda.

The onset of the war gave a new impulse for unification to Islamic political leaders as well. In 1915, they decided to organize a centre uniting all Turkic regions of Russia, the Islamic Faction Bureau. G. Iskhaki, the editor of the newspaper Suz, was the centre's main initiator. Meetings took place in Moscow, Ufa, and Kazan. Kazan candidates to the bureau were S.-G. Alkin, S. Maksudi, and F. Tuktarov. The members of the bureau had to help the faction coordinate the activities of Russian Muslims. The commission to organize the bureau was created, and included S.-G. Dzhantyurin (representative of Ufa and member of the First Duma), G. Enikeev (deputy to the Fourth Duma), and former leaders of the tangchylar movement Sh. Mukhammedyarov and G. Iskhaki [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 199, Inventory 1, File 1112, Sheet 1].

In 1915, representatives of the national intelligentsia started gathering in the editorial office of the Yoldiz newspaper. Those were the newspaper's editor, A.-H. Maksudi, and his brother S. Maksudi; newspaper contributors G. Battal, G. Kamal, and F. and I. Amirkhanovs; the editor of Ang magazine, G. Khasanov; the editor of Yalt-Yolt magazine, A. Urmancheev; the owner of the printing house, Gilm. Sharaf; Sh. Akhmerov; V. Tanacheev; G. Kariev; the editor of Ak Yul magazine, F. Ageev; the editor of Rusiya Seudese magazine, V. Shagidullin; and Gimran Sadykov [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 199, Inventory 1, File 1112, Sheet 1 reverse]. Thus, the national activists in Kazan, first of all, concentrated on educational activities.

The Tatar elite hoped that Muslims, who had spilled their blood on the front lines, would obtain equal rights. On 20 July 1915, K.-M. Tevkelev, on behalf of the Duma representatives of the Latvians, Lithuanians, Estonians, Armenians, Jews, and Muslims, declared: 'We express... profound confidence that in the matter of resisting the enemy and defeating him, one of the main conditions for success is raising the spirit of the peoples inhabiting Russia, and the possibility for them to freely place their efforts into the common goal of fighting the enemy, and that such a situation can be best achieved when all the nationalities in Russia are granted civil and national equality of rights'. The declaration was denied by 190 votes against 162. It was the last real attempt of non-Russian peoples to compromise with the Duma majority [State Duma, 1915b, column 187, 196].

In 1915, Muhammad-Safa Bayazitov was appointed mufti of the OMSA. If the Clerical Assembly was earlier considered by national leaders a neutral body, after Bayazitov's appointment, they aimed at making a secular nationwide body not connected with the assembly. In the beginning of 1916 a meeting took place in Petrograd, where it was decided to create a bureau at the Islamic Fraction. Sh. Mukhammedyarov, G. Iskhaki, I. Bikkulov, and S. Maksudi participated in the meeting. The bureau was supposed to consist of representatives of Kazan, Orenburg, Moscow, Astrakhan, Troitsk, and Chelyabinsk. In reality, the Tatars were represented by Kazan, Orenburg, and Ufa. Akhmet Tsаликов (North Caucasus) was elected chairman of the bureau, and Ismagil Lemanov (Crimea)—its secretary. The bureau assumed the role of an information and coordination centre for the Muslims of Russia. The faction and the bureau ever increasingly perceived themselves as the sole...
lawful representatives of Russian Muslims. At the same time, the issue of joining the oppositional Progressive Bloc of the Duma was being discussed. The most zealous supporter of this idea was S. Maksudi. The leaders of the Ufa murzas and the Tatar Socialists showed opposition on principle to the alliance on the national political scene, which would unite the right and central parts of the Duma deputies. That was why the representatives of Kazan, who were looking for political partners, did not take an active part in the activities of the bureau. [Khabutdinov, 2001b, pp. 254-259]

In 1915, Kazan students then in Petrograd (Galimdzhan Sharaf, Ilyas and Dzhigangir Alkins, and Sultanbek Mamliev) established the society Tatar Uchagy (Tatar Hearth), which was based on the activities of Yu. Akchura's Turkic Hearth, and had as its goal the growth of the Tatar nation's political culture and its modernization. All of them except for Sharaf were conscripted into the army, and later became the key figures in uniting Muslim soldiers and establishing Harbi Shuro [Khabutdinov, 1997. Part 1, pp. 28-29]. The leaders of Tatar Uchagy publicly expressed their positions for the first time in the beginning of 1917. The young men declared that in the discussion about the existence of the Turkic or Tatar nation, voicing the thoughts of all the young generation, were fully on the side of the existence of a separate Tatar people and a fully legitimate Tatar language. This language had to be used officially in the courts and local institutions [Koyash, 1917, 14 February].

During the war years, Kazan was the centre of Russia's biggest home-front military district, with 98 garrisons located on the territory of 10 governorates and 2 Volga-Ural regions. The garrison of the city itself amounted up to 50,000 people. March companies for the front lines were formed in the district. In 5 alone, five mobilizations had been carried out in Kazan guberniya. According to some data, the population of the governorate decreased from 2.8 million to 2.2 million over 18 months [Medvedev, 1948, p. 4].

In the first three months of the war, a popular patriotic upsurge, which was evident from the letters of front-line soldiers, could be observed. For example, Grigory Vostryshev wrote on 10 September 1914: 'a Russian soldier can endure it all, he is not afraid even of the Devil himself. The Russian heroes will stop at nothing and will win the glory for our Father Tsar and dear Mother Homeland. We will be able to defeat the damn Germans, so that they will remember it for the whole century.' [Maksimov, compiler, 1932, p. 17] However, according to censorship office information, already more than half of soldiers' letters had no references to the war, but were filled with worries about home, family, and household.

In 1915, the war was already perceived as a national tragedy. Thus, an unknown soldier of the 30th infantry regiment said in a letter to Nina Prosveleva in Kazan: 'The soldiers in general view the war correctly, as a great disaster not for separate individuals, but for the whole country, as much an economic as well as a moral disaster, and see the German soldiers as their fellow-sufferers.' An important factor was that the war was waged far from home and from the ethnic territories of the region's peoples. In the same letter, the writer attacked the half-company commander: 'He has forgotten that the homeland is dear to us only because of our homes and relatives, not because of the history books by Ilovaysky or Ostrogorsky.' [Maksimov, compiler, 1932, p. 24] The soldiers were outraged not only by their own lack of rights, but also by the lamentable condition of the working masses in Russia. M. Petrov ('1st park, 20th Martyrny park of artillery division') wrote to E. Petrova in Kazan on 31 January 1916 that the peasants lived in the dirt and the cold, because they were not allowed to use the forest lands. On the contrary, 'when the Germans capture our territory, they let the peasants take as much wood as they want for restoring houses and for fuel.' He wrote with special pain about the fate of children: 'As many of these kids die and wither away, it is the governorates of Minsk, Grodno, Vitebsk and others. And I think that the Germans have the right to consider us savages.' [Maksimov, compiler, 1932, pp. 64-65] In 1916, information appeared about soldiers killing officers. In
a letter by Gavrila Romanov dated 25 March 1916, it is indicated that 'officers in the Kuban and Derbent regiments were attacked.' [Maksimov, compiler, 1932, p. 91]

By the beginning of 1917, military censors of the Kazan military district had marked a sharp rise of anti-war sentiments in the soldiers' letters, especially of the Tatars. The list of Muslim soldiers' complaints to the government included the impossibility of observing religious rites, a lack of press in their native languages, disunity among Christians, impossibility to freely associate in their native languages, and preconceived attitude of a part of their fellow soldiers to Muslims. [Maksimov, compiler, 1932, pp. 100, 106, 186-196]. The distinctive feature of the major part of the letters cited was the dissatisfaction with the humiliating position, the feeling of being separated from their compatriots, and not the negative attitude towards war and civic duty. By 1917, desertion in the Kazan Military District had become a mass phenomenon.

At the beginning of 1917, Kazan public leaders concentrated on elections to the City Duma. The 'progressive group' (that is, the national liberals) proposed a list of 16 candidates in Kazan in February 1917. On 13 February 1917, a meeting under the chairmanship of S. Maksudi took place in the 'Amur' Hotel, where the question of proposing candidates to the City Duma, making an alliance with Russian parties, and the conditions of such alliance were discussed. After A. Mustafa presented his report, the following conditions were defined: Muslims in each commission of the Duma, introducing Muslims into City Administration, the Administration of the City Society Bank and Pawnbroker, and transferring one of each of the town girls' and boys' schools to Muslims. The list consisted of: 1 mullah (G. Apanay), 9 representatives of the bourgeoisie (including S. Aitov) and 6 representatives of the intelligentsia: 1 teacher (G. Gubaydullin), 2 doctors, 1 publisher and 2 barristers (S. Maksudi and V. Tanachev) [Koyash, 1917, February 16]. In general, this list shows an absolute preponderance of the secular liberal elite, as a rule, of the period of the Russian Revolution of 1905-1907, as well as the preponderance of the bourgeoisie among the urban figures of Kazan.

However, the attempts to partially solve the problems at the local level did not satisfy the needs of the population, which was becoming more and more radical. As early as 17 October 1915, the Governor P. Boyarsky reported to the Police Department that in Kazan 'there are signs of dissatisfaction and animosity, especially because life was becoming more expensive, starting with apartments and fuel, and ending with the most essential provisions. The blame for this expensiveness is mainly put on the speculation of the merchants. The efforts of the City Administration to bring down expensiveness by competition, could not be implemented due to a lack of money, and the city's petition for a loan of one million had been declined.

Dissatisfaction had been noted even in circles, where it could least of all be expected, and talk of revolution as the outcome of the war became commonplace' [Amirkhanov, editor, 2004, p. 59].

The machinery of the Russian government was obviously not able to cope with both the difficulties on the front lines and on the home front. By the beginning of 1917, the irregularity in provisions supply, including even the norm of black bread, lack of firewood, absence of raw material for some factories, the threat of closing down the factories and mobilisation to the front lines became more and more of a mass phenomenon [Amirkhanov, editor, 2004, pp. 67-70]. The crop yield in the countryside of Kazan guberniya dropped from 6.2 centners per hectare (average in 1905-1914) to 5.3 centners per hectare in 1917 [Medvedev, 1948, p. 4]. The situation was made worse by a reduction in areas placed under crops, the decrease in working livestock, the mass mobilisation of men to the army, heavy taxes, and the increasing confiscation of provisions. A member of the Islamic faction, parliamentarian from Ufa guberniya G. Bayteryakov rightfully stated on 24 March 1916: 'Our peasants had to and
have to support their existence under difficult circumstances. You all are well aware of the position of our village working population, deprived of its civil rights’ [State Duma, 1916, column 3951].

In the cities, during wartime, the salaries of Kazan workers increased by 81%, while the cost-of-living rose by 600% [Khalikov, 1988, p. 334]. In response, on 30 January 1917, a strike began at the Alafuzov factory. In the beginning it involved only women, because they were not afraid to be conscripted into the army. On 5 February 1917, the strike spread to other factories of the city, but on 8 February, it was put down by the police and the army [Khalikov, 1988, p. 338]. Governor P. Boyarsky offered to expel the women on strike from Kazan and its suburbs, and to send their husbands and other relatives, liable for military service, to the front lines with the first echelons [Khalikov, 1988, pp. 360-362]. A fragile truce reigned in the city and in the governorate, which lasted until the February Revolution.

§ 2. Tatars in the Russian Army

Khalim Abdullin

The Tatars as a military force have always been in demand in the Russian State. Service Tatars as a special privileged class kept their importance throughout 16th–17th centuries. The military value of the Tatars especially revealed itself during the Livonian War and during the Time of Troubles. On the whole, by 1630, the military people from the Middle Volga region amounted to 555 men, that is 20% of the total number of the Russian Army (92,555 men) [Nogmanov, 1994, p. 49]. However, the transition to a regular army at the beginning of the 18th century made their role in the Russian armed forces less significant. From 1722, recruitment duty was extended to the yasak Tatars, because recruitment into the army fell on the shoulders of the state peasants. However, when the representatives of other Volga region nationalities were recruited on the same terms as the Russians, the recruitment of the Tatars acquired a barbaric form: ‘They are taking underage Tatars, that is, from 10 to 12 years old, for the garrisons, from whom one third are to be made servants to the General Quarters and Headquarters, and some part are to be made sailors’ [PSZ-1, 1830, p. 483]. In the same year, the recruitment obligation began to be extended to the service Tatars, assigned to The Admiralty. In the 18th century, the recruited Tatars were sent to the Baltic regions to carry out their service—in the navy and the infantry.

As opposed to the yasak and service Tatars from the Central Russian regions and the Middle Volga region, the Tatars, residing in the Cis-Ural region and in the east and south-eastern fringes of the Empire, were relieved from recruitment obligations. Special ethnic and class groups of the Tatars were formed there, which were irregularly called up for military service—the Teptyars, Meshcheryaks, and the Tatars, who entered the social class of the patrimonial Bashkirs, and the Tatars, who were enlisted in the territorial Cossack forces.

In 1790, the Teptyars were assigned to the Cossack class, and together with the landless peasants of Ufa and Vyatka guberniyas, they formed a Cossack regiment. On 23 July 1791, it received the name of Ufa Regiment, and in 1798 it was divided into two: the 1st and the 2nd Teptyar Regiments [Kazin, 1992, p. 235]. The regiments were given the task of participating in military campaigns and carrying out frontier guard duties at the Orenburg Line [Rakhimov, 2002, p. 67]. Those regiments actively participated in the Patriotic War of 1812. In March of 1835, the 1st Orenburg Cossack Regiment, formed from the 1st and the 2nd Teptyar Regiments, was added to the Orenburg Cossack Army. In 1841, its old name, the Ufa Cossack Regiment, was restored, but in 1845, the regiment was abolished [Kazin, 1992, p. 235]. In 1855, all the Teptyars and landless
peasants of the Orenburg region were added to the Bashkir Army.

Since 1798, the Bashkirs and the service Tatars of the Urals, had been called by the special term 'meshcheryaks', were also added to the Cossack class and made up the separate Bashkir-Meshcheryak Cossack Army. The main battle goals, set before the army, were identical to the ones for organising the Teptyar Cossack Regiments. The Cossack troops also actively took part in the Patriotic War of 1812, in particular, the 1st and the 2nd Meshcheryak Regiments, and also the 3rd and the 5th Bashkir Regiments, formed from among the inhabitants of Menzelinsk uyezd in the Ufa guberniya. Besides this, the army engaged these regiments during the Coalition Wars, during the Russo-Turkish War in 1828-1829, for putting down the Polish Rebellion in 1830-1831, in the Khiva Campaign in 1839, and during the Crimean War in 1853-1856. In 1856, the Bashkir-Meshcheryak Army was renamed the Bashkir Army, and in 1865, the Army was passed under the control of the Ministry of Interior [PSZ-2, 1866, p. 753]. From 1874, the Teptyars, the Meshcheryaks and the Bashkirs began to be conscripted into the regular army on common grounds.

The Tatars were present from the start in many territorial Cossack armies, and later they also supplemented the ranks of the Russian Cossacks. Thus, on 11 February 1736 Cossacks from among the newly-christened Ural Meshcheryaks and other categories of Cossacks were established in the newly built towns of Orenburg and Tobynsk [Kazin, 1992, p. 235]. This date is considered to be the beginning of the official history of the Orenburg Cossack Army. Another example is the Siberian Cossack Army, which was officially founded in 1760 'from the Don Cossacks, the Bashkirs and Meshcheryaks, who constituted the frontier line in Siberia and wished to stay there for good' [Kazin, 1992, p. 272].

The Tatars repeatedly enlisted in the Orenburg Cossack Army—in 1799, the yasak peasants and the Tatars of Orenburg guberniya were enlisted, in 1817, the Army was joined by the service and yasak Tatars of the same Governorate [PSZ-1, 1830b, p. 464]. By the beginning of the 1890s, the number of the Tatars in the army amounted to 21,581 men, which was equal to 6% of all army personnel [Starikov, 1891, p. 155].

The Ural Cossack Army included the Muslim Tatars as well as the Nagaibaks—Orthodox Tatar Cossacks. According to the data, in 1853 there were 3,407 Muslims in the army [Arapov, 2003, p. 8]. Originally, the leading place among the Muslims belonged to the Tatars, but in 1838, the 9th Bashkir Canton was assigned to the Army, which was, however, later removed from the Army. By the middle of the 1870s, the number of the Muslims in the Ural Army reached 15%, however, only 4810 men, or 5%, belonged to the army class [Krasnov, 1877, p. 273]. Tatars made up the absolute majority of them. The share of the Muslim Cossacks had a tendency to grow, as was the case in the Orenburg Cossack Army: in 1885–5,378 (5.4%), 1897–6,304 (6%) [Dubovikov, 2000, pp. 21-22].

Originally, there were the Mishar Tatars and the Bashkirs in the Siberian Cossack Army, who served at the frontier line in Siberia, however, the Muslim backbone of the Army consisted of native Siberian Tatars. In 1822, seven town Cossack regiments were formed from various Cossack troops. An especially large number of Tatars served in the Tobolsk and Siberian Tatar Mounted Regiments [Kazin, 1992, p. 327]. In 1849, the Tobolsk and Siberian Tatar Town Regiments were passed under control of the military department, and new units were formed from them. At the same time, a part of the Tatar Cossacks was transferred to the category of the yasak peasants [PSZ-2, 1850, pp. 115-127]. According to information for the year 1853, there were not many Muslims in the Siberian Cossack Army itself—only 261 people. However, in the Tobolsk Battalion and the Tobolsk Mounted Regiment already 6247 Muslims were serving [Arapov, 2003, p. 8]. According to the information for the year 1908, a total of 2243 Tatar Cossacks lived in just the one Tobolsk guberniya [Fayzrahmanov, 2002, pp. 401-402].
The Tatars of the Cossack class participated in the First World War as part of regiments of their troops. Other categories of the Tatar population, who had been conscripted on common grounds since 1874, were conscripted into all kinds of regular army battalions and the navy.

It is also necessary to note that from 1797-1833, the Tatar Mounted (later Uhlan) Regiment, made up of Polish-Lithuanian Tatars, served in the Russian Army. The Crimean Tatars, annexed by Russia at the end of the 18th century, were relieved from recruitment obligations and had their national military formations in the Russian Army until the collapse of the Empire [Abdullin, 2007, pp. 49-54].

It is interesting, that even at the beginning of the 20th century, the Military Department divided Tatars on the basis of their ethnicity and class (Tatars, Meshcheryaks, Teptyars), but however took them into account as a whole group, putting them together with the Bashkirs. Before the First World War, 38679 men from the mentioned categories served in the lower ranks, which made up 3.1% of the total of the lower ranks [Military-Statistical Annal, 1914, pp. 374-375]. In contrast to the 18th century, only 14 Tatars were chosen from them for serving in the navy, the rest served in the infantry. No such national separation existed among the officers and generals, there is only information about their religious affiliation, a total of 269 Muslims.

However, after the beginning of the War, the number of Tatars in the army increased dramatically. As the literature has noted, during the course of the war, 1 to 1.5 million Turkic soldiers had been mobilised, which made up 10% of the total number [Iskhakov, 2003, p. 245]. The major part were the Tatars. The number of Tatar officers also increased.

The attitude of the Tatars to the war that had just started was not unanimous. On the one hand, the national press was filled with loyalist articles, the clergy, the nobility and the merchants echoed the patriotic sentiment. On the other hand, the main part of the Tatar population, the peasants, perceived the war as something inevitable, fatal, and only tried to avoid participating in it as far as possible. The letters of military men should be considered the most valuable historical source, reflecting the true situation of the Tatars on the front lines [Maksimov, compiler, 1932; Vakhрушева, 1972, p. 77; Sharangina, 1998, pp. 177-184]. A well-known specialist in Turkic philology N.I. Ashmarin, who during the war served as a military censor in Kazan, marked in his report that 'the letters of the Muslim soldiers are written based on one template, and carry very little information about what is going on in the war. The tone of the letters was muted... The war, apparently, is seen by a Muslim as an unforeseen disaster, which is fatal for some, while others survive; he does not go deep into the tragic connection between the events, and is dissatisfied [that] something has disturbed the peaceful course of his everyday life' [Iskhakov, 2003, p. 260].

The questions that worried Tatar soldiers at the front lines were the usual ones: cold, hunger and losses, as well as specific ones, such as: national oppression and the observance of religious rites. The Tatars of the lower ranks were prohibited to speak in their native language, were rarely appointed to command positions, subjected to insults and attacks on national grounds by fellow soldiers, and often from officers as well.

The Tatars reacted most acutely to the violations of their religious rights. As early as 1908, the positions for Islamic military clergy, abolished in 1896, were restored in the Military Department. According to the legislative act, the positions of military mullahs were available only in the District Headquarters of the Wilno (Vilnius), Warsaw, Kiev, Amur and Moscow Military Districts, where 3000 or more lower rank Muslims served before the war. The same legislative act gave equal rights to the Muslim clergy as those enjoyed by the Catholic and Lutheran military clergy [Abdullin, 2009, pp. 111-112]. However, in the difficult situation at the beginning of the war, the matter of spiritual care of representatives of religious minorities among the front-line forces remained unsolved, which caused a natural dissatisfaction on the part of Muslim soldiers. The Kazan Governor wrote in one of his reports, that it had been noted in the correspondence of the Tatar soldiers,
how discontented they were with the war and, in particular, with the impossibility to observe their religious rites. Thus, one soldier wrote: ‘...the Russians at War have priests, who serve their soldiers, but we, Muslims, do not have this. No mullahs are appointed for us, despite the fact that more than a half of the soldiers are Muslims, who die without a mullah and are buried with the Russians in one grave, in our opinion, the government should pay attention to this’ (cited in: [Arsharuni, 1931, p. 98]).

In 1914, the question about appointing mullahs to the front-line forces was discussed by representatives at the All-Russia Congress of Islamic Societies, which took the decision to petition for the appointment of one mullah to each division [Kaspy, 1914, No. 281, p. 4]. However, in 1915, the military mullahs were present mostly in the Headquarters of the Armies and in the national regiments [Decrees to the armies of the South-Western Front, 1915]. In 1915, about 30 military mullahs were appointed to these positions by decrees of the Ministers of Interior and the Military Department. Finally, on 15 July 1916, in accordance with the edict of Nicholas II the staff positions of Divisional Mullahs were introduced into the army [Zagitullin, 2006a, p. 45].

Despite all contradictions, the Tatars, in general, as in all previous wars of the Russian Empire, remained loyal to their oath and carried out their military duty irrespective of rank. Thus, Major-General Zulkarnayn Shagingirevich Dashkin commanded the 14th Orenburg Cossack Regiment, which battled its way to the town of Sukhodol to the towns of Czestochow (Poland) and Vilkomir (Lithuania) [Semenov, 2001, pp. 166-189; Denisov, 2005, p. 233]. The commander of the 166th Infantry Regiment of Rovno, Major-General R. Syrtlanov died in battle on 20 July 1916 near Skrobovo. He was posthumously awarded with the highest award for an officer—the Order of Saint George, 4th class [Iskhakov, 2003, p. 254]. Another Tatar Major-General was the commander of the 152nd Reserve Infantry Regiment Hajji-Ahmet Iskhakovich Izhbulatov [General Composition of Kazan Military District Officials, 1917, p. 66; Izhbulatov, 2005, p. 534]. It was in this war that the first Tatar Captain of First Rank, Iskhak Ibragimovich Islyamov, was promoted to the rank of Major-General [Ashmetshin, 2003]. The Commander of the 306th Mokhansk Regiment, Colonel M. Ibragimov, was awarded with the weapon of St. George; he captured the high ridge near Zagroba village on 14 May 1915 and held this position for three days against the enemy’s superior forces [Iskhakov, 2003, p. 254]. Muhammedzhan Khosyanovich Vishnyakov, Ensign of the Chechensky Mounted Regiment, died valiantly in battle on 19 April 1917, and was posthumously conferred the rank of Second Lieutenant and awarded the Order of Saint George, 4th class [RGVIA, Fund 409, Inventory 1, File 180661, Sheets 52-54; Fund 407, Inventory 1, File 2254, Sheet 73 reverse]. Akhtyam Musalimovich Bakhtizin was one of the many Full Cavaliers of Saint George from among the Tatars Bakhtizin [Nabiev, 2002, p. 318].

After the February Revolution of 1917, a significant number of questions, which worried the military Tatars in the first years of the War, were resolved. Islamic military organisations began to be established everywhere alone the front lines. It is remarkable that the first organization of this kind was the Kazan Islamic Military Committee, founded on 8 March 1917. On the whole, 4 front-line, 13 army, 12 district, 98 garrison, more than 150 divisional, and in total around 300 Islamic Committees had been established by December 1917. There was no army or district left without a functioning Islamic Committee. The Tatar and Bashkir soldiers, dispersed all over the country, could unite, having created numerous interconnected organisations, that strove to form national units [Iskhakov, 2003, p. 275]. During less than a year, significant results were achieved in forming separate military units from among Muslims. By the end of 1917, the following military units existed, made up mainly of Tatars and Bashkirs: two Crimean Mounted Regiments, Muslim Rifle Corps on the Romanian front, 1st Muslim Rifle Corps in Orenburg, 2nd Muslim Reserve Regiment (144th) in Ufa. Be-
sides this, there were several squadrons and numerous companies and battalions. The reorganisation of the 95th Infantry Reserve Regiment in Kazan, the 32nd Infantry Reserve Regiment in Simferopol and two divisions at the front lines was being completed [Iskhakov, 2004, pp. 436-437].

The experience of organising the army on 'national bases', was later adopted by the Bolsheviks, who skillfully used the centuries-old aspiration of the Tatar people to preserve their national identity, even under the severe conditions of the Tsarist army. Since the times of Peter I, the Kazan Tatars were the only people of the 'Islamic faith', who had been subjected to heavy recruitment duty. From the latter half of the 19th century, general conscription was extended to other ethnic and class groups of the Tatars. Service on a lower rank in the regular army of Tsarist Russia was not perceived positively by any of the population categories of the country. However, the representatives of national and religious minorities most acutely faced this problem, the conditions of their service, which besides everyday and services issues, were complicated by the manifestations of national and religious oppression. At the same time, common difficulties of army service brought together the representatives of various nationalities. Besides this, the majority of the Tatars, bound by their religious oath, served honestly and patiently, with bravery fulfilled their military tasks, assigned by the army authorities. In the end, none of the other 'Muslim' peoples of Russia in the army was perceived as being on the nearest mental level by the Slavic majority, like the Tatars.
Tsarist Autocracy fell as a result of triumphant uprising of soldiers and workers in Petrograd on 28 February 1917. Telegram about the victory of the revolution arrived in Kazan on 1 March, and was a signal for the start of the democratic coup. The first months of revolution were marked by the romantic mood of the population and general enthusiasm concerning the revolution. This is especially highlighted in the thousands of telegrams addressed to the new regime and newly formed the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. The following was written in the 'Kamsko-volzhskaya rech' newspaper: 'New government, formed by the will of people, has become a legitimate power. We know who is in power right now. All important ministerial positions are in the hands of the people' [Kamsko-Volzhskaya Rech', 4 March 1917]. An article called 'People are the builders' by V. Sasonov, published on 5 March, contains the following lines: 'Governments are crashing down, thrones are falling, and yesterday's ruler becomes an ordinary person or—even worse for him—a person deprived of rights. People are the Builders. They are facing now a challenging task, for they have inherited a heap of ruins from the great temple called the state'.

Indeed, at that time, everybody seemed to be a friend of people. At that time, it was not the time to determine who was a friend and who was an enemy. However, this was certainly going to happen in the coming months of the revolution. And this did happen. However, for the time being, meetings and protests, that the country was stricken with, were full of common joy, hope and wishful thinking.

Telegrams were sent from the all corners of Russia, from all the peoples that inhabited it. In this work we are going to show just some of the telegrams sent by the Muslim, and primarily, Tatar population. At the protests and meetings of the Muslim population, strong feelings of joy were overflowing with national feelings. As it was mentioned in a telegram dated 18 March, at the meeting of the Muslims in the village of Baysarovo, Menzelinsk uyezd, Ufa guberniya, they expressed hope and wished to have 'the gratifying feeling of a dawn rising over Russia', shining 'over all the nationalities of new Russia' [RSHA, Fund 1278, Inventory 5, File 1338, Sheet 142]. The Muslims considered the revolution to be 'a sun of truth, shining over Russia and its multi-ethnic population' [RSHA, Fund 1278, Inventory 5, File 1338, Sheet 216]. 'Now we feel as citizens equal with all other nations of this great state, which is proving its political maturity, with the deep certainty that the case of emancipation of the country and liberation of oppressed Russia from the age-long tyranny, which has made it as weak as a youngster'. That is how the attitude of the Kazan Muslims to the changes following the fall of autocracy was expressed in a telegram signed by Saidgarey Alkin [RSHA, Fund 1278, Inventory 5, File 1338, Sheet 2].

2 March was marked by a political demonstration of students and workers in the Theatre Square. Several small groups of soldiers also participated in it.
On the same day, the Council of Workers’ Delegates was formed; it was headed by the Mensheviks from the working group of the Military Industrial Committee. The Menshevik working group of the Kazan Military Industrial Committee headed by Efimov, Denike and Chekunov called a meeting with representatives of health insurance funds. Following discussions about the political situation in the country, the meeting of the group approved an appeal to workers, students and encouraged them to ‘... invite representatives of health insurance funds of small factories and plants into the newly formed organization’. It contained a call to hold at plants meetings concerning elections of Workers’ Delegates. Authors of the appeal thought that the Council was supposed to work ‘in consort with all organizations strongly supporting the Provisional Government’. Soon the Council was enlarged by new delegates elected at workers’ meetings. Chekunov, later exposed as an agent provocateur, was appointed the Head of the Council.

The greatest event that occurred during the democratic revolution in Kazan was the revolt of the garrison on 4 March 1917. The 94th Regiment was the first to rebel. In that regiment, there were especially many soldiers that had been to war. Deputy adjutant of the regiment was the war-time officer Novikov Vasily Ivanovich, a member of Russian Social Democratic Workers’ Party (bolsheviks) since 1904. Fedotov, Popov and other democratic-minded warrant officers were serving in the same regiment. Kapralov, a member of the Bolshevik Party, played an important role in the regiment. Revolutionary propaganda in the training team of the regiment was carried out by non-commissioned officer Mosolov.

Later V. Novikov wrote the following: ‘Our regiment was the first to go to Kazan to establish the revolutionary authority. I was among the first who marched... in the regiment...’ [See: Ionenko, 1957; Silaeva, 1958]. Later it was reported that a provisional revolutionary committee was established on the day of the rebellion, and Novikov was appointed its secretary. Following the rebellion of the 94th Regiment, the 95th rebelled, then other infantry regiments and 2nd Artillery Brigade supported the rebels.

On the night of 4 March, the Kazan garrison rebelled. Generals Sandetsky, Faydysh, Komarov, and Yazvin were arrested; commanders of the 94th, 95th, and 164th regiments, and other hated officers were suspended from command. Soldiers started establishing their own committees and sending representatives to the Soviet (Council) of Soldiers’ Deputies. Those officers who participated in the uprising against Sandetsky, personifying the tsarist regime, understood the impossibility of holding control over soldiers without organizing military committees and councils.

Together, they were all trying to control the situation. This was a period of dual power, or in the words of L. Trotsky, a multi-power period. National enthusiasm and confidence in the new authorities and in the consciousness of people were intertwined with grievances against the policies of its local bodies.

Prince Boyarsky was brought down in Kazan. Commissioner of the Provisional Government, landlord Molostov, took office on 8 March. The city militia started to function on 10 March. M. Bukhov was appointed the head of police. Warrant officers I. Alkin and P. Golanov were appointed his deputies. The Committee of Public Security, fully established by the middle of March, was supposed to be a representative body of democracy. Analogous bodies were also established in the uyezds.

In March 1917, during the mass revolutionary movement, factory committees and labour unions were established. The overthrow of Tsarist regime did not improve condition of working class. The Provisional Government carried on with the criminal imperialistic war. The struggle of workers for an improvement in their living conditions was growing day by day all over the country. Economical demands of workers were intertwining and consolidating with the political struggle. Pay increases, eight-hour work days, recognition of rights of factory committees and labour unions, atti-
tudes to the Soviets, the Provisional Government and the war comprised the main range of questions raised by the working class after the February revolution. Factory committees and labour unions were appearing everywhere during workers' strikes, and later started taking leadership roles in movements at factories and various industrial sectors. Usually, the leading role in creation of factory committees and labour unions belonged to the Bolsheviks. Kazan workers had intensified their struggle even more following the information from newspapers about the introduction of an eight-hour work day by the resolution of Moscow Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. A provincial factory inspector anxiously reported on this issue, noting that '...the situation at the factories had dramatically changed, and for this reason... we can expect more complications at local manufacturing plants'. A factory committee at Alafuzov plants and factories was formed in early March. It was formed by the initiative of the Bolshevik I. Gladilov. The factory committee consisted of 35–37 people, the company representatives.

During the first few days, a temporary workers' committee functioned at the Powder Mill. The first meeting of this newly elected committee was held on 18 March. Bolshevik A. Grishanin was elected the head of the committee.

In the following days, factory committees were formed at the majority of factories. They started playing a crucial role in the organization of workers, in taking over control over production and distribution. These days were also marked by the establishment of labour unions. A labour union at Alafuzov's factories was formed on 10 March, earlier than at other plants. It also accepted workers of the Powder Mill, and the enterprises of Ushkov, Yartsev and Shabanov. Starting from the latter half of March, the movement for the organization of labour unions already involved all industrial enterprises of the city. Meetings, rallies and protests of metal-workers, craftsmen, bakers, etc. took place everywhere. Even waiters created their own labour union, and its first activity was to organize a movement against the payment of tips.

Local political parties intensified their activities. One of the first meetings held was a meeting of the Social Democrats in room No.10 on 26 March. Representative of the Central Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (Bolsheviks) Viktor Tikhomirnov spoke at that meeting. Around 70 people were in attendance. A committee of 16 people was elected and headed by V. Tikhomirnov. This was a joint organization of the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks-internationalists.

At the same time, a local group of Socialist Revolutionaries held its own meeting. K. Shnurovsky, V. Zhilinsky and other university Socialist Revolutionaries from the coalition committee initiated creation of a Socialist-Revolutionary organization in Kazan. They turned to party members Dravert, Burgalyshinsky and others. These seasoned activists managed to become the leaders of the Socialist Revolutionary Committee. Sharp contradictions were raised in the course of the formation of the Socialist Revolutionary organization, mainly, related to the issues of war and peace. The lower party members were mainly internationalists, while the leaders were ardent defenders. The Kazan Socialist Revolutionary Organization split in the April 1917. This split resulted in the formation of the separate so-called 'Committee of the Elders', consisting of defenders and the 'Committee of the Young', consisting of Socialist Revolutionary internationalists. This was the first split among the Socialist Revolutionaries in the country. For peasants, members of the 'Committee of the Young', the left Socialist Revolutionaries, were the most authoritative. It was they who led peasants' struggle for land distribution in the Kazan guberniya.

Kazan students actively participated in revolutionary activities. At the meeting of students on 4 March, by a special resolution, the students decided to 'urgently take up the initiative to organize public protests' [Georgievskaya, 1957, p. 21]. 'The revolutionary wave that rolled into Kazan on March 1 placed the student community at the head of the local life until the revo-
revolutionary bodies of municipal government and civil society organizations were formed. Villages located hundreds kilometers away from the city, various military units, factories, plants, all of them needed in-person explanations, and the student community was sending their fellows to explain what was going on, with the corresponding evaluation of the situation, with a call to support the already started liberation movement. ’...We were faced with the question of closing the university’, ...because masses of students enthusiastically took up the work of agitation all over the city’. These lines are taken from a memo of students of Kazan University addressed to the Minister of National Education. At the same time, the student community was trying to achieve autonomy in their participation in the university’s administration. ’The views of professors and the student community on university life differed dramatically... The logical result of such mutual misunderstanding was termination of relations with professors, which according to the decision of student community, would last until the professors recognized their new autonomy based on democratic principles’ [RSHA, Fund 733, Inventory 226, File 222, Sheets 2–4].

The soldiers’ movement was an integral part of the revolutionary struggle. Military committees and Soldiers’ Soviets created in the very first days of revolution were a result of revolutionary endeavours of the troops of the Kazan Garrison. The military command was trying to restrict rights of the soldiers’ committees in every possible way. According to the special order for the district, these were to be formed with an equal number of officers and soldiers. The same order also defined the functions of committees, which came down to examination of ‘arising needs and misunderstandings of everyday nature’.

Soldiers were careful against any attempts to nullify their first achievements in the democratization of the army. Taking into consideration growing excitement in the garrison, the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries decided to create a delegation to visit the military minister and discuss the issue of Sandetsky. A delegation headed by Lieutenant-Colonel Ruanet was sent to Petrograd. According to his report on their trip to Petrograd, when it was discovered that the military command had ordered to release Sandetsky and make him a member of the Military Council, ’...the soldiers became excited and made a deal with the executive committee of railwaymen, who agreed to detach from the train the coach in which Sandetsky would be traveling on the first station after Kazan if he left the city, and the soldiers would take him into custody’.

On 11 April, the Soldiers’ Section of the Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies made a decision to examine the health of Generals Sandetsky and Yazvin for the second time, and if they were feeling better, to send them to the guardhouse. On 1 May, a crowd of armed soldiers, about 300 men from the 95th Regiment, approached the Red Cross Hospital (Krasnaya St.) and demanded General Sandetsky to be handed over for his immediate transfer to the guardhouse. The City Commander Grigoriev wrote in his report that, ’under coercion, they were forced to hand over the general’. On the way to the guardhouse, the epaulets of the general were torn off, and one of the warrant officers hit him in the head shouting ‘insignia off’. At the guardhouse, the general was put into a soldier’s punishment cell. Generals Komarov and Faydysh, arrested earlier, were put into the same cell.

Colonel Grigoriev asked the Soviet of Soldiers to investigate this case with the involvement of representatives of all soldier’ organizations and indicated that ’...the delegates (of committees and Soviets) do not have the necessary authority in the eyes of most soldiers’. Indeed, the supporters of the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries from regimental committees, the Provisional Organizing Committee and Soldiers’ Soviet did not have anymore the same moral authority they had in the first days after the February Revolution.

The so-called 'Sandetsky case' stretched out for a while, up until his transfer to the Prosecution Office of the Moscow Military region in August 1917.
As a kind of response to revolutionary demands of the majority of delegates at the conference, the District Commander General Myshlyaevsky on 6 June, the conference’s closing day, sent to all military units and teams a telegram demanding to ‘Report to me names of those whose activities did not correlate [with] the decisions of the Provisional Government, Petrograd Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies and the All-Russia Congress of Peasants [about] the necessity to bring the war to a triumphant end’. The telegram raised a storm of indignation among the soldiers, and commander had to withdraw the order dated 6 June. Soon General Myshlyaevsky was discharged from the position of district commander, and a new commander, Colonel Korovichenko, former commandant of Tsarskoye Selo, arrived in Kazan.

Struggle for obtaining official leave to join field works was of great importance in spring and summer of 1917. The Military Minister Kerensky banned leaves in May and ordered those who were on leave to get back to their units. However, the majority of soldiers did not return. They were trying hard to be elected to volost executive committees or other elective bodies in order to avoid returning to their military units. At the garrison meeting on 2 May, the district commander was told to release 10% of soldiers for farm work.

The struggle of soldiers to leave for field work was an integral part of struggle for the end of the imperialistic war. The push back of soldiers against an attempt of the military command to send the 94th and 240th Regiments in full to war was an evidence of growing anti-military mood. These regiments were the most revolutionary-minded units, and authorities simply decided to dispose of them. However, this attempt failed ignominiously. In line with the schedule, 8,000 men from the 94th regiment were to be sent out on 3 May. However, only 300 people turned up on the boarding day. As a sign of protest against the refusal of soldiers to go to front, second-lieutenant Poplavsky resigned as the Head of the Kazan Soviet. This was a significant victory for the soldiers.

The anti-war actions of Kazan garrison soldiers especially increased following the publication of the ‘Freedom Loan’ and the decision of the government to launch an offensive at the front. The ‘Worker’ newspaper issued on 8 June contained a statement, signed by 14 soldiers and addressed to the garrison, calling for a resolute resistance against the policy of continuing the imperialistic war. The same issue of the newspaper published a response of soldiers of the 240th reserve infantry regiment to soldier Poltiev, who, in the ‘Kazan workers’ newspaper’, belonging to the Mensheviks, made a call for support of the ‘Freedom Loan’. It contained a resolute denouncement of the imperialistic war.

The military command announced a protest march of the gunners and evacuated soldiers in honour of the ‘Freedom Loan’ on 11 June. A group of anti-war minded soldiers, headed by N. Andronov undertook an agitation campaign in military units, trying to disrupt the march. As a result, even soldiers of the 1st Battalion Training Team refused to participate in the march. On 13 June, at the demonstration of soldiers of the 4th Battery, Andronov announced that ‘... one has to be a bourgeois to continue this war’, and made a call for opposing the ‘Freedom Loan’. This agitation spread over all the infantry regiments and acquired such proportions that regional military commander ordered to arrest Andronov. However, the soldiers refused to comply with this order. This mass insubordination to the top military authority created a tense and critical situation in Kazan. It became even worse due to deterioration in the workers’ material conditions. There was a catastrophic lack of bread in the city. It is no coincidence that on that same day an excited crowd, consisting mainly of poor Tatars, stormed food stores and arrested the head of the Provisioning Committee M. Boronin. On 1 June at 13.30, a small group of people gathered around the Provisioning Committee, but after a while dispersed. Just 20 minutes later, a crowd of several thousand people turned up, holding a banner of the MSC, mainly composed of Muslims, workers,
soldiers, dealers and women'. This was written in the official document. On behalf of the gathered people, the well-known social activist lawyer Fuad Tuktarov addressed the committee members. He demanded all available bread be distributed to the people and 200 poods of flour be purchased from Harbin by paying a deposit to a dealer that was in Kazan. The crowd, not getting a satisfactory answer, demanded the arrest of Boronin. City major Bukhov’s interference did not help the situation either. Boronin was arrested and sent to the garrison guardhouse.

Events that occurred in Kazan on 11–13 June were a sign of the dual power coming to the end. It was obvious that the Menshevik-Socialist Executive Soviet was yielding to the administration of counter-revolutionary Provisional Government.

The Provisional Government, formed after the fall of Tsarist regime, left intact the landlords ownership of the land. Peasants were asked to wait for the Constituent Assembly, which supposedly was going to resolve the land issue. However, working peasants did not want to wait for the Constituent Assembly. Everywhere and without authorization, peasants started seizing private lands, breaking up volost administrations and forming their own freely elected committees and Soviets.

The Kazan guberniya was in first place by the size of agrarian movement. Spassk, Laishevo, Mamadysh and Cheboksary uyezds were regions of the most intense peasant movement. Influential groups of peasant activists were working in a number of the districts. The Spassk group was headed by G. Gordeev; the Mamadysh group, by Davydov and Busyrev. A similar group under the leadership of N. Gordeev was working in the Sviyazhsk uyezd.

The left Socialist Revolutionaries from the villages were gravitating towards the Bolsheviks. Gordeev’s group in Spassk included Mokhov, Khusnutdinov, Emelyanov and others, who considered themselves to be left socialists. This group reigned supreme in the villages. It consisted of twenty people. Gordeev was elected the head of the district provisioning committee; Mokhov, the head of local police; Emelyanov, the head of district police, etc. At the meeting on 9 March, the Provisional Government reviewed ‘oral suggestions of the Military and Navy Minister...’ about actions to suppress agrarian unrests that arose in the Kazan guberniya'. However, at that time, it considered 'unacceptable to use weapons to suppress the agrarian unrest' [Gorokhova, 1973, p. 34].

The seizure of private lands reached its culmination in May. The First Provincial Peasant Congress was held right at that time. It started its work on 6 May in Kazan. The Congress was opened by the soldier-peasant Agapov. In his opening address, he said the following: 'The authority of the people is you all; the village does not recognize any other authority than the authority elected by the village itself'. The congress formed the Governorate Soviet of Peasants’ Deputies.

As a result of the bitter struggle over the land issue, the Bolsheviks and the left Socialist Revolutionaries won at the congress. Of key importance was the resolution dated 13 May, concerning handover of private lands and estates to the control of volost committees ‘for the sake of the success of the revolution and provisioning of the country, up until the land issue is resolved by the Constituent Assembly. Following the creation of the volost and village committees, the Soviet of Peasants’ Deputies found it necessary to hand over all croplands and landlord meadows, state, crown, monastery, church and city lands to the control of volost committees' [Georgievskaya, 1957, p. 286]. This became known all over the country and had a significant impact on the development of the peasant movement in other regions of the country. That was also when a decision was taken about the non-recognition of the Provisional Government’s right to assign district commissars in the Kazan guberniya and recognition of District Soviets’ right to do that. The Chairman of the Governorate Peasants’ Soviet was a left Socialist Revolutionary A. Kolegayev, whose views were close to those of the Bolsheviks.
The newspaper 'Kızıl Bayrak' wrote that the decision of the Peasant Congress had realized the age-old dream of the peasantry, and that this was not only the voice of the Kazan guberniya peasants, but 'the voice and legitimate claims of the downtrodden by the absence of land through robbery peasant masses of the whole Russia' [Georgievskaya, 1957, p. 300].

Creation of the Peasants’ Soviet in Kazan led to intensification of the revolutionary democracy front and the establishment of favourable conditions for supporting the working peasantry in their struggle for land. The newspaper of the Peasants’ Soviet in the Kazan guberniya widely covered development of the agrarian movement in the Governorate. Soon it was democratized without prior permission.

§ 2. Political Groups and Struggle for Power in the Kazan Guberniya in the Years 1917–1918

Indus Tagirov

Ceremonial meeting of Soviet of Workers’, Soldiers’ and Peasants’ Deputies with the involvement of representatives of regimental, squadron and factory committees opened on 26 October 1917. N. Yershov spoke about the armed rebellion. He and other speaker emphasized the heroic involvement of Tatar workers in the armed rebellion. The following proposal was put forward: '... to replace two positions: the military and civil ones (commander of Kazan Military District and the Governorate Commissar), but for now, to elect a Soviet Executive Bureau consisting of 15 people...'. However, because they had received troublesome information about troops’ possible approaching to Kazan, the meeting urgently decided to elect a Revolutionary Headquarters consisting of 20 people. N. Yershov announced 15 names as candidates to the Revolutionary Headquarters. Out of the 15 candidates, 9 were military men. There were 8 Bolsheviks, 4 Left Socialist Revolutionaries, 2 Menshevik-internationalists, and 1 non-party candidate on the list. Lack of prominent leaders from the Kazan Committee of Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (Bolsheviks) on the list was explained by the formation of the Revolutionary Headquarters from those who directly lead the uprising. They were the most active members of the Bolshevik military organization in the Kazan Garrison. Meeting participants unanimously adopted the list put forward by Yershov, but instructed him to add four more representatives [Krest’yan’skaya gazeta, 1917, 28 October] of military units and one representative of the Powder Mill.

At the meeting, Muslim organizations that recognized transition of power to the Soviets were given the right to send their representatives to the Revolutionary Headquarters. The Xärbi Şura and Muslim Socialist Committee representatives appointed to the Revolutionary Headquarters were also mainly military men (Ya. Chanyshev, K. Yakubov, etc.). Only M. Vakhitov was not a garrison soldier.

Kazan Bolshevik Committee and Muslim Socialist Committee did not officially nominate candidates into the Revolutionary Headquarters, as the handover of revolutionary power to military authority, in that situation, was considered to be a matter of course, because its popularity allowed, in the shortest possible time, to set the revolutionary order in the city and provide a basis for proper election of the Soviet Executive Committee and hand over to that committee the entire power over the city and Governorate in general. The new

27 N. Yershov’s list included: Masalsky, Yershov, Grasys, Frolov, Olkenitsky, Konyushkin, Milkh, Korov, Kazakevich, Venetsianov, Badayev, Karpov, Zhestyannikov, Ponomarev, Ginburg. Of the eight Bolsheviks six were members of a military organisation. According to the memoirs of K. Shnurovsky, the secretary of the Revolutionary Staff was G. Olkenitsky.
transitional body was supervised by the Kazan Committee of Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (Bolsheviks), headed by K. Grasis, I. Volkov, A. Karpov, and G. Olkenitsky.

The Revolutionary Headquarters turned to the population of the city and Governorate with an appeal. It contained information about the victory of the armed rebellion in Petrograd and Kazan, overthrow of the Provisional Government and establishment of Soviet power. The horrible days of struggle are gone. The revolutionary troops won. This victory marked the handover of power to the people, represented by its competent authority the Soviet of Workers’, Soldiers’ and Peasants’ Deputies. The power of the bourgeoisie, capitalists and landlords was overthrown not only in Kazan but also in Petrograd and in a number of other cities. This does not mean that the struggle against the bourgeoisie is over. The struggle goes on and will continue until democracy is established and completely secured’ [Znamya revolyuczii, 1917, 29 October].

The following was mentioned later in the appeal: ‘... From now on, people will build their own lives, will determine their own fate. It cannot be otherwise; only the people will help themselves out of the difficult position that the bourgeois rulers and guardians had plunges them into. We are deeply convinced that people have enough creativity to create their own bright future, free of oppression, tears and pain’. The appeal called on the people to stay alert, to support the revolutionary power. It was published in the 1st issue of the Banner of the Revolution newspaper and pasted up on the city streets.

During the first meeting of the Revolutionary Headquarters, commissars of the State Bank, telegraph, post office, telephone office, water supply system, etc. were appointed. The Revolutionary Headquarters limited the amount of money that could be withdrawn using a cheque to 500 rubles. Transfer amounts could not exceed 5000 rubles. Deposits could be withdrawn only for the most compelling reasons. These measures were to be in force only until 30 October. This time period, though short, allowed to bring the banks under control. From now on, money for the needs of companies were provided only with the permission of the factory committees. On 29 October, by the decision of the Revolutionary Headquarters, 27,000 rubles were withdrawn from the State Bank: 15,000 rubles were allocated for the establishment of the new power; 10,000 rubles were provided for the publication of the Banner of the Revolution newspaper; and 2,000 rubles were allocated for business trips of the Revolutionary Headquarters managers [Kazansko slovo, 1917, 31 October].

The issue of provisions loomed large. The city had a month’s supply of food: around 100,000 poonds of white flour and 30,000 poonds of rye flour. One of the first activities of the Soviet authority was a shift towards workers’ control over production and consumption. On 9 November, a meeting of factory committees, workers’ section of the Soviet and the Military-Industrial Committee was held. The following issue was on the agenda: organization of control over production. Reports were heard from the delegates of the All-Russia Conference of Factory Committees, Bolsheviks I. Derunov and S. Rudov. They were followed by the head of the Soviet A. Karpov. He said that workers’ control shall be exercised by a special Soviet, possessing executive authority, compulsory for the capitalists, and the Soviet of Workers’ Control should continuously keep in touch with the labour unions. At the meeting, the Soviet of Workers’ Control was elected from among the representative of factory committees and labour unions. This was an important step in the preparation for nationalization of major private factories.

Changes were made in court procedures. The Revolutionary Headquarters arrested the general prosecutor Karasev and his deputies and appointed commissars for all institutions. The establishment of the Investigating Commission headed by G. Olkenetsky, Frolov and Izraylovich was of particular importance. The Commission began active work on prosecuting counter-revolutionary minded bureaucrats of the Provisional Government. The former dis-
trict commander Colonel Arkhipov, the former head of the Kazan Soviet Lieutenant Poplavsky and others appeared before the Commission. The Banks Nationalization Commission began operating.

These activities were followed by attacks on the leaders of the Kazan Bolsheviks. N. Yershov and K. Grasis were called usurpers. Sabotage was widely practiced by state civil servants across the entire country, including Kazan. Strike of post-office and telegraph workers expressed their naked hostility towards the Soviet power. On 31 October, the so-called 'Kazan Strike Committee' of post-office and telegraph workers protested against the actions of the Revolutionary Headquarters and in particular against appointment of commissars to the post offices and telegraph offices. The committee demanded the removal of commissars, otherwise they threatened to go on strike.

At the same time, a split in the Revolutionary Headquarters became apparent, and that made the difficulties being faced during the process of establishing the new power even more complicated. On 28 October some of the left Socialist Revolutionaries and the head of the MSC M. Vakhitov resigned from the Revolutionary Headquarters. Military District Committee expressed its dissent with the actions of the Revolutionary Headquarters. It regarded illegal the appointment of Nikolay Yershov to the position of Interim Military District Commander.

Members of the Military District Committee did not support the armed rebellion. One of them said: 'If power is on the other side now, we should not resist in order to prevent bloodshed'. Prominent Socialist Revolutionary Arsentyev wrote the following in the 'Revolutionary tribune' newspaper on 31 October: 'Recognition, integration were out of the question; just subordination was in question'. Thus, the Military District Committee, while condemning the Bolsheviks, did not dare to go against the rebellion, for it did not have enough authority in the garrison. However, the Military District Committee did not sit idle. Garrisons located in the Volga and Cis-Ural regions were asked about their attitude towards transition of power in the district centre of Kazan to the Soviet of Soldiers and its head, warrant officer N. Yershov. It was planned to call a congress of the District Soviets of Soldiers, but before the congress, to become fully engaged into the district administration 'in order to keep it under control'.

Negotiations with the Military District Committee started right after the establishment of the Revolutionary Headquarters and appointment of warrant officer N. Yershov as Interim Military District Commander. Representatives of the military district committee expressed sharp criticism against N. Yershov and K. Grasis and tried to replace N. Yershov with warrant officer Fedotov.

On 28 October, the Military District Committee made a decision that transition of power to the Revolutionary Committee in Kazan does not mean transition of district power to one of the garrisons; the Military District Committee considers it wrong for the Revolutionary Committee to appoint a new commander. The need for calling a district military congress was also mentioned in the decision. Members of the Military District Committee also demanded cancellation of restrictions on the amount of money that could be withdrawn from the bank, imposed by the Revolutionary Committee. Representatives of the Military District Committee walked out of the Revolutionary Headquarters after the refusal to fulfill their demands.

Under the circumstances, on 4 November, the Revolutionary Committee stepped down from office. The Kazan Soviet of Workers’, Soldiers’ and Peasants’ Deputies took over. N. Yershov managed to hold onto his position until 19 November, that is, until the opening of the Congress of Kazan Military District Soviet of Soldiers’ Deputies Representatives. At the congress, instead of a sole commander-in-chief, the District Management Soviet was elected, and N. Yershov was not among the elected. The reason behind this was strong dissatisfaction with the dictatorial manners of N. Yershov and K. Grasis. Even the Brigade Committee of the Second Artillery Brigade, headed by Andronov, refused to support their recent idol.
Chapter 6. The Revolution and Struggle for Power in the Kazan Guberniya and in Kazan in 1917-1918.

§ 3. Victory of the Revolution in Kazan

Indus Tagirov

Transition of power to the Soviets across the country happened mostly in a peaceful way. Armed conflicts were mostly an exception rather than the rule. Kazan was one of these exceptions. This was determined by its exceptional position as the centre of the biggest military district in Russia, which included 10 governorates and 2 oblasts. District headquarters, two military schools and a garrison of 40 men were located in Kazan itself. Four reserve infantry regiments, the 94th, 95th, 240th, 164th, and 2nd Artillery Brigade were preparing units to send to the front.

In the summer and autumn of 1917, an extensive propaganda campaign was unleashed in units of the leading garrison. One of the active anti-war agitators was a soldier of the second artillery brigade Nikolay Andronov, who became an idol for the soldiers and was elected the head of Soldiers’ Brigade Committee.

There were many adventurers in the units, trying to play on anti-war mood of the soldiers. They were welcomed by Andronov. One such adventurer was the warrant officer Nikolay Yershov, who was sent to the Kazan Military District following the disbandment of the second machine gun regiment in Petrograd for its involvement in the July events. Military command appointed Samara as his next duty station. However, Yershov ignored the order and stayed in Kazan and illegally remained in the 1st Battalion of the 2nd Artillery Brigade. Criminal proceedings were initiated against him for ignoring the order of military command. Yesterday’s Socialist Revolutionary Yershov quickly took the side of the Bolsheviks and unleashed an extensive anti-war agitation campaign in the units. Soon he was elected to the Soviet, where he was appointed the head of its soldiers’ section, and soon became the leader of the military organization of Bolsheviks and Left Socialist Revolutionaries.

It was at this time that the Second Lieutenant Grozdov showed up; previously, he had been arrested in Saransk for loosing a substantial sum of state money playing cards, later he escaped from the guardhouse, insinuated himself into the soldiers’ favour and was giving anti-war speeches to them. He admitted his guilt in his report to the commander-in-chief; the report contained his request to be sent to the front ‘to atone for his recent shortcoming in

Name of K. Grasis was mentioned again in Cheboksary. He had struck terror into the city. Anyone who, in his opinion, was suspicious was put under surveillance; he conducted mass executions [Novoe Kazanskoe slovo, 1918, 19 August (1 September)]. Afterwards, his ‘heroism’ continued in Astrakhan. As was previously reported, being a representative of the Front-line Extraordinary Commission in 1918, E. Bosh discredited many local workers by accusing them of either counter-revolutionary acts or misdeeds. For no good reason, he arrested the head and two members of the Extraordinary Commission of the Governorate. The protest of the head of the Astrakhan Guberniya Soviet against such an outrage was responded in the following manner: ‘I will arrest you as well’. And he did arrest him, this resulted in pitting the Muslim part of the garrison against the Soviet, the Soviet against the Muslims, and sailors against the soldiers. Everything that was happening was a kind of copy of what happened in Kazan in October 1917. He would have totally messed things up if a higher level authority did not gain an understanding that ‘for the sake of the revolution, for the sake of socialism, such heroes should leave the Extraordinary Commission’. Even those trying to support K. Grasis admitted that he is ‘selfish’, ‘rash’, and ‘sometimes shows lack of judgment’ [RGASPI, Fund 17, Inventory 4, File 52, Sheet 23].
Fire at the Powder Mill and its consequenc-
es aggravated the situation. Fire began on 14
August, at 02.20 a.m. with a fire at Porokhovaya
Station, where bags with saltpeter had ignited.
Within a short time, the fire spread to boxes of
ammunition, and then two powder magazines
exploded. One magazine contained five thou-
sand pooods and the other one, nine thousand
pooods of smokeless powder. The force of the
explosion was such that windows of houses
many versts away were broken. It was said that
horsemen several versts away from the centre
of the explosion were knocked off their horses.
Then the oil burst into flames. Ammunition was
continuously exploding. The explosions and
fire continued for several days. People run for
their lives. Soldiers of reserve regiments, garri-
sioned in the Zareche, fled away [See: Ionenko,
1967, p. 126]. Out of the 2,524 people enlisted
in the 95th Regiment, 648 people were on the
run. Over 240 soldiers of the 240th Regiment
were also on the run. The district military com-
mand imposed martial law in the city, but this
just aggravated the situation. Numerous facts
show that discipline in the garrison was weak.
Rallies calling for ending the war were held all
over the place; hated army officers were beaten.
Ammunition and weapons from storage rooms
were seized.

An all-garrison rally, chaired by N. Yershov,
took place on 15 October, on meadow lands be-
hind the train stations; a Bolshevist resolution
demanding the end to the war and transition of
power to the Soviets was adopted at the rally.

On 23 October, in their report to the Min-
ister of War, commander-in-chief and district
commissar wrote that 'Kazan is in a state of ten-
sion, garrison units have split into two camps:
one camp still supports the Provisional Gov-
ernment and is ready to execute the orders of
commanders, while the second camp entirely
follows the Soviets headed by reckless people
calling themselves Bolsheviks and demanding
transition of power to the Soviets'; they also
mentioned that the 'leaders of soldiers are two
demagogue-Bolsheviks, already convicted and
under investigation' [Gorokhova, 1973, p. 119].
They meant Grozdvov and Yershov. What stands
out in this report is the words of the District Military Commissar Captain Kalinin: 'An uprising is likely; extensive agitation has been unleashed across the majority of the garrison... The commander-in-chief is doing his best to resolve the conflict peacefully...'

[Georokhova, 1973, p. 120]. However, events escalated with unprecedented speed and not towards a peaceful resolution of the conflict.

During an evening meeting of the Kazan Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies on 23 October, a resolution was adopted to disband soldiers called up in 1899. At that meeting, Yershov said that 'representatives of the local authority will not dare to veto our decision', and that 'artillery and infantry showed that they are not joking, and not the Provisional Government but the Soviets have authority for them', and that the 'commander-in-chief is helpless because he does not have any power'. And several times he said 'we are not afraid'. He was supported by Grasis, who blamed the cadets for supporting authorities and called on soldiers to ignore them. 'We', he said, 'have the power on our side and that is why we can do whatever we want' [Georgievskaya, 1957, p. 425]. Following the break, the Socialist Revolutionaries, Mensheviks and independent Socialists made a statement that they refused to vote for the disbanding of soldiers called up in 1899. Yershov told them that the 'Bolsheviks do not care'. Then the opponents of the Bolsheviks left the meeting, and their representative headed to the meeting of the Revolutionary Headquarters.

Thus, only the Bolsheviks voted for the resolution. A total of 230 people voted for the resolution, 1 voted against, and 21 abstained. Following the meeting, K. Grasis was arrested. The military command ordered to arrest Yershov and Grozdov. It is unlikely that in this situation one of the first actions of N. Yershov would have been to organize a soldiers' rally demanding the release of Grasis. On the contrary, this arrest would have served as a pretext for a decisive implementation of the rebellion plan if such had existed. However, this did not happen. Moreover, after the transition of power to the Bolsheviks, they initiated proceedings against K. Poplavsky, accusing him of 'provoking bloody confrontations'.

Following these events, the District Military Command ordered to arrest Karl Grasis and Nikolay Yershov. K. Grasis was arrested in his apartment. However, he managed to inform Nikolay Yershov. The latter immediately headed to the 1st Battalion of the Artillery Brigade.

In the morning, warrant officer Yershov organized a rally of the 1st Battalion of the 2nd Artillery Brigade on the subject of the arrest of Grasis. Soldier Alexander Palomozhnykh rushed into the meeting and told that Second Lieutenant Poplavsky had phoned the Commander-in-Chief Arkhipov and demanded several armoured vehicles and the cavalry. Poplavsky said that he 'did it to protect himself following consultation with officers and his closest soldiers' [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 526, Inventory 5, File 1, Sheet 66—reverse].

Since 1934, following the publication of the book 'Kazan Bolshevik Organization in 1917', a completely groundless point of view that the guidance had been imposed by the Centre was approved. For many years, it became a tradition to write that the meeting of party committee was held on 23 October 1917, at which its secretary Olkenitsky supposedly read a resolution of the Central Committee dated 10 October. Meanwhile, there was no meeting of the Bolsheviks Party Committee in those days. The events that occurred in the Kazan Garrison on 23–24 October were a total surprise for the garrison and the majority of its members. This was mentioned at the party committee meeting on 30 October 1917, after the transition of power to the Soviets. A. Karpov, who presided over the meeting, in his opening address said that '...events of the previous days, before receiving information about the coup [in Petrograd—I.T.], did not happen under the leadership of the entire committee, but under the leadership of some of its members and did not have any political basis, just military one'[Znamya revolyuczii, 1917, 2 November].
The statement of Grasis that there was a plan of an armed rebellion, which supposedly 'following the coup... was approved' by some colonel supporting the revolution, is not true either [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 1875, File 24, Sheet 71]. The question arises: if the colonel supported the revolution, then why was he not shown that plan before the rebellion? Obviously, there was no plan, and there could not have been such a plan. Firstly, neither Petrograd nor Moscow gave any instructions about the necessity to conduct an armed rebellion. Moreover, the quoted decision of the Moscow District Bureau of the Russian Communist Party of Bolsheviks directed local organizations towards peaceful resolution of the issue of authority. However, apparently, it did not get to Kazan either, because Mantsev from the District Bureau was supposed to come to Kazan. But for some unknown reasons he did not come to Kazan. One thing that can be said for sure is that the general line of the party was well-known in Kazan. Secondly, rebellion had been brewing for a long time, and it had started with a conflict within the garrison, not according to a plan of some Bolshevik leaders.

Memoirs of Yershov, where he explains actions he took following his arrival at the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd Artillery brigade on 24 October, after the arrest of K. Grasis, also prove the idea that there was no plan. Firstly, he writes that 'having learned about the arrest of Grasis', he explains that 'meant the beginning of an attack and disarming of the entire garrison', secondly, he suggested to 'issue a resolution demanding to release Grasis and send a proposal to other military units to adopt the same resolution' and ordered military units to prepare for battle. In his report to division officer, dated 31 October, the duty officer of the 2nd Division Vilnyansky wrote that Yershov was speaking about 'rescuing Grasis in an orderly manner, but warned that there should not be a military uprising' [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 526, Inventory 5, File 1].

For this reason, it is worth mentioning the following words of the adjutant of the commander-in-chief Leontiev: 'Counter-intelligence delivered a message that Arkhipov was going to be arrested for rejecting the resolution of the Soviet about disbanding the 1899 recruits... Cadets were summoned not to act against the units, but to prevent the arrest'.

Indeed, Commander-in-Chief Colonel Arkhipov also leant towards a peaceful resolution of the conflict. However, Military District Commissar Captain Kalinin was assertive. It was his initiative to arrest Grasis and Yershov. By his order, his deputy Mints, together with a detachment of cadets, accompanied by armoured vehicles, arrived at the Artillery Brigade and gave an ultimatum to hand over Yershov. By his order, several shots were fired at the barracks where supposedly Yershov was staying. However, he was already not there. Accompanied by two soldiers, he moved to the 1st Battalion of the Artillery Brigade located in Arsk Field. There he was met by the head of the brigade committee N. Andronov with a report about preparation of forces for the rebellion. 'Indeed', N. Yershov wrote a little later about this, 'guns were moved to Arsk Field... and every battery was manned'. Plan of armed resistance against the authorities was discussed at the meeting of the brigade committee, which was called even before the arrival of N. Yershov.

From the 1st Battalion, located in Arsk Field, N. Yershov headed for the city to inform the Bolshevik Military Organization about recent developments. By that time, Bolsheviks from the 2nd Artillery Brigade I. Shelykhmanov and Ya. Krylov were already there. Warrant officers Frolov and Zhestyannikov were there as well. N. Yershov brought members of the organization up to date on the latest developments and ordered them to be ready for an armed uprising. It was decided to form a revolutionary headquarters out of the representatives of the 240th Regiment to lead combat operations.

On 24 October, at 11.00 a.m., the first shrapnel shell shot by gunmen of the 1st Battalion of the 2nd Artillery Brigade exploded over the city. Combat against cadets, lancers and the 6th Finland Battery began in the latter
half of the day and ebbed only on the night of 25 October. By the order of district headquarters, a detachment of cadets headed to Arsk Field again in the evening. An armoured vehicle, hidden behind trams, was moving ahead of the detachment. However, the soldiers at Arsk Field were expecting them. As soon as the cadets reached the building of the Higher Courses for Women, they were shelled and machine-gunned. The gunmen were supported by the 685th and 686th militia units. The cadets were forced to retreat. First two shells hit the building of the District Military Commissariat causing considerable damage. Shellfire was intensifying across the city. Several shells hit the building of the District Military Headquarters. Shells were exploding in the city centre. One of them damaged a column of the university building. Shops and public establishments in the city were closed. Schools were closed. Scared inhabitants hid in basements.

Soon Kazan commander-in-chief declared martial law in Kazan and suburbs, and that order was distributed around the city. The punitive detachment, consisting of all three branches of the armed forces, intensified its efforts. Cadets’ patrols began to control dikes connecting the city centre to workers’ districts.

The former chairman of the Soviet, P. Golanov, headed the military committee located in the building of the Military Academy in Kremlin. Colonel Dobryansky headed the field headquarters, established in the building of the Veterinary Institute. Chief of Police M. Bukhov mobilized all of his personnel and thus helped the cadets with intelligence gathering. However, the police, consisting of 200 men, on the whole, was not actively involved in the events. Dragoons and Cossacks did not take an active part in the events either.

All day long on 24 October, members of the Bolshevik Military Organization held rallies and meetings in military units, informing soldiers about armed clashes with cadets and explaining their meaning. Soldiers of all garrison units joined rebel gunmen. That is how the armed rebellion began in the Kazan Garrison.

As we can see, it had nothing to do with getting a signal from Moscow or Petrograd.

At noon on October 25, the struggle acquired a political character. Things were coming to the head. The 240th Regiment from the meadow side of the Kazanka River basin was approaching Kremlin, where the cadets were located. A part of the 164th Regiment, using pontoon bridge, crossed the Kazanka River and headed to help the gunmen. Breaking the enemy’s resistance, a separate battalion of the 95th Regiment arrived from the Osokin’s barracks at the same place. From the direction of Arsk Field, the attack was pushed not only by the gunmen but also by three infantry battalions. A total of 11 batteries were involved in the bombardment of the city.

At the same time, the 6th Battery of Poplavsky was sent to the city. The day before, Colonel Arkhipov personally ordered inclusion of that battery into the punitive detachment. The detachment, constituting the backbone of the counter-revolutionary forces, consisted of all three branches of the armed forces. There were total 2,000–2,500 men at the disposal of the District Military Command, including cadets of the military academy, two schools for warrant officers, a hussars squadron, a hundred Cossacks and four armoured vehicles. However, soldiers of Poplavsky’s battery started to leave as soon as the rebellion began and by the latter half of the day, only a handful of soldiers remained bearing guns.

In the first half of the day of 25 October, there were three main areas of fighting: at Arsk Field, near the fortress in the direction of the river basin and at the railway station. Two companies of soldiers began to move towards the Kremlin from different directions. At about 3 a.m., a telegram was received about the victory of the armed rebellion in Petrograd and the removal of the Provisional Government. The cadets laid down their arms upon hearing this news; the Commander-in-Chief Colonel Arkhipov ordered all military units to go to barracks. That was his last order, meaning the recognition of the coup and submission to the Kazan Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies.
The October armed rebellion was victorious in Kazan, and from the morning of 26 October, power in the city was in the hands of representatives of revolutionary workers and soldiers, who lead the rebellion. Commissar Kalinin, Colonel Arkhipov, Lieutenant Poplavsky and others were arrested.

The rebellion won almost without shedding blood. From both sides, about 10 people were killed or injured.

Following the surrender of the cadets located in the building of the Kazan Soviet (former Governor’s Palace in Kremlin), members of the Kazan Bolsheviks Committee and Left Socialist Revolutionaries Committee, members of party factions of the Soviet at an emergency meeting adopted ‘Appeals’ to the population with information about the victory of the revolution in Petrograd and Kazan.

The National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan contains a set of documents for Act No.52 of the Revolutionary Tribunal under the Kazan Soviet of Soldiers’, Workers’ and Peasants’ Deputies (start: 21 December 1917; end: 11 January 1918), which entirely disproves the prevailing conceptions about events of October 1917 in Kazan. The very name of the act already tells that the Bolshevik Party Committee could not have initiated those events. It is called an act on ‘Second Lieutenant Poplavsky being charged with provoking a bloody confrontation and injuring a sentry’. According to the information in the file, Bolshevik leaders Karl Grasis and Girsh Olkenitsky acted as the prosecutors. In their view, it was not they who initiated the October events but Kazimir Broneslavovich Poplavsky. In March, being influential in the garrison, Poplavsky was elected the First Chairman of the Soviet. He voluntarily left the office of the Chairman of the Soviet and focused on education of the soldiers. In October, he commanded an artillery battery of the 6th Finland Brigade. He would read newspapers to soldiers, take them to museums. He tried to keep away from politics. But it was impossible to keep away from politics in the mad year of 1917. He found himself involuntarily in the centre of those politics.

However, he was not the main ‘hero’; this honour went to Nikolay Yershov. This can be seen even from his letter to a friend, dated 14 November 1917, where he, in a boastful and offensive to the Tatars manner, wrote the following: ‘Hello from remote Kazan. Kazan for the second time was conquered by the Russian people, however, it was besieged not by Ivan the Terrible but by a warrant officer Yershov. The October rebellion in Kazan began earlier than in Petrograd. Maybe the first shot of the October revolution rang out by the initiative of Yershov. Following seizure of the city, the cadets and lancers laid down their arms. The rebellious people elected me the Commander-in-Chief of the Kazan Military District’.

Nothing is mentioned about either the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (Bolsheviks) Committee or the military organization. And he was elected commander-in-chief not by rebellious people but by the Revolutionary Headquarters established at the meeting of the Kazan Soviet on 26 October according to the list proposed by Yershov and headed by Grasis, that is, by a narrow circle of his people. In a message from Kazan entitled The Kazan Directorate, one Yekaterinburg newspaper wrote the following: ‘Local circles are discontent with the seizure of the position of Commander-in-Chief of Kazan Military District by an unknown warrant officer Yershov; no one either appointed or elected him to rule the Kazan Military District. Those, who know the new Commander-in-Chief of Kazan Military District, warrant officer Yershov, describe him and his colleague Grasis very negatively’ [Zaural’ skiy kraj, 1917, 15 November].

The Bolshevik Committee did not organize an armed rebellion in Kazan. There were no instructions from Petrograd or Moscow either. Facts show that armed activities could have been avoided. Balance of power in the city was such that nobody could have hampered the peaceful proclamation of Soviet power. The commander-in-chief did not have enough troops.

However, things that could have been avoided did happen. And they happened not as a result of a command from the Central Committee of Russian Social Democratic Labour Party but due to the situation in the garrison.
Autocracy came to an end, and a new authority was established across country in late February–early March 1917. Establishment of the Provisional Government (on the night of 1–2 March 1917) was a result of a compromise in the course of long and tough negotiations between leaders of the Petrograd Soviet, leaders of the Constitutional Democratic Party and members of so-called 'Provisional Committee of Members of the State Duma', and it was an important milestone during these events. Involvement of the deputies in the establishment of a new authority was required for the legalization of the authority. Following the abdication of Nicholas II and the actual termination of functioning of the majority of state institutions, the legislative power of the State Duma was the only legal inheritor of the former Russia. Presentation of the governmental declaration of 3 March 1917 was one of the first acts of the new democratic authority. It declared a transformation programme and determined the basic principles of formation of new statehood based on democratic principles.

For the Muslim people, just like for the majority, the February events in the capital were a total surprise. For instance, members of a rather small and weak Islamic faction did not take active part either in the removal of the old or in the establishment of the new authority28, which they greeted with fervour, though [Usmanova, 1997, pp. 164–170]. On 8 March, members of the Islamic faction of the State Duma sent an application to the Provisional Government expressing their approval of the declared programme, but at the same time, calling on the new authority to avoid making the same mistakes, and to a greater extent, to follow the instructions of representatives of the Islamic community when making decisions concerning the Muslim population of the empire [Iskhakov, 2009c, pp. 257–260]. Among the Tatar figures that had active contacts with the new authority, it is worthwhile to mention Ibn. Akhtyamov, who, in the very first spring months (11 March), was appointed as commissar of the Provisional Committee of the State Duma and Provisional Government of the Ufa guberniya, as well as Supervisor-Commissar of the OMSA. Muslim deputies were appointed as commissars or representatives of the new authority to the Caucasus (M. Dalgat, M.-Yu. Dzhafarov) and Turkestan (A. Bukeikhanov, M. Tynyshpayev, S. Maksudi). Chairman of the Kazan Zemskaya Uprava V. Molostov (who would soon devolve his powers to a new head of the Uprava A. Plotnikov) was appointed Commissar of the Kazan guberniya, partly for the reason that there were no Muslim deputies elected from the Kazan guberniya to the Fourth Duma. The function of Muslim commissars and members of various newly-formed committees was familiarizing the new authority with the concerns and desires of the Muslim population. Generally speaking, Muslim people played a marginal role in the events of the first spring months, honestly greeting and supporting the new authority in the hope for a renewal.

One of the important points of the declaration (3 March 1917) of the Provisional Government was a promise to cancel all religious and national restrictions. However, the government’s declaration was just a symbolic gesture towards the non-Russian population. Practical implementation of the declared principle required hard work of the legislative and executive branches. In the period from April to June 1917, the DRAFF developed a list of restrictive rules and articles of law that were canceled because of the accepted declaration. Out of more than thirty items, one third were

28 Galimdzhun Ilbragimov, criticising his political opponents, wrote that ‘throughout the events of February and the fighting of the populace on the streets of the capital the members of the Muslim faction passed the time playing card games and slept through everything.’ Even if these accusations were groundless and, essentially, ideological reprisals against his political opponents, they reflected the reality that the revolution and the fall of the autocracy came as a surprise to most politicians. See: [Ilbragimov G., 1925].
related to the position of the Islamic clergy, one third addressed issues of the education of the Muslims, and one third covered general issues [RSHA, Fund 821, Inventory 133, File 622, Sheets 4–6 reverse].

Among the canceled restrictive rules or democratic changes, the following were the most important:

– introduction of the elective principle, empowering higher Islamic spiritual organizations to appoint [subordinate elective staff];
– abolition of certificates of political reliability of candidates for jobs;
– empowerment of the parish population to determine the number of their clergymen;
– empowerment of Islamic spiritual organizations to carry out internal correspondence in local languages on condition that correspondence with state organizations was done in Russian;
– abolition of all circulars, comments and restrictive rules applied to the decree dated 17 April 1905;
– abolition of a quota for public zemsky institutions;
– abolition of restrictions for the utilization of the native language, and allowance of mother-tongue based teaching;
– empowerment of the Muslims to wear traditional head-wear in public places;
– handover of mosque schools (madrasah and mektebs) to Islamic spiritual organizations, and abolition of restrictions imposed by the existing laws;
– authorization of people that studied abroad to teach in Islamic schools (that is, abolition of the circular of the year 1911);
– abolition of restrictions on allocation of zemsky funds for the needs of the non-Russian population (abolition of the resolution of the Governing Senate of the year 1915).

Apart from abolition of the legal rules directly restricting legal capacity of the Muslims, the legislation underwent certain changes extending the rights of the Muslim population in the political and social spheres and offering the Islamic faction an actual role of an all-Muslim political centre:

– establishment of the Higher Spiritual Board in Petrograd;
– establishment of a publishing house and periodical of the Central Board;
– creation of parish 'believers union' (a project of a member of the State Duma G. Enikeev);
– provision of a salary to Islamic clergymen;
– establishment of a muftiate in the North Caucasus, Turkestan and Steppe area (among the Kirghiz population) and reorganization of Orenburg, Taurida and Trans-Caucasus spiritual boards and standardization of Muslim Spiritual Boards;
– empowerment of the Islamic faction of the State Duma 'according to its printed desire' to recommend people for positions both in the Central Board and at places with prevailing Muslim population [RSHA, Fund 821, Inventory 133, File 622, Sheets 4–6 reverse].

In the period from 15 June to 15 July 1917, around a dozen additional acts concerning the Muslims were pending at the DRAFF. They addressed the following issues:

– providing a one-time allowance in the amount of 5000 rubles to the OMSA from the State Treasury because of lack of money at the Assembly (petition by I. Akhtyamov);
– allowing exemption from military service of the people elected to the Islamic spiritual positions and called up for national service prior to approval of the position by the Governorate Administration (petition by I. Akhtyamov);
– temporarily increase in staff of the OMSA;
– call a commission for Islamic issues under the DRAFF;
– convert from Christianity to the Islamic religion according to the submitted appeals;
– allow donations of peasant allotments to religious organizations (mosques) of the Muslims [RSHA, Fund 821, Inventory 133, File 622, Sheets 1–1 reverse].

List of issues reviewed by or pending at the DRAFF concerning the Muslim population shows that these issues were prepared jointly by the members of the Islamic faction and workers of the DRAFF. All of them were repeatedly raised by Muslim representatives in petitions and reform projects or were announced from
the Duma tribune and in the press. That is, in the period between the February and October Revolutions, the leaders of the Tatar national movement focused on implementation of the programme that had been developed before the revolution.

At the same time, there is a certain degree of originality, distinguishing the post-February situation from the pre-revolutionary one: Islamic leaders were not merely satisfied with a role of a supplicant and petitioner on Islamic issues but began to apply for a role of an important coordination and political centre. It is no coincidence that the Temporary Central Bureau of Russian Muslims (TCBRM, headed by Ibn. Akhtyamov), formed in the middle of March (15–17 March 1917), and later the All-Russia Muslim Council that replaced it following the congress in May (ARMC, headed by A. Tsalikov) declared that they are the only representatives of the Muslim population whom the government should address. However, development of relations between these powers was not an easy process, sometimes turning into conflicting opposition [Iskhakov, 2009a, pp. 52–54].

During the July crisis of the Provisional Government (3–5 July), when the climate in Russian society suddenly changed, and attitudes to the new authority evolved from euphoria and enthusiastic support to the predominance of sentiment of frustration and criticism, members of the ARMC were expressing ideas about the necessity of involvement of the Muslims in the coalition government and establishment of a special Ministry for Islamic issues (Sh. Mukhamedyarov, Sadri Maksudi, Islam Shagiakhmetov, Gayaz Iskhaki, etc.) or, at least, introduction of the positions of deputies in important Islamic institutions. For instance, S. Maksudi thought that it would be rather difficult for a Muslim to be appointed as a minister, and probably for this reason, one should try to get a position of a deputy in two ministries: that of internal affairs and that of national education [Iskhakov, 2004; Iskhakov, 2009a, pp. 52–54]. Among possible candidates there were Ibr. and Ibn. Akhtyamovs, A. Tsalikov, S. Maksudi, Z. Walidi, G. Teregulov, etc. However, all attempts of Muslim figures to introduce their representative(s) were unsuccessful.

From the summer of 1917, nationwide priorities in the national movement were replaced by regional and national interests, and that quickly affected the relations with the central authority, which was also falling into a crisis. All-Russia Muslim Council was a multi-party coalition body with prevailing nationwide (Muslim-wide) concerns and positions. Leaders of the ARMC demonstrated striving for consolidation of efforts of the Muslims and consolidated support of the new democratic authority. However, party discords and class struggle were more pronounced at the regional level. While metropolitan leaders of the Muslims were mainly establishing contacts with the new authority and trying to put pressure on it, unifying Islamic movement (organizing Islamic congresses, resolving current issues, etc.), the Islamic leaders in the regions were dealing with other issues. They focused on determination of the real local authority (in governorates), political struggle and protection of interests either of separate nations (national leaders) or separate social groups (party leaders).

Apart from regional Milli Şura, there were also other political forces in the regions with prevailing Tatar population. In the Kazan guberniya, these were the Muslim Socialist Committee (MSC, headed by M. Vakhitov), Islamic military organizations with socialist-minded leaders (Xärbi Şura headed by I. Alkin and others); in the Ufa guberniya, these were the Tatar Left Socialist Revolutionaries headed by Galimdzhan Ibragimov. Considering activities of the aforementioned organizations, we can name a second determining tendency in the national movement, which became obvious in the summer of 1917, and this was a change of political elites, the nomination of new political figures (I. Alkin, G. Ibragimov, M. Vakhitov, M. Sultan-Galiev, etc.) and withdrawal from the political arena of some of the former very influential and active figures (K.-M. Tevkelev, Sh. Syrtlanov, A. Akhtyamov, etc.). Partly the changes were age-related, and partly they were
related to the fact that the ideas of social equality and socialist parties became very popular in the summer of 1917. New slogans brought new heroes.

There was one additional political power, trying to play a more active role in relations with the authority: leaders of the Vaisov’s movement headed by Gaynan Vaisov. Following his return to Kazan because of the amnesty granted by the Provisional Government, G. Vaisov revived his community and started active work. In April 1917, a congress of ‘God’s warriors’ was held in Kazan, which greeted the Petrograd Soviet of Workers’ and Peasants’ Deputies and the Provisional Government [Valeev, 2007]. A little later, G. Vaisov tried to speak at the All-Russian Muslim Congress (May 1917, Moscow) and describe the main principles of the Vaisov’s doctrine. However, the congress organizers did not let him speak, and this deepened the emerging split. Probably, this occasion predetermined the shift of Vaisov’s people to the left. In the summer of 1917 G. Vaisov planed to publish the ‘Islam’ magazine and other literature and to create his own political party [Vaisov, 1917, p. 23]. The period of the October Revolution was marked by a paradoxical situation: following the declaration of freedom of thought, the religious component of the movement took a back seat, while its politicization became irreversible. In the years 1917–1918, it was already a political movement, and its leaders did not hide their political interests and ambitions. In the autumn of 1917, having failed to find common ground with the leaders of the liberal-wing of Tatar national movement, the leaders of Vaisov’s movement declared that they supported Soviet regime, and formed an alliance with Kazan Bolsheviks. However, for the Kazan Bolsheviks, this alliance was not so much deliberate coalition with another political force as an involuntary tactical move, which was also based on personal contacts of the leaders [G. Vaisov and K. Grasis respectively].

In the years 1917–1920, the attitude of the Bolsheviks and later of the representatives of Soviet power to Vaisov’s people evolved from cautious and kind, from striving to use them in their own interests on the road to power to suspicious and very negative in the end. As the Soviet power was strengthening and victories were being secured on the front (especially on the Eastern Front), the Bolsheviks became less and less willing to compromise and cooperate with various forces, especially religious organizations. For this reason, it is no coincidence that this alliance ended up with repressions against the leaders and the most active members of Vaisov’s organization (starting from 1921), as well as with official prohibition of this organization in the mid–1920s.

Following the October Coup, the leaders of many political parties and factions, just like leaders of national movements, were faced with the issue of their attitude to the coup and the new Bolshevik authority. If we look at the attitudes of the leaders of the Tatar national movements towards the Bolsheviks, we will see a full range of opinions, with prevailing negative attitude. The National Meeting, held in Ufa from November 1917 to January 1918, almost unanimously (with the exception of a group of Left Socialist Revolutionaries headed by G. Ibragimov), spoke against supporting the October Coup, considering it a marginal group’s attempt to take over the power and believing the Bolsheviks to be temporary pseudo-political figures not worthy of serious notice. The same attitude was expressed almost by the entire leading Tatar national press: ‘Yöldiz’ and ‘Kurultai’ newspapers in Kazan, ‘Turmush’ newspaper in Ufa, ‘Vakyt’ newspaper in Orenburg, etc. However, leaders of the military organization Xärbi Şura Ilyas Alkin, Yu. Muzaffarov, O. Tokumbe-tov, etc., including leaders of the Muslim Socialist Committee M. Vakhitov and M. Sultan-Galiev did support the Bolsheviks or at the very least were not against the transition of authority to the block of socialist parties.

The elections to the Constituent Assembly played an important role in the events occurring in late 1917–early 1918. In general, slightly less that 50% of the population took part in the elections; 40% of the voters voted for the Socialist Revolutionaries, 24% voted for the
Bolsheviks, 2.5% voted for the Mensheviks (plus 1.5% for Georgian Mensheviks), 4.7% for Constitutional Democrats (in fact the only right-liberal party in the elections), etc. Many votes were given to various small parties, independent candidates and candidates from various national groups.

Muslim leaders hoped that many of their deputies would be elected to the Constituent Assembly (proportional to the percentage of the Muslim population in country, that is, around 60 people) and intended to create separate Islamic faction in it. However, during the elections, the Muslim movement split not only on a national but also on a class basis. This is supported by the numerous lists containing names of the Muslims: lists of the governorate Milli Şura, lists of all groups of socialists (the latter had especially strong positions in the Caucasus, Ufa and Kazan guberniya) (for more details, see: [Vserossijskoe Uchreditel’noe sobranie, 1930; Protasov, 1997]). As a result, only 37 Muslims were elected to the Constituent Assembly. Moreover, the majority of them were accepted by party lists of the Socialist parties and not through all-Muslim lists (local offices of Milli Şura). The creation of a united Islamic faction led to an immediate split among Muslim deputies into the Muslim nationalists (headed by F. Tuktarov and A. Tsalikov) and Muslim socialists (headed by G. Ibragimov and M. Vakhitov). That is, in both Muslim blocks the key role was played by the Tatars. It is difficult to say what the relations of these two Muslim groups would had been like if the Constituent Assembly existed longer than the time given to it by the Bolsheviks, or if the Bolshevism had a different fate in Russia.
CHAPTER 7
All-Russian Muslim Congresses of 1917, the National Assembly and Their Importance. Declaration of National Autonomy in 1917–1918

§ 1. The Importance of the All-Russian Muslim Congresses of 1917

Aydar Khabutdinov

Muslim committees and bureaus were established in all key Tatar-populated localities as national authorities common for all social groups. They included all national politicians and social activists. The liberal, moderate socialist, and left socialist wings of the committees focused their attention on the political development of the Tatar people, cultural and educational activities, laying the foundation of cultural and national and religious autonomy. The authorities were dominated by the secular intelligentsia, represented by the leaders from the period of the 1905–1907 Russian Revolution: liberals (S. Maksudi, F. Karimi) and moderate socialists (G. Iskhaki, T. Teregulov). The muslim committees and bureaus were generally national and not political bodies (except for Kazan and Ufa, where the socialist trend was dominant). These leaders played the key part in arranging and holding the All-Russian Muslim Congresses of 1917. Except for M. Vakhitov in Kazan, the committees were purely made up of socialists [Khabutdinov, 2008, p. 169].

On 17 March 1917, members of the Bureau under the Muslim fraction and local delegates formed the Provisional Central Muslim Bureau in Petrograd, headed by A. Tsalikov, to ensure preparation for the All-Russian congress and general coordination [II, 1917, 23 March].

On 23 March, the Kazan newspaper 'Qoys' published an article by S. Maksudi titled 'How to gather a national congress?' on summoning the All-National Congress in Ufa under the Spiritual Assembly to transform it into a 'religious and national centre'. This was to be an All-Russian congress, though dominated by representatives of the Muslims of Inner Russia. S. Maksudi maintained that the decisions taken by the 3rd All-Russian Muslim Congress of 1906 had to be implemented. He encouraged countrywide establishment of meetings and local bureaus, accusing the faction`s bureau of being inactive in terms of working at preparations for the congress [Koyash, 1917, 23 March].

Regional representatives, a vast majority of them being Tatars, had formed a coordinating authority for Russian Muslims by April 1917. This was a large-scale regional representation, which ensured interaction and funding to enhance preparation work for the congress. 8 April 1917. The Central Muslim Bureau in Petrograd finally announced the calling of the Russia Muslim Congress in Moscow on 1 May 1917. Telegrams were distributed with the following agenda: method of state administration, national cultural autonomy, elections to the Constituent Assembly, attitude to the war, establishment of the All-Russian Muslim Council. The labour and land issues were added to the agenda of the Congress at the last moment, by a majority of four votes. The land issue was primarily viewed as restoring Muslim`s ownership of the confiscated lands of the Crimea, the Caucasus, Turkestan, and Kazakhstan. In terms of attitude to the war, the Bureau supported the Petrograd Soviet`s resolution on a defensive war until final victory. The Bureau was opposed to the Cadets in terms of the party`s policy of controlling the Turkish straits and
A.Tsalikov undertook to prepare after he left. According to the initial version of the congress the issue of the Muslim military detachments was inclined to support the Russian Socialists was initially entrusted to K.-M. Tevkelev. The congress, when the Bureau criticized S. Maksudi’s words, except for those supporting the establishment of religious autonomy in Inner Russia and Siberia, were socialists. Chairman of the Bureau A. Tsalikov, secretary of the Bureau A.-Z. Validi and the leader of the Moscow Muslim Committee G. Iskhaki were responsible for arranging the Congress [Khabutdinov, 2008, p. 170]. The group also included the soon-to-be leader of the Xârbi Şura I. Alkin, who was in Petrograd at that time. A. Tsalikov and A.-Z. Walidi cooperated in the late March of 1917. A.-Z. Walidi recalled that it was critical for him to sow discord between the two most influential adherents of extraterritorial autonomy: A. Tsalikov and S. Maksudi. A.-Z. Validi established contact with representatives of the Caucasus, arranged a number of meetings with the Bashkirs, and arrived in Tashkent to recruit most of the advocates of territorial autonomy at the congress in Moscow [Koyash, 1917, 11 April; Togan, 1994, pp. 163–205; Sultanbekov, 1995, p. 56 ].

The protest thus was based on falsified data to politically isolate S. Maksudi. As a result, the last leader of the Tatar liberals who advocated evolutionary development of the Muslim community within Russia left Petrograd. The socialists, for whom S. Maksudi was a serious opponent, now had control over the Bureau. According to the initial version of the congress programme, Maksudi was to deliver a report on the national cultural autonomy, which A.Tsalikov undertook to prepare after he left. The issue of the Muslim military detachments was initially entrusted to K.-M. Tevkelev. The report was handed over to the representatives of the Moscow and Kazan branches of Xârbi Şura Galiev and G. Monasypov. Liberal advocates of Turkic unity thus lost control over two issues central to the Congress. All speakers, except for those supporting the establishment of religious autonomy in Inner Russia and Siberia, were socialists. Chairman of the

Chapter 6. The Revolution and Struggle for Power in the Kazan Guberniya and in Kazan in 1917-1918.
The Muslim Committees and Bureaus of Nizhny Novgorod, Zaysan, Tsaritsyno, Buzuluk, and even Baku supported the idea of holding a congress in Kazan. However, the Petrograd Bureau took the final decision to summon only All-Russian congress [Koyash, 1917, 9 April; Vakyt, 1917, 23 April].

The 1st All-Russian Muslim Congress in May 1917 was funded and largely controlled by the Tatars. The Tatars dominated the key boards of the Moscow Congress [Teregulov, 1926, p. 86]. The prevalence of the Tatars, similar to the situation at the All-Russian Muslim Congresses of 1905–1906 and 1914, was met with resistance on the part of most representatives of ethnic groups, each of whom wanted the interests of his community to prevail over the general interests of the Russia’s Muslims. In fact, the radical and socialist majority of the congress shared with the conservatives the intention to prevent any efficient All-Russia authorities from being established. That congress put an end to the ideas of political, administrative, and economic unity of the Russia’s Muslims, that is, to those of classical liberalism and the Islamic Turkic nation as developed by I. Gasprinski and his associates. The dominant idea of the Congress was not that of uniting all of the Russia’s Muslims within a single nation but that of forming separate nations of the key ethnic groups. Thus, all resolutions by the Congress, except for the resolution on the type of autonomy, had turned into declarations without any mechanisms of implementation before the Congress even ended. A. Tsalikov failed to ensure a majority of votes for an extraterritorial autonomy at the Congress. The issue of power was excluded from the All-Russia agenda, and moved to the level of separate ethnic groups [Khabutdinov, 2008, p. 171].

G. Ibragimov provided the most comprehensive evaluation of the situation—he only failed to factor in the formation of a distinct Bashkir ethnic group. He maintained that the unity of the Muslim peoples had to be political and economic, and not religious and cultural. G. Ibragimov suggested that five separate states should be created: Kazakhstan, the Caucasus, Turkestan, Tatarstan, and the Crimea [Irek, 1917, 15 June].

Thus, the 1st All-Russian Muslim Congress, held in Moscow in May 1917, was a double blow to the Turkic unity. On the one hand, the conservatives and part of the socialists proclaimed territorial autonomy and established the purely declarative All-Russian Milli Şura (National Council). On the other hand, the socialists took resolutions on equal rights for women and land allocation (socialization), which strengthened the intention of the conservatives from the Caucasus and Turkestan to ensure their isolation from the Muslims of the central regions. The congress elected G. Barudi Mufti of the OMSA. R. Fakhredtin, S. Urmakov, K. Tardzhemani, M. Bubi (the first and last woman), G. Suleymani, and G. Karashi were elected as qadis. Most of the Tatars believed that it would be impossible to reunite territories split among various governorates and populated with the Russians. F. Karimi predicted that the Tatars would constitute a minority in each state, so ‘the Muslims’ rights would be within the jurisdiction of their state parliaments, and being outnumbered, they would be unable to defend them’. Muslims would have fewer deputies in the federal parliament [Teregulov, 1926, p. 124].

The Tatars were able to establish representative (Merkez Milli Şura, Central (All-Russian) National Council) and executive (Executive Committee of Milli Şura-Iskomus) authorities of the Russia’s Muslims, headed by extraterritorial autonomist A. Tsalikov.

Speaking at a meeting of Merkez Milli Şura on 25 June 1917, S. Maksudi encouraged its members to observe resolutions by the Muslim Congress, which had established it, and go beyond the limits of interests of separate ethnic groups and towards the common interests of the Russia’s Muslims. The leader of Xärbi Şura I. Alkin criticised straightforward this statement by S. Maksudi [Davletshin, 1974, p. 109]. Therefore, even the Tatars had more than one opinion on the activities of Merkez Milli Şura. Representatives of other Muslim peoples appeared to ignore its work. During
the governmental crisis in July 1917, the Iskomus put forward an initiative to introduce the Muslims into the government. The Provisional Government rejected this suggestion [Davletshin, 1974, p. 109]. It is ironic that the only agreement reached between the Merkez Milli Şura and the Provisional Government was to increase the number of qadis in the OMSA from three to six [Iskhakov, 2003, p. 151]. When the Milli İdarə had been established and, more importantly, A. Tsalikov had been elected deputy to the Constituent Assembly to represent the Simbirsks guberniya and member of the Solux Xiyayet (Peace Board) under the Milli İdarə (10 January 1918), he coordinated his activities closely with Millât Mâclese. This is why he refused to establish a Muslim Committee within the Council of People’s Commissars in January 1918 [Khabutdinov, 2009, p. 268].

The only real enactment of Iskomus was the decision on the election procedure for the 2nd All-Russian Muslim Congress in Kazan. According to it, governorate Muslim meetings were to elect most of the delegates from among the representatives of district committees [Te-regulov, 1926, p. 154]. In contrast to the Moscow Congress, where city dwellers and young students were represented on a large scale, the representatives of rural areas received a majority of votes in Kazan, which determined the relative conservativism of this congress.

The congresses held in Kazan in July 1917 and the establishment of a cultural and national autonomous government formed the dominant Tatar national movement (see participant lists: [Kurultai, 1917, 8 August]). National liberal and moderate socialist leaders had nearly full control over the Waqitli Milli İdarə (Provisional National Government) and focused their attention on administrative rather than political activities.

We should begin analysis of the national congresses in Kazan in July 1917 by studying the clerical congress, which raised the basic questions of relations between religious and secular authorities, as well as the settlement of conflict between conservatism and modernism within the women’s issue. We will then explore the key problems, discussions, and decisions of the 2nd All-Russian Muslim Congress, which adopted resolutions and created structures to determine the development of Tatar extraterritorial autonomy.

The All-Russian Congress that opened in Kazan on 20 July 1917 was the pinnacle event of the clergy (golyama) movement. Apart from the Tatar and Bashkir representatives, it was attended by clergymen from the Crimea, the Caucasus, Turkestan, Kazakhstan, and Siberia [ Yöldz, 1917, 19 June]. Akhun Nursali Khasanov from Binski encouraged the congress members to enhance the role of the clergy. S. Maksudi disagreed with him, saying that clerical activities should be confined to three issues: meeting the needs of the cult, meeting the needs of the clergy as a class, and using the clergy’s spiritual power. He emphasised that the clergy should follow this path and not that of all-round influence. All the imams were opposed to this idea [ Yöldz, 1917, 19 June]. A paragraph was entered into the Charter of the Clerical Society specifying its mission: ‘To preserve the morals, customs, and religion of Islam’ [ Yöldz, 1917, 26 June].

The congress discussed women’s rights at its meeting on 24 July. A conservative Murad Ramzi (Mekki) presented a report. He harshly criticized the decision to ensure equal rights for women as one inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the Tatar Islamic society. To the contrary, M. Bigi maintained that ‘men and women are equal in every right, without exception’. He advocated autonomous families in order to prevent the Islamic states from collapsing. A majority of the congress members could not accept such radical ideas [ Yöldz, 1917, 26 June, 27 July; Khabutdinov, 2000a, pp. 114–116].

Representatives of the clergy at the congress were generally able to counter the liberals with their opinion on the women’s question. However, it was the Joint Meeting of the Kazan Muslim Congresses on 22 July 1917 which included the muftiate as a nätzärîte (ministry) in the national cultural autonomy government,
thus enabling the secular power to control the religious one. By giving up a number of liberal ideas (most importantly, by restricting women’s equality), the secular leaders were able to build alliances with most of the spiritual ones [Yöldiz, 1917, 27 July]. The leaders of the Ufa Social Revolutionaries, the Xârbi Şura and the MSC, were opposed to the concession [Teregulov, 1926, pp. 205–209]. The Spiritual Assembly acted to stabilize relations between the radical youth and the conservative majority of common people. This episode was one of the key reasons why the relations between the Turkist-controlled muftiate and the socialist Tatar youth deteriorated. The collision on the women’s question was one of the key problems that caused the conflict between the majority of the Congress and the socialist minority. Its basic fault was unawareness of the structure of the Tatar community and the positions of its major groups, which was similar to the position of the Tangchylar and Urachylar. The radical socialist group, which had formed in the context of the 1905–1907 Revolution, believed it reasonable to accept the opinion of the people’s majority, though they advocated equal rights for women [Khabutdinov, 2008, pp. 186–189].

National cultural autonomy was proclaimed for the Muslim Turko-Tatars of Inner Russia and Siberia at the joint meeting of the congresses on 22 July 1917 [Yöldiz, 1917, 26 July].

A discussion was held on 24 July concerning Muslim involvement in All-Russia political activities and relations with the Provisional Government. G. Iskhaki demanded on behalf of the congresses that ‘the government view cooperation with central national organizations of the peoples of Russia as its duty’. The Millî Şûra and Xârbi Şûra sent telegrams to the Provisional Government to inform it that they would begin to form Muslim regiments without the government’s approval if it did not grant permission.

G. Iskhaki reported on the tactics for elections to the Constituent Assembly. Three variants were proposed: a single Muslim list, alignment with the Socialists, and a separate list for each governorate, developed by the governorate’s Millî Şûra. The last variant was adopted [Yöldiz, 1917, 2 August].

A discussion began on 29 July that caused a conflict between the main wing of the congress and G. Ibragimov and M. Sultan-Galiev. In his report, G. Teregulov maintained that the decision to socialize lands and to return to the İttifaq’s traditional provision of confiscating without compensation state-owned, cabinet-owned, monastery-owned, and appanage lands adopted by the 1st All-Russian Muslim Congress should be cancelled. G. Ibragimov, who spoke on behalf of the minority, advocated the implementation of the land socialization provision. He even agreed to postpone discussions on the form of the autonomy but insisted that the land had to be socialized. The personal rivalry between G. Teregulov and G. Ibragimov as the leaders of the Ufa guberniya’s most influential Muslim organizations made this debate especially fierce. It was the beginning of a discord between the agrarian socialists and the main wing of the Muslim movement of the Ufa guberniya. In the end, G. Teregulov’s resolution was adopted.

M. Sultan-Galiev reported on issues concerning publishing activities. His suggestion was to identify ten regions, each with a separate network of publishing offices and book warehouses. G. Teregulov and F. Tuktarov, the leaders of the Kazan and Ufa guberniya Millî Şûras, rejected this proposal. Publishing issues were referred to the Department for Education [Yöldiz, 1917, 4 August]. Thus, M. Sultan-Galiev was unable to gain a foothold among the national elite, and this led him towards an alliance with the Muslim Socialist Committee and M. Vakhitov.

On 19 July, the ‘Kurultai’ newspaper by the Kazan guberniya Millî Şûra published an article by G. Shnasi titled: ‘How to implement national cultural autonomy for the Muslims of the Volga region?’ The author maintained that there existed two opinions for the type of relations between the All-Russian Millî Şûra and the Spiritual Assembly. One was that the Millî
Şura had to function under the Spiritual Assembly, while the other viewed the Spiritual Assembly as a separate part of the Milli Şura. Shnasi suggested that the structure of the Milli Şura should include the following departments: Religion, Justice (to exercise supervision over courts), Education and Printed Media (to provide secular education within the religious school and publish educational literature), Organization and Propaganda (for elections to administrative bodies), Finance and Waqf, Statistics, and Xârbi Şura [Kurultai, 1917, 19 July]. Thus, issues of structural arrangement of autonomous authorities remained unsettled until the last day of the congress. Even the fundamental question of the relations between religious and secular authorities and their relations with the Xârbi Şura were not solved. Factual evidence confirms the account of the events presented by S. Maksudi’s daughter Adile Ayda, who claimed that her father had developed by himself the autonomy structure and relations with the Spiritual Assembly [Ayda, 1996, pp. 100–101].

It should be noted, however, that the draft for the reform of the OMSA (further referred to as OMSA), which was presented by Yu. Akchura at the meeting of şölyama jâmiğyte under the auspices of the OMSA in Ufa in April 1905, suggested that the clergy should be classified into three categories: ‘akhuns, muhtasibs, and mudarrisises have legal structure and responsibilities. Akhuns control (nâzâretè tep) justice—legal issues (gâdeliâ) within mahallahs; muhtasibs control financial (mâliâ) and organizational (îdariiâ) issues; and mudarrisises are responsible for education (tağlim). Each is the leader of the local clergy on certain issues' (p.12). The OMSA consisted of a mufifi and six qadis and was further subdivided into three departments: 1) the Legal Department (gâdeliâ) run by akhuns; 2) the Managerial Department led by muhtasibs; 3) the Department for Education run by mudarrisises (p. 17) [Bigi, 1917, p. 44]. We see, as a matter of fact, the founding principles of the Milli İdarâ (National Administration), which was established in 1917, reflected here. The OMSA laid the foundation for the three nâzâretè (agencies) within the Milli İdarâ: the spiritual agency (dînîi), the financial agency (mâlii), and the agency for education (mâğârîf).

Even the last day of the congress was marked by a debate over the procedure for introducing national cultural autonomy. On behalf of his section, G. Shnasi advocated immediate introduction of autonomy. His principal opponents were Chairmen of the Ufa and Kazan Milli Şura G. Teregulov and F. Tuktarov, and Chairman of the Xârbi Şura I. Alkin. S. Maksudi and H.-G. Gabiyashi supported G. Shnasi. As a result, the decision was approved by an overwhelming majority of votes [Yöldüz, 1917, 11 August].

The congresses that took place in Kazan in July 1917 (the Muslim, Military, and Clerical Congresses) formed a government of cultural and national autonomy, and assured Tatar dominance of the national movement. The representative and executive bodies were the most active centres promulgating national cultural autonomy. While in May–July 1917, religious and secular authorities functioned separately and in parallel to one another, in July 1917, the muftiâte became a nâzâretè (ministry) within the autonomous government thus putting control of religious matters under secular auspices. Concessions were ensured by giving up a number of liberal ideas: the most important of these resulted in limitations on women’s rights. Thus, secular leaders were able to ally with most of the clergy while preserving the fundamental principles of the traditional community. The Waqith Milli İdarâ (the Provisional National Government) and Milli Şuras (National Councils) in the guberniyas, as well as local committees, became actual authorities [Khabutdinov, 1996, p.31].
§ 2. Organs of Tatar National Autonomy in 1917–1919

Aydar Khabutdinov

National cultural autonomy was proclaimed under the rubric of 'the Muslim Turko-Tatars in Inner Russia and Siberia' at the joint meeting of Muslim congresses on 22 July 1917; a resolution was taken to the effect that it was to be implemented immediately (see coverage in printed media: [Usmanova, 1994]). The three prospective ministries of self-government established at the 2nd All-Russian Muslim Congress in Kazan in July 1917 by the Waqtî Millî İdarâ (the Provisional National Government) represented, in fact, the three most powerful professional corporations in the Tatar world. The Millî İdarâ was composed of three nazarâtes (ministries): Mâğârîf (education), Mâliî (finance), and Diniî (religion). Diniî Nazarâte preserved its composition, elected at the 1st All-Russian Muslim Congress in May 1917. The other two nazarâtes were made up of the members of Mâğârîf from 'Böten Rusiya Uktuça râcíyâtî' (the All-Russian Teachers’ Association'), while Mâliî members were mostly bourgeois representatives of local national funds. The three nation-wide centres: Kazan, Ufa, and Orenburg–Troitsk had representatives in each nazarâte. Thus, the national administration had to rely on existing corporations and their boards for new personnel. S. Maksudi was politically and administratively adept at using the authorities to solve common national issues and bringing them under control of the united national government. By establishing the Millî İdarâ, the secular intelligentsia was able to remain in control of the nation’s social movement (see: [Khabutdinov, 1999, pp. 95–99; Khabutdinov, 2000a, pp. 103–111; Khabutdinov, 2008, pp.191–196]). S. Maksudi, Ibn. Akhtyamov, G. Sharaf, A. Mukhiedinov, F. Karimi, K. Karimov, N. Khalîfîn and Kh. Atlasî were elected members of the Board for the Implementation of Autonomy. Kazan, Ufa, and Orenburg received geographical representation. Simultaneously with moderate socialists like Akhtyamov, Sharaf and Khalîfîn, Mukhîedîno va joined the Board as a representative of the Muslim Socialist Committee [Kurultai, 1917, 8 August].

The Board for the Implementation of Autonomy met for the first time in Ufa on 25 August 1917. The meeting was attended by most of its members and those of nazarâte boards [Tormış, 1917, 27 August]. The self-rule government took its first practical steps to develop a constitution and set up internal structures at that time.

Following the Kazan Congress, Diniî Nazarâte was finally established as one of the self-government authorities [Tormış, 1917, 16 October]. The Ufa guberniya Meeting of the Clergy (golyama) in September 1917 decided that all religious schools should receive funding from their respective departments of the Millî Şûra. Religion Classes were established as compulsory in all schools [Tormış, 1917, 18 October].

The Mâliî Nazarâte met in Ufa on 10–13 October 1917 to address the issue of ‘a national treasury of the Turko-Tatars of Inner Russia and Siberia’. The Millî Xâzinî (the National Treasury) was to ensure funding for the self-government authorities, hospitals, orphanages, and trade schools. A resolution was adopted that a minimum of 1% of property should be allocated for national needs. They considered various ways of raising funds, such as taxation, direct appeal to the wealthy, and subscriptions. The meeting led to the establishment of the Central Board of the Millî Xâzinî and the Consultative Board under the Nâzârat, which consisted of 29 members [Tormış, 1917, 16 October].

A meeting under the Mâğârîf Nâzârâte took place on 1 November 1917. Issues on the agenda included teachers’ colleges, provisional courses, the establishment of non-classical secondary schools, upper-level courses, higher educational teaching institutes, and, in

general, the question of national higher education. The most favorable situation was in Orenburg, where successful cooperation between self-government institutions and the provincial zemstvo ensured funding of Islamic education. They mainly opened national schools, mostly primary, on a large scale, created Muslim educational departments or jobs for instructors at uyezd’s zemstvos, and set up provisional courses. It was difficult to establish secondary schools: out of 130 schools in the Chistopol uyezd of the Kazan guberniya, there were only two six-year schools. G. Teregulov advocated cooperation with the zemstvos, providing that an independent Muslim educational system would be introduced [Tormuş, 1917, 3 November].

The Committee for Education was established in the Menzelinsk uyezd of the Ufa guberniya in August 1917. Its mission was to transform zemsky ministry, and Kryashen schools into national ones; to establish six-year summer schools in 90 auls and teachers’ courses in Menzelinsk; to provide training in the Tatar language and history for Muslim children in non-classical secondary school, in college preparatory schools and in local vocational schools. These goals were achieved in November [Tormuş, 1917, 8 November].

We should analyze the structure of local governing bodies. Regional (governorate) authorities were established following the creation of local committees and bureaus in April 1917. After the Waqfı Milli İdarə had been established, the process of appointing representatives of Milli İdarə nəzərət departments at the provincial level began. In April of 1918, they attempted to create national districts (milli wilayətlər) as self-governing territorial units.

In 1917, governorate-level Muslim congresses were held in Ufa on 14–17 April and in Kazan on 23–24 April to establish national councils at the governorate level. An administrative system was finalized in late August, when the following provincial agencies were established in the Kazan guberniya:

1) the Kazan Provincial Muslim Assembly (Kurultai), a congress;

2) the Kazan Provincial Muslim Council (Milli Şura), a representative body;

3) the Kazan Provincial Muslim Administration (Milli İdarə), an executive body consisting of the following departments: Religion, Education, Finances, Statistics, and Propaganda [Koyash, 1917, 22 August].

The Statistical Department of the Kazan Muslim Committee, headed by G. Sharaf, was established on 15 July 1917. Its responsibility was as follows: to find out the number and percentage of representatives of different ethnic groups; to calculate the number of school-aged children and the amount of Tatar-owned land [Kurultai, 1917, 16 July]. All maps displaying Tatar autonomous territory were based upon this data.

The Provincial Muslim Congress in Kazan took place on 16–19 August 1917. The following imams made up the idarə (administration) of the Kazan Provincial Milli Şura: İmam K. Salikhi, F. Tuktarov, M. Kurbangaliyev, G. Gabaydullin, N. Khaftin, Gilm. Sharaf, and Kh. Saiftullin. They were associates of F. Tuktarov, mostly moderate socialists [Koyash, 1917, 22 August].

Local authorities for the national cultural autonomy were established in the autumn of 1917. The Kazan Provincial Milli Şura was the first to act upon this decision. Meeting on 31 August, they resolved to establish Milli İdarə agencies across the governorate. Particular attention was paid to the establishment of educational departments and ensuring control over madrasahs [Koyash, 1917, 3 September].

At a meeting of the Ufa Provincial Milli Şura on 29–30 October 1917, they established a presidium, made up of the following members: G. Teregulov, Z. Kadyry, A.-Z. Validi, G. Ibragimov, F. Saifi, and F. Akhmadullin. Thus, the presidium’s leadership included three representatives of ethnic majorities, two of the Socialist Revolutionary minority, and one representative of the Bashkir autonomists. Chairmen of provincial departments of Milli İdarə were elected: muhtasib Ziya Kamali; Head of the Department Māliā Nəzərəte Khidayatulla Enikeev; and Head of
The government appointed muhtasibs loyal to the highest point in the national movement. Due to the realities of everyday life, there was no general election to the parliament. Instead, elections took place at the provincial Millî Şuras and at Xârbi Şura offices for those on active duty. The Millät Mâclese was supposed to adopt the Constitution of the national cultural autonomy and form its government, which would have made the Tatar nation a legal and autonomous entity.

But before Millät Mâclese commenced its work on 20 November 1917, Sh. Akhmadiev, Chairman of the Salesmen’ Union, deputy of the Millät Mâclese from Kazan and member of the Islamic Socialist Committee (MSK), suggested that a telegram be sent to the Council of People’s Commissars, as they had previously done to the Provisional Government, informing them of the opening session of parliament. The decision was rejected upon the insistence of F. Saïfî and G. Battal.

S. Maksudi opened the meeting of the Millät Mâclese on 20 November 1917. The main part of his speech was devoted to the Board’s report on the implementation of national cultural autonomy. Maksudi stated that the Millâî Nâzârâte had established the Millî Xâzînâ (the National Treasury), in which there was more than a million rubles, while the Mâğârîf Nâzârâte had established contacts with zemstvos and official institutions. The Board had worked out a number of bills for the Millät Mâclese to pass, and distributed information on the autonomy via the network of imams. Maksudi then elaborated on the importance of the Millät Mâclese and autonomy to the nation’s future: ‘The northern Turko-Tatars have now declared their existence to the entire world’. In conclusion, S. Maksudi encouraged the nation to rely on itself and its people. Maksudi advocated in his speech, in fact, moving away from the notion of all-Russian Muslim unity and towards all-Tatar national unity [Tormuş, 1917, 22 November].

The next report was presented by G. Iskhaki on behalf of the all-Russian Millî Şura. Iskhaki admitted that it was not actually functioning as an all-Russian authority. In response, I. Ramiev advocated, on behalf of the Ufa Military Council, which was connected with G. Ibragimov’s group, the creation of a federation of the Uradian Muslims that would include those from Bashkiria. I. Ramiev said that their main goal was to establish a state of their own and that
he would appreciate greater financial aid for establishment of national regiments [Tormuş, 1917, 22 November]. However, negotiations with leader of the Bashkir autonomy A.-Z. Walidi were unsuccessful.

Two groups within the Millät Mäclese announced their intent to form parties: the Turkists and the Tatarists. The faction of Turkists had prerequisites for forming a united national party. Thus, an announcement concerning the formation of the 'Turkist Party' appeared on 8 December 1917. A group of five members (G. Iskhaki, G. Teregulov, Z. Kadyri, A.-H. Maksudi, and I. Bikkulov) was elected to develop the programme [Tormuş, 1917, 8 December]. The Turkists maintained that 'In the development of national and cultural institutions, the Turks of Inner Russia and Siberia should avoid tribal divisions and go forth under the banner of Turkism, thus unifying cultural affairs under one banner'. In terms of territorial autonomy, they entrusted the Constituent Assembly to decide whether or not a state should be proclaimed on the Volga River and in the Southern Urals. National cultural autonomy was to be implemented regardless of how the situation in Russia developed [Tormuş, 1917, 26 November]. The Turkists disagreed about the means of attaining the autonomy. In fact, power was redistributed among factions when decisions concerning territorial autonomy were handed over to the members of the Islamic faction of the Constituent Assembly. Other leaders of the faction, headed by S. Maksudi, focused their efforts on the Milli İdarə.

The Tatarists advocated territorial autonomy. However, there was discord between the Kazan group, which was centered around the Xərbi Şura and part of the Kazan Milli Şura, and the Ufa group, which had ties to the leftist faction of the Ufa Milli Şura. Each group struggled to gain control over the power within the state, and to proclaim Kazan or Ufa, respectively, its capital. Leader of the Muslim Socialist Committee M. Vakhitov did not visit Ufa at all.

On 25 December 1917, Yoldız published the article 'The Bolsheviks and Muslims', which contained the first report on the negotiations that had begun in Petrograd between People’s Commissar of Nationalities J. Stalin and A. Tsalikov, Chairman of the All-Russian Milli Şura. J. Stalin offered A. Tsalikov the leadership of a commissariat to be elected by a presidium of all Muslim peoples. A Muslim socialist was to be vice commissar. A. Tsalikov proposed the question to the Millät Mäclese and the All-Russian Milli Şura for consideration, but they refused to cooperate with the Bolsheviks [Yoldız, 1917, 25 December; Volobuev, edit., 1993, pp. 337–338]. Thus, all attempts by G. Ibragimov to bring his organization to the national arena were unsuccessful at the time.

On 3 January 1918 Tatarist G. Sharaf reported on plans to establish territorial autonomy. He announced that representatives of the nation, who were scattered among different governorates, needed to create a separate state [Tormuş,1918, 5 January] (see Idel-Ural concepts: [Khabutdinov, 2001a, pp. 50–59]). Turkist G. Iskhaki maintained that, in establishing a new state, they must focus on its economic sector: the Volga River must be its most important transport corridor. Since Azerbaijan and Turkestan shared borders with Turkey, it would be crucial to have access to these territories and the Caspian Sea. In response to the remark that this suggestion was unrealistic, Iskhaki proposed a referendum. If it should turn out that the population was opposed to this idea, they would give up their claim to Samara and Astrakhan guberniyas [Tormuş, 1918, 9 January].

The Board for Territorial Autonomy (the so-called Board of the Idel-Ural State—BIUS) informed the Millät Mäclese of three plans aimed at establishing Muslim autonomy in the Volga-Ural region. According to one plan, the state should include all of the Tatar, Chuvash, and Mari people. Thus, 44% of the population would be the Muslims. The plan was known as Idel-Ural Map 1. According to the second plan (Idel-Ural Map 2), the state would encompass the entire territories of Kazan and Ufa guberniyas and part of Perm, Orenburg, Samara,
and Simbirsk guberniyas. In this manner, the Muslims would represent 51% of the population. According to the third plan (the Big Idel-Ural State), the state would be composed of the entire Samara guberniya and the Bukey Horde. Here, the Muslims accounted for 29% of the population, and the Slavs, for 56%.

In the same report, G. Sharaf suggested a six-point resolution proclaiming the Idel-Ural State. The first paragraph of the draft resolution proclaimed the state within the territory dominated by representatives of the different nationalities, but did so in the name of national and economic interests of all nations within the state. The state was comprised of Kazan and Ufa guberniyas in their entirety, and parts of Orenburg, Samara, Perm, Simbirsk, and Vyatkaguberniyas, including the Chuvash and Mari territories. A legislative parliament responsible for all issues, with the exception of those referred to the federal parliament, was proclaimed the supreme authority in the state. The federation would have authority over the post, telegraph, railway and water communications, measures of weight and length, basic monetary regulations, basic civil, criminal, commercial, and exchange law, federal taxes, international loans, foreign policy, and customs. Only in these matters would laws adopted by the federal parliament prevail over those of local parliaments. Equality among ethnic groups, languages, and religions was declared in the state. The state’s parliament was not expected to participate in the passage of federal legislation and in the work of federal organizations [Tormuş,1918, 7 January].

On 5 January 1918, the All-Russian Constituent Assembly adopted the Resolution on Russia’s State Structure, in which the Russian State was proclaimed the Russian Democratic Federation, inseparably uniting peoples and regions, sovereign within the limits specified in the federal Constitution [Vserossijskoe Uchreditel’noe sobranie, 1930, p. 113].

Earlier on 5 January 1918, A. Tsalikov had announced the Declaration of the Islamic Socialist Faction. It stated that ‘the Council of People’s Commissars had been unable to ensure among the Russian peoples the free development and unimpeded realization of national cultures’. The declaration demanded that ‘Russia be recognized as a federal republic, and that the Constituent Assembly should...authorize the establishment of states’, including that of the Volga region (Povolzhye) and the Southern Urals. It envisaged socialization of land by means of special land codes for parts of the federation. The declaration provided for army nationalization [Vserossijskoe Uchreditel’noe sobranie, 1930, p. 113].

The following day after the Russian Federative Republic was declared on 6 January 1918, the Millät Mäclese proclaimed a constituent unit—the Idel-Ural State—and decided on the procedure for establishing the state. On that day, the leader of the Bashkir Autonomy A.-Z. Walidi conclusively rejected the idea of united autonomy when speaking at a session of the Millät Mäclese. The Board of the Idel-Ural State was to ensure that a congress was summoned in Ufa to adopt the state’s provisional constitution and establish a provisional government. It had to be agreed with representatives of national organizations within the peoples’ state. The Board of the Idel-Ural State was to develop a draft constitution, as well as define the state’s borders and economic status. It was agreed that the Xärbi Şura would be accountable to the Board of the Idel-Ural State. It could not elect any additional Muslim members but was entitled to elect new Board of the Idel-Ural State members representing other nations.

On 8 January 1918, G. Sharaf, S. Engalychev, F. Mukhammedyarov, N. Khaflin, S. Atanagulov, G. Gubaydullin, I. Alkin, and F. Saifi were elected to the Board of the Idel-Ural State. Representatives of Kazan dominated the Board of the Idel-Ural State. G. Sharaf, N. Khaflin, and G. Gubaydullin represented the Provincial Millät Şura; I. Alkin, Xärbi Şura; F. Mukhamedyarov, the Islamic Socialist Committee. The only representatives of Ufa and G. Ibragimov’s group were S. Atanagulov and F. Saifi, S. Engalychev did not participate in the Board’s work. The other members of the Board of the Idel-Ural State arrived in Kazan on 21 January.
The Millät Mäclese accepted the Board’s territorial autonomy project but added a supplementary paragraph. The third paragraph of the resolution read as follows, 'Being a people’s republic in terms of its government, the Idel-Ural Ölkäse along with the other ‘ölkä’ (regions, states) constitutes the Russian Federative Republic [Tömür, 1918, 8 and 10 January].

Territorial autonomy was thus proclaimed for the Tatar nation. The autonomy was to be guided by the founding principle of equal rights for all peoples within the state, while adhering to their national cultural autonomy. The Idel-Ural State was viewed as a constituent entity of the federal republic. Just like Russia, the state was established as a parliamentary republic. In the absence of federal law and a constitution, the founders of the state were to determine its principal powers and those vested in the central government on their own. That was a draft document, which was to be amended during negotiations with the central government as decided by the federal parliament. In fact, neither of the bodies existed at that time, and power was transferred to the Soviet authorities. Millät Mäclese deputies established the state to preserve the parliamentary government as a counterweight to the power of the Soviets.

At that time, Muslims had to take sides in the conflict between the majority of the Constituent Assembly and the Council of People’s Commissars [Tömür, 1918, 8 and 10 January; Yöldiz, 1918, 25 January]. Only G. Ibragimov supported the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and left the All-Russian Constituent Assembly along with the Bolsheviks and the Left Social Revolutionaries. The Tatars formed the so-called ‘Islamic Socialist Faction’ of A. Tsalikov, S. Salikhov, F. Tuktarov, Sh. Mukhammedyarov, Sh. Sunchalay, A. Mukhametdinov, G. Ilyasov, and M. Akhmerov. F. Tuktarov and F. Mukhamedyarov fully supported the political stance of the Socialist Revolutionaries’ leader, Chairman of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, V. Chernov, and advocated the struggle against the Council of People’s Commissars. J. Stalin, People’s Commissar of Nationalities in the Council of People’s Commissars, met with Muslim deputies representing the Idel-Ural State in the building that housed the All-Russian Milli Şura. G. Ibragimov, M. Vakhitov, and Bashkir representative Sh. Manatov tried to entice A. Tsalikov to become leader of the prospective commissariat, but he supported the Islamic faction. As a result, G. Ibragimov, M. Vakhitov, and Sh. Manatov decided on the terms of cooperation with the Soviet government at a meeting with the Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars, V. Lenin, and J. Stalin, on 7 January 1918. Ibragimov and Stalin had arranged the meeting. The Council of People’s Commissars gained partial control over the Tatar movement in Ufa and Kazan as well as the Bashkir movement [Ibragimov, 1922, pp. 140–143; Vakhitov, 1967, p. 116; Volobuev, edit., 1993, pp. 61, 203].

Millät Mäclese deputies refused to negotiate with the Soviet government and continued with the process of creating bodies for national cultural autonomy. On 5 January 1918, Sadri Maksudi was elected chairman of the Milli İdarə [Tömür, 1918, 9 January]. On 11 January 1918, the first session of the Millät Mäclese closed after proclaiming the autonomy’s Constitution [Muxtariyat, 1918, 16 January]. The Milli İdarə was proclaimed the nation’s only superior legislative body during the interim period. Qadıs R. Fakhretdin, S. Urmanov, K. Tardzhemani, M. Bubi, G. Suleymani, M. Makhmudov were elected to the Diniyyä Nəzarəti. G. Barudi remained the chairman. The real power in the Dinii Nəzərətė was still held by members of the Naqşbandiyya Tariqa: namely Sheikh Barudi and his murəd Tardzhemani and Suleymani, clergymen connected with Kazan’s bourgeoisie. Zakir Kadyry, Mardelgalim Makhmudov, Ismagil Utyamyşev, Gumer Teregulov, Gali Enikeev, and Ibragim Bikkulov were elected members of the Məğərif Nəzərətə, presided over by Nadzhib Kurbangaliev. Within the nəzərətė, N. Kurbangaliev represented Orenburg, four members represented Ufa, and I. Utyamyshev and I. Bikkulov represented Kazan. The Məlli Nəzərətə consisted of Salim-Girey Dzhantyurin, Garif
Karimov, Gali Kuramanaev, Latyf Yaushev, Gabdulla Bubi, and Nadzhib Khakimov, all headed by Shahjulla Alkin. The näzärâte was dominated by Ufa bourgeoisie, represented by Sh. Alkin, S. Dzhantyurin, and N. Khakimov; G. Karimov represented Orenburg, and L. Yaushev represented Troitsk. An 'ıçelâr xâyâte' (ambassadorial board) was elected as a representative body under the central government. The board included members of the All-Russian Milli Şura S. Mamliev, Z. Shamil, and G. Iskhaki [Tormuş, 1918, 14 January].

Since it was impossible to summon a new session of the Millât Mâéclese, the Milli İdarâ resolved to establish 34 millî wilâyâts (national regions). They covered territory from the Baltic region to the Far East. Ufa guberniya was split into five wilâyâts, while Kazan and Orenburg guberniyas were made up of four [Yöldiz, 1918, 22 April].

As a response to the dissolution of the Millî İdarâ on 25 (12) April 1918, the 'Tormuş' newspaper published an address to all local and all Millî İdarâs by the autonomy’s government. It maintained that it was illegal to dissolve Millî İdarâ as a non-partisan all-national authority. Local Millî İdarâs were encouraged to ensure proper performance in religious, national, and cultural life, charity, national tax collection, and representation in zemsky and city organizations in accordance with the autonomy’s constitution. Members of the Muslim Commissariat were proclaimed government officials who had wrongfully interfered in areas that should be the responsibility of nationally-elected authorities. The address was signed by Millî İdarâ Chairman, S. Maksudi, and näzärâte chairmen G. Barudi, N. Kurbangaliyev, and Sh. Alkin [Tormuş, 1918, 25 April].

According to G. Kasimov, the Millî İdarâ had the following cost allocation from October 1917 to 23 April 1918: Ufa madrasahs 'Galliyâ' and 'Usmaniya' received 25,000 roubles; the Board of the Idel-Ural State, 110,500 roubles; the Kazan Department of the Diniâ Näzärâte and the Muxtariyât Magazine, 22,604 roubles; members of the Millât Mâéclese, the Millî İdarâ, and officials, 184,533 roubles. The total costs amounted to 418,696 roubles [Kasîymi, 1918, pp. 43, 51].

Religious autonomy was formally restored after the Millî İdarâ was liquidated in April 1918, as the leaders of the Muslim Commissariat did not contest the powers of the Spiritual Assembly. The resolution to dissolve the Millî İdarâ specified that the Spiritual Assembly was to be preserved [Khañizov, 1960, p. 33]. However, Mufti Galimdzhan Barudi and the qadis still believed themselves to be members of the Diniâ Nâzârât. S. Maksudi had to leave Ufa for fear of being arrested.

On 7 July 1918, the Millî İdarâ of three näzärâtes resumed its work after troops of the Committee of Members of the Constituent Assembly took control of Ufa on 5 July. The chairman of the Mâğarîf Nâzârât, Nadzhib Kurbangaliyev, became provisional chairman of the Millî İdarâ. A congratulatory letter on liberation from Bolshevik power was signed by chairman of the Diniâ Nâzârât, Galimdzhan Barudi, Riza qâdi Fakhredîn, Salikhdzhan qâdi Urmanov, Kashshaf qâdi Tardzhemani, and Gabdulla qâdi Suleymani [Ufa heberlerê, 1918, 26 June (O.S.)]. The Address by the Committee of Members of the Constituent Assembly 'To the Turkic-Tatar people of the Russian State' dated [6 September] 1918 proclaims the Millî İdarâ in Ufa a 'provisional national self-government authority' [Vestnik Komucha (Bulletin of Komuch), 1918, 8 September].

Millî İdarâ members signed the Constitution of the Ufa Directorate—the Declaration on the Establishment of All-Russian Superior Power—in September 1918. It referred to the Millî İdarâ as the National Administration of the Turko-Tatars of Inner Russia and Siberia. S.-G. Dzhantyurin (Mâliâ Näzârât member), G. Iskhaki, and S. Mamliev (both members of 'ıçelâr xâyâte') were among those mentioned as its representatives. Ibn. Akhtiamov was on the list of representatives of the Congress of Towns and Zemstvos of Siberia, the Urals, and the Volga region [Gessen, cr., 1991, pp. 191–193].

Shortly before the Bolsheviks re-occupied Ufa on 31 December 1918, the leaders
of the Millī Īdarā departed for Petropavlovsk. However, Admiral Kolchak, whose administration was opposed to the national governments, gained power on 18 November 1918. Still, throughout 1919, the white regime was required to maintain contacts with representatives of Tatar regional communities in the Urals, Siberia and Kazakhstan, which were in fact subordinated to the Millī Īdarā and held a number of religious and educational events [Nam, 1998]. In Petropavlovsk, Millī Īdarā Chairman (former vice chairman) Ibnyamin Akhtyamov, Vice Chairman qadi Salikhdzhan Urmanov, and Secretary Ibragim Bikkulov, also a member of the Māğārif Nāzārāte, formed the core of the Millī Īdarā. The Diniyā Nāzārāte was represented by Mufti G. Barudi; Māğārif, by members Z. Kadyri and G. Enikeev; Mālīa, by Sh. Alkin and members S.-G. Dzhantyurin and G. Karimov. [Central State Archive of historical and political documentation of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 36, File 106, Sheets 137 reverse–138]. In 1919, S. Maksudi made an unsuccessful attempt at securing the nation’s status at the Paris Peace Conference. After the Kolchak regime was defeated in January 1920, the Millī Īdarā ceased to exist entirely (the last known document is dated 13 December 1919). G. Barudi returned to Ufa. R. Fakhretdin, unlike the mufti and other qadis, refused to leave Ufa in late 1918, and the Diniyā Nāzārāte continued to exist. The Diniyā Nāzārāte in Ufa was the only permanently functioning nāzārāte of the Millī Īdarā during the Civil War in spite of repressions by the Soviet government and Kolchak’s White Guard regime.

§ 3. The Kazan Muslim Congresses and the Proclamation of 'Cultural National Autonomy'

Dilyara Usmanova

A number of Muslim congresses took place in Kazan in the summer of 1917. Their participants, the nature of the work undertaken, and the resolutions made give a clear insight into the changed nature of the national movement. The 2nd All-Russian Muslim Congress was held in Kazan from 21 July to 2 August 1917. Two more Muslim forums took place in Kazan at the same time: the Islamic Clergy Congress (17–21 July 1917, about 250 delegates), and the Muslim Soldiers’ Congress (17–26 July 1917, about 200 delegates) [Vserossijskie s`ezdy` musul`man, 2002, pp. 642–644].

The Islamic Clergy Congress was focused on two issues: religious institutions and women’s rights. Once again, as with the Moscow Congress, the most heated debate was on the question of women because traditionalist sections of the clergy joined together to oppose the idea of granting equal rights to women. Mufti Galimdzhana Barudi was able to arrive at a compromise and relieve tensions during negotiations with representatives from women’s organizations.

The Military Congress was summoned on the initiative of the Provisional All-Russian Muslim Military Council. Issues addressed by the Congress included: ethnicity-based military detachments, elections to the Constituent Assembly, question regarding women and agriculture, etc. In terms of the woman question, the delegates spoke out in favour of equal civil and political rights for men and women. The Military Şura’s leaders’s political platform was close to that of the socialist party bloc. The Military Congress established the All-Russian Muslim Military Council Xärbi Şura, headed by I. Alkin, and elected 36 of its 67 members. It also resolved to publish the Beznene Tavş newspaper.

However, the 2nd All-Russian Muslim Congress, which, with about 200 delegates, seemed small compared to the Moscow Congress, was the most important of the three Kazan congresses. Among the most well-
known delegates to the Congress were Akhmet Tsalikov, Ibniyamin Akhtyamov, Gayaz Iskhami, Sadri Maksudi, and Usman Tokumbetov. However, the Congress was not attended by representatives of Turkestan, the Caucasus, and the Crimea, with some minor exceptions. The representation of the Idel-Ural region was incomparable with the May Congress, indicative of the changing situation in the country. The poor representation is probably attributable to the general deterioration of the population’s finances caused by galloping inflation and the ongoing world war. The second reason was a clear drop in social activity during the summer of 1917, when disappointment and apathy replaced the euphoria of the spring. There was a third important factor. The summer of 1917 was the time when the 'all-Muslim' movement split into regional and 'traditional' leaders of the Tatar national movement: the Turko-Tatars of Inner Russia and Siberia. On 22 July 1917, a joint meeting of the three Muslim congresses—the All-Muslim, Military, and Religious Congresses—proclaimed 'cultural national autonomy for the Muslims of Inner Russia and Siberia.' The meeting was declared to be historic, and the day was established as a holiday. Reports on the issue were presented by S. Maksudi, Gumer Teregulov, Hasan-Gata Gabashi, and Gabdulla Shinasi [Koriltay, 1917, No.7, 28 July; Yulduz, 1917; Iskhami, 1931; Daulet, 2008].

S. Maksudi was not only a leader but also an accepted authority and theorist who played a founding role in the development of the idea of 'cultural national autonomy' as applied to the Turko-Tatars’ situation in Russia. S. Maksudi’s speech relied on the following key principles. Firstly, he recognized the right of all peoples, including the 'Muslim' nation, to self-protection and development. Secondly, he demanded that governmental non-interference with peoples’ internal affairs should be enshrined in law. On the theme of what makes up national life, the speaker highlighted the following key aspects: 'Having often thought hard on this subject, I have reached a conclusion, become convinced, even, that the following three things are crucial to the preservation of our nation: language, religion, and customs (traditions). According to the speaker, these three notions incorporated literature, books, schools, etc. Each nation, including Russian Muslims, should be protected against governmental interference in their national affairs. The right of independence should be not only recognized by the government but also enshrined in law [Tormuş, 1917, No.632, 30 July].

Other speakers supported the report and elaborated on its message. The most emotional speech was made by Gumer Teregulov, who spoke of the value to civilization of every nation and ethnic group, no matter how small [Koriltay, 1917, No.7, 28 July].

Guided by the principle that 'any business needs government, and any government needs organization', S. Maksudi, in his further speeches, presented in detail the three-tiered structure of the autonomy: community—national governmental bodies—central governmental bodies (National Administration) and the National Assembly as the supreme legislative body. The speaker then elaborated on each body’s structure and objectives [Tormuş, 1917,
No. 633, 1 August]. S. Maksudi’s fundamental principles formed the basis of the prospective project.

Elected by the Congress, and composed of 12 members headed by S. Maksudi, a select committee for 'developing the fundamental principles of the cultural national autonomy' was formed to develop draft legislation on national autonomy and take all organizational and preparatory measures to summon the first ever Turko-Tatar National Assembly (the Millät Mäclese). On 25 August the members of the board arrived in Ufa, where an official ceremony was held to celebrate the newly-proclaimed autonomy [Tormış, 1917, No.708, 30 August; No.709, 31 August; Irek, 1917, No.34, 4 September; Soldat Telyage, 1917, No.13, September 14; Daulet, 2008, etc.]. 'The Fundamental Principles of Cultural National Autonomy' were soon published, which stated the basic principles and structure of the prospective autonomy [Tormış, 1917, No. 726, 3 October; Mokhtarıyät, 1918; Davletšìn, 1974, pp. 338–352; Fakhrudtinov, 1992; Tatarstan, 1992, No. 5/6, pp. 90–100; İdel, 1995, No. 5/6; Politika, 1995, pp. 93–105; Daulet, 2008]. These 'Fundamental Principles' were further approved by the National and Constituent Assemblies and thus enacted in law.

If we compare the Kazan Congresses, their nature and resolutions, with the Moscow Congress, we can infer the following. Firstly, the 'Kazan' period became a time of regionalization, ethnicization, and general fragmentation of the all-Muslim political movement. That is to say, the focus shifted from general Muslim issues to national ones. As a result, autonomy was proclaimed for the Turko-Tatars and not for all Muslims in Russia. Secondly, the balance of power within the Tatar national movement between those who supported extraterritorial autonomy and believers in territorial autonomy remained for the time being with the former group. Their advantages included a relatively well-developed programme, the backing of the cream of the intelligentsia, clear public approval for the idea of cultural national autonomy (one example of which is the content of the 'notes' containing people’s requests to the Moscow Congress), and, importantly, the pessimistic opinions on the possibility of Tatar territorial national unity expressed by a number of leaders of the Tatar national movement (Sadri Maksudi, Gayaz Iskhaki, and others).

§ 4. The National Assembly and National Autonomy Projects

Dilyara Usmanova

The Millät Mäclese, or the National Assembly of the Turko-Tatars of Inner Russia and Siberia, was only active for 52 days, from 22 November to 11 January 1918 [Yana millî yul, 1933, No. 1, 2, 3; 1937, No. 12; 1938, No. 1; Battal-Tajmas, 1947; Tagirov, 1987; Usmanova, 1995, pp. 29–35; Usmanova, 1996, pp. 61–72; Tagirov, 2000; Iskhakov, 2004; Daulet, 2008, etc.]. Delegates were elected to it between October and early November 1917. Around 115–120 delegates were elected in total—1 delegate per 50,000 people (1 delegate per 25,000 at the front). Delegates were generally elected in two stages, at meetings of social organizations, regional congresses, etc. Some of the Muslim population was, for a number of reasons, excluded from the elections, which brought about a non-representative Assembly, incapable of adequately reflecting the structure of the Turko-Tatar population of ‘Inner Russia’. Some major social groups were represented as an abysmally small minority. The Assembly primarily consisted of ‘mullahs, teachers, editors, newspaper employees, reserve officers, military servants, students, a couple of lawyers, and two or three women’ [Battal-Tajmas, 1947, p. 47], that is, representatives of those social strata that had been the most actively involved in the national movement. It is attributable not only to the election procedure but to the nature of the Assembly. A common opinion in the Tatar community was that the Millät Mäclese was a non-partisan,
all-national authority to address only internal, national issues and not solve political, party- or class-related problems of the Turko-Tatar people. This largely determined the social and personal composition of the Assembly.

The number of delegates who worked regularly and resided in Ufa was approximately 80–85 [Tormuş, 1917, No.756, 21 November; No.758, 23 November, No.761, 28 November]. During its work, the Assembly established a dedicated board to collect delegates’ biographies and photos, which it expected to be later published as an album. Further events probably prevented the idea from being implemented. In any case, no information is available on any such album31.

The provisional board headed by S. Maksudi took all preparatory measures for calling the Assembly. Maksudi was also elected Chairman of the National Assembly in the first days of its work. Ibiniyamin Akhtyamov and Ilyas Alkin became Vice Chairmen; Gabdrakhman Fakhretdinov and Galim Akchurin were deputies. After I. Alkin and G. Fakhretdinov departed from Ufa, Fattykh Mukhamedyarov and Khalil Bakeev, respectively, replaced them [Sarai, 1917, No. 6, 27 November; Tormuş, 1917, No. 763, 8 December, No. 758, 23 November].

The founders of the National Assembly expected it to be another step towards enshrining the ideas of ‘cultural national autonomy’ in law and implementing them among the Muslims of the Volga-Ural region. However, it became clear even before the Assembly commenced its work that the disputes on the prospective national and governmental structure of the country and the future of the Tatar people remained unresolved. The establishment of two main factions within the Assembly, the Turkists (Türkçüler) and the Territorialists (Tupraçılar), proved this [Davletshin, 1974, p. 154]. They were divided by the issue of the most appropriate form of Tatar self-determination.

The two leading factions were approximately equal in numerical terms, each containing 40–45 people. The social composition of both factions is interesting. According to T. Davletshin, the Turkist faction mostly consisted of elders, people with right-wing views, and clergy-men. G. Battal believed that the Turkists were represented by progressive mullahs (a total of about 30 people), intelligentsia, and politically moderate youth [Battal-Tajmas, 1958–1969, p. 193]. Ibn. Akhtyamov and G. Iskhaki headed the faction. It is beyond doubt that S. Maksudi was one of the ideologues. When he was elected Chairman of the Assembly, he submitted an application to leave the faction in order to remain ‘neutral’ according to the parliamentary tradition [Tormuş, 1917, No. 761, 28 November]. The Territorialist faction, which was established at the initiative and under the aegis of I. Alkin and Galimdzhan Ibragimov, primarily consisted of members of the military, students, young writers, teachers, etc. In political terms, it was dominated by left-wing socialists led by G. Ibragimov. According to contemporary accounts, the Turkist faction enjoyed greater influence—its members determined the course of work and the nature of many decisions made by the Assembly [Koyash, 1917, No. 1188, 5 December].

The literature maintains that representatives of the two factions were irreconcilable antagonists. However, a comparison of the policy statements of both factions [Tormuş, 1917, No. 757, 22 November; No. 758, 23 November] suggests that they were united on some key issues. In fact, the second paragraph of the Turkist programme included all the fundamental territorialist provisions. It recognized the federative structure of the country and admitted that territorial autonomy in the form of a state was acceptable for the ‘Turko-Tatars of Inner Russia’ and that the Constituent Assembly of all peoples within the state would be a reasonable solution. At the same time, the Turkists confirmed their adherence to the principles of extraterritorial autonomy, advocating sustained efforts to implement it. The controversy was revealed when they were discussing
the state project. To quote Ahmad Zaki Walidi, a large part of the Tatar intelligentsia was 'wagging their tails between territorial and cultural national autonomy', trying to combine different forms and principles of solving the national problem.

Some personal autonomists, who in principle were not opposed to territorial autonomy in the form of a Turko-Tatar state, were guided by a unique concept of the nation (developed by Otto Bauer) as a purely spiritual, cultural notion (S. Maksudi, G. Teregulov, etc.). There was also another motivation. Its most vivid representatives were Tatars from regions that were too distant from the centre (Kazan and Ufa) to be included in the proposed state. For them to implement cultural national autonomy was the only opportunity to preserve their national authenticity and to stay within the Turko-Tatar world. Therefore, many of them did not speak out against neither a federation nor Turko-Tatar autonomy in the form of the 'Idel-Ural State' but advocated preserving 'cultural national autonomy'. Evidence can be found in non-central (peripheral) Tatar periodicals ('Muxbir' newspaper by the Ural Milli Şura, 'Sarai' newspaper by the Tatar community of Astrakhan, etc.).

When delegates to the National Assembly had to deal again with the problem of national autonomy, they were unable to simply undo their own previous decisions. Most delegates to the Assembly had attended the congresses (I. Alkin, Khadi Atlasi, Ibn. Akhtyamov, Ibragim Bikkulov, G. Ibragimov, G. Iskhaki, Z. Kadyrov, S. Maksudi, and others). Moreover, they were active members of regional Milli Şuras and could not help but take into account the real changes in the life of Muslim communities in Russia. All the more so because the changes satisfied the Tatars' old and enduring aspiration for educational and religious independence. The structure of the established Milli Şuras was also representative of these spheres of the people's spiritual life, as they traditionally consisted of departments for religion, education, printed media, finance, and statistics. Since low-level authorities of the 'cultural national autonomy' had been locally established since the summer of 1917, the Assembly had to put this somewhat chaotic process straight. Firstly, it had to approve the developed principles of extraterritorial autonomy. Secondly, it had to form the central authorities of the national autonomy.

Discussion of the 'Fundamental Principles of Cultural National Autonomy for the Turko-Tatars of Inner Russia and Siberia' began on 16 December. It turned into a fierce debate, which lasted several days. The 2nd All-Russian Congress had approved the initial version of the 'Fundamental Principles'. But to become law, the bill had to be approved, following the introduction of certain amendments, by the legislative authority, the role which the Millat Mäclese was expected to play. The 'Fundamental Principles' presented by Nazib Kurbangaleev consisted of four parts. The first part ('General Section') contained general provisions. Part Two dealt with central national authorities (the National Assembly and the National Administration), their structure and functions, while Part Three was focused on low-level, first instance (district, town, and regional) authorities. Part Four of the 'Fundamental Principles' was dedicated to possible amendments. Since the document, especially Part One, was to be considered and approved by the Constituent Assembly of Russia, it was executed in two languages: Russian and Tatar.

In his opening remarks, the speaker, who represented the Legislative Board, justified the project in terms of 'personalization' of the national question. N. Kurbangaliev maintained that 'national autonomy' was the only solution to national problems regardless of the state structure (whether Russia was a unitary republic or a federal one). Territorial autonomy alone was not enough to realize national interests in a country like the former Russian Empire since national minorities would always remain in Russia, even as a federative republic. Moreover, the Tatars had taken great efforts to win control over the national affairs even before the February Revolution. But at that time the situation was finally favourable. According to the speaker, to secure national rights in Russia,
the Constituent Assembly had to approve and include in the prospective constitution of the country the fundamental principles specified in the project\footnote{The final version of ‘The Basis for Cultural and National Autonomy,’ approved by the National Assembly and published in the ‘Mokhntiyat,’ see: [Cultural and National Autonomy, 1998, pp. 94–110].}

N. Kurbangaliev’s speech was representative of the opinion of Tatar activists who realized how difficult it would be to solve national problems in a country like Russian and tried to combined different versions. The discussion immediately revealed that many delegates did not support them and believed it impossible to combine territorial and cultural national autonomy, which they viewed as mutually opposed to the extent of negating the latter. In their opinion, territorial autonomy was the universal solution that would eliminate the need for the previously proclaimed autonomy. Delegates G. Amirov, H. Zufarov, Sh. Akhmadiev, and others expressed similar ideas. The discussion often shifted to minor issues instead of 'studying the extent to which the "Fundamental Principles" meet the national interests' (Shajhulla Alkin).

One of the last meetings of the Millät Mäclese in January 1918 elected members of the central authorities—S. Maksudi became Chairman of the National Administration; Ibn. Akhtyamov was appointed his deputy. Members of the three ministries were elected at the same time: those of Education (Nazib Kurbangaleev), Finance (Shajhulla Alkin), and Religious Affairs (Galimdzhan Barudi).

Further events prevented the national structures formed by the Assembly from having a long-lived existence. The key national organizations were liquidated in the spring: Xärbi Sura was dissolved along with the 'Trans–Bulak Republic' on 26 March 1918; the Moscow branch of Milli Şura followed on 15 April. Finally, on 21 April, shortly before the date when the National Assembly was to commence work, the National Administration was liquidated. All the financial assets were confiscated; some activists were subjected to arrest and reprisals.

Even after the Bolshevik repressions, a number of leaders of the national movement in opposition to the new government refused to give up and tried to continue their activities. When the Whites occupied Ufa in the summer of 1918, they had an opportunity to restore, though for a short time, the Milli İdarâ and establish a number of newspapers. It did not last long, and the Soviet government forced the opposition national movement out to Siberia after it had established control over Ufa.

When in Siberia, during the Civil War, the leaders of the national movement tried to establish cooperation with anti–Bolshevik leaders (both Socialists and Rights) and to persuade them to recognize the principles of 'cultural national autonomy' [Cultural National Autonomy, 1998, pp. 188–189] but failed. The key figures in the provisional governments (regardless of their personal leaders, whether dominated by socialists or monarchists) would not recognize non-state national structures, which they viewed as a threat to Russian statehood. For purely political reasons, they did not outright reject representatives of national organizations, which did not prevent them from interpreting any effort by them as claims against and a threat to their statehood [Cultural National Autonomy, 1998, pp. 188–189]. In a manner of speaking, the high priority of 'state-wide' interests as well as the traditional phobia of social or national initiative dominated the minds of representatives of the Russian government or those who wanted to obtain such power. Thus, any social initiatives contrary to the country’s official policy (in fact, to the idea of 'united and indivisible' Russia) were always rejected [Cultural National Autonomy, 1998, pp. 231–248]. Feeling pessimistic about any attempts at establishing cooperation with various forces within the anti–Bolshevist coalition and rejecting the Bolshevist strategy, many leaders of the national movement chose to emigrate. These included a large portion of this wing of the national movement: S. Maksudi, G. Iskhaki, G. Teregulov, G. Battal, Zakir Kadyri, Niyaz...
Maksudi, F. Tuktarov, and others. Having returned to their homeland, some broke with their political past and gave up their political and social activism for teaching, research, or other occupations, as did G. Shinasi, Ibr. Bikkulov, G. Sayfulmulyukov, the Akhtyamov brothers, I. Alkin, and others. Most of them suffered in the repressions of the 1930s.

A number of emigre leaders made a last abortive attempt to protect the ideas of 'cultural national autonomy'. They were Tatar delegates to the Versailles Peace Conference. Shortly before the First World War ended in Europe, the victorious allies decided to hold a peace conference in Paris to work out and sign peace treaties and decide on future rearrangement of the world. The Versailles Conference took place in 1919–1920. The National Assembly resolved to send a delegation of three members—F. Karimi, A. Tsalikov, and G. Iskhaki—to represent the interests of the Turko-Tatars in the Volga-Ural region when Russia’s future was being discussed [Tormuş, 1918, No. 748, 14 January]. F. Karimi and A. Tsalikov were unable to attend the conference due to circumstances. Instead, S. Maksudi (who emigrated following the liquidation of the national authorities in 1918), F. Tuktarov (carrying a mandate by the National Administration of the Turko-Tatars of Inner Russia and Siberia, signed by Vice Chairman Ibn. Akhtyamov), and G. Iskhaki (representing the National Assembly) attended. Having arrived in Paris in early 1920, the three of them held a number of meetings and discussions with senior officials of the French administration and Turkish representatives. At a meeting with French Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Millerand, S. Maksudi specified the main requests of the Turko-Tatar delegation. Speaking on their relations with the Bolshevik government, S. Maksudi said that, in spite of persistent distrust, they (that is, representatives of the national movement) could agree to negotiate and recognize the new government provided that:

1. Russia’s government was guided by democratic principles and summoned a constituent assembly to represent the entire people, like other democratic states;
2. Freedom of religion, language, speech, press, and assembly was ensured;
3. The 'cultural national autonomy' proclaimed by the Turko-Tatar people was to be approved, and their national authorities recognized as having equal rights as governmental institutions to the effect that equality of all peoples in Russia was recognized [Iskhaki, 1979, p. 219].

However, the international situation did not favour a policy under which the victorious powers would protect the interests of ethnic minorities in prejudice of their relations with the Soviet Russia. There was no chance that the programme would be implemented. It was made even more hopeless by the Bolsheviks’ victory in the Civil War, which had become clear by 1920 and legitimized the revolution, thus leading the world powers to change their strategy. As the Unitarist Bolsheviks became firmly established within the country, they grew less cooperative with 'bourgeois' leaders. The project of 'cultural national autonomy' thus failed.

The National Assembly was established and summoned to address issues related to the implementation of the 'cultural national autonomy'. However, the forum was to proclaim territorial autonomy for the Turko-Tatars in the form of the 'Ural-Volga State', that is, to lay the cornerstone of the renascent national sovereignty based on the territorial principle.

Since the Moscow and Kazan Congresses were initially meant to be of a general Muslim nature, the issue of the future of the Turko-Tatar territorial autonomy in Inner Russia remained open throughout 1917. The issue was referred to the Muslims of the Volga-Ural region, as resolved, but no public discussion on territorial autonomy took place until the National Assembly was summoned. This is why, according to G. Battal, it was a 'striking surprise' for such leaders of the Assembly as S. Maksudi and G. Iskhaki when G. Sharaf presented the project of the state [Battal-Tajmas, 1958–1969, p. 40]. It was apparently not the very idea of
Turko-Tatar territorial autonomy but the existence of a project developed by young activists that was surprising.

It would be wrong to say that the idea had not been expressed before. Two meetings of representatives of all Muslim organizations of the town of Kazan, held in early November (6 and 12 November) 1917, elaborated on the same idea [Koyash, 1917, 8 November; Mukharyamov, 1969, pp. 79–80]. The latter, held under the aegis of I. Alkin, adopted the resolution suggested by N. Khalifin that 'meetings (of the National Assembly) should address the issue of territorial autonomy for the Tatars' [Koyash, 1917, 8 November; Mukharyamov, 1969, pp. 79–80]. It is thus no coincidence that I. Alkin, who presided over the meeting, became one of the founders and leaders of the territorialist faction, which raised the question, and later the key driver behind the idea of the 'Idel-Ural State'.

Members of the Executive Committee of Muslim Warriors of the 12th Army advocated territorial autonomy even more expressly in a special order to the delegates (Z. Malikov and I. Kaderliev) to the National Assembly in Ufa, which read as follows: 'Even though the mission of the National Assembly is to implement the resolutions of the congresses that took place in July, taking into account the failure of the proclaimed autonomy to fully represent the rights and interests of the Muslims of Inner Russia and Siberia, the Assembly must immediately proclaim territorial autonomy for these Muslims. It must specify the borders of the federation' [Sugiş safi, 1917, No.4, 29 November].

Thus, by the time the National Assembly commenced work, most of its delegates had already come to be inclined to give a positive answer to the question of a 'Tatar federation' and, what is more, to settle the issue at that forum, seemingly called for another purpose entirely. What tipped the balance in favour of this decision? What events in the country or, perhaps, within the national movements caused the supporters to take decisive measures and those who were hesitant and uncertain to reconcile?

Tatar periodicals suggest that it was triggered by the actions of other Muslim and non-Muslim peoples (most importantly, the Ukrainians) in Russia aimed at obtaining autonomy or even independence. When the Bolsheviks came to power, it had a significant impact on the activity of the leaders of the Tatar movement. Yet, it is beyond doubt that the resolution of the Orenburg Bashkir Council, which 'declared Bashkir autonomy in the Bashkir-populated territories of Orenburg, Ufa, Perm, and Samara regions and began to implement the decision' on 16 November was the most powerful factor that influenced the sentiment among Assembly deputies [Tormuş, 1917, No. 755, 19 November]. The news landed like a bombshell on 18 November, when preliminary meetings of delegates of the Assembly were being held. It set the tone for the meetings, which resembled an agitated beehive. Here is a description of the sentiment in the city: 'At present, the delegates are concerned about the proclaimed Bashkir autonomy most of all, even more than they are excited about the opening of the Assembly. Delegates at meetings discuss the Bashkir autonomy above all and, through this lens, the federation issue' [Tormuş, 1917, No. 756, 21 November].

On 29 November, when ongoing organizational matters had been discussed for several days, the Assembly turned to the most challenging issue of autonomy and the future of the 'federation'. Editions of Yaňa Vakytn newspaper describing the actions of the Bashkir leaders had been distributed among the delegates, which complicated the situation. Delegates were reading and discussing newspaper articles, which increased the tension and aggravated the Turkists’ antagonism and the Territorialists’ hesitation—the latter ‘did not support Bashkir autonomy zealously but merely wanted to avoid an open conflict with the Bashkirs’ [Tormuş, No. 762, 1 December]. At first, the discussion seemed bound to end in a deadlock. The parties suggested two different resolutions, neither of which was able to score a clear advantage.
Following a long and fierce debate, both drafts were rejected and combined into a compromise version. The resolution of ten paragraphs included the fundamental provisions of both factions. Two paragraphs were essentially new. Firstly, that 'the autonomy must not contain separate states' (Paragraph 3). Secondly, 'regional bodies of the National Administration shall have full control over the Muslims' cultural national affairs in regions within the autonomy's jurisdiction, and no organization can deprive them of such power' (Paragraph 8) [Tormuş, 1917, No. 762, 1 December]. It was the Turkists who insisted on the last sentence. In fact, the implementation of the paragraph was to be a formal recognition of the legality of principles of 'cultural national autonomy' and the superiority of national authorities to other organizations in terms of the Muslim community's national and cultural and religious life. However, the latter provision was inconsistent both with the fundamental principles of the 'Bashkir autonomy' and with the nature of the new governmental authorities—Bolshevik Soviets, who wanted to monopolize power over the country, thus making the ideas impossible to implement.

Therefore, 29 November 1917 was the day when the National Assembly adopted the historic resolution to recognize the necessity of creating a territorial autonomy of the Turkotatars of Inner Russia and Siberia as the 'Idel-Ural State'. On that date, the question of Turkotatar territorial autonomy ceased to be a formal recognition of the legality of principles of 'cultural national autonomy' and the superiority of national authorities to other organizations in terms of the Muslim community's national and cultural and religious life. However, the latter provision was inconsistent both with the fundamental principles of the 'Bashkir autonomy' and with the nature of the new governmental authorities—Bolshevik Soviets, who wanted to monopolize power over the country, thus making the ideas impossible to implement.

The second project, based on the same principles (regional or national territorial autonomy, ratio of ethnic groups in the state, etc.) yielded five projects of the prospective state [Tormuş, No. 780, 7 January]. By comparing the contents of the five projects, we can trace the evolution of the very idea of national sovereignty. More than anything, arguments presented by supporters of various projects in discussions are indicative of the extent (rather low) to which delegates to the Assembly understood the essence of the national idea.

The first project, titled 'Bashkir Autonomy' (or 'Malaya Bashkiriya') was based on the principle of national territorial autonomy. The Board rejected it immediately as it included a small part of the 'Muslim' (and mostly Bashkir) population of the region and contained no towns except for Zlatoust. The high percentage of the Muslims (75%) in the prospective state was mentioned as an advantage.

The second project, based on the same principles, had somewhat wider borders, which led to a low Turkotatar population percentage of
57–58%. The board rejected this project, too, as it excluded Kazan guberniya and Kazan, which was the economic, political, historical, and cultural centre of the Tatar people. The press reported that project won very little support among delegates to the Assembly. However, the Bashkir delegates insisted on this version, of which the resolution of the All-Bashkir Congress is evidence [Tormuş, No. 765, 12 December; No. 769, 20 December].

Galimdzhan Sharaf authored Projects 3 and 4. They were based on the principles of regional autonomy. The difference between them was confined to whether the state included the land inhabited predominantly by the Chuvash and Cheremis people. The third version was broader but had a reduced percentage of the Turko-Tatar population of 43–44%, while the fourth (excluding the named territory) increased the percentage of the Muslims to 51% [Tormuş, 1918, No. 780, 7 January].

The state became even larger in the fifth version, which included Samara and Astrakhan guberniyas, bringing about a reduction in the percentage of the Turko-Tatars (29%).

Intra-faction discussions of the five projects revealed that the Turkists were inclined to accept the fifth, while the Territorialists preferred one of the proposals from G. Sharaf [Tormuş, 1917, No. 767, 17 December]. The board eventually rejected the last project in spite of its favour with the Turkists. The main argument against it was the fact that to accept that version meant reducing the Turko-Tatar population to a small minority: 29% of the Turko-Tatars as compared to 56% of the Russians and 8–9% of the Chuvash people [Tormuş, 1918, No. 780, 7 January]. G. Iskhabi, Sh. Alkin, Daud Enaliev, Ibragim Bikkulov, H. Zayni, and other Turkists advocated the minority project, primarily citing economic reasons. However, the suggestion was rejected by a majority of votes in spite of their great efforts [Tormuş, 1918, No. 783, 12 January, No. 784, 14 January].

Following a month of hard work, having discussed each suggestion and considered all benefits and disadvantages of each project, the Board decided in favour of a project by G. Sharaf, which was to be discussed at the general meeting of delegates to the National Assembly on 3 January 1918. G. Sharaf and G. Amirov made statements on the matter (the latter spoke on the economic aspects of the issue).

In his report G. Sharaf mentioned all projects considered by the Board, highlighting their advantages and obvious flaws, and provided detailed statistics for the prospective state [Tormuş, 1918, No. 780, 7 January; DerNeue-Orient]. According to the author, the state was to include the entire Kazan and Ufa guberniyas and separate districts of Orenburg, Perm, Samara, Simbirsk, and Vyatka guberniyas, which were predominantly populated by the Turko-Tatars. The report mentioned that the decision on whether certain volosts should be included in the state was to be made following a population survey in the districts. The Chuvash and Cheremis people were also expected to enter the state because they were 'incapable of establishing autonomy of their own'. Smaller states could appear as the cultural level of these small ethnic groups would rise. The board opted for a neutral name—'Idel-Ural region'—that contained no ethnic name in order to avoid possible complications.

So, what were the principles and fundamental provisions of this project of the prospective 'Idel-Ural State'? They were partly formulated during the preparation and discussion of the projects and laid down in final decisions, taken shortly before the Assembly ceased to work. This included the Resolution by the Congress of 6–7 January on Establishing the 'Idel-Ural region' and its Relations with other regions within the Republic of Russia, the Resolution of the Principles and Rights of Language and Religion of the Peoples within the 'Idel-Ural region', and the Resolution on the Establishment of the Board for the Implementation of Territorial Autonomy, Its Functions and Rights [Tormuş, 1918, No. 781, 9 January].

All these resolutions contained the following provisions concerning the prospective state:

– Being based on the principle of regional autonomy, 'Idel-Ural' is a constituent republic with the federative republic of Russia;
– The superior authority of the republic (region) is the parliament to be elected through universal, direct, secret, and proportional voting, which shall be responsible for the region’s internal affairs except for those listed below. It is the only authority which is entitled to adopt laws on the domestic life of the region’s peoples;

– General affairs of the entire country, such as the following: post, telegraph, railway and water communications, the common system of measures of weight and other units, the monetary system, the development of civil, criminal, commercial, and exchange laws, federal taxes, foreign policy, customs, and similar issues shall be referred to the all-Russian parliament. Laws adopted by the all-Russian parliament shall prevail over local enactments in the matters above.

– All ethnic groups, languages, and religions have completely equal rights within the republic (region);

– To adopt laws on national issues and address such issues is the responsibility of the central authorities of the nations, and the regional parliament cannot interfere with such matters [Tormuş, 1918, No. 781, 9 January].

Thus, all the state’s/region’s/republic’s governmental authorities fell into two categories—‘all-national’ and ‘national’. The former group included organizations responsible for the affairs of the state’s entire population, that is, those of non-national nature: zemstvos, city dumas, etc., including the republic’s parliament. If an ethnic group within such area constituted a specified percentage (25%), the ethnic language was to be recognized as official. The second group included organizations established according to the national principle. They were responsible for all cultural national issues. For convenience, the state was to be divided into ethnic regions. This applied to all ethnic groups within the area. This abolished the idea of a state, official nation. All ethnic groups were to have completely equal rights [Sarai, 1918, No. 15, 5 January].

Characteristically, all national authorities responsible for national issues would be extraterritorial, that is, they would go beyond the limits of the state or republic, covering the entire territory populated by this or that nation (in this case, the Turko-Tatars) regardless of the location of the central authority [Tormuş, 1918, No. 781, 9 January]. Thus, historians who maintained that the National Administration elected by the Assembly was the government of the prospective 'Ural-Volga State', while the 'cultural national autonomy' was 'confined to a certain territory', were wrong [Mukharyamov, 1969, p. 81; Khasanov, 1977a, p. 127]. On the contrary, the 'cultural national autonomy' and the scope of national authorities, all governed by the National Administration, was broader than the territory of the prospective state. The Assembly’s decisions contained a special paragraph which stipulated that the scope of such national organizations was not to be confined to the territory of the autonomy where its central authorities were situated but had to cover all Turko-Tatar expatriate centres and communities [Tormuş, 1918, No. 781, 9 January]. At the same time, the national authorities would have public law, that is, they would be public and not governmental organizations. These and other, more specific, problems were determined under the second resolution of the Assembly, adopted on 7 January 1918. The third resolution regulated the structure and activities of the board for the implementation of 'territorial autonomy'.

The project of the 'Idel-Ural State' by G. Sharaf and the relevant resolutions by the National Assembly were, in fact, a compromise, an attempt—a successful one—at combining territorial autonomy with the principles of personal autonomy, most importantly, by proclaiming governmental non-interference with the people’s national issues by dividing the scope of governmental and public, national authorities. G. Sharaf’s active participation in the work of the Board for the Development of the Fundamental Principles of Cultural National Autonomy, headed by S. Maksudi, as its secretary undoubtedly contributed to the project. This is why his variant of ‘territorial autonomy’ combined two different types of autonomy...
(territorial and extraterritorial), thus ensuring opportunities both for territorialists and for personal national autonomists.

By approving the 'Fundamental Principles of Cultural National Autonomy', Delegates to the National Assembly enacted them as a law. They consequently elected members of central national authorities. However, for a number of reasons, they were unable and did not want to restrict themselves to cultural national autonomy alone and decided, partly under external pressure, in favour of a Tatar territorial autonomy. Having discussed different options, they resolved to establish the 'Idel-Ural region', thus clearly supporting the idea of a 'territorial autonomy' based on the principle of regional autonomy with certain features of 'cultural national' or 'personal' autonomy. These efforts by the leaders of the Tatar national movement suggest that they wanted to turn Russia from 'a national state' to a true 'state of nations'.

§ 5. Attempts at Proclaiming the 'Idel-Ural State' and National Projects in the Spring of 1918

Dilyara Usmanova

In the spring of 1918, after the first session of the National Assembly closed on 11 January, Kazan, where the 2nd All-Russian Muslim Congress began its work in early 1918 (8.01.–3.03.1918) became the centre of events again. The spring period in the development of the national movement was also marked by the rise of the so-called pro–Soviet wing. Even though the Assembly included a group of Tatar socialists, led by Galimdzhan Ibragimov, Socialists in general were not crucial to the Muslim congresses of 1917. Moreover, they were a marginal force. The population began to become increasingly radical in the spring of 1918; the socialist movement gained momentum. It was partly caused by the establishment of Soviet government across the country ('the triumphant march of the Soviet government'), which caused the percentage of its supporters in the traditional inert population to multiply. On the other hand, all of Russian society—the Muslims were no exception in this respect—was captivated by the idea of social equality and socialist slogans.

After the decision-making centre was transferred from Ufa to Kazan, where members of the Board of the Idel-Ural State had moved, new factors and forces began to determine the future of the idea of national autonomy. The month following the closing of the Assembly was a period of 'peaceful' confrontation and attempts at 'co-existence' between the Bolshevik-led Kazan Council and the leaders of the national movement. They were able to peacefully co-exist for a little longer than a month (from the middle of January to the end of February N.S.) until a preventative blow by one of the parties caused it to acquire the form of military struggle known as the 'Transbolaq Republic', which had a tragic outcome.

The dominant political forces of that period were the following: (1) the Board (BIUS) elected by the National Assembly for the implementation of the 'Ural-Volga State', (2) the management of the Military Şura and the Military Congress, (3) the Kazan Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, which initiated the calling of the regional Soviet Congress, (4) the Muslim Commissariat, established under the Kazan Council on 18–21 February after the radical part of the Left faction left the Military Congress.

The BIUS was to work in Kazan, where most of its members had arrived by the end of January. The most important task faced by the Board was to hold meetings and negotiations with representatives of different political and national forces in the region to reach a compromise concerning the prospective state. Taking into account the changes in the country,
the Board delegated three of its members—I. Alkin, G. Sharaf, and S. Attagulov—to the Regional Congress of Soviets (21–22.02.1918), who were to form a united faction of Muslim delegates at the Congress.

The issue of the state was central to the 2nd All-Russian Muslim Congress, though it was officially number 5 or 6 on the agenda. It was generally understood, however, that other issues, including that of the future of national military detachments, directly depended on the implementation of the autonomy. Already at this meeting, the prospective state was declared to be an autonomous part of the federal republic of Russia. The authorities were to be established by state’s constituent assembly through universal, direct, equal, secret, and proportional voting. Before the constituent assembly was called and the state proclaimed, a provisional government consisting of representatives of democratic organizations, delegated on the same proportional basis, was to have the power. Thus, the Muslim Military Congress denied the total power of the Bolsheviks, maintaining that all democratic (socialist) parties, both all-Russian and national, had to be represented in regional authorities. This alone, as well as the fact that the Military Congress admitted the necessity of implementing the decisions of the National Assembly, made its conflict-free cooperation with the Bolsheviks, who were reluctant to share power, questionable. It should be noted that the position of the leaders of the Chuvash national movement, which was rather weak and inert at that time, remained vague—they were hesitant about their preferences and decisions. Delegates to the Military Congress included stalwart advocates for the Bashkir autonomy model (Imakov, etc.) who believed the ‘Idel-Ural State’ to be a vain dream, an illusion of Tatar bourgeois nationalists. Finally, the Kazan Bolsheviks suggested the idea of a ‘Kazan Soviet Socialist Republic of Peasants and Workers’ as an alternative to the ‘Ural-Volga State’. They were going to proclaim the alternative project at the Regional Congress of Soviets, which was to take place on 21–22 February 1918. According to the official line, the Regional Congress was summoned to discuss the ‘forms of settling the national issue as applied to the peoples of the Middle Volga region’. It was initially planned to be opened on 1 February. Approximately 700–800 delegates from 11 governorates were expected to arrive. However, poor preparation resulted in a long delay and only 144 delegates, numerically dominated by representatives of Bolshevik councils. According to Tatar periodicals, the organizers of the Congress, having invited all kinds of public organizations, even the smallest and least significant ones, did their best to limit the representation of Islamic national associations. It was no surprise that the Regional Congress rejected all resolutions by the National Assembly, including the project of the 'Ural-Volga State', which it declared to be of 'bourgeois' nature, by a majority of votes. At the same time, the Regional Congress suggested no alternatives as the organizers had not developed a single project. Having rejected all suggestions and projects by Tatar public organizations and forced the Tatar Bolsheviks to leave the Military Congress, the Regional Congress concluded its work with a non-committal empty resolution. All these actions by the Kazan Bolsheviks raised persistent suspicion among the Muslim participants that the Regional Congress was initially meant to be smoke and mirrors to gauge the public sentiment and 'prevent the state project approved by the National Assembly from being proclaimed' [Koyash, 1918, No. 1216, 26 February].

On 23 February 1918, Muslim delegates to the Regional Congress in opposition to the Kazan Bolsheviks published a resolution of their own, which consisted of the following nine paragraphs:

1. Every nation and every ethnic group is entitled to proclaim cultural national and territorial autonomy through its proletariat. The only restriction is that they must not encroach on the rights of any ethnic minority within the territory of the state they establish. If the minority wants to establish an autonomy of their own, such opportunities must be provided to it.
2. Poor workers and peasants must have power over the region (republic and autonomy), as well as uyezds and volosts.

3. Re-election to the government must be arranged in adherence to the national-proportional principle.

4. The Idel-Ural region must be created.

5. The Ural-Volga region should be established in a way to ensure the largest Muslim population possible, while non-Muslim peoples should remain in adjacent autonomies where possible.

6. Full freedom and autonomy shall be granted for all languages and religions in the Idel-Ural region.

7. To ensure the fullest cultural and national independence possible, peoples can unite in a cultural national autonomy within the autonomous region.

8. Re-elections to the Soviet of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies, as well as to the Executive Committee and other authorities, must be carried out on a national-proportional basis.

9. Freedom, even to the extent of territorial autonomy, must be provided for ethnic minorities [Koyash, 1918, No. 1216, 26 February].

A brief analysis of the resolution suggests that, on the one hand, it contains modern terms ('proletariat', interests of ethnic minorities, national-proportional principle, etc.). On the other hand, it indicates a persistent adherence to the idea of the 'Ural-Volga State' and cultural national autonomy, that is, to decisions of the National Assembly. At the same time, on 23 February advocates for national autonomy in the form of the state were intending to hold their official ceremonies no earlier than the end of April 1918.

The situation grew more difficult over several days at the end of February, and the events forced the Tatar leaders (BIUS members, leaders of the Military Şura, personally I. Alkin, and others) to take active measures: the ceremonial was developed urgently, and the proclamation was scheduled for 2 o'clock on 1 March in Theatre Square (today's Svobody Square, Kazan). The universal was to be read out to representatives of public organizations, after which the cavalry and infantry national guard was to march across the square. Prayers from the Quran were to be read out in a dedicated place. The gathering was then expected to come to the Tower of Sütümbike, where the organizers intended to put up a crescent if they had enough time for preparation. Participants in the event were to go home after that. That was the plan for the ceremony. As we can now see, all events were symbolic and did not look like a takeover attempt. In addition, there was not a single so-called bourgeois or nationalist organization on the list of participants (like such religious organizations as Milli Şura and others): the Board of the Idel-Ural State, members of the Islamic faction of the Regional Congress of Soviets, the Muslim Socialist Committee, representatives of the Committee of Working Muslim Women, and representatives of the Central Teachers' Union. It is clear that the above organizations shared the socialistic platform. Moreover, Tatar periodicals ensured a large-scale coverage of the preparation for these events.

However, members of the Bolshevik Kazan Council were not satisfied with the expected course of events, and 'peaceful' resistance entered the active stage: preventive arrests of the leaders of the Islamic Military Council, brothers Ilyas and Dzhigangin Alkin, Usman Tokumbetov, and Yusuf Muzaffarov, took place on the night of 28 February 1918. The arrests were initiated by the leaders of the Kazan Council K. Grasis and Ya. Sheynkman in cooperation with Head of Islamic Commissariat Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev. This was the beginning of the so-called Trans–Bulak Republic.\footnote{The ‘Trans–Bulak Republic’ (‘Zabulachka’) is a term used to describe the events of the spring of 1918, when the rivalry and conflict between the Bolshevik government (represented by the Kazan Soviet of Workers, Soldiers, and Peasant Deputies) and the Tatar national movement (Collegiate of the Volga-Ural State et al.) assumed the character of open confrontation. The central question, around which the events were unfolded, was the project of national territorial autonomy [Valeyev, 2005, pp. 399–400].}
The arrest of famous politicians shortly before the ceremony escalated the situation in the city, especially among the Tatar population. All shops were closed. People gathered in streets and squares. Numerous rallies took place across the city. Rumors were rife and the increasing anxiety posed a threat of mass disturbances. The most recent memories by M. Sultan-Galiev suggest that the Kazan Bolsheviks, supported by a small group of Tatar communists, ventured to trigger the negative scenario by provoking an open conflict—they were not even afraid of bloody confrontations [Sultanbekov, 1991, pp. 113–115]. However, the Bolsheviks did not have enough power and had to compromise (only K. Grassis and Ya. Sheynkman were opposed to the agreement) by releasing the arrested members of the Military Şura. The latter were released on bail of M. Sultan-Galiev on the condition that they had to sign the following obligation: to refrain from preventive proclamation of 'Ural-Volga States' or any active measures against the Soviet government and to dissolve Islamic military organizations (Xarbi Şura and its departments) [Mukharyamov, 1969, pp. 100–101]. This decision naturally caused dissatisfaction among the Tatar population and participants in the Military Congress. The latter finished its work on 3 March, having expressed support of the former leaders of Xarbi Şura and the idea of the 'Ural-Volga State', elected the 'Muslim People’s Commissariat for State Implementation' (consisting of 15 members, headed by I. Attagullov), and resolved that the 'İdel-Ural Olkese' newspaper was to be published to replace Bezneñ Tavş, which had been banned by the Bolsheviks. However, this was not the end of the confrontation: in early March the Tatar part of the city (the Tatar slobodas in the 'trans–Bulak' area) was encircled by troops and declared an anti–Soviet 'Trans–Bulak Republic' on the initiative of the Bolsheviks. The tragic resolution came a month later (27–28 March) when sailor detachments of the Baltic Fleet and other Red Army troops, having arrived in the city, entered the so-called 'Trans–Bulak Republic' and, meeting no armed resistance, established full control over it. Soon all national authorities (Xarbi Şura/Military Council in Kazan on 26 March, the National Administration in Ufa, etc.) were banned, and a number of national politicians were arrested or had to flee from the city. The Bolsheviks were able to establish full control over Kazan and strike a heavy blow against the Tatar national movement.

Apart from using military force and reprisals, the Bolsheviks resorted to their traditional technique—demagogic promises, mostly borrowed from their opponents. That is, the Bolsheviks used the carrot and stick method. The army (sailors) and the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission acted as the stick; promises and insignificant concessions were the carrot. On 7 March, in the thick of events, the Kazan Council adopted the following resolution: 'The Council shall take urgent measures to organize the Ural-Volga Republic, which republic shall be organized as governed by the Council of People’s Commissars on the proportional-national class basis. The Presidium must be instructed to cooperate with the Ufa and Orenburg Councils to urgently proclaim the Ural-Volga republic' [Mukharyamov, 1969, p. 96]. As we can see from the text of the resolution, it was fully borrowed from the bourgeois Muslim Military Congress. The Bolsheviks were ready to promise anything, even an Ural-Volga Republic, to buy over the masses. Moreover, the same meeting declared that 'the Council, having considered the requests of all national peoples and the local conditions, has predetermined a re-arrangement on the proportional-national class basis,' which had not been done [Mukharyamov, 1969, p. 102].

A telegram from Moscow, signed by M. Vakhitov, was a second 'carrot'. It said that the Tower of Suyumbike was to be transferred to the working Tatars of Kazan. The telegram was read out in public and consequently published in newspapers [Tagirov, 1987, p. 252].

The final carrot was a decree on the establishment of the Tatar-Bashkir Republic (the decree was signed on 22 March, sent to Kazan, Ufa, and Orenburg on 23 March, and published in newspapers on 24 March). What is the...
principal difference between the Tatar-Bashkir Republic Decree and the Ural-Volga State project? None except for the name. The borders of the prospective republic, according to the decree, were nearly the same as the state's frontiers in G. Sharaf's project, which had been approved by the National Assembly, the Muslim Military Congress, and the Islamic faction of the Regional Congress. The only novel point was that the implementation of the project was entrusted to the Commissariat of Muslim Affairs in Central Russia, that is, to the Tatar Bolsheviks. It was crucial for the Bolsheviks to hold the initiative on this. History provided no opportunity to check how sincere the promises given to suppress the national movement under the banner of anti-Trans–Bulak struggle were: the Civil War broke out soon, and all projects of the kind were shelved.

It should be noted that the leaders of Kazan Bolsheviks and Tatar communists demonstrated extreme flexibility and even unscrupulousness during the events of February–March 1918 (what were the morals behind the behaviour of M. Sultan-Galiev, who not only advocated arresting the leaders of the Military Congress but bailed them out, or the borrowing of projects, the idea to put up a crescent of the Tower of Süyümbike, and more?). Most importantly, they were immensely, sometimes overwhelmingly eager to go to extremes, even spill blood, to achieve their purpose, that is, to establish total control over events. This is to say, the Bolsheviks outdid their opponents in their aspiration to win and keep power.

To sum up the development of the idea of Tatar national sovereignty in 1917–1918, the following can be said. Initially, the leaders of the Tatar national movement wanted to stay within the framework of the united Muslim movement and acted on behalf of the united Muslim nation. This partly resulted from the political tradition dating back to the late imperial period, which was revealed in the policy of the Islamic faction of the State Duma. As another factor, some of them were sincerely mistaken, believing the Muslims to be a single nation with common national interests. Resolutions by numerous regional congresses and meetings, the work of the Moscow Congress, and, most importantly, the activism of the leaders of peripheral Muslims suggested that the situation was, in fact, much more complicated. Even though the basic vocabulary remained unchanged, the Tatar national movement made a significant shift from the all-Russian level to that of regions in the summer of 1917. Activists advocating 'cultural national autonomy' came into play. Even though the focus was to shift to territorial autonomy, the Tatars, scattered across the empire in dispersed settlements as they were and having a well-developed network of cultural-religious institutions, remained adherent to the principles of personal (extraterritorial) autonomy. At the same time, at the turn of 1917–1918, the situation in the country in general and in the Volga-Ural Region increasingly favoured local national territorial autonomy. The leaders of the Tatar national movement had to cover a long way from the Moscow Congress to the National Assembly in Ufa before a wide Tatar public accepted and supported the idea of territorial autonomy. It took Tatar Uçagı, headed by Galimdzhan Sharaf, over six months of hard work to develop the initially abstract idea of Tatar territorial autonomy into the specific 'Idel-Ural State'. The first half of 1918 was marked by failed attempts at implementing the project. They were generally fruitless. The notion of territorial autonomy was borrowed, with adjustments, by the Bolsheviks, who were able to achieve a convincing victory in their confrontation with liberals and socialists representing ethnic minorities and win control over the situation by demonstrating greater will and perseverance (we will not go into the moral and ethical details of the Bolshevik policy, which apparently was based on the principles that 'success is never blamed' and 'history is written by the victors'). As a result, the project of the Tatar-Bashkir Republic was presented as an alternative to national suggestions in the spring of 1918. The active stage of the Civil War began soon, opening a new chapter in the story.
Section II

Stages in the Formation of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic
CHAPTER 1
The Establishment of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and the Tatar Community of the Soviet Russia in the Context of the Socio-Political Transformations of the 1920–1930s

§ 1. Projects of National State-Building and the Establishment of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic

Ramzi Valeev

Following the February Revolution of 1917 in the Russian Empire, seismic socio-political changes took place that affected all strata of Russian society. The Tatar national democratic movement had formed by November 1917. A network of ethnic organisations covered nearly the entire territory populated by the Tatar people. The Milli Şura (National Council) and the Xärbi Şura (Military Council) were the hubs of the Turko-Tatar movement. The 1st and 2nd All-Russian Muslim Congresses and the 1st All-Russian Muslim Military Congress developed the basic principles of the Cultural-National Autonomy of the Turko-Tatars in Inner Russia and Siberia. Many leaders of the national movement viewed the acquisition of cultural-national autonomy by the Turko-Tatars as the first stage towards national sovereignty. In order to implement the cultural-national autonomy of the Turko-Tatars, the Muslim Congresses elected Millät Mäclese (the National Assembly) and the supreme executive body of the cultural-national autonomy of the Turko-Tatars, Milli İdarə (the National Administration of the Turko-Tatars of Inner Russia and Siberia), headed by noted statesman, Constitutional Democrat (Cadet), Sadri Maksudi.

On 20th November 1917, Millät Mäclese (the parliament) commenced its work. Approximately 110 deputies had been elected to the parliament, but some of them were unable to participate in its work. According to different estimates, between 67 and 96 deputies representing the intelligentsia, clergy, nobility, and petite bourgeoisie participated in it. The parliament first met on 22nd November to elect the Presidium, headed by S. Maksudi and his assistants, Ibniyamin Ahtyamov and Ilías Alkin. The Millät Mäclese established the following commissions: the Commission for Legislative Proposals, the Credentials Commission, the Educational, Financial, and Religious Commissions. It was operating in a highly complex socio-political situation during the so-called triumphant march of the Soviet government.

The Millät Mäclese met to address various issues, including the establishment of a Turkic-Tatar state. It was put on the parliament’s agenda in November–December 1917. The Turko-Tatar autonomy project initially came in three versions. The discussion gave rise to several splinter groups within the parliament. The bitterest dispute was between the advocates of a cultural-national autonomy and proponents of a territorial-national one. The former group, headed by parliamentary speaker Sadri Maksudi, also included Zakir Kadyri, Ahmethadi Maksudi, Gumer Teregulov, and others (totalling around 50 deputies). The latter was led by Maksudi’s assistant Ilia Alkin (its members were Salyakh Atmagulov, Khadi Atlasi, Gadelbar Battal, Salimgerej Dzhan-tyurin, Galimdzhan Sharaf, and others, making a total of 37 deputies). The faction headed by S. Maksudi, named Türkçüler (Turkists), pressed upon parliamentary delegates the idea of cultural-national autonomy during the discussion of issues of Tatar national sovereignty.
They believed that the cultural backwardness of most Turko-Tatar peoples was a serious hindrance to their national-territorial autonomy. Their suggestion was therefore to confine the first stage of national state-building to the establishment of a Turko-Tatar national autonomy with broad powers. The proposed programme of cultural self-determination (incidentally, borrowed from the Cadets) seemed to safeguard the Turko-Tatars against revolutionary disturbance and favor peaceful acquisition of national sovereignty. They believed that their first-stage objective was to improve the cultural and educational level of the Turko-Tatar peoples, which would be followed by the creation of a Turko-Tatar territorial autonomy. The Turkists did not view the Tatar people as a bourgeois nation, and believed that the Tatar community was as yet unable to provide the necessary conditions for national sovereignty.

In contrast, I. Alkin's adherents, who to some extent promoted 'socialist ideas', argued that a Turko-Tatar territorial-national autonomy ought to be formed. The movement was named Tufrakçılardar (Territorialists). It should be noted that some representatives of this faction had been studying the issue back during the First World War. For instance, members of the student group Tatar Ucagı (Tatar Hearth), which was active in Petrograd in 1915–1916, I. Alkin, G. Sharaf, and others met to address issues of national state-building for Muslim peoples in Inner Russia, Siberia, and the Caucasus, suggesting territorial-national autonomy as a form of Tatar sovereignty. They were already opposed to trends of Pan-Turkism in the national movement back then. I. Alkin's adherents were able to tip the scales in their favour through fierce debates at meetings of the Millät Meclesi—the parliament resolved to establish territorial autonomy in the form of Idel-Ural şatı (the Idel-Volga State). The socio-political situation in Russia was favorable for them: when the Bolsheviks came to power, Cadets were outlawed and their organisations banned, to which the 'Bolshevik Declaration' on the right of nations to self-determination to the extent of establishing a sovereign state.

The Millät Meclesi also addressed other burning issues of national state-building, in particular projects specifying the frontiers of the state, the composition and functions of the board for state implementation, state structure and government. The parliament adopted the project with minor amendments and resolved to establish the 'Ural-Volga State'.

In January 1918, the Millät Meclesi established the Board for the Implementation of the Ural-Volga State with the following membership: Ilias Alkin, Səlahat Atıgulov, Gaziz Gubaydullin, Fatih Saiifi, Nadzhib Halfin, Galimdzhan Sharaf, and others. The board's responsibility was to establish the state's borders, develop its draft constitution, call the founding conference for the Ural-Volga State, establish a temporary government, etc. When discussing government authorities in the prospective state, several left-wing members of the board suggested that Soviets with national-proportional representation should be introduced as the basic body. At the board's first meeting following its transfer to Kazan, the Presidium was formed; I. Alkin was elected its chairman, and G. Sharaf—his deputy. G. Sharaf presented a report on the structure of power at the Presidium's meeting. Contrary to the Millät Meclesi's decision, he suggested that Soviet-type governmental bodies should be established, that is, each Soviet should be elected on a proportional basis in accordance with the population's ethnic composition. G. Sharaf's suggestion was accepted by a majority of votes following a long debate. G. Gubaydullin and N. Halfin ceased to be members of the board as they disagreed with such statement. Thus, almost the entire board issued the suggestion that the state should rely on the Soviet (council) system, which incurred displeasure among right-wing deputies of Millät Meclesi—they criticized G. Sharaf's position in Tatar newspapers. He was accused of violating the prerogatives of the nationally elected majilis and rebuked in Tatar printed media in Ufa and Kazan, a reprimand which was signed by Vice Chairman I. Ahtyamov.
The board also specified the borders of the prospective state formation and its basic administrative units. The Ural-Volga State was to include the entire territories of Kazan and Ufa Governorates and the adjacent areas in Vyatka, Orenburg, Pern, Samara, and Simbirsk Governorates of the former Russian Empire with a predominantly Turko-Tatar population. The territory was mostly inhabited by non-Russian peoples: Bashkirs, Maris, Mordvin, Tatars, Udmurts, and Chuvashes. The board eventually arrived at a consensus between the Tatars and the Bashkirs. The Chuvash, Mari, and other peoples demonstrated willingness to enter the Ural-Volga State voluntarily. During the 2nd All-Russian Military Muslim Congress (January–March 1918), representatives of these peoples called the Tatars their elder brother, to whom they expressed appreciation for not forgetting them. However, the ill-judged actions of some Tatar and Bashkir politicians broke the fragile consensus between the Bashkirs and the Tatars. I. Alkin's harsh criticism of the Bashkir leaders and A.-Z. Validi fuelled tension between the Bashkir and Tatar representatives.

However, the board did not suspend its preparation for the establishment of a united Turkic-Tatar state in the form of the 'Ural-Volga State' in spite of the controversy between the Tatar and Bashkir national leaders. G. Sharaf prepared an universal on the establishment of the state. It was to be declared on 1st March 1918. On that date, delegates of the 2nd All-Russian Military Muslim Congress were to announce the universal on the establishment of the 'Ural-Volga State' during a ceremonial meeting in Kazan's central square. Thus, the 2nd All-Russian Military Muslim Congress was to shape the future of the prospective Turkic-Tatar state.

The Military Congress began in Kazan on 8th January 1918. It was attended by approximately 200 delegates, in particular 141 Tatars and 35 Bashkirs. Representatives of ethnic organisations from Ukraine, Crimea, Poland, etc. came as guests. The following issues were on the agenda: 1) position on the Constituent Assembly; 2) position on the Soviet government; 3) the 'Ural-Volga State'; 4) the Muslim army. At the time when the 2nd Congress was called, the number of Muslim soldiers in Kazan was over 20,000; in Orenburg, about 10,000; in Ufa, approximately 15,000. Moreover, Muslim troops were deployed in Astrakhan, Samara, Omsk, Irkutsk, Yekaterinburg, and other localities of Inner Russia and Siberia.

A number of ideological and political groups formed within the congress during its work. Yet, the bitterest dispute was between the Rights—adherents of the 'Ural-Volga State'—and the Lefts—advocates of the Bolshevik regime. On the first day of the Congress, most of the deputies supported the Constituent Assembly, which the Bolsheviks had dissolved. This fuelled the factional struggle. It was especially fierce between the two factions when it came to their attitudes to the Soviet government. The right faction of the Congress was opposed to the Bolshevik usurpation of power and struggled to establish a democratic state in the form of a federation governed by the rule of law, which was to include the 'Ural-Volga State' apart from other territorial-national autonomies. But its plans were fated to never be realised.

In order to prevent the establishment of the 'Ural-Volga State', the Kazan Bolshevik Organisation initiated intense political propaganda among the troops of the local garrison and industrial workers. Anarchistic delegates, representatives of left parties, had to leave the Military Congress under pressure from the Bolshevik's administration of Kazan exerted in the form of an ultimatum. On their departure, they declared that 'Any resolutions adopted by the Congress after 17th January shall not be regarded as binding' [Znamya revolyuczii, 1918, No. 39]. They thus increased political stratification in the Turko-Tatar national-democratic movement. In fact, two camps formed within it: left nationalist internationalists hewing to Bolshevik ideas and advocates of Turko-Tatar national autonomy.

The Congress of Soviets of the Volga region and the Cis-Ural region was called on 8th January 1918 on the initiative of the Kazan Soviet to commence it work at the same date as the
2nd Muslim Military Congress. The local Bolshevik administration was trying to reinforce its standing with the Nationals. It was attended by representatives of Soviets and Muslim ethnic organisations of Astrakhan, Vyatka, Kazan, Nizhny Novgorod, Orenburg, Penza, Perm, Samara, Simbirsk, Ufa, and some other governorates. The predominant issue on the agenda was possible solutions to the national question of the Turko-Tatar population. In spite of the heavy ideological and political pressure that Soviet and party authorities had been exerting on the delegates, the Congress adopted a resolution on the self-determination of the peoples in the region as the Volga-Ural Soviet Republic. In fact, the resolution supported the Miilett Mäclese's decision. Following its political failure at the Congress, the Bolshevik administration of Kazan took aggressive measures—the Congress was dissolved on 9th January; in February 1918 the Bolsheviks established an independent state formation—the Workers' and Peasants' Soviet Republic of Kazan—on behalf of the so called 'working people', which included the working class and the poorest peasant groups, to combat 'counter-revolution'. Ya. Sheynkman was elected Chairman of the Republic's Council of People's Commissars with the following membership: S. Braude (People's Commissar for Labour), A. Karpov (Industry and Commerce), V. Mokhov (Internal Affairs), Sahipgerey Said-Galeev (Nationalities), Kazimir Shnurovsky (Agriculture), and others. This extraordinary state formation, headed predominantly by Bolsheviks and left Socialist Revolutionaries, had nearly totally power over the governorate. The first political action of the self-proclaimed Council of People's Commissars was the establishment of the Revolutionary Headquarters (presided by K. Grasis with the following membership: A. Ginzburg, M. Sultan-Galiev, Ya. Sheynkman, K. Yakubov, and others) Leaders of the Military Congress Iliaas and Dzhangir Alkins, Yusuf Muzafarov, Usman Tokumbetov, and others were arrested on the night of 27th February; a state of emergency was imposed on the governorate on 1st March. The Military Congress was thus suspended, and the announcement of the universal on the establishment of the Ural-Volga State, which was to take place on 1st March was prevented. The revolutionary headquarters adopted the following resolution: '1) to form military detachments of factory workers; 2) to reinforce the Red Army and send propagandist to nearby villages [20 let TASSR, 1940, p. 43].

Aside from these political actions, the Kazan Bolshevik Organisation initiated a mass awareness-raising work among the workers and soldiers of Kazan. As a result, Tatar workers and Soldiers of the Alafuzov city district yielded to Bolshevik propaganda and issued a special resolution: 'Having considered the report.... we, workers and soldiers of Alafuzov District, declare that it is beyond doubt that such rumour is being spread by the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie in order to sow discord between Russian and Muslim workers, soldiers, and peasants for the specific purpose of triggering a bloody confrontation and a fratricidal slaughter; by drowning us in our brothers' blood, the bourgeoisie hopes to wreck the revolution and the power of the Soviets. We declare that the interests of the proletariat of the Russians, Muslims, and others are the same. All workers regardless of their nation are equally oppressed by autocracy and capitalists. In view of the above facts, we hereby request the Kazan Soviet of Working Class, Soldier, and Peasant Deputies to ensure that all individuals who spread provocative rumours are arrested and put on trial by the revolutionary tribunal. Passed unanimously' [Znamya Revolyucii, 1918, No. 12].

At the same time, the Kazan Organisation of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) escalated its propaganda among soldiers and junior officers in Muslim regiments of the Kazan Garrison. The Bolshevik administration was able to draw part of the soldiers to their side. Tired of war and revolutionary upheavals, most serving in the military were against any military action. A large portion of Xärbi Şura leaders and delegates to the Military Congress had the same position. Unlike the Bolsheviks,
who had embarked on a military struggle for power, they were searching for peaceful ways of ensuring national self-determination for Turko-Tatar peoples and called their followers for a peaceful demonstration. Some of them were ‘hot heads’ advocating a forcible settlement of the national issue, like Gabdulgaziz Munasypov, who at the morning meeting of the Military Congress on 28th February (following Bolshevik arrests) suggested declaring the establishment of the Ural-Volga State, issuing a decree to conscript Muslims aged 18 to 40, taking the power, and arresting members of the Kazan Soviet of Working Class, Soldier, and Peasant Deputies and members of the Muslim Commissariat.

However, many leaders of the Tatar national democratic movement were opposed to any violence. This resulted in a peaceful Tatar demonstration in Kazan on 28th February 1918, which attracted over 10,000 people. Its participants sent their representatives to the Kazan Bolshevik administration to demand that the arrested leaders of the Military Congress should be released, which elicited no response. In turn, the Kazan administration relied on the Centre to enhance the extraordinary measures in the governorate and gather troops loyal to it in Kazan. As a provocation, Soviet punitive bodies (presumably the Cheka) murdered Vaisov’s leader Gaynan Vaisov, who promoted peaceful and non-violent settlement of the issue. Thus, the local administration initiated active military struggle.

In spite of the strained situation, the delegates resumed the Military Congress in the barracks of the 95th Reserve Infantry Regiment, which lay in the Trans-Bulak part of Kazan, at the beginning of March. The Revolutionary Headquarters of Kazan Bolsheviks subsequently declared the Trans-Bulak part of the city (as small as several square kilometres) the ‘Zabulachnaya republic’, initiated active military preparations, and began to tightly encircle the Tatar Slobodas. Those leaders of the Military Congress who had not been arrested established the Muslim People’s Commissariat headed by Ismagil Attagulov (members: Ishak Almashev, Fahrelrazy’j Basyrov, Akram Biglov, Aftahetdin Gabidullin, Gabdulla Gabdrashtov, Sulejman Lovchitsky, Gali Morakaev, Fatik Mukhammedyarov, Sulejman Poltarzhitsky, Ahmetsultan Tagirov, Kashaf Teregulov, Adam Yakubovskiy) to coordinate the activities of ethnic organisations and the city’s Turko-Tatar population as founded the Muslim Revolutionary Headquarters, headed by Gabdulgaziz Munasypov, and began to publish the Idel-Volga Olkese (Ural-Volga State) newspaper. They appealed to the Islamic section of the population, encouraging united action in support for the establishment of the Ural-Volga State, and expressed willingness to cooperate with all organisations which accepted the need of founding the State, and demanded that the local soviets should be re-elected with adjustment for the national composition of the population.

However, the Turko-Tatar leaders adherent to non-violence refused to start a military struggle for national sovereignty. The Kazan administration took advantage of their inactivity. By 27th March, its troops had fully encircled the Trans-Bulak part of the city. Its ultimatum to the Muslim Revolutionary Headquarters was as follows: hand over all weapons and ammunition in your possession. When the ultimatum period expired on 28th March, the Revolutionary Headquarters brought a detachment of seamen from Moscow and other military units to the Trans-Bulak part of the city. Having entered the Tatar Sloboda, they used rifles, shotguns, and cannons to disperse the so-called ‘Zabulachnaya republic’. No serious military confrontation followed. The Muslim military detachments deployed in the Trans-Bulak part of Kazan had to surrender. The ‘Temporary Revolutionary Headquarters for the Tatar Part of the City’, established to suppress the disturbance, searched and arrested members of the Muslim People’s Commissariat and the Muslim Revolutionary Headquarters. On 1st April 1918, a Kazan Bolshevik leader M. Milkh reported to Moscow that the authorities of the ‘Zabulachnaya republic’ have been abolished. The Xärbi Şura and the Kazan Council of People’s Commissars agreed to release the previously
arrested leaders of the Military Congress; Muslim military units were assigned to Kazan Military District. The Xarbī Şura undertook refrain from any specific measures to establish the Ural-Volga State.

The active ethnopolitical movement of non-Russian peoples, especially the Turko-Tatar population of Inner Russia and Siberia, made the Soviet government take a new look on the national questions, take certain steps towards its settlement across the territory of the former Russian Empire, and the establishment of national entities. The Soviet government began to take a series of practical measures to sow discord within national democratic movements when the 2nd All-Russian Muslim Military Congress commenced its work in January 1918. In late January 1918, the Central Muslim Commissariat headed by Mullanur Vakhitov was established under the People's Commissariat of Nationalities, which was headed by Joseph Stalin. The establishment of an Muslim commissariat was a turning point in the history of the Turko-Tatar national democratic movement. At the same time, the Council of People's Commissars of Nationalities resolved to establish Muslim commissariats under local soviets. In February 1918, regional Muslim commissariats were founded in towns at a quick pace. The same commissariat was established under the Kazan Soviet of Working Class, Soldier, and Peasant Deputies with departments for labour, peasants, military issues, and culture and education. It embarked on a fierce struggle against supporters of the Ural-Volga State on the first day of its existence.

On 26th March 1918, in the thick of the struggle against the Turko-Tatar national democratic movement, a resolution signed by People's Commissar of Nationalities, Joseph Stalin, and Chairman of the Central Muslim Commissariat, M. Vakhitov was published to the effect that the All-Russian Xarbī Şura was liquidated. It read as follows: 'The All-Russian Military Office and the related garrison and regional committees and any other military organisations regardless of their name are hereby abolished. Any cases, documents, property, and capitals shall be assign to local Muslim Soviet commissariats, which are accountable to the Commissariat for Muslims of Inner Russia, People's Commissariat of Nationalities. Those found guilty of misappropriation of property during the liquidation of the above committees shall be tried by the revolutionary tribunal. Any unauthorized organisations established to tear the power from the hands of Muslim commissariats under the Council are hereby announced counter-revolutionary and shall be liquidated immediately [News of Central Executive Committee, 1918, 28 March]. On 1st May 1918, the Central Muslim Commissariat issued a special decree on the abolition of Milli İdarə, under which governorate, uyezd, and district organisations and the Milli Fond (the National Treasury) were to be abolished and all their property, money, and documents disposed of by the Commissariat. By the end of May 1918, nearly all Turko-Tatar national democratic administrative bodies elected at All-Russi Muslim Congresses had been dissolved.

Thus, the 'Zabulachnaya republic' was a tragic chapter in the history of the struggle of the Turko-Tatar population of the former Russian Empire for national sovereignty, during which Tatar national democratic organisations were banned, the peaceful attempt at solving the problem of Tatar national self-determination was stamped out, and the Bolshevik model of national state arrangement imposed on the people.

The activities of the Millät Mâçele and its organisations was clearly indicative of the political maturity of the leaders of the Tatar nationalist democratic movements and the aspiration of a wide Turko-Tatar public to establish a national sovereignty. The project of the 'Ural-Volga State' was the first application of the idea of establishing Soviet Socialist Republics (States) in Russia. Leninist ideologists of Soviet national state-building could not help but admit it. For instance, People's Commissar of Nationalities of the RSFSR, Joseph Stalin, wrote in an article in Pravda dated 23rd March 1918: 'It has been two month since the 3rd
Congress of Soviets, which declared the Russian Republic to be a federation, but peripheral territories still engaged in establishing Soviet government at the local level have not come up with any specific federation forms. The Tatar-Bashkir region seems the only area where revolutionary organisations have developed a clear plan of forming a federation with the Soviet Russia. We envisage the precise general outline of the arrangement of the Tatar-Bashkir Soviet Republic which has been on the tongue of men, developed by the most influential Soviet Tatar and Bashkir organisations' [Stalin, 1951, pp. 40–41].

The question now arises of what national organisations developed the original project of the Soviet Federation. Even though Stalin maintained that it was Tatar-Bashkir revolutionaries who had implemented the idea of rearranging the former Russian Empire as a federation, this is not true. The concept of the federation was developed at the meetings of the Millät Mäclese, the first democratic national parliament in the new Russia. Therefore, the Bolsheviks borrowed just another idea from their political opponents—the leaders of the Tatar national democratic movement, as they had previously done to left Socialist Revolutionaries' projects. It is no wonder that the Bolsheviks, advocating a united and indivisible Russia and opposed to federation after a series of international conflicts in the Turkic Tatar world, became federalists. This all motivated them concede to the Tatars and the Bashkirs by issuing the Regulation on the Tatar-Bashkir Republic. The suggested state formation covered most of the territory of the unrealised 'Ural-Volga State'.

Thus, the Turko-Tatar national democratic force achieved the establishment of the Tatar-Bashkir Republic in spite of their defeat at the hands of the Bolsheviks. The Soviet government had to initiate Turko-Tatar national state-building and suggest an alternative to the Ural-Volga State that would satisfy the Tatars and the Bashkirs. It was not the Central Muslim Commissariat but the Millät Mäclese and the Board for the Implementation of the Ural-Volga State which were politically essential in this respect. The Muslim Commissariat betrayed the interests of the Tatar and Bashkir people by helping the Soviet government to dissolve all Turko-Tatar organisations established by the All-Russian Muslim Congresses.

On 22nd March 1918, the Regulation on the Tatar-Bashkir Soviet Republic People's Commissar of Nationalities of RSFSR, Joseph Stalin, and Chairman of the Central Muslim Commissariat, M. Vakhitov was published. It read as follows, 'referring to the principle of national self-determination of the working masses, which was approved by the 3rd All-Russian Congress of Soviets, the People's Commissariat of Nationalities in concord with the Commissariat for Muslims in Middle Russia has developed the following regulations of the Tatar-Bashkir Republic: 1. The territory of the South Urals and the Middle Volga region is hereby declared the Tatar-Bashkir Soviet Republic within the Russian Soviet Federation. 2. Its borders shall be established according to the project developed by Bashkir and Tatar revolutionary organisations (the entire Ufa guberniya, the Bashkir part of Orenburg guberniya, Kazan guberniya except for the Chuvash-Cheremis part [the Chuvash and Mari people.—R. Sh.], and the adjacent Muslim parts of Perm, Vyatka, Simbirsk, and Samara guberniyas). The final establishment of the republic's borders shall be the responsibility of the Founding Congress of Soviets of the republic in question. 3. Any political and economic relations of the republic's western part and Bashkortostan shall be determined by the Founding Congress of Soviets of the Tatar-Bashkir Republic. 4. It is the responsibility of the Commissariat for Muslims in Middle Russia to establish a commission for calling the Founding Congress of Soviets' [20 let TASSR, 1940, pp. 45–46]. The Bolshevik's administration was able to deceive not only the wide public but even many representatives of the Turko-Tatar intelligentsia with this regulation.

It is noteworthy, however, that the regulation was not authored by the most powerful leaders of the Soviet State—Chairman of the Council of People's Commissariat, Vladimir Lenin, and Chairman of the All-Russian Cen-
the household, economic, and national sovereignty for the Tatar-Bashkir population. Most probably, the Bolsheviks needed it to sow discord in the Turko-Tatar national movement and thus put an end to it.

In the above context it appears important that not all peoples in the Urals and Volga region welcomed the Regulation of the Tatar-Bashkir Republic, as the Soviet press presented it. For instance, it raised bitter disputes at the Meeting of Minor Ethnic groups of the Volga region and the Cis-Ural region on 13th June 1918. The Chuvash and Mari representatives were opposed to the project of the Tatar-Bashkir Republic. They believed the arrangement forms of the prospective republic to be inconsistent with the household, economic, and national situation of the peoples of the Volga region and the Cis-Ural region. Kryashen representatives, I. Petrov, Gavrilov, and Kuptsov, joined them in expressing a negative attitude to the Tatar and Bashkir republic. Even G. Sharaf was unable to persuade them by saying that ‘they are not going to enslave anyone by establishing the republic. The only thing they aspire for in cultural-national autonomy. There is nothing chauvinistic about the idea of the state. The Soviets of the Russian Republic largely represent the Russians; few positions were available for ethnic minorities, which is a heavy blow to their interests. Complete autonomy is necessary. It is impossible for Muslims alone but very likely to be achieved in cooperation with other ethnic groups. Any Tatar-Bashkir hegemony is out of question—all peoples will be equal. The language of each ethnic group must be an official language, even though it would require a large number of officials at institutions. There is no reason to be apprehensive lest the Tatars dominate the state—they will only constitute 44% of it. We are guided by the principle of equality and cultural-national autonomy exclusively. The state shall include the following governorates: Ufa, Kazan, Orenburg (including the Tatars and the Chuvash people), and Perm. In percentage terms, its ethnic composition is as follows: Chuvash—12%, Mari—4–5%, Great Russians—33%, Muslims—43%, Tatar Christians—1.1–2%. The name 'Tatar-Bashkir' is not final; it is up to the Founding Congress. Shall any ethnic group refuse to enter the republic, the territory will be excluded provided that it is a majority. Otherwise, it will remain within the republic. The state is about Tatar-Bashkir cultural independence, which is why they will never give up on realising this idea. The state will ensure independent cultural development for everybody; the Tatars have no aggressive ambitions.' The Chuvash, Mari, and Tatar Christian representatives remained unconvinced by G. Sharaf’s strong arguments and encouraged all participants in the forum ‘To refrain from participating in any attempts at establishing a state according to any current projects developed by Tatar-Bashkir congresses under the aegis of the central government’ [Obrazovanie TASSR, 1963].

Therefore, the Regulation on the Tatar-Bashkir republic was a turning point in the national state-building of the peoples of the Volga region and the Cis-Ural region. That was the beginning of the so-called 'Leninist-Stalinist national policy'. Having gained ground in most of the regions of the former Russian Empire, the Bolsheviks tried to summon their forces against national autonomies to obtain economic and political dominance over the peoples, which they did under the slogan of national unity. By resolving to establish the Tatar-Bashkir Republic, the Bolshevik government tried to give the impression that the key aspects of their party programme were being implemented. Thus, national state-building in Russia became an exclusive prerogative of the Bolshevik government, while the masses were almost completely excluded. Depending on the socio-political situation in the country, various forms of national sovereignty were imposed on non-Russian peoples. It was the case with the Tatars and the Bashkirs.
Quotes by Joseph Stalin are clearly indicative of the type of autonomy which the Soviet government found preferable [see: Stalin, 1951, pp. 86–87]. He needed a Soviet autonomy essentially deprived of rights so that party officials could fully control the country's peoples. The Soviet government could not authorize the full-fledged Tatar-Bashkir autonomy with wide powers of authority for which the wide Turko-Tatar public aspired. The Soviet government could not grant an autonomy in which the people would enjoy complete power, thus restricting the role of the Centre significantly, to the Nationals. This is the reason why two Meetings on the Tatar-Bashkir Republic, held in Moscow on 13th–15th April and 10th–16th May 1918, were very unproductive and failed to make any fundamental decisions or documents on the issue.

However, a commission was established at the later meeting during a bitter dispute between attendants opposed to the idea of the Tatar-Bashkir Republic (K. Grasis, F. Syromolotov, I. Tuntul, and others) and its advocates (M. Vakhitov, G. Ibragimov, K. Yakubov, and others) to prepare and summon the Founding Congress of Soviets of the Tatar-Bashkir Republic, which was instructed, in particular, '... to develop a procedure for arranging uyezd and district congresses... To delegate propagandists to raise public awareness of the prospective republic and all before the congresses are opened and to introduce the issue of the Tatar-Bashkir Republic to all national propaganda courses' [Pravda, 1918, No. 101]. In the summer of 1918, the Commission adopted a series of controversial decrees: it entrusted the settlement of the autonomy issue, as well as that of its competence and territorial boarders, to the Founding Congress of Soviets, while the date of summoning the congress was the to be agreed on between People's Commissariat of Nationalities and the local deputy councils. Thus, it shed all responsibility for the future of the prospective republic. For some reason, Ufa was where the congress was to take place and not Kazan, in which adherents of the 'Ural-Volga State' were still numerous. This fact aggravated tensions between the Bashkir and Tatar leaders. It was probably initiated by Joseph Stalin, for he was satisfied with the situation and he toyed with inter-ethnic conflicts to delay the establishment of an autonomy. His other actions indicate that this assumption is correct. For instance, in the summer of 1918, when delays occurred in the funding of preparation for the summoning of the Founding Congress of the Tatar-Bashkir Republic, Tatar senior officials turned to Moscow. However, I. Falin prevented the cost estimate which K. Yakubov brought to Moscow from going any further. Speaking to M. Vakhitov, Stalin's assistant S. Pestkovsky attributed the delay to Stalin's instruction not to force the preparation for the congress. M. Vakhitov had to approach Vladimir Lenin. When Lenin asked why the cost estimate had been delayed, Pestkovsky said that Vakhitov's cost estimate was sure to accelerate the calling of the Founding Congress of the Tatar-Bashkir Republic, while Stalin had instructed him not to hurry before departing. On 17th July 1918, the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR adopted a decree to allocate some advance funding to the Central Muslim Commissariat, but the Board of the People's Commissariat of Nationalities challenged the decision. Therefore, the Soviet government, headed by Vladimir Lenin, reconsidered fund allocation to the Central Muslim Commissariat on 20th July and approved the previous funding. This fact indicates that Stalin was doing his best to prevent a powerful and legitimate Tatar-Bashkir autonomy from being established.

The Soviet government took its own way through a masterful political play with Tatar-Bashkir leaders, which enabled it to take the lead and leave behind the Nationals, thus bolstering the Centre's position in terms of the national question. Lenin's government had to reconsider the issue during the hardest days of the war, when the white army had surrounded the Soviet Russia with General N. Yudenich's army advancing from the north-west, that of Admiral A. Kolchak from the east, and that of General A. Denikin from the south. On 20th March 1919, the 'Agreement of the Central Soviet Government with the Bashkir Government...
Chapter 1. The Establishment of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and the Tatar Community of the Soviet Russia

on the Soviet Autonomy of Bashkortostan' was signed in Moscow. The autonomy was confined to the so-called Little Bashkortostan and included the southern, south-eastern, and north-eastern territories of today's Bashkortostan. In fact, the Soviet government took the advantage of the difference between Kolchak's administration, which aspired for an united and indivisible Russia, and the Bashkir nationals led by A.-Z. Validov. The Bolsheviks granted autonomy to the Bashkirs, who, in turn, recognized the Soviet government, so the Bashkir corps that had been previously fighting within A. Kolchak's army attached the troops of General N. Yudenich in September 1919. That is, the Bolsheviks took the decision to put a stop to implementing the regulation on the Tatar-Bashkir sovereignty.

However, many Tatar-Bashkir national leaders would not accept the political action of the Soviet government. The issue of the Tatar-Bashkir autonomy was raised again on the 2nd All-Russia Congress of Communist Organisations of the Muslim Peoples of the East, which was held in Moscow from 22nd November to 3rd December 1919. The Congress stated in its resolution that '...the fact that the Little Bashkortostan was declared Autonomous Soviet Republic by no means cancels the Regulation on the Tatar-Bashkir Soviet Socialist Republic by the Council of People's Commissars and provides no formal solution to the Tatar-Bashkir problem in the whole, since the republic only includes one third of the Bashkir population of the Soviet Republic... The best solution to the Tatar-Bashkir problem, in terms of politics, natural history, and socio-economic aspects, is to create a common Soviet Republic to unite the entire Tatar-Bashkir proletariat; the republic shall include the following governorates of Ufa, Kazan, and the adjacent Tatar-Bashkir-populated parts – Samara, Simbirsk, Vyatka, and Perm Governorates... The Tatar-Bashkir issue is an urgent priority in the national policy of the Soviet Republic. Referring to the principle of self-determination of nations declared in the RSFSR Constitution, All-Russian Congresses of Soviets, and the 8th Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks)...', the Congress finds the following necessary: 1) To implement the Regulation on the Tatar-Bashkir Soviet Socialist Republic by the Council of People's Commissars within borders exclusive of the autonomous Little Bashkortostan. 2) Refer the issue of including the autonomous Little Bashkortostan to the Tatar-Bashkir Soviet Socialist Republic to the proletariat of the Little Bashkortostan. 3) To entrust the execution of the Congress' resolution to the special revolutionary committee established by the present Congress as agreed with the CC WPP (B), instructing the latter to summon the Founding Congress of Soviets of the Tatar-Bashkir Soviet Socialist Republic' [20 let TASSR, 1940, pp. 57–58].

It is characteristic that, while Tatar-Bashkir national leaders advocated the autonomy, Stalin's government embarked on a policy to combat it. On 13th December 1919, it was able to impose a decision to cancel the Regulation on the Tatar-Bashkir Republic dated 22nd March 1918 on the Political Bureau of the CC WPP (B). Even after that, the issue of Tatar-Bashkir autonomy was discussed at many forums with the direct participation of Vladimir Lenin and Joseph Stalin. A new special commission was established to finally solve it. However, the situation in the country had changed by that time. The broader public was no longer able to openly state its demands. The Soviet government took the lead in national state-building completely. During the 9th Congress of the RCP (B) in April 1920, the Council of People's Commissars had a special meeting presided by Vladimir Lenin (attended by Joseph Stalin) with representatives of party and Soviet organisations to discuss the establishment of a Tatar Republic. Several representatives of the Russian-speaking Kazan governorate administration spoke against the establishment of a separate Tatar Republic, maintaining that the Tatar people could not provide well-prepared communists to govern the republic. They believed that establishing a Tatar Republic under such conditions would cause the Soviet and eco-
nomic apparatus to malfunction and eventually deteriorate. In spite of their disagreement, a majority claimed that it was necessary to establish a separate Tatar Republic.

In the middle of May 1920, the Political Bureau of the CC WPP (B) held a special discussion on this issue. The Commission for the Development of a Draft Decree on the Establishment of the Tatar ASSR, headed by Joseph Stalin, was founded at the meeting, led by Vladimir Lenin. On 27th May 1920 the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR issued the Decree on the Establishment of the Autonomous Tatar Soviet Socialist Republic and on the establishment of the Provisional Revolutionary Committee of seven members, which was signed by Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars Vladimir Lenin and Chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee Mikhail Kalinin.

The All-Russian Central Executive Committee resolved that the Tatar Republic should be established within the territory specified in the Regulation on the Tatar-Bashkir Republic by the People's Commissariat of Nationalities dated 22nd March 1918, except for the territory of the existing Autonomous Bashkir Socialist Republic. In fact, it was not only Little Bashkortostan but Krasnokokshaysky, Cheboksary, Tsivislk, and Yadrin uyezds, Kazan guberniya, Ufa and Birsk, Belebey and Ufa uyezds, Ufa guberniya, which were specified in the Regulation of the Tatar-Bashkir Republic, what was excluded from the Tatar ASSR. As for Belebey and Birsk uyezds, the issue remained unsolved until the working masses of the two uyezds made a decision. It was probably a tactical subterfuge to which the Soviet government resorted. In late 1922, Ufa and Birsk, Belebey and Ufa uyezds were declared part of the Bashkir ASSR, thus forming Bolshaya Bashkiria.

Noteworthy, a bitter dispute over the territories was maintained during the meeting on the establishment of the Tatar ASSR. The Tatar representatives, who agreed to the establishment of the Tatar Republic, had to argue with the Centre on the inclusion of the city of Ufa as well as Menzelinsk, Ufa, and Belebey uyezds in the prospective republic. It was permitted to include several volosts within Samara, Simbirsk, and Vyatka gubernias in the Tatar Republic. Ufa uyezd was excluded from the republic; attempts were made to prevent Menzelinsk uyezd from becoming its part. 'We,' Burundukov said, 'maintain that the majority of the population of Menzelinsk uyezd and the inhabitants of Menzelinsk are Tatars and Bashkirs, the two ethnic groups with similar traditions, and they won't mind it. That is why we requested that Menzelinsk uyezd should be included in the Tatar Republic. Yet, the request was denied' [Kızıl Armiya, 1920, 6 June]. However, the inhabitants of Menzelinsk insisted, and the Centre could not but agree to its inclusion in the Tatar Republic. A referendum was to be held in order to decide whether Ufa should be included in either of the republics.

In this context, M. Sultan-Galiev found it possible to establish a republic including Ufa and Birsk near the Little Bashkortostan, having its capital in Sterlitamak, and call it the Tatar-Bashkir Republic.

Stalin's government thus accomplished its end. A small, economically weak republic was established, while a large part of the Tatar people remained beyond Tatarstan. The percentage of Tatar population in the Tatar Republic was as low as around 50%. The second largest group was the Russians. This all enabled the central government to interfere with the internal affairs of the Tatar ASSR.

On 25th June 1920, the powers of the Kazan Governorate Executive Committee were vested in the Provisional Revolutionary Committee. The date went down in history as the day when the Tatar ASSR was established. While Tatar national leaders disputed fiercely with representatives of the People's Commissariat of Nationalities, S. Said-Galiev was elected Chairman of the Provisional Revolutionary Committee. Many national senior officials wanted the well-educated, proactive, vigorous, and daring M. Sultan-Galiev on this position. They associated the future territorial expansion of the republic and the development of Tatar sovereignty and culture with his name. How-
ever, Said-Galiev was preferable to the Centre both in terms of social origin (working-class) and on the level of 'business qualities' (poorly educated, weak-willed, lacking initiative, pliable, vindictive, etc.).

A number of bodies were established within the Provisional Revolutionary Committee, including the Departments for Internal Affairs (headed by Gasy'm Mansurov), Healthcare (Kashaf Mukhtarov), Land (Yunus Validov), People's Education (Karim Khakimov), Justice (A. Nekhotyaev), Labor (A. Dogadov), Social Welfare (Valei Iskhakov), and Finance (A. Gordeev); the Soviet for People's Economy (M. Roshal'); the Military Commissariat (Itelson); the Governorate Commission for Foods (Barabarchuk) and the Extraordinary Commission (G. Ivanov). The main candidates for positions of power within the committee were also imposed by Moscow; their appointees occupied all the key economic and power structures. The Provisional Revolutionary Committee was preparing to call the Founding Congress of Soviets of the Tatar ASSR from July to August of the year 1920. The Congress commenced its work on 25th September. It elected the Central Executive Committee of the Tatar ASSR of 59 members (G.Bagautdinov, A. Dogadov, K. Ismaev, B. Mansurov, K. Mukhtarov, S. Said-Galeev, M. Sultan-Galiev, and others). The government in the form of the Council of People's Commissars was formed at the first Plenary Meeting of the Central Executive Committee on 28th September. Presided by S. Said-Galeev, it included the following 15 members: Galeev Yu. Validov, A. Gordeev, A. Dogadov, A. Izmaylov, A. Izyumov, V. Iskhakov, K. Mukhtarov, A. Nekhotyaev, M. Roshal', and others). The Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the Tatar ASSR of 7 members was founded (Chairman B. Mansurov, members: Kh. Gaynullin, A. Denisov, A. Kopnov, A. Samokhvalov, A. Tanyaevev, and N. Yarullin).

In the autumn of 1920, nearly all of the republic's power structures were established. And here the Centre once again interfered. The community had to defend a number of applicants for public office, sometimes unsuccessfully, as it was with M. Sultan-Galiev. The composition of superior power structures was unstable and changed often. The central government wanted it because intense rotation in the administration enabled them to manage the republic through their appointees in the Provisional Committee. This category of governors had neither common republican nor common national interests. Many of them viewed their position purely as a source of income, which they were willing to maintain by fulfilling any order by the Centre. The central government would send opinionated and intractable administrators to minor offices in other regions on the pretext of promotion. The Tatar Regional Committee as well as the Secretariat and Organisational Department of the CC WFP/CPSU(B) were also crucial to this process. According to the principle of democratic centralism, rank and file party members were subordinated to the party elite.

Thus, the Tatar national autonomy developed under extremely challenging conditions—during a socio-economic and political crisis in the country, in times of a fierce socio-political struggle between national and Bolshevik leaders. The Tatar sovereignty emerged and got established in the context of struggle against nationalist internationalists and great-power chauvinists, who were opposed to any national state formations. The leaders of the Tatar national democratic movement made an enormous contribution to the establishment of the Tatar national autonomy. Owing to their effort, the Tatar people became a state-forming nation again, though in a violently abridged and restricted way. Yet, it was a major victory that could lay the foundations for a future struggle to restore a full-fledged state. Several national autonomies, in particular the Tatar ASSR, emerged eventually in the region initially allotted to the Ural-Volga State and later to the Tatar-Bashkir Soviet Republic.
§ 2. The Formation of Soviet Government Institutions in the TASSR

Indus Tagirov

The people won their republic at a heavy price. Famine befell it in the very first year of its existence. Its cause was not only and not so much objective conditions as the food policy of party authorities and the republic's administration.

At first, 10,120 poods of Prodrazverstka were imposed on the republic. The issue was discussed at the republic's first party conference.

Honored party official Ivan Derunov said openly in his speech that the republic was unable to fulfill the Prodrazverstka target. 'However,' he said, 'you can only publish it with other party officials.' Aware of the conditions in Kazan guberniya, he said that its old uyezds had long been drained and that he could only rely on uyezds from different governorates within the republic. To his credit, the party official also said that the peasantry had not yet been paid for the previous harvest and mentioned the lack of salt and not imported dry goods [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 1, File 3, Sheet 13]. Unfortunately, his speech was of uncommon nature. Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars K. Mukhtarov preferred to omit the fact by elaborating on the prospects for global revolution. Aggressive measures to ensure that the food policy was implemented were the dominant idea of the conference.

In his report at the Meeting of the Bureau of the Regional Committee, Chairman of the Governorate Emergency Committee, A. Denisov emphasized the practice of collecting warm clothes from the population. In fact, party officers were ordered, 'Exercise compulsory withdrawal of warm clothes by means of searches' [Ibid., Sheet 51]. Apart from Prodrazverstka, which amounted to 15.4 million poods due to the republic's pliable conformist administration, headed by Said-Galiev, the population had to carry the burden of meat, oil, vegetable, egg, wool, honey, hay, poultry, and other taxes. To supply all these would mean a death sentence not only for the peasantry, but for the entire population of the republic. To ensure that the Prodrazverstka target was achieved, 1,500 people were conscripted and a number of revolutionary tribunals were established, which, to quote documentary records, 'had moral influence on the peasant masses and reinforced their awareness of how necessary and mandatory it was to fulfill the Prodrazverstka' [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 1, File 202, Sheet 23].

On 20th August 1920 the Tatar People's Commissariat for Food issued and order to declare governmental crop and fodder razverstka 'mandatory and unconditionally binding, even in the prejudice of the established food standards.' The following procedure was introduced: District commissariats for food were to carry out volost Prodrazverstka with reference to standard values, taking into account the statistics regarding area under crops. Prodrazverstka by settlement was entrusted to volost executive committees, while village soviets were responsible for providing household Prodrazverstka in adherence to the following principles: 1) duty was to be imposed on the whole household depending on its area under crops; 2) imposing duty on a per mouth or per capita basis was unacceptable; 3) responsibility for fulfilling Prodrazverstka was collective, but not individual. Penalties were specified, too. The principal penalty was judicial punishment. Dedicated military detachments for food could be used for immediately crop confiscation as an additional enforcement measure.

The punitive measures to be taken to the peasant population were not new. They had been practiced since the first days of the Soviet regime. Arsk volost, where peasant dissatisfaction during crop inventory in November 1918 led to disturbance. A military team was used to suppress the peasant disorder. The same was done to the population of the village of Shumkovo, Laishiev uyezd, on 16th December.

The government resorted to even more cruel measures to suppress the Black Eagle peasant
rebellion. Thus, the population had no reason to doubt the authorities' determination to apply a similar approach to Prodravzerstka.

The first plenary session of the republic's Council of People's Commissars took place on 30th September 1920. Aside from developing a procedure for governmental work, another issue on the agenda was to publish the Appeal to the population of the Tatar Republic to encourage it to fulfil Prodravzerstka. Shamil Usmanov refused to sign it and said that he did not want to 'rob his people'. His close associate People's Commissar for Agriculture Yunus Validi called those who insisted on adopting the Appeal 'Moscow's toadies' and 'traitors of the nation'.

This was remarkable behaviour and certainly influenced their fate.

It was an appeal in name only—it was in fact a decree. The document not only encouraged peasants to fulfil Prodravzerstka no matter what but gave them the ability to apply repressive measures.

It is hardly possible that the republic's administration, in particular Said-Galiev, were unaware of the threat of famine and the population's continuously deteriorating situation. He had been regularly receiving reports from the Emergency Committee. But the head of the republic believed that it was 'necessary to save the revolution' and that 'the Tatar people are nothing when compared to the global revolution' [SA HPD TR, Fund 36, List 2, File 3, No. 21].

According to Kh. Gabidullin, 'they could have imposed a much smaller Prodravzerstka from the Tatar population. Nobody can deny it. You can justify Said-Galiev by claiming that he did that out of revolutionary conscience, but not a single worker can deny that the Tatar Republic was mere fiction' [Ibid., Inventory 1, File 8, No. 7a, Sheet 21]. This contests the idea that one should accept death of hunger for the republic's sake, in return for its establishment. The republic was fiction, while Prodravzerstka was the crude reality. This is how those to be later enlisted as the right opposition within the Tatar Party Organisation viewed the issue.

The Republic continued to develop in the meanwhile. The issue of translating minutes of meetings of uyezd executive committees and accepting applications in Tatar was also discussed at the aforementioned meeting of the Revolutionary Committee on 20th July. The recommendation was to keep the Revolutionary Committee's minutes in Tatar beginning from 25th June. Uyezd executive committees were 'to begin to accept applications in Tatars, for which purpose a translation bureau should be established under each uyezd executive committee.' Another resolution was to use the same office for receiving telegrams in Tatar.

Some uyezds did not hesitate to implement the decision. On 2nd–3rd August, the 4th Bugulma Uyezd Conference took place, at which Shingareev's report on the organisation of the Tatar Republic was followed, on a suggestion by Galaktionov, by a decision to 'take every effort to reinforce the spiritual and economic power of the working people of the Tatar Republic in close unity with the workers of the Russian Soviet Republic and the entire world.' On 6th August, the Uyezd Executive Committee met to discuss the implementation of the Revolutionary Committee's decision of 20th July. The Muslim Section of the Uyezd Committee of the RCP (B) was instructed to establish an office to receive applications in Tatar.

Starting on 15th September, Uyezd's Soviet Congresses took place in every uyezd to celebrate the establishment of the Tatar Republic and elect delegates to the 1st Congress of Soviets of the Tatar ASSR.

The 1st Founding Congress of Soviets of the TASSR was working in the building of the Drama Theatre from 25th–27th September. 348 delegates attended the congress: 150 Tatars, 167 Russians, and 29 representatives of other nations. Reports on the current situation and the activities of the Revolutionary Committee were presented. The food and land question as well as the issues of public education and general labor and cart duties were addressed. The delegates adopted a resolution on each issue. Vladimir Lenin and Chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee
Mikhail Kalinin welcomed the congress. The resolution on the current situation emphasized the sentiment in the West, where 'the working masses of the West follow the model of Russian workers and peasants to prepare for a decisive struggle against the bourgeoisie and for establishing a Soviet regime under the banner of the 3rd Communist International', and in the East, the peoples of which the resolution claimed to 'associate their liberation movement with the future of the Russian revolution.'

The concluding part of the resolution, titled 'Every Effort for Victory', emphasized the fact that 'a peaceful development and the very existence of the Tatar ASSR is only possible provided that the socialist revolution in Russia and other countries wins.' The resolution on the Revolutionary Committee's report was brief and generally approving.

By contrast, the resolution on the food issue was severe and uncompromising. It consisted of nine provisions, each rather like a policy statement. It declared the food policy of the Soviet State to be 'the only possible policy and the only right one'. It mentioned emphatically that 'the correct economic development of the Tatar ASSR can only be ensured provided that food production and supply is centralized completely across the RSFSR.' It also declared that 'to completely fulfill Prodrazverstka is the responsibility of each peasant.' Another noteworthy fact is that the congress recognized 'Prodrazverstka as the minimum set of requirements', denying 'any attempts at partially reducing or fully abolishing it in advance.' The fifth provision sounds especially harsh: 'The Congress believes that society in general should be liable for failure to fulfill Prodrazverstka. Thus, the amount of food not provided by one member of the society shall be compensated for with the supplies of the entire society.' Finally, the last provision of the resolution sounds like an order: 'Each member of the Congress must proceed to coerce peasants to fulfill their Prodrazverstka completely as soon as they arrive.'

Delegates to the Congress did execute the order of the newly created republic's superior governmental body.

The land resolution was a sensible approach, as it raised the question of land, arable land, meadow and forest management. It also mentioned the necessity, as well as the available methods, of fostering agricultural growth. The authors also gave due attention to the development of agricultural education and encouraged advanced industry methods, in particular for animal breeding.

The resolution on popular education emphasized the problem of the development of professional training for adults. The highest priority was given to schools and their teaching staff, as well as to the translation of specialised books into Tatar and Chuvash.

The resolution on general labor and animal duty is also harsh, and the following phrase taken from it is extremely representative of that fact: 'Workers must improve the productivity of labor. Peasants must fulfil the duties that the government imposes upon them.'

Congress elected a Central Executive Committee of 56 members presided by Burkhan Mansurov.

A plenary meeting of the Central Executive Committee of the TASSR took place on 28 September to address the issue of the composition of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars. Apart from B. Mansurov, the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee included six people: Samokhvalov, Tanyaev, Denisov, Yarullin, Kopnov and Gaynullin.

A government comprised of the following 15 people was elected: Said-Galiev, Izmaylov, Izyumov, Roshal', Sultanov, Nekhotyaev, Iskhakov, Bochkov, Dogadov, Mukhtarov, Validov, Gordeev, Ivanov, Khakharev and Veytser.

Yet this Congress failed to stabilise the situation in Tatarstan. Discord among the republic's government escalated until it peaked during the implementation of Prodrazverstka in 1920, which brought about innumerable losses and immense suffering to the people.

When a newspaper report appeared on 11 October saying that nationalists and the bourgeoisie had attempted to assassinate the Chairman of the Republic's Council of People's
Commissars Sakhibgarey Said-Galiev, it only aggravated the situation. A series of bizarre arrests followed suit. The Head of the Millät Printing House N. Mukhtarov, who shared an apartment with S. Said-Galiev and Vali Shafiguullin in 1919, was arrested. In his report on S. Said-Galiev, he wrote that he saw no nationalists or bourgeoisie in the cellars of the Special Department where they had brought him. It appeared to him that somebody else was using him to settle their affairs with somebody else. 'As for the attempts at assassinating comrade Said-Galiev,' he wrote, 'I cannot say anything for sure; but rumor has it that it was Russian nationalists and members of the Russian bourgeoisie. But rumor also has it that he did it himself because of his career. But this is all rumor, and it's no business of mine whether it's true or not.' This document is suggestive of a rivalry between different groups of the republic's national intelligentsia.

Even though arrests were often arbitrary, it was not G. Ibragimov, S. Atagulov, F. Saifi, G. Baimbetov, and others (i.e. Said-Galiev's followers) who played the central role in them, but rather political forces of a higher level. The commission sent from Moscow to investigate the attempted assassination did not produce any formal statement concerning its activities. Yet, a series of telegrams of condolence expressing contempt for the mastermind of the attempted assassination of the leader of the Tatar proletariat are to some extent indicative of a political motivation behind the action.

In his report to the CC WPP (B) concerning the incident, Sultan-Galiev wrote that it was 'an artificial history', since 'it was pointless to assassinate Said-Galiev, as it would pave the way for counter-revolutionary disturbances', and 'if any assassination had been attempted, it would have been well-coordinated, and Said-Galiev would not have escaped with just a mere scratch' [Sultan-Galiev, 1998, p.290].

In any event, the struggle between the Rights and the Lefts among Tatar activists grew more violent. As a result, S. Said-Galiev was withdrawn from Kazan to be appointed Chairman of the Council of the People's Commis-
sars of the Crimean Republic. The republic's administration was dominated by the Rights, which means mainly Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev's associates. Burkhan Mansurov headed the government, but this was far from the end of a political saga. It instead acquired a different nature and brought forth new political changes concerning the case of Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev. During its time, both the subject and name of Sultan-Galiev as an enemy of the people were taboo. However, investigations into Sultan-Galiev's case enjoyed a new wave of effort following his rehabilitation to provide a truthful account of the dramatic events of the 1920s–1930s.

Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev, a member of the Small Board of the People's Commissariat of Nationalities and a representative of the Tatar Republic in Moscow at the same time, enjoyed great respect and prestige among workers in national republics. He was constantly acting as the protector of individuals, national organisations and republics as a whole. The leaders of the Soviet government, especially Stalin, also accounted him due attention.

But while appreciating him as a tireless activist and a gifted theoretician and coordinator, officials nevertheless treated him with caution. To a certain extent, we have already mentioned Lenin's respect for him. Here it would be useful to refer to Sultan-Galiev's written appeal to Lenin dated 7 August 1919, in which he complained that Lenin had never agreed to a meeting in person, while Zaki Validov, Musa Bigiev, and Indian activist M. Barakatullah all enjoyed free access to him.

'Letter to V. Lenin to Request an Audience on August 27, 1919
Dear Vladimir Ilyich,
I am one of the key initiators of and active participants in the struggle against Islamic bourgeois organisations pursuing a policy of accommodation in the Soviet Russia.
The elimination of the All-Russian Islamic Military Council, the All-Russian Islamic National Council, and the National Parliament of Muslims in Inner Russia at a time when they posed the threat of turning into active oppo-
ments of Bolshevism is my key merit as a revolutionary.

These institutions were abolished during the revolutionary struggle at the first stage of the October Revolution, so decrees on their abolition were not issued until it had taken place, when the petite and large Muslim bourgeoisie had been in opposition to Bolshevism had finally been suppressed. The fact that the leaders of the revolutionary movement Muslims in Inner Russia have not been honored by an audience with you after the death of Mullanur Wazpitov, while Islamic nationalists (Z. Validov, Barakatullah, Musa Bigiev, and others) enjoy free access to your office, hurts me and my Tatar communist colleagues.

I believe that this note of mine will persuade you to receive me and hear me out in person.

I am more entitled to this than Z. Validov, M. Bigiev and others, if even for just the sole reason that you have never received me.

Please receive me once and only once, and I will never bother you again.

Yours truly,
Chairman of the Central Islamic Military Board, Commissar for Muslims in Inner Russia, Member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 2nd Army M. Sultan-Galiev’ [Sultan-Galiev, 1998, p.197].

One possible reason why Lenin would not receive Sultan-Galiev was because of Stalin, who had apparently been providing corrupted information on him. The fact of the matter is that Stalin envied Sultan-Galiev’s exceptional abilities and had been seeking incriminatory evidence against him, in particular with the help of E. Stasova. However, he was soon able to overcome his artificial isolation from Lenin. After about a month after his letter, Lenin agreed to a meeting with Sultan-Galiev.

The Secretary of the Central Committee E. Stasova was the first to develop a suspicious attitude towards Sultan-Galiev because of his active involvement in negotiations between the Soviet government and Little Bashkortostan. Sultan-Galiev was suspected of being in collusion with Z. Validov. It remains unclear what Stasova’s ultimate contribution to this matter was, but Lenin developed a mistrust for Sultan-Galiev, which as we have already mentioned, manifested itself during the establishment of the Tatar Republic. They followed him closely and made reports on him.

Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev was dissatisfied with the policy of the CC WPP (B) regarding eastern republics, especially in terms of the establishment of the USSR, when the autonomous republics found themselves deprived of rights. He wanted rights equal to those of other Soviet republics and a higher status for them. He therefore criticised Stalin many times in letters and notes to his associates. Part of them were intercepted as evidence, which to quote his friend and associate Firdevs, consisted of 'two idiotic letters'. But just a few words said to Stalin in the wrong tone were enough to make the evidence come into play. Sultan-Galiev was arrested. His expulsion from the party as an anti-party and anti-Soviet supporter followed on 4 May 1923. The letter in defense of M. Sultan-Galiev by the government of the Tatar Republic delivered to Zinovyev, Kamenev, Trotsky, Bukharin, Radek and Kuybyshhev had no effect. The 4th Meeting of the CC WPP (B), which was attended by key political figures of the national republics, was summoned to criticise Sultan-Galiev in public.

Members of the Regional Committee of the CPSU(B) met in Kazan on 19 July 1923 to discuss the outcome of the 4th Meeting. They sat for three days and 130 people were present. The Chairman of the Tatar Emergency Committee S. Schwartz presided over the meeting.

The Secretary of the Regional Committee D. Zhivob began his report as follows: 'It is a common fact that M. Sultan-Galiev represented the Tatar Republic in Moscow, exercised certain powers on our behalf, enjoyed our trust, was intimately associated with our workers, was representative of certain trends in a number of matters, and was treated as the chief of the Tatar working masses, though I find it difficult to say that the latter treatment was just.' To sum it up, he said that Sultan-Galiev had lost everything.

Not a single question followed the report, which was attributed to a lack of 'awareness concerning the contents of the report'. It was
resolved to deliver the shorthand record of the 4th Meeting to party organisations in cantons.

Sh. Usmanov provided the following commentary on the report: 'Comrades! The report by comrade Zhivot fell on us like a bombshell. Our workers had been excluded from the boiling pot of the national question, as we have kept it a secret like a venereal patient conceals their disease. The result of this is the ugly popped abscess among us'. He described the draft revolution suggested by the meeting's attendees as follows: 'The Bureau has suggested a draft resolution on combating the alleged 'Sultan-galievshchina' (Sultan-Galiev policy) in Tataria. That would only fuel the flame. It is not only the consequences but the causes that we should combat. The ultimate display of chauvinism and power is the cause of Sultan-galievshchina. This must be emphasised. Otherwise, everybody will start calling Sultan-Galiev their opponent.' He also accused Said-Galiev, who had kept the letter by V. Lenin containing, 'in fact, an order that the republics must last long and that Russian comrades should not act as their nurses, but as assistants of local communists' without referring to it. Usmanov rebuked the leaders of the Regional Committee for having taken 'an unusual approach to combating the Lefts and the Rights.' He claimed that the Lefts enjoyed the Regional Committee's pity 'as people aggrieved for no reason and helpless', while excluding 'some of the Rights who are more active in national terms from work by preserving them as reserve political officials of the Red Army'.

Sh. Akhmadiev delivered a similar report criticising Sultan-galievshchina. Unlike Sh. Usmanov, he attributed it not to Russian chauvinism, which 'Russian communists, who have extensive experience and a variety of time-tested approaches, can easily defeat'. He reminded the public of the fact that the 4th Meeting expressed regret that 'local organisations had been unable to expose the clandestine organisation', accusing the Regional Committee of resembling 'a village community that for some reason cannot catch its own horse-thief until the neighboring village does.' He arrived at the following conclusion: 'We would like to request the Regional Committee, which remains the superior party organisation of authority, to straighten up and act in accordance with the resolution of the 10th Party Convention and that of the Party Meeting on the National Question'.

Commentators on the report in one way or another fell into two groups. To quote Yakubov, 'those who defended Sultan-Galiev and those who rejected him'. In the opinion of G. Ibragimov, 'some events, and even the meeting itself, were marked by residual Sultan-galievshchina'. He added the following, 'When Comrades Usmanov, Taneev, and Validov spoke, I felt scared. Even though Sultan-Galiev himself has been neutralised through expulsion from the party, hearing some people speak makes you think it is Sultan-Galiev's shadow'. He claimed conviction and coercion as the correct methods for correcting such people.

In fact, M. Sultan-Galiev's supporters were not as pugnacious as G. Ibragimov depicted them to be. For instance, B. Mansurov merely warned the public against discussing the issue through the prism of Said-Galiev or Sultan-Galiev. Enbayev only reminded the gathering that the discussion should not acquire an investigatory form or be held to settle old scores. M. Brundukov also admonished them to not stigmatise all Tatars as Sultan-Galiev's adherents, effectively 'tarring everyone with the same brush just because they have shaken hands with Sultan-Galiev'. The Lefts were only reminded for having an opportunity to 'fish in troubled water and capitalise on the case'.

Yet, it was not the Lefts and not the Rights who had been fishing but other forces, who D. Zhivot mentioned in his reply to M. Sagidullin: 'There is nothing for us to be afraid of, comrade Sagidullin. The proletariat party has apparatuses at its disposal which should, do, and will keep an eye on anyone who might harm the power of the proletariat'. This was a warning to anyone who had forgotten that the Tatar Republic was not a shield in the struggle for Tatar people to obtain their rights, and that there were forces out there to cut them down to size.
Bronstein rightfully noted that only 10% of speeches were aimed at ensuring the correct national policy, while the remaining 90% resembled 'either those of prosecution or those of defense'. The Head of the Emergency Committee S. Schwartz summed up the discussion: 'Are comrades who used to be connected with Sultan-Galiev and are currently in power guilty? We cannot say that they are not. It is clearly our duty to declare them guilty. But can we really group them in with Sultan-Galiev? Of course not. Sultan-Galiev is a traitor who betrayed the working class, aligned himself with the basmachi rebels, etc. Our reliable Tatar communists are guilty of having not been watchful enough of Sultan-Galiev. I have no reason to say that they were aware of his plans, but they trusted him too much'. The shorthand record of the meeting contains an intervention: 'We are people of little mark. The Central Committee trusted him more.' However, nobody seemed to hear these words. The final speech was a conviction of local Sultan-Galiev supporters.

Soon afterwards in 1924, K. Mukhtarov, G. Mansurov and A. Enbayev were transferred from Kazan to Moscow as resolved by the 8th and 9th Regional Party Conferences. However, as fate would have it they were to encounter Sultan-Galiev once again. Six years later, they were accused of nationalism and called betrayers of the proletariat. At this point Lefts replaced them in the Tatar administration.

The Russian practice of creating powerless national autonomy also affected the Crimea, which had tight connections to a number of Kazan political leaders, primarily M. Sultan-Galiev and S. Said-Galiev. It was all the more difficult to develop Crimean autonomy because army General Suleyman Sulkevich made attempts at establishing national sovereignty under the aegis of Wrangel during the preceding Civil War. In addition, the Tatar population of the Crimea was as small as 126,600 out of a total 740,000. This ratio had many causes, including the famine that befell Crimea during the Civil War. However, it is largely attributable to the tsarist government's regular measures to force Tatars into Turkey. Therefore, Tatar activists took efforts to ensure that the Tatar population could return home. They also found the idea of establishing a Jewish autonomous area in the Crimea extremely bothering.

In short, the situation in the Crimea, in particular relations between leaders of the Crimean Tatars, was marked by tension.

Some political forces in Moscow had always found Sultan-Galiev's connection to national republics suspicious. A clear attempt was made to isolate Sultan-Galiev from Tataria and Bashkortostan. The government paid tireless attention to his relations with Crimean Tatar workers. For instance, one document terms Sultan-Galiev 'a pan-Turkist who has been able to worm himself into the Bolshevik party', while referring to Ismail Firdevs, an influential Crimean Tatar Bolshevik, as a person working under his ideological influence.

There was a party called Milliy Firqa that existed in the Crimea, and its active members joined the Bolsheviks after the revolution. The document read: 'The more influential representatives of Nationals M. Sultan-Galiev and Shagimardan Ibragimov tried to establish ethnic Communist Parties, or a single Muslim communist party, to formalise the double party membership of local National Communists. M. Sultan-Galiev, I. Firdevs, and other Tatar Left Social Revolutionaries were the masterminds behind this plan. When the Tatar, Bashkir and Crimean Republics were being established, the movement for an 'independent national Communisit Party' acquired serious form and a conspiratorial nature. M. Sultan-Galiev was the leader, while local executors included I. Firdevs in the Crimea and A. Enbayev in Kazan. Milliy Firqa members reportedly formed a group in the Crimea headed by I. Firdevs and O.A.G. Deren-Ayler.

The document mentions the criminal movement allegedly led by Crimean Tatars that emerged following Vrangel's defeat as one of the reasons for Milliy Firqa's influence. The movement was also reported to be headed by White Guard officers and associated with clandestine counter-revolutionary groups, 'naturally including M.F.'
Moscow sent a dedicated commission headed by Shagimardan Ibragimov to eradicate the uneasy situation in Crimea created by criminal groups.

The document also expresses an appreciation of Sh. Ibragimov's measures to stabilise the situation in Crimea: 'The arrival of Ibragimov's Commission solidified the agreement between the Regional Committee and M.F. Thanks to their measures, the foundation was laid for eliminating organised crime'. The specific results of the Commission's work reportedly included the signing of a capitulation agreement by major gangs on 3 July 1921, followed by the progressive surrender of criminal groups. The Commission can also boast of a series of measures to ensure agreement between the Regional Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and Milliy Firqa.

The document then specifies the facts that did not sit well with Moscow. Firstly, a large number of meetings with Milliy Firqa had been found to have taken place without the knowledge of the Party's Regional Committee. Secondly, Sh. Ibragimov reportedly used his position as a representative of the Central Committee to apply for the position of Chairman of the Council of the People's Commissars of the Crimean Republic. Quite naturally, Moscow could not accept someone so closely associated with the nationalist leaders of Milliy Firqa. Therefore, Moscow chose Said-Galiev, who had been uncompromisingly opposed to Sultan-Galiev.

Sh. Ibragimov's letter to Crimea he wrote on returning to Moscow provides an account of the events. It reads as follows: 'Dear Comrade Ferdevs, Hello and kindest regards. Unfortunately, I cannot inform you in person of everything taking place in Moscow. You will see why from the letter attached hereto. A greeting telegram Stalin did not let me work in Crimea, as Said-Galiev is heading there. I know you will be displeased, but what can I do if the Central Committee wants him to go? I think Said-Galiev will try and say that he attempted to refuse, but he did not. In any event, you should not be apprehensive about his arrival. Comrade Stalin instructed him properly in this respect, and I insisted that not a single worker should be taken along'.

However, Sh. Ibragimov was sadly mistaken to think that he enjoyed trust and confidence. The further text of the letter is indicative of this fact: 'You should know that the Centre is on my side. If you are able to achieve something, I will support you. It is essential that you should try and attract Tatar Communists and the [non-partisans] of Milliy Firqa. They will gradually change their attitude to you.

Keep an eye on Said-Galiev during the regional party conference because there is a lot of incriminating evidence against him available. If he works well, let him work. Please send regular reports. I am looking forward to hearing from you. With communist greetings, Sh. Ibragimov. The letter is dated 31 November 1921. It ended with an expression of confidence: 'Perhaps I'll chance to be in Crimea some day'.

The fact that the Emergency Committee eventually received the letter is suggestive of Sh. Ibragimov's credit. It further stated that members of Milliy Firqa as 'the only group in Crimea capable of operating' had obstructed the Crimean Soviet government headed by Said-Galiev. The Head of the Tatar Section of the Party's Regional Committee Deren-Ayery, who was shortly afterwards elected Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, was presented as the main culprit.

The All-Russian Emergency Committee/Joint State Political Directorate deliberately forged a tie between many different people. The were working on a new case of what was known as 'the Moscow Centre', which is described below.

Indeed, new hardships stood ahead for the country as a whole, in particular for the Tatar Republic.

But no matter how difficult it was to carry out the Tatar national autonomy project, regardless of what paltry rights the Tatar Republic had, it was the foundation of the further struggle for national independence.
§ 3. Ideological Struggle Over the National Question in the Country in the 1920s

Damir Sharafutdinov

The ideological struggle over the national issue in 1918–1920 was the most violent part of establishing autonomous republics within the RSFSR and the USSR with union republics. Back in 1917–early 1918, attempts were made at establishing the 'Idel-Ural State' as part of the Russian Federation [News of all-Russian Muslim military shura, 1918, February 26(13)] with reference to the Declaration of Rights of the Peoples of Russia, dated November 2, 1917 and signed 'in the name of the Russian Republic' by the Chairman of the Council of the People's Commissars V. Lenin and the People's Commissar of Nationalities J. Stalin, which declared 'equality and sovereignty for the peoples of Russia' and the 'right of peoples of Russia for free self-determination, including secession and the formation of a separate state' [Dekrety Sovetskoj vlasti, 1957, No. 29; Obrazovanie TASSR, 1963, pp. 24–25]. The 2nd All-Russian Muslim Military Congresses summoned by the All-Russian Islamic Military Council (presided over by Ilias Alkin) resolved that the declaration of the 'Idel-Ural State' was to be announced on 1 March 1918 [Ilias Alkin, 2002, p. 6]. However, the leaders of the Military Şura were arrested shortly before they started. It is noteworthy that the Military Şura had over 50,000 bayonets at their disposal at the time [Davletshin, 2005, p.162], including 20,000 soldiers and 30,000 officers in Kazan and Ufa [Gizzatullin, 2002, p. 103], while the Chairman of the Military Şura I. Alkin enjoyed the trust of such influential military commanders as 37th Corps General-Lieutenant Suleyman Sulkevich, General-Lieutenant Jakub Yuzezovich of the 12th Army, and others who were willing to cooperate with him [Ilias Alkin, 2002, pp. 9, 77–79]. The central and local bodies of the Soviet government did not want to have such a large republic in Russia, capable of influencing general RSFSR policy, which would disadvantage the Bolshevik administration [Gizzatullin, 2002, p. 126], while the leaders of the Military Şura lacked the determination to defend the idea of the state. This prevented the plan of establishing the 'Idel-Ural State' from actually occurring. In addition, it should be noted that to settle such a pressing national problem without spilling any blood was a unique solution both for that period and for later times as well.

As a political measure against participants in the ideological struggle over the national question, the Central Islamic Commissariat under the People's Commissariat developed a draft Regulation for the Tatar-Bashkir Soviet Republic dated 13 March 1918 [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 2648, File 17, Sheet 6.], which was approved under the Decree by the People's Commissariat of Nationalities dated 22 March 1918 [Izvestiya VCIK, 1918, p. 394; Obrazovanie TASSR, 1963, pp. 39–40]. Several days later, the People's Commissariat issued a decree to dissolve the Xärbi Şura (Military Council) [SA RF, Fund 1318, File 25, Sheet 57]. Both documents were signed by the People's Commissar of Nationalities J. Jughashvili-Stalin and the Commissar for Muslims in Inner Russia Mullanur Vakhirov [Mullanur Vakhirov, 1986]. Importantly, both Mullanur Vakhirov and Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev trusted the Bolsheviks and believed in the sincerity of their leaders, with whom they maintained close contact back then. For instance, in his speech to summon the Founding Congress of the Tatar-Bashkir Soviet Republic, M. Vakhirov expressed deep gratitude to comrades Lenin and Stalin for adopting said Regulation and stated that 'when creating the Tatar-Bashkir Republic, the Islamic proletariat will give their lives to protect the gains of the October Revolution' [Ibid., p. 43].

The issue of granting soviet-based autonomy to the Bashkir people was for the most part settled in early 1918 [Raimov, 1952, p. 254]. On 20 March 1919 the Council of People's Commissars and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee approved the establishment of the Bashkir Autonomous Republic under a

The issue of establishing a Tatar Republic separate from Bashkortia thus made the agenda. M. Sultan-Galiev took an active hand in this matter, as he was strongly assured that the two republics were to unite in the future.

When M. Sultan-Galiev became Chairman of the Central Islamic Committee after his mentor M. Vakhitov died during the Czechoslovakian occupation of Kazan in August 1918 [Tatarskij e'ncizklopedicheskij slovar', 1999, p. 108], he became fully engrossed in Tatar and Bashkir national sovereignty. Well aware of the socio-economic situation in the Ufa and Kazan guberniias and the affinity between the Tatars and Bashkirs, their almost common language and shared culture, and with the realisation that there was no way to separate the Tatars from the Bashkirs and the Bashkirs from the Tatars without losses, as Tatar villages were geographically mixed with Bashkir settlements, Sultan-Galiev believed the best solution to be the establishment of a united republic, and took various measures to implement the Regulation on the Tatar-Bashkir Soviet Republic approved under the Decree by the People's Commissariat of Nationalities dated 22 March 1918. He did not give up the idea, when the Bashkir ASSR (Little Bashkortostan) was established in March 1919. On 28 November 1919, while speaking on the Tatar-Bashkir issue at the 2nd All-Russia Congress of Communist Organisations of the Muslim Peoples of the East, Sultan-Galiev maintained that it was necessary to establish a Tatar-Bashkir republic that would include parts of the Ufa guberniya, that had been excluded from the Bashkir ASSR and were home to 356,000 Bashkirs and over 1.3 million Tatars [Obrazovanie BASSR, 1959, p. 521]. Following an exhaustive and lively discussion, the congress adopted the resolution by a majority of votes to the effect that the Regulation on the Tatar-Bashkir Republic was to be implemented within borders that excluded Little Bashkoria. As the entire Bashkir delegation voted against the resolution, the issue was referred to the Political Bureau, which resolved on 13 December 1919 that the Tatar-Bashkir Republic shall not be established and party members shall not campaign for it [Ibid.].

Another noteworthy fact is that I. Alkin, who was to later become a professor at the Communist University for Workers of the East and be executed by shooting at the hands of Stalinists in 1937, had by that time become Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander in Chief following an ultimative requirement crafted by the Bashkir troops [Murtazin, 1927; Ilias Alkin, 2002, pp. 137, 140–142, 146–147].

The issue of establishing a Tatar Republic separate from Bashkortia thus made the agenda. Sultan-Galiev participated in developing the draft Regulation on the Tatar ASSR as a member of the commission established by the Council of the People's Commissars to develop materials on the establishment of the republic. When the republic was eventually established, he was elected as a member of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of the TASSR in 1920 and 1922.

On May 25, 1920, Sultan-Galiev was appointed a member of the Board of the People's Commissariat of Nationalities at a meeting of the RSFSR Council of People's Commissars.

The Central Islamic Commissariat, headed by M. Sultan-Galiev, was transformed into the Tatar Department of the People's Commissariat of Nationalities, when the Tatar ASSR was established. The Representative Office for the Tatar Republic under the People's Commissariat of Nationalities was established within the department. As Head of the Tatar Department, Chairman of the Representative Office for the Tatar ASSR, and a member of the Board of the People's Commissariat of Nationalities, Sultan-Galiev had the opportunity to get a closer look at Stalin, a man whom he respected. It is
most likely that J. Stalin appreciated his expansive knowledge, analytical mind, businesslike character, fidelity to principles, managerial qualities and high esteem among workers of the eastern republics. The more Sultan-Galiev learned about Stalin, the more disappointed he grew; they clearly had different opinions on the critical aspects of national policy. This difference became apparent when they discussed the national question at the time, when the USSR was being formed.

It is now a common fact that Stalin never had any mercy for his opponents. Sultan-Galiev was no exception. In the summer of 1922 Stalin tried to go through the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party and Chairman of the CSC V. Kuybyshev to kick Sultan-Galiev off the Board of the People's Commissariat of Nationalities. He was even sent to work in Transcaucasia, but was then transferred from the Caucasian Office of the CC WPP (Bolsheviks) to the People's Commissariat of Nationalities and reinstated as a member of the Board upon a petition by the representatives of a number of autonomous republics and regions of the RSFSR in September 1922 [Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev, 1998, pp. 409–410]. He was appointed a member of the Small Board of the People's Commissariat of Nationalities in April 1923.

Speaking on the unification of Soviet republics at the 10th All-Russia Congress of Soviets on 26 December 1922, Stalin said that the USSR contained the RSFSR, the Transcaucasian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic, Ukraine, and Byelorussia, which were the only constituent entities of the USSR. Sultan-Galiev made the following statements at a meeting of the fraction of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) within the Congress: 1) autonomous republics within the RSFSR and the Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic should be direct constituents of the USSR; 2) it would be reasonable to have an authorised representative of the autonomous republics in the Central Executive Committee and the Council of the People's Commissars of the USSR (he emphasised, that the practice of dividing nations into sons and stepsons was abnormal) [Ibid.].

Other delegates raised the question of upgrading the status of the autonomous republics as constituent entities of the USSR, too. Yet these suggestions were rejected under pressure from Stalin.

During a report on the national aspects of the party and state construction at the 12th Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) (April 17–25, 1923), Stalin reduced the solution of the national question to establishing a chamber of nationalities along with a Union Chamber in the Central Executive Committee of Soviets of the USSR. A number of delegates to the meeting of the national section of Congress criticised Stalin's report. 'In my opinion,' Sultan-Galiev stated, 'the approach suggested by comrade Stalin does not offer a solution to the national question, so we will have to face this issue once again, unless we address it in a more comprehensive way'. Emphasising, that local nationalism in response to great-power chauvinism was in fact not nationalism, but rather an anti-chauvinist measure, Sultan-Galiev maintained that it was necessary to combat any nationalism manifested as a nation oppressing relatively weak ethnic groups [Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev, 1998, pp. 435–437; Istoriya VKP(b), 1952, pp. 250–252].

Sultan-Galiev's speech put Stalin out of temper. He decided to use the party apparatus and punitive authority—the State Political Authority of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs—to finally get rid of him. Eight days after the speech on 4 May, the Party Board of the CSC resolved to expel Sultan-Galiev, whom they had not invited to speak at the meeting, from the party, remove him from any governmental and party offices 'as an anti-party and anti-Soviet supporter', and refer his case to the CPA. Paragraph 9 of Minutes 6 of the Meeting Party Board of the CSC on 4 May 1923 presents the situation as if Sultan-Galiev attended the meeting and even personally commented on the accusations. He was arrested and escorted to the Lubyanka.

Many years later, L. Trotsky in his book Stalin quoted L. Kamenev concerning this episode: 'Remember the arrest of Sultan-Galiev, the former Chairman of the Tatar Council of
the People's Commissars (the position mentioned is incorrect. – *Cr*), in 1923. It was the first arrest of an influential party member at Stalin's initiative. Zinovyev and I unfortunately agreed to it. It seemed like Stalin got a taste for blood after that...’ [Trotsky, 1990, p. 260].

On the same date, 4 May, the Party Board's decision was approved by the Organisational Bureau, and on 10 May the Political Bureau of the CC WPP (Bolsheviks) approved it.

The arrest of Sultan-Galiev left the local administrations feeling perplexed. As soon as the rumor reached Kazan, a group of the republic's senior officials wrote the 'Letter of 39' to the Party Central Committee, stating that if Sultan-Galiev had really been arrested, it was purely a mistake, and asked to release him. When their suspicions were confirmed, Kazan officials wrote a second letter, demanding that the Central Committee release Sultan-Galiev on bail.

All signers of the letter were eventually repressed.

As we have emphasised before, it was Stalin, who summoned the 4th Meeting of the CC WPP (Bolsheviks) with senior officials of the republics and regions held in Moscow on June 9–12, 1923. The 'Case of Sultan-Galiev' was the first issue to be addressed. In his report, composed with the help of Stalin, V. Kuybyshhev groundlessly accused Sultan-Galiev of being an enemy of the Soviet government. The meeting was in fact a clash of two trends in the national question, two opinions of the prospective development of inter-ethnic relations.

The public now knew that the case of Sultan-Galiev was considered by the Political Bureau before the meeting, and that the Political Bureau had authorised Stalin to destroy Sultan-Galiev politically.

Stalin was not intending to physically end his life at that time. At that point he thought his political destruction to be more important. To sum up his speech, Stalin said: 'I said it before the meeting and I say it now: comrade Kuybyshhev is right to think that he should be released. This person has admitted all of his sins and repented. He has been expelled from the party and naturally has no chance of returning... He is finished as a political force. What else do we need?' [The fourth meeting of the CC WPP, p. 69].

Stalin wanted to use the case of Sultan-Galiev to teach his opponents a lesson in national terms, and thus reinforce his position. It is the only explanation for the fact that the shorthand record of the meeting was urgently printed as a Top Secret book and delivered to party organisations. Similar meetings were held at the local level to take resolutions, criticizing Sultan-Galiev. In particular, one meeting took place in Kazan on 19–21 July 1923. Characteristically, the Head of the Tatar Department of the CPA S. Schwartz was presiding [Tajny' nacional'noj politiki, 1992, p. 294].

Before Sultan-Galiev was released, he was informed of his expulsion from the party and removal from all offices.

The reason why Stalin and his adherents needed to flagrantly violate the effective Party Charter while expelling Sultan-Galiev, falsify the minutes of the meeting of the Party Board of the CSC, and prevent Sultan-Galiev from attending the 4th Meeting on his 'case' is that they wanted to conceal the true motivation behind why they expelled, arrested and accused Sultan-Galiev of crimes he had never committed from other party members [Istoriiya VKP(b), 1952, p. 252].

A new case was fabricated in 1928 against Sultan-Galiev's adherents as agents of international imperialism. Sultan-Galiev was once again arrested. Many crucial figures of the Tatar, Bashkir and Crimean Tatar intelligentsia were arrested. The proceedings were even more expansive than the notorious political trials of 1936–1938 in terms of how many people were brought before the court. In 1930 Sultan-Galiev was sentenced to execution by shooting, which was reduced to 10 years in prison after six months. He was set free on parole in 1934. In 1937 he was arrested again, subjected to the cruelest of physical torture and killed on 28 January, 1940 [Neizvestnyj Sultan-Galiev, 2002, p. 384]. The bloody tyrant Stalin thus destroyed the glorious son of the Tatar people Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev for asserting the
equal rights of all peoples of the country and the improved status of autonomous republics, for wanting to turn the USSR into a union of truly sovereign republic and daring to criticise Stalin's discriminative national policy. Sultan-Galiyev's wife and two children also died in Stalin's torture chambers.

M. Sultan-Galiyev's close associates—Mikdat Burundukov, Arif Enbayev, Kashaf Mukhtarov, Rauf Sabirov, Shamil Usmanov, Izmail Firdevs and tens of thousands of innocent 'Sultanagliyetses'—were repressed and executed by shooting for no reason. However, the ideological struggle over national culture continued in the country even in the latter half of the 1920s.

In an attempt at creating a united front for the ideological struggle over the national question, the Department for Nationalities under the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and Vice Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR T. Ryskulov summoned a meeting of representatives of ethnic units within the RSFSR on November 12–14, 1926. This came to be known as the Ryskulov Meeting. T. Ryskulov maintained that autonomous republics and regions should be directly included in the USSR.

The meeting revealed a general dissatisfaction with the status of autonomous units within the RSFSR, as their rights had been restricted to those of governorates, and with the fact that they had no influence in the governmental authorities of the RSFSR and the USSR.

The government took measures to prevent ideas of improving the status of republics from spreading. A campaign was initiated to discredit the Ryskulov Meeting as not representative of the opinion of local party organisations and to criticise the suggestion to include autonomous republics in the list of union republics and autonomous regions in the list of autonomous republics, and also to establish a Russian republic.

M. Sultan-Galiyev called the meeting arranged by Ryskulov, with whom he shared views on the national question, a nationalist demonstration of dissatisfaction with the national policy of the Party and the Soviet government [Tagirov, 2005, p. 104].

Many adherents to Sultan-Galiyev were rehabilitated following the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. However, any attempts at doing the same for the leader of the movement and his closest associates were rejected: 'he has been an enemy, and he will remain one.' In fact, to rehabilitate him would have required the authorities to reconsider a number of historical and theoretical postulates and principles, in other words to 'give up', which would threaten the established perception of the global liberation movement and the prospects of socialist development. Sultan-Galiyev's ideas differed radically from the dominant concept, developed by Stalin and his successors. This is why the official party leaders could not accept him.

It was not until 1990 that M. Sultan-Galiyev and his associates were completely rehabilitated following a thorough analysis of his multivolume 'case' by law enforcement authorities. All charges brought against them turned out to be false [SA HPD TR, Fund 8237, Inventory 1, File 12, Sheet 67; Fund 8237, Inventory 1, Sheet 12; News of Central Committee of Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1990, No. 10, pp. 75–88].

The republic's newspapers and magazines contributed greatly to restoring Sultan-Galiyev's reputation—they began to publish works by the repressed leader and articles on him long before he was rehabilitated. As the periodicals were active read, civically conscious, and aware of their responsibility towards society, they were able to bust decades-old stereotypes regarding Sultan-Galiyev's personality, and raise public interest for his personal and professional life, the tragic turn it took, and his theoretical legacy. It required not only authors but, most importantly, editors to demonstrate extreme resolution. The disapproving party resolutions, regarding Sultan-Galiyev, had not been nullified at that time.

The republic's periodicals published profound articles on Sultan-Galiyev and suggestions that he should be rehabilitated by such Kazan scientists as I. Tagirov, B. Sultanbekov,
The author of the present work published a collection of works by M. Sultan-Galiev in English and Russian in 1984.


So what is the key message of M. Sultan-Galiev's spiritual legacy?

His articles published before 1917 dealt mainly with Tatar culture and popular education, and the national/colonial issue became central to Sultan-Galiev's works in 1918. After studying the matter profoundly, he presented a hypothesis on the relations between the oppressing peoples and those oppressed that was of great theoretical and practical importance in late 1917–early 1918. He revisited the subject many times in later articles and speeches to expound on the issue. He viewed peoples in colonies and semicolonies, in particular the most disadvantaged Muslim peoples in the East, as those under oppression. He also included non-Russian peoples in the Russian Empire, among which there were Tatars and Bashkirs in the category. The oppressors were metropolitan peoples, who got rich on the sweat and blood of the people they colonised. M. Sultan-Galiev indirectly classified the West European working class as a consumer of the riches, that the imperialist bourgeoisie had obtained by exploiting the colonies as the oppressors. This statement underlay another theory by Sultan-Galiev of no less importance: the West European proletariat was not ready for the socialist revolution, as capitalists in those countries had been able to meet their workers' economic requirements at the cost of the colonies, and thus nip revolutionary stirrings in the bud. Sultan-Galiev presented his theory at a time when Bolshevik leaders were delusionally expecting the West European proletariat to start a socialist revolution in the nearest future. According to Sultan-Galiev, the oppressed East was prepared to revolt provided its colonial dependence was eliminated. Therefore, he attached great importance to an anti-colonial revolution at the national level. He maintained that a nation aspiring for independence and sovereignty had no right to split into classes and parties, while united national revolutionary democratic forces can ensure victory.

Sultan-Galiev believed it untimely and unacceptable to release socialist slogans and ideas of class struggle at the anti-colonial revolution stage in order to prevent national unity, as such slogans and ideas could turn the national bourgeoisie against the revolution and cause them to ally with their mother countries, which would bring about a rise of individualism in the colony and eventually defeat the revolution.

The concept of united national revolutionary-democratic forces was a valuable contribution to the anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist struggle. This is why Sultan-Galiev is renowned as the father of the revolution in the third world.

Sultan-Galiev had a special opinion of the seemingly axiomatic definition of imperialism suggested by Lenin. He did not agree that imperialism as an economic and political category was confined to the monopolist stage of capitalism. On the contrary, he associated it with capitalism as such, regardless of the stage of its development, and believed it possible, both in theory and in practice, that a socialist or communist imperialism would develop with a colonial economic system (the exploitation of national peripheral territories as a source of industrial raw material for central areas, underdeveloped, if any, plants to process local raw materials on the marginal areas of the country, their complete reliance on the centre for the supply of critical industrial goods, food, etc.).
It hurt Sultan-Galiev to acknowledge, that the victory of the revolution and the establishment of the USSR had been unable to put an end to Russia's imperialistic development.

This is why, being strongly assured that the empire as such was doomed to collapse, he viewed the USSR as an empire, albeit modified, and predicted the unity as unstable and bound to collapse one day. As we have already mentioned, the country's hypocritical national policy brought about the ranking of ethnic groups and their state formations.

The resulting inequality was formalised in the USSR Constitutions of 1924, 1936, and 1977. Only the union republics were entitled to secession from the USSR, which was virtually impossible in practice. Autonomous republics and autonomous national regions and districts were deprived of important rights and economic, educational and cultural opportunities. Instead of settling ethnic differences, the government suppressed the disturbances they caused. Stalin's unsound national policy, which his Bolshevik successors maintained, was one cause of the dissolution of the USSR, civil wars in a number of republics, and the tragedy in Chechnya.

Sultan-Galiev doubted the core of Marxism—the concept of proletarian dictatorship. He maintained that to replace the bourgeois dictatorship with that of another class, meaning the proletariat, was no good. Time has proven him correct in this belief.

Sultan-Galiev's ideas have spread globally. They are especially popular in countries that at one point joined a national liberation movement in order to break the chains of colonial dependence and have already succeeded.

Tatarstan celebrated the 100th anniversary of M. Sultan-Galiev's birthday on a large scale on 12th of June in 1992. The celebratory activities in his honour clearly indicate how important this historical event is for sovereign Tatarstan. A square in the centre of Kazan was named after M. Sultan-Galiev to celebrate the anniversary. A memorial stone was also erected on Sultan-Galiev Square, where a monument to the famous hero of the anniversary is to eventually be built.

To sum up, the comprehensive and unbiased study of ideological struggles over the national question in the 1920s is not only of scientific interest, but also has practical implications in terms of drawing a distinction between the positive and negative experience of implementing national policy during the formation of truly federalist relations in Russia. Even though these questions were first raised back in the previous century, they will determine Russia's development throughout the 21st century.

"§ 4. The Establishment of the TASSR and Solving Indigenisation Issues"

Zubaryzat Garipova

After the Tatar Republic was granted autonomy in the Decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the RSFSR Council of the People's Commissars dated May 27, 1920, it had to struggle for its autonomous rights. The introduction of the Tatar language to records management, and ensuring that the Tatar people were represented in Soviet institutions and had access to schools with instruction in their mother tongue, were objectives of primary importance. This was achieved under the Decree of the TASSR Central Executive Committee and Council of the People's Commissars dated June 25, 1921, according to which Tatar was established as an official language. The introduction to the Decree contained the following excerpt: '...The Tatar Central Executive Committee and the Tatar Council of People's Commissars have resolved that the Tatar language shall be introduced as compulsory to all Soviet public institutions' [Kul'turnoe stroitel'stvo v Tatarii, 1917, p. 169].

It should be noted that even before the Decree was adopted, the republic's Council of the People's Commissars issued a resolution on May 24, 1921 to instruct the People's Commiss-
sariat for Education to establish courses on the Tatar language in Kazan, along with cantons and volosts within three weeks [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund P-732, List 1, File 6, Sheet 45; Fund P-3682, Inventory 3, File 436, Sheet 44]. Such courses were soon established even despite the famine. The Tatar intelligentsia had also raised the question of translating records management documents into Tatar in periodicals before the Decree was adopted. For instance, in July 1920 the famous writer and politician Shamil Usmanov declared at a meeting of the Provisional Revolutionary Committee that a dedicated system shall be introduced to receive telegrams in Tatar. Another measure to be taken was the indigenization of the republic's judiciary authorities. The Tatars were not allowed to speak and appeal to justice agencies in their mother tongue until the TASSR was formed. None of the 83 judicial sub-districts was Tatar-speaking in 1920–1921. Then a minor change took place in 1922 when three Tatar investigation sub-districts were established. The central magazine Novy' Vostok (New East), run by the Scientific Association for Oriental Studies, reported that the judicial system had been 2.8% indigenised in 1922; the percentage increased to 22.8% in 1924, 30.8% in 1926, and 38.5% on July 1, 1927 [Oushchestvenie politiki korenizacii, 2009, p. 41].

Deliberate steps were paid to the state apparatus, which were unfit to meet Tatar needs at that time. The percentage of Tatar officials in the republic's central institutions was as small as 7.8% as of January 1, 1921 [Rezoluciya, 1924]. The bureaus, plenary sessions and secretariats of the Tatar Party Regional Committee and the Tatar Central Executive Committee issued a series of resolutions aimed at implementing the Indigenisation policy and eliminating any shortcomings or mistakes in it. The growth percentage of the number of Tatar senior officials was monitored; institutions had to provide reports every six months. It must be admitted that the results were significant. For instance, the percentage was 18.6% as of October 1924, 20% after 6 months, meaning on April 1 of the same year, and 22.4% in September 1925. However, the share of Tatar senior officials and industrial managers in Kazan was somewhat smaller than the average figures for the republic: 14.1% as of September 1, 1924, 17.1% as of April 1, 1925, and 17.5% as of September 1, 1925.

See Table 2.1 for more details on the extent of Indigenisation in the administrative apparatus as of 1925 [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund P-732, Inventory 1, File 766, Sheet 20].

Of great interest in terms of dynamic development is the information we have on indigenisation in the Central Executive Committee and the Council of the People's Commissars as well as the People's Commissariats of the Tatar Republic. For instance, a total of 40 employees worked in the TASSR Central Executive Committee in 1936. Tatar senior officials accounted for 17.5%, and senior executive officers and

**Table 2.1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition of control apparatus indigenisation in TASSR in 1925</th>
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<tr>
<td>Number of volosts providing services in the Tatar language</td>
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<td>Number of central institutions switching to the Tatar language</td>
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<td>Number of executive officers in Soviet administrative offices of Kazan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of canton executive officers</td>
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<td>Number of technical employees</td>
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<td>Number of volost ranking officers</td>
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<td>Number of technical employees</td>
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Once in institutions dealing directly with the
language was being gradually introduced in
lower-level Soviet apparatus, village sovets
and volost executive committees. The Tatars
were also receiving wider representation in
the republic’s educational and administrative
institutions.

The Tatar inflow to Kazan increased in
the 1920s. While in 1920 Tatars accounted for
21.9% of the city’s population, in 1926 the
percentage was 25.7% (44,000 people).

There is documentary evidence that the
republic took effective measures to engage Ta-
tars in industrial production and increase their
population. However, the eagerness sometimes
resulted in unsound sentiment, often caus-
ing some portion of Russian workers to resist
openly. For instance, a 1926 report by the Ta-
tar Regional Committee of the Party states that
Tatar applicants for work often have to face
excessive requirements that they are clearly
unable to meet— apart from professional
knowledge, they had to speak foreign languag-
es and have a long record of practical service.
For instance, the Gostorg (State Office for Ex-
port and Import) employed only 1 Tatar for a
technical position out of the total 39 workers.
The El’votdram trust company rejected candi-
dates suggested by the Central Commission on
the Implementation of Tatar Language on vari-
ous pretexts. A 1928 resolution by the Upper
City Regional Committee of the Party in Kazan
attributed the low number of Tatar workers at
six enterprises, namely the Vakhitov Plant, the
Krasnyj Put’ (Red Way) Plant, the Krasnyj
Vostok (Read East) Plant, Kazan and Yudino
Railway Stations, and the State Agency for
Steam Navigation, to insufficient indigenisa-
tion in their management [SA HPD TR, Fund
15, Inventory 1, File 1347, Sheet 44; Inventory
2, File 501, Sheets 27–28].

The Tatar language was introduced to
institutional records management in the 1920s.
The basic laws, i.e. the Criminal, Civil, Crimi-
nal Procedure, Land and Labor Codes were
translated into Tatar. Court trials attended by
Tatars were held in Tatar. The measures taken
under Decree by the TASSR Central Executive
Committee and Council of the People’s Com-
missars dated June 25, 1921 gradually yielded
results: the ratio of elected bodies from village
and volost sovets to canton executive commit-
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The authorities of the Tatar Republic were
determined to ensure service in their mother
tongue for the Tatar population. In particular,
the Central Commission for the Implementa-
tion of the Tatar Language was responsible for
carrying out this policy. To quote Vice Chair-
man of the Presidium of the Central Executive
Committee of the TASSR Sh. Shajmardanov,
the general line originally consisted of the
following aspects: a) ‘the aspiration to ensure
complete and real equality between the Tatar
and Russian languages in institutions and com-
panies; b) to implement active records manage-
ment in the mother tongue of the majority of
service consumers while preserving passive
records management in the language of the
minority; c) introducing the Tatar language at
once in institutions dealing directly with the
lower class masses’, and they remained the
main policy of the Central Commission for the
Introduction of the Tatar Language even in the
latter half of the 1920s [National Archive of the
Republic of Tatarstan, Fund P-732, Inventory 1,
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15, Inventory 1, File 1347, Sheet 44; Inventory
2, File 501, Sheets 27–28].
A report to the Nationality Department under the Presidium of the All-Russian Executive Committee by the Tatar Central Executive Committee dated 1931 mentions the regular rejection of Tatar applicants by the Kazan Sowing Factory, which had an insufficient number of employees. The document reported personal affronts and physical altercations based on ethnic grounds at the Silicate Plant of Kazan and the Clothes Factory of Naberezhnye Chelny. Group confrontations between the Russian and Chuvash took place in the Chistopol District. Female Tatar students were subjected to hounding and neglect, when skilled workers refused to teach them at the Needle Clothes Factory of Naberezhnye Chelny [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund P-732, Inventory 1, File 1931, Sheets 222–223].

The situation is partly attributable to insufficient governmental measures to raise awareness concerning the nature of indigenisation and its importance for the country’s economic development. The resolution by the Tatar Regional Committee of the CPSU(B) dated March 20, 1931 included that the party group of the Tatar Soviet for the People’s Economy had not taken efficient measures for the indigenisation of the management apparatus and had no plans for doing such, suggesting that a schedule should be developed in order to increase the percentage of Tatars in the apparatus compared to the Tatar share of industrial workers [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 2, File 956, Sheet 48]. It should be noted that such schedules were developed, and practical measures were put underway. It would be a mistake to say, however, that nothing impeded this from running smoothly. In 35 Tatars accounted for a small percentage (35%) among large-scale industry employees. But it was still an improvement compared to 15.5% in 1921.

In general, the republic’s government did not hesitate to rely on its autonomous status to take consistent and constructive measures to implement indigenisation. The principles of indigenisation still applied in the 1930s, even in face of the repressions that marked the period of Great Terror. Inferior authorities remained accountable to their superiors, and institutions and enterprises continued to provide statistics on the number of Tatar employees on request in 1937 and 1938. The Tatar Central Executive Committee also occasionally heard reports by the people’s commissars on the percentage of Tatars and the provision of public services in Tatar, which increased the executors’ sense of responsibility. The republic’s government took a notably reasonable approach to indigenisation, which they viewed as a general improvement to Tataria’s economy and culture. The steps taken towards reconstructing agriculture were indicative of the government’s awareness of how backwards the Tatar peasantry was, and thus primarily dealt with land management, settlement establishment, agricultural cooperation, and the allocation of credits, seed grains, and machines to Tatar and other non-Russian areas with adherence to the principle of support for the poor.

In industry, indigenisation was chiefly implemented in the form of training for Tatar and ethnic minority experts, skilled workers and academic employees. It was generally aimed at ensuring growth for the Tatar and ethnic minority portion of the population in excess of the number of Russians until their economic and cultural levels were equal, as well as engaging the masses, which tsarism had turned backwards, in building socialism. Many ethnic policies in the republic pursued this goal.

Nevertheless, Tatar was in fact rarely used in administrative and judiciary institutions in the 1930s, and officials ceased to study Tatar. The growth of the percentage of Tatar officials stabilized. As the totalitarian trend gained momentum, ethnic-oriented policies were scrapped.
CHAPTER 2
The Socio-Economic Status of the TASSR and the Tatars
in 1917–1940s

§ 1. The Soviet Policy of Dismantling the Proprietary Classes

Irina Gataullina

A systematic approach to the analysis of historical phenomena, and viewing the subject within the framework of the study with specific thematic, chronological, and territorial limits against a wider backdrop of issues and events, is a crucial methodological requirement. It is thus important to remember that the subject represented in the title is part of a fundamental historiographic problem of military communism—an ideology predetermined by governmental economic regulation in 1914–1917 and resulting from the Bolshevik's utopian idea of how the global revolution might be started. Indeed, the military communist context allows us to view the policy of dismantling the proprietary classes through the lens of problems in the country's socio-economic development and controversies in the public conscience. This policy, written by the new government's attempt at achieving doctrinal goals with a dramatic outcome for the country (enormous financial and human losses), raises the issue of the social 'cost' of transforming a traditional society into an industrial one. It is more important here to see whether the government can make responsible decisions to determine the country's historical choice, than to find the rights and wrongs of the matter. It was the Bolsheviks who implemented the policy of dismantling the proprietary classes, but are they really the only ones to blame for the dramatic outcome of the revolutionary process in post-October Russia?

Why was the radical avant-garde, who sincerely aspired to establish a fair social order, unable to put up with the opposition, and why did thing take a turn towards totalitarianism by suppressing the 'old guard' and later destroying them?

In order to get insight into the logic behind historical development after October 1917 and provide an unbiased assessment of the policy of dismantling proprietors and their property, we should explore its origins with the Provisional Government during the period of diarchy, which gained ground with the Bolsheviks after they came to power and finally yielded their 'bitter' fruit in 1918–1921.

Taking into account Menshevik historian N. Sukhanov's opinion that the policy of military communism was introduced as soon as a wheat monopoly was established in Russia just after the February Revolution, we have to admit that the Provisional Government, at least for personal safety, had to regulate economic relations using coercion like European countries, who along with Russia found themselves embroiled in World War I. While in Germany governmental regulation was implemented immediately as a 'forced economy' in all branches of production through price fixing and the standardised allocation of not only industrial raw materials, but also direct human consumption, through the use of cards and daily allowances, Russia delayed these measures until they were needed in the most radical way. As Russian philosopher P. Chaadayev rightfully described Russia's complicated historical path, 'what other nations turned into habit and instinct, we had to hammer into ourselves' [quoted by: Nashe Otechestvo, 1991, p. 41]. The root cause of this is Russia's

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1 In the opinion of leading specialist of the IRH RAS A. Sokolov, the current concept of classes needs to undergo a methodological rethinking to reflect actual historical content [see: Sokolov, 2002, p.104].
belated transition to capitalism. World War I revealed the immaturity of its bourgeois relations, which meant that neither the bourgeoisie nor the government had learned the rules of using market mechanisms. This appears to be the reason why Russia's economy, which had become the world's largest crop exporter after the rise of 1914, relapsed into an imbalance of surging prices, troubled transport, and backdoor sales after only five months of war. Under such conditions, the main concern of the bourgeois landlord government was to drastically reduce large landowners' right to use their commodities, so it introduced the mandatory supply of crops to the treasury. The Provisional Government demonstrated its awareness of the problem and willingness to control all the country's crops except for food and housekeeping stores by issuing a decree on a state monopoly in the crops trade on March 25, 1917 according to the principles of Prodravverstka, which was introduced in the autumn of 1916. However, the measure required a governmentally regulated market of industrial articles, for which purpose the Menshevik Social Revolutionary Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet passed a resolution on 'the government's regulatory participation' in nearly all industries in terms of raw materials, finished goods, and pricing. Yet the pressure the industrial community exerted in the government prevailed over the situation. The Provisional Government never adopted a programme for socio-economic regulation, which suggests its preference for populist actions, meaning when certain proprietary classes are supported to the detriment of national interests.

The bourgeoisie's uncompromising measures and unawareness of the temporary and forced nature of the governmental economic regulations laid the foundation for the advent of a political force that would have to use the hammer of military communism for governmental regulation.

This was logically caused not only by the liberals' blatant irresponsibility, but by the perilous self-assurance of the Bolshevik government, which free of any bonds of respect for sacred private property, formed a new social order in the context of property, aspiring to ascend beyond the limits of a commodified society and excluding the issue of governmental regulation as one of secondary importance from the scope of objectives related to the socialist revolution, to which the Bolshevik attached greater significance.

However, the dormant socio-economic and political problems of the pre-revolutionary period that had resurfaced in post-October Russia made the problem of governmental regulation even more pressing. Largely restricted to external causes (World War I) during the period of diarchy, the problem acquired an internal nature after the October Revolution. First and foremost, the food supply of the population continued to deteriorate severely enough to derail the government's benevolent intentions.

The ubiquitous Bolshevik slogans of peace, land and freedom were, indeed, widely recognised and welcome, and they ultimately did contribute to Russia's modernisation and integration with contemporary global industry. Yet the only way to keep promises closely associated with narrow class interests was through proletarian dictatorship, which V. Lenin defined as the primary form of class struggle during the stage of transition from capitalism to socialism [Lenin, 1970, pp. 14–15]. As the economic crisis gained momentum, the Bolsheviks were urged to resort to extreme coercion and violence.

The first manifestation of the Bolsheviks' political ultimatism was their dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, which democratic forces in post-October Russia characterised as 'the most dreadful crime against the Revolution'. By ordering soldiers to fire upon workers and officials participating in peaceful demonstrations in Petrograd and Moscow, the new government demonstrated its political intolerance, which consequently caused public resistance, followed by a civil war. V. Lenin said at the 3rd Congress of Soviets on 11 January 1918, 'Our response to any accusations of initiating a civil war is as follows: "Yes, we openly declared what no government had been able to declare... Yes, we waged war on the exploiters, and continue to fight' [quoted by: Nashe Otechestvo,
1991, p. 41]. It would be wrong to say, that the Bolsheviks neglected the importance of solving the problem of governmental regulation during the first months of the revolutions. However, the priority of narrow class interests and the complexity of the situation made it both crucial and urgent to 'suppress the resistance of the proprietor classes' to resolve any economic and food issues. The government's political orientation was met with the logical public response. In his diaries 'Cursed Days', I. Bunin copied verbatim one street dialogue between the 'formers' and representatives of the 'hegemon'. A worker's reply to the question 'who is better off with the Bolsheviks? Everyone is doing worse, especially us, the people', was as follows: '...We'll slaughter you all.' The soldiers agreed, 'Right you are!' and walked away [Bunin, 1988, p. 401]. This bitter tone is suggestive of despair behind the wrongful acts of workers and soldiers, even to the extent of physical extermination, though they were indifferent to the outcome. The moral indifference of the population caused by failed expectations, disorder and deprivation was the foundation the government laid to later justify civil slaughter.

Before political opponents of the Constituent Assembly were shooed off stage, the Bolsheviks embarked on a programme to eliminate the economic base of the proprietor classes as soon as the bourgeois government was subverted. Capitalist property faced its end in Russia on November 20, 1917, when the monetary funds of the Petrograd State Bank were expropriated. Private banks were nationalised on November 17 on V. Lenin's order. In January 1918, all securities in the form of shares were canceled, and all governmental loans of the tsarist and provisional governments were canceled in February. A campaign was launched at the same time to confiscate and nationalise bourgeois businesses. All state-owned factories and plants became property of the new government by default. The nationalisation of private enterprises began in November–December 1917, when Russia's largest industrial plants were confiscated: the Putilov, Neva, and Sestoretsk Plants, and a number of factories in the Donbass and Urals. The decree on the nationalisation of industry dated January 1918 put an end to attempts of commercial fleet owners to sell their plants to foreigners. The final blow to property came on June 28, 1918, when all large industrial plants and private railways were to be transferred to the Soviet government with no monetary retribution under a decree by Lenin. A week earlier, the government confiscated all private plants employing over ten workers (over 5 for those with a mechanical engine).

The industrialisation of industry acquired its own special form in non-central regions. For instance, it had a slower pace in the Tatar ASSR compared to industrially developed regions because of the active resistance of the proprietor classes and fierce opposition from the Menshevik Social Revolutionaries in local soviets. Many property owners from Chistopol and Yelabuga managed to flee abroad, while small-scale industry was able to avoid complete nationalisation [Rabochij klass Tatarii, 1981, pp. 110, 112]. However, the nationalisation rate was higher than the country's average in the Tatar Republic starting in autumn of 1918. Around 60.9% of the total number of businesses alienated had been nationalised by that time, compared to 38.4% across the country [Ibid., p. 112].

Therefore, the Bolshevik government was able to implement their programme and eradicate private property in industry as the economic foundation of the proprietor classes in its entirety by relying on its political doctrine, which was guided by the principles enshrined in the Declaration of Rights of Working and Exploited People, which had been rejected by the Constituent Assembly but approved by the 3rd All-Russian Congress of Worker, Soldier and Peasant Deputies. It was expected that centralised control would improve workers' financial situations, increase their salary, and enhance their involvement in production management. However, the nationalisation campaign resulted in an industrial collapse, while the introduction of governmental grants in fact meant no funding at all. The government kept increasing emissions; inflation and unemployment were on the rise. The situation was so desperate that not only the general
population but governmental leaders repeated the slogan 'bread and more bread!' In February 1918 V. Lenin demanded terror and summary executions on the spot for peasants, who failed to supply foodstuffs on time [see: Nashe Otechestvo, 1991, p. 46]. It seems natural that in the same month the All-Russian Executive Committee adopted the Fundamental Law of Land Socialisation, under which peasants were to receive 150,000,000 desyatinas of land and be relieved of any bank debts and land payments according to the Decree on Land. However, the government supported poverty conditions when allocating this land, thus creating a resistance movement among wealthy peasants, who retained their crops. On March 26, 1918, the Council of the People's Commissars issued a decree on the management of commodity exchanges in order to solve the food problem in town and regulate free trade. But the measure proved inefficient—commodities were used not as exchange items but as a reward for the poor, who contributed to getting crops from wealthier households. The special instruction to the above decree adopted by the People's Commissariat for Food prohibited exchange with individual peasant households, as well as purchasing crops from organizations. Volosts and districts were only entitled to receive commodities, if they provided the specified amount of crops. The poor were the primary providers of agricultural services.

'Six months of peasant self-management in the country,' as some authors termed the period from October 1917 to the summer of 1918, caused a social resistance there and paved the way for the intensely repressive decrees of May and June 1918, which introduced food dictatorship, Committees of Poor Peasants, and food groups. High-priority class interests overshadowed the stabilising significance of commodity exchange. As a result, the new government was facing the issue of a crop monopoly that the Provisional Government failed to settle in 1917, a year later. Incapable of demonstrating any political will, the bourgeoisie left no choice for the Bolsheviks. The latter had to rely on 'using military force in case of resistance to the requisitioning of crops and other foods.' Social struggle in the country continued on what was experienced in towns. The Soviet Menshevik Socialist Revolutionary opposition criticised food dictatorship and suggested that the government rely on representative peasant Soviets and embark on a programme to restore democratic values and democracy as such. They believed that the new convocation of the Constituent Assembly would be able to solve the issues as such. Yet no major changes seemed possible at that stage of institutional decay. The critical transformation had been too heavily delayed and too painful, since the time of the bourgeois government to hope for a peaceful settlement. The Czechoslovak Corps rebelled at the end of May 1918 as a signal for all anti-Soviet forces in the east of the country to unite, thus initiating a standard civil war, involving great masses of the population taking part in the military action along its newly formed fronts.

Both governmental leaders, such as L. Kamenev, A. Rykov, and Yu. Larin, and Mensheviks R. Abramovich, V. Alter, and A. Beylin were opposed to food dictatorship. However, no open resistance to the Bolsheviks was apparent until the left Socialist Revolutionaries mutinied at the 5th All-Russian Congress of Soviets on July 6–7, 1918. In order to legitimise their actions, the Bolsheviks approved the first RSFSR Constitution at the same convention of worker, soldier, and peasant deputies to deprive representatives of the former proprietary classes, clergymen, police officers and agents of the right to vote, and consequently, participate in the country's politics. By introducing the priority of worker rights over peasant rights, the Bolsheviks formalised a system of elections that were exclusionary, indirect, and unequal. The class nature of the civil rights established in the Constitution were harshly criticised. In particular, the Menshevik N. Rozhkov described it as an anti-democratic and even reactionary law. He wrote that 'the republic is a socialist one. So it is therefore strange that its Constitution contains many things, which we have known since tsarist Russia. ...This socialist republic does not even have universal and direct voting.
The opposition is silenced and expelled from all authorities. All freedoms have been abolished. Blatant terror is plaguing the country. It retains all the features of the old order [quoted by: Volobuev, Ilyaschuk, 1991, p. 48].

Thus, declaring the introduction of political freedoms like the right to free speech, print, assembly, meetings, and marches, which were all in fact being violated, Russia's first Constitution was clearly representative of the deep confrontation between the government and society. Committees of Poor Peasants could only withdraw the tiniest portions of food from peasant households in the summer of 1918. The 30 million pood of crops collected in the autumn came at the cost of mass disturbances and waves of peasant rebellions. After realising the absurdity of the situation and the need to relieve the pressure exerted by Committees of Poor Peasants, V. Lenin changed his tactics for the peasantry in early August 1918. Despite of the new policy aimed at an agreement with medium-income peasants, the country continued to derail state procurement because of the difficult crop exchanging procedures for industrial commodities, most of which came to town along illegal trade channels.

In the context of money emission, when the disparity between income and expenditures on a budget is too dramatic, the illegal exchange of commodities is critical for the population. According to a famous economist of the time named S. Pervushin, extensive studies yielded irrefutable evidence that the population received most of its food from the 'free market', of which not only common people, but also governmental institutions took advantage [See: Pervushin, 1921, p. 2]. However, the government attached greater importance to the struggle for pure class principles at that time. Therefore, after issuing another decision to abolish, what had remained of private trade on November 21, 1918 and vesting the functions of state procurement and providing the population with personal and household products to the Commissariat for Food, the Council of the People's Commissars struck a blow at profiteering as the people's only means of sustenance. The implementation of all these adopted decrees affected the Russian population dramatically. The activities of the Committees of Poor Peasants and the military campaigns waged against the country to alienate over 15 million desyatinas of land from wealthy peasants had especially tragic outcomes. The decree on the requisition of cereal crops and fodder dated January 11, 1919, was a logical extension of food dictatorship. By specifying the amount of crops required, it somehow restricted the government's demand and was formally interpreted as a concession. However, opponents of the Bolsheviks had a much different perspective. For instance, N. Rožkov maintained that the Bolsheviks should have begun the transformation of their economic policy by canceling food dictatorship completely. 'Your entire food policy,' he wrote to Lenin on the same date as the decree, 'hinges on an incorrect foundation... Preserve your supply apparatus and continue to use it, but do not claim monopoly for any food, even wheat... abolish any barrier detachments, which you should even do by force if necessary... You cannot turn a 20th century country into a group of medieval, isolated local markets' [see: Simonov, 1992]. V. Lenin replied that the Bolsheviks did not doubt the success of the military communist policy, which was to lead directly to socialism [Ibid.].

Not only Mensheviks criticised food dictatorship, but also trade unions, which had been participating in the requisitioning policy, were aware of its negative effects, and were opposed to it. Yet advocates of military communism were relentless in their approach. N. Bukharin and L. Trotsky followed V. Lenin in encouraging relentless terror, demanding show trials with severe sentences, and signing a decree to the effect that 'class aliens' were to be exiled from the country. Even though they came to strongly support the New Economic Policy afterwards, their attempts at implementing the illusory concept of communism were violent and caused human losses in the very first year of the new regime. In the spring of 1918, 800 people were executed during the suppression of worker strikes in Perm. The Dekulakisation policy, implemented under the auspices of Ya. Sverdlov and L. Trotsky, claimed the lives of 2
Chapter 2. The Socio-Economic Status of the TASSR and the Tatars in 1917–1940s

Poor Peasants brought about a mass counter-economic foundation of the proprietary classes, by abolishing private ownership and taking a series of measures towards the expropriation of expropriators. The monopolisation of all the assets of bourgeois Russia enabled the Bolsheviks to launch an attack on the opposition, which developed into a civil war where the proprietary classes were liquidated, that is, physically exterminated.

Domestic historians have different opinions as to when the civil war began. Some believe that it broke out in October 1917, while others name spring–summer 1918 as the real starting point, when the major centres of the anti-Bolshevik movement had formed and foreign countries began to intervene. The Bolshevik government formalised its 'right' of violence towards opponents in the Decrees on Arresting Leaders of the Civil War against the Revolution (November 1918) and on the Red Terror (September 1918). Anti-Bolshevik rebellions led by the Atamans of the Don Cossack Army A. Kaledin, and in the South Urals A. Dutov, were suppressed during what is known as the consolidation of Soviet power from October 1917 to May 1918. The Volunteer Army, which was to become the basis of the White Movement, began to form in South Russia and the North Caucasus under the aegis of Generals M. Alekseyev and L. Kornilov. From summer through autumn, English, French, American, and Japanese interventions followed the rebellion of the Czechoslovak Corps. The introduction of a food dictatorship and Committees of Poor Peasants brought about a mass counter-revolutionary base in the country. The 'democratic revolution' and the White Movement also joined forces against the Bolsheviks. When the East Front was established against the rebellious Czechoslovak Corps and the anti-Soviet forces of the Urals in Siberia and the Red Army launched an offensive in early September 1918 to force the enemy to retreat behind the Urals in October–November, the 1st stage of the Civil War was over and the Soviet regime was restored in the Urals and the Volga Region.

The 2nd stage of the Civil War was marked by the most violent confrontation and lasted from December 1918 to June 1919. The fierce struggle between the Red and White Armies resulted in blatant red and white terror. Admiral A. Kolchak was appointed 'Superior Ruler of Russia' and came to power in Siberia to launch an offensive in the Cis-Ural region in November to merge with the army of General E. Miller, who was relying on the Entente for a coordinated attack on Moscow. After occupying Perm on December 25, Kolchak was checked by the Red Army on December 31, 1918. A. Kolchak launched a new offensive from the Urals towards the Volga in March 1919. Yet the troops of S. Kamenev and M. Frunze stopped the attack in April to force his army to Siberia in the summer. A powerful peasant rebellion and partisan movement against A. Kolchak's government enabled the Russian Army to establish Soviet power in Siberia.

The 3rd stage (July 1919 to November 1920) was marked by the crushing defeat of white armies as a result of the new Bolshevik policy for medium-income peasants. In July 1919, A. Denikin occupied Ukraine and initiated an attack on Moscow following a conscription campaign in the newly conquered territory. The South Front, commanded by A. Egorov, was established against A. Denikin, and the Red Army took the offensive in October. The peasant rebellion movement led by N. Makhno, who established a 'second front' in the rear of the volunteer army, supported it, leading to A. Denikin's army's demise in December 1919–early 1920. Soviet power was thus established in South Russia, Ukraine and the North Caucasus. Having assumed command over the remnants of Denikin's Volunteer Army, P. Vrangel was appointed 'Ruler of South Russia' and lead the anti–Soviet struggle starting in April 1920. The South Front, commanded by M. Frunze, launched an attack on Vrangel's 'Russian Army' to crush it at the end of October; Red Army troops invaded the Crimea in November. Vrangel's defeat suggested that the Civil War was approaching its end. Finally,
Section II. Stages in the Formation of the TASSR

The remaining centres of civilian opposition in the Far East, Middle Asia, and Transcaucasia were liquidated during the 4th stage (December 1920–1922). The surviving representatives of the White Movement and the Liberal Democratic opposition emigrated.

The question of who initiated this fratricidal war—representatives of the former proprietary classes who lost power and property, or the Bolsheviks who wanted to impose their method of social transformation on the population—remains controversial among experts. We agree with the authors of 'Political History: Russia–USSR–Russian Federation' that the Bolsheviks owed their victory not to support from workers and peasants during the Civil War, but to their tactics of conquering a split society incapable of national resistance, group by group [Politicheskaya istoriya, 1996, p. 103]. However, it seems reasonable to raise the question of the government's responsibility for its decisions. The Civil War as a national tragedy was a logical extension to the October Revolution of 1917. To speak of the masterminds behind it according to A. Sinyavskij, they were 'not Bolsheviks, but a small dissident' group, that could not hope for any real progress before the revolutionary boom. It was the liberals, whom historians tend to idealise today, who gave the Bolsheviks the means to victory. It was liberals of every stripe and color, who had been undermining the Russian state for many decades before the revolution, motivating the government to make decisions inconsistent with the current social situation and directly causing a subversion of the autocracy. That is, the subversion of a regime that at the time fit in the historical, socio-cultural, and social context... For reasons beyond anyone's control it was not a democracy, but an even more repressive and hard-line regime that was to develop into the 'totalitarian model', that eventually replaced it. It seems that the root cause of this development was revealed as the government's inability to give priority to narrow classes over general national interests. As a result, both the liberal government and the Bolsheviks are equally at blame for their national disaster.

The most influential Western historian of the Soviet period W. Chamberlain maintained that the period of military communism was a most dramatic and utter failure. It affected not only the country's economy, when the national income in 1921 amounted to 1/3 of that in 1913, but agriculture had dwindled by half and the transport system was in ruins. The revolutionary process that ended with the Civil War caused a decay among the Russian population that predetermined its demographic development for a long time to come. According to V. Zhiromskaja, Russia's population fell by 7.1 million people from the autumn of 1917 to 1920, by 10.9 million before 1921, and by 12.7 million before 1922. It is hard to calculate the share of proprietary class members, but there is indirect evidence that the bourgeoisie, merchants, tradesmen and kulaks, who accounted for 16.3% of the total population in 1913 and 8.5% in 1924, had been reduced to 4.5% of the population by 1928, and ceased to exist as a social group in the 1930s.

The anti-property, anti-capitalist sentiment in Russian society was the most dramatic outcome of the Soviet attempt at eliminating the proprietary classes. Systematically implemented by the Bolsheviks, it was reinforced through radical deinstitutionalisation in 1917–1921. The policy was naturally caused by the bourgeoisie's inability to solve a number of political, economic and social problems, which narrowed the historical environment where new, more radical forces could address them. To sum up, the short-sightedness of the Provisional Government in solving the problem of governmental regulation in 1917 gave rise to Bolshevism, which attached the highest priority to narrow class values, thus determining the further totalitarian development of Russian society. Bolshevism was not the country's only alternative, but the complex historical situation, analysed above determined a hard-line solution to major problems, which took a particularly dramatic form in the extermination of the country's population based on class.

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2 This view is echoed, not without good reason, by the authors of the publication 'Nashe Otechestvo' ('Our Fatherland').
§ 2. Peasantry in the State and Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic

Rafael Shaydullin

A new agrarian order with a predominant small-scale peasant economy was formed in Russian villages as a result of agrarian reforms in the first years of Soviet power. The elimination of large-scale, semi-serf landed property—the main stronghold of the political reaction and conservation of traditional relations in the country—was the most striking result of these reforms. Russia, which in fact used to be a country with large landholdings, was transformed into a country of cropping agriculture. 'The Soviet poor man' became the main figure in the country.

The area of peasant plots of arable land increased during the course of the agrarian revolution of 1917–1918. As part of the agrarian reforms in Kazan guberniya, 714 thousand desyatinas of landowner, independent principality and church lands were nationalised and given to peasants [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 1, File 1331, Sheet 58]. As a result, the average allotment increased by 10.4% (from 1.47 to 1.64 desyatinas) [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund R-4580, Inventory 1, File 118, Sheet 1]. The comparative analysis of land assigned to peasants shows that the average Tatar peasant plot area increased by 0.12 desyatinas, and for Russian peasants by 0.38 desyatinas [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 1, File 1331, Sheet 58]. It followed from this, that Russian peasants found themselves in the most privileged position from the standpoint of land provisions. In 1920 the average allotment for Russians was about 1.89 desyatinas per mouth to feed, 1.52 desyatinas for Tatars and 1.51 desyatinas for national minorities [Ibid]. In some cantons mostly settled by Tatars, for example Arsky or Mamadyshsky, the area of arable land plots per head was 0.5 desyatinas [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 1, File 1331, Sheet 58].

It is important to take into account the complicated character of the socio-economic situation observed in Tatar villages in the period of post-revolutionary agrarian reforms when examining the reasons behind this matter. It is known that such an uneven distribution of privately-owned lands between different national groups of the peasantry during the agrarian revolution occurred as a result of the socio-economic and historical reasons of the past. Here it is not out of place to bring up the opinion of one of the contemporaries of the period when privately-owned lands were being divided up, the ranking officer of the People's Commissariat of Farming of Tatarstan A. Korzhets: Such an uneven distribution of landowners' lands occurred because of the fact, that they were "mainly located among the allotment lands of the Russian population, along large industrial centres and the waterways of the Volga, Kama", whereas the lands of the Tatar population were withdrawn from these centres as a result of historical reasons to deep in the country and, naturally, could not join the agrarian revolution" [Korzhets, 1925, p. 8].

After Soviet power had been established, the economic state of the Tatar peasantry started deteriorating day by day, and Prodrazverstka became the toughest burden for authorities to carry. The new power defending the interests of the proletariat and the poor demanded the strict collection of prodrazverstka from all members of village society. The system of mutual responsibility revived in a new form was especially pressing for the peasantry, as the entire village was responsible for poor people in payment arrears. Many other duties and special requisitions could be added to this: national service, cart service and labour service, revolution taxes and contributions. Administratively repressive measures towards 'unruly peasantry' were put into effect, simultaneously combining taxes, expropriation, prosecution and sentences to labour camps. The development of the agrarian sector moved towards a further decline in peasant activities and the devastation and impoverishment of villages.

In post-revolutionary years the dream of villagers to be land owners and be able to freely
handle its products provoked a sense of peasant self-consciousness, and encouraged villagers to proceed to live actively. All the individual consciousness and worldly psychology of the peasantry opposed not only the anti-religious policy of the atheist communists, but also the Prodravzerstvka of the authorities, which forced them to be in opposition. They could no longer put up with the current policy of military communism, and declared an economic boycott of the governing regime through the reduction of crop and livestock areas, the transition to a consumer economy, and hiding grain stores and their feeding to animals. In addition to relying on economic forms of pressure on those in power, peasants gradually started taking political action. The events of summer-autumn 1918 indicated the beginning of the peasant war in the countryside when the conflicts between villagers and authorities, which often ended up with the interference of AEC detachments and military units, became frequent everywhere. In September–December 1918 a significant part of the territories inhabited by Tatars was in disturbance. For example, in September 1918 peasant disturbances erupted in Laishevsk uyezd [SA HPD TR, fund 868, Inventory 1, file 100, sheet 18–19], in November in Kazan uyezd [Chukanov, 2005, p. 388], and in December in Sviyazhsk uyezd [Ibid., pp. 334–342; National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund R-98, Inventory 1, File 61, Sheets 19, 28, 29] of Kazan guberniya. In December 1918 in Kazan uyezd, distressed peasants rallied and decided to make demands to the authorities; representatives of 6 volosts were present at the peaceful gathering. The authorities countered by directing a punitive detachment to disperse members of the protest. They started shooting at unarmed people, resulting in casualties of more than 100 [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund R-98, Inventory 1, File 61, Sheet 16]. In spring 1919 peasant revolts burst out in the Volga and Cis-Ural regions. The Chapan war, covering a significant part of the Volga region, was combined with a series of peasant uprisings taking place in March 1919 in Sviyazhsk, Spassk [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund R-98, Inventory 1, File 61, Sheets 46, 108] and Chistopol [Ibid, File 36, Sheet 5] uyezds of the Kazan guberniya. The authorities only managed to get the wave of peasant uprisings under control, by spring sowing time through the use of severe repressions and various economic concessions.

These uncoordinated peasant disruptions became the pretext for the Pitchfork uprising of 1920, which covered the uyezds of Kazan, Samara and Ufa guberniyas, and densely populated areas of the Tatar peasantry. The main pretext for proceeding to take action against Soviet power was a toughening of measures towards Prodravzerstvka defaulters, as well as the numerous outrages of members of food detachments in rural areas. The slogan of the 1920 prodravzerstvka campaign became the most offensive moment for peasantry suffering from famine: Prodravzerstvka must be collected as soon as possible and to the maximum extent. The report of the head of the garrison of Bugulinsky uyezd I. Chujkov is evidence of this fact. It stated that 'we must take bread in the next two weeks according to Prodravzerstvka so that the starving centre can breathe with relief, where they eat bread baked with hay, while here peasants eat as much bread as they want' [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 1, File 389, Sheet 150 reverse]. Certainly, the author of the report overestimated the ability of the region to produce enough grain to collect. Local peasants did not eat their fill either, and many of them ate substitute bread.

A peasant rebellion, known as the Pitchfork Uprising, began on 4 February in Novaya Yelam village, Menzelin uyezd, Ufa guberniya, which later spread over to the Kichuy, Almetyevo and Uralinsk volosts, Bugulinsky uyezd, Samara guberniya and some volosts of Chistopol uyezd of Kazan guberniya, and lasted 35 days. It is noteworthy, that sometimes it had an organised character involving all the national and social groups of the village and a pronounced anti-Soviet orientation. During the armed conflicts between authorities and peasants, manifestations of cruelty were reciprocal. For example, the detachment of the Head of the Bugulinsky military garrison I. Chujkov, which numbered 50 people, carried out numer-
ous atrocities in Tatar villages from Kichuy to Bugulma for 10 days (February–March 1920). Later, this became the reason behind inviting him to the party commission. Hungarian internationalists, headed by Zhigo, sent there to squash the pitchfork uprising killed and violated peasants, plundered and burnt down villages. Contributions were imposed on villagers at many places; mullahs, wealthy peasants, members of their families, etc. were taken as hostages, and threats of shooting were a familiar phenomenon. They were made to serve as guarantors for fulfilling Prodravzerstka and contribution plans, and were forbidden to take part in anti-government uprisings. The population of villages occupied by Red Army men and detachments of the AEC were robbed of their bread, grain, cattle, hay, firewood and other goods. For example, the inhabitants of Malye Chutyi village in the Bugul'minsky uyezd of Samara guberniya were subject to Prodravzerstka equaling 14990 poonds of bread and fodder.

The Pitchfork uprising was put down violently, and there were dead and injured among the rebels. According to the report of the head of the reserve army of the republic B. Goldberg, while his military units were heading in the direction of Bugulma through the territories of the Chistopol uyezd of the Kazan guberniya, the Menzelinsk uyezd of the Ufa guberniya, and the Bugul'ma uyezd of the Samara guberniya, 637 people were killed and 5,235 were arrested. According to incomplete data, about 3 thousand peasants were killed while the pitchfork uprising was being suppressed. Losses on the other side equaled 800 people [Shaydullin, 2000, p. 184].

After the local rebellions of multinational peasantry had been put down towards the beginning of the 1920 sowing campaign, it was mainly quiet in the main part of densely populated Tatar settlements. This lasted until the beginning of a new Prodravzerstka. After the Prodravzerstka of 1920–1921 had begun, a new wave of discontent swept the countryside. Peasants from many Tatar villages started saying that the authorities were stealing the last crumbs of bread from them and they apparently want them to die of starvation [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 1, File 197, Sheet 3]. The real outrage was carried out in the Salaushsk volost of Yelabuga canton, where the food detachment headed by A. Yashin from Menzelinsk almost completely confiscated the grains and belongings of the local inhabitants on 26 November 1920. He robbed people of everything they had... beat them with whips unmercifully, threw them in cold barns'. As a result the population had literally nothing to eat, but Prodravzerstka was nonetheless carried out flawlessly [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 1, File 104, Sheet 104].

The total confiscation of food stocks and seed products from the peasantry in 1920-1921 resulted in an extremely unfavourable economic situation in many places, where the Tatar population density was high, especially in the Middle Volga region. Peasants deprived of not only bread stocks but also a significant part of other foodstuffs and seed products, were becoming gradually less and less concerned with the development of their own farms. Day after day their farms fell further into decay and arable lands shrunk in size, especially land connected with market crops. For example, arable lands in Kazan guberniya in 1920 shrank by 22.2% in comparison to 1913 (2.2 million desyatinas compared to 1.71 million desyatinas) [Shtutser, 1924, p. 3]. The rye yield fell by 2.5 times (in comparison with 1 desiatina), oats yielded 2.1 times less, and buckwheat 2.7 times less. The total harvest fell 4.3 times in comparison to pre-war levels [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 1, File 1330, Sheet 23].

Wars and forced Prodravzerstka not only interfered with the normal course of development of the agrarian sector, it also required an economic policy that would serve the interests of war time. The Soviet government introduced government regulation of the agrarian sector of economics right in the footsteps of the imperial government. As a matter of fact, this decision was the first attempt to plan the number of arable lands and define the size of planted crops on a scale that matched Russia's size. The government then put forth a severe sowing plan in the form of an order and established a group of obligatory crops. In accordance with this plan,
each peasant household received strict orders regarding the provision of cereal to the state and the transfer of sowing materials to public barns. The government of the country tried to control almost all of the peasantry's economic activity in this way.

In spring 1920, the Soviet Government worked out special bodies called sowing committees in the countryside to achieve this goal. According to the plans of the Bolshevik's government, they played a significant role in the transformation of multinational villages. They had to provide practical assistance to peasants in finding seeds, acquiring the necessary land cultivation equipment and manpower, and thus had to actually ensure that each rural court met its planned sowing goals. Sowing committees laid special stress on helping the poor and sowers who had no power. But in fact, the only thing they did was extort the seed stores of peasants and pour them into public barns.

Nevertheless, the state measures aimed at regulating agriculture turned out to be far from efficient. All the attempts to solve this complicated problem in one fell swoop failed. The administrative delight of some workers on this account turned out to be especially destructive. An attempt was made for the quickest resolution of the food problem by defining a strict sowing plan with a binding list of crop products for each peasant holding, which turned out to be a pure utopia. The state regulation of agriculture could not bring about noticeable results. A significant portion of peasant fields remained fallow. As a final result, the Tatar villagers lost the stimulus of productive labour, and they gradually began to switch to more full-scale (consumer) forms of management [Sabanche, 1922, 24 August; 1923, 24 March].

The Prodravverstka campaign of 1920-1921 was characterised by the wide spread of administrative coercion against the peasantry. As stated in one of the documents of those years, in 1920–1921 the "forced methods and decisive actions of food bodies and the entire subsidiary apparatus were distinguished by a special convexity and vividness" [Bulletin of People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs of Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, 1921, No. 4–6, p. 4]. The main reason for this unrest was the mass devotion of party and Soviet employees to the military/administrative method of problem solving. They accepted any task as if it were a party combat mission, and solved them 'energetically', and with 'khasnovardeiskii attacks' of the means of the 'petty bourgeois masses of peasantry'. While describing the work of local authorities and the food department, one of the management supervisors of the Tatar republic N. Baryshev at the 2nd conference of the Tatar regional committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) (on 26 February 1921) noted: Today we can see what outrages are committed in the uyezd district food committees and in the management of the food department because the people who work there are extremely irresponsible, politically unknown and inadequate [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 1, File 79, Sheet 55].

This is an illustration of the fact that local Soviet higher authorities did nothing, or they were observers of those events. In fact, their participation in this process was nominal: they limited all their work by composing countless instructions, as a rule, because the amount of food distribution was determined by the Centre, and it formed food troops for its collection. For this reason the majority of local leaders stood by idly, did not show any of their own initiative, submissively executed guidelines from the top and often did not consider whether or not these instructions were meeting the interests of the local population. The speech of the management supervisor of the local AEC for Combating Counter-revolutionary Activity and Sabotage A. Denisov made at the 2nd conference of the Tatar regional committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) (26 February 1921) testifies to the fact that: 'We have seen many written instructions since then. The instructions are positive. In business terms, the practical proposals were not implemented through direct visits to the areas of the members of the Bureau of regional committee themselves'. 'Common workers with no idea of party work' are sent to places to carry out instructions written in 1917 [SA HPD TR, Fund
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15, Inventory 1, File 79, Sheet 60]. These leaders averted their eyes to the unrest of members of ration detachments and allowed them to rob peasants. When the peasants turned to them, they spread their arms in amazement and said it was not their fault, they were just carrying out the orders of the higher bodies.

As a result, different means of administrative, economic and political coercion started becoming possible. Tatarstan was one of the first regions in Russia that exceeded the Pro-dazverstka plan by 103%, while in Russia only 58.7% of it had been fulfilled by 20 February 1921 [Polyakov, 1967, p. 54]. This lax policy of local authorities resulted in a large number of grains from the poor harvest of 1920 (more than 32 million poods [Economic conference report The Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, 1922, p. 52]) being confiscated and removed (more than 10 million poods, or 35% of gross grain output [Shaydullin, Valeev, 1995, p. 424]). This led to the mass starvation of the population and the deterioration of social tensions in villages in 1921. Peasant revolts were ignited because of starvation in late 1920, and especially in early 1921. The repressive measures of the Soviet government could not stop the movement of the entire peasantry. In a description of the political movement in the country at the 2nd conference of the Tatar regional committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) (26 February 1921), N. Baryshev stated that ‘...revolts were taking place. Your hair stands on end when you look out at the countryside’ [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 1, File 79, Sheet 57].

In 1920–1921 the Tatar villages were going through an acute food crisis. A wave of revolts shot through the more densely Tatar populated areas of the urban population. In April–May 1921, peasant revolts took place in the Arborsk, Shubinsk and Atinsk volosts of Arsk canton, the Baisarovsky volost of Menzelinsk canton [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 1, File 197, Sheets 17, 20], and the Alekseevo volost of Chistopolsk canton [Ibid., File 128, Sheet 481]. As a result, peasant seed grain kept in public barns was divided. The main reasons for discontent among the peasantry were the lack of food, seeds, food-items and the high prices of goods among others.

In the end, the continuation of the ‘military communism’ policy was the reason behind the starvation of 1921–1922, when more than three million Tatars were condemned to starvation. In 1921 a horrific famine attacked the Volga and Cis-Ural regions, including the Tatar republic. In comparison with 1913, grain harvests in Tatarstan decreased by 94% (from 112 to 6.4 million poods) [Shalavin, 1923, p. 48]. A staggering 83.3% of the republic’s population was doomed to starvation [Otchyt o deyatel’nosti CIK i SNK, 1922, p. 60]. The poor peasantry, after being left with nothing after the Prodzverstka campaign of 1920–1921, demanded the government provide them with foodstuffs. But the local authorities were not in a hurry to provide food assistance to the rural population; on the contrary, they collected taxes and inculcum all the way up through November–December 1921. The peasants in distress decided that the Americans were their saviors. According to many people, ‘the Americans have come and want to take power into their hands and then feed the masses’ [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 1, File 100, Sheet 13]. Indeed, the American Relief Administration and other foreign, non-government humanitarian organisations saved several hundred thousand Tatar peasants from starvation and epidemics.

In 1921–1922, famine gripped many densely populated Tatar areas. According to documents from the Penza governorate, which was officially recognised as the most prosperous region [State Archive of Penza Region, Fund R-298, Inventory 1, File 5, Sheet 18], the Tatar villages overcame the same hardships as the starving governorates of the Volga region [Sabanche, 1924, 22 December]. In this period, different emergency committees were formed in local areas to help starving people and provide them with mutual aid. On 21 June 1921, the emergency committee on starvation was formed on the basis of the Central Executive Committee of the Republic. The Tatar national section of aid for the starving was created in the Saratov guberniya along with German and Moldovinian mutual aid efforts [State Archive
of Contemporary History of Saratov Oblast, Fund R-27, Inventory 2, File 57, Sheet 12]. Epidemic diseases and the starvation death-rate in the Volga region governorates significantly decreased as a result of the activity of these commissions [State Archive of Contemporary History of Saratov Oblast, Fund R-27, Inventory 2, File 181 b, Sheets 9, 47]: in early 1922 it did not exceed 6% [Sabanche, 1922, 11 September].

Despite said measures, the years of the 1921–1922 famine were characterised by a high death-rate in some densely populated Tatars areas, and the mass flight of peasant to governorates, where grain was harvested. For example, according to the register offices (ROs) of Tatarstan in 1921–1922, the population decreased by approximately 600–700 thousand people including 300 thousand cases of death [Shaydullin, 2000, p. 168], the main part of which was among the Tatar peasantry. The death-rate of the Tatar population in Tatarstan was especially high in the first half of 1922. According to the data of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, by the end of 1922 the rural population had decreased by 400 thousand people because of death and resettlement when compared to the 1920 census. As far as the data from the 1920 agricultural census is concerned, this difference totals more than 650 thousand people [Shaydullin, 2000, p. 169]. As a result, the death-rate of the Tatar population in comparison with Russians increased, and the birth-rate declined. In 1921-1923 the death-rate of Tatars was 6.6%, for Russians—4.1%, and the birth-rate of Tatars was 1.7%, and for Russians—1.9% [Tretij plenum, 1927, p. 35].

The difficult consequences of the bad harvest in 1921 left its mark on every aspect of the economic life of Tatar villages. During the famine, the number of peasant allotments decreased by almost three times in Tatar villages, which led to a significant growth in fallow agricultural lands. For example, in Tatarstan arable lands decreased by 39.8% (from 1.71 to 1.03 million desyatinas) in comparison to 1920 [Shtutser, 1924, p. 3]. The poor harvest in 1921 also adversely affected cattle breeding. Many Tatar peasants were deprived of their livestock, which was eaten up or used to barter. It should be noted that horses were traditionally used in Tatar villages as both draught power and food. By 1922, in comparison to 1917 the livestock decrease in Tatarstan totaled 65% (horses), 65% (cattle), 91% (sheep and goats), and 97% (pigs) in comparison with 1917. The ploughed cattle found itself in a particular dilemma: according to a modest computation, the normal development of the agrarian sector of the republic needed approximately 400 thousand horses [Bulletin of the Council of People's Commissars of Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, 1923, 32, p. 4]. These significant losses in cattle breeding threw the Tatar peasantry into a quandary. It is known that in those years horses and cows were the bare minimum for peasants, and without them there was nowhere deeper to fall than to become a complete proletariat, 'a farm labourer contemptible in Tatarstan villages'. Peasant allotments also experienced the acute shortage of agricultural inventory. In 1922 in Tatarstan, each farmstead accounted for on average 0.6 carts, 0.4 ploughs, 0.3 plows, 0.6 harrows, 0.5 scythes, and 2 sickles [Averbukh, 1922, p. 56].

The same situation could be seen in other places where there was a dense Tatar population. Krivozerskoi volost and the Penza guberniya, where by 1922 in comparison to 1917 the total number of horses had downsized by almost 70%, for cows—73%, and sheep—83% [State Archive of Penza Oblast, Fund R-298, Inventory 1, File 14a, Sheet 117], clearly prove the relatively comparative evaluations. In the other volost of the same governorate in Tatarstan villages, the total number of horses fell by 71%, cows—88%, and small cattle—91% [State Archive of Penza Oblast, Fund R-298, Inventory 1, File 14a, Sheet 112].

These data clearly prove in the years of shortage from 1921–1922, Tatar peasants from regions which were exposed to the cruelest drought, as well as more successful regions with dense Tatar populations, for example Penza guberniya, also strongly suffered. This allows us to conclude that 'peasant agriculture
must be restored and built up again from the ground up' [Ibid].

The transition to the new economic policy was a turning-point in the economic development of the country. This process was not only combined with social changes in the countryside, but also some qualitative shifts in the development of agriculture. First of all, this was shown in the increase of arable land, the growth of farming culture and the market-ability of agricultural products. The summer of 1922 was productive in some regions of densely populated Tatar areas of the Volga and Cis-Ural regions, which contributed to their return to normal life. State agricultural and the material support of the peasantry intensified the drive towards agricultural work [Sabanche, 1922, September 1]. In 1923–1924, the growth of planted fields and peasant livestock could be observed in almost all densely populated Tatar areas [Rosnisky, 1925, p. 13]. In 1922–1923 the area of ploughed fields increased by 15% and the number of general livestock went up by 10% in the Saratov guberniya [State Archive of Saratov Oblast, Fund R-521, Inventory 1, File 948, Sheets 5, 9; Fund R-466, Inventory 1, File 57, Sheet 1a; State Archive of Contemporary History of Saratov Oblast, Fund R-27, Inventory 3, File 23, Sheet 84, File 32, Sheet 69; File 147, Sheet 64]. The same trends could be seen in the Republic of Tatarstan, where arable lands increased by 11.5% in 1923–1924 [Danilovsky, 1924, p. 3].

Nevertheless, the increase in arable lands combined with the reduction of crop capacity does not allow us to conjecture about the increase of the gross harvested yield. This is confirmed by the depressive character of the development of agriculture in Tatarstan. Unlike other regions of Russia, this was a republic in which there were no significant changes during the first several years of the new economic policy. A large swath of varying circumstances hindered this, including bad harvests in 1922 and 1923, mass starvation, and significant material and human losses. For example, in Tatarstan in 1923 gross grain harvests decreased by 20.8% in comparison to 1922 (29.5 million poods and 23.4 million poods, respectively) [State Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Dund R-1066, Inventory 1, Dile 157, Sheets 69,66]. The insufficient harvest led to an acute food crisis and the mass starvation of the population. On 1 February 1923, 993,711 people were suffering from famine in Tatarstan [Ibid., Inventory 2, File 127, Sheets 130-131], in March 1924—340 thousand people [Ibid., Inventory 1, File 157, Sheet 80]. Only in 1924–1925 did the agriculture of Tatarstan gradually start to pick up the pace. According to our calculations, in 1925 gross harvesting increased by 306% compared to 1923, and by 426% in 1926.

And this situation was typical not only for the first half of the 1920s, but for the entire period under consideration. This state of affairs in turn was combined with a natural striving for intensive work. The regional authorities were doing all they could to support farmers [State Archive of Saratov Oblast, Fund R-521, Inventory 1, File 950, Sheet 3]. However, the desire for restoration faced a seemingly insurmountable range of barriers, one of them being a critical situation with draught power. It is necessary to note here the efforts of province and republican authorities concerning the provision of farming machines and tools, and working and productive cattle. The authorities helped repair peasant inventory, and managed agricultural machine rental stores at the local level [State Archive of Contemporary History of Saratov Oblast, Fund R-27, Inventory 2, File 10, Sheet 32]. For example, in 1922 the Soviet government allocated 45 million roubles to purchase plough cattle, 27 million roubles to plant new crops, and 10 million roubles for harvest time. The main part of this money was granted to the poor. Moreover, 19 million roubles were allocated for the directed crediting of the lower classes in the countryside [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund R-3452, Inventory 1, File 117, Sheet 14]. In 1924–1926, 70 thousand ploughs, 74.6 thousand harrows, 461 seeders, 1,437 threshing machines and 3,005 grain-cleaners were shipped into the Tatar republic to improve the peasantry's standing with agricultural machines and farming inventory. In 1927 agricultural machinery costing 3.0 million roubles was additionally brought into
the republic [Dyuvbanov, 1975, p. 18]. Starting in 1922, tractors started to make their way into Tatarstan along with an agricultural inventory. In 1922–1923, 13 tractors with an output of 495 hp were registered, but only 4 of them were used. On the Kiremetevskom Chistopol state farms of the Aleksandrovsky and Sviyazhsky cantons, with the help of the Region's Experimental Station, over 302 desyatinas of farmland were ploughed, and 20 thousand poods of grain [Trud i xozyaistvo, 1923rd, No. 6, page 123] were threshed. By October 1928 the total tractor fleet in Tatarstan numbered 135 units [Asanov, 1928, p. 48], although Tatarstan was behind many regions in this respect. For example, it yielded to the Volga German Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic numbering 450 tractors in 1925 [Verbatim record, 1925, p. 202]. The Germans of the Volga region mainly used tractors for rural activities. The numerical growth of the fleet of tractors in Tatarstan did not lead to the qualitative improvement of farming. For example, at the 12th conference of the Tatarstan regional committee of the CPSU(B), S. Bashikirov noted that out of 110 tractors in Tataria, 12 tractors with different systems stood perfectly idle out of the impossibility to rationally use them in our conditions. Out of the remaining 98 tractors with the 'Fordzon' system, only half of them were being used because 25% required major repairs, and 25% needed operating repairs' [Verbatim record, 1927, p. 194].

The cooperative network was applied from the very first years of the NEP to provide the peasantry with material and technical assistance. It mainly concerned the provision of horses. Different governmental organisations (Central Committee of the Consequences of Famine, the People's Commissariat of Farming in Tatarstan, the Kazan Department of the State Bank, etc.) along with peasants themselves allocated money to purchase horses. For example, in 1923 3,500 horses were brought into Tatarstan using public and cooperative money, and 31 thousand horses came in on money from the peasants [Bulletin of the Council of People's Commissars of Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, 1923, No 2, p. 7]. By 1925 there were 402,256 horses in the republic, and their number increased by 26% in one year. And as a result, the number of horseless farmsteads fell by 50% [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund R-5874, Inventory 1, File 963, Sheets 2, 3].

In the 1920s peasant allotments of Tatarstan were in dire need of capital goods despite the significant material/technical assistance provided by the public and cooperative organisations. The shortage of inventory and draught power reinforced their load and deteriorated the quality of their ploughing. For example, in 1926 the load on a single ploughing tool in Tatarstan increased by 30% in comparison to 1917 [Sivogrivov, 1929, p. 44]. At the same time, it should be mentioned that in 1922 the average load on a horse was 15 desyatinas, in 1927—6 desyatinas, and in 1917—3 desyatinas [Trud i xozyaistvo, 1924, No 10, p. 22; News of Tatar Central Executive Committee, 1922, November 15; National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund R-5874, Inventory 1, File 963, Sheet 3; Asanov, 1928, p. 48].

It is also relevant that a whole range of cantons in Tatarstan, especially Tatar villages, were in a sad state from the perspective of the farming tools at their disposal. Furthermore, peasant allotments in the Buinsk canton were provided with agricultural inventory much worse than in other cantons of the republic. In 1926 5.7 ploughs accounted for 100 hectares of arable lands and that number was 9.07 ploughs in Tatarstan. Primitive agricultural inventory—plows, roes and sabans—were used in a significant part of the peasant allotments of Buinsk canton. There were 34,673 wooden plows, 1,907 roes and sabans, and 15,173 ploughs in peasant allotments [Malkina, 1929, p. 7].

There were also problems with the provision of farming machines in other densely populated Tatar areas. The quantitative growth of complex agricultural machines was very slow because in 1922–1923 the number of tractors in the Penza region increased by just 9 units. By 3 May 1923, 7,442 agricultural machines had been brought into the Saratov guberniya [State Archive of the Russian Federation, Fund R-1066, Inventory 2, File 7, Sheet 122]. There
were 6 times fewer harvesters in the Penza guberniya compared to in the RSFSR [Roznitsky, 1925, p. 19], which could be explained by the purchasing capacity of peasants. But even when policies for the provision of agricultural machines were being followed at the state level, the low level of awareness, lack of education, and the absence of skills for operating the farm machinery led to the fact that machines often broke down [Sabanche, 1926, 20 July]. With no experience in how to use them, the peasants of Tatar villages often broke their machines. The lack of storage facilities coupled with an irresponsible attitude towards the use of machines led to their shortage and disruptions regarding certain kinds of agricultural works.

By the 1920s, the small family unit had become firmly established in Tatar villages. If a large family consisted of three-four generations, a small family usually consisted of two generations, that is a married couple and their children, and it sometimes included parents. Traditionally, the Tatars had two types of partitions: individual and communal. The individual partitioning of property did not lead to the break-up of large families and meant that only one family unit had to leave it. These types of partitions usually took place while the father was alive. A separated unit was allocated for a person's own share of property. But the head of the family tried their best so that the break-up did not affect the economic life of the family. This principle of partition was maintained throughout the period under discussion [State Archive of Penza Oblast, Fund R-1336, Inventory 1, File 9, Sheet 3]. Therefore, the worst part of the property was always allocated to the separated family. The individual partition of property only partially led to a solution for the family contact. After one unit had left the family, the contradictions did not cease, and eventually led to an all-family partition.

Tatar villages mostly existed according to communal traditions. The fear of losing land and the threat of famine consolidated the commune of Tatar villages in the countryside. That is why the main part of the Tatar peasantry advocated for the preservation of communes and was against introducing private landholding, and opposed peasant proprietors and individual settlers. The reasons (and forms) of this fight were quite varied. From an economic perspective, the exit of peasants from communities was often linked to a violation of typical crop rotations, as well as the entire agricultural work cycle, which had an extremely negative impact on the farmsteads of other commoners. Socially, the hatred towards people leaving communes can be explained by the fact that there were lots of new-comers among them who got the best lands, according to peasants. In this last case, the situation was worsened by the actions of authorities who often provoked the members of communes to initiate uprisings. Lastly, remnants of patriarchal communities stayed alive in the consciousness and behavior of peasants, along with the view of land as a gift from God and nationwide property one could transfer for private ownership, and played an important role. The struggle of peasants against 'individual peasants' manifested itself in both pressure on their rural gatherings and the direct sabotage of their allotments. This is why such an insignificant number of peasant farms separated from communes. Many peasants handing in an application to leave the commune had to revoke it under the pressure of commune members. Moreover, individual peasants had difficulties with livestock breeding because the commoners forbade them to use public meadows, pastures, and hayfields. Apparently, properly managed farmsteads actually functioned more efficiently than communal ones, but they could have hardly had an instantaneous, significant impact on the overall indicators of the farming industry. Research shows that their allotments were slightly different from those of commoners. The transition to divisional land far from everywhere led to progress in land cultivation, and was in fact a clear illustration for the surrounding peasant population. So it is not surprising that khutors and otrubs were not widespread in Tatarstan. By 1924 khutors only occupied 0.25% (283.2 thousand desyatinas) of common ploughed field [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 1, File 1331, Sheet 61].

However, the Tatar commune was not at all inviting to modern agricultural measures and
farming techniques. As a result, the multifield agricultural system was adopted in many Tatar farming communities very slowly. In 1924, 100 thousand desyatinas of ploughed fields in Tatarstan were allotted for multiple crop rotation, in 1925—57 thousand desyatinas [Verbatim record, 1927, p. 148], in 1926—70 thousand desyatinas [Shestoj s’ezd Sovetov TASSR, 1925, p. 256], in 1927—100 thousand desyatinas or 4% of all area under crops [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 2, File 323, Sheet 122]. In the Penza guberniya in 1923–1926, the area under crops doubled in size [Sabanche, 1923, 1 November]. Broadly speaking, it should be stated that multifield crop rotations were rather uncommon in Tatar farming communes both in this governorate and other densely populated Tatar areas. According to our calculations, this number is less than 1% of the entire area.

In the 1920s, there was a certain noticeable economic backwardness among the Tatar peasantry. The economic backwardness of this part of the republic's population compared with the average level of Russian peasants was in fact never under any dispute. In terms of sowing, the Tatar peasantry of Tatarstan lagged behind Russians by 7.5%; regarding the entire herd of livestock—17%, working livestock—7%, plows—32.3%, etc. [Iskhakov, 1929, p. VI]. The fact of differences in the economic development of Tatar and Russian villages itself has deep roots originating from the times of the Russian colonisation of Kazan land. In the latter half of the 16th century, the Tatar peasantry had to choose to either get used to the inexorably evolving process of the Christianisation of the non-Russian peoples of the region and accept orthodoxy, or leave their traditional homes and move to remote fallow lands, and in doing so losing their positions in the main trade and economic centers close to large waterways and highways. A significant part of the Tatar peasantry tried to preserve their religion, culture and traditions by sacrificing their well-being.

In the 1920s, the life of the Tatar peasantry was linked, just as before the revolution, mainly to small individual family households which that used mainly natural productive forces, land, livestock, and peasant manpower. The small rural commodity producer engaged mainly in simple physical labour, exerted just like in nature itself, and the peasant holding was, as a rule, even the main consumer of whatever was produced on the farm. At the same time, not an individual member of a peasant holding, but the family labour group of individuals running the farmstead together was the bearer of land and proprietary rights. Family cooperation served as a sufficient condition for the use of the present means of production, which was in a direct relationship with the number and composition of a family because the common practice of equalisation/labour land redistribution limited the size of land allotments. Naturally, the nature of a significant part of Tatar farmsteads, like consumers and the economic non-sociability produced by their circumstances, as well as traditionalism, conditioned in the Tatar country the domination of a mode typical of pre-capitalist forms of management, where manufacturing power was not defined by goods/monetary relations. Tatar villages were more sensitive to any kind of changes in the current market situation.

The economic inequality between the Tatar and Russian peasantry becomes more apparent, if their budgets are considered. The Tatar peasantry lagged behind the Russians by 20–30% in terms of revenue. It should be noted that the decline of profitability among this group of farms did not just depend on said factors: not only the presence of livestock and inventory and the uneven distribution of landlords’ lands, but also the development of market relations. The remoteness from waterways, railway lines, motorways and major trading cities left its mark on all the economic mechanisms of the Tatar villages. Moreover, transportation means were poorly developed, and they mainly relied on animal transport. For example, in Tatarstan 2.6 versts of railway lines, 17.1 versts of waterways and 1.8 versts of motorways accounted for 1 thousand versts of communication lines. The republic was 8 times poorer in terms of railways as the Penza guberniya (21.8 versts), 5.5 times as poor as the Ulyanovsk region (14.5), and 4 times as poor as the Saratov oblast (2.36) [Asanov, Berger, 1927, p. 36].
Certainly, the geographic position of the Tatar villages left an indelible mark on their economic development as well. The Tatar peasantry cultivated less intensive crops in their allotments, mainly gray cereals, such as rye and oats, and they hardly cultivated market crops like wheat, flax, hemp, sunflowers and others. In terms of crop rotation for the winter and spring, among the Tatar peasantry over 90% was allocated for grain crops. Moreover, fruit and vegetable gardening was all but insignificant in Tatar agriculture. Budget data of peasant farms in Tatarstan from 1927 are the brightest evidence of this fact. A comparative analysis of 100 Tatar and 100 Russian peasant farms showed that the area of allotment crops in Russia was 15 times larger than in Tataria. On average, allotment crops totaled 0.1% of ploughed fields on Tatar farms, and 1.5% on Russian farms [Ermolaev, Sharaf, 1927, p. 8].

The process of guaranteeing a real equality of rights for the Tatar peasantry began after the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic had been formed. Many Russians, representatives of the dominate nation, found it difficult to get used to the equality of nations declared after the Bolsheviks came to power. Indeed, the transfer to a new economic policy gave a certain amount of hope for the actual equality of nations and religions. In those years, matters of land management stood prominently on the government’s agenda. The necessity of a growth of productive forces and the intensification of the agricultural industry hinged heavily on land management use. In the 1920s in Tatarstan land was utilised over 2.3 million desyatinas, of which the Tatar peasantry accounted for 51.1%. In addition, out of 111 townships founded on state fund lands in 1923–1926, 84 belonged to the Tatars [Khafizov, 1960 а, p. 284].

The economic backwardness of Tatarstan villages also required action on behalf of the local leadership in the agricultural education of the rural population through the respective literature. It must be stated that for these purposes 26 publications in Tatar on 98 printed sheets with a total circulation of 51.1 thousand copies published by the People’s Commissariat of land cultivation of Tatarstan, and 10 publications on 27 sheets in Russian with a total circulation of 20.6 thousand copies were released just in 1925 [Otechot CIK i SNK TASSR, 1925, p. 15]. However, many educational activities of the People’s Commissariat of land cultivation of Tatarstan did not reach the main population of the Tatar peasantry. They still continued to manage their farms on the basis of obsolete technologies that were passed down from their grandfathers and great-grandfathers. Any innovation was met with a hostile reception. Sometimes the Tatar peasantry rejected even the most necessary measures to develop their farmsteads. For example, in 1923 they fought back against the extermination of locusts, saying that it was equal to fighting against God [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 1, File 906, Sheet 101]. As a result, the agricultural enterprises of the local government were often ineffective.

The introduction of emergency measures during the 1927–1928 bread procurement campaign completely changed the attitude of the Soviet leadership towards the new economic policy. The group administration methods of agriculture management, which were widely used during the civil war and subsequently discarded following the transition to the new economic policy, began to be rebuilt: markets began to close, free trade was banned, protection detachments formed for the struggle against the bag people, and plans came down from the top for cereal rent in the form of food distribution, etc. After starting with soft forms of noneconomic coercion, the authorities, at the same rate the 1927–1928 bread campaign was forced, gradually reinforced its repressive orientation in terms of the forcible seizure of peasant property, livestock, and land cultivation equipment. After Soviet leadership passed a number of extraordinary legislative acts in densely populated Tatar areas, the situation of the national peasantry became even more aggravated. Every district and village received an obligatory grain delivery plan on the basis of the Decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of the People’s Commissars of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, starting 29 June 1929. After
its announcement, the local authorities began to force peasants in villages and regional assemblies to make commitments for delivering grains. A large part of the 'cereal partition' was forcibly built in the well-to-do sections of a village regardless of whether or not they trade [State Archive of Penza Oblast, Fund R-1315, Inventory 1, File 1, Sheet 30]. The requisition of surpluses of grains, forage and seed material took place everywhere.

But even such emergency measures did not help the state and cooperative grain procurement institutions. According to the documents, bread procurement in the 1928–1929 campaign in many places densely populated Tatar areas remained unfulfilled [State Archive of Penza Oblast, Fund R-1315, Inventory 1, File 1, Sheet 60]. During this period, Article 107 and Article 58 of the Criminal code of the RSFSR on counter-revolutionary activity was being applied especially widely. Peasants started to be held liable for the non-fulfilment of tax, insurance, borrower and other obligations to the state, and also for hiding grain reserves and raw leather hides. In reality, the ban against the market corn trade was introduced by this act in the country [Kolganov, 1990, p. 108], the New Economic Policy began wrap up in the villages that were developing toward a public/political campaign on the transition to the forcible collectivisation of peasant holdings.

As the documents suggest, the process of establishing collective farm farms in densely populated Tatar areas during the New Economic Policy was extremely slow, difficult and spontaneous. For example, the report 'On the state of collective farms in the Tatar republic' presented on 27 September 1927 at the conference of the secretariat of the Tatarstan regional committee of the CPSU(B) by instructor A. Gudozhnikov, stated that on average 215 desyatinas of land account for one kolkhoz. As for the national structure, 52% of their personnel consisted of Tatars. The availability of land totaled 3,16 desyatinas per person, which is more than for an average peasant. There was less cattle and agricultural inventory in kolkhozes than on peasant farms. No collective experienced collectivisation in the proper sense of the word, 20 out of them did not even have a hint of collectivisation, their everyday lives lacked a sense of collective purpose, and communal kitchens can only be found in four kolkhozes. On average, harvests in the kolkhozes exceeded harvests in peasant farms by 25%. Kolkhozes were not efficiently used, and 83% of them were economically inefficient [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 2, File 23, Sheet 30]. According to other calculations, 12.5 farms and 163 hectares of agricultural holdings accounted for one collective on average [SA HPD TR, Fund 292, Inventory 1, File 553, Sheet 25]. It should also be remarked that the majority of kolkhozes operated at a loss, and the use of complicated agricultural machines was not profitable.

In 1927 around 100 thousand peasant farms in Tatarstan (19%) were engaged in the implementation of different forms of cooperation [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund R-4580, Inventory 1, File 403, Sheet 42]. Out of the total amount of united peasant holdings, 95% were joined by credit and procurement-sale partnerships, and 5% by industrial cooperation [Krasnaya Tataria, 1926, 17 October]. The speed of the development of kolkhozes in Tatarstan was slow. In 1928 the kolkhoz sector accounted for 0.5% of all peasant farms in the republic [Gusev, 1929, p. 25]. The process of the establishment of kolkhozes was most likely brought about by the ability to receive public credit, tax incentives and other material privileges, and not some belief in their 'bright future', which often caused the peasantry to form nominal collective farms. As a result, many kolkhozes failed to wrench themselves out of the mire of their state debt and their consumption of material resources. The harvest in kolkhozes was therefore a bit higher than on single peasant farms. But this growth was insignificant. After the needs of the members of kolkhozes had been met and other expenses had been covered, the remaining surplus did not guarantee the rate of saving needed. It was impossible to rely on the further development and the flourishing of the kolkhoz system without that. The majority of kolkhozes remained static at the stage of manufacture development.
During the transition to the mass collectivisation of peasant holdings in densely populated Tatar areas in order to manage the process of creating a collective farm system, people responsible for work with national minorities started to become actively engaged in this type of progress. As a rule, their main duties involved the agitation and distribution of propaganda to national minorities [State Archive of Penza Oblast, Fund R-1315, Inventory 1, File 4, Sheet 8]. For example, three instructors who provided assistance to peasants in economic and socio-economic matters worked in the Penza region in districts which were on average inhabited by the Tatars. Despite these organizational issues, the kolkhoz movement was not wide spread during the first years of collectivisation. In general the simplest forms of industrial and consumer cooperation still functioning, mainly in the form of associations. For example, as of October 1, 1928 there were 1282 different forms of cooperative societies in Tatarstan [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund R-4580, Inventory 1, File 403, Sheet 42]. On average each one of them accounted for 331.6 farms and 1072 people 32.8% of the rural population of Tatarstan was involved in cooperative economic activity. [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund R-3452, Inventory 1, File 29, Sheet 2]. The same situation could be observed in the Penza region where 46% of the population were involved in the simplest forms of industrial cooperation [State Archive of Penza Oblast, Fund R-1694, Inventory 1, File 13, Sheet 206]. The socialized kolkhoz sector in the villages of the Tatar republic remained insignificant: gross production in 1926–1927 amounted to 1.3%, and in 1928–1929, 2.8%. The commercial sector in 1928–1929 amounted only to 3.1% [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund R-4580, Inventory 1, File 336, Sheet 3]. According to documentary data from other compact Tatar settlements, the process of cooperation in the Tatar villages was very slow: in the late 1920's it amounted to 15.4%, in the early 1930's, 46% [State Archive of Penza Oblast, Fund R-1315, Inventory 1, File 13, Sheet 155].

The Tatar peasantry resisted the socialization of livestock, especially horses. The threat of being excluded from the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was not a convincing argument for Tatar communists. They openly declared to the state: 'Throw me out of the Party, I'm not giving you my horse'. [State Archive of Penza Oblast, Fund R-1694, Inventory 1, File 3, Sheets 143, 449]. At the same time, Tatar peasants suggested leaving livestock on the collective farms for individual use as a measure of safeguarding the individual rights of livestock owners [Ibid., Fund 13, Sheets 198-198 reverse]. Draught horse power was highly valued; for example, 133 farms of Bikmurzino village in Neverkinsky district of Penza region possessed 80 working horses [State Archive of Penza Oblast, Fund R-1315, Inventory 1, File 9, Sheet 5]. Due to unfavorable conditions in the grain market and the strict tax policy in the late 1920's to early 1930's, many peasants with horses found it more profitable to go to the city and earn money there. Suffice it to remark that the profit from the transport trade in the 1920s was quite impressive when considering the tariffs: 1–25 versts for 5 roubles, up to 25 roubles for a passenger with luggage [State Archive of Penza Oblast, Fund R-1694, Inventory 1, File 3, Sheets 143, 449].

At the same time the mass collectivization of peasant farms was combined with intensive migration of the Tatar population to Central Asia and Transcaucasia, especially from the Middle Volga Region. Leaving their farms and plots of land many peasants went to different building sites, oil fields and mines. For example, the Tatars living in the Penza region and adjoining areas resettled to Baku with their families to produce oil, while those living in Tatarstan went to the republics of Central Asia where they settled there and formed a large Tatar diaspora. The intensive migration of the rural population from 1930 to 1931 resulted in the mass outflow of kolkhoz peasantry from the collective farms. Thus the number of kolkhozes in the Penza region fell to 25.2% as a consequence of the mass outflow of villagers from kolkhoz collective farms [State Archive of Penza Oblast, Fund R-1694, Inventory 1,
Section II. Stages in the Formation of the TASSR

File 13, Sheet 206]. The process of migration of the Tatar population to a certain led to delays in the introduction of a passport system in rural areas which would clearly have attached them to the system of kolkhoz collective farms and sovkhoz state farms. The document also provides data on sabotage, acts of arson and destruction of kolkhoz property, as well as assassinations of collective activists [State Archive of Penza Oblast, Fund R-1315, Inventory 1, File 13, Sheet 71].

Thus the process of collectivization of Tatar villages faced many difficulties. The percentage of Tatar peasantry assigned to collective farms, in many compact Tatars settlements in the Middle Volga Region and Cis-Ural region in the middle of the 1930s was much lower than in comparable indicators for Russian villages. Nevertheless, Tatarstan unlike many regions of compact Tatar settlements was ranked third in Russia for the pace of collectivisation of peasant farms in 1930. The growth in the number of cooperative members was connected to peasants of average means and the poor. Tatars eagerly joined the cooperatives in the hope that the credit cooperation would allow them quickly to revive the economy and make consumer cooperation more reliable [SA RF, Fund R-1235, Inventory 120, File 100, Sheet 53]. As for industrial cooperation, it thrived with some difficulty in the Tatar villages. Only by the late 1930's did the kolkhoz economical system develop as a result of the forced collectivization in Tatar villages.

§ 3. The Policy of Industrialisation of the Country: Results in the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and its Influence on the Position of the Tatars in the Republic and Beyond its Borders

By the middle of the 1920's it had become evident that the expectations of the upcoming world revolution of the proletariat would not be met. In the conditions of intense economic difficulties, an intense power struggle for power and fierce discussion within the party, the following point of view prevailed: 'about the possibility of constructing socialism in a single country'. The party of Bolsheviks decided to construct socialism in the USSR using their own powers. Its main principle was the first-ever alternative capitalist forced socialist industrialisation, to be implemented on a new basis— the socialist ownership of tools and the means of production, as well as planned agriculture under the conditions of the state dictatorship of the proletariat.

The industrial course of the country was officially declared by CPSU(B) as the general line of the party at the 14th congress of the party held in December 1925. The essence of the policy was to transform "the USSR into an importer of machinery and equipment into a producer of machinery and equipment, to avoid it becoming an economic appendage of the global capitalist economy being surrounded by capitalist states [KPSS v rezolyuciyx, 1970, p. 245]. The 14th congress of CPSU(B) also emphasized "the exceptional importance of the development of industrial life in every district, every Governorate, region, national republic, and the involvement of all the workers in active industrial work [Sazhin, Nalimov, 1960, p. 111].

The strategic course of the party envisaged the planned reconstruction of the national economy based on the development of priority branches such as heavy industry, especially mechanical engineering—it's core. The industry of Tataria was in a critical situation as a result of the consequences of the First World War and the civil war; military actions which took place twice on its territory, as well as the significant damage caused to human resources and national economy as a result of the 1921–1922 famine. There was not enough money to restore industry. This was noted at almost all the Congresses of the Soviets of the TASSR, in

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decisions of the regional party conferences and decrees of the regional party committee. The republic lagged behind other regions of the RSFSR in industrial reconstruction.

Heavy industry in the Tatar republic was operating at a loss until 1924–1925. It was not until the 1926–1927 economic year that a profit of 4.6 million rubles was achieved. This was restored in the 1927–1928 economic year. The gross production of heavy industry was 120% of the 1913 level [Sazhin, Nizamov, 1960, p. 111]. However, less electric power was produced. Some industries such as textiles, woodworking, food and clothing—provided more production than in 1913, but the volume of production in many soap manufactories, printing, construction and other enterprises had not yet been restored [Malkov, 1930, p. 20].

The restoration of industry was based on principles of the New Economic Policy (organization of industry into trusts, self-supporting running, etc.). The aim of the policy was to support small private businesses, to create favourable conditions for introducing private capital into the republic's industry. This enabled private entrepreneurs to aid in the reconstruction of large-scale industry. The state obtained supplementary resources from them in the form of lease payments and taxation. In addition to this, private entrepreneurs were able to produce the goods necessary for the population. For example, in the first half-year of the 1924–1925 economic year alone, the total leasing enterprises in the republic achieved production amounting to 850 thousand rubles, or 10% of all the republic's state production. In other words, a worker in a leased enterprise manufactured twice that of a worker in the workers' trusts [Tlevsky, 1925, pp. 41–43].

Due to the party's concerns about growing social differentiation resulting from the development of private property, the control of the state and public organisations was increased. Restrictions on the activity of tenants and owners introduced in 1924 ended in Tataria in 1928–1929, with the final elimination of private capital in the republic's industry [see Nazipova, 2000, pp. 305–324].

The industrial recovery took place using old technology and the entire resources of the existing enterprises, thanks to a more favourable raw material supply chain. The depreciation of capital assets of industry amounted to no less than 50–60% of their original cost [Industrializatsiya TASSR, 1968, pp. 144–145]. The aims of further industrial and economic development required not only the re-equipping of old factories and plants with new technology and technologies, but in particular the construction of new modern enterprises. In addition to the technological backwardness, significant problems were created by the shortage of material and financial resources, skilled workers, and engineering personnel with experience in heavy industrial construction.

There were opponents of industrialisation in both Tataria and the state as a whole. They could be also found in the republic's party organization and local government bodies. When referring to the economic backwardness of the republic, some of them stated that industrialisation was beyond its capabilities. Others believed that it could be carried out unilaterally only at the expense of light industry and food production.

They were opponents of accelerated growth, the creation of national proletarian cadres, grassroots ethnic policies (korenizatsiya) of the party, and the Soviet state economic apparatus. The difficulties of international relations were another obstacle to industrialisation [Tagirov, 2008, pp. 241–256].

The favourable conditions inside the republic were of great importance for the development heavy industry and turning Tataria into a heavy industrial centre: the presence of state industry, agriculture, forest raw materials, the reserves of hydraulic engineering resources of the Volga and Kama Rivers, a profitable transport position between the industrial areas in the Urals and the industrial centre at rail and water crossings, minerals, labour resources, skills in trade and industrial labour by population.

Resolution of the tasks needed to promote industrialisation required an intensification of all the efforts and resources, in the quick-
est possible time scale using internal resources and the strictest possible economic regime. The party, Soviet, trade unions and other public organisations in Tataria were all trying to foster the living creativity of the masses, and turn industrialisation into a nationwide activity.

The workers of Tataria took part in procuring and mobilising funds for industrialisation. Their aim was to reduce the number of personnel necessary, reduce expenditures required for the maintenance of enterprises, and achieve cheaper building costs. As a result of reduced costs for administrative personnel in industrial enterprises and on administrative bodies, in 1926–1927 year alone about 3 million rubles was saved and directed towards industrial development.

Workers, peasants, and the intelligentsia of the republic increased their cash deposits in savings banks, subscribed to bonds for industrialisation, and gave a significant part of their savings to the fund for industrialisation. For example, in 1927 the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic received 12 million rubles by implementing three 'loans' for industrialisation [Istoriya TASSR, 1968, pp. 408–409].

The export of grain is considered to be one of the main sources of accumulating income for industrialisation. V. Le'l'chuk, L. Koshel'eva and other historians claim that the sale of grains seized from peasants at remarkably low prices did not provide enough money to purchase equipment, so it was not of great importance. The largest proceeds from the export of grain were earned in 1930 – 883 million rubles. In the same year the sale of petroleum products and timber provided more than 1 million rubles. Fur and flax inter alia amounted to another half a billion. In the ensuing years world grain prices fell. The export of a large volume of grain in 1932–1933, when the Soviet people were stricken with famine, earned 389 million rubles in total, the export of timber nearly 700 million rubles, and the export of petroleum products the same amount. Only fur sales in 1933 provided more profit than grain exports [Pravda, 1988, 28 September].

Realizing the benefits, the fur syndicate of the People's Commissariat of foreign commerce began the creation of a fur industry in the country by the construction of fur factories. In order to avoid selling raw material at a half-price to New York and Leipzig furriers and thus risk the loss of a considerable amount of hard currency, Pushnosindikat created a domestic fur tanning sector through the local offices of the State Commercial Enterprise – Gostorg. For example, in a village near Kazan where the fur industry was developed, local craftsmen performed the initial treatment of raw materials. This was then further processed at foreign fur factories. They needed their own factory. Kazan was chosen by People's Commissariat for Foreign Commerce as the location for building a fur factory. In spring 1927, work commenced on a fur factory in Kazan where the conditions were favourable. There were experienced master furriers and fur producers here. During construction a number of unused buildings were used as well as the equipment of former private factories in the Novo-Tatarskaya sloboda. The factory was built by local workers, technicians and engineers under hard conditions. At the end of 1928 the 1st Kazan fur factory was launched; it was called 'The 1st Tatar Factory'. It was the parent enterprise for the future Kazan fur industrial complex. In 1928–1929 gross production of the factory amounted to 8 million roubles [Skaz o kazanskix mexovshikhak, 1974, p. 57]. Its 'soft gold' was transformed into hard currency. The money was not allotted to the local budget.

In the Tataria forestry sector between 1927 and 1929, 6 operative factories belonged to the Forest Trust. About 70% of its produce was sold beyond the republic's borders. The report of the State Plan of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic 'On economic development of the republic in 1925–1926 and 1927–1928' stated that the centre allotted 1584.5 thousand rubles over a period of three years which 'did not contribute to the improvement of the industrial state of the Republic of Tatarstan. From the designated sum for special purposes from the centre', '1082 thousand rubles was spent on financing the Forest Trust' [Industrializacziya TASSR, 1968, p. 146]. In November 1926 a
new sawmill was built at the Vasilyevo station of Moscow-Kazan railways [Krasnaya Tataria, 1929, 9 May]. In 1929 the Volga plywood factory No. 3 in Zelenodolsk became operational. This high technology factory was the largest in Europe. All processes there were completely mechanized. The ‘Red Kommunalnik’ sawmill was opened. In 1928, saw-mills were built in Naberezhnye Chelny, Svyazhsk, Alekseevsk district [Istoriya TASSR, 1968, p. 412; Rabochij klass Tatarrii, 1981, p. 173]. Their produce was also exported. In 1940, hardwood exports amounted to 507 thousand cubic metres.

In 1928, the USSR still ranked fifth in the world and fourth in Europe in terms of industrial output. About two thirds of production was provided by agriculture and slightly more than one the third by industry [SSSR, 1982, p. 137]. "We are 50 years behind the US in terms of national income and capital intensity [Pravda, 1988, 28 October]."

Beginning with the 4th quarter of 1928, the development of Soviet economy was based on five-year plans. The first five-year plan for agricultural development - 1928–1929 and 1932–1933 was a specific program for the reconstruction of the national economy including the industrialisation of the country. It was considered in April 1929 at the 16th conference of the CPSU(B) and then confirmed by the 5th Congress of Soviets of the USSR in May 1929. The plan stipulated the transformation of the agricultural of the USSR into a developed industrial power. The CPSU(B) became the only political power in the USSR to undertake public administration in the field of industrialisation. It developed policy, strategy and industrialisation methods, while providing guidance for their implementation.

The first five-year plan for the national economy and the social-cultural construction of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic - 1928–1929 and 1932–1933 - was revised several times. Each new draft increased the rate of the national economy's reconstruction. Its final draft was considered and approved at the beginning of November 1929 by the plenum of Tatar regional committee of the party. In December 1929, it was approved y the 2nd session of Tatar central executive committee at the 8th convocation and became law.

In 1928, Tataria was a region with poorly developed industry. The ratio of its industry made up 33.1% [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, fol. R-100, § 4, file 1096, p. 103; SA RF, Fund 262, Inventory 1, File 549, Sheet 6]. The main task of the first five-year plan was to resolve the matter of economic and cultural backwardness. The main factor in solving this problem was the need for the rapid development of heavy industry, as well as increasing the volume and quality of the working class, while in particular the formation of national ethnic cardes and raising the level of their skills. To overcome the backwardness of industry, the plan envisaged higher rates of development than in the country on average. The building of 26 factories and plants was planned, TPP No 1. Investments of 86.6 million rubles was envisaged to construct new buildings and reconstruct existing ones.

In years of the first five-year plan the increase of industrial products and revenues of the republic had to occur at the expense of branches of light and food industry.

The first five year plan for Tataria was revisied several times by the State Plan of Russia. For example, it did not include the Bondyuzhskiichemical plant named after L. Karpov which had all-union significance and which the Severokhimtresta organisation planned to liquidate in 1929 without significant reason. The plant produced 405 types of salts manufactured in the Soviet Union, and it was the only manufacturer of such products as hyposulfite barium chloride. In addition the plant produced sulfuric, hydrochloric, nitric acid, chlorine, calcified and caustic soda [Kashin, etc., 1965, pp. 54–55; RGAЕ, Fund 4372, Inventory 9, File 1049 (g), Sheet 61]. Its produced was ranked first in the country in terms of quality and it was used in the defense, textile, paper, glass, and leather industry. It was delivered to enterprises in Moscow, Leningrad, Nizhny Novgorod, Saratov, Sverdlovsk, and other towns of the Central, Volga and Ural regions of the country, exported to other states [RGAЕ, Fund 4372, Inventory
9, File 1049, Sheets 46, 98]. The Bondyuzhsky plant was the first and oldest chemical enterprise in Russia. Three generations of chemists and EM worked there. The first-class personnel of the plant supported other enterprises in the growing chemical industry.

The personnel of the plant, the Tatar regional committee of the party, the government of the republic decisively spoke against the liquidation of the enterprise. They managed to preserve it.

It took about a year and a half for the collective of the chemical plant to increase labour productivity by one and a half times and abruptly reduce the cost price of production. At the end of 1930 the Bondyuzhsky plant became one of 11 best enterprises of the country [Krasnaya Tataria, 1988, August 28].

In the first two years of the five-year plan, the industry of Tatarstan was approaching the average level of the RSFSR in terms of growth rates. This can be explained by the possibility for expansion at the expense of the fixed capital of existing industries. For further development, additional investments to create new sectors of large-scale enterprises were necessary. When it came to new large-scale industrial construction, it was left to other regions of the country due to a lack of investments. This was connected to the fact that excessive capital investments in Tatarstan's local industry started only in 1926–1927, whereas a similar process to support the expansion of production in the USSR started from 1923–1924, that is 3 years earlier than in the 'Tatar republic'.

Significant investments and major repairs of existing enterprises required 3.5 million rubles in 1928–1929 (five-year plan, i.e. in the first year) [State Archive of the Russian Federation, Fund 1235, Inventory 125, File 332, Sheet 1]. In 1929–1930, 10 million rubles (not including house building) were directed to the development of industry according to the five-year plan of Tataria, but in fact they amounted to 7.4 million rubles, in 1930–1931 (not including shipbuilding), 14 million rubles. Investments envisaged by a resolution of Presidium of state planning of the RSFSR fell to 9.1 million rubles. That meant that investments in the industry of Tatarstan fell in comparison with the five-year plan by 25% in 1929–1930 and 35% in 1930–1931. Moreover, the state plan of the RSFSR excluded the building of ten new factories and plants that had a great importance for industrial development from the final calculations. All these circumstances led to a situation in which the rate and share of investments in Tataria would be even lower than in Russia on average, such that the implementation of the five-year plan would be under threat.

The facts represented above refer to the 3 June 1930 The Council of People's Commissars of the Tatar autonomous Soviet republic for Department Of Nationalities of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee where the 'well-founded objections against reduction of limits of capital industrial construction for 1930–1931 performed by the Presidium Of State plan of the RSFSR' were presented. [Ibid., Sheets 1–2, 8–9 reverse].

the 14th All-Russian Congress of Soviets which took place in 1928 in Moscow held discussions about the matter of national regions of the RSFSR. Representatives of the autonomous republics appearing at the congress talked about limitations on their independence and economic rights mentioning their economic problems.

The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, K. Ismaev, appearing in the congress said: 'The first issue is the question about the relationship of republics and regions within the government of the RSFSR...

Despite having achievements in the field of ordering budget rights of autonomous republics, they do not have approved constitutions (I don't know how it is with the rest of the republics but this is definitely true for the Tatar republic). The Tatar autonomous republic has existed for almost ten years, and we still do not have a constitution confirmed by the centre. This complicates the work of local authorities and creates problems for normal interaction with People's Commissariats of the RSFSR. I would be able to provide many examples characterising relations between the autonomous...
republics and central People's Commissariats. I'll say this much, sometimes several People's Commissariats treat autonomous republics just as governorates and sometimes even as districts. I think that is inadmissible. The People's Commissariat of Trade of the RSFSR, in particular, indicates that the warehouses involved in egg packing must be organised. Furthermore, the People's Commissariat of Trade considers this decision as final and not subject to change in the provinces. It seems to me that regulation of this kind, centralisation of this kind, is hindering the development of work and the manifestation of local initiative. When plans are composed, for example, five-year plans, they always apply us to one region or another and it complicates our work. We'd like the government of the RSFSR to issue a decree saying that the Republic of Tatarstan is an independent economic entity' [State Archive of the Russian Federation, Fund 1235, Inventory 123, File 4, Sheets 9, 12].

Nevertheless from the 1929–1930 economic year new industrial construction began in Tatarstan on an unprecedented scale. During the first five-year plan, the republic continued to lag behind the whole country in terms of the average level of electricity generation. In 1930, the USSR produced 57 kilowatts per person, in the Tatar republic 17 kilowatts. In 1932, the entire country was producing 100 kilowatts per person while Tataria was at the same level as it had been before [20 let TASSR, 1940, p. 73].

Building new factories and plants, development of industry and the social-industrial sphere is out of question without a sufficient power base and centralized electric power system in the republic.

In May 1930, construction of the Kazan state district power station, TPP No. 1, began in the southern suburbs of Kazan, in Zhirovyka sloboda. The construction of an integrated, combined enterprise with the newest technology was being undertaken for the first time in the republic. Therefore during the construction stage many difficulties and problems were faced in the initial stages. The first project of the station was unsuccessful. The builders had to amend the designs, procure cement, iron, and building materials. There was a shortage of specialists and workers.

They had to build despite the shortage of technical equipment. Spade, picks, wheelbarrows, and at best horses and carts were the main tools. Operating and life conditions were tough, especially at the beginning: workers lived in dugouts, temporary tents and barak huts. They had great difficulties concerning food supply. All these factors affected the pace of construction.

The construction of the Kazan Thermal power plant (TPP) No. 1 was at the centre of attention of the party, public and non-governmental organisations in Tataria and local media from the outset. The construction was declared as a national and republican project. It was included in the 518 most important construction projects in the country [Rabochii klass Tatarii, 1981, pp. 171–173; Istoriya Kazani, 1991, pp. 121–122; Belyakov, 1978, pp. 171–177]. Ali Ganeevich Ganeev was the head of the construction site.

The acceleration of the construction of TPP No. 1 was enabled by its inclusion in the list of items due to be commissioned by order of Chairman of Supreme Soviet of the National Economy G. Ordzhonikidze on 8 January 1931. This led to a significant improvement in the materials, equipment and machine supply. Material and human resources assistance also improved.

Brigades of concrete workers from Berzniki, boiler erectors from Magnitogorsk, workers and experts from other advanced building sites took part in building the TPP No. 1. They were mainly bricklayers, pipe fitters, form builders, other craftsmen and unskilled labourers with no qualifications from Kazan and all parts of the republic. Despite the low degree of mechanisation and the insufficient qualifications of the construction personnel, the intense rates of labour on the building site, allowed the first combined thermoelectric station to be built in record time (on 17 January 1933, the start-up trials of the first turbine unit took place in a ceremonial setting. On 18 January 1933, an article under the name 'Powerful electric factory' was published in the 'Soviet
Tataria' newspaper. It stated: 'KazTES is a new type of station. Almost all the achievements of world technology have been put to practical use here. There are 5 boilers at the station. Each of them produces 45–50 tons of steam per hour at a pressure of 36 atmospheres. Eleven first-class foreign companies and more than twenty Soviet plants have produced equipment for this TPP'. TPP No. 1 was equipped with mainly imported equipment. It was often the case that the engineers and workers were able to resolve problems faster than experienced representatives of supplier companies while assembling the equipment. Some of the foreign equipment was installed without the oversight of firm representatives. For example when an Austrian crane was installed in the turbine shop.

The launch of TPP No. 1 led to the development of the power system in Tataria, TPP No. 1 was a modern station at that time generating power and heat energy according to the most economic technological cycle [Sovetskaya Tataria, 1987, 2 July].

In recognition of the fast rate of work in constructing the station, its early commencement of operations and the labour heroism of the collective of builders and fitters, it was registered in 'Red Book of new buildings of Tataria' according to the regulation of Central Executive Committee of the TASSR.

This building site provided systematic training for building electric power stations, new large factories and plants in the future. Workers, engineers and technicians for other building sites of the republic were trained there.

The fur industry developed rapidly in Tataria during the first five-year plan, in accordance with a decision of People's Commissariat of foreign commerce of the USSR to industrialise the fur industry. By the end of the five-year plan, investments in fur industry of the republic amounted to about 20 million rubles [Industrializatsiya TASSR, 1968, p. 324]. In 1928–1929 a dyeing-house and raw-material factory were built. At the beginning of 1930, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR issued a special decree on the construction of the largest enterprise in Europe for a dressing sheep- and lambskin factory as a priority construction project in the USSR.

The enterprises were provided with equipment and raw materials. They were built in accordance with the latest technological achievements and equipped with Soviet and foreign machines. In 1930 the enterprises were united and the Kazan fur plant was created. It was the largest enterprise of fur industry. It included: 5 main factories, 2 utilization plants, a mechanical plant, FTA, a fur technical school as well as large farms: raw material sources, material sources and transport equipment.

During the first five-year plan, 22 large enterprises were built in the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, many of them were of all-Union importance (the first and only cat-gut plant in USSR; the largest felt footwear factory named after M. Razumov, factories of fur plant No. 3, 4, 6, 8). They also built more than 60 average factories and plants as well as lots of small enterprises. In 1932, the gross output of large enterprises amounted to 117,497 thousand rubles [RGAE, Fund 4372, Inventory 30, File 822, Sheet 13; SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 14, File 157, Sheet 2].

In total about 30 factories and plants were reconstructed during the first five-year plan. These included the 'Red Textile-Worker' factory in Kukmor, the V. Lenin linen factory, 'Spartakus', 'Hammer and Sickle', and M. Vakhitov, etc. Their gross output in 1928 amounted to 45 million rubles and 133 million rubles in 1932 [Ob` edinyonnyj plenum, OK i OK VKP (b), 1933].

After the first five-year plan had been fulfilled, Tataria became one of the most significant light industry regions in the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. For example, if in 1928–1929 the Kazan fur factory had produced goods worth 8 million roubles, in 1932 its gross output amounted to 128 million 614 thousand roubles. By over-fulfilling the export quotas for 1932, it had achieved the task set by the government of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic 'On manufacturing consumer goods at the amount of 7,100,000 rubles' of 2 July 1932 ahead of schedule [Skazo kazanskix mexovshhikax, 1974, pp. 56–57].
The clothing, footwear and felt boot industries which used to be semi-handicraft sectors became large mechanized ones. The share of clothing industry of Tataria in this field in Russia amounted to 7.5% in 1932, 9.2% in the flax, 3.5% in fat [RGAE, Fund 4372, Inventory 31, File 1928, Sheet 113]. In 1932, 1,646 thousand pairs of felt boots were produced in the republic and its share in the corresponding branch of industry of the USSR amounted to 34.5%. During the first five-year plan, leather footwear production increased by 3.4 times and linen cloth production increased by 1.1 times.

The republic became one of the centres of the woodworking industry [Dostizheniya TASSR, 1967, p. 16].

After the publication of the article 'How to organize competition?' by V. Lenin was published on 20 January 1929, mass socialist competition for the realization of the 1st five-year plan began to develop in the republic. Intensive work practices were the main form of competition in this period. By the end of 1929, there were 305 shock brigades in the republic. 40% of workers in the industry were drawn into the competition. These are the main tasks which were put forward and solved: increase of labour productivity, cost saving, cutting the cost of products, reduction of wastage and solving the problem of lateness at work.

Plant workers proposed industrial and financial counter plans, reinforced control over their realisation. There were also other forms of competition: start-to-finish production teams, social towing, 'Best institution' contest, interplant competitions, and others. Slogan 'Five-year plan within 4 years' was the main one [Rabochij klass Tatarri, 1981, pp. 186-194; Istoryi Kazani, 1991, pp. 127-133].

Fixed assets invested in the consumer industry by 1930 led to a reduction in the times need for capital investment recuperation. It also accelerated the growth of the republic's revenue and contributed to the acquisition of resources for the development of manufacturing capital goods in the ensuing years. Despite great difficulties with raw material, by the end of the first five-year plan, consumer production in Tataria's large-scale industry had increased 3.5 times while the increase in the whole of the USSR amounted to by 87.3%. The gross output of light industry of Tataria in 1932 amounted to 221.3 thousand roubles in comparison with 59.6 thousand roubles in 1927–1928 [RGAE, Fund 4372, Inventory 31, File 1928, Sheet 110].

The growth of internal economic savings allowed for an increase in investments in heavy industry of the republic by redistributing a share of revenues. Thus during the first five-year plan they invested twice as much money in the development of heavy industry as was initially planned (57.9 million rubles instead of 36.0 million rubles defined by the plan, or 48.0% of investment).

In 1932, certain non-plan construction projects were undertaken in the republic. This was completely justifiable from the standpoint of the Tatar economy and the geographical allocation of such giants as: an aircraft manufacturing plant, synthetic rubber plant, film factory, and others.

At the beginning of 1933, the Soviet people started work on the implementation of the second five-year plan of economic development for 1933–1937 confirmed at the 17th congress (January-February 1934) of the CPSU(B). The completion of technical reconstruction of economy, mastering new technology and new industries were the main economic tasks of this five-year plan. The nation's economy was equipped with new technology which needed to be employed effectively. The plan envisaged the accelerated development of the eastern districts and national republics including the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, and the creation of sustainable facilities.

The second five-year plan of Tataria envisaged its transformation into one of most advanced industrial centres of the country, and 'one of powerful industrial districts of the USSR' [RGAE, Fund 4372, Inventory 3, File 1933, Sheet 6]. This was to be achieved at the expense of development of branches of heavy

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3 The terms 'shock workers' and 'shock work' denote honesty, initiative, and professional skills.
industry such as: metalworking and chemical industry. At the same time light industry, food and forestry had to be developed. 1,087.68 million roubles were spent on national economic and cultural construction during the second five-year plan. 703.2 million roubles of investment was directed at the development of industry of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic [Industrializacziya TASSR, 1968, pp. 477–478].

Two powerful Thermoelectric Stations were built during the second five-year plan: Thermal power plant No 1 (the second phase of TPP No. 2). Facilities available for power generation grew by 117.8% in comparison with 1932. In 1937 they produced three times as much electric power in Tataria as in 1932. Electricity consumption doubled in these years [Rabochii klass Tatarii, 1981, p. 206].

The metal working industry in Tataria developed in the following directions: mechanical engineering, ship building, repair and engineering works in Kazan and Chistopol', nail-making and iron works. During the second five-year plan, the republic possessed 17 mechanical engineering and metal working enterprises; 11 of them were rebuilt, 4 of them (2 ship repair yards and 2 metal working plants) were reconstructed, all the rest were under construction [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund R–100, Inventory 4, File 2931, Sheets 24–29]. The 'Red Metal-Worker' shipyard increased its activity significantly. In 1932 it was named after A. Gorky. The factory specialized in ship repair and produced farm machinery: fanners, threshers, iron founding. After reconstruction in 1925–1926, they commenced construction of merchant ships (bulk-cargo barges, towboats) and naval ships (armoured vessels) from 1934 [Tatarskaya e'nczilopediya, 2005, p. 451].

The construction of the 'Kazmashstroy'—Kazan air manufacturing plant was rated among the most significant shock building sites of the second and third five-year plans. People's commissariat of heavy industry of the USSR made the decision to build it in 1931.

With ceremonial fanfares on 2 May 1932, in the presence of hundreds of people, the first stones were laid in the foundations of a future giant mechanical engineering in the Karavayevsky fields in the outskirts of Kazan. They offered the following slogan: 'All Tataria is building Kazmashstroy' which found a broad response. The districts of the republic were led by future builders cadres. Enterprises and institutions sent their reliable comrades to manage economic, party, komsomol and trade union work.

The construction project was international. Workers from Chuvashia, the Gorkovsky region, Ukraine, the Mari Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, and others arrived there. It received different kinds of support [Sovetskaya Tataria, 1967, 7 July].

The foreign specialists and workers took part in building the aviation complex and lived in a hostel built specially for them. They lived in a commune called 'cement'. They worked as instructors and brigade-leaders teaching beginners building craftsmanship. Amongst them were winners of socialist competitions who had been awarded the title of 'Heroes of the Socialist Construction of Tatarstan'. The head of communist party of Germany Ernst Telman was awarded this title at the request of the workers of Aviastroy for providing assistance in building the air manufacturing plant and other enterprises [Sovetskaya Tataria, 1979, 6 October, 1981, 22 January].

The aviation manufacturing plant consisted of two integrated factories: an aviation manufacturing factory and motor-building factory producing airplanes, screw propellers, fittings and attachments. The additional industries were developed at the same time (TPP, surface water management, railways and conveyor tracks, lime-and-sand brick factory, mechanized bakery). The entire republic took part selflessly in the building project. As a result, in 1937, aircraft plant No. 124 specializing in repairing TB-3 all-metal bombers and manufacturing small series of DBA-A, TB-7DS-3 entered the list of active enterprises.

By the beginning of the great patriotic war they had mastered the production of Pe-2 light bombers. In 1940 the engine plant was
launched. The production of airskis was mastered at the train parts plant.

By the end of the 1940's, aircraft engineering, one of the most technically developed branches of mechanical engineering with a high degree of cooperative and productive concentration, had become Tatarstan's leading branch of mechanical engineering. It accounted for more than 85% of basic production assets, 70% of employees and 60% of production in this sector [Tatarskaya e'nczilopediya, 2002, p. 31].

The building of 'Pishmash' factory was still excluded from the first five-year plan by the state plan of the RSFSR. The Resolutions of the Defense Board of 21 April 1933, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of 24 October 1935, resolutions and decisions of Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of 20 February and 20 June 1936 were necessary for that [RGAE, Fund 4372, Inventory 31, File 1930, Sheet 44; Industrializaciya TASSR, 1981, p. 494]. A new small-scale typewriter factory was built in Kazan. It was designed by Moscow organisation called 'Gipromash'. The creator of the first Soviet typewriter G. Elizarov was sent to America to study this industry. In 1937 he became the director of the plant and one of its planners. The former craftshop was transformed into a State typewriter factory producing 6,000 typewriters a year typing in the 42 languages of the different ethnicities living in the USSR. By December 1939, the plant had produced more than 30000 typewriters. In addition to Tatar font, it also produced typewriters with Chuvas, Kazakh, Uzbek, Mari, Udmurt, Bashkir, Kabardin and other typefaces. The produce of the factory went to Yakutsk, Ulan-Ude, Omsk, Frunze, Almaty, Tashkent, Dushanbe, Baku, Yerevan, Tbilisi, Kiev, Minsk, Leningrad and other cities of the country. In 1940, the 'Pishmash' plant started producing a typewriter called 'Progress' which became famous. Specialists considered it the best in the country [Rabochii klass Tatarii, 1981, p. 208; Evening Kazan, 1979, 1 December].

A large step on the path towards the further development of chemical industry in Tataria was the construction in Kazan of one of four plants (SK-4) (the others were in Yaroslavl, Yefemov and Voronezh) where the production of synthetic rubber was carried out for the first time in the world. The building of the factory began in 1932. It had many problems. For example, in February 1933, opponents of the domestic rubber industry managed to delay the building of Kazan factory. Subsidies were reduced to 1 million rubles from the expected 20 million rubles. The building of the factory was frozen temporarily. Thanks to the efforts of the Tatar regional committee of the party and director of the plant F. Egorov, who met Sergei Ordzhonikidze, the construction of the plant was renewed. In 1934, the construction of the major technological workshops was finished thanks to the selfless work of the builders. During the construction of the Kazan synthetic rubber plant (total cost of 58 million rubles and productive capacity of 10 thousand tons) of rubber a year) the experience gained by builders of the Yaroslavl, Voronezh and Efremov synthetic rubber plants was taken into account. This allowed for the plant to be built with 2.5 times greater capacity [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund R-732, Inventory 1, File 2750, Sheet 52]. If the first plants were equipped with foreign machines, the Kazan plant was equipped with complex Soviet apparatus produced at local enterprises.

More than 60 enterprises and scientific and technical institutions of the country took part in building the plant. New highly-qualified specialists and workers for SK-4 were trained with the help of the Yaroslavl synthetic rubber plant. Engineering and technical specialists underwent specialised training in affiliated enterprises [Abramov, 1970, p. 42]. In August 1936 the first section of the plant was brought into operation and by 1940 its forecast capacity had been reached. The synthetic rubber plant named after S. Kirov was a pioneer of organic synthetic industry in Tataria. Its activity helped the country overcome the need to import a significant amount of expensive natural rubber. During the Great Patriotic War it remained the only enterprise
satisfying the needs of the front and national economy for rubber.

An important role in development of the film industry of the country was played by the construction of Factory No. 8 of the Kazan film and photo plant. According to the resolution of Council of People's Commissars of The USSR of the 30 April 1933, it formed part of the list of hero projects. Its rapid construction and implementation was of great importance [On the course of building, see: Abdullina, Ablyazov, 1970]. The capacity of Factory No 8 alone was planned to amount to 250 million metres of film per year, while the industrial capacity of two first Soviet film factories in Shostok and Pereslavl did not exceed 70 million metres per year [SA HPD TR, Fund R-732, Inventory 1, File 2750, Sheet 520].

By 7 November 1935 the factory released its first order. "The young collective of the Kazan research-experimental film factory", in the words of "Red Tataria" on April 17, 1936, gained a great victory. The film "We are from Kronstadt" has been printed on their first release of film. Its quality significantly surpassed films made at old factories in Shostok and Pereslavl. The Kazan factory produced several types of film: positive, negative, X-ray, amateur films, and others.

The film factory became operational in 1936 and the same year the Soviet Union ranked third in the world by film production [Sovetskaya Tataria, 1977, 25 May].

The 18th congress of the CPSU(B) held in March 1939 confirmed the plan of Soviet economic development for 1938–1942. The XVIII Congress defined the main task of the 3rd Five-Year Plan: to catch up with and overtake the most developed capitalistic countries economically; this means from the standpoint of per capita industrial production. The plan envisaged significant growth in all sectors of national economy, first of all the rapid development of heavy industry was in the spotlight. It planned to increase productivity twofold in comparison with 1937.

The third five-year plan of the USSR also defined planned tasks for all branches of economy of the Tatar republic as well. The plan envisaged the investment of 1 billion 69.5 million rubles in industrial construction [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 20, File 34, Sheet 42]. By the end of the 3rd five-year plan the gross industrial output of Tataria was envisaged to increase by 2.3 times in comparison with 1937. The third five-year plan envisaged the development of heavy mechanical engineering in the republic, primarily in Kazan as a basis for the mechanisation and automation of the whole national economy. Serious attention was paid to the further development of the chemical industry, the building materials industry, the construction of duplicate factories, as well as the energy sector and the consumer and food industries.

In addition to Kazan, the construction of large industrial enterprises was envisaged for Zelenodolsk, Chistopol, Kama Ustye and Bigilma. It also envisaged the creation of large-scale oil exploration works and conditions for the following new sectors: oil-producing and oil-processing industry. Thus it was planned that the republic take an active part in creating a new oil depot in the country, the second Baku [Krasnaya Tataria, 1939, 2 April].

In 1939, plans were made to spend 1,340 thousand rubles on oil exploration works in the Tatar republic. In 1940, 10,390 thousand rubles, in 1941, 11,610 thousand rubles [Sovetskaya Tataria, 1977, 29 May].

According to state planning documents of the USSR and the RSFSR, 'Tataria was defined as a district favourable for the development of precise and well-qualified mechanical engineering' demanding relatively low metal consumption and a 'technically perfect chemical industry' [Industrializacziya TASSR, 1981, pp. 451–452].

In the years of the third five-year plan, the outbreak of the Second World War and the threat of war, led to the accelerated development of heavy industry and above all of its military industries. All existing enterprises and industrial sectors began manufacturing products and materials necessary for defence. The production of consumer goods in the republic decreased, leading to shortage and additional problems for the population.
The share of industrial products in the economy of Tataria in 1941 amounted to 86%. In large industry, 77.6%. That meant that industry became the main sphere of production and the republic which used to be agrarian-industrial became industrial-agrarian.

By mid-1941, 58 large industrial enterprises, small and medium-sized enterprises had been built and put in action, while pre-war five-year plans were being fulfilled. All old factories and plants were refitted. As a result, at the beginning of 1940 there were 805 factories in the republic, in comparison with 127 in 1928. In 1940, the gross output of heavy industry increased twelve times in comparison to 1913, mechanical engineering and metalworking by 71 times, the chemical industry by 24 times, wood processing by 21 times the building material industry by 12 times, light industry by 14.4 times, the food industry by 5 times. In 1940, the power output of electricity generation increased 7 times in comparison with 1928 and energy yield increased 17 times [Rabochij klass Tatarii, 1981, p. 210; Dostizheniya TASSR, 1967, pp. 17–19, 25, 29, 31, 77; Narxoz TASSR, 1970, pp. 28, 47, 50, 52].

The majority of factories built before the war had all-Union significance. The following branches of heavy industry were created: power engineering, mechanical engineering, production of building materials, the chemical industry. New branches of industry appeared: airplane manufacturing, production of synthetic rubber, film, photo gelatin, artificial leather as well as different kinds of defence products.

The 11-fold increase in Tataria between 1928-1940 of per capita industrial production per, which in 1913 was four times less than in Russia, allowed for this difference to be removed. [Dostizheniya TASSR, 1967, p. 30].

Separate factories and branches of industry of the republic were especially important in the scale of the whole country. For example, in 1939, 43% of typewriters, about 50% of fur products, 32% of felt and 27.9% of fullled footwear, 8.6% of plywood produced in the USSR were produced in Tataria [Izvestiya, 1939, 4 June; Industrializatsiya TASSR, 1981, pp. 466, 473, 479].

The crucial task of training qualified specialists to manage the enterprises under construction and provide them with optimal conditions was resolved as follows: Engineering and technical personnel including those from the broader nation and who were able to use new technologies and improve them, were appointed to administer complex technological processes and move them forward. This had to be achieved as early as possible without trial and error in an economically backward and technically illiterate country.

There were problems with technicians and engineers in Tataria's industrial sector. By the end of 1926 there were only 43 engineers (2 women), 150 technically qualified people (1 woman), and 121 foremen (1 woman). There was the following number of the Tatars among them: 2 female engineers, 3 technically qualified men, 32 foremen [Rabochij klass Tatarii, 1981, p. 177]. In 1928–1929 the industry of the Tatar republic was behind the RSFSR in general in terms of engineers and technicians. If in the RSFSR the technical staff made up 2.5% of workers employed in industry, in Tataria they made up 0.87%, 0.27% of which possessed higher education and 0.60% possessed secondary education [State Archive of the Russian Federation, Fund 1235, Inventory 123, File 7, Sheet 44]. Old engineering and technical workers could not meet the demands of developing industry. There began a process of forming new industrial and technical intellectuals, engineers, designers and technologists from among workers and peasants. Large industrial enterprises of the Tatar republic became mass schools training highly qualified technicians and engineers in the hours after work. Some enterprises organized evening technical schools and even technical colleges.

On 16 December 1929 The Council of People's Comissars of the Tatar Republic issued an order about the organization of a technical educational institution on the basis of the Vakhitov factory. I. Neomtov was one of its founders and first rector. The technical college was opened in January 1930. It was the first attempt in Tataria to establish a new type of technical educational institution. The college
trained specialists for the fat industry of all the country. They found premises for the technical college, equipped it properly and employed local lecturers.

A large group of factory workers enrolled in the technical college. They studied without taking time off work, but with a reduced working day of 6 hours. The factory trained engineers-technicians and heating engineers. The college produced 37 engineers-technologists, 20 machine engineers, 35 technical chemists and 11 technical mechanics including 20 engineers and 3 technicians who were Tatars. Many graduates of the college took up responsible positions at the Vakhitov factory and other factories. In 1936 the factory was transformed into a fat technological college.

I. Neometov was one of the first employees in the republic who was honoured with the title Hero of Socialist Labour of Central Executive Committee TASSR for production work, and he was appointed director of the Vakhitov factory. According to the resolution of the Central Executive Committee of Tatarstan of 30 April 1931 [Geroi truda Tatarii, 1974, pp. 203–204].

The construction of TPP No. 1 was also in process, its director Ali Ganeevich was the initiator of creating an energy institute in Kazan. In October 1990 a new college was opened in Kazan. Ali Ganeev became its rector. The creation of the Kazan Power Institute was the first attempt to establish an energy institute in the Tatar republic. In 1930, energy institutions were opened in Moscow and Ivanovo, in addition to Kazan.

The Kazan Energy Institute was established on the basis of the Kazan Polytechnic Institute (KPI). KIE trained engineers in two specializations: 'Industrial power engineering', 'Central electric power station management'. There was full-time and part-time education, a factory department, extramural semi-annual department training for engineers and technicians at the institution. On January 1, 1931 107 people studied here with an academic and teaching staff of 26. The KIE existed for five semesters and was closed in 1933 for reasons unconnected to the quality of training. This higher education institution accepted not only first year students but also older entrants from its early days. There were several graduating classes, and it left its mark on history of power engineering education and the electrification of Tataria [Kazanskiy gorodarsvannyj energeticheskiy universitet, 2008, pp. 5, 12; Geroi truda Tatarii, 1974, pp. 73–80].

The students did practical training while TPP No. 1 was being built. It became a laboratory where new equipment and technologies, working methods and industrial engineering techniques were implemented. The director of construction, A. Ganeev and K. Mukhidinov, heating engineer and A. Smirnov, construction superintendent, etc. were among the most outstanding builders of the power plant who were awarded the honorary title of 'Hero of the socialist construction of Tatarstan' [Geroi truda Tatarii, 1974, pp. 186–190]. In April 1933 The Kazan Energy Institute was transformed into an energy technical college.

The V. Ulanyov-Lenin Kazan State University was the cradle of many institutions including the A. Tupolev Kazan State Technical University. The aerodynamic department separated from KSU to lay the foundations of the Kazan Aircraft Institute. The first students of the new aviation institute were the students of the Aerodynamic department of the Faculty of Physics and Mathematics of KSU. Professors and lecturers of Kazan State University were the leading teaching staff of the institution. All the academic, research, scientific and organizational activities were led and directed by the most outstanding scientist, and specialist in the field of sustainability of motion, professor N. Chetayev. By mid-1932 there were two departments at Kazan Aircraft Institute, Aerodynamics and Aircraft Manufacturing. In total 618 students studied there.

KAI was created to meet the demands of the aircraft industry which started developing in Tataria from 1932 when 'Kasmashstroy' was built in Kazan. The graduates of the institute—scientists, aircraft constructors, and technologists—participated in the creation of generations of airplanes which symbolised the development of aviation science and tech-
nologies [Kazanskij universitet, 1979, p. 119; Sovetskaia Tataria, 1977, 7 May].

By the beginning of 1932 there were 6 technical institutes of higher education in Kazan: the Vakhitov Technical College, energetic, aircraft, chemical and technological, forestry engineering and communal-constructive institutions. There were 635 Tatars, or 29% of students studying in industrial IHLs.

By the beginning of 1939, 1,547 (352 women) Tatars were in full-time studies, 1,547 (352 women), Tatars studied part-time, 9,224 (4,436 women), FTA, 1,821 Tatars (587 women) were studying in the republic's higher education institutions [Istoriya Kazani, 2004, p. 29].

By the beginning of 1941, the institutes of higher technical education had trained 1,333 chemical engineers, 1,029 building engineers, 530 aircraft manufacturing engineers for the whole country and Tataria [Rakhmatullin, Shashkevich, 1970, p. 55].

By the beginning of 1939 the number of technical personnel had reached 8,305 people in the main professions thanks to engineering and mechanical specialists in full-time, part-time, evening educational institutions, mass schools, and other forms of training highly skilled engineers and specialists in technique in after work studies. They included 2,072 (406 women) engineers, 557 (117 women) designers, 2,558 (525 women) general technicians, 2,773 (446 women) foremen (excepting working foremen), 345 (7 women) construction superintendents.

The ratio of the Tatars among mechanical personnel increased from 9.6% to 25.1% between 1926 and 1939. At the beginning of 1939 there were 1,494. They numbered 300 engineers (75 women), 61 builders (10 women), 396 technicians (80 women), 737 foremen (143 women) (with the exception of working foremen), 13 construction superintendents (1 woman). Despite the absolute and relative increase of engineering and technical among the Tatars, their proportion among technical personnel was low. Most positions belonged to Russians. [Vsesoyuznaya perepis', 1992, p. 181]. The increased number of engineering and technical personnel meant their new role in the industry of the republic, especially in such leading branches as mechanical engineering, metal working and chemical industry. They directly operated production processes, took part in its organisational-technical administration, training highly skilled labour forces and the distribution of technical requirements.

Industrialisation changed the distribution of workers to branches of economics and their social structure. According to the census of 1939, the social structure of Tatarstan's population was as follows: 21.4% of workers (with their family members), 13.8% of clerks, 61.2% of individual farmers, 3.3% uncooperated handicraftsmen, 2.3% other groups [Abramov, etc., 1970, p. 22].

The creation of large-scale industry in the republic was combined with the increasing share of workers (people employed in industry) from 1.16% in 1926 to more than 15% in 1939. In these years the number of workers in large-scale industry increased from 15,704 to 120,600. Of this number about 45,800 people (37.9%) were employed in heavy industry, 33,000 people (27.4%) in light industry, 13,500 people (11.2%) in the food industry, 23,600 people (19.6%) in wood processing and sawing [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 22, sv. 156, File 531, Sheet 48]. The number of Tatars engaged in the large factory-plant network increased from 3.1 thousand people to 28.1 thousand people in 1937, that is by 8.3 times. Their ratio among the workers of large-scale industry increased from 2.16 to 34% [TASSR za XX let, 1940, p. 18].

Kazan was a large industrial centre. In 1940, the manufacturing output of Kazan factories stood at 897 million rubles in terms of gross output and 840 million rubles for commodity output. There were 80 thousand employees, EM and clerks working at 139 enterprises, more than 52 thousand people out of them were production workers [Istoriya Kazani, 2004, p. 171].

The unemployed were the main source of reinforcement of the working class in the 1920s. After 1931, due to the elimination of unemployment, the role of the village in satisfying the demand for workers in large-scale
industrial construction became more important. It was carried out at the expense of the inflow of villagers in the form of organised recruitment. Two thirds were forced resettlements. In 1931, 56,778 people were recruited for Tatarstan in villages [SA HPD TR, Fund 262, Inventory 1, File 549, Sheet 31].

Entire districts were assigned to such building sites as factory SK-4, factory of film strip, Aviastrory, and others. For example, 28 districts were assigned to Aviastrory. In 1932 alone more than 10 thousand people from the agricultural sector were engaged in the industrial sector, as a result of the organized recruitment of workers [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 14, File 256, Sheet 5].

Building was a transitional stage in industry and the first industrial school for people recruited in the countryside. Here all of them beginning with a digger and ending with an unskilled labourer, could become part of a collective, acquire production skills and qualification at special courses and schools.

In the years of industrialisation, a network for professional-technical education and professional skills of specialists was formed to train qualified workers and guide them in terms of specialisation.

The stationary network of vocational-training education provided training in the following centres: young specialists were trained in FTA, SAMP, and vocational schools.

Between 1932 and 1935 Tataria's FTA trained 10 thousand workers of this kind [Rabochii klass Tatarii, 1981, p. 212]. Most of the workers studied and improved their professional skills after work, through individual brigade training, courses, workshops, etc. On 1 January 1933 28,658 people studied in the republic in after-work courses.

The implementation of scientific achievements and new technologies demanded not only professional skills but also broad technical knowledge from workers. The development of vocational competence and technical literacy were usually simultaneous and mutually enriching.

In 1932, 32 enterprises offered technical studies in Tataria, 328 technical societies were opened. Almost one third of industrial workers were able to enhance their professionalism there [Rabochii klass Tatarii, 1981, p. 181].

In 1935, 10,815 were engaged in different types of technical studies including 4,681 Tatars. 5,571 people took courses providing the required minimum of technical knowledge, 1,299 people were enrolled on technical knowledge enhancement courses, 1,703 people for courses of socialist labour foremen [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund R-732, Inventory 1, File 2742, Sheet 262; Belyalov, Nizamov, 1969, p. 106].

Mass forms of industrial and technical studies also existed. Voluntary communities referred to as 'ZOT', (an abbreviation meaning 'for mastering technology'), were formed. The technical secondary school became the most widespread form of technical education during the implementation of the second five-year plan. On June 30, 1932 The Council of Labour and Defense of the USSR ordered the implementation of an obligatory technical minimum of knowledge for workers working with complicated units, settings and mechanisms. Members of the Komsomol (Communist Youth) working at the 'Hammer and Sickle' and 'Pish-mash' factories in Tataria were initiators of the movement to take social and technical examinations to allow them to operate machines. By the end of 1933, all workers had passed the social and technical examination at these factories which offered well-regulated technical studies. By the beginning of 1934, there were 2,871 people in Kazan engaged in production who had passed the social and technical examination out of 5,394 members of the Komsomol (that is 53.2%). In 1935, a state technical examination was introduced for workers studying for the technical minimum. It was not only a form of knowledge management but also that of controlling manufacturing activity, discipline and plan execution. The results of examinations influenced career opportunities, dismissals, etc. [Istoriiya Kazani, 1991, p. 157].

In 1935, the movement of industrial innovators began in the USSR. It broke out-of-date technical norms and exceeded them by several times. It was named the Stakhanovite move-
ment after Donetsk miner A. Stakhanov, who set the world record for coal production in August 1935. His initiative was adopted in other branches of economics. The Stakhanovite movement was a breakthrough in the development of socialistic competitions. The movement was about increasing labour productivity achieved by advanced workers, mastering technology and organising their work and time in a rational way.

The industrial classes of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic adopted this patriotic movement with enthusiasm [On the Stakhanovite movement, see Belyalov, et. al., 1976; Rabochij klass Tatarii, 1981, pp. 222-232; Istoriya Kazani, 1991, pp. 159-167; Petrova, 1985]. The first Stakhanovites appeared in the republic in September 1935. By the end of March 1936 there were more than 15 thousand Stakhanovites in industrial enterprises. 4,800 were engaged in heavy industry, more than 12,000 people in the fur industry, 3,260 in local industry, and more than 2,500 in the light and food industries. The number of Stakhanovites in Tataria increased from 28,986 people from 1 January 1938 to 31,586 people on 1 January 1940. The ratio of Stakhanovites among workers of light industry had reached 57% by the beginning of 1941 and 67.7% in the food industry [Rabochij klass Tatarii, 1981, pp. 227, 231].

The Stakhanovite movement created new forms and methods of technical training of workers and propaganda for shock methods of labour. The Stakhanovites stood behind workers who failed to cope with targets, passing on their experience and skills. During this period the transition from individual patronage to the organization of the public institute of Stakhanovite instructors took place. Each public instructor taught new methods to the whole brigade or district. Instructors took special and professional courses. After Stakhanov schools were created, workers were taught advanced industrial techniques and methods. Their work produced impressive results. Normally workers who failed to cope with output norms before entering Stakhanov schools, demonstrated 100–160% results when they graduated.

During the years of the second five-year plan, labour productivity in Tataria's industry increased by 1.5 times in total. In the metal working industry it increased by 4.5 times. The Stakhanovite movement played a significant role in this process.

The introduction of new techniques and technologies in all industrial branches and all the efforts made to master them brought about qualitative and quantitative changes in the professional structure of Tataria's working class. New jobs demanding high qualification and a broad technical horizon appeared. Machinery and metal working went through the most significant changes from 1926 to 1938. According to the All-Union Population Census of 1926, the republic had 3904 metal-workers of all kinds. There were 1,037 plumbers (7 women), 180 lathe operators working in local industries. By the beginning of 1939, the number of metalworkers had reached 13813 (1,063 women). There were skilled workers operating machinery and mechanical apparatus, including: turners, milling-machine operators, motor-mechanics, electricians as well as toolmakers, electric and autogenous welders, steel founders, casters and moulders, and others. The number of plumbers increased from 1,037 (7 women) to 12,953 (395 women), the number of lathe operators increased from 180 to 3,067 (251 women).

There were few metalworkers among the Tatars before the October revolution as the tsarist monarchy did not allow them to do this work. They were prohibited from being smiths, and not allowed to produce metal products, arms or knives. By 1939, the number of Tatar metalworkers had reached 5,770 (408 women), plumbers, 2975 (134 women), turners, 685 (93 women), milling machine operators, 105 (27 women). They made up 45.8% of steel founders, 32.7% of casters, 34.4% of milling machine operators, 26.5% of electric and autogenous welders, etc. [Vsesoyuznaya perepi, 1929, p. 378; Vsesoyuznaya perepi, 1992, p. 182]. There were only 370 Tatar women among representatives of all the professions mentioned above. They were mainly among plumbers, turners and milling-machine opera-
The number of skilled Tatar workers increased by 53.3% of Tataria's population. The number of skilled Tatar workers increased from 22 to 35% during the first five-year plan. More than 50% of the Tatars obtained vocational qualification during the second five-year plan. By January 1, 1937, they accounted for 29.2% of the highly skilled group and 39% the medium skilled group [Naziyova, 1989, p. 38; Rabochij klas Tatarii, 1981, p. 213; Istorinya Kazani, 1991, p. 158]. Despite obvious shifts in training workers with professions requiring skilled labour, there was a larger group of unskilled workers in the ranks of the republic's working class at the least mechanised, organised, low payment level and heavy manual operations. This especially referred to the Tatar workers who still lagged behind Russians in terms of their professional qualifications and industry structure, despite the achievements in advanced training already made. A whole range of problems and disadvantages regarding training mostly rural qualified Tatar workers prevented this from being resolved. Mastering new specializations was hindered by the fact that some of them did not know the Russian Language, or were either illiterate or semiliterate. They also had difficulties because the alphabet of the Tatar language had been changed twice in ten years.

The Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was the largest supplier of labour for the building sites of the USSR, ports and the Donbass objects. In 1931, the republic surpassed the plan of organized recruitment and was ranked first leaving behind other republics and regions. In the same year it sent 125 thousand people to the Donbass, Central Russia, Ural, Baku, Moscow and other building sites. For example, 10,668 people came to Magnitostroy from the republic [Rabochij klas Tatarii, 1981, p. 195]. Tataria was ranked second in the country after the Ural region for providing Magnitostroy with workers [Istorinya TASSR, 1968, p. 436].
perny said: ‘We are in such a situation because tens of thousands of people are leaving Tataria every year to work beyond its borders. We are providing Donbass, Ural, and the whole range of other large building sites with manpower, as we always have, but to our great shame there is a whole range of enterprises for we can not provide mainly due to insufficient accommodation...’ [State Archive of the Russian Federation, Fund 1235, Inventory 126, File 3, Sheet 37 reverse]. This trend could be observed in the ensuing years as well.

In 1926, about 90500 Tatar workers were beyond Tatarstan; they mainly settled in the Urals, Donbass, Azerbaijan, Central industrial region and other industrial regions of the country. According to the population census of 1939, there were 16,676 immigrants from Tatarstan in the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, 18,500 people in the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, 29,004 people in the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic, 9,324 people in the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic, 1,836 people in the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, 5,089 people in the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic, etc. In total, there were 512424 Tatar workers in the USSR [Senyavsksy, Telnukhovskoy, 1971, pp. 335–336]. Tatars could be seen on many large-scale building sites of socialism where they worked devotedly and made great success [Năcăpova, 1972, pp. 141–152; Nazìpova, 1997, p. 3; Nazìpova, 2004].

The industrialisation of the USSR was undertaken under complicated political, economic and international conditions provided the removal of technical and economic backwardness, achievement of economic independence, reinforcement of the defensive capacity of the country. The USSR reached the level of developed countries due to its structure of industrial production and it overtook England, Germany, France on the number of the main sectors of industrial production only yielding to the USA [Pravda, 1988, 18 October].

Historical experience shows that centralised accelerated industrialisation dictated from above is fraught with enormous objective difficulties, problems, errors, and subjective miscalculations. For example, deficiencies in planning and project overruns were reflected in the incorrect assessment of the real potential of providing construction with human and material resources. This led to the dissipation of resources, cost increases, and delays and a deterioration of working conditions.

Accelerated industrialisation contributed to the formation of path of economic development in the country directed toward quantitative increases rather than qualitative improvements, an irrational use of human and material resources. Hasty actions, strict centralisation, an administrative-command distribution system of economic management with its absolute subordination to the centre, striving to succeed at any cost, created conditions for social tension in the country. This led to repressions, and brought much suffering to the people.

The course of industrialisation as a general line was declared by CPSU(B) in December 1925 at the 14th party congress. The growth of the USSR's national economy and the restoration of its pre-war level were noted. The restoration of industry of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was slower than in the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic because of the civil and world wars, and the famine of 1921–1922. Industry was only restored in 1927–1928 economic year. Due to a lack of necessary investments, the republic lagged behind other regions after the beginning of new large-scale industrial construction. The government of Tataria hoped to reduce the republic's investment repayment period and accelerate income growth by investing mostly in production of consumer goods during the first five-year plan. The new resources were envisaged to be directed not only at the development of light industry but also that of heavy industry. From there, the main part of investment was directed at extending and reconstructing existing old enterprises and building new light and food industry factories and plants. The fur industry was expanding by leaps and bounds and soon made enormous advances in this sector throughout the country. Leather-dressing, sewing, felting, fat, foot-
wear and woodworking cottage industries also transformed. This managed to surpass the pre-war level of industry. After the first five-year plan had been fulfilled, the republic became one of significant regions for light industry in the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. Large-scale industrial building only began in from the 1929/1930 economic year (the second year of the first five-year plan). The construction of the Kazan state district power station, TPP No 1, was the first important project. It was planned to be a combined enterprise equipped with the most modern technology which had no analogues in the republic. The construction project was nation-wide. The entire republic took part in it.

Despite poorly-qualified builders, the low level of mechanization and many other difficulties and disadvantages, TPP No. 1 was constructed in record time due to the significant labour development that had prevailed there. Its launching laid the foundation for the development of the power-system in Tataria. Its building was a good school of erecting new electric power stations, large factories and plants. Technical and engineering employees were trained there.

The second and the third five-year plans became a period during which extensive heavy industry enterprises were constructed: mechanical engineering, metalworking and chemical industry. New modern branches of industry appeared: power engineering, aircraft building (one of mechanical engineering’s most technically developed fields), shipbuilding, synthetic rubber, cinemfilm, gelatin, artificial leather, instrument-making as well as producing different kinds of defence items and building materials. Several branches and enterprises had specific importance from a national point of view.

The specific weight of industrial goods as a part of the national economy in Tataria made up 86% at the beginning of 1941 and 77.6% in heavy industry. Industry became the main support and sphere of production and the republic had transformed from an agrarian-industrial to industrial-agrarian economy. The significant industrial gap with other regions of the USSR had been eliminated. The economic potential and industrial basis of modern Tatarstan were created.

The number of specialists and workers able to master new technique and become proficient, was growing rapidly in Tataria, unlike the largest industrial states where this type of worker had been formed over decades. Their training and building of new enterprises equipped with new techniques progressed at the same time.

On the eve of industrialisation, the republic lagged far behind the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, in general, from the standpoint of adequate provision with engineering and technical personnel. At the end of 1926 there were 43 engineers (2 women), 150 technicians (1 woman), 121 masters (1 woman) at factories and plants. There was the following number of the Tatars among them: 2 engineers (women), 3 technicians (men), 32 masters (men).

During the pre-war five-year plans, the process of forming modern production and technical intellectuals was also taking place. Large enterprises in the republic became mass schools training highly skilled technicians and detail engineers on a part-time basis. Some enterprises even founded technical colleges and schools.

New technical higher education institutes and colleges were created. By the beginning of 1932, there were 6 technical higher education institutes in Kazan: technical school at the plant named after M. Vakhitov, energy, aviation, chemical-technological, forestry engineering, construction colleges. 635 Tatars studied there. The rule of party-class approach was conceived while registering entrants as students. Children of workers and poor peasants were preferred. Technical higher education institutes in Kazan became training centres for chemical and civil engineers, engineers of aeronautical industry of the country and republic.

By the beginning of 1939 there were 8,305 technical personnel in Tataria. There were 2,072 engineers, 557 builders, 2,558 technicians, and others, among them. From 1926 until 1939 the proportion of Tatars among technical personnel increased from 9.6 to 25.1%. Despite the absolute and relative increase of
engineering and technical among the Tatars, their proportion among technical personnel was low.

Industrialisation was the material basis for the development of the working class. Its process affected the rate and character of this development, its radical quantitative and qualitative inter-class shifts. The accelerated growth of the industry and construction was combined with the rapid growth of personnel in large-scale industry, an increase in the number of employees engaged in the capital goods sectors (especially in metal working and mechanical engineering). Women were intensively involved in the ranks of industrial workers.

National growth rates overtook the growth of all working class of Tataria. The number of workers employed in large industry and mechanical engineering had been increased.

The process of further industrialisation of the republic went hand-in-hand with the trend towards grass roots nationalisation of ethnic personnel. The sources and forms of its replenishment had altered. The network of professional education and advanced professional training was expanded in the years of pre-war five-year plans to train skilled specialists. The development of vocational competence and technical literacy were usually simultaneous and mutually enriching. Most workers studied and improved their skills after work in a variety of courses. The core of industrial workers of the modern type was formed in the republic.

Industrialisation changed the distribution of workers to branches of economics and their social structure. This was then combined with the growth of the urban population, especially in Kazan where construction work was especially active in the years of the five-year plans.

Workers, engineers and specialists of the Tatar republic who had grown up in a complicated and contradictory era managed to lead the republic out of technical and economic backwardness and create bases for its further industrial and cultural development, despite the absence of the economic conditions to satisfy material interest and personal initiative.
CHAPTER 3

Ethnodemographic situation in the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in the 1920–1930s

Natalia Fedorova, Ilnara Khanipova

Soon after the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was formed in August 1920, the Russian Federation held its first census of the population. It cannot be called universal in the full sense of the word because the armed forces personnel and the population of occupied and frontline territories were not taken into account. Nevertheless, its materials can be regarded as highly trustworthy for the Middle Volga region in general and the TASSR in particular, and considered as basic for the analysis of the population’s demographic characteristics. According to its data, 2,892 thousand people lived in the republic's territory, 1,492,272 of them were Tatars amounting to 51.6% [Istoriya TASSR, 1960, p. 139]. The Russian population consisted of 40.4%, the Chuvashes, 4.3%, Maris, 1.5%, other ethnic groups, 2.2% [Istoriya TASSR, 1960, p. 139]. The absolute majority of inhabitants of the republic were concentrated in countryside—2,639 thousand people. The rural areas-1,452,506 Tatars or 54.8% of the total rural population [Sharaf, Ermolaev, 1925, p. 25]. As it can be seen from the provided data, the Tatars were a rural ethnos at the moment of formation of the autonomous republic—97.3% of Tatars lived in the countryside.

Peasants representing the overwhelming majority of rural population preferred a compact mono-national settlement. Out of 3,548 inhabited localities, 42.2% were Tatar, 43.7%—Russian, 6.9% were mixed population. On average, 928 inhabitants accounted for a Tatar settlement in comparison with 583 inhabitants for a Russian settlement.

The ‘nourishment coefficient’ of the Russian and Tatar peasant in the republic was the same. That is, the ratio of the number of mouths to feed per worker. That meant that one worker or an adult economically active man could provide five people with the product of his labour. Taking into account the number of family members, one can state that agricultural marketability was very low. Almost everything that was produced was consumed by family members and almost nothing was offered for sale.

As for cities, the capital of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Kazan, was the largest and the most significant in all respects. The 1920 census recorded 146,495 inhabitants. It should be noted that it was a multinational city where the Russians dominated (73.95%), though in total there were more than 50 different ethnic groups. The Tatars occupied 19.43% [Atlas of the history of Tatarstan, 1999, pp. 48–49] (Table 2.2).

From 1921 to 1923 the republic was stricken by famine. Human losses were not calculated because a count was never organized. One more problem was the absence of a unified system for counting the victims of famine. People died of starvation, malnutrition, concomitant diseases (the 1918 flu pandemic, typhus and cholera), babies were stillborn, premature, died during the first days of their life, and people fell victim to crimes prompted by starvation. Organized and spontaneous migration should also be included in demographic losses. Even superficial calculations indicate the factors which led to changes in the population of starving regions and shows how difficult it is to make an accurate evaluation. According to official data, the total number of the rural population fell by 218.7 thousand people between 1922 and 1922 [20 let TASSR, 1940, p. 106].

The famine had not yet been overcome, and bearing this in mind the trend continued. Thus
the mortality rate was four times the birth rate. [Olschamovsky, 1923, p. 130]. According to the census of 1920, there were 522,3 thousand peasant farms in Tataria and by 1922 there only 484,6 thousand farms were left [Tarkhanov, 1930, p. 20].

In 1923, an urban population census was carried out in the Russian Federation. Emphasis was placed on workers in industrial enterprises beginning with handicrafts and ending with large factories and plants. It took many years to process the results of the research and it was not completely finished. According to its data, 255,039 people lived in the cities of Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. There were 158,085 people (61.9% of townpeople) in the main city of the republic, Kazan [Itogi VGP, 1923, p. 19]. Tatars accounted for slightly more than 16% of the urban population.

Documents from the All-Union Population Census of 1926 provide a clearer and more accurate idea. It was the first complex research into the Soviet population as a whole and was held under relatively favourable political and economic conditions in December 1926, according to a unified and accurate programme [see Fedorova, 1991, pp. 17–47]. Its results were presented in all official statistical reference books. The census showed that a total of 2,916,536 people in the USSR considered themselves Tatars (1,413,027 men and 1,503,509 women), making up 1.98% of the USSR population. 2 people were registered in the towns of the USSR and 2,465,096 people in the countryside. It can thus be stated that Tatars accounted for 1.716% of the urban population of the USSR and 2.042% of rural population of the USSR [Central Statistical Administration of the USSR, 1929, pp. 8–9, 28–29].

The leading position among the cities of the republic belonged to Kazan. 63.8% of the total urban population was concentrated here. According to the data of the census of 1926, representatives of 49 nations and ethnicities lived in the capital of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Russians made up the majority (more than 70% of people), the Tatars were the second most numerous group of population at 24.5%.

Comparing the materials of censuses of 1923 and 1926, it can be stated that the urban population grew due to the mechanical movement of population. The movement was mainly from the rural districts to cities (approximately 11 people a year). With regards to natural increase, the birth rate of the Tatar populations was higher than that of Russians (3.64 against 2.47 according to the data of 1926).

The Tatar population in the countryside amounted to 1,198,702 people. The Tatars amounted to 51.8% of all the inhabitants of the

### Distribution of Tatar villages based on the number of resident population (%)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of the residents</th>
<th>Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 300</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300–500</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>501–750</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>751–1000</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1001–1250</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1251–1500</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1501–2000</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001–3000</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3001–4000</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 4000</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Section II. Stages in the Formation of the TASSR

Distribution of the Tatar population by the republic cantons in the mid-1920s*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kantons</th>
<th>Number of Tatars (absolute)</th>
<th>Number of Tatars (proportional)</th>
<th>Share of Tatars in a kanton</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arsky</td>
<td>220399</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>59.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buinsky</td>
<td>75540</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>54.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bugulminsky</td>
<td>142763</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>58.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yelabuzhsky</td>
<td>66391</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>49.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laishevsky</td>
<td>76161</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>46.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mamadyshsky</td>
<td>114820</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>69.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Menzelinsky</td>
<td>122990</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>77.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sviyazhsky</td>
<td>51198</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>34.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spassky</td>
<td>41454</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tetyushsky</td>
<td>77071</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>54.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chelninsky</td>
<td>114541</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>54.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chistopolsky</td>
<td>93800</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>30.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1197128</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>51.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Compiled from: Central Statistical Directorate of the USSR, pp. 372–417.

countryside [Central Statistical Administration of the USSR, 1928, pp. 193, 243] (Table 2.3).

The discrepancy of 1,574 in the total number of the rural population can be explained by the fact that some characteristics were calculated according to the data on the existing population while others according to the data on residential population.

The data provided in the chart shows that Tatars were settled on the whole territory of the autonomous republic, and they accounted for the ethnic majority of the population except for Chistopole, Sviyazhsk, Laishevsk and Spassk cantons.

The marital status of population was registered since the age of 16 without presenting any supporting documents. As far as the rural Tatar population was concerned, in the mid-1920’s single young men dominated over single young women (103,457 young men to 100,284 girls). On the one hand, this can be explained by the local ethnic traditions that girls marry earlier. On the other hand, this is a sign of high birth rate. Civil status categories (family, widowed, divorced people, those who did not indicate their family status), show a prevalence of the female population. This is evidence of destructive consequences of revolutionary events, world and civil wars.

The absolute number of widows is 11 times as great as that of widowers.

In the 1920’s, the Tatars demonstrated a high level of literacy: 39.8% of men and 25.2% of women in the republic could read and write. The correspondent indicators were not much higher of the national state: 41.4% for men and 26.2% for women. It should be emphasized that the Tatars were especially literate when it came to the Tatar language: 98.7% of men and 99.6% of women among the literate Tatars were fluent in the written culture in the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. The prevalence of women can be explained by active engagement of male population in social-political processes. This required learning Russian as a language of international communication.

In the latter half of the 1920’s, the policy of the Soviet power was directed at improving literacy and the proficiency of representatives of non-Russian nationalities, or national mi-
norities. Official reports provide us with the following key statistical figures: the proportion of Tatars among students in the primary schools in the republic in 1928–1929 made up 54.2% (38.5% of Russians), 49.3% among college students (38.2% of Russians), 12% among students in higher education. At the same time 482 Tatars studied at factory institutes (rabfaks), accounting for 40% of the total number of such students [Tarkhanov, 1930, pp. 28–29].

In the 1930’s, the Soviet government carried out two demographic censuses, in 1937 and in 1939. The data from the 1937 census, clearly did not coincide with expectations and were considered inaccurate. The organizers and some participants of the research were persecuted. The government of the USSR decided to hold a new population census which was adjusted to a previously planned schematic. The 1939, census data explicitly affirmed the progress in constructing socialism in the USSR, unlike the materials from the 1937 census. Nevertheless, both the total and mean indexes can be calculated on the basis of the first and the second censuses of the 1930’s. However, there are only insignificant discrepancies.

Administrative and territorial division of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. The cantons of the 1920’s were replaced by districts. The regional administrative areas became smaller and that was evidence of greater governmental control over society.

In the 1930’s, The Tatar Republic remained polyethnic (Table 2.4). At the same time certain changes took place in population distribution, as a result of political, social and economical causes. These changes mainly resulted from intensive migration processes including forced migration arising from the removal of kulaks (private farmers) from the rural areas. The resettlement policy and organized recruitment of labour to create industry in the USSR as a whole took place also in the

### Table 2.4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National ethnicity</th>
<th>According to census data for 1937</th>
<th>According to census data for 1939</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Absolute (%)</td>
<td>Absolute (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatars</td>
<td>1,337,338 48.8</td>
<td>1,421,514 48.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>1,182,577 43.2</td>
<td>1,250,667 42.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuvash</td>
<td>128,782 4.7</td>
<td>138,935 4.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mordvin</td>
<td>32,908 1.2</td>
<td>35,759 1.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mari</td>
<td>13,545 0.49</td>
<td>13,979 0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Udmurts</td>
<td>25,257 0.92</td>
<td>25,932** 0.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>6,575 0.24</td>
<td>13,087 0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebrews</td>
<td>5,305 0.19</td>
<td>6,050 0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bashkirs</td>
<td>922 0.03</td>
<td>931 0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>6,569 0.23</td>
<td>8,423 0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>2,739,778 100.00</td>
<td>2,915,277 100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Compiled from: Russian State Archive of the Economy, File 1562, List 329, Act 145, Sheets 15–16; List 336, Act 348, Sheet 8. For more detailed information on the ethnic composition of the population of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in districts, cities and large settlements [see: RGAE, File 1562, List 336, Act 348, Sheets 50–53].

** In the census of 1939, to a significant extent, the Udmurts were combined with the Besermyans that they had assimilated and whose number totaled 10 thousand according to the 1926 census. [see: Vsesoyuznaya perepis’, 1992, p. 246].
republic. That led to depopulation, especially in the rural population.

According to the census of 1939, the population of the republic consisted of 2,915,277 people (1,359,735 men and 1,555,542 women). Representatives of 36 nationalities lived in the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. The Tatar population amounted to 1,421,514 people, or 48.8%. Out of these, 657,979 were men (46.3% or 48.4% of all male population of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic) and 763,535 women (53.7% or 49.1% of all female population of the republic) [Vsesoyuznaya perepis’], 1992, pp. 25, 181]. According to the census of 1939, the population of Tataria was made up of 2,853.3 thousand people, taking into account upward distortions and draft estimates (the percentage of upward distortion made up 2.2%, that is 62,000 people) [Zhiromskaya, 1997, p. 52].

In the 1930’s, more than two thirds of the population of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic continued to live in rural areas. The urban population numbered 614,293 people including 293,536 men and 320,757 women. The Tatars accounted for 28.4% of them (174,622). The majority of townspeople were Russians (66.9%, 410,844), Chuvashes (1.1%, 6,678), Mordvin (0.7%, 4,083), Udmurts (0.2%, 1,405), and other ethnic groups (2.7%, 16,661). According to the 1939 census, 64.8% of all citizens were concentrated in Kazan. Russians ranked first (65.2%, 259,387). They were followed by Tatars (30%, 119,282). [RGAE, Fund 1562, Inventory 336, File 349, Sheet 36].

2,300,984 people lived in the countryside including 1,066,199 men and 1,234,785 women. This included 1,246,892 Tatars. Their share in the rural population was 54.2% [RGAE, Fund 1562, Inventory 336, File 348, Sheet 50]. The percentage of the rural population in the Tatar population of the republic was 87.7% (Table 2.5).

Twelve districts (Aznakayevsky, Aktyubinsky, Almeteyevsky, Atminsky, Baltasinsky, Voroshilovsky, Kalininsky, Kzyl-Yulduzsky, Kzyl-Yulsky, Sabinsky, Sarmanovsky, Tumutuksky) out of 63 rural areas in the republic were mainly Tatar. The Russian population dominated in Aktashsky, Bugulminsky, Yelabuzhsky, Verkhne-Uslonsky, Novo-Sheshinsky, Stolbishchensky, Tenkovsky and Yudinsky districts. The population of other districts was ethnically mixed. There was a significant number of Chuvashes in nine districts, Maris in four districts, Mordvin in three districts and Udmurts in two districts. In Bugulinsky district 3.9% of the inhabitants were Ukrainians [according to National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, l. R-1296, § 18, file 519, p. 64; also the Russian State Archive of the Economy, vol. 1562, § 336, file 348, pp. 50–53).

In the total population of the USSR, the Tatars were one of the largest national groups, ranking fifth by population. According to the census of 1939, the Tatars numbered 4,313,488 people (with families) including 3,212,455 villagers (74.5%) and 1,101,033 townspeople (25.5%) which made up 2.53% of the total population of the USSR. If the census of 1926, indicated several nationalities close to the Tatars such as the Mishars (243,000 people), the Kryashens (101,000), the Teptyars (27,000), the Nagaibaks (11,000), the census of 1939 defined all these groups as the Tatars. They also included the Crimean Tatars [Vsesoyuznaya perepis’, 1992, pp. 57, 246].

According to the nationality and mother tongue ranking of the Soviet population provided by the census of 1939, 966 people out of 1000 Tatars considered Tatar language their mother tongue. Out of 4,313,488 Tatars, 4,167,363 people considered the Tatar language their mother tongue; 113,922 people listed Russian; 32,203 people listed other languages (Udmurt, Chuvash, and others). [Ibid., p. 80].

The mother tongue ranking of the Soviet population shows that 4,533,324 people called the Tatar language their mother tongue including 1,033,753 townspeople and 3,499,571 villagers [Ibid., p. 81]. This was about 2.66% of total number of population.

Tatars ranked second in the RSFSR in terms of population, numbering 3,901,835 people including 3,043,332 villagers and 858,503 townspeople, according to the census of 1939.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Republic districts</th>
<th>Number of Tatars (absolute)</th>
<th>Number of Tatars (proportional)</th>
<th>Share of Tatars in the district</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agryzsky</td>
<td>23882</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>62.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aznakaevsky</td>
<td>22816</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>91.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aksubaevsky</td>
<td>11140</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aktanyaksky</td>
<td>36998</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>88.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aktashsky</td>
<td>3674</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexeyevevsky</td>
<td>7030</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alkeyevsky</td>
<td>16999</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>60.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almeteyevsky</td>
<td>30237</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>85.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apastovsky</td>
<td>32724</td>
<td>2.29</td>
<td>78.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arsky</td>
<td>40174</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>74.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atinsky</td>
<td>34680</td>
<td>2.44</td>
<td>94.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bavinsky</td>
<td>16528</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>51.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltasinsky</td>
<td>21194</td>
<td>1.49</td>
<td>89.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilyar</td>
<td>12775</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>39.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolshetarkhansky</td>
<td>11066</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>34.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bondyuzhsky</td>
<td>21724</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>54.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bugulminsky</td>
<td>7794</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budyonnovsky</td>
<td>22226</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>57.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buinsky</td>
<td>30451</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>65.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verkhneuslonsky</td>
<td>3511</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voroshilovsky</td>
<td>23830</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>88.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vysokogorsky</td>
<td>7736</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drozhhanovsky</td>
<td>32565</td>
<td>2.29</td>
<td>56.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dubyzsky</td>
<td>28942</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td>71.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yelabuzhsky</td>
<td>13380</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zainsky</td>
<td>27215</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>63.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaybitsky</td>
<td>31549</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>55.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalinskys</td>
<td>35104</td>
<td>2.47</td>
<td>93.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamsko-Ustinsky</td>
<td>19853</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>56.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kzyl-Armeysky</td>
<td>14880</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>71.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kzyl-Yulduzsky</td>
<td>37713</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td>82.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kzyl-Yulsky</td>
<td>27728</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>95.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krasnoborsky</td>
<td>20456</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>60.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuznechikhinsky</td>
<td>9783</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>35.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuybyshevsky</td>
<td>7602</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kukmorsky</td>
<td>39804</td>
<td>2.79</td>
<td>74.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laishhevsky</td>
<td>14497</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>31.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mamadyshsky</td>
<td>18728</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>41.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Section II. Stages in the Formation of the TASSR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Republic districts</th>
<th>Number of Tatars (absolute)</th>
<th>Number of Tatars (proportional)</th>
<th>Share of Tatars in the district</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Menzelinsky</td>
<td>30243</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>52.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslyumovskiy</td>
<td>27051</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>76.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novopismyansky</td>
<td>9139</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>40.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novosheshminsky</td>
<td>6797</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>15.8</td>
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<td>Nurlatsky</td>
<td>25601</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td>60.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oktyabrsky</td>
<td>16833</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>37.1</td>
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<td>Pervomaysky</td>
<td>23950</td>
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<td>51.4</td>
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<td>Pestrechinsky</td>
<td>11270</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>32.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rybno-Slobodsky</td>
<td>14209</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>37.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabinsky</td>
<td>40975</td>
<td>2.88</td>
<td>91.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarmanovsky</td>
<td>31559</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>87.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stolbischensky</td>
<td>2133</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>6.5</td>
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<td>Takanyshsky</td>
<td>32573</td>
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<td>67.5</td>
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<td>Telmansky</td>
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<td>34.8</td>
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<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
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<td>Tetyushsky</td>
<td>3922</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>10.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tumutuksky</td>
<td>20324</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>91.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tyulyachinsky</td>
<td>24477</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>73.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsipiyinsky</td>
<td>17511</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>70.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chelninsky</td>
<td>24558</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>45.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chistopolsky</td>
<td>21658</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>31.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sheremetyevsky</td>
<td>14314</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>31.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shugurovsky</td>
<td>26598</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>67.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yudinsky</td>
<td>12598</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yutazinsky</td>
<td>24214</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>69.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1295737</td>
<td>91.15</td>
<td>44.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, Tatars who are urban residents of

| Kazan                     | 119282                     | 8.39                            | 30.0                          |
| Zeleny Dol               | 6495                       | 0.46                            | 21.5                          |
| Total                    | 1421514                    | 100.0                           | 48.8                          |

*Compiled from: National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, File 3610, List 1, Act 27, Sheet 7; Russian State Archive of the Economy, File 1562, List 336, Act 348, Sheets 50–53.

[Vsesoyuznaya perepis’, 1992, p. 59]. Thus Tatars accounted for 3.6% of the population of the RSFSR.

On 1 January 1941, the population of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic numbered 2,760,000 thousand people. As far as ethnic composition is concerned, the correlation shown by the 1939 census was preserved: Tatars (48.8%), Russians (42.9%), other nationalities (8.3%) [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund TR-1296, § 18, file 538, p. 22]. The number of villagers significantly fell decreased over the period of two pre-war years.

According to the 1939 census, it was normal at the age of 15 for the population to en-
The size and age structure of married Tatars
(according to the 1939 census)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age (years)</th>
<th>Population size</th>
<th>Urban population</th>
<th>Rural population</th>
<th>Population at large</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15–19</td>
<td>total</td>
<td>11003</td>
<td>10285</td>
<td>21288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>married</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20–29</td>
<td>total</td>
<td>18972</td>
<td>20994</td>
<td>39966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>married</td>
<td>8845</td>
<td>11646</td>
<td>20491</td>
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<tr>
<td>30–39</td>
<td>total</td>
<td>14077</td>
<td>13421</td>
<td>27498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>married</td>
<td>12693</td>
<td>10004</td>
<td>22697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40–49</td>
<td>total</td>
<td>7267</td>
<td>6817</td>
<td>14084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>married</td>
<td>6907</td>
<td>4744</td>
<td>11651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50–59</td>
<td>total</td>
<td>4758</td>
<td>4639</td>
<td>9397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>married</td>
<td>4473</td>
<td>2326</td>
<td>6869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 and older</td>
<td>total</td>
<td>3132</td>
<td>4492</td>
<td>7624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>married</td>
<td>2651</td>
<td>1034</td>
<td>3685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total of 15 years and older</td>
<td></td>
<td>59209</td>
<td>60648</td>
<td>119857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>accounted for 1000 people</td>
<td></td>
<td>35689</td>
<td>30318</td>
<td>66007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Compiled from: Russian State Archive of the Economy, File 1562, List 336, Act 520, Sheet 30.

In the 1930's, the level of literacy of the population of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic improved significantly. If according to the census of 1926, 48.2%, people aged 9 and older were literate, according to the census of 1939 it was 81.7%. The number of literate people aged 9–49 made up 53.6% according to the census of 1926 and 90.4% according to the census of 1939. According to the census of 1929, there were twice as many literate people aged 50 and older in the republic, than according to the census of 1926 (22.5% and 43.5% correspondingly) [Vsesoyuznaya perepis’, 1992, p. 41].

The population of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was divided by the level of education in the following way: of 1000 persons, 60.6% people possessed secondary education including 72.5% of men and 50.2% of women. of the inhabitants of the republic, 42% had a higher education including 5.7% of men and 2.9% of women. In total, 176,738 people (including 98,622 men and 78,116 women) had secondary education in the republic, 12,295 people (including 7,754
men and 4,541 women) had college education [Vsesoyuznaya perepis’, 1992, p. 52].

The literacy of the Tatars significantly increased in the 1930’s, in comparison with literacy indicators of the 1920’s. According to the census of 1939, 79.7% of Tatars at the age of 9 and older were literate in the republic [RGAE, Fund 1562, Inventory 336, File 348, Sheet 10]. The literacy of the Tatars living in the city (87.9%) was higher than that of the Tatars living in the countryside (78.6%); 85.1% of Tatar men and 75.5% of Tatar women were literate. These indexes were slightly lower than those in the entire USSR. In general, 77.9% of the Tatars at the age of 9 and older were literate. The index of literacy among Tatar men was 84.7%, Tatar women, 71.5% [Vsesoyuznaya perepis’, 1922, pp. 83–84].

The education level of the Tatars living on the territory of the USSR was the following: 216,965 people had secondary education (including 128,492 men and 88,473 women), 9,640 people had college education (including 6,613 men and 3,027 women) [Vsesoyuznaya perepis’, 1922, p. 86].

Out of 1000 people, 50.3% had secondary education including 61.1% of men and 40.0% of women, 2.2% of the Tatars living in the USSR had higher education including 3.1% of men and 1.4% of women.

**Tatars in the social structure of the USSR.** The Soviet statistics of the 1920s registered the social status of a person based on his occupation and branches of national economy. Official documents contained classification of occupations according to 10 positions revealing the social structure of the society: workers, clerks, professional workers, landowners with hired workers (private entrepreneurs using waged labour), landowners working only with the members of their families and members of artels, independent farmers, members of the families helping the head of the family, people without occupations, unemployed and military men. The ranking was produced from the of 10, from the moment the state recognised the right to earn an independent wage. Children under 10 were considered to be dependent. This approach is evidence of the country's low level of economic development. The later an individual commences labour activity, the wealthier a family and country in general. Reports show that children in Tatar families became independent later than Russian families. For example, the percentage of children under 10 with their own income amounted to 0.09 among the Tatars and 0.14 among Russians [according to the All-Union census, 1929, p. 231] (Table 2.7).

According to this data one can conclude that the Tatar population was less involved in the state political-economic system. Tar workers amounted for 23.1% of workers who were mainly employed in the public sector of the economy. There were 3.7 times fewer women then men. The formation of a proletariate amongst the Tatar population was considered to be the main task of the government and party bodies. Labour exchanges, factory-and-workshop schools, structures of the Tatar council of trade unions and People’s Commissariat of Labour were engaged in fulfilling that purpose. By the late 1920’s, the percentage of Tatar workers in trade unions amounted to 26.3% [Ivanov, 1929, p. 22]. In total there were 4,316 Tatar workers (27.24%) on 1 July 1928; 1,279 of which were women.

There were almost no employees in the private sector. The percentage of Tatars among them reached 20% (Table 2.8), there were 2.6 times fewer women than men [Karimova, 2009, pp. 113–126].

The communist party implemented a policy of korenizatsiya (ethnicsiation) of the cadres and the appointment of Tatars in the field of administrative management. According to reported data, only 4% of the Kazan city council (8th convocation) was Tatars, by 8 this index stood at 31.7% [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, R-326, fol. 1, § 62, p. 1; Red Labour, 1924, 3 October]. In 1928, out of the six institutes of higher education in Tataria, three rectors were of Tatar descent [Tarkhanov, 1930, p. 29]. At the same time many Tatars were members of volost and canton executive committees. According to the data of 1921, 30.4% of employees of volost executive committee were Tatars out of 664 people and 35% of employ-
Distribution of active Tatar population by occupation*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>6234</td>
<td>1671</td>
<td>7905</td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative and service</td>
<td>5898</td>
<td>2280</td>
<td>8178</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free professionals</td>
<td>842</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>865</td>
<td>40.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owners with hired workers</td>
<td>2769</td>
<td>1613</td>
<td>4382</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owners with family members and</td>
<td>200582</td>
<td>29629</td>
<td>230211</td>
<td>55.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>members of the artel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuals</td>
<td>7231</td>
<td>6012</td>
<td>13243</td>
<td>40.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of a family business</td>
<td>151991</td>
<td>378947</td>
<td>530938</td>
<td>54.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unoccupied or occupation is not</td>
<td>4838</td>
<td>3042</td>
<td>7880</td>
<td>29.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mentioned</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>885</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>1279</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military personnel</td>
<td>1201</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1201</td>
<td>58.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>382471</td>
<td>423611</td>
<td>806082</td>
<td>53.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Compiled from: All-union census, 1929, pp. 230–231.

The absolute majority of economically active members of the Tatar population worked independently. Their level of life had always depended on their own effort, initiative and ability. Wealthy and rich peasants were engaged in trade as their main occupation or in addition to agriculture. Many peasants especially those who lived in the large villages were engaged in different distributive transactions mainly in the form of raw materials subsequently resold to city dealers.

In the 1920's, seasonal work became widespread among villagers. Most of them had neither skills nor a profession and were ready to do any kind of work for any pay. Tatar peasants who had horses also worked as hauliers.

The social state of society observed by the middle of the 1930's, was recorded in the population census of January 1937. Such social groups as workers, clerks, kolkhoznik collective farmers, individual farmers, cooperative
and non-cooperative handicraftsmen, professional workers, clerics, public dependents and pensioners, disabled people in nursing homes and residents of children’s homes, rentiers earning their living by selling real estate and renting houses, rooms and other types of accommodations as well as the unemployed were mentioned in census schedules [RGAE, Fund 1562, Inventory 336, Part 1, File 242, Sheet 4]. The category of entrepreneurs 'owner with hired workers' was not reflected in the census.1

Such categories as “landowners working only with the members of their families” or “individual landowners” found in the census of 1926 were absent in the census of 1937. Instead of these terms, others were used: 'individual' (yedinolichnik) and 'non-cooperative handi-craftsman'. These referred to, respectively, the operator of a farm without hired workers and someone engaged in a cottage industry on an individual basis. Comparing the data of the 1937 and 1939 censuses, we can see a tendency towards a fall in the number of individual farmers of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in both the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic and in the USSR.2

The majority of former independent proprietors in agriculture and trades were now engaged in cooperative labour. However, there were relatively few cooperative handicraftsmen.

Such categories as professional workers, clergymen (or religious workers according to the terms of 1937), rentiers and the unemployed were mentioned in the census of 1937 for the last time. Their share made up much less than a hundredth, or a thousandth of a percent, nevertheless they all had a place in the census.

Service personnel occupied a special position in the structure of the employed population of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Their percentage was 13.8%. This is slightly lower than the percentage of economically active people in the RSFSR (17.7%) but close to the average indicator in the USSR (15.6%). Employees made up 8.2% of the republic’s rural population (against 9.6% of the RSFSR) [RGAE, Fund 1562, Inventory 336, Part 1, File 374, Sheet 140; File 476, Sheet 163].

Employed persons in the countryside were made up of accountants, ledger clerks, cashiers, tally clerks, livestock specialists, agrotechnicians and agronomists. The number of administrative staff, which including chairmen of kolkhoz collective farms and farm directors had expanded according to the census of 1939. The predominance of men among them is clear. In particular, only 2.10% of those who administered kolkhozes were women and only 16.6% of agronomists and livestock specialists were women. [RGAE, Fund 1562, Inventory 329, File 144, Sheets 103–105 reverse].

A significant part of inhabitants of the Tatar republic were in the category of workers and clerks, since the sovkhoz state farms and the MTS - machine and tractor stations were equivalent to public enterprises and were under the charge of a special People’s Commissariat. Their workers received salaries, and as such they were accounted in Soviet statistics not as peasants but agricultural workers. Secondly, many citizens were employed at industrial enterprises of the city although they continued living in the countryside.

Workers of sovkhozes accounted for 12.5% of the rural population of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. They were slightly different from collective farmers in terms of their work and their social status. Both of them depended on the state to a great extent. The kolkhoznik collective farmers were engaged in both the social sphere and private subsidiary economy, while the sovkhoznik state farmers were principally engaged in the social sphere.

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1 According to Article 1 of the Constitution of 1936, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was a socialistic state of workers and peasants, in which only small-scale private trading by individual peasants and craftsmen was allowed, based on their personal labour and precluding the exploitation of the labour of others [see: The Constitution of the USSR, 1999, p. 343].

2 By the early 1940s individual farmers, peasants, and craftsmen accounted for only 2.6% of the population [see: Sovetskoye krestyanstvo (The Soviet Peasantry), 1970, p. 283].
although sometimes they worked on subsidiary personal plots.

There is no evidence regarding the number of workers employed in cooperative sector in the census of 1939. This can be explained by further growth of public sector. The overwhelming majority of employees worked in public enterprises.

Unfortunately the data of censuses of 1937 and 1939 do not allow us to reveal the social structure of the Tatar Republic from the national point of view (Table 2.8).

Based on absolute indicators, 1,286,703 people (686,963 men and 599,740 women) in the Tatar republic were employed according to the census of 1939. Of these, there were 622,691 employed Tatars (318,435 men (46.4%) and 304,256 women).


According to the census, among the leaders of party organizations, cooperative and community offices and institutions there were 11,205 Tatars (42.8%) including 793 women. Representatives of the Tatar nation in executive positions at the level of the republic amounted to 38%. Tatars in charge of district

### Table 2.8

**Composition of the TASSR population by social groups based on the 1939 census (%)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population at large</th>
<th>Rural population</th>
<th>Population at large</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>13.98</td>
<td>11.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative and service</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>7.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kolkhoz members</td>
<td>72.11</td>
<td>76.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperative</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-cooperative workers</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed farmers</td>
<td>2.67</td>
<td>3.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonworking</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>15.60</td>
<td>6.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative and service</td>
<td>10.62</td>
<td>3.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kolkhoz members</td>
<td>69.13</td>
<td>84.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperative</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-cooperative workers</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed farmers</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>4.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Compiled from: Russian State Archive of the Economy, File 1562, List 336, Act 348, Sheet 15. The census data of 1939 in the reference books of the Soviet period is slightly different. The social composition of the whole republic was characterized by the following data: workers and employees: 35.2%; kolkhoz members: 59.8%; self-employed farmers: 2.5%; others: 2.5% [see: Agitatoru, 1957, p. 42].
and city establishments and institutions were 50%. The Tatars were successfully represented in village councils, 53.3% of Tatars were chairmen and deputy chairmen of village councils. Tatar directors of kolkhoz collective farms (chairmen and deputy chairmen) amounted to 52% of the total.

There were 5,607 Tatars among maintenance personnel (engineers, constructors, technicians, agronomists and agrotechnicians, livestock specialists, maintenance foremen, and others), this figure also included 1,140 women. The percentage of the Tatars employed in agriculture was much higher: agronomists (42.4%), livestock specialists (40.3%), agrotechnicians (56.2%), veterinary technicians (56.2%), and veterinarians (39.5%).

The number of Tatars employed in cultural and political-educational spheres was 14,908 (47.3%) including 6,990 women. Academics, professors and lecturers were in this group, of which 229 (17.2%) were Tatars including 53 women. As far as school teachers and course instructors were concerned, there were 10,607 Tatars including 4,686 women. A significant number of Tatars (59.9%) of those employed in this sphere, or 1359 individuals including 487 women, were directors of clubs and village reading rooms. There were 443 Tatars (40.2%) including 375 women among the chiefs of libraries and librarians.

The share of Tatars employed in other occupations was not high, for example: accountants (18%), economists (23.8%), statisticians (30.8%), lawyers and legal advisers (28.3%).

Tatars comprised only 25.8% of medical personnel (they were mainly women). The share of Tatar doctors made up 16.5% of the common number of doctors in the republic, the share of the Tatars working as nurses and midwives made up 31%.

Positions in pre-school education (kindergarten teachers and directors) were completely occupied by women, 39.6% were representatives of the Tatar nation.

The percentage of Tatars employed in agriculture was much larger. Of kolkhoz farm managers - 53.6% were Tatars, 53.6% of foremen of field teams and 58.7% of other agricultural brigades, 53.7% of directors of laboratories and 60.6% selective breeders, 51.4% of foremen of tractor brigades and 49.3% of tractor operators, 47.5% of combine operators and drivers, 58.8% of engine drivers and operators, 51.3% of cattle workers, stablemen and milkmaids. The percentage of Tatars employed in gardening was larger (34.4%).

The Tatar nation was weakly represented in non-professional and building occupations. The percentage of Tatar oil drillers was 23.7%, turners (22.3%), plumbers (23%), assemblers and electricians (23.2%), mechanics (working) 22%, machine operators and woodworkers (27.9%), machinists (31.1%), fitters (32.3%), concrete layers (56.6%), excavator operator (16.7%). The percentage of Tatars employed in textile industry was greater: hosiery workers and knitters (23.4%), weavers (38%), textile apprentices (38%), spinners (39.6%).

The percentage of Tatars employed in the transport sphere was also rather small. Tatars made up only 15.1% of rail engineers and their assistants, helmsmen (17.3%), drivers (31.9%).
CHAPTER 4
Culture, Education, and Science in the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and among the Tatars (1920–1930s)

§ 1. Formation of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and the Development of National Culture

Indus Tagirov

The Ratification of the Decree on the Formation of the Tatar Autonomous Republic was of great importance for the development of the culture of the Tatar people, despite the many negative facts accompanying this historical act, which processes took place in spiritual life of Tatars from the 1920's to the 1930's?

Firstly a few words need to be said about the main problems of the formation of the republic, manoy of which had a negative influence on the spiritual state of the nation. First there was the "Pitchfork Uprising" which began at the beginning of February 1920 and lasted 35 days. Many peasants from Ufa and Kazan governorates took part in it. It was put down in the most merciless manner. Certain party figures, it had to be said, tried to define this tragic event as an Islamic rebellion, in an attempt to avoid the possibility of ethnic autonomy.

Second was the famine of 1921–1922 which resulted in significant human losses. By 1926 the population of the republic had decreased by 400 thousand. Thirdly, the systematic actions taken on the part of party departments with the intention of usurping the plenary powers of the Soviet authorities of the republic need to be taken into account.

Nevertheless, the republic was founded. Deputy Chairman of Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR Turar Ryskulov stated in one of his speeches in 1926 that 'the Tatar republic is conceivable as a national state', that the Tatars are 'a mature nation with mature social classes and social maturity'

[SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 2, File 183, Sheets 71–72]. In his opinion all other republics of the RSFSR only exist thanks to the federal authorities.

Indeed, the Tatars underwent a genuine renaissance at the turn of the 20th century, embarking on a course of state construction with their own education system, dozens of newspapers and magazines, their own theatre and a developing musical culture. Hundreds of talented writers, poets, journalists, and men of art worked in the cultural sphere.

The proclamation of the republic was perceived as a statement of restoration of statehood, giving a powerful impetus to the development of national culture. The entire cultural life of the people was undergoing reconstruction under the new conditions. This process, however, faced some difficulties.

Religion fell under the most difficult conditions. Everywhere madrasahs and mosques were being steadily closed, and clerics were persecuted. Of special interest in this context is the destiny of the outstanding theologian Musa Bigiev, who wrote the 'The Alphabet of Islam' in 1920, in response to the 'Alphabet of Communism' by N. Bukharin and E. Preobrazhensky. In the opening chapter, he bitterly criticized communist ideology and its founder Karl Marx. In the same year he presented its main theses to participants of the congress of Islamic clergy in Ufa. Then he went to Turkestan with the intention to publish his book. However, he was arrested in Tashkent at the beginning of 1921. He was arrested for a sec-
ond time in Leningrad after his book had been published by Kaviyani, in Berlin, and 1500 to 2000 copies had been distributed in Russia. It was edited by Gayaz Ishkahi. Bigiev was freed because he was well-known to the Islamic population and as a result of the intercession of Turkish, Swedish and Finnish state agencies [Bigiev, 2005, p. 13]. Galimdzhan Ibragimov wrote in praise of his civil courage, that while living in the proletarian centre of Leningrad, he published a book opposing the revolution and defending the principles of capitalism using money provided by the Tatar bourgeoisie [Giymadiev, 2000, pp. 147–157].

The policy of Soviet power directed at the complete eradication of religion from social life faced the resistance of population. The organisers of the resistance were sanctioned with varying kinds of judicial penalties.

In May 1929, 36 people and their families were brought to trial for holding Kurban Bayram in the villages Bolshiye and Malye Truyeny Vershiny, Bolshoy and Maly Chirkley, Tatarsky Kanadey and Kumayevka in Penza governorate in cooperation with 8 thousand peasants. Ten of them were shot. All the rest were condemned to life imprisonment in a concentration camp.

From the late 1920’s, to the early 1930’s, the peasants of the Drozhkovskiy volet of Buinsk uyezd who had grouped around Ishaan Safa Bikkulov and acted in opposition to forced collectivisation and the religious policy of the Soviet state suffered the same tragic fate. The most active role was played by women who disarmed the task force which had come to arrest the mullahs. About 800 people, armed with everything they could find, forced the agressive task force to leave Novo-Chukaly village. Ishaan Safa Bikkulov was executed by firing squad for his participation in these events and his family was sent into exile in Siberia. More than 60 people were condemned to different types of imprisonment [Tagirov, 1999, pp. 250–252, 266–272].

Beginning with 1923, when the so-called 4th Congress of the CC WPP was held to discuss the nationalities’ question, a sword of Damocles hung over Tatar intellectuals relating to accusations of nationalism. [Tajny’ nacional’noj politiki, 1992].

Experienced and mature aksakal (figures of respect) of Tatar literature – G. Ibragimov, M. Gafuri, G. Kamal – before whose eyes events of the same scale had occurred in pre-revolutionary period, searched for ways to obviate the barriers of this new era. Sometimes they succeeded. They created a range of talented works which received public acclaim. These included 'Red Flowers', 'Daughter of the Steppes', 'Deep roots' by G. Ibragimov, the novella 'Kara yezler' ('The Dark-faced') by M. Gafuri, 'Matur tuganda' ('When Beauty Appears') by Sharif Kamal and others.

Many talented writers and poets were influenced by these outstanding figures. The constellation of young literary men was represented by Kavi Nadzhmi, Musa Dzhahil, Fatkhi Burnash, Gali Rakham, Shaikhi Man-nur, Khasan Tufan, Tazi Gizzat, Saiﬁ Kudash, Nura Bayan, Salikh Battal, Tukhvan Chenekay, Abdrakhman Minsky, Mahmut Maksud, Afzal Shamov and many others, writers and poets.

This young generation searched for its ideals under conditions of turbulent and uncertain social life. Discussions and literary soirées became loud and torrid. The problems of spiritual legacy and prospects of literary creation were discussed. Mutual reproach and accusation were inescapable in such an atmosphere. According to G. Kutuy, cliques arose which 'brought together similar minded thinkers on a range of matters'. One group was represented by Fatik Saiﬁ, Zakir Gali, Ismagil Rameev, and another included Kavi Nadzhmi, G. Tulumbaysky, K. Tufan, Abdrakhman Sagdi, M. Gali. The third group consisted of Gu-mar Gali, Gazziz Idelle, Khadi Taktash, Gadel Kutuy [Gasrlar Avazi = Echo Vekov, 1997, No. 3/4, pp. 164–165].

The literary youth was keen on revolutionary class ideas and to some extent denied the cultural legacy of the past. According to G. Kutuy, they even made an attempt to create a coalition to fight against Tukay and his contemporaries. This coalesced around a group of young people in the so called Tatar Association of Proletarian Writers (TAPW). Certain
young people who were members of the Association disliked the fact that some considered Tukay the God of Tatar literature. There was also a group of writers bitterly criticizing Galimdzhanzhan Ibragimov. This included Fatkhi Burnash, Shamil Usmanov, Sadri Dzhalyal. Adel Kutuy was criticised for being the son of Fatkhi Burnash, a bourgeois, was alleged to be yearning for the days of the khan. Many labels were attached to intellectuals at that time. It is probably hard to recall a writer or a poet who did not have one.

The literary trial held to condemn works by Fatkhi Burnash with the participation of students of Tatar communist university is remarkable. Discussions on creating proletarian literature were stirred up. The same processes took place in Ufa.

It resembled a childhood disease which needed to be overcome in tough conditions. Nevertheless it was difficult to surmount it.

The first expression of these difficulties were Dzhidegyan case. This was an organization alleged to consist of seven young writers. Gabdrakhman Minsky, Saifi Kudash, Naki Isanbet, Sagit Agish and Tukhvatulla Chenekaj were charged with membership of this organisation. Gadel Kutuy was considered to have put forward the idea of its formation. They failed to find the seventh member of 'Dzhidegyan'. The names of several literary men were called out. Editor of the newspaper 'Kyzyl Tatarstan', Safa Burgan, Bashkiri writer Sagit Agish denied these suspicions for a long time. Galimdzhanzhan Ibragimov was also under suspicion. In 1931, A.K. Naumov wrote in the 'October' magazine: 'To be honest, G. Ibragimov is not a Bolshevik, he's a Tatar nationalist. He's an opportunist who expresses the intentions of Tatar nationalists and translates their purposes into reality through his cultural agents called 'Dzhidegyan'!'

It was an exaggerated, absolutely baseless case. The story started in 1928 with a trip which Gabdrakhman Minsky and Adel Kutuy took to Ufa. Tukhvatulla Chenekaj had arrived there a little earlier on his own. The purpose of the trip was to establish friendly relations with Bashkiri literati. As a result, a literary soirée with the participation of Tatar and Bashkir writers took place. Madzhit Gafuri, Adel Kutuy, Gabdrakhman Minsky and Tukhvatulla Chenekaj recited their poems.

Young writers and poets debated with their colleagues from Ufa. There was no particular unity of views among them. Many of them were searching for like-minded thinkers and indeed they seemed to succeed in doing so. Of course, they sometimes had to make compromises. The outstanding and highly experienced writer Madzhit Gafuri, a citizen of Ufa, tried his best to reconcile all the literary men of Kazan and Ufa. It is plausible that A. Kutuy, A. Minsky, Naki Isanbet, Tukhvatulla Chenekaj, Saifi Kudash became close for a while. There may have been seven of them. There have been more or less. However, there was no such thing as 'Dzhidegyan'. There were amicable meetings during which active young writers worked out a common position concerning a whole range of literary figures. They probably promised to meet more frequently. In any case, the men from Kazan returned home satisfied with results of the trip.

However, someone informed that, a secret bourgeois organization called 'Dzhidegyan' had been founded in Ufa. Soon those charged with the case were arrested. An unbridled campaign against the arrested literary men expanded in the Kazan and Ufa press. With certain intervals, it was to last up to the 1960's. The writers were pitted against each other Party agencies in both republics set the tone of the campaign. Newspapers and magazines stigmatized the supposed members of 'Dzhidegyan' and followers of Sultan Gali simultaneously. Five people mentioned above denied their belonging to this mythical organization and had to write revealing articles on pages of printed editions launching a campaign of slander against the seven possible members of 'Dzhidegyan'. The letters written by T. Chenekay to the 'Bashkortostan' newspaper and by G. Minsky to 'Kyzyl Tatarstan' newspaper were of this type. These and oth-
er dozens of articles contained all manner of slander, some worse than other. Not only were the names of 'members of Dzhidegan' mentioned, but also those of writers and poets as well. During this artificially-created mutual slander campaign, the relevant institutions maintained files on many cultural figures and literary men. The defendants G. Kutuy and N. Isanbet had to give written evidence of the same character [Gasurlar Avazi = Echo Vekov, 1997, No. 3/4, pp. 139–171].

The investigation lasted more than half a year. Naki Isanbet and Adel Kutuy were interrogated in Kazan. It goes without saying that they mainly gave evidence under duress. So it can hardly be considered trustworthy and reliable. Nevertheless it contained nothing significant enough to bring them to trial.

The conclusion of the Joint State Political Directorate of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of 11 September 1931 on the activity of 'Dzhidegan' said: '...There are no materials confirming the corpus delicti concerning the defendant... because this activity is withing the limits of Soviet legality... Case No. 114819 must be dismissed and the prisoners must be discharged from custody' [Zaynutdinova, 2008, p. 211]. Although they were freed, a nationalist stigma still attached to them.

On 25 July 1937, at the height of represions, the secretary of Tatar regional committee of the party, G. Mukhametzyanov, ordered the agencies of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) to uncover the case on the counter-revolutionary organization "Dzhidegan" in the archives, and provide the relevant reports about its members indicating measures that have been taken with regard to these people'. Remarkably the second point of the order said that the 'relevant materials concerning the writer Karim Tinchurin' needed to be found. [Valiev, 1999, p. 160].

It is hard to say what exactly the reason was for the arrest and further repression of Tinchurin. However, Mukhametzyanov did not escape a tragic fate either. In 1937, he was repressed along with many party and economic activists and cultural figures.

The authors of S. Kudash memoirs wrote that in 1941 Adel Kutuy was a candidate for the position of people's commissar of education of the TASSR. However, someone was alleged to have said during discussions that he had been a member of the counter-revolutionary organization 'Dzhidegan'. The question was no longer relevant. It left a deep trace in the poet's soul. He volunteered for the army and never returned.

Young literary men began trying to write in different genres. For example, Khadi Taktash breathed new life into Tatar poetry combining romance with the difficult and far from romantic realities of Soviet life. Such is the tenor of his poem 'Centuries and minutes', 'Letter to Gul'chachak', 'Provocateur' and other works. They are considered to be the most valuable possessions of Tatar literature. Apart from the widely known works of great talent by Musa Dzhafar, Adel Kutuy, Fatkh Burnash, Abdulla Alish, M. Maksud, A. Shamov, fine poems by Tukhvatulla Chenekay, M. Krymov and other poets also appeared.

S. Usmanov occupied a special place in Tatar literature during those years. He was not only a passionate revolutionary but also contributed to the emergence of the Tatar republic on the political map. He wrote works expressing the pathos and pain of civil war: 'On bloody days', 'Under the red banner'. He also wrote a science fiction novel 'Radio from the Pamirs'.

Kavi Nadzhmi was also remarkable for his stories and poems which also reflected the difficult years of the civil war. His story 'Shobaga' ('Destiny') enjoyed wide popularity. A remarkable fact about 'Dzhidegan' appears in his biography. When one of the defendants came to him, in his capacity as the head of the Tatar association of proletarian writers, to unfrock Adel Kutuy as the initiator of 'Dzhidegan' organization, he threw him out of his office.

The playwright G. Kamal wrote a whole range of satiric stories and parodies in addition to his plays, which were of great success. When creating the New Tatar dramatic art, he based his work on traditions of folk culture
originating in Bulgar times. According to Professor Y. Nigmatullina, this mature literary man presented the life and customs of the main social classes in flux, 'in burlesque, using openly rough buffoonery to criticise them'. The language of his characters is characterized by exactness, precision and wit.

F. Amirkhan is G. Tukay's friend and confederate, an outstanding Tatar writer introduced optimism and joy of life into Tatar dramatic art.

The musical dramas 'Galiyabanu' by M. Fayzi, 'Bashmagym' by Kh. Ibragimov, and K. Tinchurin's 'Fading stars' and 'Kazan towel' were quite successful.

Tadzh Gizzat became one of the leading playwrights. His plays 'Tashkynnar' and 'Free lance' came to the attention of the public not only in Kazan but also in Moscow, Simbirsk and a whole range of cities of the republic.

K. Tinchurin continued the fundamental dramatic principles of G. Kamal. He enriched elements of farce and the grotesque typical for his plays with elements of tragedy. The innovation in the works by Tinchurin is the new musical drama which he formed with Salikh Saydashev [Nigmatullina, 2000, p. 119].

Salikh Saydashev started his creative life with famous troupe 'Sayar'. He accompanied their plays on the piano and redeveloped Tatar folk songs for string orchestra. While he was serving in the army in Orenburg, he worked as a piano player at the Tatar drama theater organized by the 1st Army's political department. All his later life was connected with Kazan. He composed more than 30 plays. The first success of the composer was the performance 'Zenger shal' ('The Blue Shawl'). It was followed by 'The Hireling', 'Il' ('Motherland'), Kandyr Buye ('At the Kandra'), 'Bishbulek', 'Kuzler' ('Eyes') and other works [Yunusova, 2006, pp. 156–159]. The creative union of Tadzh Gizzat and the composer Dzhavdat Fayzi was an undoubted contribution to the formation of musical drama.

The creation of the mobile kolkhoz (collective farm) branch of the Tatar State Academic Centre in 1933 to serve the rural population was an important event in the cultural life of the 1930's. Its first director was Gali Ilyasov. Actors G. Bolgarskaya, M. Ildar, G. Gimatov, G. Kamskaya, B. Galiullina, Z. Agisheva, F. Narimanov, E. Yagudin, A. Gatsulina, B. Akhtyamov and others were on the staff [Zabbarova, 2000, p. 232].

The Tatar opera 'Saniya' created by V. Vinogradov and S. Gabayashi was a large success in the musical culture of the republic. The leading vocal parts were performed by S. Aydarov, G. Kaybitskaya, M. Rakhmankulova.

The Kazan Oriental Musical College, formed from two already existing musical training institutes, contributed to the growth of musical art in Tataria.

In 1925, the republic had more than 150 public libraries, 211 clubs, 305 village reading rooms, and about 70 "krasnie ygolki" community activity rooms. From 1923 to 1924, Tatizdat published 107 types of books including 88 written in Tatar; Between 1924 and 1925, 150 types of books appeared, including 143 in Tatar. In 1925, six regional newspapers and seven magazines in the Russian and Tatar languages were published in the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.

In 19 April 1921, the Academic Centre was founded at the People's Commissariat of Education. Galimdzhan Ibragimov was quickly appointed to be its director. By 1924, after completion of the process of forming collectives of authors, it became the main body to coordinate textbooks. The school programs of the 1st and 2nd grades were elaborated and published in Tatar and Russian. The Academic Centre coordinated the publication of works of history, archaeology, ethnography, the study of the history, culture and geography of Tatarstan, Turkology and children's literature [Gasırlar Avazı = Echo Vekov, 2000, No. 1/2, pp. 228–230]. It consisted of scientific, translation, artistic, the republic's archives and a museum.

The construction of museums was significantly expanded - something which had deep roots in society. In 1895 a museum was created using exhibits from an an exhibition "to
provide a picture of the natural minerals of the
region and its productivity”. The initiative
for the museum arose from A. Likhachev, and
by the beginning of the 20th century, it had
turned into one of the largest cultural centres
of the Volga-Ural region. Students of local
culture, history and geography, including aca-
demics and amateurs gravitated around it.

In the 1920’s and 1930’s, the Kazan Uni-
versity Society of Archaeology, History and
Ethnography, the Society for the Study of Ta-
tarstan and the Scientific Society for the Study
of Tatar Studies operated successfully. Their
activity was broadly reported on the pages of
the 'Bulletin of the Scientific Society for Tatar
Studies'. In 1921, The 'Museum bulletin' be-
gan publication.

The formation of the Tatar Autonomous
Soviet Socialist Republic gave the impetus for
the creation of local museums. Museums in
Sviyazhsk and Chistopol were opened in 1921. Active work on creation of museum
in Arsk, Bugulma, Laishev and Mamadysh
began [Sinitsina, 2002, p. 54–55]. By 1927,
10 museums had been opened in the republic.
With every successive year, they became
more and more popular.

It appeared that the situation prevalent in
the mid-1930’s presaged little danger. On 27
October 1936, the Bureau of the Regional Par-
ty Committee issued a decree on the work of
the Tataria Writers’ Union. It gave a high es-
imation of the novel 'Our days' by G. Ibragimov,
also 'In the fog' by Sharif Kamal, 'Fine epoch'
by Tazi Gizzat, 'Agidel' by Mirsay Amir. Note
was taken of 'the positive work on organiza-
tional union around the Union of Writers... and
 discovering and engaging new young au-
thors in literary activity.' G. Mukhametshin,
L. Gilmanov, G. Razin and I. Salakhov were
mentioned among the young writers.

However, the party group of the Union of
Writers, and Kavi Nadzhmi personally, sus-
piciously received a warning 'for displaying
liberal treatment towards hostile Trotkskist
bourgeois-nationalist elements adhering to
the literary front, for the absence of an active
struggle against the ideological distortions
taking place in the works written by some au-
 thors [Sultanbekov, 2006, pp. 98–99].

A few words need to be said about A. Lepa,
Executive Secretary of the Tatar regional
committee of CPSU(B). Despite systematic
reports against representatives of the cre-
avtive intelligentsia, he maintained a moderate
policy and refrained from mutual insults and
complaints. For example, seeing dark clouds
going thicker over the head of Galimdzhan
Ibragimov who lived in the Crimea because
of his disease, he tried to save him from pos-
sible punishment. Before his arrest, A. Lepa
on three occasions refused to sanctions Ibrag-
imov's detention. Significantly after his arrest,
he was charged with indulging bourgeois na-
tionalists.

This is what G. Malenkov, the secretary of
the Central Committee of Party of Bolsheviks,
charged him with when he came before the
Plenum of regional committee of CPSU(B) on
27–28 August 1937. The Plenum radically
changed the social atmosphere in the republic
and launched a repression campaign in the re-
public. A. Lepa was condemned and killed by
firing squad on 9 May 1938. The total arrest
of literary men and cultural figures began. S.
Usmanov, K. Tinchurin, M. Galyau, M. Kry-
mov and a whole range of other writers were
arrested and shot following G. Ibragimov.
Dzhama Validi was arrested in 1932 and he
died in prison. According to the book of po-
 litical victims, about three thousand people
were shot in the republic in the period be-
tween 1937 and 1938.

However, despite the tragic events of these
years, the cultural life in the republic contin-
ued during the Great Patriotic war and later.

Zubaryyat Garipova

During the first five or six years after the October Revolution in 1917, the primary organisational structures of the new Soviet education system began to be formed. Its path of development was defined by a series of documents issued by the Soviet government of 1918. The decrees of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR 'On liberty of conscience, clerical and religious communities' of 20 January 1918, led to anxiety among both Russian and Tatar intellectuals [Lenin i kul'turnaya revolyuciya, 1972, p. 49]. In connection with secularization and the prohibition of teaching religion, all maktabas and madrasahs had to be closed. Nevertheless, they continued to exist for a number of years. The People's Commissariat of Education of the Tatar Republic was typically zealous during first period of its existence.

The Decree of Central Executive Committee and Council of People's Commissars of Tatarstan of 25 June introduced many new features related to the teaching process of the republic [Kul'turnoe stroitel'stvo v Tatarii, 1971, p. 169]. On 10 December 1922, the 3rd congress of the Tatarstan Soviets adopted the following resolution: 'The Tatar language must be taught at senior schools and vocational schools' [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund R-3682, Inventory 5, File 1, Sheet 27]. The same objective was formulated by the Academcentre in 1924. The People's Commissariat of Education became responsible for preparing school programmes. Work on the translation of new programmes from Russian into Tatar and enhancing them with materials on local tradition was entrusted to the Academcentre of People's Commissariat of Education. From 1927, they began to develop new textbooks for Tatar schools and appointed experienced teachers in their development.

The idea of introducing comprehensive compulsory children's education was more effective. By February 1931, the first phase of comprehensive education had been successfully completed. During the course of the 1930/1931 school year, Tataria engaged 40% more school-aged children in primary schools, a time when the average percentage in the country made up 28.8%. However, in 1940–1941 the number of schools did not increase, despite the great increase in the number of pupils up to 54,800.

In the 1920's and 30's, in addition to the development of schools for school-aged children, work on the abolition of adult illiteracy also began. During these years, this process had specific features. It began in 1928 with the translation of the Tatar written language from Arabic to the Latinized Yanalif script, This was was completed in January 1931. The Tatar language was translated into the Cyrillic alphabet by the order of the Presidium of The Supreme Council of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic on the 5 May 1939. The two-fold changes in the Tatar written language was completed in two years. It certainly influenced the quality of the literacy of the Tatar population. The traditional Tatar system of education was completely destroyed in the process of the creation of the unified Soviet school system.

Nevertheless, it is significant that before the revolution, Tatar children mainly studied at madrasahs. They numbered at about one thousand with 80 thousand students. In 1939, 281 thousand Tatar children studied at elementary, junior high schools and secondary schools (49.5% of the average number of students of these schools) [Krasnaya Tataria, 1940, 27 May].
§ 3. Development of Professional Art and Culture

Zubaryyat Garipova

The revolution and the civil war was a complicated and tragic period for the development of ethnic cultures. All cultural figures approved the fall of the autocrat monarch. However, further events divided them into different political groups and tendencies. During the first years of Soviet power, the development of Tatar literature was specific and contradictory. A whole range of Tatar writers and poets stopped writing after the Bolsheviks came to power. These included famous poets who enjoyed popularity before October 1917: G. Iskhaki, R. Fakhretdin, poets Z. Ramiev (Derdmend), N. Dumavi, S. Ramiev, S. Sunchaley.

The emigration of G. Iskhaki was a great loss for Tatar Soviet literature. F. Tuktarov, G. Teregulov, R. Ibragimov, the poet Saniya Giffat preferred to stay abroad as they were opposite to Bolsheviks politics.

In the early 1920's, a struggle began between different movements of Tatar literature, not only over form but also over content. During the civil war, literature focused on such themes as the front-line, war, the Red Army and war-time communism. Subsequently such themes as the new family, factories and plants, the working process, the psychology of the Soviet peasant, the mode of life of the worker and others became topical. The changes in literature affected not only themes and subject matter but also language and style. Many Arabic words were substituted for specific phraseology rarely used until then by the people, as well as expressions, words and 'international' terms.

The hope of a glorious future and spiritual enthusiasm encouraged many cultural figures to create interesting works of literature. Despite the changing social-political conditions, national literature continued to develop. G. Ibragimov was an outstanding personality of that time. In 1920, he published the first book in the trilogy 'Bezen kemner' ('Our days') (written in 1914), the drama 'Yana keshelar' ('New People'). His story 'Kazak kyz' ('Daughter of the Steppe') was published in 1923, and the novel 'Tiren tamyrlar' ('Deep Roots') in 1928.

Fatihk Amirkhan and Galimdzhan Ibragimov were the most outstanding writers to come into Tatar literature after 1905. Fatihk Amirkhan revealed the social contrasts of his reality in his works, reflecting the problems facing Tatar society in the early 20th century. His satiric tale 'Shafigullia agai' (1926, published in 1991). ridiculed Bolshevik dogmatism and fanaticism. In his articles, he defended national roots and realism in literature and art.


Works by M. Gali, G. Tumbaysky, G. Gali, G. Minsky, A. Shamov, A. Tagirov were devoted to the reflection of peasant life [Väli, 1928, pp. 26–28].

In 1919, Sh. Usmanov began writing his stories and plays on the theme of military life. The playwrights T. Gizzat and M. Feyzi, the founder of Tatar musical dramatic art, the author of play 'Galiyabanu', the poet and prose writer Kavi Nadzhi, the prose writer A. Shamov, satirist G. Tumbaysky, poets A. Kutuy, M. Dzhaliit contributed significantly to national literature. This was a period of more benevolent development, Independent of the dictates of the authorities.

In the 1920's, drama took a step forward in Tatar literature. G. Ibragimov and Sh. Usmanov were the first to lay its foundations. Musical dramas by F. Burnash were of general interest.

K. Tinchurin brought musical comedies to the Tatar stage. Akhmet-Tazetdin Rakhmankulov brought the genre of adventure to Tatar dramatic art [Väli, 1928, p. 28].

Experts concur that the prose writer and playwright Khadi Taktash (1901–1903) was
one of the most promising literary men of that period. He was a literary critic and publicist of great talent. He opposed pressure, inequality and injustice but he was a lone-rebel rather than a revolutionary. He considered revolution a destructive power ('Volcanoes', 1923). His ideal was a hero liberating the oppressed. 'Gasyr lar kham minutlar' [Davletshin, 2005, p. 269].

In the early 1920's, writers were given relative freedom and they formed literary unions to take advantage of it. However, there were many contradictory and mistaken features in their activity.

The relatively free development of Tatar literature took place in the context of complicated and contradictory conditions. In the latter half of 1920's, the ideological pressure of the communist party on writers was becoming more and more intolerable. At the same time, the trend towards the Russification of Tatar culture and language began to appear. The nascent discussion about substituting Latin script for Arabic intensified in 1927. It also affected issues of Tatar culture and the course of its development in general.

The works of Tatar writers of the 1930's, were different from those of the 1920's. They are remarkable for their subject matter. Factories and plants, kolkhoz collective farms, acts of sabotage initiated by the kulaks and mullahs who are alleged to infiltrate kolkhozes and perform subversive acts. The literature of the 1930's was characterized between 1960 to 1980 in the following way: "In the late 1930's, the so-called 'commissioned' stories and essays appeared. Character development and conflict was often replaced by vain pomposity and popular slogans. The literature of the 1930's, grew as it participated in the construction of socialism. The theme of modern times is in the foreground in novels and tales, poems and dramas, and there is a growing trend towards the to depiction of reality in an ethnic way' [Istoriya tatarkoj sovetskoy literatury', 1965, p. 242; Tatar âdabiyati tarikhy, 1989, p. 359]. The young writers selected themes from the lives of workers and peasants. However, the sudden outbreak of terror paralyzed the creative life of writers.

One thing is clear: the new ideology dominated the literary life of the republic. According to the contemporary press, the old measured rhymed type of verses was dealt a serious blow. A group of young poets tried to create something new in the field of Tatar versification turning against old traditional forms of prosody. However, they had to work in an atmosphere of strict control and censorship.

**Theatrical Arts.** The 1920's were a period of intensive searching for new forms of work in the theatre. If in the first years after two revolutions, there was a noticeable revival of theatrical life in Kazan, (there were about ten professional and semi-professional troupes and about thirty amateur troupes from 1918 to 1920) [Garipova, 2004, p. 110], this theatrical enthusiasm began to decline in the ensuing years. Subsidies were removed and troupes began to disintegrate. Some theatre groups were ill-equipped for survival. Manifestly poor performances were staged. In 1923–1924, to find a way out of the crisis and enrich the repertoire, a contest for the best Soviet play corresponding to proletarian ideology was announced. This led to the appearance of a new genre called heroic-revolutionary drama.

From the summer of 1923 and throughout the entire 1923/24 season, the debate about the compliance of the aims of theatre to the requirements of ideology spread onto the pages of periodical literature. The following matters were discussed: How should Tatar theatre develop? How should the oeuvre of the past be used? Which stylistic trend should be preferred? The discussion was opened by K. Tinchurin's article entitled: 'What should the Tatar theater be like?'. The famous playwright thought that dramatic art should not reject the realistic method predominant since the earliest days of the national theater [Arslanov, 1992, pp. 123–124]. Several personalities were extremely fond of new trends in dramatic art. Sometimes, this found expression in critical assessments in the media, de-
nying the repertoire and casting of the old theatre. Debates did not subside during the 1923/24 season. A heated exchange of views on the function of dramatic art and the form of new performances took place on the pages of newspapers and magazines. For example, A. Mazitov tried openly to oppose the realistic and modern theatres in his articles. He propagated methods of constructive-experimental workshops of the modern type recommending it as a standard of revolutionary art [Tatar adbiyati tarih, 1989, p. 241]. Discussions of this kind lasted until the late 1920's. Karim Tinchurin, the principal director of The Tatar drama theatre gave many explanations and recommendations on how to improve the model.

The 1925/26 season was a jubilee season for the development of Tatar theatre. Principal director Karim Tinchurin assigned the best actors to the troupe: M. Mutin, Z. Sultanov, B. Tarkhanov, Sh. Shamil, S. Aydarov, K. Urazikov, G. Bolgarskaya, F. Ulskaya. Gumer Devishev and M. Magdeev were appointed directors. Composer Salikh Saydashev, created an orchestra consisting of 17 musicians. During these year a series of interesting plays were staged, all of which were acclaimed by the public and critics. These included: 'Without Winds', 'Blue Shawl', 'American Man', 'Little Brother' by K. Tinchurin, 'Resettlement' by N. Isanbet, 'Sten'ka Razin' by V. Kamensky, 'Old Man Kamal', 'Wayward Girl', 'Landless', 'Khusain Mirza' by F. Burnash, 'Galiyanabu' by F. Amirkhan. Performances of 'Sennoy Bazaar', 'The Girl from Kazan' by K. Amir, 'Brothers-in-Law' by G. Tulumbaysky, 'Director Dzhamilev', 'Sister-in-Law' by A. Kutuy, etc. were devoted to critique of the petty bourgeoisie.

The Tatar drama theater had an impressive repertoire in the late 1920's. In 1928 it numbered 12 new performances confirmed by its artistic council. There were new authors on the list. The theatre's repertoire also included works on the life of the Crimean Tatars and Uzbeks [Yanafil, 1928, No. 19, p. 10].

Such young directors as Gumer Devishev and others put on the stage works translated from Russian and other languages. However, the theatrical arts created its masterpieces under the conditions of state terror, the peak of which was reached in the mid-1930's. Increased ideological pressure made demands on art as a whole, including theatre. The broad and diverse repertoire seemed to comply with the directive. However, the Tatar regional committee of the Party displayed vigilance and issued a decree on the 4 November 1933, in which it criticised the activity of the Tatar Academical Theatre. It recommended that 'greater administrative control be exerted over the work of playwrights'. The theater was advised to "invite a Russian artistic director as a consultant, and send plays to Moscow to be approved by the Central Committee of CPSU(B)" [National Archive of Republic of Tatarstan, Fund R-7239, § 1, file 1, p. 166]. These intentions were put into practice.

The Kazan Russian Drama Theatre was an integral part of Tatarstan's theatrical arts. Between 1924 and 1929 it was called 'The A. Lunacharsky Theatre', and from 1948 was named after V. Kachalov. The theatre operated on the principle of a single-show with a seasonal troupe until 1934, after which it began to operate on a regular basis. From the first years of the Soviet government, its responsibility was "to educate the working class in the spirit of Soviet patriotism". Thus performances on revolutionary themes were mainly staged. The theatre began to develop along the path socialist construction and the "new Soviet culture", staging politically topical plays covering the problems of party life and emphasizing the importance of Soviet man.

At the same time, the repertoire of 1940 demonstrated the diverse activities of the Bolshoi Drama Theater, created by such splendid actors as F. Grigoriev, N. Yakushenko, G. Ardarov, Preobrazhenskaya, etc.

In 1932, the creative biography of the Young People's Theatre (YPT) took its first steps. It arose from the Central City Pioneers Club.

In 1934, the Kazan puppet theater was created by an amateur group of the Central City Club of Pioneers as the first public in-
ternational puppet theater. Performances were produced in both Russian and Tatar.

The increased interest in the arts was a typical feature of that period. In particular, this was reflected in the growth of popularity of theatre performances. To a certain extent this can explain the appearance of the TRAM movement, which spread throughout the entire country in the 1920's and 1930's. The first TRAM ('Theatre of Working Youth') was opened in November 1925 in Leningrad [Mironova, 1977, p. 6]. Subsequently working youth theatres appeared in other cities. The first Tatar workers' theatre opened in 1929. The Kazan Working Youth Theatre was established in 1930. For a long time, they assumed a "middle" position between the professional theatre and the qualified amateur groups. Publications about the TRAM performances refer to the close contact between the audience and actors, animated debates and discussions during the intervals. These performances discussed topical and important themes. The repertoire of the theatre reflected the labour and social life of various enterprises. Subsequently their performances would be considered archaic. The working youth theatre needed enhanced forms. However, it played an important part in the growth and development of amateur artistic activities. At that time amateurs groups were a powerful means of exerting influence upon the youth.

Cultural figures and the public were searching for answers to questions arising in the awareness of the young people during the complex years of the 1920's and 1930's.

**Music.** Tatar music began to develop as a professional genre after 1917. At the beginning of the 20th century, there were no musicians with professional education. The centuries-old music of the Tatar people only existed in the form of oral tradition represented by solo songs without accompaniment. Social and national oppression had given rise to lyrical songs about hard life. Not only was the Tsar's administration indifferent to the state of cultural development of foreigners, it even put obstacles in the way of the spiritual culture of national minorities. Professional music requiring special conditions for performance and distinctive social institutions could not be developed. The first Tatar musicians were mainly gifted self-taught composers (Z. Yarullin, F. Latypov, S. Gabashi) [Nigmatzyanov, 1980, p. 273], and their first creative experiments were to mark the beginnings of professional music. Works composed by these musicians laid the ground for creative development and performance after the October Revolution. This was a time when the spiritual revival of the people and the construction of its theatrical and musical culture became a state concern of the Tatar government.

In November 1919, the musical section of the governorate's department for national education and a music library providing the city with sheet music were established. Two comprehensive secondary music schools were opened the same year to promote music education. Their programmes included the rudiments of music, choral singing, voice training and familiarity with musical instruments.

Comparable schools were created on the basis of the 'Polar' and 'Victory' plants, under the Krestovnikov and Alafuzov factories. In September 1919, showcase concerts of the symphony orchestra began in Kazan. Tatar singers F. Latypov, M. Gamayev, A. Mukhtarov, K. Mutygi, composer and singer G. Almukhametov, G. Kaybyskaya, A. Izmaylova, and a chorus headed by S. Gabashi performed there with Russian musicians.

Performances of Russian folk orchestras under the guidance of Vali Anapaev and Ismagil Galiakberov, virtuoso accordionists Faizulla Tuishev, Fayzi Bikkinin, piano player Zagitulla Yarullin, violinists Khabibulla Ahmedullin and Muhammed Yaushev were also very popular.

The young Tatar Government created after the formation of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic took active measures to train music teachers. For example, in 1921, the People's Commissariat of Education issued a decree on the organization of 4 to 6 month courses for future employees of music
schools, kindergartens and comprehensive schools. The Kazan Oriental Musical College created on the basis of two previously existing music colleges, in particular contributed to the growth of musical art in Kazan. By 1925 it had become a significant music educational institution of the RSFSR, concentrating the best music teaching resources of the city. In 1927, 59 Tatars studied there. In total, 258 people studied there [Garipova, 2004, pp. 117–119].

In the early 1920′s, songs of a new genre began to appear. According to musicologists, they included elements of "upbeat urban music". 'Kom burany', 'Kaz kanaty', 'Balamishkin', 'Zamana', and others, are among them.

In the years between 1920 and 1930, the musical style of Tatar popular and lyrical songs began to take shape in works by S. Gabashi, S. Saydashev, M. Muzafarov, J. Fayzi, Z. Khabibullin, F. Yarullin, A. Klyucharev.

Theatrical performances used musical scores by S. Gabashi and S. Saydashev. Many songs from these performances became popular songs. Composers introduced new forms in atar music such as arias, duets, choruses.

S. Saydashev was one of the founders of Tatar popular orchestra music. Between 1920 and 1925, the composer wrote his 'Ballet Suite' for orchestra. Music critics remarked that in the early 1920′s, he found a solution for many difficult problems in his music which had until then been real challenges for the young ethnic cultures. In the early 1920′s, many aspects of music education were shaped by the passionate enthusiasm of the proponents of Soviet culture.

In the 1920′s, Saydashev wrote many works in the genre of marching songs. This was a mass phenomenon in Soviet music only in the 1930′s. Musical scores composed by S. Saydashev for performances in the Tatar drama theatre in the early 1920′s was a fundamentally important phenomenon in Tatar Soviet music [Salitova, 1983, pp. 266–267].

Vasily Vinogradov also made a significant contribution to the development of young Tatar musical culture. From 1921 to 1924, he wrote a number of large-scale symphonic works such as 'Tatar Suite' and 'Shikhay'. The first Tatar opera entitled "Saniya" was a major success. The libretto was written by the composers themselves. The score was written by V. Vinogradov, S. Gabashy, and G. Almucha-metova and it was staged by the Tatar State Academical Theatre on 25 June 1925.

In 1927 a clavier and photograph of the performers of the first Tatar opera "Saniya" were exhibited at an International musical exhibition in Frankfurt-am-Main. According to a communique from the Community of Cultural Communication with Foreign Countries to Kazan, the German press wrote of the special attention and public interest in the opera 'Saniya'. [Krasnaya Tataria, 1927, 23 July].

In 1927, the same group of musicians created the opera 'Eshche' (M. Gafuri).

Musicians consider that Tatar Soviet songs in the 1920′s contains the seeds of a mixture of typical folk elements and march intonations of Russian revolutionary hymns as well as new Komsomol songs. S. Saydashev's works reinterpreted these sources in a rather complicated form. First of all there was the influence of a type of melody involving, particularly, short, precise declamation [Saydasheva, 1995, p. 42].

Tatar professional musicology and musical study of folklore developed during this period. S. Gabashi was one of the outstanding theoreticians of national musical art. He made a series of interesting observations on the course of Tatar music course and its development. He was the first one to collect and popularize samples of folk music in a systematic way.

The opening of the Tatar State Opera Theatre in 1939 on the basis of the Edict of the Council of the People's Commissars of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic issued on the 28 October 1938, was a real event in the musical life of Kazan. The creative group was set up by graduates of the Tatar opera studio at the Moscow State Conservatory.

The theatre was searching for new directions in the development of national arts. In 3 the theater had three performances in its repertoire. It began to rehearse a number of operas: 'Altyneche' (libretto by M. Dzhalal, com-
composer N. Zhiganov. 'Galiyabanu' (libretto by A. Erikeev, composer M. Muzafarov), 'Safa' (libretto by A. Fayzi, music by D. Fayzi). S. Saydashev worked on the opera 'The Hireling' (libretto by T. Gizzat); Z. Khabibullin on the opera 'Kara kyuzlyar' (libretto by M. Maksutov); F. Yarullin on the ballet 'Shurale' based on a libretto by A. Fayzi, Oransky on the ballet 'Hadzhi, Get Married' based on the libretto by T. Tagirov [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund R-6663, Inventory 1, File 17, Sheet 25].

In 1940, Moscow theater critics gave high praise of the operas 'Kachkyn' ('The Runaway') and 'Irek' ('Freedom') by the young composer N. Zhiganov, considering him 'an absolutely talented creative personality. Characterizing his two first operas, the magazine 'Theatre' wrote: 'They can successfully compete with numerous works by modern Russian composers due to their emotionality, depth of musical themes, orchestration and technical skill'. There was a lively discussion about N. Zhiganov's operas prompted by the erroneous opinion that the authentic national character can only express folk materials in a 'pure' form. The composer was criticised for deviating from this practice. "Theatre" journal wrote: "In terms of his emotionality, the depth of the musical themse, the orchestration and technical expertise, they can successfully compete with the many works of contemporary Russian composers" [Leskov, 1940, page 142].

One more great work is noteworthy - the first Tatar ballet 'Shurale' written by the young composer Farid Yarullin who was to become the founder of the national balletic art and propel Tatar music onto the international scene. The ballet 'Shurale' became one of the repertoire ballets not only in Tatarstan but in many countries around the world.

The Opera Theatre with its five new productions, thus, was able to prove the great creative potential of its collective.

Tatar State Philharmonic Society created in 1937, and the Ensemble of Tatarstan played an important role in the popularisation of musical culture. 589 concerts performed by the Tatar State Philharmonic Society in 1940 is an impressive indicator of its activity [Kul'turnoe stroitel'stvo v Tatarii, 1971, p. 608]. The Kazan Cabinet of Musical Folklore created in 1938, was engaged in the academic study of Tatar folk songs and published them on a regular basis. Over the period of a year and a half, it managed to collect and create a phonogram of more than 300 Tatar folk songs of the pre-October and post-revolutionary periods [Klyucharev, 1939, pp. 74–78; Nigmedzhanov, 2003, p. 17]. In 1940, the Cabinet released the 1st volume of Tatar songs including 145 titles with academic analysis and comments [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 4580, Inventory 33, File 1380, Sheets 69–81]. The January report of its director A. Klyucharev in 1941 stated that the activity of this institution was aimed at the study of the Tatars in the republic and localities of the USSR inhabited by them. Organised expeditions to Western Siberia allowed the collective to prepare popular academic essays on the history of Tatar musical culture [Istoriya Kazani, 2004, p. 611].

Despite hard times, the republic lived a bright musical life. The musical life was created by composers, performers, musicians and their audience.

Art and architecture. For a variety of reasons the art and architecture of Tatarstan could not develop until the late 19th century. In 1895, the Kazan artistic school was opened. The painters Pavel Benkov, Nikolay Feshin, Pavel Mansurov, Stepan Fedotov, and others taught there in the first decade. They determined the direction of realism which was to shape the professional art of Tatarstan.

The 1920's were a period of intense searching for new paths of development in art. Heated arguments on the tasks and functions of art took place from 1922 to 1924. Members of the Association of artists of revolutionary Russia (AARR) and members of the Left Front movement were at loggerheads.

Historically the Tatars did not have their old traditions in easel painting, sculpture and
graphics but they had deep roots in architecture and arts and crafts. In the early 20th century the first Tatar graphic artists, book and magazine illustrators M. Galeev, G. Gumerov, G. Kamal, and others, began to appear. The graphic artist Sh. Tagirov, graduate of St. Petersburg Academy of Arts, and first arts lecturers and theater artist Ch. Yakhshibaev were to become quite celebrated.

By the 1920’s, the need for professional art education began to show. After receiving a special education in St. Petersburg before the revolution, the sculptors Mirzadzhan Baykeev, living in Ufa, and painter Kasym Davletkildeev, living in Ufa, were to have a large influence on the development of Tatar figurative art.

The first Tatar masters to lay the foundations of modern national art studied at the Kazan Arts School. After the October revolution of 1917, it was to become the State Independent Workshops of Architecture and Painting and then into the Arts Technical College. Nikolay Feshin working at the Kazan School of Arts from 1908 to 1922 had much influence on the formation of the artists of that city. In the early 1920’s, abstract painting was taught in the workshops of Stepan Fedotov and Pavel Mansurov in AAW. According to L. Galeev, the programmes of Kazan artistic workshops were created under the influence of P. Mansurov. In his opinion, a particular feature of Kazan art in the 1920’s was the avant-guard aspirations of young artists in the area of graphics. [Arkhumas, 2005, pp. 15–16].

The number of young Tatars among students of the Art college increased in the latter half of the 1920’s. S. Mukhamadzanov, G. Yusupov, and G. Musin, Gazizova were among them. This was the first generation of Tatar artists who graduated from the Kazan Art Technical College [Urmanche, 1985, pp. 69, 71].

The specific features of the 1920’s were to have a strong influence on the themes of paintings and the form of artistic style. In these years, the students of the Kazan College were opposed to naturalism and advocated new realism in painting, 'economy of the means expression'. They claimed that modern art should follow two paths: a) involvement of professional artists in production – posters, books (printed art), advertisements, clubs, etc.; b) the reform of easel forms, by adopting them to the needs of mass consumption (clubs, public institutions, streets) instead of parlour easel painting’ [Arkhumas, 2005, pp. 15–16].

The famous arts critic, P. Dulsay, wrote that 1924–1925 marks the period of the rise of national graphics in the Tatar republic. It was only at the major jubilee exhibition of arts of the people of the USSR in Moscow (1927), when the Tatar artists began to lay the foundations for their book art. Having made a name for themselves there, Tatar artists were invited to take part in international exhibitions in Paris, Chicago, Philadelphia in 1931 and 1933. In 1931, 150 pieces of Soviet graphics by the best masters were displayed in Paris. Works by Bakir Yusupov (his initials appear in different ways in different sources: B., G., T.) [Chervonnaya, 1975, p. 201], Faik Tagirov, Shakhir Mukhametzhyanov and Nikolay Sokolsky were among them. The foreign media remarked on this event highly estimating it on pages of the 'Times' [Krasnaya Tataria, 1933, 22 November].

Faik Tagirov, in the opinion of artists, created his unique style representing a peculiar, absolutely a particular eastern interpretation of of constructivism, combining avant guard European culture with ancient national origins, with Arabic graphics characteristic for the Tatars. As early as 1925, Tagirov was using photomontage in his works. It became the most important element of artistic language of constructivism and of great significance in the Soviet art of the 1920’s and early 1930’s. The artist worked in Moscow in latter half of the 1920’s and became a full participant of the process of creation of Russian Soviet book [Arkhumas, 2005, p. 15].

In the latter half of the 1920’s, Baki Urmanche played an important role in the Art College's training of students in painting and graphics. He was a painter, sculptor, founder of professional art and returned to Kazan in 1926, after graduating from The Higher Arts School Technical Workshop. One of his man tasks was to organise the work of the
graphic workshop. In 1977, a production collective was established at the Kazan arts college, consisting of: V. Badyul, Kh. Almayer, M. Mukhametshina, S. Mukhametshanov, G. Yusupov, A. Bashirov, E. Rozova, A. Goncharov, and others. A characteristic feature of this group was its use of propaganda leaflets and cheap popular prints [Ibid., p. 16].

In the 1920's, artists mainly turned to local themes, history, cultures of the Volga peoples, discovering particular features of Tatar art.

The 1930's, and especially pre-war years infused a fresh spirit into the republic's representational art. Arts critics noted that the growth of art was beginning to slow down. Only in the works of certain artists could the development of social and civil themes be observed [Valeeva, 1999, p. 32].

An article by N. Mashkovtsev entitled the 'Artistic life of Kazan' appeared in the central magazine 'Creation', stating: 'The capital of the Tatar Republic has recently acquired the reputation of a city notable for its well-developed artistic culture. Exhibitions involving artists from Moscow and Leningrad were constantly held in Kazan. "Kazan's artistic 'present' is infinitely less joyful than its 'past', since the work of graphic artists in the area of easel arts and engraving masters is not being encouraged' [Mashkovtsev, 1940, p. 15].

The state of the representational arts art in Tatarstan was voiced at the 3rd plenum of Organization Committee of the Council of Soviet artists of the USSR on 4 April 1940. The resolution stated that Kazan which had been one of the outstanding centres of our artistic culture, has become a city deprived of real creative activity in the field in figurative art [Ibid., p. 14]. However, Kazan did have a significant group of artists with a serious creative culture.

After the creation of the Tatar Republic, there was a shift in city construction. A goal was set to preserve and maintain existing buildings, repair and restore the most valuable architectural monuments, erect new buildings, and equip the city with modern amenities. The first attempts to create schematic plans for further construction and planning in Kazan were made between 1924 and 1926 by F. Gavrilov, the architect of the Directorate of Engineers of the TASSR. Architects were involved in the construction of Kazan and the city's slobodas. They planned to unite all sloboda districts and transform them into a united city organisation creating the new main square at the Kremlin, on the territory of the former fair (where the palace of sports and circus are now situated).

The council of architects of Kazan city council, Architectural Planning workshop, local staff and graduates of the Institute of Leningrad communal building contributed to the creation of many building projects: The Furrier's Club (architect Gaynetdinov), 'Dinamo' stadium (Speransky), the Commissariat of Internal Affairs building at K. Marx street (Fedotov), hotel 'Tatarstan' on Kuybyshev street, the Palace of Culture near Kaban Lake which was planned to accommodate a theatre, a museum, a library and other cultural institutions. The Kazan architects Gaynetdinov, Speransky, and Dubrovin also took part in the contest [Dulsky, 1935, p. 90; Dulsky, 1934 b, p. 81; Ostroumov, 1978, pp. 152–167]. However, these projects never came to life.

In 1933–1934, the city's main roads were intended for fast and convenient connection between all districts of Kazan. The city's central street network preserved the historically formed structural network. The general layout of 'Great Kazan' was finished and confirmed by the government on 19 June 1941, three days before the Great Patriotic war began.

However, specialists thought that the absence of large building ensembles in the city centre was a fault of the building of this period. Socialistic realism was to be expressed through architecture. According to publications, certain architects had attempted to restore the architecture of previous epochs which was considered to be a classical, unattainable ideal. However, the June plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) in 1931, ended these attempts, and specific proposals on socialistic reconstruction of cities were made. [Ostroumov, 1978, pp. 152–167].
In the area of sculpture, there were many famous names in Tatarstan. In the 1930's, greater attention was being paid to this art form as a stylistic element in the decoration of new 'socialist cities'. The first steps were made with the installation of two monuments: The statue of Bauman at the Ring (now this place is called Tukay Square) and Statue of Lenin in Zarechye (now it is Kirov district) by Moscow sculptors. In the early 1930's, Sadri Akhunov proved himself a talented sculptor. The following works belong to him: a bust of the poet Khadi Taktash and 'Kolkhoz-woman working in the garden' [Dulsky, 1934 a]. Kazan had to consult Moscow to install a monumental sculpture and to approve any building project. This circumstance as well as the absence of conditions for the development of art by Kazan specialists led to a high turnover of persons working in this field. Many of them left the republic.

Sculpture was also obliged to have ideological contents, and its themes had to correspond to 'the elevated style of the socialist epoch'. The technology of the work needed to emphasise the resonance of volume and spatial relations, stress power and strength of figures and the image of the new man. The only possible 'realistic method' [Mashkovtsev, 1940, p. 14] became the basis for the forced consolidation of different creative groups within the Union of Soviet artists.

So art in Tatarstan took a complicated path. During these years it reflected all the tendencies and styles which were typical for the art of the country.

The first powerful manifestation of artistic life of Tatarstan occurred in the 1920's. New European types and genres appeared in the art of the Tatar people: professional music, professional pictorial art - painting, sculpture, easel graphic works. Outstanding masters appeared literally in every type of art.


Zubarzyat Garipova

In the 1920's, the Republic of Tatarstan became one of large scientific centres of the Soviet Union. However, publications show that prior to this during the first years of Soviet power there had been a decline in scientific work. The main reasons were allegedly the "retirement" of many professors', a decreasing possibility to cooperate with the west, the total absence of new literature and facilities for research work. In the 1918–1919 academic year, Kazan University's Society of Physicists and Mathematicians, Society of Naturalists, Society of Lawyers, Pushkin Society, Society of Physicians, Society of Neuropathologists and Psychiatrists no longer operated. Works were no longer published due to the high cost of printing [Sotonin, 1922]. With the stabilisation of the political situation and the resolution of the consequences of the civil war and famine, the results of their work once again became accessible to the public.

Many chairs of Kazan institutes, including Kazan State University, conducted research in many fundamental and practical directions. Moreover, specialised research scientific institutions were active, seven of them in the 1920's. Then new institutions started appearing, for example: the Regional Microbiological Institute (1925), the Zoological and Botanical Garden, the Regional Forestry Reclamation Station (1926), the Institute of Social Health Care and Hygiene (1926). Traditional scientific fields continued their work; new scientific schools appeared at the same time.

In the early 1920's, the number of people involved in scientific work in mathematics increased greatly. Their works covered almost all branches of modern mathematics. The scientific research institute of mathematics and
mechanics of Kazan university united mathematicians from different higher education institutes in Kazan. The Kazan Community of Physics and Mathematics was another centre of this type. Kazan mathematicians solved a whole range of important problems. They elaborated methods used in works written by other Soviet and foreign mathematicians. Kazan scientists conducted research in the following branches of mathematics: algebra, number theory, theory of groups of differential and integral equations, real variable theory, theory of analytic functions, theory of chance and geometry. According to B. Gagarin, algebra became the subject of study in the republic only in 1928 when Professor N. Chebotaryov came from Odessa. According to Gagarin, before Chebotarev arrived, nobody had worked in the field of mathematics after N. Lobachevsky. A series of works dedicated to distribution of formulaic roots belongs to Chebotaryov and his students. N. Chebotaryov solved a whole range of important problems connected with the theory of Lie groups. B. Gagarin wrote an entire series of works on the study of convergence and summability of orthogonal series.

It should be noticed that Tatar mathematicians became popular in this very period. Professor B. Gagarin's student—G. Maksudov (mathematical analysis), N. Parfentyev's students—K. Galimov, M. Almukhametov studying at the chair of mechanics were among them. Works on analytical functions written by N. Usmanov who developed his activities at Leningrad Air Force Academy were especially remarkable. Interesting works on integral equations were written by B. Gagarin's student G. Salikhov who proved the existence of solutions of linear integral equations, which were more general than those examined before, as well as the existence of their own values. He produced a whole range of interesting results on solving different classes of equations using private derivatives which are a generalization of classical formulas [Uchenye' zametki KGU, 1946, vol. 106, ed. 4, pp. 3–13].

N. Chebotaryov wrote in 1938, that the developed theme of 'single-sheeted continuable polynomials' was extremely complex and it was of great significance to the theory of analytical functions. He wrote two monographs himself: 'The theory of Lie groups' and 'Algebraic Numbers'. M. Almukhametov wrote 'Special Features of Differential Equation Systems'. V. Yablokov studied geometrical couplings in a null system and Finsler manifolds, P. Shirokov specialized in Riemannian geometry. N. Chetayev finished his work 'On Stable Trajectories of Dynamics', K. Mushkari his doctoral thesis 'On the Stability of Thin Shells', M. Aminov studied aerodynamics of flapping wings and the theme of doctoral thesis 'Changes in Gaussian Elimination as Applied to Some Elements of Dynamics' [Chebotaryov, 1938, pp. 297–299]. It is evident from this short review of works written by Kazan mathematicians that Kazan had become one of mathematical centres of the Soviet Union.

Despite the difficulties of the 1920's, the scientists N. Parfentyev, N. Chetayev, A. Aminov, K. Mushkari, N. Chebotarev, E. Zavoisky, P. Shirokov, and others provided valuable research in the fields of physical and mathematical sciences. Works in mathematics, astronomy, physics written by Kazan scientists not only captured the attention of Soviet scientists at that time. Many scholar schools made use of their achievements.

It was no wonder then that international contests for the Lobachevsky Prize were held precisely at Kazan University. A whole range of Kazan mathematicians and engineers worked on stability theory from 1929, at the initiative of Professor Chebotaryov. This theory was of great importance for the development of mechanical engineering, aeroplane theory and high-speed trains. The results obtained by Chebotaryov, Persidsky and Malkin were later noted at the All-Union Mathematical Conference.

The struggle to achieve high durability, lightness and economy in construction led to the broad use of thin shells and coverings in
many technological spheres. Different combinations of plates and coverings are elements of construction in aeroplanes and ships. At that time many main parts of flying machines and high-speed turbines were made in the form of coverings. This required elaborating reliable methods for creating of thin-slab structures from the standpoint of solidity and firmness.

The non-linear theory of elastic plates and coverings was increasingly developed in the Soviet Union and abroad in the late 1930's, in connection with the importance of applying the theory of elastic plates and coverings. The efforts of Kazan's scientists in the post-war period were mainly aimed at the development of shallow shells theory [Surkin, 1957, pp. 27–29].

By the late 1930's, the mechanical-mathematical school established by N. Lobachevsky had developed scientific problems with defense significance.

The rapid growth of physics fell in the 1930s. Before the great patriotic war, the scientists E. Zavoisky, S. Altschuler, B. Kozyrev were on the threshold of discovering the phenomenon of paramagnetic resonance which was of great importance.

Kazan astronomers continued conducting fundamental research in studying the Moon. It should be remarked that the development of astronomy in the region is connected with the foundation of Kazan university in 1804 and the training of professional astronomers at the astronomy faculty (from 1810). This was one of the first in Russia. Also important was I. Littrov's work in equipping the first Kazan city astronomy observatory. The publication of scientific magazines 'Works of Kazan City Astronomical Observatory', 'Proceedings of the Engelhardt Astronomic Observatory' and the opening of the Astronomic Observatory of Kazan University in 1901 contributed to the development of astronomy. In the 1930's, the Astronomo-Geodetic Society was founded.

The first director of the Astronomical observatory was D. Dubyago (until 1918). He made a large contribution to the theory of comet motion. Thanks to the work of D. Martynov and his students in the 1930's and 1940's, Kazan became a leading centre in studying eclipsing variable stars. Kazan chemical school had been recognized throughout the world before the October revolution. After October 1917, the outstanding scientist A. Arbusov conducted pioneering research in chemistry at Kazan university. In the 1920's, he wrote fundamental works in the field of oxygen-containing organic phosphorus derivatives. Concentrated phosphorous acids were discovered in the laboratory of Arbusov as well as the means of phosphorocarboxylic acid syntheses. As a result Kazan became a world centre for organic phosphorus compound research. In this period A. Arbusov started working on problems of national economic and defense significance: he studied resins of conifers, the structure of pine tar and turpentine. This was a first in the Soviet Union. This research established the difference between Soviet turpentine, on the one hand, and the French and American variety on the other. New methods applied by Kazan chemists made it possible to find the terpinkerin in turpentine which was previously unknown. Theoretical evidence gradually proceeded to practice. For example, Arbusov's laboratory secured an order from the Dulevo porcelain factory. These discoveries could develop tapping in the east of the European part of the country as it was an important part of the forestry industry.

In the late 1920's, one more important economic problem was solved in the laboratory of A. Arbusov. Researchers invented a method of obtaining furfural from agricultural waste as a raw material for producing plastic [Garipova, 2004, p. 101]. After 1929 intensive work on organic phosphorus derivatives started in the A. Butlerov Scientific Research Institute. After 1930, research into organophosphorus compounds was carried out in the faculty of organic chemistry of Kazan Institute of Chemistry and Technology. In 1929, A. and B. Arbusovs discovered a new method of obtaining three aryl-methyl group free radicals. In the period before the Great Patriotic War new centres for the study of organic phosphorus compounds began to appear and develop. This research includes work...
conducted at the Institute for Organic Chemistry of Soviet Academy of Sciences of USSR. [Arbuzov, 1957, pp. 35–36]. The role of the Kazan School of Chemistry in the emergence and formation of the Soviet chemical industry in the country has been recognized, while its influence on the world chemical industry has also been significant.

In the early 20th century, tectonic research was also carried out in Tatarstan. For example, A. Nechayev, A. Zamyatin and M. Noinsky provided especially significant data. Nechayev and Zamyatin discovered the outcrops of Lower Perm limestones in the core of Soksko-Sheshminsk dislocation which had not been described before. At that time they took them to be carboniferous calcareous sediments. Similar limestone was found at the Kama River in the core of the Izhminvodskaya structure by M. Noinsky. Professor B. Yusupov noted that the studies of tectonics in Tataria had more of an occasional than systematic character at that time. There was insufficient data to provide a generalized observation of separate tectonic phenomena.

The systematic study of Tatar tectonics only began from 1920. Important work was carried out by participants in the 1929 conference at the Polytechnic Museum in Moscow in planning work on the study of tectonics of the Urals-Volga region. M. Noinsky gave a report on the tectonic structure and prospects of Tataria’s oil-bearing potential at the conference. The participants of the conference elaborated the plan of structural-geological survey which was to mark the beginning of a new period in tectonic research in the Tatar republic. S. Mironov, E. Tikhviniskaya, K. Chepikov, N. Gerasimov, S. Chernov, V. Butrov, B. Selivanovsky and others played the leading part in the realization of this plan.

In the 1930’s, M. Noinsky carried out research at the Izhievsk mineral spring and E. Tikhvininsky studied oil migration in the soils of the TASSR. The All-Union Scientific Geological Survey Research Institute undertook important work on reviewing research in the oil expropriation sector. In 1942 in particular, they created a unified structural map of Tataria which delineated the horizons of the Upper Kama deposits edited by S. Mironov. In 1943, the structural map for the east of Tataria along the upper boundary of Lower Kazan deposits was published by A. Melnikov [Yusupov, 1957, pp. 71, 79].

Representatives of the Kazan Geological School developed stratigraphy, paleontology, tectonics and mineralogy of Upper paleozoic deposits of the east of European Russia, investigated for the presence of oil, gas and ore in the Middle Volga, Kama and Cis-Ural regions. Fundamental research in mineralogy is connected with the names of scientists working in Tatarstan in the 1930’s—B. Krotov, L. Miropolovsky, B. Yusupov, and others. Tataria’s physiologists were devoted to the issue of nerve activity as one of the central problems of their research. ‘The understanding of many processes in human body, the causation of a whole range of diseases depended on its solution’, wrote professor A. Kibyakov [Kibyakov, 1941]. The scientific activities of Kazan physiologists were devoted to this problem from 1858 when the Chair of Normal Physiology of Medical Faculty of Kazan university was headed by professor Ovsyannikov.

The physiological laboratory of the university was created by scientist of worldwide repute, professor A. Samoylov (deceased in 1930). His laboratory was considered to be the centre of electro-physiological knowledge for Soviet scientists. The work of the Physiology Faculty of Kazan University headed by professor Samoylov was known beyond the USSR in the 1920’s. His laboratory not only ranked first in the USSR in terms of the accuracy and precision recording electrical current of living organisms, it was also comparable on a global scale. At that time Kazan scientists were already aware that every moment of the life of the central nervous system was combined with the appearance of electrical current. They also knew every organ manifests its own electrical reaction which allows for the detection of new aspects in the functioning of the variety.
of organs in the human body. The work of scientists in this field was published in a range of journals not only in the USSR but also abroad. Professor Samoylov himself gave lectures on research undertaken by his laboratory in Holland, the USA, the Physiological Society at Harvard University in Boston, and in Berlin, all by the invitation of foreign scientists.

It is remarkable that heart current was recorded for the first time in Tatarstan, in Samoylov's laboratory. Doctors from Moscow and other cities were sent to Kazan for advanced training. Famous Moscow institutions such as the Botkin Hospital and the Obukh Institute for Work-Related Diseases, as well as resort-based cardiological clinics created electrophysiological laboratories according to the methods and instructions designed by the Kazan scientist Samoylov [Garipova, 2004, pp. 101–102].

Professors Vorontsov and Kiselyov were Samoylov's worthy successors. In the late 1930's, research on the study of wave excitation along nerve conductors was carried out at the physiological laboratory of Kazan university. The director of the laboratory chief, Professor Rezvyakov, established a series of facts proving that excitation faces resistance as it runs down nerve stems. According to Professor Kibyakov, there is no consensus of opinions on what happens to the nerve impulse as it passes down the nerve stems. He came to the conclusion that the discovery of this process is of practical importance, allowing us to understand the cause of many peripheral nerve diseases.

One of the most important founders of the Kazan physiological school was Prof. Mislavsky, a scientist of world reputation. The following physiologists were educated there: the Associate Professor I. Validov, Professors Chebotaryov, Vishnevsky, Chirkovsky, Goryaev, Teregulov, Domraichev, and others.

During these years, the Physiological Laboratory of the institute proved for the first time that chemical factors also take part in interactions between separate neural elements.

The laboratory of the Pedagogical Institute was the newest physiological laboratory in Kazan. New data concerning the impact of direct current on ventricular heart bands was discovered in this laboratory under Professor O. D. Kurmaev. This data was of theoretical and practical importance at that time (the restoration of cardiac work and mechanisms of electric anesthesia) [Kibyakov, 1941].

In 1920, the Clinical Institute was founded in Kazan (after 1925 it was renamed the Kazan State Institute of Advanced Training of Doctors - KSIATD). Although initially its main function was to enhance the level of the skill of medical personnel, later the Institute conducted research in the primary directions of medicine. During these years, specialized medical research scientific institutes (microbiological, tuberculous, trachomatous) also functioned. They made a special contribution to the development of medicine. Their purpose was to conduct complex research into the human body, search for new methods of examination, treatment and prevention of diseases on the basis of achievements of biology, physics and chemistry.

The Institute of Agriculture and Forestry founded in 1922 by merging the forestry faculty of the university and the agricultural faculty of Kazan Polytechnic Institute (The Kazan Agricultural Institute since 1930, Kazan Agricultural Academy since 1995) was a major centre for agricultural and forest sciences. The founding of this institute and the commencement of its activity were of great importance in saving agriculture from collapse, decline and poverty. The Institute's lecturers included Professors A. Vasiliev, A. Gordygin, N. Parfentiev, M. Grachev, M. Noinsky, N. Livonov, V. Belyaev, and others.

It should be emphasized that forestry in Tatarstan has an earlier history. It began in 1911 when the Experimental Forest District was established. However, forestry at that time was limited only to the collection of knowledge through observations, but experiments were not carried out for a long time. Theoretical questions of forestry were not of primary significance during the Civil War and in the first years of the period of rehabilitation. Forestry thus remained in a state of stagnation. Scien-
Scientific research work in the Kazan Experimental Forest District was carried out from the end of 1922 under the direction of professor K. Voyt. The circumstances demanded that forestry adopt new forms of organization. A new edict establishing a experimental forest district of the Tatar Republic was issued on 12 July 1926. The Central Executive Committee of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic established the Bureau of Experimental Forestry and the 'Tatarstan' Experimental Forest Station as part of the Tatar people's land commissariat.

In the 1920's, in addition to the experimental forest district and forestry test station, the faculties of the forestry department of the Kazan Institute of Agriculture and Forestry conducted important research. They conducted research into advanced pine sapling thinning, studied the dynamics of natural pine reforestation in cleared space. They tested tapping fir- and pine-trees according to chemical technology. Soil scientists studied the genesis of different kinds of soil. In the area of forest entomology, they conducted research into a variety of means of protecting forests from pests.

Between 1925 and 1930, the forestry faculties of the Institute were involved in research in 77 areas, 26 of which had been studied thoroughly by 1931. In our opinion, this was not insignificant work, indeed it shows that researchers were able to work in different fields. The results of their activity and research were published in 'The Proceedings of Kazan Institute of Agriculture and Forestry', in the journals 'At the Planting Front', 'Forestry and Forest Exploitation', 'Works of the Society for the Study of Tatarstan' and others. Researchers such as Professor A. Gordyagin, A. Yunitsky, L. Yashnov, A Tolsky and G. Sudeykin as well as B. Martynov, P. Troshechanin, B. Alimbek, N. Stepanov, and others [Bobrovsky, 1952, p. 3] were famous for their works in general forestry, forest plant pathology, ornithology, entomology, fruitification, standardization of seeds, and forest management. It should be noted that thematic plans were structured according to industrial demands and took into consideration the national economic tasks of the government of the Republic. The activity of forestry scientists in the 1920–1930's enriched forestry science and left a practical mark on forestry technology.

Key matters of organizing and planning of agricultural production in kolkhoz collective farms and MTS (machine and tractor stations) were studied by the Tatar research-and-development institution of the socialistic reconstruction of agriculture created in March 1933. In the space of a single year, the institute was able to hand on the positive results and practical outcomes to kolkhoz collective farms and Machine Tractor Stations, or publish them in the press. For example, works by M. Safiullin, A. Trapeznikov, and others saw the light of day in the form of books or in the journal of 'Socialistic Economics of Tatarstan' [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, fol. R-1076, file 1, § 68, p. 1].

The Tatar Scientific Economic Research Institute, which began work in July 1930, developed many economic questions and was able to implement the first results. During the first year of existence, the Institute undertook research into the manufacturing needs of the republic. It also carried out specific work on the raw materials needed for local industry. In particular, the scientific principles for oil well drilling were defined.

The team of the institute achieved similar results with regard to other natural resources. The republic was one of the most abundant regions for gypsum deposits, although its use was not discussed. In their research into gypsum, the institutes showed that numerous construction materials could be produced from it. [Garipova, 2004, p. 103].

During these years research was also carried out into the use the gypsum and anhydrites deposits in Tataria. Several researchers including A. Bogoroditsky, A. Lunyak. V. Sobolev (1930) focused their attention to the possibility of producing sulphuric acid and Portland cement. Recommendations on the need "to raise the matter of the production of Portland and natural cement in the Republic
using domestic limestones, dolomites and clays” were issued by the Kamstroym brigade (Baty, Trofimuk, Myasnikova) in 1932. In 1939, E. Tikhvinskaya noted the advisability of using Upper Kazan layer limestone indicating a whole range of possible uses for limestone [Nezimov, Sementovsky, 1957, p. 114].

The scientists of the The Tatar Scientific Economic Research Institute also raised the subject of copper, its exploitation for the development of the copper industry. Their interest was also based on the recommendations by historians, since Tatar territory was once a centre of the copper smelting industry.

The semi-annual report of the institute for 1930–1931 contained such works as testing copper ore in Mamadyshsky district, geological survey and registration of minerals in Bugulinsky, Rybno-Slobodsky districts, near the Bondyuzhsky chemical plant; geological exploration work on shale oil in Bugulinsky district; glass-melting sand at Vasilyevsky station as well as argile cimolite in Chistopol district, natural red oxide of iron at Kizichesky swamp.

The essential needs of the TASSR and adjacent territories' economic development and the presence of real potential for the creation of a cement industry were the reason for numerous attempts to resolve this problem. The question of cement production in the republic was brought up for the first time as early as 1930/2, in the connection with major objectives set for the whole country during the first five-year plan. S. Egorov noted the possibility of using Kazan limestone deposits near Yelabuga at the mouth of the Izh River for Portland cement production in a collection of works called ‘Geology and minerals in the Tatar Republic’ (1932). O. Khovanskaya in her studies of clays of different ages came to the conclusion that ‘...all researched samples of clay of Tataria are appropriate for the cement industry...' [Nezimov, Sementovsky, 1957, p. 114].

The scientists of Research Scientific Economic Institute worked on such subjects as the technical-engineering basis for building of a nitrogen compounds plant, tje development of Tatarstan's silicate industry, and the prospects of cost reduction of industrial goods.

The scientists of the transport economics section of the same institute developed the economic characteristics of planned railway lines in the republic and inspection of reinforced-concrete bridges [Garipova, 2004, pp. 103–104].

It should be emphasized that studies of subjects such as ecology, systematization of vertebrates, fauna of the land, water regime of plants, entomology, hydrological coverage of small rivers in the Middle Volga region elaborated in the post-war period were based on the theoretical work carried out in the 1920’s and 1930's.

Hydro-geological research in Tatarstan has a long history. Similar research was carried out in connection with water supply of the ancient town of Bolgar. "However, the results of this work were not revealed in literature", wrote scientist M. Kaveev in 1957. In the late 19th century special works in studying underground waters were undertaken in connection with the problem of water supply in large inhabited localities. The materials of water supply drilling between 1883 and 1900 were published by professor A. Shtukenberg in works of the Kazan Society of Naturalists.

After the October revolution of 1917, hydro-geological research was linked to the design of hyroengineering structures, exploitation of mineral deposits, the study of mineral water and engineering construction. After 1917, the process of drilling water wells was uninterrupted. Drilling rates increased more and more every year. In 1920, 27 wells were drilled, while in 1930 - 40.

Hydrogeological observations undertaken during geological surveying contributed to collating information about the regional hydrogeological features of the republic. From 1933, almost the entire territory of the TASSR was mapped by geological survey, for the purpose of studying the tectonic structures. The process defined the specific features of the hydrogeology of permian and later geological surface formations. The subterranean waters in the deep horizons of sedimentary rocks in
the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic were studied A. Zabirov, V. Sulin, and N. Tafeeva. With the establishment of the Kazan Branch of the Academy of Science, the hydrogeological research of the Geological Institute was used in the elaboration of theoretical questions needed to resolve the practical tasks connected with oil exploration. [Kaveev, 1957, pp. 97–99].

In the area of history and linguistics, the first decade after the February revolution of 1917 provided quite beneficial conditions for the academic study of the history of the Tatar people. The academic and research projects of the Academic Collegium, the Academic Centre and a series of academic communities were dedicated to this work. The institutions included: the Tatar Pedagogic Society, Scientific Society of the Study of Tatarstan, House of Tatar Culture, and then the Tatar Scientific Economic Research Institute which was established in 1930 and remained in existence for about a couple of years. In the 1920's, the following fundamental works were published: 'Essays on History of the Kazan Khanate' by M. Khudyakov, 'History of the Tatar Classes' by G. Ibragimov, 'On the Origins of the Volga-Kama Bulgars' by V. Smolin. In 1925, the 'Introduction to Volga-Kama Bulgaria', 'the Real Dictionary of the Volga-Kama region' were completed.

Articles by Dzhamaal Validi on the dialects of Glazov and Karin (or Nokrat) Tatars and Gali Rakhim's analysis of the epigraphic inscriptions of Tatar monuments during the epoch of the Kazan Khanate, which had not yet been an object of research were published by the Society for the Study of Tatarstan in 1931. Gali Rakhim examined more than fifty 15th century monuments of the Arsk canton and was the first to draw conclusion as their language (the language of the local Tatars combined with words of the Chygtays from Central Asia).

The conclusions of researcher A. Vasilyev based on the analysis of five silver coins in the Golden Horde with inscriptions in Tatar found on the territory of Tatarstan at Kirbi village in Laishevsk district are noteworthy. The academic discovered that the coins related to khans who had reigned in quick succession (over one decade) – in 806–818, i.e. 1412–1413 AD. According to A. Vasilyev, they are rare coins, and one of them was mined in 'New Bulgar'. The author of the article poses the question: 'What is New Bulgar'? "Coins bearing the place of coinage are known: New Sarai, New Azov, New Astrakhan, New Gublistan, but New Bulgar had not been encountered on coins'. The eminent orientalist Fren also questions their definition and does not express his point of view [Trudy' OIT, 1930, p. 175].

E. Chernyshyev, in his article 'Reason for the Emigration of the Crimean Tatars to Turkey' based on new archive materials, gives a new explanation for this problem. He saw the reason for Crimean-Tatar emigration as a consequence of the economic development of Russia in the middle of the 14th century, its interest in eastern markets for Russian goods and the corresponding agricultural policy of the tsarist government aimed at the expulsion of Crimean Tatars from their native lands. Trudy' OIT, 1930, p. 173]. It should be noted that the academic's conclusion was not only a new idea since other researchers considered the incitement of the Crimean Tatars to emigration by Turkey as the main reason for this emigration, but indeed a courageous act,

Amongst works on Tatar studies in 1930, special attention must be paid to the article by Professor N. Firsov on the work of Erenzhen Khara-Dovan 'A Cultural-Historical Essay on the Mongol Empire in the 12–14th Centuries' published in Belgrade in 1929. The Society for the Study of Tatarstan placed it on the pages of its collection under the title 'Genghis Khan as a commander and his legacy' [Trudy' OIT, 1930, p. 179].

In his assessment of the work, N. Firsov stressed the view of Dr. Erengene that 'Genghis Khan's Empire was governed at the expense of strict legal observance which was obligatory for everybody beginning with the head of the state and ending with its last subject'. Analyz-
ing the work by Erengene, N. Firsov wrote that the author had explained only the positive aspects of Genghis Khan’s monarchy: "Of the cultural heritage bequeathed to other nations, in particular the nations of Eastern Europe, which incorporated the majority of the possessions of the Mongol state under the government of the new state structure (Moscow and Petersburg), religious tolerance was of particular importance". However, whatever the cultural benefits and technical prowess bequeathed by Genghis Khan through the Golden Horde to Russia, this circumstance does not give us any right to dream of the revival of the Great Mongol State' [Trudy OIT, 1930, p. 180].

Another outstanding scientist F. Ballod also made great discoveries in the field of studying the history of the Tatars which were the result of excavations held in the ruins of former centres of the Golden Horde. This research raised the question or revision of established views about the Golden Horde as a nomadic and barbarian state (stated in works by Berezin and Sablukov).

The history of the Tatar people was given priority in the plans of the Tatar Economical Research Institution which was founded pursuant to an Edict by the Council of People’s Commissars of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic dated back to 18 March 1930 [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund P-516, § 1, file 4, p. 9] For example, the 1930–1931 plan for the History Office had the following subjects: 'Turkic influence on the history of Tatars', 'History of the main Tatar madrasas of Kazan and Kazan governorate, Ufa and Orenburg'. The following topics were included in the plant of the Cabinet of Language and Literature for 1931: 'The Origins of Handicraft of Ural-Altai ethnicities according to the evidence of speech paleontology', 'Origins of farming of the Turks according to the evidence of the Turkic-Tatar language', 'Ancient Tatar literary monuments', and others. The authors of these themes were well-known academics and writers, public figures such as G. Alparov, G. Sharaf, S. Attagulov, G. Galeev, G. Rakhim, G. Tulumbaysky, A. Shnasi, and M. Fazullin. [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund R-516, § 1, file 137, p. 9].

Gradually new ethnographic research began to be undertaken. Kazan had been a major centre for oriental studies for a long time. Kazan University played an especially important role in this respect. Many outstanding scientists interested in the study of history and ethnography of peoples of the Volga region worked there. The peoples studied included: the Tatars, Chuvashes, Maris, Udmurts, and others. The work of local academics in the field of ethnography began almost immediately after the establishment of Kazan university in 1804. The first of these was Professor K. Fuchs who published an entire range of works in ethnography of peoples of the land, especially the Tatars, in 1814–1844. In the period between the 1840’s and 1860’s, V. Sboyev, A. Artemyev and other academics presented their valuable works.

The creation of Archaeological, historical and ethnographic society at Kazan University in 1878 gave important impetus to studying the way of life of peoples of the land. Its print-ed journal - 'Izvestiya' - became the centre of local ethnographic thought. The chairs of geography and ethnography at Kazan University (P. Krotof, B. Adler) opened in 1888 and the Kazan City Museum with its historical-ethnographic department headed for a while by N. Katanov gradually found themselves at the forefront of studying the way of life of peoples living in the land.

Even prior to the 1917 revolution, Kazan ethnographers, statisticians and economists collected materials on the characteristics of the pre-revolution way of life of peoples dwelling the Middle Volga region. 'All researchers were interested in non-Russian peoples with their peculiar way of life', wrote N. Vorobiov and G. Khisamutdinov, 'the Russians were considered to be the ordinary Slavs'. Kazan ethnographers were considered to be some of the most competent researchers in Russia. Examining the life and mode of life of non-Russian ethnicities they mainly defended the interests of these ethnicities against social and national oppression.
In connection with the formation of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, the people became interested in learning the language, history and ethnography of their nations. Nevertheless, the 1921 famine hindered investigative fieldwork among people. Thus prior to 1923, the concentration of available scientific materials, enlisting the services of scientists and training national scientific researchers took place mainly in Kazan. The Museum of Oriental Peoples began to collate its materials in 1920. Later on it was consolidated with the Central Museum of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. In these years it became the centre for local studies in the Republic. A whole range of expeditions was organized to explore the ruins of the ancient city of Bulgar and epigraphic monuments in the region.

The art critic P. Dulsky, a famous specialist in Mordvinian M. Evseev, an expert in the Chuvashes N. Nikolsky, the young historian M. Khudyakov and G. Gubaydullin, ethnographers, M. and K. Gubaydullin and M. Gubaydullina, arts critic and architect V. Egerev, geographer and ethnographer N. Vorobiov all started working in the field of ethnography at the same time. More methodical work in studying Tatar ethnography, under the guidance of N. Vorobiov, began after 1924. Ethnographic expeditions to different places of Tataria financed by local institutions were held almost every year. The following figures took part in expeditions: N. Vorobiov, K. Vorobiov, F. Teregulova, ethnographers Gubaydullins, historian Saïd Vakhitov, literary scholars Jamal Validi, Ali Rakhim (A. Abdarakhminov), historians R. and S. Tagirovs, certified photographers Kh. Apanayev, N. Zasypkin as well as the arts critic P. Dulsky. The results of these studies were published in the 'Bulletin of the Scientific Community for the study of Tataria' and the magazine 'Labour and Economics'.

The article by the Gubaydullins on the subject of 'The Raising of Children by Tatars in Russia' captured attention of the Italian magazine 'New East' and it was published in Italian in 1926. N.I. Vorobiov's book 'The Material culture of the Kazan Tatars' (Kazan, 1930) contains an ethnographic analysis of Tatar clothes in comparison with clothes of people with a kindred language or culture. The mode of life and material culture of the Kazan Tatars were described from historical point of view [Vorobiov, Khisamutdinov, 1957, pp. 163, 165–166].

In general, the period covering more than the first decade after the October revolution was a time for gathering academic forces and new materials for ethnography. From the late 1920's to the early 1930's the first attempts at revising ethnographic methodology were made. Ethnographers were required to learn Marxist-Leninist methodology and employ it in their research work. An ideological battle began in ethnography, numerous theoretical conferences and discussions took place.

The establishment of the History and Philosophical Faculty at the Kazan State University in 1939 and the creation of the Tatar Scientific Research Institute of language, literature and history in the same year helped to revive research work in the field of history of the local land. Nevertheless, it should be noted that ethnographic studies at that time were not conducted in the Tatar republic. Fundamental work in this direction was renewed only after the Great Patriotic War.

The study of Tatar folklore has a rather long history. The famous folklorist Prof. Khamir Yarmukhametov dated the beginning of recordings of Tatar folklore to the 18th century. He explained this by the fact that in the 18th century Russian academic literature contained evidence about the ethnography of the Kazan Tatars and their folklore. In his collection entitled 'The Russians in their proverbs', I. Snegirev (1834) included Tatar proverbs in Russian and Tatar for the first time. Folklore materials are subsequently presented in collections of works by Karl Fuchs (1844), selected readings by M. Ivanov (1842), 'A Russian-Tatar Alphabet Book' by G. Vagapov (1852), 'A Tatar Chrestomathy' by S. Kuklyashev (1859) and a whole range of other works.

Works by the famous Turkologist, the academician V. Radlov became an important
contribution to the study of Tatar folklore. He published a large-scale work devoted to the folklore of Tyumen, Tobolsk and Tarsk Tatars after he had lived with Siberian Tatars for a long time in the 1870's. K. Yarmukhametov remarked that the collection and study of Tatar folklore before Kayum Nasyrov and Gabdyl- lah Tukay was merely fragmentary and disparate. The activities of the academic Kayum Nasyrov implemented many new features in the study of Tatar folklore. The national poet G. Tukay not only collected samples of national poetry but also presented the first research on the character and specific features of Tatar folklore. The issue of the social function of folklore works and their class differentiation, the problem of copyright in folklore, the ideological orientation and structure of Tatar folk songs, all these matters were essentially examined for the first time by G. Tukay [Yarmukhametov, 1957, pp. 173–175].

In pre-revolutionary years, Khuzi Badygov's work in the area of collecting Tatar folklore occupied an important place. He published a whole range of works including proverbs, riddles, songs and tales (1912, 1913, 1919, 1926).

In the first years after the October revolution of 1917, there was no systematic attempt to collate Tatar folklore. This work only was to begin in the 1930's. At that time, in addition to an increase in the collation of folklore, collections also began to be published. For example, 'Soviet songs' (1933), 'People's art' (1938, 1940), 'Folk songs' (1939), 'Folk fairy tales' (1940). Gumer Bashirov was the first person in the Tatar study of folklore to create a collection of Tatar fairy tales conforming to all the demands of the field [Yarmukhametov, 1957, p. 177].

Tatar linguistics has a rich history which encompasses many years. The Tatar language was an object of academic research before the October revolution of 1917, along with other Turkic languages. Such outstanding linguists as I. Berezin, S. Khalifin, Kayyum Nasyri, V. Radlov, N. Katanov, and others collected and examined materials on Turkic languages in general and on the Tatar language in particular. Nevertheless, according to specialists, the study of the Tatar language was not formed as an independent branch of linguistics before the Revolution.

As early as the period between 1918 and 1919, Tatar intellectuals began intensive work in all its areas. First the question of spelling reform of the Tatar language based on the Arabic fonts was raised during the III All-Russian Conference of Teachers in May 1918 in Kazan. In January 1919, the problems of Tatar language were discussed at the 1st All-Russian conference on type and spelling. Decisions made in the conference formed the basis for measures aimed at improving the type and spelling of the Tatar language. In 1927, Professor G. Alparov noted that the Tatar literary language had become scientifically well-ordered and independent [Zalyay, Amirov, 1957, p. 183].

In new textbooks of the 1920's, Tatar grammars for primary and secondary schools were published, in addition to manuals in the Tatar language. Different linguistic orientations, such as logicism and formalism, were finally formed in works by G. Alparov, J. Validi and other scientists.

Such outstanding linguists as Professor of Philology G. Saadi, G. Nugaybek, G. Alparov, G. Badigov, J. Validi worked in the Academic Centre. These scientists had begun their linguistic activities before the revolution. G. Saadi started publishing his works in 1911. His 'Morphology of the Tatar language in a new simplified form', 'Improvement of grammar of the Tatar language (morphology and syntax)', 'Tatar etymology' were released before the revolution. After October 1917, he published works on the classification of Turkic languages, history of language, script and literature, on principles of studying Turkic languages and composing their grammar, numerous works in literature and art.

The Academic Centre organized a special commission to elaborate the scientific terminology required for study guides and studies. This commission developed about 15 thousand new native terms in different scientific fields (mathematics, physics, botany, chemistry, zoology, etc.). According to linguists, the
growth of using folk words, phraseology, and speech tokens in Tatar fiction was significant.

G. Alparov ('Tatar Grammar on a Formal Basis', 1926), S. Ramazanov (he published articles, textbooks and guides between 1930 and 1947, 'Grammar of the Tatar Language' (Part 1), 'Essays on the Tatar Language', 'Spelling of the Tatar Literary Language') made an important contribution to the development of modern Tatar. One of their successors in this field was V. Khangildin. His works in the Tatar language became very popular beyond the borders of the Republic. Between 1934 and 1957 his articles on the most topical issues of modern Tatar grammar were published. The work by V. Khangildin 'Grammar of the Tatar Language. Essays on Morphology' won the award of the Presidium of Academy of Sciences of the USSR in 1954.

Works by professor V. Bogoroditsky occupy a special place in the development of academic grammar and phonetics of the Tatar language in the Soviet period. He was the first to establish the Kazan Cabinet of Experimental Phonetics in the Volga-Kama Region which was highly appreciated in the USSR and abroad [Krasnaya Tataria, 1932, 10 June]. After 1920, the Correspondent Member of Academy of Sciences of the USSR, V. Bogoroditsky began studyng the Tatar language using the comparative-historical method. He created such works known in Turkology as 'Essays on Tatar and Turkish Linguistics' (1933), 'Introduction to Tatar Linguistics in Connection with other Turkic Languages' (1933) as well as separate articles and essays: 'The Character of Turkic Synharmonism', 'The Evolution of the Genitive in Turkic languages', 'Tone Movement in Two-Syllable Words in the Tatar Language' [Zalyay, Amirov, 1957, p. 187]

The successors of the Bogoroditsky school in the field of experimental phonetics were his students Galimzhan Sharaf, and others. A number of publications became famous beyond the borders of the TASSR, G. Sharaf's book 'Sonoric Length in Tatar Phonology', 'Palatograms Tatar Phonology', and the articles 'Palatograms in Tatar Phonology in Comparison with Russian' [Bulletin of the scientific society in Tatar jurisdiction 7 (1927), pp. 65–102].

In the first decade after October of 1917, active work in the field of Tatar lexicography began. By 1927, two parts of the 1st volume of the Complete Dictionary of the Tatar Language by J. Validi, as well as a whole range of dictionaries of terms were published. The systematic release of Russian-Tatar dictionaries of different kinds began from 1927 (1927, 1929, 1931, 1932, 1936, 1938). In 1939, the Russian-Tatar dictionary of terms in physics and meteorology was published. In 1941, the Russian-Tatar dictionary of political-economical terms was edited. However, the Great Patriotic war suspended work in the field of Tatar linguistics. A revival only took place after 1946.

At the same time it must be noted that unjustified repressions with regard to those who stood at the forefront of science, and who were its most prominent researchers inflicted serious damage upon the development of science in Tatarstan. The 1930's were filled with cruel persecutions and terror towards representatives of Tatar culture.
CHAPTER 5
Religion and society in the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic under the Conditions of the Administrative Command System

§ 1. Muslim communities in the 1920–30’s:
Legal-Political and Socio-Economic Condition

Ilmir Minnullin

One of the most dramatic periods in the history of Russia's Islamic community was the epoch of the social revolutions of the 20th century leading to the establishment of absolutely new political relations and the construction of the state on the basis of anti-religious ideology. The establishment of Soviet power and the consequent radical reforms in all spheres of social life had a profound effect on principles of organization and existence of the Islamic community and presaged the radical transformations of its institutions, destroying customary confessional ties and traditions of the Tatar people.

In pre-October period, the social life of the Tatars was organised around the local confessional community called mahallah. The following definition can be given to this social institution: 'A Tatar mahallah is a self-governing Islamic community which is localized by virtue of distinct historical and historical-architectural factors, and which in the context of a non-Muslim state organizes its internal life according to Sharia standards and provides its members with an opportunity to carry out their religious-moral duty' [Salikhov, 2004, p. 69].

Researchers analyzing the essence of the local Islamic community, its social forces and structural elements, defined its three integral parts. Firstly, it was a community of faithful living within a given territory united with professional, neighbourly and kindred relationship. Secondly, a 'parish' cleric was the primary person responsible for the religious matters and the discharge of religious duties, in accordance with the rules of Islamic law. Thirdly, a local mosque should simply resemble a building for religious rituals but a community club where the pressing problems of daily life of the mahallah could be discussed. [Sukhareva, 1960, p. 58; 1976, pp. 19–23]. The fourth most important institution of the community was also a religious education institution. This took on the role of an Islamic educational and pedagogical body training future Islamic preachers and pedagogues.

The development of the Tatar local Islamic community in the pre-October revolutionary period was characterized by the consolidation of local clerical positions, the creation of communal educational centre, as well as the formation of a charitable system satisfying the needs of the mahallah. The representatives of Tatar bourgeoisie who financed the spiritual and educational needs of their co-believers played an important role in this process.

The revolution of 1917 brought new changes to the lives of Muslims. The religious policy of Bolshevik power was aimed at the gradual and complete exclusion of religion from social life and ideology of the faithful.

Mahallah and Soviet legislation about religious communities. During the early years of Soviet power, the issues of legislation of religious communities were given much prominence. This was explained primarily by the real need for the practical separation of church and state. The legal status of religious communities and their new position in society were clearly defined in decrees, resolutions and instructions. The religious community in Soviet times was a union of the faithful which was completely de-
pendent on the state. Its legal status emphasized its lack of rights and even the nominal character of its existence. The legal status of religious communities allowed the state to control their activities entirely, prevent their registration and remove them if necessary. The logic of defining the legal and political status of the Muslim community within the Soviet state, particularly in the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was consonant with the spirit of the Soviet legal system. There was no notion of a Muslim 'parish' in the laws of the RSFSR. The only document mentioning such an organisation was "The Memorandum of the Spiritual Organization of Muslims of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic ' (1923) [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund R - 732, § 6, file 133, pp. 107–110].

The parish was a union of Muslims organized to hold services and rituals, and to supply religious and moral needs of the faithful. Each mahallah was limited to a certain district, the borders of which varied depending on the region. For example, the population of a village could be included in a mahallah with a single mosque. Nevertheless, there were about 2–3 'parishes' in most villages and settlements. The 'parish' was represented by Muslim population of a given location, and included persons of both sexes of the full legal age (18). A general assembly the faithful would be convened to resolve internal problems. Their work was organized in the same way as that of meetings of other communities: the chairman of meeting and secretary were elected, the minutes were kept obligatorily.

The parish government or "mutavalliyyat" dealt with all others affairs between the meetings of the faithful. According to the charter, its duties included providing for the material needs of the community and the management of its possessions, including supervision of cemeteries, the state of mosques and other religious buildings, concluding contracts on the exercising of possessions and implementing the resolutions of the general assembly. These duties were typical for a mahallah of the Soviet period, unlike that of the pre-Soviet one. The activities of the first were limited to religious affairs, while the second was also responsible for social measures.

Nevertheless, each parish existed not only on the basis of the Statute for Religious Organizations. With the development of Soviet religious legislation, the activities of Muslim community. were further defined. The notion 'parish' was substituted by 'community' (religious community) in law-making practice as well as that of other communities. Religious communities could be formed by no less than 50 persons of the full legal age (18). According to the Decree on the separation of church and state, religious organizations were deprived of the right of legal entity, their activities did not go beyond the satisfaction of the religious needs of the faithful, i.e. conducting ceremonies. Religious communities were obliged to submit to the administrative authorities the minutes from the meeting of founding parties, as well as founding charter and list of founders. After documents had been investigated, the religious community was registered with the NKVD.

Thus, the Muslim parish was a common religious community of the Soviet type from a legal standpoint. A mahallah was a union of Muslims intended to conduct divine service and rituals.

In general, the legal and political status of religious communities did not change until the late 1920's. A Decree of Presidium of All-Russian Central Executive Committee and Council of People's Commissars of Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, issued on the 8 April 1929 'On religious communities' toughened the process of their registration, increased their dependence of the state, and made the process of their liquidation easier.

Establishing the legal bases of religious community, the Soviet state restricted its functions from the very beginning. The community could only arrange divine services, serve as a place of worship, take part in meetings and appoint worshippers. However, even these types of activities were not completely free from government interference. In fact, the community lost such important functions as those related to education, propaganda and charitable acts.
However, until the middle of the 1920's the state maintained an ambiguous position concerning religious organizations. The attitude of the state towards Islam in general was relatively tolerant. In comparison with such anti-Christian actions as the closure of monasteries and withdrawal of material resources from the Orthodox church, the Muslim parishes were practically untouched by Soviet expropriation. In general, prior to 1922, neither reports of Tatar regional committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) nor reports of local department of the CPA and other sources dealt with the 'Muslim question'.

Thus, when analyzing sources, it can be stated that in the 1920's, the Muslim community was still able to function under the former, pre-revolution conditions. For example, this affected the educational function of the mahallah.

**Islamic Education.** The confessional parish school was always a key element in the structure of a Tatar mahallah. In addition to producing professional clerics as a crucially important function for the Islamic world, it also played a critical role in the religious education of general Tatar population. Nearly every community had educational institutions, including cathedral mosques, and at some mosques where prayers (salah) were said five times a day.

Therefore, the development of Islamic schools was important for the mahallah's existence after 1917 as well. Once the civil war was over the clergy began to resume the system of Islamic education. During that time secular education was going through a period of difficulty. Soviet schools were no longer funded by the state and after transfer to local financing, they were funded by poor local budgets. In these conditions, the religious population led by the spiritual leaders of their communities refused to support the teachers and the operation of the Soviet schools.

It should be noted that, due to the necessity of rudimentary education as well as the closure of secular schools due to a lack of funds, the Muslim population positively viewed the idea of education in a religious school. However, during this period the local Soviet authorities torpedoed such initiative by administrat-
allowed to profess Islam freely, without any limitations. The following demands were constantly being put forward at Mukhtasibat congresses: not to limit religious teaching to inside the walls of the mosque, to allow the use of special buildings for this purpose, not to limit the age or number of students, the program of the Central Muslim Spiritual Board (CMSB).

The activity of the Third All-Russian Muslim Congress in October–November 1926 clearly defined that further development of Islamic education was a priority in the work of the Spiritual Directorate. The demands of the congressional delegates on this issue came down to ensuring the complete functioning of the Islamic school institute. However, by the end of the year, party and Soviet bodies of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic decided to gradually prohibit religious education. By 1927 the number of Islamic schools had decreased dramatically. According to varying statistics, in 1926 this number had reached 800–1000 with 30 thousand students, by 1927 it had fallen to 150–200 with 6 thousand students.

Such a decrease was caused by a host of reasons. Firstly, there were numerous administrative barriers that hindered the opening of religious schools as well as repressive measures provided for by the state. Secondly, there was shortage of personnel, teachers-muallims, who had no material incentive and were not satisfied by the program. These reasons were named in official sources. It is also stated here that the decrease in number of religious schools was affected by the natural withdrawal of the population from religion and their dissatisfaction with religious education. Parents who enrolled their children into Maktabs were subjected to administrative and psychological pressure by the local party and state bodies, their children were deprived of the opportunity to continue their education. On the other hand, Islamic education did not make it possible for anyone to be an active citizen of the new society, and the commitment to religion took away the opportunity to use social benefits. Obviously, a lack of interest in religious education was the reason of its decline, though this factor is virtually ignored in unofficial sources. However, it is apparent that sooner or later, the mass anti-religious offensive, even without the application of prohibitive measures, the withdrawal of the mainstream population from religion and religious schools would have occurred.

The work of religious schools became an important condition for the further development of Islam in the atheistic state. The vital task of replenishing the cadre of teachers and theologians stood before the Muslims of Soviet Russia. Therefore, apart from opening religious schools, in 1920 the Islamic clergy tried to actively open secondary educational institutions or imam training courses.

At the end of 1924 the Kazan clergy created a special committee to arrange for the establishment of a madrasah in the city. However, due to persistent administrative pressure and control, religious leaders decided to only open imam retraining courses. Frequent meetings of the clergy were conducted in Kazan to discuss this issue, which could not go unnoticed by the state authorities. Thus, the local department of the Joint State Political Directorate considered it undesirable to open the courses because '1. this would help to strengthen the influence of the Kazan mullahs on village mullahs since nearly all of them would take positions of the teachers and village mullahs would find themselves being as students. 2. the main purpose of the courses was to show a practical way of adjusting religion to the present conditions' [Archive of Administration of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation in the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 109, Inventory 9, File 15, Sheet 3].

In April of 1925 the CMSB prepared a special instruction on the activities of uyezd religious courses which were organized for imams and muezzins and lasted one month in order to improve their professional and moral qualities. The courses were funded by voluntary donations and run by a mukhtasib and a special board. The management of the Spiritual Directorate developed a short-term training program for the courses [Archive of Administration of the Federal Security Service of the Russian
Federation in the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 109, Inventory 9, File 15, Sheet 24).

In the summer of 1925 the question of opening a madrasah was raised again, and the Kazan clergy united with the clergy of some cantons for this purpose and began to raise money. This question was only solved positively in the middle of 1926 when the Tatar People's Commissariat of Education issued a notification to the Kazan mukhtasibat 'on the absence of encumbrances on its part'. However, this situation was not resolved ultimately, as the Joint State Political Directorate told the Tatar People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs that such a step was pointless [Archive of Administration of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation in the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 109, Inventory 9, File 15, Sheet 16, 20 reverse].

Opening madrasahs was also planned in Buinsk, Naberezhnye Chelny, Yelabuga, and other cantons. One of the first madrasahs opened in 1920 was 'Islamia' in Buinsk which was attended by up to 70 people. However, under the conditions of famine of 1921–1922 and the well-known resolutions of 1923 the madrasah could not function properly. The canton congress in 1923 adopted a resolution on resuming the madrasah's activity, which was organized at the expense of the canton's Islamic parishes. More over, a considerable assistance was also offered by the Tetyush mukhtasibat [Archive of Administration of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation in the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 109, Inventory 9, File 1, Sheet 5]. At the beginning of 1926 retraining courses were to be opened in the Mamadysh canton and in Menzelinsk, however, no permission was granted.

This matter was discussed actively by the local and central authorities throughout 1927 and the beginning of 1928. The All-Russian Central Executive Committee informed the government of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic about the absence of legal encumbrances and asked them to give reasons for the local authorities' denial. The Tatar Central Executive Committee, on their part, referred to the resolution of the Bureau of the Regional Committee of the CPSU(B) dated 3 January 1928 in which the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs was suggested to give no permission to open the madrasah due to some formal grounds [Archive of Administration of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation in the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 109, Inventory 9, File 20, Sheet 81].

**The Forms of Activities of Islamic Communities in the 1920s.** In 1920s Islamic communities, while developing historical traditions, tried to continue charity work within the makhallya, although this sphere was narrowed dramatically due to a great number of prohibitions on the part of the authorities and absence of the necessary means. Some Islamic parishes and the clergy created a special fund out of the parish income which was used to provide economic aid to poor families, widows and orphans.

In 1926 a mutual benefit fund was set up in Chistopol. It was used to provide monetary assistance to the poor who attended the mosque [Ukhanov, 1932, p. 44]. The Kazan mukhtasibat provided assistance to homeless children, which, for example, was clearly manifested at the congress of Islamic parishes and the clergy of the city on 20 May 1923. As early as 17 September 1922 the question of establishing an orphanage for Muslim children and a charity were discussed at one of the meetings of Kazan imams [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 1, File 591, Sheet 52].

In order to strengthen their position in society Muslim communities and the clergy also conducted active outreach among the population. In the conditions of increased atheization and incultication of ungodliness ideas in the society by the authorities such activities were very important. In this respect, the activity of the community, first of all, reached out to Muslim youth, that is to that layer of the society which was most prone to breaking off with religion. The elder generation of Muslims kept observing the traditional rituals and living according to the orders of Sharia. Religious schools were certainly the major channel which helped to attract young people to religion. Besides, active community leaders took other measures to attract the population to mosques. Thus, some of them used the mosque as a cult building and as a youth club at the same time.
The outreach work of the clergy among women played an important role as well. A notable result of this work was establishment of a women's mutavalliyyat at the 12th mosque of Kazan. The outreach work of the clergy among women was also a form of social influence. In this regard the actions of the imam-khatib of this parish Gayaz Yakupov came to prominence. In order to attract women come to the mosque he gathered them weekly for preaching where he touched upon current issues of household activities: relations with the husband, the upbringing of children [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 2, File 172, Sheet 20–21]. The women's mutavalliyyat set up the tasks of educating women, equaling them with men when they attended a mosque. Imam G. Yakupov also encouraged his female believers to participate in elections.

Imam S. Imankulov practiced conversations with women as well. He gathered them in the mosque twice a week. The mukhtasib of the Agryz and Yelabuga district Ya. Adutov was known for his positive standpoint towards the protection of women's rights during discussions. In the mosques of Agryz, he regularly conducted meetings of women at which he encouraged them to attend the mosque and bring children with them, fast and observe other rituals.

Gatherings of women by mullahs' wives — abystais — was practiced at home. The state and party authorities considered such meetings as a new form of adversary activity of Islamic organizations designed to ideologically manipulate the population.

Thus, up to the end of 1920s, Islamic communities continued their activities in the conditions of relative freedom without limiting themselves to holding services in the mosque. The community strove for control over the system of education, influenced various layers of the society, took measures to improve the social and economic situation. As a whole, Muslim societies were very active.

In the 1920s such structures of a makhallya as the clergy and mosque were preserved. Despite the fact that the clergy was restricted in civil rights and subjected to intense taxation, parish imams not only performed religious management but also participated actively in social life. The mosque kept being used by believers, although it was public property. Up to the mid of 1920s, the number of mosques and parishes continued to grow. The year 1927 was a landmark for building mosques. The number of parishes began to decrease thereafter. By that time the number of Islamic parishes in the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was around 2 thousand and the number of imams and muezzins was around 4 thousand people.

**The Economy of the Makhallya.** Despite the intensive pressure on the part of the state, in 1920s the financial system of the makhallya was functioning. An important condition for an Islamic community to exist was always its economic solvency based on the mandatory confessional imposition and extensive charity of believers. Before the revolution a local Tatar Islamic community possessed a financial base and conducted spiritual and educational activities independently. The possibility to establish parish funds, donations of believers, absence of parish taxes, support from the business elite — all this allowed Islamic communities to function without direct public support.

The revolution of 1917 changed the financial base which had made it possible for Islamic communities to exist, the parishes lost financial independence. This was mainly caused by destruction of the makhallya funding institute in which an important role was played by the representatives of Muslim industrial and commercial bourgeoisie. As early as during the fledging years of the Soviet system they all were subjected to persecutions and repressions, their property and capital were nationalised, many of those from merchant families found themselves in emigration. The annihilation of the Muslim bourgeoisie as a class became a determining factor in the process of complete destruction of the former system of community economical self-sustainment. Government policy played a big role in the destruction of the makhallya's financial base, whether it was the regulation of the communities’ activities or their taxation. In the 1920s the government
legislatively controlled the financial stream of confessional associations. However, due to various circumstances, the efficient control in this area was not possible yet. Generally, the source base used for studying the issue of religious gatherings in an Islamic community is very poor. It can be assumed that Muslims kept donating to the mosque and clergy during the Soviet period as well. This assumption can be proved by separate documenting materials.

For example, it was noted in information reports of the Joint State Political Directorate of the 1920s that the clergy was carrying on agitation for collection of the natural tax for different purposes. In summary, from 26 September 1922 it was reported that money was being raised in Kazan in favour of the MSB, with the city mullahs being especially active [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 1, File 591, Sheet 52].

Due to the lack of material security in the majority of the clergy, in the summer of 1924, the CMSB was forced to issue an appeal suggesting that a religious fund be established. This fund was intended to distribute money for the needs of the clergy, the repair of mosques, and other religious needs [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 1, File 918, Sheet 155]. In the same year the imam-mukhtasib of the village Bolshaya Atnya (now the center of the Atnya district of the Republic of Tatarstan) S. Maksudov suggested that the mullahs and population collectively give ushr (natural donation in favour of the mosque or madrasah, amounting to 1/10 of the harvest). He suggested that this money should be used to cover the needs of the Spiritual Directorate and mukhtasibat, and the rest should be shared proportionally among the clergy [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 1, File 918, Sheet 155]. The tradition to give a part of the harvest yield to the mosque was common in villages where authoritative mullahs or ishans lived. Thus, this imposition was applied in many villages of the Buinsk canton, one of the most religious regions of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 1, File 918, Sheet 208].

It was stated that when few people attended mosques, parish councils kept working, mullahs received payments, prayer buildings were heated and lighted [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 1, File 1333, Sheets 186–187]. The writer and columnist F. Saifi, who made a trip to the Mamadysh canton, wrote that 'the collection of a tithe for mullahs was uncommon in other cantons, but it was thriving in Saby...'[SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 1, File 1347, Sheet 96].

In a summary report of the Joint State Political Directorate on political climate in the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic for April–June of 1925, it was noted that when large donations were given in favour of the clergy peasants refused to support the teacher and 'gave the most miserly sums for building a monument to Lenin' [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 1, File 1378, Sheet 13]. Forcible collection occurred in the village Ashybash of the Arsk canton where the mullah threatened to keep insurance contribution of non-payers out of the mosque [Ibid., Inventory 2, File 72, Sheet 36].

It can be said that in the early 1920s, financial contributions were still made by well-to-do peasants in the country and merchants in the city. The makhliya funding institute still existed, though in an altered form. The same F. Saifi noted that, nearly each of the 47 Islamic communities of Saby volost had 3–5 trustees: 'A trustee for the Islamic clerical movement is the strongest instrument. Usually trustees were elected from among the peasants who were good farmers and had authority among the population, very religious ones' [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 1, File 1347, Sheet 96].

Much attention was given to the makhallya's affairs by representatives of the Tatar bourgeoisie in Kazan. So, in a summary report of the Joint State Political Directorate the economic committee of the Kazan mukhtasibat was named the 'official representation' of the national bourgeoisie in this religious body [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 1, File 1378, Sheet 34]. At nearly all mukhtasibat congresses the issues of financial well-being of the mosque and mukhtasibat were raised. Thus, in the autumn of 1925. a cost estimate of keeping a regional directorate was approved at the congresses of mukhtasibats 2 and 4 of Naberezhnye Chelny canton [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 2, File 72, Sheet 61].
Bulletins of the Joint State Political Directorate continued to provide information on financial streams in the makhallya. In March of 1927 the mullahs in Agryz mosques encouraged people to pay ushr and fitr. In the village Tabarli of the Yelabuga canton, the collection of 1/2 pood of bread per house was performed, with the members of the village council being involved. In the village of Tersi in the same canton the village council provided the mosque with 1.5 dessiatinas of timber. In the village Sluzhilaya Ura of the Arsk canton believers made a decision to collect in favour of the mosque 1 rouble from middle peasants and 50 kopeks from poor peasants. In the village Bulym-Bulykhchi of the Tetyushi canton, for the upkeep of the mosque and other needs a pood of grain per farm was collected in one parish, and 2-3 poods—in the other parish [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 2, File 355, Sheets 7, 12, 14].

The limitation of the makhallya's Functions and Activities in the 1930s.

The drastic alterations in all areas of social life which followed in the late 1920s had a great impact on the existence of an Islamic community. By 1927 the authorities made educational activity of the makhallya impossible. In January 1927, the Agitation and Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) prepared a draft resolution of the Organizational Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) 'On the Measures for Fighting Against the Islamic Religious Movement', which, in particular, suggested that the possibilities to teach Islam and train clergymen were drastically limited. In May of 1928, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) took a decision to close Islamic schools [Nurullaev, 1999, p. 137], and then the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR canceled the resolutions on Islamic instructions [Archive of Administration of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation in the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 109, Inventory 9, File 19, Sheet 58].

In January of 1928, the Eastern Department of the Joint State Political Directorate in its letter to the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR actually derailed the hopes of Muslims for opening a madrasah in Kazan: 'As regards the struggle against the clergy we certainly do not see it as beneficial to establish a madrasah intended, first of all, to prepare the Islamic clergy for the struggle against us. However, tactical considerations that you are aware of compel us to resolve this issue positively. That's why in practice we should consider the question of establishing a madrasah with exceptional care — and this year only as an experiment. Hence our opinion is basically to permit opening a madrasah only in Ufa at the Central Spiritual Directorate so far. The permission to do this should be given in the name of a person who could show us at least some credibility...’ [Archive of Administration of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation in the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 109, Inventory 9, File 1, Sheet 76].

The resolution of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic 'On Religious Associations' of 8 April 1929, permitted the teaching of religion only at special theological courses which needed a special permit from the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs and the Central Executive Committee to open. No meetings or religion study groups were allowed. But even this right could not be used by Islamic parishes since the repressions restrained the Islamic clergy as a component of Islamic education. Thus, the system of Islamic education was ultimately destroyed.

Generally, the resolution 'On Religious Associations' and the Instruction of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic 'On the Rights and Obligations of Religious Organizations' drew a line defining a religious society. For the first time the Instruction listed the activities which were prohibited for the communities to engage in:

'a) to set up mutual benefit funds, asylums, shelter-care facilities, hospices, boarding houses, funeral funds, etc.;
b) to establish cooperatives, production enterprises and generally use property possessed by them for any purpose other than satisfaction of religious needs;
c) to provide financial support to members of a religious association;
d) to organize special children's, youth, and women's prayer meetings as well as other gatherings;
e) to organize general Bible, literary, handicraft, labor, religious instruction meetings, groups, clubs, departments, and so forth;
f) to arrange excursions and play grounds for children;
g) to open libraries and reading rooms;
h) to organize health resorts and medical assistance' [Bulletin of People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, 1929, No. 37, p. 691].

In this way, the scope of religious groups functions was narrowed down, within the framework of the law, to satisfying religious needs in a house of prayer. This squeezed out religious organizations from all spheres of public life, where they had functioned before. An analysis of the sources shows that in the 1930s such a narrowing of functions occurred not only legally but also in practice.

From that moment, large-scale economic and political campaigns were conducted in the country, which put religious communities into critical condition. It is impossible to speak about the active presence of religious communities in the 1930s. According to the analysis of documents, the basic activity of Islamic parishes was narrowed down to religious services in the mosque and observing rituals. The participation of the population in religious festivals and every day rituals was practically the only indicator of religious life. It is however noteworthy, that the population of all Islamic regions observed fasts, and butchered livestock for the holiday Kurban Bayram (The Festival of Sacrifice). In the meantime, the religious ritualism of Muslims could not be eliminated by administrative measures. Summary reports of the Joint State Political Directorate note a high attendance to mosques, especially during Islamic holidays. In 1935, during Kurban Bayram, all the three mosques of the village Bolshiye Nurlaty were overcrowded. In the same year, during the holiday of Uraza Bayram, the Azimov mosque was attended by about 500 people, in the Novotatarskaya sloboda by 800 people, and the White mosque—by up to 1 thousand people, most notably that 20% of believers consisted of the Kazan youth [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 3, File 865, Sheet 63].

In the absence of active forms of religious activity which were common in 1920s, the regional party committees reported even presence of a namazlyk (carpet) or a kumgan (jar) in Tatar families as manifestation of religiosity. The battle against such anachronisms was one of the major anti-religious activities. In 1936 the Central Council of the League of Militant Atheists suggested, for example, 'to resolutely battle with the ritual of circumcision' in the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.

Since the end of the 1920s, information about the financial base and system of sustenance of the mahallya (congregation) is not available. It was gradually destroyed as a result of collectivisation, dekulakization, and repressions. These processes, firstly, eliminated the well-to-do class, which traditionally provided substantial financial assistance to the parish, secondly, subdued religious feelings of the believers who now could not (or did not want to) support the religious society even financially. In the 1930s information on any donations in favour of the mosque were rare. In the village Dyusum of the Sarmanovo district, there were many occurrences of disruptions of anti-religious lectures because the club, in contrast to the mosque, was neither heated nor lighted. The collection of money for payment of taxes by the ministers of religion for their own needs, for repairs of the mosque and its rent, to support the Spiritual Directorate and provide assistance to families of repressed mullahs was performed in the village Psalym of the Arsk district in 1937 [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 4, File 762, Sheet 16].

Thus, if in the 1920s there were still financial incomings to the communities in different forms, then in 1930s the economic independence of an Islamic community was brought to nought.
The mass closure of mosques. In the 1930s makhallyas certainly received financial assistance in places which had a mosque and a legally registered religious society. Therefore, the dedicated and mass campaign of mosque closure was also for the authorities a way of fighting against religion and the influence of the clergy, against the religious community.

The closure religious buildings began with from the first years of Soviet power. At the end of the 1920s regulatory acts made this process even easier. The regulatory documents were the resolution of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of 8 April 1929 'On Religious Associations' and the instruction of the Permanent Committee on Cult Issues at the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of 16 January 1931. 'On the Procedure for Enforcement of Cult Legislation'. In fact, however, no law was observed during the execution of agreements and the closure of cult buildings, and this process was accompanied everywhere by an abuse of power by the authorities and party bodies.

The beginning and escalation of this process coincided with large-scale industrialisation and the mass collectivization of agriculture. Therefore it was critical for the Soviet system to destroy major urban religious centers which remained not only a unique stronghold of the spiritual opposition but also a hotspot of 'harmful' ideological influence on the proletarian masses. It should be noted that, for example, in Kazan, the closure of churches only started in 1928, and the Orthodox churches and monasteries were the first to experience administrative pressure. Thus, in October 1928—April 1929, 12 out of 52 churches and monasteries ceased their activities, but none of the 19 mosques were closed [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, f. P–5852, f.a. 1, f. 784, s. 12 reverse].

It was exactly the quarters of the historical national district of the city — Novotatarskaya sloboda — in 1928 that became the field of the first large socialist construction site of Kazan, namely construction of a large fur production complex. The implementation of this grand technological and, of course, social and political project required the complete destruction of the former way of life and household of the sloboda's residents who historically would group into confessional communities around the three local mosques. It is well known that, before the revolution all the makhallyas of Novotatarskaya sloboda stood apart by high social activity. It was a place where many well-known educational Islamic centers functioned, famous teachers and theologians preached and taught [Salikhov and others, 2004, pp. 294–295]. It can be said that such religious hotspot in the very center of the construction being launched was initially doomed. The 11th mosque in the Novotatarskaya sloboda was the first Islamic cult building of Kazan closed, taken away from the believers and 'transferred for cultural needs' [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund P–5852, Inventory 1, File 784, Sheets 5–12 reverse].

Once the construction of the fur factory was over, the local authorities began to receive petitions from labour collectives to close the remaining mosques in the Novotatarskaya sloboda. The last remaining prayer house of the Novotatarskaya sloboda — 'Iske Tash' mosque — was also on the verge of closing. In 1931 its imam M. Imankulov was arrested. Immediately after this a signature collection campaign for the closure the mosque started among workers of the fur production complex. However, apparently from the numerous complaints of believers from this industrial district to the highest public authorities suspended the closing process, which was only completed in 1939.

By that time, all the clergy of the Novotatarskaya sloboda had been repressed, and the two century history of its religious communities practically ended. However, out of the 19 city mosques only one mosque — 'Marjan' — was functioning at that time, which, of course, could not satisfy the spiritual needs of all the city's Muslims.

The mass closure of mosques continued up to the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. Only 100 out of 13.7 thousand Islamic parishes of Inner Russia functioned in 1941 [Yunusova, ...}
1999, p. 189]. In early 1939, at a republic-wide meeting of the Political and Educational Department of employees and the League of Militant Atheists the Secretary of the Tatar Regional Committee of the CPSU(B) Mukhametov stated that the clergy of the republic sowed a rumour about the planned sweeping closure of prayer houses. Nonetheless, this fact proved to be true: the analysis of the materials shows that in 1939 only 698 prayer houses were closed, including 574 mosques and 124 churches [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund П–3610, f.a. 5, f. 3].

The campaign for the closure of cult building, launched in the late 1920s, marked the beginning of drastic destruction of traditional relationships in the Islamic communities and was intended to prepare the necessary ideological and social ground for performing the complete collectivization in rural areas. The mass closure of mosques resulted in the elimination of the most religious society which lost even the need of financial independence.

**The Socio-Economic Status of the Islamic Clergy.** Apart from these processes, the destruction of the Islamic clerical institute strongly affected the transformation of the Islamic community in the 1920–1930. Initially, the Soviet government set the task to neutralize and eliminate it from the society. Even the first decrees of the Soviet system restricted church servants in their activities and they became just ritual performers, immediately they were deprived of voting rights, which prevented them from participating in the social and political life of the country.

The restrictions in civil rights was not the only form of the pressure exerted on the clergy. In the 1920s the economic policy served as the main method of its neutralization. The unreasonably high tax rates for this population category allowed for the restriction the clergy financially. One of the serious consequences of the legal and economic restrictions imposed by the state was the wide-scale refusal of religious leaders to perform their spiritual duties. The departure of the clergy from religious activities is important for understanding the transformation process of the Islamic community in the 1920–1930.

This phenomenon was observed even in the early years of the Soviet system. As a rule, sweeping resignations from clerical positions was observed when public policy towards the clergy was being tightened, and the financial and social status of clergymen was declining. So the first mass resignations from spiritual positions took place immediately after October 1917. In Tataria, during the fledgling years of the Soviet system over 200 mullahs resigned from their religious position [Matorin, 1929, p. 145]. This process acquired a new drive after the civil war was over, when new restrictions on the activities of the clergy were imposed and taxation policy was made more rigorous.

Concerning the reasons for the resignations from religious positions, it should be noted that the documents of the regulatory authorities, and particularly of the Joint State Political Directorate, barely mention any ideological split with religion. Such cases were isolated, and as a rule they were widely advertised in the press. The major reasons for the resignations were related to the social and economic status of the clergy. The clergy was charged taxes, deprived of voting and other civil rights, and social benefits were not available to members of their families. Resigning enabled their rights to be reinstated and meant that they could participate in public life. Therefore many of them preferred living an equal footing with other citizens to being 'the deprived'.

The lack of social and material incentives associated with official spiritual service was the key reason for the clergy resignations. And as such some mullahs ceased to perform their duties in the parish forever. However, some of the clergy used this situation for informal religious worship. The history of this process is unclear due to the absence of statistical materials. According to the authorities, this process built up during the electoral campaigns when the official split with religion gave access to participation in public life. The same tendency was also widely used for discrediting the clergy [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 1, File 1347, Sheet 92].

The leading social and economic reasons for the resignations was that it was impossible
to pay all the taxes. In this situation it was the people that sometimes provided financial support; allocating monetary or arranging payment in kind for their imams. However, in the parishes where this was impossible due to the poverty level of the believers or the active countermeasures of the rural authorities, resigning was the only way out of the situation. In the mosque of the village of Mellya-Tamak of the Menzelinsk canton imam-khatyb declared: 'We, the mullahs, serve you and serve to preserve religion in future. If we, the mullahs, due to the burden tax and burden of other levies, have to resign from our positions in the future, your mosque will be turned into a club. In this case funerals and marriages will not be performed' [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 2, File 524, Sheet 99]. Very often the reason for resigning appeared to be the social limitations imposed on a mullah's family, particularly the fact that is was not possible to provide school education for their children.

This process was most widespread in the late 1920s. The Dekulakisation policy was the major reason for the clergy's resignation on a large scale. During this time new methods of fighting against the clergy were added to the social and financial deprivation. The official split with religion became the only way of saving oneself and one's family from dekulakization. The party bodies admitted that the resignations were primarily caused by social and economic deprivation: 'The material troubles and absence of civil rights, the impossibility to provide education for one's children in Soviet educational institutions, and, separately, the ideological withdrawal from religious beliefs led to some of the clergy abdicated from their religious positions and start a working life' [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 2, File 524, Sheet 96].

In 1928–1929, 150 Islamic clergymen were registered as resigning. The mullahs themselves sometimes advocated for mass resignations. In their opinion, this would force the government to make certain concessions. The mullah Valeev from the village of Almetyevo of the Chelnay canton stated: 'We, the mullahs, should now resign all together and at the same time, there is no other way to get exempted from taxes' [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 2, File 524, Sheet 100 reverse]. This tendency was observed in many cantons of the Tatar ASSR. In the Shonguty volost of the Buisnisk canton 19 mullahs were ready to take this step.

Violations of religious law became standard practice in the late 1920s, and at that time they were practically legalised. At that time the clergy was subjected to further impingements on their social and economic rights. During the collectivisation and dekulakisation the clergy was officially classified as kulaks which meant that the livelihood of the clergy could be taken away and also the most active religious leaders could be 'neutralised' and eliminated. In the late 1920s–early 1930s the clergy, deprived of its civil rights and material resources, notably declined.

In the 1930s the campaign to close religious buildings inflicted another blow on the status of the clergy. Having lost the mosque the parish ceased to exist, and community servants lost their source of income and had to cease their spiritual work. Besides, tax legislation was not eased for the clergy and all social restrictions remained in force. To sum it up, the lack of civil rights, unreasonably high taxes, and dekulakisation gave rise to the drop in the number of clergymen and the decline of their role in society.

**Repressions against the Islamic clergy.**

State repressions were one of the main factors which influenced the Islamic clergy in an oppressive way. The first wave of mass repressions against the clergy began at the very end of the 1920s, when forced improvements were begun in all aspects of country life. The authorities considered religion, priesthood and ordinary religious people an important obstacle in the way of the reforms. The consequences of that policy took the hardest toll on rural areas, where collectivisation and incidents related to it broke the traditional tenor of life, destroyed the worldview of the peasant community, as well as the population's devotion to religion.

The policy of the 'abridgment and displacement of the kulaks [peasant bourgeoisie]
through economic methods' was accompanied by repressive administrative measures during the economic and political campaigns. It was constantly emphasised that households belonging to representatives of the clergy were also kulak households. From that time, the punitive policies of the Soviet state was directed not against the clergy in general, but against its representatives as 'members' of the anti-kolkhoz movement. Almost all the clergymen convicted between 1929 and 1932 were accused of opposing the kolkhoz and other farming campaigns, and of organising kulak groups in favour of the opposition. In that time, religious activity was de facto equated with anti-kolkhoz activities, especially in cases where no evidence was found on opposition to the creation of kolkhozes.

At the end of the 1920s–beginning of the 1930s, the Joint State Political Directorate of the TASSR fabricated several group cases on the so-called 'mullah-merchant counter-revolutionary formations'. The repressions were started on the basis of the directives on mass operations to eliminate the kulaks, and it covered all regions of the republic. For example, in September 1931, the Tatarstan department of the Joint State Political Directorate performed the investigation of the case of the so-called 'counter-revolutionary bourgeois-nationalist religious insurgent organisation' in the Mamadysh, Sabinsk and Rybnaya Sloboda districts (former Mamadysh canton) [Archive of Administration of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation in the Republic of Tatarstan, Archive Investigation File No. 2–14047 (in vol. 4)].

One of the main points of the indictment was the attempt to associate the anti-kolkhoz mood with the religious movement in the kanton which was accompanied by the requirements to restore mosques and release the arrested clergymen.

According to the existing practice, the case was typically built around one important well-known person: all of his or her professional and non-professional contacts were revealed, and all of these targets were then united into a single organisation. This case was no different: the leader of that non-existing entity was a well-known influential imam-hatib of Mamadysh, muhtasib of Mamadysh canton Mukhamet Berkutov. His activities as the imam and muhtasib, as well as his contacts with clergymen of different positions were the subject of special interest on the part of security forces. For example, M. Berkutov participated in the work of the All-Russian congresses of the clergy between 1920 and the 1926s, was the organiser of the campaign aimed at opening religious schools in the kanton. He also actively advocated for the rights of the clergy and the restoration of mosques. It is natural that his acquaintances included not only representatives of parishes of the Mamadysh muhtasib, but also Muslim leaders from Kazan, Ufa and other centres. On this basis, the local department of the Joint State Political Directorate built up the structure of the 'organisation'. So in the course of the investigation, this 'entity' united 70 people who lived in different villages, and allegedly comprised 15 groups. The Mullahs were the leaders of each gang, and its other 'members' were said to be the kulaks.

The indictment extensively described the activities of each cell of the organization within the Mamadysh canton. However, at the kanton level, the scale of the organisation would be insignificant. Such 'organisations' were usually said to have connections with Kazan, in particular — with M. Imankulov. It was stated that their general management was performed by the CMSB. They were also said to be related to other regions, in this case — to Middle Asia. Any trip or a correspondence acquaintance could serve as a formal reason for establishing the connections of the 'organisation'.

The directives of the Joint State Political Directorate affected not only villages. Considering the 'revival of the urban counter-revolution', it was supposed to also intensify their activities in cities. At the same time, the Tatarstan department of the Joint State Political Directorate prepared a new repressive campaign against Kazan influential clergymen and the bourgeoisie who were united in the 'mullah-merchant gang of Kazan'. According to the typical scenario, this case was formed around a well-known public person — the Kazan muhta-
sib, imam-hatib of the 9th cathedral mosque, M. Imankulov.

As a result of the mass repressions at the end of the 1920s—the beginning of the 1930s, a significant number of clergymen of all confessions were executed throughout the whole republic. The 'trinity' of the GPU-NKVD [the State Political Administration at the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs] of the TASSR alone convicted 802 representatives of the Islamic clergy of the Tatar ASSR between 1929 and 1938. The Islamic clergy thus lost its most active and educated religious representatives whose place was occupied by non-professional imams, and this led to the loss of the Islamic heritage by the Tatar society. Although some mullahs returned to their motherland from concentration camps and exile, many of them did not continue to perform their professional duties. In the middle of the 1930s they were all victims of even severer repressions.

We can judge how enormous the losses among the clergy were if we look at the number of people who officially remained at their posts. As a result of natural decline, resignations and repressions, the number of Islamic clergy of the Tatar ASSR by the beginning of the 1930s was reduced fourfold: if by 1927, the number of Islamic clergymen fluctuated between 3.6–3.9 thousand persons (so was almost unchanged), by 1934 only about 1,000 registered imam-hatibs and muezzins (according to the official data — 1,555 persons remained, but this number also included 'lapotnys' ['wearing bast shoes'], 'vagrants' and those who were removed from their position).

The unprecedented attack began in 1936, when almost all representatives of the administration of Islamic organisations were executed. The destruction of the CMSB and its members enabled the elimination of the Islamic clergy to be initiated throughout the whole country. That same year, the criminal prosecution of the

clergy of the Tatar ASSR was initiated, with the 'case of Atlasov' being one of those most high-profile examples.

In 1937 the repressions intensified throughout the entire USSR. As before, the clergy of all confessions suffered greatly. In the course of the 'kulak operation' in the Tatar ASSR, a significant number of Islamic clergymen were repressed. The following famous Islamic representatives of Tataria were condemned to death: muhtasib of the Dubyaz district F. Shamsutdinov, muhtasib of the Arsk district G. Urazgildiev, former imam of the 17th mahalla of Kazan S. Vakhtitov.

By that time, the supreme clergy — the former administration of the CMSB — had been almost completely eliminated. In 1936, the kadi of the CMSB Mukhlsa Bubis was shot; in 1937 the imam of the cathedral mosque A. Shamsutdinov was also shot in Moscow; in 1938 almost all the leaders of the Spiritual Directorate were sentenced to death: Sh. Sharaf, Z. Kamali, Dzh. Abzgildin and others. Deputy mufti K. Tardzhmanov, who in January 1937 was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment, was sent in October of the next year to the prison in Ufa where he was subjected to interrogation for a year.

Despite a small general decrease in the scale of the repressions, 1938 saw new tendencies in punitive policies on religious and national grounds. During this time, the number of cases involving clergymen increased because of the elimination of the so-called 'branches' of the organisation 'Idel-Ural' in the Tatar ASSR. Since the focus was on the revelation of a plot throughout the whole republic, Islamic clergymen were murdered for being 'ideological leaders' of these branches.

The repressions of the 1930s completely changed the social and cultural characteristics of the Islamic clergy and devastated their numbers. Arrests and shootings of thousands of imams caused a noticeable loss of the continuity of religious traditions between generations.

Therefore, the existence of Islamic communities between the 1920 and 1930s was dependent upon the logics of development of the Soviet state: any action it took was directed
towards breaking the former communal institutions. However, the specifics of such policies depended on the social, political and economic environment in the country. So before the middle of the 1920s, the state did not openly interfere in the matters of the communities, but forced them to limit their scope of activities. Technically, the community could only organise church services, monitor the safety of buildings of worship, participate in congresses and appoint clergymen.

An analysis of the available materials shows that before the end of the 1920s, Islamic communities continued their work in an environment of comparative freedom, without limiting themselves only to conducting liturgical services in mosques. The community fought for the ability to control the system of education, had an influence on diverse layers of society and took measures to improve their socio-economic conditions.

However, at the end of the 1920–1930, the state took a range of measures which brought the traditional Tatar mahalla with all of its social and economic functions to the verge of extinction. At the end of the 1920s, the state took steps to eliminate the religious system of education. At first, severe administrative limitations were imposed upon it, and then it was completely eliminated. The tax pressure of the Soviet authorities destroyed the economic potential of the mahalla. In 1930s, the mass demolition of mosques was organised. The liquidation of the institution of the clergy led to the complete incapability of the Tatar mahalla in its previous form. If in 1920s the basic Soviet methods of neutralising clergymen were social and economic limitations, in the 1930s, the repressions led to the almost complete elimination of this layer of Islamic society.

The 1920–1930 marked a deep transformation of the Russian ummah. The mahalla itself ceased to be a self-managing Islamic community possessing a particular lifestyle. It turned into a religious group — registered or unofficial — which brought believers together with the sole aim of conducting religious rituals. Over the next long period of time, the existence of this kind of religious community was supported either via the presence of the mosque, or through the presence of a person who performed rituals.

§ 2. Political repressions in the TASSR in the 1930s

Ayslu Kabirova

The consolidation of I. Stalin's personal power in the Soviet state was accompanied by the planting of an atmosphere of suspicion and hostility in society, the activation of the JSPD's work to root out 'enemies' and take punitive measures. In the 1930s, large-scale political repressions affected all categories of the population. Undoubtedly, the political elite was the first to be affected. After the demonstrative educational trial of M. Sultan-Galiev, who was the test run for the subsequent systematic elimination of the Soviet opposition, other influential workers of the Tatar ASSR party bodies were also removed from their posts. The Chairman of the Tatarstan Central Executive Committee G. Baichurin and the secretary of the Tatarstan Regional Committee of the CPSU(B) G. Mukhametzyanov were accused anti-Soviet activities. S. Said-Galiev, K. Mukhtarov, Kh. Gabidullin, Sh. Shaymordanov, A. Davletyarov, who occupied the position of the chair of Tatarstan's Council of People's Commissars in different years, and many commissars and senior commissariats were arrested and later shot [Politicheskie repressii v TASSR, 2011, p. 26]. As a result, it was established that workers of law-enforcement bodies applied illegal methods to these leaders, including beatings, torture and starvation, thus forcing them to 'confess' to crimes they had not committed.

The following cases trumped up by the NKVD became high-profile in Tatarstan: the cases of 'Dzhigedyan', 'State Publishing House', 'Novatory', 'Yana Kitap', 'Commissariat of Ag-
riculture', 'Peasant Ittifaq', 'Right-Trotsky Nationalistic Organisation', diverse diversionary-sabotage organisations within the defence industry, terrorist and insurgent spy organisations, the anti-Soviet formation 'Idel-Ural' and the like. According to the calculations of A. Litvin, between 1929 and 1938 the chekist trinities of the Tatar ASSR reviewed over 20 thousand cases on an extrajudicial basis, and every fifth convict was sentenced to death [Litvin, 1995, p. 172].

The intelligentsia was considered to be influential and therefore a 'dangerous part' of society for the power structures. For this reason, the cream of the Tatar nation was repressed: Karim Tinchurin, Galiaskar Kamal, Baki Urmanche, Gaziz Gubaydullin, Khasan Tufan, Fatykh Karim, Gilm Kamay, Salakh Atnagulov and others. More fictitious reasons were found than necessary. Many widely known Tatar writers and scientists had displeased I. Stalin and his closest state figures back in the 1920s when they questioned the necessity of the reform of the Tatar language imposed by the supreme bodies, which suggested transferring from the Arabic script to the Yanalif ['the new alphabet'].

Lively discussions on this issue were erupted in the latter half of the 1920s. The Arabic script was proclaimed an 'obstacle' to the socialist reforms. The way to the 'glorious future' according to the authorities had to be secured by the internalisation of national cultures, which was to be achieved through the official mass introduction of the Latin alphabet. A discussion of these problems was included in the agenda of the First Turkology Congress held in Baku in 1926. The most ardent adherents and supporters of latinisation were the Azerbaijan leaders, while Armenia and Georgia by contrast considered that there was no need to hurry with its introduction.

The position of Tatar scientists and public figures was also divided. Shamil Usmanov supported the introduction of the Yanalif, suggesting that it would 'fundamentally solve all issues related to the orthography of the Tatar language'. Salakh Atnagulov and Fatykh Saifi agreed. However, other scientists such as Galimdzhhan Ibragimov and Galimdzhhan Sharaf called for prudence and care when performing the revolutionary changes [Davletshin, 2005, pp. 362–363]. Many non-party representatives of the Tatar intelligentsia adhered to the same view, believing that the elimination of the Arabic script would immediately lead to the destruction of the centuries-old written heritage of the Tatars. Being afraid of such an outcome, they protested against the accelerated pace of the transfer of the Tatar alphabet into the Yanalif and sent a personal letter to I. Stalin. These protests went down in the history books as the 'Letter of 82'. The document was signed by: G. Gubaydullin, B. Urmanche, G. Kamal, A. Rakhim, F. Muhamedyarov, M. Gali and others [Sultanbekov, 1994, pp. 129–131].

After the 'expository' measures organised by the Party bodies, they had to withdraw their signatures, however, the very existence of the signatures was treated as a crime against Soviet power was grounds for prosecution.

The 1930s marked a new wave of repressions against the Tatar members of the intelligentsia. In August 1930, there was 'unveiled' a mythic organisation of Tatar writers named 'Dzhigedyan' ('Big Dipper') which had allegedly been created back in 1928. Its literati members were accused of attempting to fight against the authorities of the Communist Party through fiction, of not understanding the ways proletarian literature could develop, and of stirring class hatred among the Tatar people. In the meantime, the literary collection published for the 10th anniversary of the TASSR was also severely criticised, as its authors included defendants in the case of 'Dzhigedyan'. The edition was dubbed the 'collection of anti-Soviet rants' and its compilers headed by Tatar writer Tukhfat Chenakay were accused of belonging to the counter-revolutionary movement, while the Tatar publishing house which published the book was said to be littered with nationalists. Since the revelatory campaign against the followers of Sultan-galiev or 'Sultangalievets' gained momentum in the republic at that time, the easiest thing was to attribute everything to their harmful ideological influence. And this is what was done. In
1931, all the members of the secret organisation 'Dzhigetyan' were categorised as Sultangalievs and thus a tragic fate awaited them.

In 1932, bodies of the CPA reported on the 'disclosure' in Kazan of the nationalist counter-revolutionary Trotskyist group 'Krestiansky Ittifaq' [Tagirov, 1999, p. 224]. This organisation was said to have been managed by Galimzhan Aminov — the instructor of the Tatar publishing house, while Mingarey Sagidullin was proclaimed the mastermind of the organisation, as his friends would call him 'Tatar Bukharin' for his sagacity and extraordinary wit. Writer F. Saifi, head of garment factory No. 4 A. Nugayev, secretary of the Bavly District committee of the CPSU(B) Sh. Yakupov, head of the Menzelinsk Executive Committee Council G. Sultanov and others were close to this group.

In total, in March 1933, 13 persons from the list of the 'counter-revolutionary group' were excluded from the Party. The indictments give us an idea of how these cases were fabricated. M. Khuzev was persecuted for 'having friendly relations with Sagidullin'; writer G. Galev — the chair of the sector of Tatizdat ('the Tatar Publishing House') — was persecuted for his connections with disgraced writer G. Baimbetov whose Moscow apartments he used to visit; S. Bkushev — the chair of the Party branch of the newspaper 'Kyzyl Tatarstan' — was accused of 'not taking any measures to disclose the anti-Party activities of the counter-revolutionary gang'.

Even the famous Tatar commander Yakub Chanyshhev was involved in the investigation of 'Krestiansky Ittifaq'. The investigative bodies reminded him that the general listened to L. Trotsky at the Marshall courses in Moscow, spoke of him positively, kept his portrait and even Trotskyist literature. Therefore, it was not necessary for one to be a counter-revolutionist so that the respective authorities could render judgment; it was sufficient to be acquainted with participants of undesirable organisations, communicate with persons disloyal to the state, behind the scenes agree with the activities of L. Trotsky, G. Zinoviev, L. Kamenev and other repressed state and public figures, not engage in whistleblowing and the like.

The operation 'Novatory' conducted in Kazan in 1936 was to a degree a continuation of the case of 'Krestiansky Ittifaq', in which a large counter-revolutionary organisation of literary-publishing workers was 'exposed' [Sultanbekov, 1994, pp. 132–152]. The main actors mentioned were Salakh Atmagulov — an authoritative specialist in the field of Tatar literature and linguistics, an Associate Professor of Kazan Pedagogical Institute; Iskhak Rakhatmatullin — the former Commissar of the enlightenment of the republic who later occupied different positions at the Tatar State Publishing House; Fatykh Saifi — a writer and public activist; Zaki Gimranov — the former head of the publicity department of the CPSU(B). All of them were arrested in 1936. The accused were charged with preparing acts of terrorism, spreading Trotskyist and nationalist-bourgeois elements while occupying responsible positions at the state publishing house, frustrating the plans to publish Marxism-Leninism classics in the Tatar language, publishing ideologically harmful literature with anti-Soviet contents, and the like.

Using inhuman investigative techniques, the chekists beat false confessions out of them and forced them to incriminate not only themselves, but also other people who belonged to the ideological elite of Kazan. In total, 34 persons were targeted in the investigation.

The 'Novatory' were to be judged in Moscow at the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court. A show trial was supposed to be held. However, later the procedure was fully simplified. In May 1938, during a visiting session which lasted just two days, over 100 people from Tatarstan and 18 from the Mari Republic were sentenced to death. These numbers included famous representatives of the Tatar nation: the chairman of the Kazan State Pedagogical Institute G. Kasymov; 'Izvestiya' reporter S. Burgan; the head of the Department for the Arts G. Almukhametov; the former rector of Kazan State Pedagogical Institute and then head of the Tatar theatre M. Yusupov; the former secretaries of the Kazan City Committee of the CPSU(B) B. Abdullin and A. Biktagirov; the prominent philologist and ethnographer N.
Khakimov and others. K. Nadzhmi, Kh. Tufan, G. Nigmati, S. Aydarov, A. Kutuy, N. Isanbet, A. Alish, S. Battal and others were categorised as nationalons during this investigation.

The year of 1937 is sadly known for the severe nature and large scale of the repressions, and it brought with it new misfortune. The 'Case of Narkomzem' was the most high-profile and large scale in the republic [Sultanbekov, 1994, pp. 152–164]. Heads of kolkhozes and MTS's, chairs of district land departments ('raizo'), workers at offices of 'Zagotzerno' [grain procurement office] were also prosecuted. They were accused of the collapse of the kolkhozes, the death of animals, lack of fuel, and the like. The majority of alleged offences were economic crimes, for which only disciplinary actions would have been imposed at another time. However, in the environment of the excessive revelatory campaigns, the court considered them to be various forms of political crime. In general, it is noteworthy that the reclassification of economic crimes from article 109 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR (abuse of office) into one of the sub-paragraphs of article 58 on counter-revolutionary activities directed at undermining the economy became an ordinary and therefore terrible phenomenon.

'Agricultural diversionists' and 'pan-Turkists in cattle-breeding' were 'exposed' all over the country. The constant repressions affected many Tatarstan districts at that time: the 'Buinsk case' was high-profile, as K. Gafurov — the first secretary of the District Committee of the CPSU(B); G. Valeev — the chair of the District Executive Committee; Z. Sharafutdinov — the chair of the District Land Department were implicated in 'crimes against their people'. A similar case was filed against the leaders of the Kyzyl-Yulduzcha district. In this case the chair of the District Committee of the CPSU(B) B. Shaymardanov and the chair of the District Executive Committee Ya. Kuramshin and others were brought to trial. Similar proceedings were held in Bavl, Kukmor, Almeteyevsk and other districts of the republic. The accused were excluded from the Party, arrested, brought to trial, shot or exiled to camps for long periods of time.

The mass wave of repressions also affected the Red Army (according to statistics, 90% of generals and 80% of colonels were executed in the 1930s) and this affected commanders of Tatar nationality. Khusain Mavlyutov was among them. In the days of the Civil War, he was the regimental commander of the first Tatar rifle brigade, and in the latter half of the 1920s, he had a successful career in the Soviet military intelligence. In July 1937 he was arrested and shot. The documents released in the course of his rehabilitation in 1957 showed that no corpus delicti were found. A severe fate awaited Adi Malikov who served as the chief of staff of the second Tatar rifle division during the Civil war and who in 1928 worked in the intelligence diplomatic service. He was accused of being a member of the 'right-Trotskyist counter-revolutionary nationalist organisation' which had supposedly existed in the Kazan garrison since 1931. A. Malikov was arrested in June 1938 and exiled to a labour camp. He was released only after 16 years of hard labour, in 1954, after complete rehabilitation. In the midst of the war with Nazi Germany, in 1942, Lithuanian Tatarian Alexander Talkovsky was arrested and executed. He participated in World War I as the battalion commander, and in the Civil war he served as chief of staff of the first Tatar infantry brigade and was later appointed to the position of chief of the joint Tatar-Bashkir military school in Kazan. He was accused of having relations with the Germans, who between 1928 and 1931 had attended the armoured tank courses in Kazan, and of espionage for the benefit of Germany. A. Talkovsky's assurance that he had never been involved in any military polts was not accepted by the crime investigator [Litvin, 1993, pp. 24–26].

It is noteworthy that in the latter half of the 1930s, accusations of espionage were the most widespread reason for judicial punishment. On the eve of the Second World War, the search for foreign intelligence agents was intensified, who had allegedly skillfully infiltrated industrial, commercial and other organisations. The apotheosis of the false accusations was the 'participation' of the Tatar immigrants
in the so-called counter-revolutionary organisation, called 'Idel-Ural' [Stepanov, 1996, pp. 39–45]. It was considered that this organisation was managed by the Tatar immigrants of the White camp from Japan, Germany and Turkey and was simultaneously used for espionage and sabotage purposes to the benefit of these countries. Galimzhana Sharaf was considered to be the head of the organisation (he was the author of the project to create the state 'Idel-Ural') and former active leaders of Milli Shuro were said to head its branches. The members of the organisation were said to have conducted subversive activities aimed at weakening the defensive capabilities of the Soviet Union, undermined production plans, and conducted subversive and sabotage activities in industrial enterprises, collected secret materials, prepared militant terrorist groups aimed at attacking the Party and government leaders, and prepared an armed uprising against the Soviet authorities at the time capitalist countries intended to attack the USSR.

In total, 1000 'revealed' members of the organisation were under investigation. Out of them, 450 persons were subject to arrest via direct enrollment. According to the investigation file published in the modern period of historiography, prominent political figures were listed as agents of foreign intelligence services: Mirsaid Sultan-Gaieiev (an agent of the Turkish and Japanese intelligence since 1919), Kashaf Mukhtarov (served for Turkey and Japan since 1921), and others. The people accused of belonging to this organisation and later convicted included the famous Tatar playwright Karim Tinchurin; the popular Tatar poet Khasan Tufan (both were accused of espionage for the benefit of Japan); the former rector of Kazan Chemical-Technological Institute and former Commissar of Justice of the TASSR Gimaz Bagautdinov; the famous chemist Gilm Kamay (both were named in the investigation as German spies); a senior professor of the Turkish language at the Institute of Asian Studies Fatykh Karimi, his agents were said to have been writer Shamil Usmanov, political and public figure Ilyas Alkin, and historian Khadi Atlas (who allegedly transferred secret information to Turkey), and others.

So the campaign to exposure famous Tatar civil and political figures, well known representatives of science and culture, administrative workers, military men, leaders in agriculture who had been implicated in engaging in hostile activities — affected a significant number of people. Year by year, the repressive machine gained momentum. Workers, peasants, scientists and writers were sentenced to death. According to data provided by Tatarstan's edition of the 'Book of Memory', as of 2011, 54,727 inhabitants of the republic suffered political repressions (were indicted for state crimes under article 58 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR) [Kniga Pamyati]. They included 17,188 Tatars (including the Kryashens), which amounted to 31% of the total number of the repressed [Politicheskie repressii v TASSR, 2011, p. 75].

Not only people suffered from the repressions, but also the cultural and scientific inheritance they had created: books and magazines were withdrawn from libraries; literature and music, as well as canvases were banned; scientific works were destroyed, while names which were undesirable for the state were exterminated. In Tatarstan alone, over 700 reference books were withdrawn from public use. So by the end of the 1930s, through these severe, pitiless methods the country absorbed the supercentralised command-administrative system of governance led by I. Stalin. The leader's authority was indisputable. So the totalitarian regime was established in the state.
On 22 June 1941 with the attack of Nazi Germany, the personal plans and hopes of tens of millions of Soviet people were broken overnight. Thus began the Great Patriotic War, which was to be a horrendous ordeal for our Motherland. All the peoples and nations of the Soviet Union stood to defend their common home, thus denying the fulfillment of the plans of Hitler and his henchmen who suggested that the USSR was ‘a colossus on clay feet’ and would not be able to parry the thrust due to the aggravation of ethnic conflicts. But the aggressor played the wrong card: in a severe battle to the last drop of blood, the consolidation of nations appeared to have been more important than all the divisive factors. The Tatars and inhabitants of the Republic of Tatarstan also made an important contribution to the destruction of the hateful enemy and the final victory.

§ 1. Participation of the Tatars and Tatarstan inhabitants on the war fronts

Ayslu Kabirova

Mobilisation in the country and the republic was launched immediately after the announcement of the beginning of the war. According to the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR dated 22 June 1941, all conscript citizens born between 1905 and 1918 were subject to mobilisation. The Tatar ASSR was part of the Volga-Region military district.

Bustling rallies were held throughout the republic, and their participants expressed their readiness to defend their Motherland. Gilmutdinov, and electrician at factory No. 27 in the Lenin district stated in his presentation at a rally organised during the first days of the war: 'Brutal fascism has attacked our peace loving country. Our target now is to raise workforce productivity even higher and at the same time — be ready, if it is necessary, to take a rifle and defend our socialist Motherland' [SA HPD TR, Fund 26, Inventory 10, File 130, Sheet 22]. At a rally in the kolkhoz 'Dirizhabl' in the Almetyevsk district, Zakir Galiev emphasised: 'The Patriotic war is a sacred war... At this very moment my two sons are fighting for the Motherland, for Stalin. Although I am 53 years old now, I am ready to join my sons in the battle to destroy these fascist gangs' [Soçializmgə ('Towards socialism'—Tat.), 1941, 6 July]. All the speeches given by the presenters were imbued with a firm faith in the inevitable victorious end of the war.

The armed forces were formed not only by those people who were subject to mobilisation. From the very first days of the war, a wave of citizens who wanted to join the Red Army rushed to the Party and government bodies and to the military commissariat. Claims of the following content were typical: 'The villainy of the fascist pack which has dared to attack our Motherland, spurred a great hatred in me towards the bitter enemy... I kindly ask you, comrade military commissar, to send me for active duty. I will spare neither myself, nor my life for my beloved Motherland's victory'—wrote A. Lyvina, a woman working at the department of communications [Tatariya v VOV, 1963, p. 27]. The secretary of the Alkeev district committee of the Komsomol M. Mangushev declared: 'My dream is to serve in the army and be at the front right now — it is my highest ideal... I swear to be loyal to my Motherland till the very end and to withstand all hardships and misfortunes when fighting the Nazi German aggressors' [Zalyalov, 1975, p. 4].

Only 6 days after the beginning of the war (from 23 to 29 June 1941) over 5 thousand applications from the citizens of the republic
were received who asked to join the Red Army. By mid-July, the total number of volunteers throughout the TASSR exceeded 14,000 [Istoriya TASSR, 1968, p. 508]. However, due to the large-scale nature of warfare and the 1000-kilometer length of the fronts, mobilisation was the prevailing source of replenishment of the active army.

In the post-war years, historians and regional ethnographers repeatedly attempted to estimate the number of combatants from Tatarstan, as well as the amount of losses the republic suffered during the war. Large-scale, meticulous work in this respect was performed by workers of the republic's editorial board of 'The Book of Memory', created under the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Tatarstan ahead of the 50th anniversary of the victory. Over years of research and search expeditions they clarified the main data concerning the overall participation of the Tatars and inhabitants of Tatarstan in the armed struggle against fascism. According to this data, in the years of the war, circa 700 thousand of our countrymen fought in the army. Over 350 thousand of them did not return to their relatives [Tatarstan v Velikoj Otechestvennoj voine, 2000, p. 3; Tatarstan v Velikoj Otechestvennoj voine, 2009, p. 3; Istoriya Tatarstana, 2001, p. 414] (every second fighter was killed)\(^4\). This totals 11.5% of the overall pre-war population of the Tatar ASSR\(^5\).

The phenomenon of the mass heroism of the Soviet people, which the above stated numbers reflecting the level of participation of the people of Tatarstan in the military operations attest to, is still a matter of admiration and study for both national and foreign specialists. However, public opinion in the republic cannot be presented as uniform. On the contrary, as shown by archival documents, opinion was quite contradictory. In the course of the mobilisation organised by the military commissariats and the creation of the people's militia, not everyone was eager to get to the frontline. Against the backdrop of the mass expression of patriotism, there were certain cases of desertion, self-maiming and evasion of service. This occurred, for example, in the Mushlyumovo, Tyulyachi and Arsk districts of Tatarstan [SA HPD TR, Fund 7130, Inventory 1, File 9, Sheet 351]. According to sources, in just three months since the beginning of the war, the military prosecutor brought criminal proceedings against and sentenced to different terms 49 people for evasion from mobilisation and 27 people for desertion [Krivonozhkina, 2001, p. 204].

The so-called 'counter-revolutionary' sayings of the citizens were also widely spread during the war. In the reports to the Tatar regional committee of the CPSU(B) it was noted that conversations among the people were recorded such as: 'We have no bread, we are starving, while our husbands and brothers are forced to fight' (Drozhzhansovsk district); 'We cannot win, Germany will defeat us, we are sent there as cannon fodder...' (Almeteyevsk district); 'This war is good for us, we live poorly under the Soviet rule, if the government changes, we will live better' (Rybnaya Sloboda district) [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 5, File 351, Sheet 350; Fund 273, Inventory 1, File 178, Sheet 19; Fund 15, Inventory 5, File 153, Sheet 78], etc.

Although such complaints were atypical, they were not isolated. They reflect a complicated range of feelings which people experienced during war time. Along with the majority of the population who sincerely desired to defeat the foe, there were certain categories of citizens in the country who were 'offended' by the Soviet authorities during the period of industrialisation and collectivisation, who could not accept destruction of churches and mosques and were in-

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\(^4\) The names of dead soldiers and officers are listed in the book 'Pamyat' ('Memory'), published in Tatarstan. 27 books by this mournful martyrologist were published in the Russian and Tatar languages between 1993 and 2010. This multivolume work has become an essential printed historical and memorial monument, the main purpose of which is to immortalise the names of the fallen heroes. [See: Pamyat’ (Memory), 1993–2010].

\(^5\) These works, devoted to the war period, reveal that 560 thousand men from the Tatar ASSR were sent to the front, 87 thousand of whom were killed in battles against the Nazi invaders [see: Gilmanov, 1981, pp. 4–5].

\(^6\) The percentages have been calculated on the basis of the total number of the pre-war population of the republic. According to a survey carried out in 1939, 2,914,200 people lived in the Tatar ASSR [see: The TASSR over 40 years, 1960, p. 15; The Narkhnoz of the TASSR, 1970, p. 8].
nocent victims at the peak of the political repressions. Radically different positions and opinions co-existed in the mass consciousness. However, whereas during peacetime, people attempted to restrain themselves in expressing emotions, the war unveiled all innermost thoughts and even revived some hopes for restoration of the old order among some segments of the population.

Still, the majority of Soviet citizens did indeed treat the war as the Great Patriotic War. Feeling their belonging to the Motherland’s destiny, battle-front veterans reconsidered such concepts as ‘the nation’, ‘the Motherland’, and also expressed their readiness to defend the integrity and independence of their country. The desire to protect the home where they were born and the lives of their families and loved ones captured their thoughts and motivated them to act.

From the first days of the war, the republic turned into a real foundry of the military reserve for the Red Army. Well organized efforts directed towards military education of the population significantly contributed to it. Osoaviakhim (Society for Assistance to Defense, Aviation and Chemical Construction), sports organizations, the Red Cross and the Red Crescent took an active part in it. In October 1941, a special decree of the State Defense Committee introduced compulsory training in military science (Vseobuch) for all citizens of the USSR. Between 1941 and 1945, Tatarstan trained a total of 350,000 people in over 30 military occupations (pilots, operators, snipers, machine gunners, radio operators, etc.) [Tatarstan v Velikoj Otechestvennoj voine, 2000, p. 125]. The Kazan tank school made a significant contribution to training tank officers. During the war, 23 graduation ceremonies were held at the school, which supplied the Red Army with 4,628 commanders and 832 political commissars [Panov, 2009, p. 206]. Seventeen alumni of the tank school became Heroes of the Soviet Union [Sovetskaya Tataria, 1970, 13 September].

Not only men, but also women also took up military occupations. Tatarstan’s Vseobuch system trained over 23,000 women as radio, telephone and telegraph operators [Kabirova, 1995, p. 137]. The task of military education of women and girls as junior and senior medical workers was fully traditional. Their training was usually carried out during short courses organized at businesses, offices and in districts. During the war, around 3,500 nurses and over 3,000 nursing assistants were sent to the front and field hospitals from Tatarstan [Pyanov, 1979, p. 23].

After completing military training, the staff would be immediately sent to the active army. However, despite a huge amount of work on organization and mobilization, the scale of the war made replenishment of the Red Army with new soldiers a necessity. Catastrophic defeats of Soviet troops at the initial stage of the war forced the country’s leaders to search for new opportunities for forming significant military reserves. It was decided to recruit new divisions and forces directly from national republics, in the deep rear. By the beginning of the war, the 18th and 86th rifle divisions were already deployed in Tatarstan. Manning of the 352nd rifle division started in August 1941, followed by the 334th division in September 1941. Formation of the 146th and 147th divisions started in December 1941, followed by formation of the 120th rifle division in March 1942.

Altogether, during the war the republic sent 7 rifle divisions (the 18th, 86th, 120th, 146th, 147th, 334th and 352nd divisions) to different parts of the front along with the 91st separate tank brigade, a separate engineer-sapper battalion, two aviation divisions and dozens of separate regiments. These military divisions were multinational in their composition. At the same time, the work on forming them in the TASSR anticipated the fact that Tatars made up a significant proportion of them. For example, representatives of 33 nationalities served in the 334th rifle division, and Tatars made up 9.5% of the division. The 352nd rifle division was staffed with representatives of 27 nationalities, 7.9% of whom were Tatars [Dyuryagin, 1984, p. 88; Buzyakov, 1987, p. 63].

Tatars were represented to a considerable extent in military units formed in other regions and republics of the Soviet Union that were noted for dense settlement of Tatars before the war. For example, there were 1,945 Tatars in the 195th rifle division formed in March 1942 in Chkalovsk (now Orenburg) Region. In addi-
tion, Tatars made up 2.1% of the 8th rifle division, which was staffed in Kazakhstan [Artemyev, 1975, pp. 41–55].

Unfortunately, the condition of the source base still does not allow us to obtain accurate data on persons of Tatar nationality mobilized to fight at the front. Nevertheless, according to our estimates, during the war, about 390,000 Tatars were mobilized from Tatarstan, the area most densely populated by Tatars (numbering 1,419,400 people according to the 1939 census, they made up 48.7% to the total population of the republic [Narxo TASSR, 1970, p. 11])

In addition, research carried out by the eminent Soviet historians Yu. Korabliyov, G. Kumaney and A. Artemyev show that in 1943, Tatars made up 2.6% of the 200 rifle divisions they studied. Meanwhile, the share of the Tatar population in the overall number of Soviet citizens in that period was 2.54% [Korabliyov, Kumaney, 1972, p. 200; Artemyev, 1975, p. 58] (according to the census of 1939, there were 4,313,500 persons of Tatar nationality in the USSR [Kozlov, 1974, p. 249]).

Tatar soldiers from the Republic of Tatarstan proved themselves as brave and courageous fighters at the front. The Chronicles of the Great Patriotic War is full of examples of their heroism and fearlessness.

Frontier outposts were the first to resist the enemy. By the time Germany attacked the USSR, it had fully equipped and technically trained military formations united into powerful offensive forces 8, and expected to break through the resistance in the frontier zone within an hour. However, from the very beginning of the ‘blitzkrieg’, German troops and some of Germany’s allies faced fierce resistance from Soviet soldiers and officers. It turned out to be hard to drive the frontier guards from their lines.

Our countrymen were also among those who had to face the fascists in the first days of the war: Nikita Kaymanov, a native of Prosti village of Nizhnekamsk district of the republic defended the Motherland in the region near the border between the Soviet Union and Finland. He was later awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union; the future famous writer of Tatarstan, Gennady Paushkin, and his companions bravely rebuffed attacks of the Hitlerites near the Romanian border. Pyotr Mikhailovich Gavrilov, a native of Pestrechinsky district who was the commander of the 44th rifle regiment, brought honor to himself and the whole Tatar nation when defending Brest Fortress. He led the defense of the Eastern Fort of the Kobrinsky reinforcement of the fortress. For almost a month, a handful of fighters under the major’s command held off the advance of almost an entire German division. Exhausted by the lengthy battle, hunger and thirst, the Fortress’s defenders fought to their last drop of blood. On the 32nd day of resistance, the unconscious P. Gavrilov was captured. Russian doctors at the camp hospital for prisoners did everything possible to resuscitate the dying hero. Later they recounted how German officers visited the camp for several days to see the Soviet commander.

But there is a good reason for the saying ‘a prophet is not recognised in his own land’. The paradox of history is that the man who amazed the Hitlerites with his tough spirit, remained ‘under suspicion’ for Stalin and all the Soviet people for a long time. After being captured by the fascists, it took a long time for P. Gavrilov to prove his innocence to the proper authorities. It was only after the death of the Supreme Commander, during the ‘Khrushchev Thaw’, that the legendary commander was rehabilitated, and in 1957 he was awarded the title of Hero of the

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7 The author’s calculations (based on the total number of Tatar soldiers forming part of the army and the percentage ratio of the Tatar and Russian population of the republic).

8 In their first offensive against the USSR the Nazi bloc employed 4.4 million soldiers and officers, 4.4 thousand aircraft, 4 thousand tanks and assault arms, and 39 thousand guns and mortars. The enemy was confronted by the combat forces of the western border districts. These included 3 million Soviet soldiers and officers, 39.4 thousand guns and mortars, 11 thousand tanks and assault arms, and 9.1 thousand war planes. It is the estimation of military experts that, although the Soviet troops had significantly more tanks and aircraft, the enemy had a number of advantages: their troops were on full alert, their military equipment was of better quality, they were also superior in terms of road transport, etc. [see: The History of Russia 2008, p. 193].

Soldiers and officers of operating units and fighting forces also proved their valor in frontier battles. At the Polish border, near the town of Ciechanowiec, the war reached the 86th rifle division named after the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Tatar ASSR, which had been formed in our republic in the pre-war years. It had to take the brunt of the attack by elite German troops. People of Tatarstan led by Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel M. Zabashilov not only managed to halt the enemy's offensive, but also drove the Hitlerites away from the state border.

The Battle of Moscow was the most important event of the first year of the war. The Soviet people had to pay a huge price to prevent the fascists from reaching the capital. However, it was there that Hitler's army, which had triumphantly marched through Europe, suffered its first major defeat.

Kazan native Ramazan Bikmukhamedov distinguished himself in the battles near Moscow. The rifle regiment in which he served entered the battle as soon as they arrived. When all the officers were killed, the injured R. Bikmukhamedov took command of the battalion. For his courage in battle, the commander of the 16th army, General K. Rokossovsky awarded him the medal For Bravery [Gilmanov, 1981, p. 50].

Bary Yusupov, a native of Almetyevsk District of Tatarstan, was awarded the title of True Hero of the Patriotic War during the fierce battles near Moscow. The 'Katyushas' division, which was under his command, struck terror into Nazi soldiers when it appeared in one part of the front or another. In one of the battles near Staraya Russa, to which a fighting force was redeployed in order to rebuff the attack of enemy tanks, the colonel of the guard was wounded and blinded, but did not leave the line of defense. When the fighting was over, many soldiers thought that their commander had been killed; however the commissar doubted that and gave orders to bring Baryi Abdullov-

ich into an izba. The colonel was between life and death for ten days before he was airlifted to Moscow. The courage of the Soviet officer was highly praised. Member of the State Defense Committee A. Shcherbakov personally came to the hospital to award the hero the Order of Lenin, while the renowned sculptor V. Mukhina also sculptured his bust at the hospital [Sovetskaya Tataria, 1964, 17 April; 1966, 17 May; 1969, August; 1970, 27 March; Socialistischeskij Tatarstan, 1968, 23 February].

Fighters of the 18th, 146th, 334th and 352nd divisions from Tatarstan gained a reputation as brave and fearless soldiers in the battles near Moscow. Army General P. Kurochkin wrote when appraising the soldiers' feat: 'As the commander of the 20th army, I will always cherish the best memory of the 18th division, of all of its soldiers, commanders and political commissars. Kazan natives passed through the hardships of the initial stage of the war with honor' [Kazantsev, 1968, p. 4].

After the failure of the lightning war near Moscow, Hitler's headquarters envisioned the summer campaign of 1942 as the one that would determine the balance of power at the Eastern front. Taking advantage of the absence of a second front, the German command organized another strong offensive, as the result of which the adversary's armies managed to break through to the Caucasus foothills and the area of Stalingrad. The defense of the Volga Region stronghold is considered to be one of the most heroic chapters of the Great Patriotic War.

Entire military units formed in Tatarstan fought furiously without giving a moment's respite to the enemy in the battles near the Volga. Soldiers of the 147th rifle division fought bravely under the command of A. Volkhin as part of the 62nd army. The 91st separate tank brigade led by Ya. Yakubovsky caused major damage to the adversary. Fighters of the 38th rifle division under the command of Colonel G. Safullin, a native of Arsk district, showed themselves as skillful and courageous fighters [Geroi, 1985, p. 38].

Many Tatar soldiers not only from Tatarstan, but also from other regions were involved in the battles near Stalingrad. By 10 September
1942, the troops of the Stalingrad front included 6,671 Tatars [Military and historical journal, No. 12, p. 20]. We can judge how they fought from the descriptions in various sources. A letter of a German lance bombardier to his brother has the following lines: 'Many Tatar people stand against us here. They are mad people, and I wouldn't want to meet a Tatar even in my dreams' [Za Rodinu, 1942, 3 November]. "He's a Tatar, he will keep his end up' could often be heard at the front', as Ilya Ehrenburg noted in his correspondence about Tatar soldiers [Sovetskaia Tatarstana, 1970, 8 May].

Awareness of the importance and the huge influence the national factor had on the soldiers made the leadership consider the possibility of using it in wartime. During the Battle of Stalingrad, the Supreme Command made the decision to organize publication of front newspapers in the languages of the nations of the USSR in order to unite the soldiers by nationality and thus consolidate their efforts in fighting the Nazi German aggressors.

Soviet historiography asserted that 8 Tatar front newspapers were published during the war [Muradyan, 1978, p. 84]. However, scrupulous investigations conducted by Kazan journalist and academic A. Ajudinov led to the conclusion that the number of the published Tatar newspapers was twice that. At present, we know about 16 front newspapers published in the Tatar language [Ajudinov, 1984, p. 8]. A group of writers from Tatarstan was sent in 1942 in order to reinforce their editorial offices. In particular, copy editors of the newspaper Vatan Ochen ('For the Motherland') at the Northwestern front included Kh. Usmanov, Sh. Mudarris and G. Nasry. Writers G. Bashirov and M. Amir took a creative assignment to work in the newspaper's editorial office. I. Gazi and A. Kutuy actively worked in the editorial office of the newspaper Kyzyl Armiya ('The Red Army') of the 1st Belorussian Front. A. Absalyamov collaborated with the newspaper of the Karelian front Vatan Õchen Sugiska ('In the Battles for the Motherland').

Tatar frontline newspapers were published in a 30x42 format twice a week. Initially, their circulation fluctuated between 5,000 to 8,000 copies, and then it reached a level where one newspaper was read by 5 to 10 people. Despite the fact that frontline newspapers in the Tatar language had a Soviet populist character mainly fulfilling purely ideological tasks, they were extremely important and necessary for the soldiers, since reading newspapers and leaflets in their native language united battlefront soldiers, improved their mood and strengthened their spirit, and also helped them survive.

The historic Battle of Stalingrad ended in a resounding victory for the Red Army in February 1943. The military operations of Soviet soldiers and officers led to encirclement and complete elimination of a huge force of Hitler's troops.

During the Battle of Stalingrad, an event happened in the forests of Belarus which has not yet occupied a proper place in the history of the Great Patriotic War. On 23 February 1943, the 825th battalion of the 'Idel-Ural' legion sent to fight Belorussian partisans raised a rebellion, and after killing all the German officers, joined the Soviet forces near Vitebsk with full equipment and ammunition.

The general euphoria over the defeat of the German Wehrmacht at Stalingrad did not allow an assessment of this turn of events to the necessary extent. It is possible that it was only treated as an episode against the backdrop of the global history of military opposition to fascism. However, its significance went far beyond local battles, and most importantly, it was unquestionable proof of the Tatars' loyalty to their Fatherland.

Hitler's command came up with the idea of using captured Soviet soldiers not only at auxiliary (mostly excavation) works at the front, but also in armed divisions in the spring and summer of 1942 after their defeat near Moscow. The 'Idel-Ural' legion was formed in the Polish town of Yedlino near Radom, and among others (along with Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaijanis and others), included prisoners of war from German concentration camps representing the Volga Region nations: Tatar, Bashkir, Chuvash, Mari peoples and others. Since the bulk of the legion consisted of Volga Tatars, the fascists sometimes called it the Volga Tatar
legion⁹. Thousands of soldiers who had been signed up as legionaries involuntarily were immediately ranked with the number of traitors and betrayers after they returned to their Motherland. At that time, the black shadow of suspicion lay upon all Tatars. However, the legionaries were not what Stalin considered them to be. The first experience of using the battalions of the Volga Tatar legion against Belorussian partisans showed that the fascists’ idea of turning the arms in the captives’ hands against their own countrymen was a failure. As a consequence, the German command was cautious about sending battalions of the ‘Idel-Ural’ legion to the Eastern Front [Gilyazov, 2005].

In the battles between 1943 and 1944, the Soviet Union firmly held the strategic initiative. After the victory near Stalingrad, the counter-offensive of the Red Army developed into a huge offensive on a larger part of the Soviet-German front. In the operations that followed, the enemy was forced 600–700 km away from the Volga. In January 1943, the multi-month Siege of Leningrad was finally broken. Battles on many fronts were opened simultaneously. The fascist occupants started being driven away from the territory of the Soviet Union, which in 1944 continued in the lands of the adjacent countries.

Many Tatars distinguished themselves in these military operations as well. Among them were Zakiy Shaymardanov, a gunner and a native of Rybnaya Sloboda District of Tatarstan, who destroyed 12 fascist tanks in the battles near the village of Krasnaya Dubrava; Shamal Abdra-shyutov, a pilot and an alumnus of Orenburg Military Aviation School, who made 242 operational flights and personally shot down 16 enemy jets; and Nabiulla Yunysov, a shooter and a radio operator and native of Leningrad who proved himself heroically when breaking the blockade of the city on the Neva. All of them were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

An unparalleled feat, which became the paragon of service to the Motherland, was accomplished by Alexander Matrosov in February 1943 near the village of Chernushki of Pskov Region. After running out of ammunition, he covered the weapon port of the enemy's earth-and-timber emplacement with his body at the cost of his life, thus ensuring that the mission of his division was completed. Documents that were later found by investigators established that the 'Russian wonder bogatyry', as the mass media called him then, was Shakerzhan Yunusovich Mukanmetzhanov, a son of the Tatar nation and a native of the Bashkir ASSR. After losing his parents at an early age, he was brought up in an orphanage of Ulyanovsk district and received a Russian name in the city of Melekess in the same district [Tatarskij e’neziklopedicheskij slovar’, 1999, p. 347].

Twenty-six natives of Tatarstan became Alexander Matrosov’s brothers in military feats during the war years: Gazinur Gaflatulin, Baryi Shavaliyev, Khafiz Zaripov, Alexey Isev, Nur Idrisov, Nikolay Lipatov, Arseny Kartashov, Abdulla Salimov, Mingaly Gubay-dullin, Mansur Valiullin, Salakhutdin Valiullin, Akhmet Mukhamedov, Afanasy Panarin and others¹⁰.

During the bloody battles near the Kursk Bulge, Tatarstan soldiers F. Sharipov, V. Kha-likov, K. Urazov and M. Novikov fought as part of the 10th tank corps in the famous tank battle near the village of Prokhorovka. All the brigades of the corps were equipped with T-34 tanks with the inscription 'Kolkhoznik of Ta-taria' on their broadsides. The famous corps under the command of Lieutenant General Vasily Gerasimovich Burkov, a native of Yelabuga district, were also given 200 combat vehicles built with the funds of Tatarstan workers. Petlyakov Pe-2 light bombers attacked the enemy

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⁹ Seven combat battalions of the Volga-Tatar Legion were formed in 1942–1943 alone, numbered from 825 to 831, as well as a sapper, staff, or reserve battalion, and a number of working battalions. According to various sources, between 8 and 10 thousand legionnaires served in these battalions [see: Failure of the Operation, 2010, p. 42].

¹⁰ It was previously assumed that feats like that of A. Matrosov were accomplished by 13 Tatarstan soldiers. The research of the Tatar journalist and local historian Sh. Mustafin has confirmed that there were twice the number of such heroes [see: Mustafin, 2008].
near Belgrade. The aircraft were given to the regiments of the 202nd bomber aviation division by citizens of the republic. The inscription 'Soviet Tatarstan' was placed on the fuselages of the bombers.

Special women's formations made a great contribution to the enemy's defeat during the war, including aviation regiments and rifle divisions. Female pilots of the legendary Taman women's night bomber regiment especially harassed the fascists. The pilots included representatives of the Tatar nation — Olga Sanfirova of Kuybyshev and our countrywoman Maguba Syrtlanova, a native of the city of Belebay in the Bashkir ASSR. Both of them were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. The archives of the destroyed imperial air fleet still contain the decrees of the Hitlerite command with a peremptory order to hunt the small manoeuvrable U-2 planes used by 'furious Russian witches' [Kabirova, 1995, pp. 142–143].

Tatarstan natives also distinguished themselves in the final stages of the war in Germany. The 76th guard division under the command of Kazan native Major General Alexander Kirsanov fought in the capture of the city of Prenzlau as part of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front. The 146th Kazan rifle division freed over 100 sections of Berlin and ended the war at Alexanderplatz in the city center.

The storming of the Reichstag became a symbol of the complete victory over fascism in the consciousness of the whole Soviet people and each soldier of the Red Army in particular. Gazi Zagitov, a Tatar and a native of the Bashkir ASSR, together with a group of his military comrades-in-arms, was the first to plant the standard on the roof of the last citadel of fascism. Apart from Gazi Zagitov, the group included the following soldiers: A. Bobrov, A. Lisimenko and M. Minin, with V. Makov as its commander [Piskarev, 1996, pp. 92–107]. According to the extant documents, they set a red banner on the Reichstag several hours earlier than the 'flag bearers of the Victory' M. Egorov and M. Kantariya, who were officially declared to have done it as a concession to the political environment of the time. In 1994, taking advantage of the environment of the review of many former unshakable postulates, the community of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan made a petition to award the highest title to the above-mentioned heroes — the title of Hero of Russia. Unfortunately, the petition was not supported by the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

Tatar soldiers proved themselves as heroes not only as members of Red Army divisions, but also in the enemy's rear. In Smolenshchina alone, guerrilla detachments included over 200 sons of Tatarstan. One of the divisions of the Gerchikov guerrilla warfare was led by Major Bari Kadyrmetov. The Saska partisan regiment was organized by Akhnef Bikbaev. Tatar poet Zaki Nuri, Bugulma native Boris Pakhmov, graduate of Chistopol Secondary School Rita Zagirova, and former secretary of the republic's regional committee of the Komsomol Ivan Zaikin fought the enemy in the ranks of the Belorussian guerrillas. The riskiest and most dangerous operations of the Minsk guerrilla warfare were delegated to Kazan native Ivan Kabushkin, known to the fascists as 'Zhan'.

Soviet patriots never lost their nerve and continued their struggle even if they were captured by the fascists. An example of determination and fearlessness for all prisoners of war of the Auschwitz concentration camp was Tatar Dmitry Karbyshev, a famous lieutenant general of engineering troops. In the fascist camp in Munich, Tatar writer Khayrutdin Mudzhay (M. Khayrutdinov) initiated the creation of the Fraternal Cooperation of Prisoners of War. Tatarstan native Mikhail Devyatayev accomplished a feat that was unprecedented in the history of aviation and the war itself. An alumnus of the Kazan Aeroclub, he and a group of Soviet prisoners of war hijacked a German 'Heinkel He 111' aircraft and escaped from fascist captivity.

Thus, Tatars and other citizens of Tatarstan set examples of heroism, valor and patriotism at all stages of the Great Patriotic War. They left hundreds of inscriptions on the Reichstag's walls, evidence that they were directly involved in achieving the victory. We are among those who fought to the death at the walls of Stalingrad and stormed the fascist lair of Ber-
lin, P. Malkin, born in 1918 in Tataria,' — this inscription was signed by Pyotr Malkin, a full Cavalier of the Order of Glory. 'A Tatar woman from Kazan came here with battles from the Volga,'—this inscription was left by Kazan native R. Nasyrova, who served as the senior doctor of the guard regiment [Front hakiykätä, 1945, 12 July; Sovetskaya Tataria, 1968, 4 February; 1970, 12 May]. M. Akhmetshin, S. Akhtyamov, V. Bulatov, T. Ibragimov, G. Rashitov, S. Sadriev, M. Syrtlanova, F. Tukhvatullin, V. Shagiev, R. Khalitov, M. Khasanshin and others marched through Red Square in the historical Victory Parade held in Moscow on 24 June 1945.

The government greatly appreciated the feats of its sons and daughters. By 1 November 1947, fighters of 193 nationalities were among those awarded orders and medals. Out of a total number of 9,284,199 awards, 174,886 were granted to Tatars [Artemyev, 1975, p. 176]. During the war, the title of Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded to 11,519 people representing 100 nations and nationalities. In the number of Heroes — 161 people – Tatars were in 4th place after Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians. In 1984, the Military Publishing House issued a statistical essay entitled 'The Heroes of the Soviet Union' which presented numerical data on each period of the war. Thus, in the first period of the Great Patriotic War (between 22 June 1941 and 18 November 1942) 625 people were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, including 3 Tatars. In the second period of the war (from 19 November 1942 to 31 December 1943), a total of 3,658 people were awarded the Gold Medal of the Hero. They included 63 Tatars. In the third period (from 1 January 1944 to 9 May 1945), out of 7,008 people who received the award, 94 were Tatars. One more Tatar was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for participation in the guerrilla war in the enemy's rear [Geroi Sovetskogo Soyuza, 1984, p. 228].

However, life goes on. Thus, even after the war, historians and journalists continued their research. Students and pupils contributed to their investigations. A patriotic movement in which 'Snezhny Desant' ('Snow Paratroopers') detachments, and the 'Dolina' ('Valley') and 'Otechestvo' ('Fatherland') youth movements were created, became widespread throughout the republic. Thanks to active investigative work, new facts about the feats of the sons of the Tatar nation continued to gain wide publicity. In the post-war years, the list of names of legendary Tatars was significantly enriched. As a result, according to the latest data, their number among the Heroes of the Soviet Union is 179 people\(^3\).

As for the achievement of the republic's native people of all nationalities, all of them were distinguished in the following way: During the war, over 200 of our countrymen were awarded the Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union; N. Stolyarov, the only pilot from Tatarstan, was twice awarded this supreme title; over 100,000 people were awarded orders and medals of the USSR [Gilmanov, 1981, p. 5]. Fifty natives of the republic out of a total of 2,457 were full Cavaliers of the Order of Glory [Istoriya TASSR, 1980, p. 179].


\(^3\) The author's calculations are based on the book by I. Ismagilov 'The Heroes of the Tatar People.' I. Ismagilov states on page 166 that new heroes of Tatar nationality were identified during the preparation of the materials of the book. Thus, as he observes, 'the actual number of Tatar heroes of the Soviet Union, those participating in the Second World War and military events, was 184. Considering that this figure includes not only veterans of the Second World War but also participants in other military operations, we for our part have performed the necessary arithmetic operations, by calculating the difference between the figure given and the deductible specified by us in the course of the study of the text (we have excluded Nos. 1, 15, 16, 171 and 182): 184 – 4 = 180. Further: N. Stolyarov, of Russian nationality, is erroneously included in the list on page 90 under No. 142. In total, the number of front-line soldiers, according to our calculations, amounts to 179 (including men who received this title during the pre-war period of 1938-1940, but who took part in the armed struggle against fascism) [see: Ismagilov, 2007, pp. 166, 15, 44, 90, 171, 182].
The heroism of the republic's soldiers did not go unnoticed by famous Soviet military leaders. Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Malinovsky wrote back in the days of the war: 'As an old soldier, I saw many Tatar fighters and commanders at the front and I have always admired their perseverance and iron will in battle. This nation has won respect for extraordinary courage' [Kniga geroev, 1946, p. 25]. 'Natives of Tataria fight the enemy like lions', wrote Marshal of the Soviet Union I. Konev, who also duly appreciated the fortitude, self-possession and persistence shown by our compatriots in achieving the objective [Istoriya TASSR, 1980, p. 179].

§ 2. The Tatar ASSR as an important rear base of the USSR

Ayslu Kabirova

From the first months of the German attack against the USSR, the Tatar ASSR, together with other republics and districts of the Volga Region, Urals and Siberia, turned into one of the most important military-industrial arsenals of the Soviet state, supplying the front and the army with ammunition, weapons, equipment and provisions.

The Tatar ASSR had a population of 2,914,200 people on the eve of the war. Of this population, Tatars made up 48.7% (1,419,400); Russians, 43.0% (1,251,300); and the remainder included Chuvash, Mordva, Udmurts and other peoples [Narxoz TASSR, 1970, pp. 7–9, 11]. The large-scale economic and socio-cultural reforms carried out in the republic in the 1920s and 1930s, formed the basis for the powerful rear base formed in the east of the country during the war.

In the summer of 1941, the Council of People's Commissars prepared and accepted for execution a number of mobilization programs aimed at reorganizing the national agriculture of the USSR into a wartime mode. An important and very significant part of the organization of military manufacturing was the evacuation of manufacturing plants from the frontline zone to the deep rear [Direktivy KPSS, 1957, pp. 707–712]. In the latter half of 1941 alone, over 2,500 industrial plants were moved to the east [VOV, 1985, p. 802].

Since the TASSR already had industry-specific factories and plants, many similar industrial enterprises located in regions of the USSR that were vulnerable in military terms had already been evacuated to the republic in the summer and autumn of 1941. They included the largest in their own industries: the Moscow Aircraft, Leningrad Aircraft, Leningrad Metalworking, Moscow Watch and other factories; the 'Bolshevik' Moscow Confectionery Factory, Vyborg Tobacco Processing Plant, Dnepropetrovsk Biofactory, Krenholm Manufacturing Company from the city of Narva and others. Out of 226 enterprises evacuated to the Volga Region, over 70 plants were accepted for transfer and relocated to Tatarstan [Gilmanov, 1977, p. 70], and the deadlines for recommissioning them were extremely short. Thus, the Moscow Aircraft Plant named after S. Gorbunov, which was reconstructed at the Kazan Aircraft Factory named after Sergo Ordzhonikidze, started producing Pe-2 dive bombers only two months after relocation. It took only two weeks for another aircraft factory from Leningrad to restore production of its legendary 'sky snails' — the U-2 aircraft that were widely used at the front as scouts, communication airplanes and carriers of the wounded. It took an average of 2 to 3 months for the relocated enterprises to settle into the new sites and start producing the goods necessary for the front in the quantities required by the State Defense Committee.

Local factories and plants lent them invaluable assistance. Moreover, many of them also proceeded to fill defense orders. For example, Kazan Film Factory No. 8 named after V. Kuybyshhev mastered the production of new aviation film for taking pictures of the enemy's military facilities from high altitudes. The Hammer and Sickle factory increased the production of metal-cutting equipment by one and
a half times. Factories producing leatherette, typewriters and garage equipment switched to producing mortar bombs, missiles and photoflash bombs. The Kazan Catgut Factory produced really unique goods and was the only facility supplying hospitals with life-giving catgut threads for stitching up wounds, without which it would have been impossible to carry out difficult operations. A fur factory started production of caps with ear flaps, gloves, high fur boots and headsets for soldiers. The 'Spartak' factory delivered army boots.

Mastering production of weapons and equipment for the Red Army was fraught with considerable difficulties. It required new technologies and clear organization of labor. However, the most critical factor was the lack of staff. Mobilization of men to the front aggravated the staffing problem. A whole range of measures was carried out in order to solve it: a seven-day work week was introduced, annual and additional leaves were canceled and replaced with monetary compensation; universal labor duty was introduced and then labor mobilization, along with criminal penalties for being late for work or for unauthorized leave. However, the gap between the needs of Tatarstan's industry and its provision with labor forces remained enormous. Moreover, even the existing workforce was constantly distracted from fulfilling their core functions at the plant. The republic's population was forcibly involved in different kinds of socially useful work: logging, peat cutting, and clearing construction sites. Construction of the Volga defense line was a difficult challenge for Tatarstan's inhabitants. It was built in four months between October 1941 and February 1942 in order to prepare the area in case of real danger of the enemy's penetration into the country's rear. The line was 331 km long [Tagirov, 1999, pp. 328–329].

Under the current conditions, the evacuation of staff from outside sources contributed to solving the personnel problem. Initially, according to the Decree of the Central Council for Evacuation, our republic was supposed to re-settle 165,000 people [Tatariya v VOV, 1963, p. 35]. But in reality, these numbers were repeatedly corrected. Several times, Tatarstan had to accept citizens who could not be settled in other regions. Proof of this is found in the National Archive of the republic. It is a telegram sent by the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Railways to the Council of People's Commissars of the TASSR dated 23 July 1941, which ordered: 'Two trains of 60 cars on the home road each directed to Ulyanovsk; two trains of 90 cars each directed to Sverdlovsk and two trains of 101 cars each directed to Omsk, with the evacuees unloaded within the TASSR [NA RT, f. P-128, l. 1, f. 3638, s. 49].

By mid-August 1941, 163,000 people had already arrived in the republic [NA RT, Fund P-128, Inventory 1, File 3635, Sheet 26], while by 15 January 1942, according to official data, 273,500 people had already been settled there [NA RT, Fund P-1296, l. 18, f. 508, s. 183]. As a rule, skilled workers, as well as engineering and technical personnel, arrived together with the evacuated manufacturing plants and were lodged in the cities. Evidence of this is the fact that the population of Kazan alone rose from 401,000 to 515,000 people in the first year of the war. The rest were settled in districts of the TASSR. For example, in July 1941, 3,451 people were sent to Kukmor District for temporary residence; 1,765 evacuated citizens were directed to Bavlly District, while Tyulyachi District received 2,146 people, and so on. Eventually, with consideration of natural growth among the evacuees, the population of the Tatar ASSR on 1 September 1941 was 2,996,179 people. Of these, 771671 people lived in cities and 2,224,508 in rural areas [NA RT, Fund P-1296, Inventory 18, File 508, Sheet 187]. After being provided with housing, the newly arrived citizens were immediately involved in public production thus helping to fill in the gap in Tatarstan's workforce.

The problem of the lack of personnel was solved to some extent by training young workers in the state reserve system. Annually, throughout the war, this system graduated more than 13,000 young skilled workers in 53 different specialties in Tatarstan. Between 1941 and 1945, 49,261 young workers were professionally trained at vocational and railway schools and FWT schools of the TASSR for the repub-
lic's defense industry [SA HPD TR, Fund 4034, Inventory 26, File 199, Sheet 5; Kalishenko, 1950, p. 68; Khanin, 1966, p. 84].

Most of the people who came to work in manufacturing were totally dedicated to their jobs and often overextended themselves. Shock work as a real contribution to achieving Victory over fascism as quickly as possible was a matter of honor in wartime. Various forms of socialist competitions became widespread at factories, such as movements of multi-tasking machine operators, innovators and inventors. The most popular wartime motto was 'work for yourself and on behalf of your comrade who is off to the front'. The whole republic knew the names of N. Khabibullina, who initiated the movement of dvukhsotniks [workers who fulfilled their production norm by two hundred percent during one shift] and was a Russian leather cutter at the Kazan 'Spartak' factory; M. Romanova and A. Bulaeva, who were trekhsotniks [workers who fulfilled their production norm by three hundred percent during one shift] at the '20th Anniversary of Tataria' work association; M. Yusupova, pyatisotniks [five hundred percent of the production norm] of the 'Svetoch' confectionery factory; and tysyachniks [one thousand percent] F. Abdakhmanov, S. Khidiyatullin and A. Biryukov, who worked in shops of machine-building plants, and many others. By the end of the war, there were about 50,000 Stakhanovites working at factories and plants of Tatarstan [V. D. Zdoroveeva, 1970, p. 174].

Apart from individual forms, collective forms of socialist competition, in particular, the movement of the Komsomol youth brigades, were widespread. The title of front brigade was awarded to those who fulfilled their quota by 150–200% and delivered outstanding products. By 1 July 1942, 204 brigades were granted the title of front brigades; and by the end of the war, there were already 1,642 Komsomol youth front brigades in the republic [I. I. Toshchakov, 1968, p. 183]. The brigades led by Z. Varlamova, A. Battalova, N. Ignatyeva, A. Zakirova, M. Buraykina, M. Pchelina and others were the best known.

However, not everyone endured the tough mobilization of industrial labor. Thus, forced and punitive methods were also used to motivate the workers' labor. In order to suppress violators of workplace discipline, so-called labor repressions were applied during the war. According to the archive sources, the number of offenders and deserters varied in the republic in different periods of the war. During the first months of the war, the administration of factories and plants strictly monitored violations of the work rules, pursuant to the Decree dated 26 June 1940, which stipulated criminal punishment of workers for unauthorized absence and being late for work. An audit of 39 plants and establishments of Kazan and districts in July 1941, which was especially organized by the prosecutor's office of Tatarstan, showed a downward trend in the number of offenders from 15 February to 1 July 1941: 11,552 cases were referred to judicial authorities, whereas in 1940, 25,081 persons were convicted for the same period [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 5, File 147, Sheet 3].

However, by the end of 1941, the number of absentees rose again exponentially. The reasons for such 'unpatriotic' labor behavior of citizens are obvious: because of the mobilization of experienced personnel to the front, manufacturing plants were forcefully supplied with new population groups from the countryside and young people, which broadened the contingent of potential offenders.

Especially tough measures were applied against the workers who violated the main terms and conditions of the Decree of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated 26 December 1941: 'On the responsibility of workers and employees at military industrial enterprises for unauthorized departure from work' which stipulated criminal penalties of 5–8 years of imprisonment. By 23 February 1942, 176 cases of this kind were already in proceedings of the court martial of the NKVD of the TASSR [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 5, File 472, Sheets 38–39]. But in general, 1942 was marked by somewhat of a decrease in the number of cases concerning labor discipline. An insignificant rise was noted in 1943, while
1944 again showed a decrease in the number of cases. For example, in two quarters of 1944, only 4,659 cases were filed against deserters [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 5, File 147, Sheets 1–7], whereas in 1941, there were 2.5 times more such cases [Ibid., Sheet 3].

The reduction of desertion and disciplinary infractions at the republic's enterprises was related to the fact that since 1943, the issues of fighting these occurrences in Tatarstan had started being resolved comprehensively. Along with the application of repressive measures, there was a focus on improving the living conditions of workers at industrial plants. The decrees and resolutions adopted in numerous party committees and economic bodies directed the management of establishments and organizations towards solving current social issues related to housing, food and wage increases. The emphasis was on an individual approach to people, and consideration of their personal interests, talents and requests [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 5, File 704, Sheets 92–93]. Owing to the improved organization, discipline in the republic's public production improved at the end of the war.

The result of the supreme efforts made by Tatarstan's workers was the creation of a mobile war economy in the republic. The front was supplied with over 600 units of weapons, ammunition and equipment: shells and fuses, bullets and bombs, aircraft instruments, landing craft, and communications equipment [Gilmanov, 1977, p. 128]. Kazan Aircraft Factory No. 22 named after S. Gorbunov (now 'Kazan Air Enterprise' JSC) was the only one in the country that manufactured Pe-2 and Pe-8 strategic bombers, which were considered to be the best examples of aircraft of this class in all the warring armies. The Leningrad Aircraft Factory (now 'Kazan Helicopter Plant') was involved in manufacturing U-2 (Po-2) night bombers, which were indispensable for carrying out military operations at low altitudes. In total, the republic produced 22,000 warplanes. According to specialists' calculations, every sixth plane manufactured during the war was given permission to fly from Kazan. About ten Tatarstan enterprises took part in the development of various components for the famous 'Katuyshas'. The Kazan powder mill alone sent a million charges for them. The Kazan catgut factory increased production of catgut by 5 times. Production of aerial photography and x-ray film at Film Factory No. 8 named after V. Kuybyshev (now 'Tasma' JSC) was increased by 4 times. This factory also served as a storehouse during the war for the unique State Film Foundation of the USSR, which was sent there from Moscow Region.

Overall, the gross industrial output of the republic in the war years increased by 2.2 times, to 219% in 1945, compared to 1940 [Narxoz RSFSR, 1957, pp. 109–110; Narxoz TASSR, 1970, p. 28; 50 years of the TASSR, 1967, p. 18]. These numbers significantly exceeded the overall results of industry of the RSFSR in the same period, the gross output of which in 1945 was only 106% [Sovetskij ty'l, 1986, p. 260]. The main volume gain of Tatarstan's industrial sector was achieved by commissioning the evacuated facilities and expanding production at the existing industrial enterprises. The heavy equipment industry predominated in the republic with a share of products amounting to 2/3 of all industrial products of Tatarstan. The geography of industry locations also changed. Along with Kazan and Zelenodolsk, new industrial centers appeared in the towns of Yelabuga, Chistopol, Mamadysh and Bugulma. As a result of the dramatic qualitative changes in the industrial scene of the Tatar ASSR, the republic, which had become an industrial agrarian region back in the latter half of the 1930s, was transformed into a region of developed heavy industry and mechanical engineering. The share of the industry manufacturing means of production rose from 48.8% in 1940 to 83.3% in 1944 [25 let TASSR, 1945, pp. 63–64; Gilmanov, 1977, p. 130].

Due to objective circumstances, light industry remained at the prewar level, although it provided the front with about 200 different items of clothing and uniforms for soldiers of the Red Army. During the war, nearly 1 million overcoats and 1.5 million all-weather raincoats were produced in the republic. Each working day, Tatarstan's factories produced enough
Section II. Stages in the Formation of the TASSR

clothes for a regiment and enough boots for a division. Clothes and boots produced in the TASSR were enough to equip an army of three million.

An event of truly strategic importance in the war years was the discovery of commercial oil reserves in the Republic. On 6 August 1943 around Shugury, drillers G. Khamidullin and Ya. Buyantsev produced the first crude oil run. Within a year, in the summer of 1944, there was an even more powerful oil gusher at a second well [Kzil Tatarstan, 1944, 18 June]. Discoveries in wartime, which led to the start of 'black gold' production in the region, anticipated priority development of the oil industry in the republic.

Tatarstan's agriculture was in an extremely difficult situation in the war years. The collectivisation carried out in the republic eliminated private peasant farms, but the kolkhozes (collective farms) and sovkhozes (state farms) which replaced them did not have time to consolidate themselves. The physical resources of the republic's agricultural production were extremely poor, and with the start of the war, it stopped growing at all. There was a lack of tractors and machinery and the problem of fuel was acute. The number of horses decreased drastically, and therefore it was decided to use the draft power of bulls and cows. However, the most important problem was that there was no one to work in the fields. After mobilization, the republic's employable population was reduced by over one-third.

The problem of the labor shortage in the republic's agriculture was solved by intensifying labor and toughening discipline. In 1942, a mandatory minimum number of workdays was defined for kolkhoz workers (100–150 for adults and at least 50 for teenagers), and they could be brought to trial for failing to fulfill them. Implementation of this decree was delegated to the political departments revived in rural areas. Along with the district commissariats of the CPSU(B), they exercised political and economic control over kolkhozes and sovkhozes.

Nearly everything produced in public production was handed over to the state. According to archival documents, the authorities used all means in order to fulfill state tasks and orders coming from above. Grain was delivered under threat of arrest, and searches were conducted in homes. It was not allowed to collect grains of wheat left in the fields, pick vegetables, or bring nuts and berries home, etc. Beatings of kolkhozniks 'for negligence' by the heads of kolkhozes and supervisors were not uncommon. Essentially, the task of providing food and raw material to the state assigned to the republic's agriculture during the war was mainly achieved by a strict system of state regulation, direct administrative measures and the use of force against the collective farm peasantry. And yet, at the cost of enormous efforts, the kolkhozes and sovkhozes of Tatarstan supplied the state with 131 million poonds of grain, 39 million poonds of potatoes and vegetables, 56 million poonds of meat, 200 million liters of milk and other products necessary in wartime [Gilmanov, 1977, p. 175].

However, the quality of life of the population itself was extremely low. The problem of housing remained acute in the war years. It had been difficult in the pre-war period, and it became even more acute due to the arrival of the evacuees in the republic. Public and industrial buildings, school rooms and cottages were adapted for housing. Under pressure of the administration, the local population provided their own homes to the new arrivals. Due to the lack of housing, many workers and office employees had to live 10–20 km away from their work, and every day it took 2 to 4 hours for them to get to work. The average living space per person in Tatarstan was 4 square meters, but there were also cases when there were only 2–3 square meters per person [SA HPD TR, Fund 840, Inventory 1, File 387, Sheet 19; NA RT, Fund P–1804, l. 1, f. 66, p. 1].

Production of staple goods significantly decreased. Clothes, matches, salt, kerosene and the like disappeared from sale. The food problem was difficult to deal with. Prices on the free market were exorbitant. Theft and embezzlement in distribution, as well as officials' misconduct when reviewing citizens' claims
and complaints, acquired a mass character. A card system was introduced in order to provide the population with basic foods and industrial goods; however, it was unable to satisfy people's needs. In addition, the standard ration applied only to urban residents and members of the rural intelligentsia. Kolkhozniks were deprived of this support from the state. The supply of goods to peasants depended solely on the number of workdays they completed. It was also nearly three times lower compared to the pre-war period.

Hunger and cold were constant companions of the war years. The inability to feed themselves and their families was the reason for a terrifying epidemic of the septic angina, which affected most of Tatarstan's districts in the spring of 1944. Eating overwintered food grain, which had become a deadly poison, also caused mass diseases. By the end of June, 23,470 cases of disease had been recorded in the republic, and over 6,000 of them were fatal [Serebryannikov, 1997, p. 261].

The high mortality rate (up to 25% of cases) was due to the lack of medicines and doctors. The network of civilian medical institutions preserved in the Tatar ASSR suffered shortages of facilities and medicines, lack of space and personnel.

However, despite the difficult life circumstances, people believed in the Victory and brought it nearer in any way they could. The people of Tatarstan even managed to spend their modest amounts of money and food supplies so wisely, they were able set aside some funds to cover utilities, pay taxes and sign up for voluntary and compulsory loans. Of course, this was usually to the detriment of themselves and their families. However, people sacrificed the last they had to bring the day of Victory nearer, by participating in numerous movements in aid of the front. The citizens of the republic donated a total of 262 million rubles to the Red Army Defense Fund [Sovetskaya Tataria, 1970, 6 May]. Formation of the 'Krasnaya Tataria' ['Red Tataria'], 'Kolkhoznik of Tataria' ['Kolkhoznik of Tataria'] tank columns, the 'Sovet Tatarstan' ['Tatarstan Soviet'] aviation division, and the construction of armored boats, armored trains and the like were personally funded by the republic's citizens.

The movement to collect winter clothes for frontline soldiers was one of the best examples of patriotism expressed by the citizens of Tatarstan. The republic's workers collected 23,000 fur jackets, 54,000 pairs of felt boots, 59,000 quilted jackets and cossack trousers, and 106,000 sets of long johns for a total of 10 million rubles [Krasnaya Tataria, 1944, 1 February]. The donor movement was widespread. Throughout the war, donors in Tatarstan donated 42,000 liters of blood, 12,000 liters of which were sent directly to the front. Those who distinguished themselves most of all included O. Kuritsyna (a housewife) who donated 14.5 liters of blood; M. Bukova (1st garment factory) who gave 13 liters; M. Pavlicheva (a nurse), who gave 12.5 liters, E. Belozyorova ('Iskra' work association), who gave 10 liters, among others [Kabirova, 1995, p. 125]. The uninterrupted supply of the front and rear hospitals with donor blood made it possible to save the lives of hundreds of thousands of seriously wounded fighters and significantly reduce their periods of treatment. There were 50 hospitals deployed and equipped in Tatarstan alone, where 334,000 thousand injured and ill soldiers were treated during the war, and 207,000 of them were returned to active service [Ocherki istorii partizhnoj organizacii Tatarsii, 1973, p. 475].

The moral and religious level of the republic's population increased noticeably during the war. Softening of the position of Soviet leaders towards religious organizations led to the restoration of prayer houses, cessation of violence against the clergy, as well as weakening of control over the activities of churches and mosques. In turn, religious institutions, which had increasing influence on the masses, started to carry out patriotic work in a more purposeful way, calling for active provision of financial assistance to the front. By September 1944, the savings bank of the TASSR had received 1,273,400 thousand roubles. Moreover, the republic's believers collected nearly 4 pounds of gold for the Defense Fund along with 476 items in aid of Stalingrad, as well as for presents to
soldiers and commanders of the Red Army [NA RT, Fund P–873, l. 1, f. 2, p. 26].

A special page in the history of the war should be devoted to the activities of scientific and creative intelligentsia to develop the spiritual potential of the Victory. In Tatarstan, the new tasks assigned to science were accomplished in close collaboration between local scientists and the best scientific staff of the country from the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. The decision to relocate academic institutions was made on 16 July 1941. Within a short time, the leading institutes of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR were transferred to Kazan. They included institutes of organic chemistry, inorganic chemistry, colloid chemistry, physical problems, fossil fuels, as well as physics, radiu, power institutions and so on.

A total of 1,660 research fellows and 93 academicians and corresponding members of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR were settled in Kazan [Tatarstan v Velikoj Otechestvennoj voine, 2009, p. 195]. Among the scientists who received international recognition were A. Popov-Koshtyats, B. Grekov, E. Tarle, G. Khrizvakovsky, S. Vavilov, A. Ioffe, A. Nesmeyanov, S. Obnorsky, P. Kapitsa, M. Keldysh, N. Zelinsky and others. The Presidium of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR was also located in Kazan from August 1941 up to its transfer to Sverdlovsk in May 1942.

The range of research of the evacuated scientists was very broad. During their time of residence in Tatarstan, they developed improved alloys for building motors (E. Chudakov, A. Dychkov), proposed effective methods for calculating aircraft aerodynamics and ballistics of guns (L. Rusinov, L. Shestopalov), prepared equipment for remote detonation of mines (N. Andreev), approved the composition of the armor for the famous T-34 tanks (A. Bochvar, N. Gudtsov), continued experimental research on nuclear chain reactions on fast neutrons, which led to the creation of the national nuclear industry (I. Kurchatov), and so on.

A huge amount of work on perfecting military equipment was carried out in Tatarstan by the renowned Russian engineers A. Tupolev, S. Korolev, S. Chaplygin, V. Petlyakov, V. Glushko and others. During the period of total repression of the 1930s, many of them were arrested on charges of forming German espionage and subversive groups. However, despite their death penalties, almost all scientists were left alive and were soon allowed to continue their work at the special design bureaus of Moscow and other cities with large aircraft factories. Many of them came to Kazan this way and worked here as members of the ‘special squads’ of Kazan prisons at so-called ‘sharashkas’ (secret laboratories staffed by prisoners) on the sites of local aircraft factories [Sultanbekov, Malyheva, 1996, pp. 252–253].

Thanks to their efforts, mass production of the Pe-2 dive bomber (V. Petlyakov) was started during the war; the US pulsating accelerator was developed (B. Stekhin, G. List); and new types of diesel engines for heavy aircraft (A. Charomsky) were improved. But the main achievement of aircraft designers in Tatarstan was the development and use of a jet engine on Pe-2 aircraft, which was designed as a result of the joint work of V. Glushko and S. Korolev. Their discovery marked the beginning of development of jet-propelled aviation in the USSR and a step toward space travel.

Kazan scientists also worked intensively during the war. Their activities were largely directed toward finding solutions to local industrial problems: more appropriate use of the region’s natural resources, obtaining new materials and products necessary for the front and rear, etc. For example, the research conducted by the famous chemist, professor B. Arbuzov, made it possible to improve the quality and cold resistance of rubber, which was of great significance, as it ensured smooth operation of military vehicles in winter. Professors G. Kamay and M. Belyaeva were involved in improving the technology of deriving new types of catgut — an extremely important surgical suture material for military medicine. Academician A. Arbuzov worked on problems of organophosphorus compounds, which played an important role in the production of optical devices for artillery systems, as well as in the development of new types of medicines.
The discovery of electron paramagnetic resonance by Kazan physicist E. Zavoisky in May 1944 was an outstanding event in international science. He was awarded the Lenin Prize and was made a full member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR for this discovery, which was of global importance. Electron paramagnetic resonance became a powerful research tool in physics and laid foundation for a new field — magnetic radio spectroscopy.

Research of the republic's geologists was also of great economic importance. Professor L. Miropolsky was an ardent advocate of intensive development of Tatarstan's mineral resource base. He was the first to attempt to identify the possibility of producing new building materials. In particular, he was the one who initiated more extensive use of gypsum both in construction and in agriculture for the production of mineral fertilizers. Associate Professor E. Tikhvinksaya, the first woman of the republic to defend her doctoral thesis during the war, was engaged in studying problems of oil-bearing resources of our region.

Professors V. Gusynin, F. Muhamedyarov and A. Teregulov proposed effective methods for treating the wounded. A real breakthrough in medicine was made by outstanding Kazan surgeon A. Vishnevsky who developed a method for local anesthesia and novocaine block.

Many of Tatarstan's production problems were solved thanks to the collective work of scientists from Kazan and evacuated institutes. The new form of organizing this collaboration during the war consisted of regional commissions that made it possible to solve any problems comprehensively and in depth. In June 1942, following the example of other regions, a Committee in Kazan was formed which was responsible for the mobilization of resources of the Middle Volga and Kama River regions for the purposes of the defence. The Committee was headed by vice-president of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR Ye. Chudakov.

The collaborative research of Kazan people and academicians, who were the leading specialists in their fields, contributed to the growth of the republic's academic potential. After the re-evacuation in 1943 of the majority of institutes and laboratories of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Kazan academics continued to work independently on the projects which had been begun as collaborative. The establishment in the republic of the Kazan branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences was recognition of the contribution of Tatarstan's academic community to the protection of the Homeland. This decision was taken by the Soviet government on 13 April 1945.

The activities of the republic's educational institutions were subject to radical reform. Due to the lack of space, school children studied mostly in three shifts and they did not have sufficient school supplies such as schoolbooks, notebooks, pencils. Due to a lack of resources, absence of clothes and boots, educational delinquency increased, and it could reach up to 40% in certain schools. There were also difficulties with the teaching staff. In 1941–1942, out of the 8444 teachers in Tatarstan working with pupils of the 5–10th forms, only 1517 teachers had higher education and 352 were not even secondary school graduates. Nevertheless, all efforts of the teaching staff were directed to complying with the law of the Vseobuch [universal education]. If possible, pupils were provided with social help. Students of senior classes repaired school equipment on their own and went to procure firewoods.

The educational programmes were also subject to changes. Their main focus was made upon strengthening the patriotic component in the activities of schools. In order to provide incentives for students, matriculation examinations were introduced and the system of award of gold and silver medals for successes in studies was established. In general, despite the war time, the system of public education was preserved. The number of schools in the republic was not reduced. Quite the opposite — it increased from 3510 in the 1940/1941 academic year to 3718 schools in the 1944/1945 year (1901 schools were Tatar). However, the school enrollment decreased to a certain extent from 445.8 thousand pupils to 409 thousand respectively [25 let TASSR, 1945, p. 82].

Industry-specific training at higher education institutions was in many ways reoriented.
Future doctors, chemists and geologists were provided with education in accordance with practical needs. In order to fill the gap in personnel at the beginning of the war, reduced study programmes were introduced. However, this measure was not justified and in 1942/1943, the prewar study plans were returned. In general, during the war period, there were 13 IHLs in Tatarstan, where 21.1 thousand of students studied. By the end of the war, due to unavoidable circumstances, the school enrollment fell to 11.2 thousand people. However, the number of highly qualified personnel was still high [Dostizheniya TASSR, 1967, p. 97]. Between 1941 and 1945, over 6 thousand specialists in various fields graduated from the republic’s schools of higher education. There were mathematicians, physicists, meteorologists, chemists, biologists, doctors and other specialists among them [25 let TASSR, 1945, p. 54]. New institutes and faculties were also opened: in 1944, a special department of Tatar language and literature was opened within the History and Philology Faculty of the Kazan State University. In 1945 the Kazan Conservatoire was founded and the Kazan Institute of Engineers of Civil Construction was established.

Those people who were employed in the creative professions also played a significant role in the political mobilization to oppose fascism. Topics of the Soviet people’s heroism at the war fronts and their selfless work in the rear represented the top priority for the national intelligentsia. Many Tatar writers-at-arms took a stand for their Homeland’s independence. 25 out of 53 members of Tatarstan’s Union of Writers went to the front in the first year of the war. Musa Dzhalil, Fatykh Karim, Abdulla Alish, Adel Kutuy, Sibgat Khakim, Khakim Dauli and others were among them. In 1942–1943, a large number of Tatar writers — about 15 — were sent to editorial boards of Tatar front newspapers.

Today, the name of Musa Dzhalil is known all over the world. He is rightly treated as the symbol of Tatar poetry of the war years. In the summer of 1942, when attempting to break through the encirclement near Myasnoi Bor station, M. Zalilov (Dzhalil or Căilil), who was at the time working for the newspaper 'Otvaga' ['Courage'] of the 2nd Strike Battalion of the Volkhovsky front—was injured and captured by the fascists. He was held in a concentration camp, where he continued his struggle as a member of a conspiracy. However, betrayed by an agent provocateur, he was incarcerated. Sentenced to death, the poet while in detention wrote a cycle of poems called 'The Moabit Notebooks' with profound patriotic content. In 1956, Musa Dzhalil was posthumously awarded the title of the Hero of the Soviet Union, and a year later he became the first among poets who, for his literary achievements, was awarded the Lenin Prize.

Other 30 writers of the republic also sacrificed their lives for their Fatherhood’s liberty: M. Abliev, A. Aitov, A. Alish, M. Akhmetgaliev, K. Basyrov, N. Bayan, M. Vadut, Sh. Garay, M. Gayazov, R. Ilyas, Kh. Kaveev, A. Kamal, F. Karim, A. Kutuy, V. Miftakhov, Kh. Mudzhay and others. No other literary organization of the country suffered such losses. The reason for this was the lack of a mechanism designed to preserve the very best of the national intelligentsia. The brightest representatives of the Tatar culture and literature were sent to the war front as ordinary soldiers. Although we must recognize that efforts were made to attract public attention to the necessity of changing the current situation. Thus, back in November 1942, the chair of TASSR’s Union of Writers Tazi Gizzat bitterly noted that ‘the administration of our republic and city have never been interested in the creative activities of a Tatar writer... Tatar writers who fight at the front are not being used according to their specialty, since military commissariats of the Tatar republic send them to army units on a regular basis’ [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 5, File 547, Sheet 109]. However, unfortunately, his submission did not have a significant impact upon the widely spread practice of mobilization in Tatarstan of the national intelligentsia.

The work of writers who remained in the rear also suffered considerable changes. A significant part of their lives became occupied with ideological work among the population: litterateurs organized artistic receptions, made
presentations on the radio and via mass media. Moreover, they were actively enlisted to participate in a wide range of socially beneficial events. Nevertheless, writers did not cease their own literary work. During the war, the Tatar publishing house issued 220 books of writers and poets of the republic with a circulation of over 1.5 million copies.

During the war years, the prevailing form of Tatar prose was the small form of essays and short stories. The most famous among the population were short stories 'Artillerist Suleyman' written by K. Nadzhmi; 'Sergeant Khayrullin' by G. Bashirov; 'Night Meeting' of G. Nasretdinov; 'In a Winter Night', 'There Were Three of Them' by I. Gazi; 'Unity', 'Stronger Than Death', 'Soldier Khayrullai' by A. Ab-sallyamov; 'In a Roaring Night' by A. Shamov; 'Maraat' Sh. Kamal. Among larger literary works, we should mention tales 'Notes of a Spy', 'In a Spring Night' by F. Karim; 'Adventures of Rustem' by A. Kutuy.

Poetry was represented by over 20 poems and hundreds of verses, among which 'Son of the Volga', 'Sniper', 'Wife of the Partisan' written by F. Karim; 'Artillerist Vagap' by Sh. Mudarris; 'Front-Line Soldier', 'Before the Attack' by S. Khakim; 'Khayat-ap' ['Aunt Khayat'], 'Farida' by K. Nadzhmi; 'A Russian Girl' by N. Arslanov; 'Song of Brave Tanker Pyotr Novikov' by A. Iskhak, etc can all be mentioned.

Writers of the Russian section of Tatarstan's Union of Writers M. Yelizarova, B. Zernit, I. Subbotin, Ye. Vereyskaya also successfully worked on new works of literature.

Together with representatives of the local creative intelligentsia, the tasks of political character were fulfilled by Russian and foreign writers evacuated to the republic. They settled mainly in the cities of Kazan and Chistopol. During the war years, A. Fadeev, M. Aliger, B. Bakhtiyev, M. Isakovskiy, K. Trenev, L. Leonov and K. Fedin lived and worked in the republic. Here, the following famous anti-fascist writers were also provided with temporary accommodation: Jean-Richard Bloch from France, Giovanni Germanetto from Italy, Johannes Becher, Willie Bredel, Clara Blyum from Germany, César Aronada from Spain, Leon Pasternak from Poland. Subsequently, they fondly recalled Tatarstan. Plots related to their life in the republic firmly settled in the works of the war years and will forever remain in the chronicles of Soviet and world literature.

However, during the years of the Great Patriotic War, the cultural life of the republic experienced significant additions, but also acute losses too. They were mainly connected to the change of the vector in the ideological direction of the Soviet state. In the initial period of the war, the confusion caused by front-line failures and defeats led to the Stalinist state agreeing to a number of concessions of a political nature. This included using the national factor as an element in raising the patriotic spirit of different nations. Taking advantage of the given right, the Tatar intelligentsia addressed long forgotten themes carefully preserved in the memories of generation, as well as images of the heroic past, recalling a time when powerful Medieval Tatar states existed, as well as revived images of the national heroes. Famous writers: N. Isanbet, F. Khusni, Sh. Mannur, S. Khakim, F. Karim finally started to work on their masterpieces without a thought for the security institutions.

However, these ideological concessions appeared were short lived. Once Victory appeared on the horizon, the authorities began to restore order with the same zeal. In 1944, entire nations (Kalmyks, Chechens, Crimean Tatars, Ingushes, Balkars and others) were forced out of their homelands for political reasons. The presumed reason for their deportation was accusation mass betrayal. Any expulsion of the Tatar nation would have been problematic (the Tatars represent a dispersedly settled nation. — A.K.), so the authorities took a hard line with them, involving their spiritual enslavement and the destruction of its ethnic history. It found its expression in the decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) dated 9 August 1944 'the conditions and measures of improvement of the overall political and ideological work in the Tatar Party organization'. The decree ostracized the republic's supreme bodies due to 'exaggerated attention' upon the national fac-
tor [KPSS v rezolyuciyax, 1985, pp. 513–520]. The authorities expressed special disfavour towards the works of Naki Isanbet 'Edigii' in which they 'discovered' such mistakes as 'the embellishment of the Golden Horde', 'promotion of the khanate-feudal epos' and so on, although not so long ago, this work had been treated as 'politically correct' and reflecting the history of the Tatars.

This decree determined the landmarks in the national policy-making of Tatarstan's Party and state bodies for many decades. All academic and cultural institutions adjusted their activities accordingly. The slightest attempts taken by representatives of the intelligentsia in the sphere of the humanities to deviate from the established paradigm of Tatar history were declared nationalist and severely punished. The authorities' interference in the creative processes during the war period laid the foundation for the further persecution of cultural luminaries in the post-war years.

Workers in the field of the visual arts made a significant contribution to the common victory. From the first days of the war, artists began the organized publication of political and military posters. They demonstrated the heroism displayed by soldiers, the labour feats of the people working in the rear, and exposed the myths of the fascist ideology. The Tatar State Publishing House created posters inspired by Kazan artists B. Almenov, A. Rodionov, N. Sokolsky, R. Sayfullin, E. Gelms.

In addition to the typographic posters, they produced about 170 posters of 'Okna Satiry' ['Windows to satire'] painted by hand in Kazan. Their publication was initiated by such artists as I. Bobrovitsky, N. Sokolsky and poet Bruno Zernit. 4 copies of 'Okna satiry' were published every month with the circulation of almost 300 copies. These posters were accessible to the general public and of strategic importance. They were displayed in all the crowded places of the city and reflected the latest events from the life of the country and the world.

The creation of new paintings also helped the republic's artists improve their skills. Most of them were military and patriotic in nature. 'Listening to the Communique of the Soviet Information Bureau', 'To Slavery' were painted by V. Timofeev; D. Bulat painted 'The Unit of Hero of the Soviet Union Comrade Batyrshin in a Bayonet Assault'; G. Rakhmankulova — 'Portrait of Sarazeeva, the Mother of Veterans'; K. Maksimov — 'Provision of Peat', 'Helping Adults', 'Evacuated from the Kolkhoz'; I. Novoselov — 'Defence of Kazan'; G. Katkov — 'Vseobuch in Kazan'. The famous Tatar craftsman S. Akhun created indoor sculptures. His most significant works are 'Lågnät!' ('Damn!') and 'Çiňić' ('Victory'). During the war, Baki Urmanche lived in the city of Alma-Ata. Much of his work was devoted to military topics, and in particular, he wrote such narrative canvases as 'Return with the Victory', 'At the Hospital', 'Portrait of Sniper Afanasyev'.

Significantly despite separate attempts by national artists not to lose face and continue the traditions of the pre-war years, Tatar decorative art notably suffered in the war period. Out of 46 members of Tatarstan's Union of Writers, 22 fought at the front and 14 of them were killed. Among those who did not return from the front were both experienced craftsmen and young artists who had just begun their lives and were full of creative plans. N. Valiullin, P. Baybaryshev, L. Aleksandrov, A. Silantyev, Yu. Zinovyev, V. Guryev, G. Musin died fighting at fronts in the war years. For those who managed to stay alive, the theme of war remained a defining element in their creative work. They included Kh. Yakupov, M. Usmanov, L. Fattakhov, V. Kudelkin. Time needed to pass before they managed to address other topics.

Along with the rest of the nation, composers also attempted to bring the end of the war closer. Their works were mainly of a military character. Of 108 works written during that period, 72 of them were military and patriotic. Similar to other fields of art during the initial stage of the war the small forms of work dominated composers' creativity, such as mass songs and marches. The most popular songs were 'For Motherland!', 'To the War, Comrades', the music for which was written by M. Musafaroy; 'Murder for Murder!' Dzh. Fayzi wrote the march 'Motherland' for symphony orchestra. 'Suvorov March' for wind orchestra was
written by S. Saydashev; 'March for a Military Campaign' by Dzh. Fayzi; and 'March of Mili-
tia' by V. Vinogradov.

At the same time, works by Tatarstan com-
posers were marked by a range of genres and
were addressed to large music forms. During
this period, N. Zhiganov wrote his operas 'Il-
dar' and 'Tulyak'; M. Muzafarov created his
'Zulkhabira'; M. Yudin — 'Farida'. The ballets
'Fatykh' and 'Zyugra' of N. Zhiganov were also
created at that time. Symphonic music was also
developed further and was mainly represented
by works of M. Muzafarov, N. Zhiganov and
Z. Khabibullin. Moreover, Tatar music was
marked by the appearance of a new genre —
the musical comedy. Composer Dzh. Fayzi cre-
tated two works: 'Boots' written on the basis of
a libretto written by Tazi Gizzat's and 'Seagulls'
on a libretto by A. Fayzi's libretto.

Many composers also fought in army forces.
With weapons in their hands, Kh. Abdulmenov,
Kh. Valiullin, M. Latypov and Sh. Shamsudin-
ov fought against the fascists. There were also
irreparable losses. Farid Yarullin, a young and
talented composer, and the author of the first
Tatar ballet 'Shurale' died heroically in the au-
tumn of 1943 during a combat mission.

The theatres in Tatarstan led almost a front-
line life. With the beginning of the war, new
patriotic motives appeared in their repertoires:
For example: K. Simonov's 'A Lad from our

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Village', about the struggle of republican Spain,
'Field-Marshall Kutuzov' by V. Solovyev about
the events of the Patriotic War of 1812. Plays
on the topic of the Great Patriotic War, includ-
ed 'Front' written by A. Korneychuk, 'Mariyam'
by N. Isanbet, 'Minikamal' by M. Amir. Much
of the activity of artists and performers was
devoted to concerts held in kolkhozes, hospi-
tals and at the front-line. In total, 18 creative
brigades were formed in the republic which
held over 2000 concerts at 11 fronts and per-
formed almost 70 plays [Ivanov, 2010, p. 57].
The audience especially loved Kh. Abzhalilov,
G. Bolgarskaya, M. Bulatova, F. Ilskaya, G.
Kaybitskaya, M. Rakhmankulova, F. Tuishev
and others.

In this way the citizens of Tatarstan with-
stood the difficulties of the troubled year with
honour and dignity. The most difficult tasks
which lay before the home-front workers were
accomplished at the cost of their great self-
abnegation. All day and night long, Tatarstan's
inhabitants toiled in the factories, felled trees,
ploughed, sowed and gathered in the harvest,
while working on strengthening the spirit and
morals of the people through realizing their
creative potential. A hope for a better future,
the feeling of love and loyalty to their Mother-
land, a deep faith in the Victory united people,
invigorated them and helped them withstand
the troubles.

§ 3. The Eastern Policy of Germany and the Volga-Tatar Legion —
Legion 'Idel-Ural'. The Immortal Feat of Musa Jalil

Iskander Gilyazov

On 16 July 1941, at a meeting of the Ger-
man senior management with the participation
of Hitler, Rosenberg, Keitel, Göring and Lam-
mers, the following statement was made: 'It
must become and remain an iron rule: No one
must be allowed to carry weapons, except for
the Germans! And this is particularly impor-
tant, even if it may seem easy at first to enlist
foreign subdued peoples for military aid —
all this is not true! Sometime it will be inevita-
bly turned against us. Only Germans may carry
weapons, not the Slavs, not the Czechs, not the
Cossacks or the Ukrainians!' [Der Prozeß ge-
die Hauptkriegsverbrecher, 1949, p. 88].

This as a very emphatic statement and there
could be no revision of the strict prohibition.
However, by the end of 1941 and during 1942
tens of thousands of representatives of the
peoples of the USSR had been put under the
banner of the Wehrmacht. They were hastily
formed into the Ostlegionen (literally 'Eastern
Legions'), the main impetus for the creation of
which was given by the obvious failure of the Blitzkrieg plan.\footnote{\textsuperscript{12} However, to explain the creation of the Eastern Legions exclusively in terms of the failure of the planned 'Blitzkrieg' is to over-simplify the problem. This tendency is all too apparent in our historiography [see, for example: Abdullin, 1985, p. 44]. Even the creation of committees for the selection of Turkic prisoners of war has been 'aligned' to the defeat of the Germans just outside Moscow, although these committees, which will be discussed below, were already in existence in August–September 1941 [see, for example: Mustafin, 1993, p. 73].}

Other major circumstances also contributed to the creation of the Ostlegionen:

- the huge number of Soviet prisoners of war in the hands of Germany;
- the active German propaganda among the population of the occupied regions of the USSR and against the front units of the Red Army. The results was that many members of the civilian population of Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic states cooperated with the Germans. A considerable number of soldiers and officers of the Red Army passed over to the German side, especially in the first period of the war.

The position of some foreign countries, demanded more humane treatment at least in relation to the Turkic, Muslim prisoners of war. Turkey's politicians expressed the greatest interest in this matter. This also should include the intensification of emigrant leaders from the representatives of the peoples of the USSR with the beginning of war.

When the 'Blitzkrieg' plan failed, these factors influenced the German government's position. In spite of the difference in points of view and serious contradictions between the tribal leaders and senior government and military institutions of the Reich, the German government decided to use these circumstances to its advantage.

The headquarters for the creation of the Ostlegionen was located from 18 February 1942 in Poland, in the town of Rembert. The summer of the same year was transferred to the city of Radom under the name 'headquarters of the Ostlegionen', on 23 January 1943 it was renamed as the Command of headquarters of the Ostlegionen [Hoffmann, 1976, pp. 30–31].

The Volga-Tatar legion (or Legion 'Idel-Ural') was set up later than all other legions. Although the actual representatives of the peoples of the Volga region were separated into special combined camps in the autumn and winter of 1941–1942. The documents at our disposal mention for the first time the creation of the Volga-Tatar Legion in 1 July 1942. On the same day, information about emerging legions, including the Volga-Tatar Legion, was sent to a number of institutionst [BA-MA, RH 19 III/492, Bl. 232]. On 1 August 1942 an order, signed by Keitel, the chief of headquarters about the creation of the additional units to the existing Legion. They consisted of Volga (Kazan) Tatars, Bashkirs, Tatar-speaking people, the Chuvash people, the Mari, Udmurts and the Mordvin [Bundesarchiv-Koblenz, NS 19/2523]. The order instructed that the representatives of these peoples be separated into special camps, to intensify the efforts to recruit prisoners of war. It was noted that the status of the Volga-Tatar Legion was exactly the same as that of the first such groups, and that the use of the Legion was prescribed in the fields of military actions, but especially in the areas of guerrilla actions.

Keitel's order was practically given from the top and the actual order of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht was signed on 15 August 1942. It already contained more specific information:

1. Create a legion of Tatars, Bashkirs and Tatar-speaking peoples of the Volga region;
2. Transfer the Tatars assigned to the Turkestan legion into the Volga-Tatar legion;
3. Immediately separate Tatar prisoners of war from the others and send to the Siedlce camp (on the Warsaw-Brest railway line). Send them over to the military commander in the General Government (Militärbefehlshaber im General-Gouvernement);
4. Use the legion primarily in the struggle against the guerrillas [BA-MA, RH 19 III/492, Bl. 172 oder RH 19 V/79, Bl. 8].

Practical work on the creation of the Volga-Tatar Legion began on 21 August 1942: the place of its formation was a camp in Jedline
under the Radom, where uniforms and weapons for the Legion were supplied. This was also the place where the German executive staff arrived. The Siedlce camp, located near Yedlino, had previously become an assembly point for prisoners of war from the Turkic peoples.

A banner was presented to the Volga-Tatar legion on 6 September 1942, so the legionaries considered this as the date of the final formation of the union [Idel-Ural, № 36 (42), 05/05/1943].

On 8 September 1942 the Volga-Tatar legion was placed under the command of the Ostlegionen Headquaters, and the commander of the military district in the ‘General Government’.

Tatar prisoners of war were concentrated mainly in the camp Siedlce A, where they were sent to prepare for the Legion in Yedlino. Subsequently, the camp in Deblin also fulfilled the function of a pre-camp (Stalag 307). In early 1944, after the transfer of the Ostlegionen to France, the general pre-camp was in Legionowo, near Warsaw [BA-MA, RH 53–23/44, Bl. 136], since March 1944—and again in Siedlce B (Stalag 366), and in the camp Nehrybka (Stalag 327) [BSTU-Zentralarchiv, RHE 5/88–SU, Bd. 2, Bl. 143].

Major Oskar von Zekendorf, a quite old and experienced man of war, was appointed as the commander of the Volga-Tatar legion. He was born on 12 June 1875 in Moscow, he spoke English, Russian, French, Chinese well; as well as Ukrainian and Spanish to a lesser extent

Later, he was promoted to lieutenant colonel.

According to the available documents it can be judged that Zekendorf, despite his age, took the tasks quite vigorously, above all paying attention to the issues of the combat training of legionaries. Perhaps one of the most serious problems for him (as well as for other German organizers of the Ostlegionen) was the problem of the training the national officers staff. This was a problem which was not to be resolved before the end of the war, although it rose again many times.

According to the plan, the first battalion of the Volga-Tatar Legion, which received number 825, was to be established by 1 December 1942, but it was formed a little earlier — on 25 November. The date of the formation of 826 Battalion was established 15 December 1942, the date of 827 Battalion — 1 January 1943. In fact, it happened, respectively, on 15 January and 10 February 1943 [BA-MA, RH 19 V/110, Bl. 254; RH 53–23/38, Bl. 218; RH 53–23/51, Bl. 18; RH 58/42, Stammtafel der Wolgata-

All three battalions were first mentioned in the surviving documents on 3 November 1942 [Ibid., RH53–23/51, Bl. 28–29].

Tatar battalions, which were created in Poland, Yedlino, under the control and jurisdiction of the Ostlegionen Command in the German armed forces, and which are described in detail on the basis of available documents, were not the only ones. It is most likely that other Ta-

Tatar unions were create in individual armies or groups of armies, at a later date during 1944. There were both fighting, and construction, and supply subdivisions among them.

825th Battalion. This the most famous of all Tatar battalions. The commander of the battalion was Major Caecus. The exact number of Ta-

Tatar legionnaires in the battalion is not specified in surviving documents. However, by compar-

ing it with other similar units, we can assume that there were approximately 900 people.

The 825th Battalion is especially famous for its armed action against the Germans at the end of February 1943. This fact is reflected in domestic publicistic literature [Zabirov, 1990, pp. 57–59; Mustafin, 1971 pp. 124–141].

It happened as follows. Judging by reports, on 14 February 1943 the bat-

talion was officially sent to the front: 'Before the battalion left to fight guerrillas, a profes-

sor, his name was unknown, arrived in Yedlino village from Berlin to make a report.

13 Fragmentary biographical information on O von Seeckendorf [see: Bundesarchiv-Potsdam, NS 31/45, Bd. 237; NS 31/55, Bl. 27]. In the book by S. Drobyazko his name has been distorted and appears as Ziker-

dorf [Drobyazko, 2004, p. 151]

14 This episode in the history of the war is de-
scribed in most detail in the book compilation [Failure of the Operation, 2010].
The report was in a foreign language. In his report the speaker appealed to the legions to destroy the Bolsheviks, (speaking) about the establishment of the "Tatar state" by Hitler, about the creation of a new beautiful life', — the source of the Belorussian partisan environment reported [National guerrilla movement, 1973, p. 230]. On 18 February the battalion arrived in Vitebsk at night, after that it was sent towards the village Belynovichi on the Surazh highway. Then, the main part of it was located in the village Gralevo on the left bank of the Western Dvina. On 21 February representatives of legionnaires contacted the guerrillas.

As a result of the negotiations, it was agreed that on 22 February at 23 o'clock a general rebellion of the Legion would be raised, and it would go over with its arms to the side of the guerrillas. Obviously, the Germans became aware of the plans of the underground conspirators. One hour before the planned acts took place, arrests were made and the leaders of the rebellion Zhubkov, Tadzhiev and Rakhimov were caught. Then the headquarters company commander Hussain Mukhamedov took the initiative. A signal was sent to almost all the battalion units located in different regions in the neighborhood, — the rebellion began. According to the source, the news could not reach two platoons of the second company.

The transferred legionnaires were distributed amongst the partisan brigades, commanded by Zakharov and Biryulin [Mustafin, 1971, p. 134]15.

Thus, the first entry into the battle of the first division by the Volga-Tatar Legion ended in failure for the German side. The reasons for this are clearly visible in the German documents, albeit in veiled form: firstly, the clear activities of 'certain intellectual Tatars' among the legionaries who organized the transfer of the battalion to the side of the guerrillas. This might refer to the activity of Musa Jalil group, or his predecessors, but in any case, the legionnaires' actions had been organized and prepared in advance. Secondly, despite the long indoctrination, the Germans were still unable to enlist the support of the Tatar legionnaires. Their Soviet patriotism was much stronger. The Germans, in spite of their efforts, remained 'strangers' to the Tatar legionnaires, the latter saw the Belarussian guerrillas as their own comrades.

Former legionnaires, who transferred to the guerrillas, apparently, almost immediately took part in the battles against the German army. They were especially intense on 28 February 1943 and were intended to break the blockade. They later continued to remain in the partisan units in Belarus. This is confirmed, for example, by data from letters of the Belarussian Headquarters Partisan Movement dated 2 July 1943: 'After their transfer to the guerrilla battalion, their staff was really dispersed amongst the Partisan Brigades. They participated in the fighting against the German occupiers, and proved to be good. Some of the personnel of the battalion remained in the partisan brigades until the present time' [Garayev, 2003].

After these events, the legionnaires of the 825th Battalion who remained on the German side, were immediately sent to the rear and assigned to other units. The rebellion of the 825th Battalion was like a 'cold shower' for the German command. This event played a significant role in the future of the Eastern legions.

826th Battalion. The organization of the 826th Battalion planned for 15 December 1942 did not take place — it was formed in Yedlino on 15 January 1943. In March 1943, after the uprising of the 825th Battalion, the 826th Battalion 'was transferred out of harm' to Dutch territory in the city of Breda area [Tessin, 1976, p. 33]16. Here, apparently, they served as guards.

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15 The partisan movement in Belarus at that time developed in extremely difficult circumstances: according to data on the partisans, it is a well-known fact, for example, that in February 1943 6,000 partisans were surrounded in the area of Vitebsk by enemy units totalling as many as 28,000 men with artillery, tanks, and aircraft at their disposal. The first Vitebsk partisan brigade was commanded by M. Biryulin, his commissary was V. Khabarov, and the chief of staff was L. Korneev [see: Garayev, 2003].

16 Incidentally, the book by Yu. Karchevskiy and N. Leshkin notes that the 826 Battalion was 'triumphantly' despatched to France on 2 April 1943. The source of this information is unknown to me [Karchevsky, Leshkin, 1982, p. 83].
and were involved into other works. The 826th Battalion was not involved in real military operations.

On 1 September 1943 the battalion may have been in France (there is no more precise indication) [Bundesarchiv-Potsdam, NS 31/55, Bl. 8]¹⁷, and on 2 October 1943 it was again relocated to Holland, where it stayed throughout 1943—the beginning of 1945. [Die geheimen Tagesberichte, 1988, p. 168].

R. Mustafin recounts an eloquent fact about the history of the 826th Battalion. An uprising had been planned in the unit, but the German secret service managed to break the plans of the members of the underground. 26 members of the underground organization were shot after that, two hundred men were transferred into the penal camp [Mustafin, 1974, pp. 199–200]¹⁸.

827th Battalion. The battalion was established on 10 February 1943 in Yedlino. Its field post was number 43645A-E. The commander of the battalion was Captain Pram.

At the end of June 1943 the 827th battalion was sent to fight the guerrillas in the Western Ukraine [BA-MA, RH 53–23/51, Bl. 88]. There legionnaires participated in several clashes with the guerrillas.

In early October 1943 the battalion was transferred to the city of Lannion in France and was placed under command of the 7th Army [Die geheimen Tagesberichte, 1988, pp. 233, 248]. The 827th battalion disappointed the German command during the actions against the partisans in Western Ukraine too. Moreover, the fact that the battalion remained in the area only strengthened the guerrilla detachments, since many legionnaires went to them. After the transfer of the battalion to France, it did not become a 'reliable' unit for the Germans, since many legionnaires transferred to the French partisans as well.

828th Battalion. This battalion was created in the period from 1 April 1943 and was finally formed on 1 June 1943¹⁹ After the formation, the battalion spent a long time in Yedlino. [Bundesarchiv-Potsdam, NS 31/55, Bl. 8].

On 28 September 1943 the unit was sent to Western Ukraine instead of the 827th Battalion which turned out to be 'unreliable' [BA-MA, RH 53–23/42, Bl. 267]. The hopes of the Germans about the newly arrived legionnaires were in vain. Sources indicate clearly that during the stay of the 828th battalion in Western Ukraine, many of legionnaires transferred to the partisans.

829th Battalion. It was created on 24 August 1943 in Yedlino. As a result of the failures of the first battalions, the 829th battalion remained in Yedlino for a long time [Ibid., RH 53–23/51, Bl. 100]. However, the battalion was later also moved to Western Ukraine [Ibid., RH 53–23/44, Bl. 136].

The end for the 829th battalion came soon enough: Due to frequent cases of 'misconduct' in the battalion, it was dismissed by order of the commander of the military district in the 'General Government' on 29 August 1944 [Ibid., Bl. 164]. All these events were to take place prior to 18 September 1944.

That was how the story of the 829th Tatar battalion ended.

830th Battalion. There is no precise data on the formation of the 830th Battalion. Although the unit is already mentioned in documents after 1 September 1943 [BA-Potsdam, NS 31/55, Bl. 8], its existence on that day is doubtful, since in a document dated 26 October, it is referred to as 'being formed' [BA-MA, RH 53–23/51, Bl. 100].

The Germans had already decided not to use the battalion against partisans: it served as

¹⁷ These details are most probably inaccurate. The battalion is likely to have remained in the Netherlands and was not transferred from one country to another.

¹⁸ Supplementing, as it were R. Mustafin’s information, M. Cherepanov writes: ‘The 826 Battalion also rebelled in 1944 and tried to go over to the side of the French (? — I. G.) partisans’ [Cherepanov, 1991, p. 41]. But I have not been able to find this information in the sources either. I have, however, succeeded in finding another interesting observation regarding this battalion in domestic journalism. G. Kashshaf referred in his book to the diary of the German officer Walter Heisen, who reported on the complete disarmament of the remnants of the 826 Battalion on 6 September 1944 because of its unreliability [Kashshaf, 1984, p. 184].

¹⁹ S. Chuyev wrongly gives his name as ‘Gaulinz’ [Chuyev, 2004, p. 506]
guards in different towns of Western Ukraine and Poland. These transfers were carried out to check the 'reliability' and combat capability of the battalion, which gave cause for suspicion amongst the Germans, which was not unfounded.

In June 1944, the branch of the Gestapo in Radom managed to extract from one of the non-commissioned officers of the 830th Battalion, that he was looking for communication with 'communist gangs'. He seems to have managed to organize 20 legionnaires to kill people from the German staff during the night of June from 17 to 18, to open the armory, steal cars and weapons and to escape to partisans. However, on 12 and 15 June the initiators of the conspiracy, more than 20 people, were arrested. 17 people were subsequently released by the military court due to lack of evidence. Representatives of the secret police believed that the decision was legally justified, but its consequences could be unpredictable, therefore it was recommended to discuss the situation in detail with the commander of the eastern detachments [BA-Potsdam, Film 56636, A 196]²⁰.

Probably at the final stage of the war, the 830th Battalion existed as building and combat — engineering. In in early 1945 it was located in the bend of the Vistula River, and later — in Pomerania [Ibid., Bd. 13, p. 38.].

831st Battalion. It was created in the fall of 1943 in Yedlino. Its existence is confirmed in the latter half of October. Judging by the text of the document, it provided protection for the main camp of the Volga-Tatar Legion in Yedlino [BA-MA, RH 53–23/51, Bl. 100]. The unit had to do practically the same in February 1944, when it was in Legionovo near Warsaw [Ibid., RH 53–23/44, Bl. 136].

Other references to the 831st Battalion in the known sources are not available.

Battalions 832, 833, 834 of the Volga-Tatar legion were due to be established in the autumn of 1943. They must have not been formed. No references which would really confirm the existence of these Tartar battalions could be found.

On 29 September 1943 Hitler ordered the transfer of all the eastern volunteers from East to West [Neulen, 1985, p. 331]. This was reflected in the order of the German General Headquarters on 2 October 1943 (№ 10570/43) on the transfer of the Eastern legions from Poland to France at the disposal of the commander of Armies group West in the city of Nancy [BSTU-Zentralarchiv, RHE 5/88-SU, Bd. 3, Bl. 91]. The relocation was supposed to be carried out in the following order:


This order then did not concern all the Eastern battalions, some of them remained on the site of their military service. All the structures of the Eastern Command of the legions, the so-called 'main camps', and a part of the battalions were transferred to France.

To implement this large-scale deployment a special liquidation headquarters under the command of Colonel Moeller was set up. The procedure prescribed by the order was observed in general: for example, the main camp and the command of the Volga-Tatar Legion left Yedlino on 19 October 1943, and command and headquarters of the Eastern legions set off on 24 October [BA-MA, RH 53–23/43, Bl. 36]. The transportation was carried out very quickly by special military echelons. Nevertheless, in the first half of November 1943 the relocation was largely completed: on 1 March 1944, 61439 foreigners and eastern volunteers, according to official data, were at the disposal of the commander of a group of Western armies [Neulen, 1985, p. 331].

The Command of the Eastern legions in France in October 1943, was in the city of Nancy (Eastern France), but at the end of November it was transferred further to the south to the town of Millau [BSTU-Zentralarchiv, RHE 5/88-SU, Bd. 3, Bl. 98]. It is most likely,
that due to the unfavorable development of the military situation for the Germans, on March 15, 1944, the command of the eastern unions from Millau returned to Nancy again (this concerns the former command of the Eastern legions, not of the command of all the volunteers unions) [Ibid., Bl. 101].

At the beginning of 1944 in France, there was a serious restructuring of the units of the eastern nations, which, most likely, was intended to strengthen control over them and maximize their battle readiness [See: Romanko, 2004 p. 204–206]. Here in February 1944 a new structure was formed. It was called The Main Volunteer Division (Freiwilligen Stamm Division) with the center in Lyon and was initially under the command of Colonel Kholste. In late March 1944, Kholste was replaced by Major-General von Henning. The division was divided into a number of regiments on a national basis, including units of Russians, Ukrainians and Cossacks. The Volga-Tatar legion, the commanders of which was located in Le Puy, belonged to the 2nd Regiment, and the union continued to be named the Volga-Tatar Legion as a part of the 2nd Regiment.

The Eastern battalions, located in different countries and regions of the Western Europe, were intended not only for the defense of the Atlantic Wall, but also to fight against guerrillas, as in the East. For example, three companies of the Volga-Tatar Legion took part in the German action against the French Maquis in Chantal department in early June 1944. In early August divisions of the Volga-Tatar Legion participated in similar actions in the areas of Issoire and Rochefort (in the city of Clermont-Ferrand area) [BA-MA, RH 36/509, Bl. 8].

The Eastern legions in France as a whole showed the same qualities as they had shown before in Ukraine.

The divisions of the Volga-Tatar Legion demonstrated clear 'unreliability'. On 13 July 1944 the Field Commandant's Office 588 in Clermont-Ferrand clearly stated in its summary with bitterness: 'The reconnaissance group of the Tatar Legion could catch no more than a few previously escaped Armenian Legionnaires' [Ibid., RH 36/509, Bl. 46]. On the night of 29/30 July 1944 a Russian officer and 78 legionnaires of the Volga-Tatar legion, according to the same commandant data, transferred to the guerrillas, and the remaining were immediately returned to the barracks [Ibid., Bl. 61]. There were many examples when eastern legions transferred to partisans in the last period of the war. Many such cases have become widely known due to the publications in our press[1].

Most of the eastern battalions of volunteers on the Western Front were divided and distributed into different regions and assigned to larger German units. This isolation from each other, no doubt, marked enhanced the sense of confusion and depression among the majority of legionnaires. In general, the use of the Eastern legions did not bring the desired results in Western Europe either. Many of the legionnaires were very afraid of being captured by the advancing Soviet army, preferring in the end to find themselves prisoner of the allies. However, this fate was also unenviable. According to the agreements between the USSR and the Allied Powers, all Soviet citizens who found themselves in the hands of British and American troops, were subsequently transferred to the Soviet side. They returned to their homeland, where in most cases severe punishment awaited them[2].

Thus, we see that the German plans to use units consisting of the Turkic peoples of the USSR, including Tatars, especially in 1942–1944, resulted in failure. The clandestine anti-

[1] Bronstein, 1995; Kashapov, 1994 b; Kashapov, 1992; Kashapov, 1994 a; Mustafin, 1992; Cherepanov, 1993, pp. 50–61; Cherepanov, 1995, pp. 86–93. Although these publications often contain a considerable number of inaccuracies regarding the general history of the Eastern Legions, they provide important information on the war-time and post-war fate of many former legionnaires of Volga-Tatar Legion.

[2] The fate of most of the former legionnaires and, in fact, all Soviet citizens, who were on the side of Germany and ended up as Allied prisoners of war, is truly tragic [see: Tolstoy, 1996]. According to the author, in 1944–1947 the allies of the USSR released more than two million Soviet citizens (among whom were inmates of the camps, prisoners of war, the remnants of various ‘volunteer units,’ eastern workers, etc.). It is not hard to imagine what awaited the majority of these people in their home country.
fascist groups which arose among the eastern legionnaires, of course, had played their role in the failure of the aspirations of the Nazis. One of the best known of these groups was a group led by Guinan Kurmashev and Musa Dzhaliil. The group apparently began its activities in late 1942. It consisted primarily of Tatar officers who find themselves to be German prisoners of war. The conspirators concentrated their efforts on the expansion of the Legion 'Idel-Ural' inside and preparation for rebellion. They used the printing house of the newspaper 'Idel-Ural', released by the East Ministry of Germany specifically for legionnaires from the autumn of 1942, to achieve the goal.

Guinan Kurmashev created and coordinated the work of five groups of the underground organization. Musa Dzhaliil, who had the opportunity to move freely throughout the territory of Germany and Poland, organized a campaign amongst the legionnaires. Ahmet Simayev worked on the propaganda radio-station 'Vineta', where he could get information to the resistance group and produce leaflets. Abdulla Alish, Akhat Atmashev and Zinnat Khasanov also took active participation in the production and distribution of leaflets.

It is safe to assume that the battalions of the Legion 'Idel-Ural' did not meet the expectations that had been assigned to them by the German command, largely due to the activities of the underground group of Kurmashev and Dzhaliil. Unfortunately, this work was interrupted by the German counterintelligence: the members of the underground were arrested in Berlin on the night of 11/12 August 1943. About 40 people from the propaganda departments of the Legion 'Idel-Ural' were captured in August 1943.

After a prolonged investigation, the members of the Resistance were brought to the Imperial court in Dresden. On 12 February 1944 11 people were sentenced to death by decision of the court. They were: Musa Dzhaliil, Guinan Kurmashev, Abdulla Alish, Ahmet Simayev, Akhat Atmashev, Abdulla Battalov, Fuat Bulatov, Salim Bukharov, Fuat Sayfulmulyukov, Zinnat Khasanov, Garif Shabayev. The text of the sentence referred to 'assistance to the enemy' and 'undermining the military power'. This formulation reasonably suggests that the Resistance group which existed in the 'Idel-Ural' Legion caused serious damage by their actions to 'The Third Reich'.

The Tatar patriots were executed by guillotine in Berlin in the Ploetzensee prison on 25 August 1944. The first who ascended the scaffold was Guinan Kurmashev — at 12 o'clock 06 minutes. The other members of the underground were executed at an interval of three minutes.

A memorial plaque containing the names of the band in Berlin, in the Museum of the Resistance to Fascism and exhibits of materials about the heroes in the Ploetzensee prison commemorate the Tatar underground members.

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23 More detailed information about the underground activities of the 'Idel-Ural' Legion [see: Zabirov, 1990; Mustafin, 1971]. These activities are described in summarised form in the work [Akhtamzyan, 2002]
CHAPTER 7
The national problem and political situation in Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in the middle of the 1940s–the first half of the 1980s

Alfiya Gallyamova

In the early post-war years, society lived in hopes of democratic changes. However, the response to them was the reinforcement of state party control over various sectors of socio-political and spiritual life and repressions. The ideological adjustments started in the country in 1943, when along with the decisions on reviving the national economy in the regions, freed from the German occupation, a number of Soviet magazines were developing measures for overcoming 'major political mistakes' [Novejshaya istoriya Rossii, 2007, p. 327]. In the summer of 1944, the state adopted a regulation on reinforcing the ideological programme in the Moldavian and Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republics [Ibid., pp. 501, 506]. In August 1944, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) issued a resolution 'On the status and means of improving the massive political and ideological activities in the Tatar Party organization'. The decisions were aimed at the renunciation of the ideological 'concessions' made due to extreme circumstances of the war time. Under the new conditions after the routing of the enemy from the country, the official propaganda began to change its tone. It no longer needed to focus on the national heroic epic and historical images, living in minds of the USSR nations and raising people's patriotic spirit.

The key point in the resolution made by the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (TASSR) was to erase the historical memory of the past powerful Tatar states from the conscious minds of the Tatar people. So the first ideological stroke was deliberately aimed at historical studies. The history of the Golden Horde was banned from educational programmes. It was considered to have a negative impact on sociogenesis not only in Tatarstan, but Russia as well.

In the post-war period, the use of the Tatar language was also restricted. This also reinforced the Russian language and the importance of all things Russian in the socio-political life of the country. I. Stalin set the tone: in May 1945, during the celebration of victory, he called Russians 'the most outstanding nation of all the nations in the Soviet Union' [Pokhlebkin, 1997, p. 349]. Soon afterwards, a thesis was released that proclaimed the Russian people the big brother of all the other nations of the country.

The foundation of developing language, working traditions, customs and other national features has always been manufacturing production. In the 1940s, the Tatar language was further losing its social function in the urban labour sector of the republic. For instance, 40% of workers in the Kazan Aviation Plant were Tatars, but there was not a single community club which functioned in the Tatar language [Tagirov, 1973, p. 23]. The oil industry which evolved in the republic during the post-war period, did not have professional terminology in Tatar, as it was fully adopted from the Russian language. Even though the oil-producing industry was evolving in a region where the majority of people were ethnic Tatar.

Russian vocabulary was introduced, with the disapproval of Arabisms in verbal speech and, especially, in writing. For instance, during one of the sessions of the Union of Writers of the Republic, the Secretary of the Tatar Regional Committee of the CPSU(B), Rakhmatulin, made a statement: 'We will fight grimly the Arabic words', and in confirmation of his words,
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he criticized K. Nasyri for using a lot of 'Oriental' words in his works. In 1951, a session of the Union of Writers of the Republic session gave its approbation for the purification of the language from any inclusions of Arabism, Farsism and pan-Turkism, and showed their support for the introduction of Russian vocabulary. Many writers, for example, Sh. Mannur and N. Isanbet, expressed their fears that concentration on the Russian language might lead to people forgetting their native language. However, some of them supported the official approach of the language policy for pragmatic reasons. For instance, I. Gazi argued that fluency in Russian was necessary for higher education [Khaplekhmatov, 2008, p. 47].

Nevertheless, in the early post-war years the Tatar population ignored this reasoning. In the late 1940s, the vast majority of Tatars sought to study in Tatar. 95% of Tatar children studied in Tatar schools of which there was insufficient number in the republic. As proof of this, in the early 1950, there were numerous written requests from the Tatar citizens of Kazan addressed to the Tatar Regional Committee of the CPSU(B) to open new Tatar schools. In July, 1950, under pressure from persistent requests from Kazan citizens, the Head of the Kazan Urban department of public education, N. Trusenkov, appealed to the Tatar Regional Committee of the CPSU(B) to open a Tatar school near factory No. 237, where many of the workers were former Tatar peasants. The inquiry stated that 'the schools nearby, located in barrack-type buildings, operated in three shifts and were full to capacity' [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 31, File 760, Sheets 398–399].

However, no new Tatar schools were opened. On the other hand the authorities were taking active measures to improve the Russian language classes in existing Tatar schools. In 1946, the Kazan and Elabuga teacher training institutes established departments to train training Russian language and literature teachers to work in Tatar schools [Deminova, 1977, p. 74]. In 1948, the main newspaper of the Republic 'Krasnaya Tataria' ('Red Tataria') published a series of articles about methods of improving the efficiency of Russian classes introduced by the Russian language and literature teacher, Z. Maksudova. Later the newspaper published articles by academics, university teachers and some of the most distinguished middle school teachers. One of them was G. Kamay, a famous academic.

In 1949, the First Secretary of the Tatar Regional Committee of the CPSU(B), Murtov, appealed to the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) to mandate the Ministry of Education of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) to increase the number of teaching hours for Russian language and literature [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 30, File 6, Sheet 406]. In his request he was motivated by the concern for the cultural level of Tatars, and the fact that fluency in Russian offered an advantage in secondary vocational and higher education. In fact, in the 1947/1948 academic year, only 70% of 10th form Tatar students managed to pass their exams. The vast majority failed the Russian exam. The following years, the situation did not change. In the 1952/1953 academic year, 51,752 people, or 64%, out of 80,634 low-performing students failed the Russian class [SA RF, Fund A–2306, inv. 72, f. 2751, s. 18]. The situation in the republic remained the same and in summer, 1953, the matter of the low level of fluency in Russian amongst Tatar students was discussed by the Collegium of the Ministry of National Education of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR). The main focus was drawn to that fact that the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (TASSR) was the only autonomous republic, where all the subjects in Tatar schools from the 1st form to 10th were taught in the native language. The Collegium of the Ministry of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) acknowledged the importance of enhancing the skills of the Russian language teachers in the republic. Only 132 out of 1827 Russian teachers had higher education, 459 were undergraduates and 1236 people had secondary education [SA RF, Fund A–2306, inv. 72, f. 2751, s.19]. The main reason why Tatar school students had poor knowledge of Russian was believed to lie in the fact that primary school teachers did not know Russian themselves [SA RF, Fund A–2306, inv. 72, f. 2751, p. 129].
In the early 1950s, the republic authorities did consider the possibility of developing higher and vocational education in the native language. While not denying the direct involvement of the republic leaders in the process of Russification, it must be acknowledged that it was impossible to oppose it. Significantly not only Tatarstan, but no single Soviet republic adopted resolutions to improve the teaching of native language. Meanwhile, every Soviet and autonomous republic without exception passed several resolutions on improving the quality of Russian classes.

However, it is important to mention the following nuance. The Tatar language was actively used in promoting the communistic ideology amongst the native population of the republic. In the beginning of 1946, the Bureau of the Regional Committee of the CPSU(B) organized a special committee under the Propaganda and agitation Department to translate the works of the Marxism-Leninism classics into Tatar. In the latter half of the 1940s–the early 1950s, two volumes of works by K. Marx, F. Engels and V. Lenin in Tatar were published. In December 1953, the Bureau of the Tatar Regional Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) considered publishing the collected works of V. Lenin in Tatar in an edition of 10 thousand copies. In other words, the exploitation of the Tatar language for promoting the communistic ideology not only was as common, but continued to expand even further.

In the latter half of the 1940s, the ideological pressure intensified in the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) and in the country in general. After the war, the authorities started actively using repressive methods, reviving the pre-war atmosphere of fear and suspicion. A slightest fault, even a careless statement could lead to accusations of anti-Soviet activities and counter-revolutionary acts. For instance, in 1947, the Party expelled U. Baychura from the Kazan branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences for saying the following words looking at the portrait of Stalin, while drinking tea with his colleagues: 'Now he does not worry about rations'. What made it worse was that they were having tea in a polling station which was supposed to be an embodiment of political perfection. Clearly this innocent incident was to have unpleasant consequences not only for the man who made the otherwise harmless statement, but for the Secretary of the Party organization, Furasov, as well. He was removed from his post for 'sluggishness in taking the decision regarding the offence' of Baychura [SA HPD TR, File 26, Inventory 16, File 10, Sheets 10–12].

Prisoners of war were particularly distrusted. The reaction of the Tatar Regional Committee of the CPSU(B) to an anonymous letter (1949), containing the facts about 'improper attitude' of the First Secretary of the Kyzyl-Yulduz District Committee of the CPSU(B), S. Vafin, towards the staff, is quite eloquent. It contained a list of people, who were, according to the author, unworthy of their positions. Yet they were all based on different reasons, often being careless discharge of their duties, mutual cover-up, immorality. However, regarding L. Novikova, an assistant of the Secretary, the reasoning behind the accusation was the fact that her brother, maths teacher in the Kutlu-Bukashk middle school, G. Novikov, was once in German captivity. The Tatar Regional Committee of the CPSU(B) responded to only this argument, by recommending the dismissal of Novikova [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 30, File 1, Sheets 123–124]. Notably, the archive funds of records of the post-war period, contain many similar anonymous incriminating documents [Ibid., Fund 15, Inventory 30, File 1, Sheet 115; File 4, Sheet 5; File 5, Sheets 104, 165, 174; Inventory 37, File 15, Sheet 215].

The cautious attitude of the authorities towards those who only yesterday reached Berlin and won the war had its reasons. They saw war veterans as a potential source of undermining the ideological principles of the USSR as the most progressive country in the world. In fact, many veterans changed their social and psychological attitude, after they had learned about life in the west. For instance, many people in Novy Nadyrov remembered the admiration expressed by Yusup Shafikovich Garayev, son of the kolkhoz chairman, first kolkhoz driver, for life in Germany, after fighting throughout the entirety of the war. Prisoner of war, Salikh Zaripov, who
also lived in Nadyrov, told his fellow villagers that even in captivity the living conditions were better than in the kolkhoz. As a result, the veteran was convicted for 'anti-Soviet agitation' and sentenced to 25 years in prison. The manhunt targeted even those veterans who were never caught making any anti-Soviet statements. Thus, within a few years the state imprisoned many now famous activists and figures, such as the writers Ayaz Gilyazov, Gury Tavlin, Subbukh Rafikov, defender of the Brest Fortress, P. Gavrilov, valiant pilot, M. Devyatayev, member of the French Resistance, A. Utyashev.

A common punishment for communists who had been held in captivity was expulsion from the Party. In 1947–1948, punishment was inflicted upon 26 people. Similar measures were taken with regard to the 'children of former exploiters', people who did not hide their religious views and openly observed the rituals. In 1947–1948, the Tatar Regional Committee of the CPSU(B) expelled 26 people from the Party for hiding their social origin, 23 people for observing religious rituals and 26 people for anti-Soviet comments. The majority of those expelled were young communists who had joined the Party in 1941–1947 [SAHPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 30, File 6, Sheet 177]. Many of them were talented young people and prominent figures.

Between 28 June and 25 September 1949, a Party group of the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) conducted a complete review of the ideological activities in the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (TASSR). They paid particular attention to the work of all the mass media including the local newspapers. It examined the branch of the Academy of Sciences, the Union of Writers and the Opera Theatre, the Lenin memorial houses in Kazan and in the Kokushino village. Most of all their verdict criticized the national newspapers 'Krasnaya Tataria', 'Kzyl Tatarstan' and 'Kherre Yalav'. Afterwards, the Regional Committee of the CPSU(B) gathered the staff reporters of national newspapers to discuss the results of the latest plenary session regarding the harvest and preparations for it. The Committee examined the work of the Tatar publishing house and 'assisted it with publication planning' [RGASPI, Fund 17, Inventory 132, File 103, Sheet 102]. In other words, during the entire post-war period, ideological pressure in the republic became stronger and broader.

The process of de-Stalinization which began in the 1950's, led inevitably to revitalization in a wide range of spheres of social life in Tatarstan. Perhaps, the first substantial sign of political change was the rehabilitation of repressed persons which began in autumn 1953. It affected hundreds of people convicted in the show trials held in the republic between 1933–1937. Such trials were based on fabricated evidence of affiliation to such organisations as the 'Counter-revolutionary German Fascist Organization', 'Counter-revolutionary Insurrectionary Organization', 'Counter-revolutionary Trot Group', 'Counter-revolutionary Trot Terrorist Organization', 'Peasant Ittifak' ('Society') and 'Counter-revolutionary Trot Nationalist Terrorist Organization'. Among the most famous political officials and creative professionals of the republic, the rehabilitation involved the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, K. Abramov, Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, G. Baichurin, state official, the 'Kzyl Tatarstan' newspaper editor, A. Davleyarow, First Secretaries of the Tatar Regional Committee of the CPSU(B), A. Lepa, M. Razumov, M. Khataevich, People's Commissar of light, and later local industry of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, A. Ganeev, People's Commissar of Agriculture, A. Iskenderov, former chief assistant of the Republic Prosecutor, Kh. Alkin, First Secretaries of District Committees of the CPSU(B), Z. Gilmudinov, Kh. Palyutin, G. Tikn, politician, Pro-rector of the Tatar Communist University, I. Rakhmatullin, Editor in Chief of the Tatar State Publishing House, V. Shafigliullin, linguist, brother of Sadri Maksudi, Khadi Maksudi, former 'Muhammadiyah' madrasah teacher, A. Mustafov, historian, Pro-rector of the Tatar Scientific Research Economical Institute, M. Korbut, economist-geographer, Rector of the Kazan State University, N. Vekslin, anatomical pathologist, Rector of Kazan State Institute of Advanced Training of Doctors (KSIATD), M. Aksyantsev, publicist and educator, S. Attagulov,
First Prosecutor of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Principal of the Kazan Institute of Chemical Engineering, G. Bogauldinov, writer and educator, F. Safit-Kazanly, Principal of the Kazan Institute for Occupational Health and Safety, S. Schwartz, historian, Professor N. Elvov, and famous writers, Galimdzhan Ibragimov, Karim Tinchurin and Shamil Usmanov. The writers Ayaz Gilyazov, Gury Tavlin, Subbukh Rafikov, poet Khasan Tufan, generals Nigmat Enikeev and Yakub Chanyshyev managed to survive the Stalinist camps and returned home.

However, the process of rehabilitation in the 1950's was not completed. Many prominent figures of Tatarstan of the 1920–1930s still bore the sinister stigma of nationalists and sultangalievers. The accompanying letters from the supreme judicial authorities specified: 'In the event of finding close relatives, they should be informed only the result of the trial, and details of the court decision shall be omitted.' The rehabilitation did not involve people, who were repressed during the forced collectivization, or who struggled against 'national deviation-ism' or who were persecuted for religious reasons. The local authorities often played it safe when re-examining appeal cases of victims and their families, by unreasonably withholding the decisions of acquittal. An illustrative example of this is the report note from the Prosecution Office of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) related to a review of the Prosecution Office in the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (TASSR) in 1959. 22 cases, examined by the Russian authorities, either concluded with ungrounded rejection by the Prosecution Office of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (TASSR), or were sent for additional investigation, even though the sentence was clearly unfair. For instance, additional investigation was assigned to the case of A. Shakirov, who, as it is said in the document, was a 'senior member of the Party and leading academic'. In 1942, he was accused of organizing anti-Soviet nationalistic activity, but there was no evidence of Shakurov's guilt in the case. A similar situation arose with the cases of M. Byvaltsév, A. Prokhorov, S. Sharaféev, V. Khamzin and others.

In the mid-1950s, the state was diverging from open dictatorship and the unitarian model with a strong centre towards distributing certain authorities to different regions. There were attempts to enhance the status of Soviets in cultural development. Furthermore, in 1957, the Supreme Soviet of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, as well as the corresponding bodies in other autonomous republics, began to discuss annual national economic plans based on central directives. The authority of the autonomous executive structures were slightly expanded in industry management. On the other hand, the authority of municipal and district Soviets was increased in areas of cultural and social construction across the entire territory. The development of the socialist democracy was supposed to be supported by various social organizations which were actively formed during this period in workplaces, communities and Soviet bodies. Numerous house committees, street committees, women's committees, vigilance groups, production site community bureaus and so on, were aimed at directing people's energy towards the establishment of communist relationships in society. Political documents declared that such relations were to become dominant in the USSR within 20 years. However, none of the social organizations could exist without the approval of the Party and State authority bodies, indicating the narrow limits of the policy of social democracy.

Meanwhile, the move towards liberalization provided the impetus for the process of spiritual emancipation and revived people's hopes for radical changes in the political environment. The Tatar Republic, as well as the country in general, witnessed attempts to form independent social organization outside the Party and Komsomol influence. However, they were immediately shut down, as the authorities saw them as a threat of revival of the oppositional political movements.

Students of the Kazan IHLs took significant actions towards bringing the true principles of democracy to social life. For example, in 1956, communist Saidgadzhiev and Komsomol members Gaynudinov, Nurullin, Turyansky and
Katayev from the Kazan Financial Economic Institute tried to organize a discussion club. Their club enrolled 'only those, who had their own thoughts, who could think independently, regardless of our Party ideology' [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 38, File 133, Sheet 18]. As announced by Katayev in the Komsomol student group meeting on 29 November 1956, 'the students gathered to discuss the issues of politics, economy and culture without being guided from above' [Ibid.]. They even took first steps towards putting it all into action. During one of the society meetings, they discussed the issue 'Is cult of personality the product of socialist society?' Katayev made the following note-worthy statement: 'If we had two parties, there would be no cult of personality. For instance, the capitalist countries have several parties, so they do not have, and cannot have a cult of personality'. It is interesting to note that Katayev remarked that the personality cult in the country was transitioning from a Stalinist cult to a Leninist one [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 38, File 133, Sheet 19].

Along with the Financial Economic Institute, the Kazan Institutes of Chemical Engineering and of Veterinary Research were also showing 'disloyalty'. For instance, students of the Kazan Institute of Chemical Technology, Sapozhnikov and Fridman, 'secretly, without informing the Party and Komsonol organizations', released a special issue of the wall newspaper 'Golos kursa' ('Voice of the course'), the headline of which contained a slogan: 'We have to berate all that seems to be wrong, dull, bureaucratic' [Ibid.]. In the Veterinary Research Institute, attention was drawn to 'disorganizing, demagogic and anti-social' public speeches of the fifth year students, Pavlov, Lipovtsev, Akhmetov, Yeltsov, Chegvintsev and Sirazeev, against the higher education reform project suggested by the USSR Ministry of Higher Education Institutions [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 38, File 133, Sheet 21].

Although the majority of the students' specific proposals involved complaints about the school organization and their desire to bring about what they believed to be efficient changes, the republic authorities were quite worried about the sentiment of student youth. All of the Kazan IHLs held meetings, where the above-mentioned students were subject to public censure. The fact that all of these meetings were attended by accredited leaders of the republic meant that the authorities took them quite seriously. For instance, the Secretary of the Regional Committee, Batyev, attended the meeting in the University and in the Institute of Chemical Engineering. Badygov visited the Institute of Veterinary Research, whereas the Institutes of Agriculture and Aviation were visited by the Deputy Manager of the Department of Science, School and Culture of the Regional Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mangutkin, and so on [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 38, File 133, Sheet 22].

Furthermore, the aspirations towards 'democratic excesses' did not end with moral punishment for all students. The initiators of the discuss club in the Kazan Finance–Economic Institute, Katayev and Nurullin, were expelled from Komsonol, Saidgadzhiyev from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and all three of them were expelled from the institute. The Principal of the Institute, Bunin, and the Dean of the Faculty, where the students were studying, Andreev, received Party penalties for 'losing political vigilance' [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 38, File 133, Sheet 21].

Much more brutal measures were taken against people who expressed oppositional sentiments regarding the existing regime, not just by making public statements, but by taking real actions. For example, on 16 August 1957, 4 leaflets with 'anti-Soviet content' were found attached to the building of the City Soviet in Chistopol. After thorough investigation, the author was found. It was a native citizen of Chistopol, fourth year student in the Moscow Institute of International Studies, A. Vasilyev, who had come home for holidays. He was arrested by the Committee for State Security of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, pursuant to the notorious Article 58–10 [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 38, File 93, Sheet 155]. In the document of the State Archive of the Historical and Political Documentation of Republic of Tatarstan which we discovered, the author of
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the leaflets repents his action and tries to explain the origin of his oppositional view with personal reasons: the fact that the authorities refused to allot better housing for his parents.

In this particular case, perhaps, it might have been one of the deciding aspects to express disloyalty to the authority. However, it would be definitely wrong to ascribe oppositional public sentiment only to such factors. Nor can such cases be considered accidental or isolated. In any case, there are certain documents proving that similar 'manifestations of hostile anti-Soviet elements' took place in the republic. As an example, there is an accompanying note from the Secretary of the Tatar Regional Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, S. Batyev, to the Department of Party Organizations in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR), V. Churaev, dated 12 February 1956. It notably says: 'We attach the leaflet "Message to all citizens of Kazan" of anti-Soviet content' [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 38, File 93, Sheet 71].

On 30 April 1956, 5 page letters containing a 'proclamation of anti-Soviet nature' were found in the mailboxes of 35 Kazan flats. It contained a message to various establishments and figures of the Tatar and Bashkir ASSRs, Arzamas, Chkalovsk and Kuybyshev oblasts, primarily to the Tatar pedagogical institutes, academies and schools. The text of the proclamation letter was written by hand in block letters and copied on carbon paper by one person, signed as I. Bubulat, on behalf of the 'Committee for organization of opinions regarding issues of national freedom'.

The proclamation began with a statement about the harassment that 'the Tatar people have been subjected to for 400 years'. Then the author of the proclamation exposes the policy of Russification policy in the education sector. What makes this leaflet so curious is that its author, unlike those who directed their writings to official authorities, reached out to 'pure, fresh public forces', as he calls them. The originator or originators of the leaflet did not believe in the creative potential of the authority, at least, in the matter of finding a solution to the national problem. The leaflet addresses this issue as follows: 'Waiting for something from the Central Committee or their hirelings in the regions is the same as lying to yourself... The current leaders are wrong to blame all the atrocities of the 1930–1940 on Stalin alone. Their hands are also covered in blood, shed throughout the years of Stalin's dictatorship. They contributed to the establishment of a bloody dictatorship. Stalin's supremacy, based on terror, survived with their help, and the Tatar people do not care whether there is one dictator leading the Russian government, or 10–15 party aristocrats or whether the national policy of the ruling communists is called Lenin's or Stalin's. Their policy is based on Russian chauvinism...'. Hence, the author of the leaflet makes a conclusion that there is no use in appealing to the Central Committee of Communist Party of the Soviet Union. However, he does not encourage the radical struggle either. Basically, the idea of the text is to enlighten Tatars, 'to explain to people the basics of the policy of Russian chauvinists' [RGASPI, Fund 556, Inventory 14, File 55, Sheets 15–17].

Inspired by the liberal endeavours of the 20th CPSU Congress, broad categories of the Tatar intelligentsia submitted requests to enhance the status of the republic with the Soviet state. They also made suggestions with regard to solving the problem of the national culture and language development.

The most radical requests, regarding the national status of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, came from the Tatar intelligentsia. Even before the famous 20th CPSU Congress, a group of creative activists of the Republic had sent a letter to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, where along with the issues of cultural revival of Tatars, they addressed the problem of giving Tatarstan the status of a union republic [Ishkakov, 1997, p. 34]. After denouncing criticism of the Stalinist personality cult from the Congress tribune, the public speeches made by intelligentsia increased in quantity and intensity.

In 1956, during a meeting of the Kazan Baum District Party Economy committee, the writer G. Kashshaf, while talking about how
harmful the personality cult had been for historical studies, literature and art, openly expressed his hopes that the Central Committee of the Party will work on the issue of possible reformation of 'Tataria into a union republic' [SA HPD TR, Fund 19, Inventory 45, File 72, Sheet 108]. In 1957, writer N. Fattakh sent letters, requesting the re-organization of the Tatar Autonomous Republic into a union republic, to the top officials of the state, including N. Khrushchev [Ibid., Fund 15, Inventory 38, File 196, Sheet 111]. Prior to that he had appealed to the supreme authorities of the republic, where his reasoning had been found to be erroneous. The unfairness of the autonomous status ascribed to the Tatar Republic was the theme of a letter also written in 1957 by G. Enverov and Sh. Fakhrulishamov to the 'Literary newspaper'. They wrote in their message 'On the future of Tatar Nation' to one of the most popular publications at the time: 'For this minor reason' such as the lack of borders with foreign states, the situation in our schools with entrance examinations to IHLs is also different from the situation in other republics [Ibid., File 191, Sheet 65].

The famous Tatar writer, Sh. Mannur, who was notable for his ability to tell the truth and live by it even during the post-war Stalin era, for which he was expelled from the CPSU(B), after the 20th Communist Party of the Soviet Union Congress did not shy away from directly addressing himself to the first official of the state, N. Khrushehev. He gave an honest expression of his concern for the socio-economic and socio-cultural situation in the Tatar Republic [RGASPI, Fund 556, Inventory 14, File 55, Sheets 108–116]. The author was particularly worried about the spiritual state of Tatars. Notably, Sh. Mannur pointed out: 'We have a lot of confusion and perversion in the sphere of enlightenment, language and literature, culture and art. The registry of records and even all records management in Kazan and many other districts are based upon the Russian language. Our leaders make all their public speeches in Russian. During the post-war decade, Tatar literature and art made very little progress. The Tatar drama theatre is in a particularly difficult situation. Every year it loses its best old actors, but does not train new ones. In this decade the secretaries of the Regional Committee supervised literature and art only through clamour, elaborations, expulsions and stentorian resolutions. That is why the development of literature and art far from being encouraged, is actually being artificially restricted. The tragedy of the situation is that these tovarishes (comrades) do not read and do not understand their own literature. Hence, the lack of vivid party leadership in this area'.

The Tatar intelligentsia in Kazan made numerous attempts to develop a strategy to consolidate the Tatar nation in the changing world. During the Union of Writers meeting in 1956, Amirkhan Eniki, Akhmet Fayzi and Khatip Usmanov brought up the importance of creating a cultural coordination centre for all six millions of Tatars, scattered across the country. However, this proposal was flatly rejected by the leaders of the republic, S. Ignatyev and S. Batyev, as a course towards national isolation, a return to the 'theory of cultural national autonomy by a party which had long since been dissolved' [RGASPI, Fund 556, Inventory 14, File 55, Sheets 10–11].

A one of the most respected Tatar writers, Amirkhan Eniki, took a courageous social stance. Basing his views on many facts, A. Eniki publically expressed concerns regarding the disparity of the development rates of the republic's economy and qualitative changes in Tatars' ethnic development. 'I am not saying that the Tatar nation will become extinct. It will exist and create, but what will happen to its culture? I feel like in the past 15–20 years there have been many flaws in the praxis of the national policy (theoretical guidelines were certainly valid)’,—the writer concluded [RGASPI, Fund 556, Inventory 15, File 31, Sheet 8]. This statement by A. Eniki eloquently reflects the attitude of the Tatar intelligentsia towards the modernization processes in the republic. The writer's belief both in the correct theoretical principles of national policy and also that the Tatar nation would continue to live and create, while at the same time expressing his concerns about the fate of Tatar culture, show that the Tatar creative intelligentsia accepted the Soviet model of social transformation, but realized the dangerous decaying tendency of the ethnic factor in the modernizing republic.
This tendency made itself felt not only among the creative elite. The letter of a teacher from Almetyevsky district, Muzafarov, to the editorial office of the 'Pravda' ('Truth') newspaper was further proof of this. In his letter, he proposed the creation of the Tatar Teptyar Autonomous Republic in the oil regions of South-Eastern Tatarstan and Western Bashkortostan [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 38, File 195, Sheet 58]. In my opinion, it was caused by the wish to halt the rapid process of transforming the oil region into a new Russian-speaking enclave, corroding the cultural community of Tatars.

This process even more so involved those Tatars, who, as a result of the Soviet policy of extending the economy and intensive reclamation of new lands, happened to be outside the territory of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Those who found themselves in a different ethnic environment as a result of the policy of planned migration naturally wanted to preserve the national spirit. Far from their homeland, they tried to organize Tatar ensembles, amateur theatres; in the evenings they gathered around to sing native songs. However, it was not easy to keep the native culture alive outside the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (TASSR). For instance, in the 1950s, in the mining town Prokopyevsk of the Kemerov oblast, Tatars managed to organize a Tatar dancing and singing ensemble and a Tatar-Bashkir ensemble called 'Agidel'. It developed an interesting repertoire and played no less than twenty concerts. However, their creative career was not destined to last. A local official of the cultural sector banned the work of the amateur artists and said: 'If you want to listen to and perform native songs, then go to Kazan' [Sovetskaya Tataria, 1990, 15 November].

In the 1950s, it provoked the Tatar's rebellious spirit, as they appealed to the supreme authorities with complaints about the local government. One of those letters was sent in 1958 to the governing authorities of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in Moscow, Almaty and Kazan by Honoured Teacher of Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, educator in the Semipalatinsk Pedagogical Institute, M. Yagudin. The author thoroughly analyzed the cultural and political situation in Kazakhstan with all nuances, describing it unfavourable for the national self-definition of Tatars living there. Yagudin wrote about the closure of Tatar libraries, other cultural educational establishments and radio programmes.

Typically, in all these appeals, in all forums regarding the national problem, the people of the republic expressed their worries firstly about the fate of the Tatar language. In the 1950s, its use field was rapidly decreasing. The fast pace of industrial development in the republic led to the corresponding growth of the urban population. The urban production sites and establishments often used Russian as a means of communication. The older generation in the cities, many of whom had until recently been peasants, were now struggling because of their poor knowledge of Russian. They wanted to insure their children did not suffer from the problems that they did.

Seeing the lack of potential in being fluent in the Tatar language, many members of the Tatar creative intelligentsia actually sent their children to Russian schools. This matter was frankly addressed by the Secretary of the Tatar Regional Committee of the CPSU, K. Faseev, during the Plenum in 1958, dedicated to the language situation in the republic. 'Here is an interesting story, — he pointed out — teachers themselves work in Tatar schools, persuade others to send their children to Tatar schools, but send their own children to Russian schools'. He backed up his words with an example from one of the Agryz schools, where only two out of 39 Tatar teachers had their children studying in the Tatar school [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 39, File 141, Sheet 33].

In the capital of the republic, Tatar schools began to lose their popularity in the early 1950s, so in 1958, there were only 3 Tatar and 17 mixed schools in Kazan, as 83% of Tatar children were studying in Russian schools [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 39a, File 77, Sheet 44]. By the end of the 1950s, the relevance of national school was rapidly decreasing in other cities and district centres of the republic. There was a drastic fall in the number of children studying in Tatar schools in the republic.
The notable decrease in the relevance of the Tatar schools was shown in the numbers of applicants for IHLSs. In the late 1950s, out of all students of the republic only 28% were Tatars, the majority of whom were graduates of Russian schools. For instance, in 1957, 620 people were accepted into the Kazan University, including 173 Tatars, but only 27 of them were Tatar middle school graduates, 24 of whom applied to the Department of the Tatar language. In 1957, the Kazan Aviation Institute accepted 750 students, including 113 Tatars and only 11 of them were from Tatar schools; Kazan Finance and Economics Institute accepted 200 people, including 39 Tatars, only 9 of which had graduated from Tatar schools. 405 students were accepted into the Kazan Medical Institute, 121 of which were Tatars, including 18 Tatar school graduates [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 39 a, File 77, Sheet 20].

In order to save the Tatar language, many of its representatives suggested the creation of separate Tatar and Russian groups even in kindergartens. Another popular idea among the Tatar creative elite was to re-introduce the separate groups, which had existed in the 1920–1930, in IHLSs, where students would study in Tatar. The most radical members of the Tatar intelligentsia, particularly the writer Nurikhann Fattakh, famous for his oppositional views, suggested that Tatars be banned from studying in Russian schools. In an atmosphere of increased liberalism and under the influence of increasingly persistent declarations from the intelligentsia, in the late 1950s, the republic government undertook a series of measures aimed at creating more favourable conditions for development of the Tatar language and national culture in general. Naturally, first and foremost, we have to mention the Plenum of the Regional Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in May (1958), which thoroughly analyzed the status of the development of the national schools. Prior to the Plenum, the preparatory commission, which included members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, embarked on thorough preparatory work, acknowledging that the drastic fall in the number of national schools was abnormal.

The person who played the deciding role in organization of the May Plenum was S. Ignatyev, who in autumn, 1957 took on the leadership of the Tatar Regional Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This can clearly be seen in his declaration during one of the preparatory sessions of the Bureau of the Tatar Regional Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. 'Last year, in the autumn, I had a chance to meet with writers, who told me about the status of the cultural development. At the time I had no idea what was the situation with language, education, and how important the language was for a Party worker to be able to communicate the words of the Party in his native language. However, when I looked closer and started examining this issue, I felt scared. It was the first time in my experience working in national republics that I saw such situation, where people do not respect their own language, do not support it, poorly work on its development and improvement, authority figures are ashamed to speak their native language, even if they have to. After that we discussed it and decided to raise this issue properly, start talking, writing slogans and banners in Tatar, and oblige Tatars to make reports in Tatar and so on. However, in order to avoid excesses since we do not regard ourselves as specialists, we reported to the Central Committee of the Party and asked for help...'. This was an introduction to the lengthy emotional speech made by S. Ignatyev [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 39, File 70, Sheets 41–49], which quite accurately conveys the complicated situation surrounding the national problem, even for the period of liberal tendencies of the 20th Congress. His speech clearly expressed his willingness and at the same time fear to take actions aimed at saving national culture. It was a mixture of functionary communist world view and sincere astonishment, if not shock at the disloyal attitude of the republic's Tatar leaders towards their native culture.

The May Plenum (1958) acknowledged that it was abnormal for the number of national schools to have fallen so drastically. The resolutions they adopted were designed to improve the quality of Tatar language and literature lessons, consolidate the material resources, techniques and teaching methods in Tatar schools and im-
prove the teaching staff. There were also plans to organise entrance examinations to universities and training colleges in Tatar for applicants as an option. The academic development of national school issues was strongly criticized: the insufficient number of postgraduate students in Tatar linguistics, the lack of academic manuscripts on methods of teaching the native and Russian languages in Tatar schools.

The Plenum stressed the poor use of national elements in the forming the socio-cultural infrastructure, in the image of cities and towns. This issue was mentioned in a declaration made by Ryabkov, the editor of the 'Sovet Tatarstana (nowadays known as 'Vatyanm Tatarstn') newspaper. 'The city of Kazan is no different than other cities of the Volga River region, though it is the centre of a national republic. None of the shop window displays are in Tatar, nor any of the signs on administrative buildings. A passenger, going past the 'Kazan' station, through a large river harbour, cannot see any slogans, banners or displays in Tatar. This is not right. Visual propaganda in general is very poorly represented in the city, not to mention the propaganda in Tatar which is non-existent. A similar picture can be seen in other cities of the republic. Some Tatar people feel annoyed by this situation, it causes false rumours',—Ryabkov stated [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 39, File 70, Sheet 5]. The Plenum acknowledged that it was not normal to have such a poor level of political and organisational activity among the population, as well as records management in ministries and offices in the Tatar language. They also referred to the absence of banners, announcements, slogans and posters in Tatar. Therefore, they initiated a set of measures aimed at organizing educational activities in Tatar in pioneer centres, community centres, libraries, theatres, parks, cinemas etc.

The May (1958) Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union managed only to state the necessity of improving the situation with the development of the Tatar language, but failed to put anything into action. By the early 1960s, as the limitation of liberal reformations in the country was becoming more obvious, the creative workers of the republic were rebuked 'for their ill judgments about derogation of the Tatar people's interests'. In the early 1960s, the terminological commission, which was actively working on upgrading the Tatar alphabet in the late 1950s to bring it in line with the norms of the Tatar language, was disbanded. During the same period, the authorities took other measures against the work of linguists and journalists who were fighting for the integrity of the Tatar language and confronting the process of its artificial degradation by which Tatar concepts were being replaced with Russian and foreign terms.

In 1960, Moscow declared that the decision of the Plenum of Regional Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 'On the status and means of improving the work of Tatar general education schools' (May, 1958) was incorrect.

Regarding the abolition of the decision, F. Tabeev, who in 1960 replaced S. Ignatyev as the First Secretary of the Tatar Regional Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, commented: 'The implementation of this erroneous decision could have led to national narrow-mindedness, isolation, decreased demands of Tatar schools regarding advanced Russian classes' [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 39, File 129, Sheet 7]. The official position of Tatarstan was defined with internationalist phraseology. The public speeches of the republic's top officials were full of praise for the ongoing national policy and its beneficial influence on the republic. While describing the process of 'progressive rapprochment of nations during the period of building communism' in one of the meetings of the Party core group, F. Tabeev stated: 'The Republic has a good basis for international education. Our every production collective is multicultural, there is no separation by nationality or domicile, children of different nationalities grow up in the same kindergartens, and look, how many intermarriages there are' [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 7, File 4528, Sheets 23, 25].

One of the signs of the ordinary people being dissatisfied with the new turn in language policy was the collective letter to the Regional Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,
sent by the students of the Usadsky Agricultural School in 1961. Students who want to study in Tatar, — the letter said, — are getting enlisted in Russian groups, their comrades enlisted in Russian groups, sometimes have to leave school and go back home... It is not acceptable that a person cannot get education just because he does not speak Russian. This did not used to happen here before. Such practices have started here only since autumn, 1960' [Ibid., Inventory 42, File 20, Sheets 14, 14 reverse]. However, over the following 20 years the situation with language only became worse.

The change in the country's political leadership in 1964 revived the hope, especially amongst the Tatar intelligentsia, of enhancing the national status of the republic. Tatar writers once again began to address this issue to various authorities, also due to adoption of the Constitution of the USSR (1977), RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic) and TASSR (Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic) (1978). The relationship between the republic's administration and intelligentsia regarding this issue is brilliantly captured in the work by A. Eniki 'Before the sunset', where he described his dialogue with the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, S. Batyev, about the advisability of sending his letter to L. Brezhnev regarding the status of Tatar Republic [Eniki, 1996, pp. 119–121]. The story of the aksakal of Tatar culture shows that the republic authorities were upholding the position of profanation and not reacting to the attempts of national intelligentsia to raise and resolve pressing ethnopolitical problems.

A detailed letter about the transformation of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic into a union republic was sent to L. Brezhnev by the veteran of the Great Patriotic War, communist Gainulla Yafayev. He supported his proposal with six paragraphs proving the inadequacy of the autonomous republic status: there are the differences between union and autonomous republics in legislation concerning representation in the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The fact that the Tatar Republic does not have an Academy of Sciences or a film studio, insufficient popularization of works of Tatar culture on Soviet radio and television, the absence of a Tatar ASSR pavilion in NEAE (National Economy Achievements Exhibition)²³. It is interesting that Tatars living in the Tatar Republic, also sent proposals on the re-establishment of the autonomy of the Crimean Tatars. [SA RF, Fund A259, Inventory 46, File 7012, Sheet 108]. As far as the official position is concerned, it is important to note that the RSFSR administration approved the drafting of the Tatarstan Constitution project as a union republic. This was discussed during one of the sessions of the Academic Council for National Problems under the Section for Social Sciences of the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences [Drobizheva, 1997, p. 69]. However, neither in the middle of the 1960, nor in the late 1970s, at the peak of Brezhnev–Suslov conservatism, was the issue of transforming the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic into a union republic resolved.

While the tone of the official position with regard to the achievements of national policy was becoming more positive, the oppositional sentiment of the society was growing stronger. However, most of these sentiments were mainly 'underground' in nature. The intelligentsia distanced itself from the authorities. Its members formed social fringe groups with their own independent assessments of events, their own cultural interests and internal relations. National problems were discussed at literary evenings, creative professionals conventions, in the clubs and during informal meetings of like-minded people. In the 1960s, the creative intelligentsia undertook trips to Bolgar, where amongst the ancient ruins, the acute awareness of the burning issues was felt in a different way, and they were discussed with particular frankness. The members of Tatar intelligentsia discussed not only the about burning issues. In 1964–1965, a Tatar fringe group was active in the republic. It tried to encourage a sense of national identity amongst Tatars, living outside the Republic, by providing them with Tatar literature, newspapers and magazines from the republic [Gallyamova, 1997 a, p. 202].

²³ From the archive of R. Amirkhanov, made available to the author in 2000
The Tatar intelligentsia not only talked about the worrying state of national culture, but also tried to take actions, while further distancing itself from the authorities. Its members formed social fringe groups with their own independent assessments of events and their own cultural interests. In August, 1964, the KGB (Committee for State Security) under the Soviet of Ministers of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic received a report concerning a group of young engineers, who were expressing their dissatisfaction with the cultural and language situation in the republic. The group consisted of Taufik Aydi, an operator of the ‘Orgsintez’ factory, who later became a writer, and employees of the Central Design Bureau under the Kazan Optical Mechanics Factory (KOMF), E. Zaynullin, M. Mukhametzyanov and Khasibullin. One of the KGB (Committee for State Security) reports to the Tatar Regional Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union mentioned that T. Aydeldinov was known among many young Tatars for his reputation as a ‘theorist and advocate for interests of national culture’. According to this report, the main function of T. Aydi was to write both anonymously and on behalf of the group, letters to the Party and state authorities about the oppression of Tatar people. The author pointed out the small number of radio programmes in Tatar, the lack of Tatar films, Tatar philharmonic orchestra, All-Union Tatar newspaper, and insufficient publishing of books by Tatar writers.

The members of this fringe group were under real surveillance. According to the records of the state security apparatus, during his speech at the literary evening in the Community centre in Derbyski on 29 October 1964, E. Zaynullin sharply criticised Professor M. Zakiev for writing that it was necessary to enrich the Tatar language with Russian vocabulary. On 27 January and 18 February 1965, at the literary evenings in the same Community centre Khasibullin and M. Mukhametzyanov spoke against the official position regarding the language issue. In March, 1965, during the readers' conference in the republic library, E. Zaynullin once again pointed out that the Tatar literary language was 'losing its face and becoming Russified' [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 7, File 85, Sheet 14]. At the crowded literary evening, dedicated to the memory of G. Tukay, in April, 1965 in the same Community centre, E. Zaynullin and M. Mukhametzyanov made speeches, which the KGB (Committee for State Security) referred to as the 'propagation of national narrow-mindedness'. None of the people at the evening, and there were many prominent members of creative society, for instance, Kh. Tufan, G. Latyp, G. Khalit, objected. This meant that the speakers were expressing the general sentiment of all [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 7, File 85, Sheet 15].

In April 1965, T. Aydi was invited to the Leninsky District Committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League, where he continued to stand his ground, while talking about the Tatar culture falling behind the Middle Asian cultures and importance of creating an environment for higher education in Tatar. Later, in June 1965, M. Mukhametzyanov and E. Zaynullin were invited to the notorious 'Chyornoye Ozero' (‘Black Lake’) for a precautionary conversation with the KGB (Committee for State Security). They continued to maintain their attitude, when talking about the decay of Tatar education and that there was no Tatar newspaper in the Kazan Optical Mechanics Factory (KOMF), where they worked. The conversation ended with a warning to M. Mukhametzyanov and E. Zaynullin that if they failed to realize their 'mistakes', then they would use other enforcement actions.

However, even after the precautionary conversation with the KGB (Committee for State Security), T. Aydel'shinov, E. Zaynullin and M. Mukhametzyanov, despite giving up public speaking, continued 'secret nationalistic manipulation' of citizens who were in contact with them. For instance, in summer 1965, T. Aydel'dinov and M. Mukhametzyanov had trips to other districts of the Tatar Republic as newspaper and magazine distributors. In November–December of the same year, M. Mukhametzyanov visited the Moscow mosque a few times, where he persisted in 'actively manipulating its clergy in a nationalistic way'. The report also included information about those who fell under their influ-
ence. For instance, there is information about an artist Yakupov, who had a diary, where he wrote about his views on the national issue. One of his notes was included in the report: 'While this state exist, Tatars can never be free' [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 7, File 85, Sheet 15].

Judging by the report, the fringe group discontinued its activities only in late 1966–early 1967. In November 1966, after the KGB (Committee for State Security) received a report that T. Aydeldinov 'had many documents of interest', and his flat was secretly inspected. As a result, they found and photographed many manuscripts and copies of petition letters to various authorities, in which he, using numerous statistics and reference data, gathered evidence of the humiliated condition of the Tatar nation. Afterwards, precautionary conversations were held not only with T. Aydeldinov, M. Mukhamezyanov and E. Zaynullin, but their wives as well.

This 'nationalistic group' was not alone in its intention to resist ethnic assimilation. There were other bold persons in the republic who openly expressed their disapproval of the national policy. In 1968, leaflets were scattered at the Republic Congress of Writers held at the premises of Tatar theatre. They contained demands for the organization of a Tatar youth magazine. The leaflets were written by young writers R. Valeev, Z. Malikov and M. Mansurov [Idel, 1994, No. 7–8, pp. 21–23]. While giving them credit for their personal courage and dedication, we cannot ignore the fact that their oppositional activities coincided with the time of modernization of the Soviet regime, rather than its consolidation and liberation from relics of the old order. The regime had won and it did not need to resort to such forms of crackdown on opponents as repression. However, of course, the authorities could not ignore the bold statements about the decay of Tatar culture being linked to the political environment in the country. Opposition activists were brought to the KGB (Committee for State Security) many times for so-called precautionary conversations. Nevertheless, this did not change the social behaviour of the 'delinquents', suggesting that officials were quite trusting of them. Perhaps, this was because the activities of 'nationalistic groups' had little social resonance.

The oppositional nature of the national intelligentsia was also more generalized. This manifested itself in the works of Tatar intelligentsia as a confrontation with conformism. For example, the editors of the 'Kazan utlary' ('Kazan lights') magazine often published articles on themes that were not exactly approved by the authorities. The magazine caused quite significant public resonance with its publication of the discussion about the origin of the Syuyumbike tower, which was a hot topic throughout the entire Soviet period. The discussion was started by well-known Tatar artist, G. Shamukov, who wrote an article where he convincingly proved the Tatar origin of the tower.

In July 1969, I. Sibgatullin, from Kazan, set himself the same aim in a letter to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and also to editors-in-chief of the central newspapers. Referring to numerous sources, he supported the conclusion that the Syuyumbike tower was an original monument of 'Tatar domination' in Kazan, being a minaret of the 'Muraleev mosque'. I. Sibgatullin continually addressed a wide range of official authorities, referring to double standards of the internationalism policy, that allowed insults of Tatars' national feelings in Russian literature. He demanded measures be taken against Russian writers Boris Shergin (author of 'Ilya Murmets'), Anatoly Ananyev (author of the novel 'Tanks go rhombus'), who allowed themselves, according to him, 'to insult the national dignity of Tatars' [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 7, File 644, Sheets 27–29].

In the post-war decades, the tendency to consider centuries-old Tatar culture irrelevant was rapidly gaining traction in the Tatar Republic. This was especially the case amongst the intelligentsia as the most educated social category. Their spiritual world was progressively becoming modeled on the basis of Russian and foreign cultures seen through a filter of official ideology. The Tatar nation which always suffered a 'pre-supposition of guilt', was clearly undergoing a process of intensive cultural mutation. The underestimation and often disregard of national identity and interests, the unification and standardization of spiritual life, accompanied by the loss of ethnic forms of self-expression, were leading
towards the consolidation of nihilistic attitude towards Tatars' own nationality, native language, culture and traditions. The feelings of national pride, honour and dignity of Tatars in the educational process were gradually atrophying. For example, in 1975, 183 Tatarstan middle schools were named after Z. Kosmodemyanskaya, 67 after O. Koshevoy, whereas only one school was named after G. Gafiatullin who had repeated the exploits of A. Matrosov. Only 48 out of 993 pioneer brigades were named after distinguished compatriots [Andreeva, 1989, p. 101].

In terms of 'growing internationalization', the number of Tatars fluent in Russian was rapidly increasing, inevitably leading to the native language being superseded from the general education schools. In the mid-1960s, the majority of school students were children of working class Tatars, who were fluent in Tatar, but preferred to study in Russian schools. According to results of surveys carried out in Kazan factories, almost 88% of children from working class Tatar families were studying in Russian. Many Tatars tried to not demonstrate their nationality. Barely any Tatar could be heard on the city streets, the urban youth was changing their names to make them sound Russian.

Nevertheless, in the 1980s, the general public of the republic continued expressing their disapproval of the language situation. In particular, a letter was written by D. Kasimov, addressed in 1980 to the Regional Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in which he noted: 'Tatar children, raised from the very early years in Russian nurseries, Russian kindergartens and Russian schools, lose their national feelings, native language, native culture, way of life etc. The Tatar nation of the republic, native people of our land, was and is now being intensively Russified' [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 8, File 1573, Sheet 64]. Not only the Tatars referred to the importance of learning and speaking the Tatar language. For instance, judging by the letter of A. Katsyuba, it is becoming clear that people of non-Tatar nationality had almost no chance of learning Tatar even in Kazan. In her letter to the 'Vechernyaya Kazan' ('Evening Kazan') (1981) she wrote: 'I have been living in Kazan for the most part of my life, but I cannot speak Tatar. It took me so much effort to find a self-teaching guide by R. Gazizov, published in 1960 in an edition of 6 thousand copies. ... with its help I learned the grammatical system of the Tatar language and gathered some vocabulary'. Further the reader asked that some sort of courses be arranged, because, as she wrote, 'I am not alone in my wish to learn Tatar' [Vechernyaya Kazan', 1981, 20 January].

The 'blurring' ethnic image of Tatarstan was pointed out by a Tatar man from Kazakhstan who wrote to the Tatar Regional Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: 'Two years ago (in 1978. — A.G.) I had a business trip and was lucky to go for the first time in my life to the homeland of my ancestors, Tataria, and, of course, to Kazan. What a glaring contrast with Almaty! Almost all the visual propaganda, advertisements, all the banners, titles of cultural and social facilities and others are only in Russian. If it was not for the greeting in the railway station 'Rakhim itegez Tatarstanga!' ('Welcome to Tatarstan!') and the sweet conversations of old ladies in the buses and trams, I might not have believed my luck. Why and for whom does tovarishch R. Sabirov suggest in the pages of 'Pravda' ('Truth') that the future city for the builders of the Tatar nuclear power station be named Kamskiye Polyany (Kama Meadows)? Maybe Nizhnekamsk, Naberezhnye Chelny, Zelenodolsk, Chistopol, Spassk and so on and so forth are enough?" [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 8, File 1573, Sheet 20].

In the 1960–1970, the generation born after the Revolution was entering the phase of active social and working life. There are young people who have no experience with war. Bearing this in mind, the authorities placed special emphasis on glorifying the role of the Bolsheviks in the Revolution, Civil War and the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War. The propaganda was reaching its peak especially on the cusp of anniversary dates linked to the post-October history. At those times there were many public political readings, visual lectures, events linked to revolutionary, military and labour glory. An entire series of pompous events
was arranged for the anniversaries of the Great October Revolution and the Great Patriotic War.

The Tatar Republic had particularly loud and grandiose celebrations for festivals commemorating Lenin. Many historical places were named after him: the Lenin memorial house in Kazan and Lenino-Kokushkino, the Lenin memorial in the Kazan University. It became a tradition to use those venues for initiating children into the Pioneer movement, the Komsomol and for conferences on Lenin-related subjects. Lenin lesson, Lenin merit, Lenin readings — after the discrediting of the Stalinist personality cult, these were some of the most used terms in domestic policy sector.

On 16 December, the auditorium of Kazan State University hosted traditional meetings in memory of student declarations in 1887 in which Vladimir Ulyanov participated as a first year student in the law faculty of the KSU. The life and work of V. Lenin were set as an example for students in the city schools. The idolization of the leader of the World Proletariat had no limits. In the 1980s, there were about 20 monuments in Kazan, dedicated to him [Vecernaya Kazan’, 23 October 1987]. Only two of them, erected in 1954 in front of the main building of the Kazan State University and on the Ploshchad Svobody (Freedom Square) had any artistic value. The culmination point of perpetuating the memory of Lenin was the construction of a huge red building of Lenin memorial on the Kazanka riverbank among the slums of Kazan. The poet, Yevtushenko ominously referred to it as a crematorium. In fact, this massive red-stone building served as a 'temple' of communist ideology for only a short time. Soon after its construction, its monopoly along with the state system collapsed and the building was transformed into the National–Cultural Center.

Besides the events dedicated to Lenin, a major part of Kazan’s political life was occupied by celebrations of the anniversaries of Tatar revolutionaries and those, who were considered their predecessors: Kh. Yamashev, G. Kulakhmetov, G. Ibragimov, M. Gafuri, K. Nasyri, M. Vakhitov.

An important step was the introduction of Soviet rituals. In the mid-1960s, there were persistent attempts to arrange festive farewell events for those leaving to join the army, passports awards, honouring of working dynasties, farewell events for retirees, ceremonies of marriage registrations and registration of newly-borns. On 18 November 1965, the authorities established a 'Park of Newl-y-weds' by the River Harbour. Similar parks were founded in the Leninsky and Kirovsky districts of Kazan.

However, people were not in favour of ideologically-oriented events, even if they were free and sometimes on a very high professional level. For instance, the political clubs ‘Rodina’ (‘Homeland’), ‘Prometey’ (‘Prometheus’) and ‘Globus’ (‘Globe’) were not popular, since the young people did not see them as their own, authentic. The futility of ideological events was proved by poor attendance at the stage plays on historical revolutionary themes. For example, the revolutionary patriotically-themed stage play, performed in the Kachalov theatre, 'Cities of the wind' by A. Kirshon, which was outright politically pretentious, failed to resonate with the audience: People began to walk out of the auditorium. The same happened to the stage play 'Take care of the white bird' about Komsomol N. Miroshnichenko [Khakimov, 1989, p. 75]. However, performing groups were obliged to have ideologically-themed works in their repertoire. In the latter half of the 1970s, the Kamal Theatre staged the plays 'Invasion' by L. Leonov and 'Bolsheviks' by M. Shatrov. In December 1964, the Tatar State Philharmonia arranged a concert lecture 'Musa Dzhalil and Tatar music' as part of the activities of cultural universities. All of them were held in half-empt Arthur auditoriums with only about 20–30 people [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 7, File 354 a, Sheet 6].

In 1965, the Tatar Regional Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union criticized the philharmonic society for not popularising the best pieces of Soviet composers, writers and poets. In addition, popular performers of folk songs, A. Avzalova, D. Salyakhova, Z. Basyrova, G. Rakhimkulov and others did their part by performing 'mainly frivolous songs’ [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 7, File 354 a, Sheet 6]. The authorities censured the collective of the
philharmonic society for their unflattering attitude towards Soviet reality. In 1960–1970, the works of composers were often blamed from the official tribune for being predominantly sad and melancholic and having no social message. Besides, the philharmonic society was criticized in the middle of the 1960s for the small number of communists in its ranks: out of 200 people, there were only 14 communists and 2 candidates to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union [Ibid., Fund 15, Inventory 354 a, Sheet 9].

Generally speaking, social passivity, skepticism and political apathy were taking over the general public. An unwillingness to participate in socio-political activities was reflected in massive escapism. People began to 'withdraw' into themselves, their family, leaving their intellectual jobs to becoming loaders, yard keepers and so on.

The weak civic standpoint was directly caused by having no opportunities to express it. Clear proof of this was the closure of the school of communication in the Youth Centre in the 1970s, as a result of the immoral behaviour of the principal. In fact, according to the recollections of witnesses, the centre brought together ingenuous young people who raised thorny political questions and had interesting discussions about burning issues.

Even clearer proof of the dangerous consequences of expressing a fundamental civic stance can be seen in the fate of R. Ilyalov from Kazan, who then was a special correspondent of the 'Uchitelskaya gazeta' ('Teachers' newspaper'). R. Ilyalov dared to openly protest against the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Two weeks before the famous demonstration organised by dissidents in Moscow in August 1968, during the time of events in Prague, R. Ilyalov wrote a warning letter titled 'Everyone is a master in his own house' about the upcoming aggression, expecting, that would be published in the 'Rude pravo' newspaper. Having received no answer, Ilyalov wrote another letter 'Not help, but occupation' addressed to publications of several communist parties. Both letters ended up in a completely different institution and were estimated to be 'anti-Party'. Ramzi Ilyalovich wrote a weighty letter to the Central Control Commission under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, where besides the Soviet aggression in Czechoslovakia, he pinpointed the flaws of the political order in the USSR [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 7, File 645, Sheet 15]. For his freethinking he was subjected to 'social condemnation' and he paid for it with his party membership card. After his personal case was heard at the session of the Bauman District Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on 21 November 1968, R. Ilyalov was expelled from the Party. This decision was abolished only 21 years later.

Naturally, the fact that there were no similar incidents of a dissident nature in the republic does not mean that the citizens had no oppositional sentiment. The increase of negative processes in the society became the topic of hushed discussions and arguments in the university auditoriums, institute laboratories, construction bureaus, student dormitories and finally just at home in the kitchen. People were trying to peer behind the ideological curtain by listening to the jammed broadcasts of western radio stations: 'Voice of America', 'BBC', 'Deutsche Welle'. Sometimes this ended with precautionary conversations in the 'Chyornoje Ozero' ('Black Lake'). For instance, the report note written by the Chairman of KGB (Commission for State Security) under the Soviet of Ministries of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, A. Bichurin, in the 1970s, tells about the preventative measures taken against an assembly worker of the Chistopol factory, A. Ulitin, the Kazan Institution of Civil Engineering teacher, B. Kalygin, painters A. Prokopiev, N. Utkin, the Communal Accommodation Department electrician of the Gorky Plant, S. Potapov, Deputy Head of the 'Orgsintez' Plant, V. Yablokov, and a tram park worker, V. Smirnov. The main reason why these people were summoned to the 'Chyornoje ozero' ('Black Lake') was their interest in information disseminated by foreign media, recorded by special services and deemed anti-Soviet [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 7, File 85, Sheets 52–60].

Chapter 7. The national problem and political situation in TASSR in the middle of the 1940s–the first half of the 1980s
According to another official document, interest in western music was also considered a crime. This can be seen from an abstract from the KGB (Commission for State Security) report: 'It is easy to slip from idleness and parasitism to an apolitical state, and from that to committing a crime. Recently a parasitic group of 42 young people were caught in Kazan listening to the 'Voice of America' and 'BBC'. They were tape recording American and British heartbreaking jazz music and selling them off-the-books in the record stores' [Ibid., Fund 15, Inventory 41, File 140, Sheets 8–9].

'Radio hooliganism' was very common in Kazan. This involved 14–18-year-old teenagers making crude radio transmitters and, using common radio receivers. They went on air using names which confronted official ideology, for example, 'Dollar', 'Christ', 'Ragged boot', 'London', 'Various-storey America', 'BBC'. These 'Radio hooligans' set up two-way radio communication and played recordings of wild jazz music of 'Atomic bomb', 'Tubercule bacillus', 'Dixon rock'. Radio hooliganism was so popular among the youth that usual methods of propaganda to combat them through the mass media were futile. On the contrary, they made them even more appealing to the public. According to the KGB (Commission for State Security), 'after a series of lectures, both personal and through media, the number of radio hooligans have increased'. Furthermore, the public expressed solidarity with the radio hooligans: 'The majority of parents... encourage them to practice radio hooliganism... Some people's judges show too much leniency when determining punishment for radio hooliganism and do not order the confiscation of the radio equipment from hooligans, basing their decision on the fact that it belongs to the hooligans and not their parents. There have been some cases when the court orders are not being implemented by officers for various, often non-objective reasons',—a KGB (Commission for State Security) worker reported [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 45, File 25, Sheets 2–5].

An important aspect of the life of youth in the 1960–1970 was events involving original song (guitar poetry). They did not have ideological messages and often expressed a critical attitude. The All-Union Leninist Young Communist League committees tried to guide this movement into the right direction by arranging original song competitions. However, the youngsters were much more keen on unauthorised trips to the countryside, where a guitar became a symbol uniting like-minded people. This period was a starting point for the careers of famous Kazan bards, L. Sergeev, B. Liovich and V. Muravyov.

Naturally, the syndrome of consistent ideological pressure did not always lead to noble and attractive forms of social opposition. At times, young people who were indifferent to ill-fated ideological unions, clubs and committees, united in aggressive cliques. Randomly self-organized bands of provocative young people driven by the sole cult of violence spread across the entire country. However, particularly intense anti-social activities resulted in series of crimes, sometimes with tragic endings, which entered the headlines. They were to become notoriously as a 'Kazan phenomenon'. One of the important factors here was the atrophy of national identity, which among other crucial functions had a function of self-education, teaching the notion of national conscience and giving moral and ethical guides.
CHAPTER 8
Socio-economic development of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in 1945–the middle of the 1980s.

Alfiya Gallyamova

Industrial development. In the latter half of the 20th century, the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic stood out among other regions of the Soviet Union with its rapid industrial development. It was attributed to the post-war state strategy according to which the republic was an important administrative base, as well as to the establishment oil-production in the south east and Kama River industrial area in the north part of the republic. Even during the first post-war decades, the growth rate of the large scale industry gross product in the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (Tatar ASSR) was much higher than the average for the USSR. So, while in the USSR it increased 45.3 times in 1959 compared to 1913, in the TASSR it increased 146 times [Zajcev, 1957, p. 43].

In the latter half of the 1940s, the construction of new industrial plants, targeted at all-Union needs, began to develop in Kazan which was to remain the centre for the republic's only industrial hub at Kazan-Zelenodolsk. The military industrial complex occupied a firm place in the economy of the republic. It was centre around the Gorbunov Aviation Plant, which in the 1940s had begun the production of strategic Tu-4 bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons [SA HPD TR, Fund 26, Inventory 33, File 40, Sheet 23]. In 1953, the plant was the first in the country to develop the Tu-16 high-speed jet bombers. For many years they were at the core of Soviet military strategic aviation. Aircraft produced in the plant have won many aviation world records. In 1955, a specialist design department was set up in the aircraft industry system in Kazan specialising in designing specific radio measuring equipment for radar stations. The department developed projects codenamed 'Uran' ('Uranium'), 'Grunt' ('Soil'), 'Akatsiya' ('Acacia'), 'Floks' ('Phlox'), 'Volt'. Moreover, the factory made a great contribution to the development of civil aviation. Since 1956, the plant has manufactured the Tu-104, the world's first jet airliner. For the ten years which followed, the plane was one of the most long-distance airplanes of the Aeroflot. In 1957, the factory developed the Tu-110 and Tu-110A high-occupancy jet airliners and antenna systems for radar stations 'Tyulpai' and 'Dunai' [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 42, File 11, Sheet 16].

The second most important part of the MIC was the Engine Plant. In 1945, its staff started working on designing the RD-20 axial flow compressor jet engine, the first in the country. Starting from 1946, the plant embarked on serial production of these engines, and, in 1950, took the first steps in developing modern jet engines with a VK-1 radial flow compressor. In 1953, the factory began production of AM-3 engines for high-speed long range bombers. In 1957, it designed a new modification — the RD-3M engine, which provided long range, high speed and flight altitude [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 37, File 162, Sheets 1–3].

The Zelenodolsk Shipbuilding Plant manufactured anti-submarine ships. The shipyard designed a 'Sokol' high-speed hydrofoil, unparalleled in both national and foreign shipbuilding industry. The plant had a design department which developed strategically important pilot projects for the formation of the country's anti-submarine warfare. By the beginning of the 1960s, the Zelenodolsk plant was producing 'Loza', 'Onega', 'Dzozor', 'Sura', 'Kuloj', 'Uviko', 'Biko', 'Trenazher', 'Tupan' radars and test equipment for missile hydrosopes [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 42, File 11, Sheet 20].
In the 1950s, the Helicopter Plant began to developing its production. In 1957–1958, it increased the lifespan of an attack helicopter and, in 1959, the plant began manufacturing passenger helicopters. The 'Radiopribor' Plant began the manufacturing of "Proton" guidance stations, 'Svod' short-range navigation radar, test equipment, video range finder unit TP-1, Chrome and Chrome-Nickel identification additional equipment. The Mathematical Machines Plant began serial production of devices of infra-low frequency, 'Granit-2' computing device and the M-20 electronic mathematical machine [Istoriya Kazani, 2004, pp. 214–215]. The production works, especially, the defense production, developed rapidly, especially the Plug Connector Factory, Pilot-Production Plant of Vacuum Engineering (from the latter half of the 1970s production associations 'Elekon' and 'Vacuummash') and others.

By the early 1990s, 40% of the republic's economic potential was made up by defense production enterprises [Sovetskaya Tataria, 1990, 15 December].

In the latter half of the 20th century, the south east of the republic found its oil 'vocation', and began actively to industrialize. The state placed strong emphasis on the reclamation of oil fields discovered in Tatarstan during the war years. This is clear from the amounts of money allocated to this sector. In 1951–1955, the state allocated 5 billion rubles to the oil-producing industry of the republic. This is more than it allocated to its entire industry from the beginning of industrialisation [Burnasheva, 1960, p. 258].

The volume of oil extracted in the Tatar Republic began to increase at much higher rates than in other regions of the country. While across the Soviet Union in the first half of the 1950s, oil production volume a little more than 2 times, in Tatarstan volume increased 21 times. By the mid-1950s, the Republic had become the undisputed leader in the country's oil-producing industry [Bajbakov, 1984, p. 199]. Tatarstan took leading positions not only in terms of the volume of pumped oil, but for its new technological solutions as well. In the 1960s the term 'Tatar school' was coined to denote the general recognition of the achievements of the republic's oilfield workers in the production of 'black gold'. They were the first in the world to use circle water flood. In other words, they were pumping into the oil reservoirs water instead of mud allowing them to produce the cheapest oil in the country and save the state billions of rubles. Since 1952, the oilfield workers of Tatarstan have become the first in the country to fully switch from rotary to turbine drilling. As a result, the rates, achieved in the republic, exceeded comparable ratings of American drillers in similar geological conditions. It sparked the interest of Americans in the Soviet turbodrills, for which they later purchased a license. Thanks to the oil industry, by the mid-1960s, the republic was in first place in terms of gross product among other autonomous republics [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventario 7, File 270, Sheet 16]. The great contribution to the establishment of oil industry in the south east Tatarstan was made by the first heads of 'Tatneft', A. Shmarea, V. Shashin and R. Mingsareev.

By the late 1960s, the oil-producing industry reached its production peak and became a crucial part of the export resources of the country. In 1970, Tataria produced record amounts of oil at 100 million tons per year and maintained this high standard until the mid-1970s. In the beginning of the 1970s, only 5 countries in the world (USA, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Venezuela and Iraq) was producing more oil than Tatarstan [Zaripov, 1986, p. 121]. By 1971, the republic land interiors had produced 1 billion tons, in 25 years, while it took Russia 90 years to produce the first billion of 'black gold' [Zaripov, 1986, p. 121]. During the so-called Brezhnev period, the USSR economy was mainly supported by 'oil dollars'.

In the latter half of the 1970s, the development of oil industry in the republic began to slow down. The government focused on Tyumen oil in a commitment to extensive methods of modernization. The main flow of investments and equipment was directed to the development of oilfields in Western Siberia. Many skilled workers were sent there from the Tatar Republic. The oilfield workers of Western Siberia even had a saying: 'Samotlor-
skoye oil was developed with the help of three "T"s: Tractors, "Tatar" (Czechoslovakian dump trucks — author) and Tatars.

From the very outset the industrial development of the oil region was clearly based on a model of Soviet modernization driven by directives and mobilisation. The continuously and rapidly developing exploitation of oilfields was not accompanied with major developments of the oil refinery industry in Tatarstan. Initially Tatar oil was sent to refineries in Bashkortostan, Kuybyshev (now Samara) and Saratov. However, when the oil output increased tenfold, these plants could no longer cope with the volume. In the late 1950s, the republic had constructed an extensive network of tank farms and oil pipelines. 1959 marked the beginning of construction of the famous 'Druzhba' oil pipeline. The first stage of the project was completed in five years. The oil pipeline consisted of three branches, exporting oil to Poland, GDR (German Democratic Republic) and Czechoslovakia.

The development of large-scale oil-producing industry in the republic was followed by the establishment of the gas industry. 1956 marked the beginning of the first stage of Minniebaysky Gas Processing Plant, which processed associated petroleum gas. For many years, the Almetyevsk district had been the leading centre of the USSR gas industry. The development of the oil industry revived the industrial development of Bugulma, one of the oldest cities of the republic. In 1956, it resulted in opening of the Bugulma Mechanical Plant.

The chemical industry in the republic began to expand in the 1950s and 1960s. The construction of the Kazan plant 'Orgsintez' began in 1958. In 1965, it began production of its main product — polyethylene. The phenol and acetone production facilities began production even earlier, in 1963. This was to mark the development of the new petrochemical field. The chemical plants mastered the production of new types of synthetic rubber, high pressure hose, safety films, six-layer motion picture films for wide-screen picture and other products. The Kazan Industrial Rubber Products Plant, the Kazan Synthetic Rubber Plant, the Kazan Pho-
togelatin Plant and the Kazan Chemical Plant set the tone for the entire industry field.

The development of oil industry resulted in establishment of a new industrial region in north east of Tatarstan. It became known as the Kama Industrial Complex. It began with the Nizhnekamsk Petrochemical Plant, then the 'Nizhnekamskshina' Plant producing synthetic rubber and tires for heavy vehicles and 'LiAZ' buses. The transformation of fertile lands in the north east of the republic into a gigantic construction site in the 1960–1970 was dictated by not only the proximity of oil-producing regions. The area chosen for construction of KamAZ was a mono-national region, where the vast majority of population was Tatar. The construction of Kama River Automobile Plant which began in 1969, was meant to showcase the brotherly cooperation of the USSR nations in building he material-and-technical basis for communism, thus defining the economic strategy of the country. People were recruited to work here from the various regions and republics. It was to some extent caused by the fact that the central authority wanted to mobilize the working resources of the region and consolidate their commitment and identification with the Centre. However, the construction of this Auto Giant on the Kama River was not just a result of economic expansion of the Centre. It was also the result of the aspirations of the leaders of the republic who strongly encouraged it while maintaining their adherence to the policy of technocentrism. This policy was predominant both in economic policy as well as public sentiment.

In the same way that all the headlines in the 1950s were taken up by the oil-producing south eastern part of the republic, in the 1970s, the media regularly covered the process of industrial reclamation of its north eastern part. The mass media stressed the unprecedented scales of the Kama Automobile Plant, exceptionally high rates of construction and installation works supported by colossal state investments. The workers in thousands of enterprises throughout the country worked under the slogan 'Orders of KamAZ to be ready in advance!' The establishment of KamAZ, as well as of the
entire Kama River Industrial Complex, was in many ways experimental. Essentially, the construction sites were a testing area for radically new solutions in construction, an all-Union laboratory for technological and organizational innovations. The designing and construction of the Auto Giant involved about 25 ministries and institutions, more than 100 research and development institutes and about 150 building and construction departments. The construction was carried out by 5 thousand enterprises of the USSR, the equipment was supplied by 867 plants from 307 cities of the country. The construction involved workers from 96 cities and regions [Gallyamova, 2007 a, p. 50]. In the 1960s and 1970s, Naberezhnye Chelny often held All-Union Schools for advanced labour management practice. The concentration of huge numbers of people and material resources made it possible for the Kama Auto Giant to achieve its first products in 1976, even though construction had started only in 1969. The commencement of the KAMAZ works was specifically timed to coincide with the 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In Soviet times, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Congresses, held once in 5 years, celebrated outstanding labour achievements. Party congresses were regularly marked by a convoy of new 'KAMAZ' automobiles, displayed in Moscow on the Red Square by the Spassky tower of the Kremlin, to show the highest achievements of the country. In a short period of time, the workers built six factory plants which were unparalleled throughout the world. By April 1980, the plant had manufactured 'KAMAZ' number 150,000; 500,000 by 1984, 1,000,000 by 1988 [Gallyamova, 2010, p. 87].

With the development of motor vehicle industry in the Kama River region the share of mechanical engineering industry in the industrial potential of the republic considerably increased. By the mid-1980s, it amounted to 40% of the industrial output in Tatarstan. However, the establishment of KAMAZ was also an important event in the economic history of the late Soviet period, from a national point of view as well. Until the mid-1970s, the country's fleet of trucks consisted mainly of low-capacity vehicles. KAMAZ manufactured heavy vehicles and tractor units, as well as high-volume and large capacity road trains. The massive production of diesel engine vehicles contributed to the economy of the country's fuel and energy resources. By the mid-1980s, 'KAMAZ' vehicles carried out the main stream of haulage in the USSR. The country overcame the acute deficiencies in cargo transport.

Against the background of the epic transformations in heavy industry which significantly expanded geographically within the republic, the changes in manufacturing aimed at satisfying the needs of the population, were not as impressive. The external appearance of many old factory buildings was a sight for sore eyes. Many of them had been constructed before the Revolution and continued working with even older equipment. Light industrial and food manufacturing enterprises used outdated technologies and old machinery, low-quality feedstock and archaic materials.

These fields involved the highest percentage of human labour. In general, the proportion of human labour in the republic's industry remained quite high. Every year thousands of measures aimed at the technical improvement of production processes were introduced. However, any increase in manufacturing volume was achieved by increasing manpower. In the early 1980s, human labour amounted to 63% in the meat industry association and 62% in the baking industry. By the end of the Soviet period, the number of unqualified workers in the republic's industry amount to 50,000 persons. 1 in 2 people or 1,685,000 were involved in manual work, and 614,000 or every second person worked in construction [Programma stabilizacji, 1991].

By the early 1980s, only a tenth of all plants and factories were automated or mechanised. Even in the leading enterprises of the republic, only a 40–50% increase in output was achieved through scientific technical developments, although, according to the target plans, this number was planned at 75–80%. In the 1970s and 1980s, in many energy industry, transport and construction facilities, the percentage of ma-
chinery which had been in use for more that 20 years old, not only failed to decrease, but even increased. By 1985, the ratio of replacement of morally and physically outdated equipment in the republic amounted to 1.8% per year. This was approximately three times less than needed [Usmanov, 1987].

The lack of incentives for sustainable management resulted in huge economic losses. By the mid-1980s, annual wastage amounted to 290 thousand tons of ferrous metals, more than 0.5 million cubic metres of wood, and huge amounts of deficient plastic materials, as well as tens of thousand tons of textile and many others [Sovetskaya Tatarsia, 1989, 26 September]. The amount of industrial waste in the end of the 1980s reached 8 million tons or 2.2 tons per person. Almost none of it was recycled [Programma stabilizacji, 1991]. Losses from faulty goods were reaching threatening levels. Notably, the highest level losses due to faulty goods—77% from the total industry volume—was in the progressive mechanical engineering industry [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 45, File 41, Sheets 37–40]. Electronic computers and watches, manufactured in the republic, were non-competitive in the international market. Low-quality products were produced in the Compressor Plant, the Production Enterprise 'Tasma', 'Organic synthesis', Vakhitov Chemical Plant, 'Nizhnekamskshina'. The light industrial goods were not in demand not only internationally, but in domestic market as well. For instance, while the Spartak shoes were collecting dust on the shelves during the times of acute deficiencies in shoes, people were spending hours in queues for imported shoes.

The smooth work of fast developing production enterprises was notably hindered by the excessive centralisation of the administration, parallelism, regional contradictions and confusion in economic relations. The new government which came to power in October 1964, tried to create a mechanism of internal industrial self-regulation by introducing principles of material incentives in the end product and economic accounting. The expansion of industrial independence and real levers for motivating the personnel had a positive impact industrial production output of the republic in the latter half of the 1960s. The total volume of output in the latter half of the 1960s increased by 66%, workforce productivity 1.5 times and the over-plan output came to 220 million roubles. In 1970, more than 80% of manufacturing increase was achieved by increasing the performance of each worker [SA HPD TR, Fund 26, Inventory 43, File 39, Sheet 71].

However, these numbers did not mean that industry sectors managed to overcome their old problems. The aggregate indicators for the republic's industrial development reflected its high rates, but at the same time its costliness. Between 1960 and 1989, industrial output in the republic increased 6.8 times, whereas workforce productivity increased only 3.8 times [estimated acc.: 70 let TASSR, 1990, p. 20].

During this period almost the entire territory of Tatarstan was involved in intensive processes of industrialisation. Prior to World War II, the republic had only one industrialized centre in the form of Kazan–Zelenodolsk Industrial Hub. In the 1950s, it was joined by the oil region. This led to a substantial change in the economic situation in the south east of Tatarstan. The 1970s brought the third industrial centre — the Kama River Industrial Complex. This led to the involvement of entire groups of the socially and ethnically homogenous Tatar rural population in industrial and construction sectors. By the mid-1980s, Tatarstan became one of the largest regions in terms of scientific, technological and economic potential. From being a supplier of grain, animal produce and hand-made goods, it became transformed into a region exporting various machines, dental appliances, watches, medications, typewriters, furs, chemicals, films. By the mid-1980s, more than 130 types of product were exported from Tatarstan to 82 countries throughout the world. By the end of the Soviet period, the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic among 71 regions of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) occupied 11th place in terms of industrial development, 7th place in construction and 8th in terms of profit. The main economic indicators showing the per capita contribution of the republic to the eco-
nomic development of the country exceeded the average Union level. This included gross product by 14% and industrial production by 27% [Vecernyya Kazan', 1989, 26 June]. However, specific trends in the industrial development of the republic, and the country in general showed that the problem of radical technical modernization had not been resolved.

**Agricultural development.** By the end of the war, the agriculture in the republic, as well as in Russia in general, was in a state of decline and in need of support from the state. There had been a sharp deterioration in the material and technical resources of the agricultural industry. However, during the post-war period the kolkhoz farming villages have once again became the main source for the creation of resources and workforce for industry as it continued to recover.

The severe drought in 1946 caused terrible suffering a large part of the country's territory including the Tatar Republic. There had been almost no rain in the spring and summer and as a result the grain crop in the republic amounted to 3.5 quintals per 1 ha. The potato crop amounted to 43 quintals and vegetables to 73 quintals per 1 ha. Consequently, the grain harvest crop was insufficient even for the seed crops provided to the kolkhoz collective farms, meeting only 43% of the required amount [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 5894, Inventory 1, File 3431, Sheet 1]. Smaller scale droughts took place again in 1948 and 1949.

By the end of the 1940's, agricultural technology was still at a low level. In the early 1950s, spring crops were often sowed at spring ploughing time. Less than 50% of spring cultures were sowed at autumn ploughing time. There were years, for instance, in 1950, when large areas of grain and other crops were left unharvested, while huge amounts of milled grain on the threshing floors were ruined due to the lack of driers [Krasnaya Tataria, 1950, 15 September].

During the post-war period, there was a low level of electrification in the agricultural sector, even though the fourth five-year plan (1946–1950) included the massive construction of small-scale rural power plants, wind power plants and heating stations. The plan was not technically viable and most work was carried out by horse and human labour.

Many farms were systematically unable to provide themselves with seed. In the early 1950s, using their own resources, the kolkhoz collective farms sowed 36–38% of the cultivable area [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 30, File 6, Sheet 139]. In order to comply with and exceed grain supply targets, they had to give the seed grain to the state which in turn promised to allot seed loan later. However, the price for allotted seed grain much higher than the price, at which the kolkhoz collective farmers sold their grain in the autumn. The way it was delivered to the kolkhozas, as kolkhozniks recollected, was one of the worst memories of those years. Usually, the seed was allotted in spring, when the roads were impassable and the fields were flooded with spring waters. Hungry women and teenagers would drag the seed grain by hand sleighs from the state storage houses for 20–50 km. All of this had negative impact on the crop sector production indicators. As a result, the sizes of croplands decreased: in 1950, compared to 1940, they decreased by 12,000 ha [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 30, File 6, Sheet 139]. During the fourth five year plan, the average grain yield in the republic did not exceed 5.3 quintals per 1 ha. In some years the result was very modest: in the drought year (1948), the yield amounted to 4.1 quintals, and in 1949 this number came to 4.6 quintals per 1 ha. It was lower than in the country in general, where the yield amounted to more than 6 quintals in average for 1946–1950 [Zelenin, 2001, p. 47]. The gross yield of grain in 1950 was estimated at 65 million poods, that is 2.5 times less that the target plans and amounted to only 83% of the gross grain yield in 1940 [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 31, File 789, Sheet 79; estimated by: Narxoz TASSR, 1970, p. 71].

Animal husbandry was also in an advanced state of decay. None of the sectors in the republic was economically viable. Some of the kolkhoz farms did not even have buildings to house community herds. Thus the kolkhoznik farmers each kept a few heads of livestock in their
farmsteads. By early 1946, out of 4,255 kolkhozes of the republic, 4,210 had cattle farms, 3,878 pig, 4,194 sheep and 3,429 had poultry farms. The buildings mainly consisted of small houses, with cracked walls and leaking ceilings. They were typically no feeders and the animals were fed right off the floor with dirty raw potatoes or unmilled grain.

In 1950, the First Secretary of the Tatar Regional Committee of the CPSU(B), Z. Muratov, sent Stalin a letter about the terrifying situation in the countryside, showing with specific examples that the lack of economic interest of the rural population in social labour had led to the critical condition of agriculture. On 1 January 1950, deficiencies in grain supply in the republic amounted to 1,449.8 thousand tons, 3.9 thousand tons in meat supply and 242.6 thousand hectolitres in milk supply. In total, by the early 1950s, 2,000 kolkhoz farms in Tatarstan were lagging behind in production terms leading to huge deficiencies [ibid., Fund 15, Inventory 31, File 15, Sheet 148].

The low levels of agricultural production showed that military-style mobilization of agricultural policy was falling short of expectations. The agricultural sector in the Tatar Republic, and the country as a whole, was characterized by negative development dynamics, in all performance rates such as: gross product, yield, animal farming productivity. Despite an improvement in the social production resource base, shown by an increase in almost all types of community livestock and agricultural machinery, the agricultural sector was deteriorating.

After Stalin's death, the new government of the country took serious measures to alleviate agricultural policy. According to the resolutions of the September (1953) Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the tax system was changed, procurement prices for agricultural products were increased, regulations of obligatory supplies were decreased and the debts of the kolkhozes were written off. Resources for the development of the material and technical facilities in the sector were significantly increased as well. According to the latest studies by Russian agrarian specialists, whose opinion is hard to refute, the first five year plan after the September Plenum 1953 was the most successful and productive period of agricultural reform throughout the nation. It was aimed at resolving the burning economic and social problems of the countryside [Zelenin, 2000, p. 397].

However, the government was still committed to extensive development and the expansion of cultivated areas by reclaiming virgin and fallow lands of Kazakhstan, the Orenburg region and Bashkortostan. Hence, the main stream of investments, allotted for the development of agricultural sector, went to newly reclaimed areas. The Tatar Republic, being one of the old-arable regions, still lacked sufficient funds for modernization of the sector.

The establishment of oil-producing industry led to the redesignation vast expanses of the most fertile black soils in the south east of the republic. The most acute problem for the kolkhoz farms in the oil regions was the violation of their land use rights. The extent of the use of kolkhoz lands by the oil companies was often unreasonable, amounting to unauthorized land seizure, accompanied with outrageous mismanagement. The result was irreversible damage to farmlands and the environment. In the initial stages of oil field development, oil-recovery management was in an advanced state of decay and the issues of industrial drainage and waste treatment facilities had not been resolved.

The first resolution land legislation compliance in the region was passed by the USSR Soviet of Ministers in 1947. However, it is unlikely that it was efficient, since similar decisions were made in 1950, 1954 and by the same intervals in the following years up until the end of the Soviet era. Based economic modernization priorities in the country, the local party government, as well as the oil industry administration, were initially concerned with implementing plans to establish oil production, realizing that they would be held responsible for implementation the plans. On the other hand they realized that they would only be slightly admonished for land destruction. Vast areas of kolkhoz lands, fields, rivers and waters in the
oil regions were systematically polluted with oil and production waste. The lands were ruined and crops were damaged when the equipment and construction materials were transported to the sites. Eventually, the agricultural executives began to realise that ‘oil fees’ were beneficial for the farms: they could be used to resolve many of the internal problems of the kolkhoz farms.

Besides property losses, the oil industry damaged local kolkhoz farms by diverting a considerable part of the agricultural labour potential. By 1957, more than 400 thousand people of the rural able-bodied population left the countryside to work in the oil industry. As a result, due to acute shortage of manpower, many of the kolkhozes were unable to keep up with the demands of agricultural deadlines and incurred heavy losses of cultivated crops.

The situation in the agricultural sector of the republic in the mid-1950’s was exacerbated by the imposition of economic cooperation conditions with the state which were less favourable than the neighbouring regions. This was particularly acute in terms of access to the MTS’s. In the areas of the Tatar ASSR, located on the north side of the Kama River, the fixed rates of payment for tractor hire were twice that of the bordering regions of Udmurt, Mari, Chuvash Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics (ASSR) and Kirov oblast, which had the same climatic and natural conditions. For instance, in TASSR the fixed rate was 65 kg grain per 1 ha for ploughing, while in the neighbouring regions it was 35 kg. There was a similar situation in the regions of TASSR to the south of the Kama River. Here, the soil and climate conditions were similar to the areas of the Chkalov, Kuybyshev and Ulyanovsk oblast regions. Nevertheless, the fixed rate of in-kind payment for grain cultures operation in the Tatarstan kolkhozes amounted to 65 kg per 1 ha at ploughing, against 50 kg for the kolkhozes in the neighbouring regions [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 35, File 138, Sheet 149].

In 1954, the Tatar Regional Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union made a request that the situation be reconsidered. Thus the rates of in-kind payment were reduced for 27 northern districts of Tatarstan. However, even after that, they still were higher than in the kolkhoz farms of the Udmurt, Mari ASSR and the Kirov oblast. In the black soil areas the situation did not change at all. In 1956, the Secretary of the Tatar Regional Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, P. Urayev, submitted another request to N. Khrushchev to reconsider the issue in the southern districts of the republic. Moscow did not respond. The general public clearly sensed the humiliation of the republic in the agricultural sector. In 1957, Tatar writer, Sh. Mannur, in his letter to N. Khrushchev pinpointed the main issues in the agricultural development of Tatarstan. Amongst these he emphasized the excessive plans of state supplies for TASSR agricultural produce and their negative on the condition of the republic’s agricultural sector and peasants.

In the mid-1950s, the agriculture sector in the republic was still lagging behind. Due to the lack of machinery, the sowing schedule of various crops extended up to 35 days, and the harvesting up to 60–70 days. The majority of kolkhozes sowed low-quality seed. For example, in 1957, 920 kolkhozes of the republic, or 50% of the total, lacked sufficient seed. Agricultural technology was at a low level: more than half of winter crops were not harrowed, and there was almost no mineral and only a small amount of organic fertilization. Inter-furrow land treatment and thinning of arable crops were performed in gross violation of agricultural schedules, with little frequency and not over the entire area. As a result, the republic did not meet the target of state supplies for grain, vegetables, sunflower, hemp and sugar beet. By the end of the fifth five year plan (1951–1955), the agricultural production not only failed to exceed even the 1940 target, falling short of it. For example, the average annual gross grain yield in the Tatarstan kolkhozes in 9 pre-war years (1932–1940) amounted to 19.2 million quintals per year, whereas in 10 post-war years (1946–1955) it amounted only to 14.4 million quintals [RGASPI, Fund 556, Inventory 14, File 83, Sheet 79]. By the mid-1950s, the grain yield in the republic was lower than the all-
Union level. Kolkhoz animal farming was in an advanced state of decay. In the mid-1950s, the republic failed to reach livestock targets on any animal species [RGASPI, Fund 556, Inventory 14, File 83, Sheet 81].

The decline in agricultural production led to the problem of intensification by reinforcing the material and technical resources. However, the Tatar Republic, among other regions of traditional agriculture, as it was mentioned before, did not have enough funds to overcome the backward state of agricultural sector. The industrial and agricultural strategies of the government preferred extensive methods. The government wanted to achieve a breakthrough in agriculture by expanding cultivable areas into reclaiming virgin and fallow lands.

In 1957, the backward state of the agricultural sector in the republic could no longer be ignored. In order to analyze the agricultural situation, a brigade of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was sent to Tatarstan. The examiners saw hopeless poverty, the despair of the kolkhoz farmers which was pointed out in their analytical report. The report of the Moscow delegation documented the peasants' complaints about the abuse of power by the local authorities, complete lawlessness of most of the kolkhozniks and made a firm conclusion that the agriculture in the republic was in backward state.

Nevertheless, the blame for all of this was laid upon the republic government. Their work, especially of those responsible for the development of agricultural sector, was strongly criticized by local executives at the Plenum of the Regional Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March 1957. The review raised the issue of replacing the First Secretary of the Tatar Regional Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Z. Muratov, with S. Ignatyev [RGASPI, Fund 556, Inventory 14, File 55, Sheet 90].

In July 1957, the Soviet of Ministers of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) adopted a resolution 'On rendering assistance to the agriculture of the Tatar ASSR'. Beginning in 1957, the plan for mandatory grain supply for the kolkhoz farms in the Tatar ASSR was reduced. Their debt of in-kind payment payable to the MTS, as well as arrears, was written off. The republic was provided with tractors, harvesters and pedigree cattle. Despite certain in the agricultural sector, it was far from modernized. Nevertheless, in the early 1960s, investments into regarding the agricultural sector of the republic once again began to decline. For instance, if in 1953–1956 agricultural investment in TASSR amounted to 62.1 million rubles and to 90.1 million rubles in 1956–1959, that is, an increase of 45%, in 1959–1961, it was again decreased to 70.7 million rubles, otherwise by 22%. In addition, the procurement prices for agricultural products which were increased after the September (1953) Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, were reduced across the whole country. At the same time, the prices for agricultural machinery, spare parts, fodder and mineral fertilizers went up. Moreover, in 1958 the state introduced a law on the reorganization of the MTS, according to which the kolkhoz farms were obliged to purchase most of the machinery from the machine and tractor stations.

In order to achieve a breakthrough in animal farming, in the late 1950s, agricultural policy embarked upon a venturous course 'To overhaul and surpass America in meat and milk production'. Noisy campaigns began all over the country aimed at implementing increased requirements for the early implementation of the seven-year plan. During his speech at the Plenum of the Tatar Regional Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in May 1959, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, A. Abdrazyakov, declared: 'The workers of Tataria have pledged to meet the target of meat production in 3 years and the target plan of milk production in 2 years' [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 40, File 135, p. 89]. However, the price they had to pay for these achievements is captured in the complaint letters of peasants addressed to various high authority bodies. Since public farming was unable to manage increased plans for animal products supply, pressure was increased on private subsidiary farming. In order to reach the target, the kolk-
hoz farms started collecting young stock from kolkhozniks.

The local executives' hands were untied when the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in December 1959 came to the conclusion that private subsidiary farming gradually had to fade in importance. They started an irreversible campaign of forced purchase of farming products. Cases of violation of the voluntary principle during the purchase of the animal farming products were reported in the Almetyevsk, Arsk, Vysokogorsky, Drozhzhianovsky, Elabuga, Kamsko-Ustye, Kukmora and Zainsk districts.

Due to an increase in the taxation of private subsidiary farming, private animal husbandry became impractical: the kolkhoz farms seized calves in order to implement the plan and kolkhoz farmers were imposed a tax for each cow in butter, milk and meat. The situation bordered on the absurd: peasants had to buy butter in the market and hand it in as a tax. Moreover, the haylands, allotted by the kolkhoz, were clearly insufficient for maintaining livestock in personal possession. Peasants had no choice but to cut hay illegally, haul it at night, and pay for transport with vodka — an 'unconvertible Soviet currency'. In the early 1960s, the archive records and pages of newspapers had many articles about the abuse of power by the local executives against personal household plot. On 1 August 1962, the actions of some rural executives of the republic were made public by virtue of an article 'Burenskaya pravda' ('Komsomolskaya pravda') newspaper. Afterwards, some of them were discharged, others received administrative penalties by the decision of the Regional Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 44, File 37, Sheets 6, 10].

In 1963, the situation in animal farming was worsened even more by severe drought. In terms of acute deficiencies in fodder, the kolkhozes were forced to remove pigs and sheep away from weaning and fattening stock, in order to save the breeding stock. As a result, the herds of pigs in the kolkhozes reduced by 50%, sheep by 18.5%, and in sovkhozes (state farms) by 61.4 and 14.5%, respectively.

As part of the plan of the late 1950s to construct powerful farms supported with robust material and equipment resources, the authorities began another campaign to expand the kolkhozes as further advancement of forms of ownership. In practice this meant taking actions towards dealing with the backward state of production in economically unviable farms. State patronage usually meant uniting a number of weak kolkhozes unless there was an opportunity to merge them into the neighbouring powerful kolkhoz. When weak kolkhoz farms were integrated into a neighbouring strong one, the form of ownership remained the same. The process of transforming kolkhozes into sovkhozes (state farms) often led to formation of unwieldy, barely manageable, unprofitable farms whose efficiency rarely justified their reorganization. The total number of sovkhozes (state farms) in 1955–1965 was increased from 35 to 94. By the mid-1960s, they accounted for 20% of all agricultural areas, whereas they produced only 14% of agricultural products out of the total in the republic [Matveeva, 1980, p. 28].

This contradictory course of agricultural development had an impact on the general ratings of the development of agricultural sector in the following way. The gross product of the republic's agriculture increased by 40%, and of
the social production by 67.2%. This number was higher than in the USSR in general, where agricultural production increased by 10% [S A HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 41, File 132, Sheet 25]. This ratio was caused by the fact that the agricultural ‘breakthrough’ in the Tatar Republic came only in the late 1950s and the first half of the 1960s, rather than after the September (1953) Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, as it happened in the country in general. In the middle of the 1950s, the agricultural sector of the republic still remained poorly mechanized. However, the Tatar republic failed to reach the targets of the seven-year plan of agricultural development as well. In the first half of the 1960s, there was a fall in the indicators for yield and gross grain harvest in the republic. Some of the districts harvested only 5–8 quintals per 1 ha. The average grain yield in the republic did not exceed 9.5 quintals per 1 ha, yet in the best farms it reached 20–23 quintals [Karimov, 1992, p. 123]. In the late 1950s and the first half of the 1960s, meat production in the republic fell, while milk production slightly increased. However, this was significantly far from the target numbers [S A HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 43, File 30, Sheet 67]. Meanwhile, the production of sugar beet and eggs was showing high rates of growth.

Thus, the agricultural sector in Tatarstan was developing rather inconsistently. The agriculture was thrown into confusion with endless reorganizations, occasional expansions of kolkhozes and their reorganizations into sovkhozes (state farms). Generally, agricultural production was subject to micromanagement. The farms were dictated by technological processes, sowing and harvesting schedules and crop growing areas. With complete ignorance of the local conditions, the authorities praised and universally introduced one culture or technology after another. All of this began to throw the agriculture into confusion.

In 1965, the new government of the country, headed by L. Brezhnev, passed the Complex Programme of Agricultural Development, which covered an extensive list of financial, economic and technological measures for the reformation of the sector. Having fully supported the agricultural policy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the authorities of Tatarstan were focusing on extensive changes in many areas of agricultural production at once: mechanization, electrification, the use of chemicals and land improvement.

The economic reforms and improvements in the material and equipment resources implemented during the first five years after the adoption of the Complex Program of Agricultural Development, had a significant impact on the republic. Grain production — the key issue in the agricultural sector of the republic — was successfully improved by using intensive factors.

The most substantial positive movements happened in the agricultural sector of Tatarstan, as well as of the USSR in general, in the latter half of the 1960s. This was when the state adopted a series of measures aimed at reinforcing the material interest of agricultural enterprises in the results of their work. The annual average of the gross agricultural product in the republic increased during the eighth five-year plan (1966–1970) by 28% while the plan required 25%. The work force productivity in the kolkhozes and sovkhozes (state farms) of Tatarstan increased by 44%, while the USSR in general achieved an increase of 37% [Fayzrahmanov, 1981, p. 15].

However, in the 1970s, the agricultural situation in the republic was become complicated, although the emphasis in the agricultural policy remained the same. Between 1971–1981, the agricultural-industrial complex of Tatarstan received 1.8 times more capital investments than in the preceding decade—4.7 billion roubles [Narxoz TASSR, 1987, p. 124], but the main bulk went to the industrial construction.

In the latter half of the 1970s, the renewal rate of the material and technical resources for agricultural production in the republic was falling behind the rate of the USSR in general. This was mainly due to the fact that in 1974 the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union passed a special resolution ‘On further development of the Non-black Soil Belt of Russia’, according to
which huge capital investments were alloted for the development of Central Russia oblasts and republics. The Tatar Republic, regardless of almost half of its lands being non-black soil, was not included in the generously subsidized Non-black Soil Belt.

The situation in the agricultural sector was complicated by the continuing fall in the cultivated areas in the republic: in the 1970s, vast expanses of the most fertile lands were transformed into gigantic construction sites for the Kama River industrial zone, the Nizhnekamsk Reservoir and laying of the biggest oil and gas pipelines across its territory. Agricultural lands continued to decline through the entire period in question. Between the 1950s and the 1990s, agriculture in the republic lost 140 thousand ha; 2 million ha was ruined by erosion, and 1.7 million ha was acidified [Programma stabilizacji, 1991].

This had a negative impact on the level of agricultural development in the republic. Annual average agricultural output increased in the republic by 9%, whereas in the country in general it increased by 13%. Nevertheless, generally, the agricultural ratings of the Tatarstan economy were higher than a total in the Union. Calculated on the basis of 100 ha of farmland basis, the communal sector output of the agricultural production in the republic was 1.5 times more than in the Russian Federation in general [Gallyamova, 1997 a, p. 73]. However, agricultural intensification level in the republic did not correspond to the amount investments in material and technical resources spent on achieving this. The growth rate of the capital/labour ratio was a lot higher than the per capita gross product growth rate. While the capital/labour ratio in 1980 had increased by 222% compared to 1970, the gross product output per capita increased by 42% [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 8, File 116, Shet 10].


The active protectionist policy proscribed in the 'Complex Programme of Agricultural Development', ended with the adoption of yet another programme for improving the agriculture: — the USSR Food Programme. However, this also fell short of expectations and proved that strong state paternalism was not enough for agricultural development. It needed the self-regulatory mechanisms of socio-economic relations which functioned in the conditions of a civilized market.

**Urban and rural social infrastructure.** During the years of war, the territory of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was not involved in military action. However, the war had its serious consequences here as well. The lives of most people were challenged by everyday difficulties. Kazan, as well as the entire country, suffered from deficiencies in bread and other produce. People suffered from a lack of housing. The municipal economy was in an advanced state of decline. Colossal investments were needed to restore the non-industrial infrastructure. However, Tatarstan was outside the war zone and could not rely on sufficient subsidies to overcome the challenges of war time.

Moreover, during the war years the republic, along with many other regions of the USSR in the rear of the front line, was involved in helping territories liberated from German occupation. It led the restoration of one of the districts of Stalingrad and two rural districts of the Stalingrad oblast, Orel and 23 districts of the Orel oblast. Tatarstan sent equipment, construction materials, seed, pedigree cattle, clothes, shoes and household items. Qualified workers, engineers, medical workers and teachers were deployed to Stalingrad [Abdrakhmanov, 1960, p. 15].

The rapid growth of the urban population due to high rates of industrial development in the republic and the number of rural peasants 'fleeing' from the countryside led to an escalation of the housing problem in Kazan. Only certain leading administrators and the most prominent representatives of the artistic and academic intelligentsia were provided with accommodation in comfortable houses, known as
'stalinkas', in the central streets of the city. During the fourth five year plan, 80 million roubles was invested into new housing construction and 85 thousand square metres of living space was put into service in the capital of the republic. It was a fraction of the amount spent in Samara (then Kuibyshev), Nizhny Novgorod (then Gorky) and Yekaterinburg (then Sverdlovsk). In 1947–1948, the city council did not build a single house, due to the lack of construction materials [SA HPD TR, Fund 26, Inventory 20, File 4, Sheet 48]. Moreover, the Municipal Executive Committee had no tools, other than axes and saws for preparing the timber, needed for house repair works. The committee had only horses to haul the timber. The critical repairs to buildings, many of which were wooden, required 50 thousand cubic metres of construction materials [Ibid., Fund 26, Inventory 29, File 299a, Sheets 2–5; 34–36]. Most ordinary citizens had no other choice but to embark on individual construction at their own cost or using state credit. However, due to the lack of resources and acute deficiencies in construction materials, many people could not afford it. The majority of ordinary Kazan people citizens lived in houses with no amenities. Often these were no more than confined cold baraks. Houses were heated with wood or coal.

One of the most significant social achievements of the 1950s was introduction of so-called 'khrushchevka'. This was the name given to flats widely constructed across the entire country. In 1959–1965, the Tatar Republic built 4 million square metres, which was 2.2 times more than in 1951–1955. During this period, Kazan acquired new residential areas in Karavayevo, Derbysky and along the Siberian highway and blocks of flats along the Kuybysheva, Lenina (now Kremlevskaya), Pushkina, Mayakovskogo and Levobulachnaya streets. In the late 1950s, the average rating of housing provision in cities and workers towns in the republic amounted to 4.7 square metres per person or 50% of the norm, whereas in Kazan it came to 4.4 square metres [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 31, File 15, Sheets 221–222]. In 1961, about 10% of the population lived in hostels, and 19.5% in single-family houses which were often in a critical condition [Istoriya Kazani, 1991, p. 310]. The first large prefabricated panel block of flats in Kazan was built in the Leninsky (now Aviastroitelnaya) district in 1960. Since then, the preference in housing construction in the republic was given to large panel buildings. By the mid-1970s, prefabricated panel blocks amounted for 80% of total housing constructed in the republic [Tabeev, 1976, p. 115]. 75% of the housing stock of Kazan consisted of houses with nine or more storeys [Ibid., Fund 26, Inventory 43, File 525, Sheet 5]. In the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s, almost every other Kazan people managed to improve their housing conditions. More than 90% of the population were now living in houses built during the Soviet era [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 45, File 27, Sheet 13].

The house building industry in Naberezhnye Chelny showed a high level of development, as the buildings were constructed upon original projects with the use of progressive technological and organizational solutions. 1972 marked the establishment of one of the most modern house building factories in the country with capacity of 120 thousand square metres housing per year [Sovetskaya Tataria, 1972, 16 August], where all the main processes were mechanized and some of them automatized. Naberezhnye Chelny piloted the most progressive ideas in construction and manufacturing technologies for assembly details and exterior cladding.

However, the housing problem in Kazan remained acute throughout the entire Soviet period. Nevertheless, districts, occupied by native Kazan people, were neglected. The slums, where native Kazan people lived, were quickly become an eyesore in the centre of the capital city. Entire generations of native Kazan people sheltered in ill-equipped houses without hot water, gas, central heating, with leaking ceilings and frost-bound walls. They were unfamiliar with the simple conditions of normal human dwelling. The Novotatarskaya sloboda (district), traditionally occupied by Tatars, was a 'forgotten area' of the city. In the Soviet era, it was a big working district, mainly populated by the light and food industry workers. It has almost no social infrastructure, as there were
...no cultural-educational or social institutions: hairdressing salons, laundries, banyas (bath houses), health clinics etc. [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 41, File 126, Sheet 148].

The editorial offices of the central and republic newspapers were literally engulfed by letters from Kazan people. The Central Archive of Historical and Political Documents of the republic has a voluminous collection of letters received by the 'Pravda' ('Truth') newspaper in 1964, 330 letters in total. The majority of complaints were from common workers of enterprises and construction sites. They had living with their families for many years in inhuman conditions. Letters about difficult living conditions were sent by disabled veterans of the World War II, families of deceased servicemen and tuberculosis sufferers. The authors of many letters described serious violations of the rules allotting living accommodation, especially in official institutions. Workers from certain enterprises complained that sometimes flats were allotted out of turn, while workers who had been working in the enterprise for 20–25 years, did not have proper housing. Many of them resided in rented private flats [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 45, File 24, Sheets 7–15].

Starting from the middle of the 1950s, even the cultural and intellectual elite of the republic were feeling the intensity of the housing problem. During the first post-war decade, the lucky owners of 'stalinkas', which had been built in quite small amounts, were the most prominent members of artistic and scientific intelligentsia, along with high-ranking officials and economic executives.

Extensive housing construction was provided by industrial enterprises. The largest builders were manufacturing such as 'Organic synthesis', engine-building, the 'Gorbunov' aircraft production factories, the Kuybyshev, accounting and computing machinery factory and the Kazan Division of the Gorky Railway [Istorinya Kazani, 1991, p. 236]. Thus, the aviation industry alone was responsible for the construction of about 50% of the residential construction in Kazan in the mid-1950s [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 37, File 20, Sheets 58–59].

The institutional approach to the development of the housing issue led to a marked improvement in residential buildings near industrial enterprises. This also contributed to changing the spatial organization activities in the capital of the Republic. There was active construction the periphery of the city and on free land beyond the city boundaries. These housing projects occupied from 15 to 40 hectares with a population from 6 to 12 thousand inhabitants. Kazan significantly expanded its boundaries through the new development. In the early 1960s, the length of streets and passages in town was 712 km, and in the late 1970s, this number had increased to 933 km. The length of the city from north to south became 27 km, and from east to west — 29 km [Istorinya Kazani, 1991, p. 331–332].

The negative ramifications of the expansion in the development of Kazan were pointed out yet in 1956 by famous in Tatarstan poet Sh. Mannur. In the letter to N. Khruashchev he wrote: 'The issue of housing is extremely inadequate in Kazan. There are many emergency houses, in very poor condition, buildings, requiring a capital master plan, where large families of workers and employers live in precarious conditions. The City Executive Committee workers don't care much about it, residential construction in the city is miniscule. The only construction is taking place on the outskirts of the city with the support of the numbered factories' [RGASPI, Fund 556, Inventory 14, File 55, Sheet 111].

The new building development projects with its uniformity of tall nine-story buildings substantially differed from the old part. The people nicknamed them 'Chinese walls', and they could hardly be called a comfortable environment for sustainable human activity. Building infrastructure was not sufficiently developed. Thus, in 1970s the new area in Kazan was so-called 'Tankodrom'. Its inhabitants systematically complained to various institutions to show that not a single element of cultural or domestic life was fulfilled in the area. The bus stops and sidewalks were not maintained, roads to schools and shops were not made, lighting was bad. There were major disruptions in wa-
ter supply and bus transportation' [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 7, File 1184, Sheet 22]. All the new residential areas in Kazan faced such challenges. In the early 1980s, Kazan remained one of the few cities of the Volga region, where no decision had been taken on integrated development [Sovetskaya Tataria, 1983, 26 June].

The failure to address the social-domestic and social-cultural problems led to serious collisions. Significantly the dull mass residential complexes frequently referred to as 'dormitories', with their boring social interior were plagued with the problem of socially dangerous groups of marginalized youth.

Another serious problem throughout the Soviet period was the provision of hostels for students from other cities. There were cases in which students lived at the train station. Thus, in 1960 the Dean of the Faculty of Geology of Kazan State University at a city-wide meeting of higher education workers stated that he received calls from the militia of the river port requesting that students from his faculty sleeping rough at the station be gathered up. Only 25% of the students of this faculty were supplied with dormitories. In general, only 45% of Kazan students, who needed a dormitory, were provided with accommodation. [Russian State Archive of Contemporary History, Fund 5, Inventory 37, File 90, Sheet 80]. The Aviation College, Communications College, Law and Paramedical-obstetric schools in the 1940s and the beginning of 1950s did not have their own dormitories at all [SA HPD TR, Fund 26, Inventory 30, File 15, Sheet 82 reverse]. Another problem with dormitories was the intolerable living conditions. In 1955 during a meeting of the regional committee of CPSU, there was criticism of the hostel at the asphalt and cement plant: 'The kitchen is not heated at the moment, there are no washstands, water in the tanks freezes with the first frosts, there is no buffet in the workshops or premises for eating. ... We're facing many housing difficulties. So what is there to stop a construction organization or company from fixing the roof in the dormitory, changing bed linen frequently, cleaning up the mess, providing them with drinking water, or organising their cultural activities' [SA HPD TR, Fund 26, Inventory 88/16, File 39, Sheet 13 reverse].

It was extremely challenging for temporary visitors too to stay in Kazan, in the mid-1950s there were only 4 hotels in the capital, while before the Revolution were 34 [Ibid., Fund 19, Inventory 45, File 72, Sheets 19–21]. Nevertheless, there were many visitors to Kazan. In 1956, 1800 foreigners visited Kazan. They were mainly visitors from the socialist countries, although there were also representatives from England, Canada, France and Finland too [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 39a, File 77, Sheet 201].

Along with the housing issues there were also problems with utilities infrastructure in the cities. In the first place, there was the matter of providing urban citizens with drinking water and sewage systems. Owing to a lack of funds for repair, half of the communal facilities and cultural institutions in Kazan were unable to function for 5–10 years after the war, sometimes even longer. Thus, the city's inhabitants had serious concerns about the functioning of bathhouses. They were desperately short of them in Kazan, and many that should have been available were under renovation for years. Kazan people, most of whom had no bathroom or shower at home, had to sit for hours in the bathhouse queues.

The problem of inter-city roads also remained acute in Tatarstan throughout the Soviet period. By the end of 1950s, only a fifth of the Kazan streets had road surfaces, while 27% of the streets had no lighting [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 39a, File 77, Sheet 202]. In the mid-1970s fewer than half of 900 km Kazan roads were paved. At the beginning of the 1950s, with a total length of streets at 360 km, municipal services did not possess snowblowers or graders [Ibid., Fund 15, Inventory 31, File 15, Sheet 227]. Owing to the unsatisfactory snow clearance, in late February and March city roads became almost impassable for buses and trolley buses, and as a result they were frequently damaged. Public transport experienced major problems. Until the mid-1950s it mainly consisted of salvaged defense department vehicles.
As a result of rapid industrial development in the late 1950's, the metropolitan areas of the Republic faced serious ecological problems. In Kazan, environmental damage was caused by the Vakhitov Chemical Plant, 'Teplocontrol', the asphalt and cement plant and many others. At a meeting of senior executives dedicated to the ecological situation, a student of KAI Kabanov very precisely described the increasing damage of republic's capital: 'The chimneys billow out smoke all over the town. Look at the snow, it's black because of soot. There are filters for chimney stacks, and they should be introduced. Furthermore, there is Kaban Lake in the city centre. And what does it look like? In mid-August this lake turns into a swamp, slime forms on it, and children swim there. All the waste materials from industry, located around the lake, are discharged into it. Even the Kaban fish smells like that waste' [SA HPD TR, Fund 19, Inventory 45, File 72, Sheets 51–52]. The waters of the oil-drill areas were in very poor condition, especially the Steppe Zay river in the Almetyevsk area. The content of oil found in the Kama river exceeded the maximum permissible norms by 20 times.

In the 1950–1960, Kazan had a reputation for being the dirtiest city of the Volga region. In a letter to N. Khrushchev Sh. Mannur indicated: 'The city is extremely antiquated, streets are in an outrageous condition' [RGASPI, Fund 556, Inventory 14, File 55, Sheets 108–116]. The famous historian M. Usmanov in his initial impressions of Kazan from the 1950s, says: 'Kazan was very threadbare then and somewhat exhausted' [Usmanov, 1999, p. 26]. The city authorities were also very aware of the precarious state of the Tatar capital's economy. In 1954 at their initiative a meeting was held with an invitation to the Moscow leadership to reach out to them and show the extent of the accumulated problems the housing and communal services of Kazan which had been ignored for so many years. For 7 years following the war, the city authorities of Kazan annually raised the issue of the need for the immediate repair of the storm drain. However, they consistently received refusal from Moscow. For a period of three years a request by the Kazan City Executive Committee for funding for the disinfection of public sanitary facilities had 'languished' somewhere in between the central ministries. There were catastrophically few of them in a city with a rapidly developing industry. For the majority of Kazan people their 'facilities were in the backyard'.

The Minister of Public Service of the RSFSR Surov, who attended the meeting, admitted that his first impression of Kazan was that it was messy and dirty: 'There is no yard, which you would call clean, there is no street that is tidy. Even the main streets, where people walk, where shops are located, cultural institutions are poorly maintained too. … Go to the Kremlin, and there you will find a junkyard'. However, the minister tried to identify gaps in the work of the civic services. However, the speech of indictment against them was unsuccessful. Surov blamed them for the early failure of public transport buses, but he had to admit there were no spare parts for their repair, and that their frequent breakdowns were caused by terrible roads, for the proper maintenance of which the city did not have enough machinery.

Surov agreed that the municipal engineering in Kazan needed serious re-equipping, but advised to reveal the internal reserves required to remedy the situation, because the Ministry of Housing and Communal Services, he admitted, was unable to provide a single high-sided truck, snow loader, nor any dump truck. After the meeting, three vehicles for cleaning the town were allocated to Kazan, thus raising the capacity of city cleansing services by only 5%. Furthermore, 8 toilet bowls and 80 waste containers were allocated to public services, which met the needs of only one house.

There was no major breakthrough in the development of the Communal Services in 1950s. In the late 1950s, in Kazan there were only 26 vehicles for waste collection, which provided only 30% of the city needs. Owing to catastrophic lack of waste collection equipment, the city had 40 landfill sites which were in a terrible condition. During a meeting of the regional committee of CPSU in 1958, S. Ignatyev observed with undisguised disappointment, even some desperation: 'I think we actu-
ally don't have a city'. Kazan cannot be called a city just because people live here and there are many houses, yet at the same time there is a lack of factors required for workers safety. Our city is a colony for those suffering from infectious diseases, with the highest concentration of contagious diseases, tuberculosis, all types of skin conditions… Yesterday I was in the Kirov district, there is terrible dust and nothing is being done to take away the heaps of dirt. The same thing is in the city centre [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 39, File 68, Sheets 76–77].

During the post-war decades, the schools remained in a grave situation. Due to a lack of funding in the cities, almost no schools were built or repaired. However, those buildings which during the war had been allocated to evacuated institutions and organizations, were returned to their pre-war purpose. Often they were in such a condition that it was impossible to use them without at least minimal repairs. The lack of facilities led to the necessity of establishing triple shifts at schools, the number of which increased regularly. Thus, in the 1956/1957 academic year 25 schools operated in the capital of Republic with a total of 3,200 pupils on a three shift basis. While in the 1957/1958 academic year there were already 39 such schools with an enrollment of 5,800 students [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 39a, File 77, Sheet 204]. In the capital of Tatarstan only one Tatar school (No. 113) had normal educational conditions. The majority of Tatar schools were housed in badly organized premises.

Some cultural and educational institutions were unable to get their buildings back in full. In the post-war years Kazan remained the only city in the Volga region where there was no School Children's Palace [Ibid., File 15, Inventory 30, File 6, Sheet 425]. The Pioneer Palace was opened in Kazan only in 1951. During the first post-war decade in Kazan, not a single working club was built [RGASPI, Fund 556, Inventory 15, File 8, Sheet 104].

The system of higher and specialized education of the Republic experienced enormous difficulties with material and technical resource provision in the first post-war decades. All the IHLs and technical colleges in Kazan had problems with their premises. In the 1940s, veterinary and financial colleges did not possess their own buildings and classes were held in the evenings in rented premises. [Ibid., Fund 26, Inventory 88/16, File 39, Sheet 13]. IHLs and colleges did not possess furniture and students sometimes needed to listen to lectures standing [RGASPI, Fund 26, Inventory 88/16, File 39, Sheet 13]. The leading IHLs (KAI, KICT) had 2–3 square metres industrial-practical space per student with an average rate at 10 square metres. A number of IHLs worked in three shifts with shortened breaks.

From the latter half of 1960s to the beginning of 1980s, the situation regarding material resources for science and education began to change markedly. (The unfolding scientific-technical revolution encouraged the authorities to pay close attention to science and improving the material and technical resources). Two modern high-rise buildings were constructed for the Kazan University. New buildings appeared also near the Kazan Branch of the Academy of Sciences, Aviation, Scientific-Technical, Agricultural, Veterinary, Financial-Economic, Building-Engineering institutions, and the majority of technical colleges.

There were also certain advances in the development of the social and cultural infrastructure of Kazan. A number of buildings appeared which were to become landmarks and the city's most recognizable features. The center of the capital is inconceivable without the building of the Theater of Opera and Ballet named after M. Dzhaliil, opened in 1956, and the Privolzhsky district would be unthinkable without the Kirov Palace of Culture (from 2000 the Concert hall of Tatar State Philharmonic). The Moscow district (previously Lenin) would be unrecognisable without the Uritsky Palace of Culture, or the Soviet district without the Palace of Culture named after Said-Galiev. During this period in Kazan wide-screen cinemas were built: 'Druzhba', 'Pobeda', 'Zvezda', 'Mir', 'Ogonyok', named after Tukay, similar cinemas opened in Zelenodolsk, Leninogorsk, Nurzatkh, Urussu.
In Almetyevsk, in the central part of all Kazan districts, parks were built. In the capital of the Republic the Actor's House, The House of Public Amenities and Services, the covered market, swimming pool, integrated health centre 'Zdorovye', Palaces of Chemists' and Builders' Culture, the Central Stadium, the Sports Ground, Exhibition Hall of Union of artists of the Republic were constructed. The most notable reconstruction activities in Kazan were conducted on the main streets named after Yershov, Butlerov and on Tatarstan, Komsomolskaya, Profsoyuznaya, Pravobulachnaya streets.

The architectural appearance of Kazan in the 1970s acquired the appearance of the present day capital thanks to the construction of high-rise buildings. The city was decorated with high-rise buildings of Youth Centre, Publishing house, 'Tatarstan' hotel, and the House of Public Amenities and Service.

The history of architecture of Kazan was marked in 1967 by the construction of Kazan circus. Its unique architecture in the shape of a flying saucer already at that time marked it out as a 21st century building. At first the project created by A. Khuyrullin was met with great apprehension, since there had never been anything like it in before in world construction practice. Construction commenced after long periods of approvals in number of institutions, thorough calculations and the persistent work of the team of specialists including the head of 'Tatgrazhdanproekt' creative workshop, V. Panov, U. Alparov, the Director of the Institute, and engineers E. Brudny, O. Berim, and the architect G. Pichuyev. Kazan people fell in love with it immediately and it was given the highest accolades circus workers, including the celebrated Yu. Nikulin. The Circus became one of the most significant phenomena in 20th century Kazan, providing the city with an inimitable appearance and recognition.

In general, the city architecture was increasingly characterised by the excessive infatuation with glass and concrete. The construction of Conservatory Auditorium at the central Freedom Square, House of Tatar Cuisine at the central Bauman street, suburban train station in this regard was characteristic. These buildings substantially differed from the Theatre of Opera and Ballet building by the absence of expensive decor. Distinctive national cultural features were almost never used in architecture. The appearance of buildings was depressing, owing to the poor quality of the construction material used. The facades of brick buildings were made mainly from silicate bricks since the available red brick was of a lower quality.

Local industry had not developed veneered or coloured brick. The pigments used in construction had little variety in terms of coloration and quality.

The new cities in the republic which were built during the era of gigantomania and pomposity, also bore the seal of the time expressed in the construction of large monolithic buildings. Thus, in 1973 city plan for Naberezhnye Chelny town, the main nucleus of the city—the administrative square—was more than double the size of Red Square in Moscow [Republic of Tatarstan, 1995, 26 January]. This made the centre of Naberezhnye Chelny uncomfortable in the perception of the citizens.

The local government administrative buildings actively constructed in the 1960s and 1970s were an embodiment of the philosophy of standardisation and unification in opposition to distinct identity. They were designed to a single unified plan without their own face, rendering them completely forgettable. The building of the Tatar Committee of CPSU was extended with a new annex. The House of political education (current building of the Academy of Sciences of the TR) was constructed on the main street of Republic's capital, named after Bauman. Template buildings of committee of the Communist Party were constructed in each district. They differed from the surrounding buildings with their contemporary but at the same time non-descript forms and the blue spruces planted around them. At the same time throughout almost the entire Soviet period such essential centers of Tatar culture as Tatar Philharmonic [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 7, File 354a, Sheet. 6] and Tatar Academic Theater named after G. Kamal, did not have decent buildings.
During the Soviet period, Tatar television which had begun to broadcast in the 1950s was low-powered. In the early 1960s, in the Republic there were 25 thousand televisions. [NA RT, Fund 4493, Inventory 1, File 486, Sheet 1]. Kazan station television programmes were watched only in 27 Republic districts.

An important area of the urban social infrastructure is the health-care system. During period under review, the hospital network grew steadily. The number of accessible doctors per 1,000 people increased sixfold. The construction of the Republican Clinic complex was a major event. At this time the hospitals in Zelenodolsk, Elabug, Bugulma, Chistopol, Almetyevsk were awarded Republican health facility status. However, prior to 1989 the accessibility of outpatient and polyclinic health care Kazan represented only 70% of the required. In several suburbs the situation was simply disastrous. For example, in the village of Borisikovo a branch of the Medical Clinic No. 9 was stationed in an unsafe one-story wooden building with furnace heating and without sanitary facilities. There was one doctor here for more than 6 thousand people. The same situation was in the Mirny village 'Problemy' perestroiki, 1990, p. 104]. By the end of the 1980s in TASSR there were 10% fewer doctors than the national average across the USSR, and 20% fewer than in the RSFSR. The republic only had 9 beds for every 10 that it should have been allotted [Mustafin, 1989]. Frequent medical equipment failures, lack of the most elementary equipment, and a shortage of vehicles – all of this together resulted in queues, which became a defining trait of Soviet health-care. Queues in general were inescapable features of Soviet social reality. They could be seen everywhere: in hair salons, bathhouses, cinemas, and theatres. The only way one could avoid queues was to personally know a doctor, hairdresser, bath attendant, or tailor.

The most distressing queues and shortages were in the commercial sector. Relative affluence allowed people to dress and eat better. In an effort to attain a better lifestyle in all aspects, people started to invest more money and time on home improvements. This proved difficult, because obviously not enough furniture, electronics, refrigerators or washing machines were manufactured to keep up with increasing demand.

Republic authorities regularly informed Moscow about empty shelves and disruptions in grain, food, and manufactured goods distribution [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 7, File 28, Sheet 17; Inventory 37, File 190, Sheet 35]. In 1950, Z. Muratov, First Secretary of the Tatar regional committee of the CPSU(B), requested that the USSR Council of Ministers base the product norms for Kazan on the norms of centrally-administered cities, giving the city a separate line in the budget. In so doing, he emphasized that in all other areas of planning, especially industrial, Kazan had attained this status as early as 1944 [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 7, File 15, Sheets 224–225]. In 1962 the leadership of the Republic sent the RSFSR Council of Ministers a letter in which they reported an 'abnormal planning of the market reserve for dairy and meat production in Tataria' that had rapidly decreased meat and milk consumption per person [Ibid., Fund 15, Inventory 43, File 29, Sheet 52]. During this period, more and more complaints began to come in from every corner of the Republic regarding the lack of basic necessities. In an analytical paper based on letters that were sent to editors of 'Sovetskaya Tataria' in 1971, the following examples are representative: 'We workers haven't seen meat for two years, the percent of plan fulfillment is believable when it sits on the shelves'. A group of workers from workshop No. 14 at Lenin Kazan Chemical Factory (Dmitriev, Ibragimov) wrote: 'We studied Tabeev's report at the plenary session of RC CPSU. And were very surprised and disturbed when we read that there will be a bias towards pork again. [...] Why don't they push for lamb? In the newspapers everything is pretty good, but we are getting meat at the market for 4–4.50. Of course, we all make mistakes. Even Stalin did. But then city dwellers waited for food prices to drop every spring. And now they temporarily raised the prices for meat, sausage, and butter, but the prices aren't going down. The price of vodka has even gone up.
What do you think, is it necessary to explain the reason for the price increase to the people, or is it enough to issue an edict? Because issuing an edict without consulting the people is aggravating; it causes uncertainty in some, and panic in others. The other letter says: 'In 1971 I would like for meat to be on the shelves, and not in newspapers. The same people in Yoshkar-Ola get ration coupons for meat... It would be nice if we could get at least the same' [Istoriya Kazani, 2004, pp. 226–227].

The same signals were coming from the newer cities. A. Generalov, a worker, writes: 'I came to Nizhnekkamsk in 1967. Till the latter half of 1969, meat, veal, pork, canned meat, smoked and marinated herring, all sorts of sausages — everything was in the shops. Now we don't have the minimum... There are very few grocery stores. There is a terrible crush of people everywhere. The cost of lunch in the work canteens is growing very fast' [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 35, File 305, Sheets 214–215]. In 1977 residents of Nizhnekamsk wrote a collective letter to 'Pravda' newspaper in which they complained about about the rate the social infrastructure was growing in the city, and also the dysfunctional state of social order [Ibid., Fund 15, Inventory 8, File 349, Sheet 18].

By the end of the 1970s, food shortages had gotten so bad in the cities of the republic that rationing was introduced for meat products and butter that continued until the end of the Soviet period. What's more, the allotted quantities of foods remained unchanged over this whole time.

Many problems regarding urban development, which were always overtaken by industrial construction in the Republic, were related to the rapidly expanding urban population. Most locals were more than willing to work in industrial manufacturing. This was evidenced by the rapid increase in oil workers, chemists, and machine-builders, among others.

The exponential growth in workers in the industrial spheres of manufacturing was not always directly reflected in an increase in city population. Thus, due to the fact that the oil industry in the south-east is widely dispersed, when local peasants become oil workers they usually didn't move away from homes. Unlike the workers who built the factories in Kazan in the 1930s and also those who later, in the 1960–1970s, created the Kama industrial zone, when oil workers transitioned to industry they generally didn't relocate to the city. Due to the housing shortage in the city, many of them continued to live in their original homes without changing their village lifestyle. Caring for parents, raising children, tending to their own gardens, their social surrounding familiar from birth — all of it remained unchanged for many of them. Besides, the working conditions for oil workers didn't change significantly. Because, unlike factory and foundry workers who worked indoors, the oil workers laboured outside just like peasants, in the fresh air and sunshine. In the infancy of the oil industry, locals were used mainly for unskilled labour that required greater physical effort. This was also compounded by the need to make the long trip from home to work every day. Unlike the oil workers who lived compactly in the city and were brought by buses, the locals had to get to work on foot.

The urban population began to grow dramatically in the 1960–1970s mainly due to the Kama Industrial Zone. The construction of KamAZ in Naberezhnye Chelny and petrochemical plants in Nizhnekamsk urbanized a vast amount of former countryside.

Thus, in 1970–1989 the population of Kazan increased by 10%, Almetyevsk by 18%, Naberezhnye Chelny by 66%, and Nizhnekamsk by 42% [Mustafin, Khuzeev, 1992, p. 16]. The percentage of the total Republic population that lived in the capital dropped from 47% to 42%. On 16 November 1979, the millionth inhabitant of Kazan was born, Irek Shamilyevich Mustafin [Istoriya Kazani, 2004, p. 237]. But in comparison to other multi-million cities, the population of Kazan grew much more slowly, as its growth rate in the 1980s was 10%, compared to the country average of 29%. Kazan's rate of population growth was, on average, less than half of all city dwellers across the republic. The population of Nizhnekamsk grew four times faster than in Kazan, and that of
Naberezhnye Chelny grew six times faster. In general, the growth rate of the urban population of the republic was more than 1.5 times higher than the average rate across the USSR [Vecernyaya Kazan’, 1990, 30 May]. These figures show the economy of the Republic was highly specialised, which gave rise to a corresponding pace of urbanization.

As a result, the percentages of people living in cities and villages in the Republic changed significantly. In the 1950–1960s, the most significant changes took place in southeast Tatarstan. This region, along with the traditional Kazan–Zelenodolsk industrial hub, gradually became the second industrial center of the Republic with a multi-ethnic urban population. It was there that the towns of Almetyevsk and Leninogorsk and industrial communities of Aznakayev, Aktyubinsky, Bavly, Dzhalil, Zainsk, Zelenaya Roshcha, Karabash, Russky Aktash, Shugurovo, and Uruusu all appeared. From 1939 to 1959, the urban population in the Republic increased from 614,300 (21.1% of the total population) to 1,190,300 (41.8%). At that time the rural population decreased from 2,299,900 (78.9 percent) to 1,660,100 (58.2 percent) [70 let TASSR, 1990, p.5]. At the beginning of the 1970s, almost 50% of the people in the republic lived in cities; the 1989 census showed that by that time, 73% of the population lived in cities. The three industrial zones were home to 80% of the population [Nurgaliev et al., 1989, p. 69].

However, the high modernization rates in the republic's economy and urbanization of its territory didn't mean the peoples' living standards would improve. The latter urbanized regions were industrial provinces whose sky lines were known for being sparse and over simplified. A vivid example of this is the information sheet based on a comprehensive survey of the economy in Nizhnekamsk in 1966. At that time, 27,000 people lived in the city. The document noted: '... A sewing workshop is located in an inadequate, cramped and cold building. The only photographer's studio in the district had one employee and in December 1965 was located in the basement of a building. There was only one hair salon with women's and men's rooms for the whole area [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 7, File 98, Sheets 1–4]. The same information sheet pointed out the unsatisfactory performance of companies that repaired appliances and radio equipment, and offered dry cleaning and other services. It was stated that only one phone booth was operational in the city, and there were only two booths for making long-distance telephone calls. Nizhnekamsk businesses could supply only 50% of the need: there were two bakeries, one furniture shop and no specialized shops for selling manufactured goods, vegetables, milk and meat products. They had only 59% of the necessary school buildings, 33% of the children's preschools, and 32% of the hospitals and clinics needed. There was not enough heating in the city; in the winter of 1966 the temperature in buildings was 10–12 degrees Celsius. There was only one bathhouse in the city that could serve 26 people at a time, and there was no laundromat nor hotel. Owing to the lack of buses, there was no bus transportation available from the city to construction sites at the chemical factory, thermal power plant, reinforced concrete factory, and other settlements in the area. In spring and autumn it was difficult to walk through the city even for people wearing rubber boots. As mentioned in the information sheet, on the day the men's dormitory was inspected, the hot water heater and showers didn't work and there was no hot water or boiling water for tea. Bedbugs were found in bed linens [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 7, File 98, Sheet 2]. However, in the early 1960s, the design for Nizhnekamsk had been awarded a gold medal and a first-degree diploma for its simplicity, maximum convenience for residents and economic efficiency of construction at the all-USSR competition for designing new cities.

Thus, the republic's industrial development during this period featured major accomplishments in implementing advanced technologies, adding extensive new territories, and generating a number of new branches and dozens of new enterprises. Unprecedented achievements were made in the aircraft and instrument-
making industries in the post-war years. The republic was involved in the development of aerospace equipment and space exploration. Certain types of industrial products manufactured in the republic were unique, but mostly they were in the branches of heavy industry. The mining industries that generated products for export carried a lot of weight in the industrial output of the republic. Insufficient technological progress was made in fields that supplied the needs of the people.

Industrial production was modernized by increasing the complexity of production processes, but this didn't mean it was improved. It was also oriented toward extensive implementation methods that led to unjustifiably expensive changes and a progressive decline in product quality. However, it is true that the republic's economic indicators were higher across all areas than throughout Russia in general. For example, from 1940 to 1985 overall industrial output in the Republic rose by a factor of 72, and in the Russian Federation it rose by only 22 times. Meanwhile, the growth rate of productivity in Tatarstan increased by a factor of 19, and in Russia by 10.

However, the superior modernization rates in the Republic's economy and the urbanization of its territory didn't lead to the same changes in living standards for its people. On the contrary, the extensive rates of change often turned into rush work and extremism, which meant disorganization and everyday hardships. Technocratic approaches inevitably hindered the development of the social sector and the integrity of the socio-economic progress in the region.

The policy of the centre dictating where to deploy productive resources exacerbated the contradictions between institutional and local interests, wasted environmental resources, and damaged the ecological balance on a significant part of Tatarstan. This narrow-minded expansion resulted in one-sided and non-integrated social development. To mitigate these effects, the economy had to be fundamentally restructured, which brought about the revolutionary processes that led to the collapse of the Soviet model of economic modernization.
CHAPTER 9
Spiritual and Cultural Processes in the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic from the 1940s to the middle of the 1980s

§ 1. Ideology and Culture of the Tatars from the latter half of the 1940s to the middle of the 1980s

Alfiya Gallyamova

The ideological orthodoxy of the post-war years was most intensely reflected in the humanities, literature and art. The authorities tried to impose a strict framework of official dogmas on, primarily, the scientific and artistic intelligentsia, who constantly felt as if they were being presumed guilty.

Among historians, the Bulgarian theory of the origin of the Tatars prevailed. All progressive aspects of the Tatars' history had to be related exclusively to the role of the Russian people and the Russian state. All issues related to the period of the strong Tatar state and connected with the Islamic East had to be suppressed or interpreted negatively. For example, instead of the Kazan Khanate being "conquered" by Russia, it was "incorporated" into it, which certainly had "progressive" significance for the Tatars.

The first major public event in light of the August resolution was held in September 1944, when there was a meeting of the most active party members of the Republic. The Tatar Scientific and Research Institute of Language, Literature and History, a center of Tatar humanities, immediately was subjected to a powerful ideological attack. In October 1944, the Bureau of the Tatar Regional Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union adopted a resolution "on errors and shortcomings in the work of the Tatar Scientific and Research Institute of Language, Literature and History" that quoted the main provisions of the August resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU(B). The institute was accused of making serious ethnic-related mistakes in elucidating the history, literature and art of the Tatars [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 5, File 1143, Sheets 51–55]. The works in which serious mistakes were made in explaining the history of the Golden Horde included the 'Prospect of Periodization of History' and the 'History of Literature' by B. Yafarov and the 'Prospect of Periodization of the History of Literature' by Kh. Khismatullin and Ya. Agishev [Ibid.].

The authorities criticized the article by Naka Isanbet called ‘500 Years of the Tatar Folk Epic—Dastan “Edigii,”’ published in 1940 in 'Soviet Edebiyaty' (No. 11–12) [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 5, File 1154, Sheets 30–31] in a resolution of the Regional Committee of the CPSU(B) dated 28 November 1944 titled ‘On the Erroneous Article by N. Isanbet’.

At a plenary session of the Regional Committee of the CPSU(B) in February 1945, First Secretary Z. Muratov and Secretary of Ideology Malov once again confirmed the official guidelines that were compulsory for all people studying or writing about Tatar history. They essentially consisted of emphasizing the positive aspects of the joint struggle of the Russian, Tatar and other peoples of the country against foreign invaders, tsarism, and the oppression of landowners and capitalists; the socialist transformation of Tataria and the popularization of Tatar revolutionaries [Tagirov, 1999, pp. 335–336]. Although two years earlier in June 1944, shortly before the August resolution, it had been considered one of the achievements of Tatar culture [Kul’turnoe stroitel’stvo v Ta-
The decisions show that an objective examination of Tatar history had been rejected. They didn’t limit themselves to just ‘eliminating the mistakes’ of historians and philologists. Stuff changes were made as well. M. Gaynullin was appointed as the new director, replacing Kh. Yarmukhametov, and some heads of departments were dismissed. In 1946, a scientific session dedicated to the ethnogenesis of the Tatars was held in Moscow. Despite the fact that many frank, well-grounded statements were made in the course of the discussion that seriously questioned the Bulgarian hypothesis, it was established in historical science [Galiullina, 2004, p. 26]. In 1949, a collection of articles called ‘Origin of the Kazan Tatars’ of the history department of the Institute of Language, Literature and History, was subjected to ideological criticism. Its authors, well-known historians B. Grekov, A. Smirnov, N. Kalinin, and E. Chernyshev, were accused of insufficient commitment to Marxist-Leninist ideology, of the objectivist approach to studying history, of overestimating the impact of the Muslim East and underestimating the influence of Rus’ on the Tatar ethnogenesis’ [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 30, File 6, Sheet 229].

However, Tatar humanists resisted the attempt to build Tatar history in accordance with the ‘pattern’ proposed by officialdom. This is evidenced by a debate between Khayri Gima-di and Magamet Safargaliev that unfolded in 1951 on the pages of ‘Voprosy Istorii’ (‘Histori- cal Issues’) regarding the origin and ethnogenesis of the Tatar people. First M. Safargaliev published an article in which he expressed his disagreement with the Bulgarian theory of the Tatar origin, believing that the ethnogenesis of the Kazan Tatars was affected by many Turkic tribes, not just Bulgars. In this regard, he criti- cized volume I of the first collective summarizing work, ‘The History of the Tatar Autono- mous Soviet Socialist Republic from Ancient Times to the Great October Socialist Revolution’, which was being prepared for publication [Safargaliev, 1951, pp. 74–80].

Literary scholars were also undergoing intense criticism at that time. An outline of the history of Tatar literature compiled at the end of the 1940s was criticized for insufficiently discussing the impact of Russian revolution- ary-democratic literature, failing to show the struggle between the two directions of liter- ature in a class society, and overestimating Sufi literature. Research done by G. Kashshaf, in which he studied Derdmend’s works, was called a blatant error only because Derdmend was a gold industry entrepreneur [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 30, File 6, Sheet 287].

Scientists working in the Institute of Lan- guage, Literature and History were accused of being ‘isolated, detached from real life and the urgent tasks of the Soviet study of literature’ [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 30, File 6, Sheet 284]. This accusation was based on the fact that no literary expert wanted to participate in the incrimination campaigns inspired from above or to publish articles criticizing cosmopolitism. The Institute was also seriously reproached for the fact that none of the philologists chose a topic for his/her dissertation related to the Soviet period. Indeed, researchers did not want to take on the politics-ridden themes of Soviet literature, because the slight- est failure to observe the Communist ‘recipe’ would be strictly criticized. F. Khusni, L. Zayyay, and F. Musagit, who were trying to critically interpret the works of contemporary Tatar writers, were rebuked for denigrating the value of their works.

The general course towards tightening par- ty control over the spiritual life of the country also directly influenced literature itself. In July 1945, K. Nadzhami, secretary of the Writers Union of the Tatar ASSR, established a rigid ideological framework in a report in which he repeated the party’s guidelines on how the history of the Golden Horde was to be interpreted and how to approach the Edigü epic. Nadzhami urged writers to focus their efforts on creating ‘highly artistic literary works revealing the high moral character of the heroes of our time, displaying the great victory of the Soviet people, depicting the life of the Tatar people during the period of socialist transformation of Tatarstan under Soviet power’ [Istoriya Kazani, 2004, pp. 440–441].
On 1947 August 1947, an article was published by S. Bakhtiyarow, a staff correspondent for Pravda who covered the Tatar ASSR, entitled ‘Serious Shortcomings in the Work with Writers of Tatarstan’ that reported on the dismissal of the editorial staff of ‘Sovet Edebiyaty’ for publishing a collection of poems by Sh. Mannur called ‘Telega Dergachey’ (‘A Wagon of Landrails’). It was labeled as libel against the Soviet reality, as were all of Mannur’s works in the article. Bakhtiyarow summed up his speech by criticizing the ‘permissive’ attitude of the leadership of the Republic’s Writers Union.

After such an article was published in a major newspaper there was a series of meetings of the Tatar regional committee, Kazan city committee, and Bauman district committee of the CPSU(B) at which decisions were made with the idea that no work should escape the attention of ‘sound criticism’ [Nikiforov, 1984, p. 153]. They demanded cultural leaders glorify the paths of recovery, portray the best features and qualities of the Soviet man and the positive aspects of the socialist system, and at the same time deprived them of the right to expose the real vices of the society. For example, a fable by A. Iskhak called ‘Dyra’ ("Hole") was criticized for very correctly noting the criteria for social success: be quiet, don't hurt anybody, and nobody will hurt you’ [RGASPI, Fund 17, Inventory 8, File 778, Sheet 43]. At the end of the 1940s, ideological critics attacked a libretto of the opera ‘Altynechech’ by N. Zhiganov, the comedy ‘Khodja Nasrutdin’, the drama ‘Raykhan’ by N. Isambet, the poem ‘Eaglet’ by A. Erikeev, as well as many stories by A. Enikeev, S. Battal (‘Along Stolbovaya Road’), F. Khusni (‘A Pedestrian’s Path’), M. Amir, and Sh. Mannur [RGASPI, Fund 17, Inventory 8, File 778, Sheet 43]. Rigid guidelines were imposed on the repertoire of theatres, which were forced to stage modern plays that faithfully reflected the life and struggle of the Soviet people. About two dozen plays of theatres in the capital were prohibited for violating the party’s guidelines [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 30, File 6, Sheet 287].

Textbooks were also reviewed in terms of ideology. A Tatar literature anthology for the eighth form of secondary school was sharply criticized twice (in September 1948 and in January 1952). The authors were accused of being ‘enthralled by bourgeois objectivism’, of including ‘harmful works’ in the anthology, of insufficient emphasis on the impact of Russian literature on Tatar literature, of incorrectly assessing Jadidism and the role of Islam, and of idealizing the ‘religious and mystical legacy’ of M. Koly and G. Utyz Imyani. The harmful works included some by G. Kandaly and F. Khalidi. In the resolution of the regional committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union ‘on errors in the textbook on literature for the eighth form of Tatar secondary schools’, Jadidism was presented as a bourgeois-nationalist movement trying to separate the Tatar people from Russia. The final result of this campaign was that the names and works of people who are the pride of Tatar literature were disgraced.

Unable to stand up to the ideological pressure, cultural leaders ceased to write and create, for which they also got a ‘scolding’ from the party authorities. In 1948, A. Iskhak, M. Maksudov, and A. Shamov, who were well-known for their satirical works, were subjected to so-called ‘party criticism’ for a lack of ‘new things’.

Party assessments, which determined the fate of the textbook and those who had written and published it, became more and more severe from one office to another, just like the organizational efforts. On 11 July 1948 'Kultura I Zhizn' (‘Culture and Life’) newspaper published an article by P. Klimov entitled ‘Good Textbooks for Schools!’ that contained critical comments regarding a number of textbooks of central and local publishing houses. The most serious claims were directed against a Tatar lit-

\[ \text{Lists of titles of prohibited performances in 1946–1949} \]
erature anthology that allegedly included ‘de-
liberately erroneous and harmful works’. Its
main points were included in a resolution ad-
opted on 2 September 1948. After the January
resolution, B. Yafarov, one of the authors, was
expelled from the CPSU(B), and M. Gaynulin,
the director of the institute, was reprimanded.
L. Zalyay, G. Kashshaf, and G. Khalit were re-
proached for incorrectly interpreting issues in
Tatar literature, particularly for their positive
assessment of Jadidism.

Ideologically verified guidelines for as-
sessing Tatar social ideas were identified in a
collection of articles about Qayum Nasyri pub-
lished by the staff of the Institute of Language,
Literature, and History in 1948. In it, Q. Nasyri
was characterized as a major Tatar educator,
and G. Tukay presented as a folk democratic
poet. Thus, the positive interpretation of en-
lightenment and the democratic nature of cul-
tural leaders from poor classes of the pre-rev-
olutionary society were officially approved, as
opposed to Jadidism and outstanding personali-
ties from the upper classes. In other words,
the main criterion used to assess the pre-revo-
lutionary culture was to be the class approach.

Under these circumstances, the Tatar intelli-
gentsia, who did not want ‘to dance to the ideo-
logical tune’, often resorted to so-called ‘inter-
nal emigration’. For example, this is evidenced
by a letter from S. Mokshin, a correspondent
from ‘Sovetskaya Rossia’ (‘Soviet Russia’) new-
paper for the Tatar ASSR, to P. Erofeev,
the editor in chief of this newspaper. He writes:
‘After the well-known resolution of the Central
Committee regarding the Tatar party organiza-
tion, the newspapers of the republic swung to
the other extreme and stopped talking about
the Edigu epic and Jadidism at all, and stopped
waging the ideological struggle against bour-
geois ethnic prejudices. This led to a situation
where these issues were discussed behind the
scenes in narrow circles but nothing was pub-
lished about these issues at all. Newspapers
have not recently been publishing any articles
devoted to promoting the success of the Lenin-
ist national policy or the friendship of the So-
viet peoples. And if such articles appear from
time to time, they are mostly declarative, they
lack the proper political insight, and are usu-
ally far removed from local life. The ideologi-
cal work in newspapers is defensive rather than
offensive in nature; articles rarely rebuff wrong
views or backward attitudes’ [RGASPI, Fund
556, Inventory 15, File 31, Sheet 14]. This let-
ter clearly demonstrates that the national lit-
ary intelligentsia were opposed to the official
interpretation of the history and culture of the
Tatar people and sabotaged propaganda duties
imposed on them by party authorities.

All branches of knowledge were undergo-
ing intense ideological review in the post-war
period. There were discussions about starting
a ‘pogrom’ in philosophy, biology, linguistics
and political economy in the republic, as well
as throughout the country. In 1947, all scien-
tific and educational institutions held meet-
ings denouncing Klyueva and Roskin, two
Moscow professors, for an attempt to publish
their articles in an American scientific jour-
nal. Despite the fact that the Soviet doctors
had acted officially, having asked permission
to introduce their research to a foreign audi-
cence, the Ministry of Health accused them of
being unpatriotic. The accusatory campaign
unfolding in the country affected Kazan scien-
tists as well. Velikhov and Porfiriev, teach-
ers at the Pedagogical Institute, who, like
their Moscow colleagues, wanted to publish
their work abroad in response to an offer
from the University of California, were ac-
cused of servility to the West. Nikanorov,
a scientific secretary of the Chemistry Institute,
was reprimanded for publishing a note about a
medicine he prepared in the foreign press. It
should be noted that there were scientists in
Kazan who risked their careers by not par-
ticipating in the public ‘thrashing’ of their
colleagues. Thus, Arbuzov and Miropsky
openly declared that they did not consider it
a mistake and even welcomed the desire of
the scientists to maintain scientific contacts
with foreign colleagues [RGASPI, Fund 17,
Inventory 122, File 277, Sheets 3–10].

In 1948–1950, the Tatar Regional Commiss-
tee of the CPSU(B) made a number of deci-
sions against scientists whose work did not
fit in the ideological template. During this
period they denounced the activities of scientists and lawyers from Kazan State University and the animal breeding station of the Tatar Scientific and Research Institute of Agriculture, as well as teachers at the Financial and Economic Institute. The experimental animal breeding station was accused of a low level of research in an article written by Lebedev, a station employee, entitled ‘Study of the State of Cherkassy Sheep in the Conditions of the Tatar ASSR’. The article compared two groups of sheep — those raised collectively and privately — and all the indicators studied were worse for the collective herd, so the study was declared anti-scientific. Elia, a staff scientist and associate professor of the Institute of Language, Literature, and History, was criticized for discrediting the collective farm system, as he was a leader of a folklore expedition that collected ‘anti-Soviet, anti-collective farm chastushki’, as was noted in the party document [RGASPI, Fund 17, Inventory 122, File 277, Sheet 10]. From the authorities’ point of view, the scientist should have filtered the oral folk arts, not recording the peasants’ negative attitude towards Soviet reality.

In 1949, the ‘Proceedings of the Law Institute’ were taken off the market for a number of ‘blatant theoretical errors and political distortions’. Specific claims were made against Levshin and Malenkov because in their joint article, they provided data on the marked decrease in ‘speculators among private farmers’ and the insignificant decrease in speculators among collective farmers and civil servants. An article by Akhmedov, a senior teacher, entitled ‘Essays on Constitutional Turkish History’ from the same collection of articles was called vicious and harmful, because the author characterized the Turkish state system as democratic, emphasizing the great role of Kemal Pasha and Yalcin the journalist in its establishment. The Regional Committee of the CPSU(B) negatively assessed a collection of works of the Kazan Financial and Economic Institute (Ed. 8, 1948) for its ‘non-political nature and low ideological level’. This time, Saks, an institute employee, was accused for failing to criticize bourgeois economists for the tax policies of capitalist states. As noted in party documents, Saks ‘actually promotes the tax theory of bourgeois economists under the guise of polemics with them’ [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 30, File 6, Sheet 122].

During the Khrushchev Thaw, the creative intelligentsia tried to take full advantage of the opportunities brought about by the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to revive and further develop Tatar culture. In May 1956, a meeting of the Board of the Writers’ Union discussed the most acute problems in Tatar literature. Having expressed concern that the Tatar Book House had lost its reputation as a national publishing house in recent years, writers substantially revised the publication plan to increase the number of Tatar literary works published [Ibid., Inventory 38, File 473, Sheet 38]. During the discussion, A. Shamov, the secretary of the Writers Union, noted that 60,000 copies of ‘Neotoslaniye Pisma’ (Unsent Letters) by Adel Kutuy had been published in the Uzbek Republic. Shamov noted, ‘We have never had an opportunity to publish such a large number of a work of any of our Tatar writers’ [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 41, File 120, Sheet 85].

Writers made persistent attempts to start publishing a literary illustrated magazine for young people in Kazan at this time [Ibid., s. 94]. The reason it had not been published was directly related to the status of the Tatar Republic (which was an autonomous republic, but not a union republic). The national intelligentsia believed this was also the reason that the republic’s writers received lower salaries than those in the union republics, and raised the issue of changing this situation. Thus, Sibgat Khakim, the deputy chairman of the Writers Union of the Tatar ASSR, requested the Tatar Regional Committee of the CPSU eliminate the unjustified infringement of local writers’ rights. ‘The fee paid for literary works published in autonomous republics,’ he wrote, ‘is 25% lower than that in union republics, and 50% lower for dramatic works’ [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 37, File 378, Sheet 53].
The Tatar intelligentsia began to more actively push for improvements in the conditions for developing the national culture after a ten-day Tatar literature and art festival was held successfully in Moscow in 1957. It was a real triumph of Tatar art that demonstrated not only the great skill of the republic’s creative minds, but also its popularity among broad layers of the population. During this festival, the M. Dzhalil Tatar State Opera and Ballet Theatre, Kazan Russian Bolshoi Drama Theatre and the G. Kamal Tatar Academic Theatre staged their best performances. More than 700 works of Tatar visual arts were exhibited in the halls of the Academy of Arts of the USSR.

Inspired by the positive feedback from the festival, G. Bashirov, the chairman of the board of the Writers Union, raised a number of issues for the Tatar Regional Committee of the CPSU to consider: restarting publication of Tatar periodicals that had been issued before the war — the monthly literary and art magazine for young people and the pioneer newspaper, transforming ‘Literaturny Tatarstan’ (‘Literary Tatarstan’) almanac published in Russian into a magazine, and increasing staff and salaries for ‘Sovet Edebiyat’ magazine [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 38, File 473, Sheets 94–95].

In the same period, an article by G. Bashirov was published on the pages of a republic newspaper in which he spoke out against the law forbidding Tatars to give their children Russian names, apparently seeing it as an expression of the Tatar people’s inferiority complex [RGASPI, Fund 556, Inventory 15, File 31, Sheet 11].

Protesting against art being used as a political instrument, he spoke out publicly against the party control over the artists, and was harshly criticized by the authorities: ‘Art dies when it is forced’ [Ibid., s. 162].

The attempt to disavow some assessments of the history and cultural heritage of the Tatar people that began with the August Resolution (1944) of the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) was continued in January 1958 at a meeting of workers of the Tatar Regional Committee of the CPSU with representatives of the creative intelligentsia. S. Battal spoke out against looking at the epic ‘Edigii’ as feudalistic, considering it national. Sh. Mannur supported him on this issue. A. Fayzi called for taking a new look at Jadidism: ‘They created a bete noire from the word "Jadidism", suppress it in every way possible, and want to associate it with Pan-Turkism. But this is a scientific and educational people’s movement! Half of those sitting here came from a madrasah. However, it's true that some counterrevolutionaries joined this movement, and because of that the whole movement became counterrevolutionary’ [RGASPI, Fund 556, Inventory 15, File 31, Sheets 10–11].

It is worth noting that the cultural leaders that were present didn't object to all the issues raised. In fact, only government authorities such as S. Ignatyev, S. Batyev, and K. Faseev debated with the speakers. Thus, society in the republic was influenced by the increased liberalization course and persistently raised issues of democratic reforms in the socio-political and socio-cultural life of the republic.

A new twist in the development of national culture was in 1960 when a short ‘thaw’ was again followed by a ‘political frost’. In October 1960, the Plenum of the Tatar Regional Committee found that ‘Spring Awakening’ by G. Minsky, ‘Torments of Love’ by Sh. Khusainov, ‘Burning’ by Kh. Kamalov, and ‘Native Land and Soldiers’ by R. Latypov were ideologically and artistically depraved. To inspire writers to create works with ‘socialist content’ on contemporary topics, the writers were bound to industrial enterprises.

Tatar theatre and drama, which had been called the most backward genre of Tatar literature, underwent a new ideological review in 1960 [SA HPD TR, Fund 19, Inventory 45, File 120, Sheets 84–85]. In the specially adopted resolution of the Bureau ‘On the Regional Committee of the CPSU on the Performance of the Kamal Tatar State Theatre’, it was criticized for ‘failing to stage even a single play over the last few years which would raise the fundamental issues of the present times, for including ideologically and artistically weak performances in its repertoire, for its desire to please the outdated tastes of some spectators, for tending towards melodrama
and routine’ [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 41, File 69, Sheet 110].

The effectiveness of the authorities’ control over the intelligentsia can be evaluated on the basis of information provided by the chairman of the Committee for State Security (KGB) in 1960. He reported: ‘Of those assigned to production enterprises, R. Ishmuratov (the compressor plant), S. Battal (plant No. 16) and G. Khuzi (the chemical plant), and others have not written a single line so far’ [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 41, File 21, Sheet 5]. The artist I. Zaripov remembered the unique way he had handled his assigned business trip to the oil region. ‘I’m working on an order, but my soul wants something different’, he said. To satisfy his own longings, he first painted a picture of a ‘handsome guy in a cozy house’ and then decided to call the painting ‘Oil Industry Worker, Akhat Aby’. ‘Sure it’s about oil,’ the artist thought, ‘it’s not like he needs to be covered with oil’ [Zvezda Povolzhya, 2009, No. 47].

Humanities scholars who studied the pre-revolutionary era found themselves under strict ideological supervision. One of the documents from the Committee for State Security (KGB) (1960) specifies the exact number and gives a list of works studied by students of the faculty of history and philology (KSU) while preparing their theses. ‘Reading such literature negatively affects the scientific and political views the students will form since they are insufficiently politically prepared’, the certificate stated [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 41, File 21, Sheets 100–102]. The list of students included the names of currently well-known scientists of the republic such as R. Nafigov, A. Karimullin, and Kh. Kurbatov [Istoriya Kazan, 2004, pp. 660–662].

In 1963, an article by R. Mustafin entitled ‘Thoughts on Literary Criticism’ was withdrawn from publication in ‘Soviet Edebiyat’ for positively describing Jadism, which was still officially a pre-revolutionary movement of the Tatar bourgeois intelligentsia at that time [SA RF, Fund P–9425, inv. 1, f. 1131, s. 211].

Official guidelines to depreciate the national in favour of the international could not suppress the Tatars’ interest in their culture and history. This was evidenced by numerous letters and appeals to the governing bodies and mass media.

S. Rakhimov, a resident of the village of Bavly, sent a letter full of resentment against Kazan TV to the Tatar Regional Committee of the CPSU. ‘We TV viewers,’ he writes, ‘cannot say for sure if there is a Tatar television studio, because we do not see its work...’ [SA RF, Fund P–9425, inv. 7, f. 644, s. 22].

G. Shirgazin from Kazan wrote to ‘Sovetskaya Tataria’: ‘I’m 22 years old. I love the culture of my people. Why aren’t there any films made in the Tatar language?’ A. Sabirov from Nabereznyet Chelny indicated with reproach that ethnic music was doomed to oblivion. ‘Other ethnic groups teach their children to love their music beginning in early childhood’, he noted [SA RF, Fund P–9425, inv. 7, f. 1184, s. 14, 16]. G. Khusniev, a chemical plant employee, requested that the authorities establish a newspaper called ‘Literature and Art’ and a Tatar film studio [SA RF, Fund P–9425, inv. 41, f. 221, s. 12–12 reverse]. In the 1980s, the Regional Committee of the CPSU received a letter from Tagir Idrisov, a student at Kazan Pedagogical Institute (an investigation showed the name had been made up). The letter also mentioned the Tatar TV broadcasts for the Tatar-speaking audience were insufficient [Ibid., Inventory 8, File 1573, Sheet 34].

The failure to appreciate the treasures of the nation’s culture was obvious in the work of institutions created to enrich the spiritual life of the people, which was becoming more and more one-sided. Fewer and fewer works written by local composers were staged at the opera theatre from year to year. While 13 national performances were staged in the period from 1939 to 1950, only 8 were staged from 1951 to 1960, and just 5 from 1961 to 1970. [Komunist Tatar, 1970, No. 8, p. 10]. In 1968, the repertoire of the State Philharmonic Orchestra included 33 Russian and foreign classics, 21 works by composers of union and autonomous republics of the USSR and only 13 works by Tatar composers. By 1969, only 8 works by Ta-
tar composers were left in the repertoire [Ibid.]. The republic radio and television clearly didn’t have enough programmes in the Tatar language as well. In the 1960s, Kazan TV studio broadcast for 1.5 hours per day, which consisted of 43 minutes in Tatar, and 47 minutes in Russian. Tatar radio broadcast daily for 4 hours on average; of which from 2 hours 40 minutes to 2 hours 50 minutes was in Tatar, and from 1 hour 10 minutes to 1 hour 20 minutes was in Russian [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 7, File 640, Sheets 2–3]. Given that Kazan was the sole centre of Tatar radio and television, it is evident that the spiritual needs of the Tatar population were neglected.

The post-war decades were not only a time of spiritual deprivations. Science, education and culture also suffered. The intelligentsia defended by opposing authorities, staying firm in the face of conformism, and resisting ideological imperatives. However, the level of a civilization and progress in a society are mainly defined by those who do not fight, but build, and who ‘sow what is reasonable, right and everlasting’ both during tumultuous times of social transformation and in periods of stability. True intellectuals continued to faithfully teach, heal, write, and study despite the political situation, without changing their beliefs for the sake of their careers, making full use of their professional skills.

Education. At the end of the 1940s, compulsory seven-year education was introduced in the republic, as well as throughout the country. The transition to compulsory eight-year education was begun in 1958. The Tatar Republic reported this transition was complete in 1963. In the mid-1970s, the transition to universal secondary education was completed there, as well as across the whole country. However, according to a document issued by the Department of Statistics of the USSR for 1962, 59,000 children from 7 to 15 years old did not attend schools in the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. The Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was first in the list of regions on the document. There were 2606 children in the Tatar ASSR who did not attend schools; the region was followed by Bashkiria (2,127 people), Saratov oblast (1,749 people) and Dagestan (1,728 people). Moreover, Tatarstan was one of the nine regions in the RSFSR where the number of children who did not attend schools had increased compared to 1961 [Russian State Archive of Contemporary History, Fund 5, Inventory 37, File 104, Sheet 126]. This document shows that the progress of introducing general education in the USSR did not go as smoothly as it was presented in political statements, although its level was significantly increasing.

At the end of the 1950s, the republic, like the country as a whole, started restructuring the education system by combining studying with work for manufacturing companies. From 1959 to 1962, all seven-year schools were transformed into eight-year polytechnic ones. Ten-year schools, which were considered to be cut off from real life, were intensively transformed into polytechnic secondary schools with training in production. In 1960–1961, there were 114 of these schools, and in 1964–1965, there were 279 secondary schools with training in production for 202,600 children [Safronov, 1965, p. 185].

In 1964, it was acknowledged that the concept of polytechnic schools was a mistake, because they had not produced the expected results, and process included much formalism. However, during this period, the school specialisation process led to the establishment of the famous schools No. 18 and No. 39 in Kazan, where classes were taught in English, and school No. 36, where classes were taught in German. Kazan school No. 131 began to prepare mathematicians, programmers, radio physicists and chemical laboratory technicians. Thus, it became possible to use a differentiated approach in teaching school-age children depending on their abilities, at least for some of Kazan’s children. In 1960, a secondary music school opened in the Conservatory with a small boarding school for those who came from the regions.

As for preparing the regular labour force, the biggest bet was placed on vocational schools, the network of which expanded exponentially during this period. While there were 15 such
institutions with 4,800 students in 1941, there were 69 of them with 6,900 students in 1951, and there were 123 technical training colleges in the republic with 58,800 students studying in them in 1986 [70 let TASSR, 1990, p. 163]. At the beginning of the 1980s, 71 colleges all provided secondary education [Shakirov, 1983, p. 83].

The system of tertiary education in the republic was multifaceted and diverse. Rapid industrial development had caused a steep increase in the demand for labour, which was quite easily satisfied by peasants willing to leave villages in search of a better life in the cities. But as production was becoming more complicated, it required not just manual labourers but highly-qualified experts. The rapidly industrialized Tatar Republic experienced an acute shortage of highly-qualified personnel. Thus, in 1960, the Tatar Council of National Economy applied for 1,779 specialists with a higher education, but received only 610 people. In 1961 the situation deteriorated even further. Instead of the requested 1,780 specialists, just 482 people with a higher education came to work for the enterprises in the Tatar Council of National Economy [Russian State Archive of Contemporary History, Fund 5, Inventory 37, File 90, Sheet 79].

Under these conditions, the system of tertiary education became vital in the modernization of the republic. It was established in Tatarstan in the 1930s. In 1935, there were 13 institutes of higher learning (IHL) [Kazan’ na poroge ty’syacheleity, 2004 p. 24]. All of them were located in Kazan. The first IHL outside the capital of the republic appeared in 1939. It was the Elabuga Pedagogical Institute. Immediately after the war in 1945, a European-style conservatory was opened in Kazan, which was the first in all the autonomous republics, and remained the only one for a long time. In 1946, the Kazan Institute for Engineering and Construction, which had been created in the republic before the war, was reopened. Due to the development of energy-intensive production in Tatarstan, a branch of the Moscow Energy Institute was opened there in 1968. At this time, branches of the N. Krupskaya Leningrad Institute of Culture and the Volgograd Institute of Physical Culture were also established in the capital of the republic. By the beginning of the 1980s, there were 13 institutions of higher education in the Tatar ASSR [70 let TASSR, 1990, p. 225]. Since some IHLs merged, the new institutions did not increase the total number. The majority of institutions were still located in the capital of the republic.

Although the number of IHLs did not rise, this doesn't mean their quality stagnated. The existing IHLs underwent considerable changes and opened new faculties, expanding their educational opportunities. The creation of an architecture department at Kazan Institute for Engineering and Construction in 1969 was one of the major events of this kind. It is associated with the establishment of the Kazan school of architecture, which was important not only for the republic, but for the whole Volga region. The authorities of the republic persistently sought opportunities to prepare architects at Kazan Institution of Civil Engineering, as Tatarstan had the fewest number of architects in the mid-1960s as compared with the rest of the country: only four specialists per 1 million people. Architect teams at design institutes had only 1–10% of the staff they needed, and among 35 regional and 8 city architects, not a single one was a qualified specialist [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 7, File 76, Sheet 142].

After large oil fields were discovered and the oil industry was developed in the republic, there was a steep rise in demand for specialists in oil geology and geodesic methods of mineral exploration, as well as in development and operation of oil fields. They began to prepare such experts at Kazan State University and Kazan Institute of Chemical Technology. In 1956, teaching and consultation centers of I. Gubkin Moscow Petroleum Institute were established in Almetyevesk and Leninogorsk, and evening departments of Oktyabrsky Oil College of Bashkir ASSR were created there [Shamsheev, 1972, p. 154]. Due to the growing needs of the aviation, instrument-making and machine-building industries, the number of fields of
study was increased at the physics, chemistry, mechanics and mathematics departments of Kazan State University. The Aviation Institute began to prepare specialists in jet engines, radar, and other fields. In 1980, Kama Polytechnic Institute was opened in Naberezhnye Chelny, which prepared specialists for KamAZ. IHLs preparing specialists in modernized agriculture also expanded their capabilities. Kazan started preparing land reclamation experts, animal technicians, and other specialists.

Some growth was observed in the humanities as well. At Kazan State University, departments of Tatar language and literature and logic and psychology were added to the departments of history and Russian philology; the faculty of law was restored, etc. Elabuga Pedagogical Institute started to prepare teachers of foreign languages.

In accordance with the expansion of education opportunities, the number of students in the republic increased as well. From 1952 to 1962, the student population increased from 17,000 to 40,000, that is, by 2.5 times [Russian State Archive of Contemporary History, Fund 5, Inventory 37, File 102, Sheet 29]. The highest growth was observed in technical IHLs: Kazan Aviation Institute grew 8-fold (from 1,200 to 9,600 students), Kazan Chemical Engineering Institute grew 5-fold, and other IHLs grew 2- to 3-fold [Ibid., Fund 5, Inventory 37, File 102, Sheet 29].

As E. Bogachyov wrote in his book, ‘Kazan Aircraft Institute was in good favour at that time. Young people were trying to get into aviation, closer to the cosmos. Cybernetics was rehabilitated’ [Bogachyov, 2001, p. 43]. The number of students in Kazan was greater than in all of Turkey. The Tatar Republic also exceeded the most developed countries of Europe. In 1958, the following number of students studied per 10,000 residents: Federal Republic of Germany — 24, France — 34, Tatar ASSR — 113. Almost one-third of all students in the republic were Tatars. Many Tatar students studied at IHLs in Moscow and Leningrad [Abramov, 1960, p. 84].

The network of specialized secondary schools didn’t grow at a uniform rate. It shrank considerably during the war: from 53 in 1940–1941 to 43 in 1945–1946. By 1960, the number of technical secondary schools had dropped to 35, but it grew steadily since 1960 and reached 62 in 1985–1986 [50 years of the Tatar ASSR, 1970, p. 159; 70 let TASSR, 1990, p. 225].

There is an opinion that young people had a ‘thirst for knowledge’ in the 1940–1960s. Of course, this cannot be denied, but it should also not be exaggerated, characterising it as a mass craving for knowledge, which is not quite correct. Of course, higher education helped set the parameters for status in the Soviet Union. A graduate was guaranteed a place in the social hierarchy and a certain amount of public recognition [Nugayev and Nugayev, 1997, p. 67]. However, not everyone was tempted by a career, many people in the 1960s wanted to receive good training and achieve financial well-being. For example, as was shown in a review of the Central Committee of the CPSU in 1961, some enterprises sent their employees to institutes against their will, and these employees asked the examiners to give them low marks. In 1960, 50 employees did not pass entrance examinations for the Aviation Institute due to such tricks [Russian State Archive of Contemporary History, Fund 5, Inventory 37, File 102, Sheet 79]. However, the outright pragmatism that characterised some Soviet students did not mean that the image of Soviet students as advanced, courageous and romantic youth that was created in the public consciousness was not true. The students were diverse and did not fit into ideologically defined parameters.

By the end of the 1980s, around 11,000 students graduated from TASSR institutions of higher education annually, and more than 17,000 students from specialised secondary schools. By that time, there were 30 graduates from IHLs and 48 graduates from specialized secondary schools per each 10,000 living in the republic [70 let TASSR, 1990, p. 229].

As to the ethnic dimension, it should be noted that the Tatars excelled the Russians in terms of growth in the number of young people studying in IHLs and technical schools. While in the 1960–1961 academic year, 57.8% of the students at IHLs were Russian and 31.2% were
Tatar, in 25 years the figures were 44.5% and 44.7%, respectively. The same situation was observed in technical schools [70 let TASSR, 1990, p. 226]. The growth in the number of students led to a general increase in the education level of the population. By 1979, it had grown by 8 times. While in 1939, there were 100 people with higher or specialized secondary education per 1,000 workers, in 1979 there were 815 of them. This figure increased by 6.5 times throughout the whole Russian Federation: from 124 up to 803 people [Narxoz RFSR, 1986, 14; 70 let TASSR, 1990, p. 10]

Science. In the middle of the 20th century, the level of science development in Tatarstan was high. The rapid development of industry in the republic contributed to the increase in the number of scientific institutions with missions to ensure scientific and technical progress was made in high-priority branches of the national economy. In 1945, the Kazan branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences was opened. In 1950–1960, the Kazan branch of the S. Vavilov Leningrad Optical Institute; the Kazan branch of the Moscow Scientific and Research Institute of Technology and Production Organization; the Scientific, Research and Design Institute for the Introduction of Computing Technologies in the National Economy; the All-Union Research Institute of Raw Hydrocarbons; a branch of the All-Union Research Institute of Synthetic Rubber; and the Research and Design Institute of Vacuum Engineering were all established. The Kazan Veterinary Institute was reorganized into a research IHL.

Over the 1940–1980s, there was colossal growth in the number of scientific and scientific-pedagogical staff. In 1965, about 3,700 academic researchers worked in 51 scientific and research institutions of the republic [Resheniya parti, 1968, p. 293]. The percentage of Tatars working in intellectual fields of industry grew steadily. In 1951–1965, the number of scientific intelligentsia in the Soviet Union rose by 38%, and by 65% among the Tatars [Izmaylova, 1980, p. 188]. By the early 1980s, there were over 9,600 Tatar scientific intelligentsia in the republic. Each fourth doctor of philosophy, each third candidate of sciences (equivalent to Ph.D.), as well as each third post-graduate student in the republic was Tatar.

Kazan schools were known worldwide in many fields of natural sciences. E. Zavoysky made his discovery of global importance in Kazan. He discovered electronic paramagnetic resonance. B. Kozyrev and S. Altshuler made considerable contributions to this research. One of the largest centers for studying higher algebra was formed under the leadership of N. Chebotaryov, and a center for studying electrochemical processes was formed under S. Kochergin. N. Chebotaryov’s research was awarded a state prize. V. Morozov and I. Ado studied in his school. The discovery of a large oil field in the republic served as an impetus for developing geology in the capital. L. Miropolsky, E. Tikhvinskaya, V. Polyanin, M. Kaveev, B. Yusupov and other scientists conducted research of subsoil, the geological history and oil-bearing capacity of the Volga-Kama region. B. Laptev, N. Chetayev, Yu. Odinokov, M. Nuzhin, Kh. Mushtari and A. Petrov worked fruitfully in geometry and mechanics; B. Gagaev and G. Salekhov studied mathematics; A. Dubyago, D. Martynov, and I. Dukov were astronomers; G. Kamay was a chemist; and I. Validov and N. Livanov were biologists. Fundamental scientific problems were studied by professors V. Alemasov, K. Valiev, M. Zarirov, P. Kirpichnikov, A. Konovalov, A. Norden, K. Salikhov, I. Tarchevsky, I. Teregulov, G. Tumashev, I. Khaybullin, etc. The work of Kazan scientists in the field of chemistry enjoyed universal recognition. In 1978, the academic B. Arbuzov and the corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences A. Pudovik were awarded the Lenin Prize in the field of science and technology.

Although the authorities had a cautious attitude to their work, Tatar humanities scholars did not stop studying the ethnogenesis and ethnic development of the Tatars, accumulating valuable materials to reconstruct an authentic picture of the Tatars' past. Kazan Institute of Language, Literature and History, which was a branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences,
played the main role in studying Tatar history and culture. Of course, its resources were much more limited in comparison with those of the Academy of Sciences of the Union republics. In this regard, the resources of Kazan State University were also limited. They did not even have a department of Tatar history, but a branch of Tatar language and literature was opened in the faculty of history and philology in 1944.

In this period, Tatar folklorists’ efforts resulted in the creation of 12 volumes of ‘Tatar Folk Art’, which is a treasury of the oral legends of the people. Tatar linguists published a Glossary of the Tatar Language in 3 volumes. In 1969, F. Valeev, who was the only Doctor of Philosophy in art history in Tatarstan and the whole Volga region, published a book called the ‘Ornamentation of the Kazan TatArs’, which became a significant event in Tatar art history. A number of historical works were published by M. Abdurakhmanov, Z. Gilmanov, I. Ermoelaev, A. Litvin, N. Mukharyamov, Yu. Smykov, I. Tagirov, M. Usmanov, A. Shofman, and others. The history of Tatar social thought was developed by Ya. Abdullin, F. Gazizullin, and R. Nafigov. Archaeologists such as P. Starostin, E. Kazakov, R. Fakhrutdinov, and A. Khalikov conducted archaeological research; N. Zorin and E. Busygin researched ethnography.

Kazan was the center of Tatar linguistics. Recognized scientists in the field of Tatar linguistics such as Kh. Usmanov, D. Tumasheva, M. Zakiev, G. Sattarov, L. Zalyay, and F. Safiullina worked there. The Department of Tatar language was a major scientific center for Turkic-speaking republics. Experts from Turkmenistan, Yakutia, Chuvashia, Bashkortostan, Tuva, Karachay-Cherkessia, and Dagestan did additional training there. In 1961, the Tatar branch of the Research Institute of national schools of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences of the RSFSR was created there.

**Literature and Art.** The content of the works of art and literature created during the post-war period were greatly influenced by the conditions under which the activities of the creative intelligentsia were strictly regulated. The main themes of this period were the difficult pre-revolutionary past of the people, wartime heroics and the construction of socialism. But, as the ‘children’ of their time, the best works also embodied universal values. The books of K. Nadzhmi, G. Bashirov, A. Absalyamov, A. Eniki, the music of N. Zhiganov, S. Saydashev, M. Muzafarov, D. Fayzi, A. Klyucharev, and the paintings of Kh. Yakupov, L. Fattakhov and K. Maksimov all currently occupy a rightful place in the nation's cultural treasury. In 1951 the highest prize — the State (Stalin) Prize of the USSR — was awarded to G. Bashirov for his novel ‘Honour’ and K. Nadzhmi for his novel ‘Spring Winds’. The opening of the museum apartment of Sh. Kamal, the classic of Tatar literature, in January 1950 was a notable event in the cultural life of the post-war period.

Creative activity received a new impetus after the 20th Congress of the CPSU of the Soviet Union, which served as a forum for the disclosure of Stalin’s crimes. This was evidenced by the works of S. Khakim, S. Battal, Sh. Mudarris, and a number of other poets. Tatar prose writers addressed the problems of a person's moral and spiritual identity, and the struggle between the new and the old. For example, this eternal theme was reflected in novel about student life ‘So what do you think?’ by N. Fattakh, novel about oil workers ‘Treasure’ by G. Akhunov, and the collection of short stories by Sh. Mannur ‘A New Song is Sung’. The preparation by G. Bashirov of the collection of Tatar folklore tales ‘A Thousand and One Mezeiks’ was a clear sign that the ideological climate was warming up. In a tribute to the time, A. Rasikh, A. Eriki, Z. Nuri, M. Amir, N. Isanbet and R. Ishmurat attempted to recreate an authentic image of their contemporaries.

New generations of Tatar composers embarked on their creative activities during the period of the ‘thaw’. Wonderful songs and romances were created by R. Yakhin. E. Bakirov wrote the ballet ‘The Golden Comb’ and the musical comedy ‘Melody of the Button Accordion’ were written by E. Bakirov; the opera ‘Samat’ was written by Kh. Valiullin, and a symphony and a symphonic poem were created by A. Valiullin. Music written by N.
Zhiganov, A. Leman, and M. Muzaffiarov was hugely popular.

The Theatre School, opened at the beginning of the 1960s, occupied a prominent place in the cultural life of the republic. Performances staged by the G. Kamal Tatar State Academic Theatre were invariably played to a full house. The theatre owed its popularity to the performance of actors such as Kh. Abyzhalilov, G. Bulatova, F. Kufarova, A. Khayrullina, G. Shamarin, and F. Khabibullin and others. In 1957 the Tatar Theatre was awarded the Order of Lenin. In the same year the title of the People's Artist of the USSR was awarded to the composer N. Zhiganov, and the actors Kh. Abyzhalilov and E. Zhilina, who worked at the Kachalov Kazan Drama Theatre, which enjoyed immense popularity among the Russian-speaking audience. Hundreds of people became acquainted with the finest samples of classical music, attending performances staged by the M. Dzhailil Opera and Ballet Theatre. The works of Tatar composers occupied a prominent place in the Theatre’s repertoire: the opera ‘Dzhailil’ by N. Zhiganov, the ballets ‘Raushan’ by Z. Khabibullin and ‘Kisekbash’ by R. Gubaidullin. The orchestra of Oleg Lundstrom, a variety conductor and composer of symphonies and jazz compositions, has been performing in Kazan since 1956.

In the 1950–1960 large monumental sculptures appeared in Kazan. During this period a monument to G. Tikay was erected by S. Akhun, L. Kerbel and L. Pissarevsky. A great contribution to Kazan architecture was made by I. Gaynutdinov. His most famous of his projects include the M. Dzhailil Opera and Ballet Theatre and the building of the river boat station. The first project successfully combines the principles of the classics and Tatar ornamental decor. The second one embodies the search for new architectural solutions reflecting the current level of construction technologies. A. Bikchentayev was another outstanding architect, who made a significant contribution to the Kazan architecture of the 1940–1980. He was the creator of many major projects of public and residential buildings located mainly in the central part of the capital of Tatarstan. They include the chemistry building of the Kazan State University, residential houses on Liberty Square and on Teatralnaya and S. Khalturin Streets.

Industry was a central theme in the work of artists. Oil motifs were embodied in the paintings ‘Oil Explorers’ and ‘We’ve Struck Oil’ by A. Burlay. The modern city was depicted in the paintings of N. Kuznetsov. The opening of the State Museum of Visual Arts in the style of an art gallery in 1959 was an important milestone in the cultural life. As was noted above, in 1958 the Tikay Prize was established, which was awarded for outstanding achievements in the field of artistic culture. F. Yarullin (for the ballet ‘Shurale’), A. Fayzi (for the novel ‘Tikay’), director Sh. Sarymsakov, artist T. Tumashev, actors Kh. Abyzhalilov, A. Khayrullina and F. Kufarova, (for the play ‘Without Sails’), artists Kh. Yakupov and L. Fattakhov (for illustrations to the Tatar fairy tales), and director N. Dautov (for the staging of the operas ‘Alytynchee’ and ‘Eugene Onegin’) were the first to receive the Prize.

Despite the absence of spiritual freedom, the range of topics used in the creative work was extended in the 1960–1980s. In his autobiographical novel ‘Native region, green cradle’ and the novel ‘Seven springs’, G. Bashirov expressed his concerns regarding the erosion of the people’s memory and the deterioration of the human treatment of nature. Historical topics were touched upon in novels ‘The Ilil River flows’, ‘Whistling arrows’, the tragedy ‘Kul Ghali’ by N. Fattakh, the story ‘Arduan Batyr’ by G. Akhunov, and the novel ‘Chulman, a river of grandchildren’ by E. Kasimov. The theme of the village was depicted in a new light in the stories ‘What do the raindrops sing’, ‘Berry meadows’ by R. Tukhatullin, ‘Where the two mountains cannot meet’ by M. Khabibullin, and in his novel ‘Whirlpools’. Topical moral and ethical issues of the time were raised in works ‘In the middle’, ‘Friday night’, ‘Cock on the fence’, ‘Green meadows beyond the fence’ by A. Gilyazov; ‘An undeclared will’, ‘Pacification’, ‘Conscience’ by
A. Eniki; and ‘Two bachelors’ by A. Rasikh. In the 1960–1980s, Tatar poetry was represented by works written by Sh. Galiev, R. Fayzullin, R. Kharis, G. Rakhim, R. Gataullin, R. Mingalim, Zulfat, and others.

Works staged at the G. Kamal Tatar Academic Theatre and the K. Tinchurin Tatar Theatre of Drama and Comedy were significant events in the theatrical life: ‘The blue shawl’, ‘faded stars’, ‘Mirkay and Ayslu’ by N. Isanbet, ‘Mother has come’ by Sh. Khusainov, ‘Almandar from Aldernysh’ by T. Minnullin. The M. Jalil Tatar Opera and Ballet Theatre had many regular viewers. The premiere of the ballet ‘Su anasy’ (‘Aquatic’) by E. Bakirov was staged here in 1971. The V. Kachalov Kazan Bolshoy Drama Theatre also refreshed its repertoire. It staged such plays as ‘The Zykovs’ by Gorky, ‘Ocean’ by Stein, ‘The Flight’ by Bulgakov, and ‘To be or not to be’ by Gibson. The number of national theatres was growing. The G. Kamal Tatar Academic Theatre was awarded the Order of Lenin, and the V. Kachalov Kazan Bolshoy Drama Theatre was awarded the Order of the Red Banner of Labour. The State Folk Song and Dance Company headed by L. Kustobaeva and the K. Tinchurin Tatar Theatre of Drama and Comedy lent a vibrant national character to the cultural life of the republic.

The State Symphony Orchestra was formed in 1966. For 12 years, it was headed by Natan Rakhlin, an outstanding conductor and people’s artist of the USSR. In 1979, Renat Salavatov was made the art director of the orchestra. The orchestra was the winner of all-Russian and all-Union competitions on three occasions. Its ensemble was the first to perform symphonic works by Tatar composers. The following graduates of the Kazan Conservatory actively worked in the sphere of symphonic music: F. Akhmetov, R. Enikeev, I. Yakubov, R. Abdullin, L. Batyr-Bulgari, L. Khayrutdinova, Sh. Timerbulatov, and others. The best achievements of Tatar symphonic music are associated with symphonies by N. Zhiganov, A. Monasyrov, and F. Akhmetov. In the 1970s, the symphony ‘Sabantuy’ by Nazib Zhiganov was awarded the State Prize of the USSR, and a symphonic poem by F. Akhmetov, devoted to the memory of F. Yarullin, was awarded the M. Glinka State Prize of the RSFSR.

In the 1960–1980s, the traditional values of the national musical heritage were becoming increasingly apparent. Previously unknown archaic folklore stratifications of various dialectal and regional Tatar groups (the Mishar Tatars, Kazan Tatars, Kryashens, Siberian, Astrakhan, and other groups) were revived. The lines of development of the traditional musical culture interrupted at the beginning of the 20th century were restored; the stratifications associated with Islamic culture and oriental musical and poetic traditions (Quranic recitation, the tradition of book singing, munajats) were revived. These new trends were characteristic of works by A. Monasyrov, Sh. Sharifullin, R. Kalimullin, and M. Shamsudinova.

Begun in 1982, the Chaliapin festivals became an important event in Kazan cultural life, and their popularity rapidly increased throughout the 1980s. Participation in the festival was considered an honour not only by Russian opera stars but also by those with worldwide renown.

The songs and romances by Tatar composers were made popular by acclaimed performers such as A. Avzalova, Sh. Akhmetzyanov, E. Zalyaltdinov, R. Ibragimov, and I. Shakirov. And perhaps it was the apolitical nature of works by S. Sadykova, R. Yakhin, F. Akhmetov, and R. Enikeev, disliked by the authorities, that was the reason for their great popularity.

B. Urmanche’s works stood out in the field of visual arts. During this period, he created the triptych ‘Tatarstan’ and the sculptures ‘Sagysht’, ‘Spring melodies’, and ‘Tulpar’. New picturesque canvases were painted by L. Fat-takhov, A. Prokopyev, K. Maksimov, and N. Adylov. The monumental paintings and the easel painting works ‘In a native mountain village’, ‘Zulfiya, a Kazan beauty’ were created by I. Zaripov. The latter picture, together with works by Deynka, Plastov, and Korin, represented Soviet visual art at international exhibitions in Paris and West Baden. History and contemporary life were vividly reflected in works by such artists as V. Kudelkin, A. Ro-
dionov and M. Usmanov. Unusual pictures by
the distinctive Kazan artist G. Arkhiereev, as
well as sculptures and metal compositions by
I. Bashmakov, never failed to arouse interest.
The zonal exhibition ‘The Great Volga’ occu-
pied an important place in the life of the artists
from the 1970s.

In 1959, a fundamentally new type of art
emerged in Kazan with the opening of a televi-
sion studio: the production of TV programmes.
In the 1940–1950s, there had only been a cor-
respondent office of the Kuybyshev newsreel
studio in Kazan. The first live programmes
of the Kazan studio were mainly devoted to
the party’s activities and sports competitions.
From 1961, there was a newsreel studio here,
which yearly translated 15 feature films into the
Tatar language, produced 6 documentaries and
issued, on average, 36 magazines ‘Na Volge
shiroko’ (On the wide Volga). The editor of
the film group was S. Govorukhin, who later
became a well-known film director. At the be-
inning of the 1960s, the following films were
made: ‘I want to believe’ (Director: I. Prosh-
kuratov, Cameraman: I. Shamsutdinov), the
short film ‘Bird Cherry Blossom’ in the Tatar
language (Director: R. Sakaev, Cameraman:
I. Shamsutdinov), and the full-length film
‘Berencbe Theatre’ (Director: R. Sakaev, Cam-
eraman: A. Privin). These were feature films, in
which artists of the Kazan theatres participated.
The five-series documentary ‘Soviet Tatarstan’
was created in 1970.

In the mid-1960s, Kazan became hugely
popular thanks to the Special Design Bureau
‘Prometheus’, headed by B. Galeev, and its suc-
cessful experiments in the field of light shows.
They were the first in the USSR to stage a
sound-and-light play without actors in the open
air and to make the sound-and-light film ‘Little
tripytch’ to the music by G. Sviridov.

The work of many creative workers was
highly appreciated. Thus, the G. Tukay State
Prize of the Republic was awarded to Kh. Tu-
fan, I. Gazi, G. Akhunov, A. Eniki and A. Gily-
azov; the M. Gorky State Prize of the RSFSR
was awarded to Sibgat Khakim. The I. Repin
State Prize of the RSFSR in the field of visual

As is common knowledge, the awards only
reflected the more elegant side of the life of
creative workers. Their attempts to recreate
the true picture of Soviet reality met with dis-
approval of the authorities and accusations of
being preoccupied with the more shadowy as-
pects of life. In addressing the issues of per-
sonal life, everyday life and family conflicts,
they were criticized for their triviality, narrow-
ness of interests, and lack of ideology and civic
consciousness. In spite of this, the intelligen-
tia, who not only possessed a superior intellect
but also a true but undeclared love of the na-
tive people and homeland, served to ensure by
their labour and social position that the cultural
component of the Tatar people would occupy
a worthy position in the process of moderniza-
tion. It was, in fact, the independently-thinking
intelligentsia that was the dominant factor in
the constructive transformation of society,
calling for the maximum consideration of its
specific fundamental positions, which would
ensure a natural evolutionary path of develop-
ment without any shocks to society.

Thus, in spite of the official statement that
the national issue was fully resolved in the
country and that there was all-encompassing
development of the Soviet peoples, the com-
munity of the Tatar Republic continued to be
concerned about the negative processes in the
cultural development of the Tatar ethnics. The
most vivid examples of the resistance to the
artificially supported process of de-ethnization
were displayed by the Tatar intelligentsia. Both
within and beyond the confines of the possible,
it representatives continued to defend their
own position, which undoubtedly reflected the
sense of civic responsibility, characteristic of a
true intelligentsia, for the moral and ethical sta-
tus of their people, and the ability to speak the
truth and to follow it in any, even the most un-
favourable, circumstances. Finding themselves
in the minority and sometimes even alone, the
most resistant and principled representatives
of the Tatar intelligentsia opposed the ‘deculturation’ of society, the process of forced destruction of everything healthy in the culture of the Tatar people. Despite all the seemingly unshakable dominance of the official ideology, civil activity, albeit in a limited and embryonic state, was preserved and maturing in society. In the context of the national region, by virtue of ignoring the ethnic factor in state policy, it obtained an appropriate colouring.

§ 2. Islam among the Tatars in the 1940–1980s

Ruslan Ibragimov

By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the policies of the Soviet State concerning religion, including Islam, had almost reached their goal. According to the sociological research of those years, the number of believers was decreasing day by day and, conversely, the number of villages, settlements, cities, and regions where there was officially no functioning place of worship or religious association was constantly increasing [Barmenkov, 1979, p. 162]. By the middle of 1941, as a result of mass atheistic propaganda, repressions against believers and the clergy, and three all-union anti-religious campaigns, the religious associations of the republic were on the verge of complete destruction.

The position of the believers and the clergy changed considerably with the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. Representatives of all confessions functioning within the territory of the USSR made patriotic appeals to their followers. Among them, there were representatives of Islam, the second largest confession in the USSR. In the appeal of the Central Muslim Spiritual Board, particular attention was given to the necessity to resist the external threat. In particular, it stated: ‘The Central Muslim Spiritual Board of the USSR urges all true believers to rise in defence of their native land, to pray in mosques for the victory of the Red Army, and to bless their sons, fighting for a just cause’ [Kuroyedov, 1982, pp. 92–93].

The rigid control established by Stalin over all spheres of public life, including spiritual, the suppression of all manifestations of divergence from the Soviet way of life and thinking were impossible in conditions of war. In periods of social cataclysms, the stabilizing and integrating functions of religion become manifest and are in particular demand. Hence, during these years, many believers began to express openly their adherence to one confession or the other, to attend places of worship and perform rituals — in doing so, ignoring numerous bans and restrictions.

The international situation was one of the reasons for the policy adjustment with regard to religion. The Soviet Union, single-handedly fighting a war with Nazi Germany, faced an important task: the opening up of a second front. In these conditions, the democratization of some aspects of Soviet life was able to have a positive impact on the course of negotiations with the allies.

In September 1943, J. Stalin held a meeting with the heads of the Russian Orthodox Church, which led to the decisions that marked a new stage in the relations between the state and the confessions. In practice, this manifested itself in the liberalization of the tax law in respect of religious workers, their exemption from call-up for mobilization, the granting of limited rights of legal entities to religious organizations, etc. The permission for a group of 17 believers to do the Hajj became a milestone event for the Muslims of the country.

In 1943, in addition to the functioning Central Muslim Spiritual Board (with its centre in the city of Ufa), three more Muslim Spiritual Boards – of the North Caucasus (in Buynaksk), Transcaucasia (Baku), Middle Asia and Kazakhstan (Tashkent) – were formed. This event, according to Ya. Roy, ‘...should be considered a part of the ideological campaign carried out by the Soviet leaders to influence the civil, patriotic feelings of
the population and to mobilize them in conditions of war’ [Roy, 1998, p. 129]. Among the above-mentioned Muslim Spiritual Boards, the status of informal leader was given to the Middle Asian Spiritual Board, under whose jurisdiction was the only Islamic higher educational institution in the USSR, the madrasah of Mir-Arab (city of Bukhara).

A short-term normalization of the relations between the state and the confessions in 1943–1948 necessitated creation of a new authority capable of connecting, in these new conditions, the government and the religious associations, taking into account the changes in the USSR policy on religion. In this context, in May 1944, the Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults (hereafter CARC) was founded under the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR. This body was called upon to facilitate communication between the government and all religious associations (except for the religious associations of the Russian Orthodox Church, for communication with which the Council for Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church was founded); in 1965, both councils were united into one single body: the Council on Religious Affairs (hereafter CRA) under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, functioning on the territory of the Soviet state. Representatives acting in the regions, provinces (krais), federal and autonomous republics came under the jurisdiction of the Council. Religious followers addressed the representative in a particular region on all issues concerning relations between the state and the confessions, such as registration of religious communities and places of worship or the holding of religious holidays. Nominally, they carried out a wider range of duties, including the total control of the religious organizations.

Between May 1945 and December 1947, there were registrations and re-registrations of 16 Muslim religious associations in the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, File R–873, List 1, Act 4, Sheet 33], which was a reflection of the liberalization of the state policy on religion.

This period also saw the peak of the population’s religious activity. In 1945, celebration of Kurban Bayram was held in the republic on an uncommonly solemn and grand scale. According to a report by the Representative for Religious Affairs within the TASSR, approximately 24,000–25,000 people took part in the Namaz festivity in Kazan on 15 November (held in 6 places, although only one mosque and Muslim community were registered by the authorities), and half of these were young and middle-aged people [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 5, File 1844b, Sheet 1]. The procession towards the places where the Namaz was being held was accompanied by the singing of ‘Takbir’. In the Marjani Mosque, the only officially functioning mosque in Kazan, the Namaz festival was attended by around 12,000–13,000 people [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 5, File 1844b, Sheet 1] As the mosque was unable to accommodate such a large number of believers, the majority of them remained in nearby streets. Among the visitors there were people in military uniform, who not only participated in the religious service but also performed a sacrificial rite themselves. A further peculiarity of the Kurban Bayram celebration in 1945 was the fact that a significant number of children of school age and women participated in it. These were given an opportunity to hold a service in the Marjani Mosque on the 17 November, where there were as many as 1,500–1,800 participants [SA HPD TR, Fund15, Inventory 5, File 1844b, Sheet 1].

On that day, almost all of the villages of the republic held services in private houses and in cemeteries under the guidance of the former mullahs and elderly men who were well acquainted with the rites of Islam. A characteristic feature was participation of a considerable number of young persons (born 1928–1930) and middle-aged people. For example, in the village of Klyashevo in the Tetyushy district of the TASSR, they made up respectively 30% and 40% of the number of participants [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 5, File 1844b, Sheet 1]. It is interesting to note that one of the sacrificial rites was performed by the chairman
of the kolkhoz [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 5, File 1844b, Sheet 1].

The reason for such an active religious expression by the Muslims of the republic was, evidently, the elation that reigned in Soviet society during the post-war period. The long-awaited victory in the Great Patriotic War, the joy of the victors returning home, whose families had prayed for their lives, the re-evaluation of the spiritual values during the years of war by some servicemen, the loyalty of the authorities with regard to religion—all of this, in total, provided for an extraordinary high level of religious activity among the population in the first post-war festivity of Kurban Bayram. In the years that followed, such large-scale participation by religious followers was no longer observed.

The strengthening of religiosity among the Tatars during the war and post-war years was also expressed in increase of clerical activity. In his report, the representative of the CARC within TASSR wrote: ‘Certain religious workers who had left their former activity and worked for a number of years in Soviet institutions now (1944–1945) leave their work and return to their former occupation’ [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund P–873, List 1, File 2, Sheet 18]. But before this or that religious community nominated their candidate as a religious worker to the religious regulatory body, it had to coordinate its choice with the representative who, in his turn, had to communicate the decision to the authorized Council of the republic, krai or region, where the centre of spiritual administration was. Speaking about the mullahs’ activity, it should be noted that they, as well as the religious workers of the other confessions, were exposed to strong tax pressure. This created a situation in which it was more beneficial for clergy to hold the ceremonies being unregistered, since, according to the regulation of the Ministry of Finance of 13 December 1946, the income of former clergy who did not have their own parish and a constant income was not taxed. At the same time, the local fiscal bodies, contrary to the law, quite often also taxed the mullahs who were acting illegally beyond the mosques.

Certainly, legally functioning mosques alone could not satisfy the religious needs of Muslims. Therefore, they had to gather for collective performance of the religious rites in unregistered but actually functioning communities and groups. In this context, the practice of using empty mosques by the unregistered Muslim communities became widespread. From the point of view of the authorities, these mosques were not only the place where the believers could satisfy their religious needs but also a gathering place for people with an ideology and a world view that differed considerably from the official ones. As a result, at the end of 1940s, it was decided to resume the practice of transferring the places of worship to the cultural, educational and economic institutions.

Because of the lack of places of worship for performing Namaz on Fridays and festive days, the Muslims often had to gather in the territories of Tatar cemeteries [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund R–873, List 2, File 2, Sheet 76]. But in this case, the believers were persecuted, as according to the Soviet legislation, all cemeteries were ‘national’ and were under the jurisdiction of the village and city Councils.

Thus, the majority of the country’s Muslim associations were put under the conditions where they had to act illegally, giving the authorities a legislative basis for application of administrative measures against them.

To the unregistered communities, any kind of activity, including a collection plate for their needs, was forbidden. The Muslim Spiritual Board existed also thanks to money deducted by the Muslim communities. However, as the number of legally functioning communities was insignificant, the mufti often initiated (contrary to the Soviet legislation on cults) attribution of a certain legitimate status on the unregistered mullahs by giving them certificates providing for the right to hold ceremonies. Such a flat violation of the law about cults demanded immediate interference of the authorities. Therefore, the Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults in the person of its chairman I. Polyansky ‘offered’ the representative of the
Council of the Bashkir Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Karimov, ‘to recommend in a categorical form to the mufti Khiyaletdinov and the workers of his administration to desist from communication with unregistered groups and clergy and henceforth not to give them certificates, and at the same time, to take measures to withdraw those certificates already given’ [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund R–873, List 2, Act 5, Sheet 34].

In 1948, for the first time in 22 years, the Majlis of the Central Muslim Spiritual Board (renamed the Muslim Spiritual Board of European Part of Russia and Siberia (MSBPS) at the congress) was called, which in itself was an exceptional event in the history of relations between the state and religious confessions within the Soviet state. However, the decisions made at the congress only confirmed the limited rights which the believers and the clergy had possessed between the 1920s and 1940s. Only the functions of a purely theological character remained under its jurisdiction. In addition, its duty became to keep accounts of the mosques and buildings of worship [Yunusova, 1999, p. 218]. The political environment of that era, even in the context of liberalization of the relations between the state and the religion, did not permit raising the question of restoring the rights of believers and clergy.

The end of the Soviet state’s short-term policy of permissiveness with respect to religion coincided with the end of the post-war period. This demonstrates that for the Soviet regime, a tolerant policy with regard to religion was forced and temporary. The problems caused by wartime conditions, such as consolidation of the Soviet society before the threat of the external enemy, creation of an attractive image before the allied powers, the difficulties of the post-war period, ceased being a priority.

In 1948, the CARC sent its representatives a circular, ordering to stop making favourable decisions on petitions concerning registration of religious communities. The variants of the reasons which served as the basis for the refusal were laid down on the legislative level in the resolution of the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR of 28 November 1943. ‘On the order of opening the churches’. The reasons for the refusal could be: the technical unworthiness of the building of worship, the small number of the community’s members, the presence of a registered religious community of the same confession near the place of worship (in this case, it was offered to the pleaders to unite with this community), the use of the building for other purposes.

Along with the implementation of the above-mentioned circular, the local authorities intensified their work in the battle against illegally functioning Islamic communities and increased criticism of the officially functioning religious associations.

At the turn of the 1950s, there emerged the tendency of intensive liquidation of empty buildings of mosques as centers of ‘illegal’ Tatar religious life. The authorities initiated this process as necessary dismantling of the mosques in view of their allegedly critical condition. The doubts concerning the truthfulness of such conclusions of the authorities are raised by the fact that, as a rule, the remaining material was used for realizing cultural, educational, and economic projects. Such actions of the authorities, concerning the believers in general and Muslims in particular, were typical of the post-liberal period of the relations between the state and the confessions. The position of the authorities on this issue was defined by their desire to return the religious associations to their pre-war state.

In the mid-fifties, in the context of the general political thaw in the country, the believers had a right to count on a more tolerant policy concerning religion. However, in reality, not only did the authorities not reduce their pressure on religion, but they even increased efforts to restrict the influence it had had on society during the war and post-war years. In this context, on 7 June 1954, there appeared the resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU ‘On the major drawbacks of the scientific and atheistic propaganda and on the measures of its improvement’, where a considerable attention was paid to the measures of fight against the
influence of Islam. In particular, it contained paragraphs on prevention of new mosques’ opening, all possible counteraction to the preaching activity of mullahs and increase of the sum of their income tax [Malashenko, 1998, p. 60]. Soon, excessive ardour and inevitable excesses of local authorities, who fulfilled these decisions, led to a new resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU ‘On the mis-

functioning in their territory. According to the ideology of that period, existence of a functioning religious associations had to be registered, provided that they had a religious worker and a room suitable for the ceremonies. While it was not a problem to choose a candidate for the clergy, it was much more difficult for the believers to find space.

From 1958, a new massive attack on religion began. Having proclaimed the full-scale construction of communism, N. Khrushchev set the task of ‘overcoming religion as a remnant of capitalism in the minds of people’. ‘The crisis of religion’ was proclaimed as the dominant phenomenon in the religious sphere by the ideologists. The religious life was represented as the inevitable process of ‘degeneration’ and ‘decline’ by means of propaganda. Fundamentally, this postulate was based on a quantitative index of registered religious societies, which, according to the authorities, adequately reflected the religious activity of the population.

In the early sixties, even in the conditions of the hegemony of the command-and-control system relations and the formalism in solving various problems, it became obvious that the real situation in the sphere of religious activity of the population had nothing in common with the official one. In the report on the course of implementa-

tion of the resolution of the Council of Min-

isters of the USSR of 16 March 1961 ‘On the strengthening of control over implementa-

tion of the laws on cults’, the representative of the Council for Religious Cults within the Tatar ASSR called the unregistered communities and groups of believers and the clergy the main problem in fight against the influence of Islam. According to him, ‘... it is difficult and impossible to define what percentage of the population is under the influence of religion ... no noticeable withdrawal of believers from the mosque and no recession of the clergy activity has yet been observed’ [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund R–873, List 1,
Act 11, Sheet 6]. Actually, many Islamic rites remained quite a widespread phenomenon among the Tatar population, especially in the village.

To rectify the situation, in 1961 in the country, under Executive Committees, District and City Councils of the deputies of workers, groups assisting in the observance of law on religious cults were formed; in 1966, they were transformed into commissions for assistance to the legislation control on religious cults. Their duty consisted in exercising a daily, ongoing monitoring of religious communities and groups. A great importance was given to examining the forms and methods of the religious organizations’ activity, the extent of their influence on the population, up to studying the preaching of the clergy, to collecting data and compiling information reports on religious holidays (the Uraza Bayram, Kurban Bayram). The commissions functioned on a voluntary basis and were formed out of the deputies of the local Council, the workers of the administrative and financial bodies, departments for national education, and other entities. As the members of the commission had to attend services in person (and they took place in the working hours as well), it was recommended to engage for these purposes retired people from among local public activists who knew the issues of the Soviet cult legislation. The vice chairman or the secretary of the Executive Committee of the local Council was, as a rule, appointed chairman of the commission. The quantitative structure of the commission was defined according to the number of the functioning religious associations in this area and the degree of the population’s piety. The indicator of the latter was the number of unregistered but actually functioning religious communities and groups.

The failure and the self-deception of adequate correlation between the number of registered religious associations and the level of religiosity was demonstrated by a one-time census of religious associations and clergy carried out in 1961. It is necessary to note that, in the Soviet Union, such event was held for the first time. In its framework, it was supposed to register all the actually functioning religious communities and groups. The results of this campaign in the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic revealed that there were 646 informally functioning Islamic associations, and also 366 illegally working mullahs [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund R–873, List 1, Act 11, Sheet 107]. The materials of the census showed that, among Muslims, only old men were engaged in cult activity, but among them, there were people who had held leading positions in education, kolkhozes, sovkhozes, on the factories and served in ranks of the Soviet army. These data did not correspond to a stereotype of that time that only backward and uneducated layers of the society were subject to the influence of religion.

The results of the one-time census vividly revealed the sustainability and the capacity for survival of the Muslim way of life among the Tatars. Thanks to the generation which had received a full-fledged religious education before 1917, the unregistered Muslim communities were provided with so-called mullahs ‘without a mosque’, who were experts in the doctrines of Islam and its rites. It is possible to say that, in the 1960s, there was a person or a group of people in almost every Tatar village who was able not only to hold a festal service or to perform rites according to all the canons of Islam but also to properly explain the allegoric sense of separate Suras and Ayah of the Quran to the believers. However, in these years, natural attrition saw the number of such mullahs considerably decrease. This inevitable process, together with the destruction of the centuries-old system of Muslim education, accounted for the fact that the management of Tatar religious life passed, in most cases, to mullahs who had the minimum knowledge of dogmatic issues. In this regard, from 1960s, performance of the Islamic ceremonies became the main criterion by which the Tatars determined themselves as believers. At the same time, the world-view aspect of Islam became less important. In such conditions, according to R. Mukhametshin, when ‘... Islam "was archaized", it lost many positions developed over centuries'
[Mukhametshin, 1998, p. 38]. This absence of the system of Islamic education caused ‘... the general “deintellectualization” of Islam’ [Ibid.].

The common Islamic practice of ‘taqiyya’, that allowed Muslims to hide their true belief for the benefit of their confession, became of particular importance during the years of Soviet power. They could avoid the inevitable problems with the state authorities and public organizations and remain beyond the influence of communist ideology. Also, the rules of Islamic rites played a great role, because unlike the Orthodox rites, it was possible to perform them in houses and flats for Muslims to stay out of sight of the controlling authorities.

According to the CARC, the high level of Islamic ritualism among the population was due to not only the activity of the clergy and the faithful but also the insufficient use of the atheistic propaganda of civic rituals.

The state policy began to use less drastic methods towards religion after N. Khrushchev’s removal from power. During this period, the authorities actively encouraged the clergy to participate in public life of the country by organizing numerous meetings of the clergy with the lecturers of the 'Knowledge' society, at which they discussed the domestic and foreign policy of the Soviet Union. The Islamic clergy as well as the clergy of other faiths were actively engaged in collecting monetary funds for the World Foundation, the Society for the Protection of Monuments and the Department for External Islamic Relations. These activities of the religious organizations were encouraged by the authorities.

It becomes obvious that there was a tacit agreement between the authorities and religious organizations, as a result of which '... the religious figures were quite satisfied with the existing “freedom” and the authorities tolerated the existing level of religiosity of the population, which was preserved by that time' [Yunusova, 1999, p. 270].

Despite the fact that the media constantly declared one of the dogmas of the Communist ideology concerning the 'extinction of religion', according to opinion polls conducted in the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic at the end of the 1960s, 25.7% of the Kazan Tatars called themselves believers, and in rural areas this figure was 17.9% [Musina, 1992, p. 54].

During this period, the contingent of mosque-goers was homogeneous on weekdays. As a rule, these were elderly people. But the situation essentially changed during the days of Islamic festivals. As mentioned above, during the holidays, there were a significant number of middle-aged and young people going to mosque. In the Marjani Mosque in Kazan, the number of worshipers on weekdays reached 120 people at morning Namaz, and there were not less than 500 at noon; at Friday Namaz (at noon), there were more than 1000 people; on holidays, the number of worshipers was approximately 4,500–5,500 [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund R–873, List 2, Act 40, Sheets 17–38; Ibid., Act 44, Sheet 37]. For the mosque in the city of Chistopol, these figures were respectively 30–40, 70–80, approximately 250, and approximately 250 people [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund R–873, List 2, Act 40, Sheets 17–38; Ibid., Act 44, Sheet 37]. The number of religious Muslim communities (among the registered communities) in rural areas ranged, on average, from 15 to 45 at Friday Namaz and from 45 to 150 during the holidays [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund R–873, List 2, Act 44, Sheet 37; Ibid., Act 45, Sheet 6].

Along with the empty mosques, believers’ houses and Tatar cemeteries that formed illegal meeting places, there were also sacred spaces, that were, as a rule, 'springs' and 'holy graves'. Pilgrimages to these places were undertaken only in warm summer months, usually on Fridays. Along with the typical unsanctioned meeting places mentioned above, local authorities also tried to prevent in every possible way gatherings at these places.

The mid-1970s were marked by a lessening of international tension, as a result of which on the 23th of March 1976, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights came into force in the territory of the USSR. The articles of the Covenant related to religion declared the
freedom to adopt a religion of one’s choice and to practice it either alone or in community with others. In fact, however, it came down to the same sham religious freedom that it was before.

The practice that had been in use since the early 1960s, when some mosques of the Soviet Union were chosen to demonstrate authorities’ loyal attitude towards Islam, became common in the 1970s. The Marjani Mosque in Kazan was among them. Every time when foreign delegations from Islamic countries came to the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, its members always visited the mosque, met its imam and then wrote in the guest book that ‘the Soviet government does not interfere with the activity of religious organizations’. However, some facts unpleasant for the authorities were so obvious that they were impossible to hide. For example, in October 1979, during a visit of Muslim delegation from Turkey to Kazan, its members expressed their surprise that there were 16 mosques in Tashkent and only one in Kazan [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund R–873, List 1, Act 93, Sheet 58].

The tax law was one of the most powerful levers of influence on the clergy. The law even took into account the fact that the priests were men of retirement age. Therefore, in accordance with paragraph 172 of ‘Regulation on state pensions’, the pensions of the pensioners who were employed at religious organizations, in the cases when their income did not exceed 100 roubles, were reduced to 15 roubles. And if it exceeded the above-mentioned amount, then no pension was paid.

One of the ways to eliminate unregistered clergy was taxing them as uncooperative handicraftsmen. In February 1969, by the directive letter No.03/160, the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic required the local financial authorities to bring to taxation unregistered mullahs and abystays.

The level of the tax pressure can be illustrated by a letter of the clergy and the executive body of the Marjani Mosque, dated 13 April 1976, that was addressed to A. Kosygin, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and N. Podgorny, the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. In that letter, the applicants point out that ‘... the taxation (of clergy) ... in no way corresponds to the statements of comrade Z. Kuroyedov (at that time, the Chairman of the Council for Religious Affairs of the USSR Council of Ministers ) that the believers of all religions as well as the clergy are fully rightful citizens of the Soviet Union ... ’ [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund R–873, List 1, Act 76, Sheet 43]. To coordinate the real position of the clergy with the above-mentioned thesis, the applicants proposed: 1) to impose the income taxes on the clergy that will be equal to the income taxes of all citizens of the USSR; 2) to allow the formation of the union of workers of religious institutions and mosques that will be responsible for temporary disability, regular holidays and retirement pension payments. Membership fees of the union and contributions to the social security fund shall be accumulated at the Spiritual Board.

The implementation of these requirements, particularly of paragraph 2, posed a threat to the government, as it would significantly increase influence of the Spiritual Board and give them some autonomy in its own personnel policy. That is why the statement caused a strong negative reaction of the authorities. Representatives of local authorities held a conversation with the people who signed the letter ‘... on the inadmissibility of such extremist manifestations’ [National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund R–873, Inventory 1, File 76, Sheet 48]. The clergy were warned about their possible deregistration if this incident happened again.

In the 1970s, some citizens of the Soviet Union became aware of the patently declarative nature of the values proclaimed by the CPSU, and that its goals and objectives were utopian. For many people, religion became an alternative ideology, a system of moral and ethical values that could fill the spiritual vacuum that many people possessed after suffering disappointment in communist ideology. In this context, the society’s interest in religion, including Islam, increased significantly.
Late 1970s and the first half of the 1980s were marked by a strengthening of the role of Islam in international relations. The invasion of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and the fight against its Islamic opposition could not have contributed to the improvement of relations between the authorities and Muslims. During this period, the state clearly divided Islam into two categories. The first category included 'peace-loving Muslims of the Soviet Union', and the second one included 'Islamic fundamentalists' from abroad. The latter allowed the government to maintain a certain fear of Islam as a whole among soviet people and to create an obviously preconceived attitude towards it as one of the causes of the destabilization of the foreign relations and a potential hazard in the country.

However, in real life, more and more Tatars converted to Islam. So, the enhancement of the role of women in Islamic societies could serve as a factor characterizing the position of Islam in the first half of the 1980s. In particular, there were up to 200 women at Friday Namaz in the Marjani Mosque. Given the fact that in Tatar society they played the major role in children’s upbringing, the importance of this fact in securing the continuity of Islamic spiritual values between Tatar generations is obvious. According to sociological studies conducted in the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in the mid-1980s, 80% of Muslim got religious education in the family [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 14, File 401, Sheet 13]. In this context, the words of the employee of the Department for Agit-Propaganda of the Tatarstan regional branch of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union sound demonstrative: 'Despite the efforts being made by the Party in the struggle against religious view of the world, we do not see any tangible results...' [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 14, File 401, Sheet 13].

A significant factor contributing to the formation of a new generation of Muslims was the Clergy’s ability to adapt and to exercise their functions under adverse external influences on the Islamic ummah by the state. In particular, there was a clear civil and moral orientation in the sermons of the imams of the Marjani Mosque, and it bore its fruits: the social basis of Islam had significantly expanded in the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, and its society of the believers 'rejuvenated'. That workers and the intelligentsia from the ages of 30 to 40 would go to mosque ceased to be a rare phenomenon. Often, even Communists and members of the Komsomol were among them. For example, there were 8 Communists and 2 members of the Komsomol among the intercessors of registration of the Islamic association in Moskovsky City District of Kazan [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 14, File 401, Sheet 5].

Some of the last anti-religious regulations of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union concerned Islam. On 21 October 1985, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union issued the Resolution 'On additional measures in connection with the intensification of the so-called "militant Islam" in Asian and African countries', and on 18 August 1986, there appeared another Resolution 'On strengthening the fight against the influence of Islam'. Despite the fact that these resolutions concerned mainly the republics of Middle Asia, the Caucasus and Transcaucasia, the governing bodies of other regions also directed government institutions towards the enhancement of the fight against Islam.

It is noteworthy that in these years the state policy on religion was inconsistent. So, along with the official documents of the Party, the purpose of which was to limit the influence of Islam, in 1986, the authorities sanctioned the International Muslim Conference 'Muslims for Peace' in Baku, which was attended by delegates from eight Islamic associations of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.

Despite the tendency of the authorities to carry out graduated democratization of the Soviet society, soon the process was out of control and penetrated into all spheres of life, including in the sphere of relations between state and religion. As in 1943, the foreign factor largely contributed to it. In the second half of the 1980s, the Soviet diplomacy intensified as it was seeking to overcome the confrontation with the major capitalist powers, in the first
place with the United States, and to establish friendly relations with them. Taking into consideration the great importance of democratic freedoms in these countries, including the freedom of religion, the leaders of the USSR not only eased pressure on religious organizations but also involved them in the realization of its foreign policy agenda. In this regard, during the visit of M. Gorbachev to the USA, in the official delegation, along with public figures and scientists, representatives of the main religions of the USSR were included, and that can be considered a major breakthrough in the state-confessional relations.

Against the backdrop of the democratization of all aspects of life of Soviet society, religions became more and more involved in public life of the Republic. The preparation and celebration of the 1000th anniversary of the Christianization of Rus' in 1988, the 1200th anniversary of the conversion to Islam of the peoples of the Volga and Cis-Ural regions, and the 200th anniversary of founding the Muslim Spiritual Board of European Part of Russia and Siberia in 1989 in many ways contributed to this process. These celebrations received a wide response in the society and were held in good form. These events significantly contributed to the fact that there started a revaluation of the role of religion in history and culture in the society. The stereotype of believers and the clergy that many people, especially the young ones, had in their minds was shaken. Approaches to media coverage of the issues related to religion and activity of religious associations radically changed. At the end of the 1980s, clergy of different confessions often appeared in the press, on radio and television.

In the latter half of the 1980s, one could observe the growing interest in Islamic educational organizations among Tartar youth. From 1980, five inhabitants of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic had graduated from the Mir-i-Arab Madrasah in Bukhara (Gosman Iskhakov, who later became the mufti of the Spiritual Board of Tatarstan, was among them), and by 1987, there were five more students from the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. A characteristic feature of the time was young people’s liking for Islamic attributes, for example, they wore pendants with the image of a crescent, wrote religious texts, and even certain ayahs from the Quran on cars. Survey data also showed the strengthening of religiosity among young people. Thus, if in 1983 only 0.9% of students said that they were believers, in 1990 this figure stood at 20% [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 15, File 266, Sheet 21; Musina, 1997, p. 212]. Overall, during 1989–1990, 34.1% said they were believers, 30.4% of Tatars living in cities vaccinated between faith and unbelief; in rural areas, the figures were respectively 43.4% and 19.1% [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 15, File 266, Sheet 21; Musina, 1997, p. 212].

It is noteworthy that at the end of the 1980s, during the destruction of the established dogmas and ideals, the regulatory function of Islam became the most needed one. The surveys conducted in cities and regions of the country showed that 30% of respondents noted that the main positive influence of Islam was its ability to establish social justice; 20% of respondents marked out its integrative function, because in their opinion, Islam was one of the guarantors of the maintenance of national culture and traditions; 10% singled out its compensatory function as faith in Allah helps in difficult periods of life [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 15, File 1626, Sheet 18].

During democratization of the Soviet society, Muslims became significantly more active in exercising their right to fulfill their religious needs. This, first of all, resulted in applications for registration of religious associations and transfer of mosques in their possession. In the political environment of that time, they received the support of the authorities.

A characteristic feature of the time was the pursuit of religious communities and clergy to raise their status in society and realize their potential in activities unrelated to religion. First of all, this pursuit was realized in setting up charities and organizing courses in the fundamentals of religion for all ages.
The sociopolitical processes taking place in the country made it necessary to change the existing legislation on cults, which no longer corresponded to the realities of that time. In this context, in October 1990, the new laws of the USSR 'On freedom of conscience and religious organizations' and laws of the RSFSR 'On freedom of religion' were adopted. These new laws provided for the actual implementation of the principle of freedom of conscience by the citizens. Thus, despite all the oppression and humiliation suffered by believers, Islam managed to retain some of its positions and had a significant effect on a certain part of the Tatars.

§ 3. Festive Culture of Tatars in Soviet Times

Raifa Urazmanova

During the Soviet period (20th century) with its new, legally mandated ideology of atheistic society, the social life of Tatars, like that of other peoples of the country, witnessed a complete change of not only the festive calendar but also the forms of celebration.

First of all, there were introduced new sociopolitical and public holidays, devoted to significant dates in the life of the Soviet State and the Red Army. Great attention was given to their preparation. In particular, already in the 1920s, the anniversary of the formation of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was celebrated with great enthusiasm. Special commissions on organizing these celebrations were created under the Central Executive Committee of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. 25 June, the day of proclamation of the autonomous republic, became a national holiday. The proclamation of 25 June as a non-working day, along with organizers’ striving to put a national colour into the holiday, greatly contributed to it.

Along with a parade of Red Army units, demonstrations of workers, solemn meetings and gala concerts in Kazan, a people’s holiday Sabantuy was also timed to the day of celebration of the first anniversary of formation of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. In 1925, the republican commission recommended to time celebrations of Sabantuy and Djien to the fifth anniversary of the republic everywhere possible. Gradually, it became a common practice.

In the 1920s and 30s, as well as in other parts of the country, there was extensive work on propaganda and widespread implementation of other Soviet holidays, such as the anniversary of the October Revolution, May Day, International Women’s Day, and others. In newspapers, magazines and specialized publications, there were articles in the native language that plainly explained the essence of holidays and collections of poems and songs that were recommended for use during the festivities. At the same time, these years were characterized by the intensification of atheistic education and the struggle against the religious rites and holidays [Urazmanova, 1984, pp. 8–9]. All this contributed to the fact that, in the pre-war years, Soviet holidays were widely included in people’s everyday life and religious ones gradually lost their positions.

However, due to the generation that had received full religious education in the pre–October period, unregistered Islamic communities had the so-called ‘mullahs without the mosque’, who knew well the tenets of Islam and its rites. In almost every Tatar village, there was a man or a group of people who was able to hold religious services according to all Islamic canons, including festive ones. These continued to be held in someone’s home, or in the territory near cemeteries if weather conditions permitted it. Although it had lost its mass character, during all Soviet years, families continued to observe the special fasting Uraza, during which it was forbidden to eat and drink, etc. in the daytime. Although a very small part of Tatars observed the fast, it became quite common to hold a special dinner, Aviz Açu. On a day of fasting, people invited guests for dinner, that...
started after the sunset, at which they read the Quran, prayed and talked on religious subjects. Among those who were invited, as a rule, there were those who did not observe the fast, mostly they were young families.

People rarely made a rite of immolation on celebration of Korban Gaete. However, in this month, part of those who had not spent Aviz Açu, sought to invite the elderly (men or women) on the so-called ‘Kartlar Aş’, rituals of which resembled Aviz Açu and which could be held at any time of the day. Holding such dinners was typical for both villagers and towns-

men. [Urazmanova, 2000, p. 132].

Due to the impossibility of public celebration, the religious holidays became private and ‘chamber’. Families with the elderly tried to prepare a festive meal and use halal products, permitted by Sharia. And even those who did not put deep religious meaning in these events had these meals with pleasure and on such occasions often tried to give Sadaqah, that is, money, food or things to elderly, orphans or deprived ones: everyone who 'knows how to pray'.

In the 1950–1960s, the Tatar people still kept the tradition of naming religious festivals and elements related to them by means of the Arabic word 'gaet': gaet namazi, gaet koymagi. By the early 1990s, this tradition was almost completely lost.

Among all significant (blessed) dates of the Islamic calendar, Mawlid, the holiday of the 'Birth of the Prophet' Muhammad [Islam, p. 78], widely celebrated since the 1960s, still was the most important one. On the one hand, these were the years of a relatively calm atheistic propaganda. On the other hand, families were accumulating their own incomes. Mawlid was celebrated in the form of a home dinner with traditional ritual reading of verses of the Quran and activities related to it. Thus, the Islamic holidays, which were the elements of the lifestyle of the past with a strong emotional component, turned into symbols that marked out elements of ethnic (national) culture, designed to emphasize its uniqueness and originality, for the majority of the Tatars in Soviet times.

Out of all traditional people’s holiday, only Sabantuy remained in Tatars’ everyday culture. This holiday not only preserved its own specific features but also expanded its functions. It was during this period when Sabantuy became an ethnic, Tatar people’s festival in contrast to the actively implemented Soviet holidays of 'the red calendar', inculcated by the state. At this stage, there appeared a distinctive ethnic-integrating function of the holiday. The Tatars who had not celebrated it in the past, including the Siberian Tatars, began to [Sibirskie tatary', 2002, pp. 134, 135].

The industrialisation of the country caused a significant outflow of country people to the cities and industrial centers. In places where a great amount of Tatars came to as a result of the migration process, for example, in Moscow, Tashkent, St. Petersburg, Samara, the industrial cities of the Urals, Siberia, etc., Sabantuy became an all-Tatar people’s holiday. Researchers into the everyday lives of Nizhny Tagil workers in the 1960s wrote about it. They rightly pointed out that celebration of Sabantuy, which had been celebrated there for many years, was a good example of the fact that folk tradition was alive in those days, and it could be successfully used for creating an interesting public holiday; and finally, it was very important that the festive customs of one people could be used for bringing together those of different nationalities, for developing sense of patriotism and internationalism [Krupyan-

skaya, Budina, Polischuk, Yukhneva, 1974, p. 142]. Moreover, T. Zolotova, a researcher in the festive culture of the Russians of Western Siberia, notes that in the 1970s and 1980s in the northern part of region, people started calling the holiday celebrated in early June 'Sabantuy'. This holiday combined the cultural traditions of the Russians and the Tatars, the two most numerous ethnic groups of the northern areas [Zolotova, 2002, p. 167].

The command-administrative methods typical for those years, by means of which the leaders of the country held public holidays, the prevailing dictates of the Party and Soviet government bodies seeking to turn them into
These rites were often declared to be begging which was timed to the date of the formation was celebrated on Sunday, the day off generally accepted in the country. The main thing was that it was celebrated on the same day in auls and regional centres and then in selected cities. The final was Sabantuy in Kazan, which was timed to the date of the formation (proclamation) of the republic. The setting of the particular date became a prerogative of the leadership of the republic. The specially appointed commission on this issue organized and held the celebration at the local level: it drew up a holiday program and appointed people responsible for this or that event. The form, justified under the new conditions, prompted by the festival’s geographical expansion, became mandatory even for villages, having replaced the century-old principle of organization on the basis of voluntary participation in this work, which was an honorable duty of the aqsaqals, figures of respect in the auls, and their assistants.

Thirdly, the change of the dates of the celebration led to gradual disappearance of ritual actions of the ‘preparatory part’ of the holiday, in which children took an active role. They would go to every house in the village to collect food for the preparation of a special porridge — Zără botqas, Qarğa botqas — and dyed eggs. [Urazmanova, 2001, pp. 24–37]. These rites were often declared to be begging insulting dignity and were banned as a result.

In this period, an adaptive and adapting feature of Sabantuy became apparent, and its secular character greatly contributed to it. On the one hand, the holiday adapted to the radically changed political and socio-economic conditions with minimal losses. On the other hand, it adopted many innovations, including global urban cultural elements, the details of which had become available due to the Tatars mobility, wide media network, and television from the latter half of the 20th century. In this period, some of them became traditional ‘Sabantuy competitions’.

These were numerous competitions in agility, courage, skill, that were rather more entertaining than sport, thus creating a relaxed atmosphere of the festival’s fun.

In Soviet times, a single (unified) holiday structure came about due to various ‘recommendations’ and ‘guides’ for the Sabantuy celebration developed by the Propaganda Department of the Party’s Tatar Regional Committee, the Republican scientific methodical center of folk art and the cultural and educational work of the Ministry of culture of the TASSR.

During the ritual festivities, there appeared an official part, typical for the majority of celebrations of that time, with the compulsory greeting speech of one of the representatives of the ‘governing bodies’, flag raising and celebration in honour of the leaders of industry. On the initiative of the developers of the methodological materials, there were proposed and introduced common rules for judging wrestling with towels (körüş), which is one of the main events of Sabantuy [Sharaftdinov, 2004, pp. 373–377]. The diversity in the list of the events in each case varied by the inclusion of new events, that did not always maintain the spirit of the holiday and usually depended on the initiative and imagination of those responsible for holding Sabantuy.

In the cities, it was a one-day holiday, which was usually held in the market square. In the auls, it took several days of action, including a prior house-to-house collection of the gifts for contestants, the competition itself in the market place, and finally, the merrymaking for the youth in the evening. In addition, in rural areas, it was the time of inviting guests, meeting with relatives and close friends. So, this holiday incorporated the function of Đjen, the summer guest holiday of the Kazan Tatars. [Urazmanova, 2001, pp. 70–84]. And if in the cities, especially the large ones, the funds for holiday expenditures, including the purchase of prizes, came from the city budget and various factories, in rural areas, the collection of gifts was usually done in the traditional way.
The revolutionary reorganization of life touched the sphere of family relations. Significant changes occurred in the structure and essence of family and household rituals. Years of prohibition of the religion and its rites led to phenomenon interesting in its nature. As the official marriage, birth and death registrations were given to the state bodies, there appeared a more deliberate attitude towards these rites as religious and ethnic ones, and for a certain category of people, in particular non-believers, as just ethnic rites, which emerged from deep in the past. This led to the emergence of two types of meals in the everyday life of the Tatars: traditional dinners held according to the rituals, and dinners held in a new way. The first type, which is called kartlar aşı, ollar aşı, is a special dinner for the elderly. Reading of the Quran, various prayers, giving handout (sadaqah), as well as the order of serving traditional dishes and absence of alcoholic beverages were kept at this type of dinner. Often men and women were treated separately (or either men or women were invited), which was considered an observance of Islamic tradition.

The special dinner of the second type greatly contrasted with the first one. Guests were invited in couples, men and women, new dishes were served, including a variety of snacks and alcoholic drinks. These feasts were accompanied by the performance of various songs (solo and in chorus) and dancing. They appeared in the late 1920s–early 1930s, when an active propaganda of new non-religious ceremonies, for example, marriage registration of young couples, the so-called 'Red Wedding' (qızıl tuya), held in public at the club [Urazmanova, 1984, pp. 84–86].

From the 1930s to 1960s, one could observe a sharp reduction in the number of traditional wedding ceremonies. Yağışp çğü, 'elopement', that was previously condemned, became common. At night, the young man, with the consent of his chosen one, took the girl to his place, often he took her from gatherings at the club, and invited his friend and the close friend of the bride as witnesses.

On the following day, the girl’s parents were informed of her whereabouts. Then, the couple invited them, along with elderly relatives and neighbours, to a feast, at which nikah was performed. People began to call this wedding feast 'nikah tu, ollar tue', a wedding for the seniors. The presence of the young at this feast was purely voluntary. This wedding feast was (became) a demonstrative act of the formation of the beginning of married life. In those years, the registration of the marriage in the marriage RO, introduced by one of the first decrees of the Soviet power was not considered to be enough to legitimate the marriage in the public’s eyes, especially in rural areas. The wedding feast, timed to any public holiday or day off, was held in the house of the groom. It was held according to the new ritual.

This feast was called 'qızıl tuya', 'yağışlar tuya'. Thus, having emerged as a club event, the 'red wedding' became a component of Tatar wedding ceremonies. Gradually, it becomes the main wedding feast, mainly in cases when the marriage was contracted by means of match-making, and a traditional wedding ritual was maintained, albeit it was shorter.

Since the 1960s, there began a new stage in the development of the wedding ceremony.

The functions of this ceremony changed, and it acquired other highlights. Now, its main function was to create an unusual, festive atmosphere, which emphasized the importance of this moment in lives of the young couple and their relatives. This was achieved by means of 'the official marriage registration', conducted by public authorities, and wedding feasts. The rest of the elements of the marriage ritual did not have a great deal of significance, and although they granted the weddings their own originality, the length and order of events were not so crucial.

In rural areas, there was a relatively large variety of options, especially in the peripheral regions, where one could previously observe a complex ritual with lots of guests’ visits [The Tatars, 2001, pp. 340–347]. In cities with multistorey buildings, the weddings were held in a more simplified and typical fashion. However,
there were a number of features typical for all wedding ceremonies.

The unified pre-wedding cycle is very interesting. Notification and the agreement of the girl’s parents for the upcoming marriage, after the young people decided to get married, became obligatory.

This act often was the moment when families of the couple got to know each other better. This change of the matchmaking functions was typical not only for the Tatars but also for other peoples [Lobacheva, 1975, p. 17; Zhirmova, 1980, p. 99; Zorin, 2001, p. 78].

The ritual of solemn marriage registration, its active promotion and legislative consolidation contributed to the awareness of the importance and necessity of the act of state marriage registration not only from a legal point of view. Solemn marriage registration became an important, the most vivid and emotionally intense part of the wedding ceremony. There appeared the conventional wedding clothes: the long white dress and white shoes for the bride, which as a rule, she wore just once, and a dark suit with a white shirt for the groom. Now the couple also bought the wedding rings. This was a new phenomenon for Tatars. In cities, there appeared special services of the RO, which organized wedding celebrations and offered services of a toastmaster, the master of ceremonies of the wedding celebrations who wrote the scenario of the celebration, and manufactures of wedding attributes: special ribbons for witnesses, bridal bouquets, photo albums, etc.

The popularity of this ritual could be demonstrated by the fact that in rural areas, where there were no wedding palaces as in the cities, the newly-weds themselves, their relatives and friends were not only active participants but also the creators of the festive, solemn atmosphere at the marriage registration.

In each region, first, in the cities, and then, in the rural areas, there gradually appeared special places, certain routes that were visited by the wedding procession after the registration of the marriage.

At wedding feasts and banquets, the guests were divided according to their age, and this tradition was firmly kept.

The wedding feast for the elderly, kartlar tue or olllar tue, was traditionally held at the bride’s home. Sometimes, it was held at groom’s house, but this was rare. Its typical feature was not only the age of the majority of the guests but also the ritual itself: no alcoholic beverages, traditional dishes, etc.

The key point of this feast at bride’s house was the performing of nikah, a religious ceremony of marriage. However, in those years, it completely lost its legal value, and its ritual was simplified as much as possible. Thus, by the 1980s, there even were no mentions of one of the most important requirements of nikah, the mähr, the marriage gift that the groom gave to the bride. Moreover, people started to call this wedding feast olllar tue, or kartlar tue, thus emphasising the age of the guests and not the essence of the celebration. Mainly, it was due to the open prohibition, which sometimes was tacit, of the performance of religious rites in the Soviet state with its atheism. The rite was maintained by the tradition as an element of the Tatar wedding ceremony and as an act of public recognition of the appearance of a new family. On the part of the newly-weds, it was an act of respect for the elders, who, by virtue of age and beliefs, could not be active participants of the main wedding: tuy, siy, qızıl tuy.

In the countryside, wedding ceremonies were still held at the club sometimes. In the cities, the wedding ceremonies were held at dining rooms, cafes, restaurants or ceremonial halls.

The style of the wedding feast itself changed due to the inclusion of game elements. Some of them were taken from the wedding customs of the peoples of our country; others, from the practices of the amusement’s organizers. The spreading of these elements was fast because of the people’s mobility, rural and urban residents’ participation in weddings and interethnic marriages alike.

The wedding night and its preparation ceased to be the important elements of the wedding ceremony.

In general, the process of the unification and contraction of the wedding rituals was going on everywhere. The ceremony embraced
many common, not only pan–Russian but also international elements.

One of the clearest indicators of changes in the life of the Tatars can be a sharp rejection of Islamic names and an intensive search for new ones, a process typical from the middle of the 1920s and 1930s. Moreover, the new names were given not only to newborns, but adults also changed their names if they wished.

The new names were completely opposite to the old ones in their lexical and semantic properties: there were the names of outstanding figures (Engel’, Telman, Frunze), geographical names (Kazbek, Ural, El’brus, Marseille’, Rome), the names based on the names of the planets (Venera, Mars), minerals (Brilliant, E’nzhe, Rubin), flowers (Rezeda, Rosa, Siren’, Landy’sh). Abbreviated ‘revolutionary’ names as Vil’ (Vladimir Ilyich Lenin), Leniza (Lenin’s precepts) Lenar (Lenin’s Army), Runar (revolution destroys the ethnic strife), Damir and Damira (Long live peace!), Izil’ (Lenin’s covenants performer), etc. became very widespread in those years [Sattarov, 1981, pp. 17–18]. Gradually, these names were perceived as Tatar names, and they became widespread in the villages.

Already in the 1930s, there were attempts to carry out a new rite of naming. So, on 22 June 1924, the newspaper ‘Red Tataria’ published the following message in this regard: ‘The octobering of a Tatar worker’s newborn was held at the tram park club in Kazan. The girl was named Trotskino after the leader of the Red Army. A greeting telegram was sent to comrade Trotsky. There was a performance at the evening’.

At the same time, these celebrations played a certain role in the struggle against religious ceremonies in general, and in particular against the Islamic rite of naming ‘isem kısu’, as well as against other various magic rites. Only a few or even a couple of old men, who knew the religious rite, were invited to isem kısu. The official registration of the newborn, which was a simple issue of the document, was conducted at the rural council or RO.

In the Soviet years, the ceremonies associated with childbirth, on the one hand, main-

tained the traditional customs, rituals and celebrations, that emphasized the joy of the family and relatives on this occasion. On the other hand, they transformed this important family event into celebration with the participation of a wider segment of people, co-workers, public organizations.

Traditionally, a new mother was visited by relatives and friends, who presented her with food and a gift for the child.

If a woman worked at a factory, her colleagues would certainly visit her and give her a present. In addition, it became a custom to visit new mother together. Friends and acquaintances agreed in advance on the day of the visit and informed the new mother. They brought food and organized a feast. Women were accompanied by their husbands. They bought the present together: it could be a bassinet, baby carriage, etc.

There appeared a celebration in baby’s honour — bäbi tue — to which numerous guests were invited: relatives, acquaintances, work colleagues. Most often bäbi tue was celebrated in the firstborn or long-awaited child’s honour (whether boy or girl) and was set to any holiday of the ‘red calendar’ (a non-working day).

The struggle against religion led to the fact that by the 1960s and 70s, the religious ceremony of name-giving, isem kısu, became uncommon even in rural areas, where traditional forms of life were more stable. Informants noted with regret that there remained no men who knew how to perform it. The number of those performing circumcision reduced as well. Thus, based on a questionnaire conducted in Almetyevsk, it reduced more than three times just from 1950 to 1965 [Urazmanova, 2000, p. 103].

In urban areas, there were fewer special rituals associated with a newborn. Young parents living far from their relatives often performed neither isem kısu nor bäbi tue. They thought that isem kısu was unnecessary because the child was already registered at the register office, and the name was found. And leading the celebration of bäbi tue, as any other holiday feast, demanded a certain amount of work,
that a young mother was not always able to do. However, in these years, there appeared new celebrations, held with participation of public organizations. They widened the circle of persons involved in this important moment of the life of a family.

Parents with a newborn were invited to the club, specially decorated with posters, pictures of a happy childhood, and sayings of famous people about the mother and motherhood. The public representatives of the factory where the parents (mother) worked were also invited. The deputy of the (rural) city Council, one of the mothers of many children, and the colleagues that came to the celebration addressed the parents of the newborn with the words of greeting. A worker of the register office or the deputy, an honoured, respected figure, congratulated the parents and handed them a birth certificate. Congratulations alternated with performances of amateur actors, 'October Children' and Young Pioneers of the local school or kindergarten. The presentation of a small gift was an obligatory point of the celebration. It was quite common to present an envelope, or sack, inside which there would be a letter, an October pin, a Pioneer tie as well as greetings from the Executive Committee printed on a special form or a postcard. The parents of all newborns for a certain period of time were also invited to these evenings. Most often, they were held every three months, six months, or once a year.

Organizers noted that parents willingly participated in these holidays and remembered them with pleasure for a long time [Urazmanova, 1984, pp. 114–116]. Nevertheless, these celebrations did not become a widespread tradition.

During the Soviet era, all funeral and memorial rites continued to maintain the traditional ritual. The burial portion itself, the washing and dressing of the deceased, digging the grave, and specific requirements for the behaviour of living ones in this situation, was specified in Sharia and corresponded to these rules. Funeral rites are associated with the ethnic, Turkic history of the people. It was perceived as Tatar, Islamic in this set of identities. Its changes consisted in reducing the strictness of observ-
suitable example. There is no analogy for it in Tatar traditional everyday life.

The emergence of the birthday celebration and its wide spread occurrence were a Soviet phenomenon because of its active atheist propaganda. This stood in contrast to the religious doctrine of the impermanence of mortal life (‘a servant of God’) and was directed at the confirmation of the self-value of life and gave a person an opportunity to become aware of himself as an individual.

It appeared in the post-war years and became a widespread custom from the 1970s. Townsmen, especially intelligentsia, were the first who began to celebrate birthdays. Fairly quickly, this phenomenon spread among all social groups of the population, including the rural areas.

Home celebration included birthday greetings, gift giving, a dinner party, to which one often invited relatives and friends. Under the influence of fiction, films and television, the Tatars began to place candles on the cake according to the number of years of the person’s age, especially at children’s birthday parties.

It is interesting to note that this absolutely family celebration also attained a collective form of celebration.

People began to celebrate their birthdays with their fellow workers. In the course of research, we became acquainted with the lives of work teams and socialist labour brigades. It was typical that they almost always remembered the dates of companions’ birthdays. The person whose birthday was celebrated was congratulated with special bulletins that were posted and colleagues sent flowers at his or her workplace. At companies, it became customary to celebrate the employees jubilee birthdays (50, 55, and 60 years). On this occasion, the order with the announcement of gratitude was issued, and the person got a gift or a money reward. The ones who particularly excelled were presented with an honourary diploma in the name of the enterprise or the superior organization. Foremost workers and holders of an order were honoured at the special place of honour that was called ‘the Red Corner’. The participants of the amateur talent groups devoted their performances to the person whose jubilee was being celebrated. On the occasion of the anniversaries of especially famous workers, Heroes of Socialist Labor, for example, in the worker township Aznakayevvo, they began to issue special brochures describing their life and labour achievements. In particular, such a brochure published in 1978 was dedicated to the Hero of Socialist Labor Garay Bagmanov, a native of Aznakayevvo, who was a renowned builder of steel scaffolding.

Following the example of the working groups, such celebrations began to be organized in the countryside as well. In the summer of 1963 in the village of Uzybak in Leninogorsk region, we were participants of the evening dedicated to the 70th anniversary of the kolkhoz member Shaykhraz Galiev. At the club in the villagers’ presence, the heads of the kolkhoz and representatives from the district center warmly congratulated him and presented gifts. The celebration continued with relatives and close friends. The collective farmers greeted the honouring of an ordinary worker with great interest. In the following years, such celebrations were not uncommon.

In many villages, all workers and pensioners of the village received greeting cards on behalf of the government, the party and local kolkhoz committees on their birthday. Sometimes such congratulations were placed on special stands in the building of the kolkhoz board. Undoubtedly, such celebrations generally had a positive effect on camaraderie, were an indicator of a good microclimate in the workplace.

Celebrations of the so-called ‘silver and golden wedding anniversaries’ were new, all-Soviet events in family ceremonies of the Tatars. Kömäş tuy and altn tuy were the 25th anniversary and the 50th anniversary of family life, celebrations of which appeared in the latter half of the 20th century. As a rule, the couple themselves organized their ‘silver wedding anniversary’, but their ‘golden wedding anniversary’ was usually organized by their children. These celebrations were held in the
form of family feasts, at which guests congratulated the heroes of the day and presented them with expensive gifts.

Typically, in the countryside, these family feasts were usually preceded by a collective celebration in the couples’ honour at the club. Sometimes these celebrations were held for several couples at the same time. Such celebrations attracted the general attention of the fellow villagers and usually turned into real holidays, granting wonderful memories not only to the heroes of the day and their families but also to all the villagers who took part in the celebration.

In cities, such celebrations were held at register offices and wedding palaces. The initiators of them were representatives of public organizations, groups in which people celebrating their jubilee worked. The couple, accompanied by children, grandchildren, relatives and friends, came to the place of celebration at the set time. Specific facts of the couple’s life were mentioned at the ceremony, having a deep emotional effect on all the participants. The names of the husband and wife were registered in special books of 'silver and golden wedding anniversaries', in which they put their signatures; there was music in their honour and the couple was presented with gifts. Such celebrations were held everywhere in our country [Rogozina, 1973, p. 38].

In many Tatar families both in cities and rural areas, it has become customary to congratulate and give presents to women on International Women’s Day and to congratulate men, even if they did not serve in the military, on 23 February, Defender of the Fatherland Day. People also celebrate numerous professional holidays, which appeared in Soviet times, in particular Teachers’ Day, the Medical Workers’ Day, and the like.

All these events are still celebrated in the post-Soviet era. Personal congratulations on jubilees by means of print and electronic media in the Tatar language became very popular. In the cities, the sphere of services that offered their assistance in the organization of celebrations, including the children birthdays and various anniversaries not only in secular form but also 'according to Sharia', was expanding.
Section III

The Republic of Tatarstan and the Tatar World at the Turn of the Millennia
A NEW PAGE IN THE HISTORY OF TATARSTAN

Mintimer Shaimiev

The Soviet period in the history of Tatarstan, even though being criticized, granted a whole range of possibilities for developing the republic. The economy was enriched with the oil industry, which is now a leading field. It was the basis for the growth of petrochemical and chemical enterprises. The aviation industry and numerous machine enterprises were set up. The KamAZ became a leading enterprise in the country, and it remains so in the 21st century. Owing to the new fields, higher educational establishments and research institutes strengthened their positions. Being a semi-agrarian republic, Tatarstan became an industrial region. During the Soviet period, a slant in the profession and qualification structure of the population was overcome. Highly-qualified specialists were fostered in the Tatar environment practically in all aspects of life. This was to lead to positive consequences later in the years of perestroika when international relations were quite tense. Climbing up the career ladder did not have a political character and the main factor for recruitment was one’s professionalism.

Despite the fact that Tatar intellectuals suffered during the years of repressions (1937), and then lost a lot of talented people during World War II, they succeeded in bringing up a new generation of intellectuals. There were outstanding scientists, writers, composers, actors, artists. The elder generation that managed to live in the conditions of the doomed democracy of the 1920s, handed the spirit of freedom on to the youth, and in many aspects this became the spiritual sustenance that appeared in the years of perestroika.

Meanwhile, the Soviet regime found ways to restrain the republic’s potential. The autonomous status of Tatarstan was considered by the population as an obvious injustice. Infrastructure was not developed. There were no roads, gasification embraced only the cities, housing construction was kept to the minimum. Residential properties were getting shabby. Shops were half empty to the extent that people went to Moscow to buy food that they produced themselves. This shocking contrast between the quality of life in the Soviet ‘hinterlands’ and Moscow, Kiev, Minsk, Almaty, Tashkent, Bishkek, not to mention the Baltic and Transcaucasian republics, had an influence on the public mood.

The technology of peaceful production in the USSR was clearly behind that of the West. All efforts were hurled into the arms race. The militarization and the monopolization of economy took on threatening proportions, and Tatarstan was included into this process, which led to the consequences during the transition into the market system in the 1990s.

There was a severe censorship in the cultural sphere. In the directive plan, Tatar schools were closing down and the Tatar language was mostly used only at the level of daily life. Newspapers and magazines were brought under regulation, radio- and TV-programmes in Tatar were severely limited. All this together created a negative way of thinking.

‘Glasnost’ caused a stir in the entire Soviet society. Moscow and the Baltic Countries set the pace. Being spread around the entire USSR, the motto ‘There is no other way’ seized the public mind. In Tatarstan, the main core since 1918 was the idea of sovereign rebirth. From the late 1980s to the early 1990s, it was expressed in the demand to provide Tatarstan with union status. It seemed to everyone that the problem was in the inferiority of autonomy. In many aspects this was true.
However, a rapid development of events demonstrated that the Union republics were not satisfied with their status either. Then the idea of the sovereignty of the republics became dominant.

Sovereignty in international law is considered in a very wide sense, although it is traditionally related to independence. In Tatarstan after long-lasting discussions, where the dispersed opinions supported either gaining independence or keeping the current autonomous status, they found a compromising formula that was later included into the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan. The fundamental law of the Republic of Tatarstan states:

'The sovereignty of the Republic of Tatarstan is expressed in possessing the entire state power (legislative, executive and judicial) out of the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and out of the authorities of the Russian Federation in the fields of the joint jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan and is an inexorable quality of the Republic of Tatarstan'.

This formula corresponds to the the Constitution of the Russian Federation¹, which is why the order of the Constitutional Court (27 June 2000, no.92-0), by which the conception of sovereignty can be related exclusively to the Constitution of the Russian Federation and cannot refer to the republics, was obviously a politically charged decision. In the federative state, the authority was divided, which means that there is a 'divided sovereignty'.

In the beginning, the sovereignty of Tatarstan also meant that the republic was subject to international law. However, later, after tough discussions, it was eliminated from the official documents, although the Republic of Tatarstan continued its international activities on a quite high level.

On 30 August 1990, the 'Declaration of state sovereignty of the Republic of Tatarstan' was adopted. The declaration was announced after the admission of the 'Declaration of state sovereignty' by the Russian Federation, which presupposed the rights of the peoples for 'the self-determination within the national-state and national-cultural forms elected by them' (p.4). It became the basis for Tatarstan admitting a set of constructive steps and opened the possibility for developing its own politics.

In the political plan, the republic came across some complicated questions that required its solution. Firstly, the status of the Tatar language, secondly, the participation in the 'Union treaty' as an independent subject together with the Russian Federation, thirdly, developing relations with the Russian Federation on the basis of an agreement. The declaration of the state sovereignty of the republic of Tatarstan adopted Tatar and Russian as the state languages. This decision was principally important for the Tatar population, although it caused the objection from the side of the opposition. The compromise meant that on the political level there was an agreement to provide Tatar with a state language status and to initiate the negotiations with the Union centre.

By the proposal of the delegation of Tatarstan at the congress of the people's deputies of the USSR, there were changes in Article 71 of the USSR Constitution, which admitted autonomous republics as the members of the Federation Council, together with the Union republics.

The issue of the form of the participation of Tatarstan in developing and concluding the Union treaty became the most principal. The Russian Federation insisted on the participation of the republics in the Russian Federation delegation. The Republic of Tatarstan supported another position, which was expressed in the order of the Supreme Council of the Tatarskaya SSR 'On the plan of the Union agreement'. Point 2 contained a principal position that the republican parliament: 'In accordance with the Declaration of the sovereignty of the Republic of the Tatarskaya SSR, 30 August 1990, and the Act of the USSR, 26 April 1990, "On the division of powers between the USSR and the subjects of the federation" announced about its readiness to be a co-founder of the USSR, to sign independently the Union treaty and to accept all the obligations coming out of it' [Khakimov, Belaya kniga, 1996, p.7].

This position required the regulation of the relations with the Russian Federation. The political situation in Kazan, Naberezhnye Chelny, Nizhnekamsk and other cities at the early 1990s was quite tense. There were regular meetings of many thousands, where the independence of Tatarstan was demanded. A lot of deputies supported this position. This is demonstrated by the fact that adopting the order of the Supreme Council of the Tatarskaya SSR 'On the Act of state independence of the Republic of Tatarstan', in accordance with which it was assigned to the Cabinet of Ministers within a month to present the Supreme Council of the Tatarskaya SSR an assessment and projection concerning the changes in the political, legal, social and economic position of the Republic of Tatarstan after adopting the Act of state sovereignty [Khakimov, Belaya kniga, 1996, p.11]. Meanwhile, the declaration of independence was related to the national referendum of 'the citizens of the Republic of Tatarstan about the state status of the Republic of Tatarstan' [Khakimov, Belaya kniga, 1996, p.12].

The political situation was quite serious, proved by the fact of the adoption of the 'Declaration of the entrance of the Republic of Tatarstan into the Commonwealth of Independent States', where it is noted that the republic announces its entry into the CIS 'as a co-founder' [Khakimov, Belaya kniga, 1996, p.12].

The political situation became smoother owing to the negotiations between the delegations of the Republic of Tatarstan and the Russian Federation, where some success was gained. With great difficulty, 15 August 1991, the Protocols after consultations was signed. It contained intentions about the necessity 'to start from the use of the agreed forms regulating relations between the Russian Federative Socialist Republic and the Republic of Tatarstan, taking into account their primary interests without damaging the interests of other republics and the Union in general' [Khakimov, Belaya kniga, 1996, p.32]. It was the first document in contemporary history signed between Moscow and Kazan, and it initiated the negotiations of concluding the Treaty about dividing powers between both sides. On 22 January 1992, an important stage was reached with the signing of an Agreement between the Russian Federation Government and the Government of the Republic of Tatarstan regarding economic cooperation.

To strengthen the status of the republic, it is difficult to overestimate the significance of the referendum of 21 March 1992. From the very beginning of the negotiating process between the Centre and the Republic of Tatarstan, 12 August 1991, the delegation of the Russian Federation posed a question about the legitimacy of the powers of the delegation of the Republic of Tatarstan. In Moscow, there was an active fight between the democratic powers and the communists. Tatarstan seemed unmanageable for many politicians as if it were a non-democratic subject, following Soviet traditions. There was an obvious misunderstanding in the centre about the processes taking place on the spot. Work was actually being carried out in the interests of the population, and it could be confirmed by a referendum. The source of rights is the people. We appealed to our population in order for them to speak out their attitude on the basis of free expression towards the declaration of state sovereignty adopted by the parliament of the republic.

The relations between Moscow and Kazan on the eve of the referendum reached rock bottom. The republic was bombarded with posters and leaflets with the call for voting against the question of the referendum. 'Do you agree that the Republic of Tatarstan is a sovereign state, a subject of international law, building up its relations with the Russian Federation and other republic on the basis of equal treaties?'

All the powerful bodies in Russia were absolutely against the referendum. It was totally unclear to us why and for what reason they are trying to deprive us of consulting the people in a very democratic way.

Precisely before the referendum, B.Yeltsin made a speech addressing the population of Tatarstan and called for boycotting the referendum. I had to speak out with the call for actively supporting the referendum question. Tension was rising. It came up to the moment that all the polling stations in the Republic of Tatarstan were sent an order by the Russian Federation Prosecutor,
warning about criminal responsibility in case of their opening for voting. However, by the morning of the referendum day, all 2611 polling stations were opened.

The results of the referendum demonstrated that both the Tatars and the Russians voted for the status of the republic. The received results (62%) proved that the people trusted the elected president and the deputies. After the referendum results, there were no objections from any political powers or the population. The results of the voting were accepted by everyone, and the republic reached the inter-ethnic and political stability, in general. The well-organized referendum with the participation of the observers from the Russian Federation and international organizations became an important argument in the following negotiations.

Confirming the status of the republic by the general voting became a basis for developing a new constitution of Tatarstan, which was adopted by the Parliament in 1992. The fundamental act became one of the basic documents for preparing the project of a bilateral treaty.

The negotiations were carried out with a huge difficulty and breaks as each party was looking for additional arguments in its favour. In 1993, the authority of the centre proposed the project of a new constitution of the Russian Federation, which was discussed at the Constitutional meeting. The President of the Republic of Tatarstan and the Chairperson of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan appealed to the President of the Russian Federation with a proposal 'on the institutionalization in the Fundamental Act of the Russian Federation the provision about the contractual constitutional relations between the Republic of Tatarstan and the Russian Federation – Russia'. However, an official reply was not received. The republican delegation left the Constitutional meeting. Later there were bilateral consultations about introducing the amendments into the project of the Russian Federation Constitution in order to take it account the Tatarstan's position. As a result, the fundamental act of the Russian Federation was added with a quite important point (Art.11 p.3) which states: 'The division of jurisdiction and the authorities between the Russian Federation state power bodies and the bodies of the state power of the subjects of the Russian Federation is carried out by the current Constitution, the federative or other documents about the division of jurisdiction and authorities' [Constitution of the Russian Federation, 1993].

Article 11 contained a principally important phrase for Tatarstan about 'other documents' as it introduced the means of concluding bilateral treaties. Obviously, there were a lot of discussions about Point 3 Article 11 later, but at that moment it was a brilliant victory of the republic in protecting its rights for independence in forming federative relations. It should be noted that the Constitution of the Russian Federation was fixed as an international legal norm about 'legal equality and self-awareness of peoples', which strengthened the positions of the delegation of the Republic of Tatarstan.

The negotiations about concluding a bilateral treaty came up to their final stage. An important argument in concluding the treaty was the fact that in 1992 the republic did not sign the federative treaty for a series of reasons. In particular, by that time the republic had actually had more rights than was provided by the federative treaty, which in fact was a typical agreement between the centre and the subjects about dividing the authorities. The following events proved the rightness of the position of the Republic of Tatarstan. The federal treaty failed to be implemented and it was soon forgotten.

At the same time, Tatarstan needed to enter the general legal area of Russia. On 15 February 1994, the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan 'On the division of the implementation issues and the mutual delegation of the authorities between the bodies of the state power of the Russian Federation and the bodies of the state power of the Republic of Tatarstan' was signed. The situation was the following: the Federal centre was also interested, against its will, in signing the Treaty as before concluding it Tatarstan did not carry out the election to the State Duma of the Russian Federation, and the republic was not presented in the Federation Council of Russia. The treaty was a historic document and determined a change in the relations with the federal centre. Bilateral relations stabilized and became a base for successful socio-economic and cultural development in the republic.
Together with a political constituent, in the republic, a conception of social-economic development was being projected. The structural reorganization of the economy, necessary for transit into the market economy, faced difficulties because of a huge military industrial complex. Besides, the economy of the Republic of Tatarstan depended enormously on oil prices, which were subject to fluctuation, and, thus, it was complicated to develop long-term economic policy. The infrastructure of the Republic of Tatarstan was underdeveloped. There were other reasons that made obstacles for a fast transition into the market relations.

The 'shock therapy', declared by the Government of the Russian Federation, exposed the republican population to a risk and threatened people with impoverishment. The transition to the market was not supposed to bring up a negative attitude towards the market economy and to cause a distrust towards the republic authorities. That is why the Government of Tatarstan chose the path of the 'mild introduction into the market'. This meant a regulated, guided social protection of the population, gradual privatization under control of state authorities, the state's preservation of controlling stakes in budgeted enterprises. Tatarstan's independent policy during the voucher period allowed to avoid selling the republic's property at knockdown prices.

The most important tasks of economic policy were to make infrastructure close to market terms. This explains why road construction, gasification, telephone lines, liquidation of old housing, and Internet fibre optic connection projects were initiated.

An important factor of stability in production supplies during these complicated years was the policy of preserving agricultural production, gradual privatization of agricultural lands by large Tatarstan firms.

At the same time, there was a course for changing economy from selling raw oil to refining it and to developing higher technologies in general. There was a gradual expansion in processing oil, in developing the oil and chemistry industries. The percentage of higher technology production in the republic's industry was rising year by year. The policy of the 'mild introduction into the market' demonstrated its value.

An important component of the post-perestroika period was the development of Tatarstan's culture. The authorities of the Republic of Tatarstan declared that financing the development of Tatar culture would be top-priority as it had suffered during the Soviet period more than the Russian culture. The Russian population of the Republic of Tatarstan supported this opinion, which was important in order to conserve inter-ethnic concord. There were new Tatar schools, newspapers and magazines in the Tatar language, satellite TV. It was important for all the Tatars, living in the Russian Federation and the CIS. The Tatar language turned from a conversational into an official one that expanded its area of usage, including the Internet. Tatarstan initiated close contacts with the Tatars within the Russian Federation and the CIS. Together with churches, mosques were being restored around all the republic. The own Academy of Sciences was set up. An important moment in the development of culture was a change in the psychology of people: they not only felt they were the owners of the republic but also got proud of Tatarstan's success.

Owing to the 1994 Treaty, the republic could develop its external relations, coordinating its activities with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. It attracted investment into the economy and raised up the status of Tatarstan among foreign countries. Kazan turned into a place of serious international forums and sport events.

As a result of steps taken in politics, economy, the social field and culture, the republic by the end of the 20th century had become one of the most dynamically developing regions of the Russian Federation. It is no coincidence that in the early 21st century Kazan is called the third capital of Russia. It was a turning point in the historical development of the republic, and that's why the period between the early 1990s and the early 21st century, to a full extent, can be called a new page in the history of the Tatar people and Tatarstan.
CHAPTER 1
Perestroika and Socio-Political Changes in the Country
and in the Republic

§ 1. The reasons for the Social and Political Changes in the USSR
and the Course for Perestroika

Mikhail Gorbachev

By the mid-1980s, the Soviet society had come to the state of deep crisis. It was drifting into a recession. The economy had stalled. The pace of economic growth had slowed down, it was practically zero. As the world’s oil prices fell down, the financial situation deteriorated. Society was agitated with breaks in supplies and a lack of consumption goods (food as a commodity) leading to endless queues. The country, richest in resources, could not resolve the simple daily needs of its residents.

The moral and psychological atmosphere was on a downward slope. The disconnect between the growing educational level of the people, their spiritual demands and the ideological dogmas implanted by official propaganda, was drawing more and more attention to itself. The limitation of civil and political rights, the dominance of censorship and ideological pressure from propaganda resulted in hard discontent, especially among intellectuals. The social situation was becoming aggrivated. The authorities represented by the party nomenclature were becoming more distant from the people. There were calls for stopping the Party bureaucracy’s impunity and abolishing privileges for the nomenclature.

At the same time, there was a scientific and technical revolution in the capitalist world on the basis of globalisation. There were the calls that could be satisfied only by changing the society, liberating it from the strangle of bureaucratic overcentralisation. The Soviet system that had carried out a rapid development of the county at a certain period practically exhausted its capacities for mobilisation. We were late with a response to the challenges of a new scientific and technical revolution. The country was losing its position. Beginning with the early 1970s, the gap with the West, which had entered a new technological epoch, was growing more and more.

In order to come out of this situation, it was necessary to get rid of the totalitarian Stalinist legacy, to overcome the alienation of people from property and power, to open up the space for realizing the nation's creative, intellectual potential, to urge people to get interested in the results of their activities. That was the task of perestroika, with its objectives to involve working people in taking economic and political decisions. It was necessary to help people in becoming citizens with all rights and in accepting themselves as the owners of their destiny. Only by switching on 'the human factor' to full force and effect, was it possible to gradually catch up with developed countries. At first, this aim was expressed in the intention 'to speed up scientific and technical progress'. A general concept called 'perestroika' was formed later.

The other important reason for 'perestroika' was the international situation in the mid-1980s. The situation of the Cold War, lasting almost four decades, was getting more dangerous and intolerable. The arms race was rolling ahead and the threat of nuclear war was growing. Certainly, no one wanted nuclear war, but no one could guarantee that it would not happen even by some ridiculous accident.

The USSR and the USA were constantly 'targeting' each other. The arms race became
a habitual aspect of world affairs. Europe turned into a real nuclear testing ground, annually getting more saturated with rockets of different power and range. Success in miniaturizing nuclear explosives led to the 'battle-ground' nuclear weapon. The seas and oceans were full of surface and subsurface launch platforms. Not only air but also space became a field of confrontation. Both superpower countries, to a certain extent, were involved on opposite sides in regional conflicts in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.

Striving for military parity with the USA and their allies lead to the fact that 40% of the USSR budget was directed at defense expenditures, and the production of military industry came up to 20% of the GNP (in some years, from 25 to 30%), that is five-six times more than the indices of the NATO countries. A general sum of science expenditures contained up to 80% spent on military research. Military expenditures depleted the national economy, restrained the growth of quality of life. Only 8 to 10% of the main funds were spent on satisfying the people's material needs.

However, state security was not becoming more reliable as nuclear weapons are weapons of collective suicide. At the same time, exactly the accumulation of nuclear weapon and the means of its delivery became a priority goal. The scenarios that presupposed the usage of weapons of mass destruction or the threat of applying them were the basis of military doctrines adopted by both parties.

It was urgent to look for a way to resolve the deadlock. The moment required radical changes and fundamental state positions, and their practical approaches in international politics, which were dictated mostly by dogmas of world-view and not by the real life interests of the people. The aim task for us was to re-determine the country's national interests, the real parameters and imperatives of its security, to thoroughly access the main tendencies of global social development and to carry out a programme of precise actions in the main external political directions.

Here was a crossing point of internal and external motives of the course for perestroika.

Fundamental reforms were impossible without creating a favourable international environment, without being liberated from the pressing burden of enormous military expenditures. It was possible to move forward only simultaneously, both in internal and external politics. The philosophy and methodology of the course for perestroika in the union of its internal and external aspects received its ground in the conception of a new way of thinking. The starting key position of new thinking was admitting the more and more consolidating integrity of the world, the interconnection and interdependence of the states, in all their disparateness and difference. From here, there is another key position, about the priority of general human interests and values. These ideas, as known, were spoken out earlier by such outstanding scientists and philosophers as Albert Einstein, Bertrand Rassell, Niels Bor, Vladimir Vernadsky and others.

In a new situation, it was already impossible to regard the world development from the point of the fight between the two opposite social systems. ---The phenomenon that the official Soviet ideology presented as a form of class struggle on the world arena actually turned into a military and political conflict of two blocs, headed by the superpower states. The policy of an ideologically motivated confrontation was outdated. The roots of new thinking were in understanding that there could not be winners in a nuclear war, that the confrontation was supposed to be replaced with policy based on the balance of interests and equal levels of security. The theory and methodology of this new thinking was based on striving for combining politics and morality, that is moral principles in the approach to solving both internal and external problems.

Initiating perestroika as a process of democratic reforms, it was necessary to have a democratic means for implementing them. The main way to involve people in politics, to make them used to the reforms was the intention of glasnost from the very beginning. For the governors of the state, it meant to tell the truth about the state of the country and the world. For the people, it meant saying
what you think, including, more often than not, saying what might be unpleasant for the leadership. Thus, a feedback from the people cropped up. The denial of the ideological repressions and censorship led to the fact that glasnost grew in real freedom of speech and of press, and became an important weapon for democratizing different aspects of life.

Perestroika spread across the economy. It started from a gradual transition of a part of enterprises into self-supporting relations, from a collective contract, renting, especially in agriculture, from the expansion of corporations as forms of entrepreneurship. From the beginning of 1988, the act about enterprises came into power. As a result of it, all the enterprises were to turn into self-supporting relations, to become independent economic subjects and to act on the basis of self-repaying and self-financing. Respectively, the management system was being reformed: the functions of ministries were limited and changed; planning shifted from being directive to becoming advisory and prognostic. There was a transition to new principles of price formation, combining market mechanisms with state regulation.

The reforms were confronted by a significant part of the managerial staff and the party nomenclature, the interests of which were greatly influenced. Economic reform was stuck. The measures to update the staff did not give significant results. The order of the day was a task of political reforms and a change in the power system. The logics of the social development dictated the necessity to hand power from the party monopoly to the Soviet, to which it was supposed to belong by the Constitution. The state was to get reformed from being 'communistic ideocratic' to 'soviet'. The crucial events in this direction were the elections of the People's Deputies of the USSR, held for the first time in the Soviet history on the alternative basis, and the first Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR (May-June, 1989).

The construction of the Congress as a new supreme power body and its activities depicted urgent problems and contradictions of the Union state transformation. Being formally a federation, the USSR actually had turned into a unitary state. All the main decisions were taken by central authorities in Moscow. The republics could deal with only around 10-15% of the economy on their territories. Overcentralization was ruining local initiative. The Congress of People's Deputies was called for not only starting the institutional fundamentals of the society and state democratization but also for becoming a huge step in changing a unitary state into a real democratic federation. Such a form of the supreme power as the Congress of People's Deputies, elected directly in the republics, was supposed to raise up the status of the latter, their voice in the Union.

The power flow from the party to the Soviets that had had from the start a national-ethnic 'context' in a sense 'legalized' the requirements for more independence from the side of the Union and autonomous republics. Glasnost and democratization of social life put the 'Stalinist cap' off the problems of multi-ethnic relations. However, the inner dangers for perestroika did not receive an appropriate assessment. In general, the national problems in the Union seemed to have been solved. This mistaken opinion turned into a serious delay in taking the required steps for neutralizing the threat of nationalism and separatism. The signs of trouble were getting more frequent. The movement of the Crimean Tatars for coming back to their homeland became organized. Condemning a violent re-settlement of the Crimean Tatars in 1944, we could not but take into account that for the last 40 years the ethno-demographic situation in the Crimea had radically changed. The problems of other illegally repressed peoples – Volga Germans, Balkars, Chechens, Ingushes, Karachays, Kalmyks – were also very urgent.

At the beginning of 1988, the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan for Nagorno-Karabakh began. In February, there were bloody pogroms against Armenians in Sumgait (not far from Baku). Events were threatening to escalate into a religious conflict which could spread outside the Transcaucasia. There were other growing processes, quieter
by form but no less important, in the Baltic republics, in Moldavia, Georgia, similar events were taking place in Middle Asia and Ukraine. In different regions, there were more frequent questions about the language of the indigenous peoples, economic sovereignty, the expansion of rights.

The main basis of these processes was the growth of the national self-awareness of the Union's peoples, a kind of national renaissance, for which the policy of glasnost and democratization opened a huge space. The problem of national relations acquired an independent significance. It was necessary to re-access the legislation regulating the interaction of the Union and the republics, to clarify or to re-define the status, rights and obligations of the Union and autonomous republics, other national formations. In particular, at the 19th party conference, it was declared that within the formed structure of the Union state it was necessary to provide a maximum account of the interests of each nation and ethnic group, the entire community of the USSR peoples in such a sensitive field as multiculturalism.

A multi-ethnic structure of the Soviet state added specific features to a political reform. The problems of the relations between the Centre (Federation) and the republics became top-priority. It was decided, within the following stage of the political reform, to develop on the basis of the constitutional norms a system of state legal mechanisms, regulating these relations inside the Union State. The necessity to develop the agreement principle of building the Union became obvious. This brought about the issue of a new Union treaty.

A new Union treaty was demanded, first of all, to support political, social, economic interests of the Union republics and the protection of their sovereign rights in the Union SSR. At the same time, the project of reforming the Soviet federation also presupposed the adoption of the status of the Soviet autonomies: expanding the rights of the autonomous republics in all the fields of state, economy and cultural construction, strengthening their economic independence as well as expanding the autonomous regions and districts.

At the discussions about the national issue, there were complicated questions about the concept of sovereignty and the interpretation of its content, the division of the authorities of the USSR and the republican federation subjects, self-supporting relations at different levels down to the local one, the guarantees of the usage of the USSR national languages, the right of the republics to leave the Union. The conception of new agreement relations that would respond the formed realities and demands of the federation development, was coming into the world on the gridiron. It was necessary to predict a differentiation and a bigger flexibility of federative relation taking into account specific conditions and possibilities of each republic. While these problems were being discussed, in the republics there was more and more passion for 'sovereignty', an intention to 'stake' out its claim without the registration required for its legal validity before the conclusion of a new treaty. The destructive powers that were speculating on the the demands of independence got activated and played with separatist sentiments.

The situation was extremely deteriorated by the decisions of the first Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR. At the Congress, Yeltsin offered a provocative conception of sovereignty, by which 'the first sovereignty belongs to a person, then to an enterprise, a kolkhoz, a sovkhoz, any other organization...'. The Congress appointed Yeltsin as the Chairperson of the Supreme Soviet, accepted the Declaration concerning the state sovereignty of the RSFSR, and, as the curtain fell, adopted the Yeltsin's provision, releasing the RSFSR ministers and a range of important ministries and bodies from subordination to the Union government. These actions, explicitly aimed at destroying the Union, urged the other republics to take the same steps and provoked the so-called 'parade of sovereignties'.

Yeltsin promised the autonomous republics 'absolutely all the rights', they would be willing to acquire. He asserted this in a speech at Kazan University. At the meeting with the society in Ufa, he proposed to Bashkiria: 'take all the power you can swallow'. Continuing
to pledge his allegiance to the Union, Yeltsin was actually leading to its collapse. However, he was forced to remanoeuvre, especially after the referendum of March 1991 (which Yeltsin bitterly opposed), where most of the citizens who took part in voting spoke out for the Union. In Tatarstan, 87.5% of the voters said 'yes' to the Union.

Owing to the success of the referendum, there was a meeting of the governors of 9 Union republics (by formula '9+1', that is the governors of 9 republics and the USSR President) and agreed on accelerating the work over the project of a new Union treaty. It led to the beginning of the Novo-Ogaryovo process. Some hope for moving forward cropped up. The governors of the autonomous republics remained dissatisfied: they spoke out the statement and expressed their anxiety about the decision in Novo-Ogaryovo that had been adopted without their participation and they demanded an equal participation in discussing the project and signing the Union Treaty. Their anxiety was well grounded. In the approach of the Russian authorities, there was a double standard: full sovereignty was granted to the Union republics, and nothing to the autonomous ones. In particular, Tatarstan, where 80% of businesses were subject to the Union, found itself in a straited situation when Russia ceased payments to the Union budget.

In the summer of 1991, the Novo-Ogaryovo process, after difficult negotiations and inevitable compromises, arrived at the agreed plan of the Treaty on the Commonwealth of Independent States. A constructive contribution was made by the former autonomous republics which were recognized the equal participants of the process as Federation subjects, together with the Union republics. The Treaty plan was published for general information on 15 August, and signing it was appointed to 20 August.

The August coup broke up signing of the Treaty, which was the aim of the coup organizers. There was a new situation when everything was supposed to be started from the very beginning, and in more complex conditions. The disorganization of the country's economic life, caused by the position of the Russian authorities, was growing and turning the discontent of the population against perestroika. For some time, Yeltsin could put off a pro-Union impression, but all his actions demonstrated the opposite. The Novo-Ogaryovo process succeeded in being reanimated but all the activities of the Russian authorities were aimed at disrupting it. The discussions about a new conception of the Union Treaty were stuck in endless debates. The acquired agreements were rolled over by recommending new terms. Signing the successive plan that had been agreed to by seven republics on 14 November, was scuttled. Later, 1 December 1991, there was a referendum about the independence of Ukraine and ... a deal between three governors of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus in the Białowieża Forest, where they committed a coup d'etat by declaring the 'dissolution' of the USSR. The country's disintegration happened after an adventure led by the State Committee on the State of Emergency and the policy of the Russian authorities by taking a course toward destroying the Union.

Perestroika was scuttled but it left a profound trace in the history of the country and the entire world. The historic achievement of the reformers during the perestroika years was the fact that they started radical urgent reforms and tried to carry them out in a democratic way, expanding the borders of freedom step by step. We moved on with the reforms so far that the trend was already irrevocable. At the same time, we avoided civil war. Perestroika stirred up society, brought it to a new level and the policy of the Russian authorities by taking a course toward destroying the Union.

The threat of a nuclear Armageddon was staved. The relations with the states of the Orient and West came...
into a normal, non-confrontational channel. It disproved a widespread opinion about the failure of the reorganization. A many of its goals were achieved. Unfortunately, the collapse of the Soviet Union led to the destruction of a powerful mechanism of the perspective development of the great country, and the world's arena lost a most important factor for bringing order and peace to international processes.

§ 2. Perestroika in Tatarstan

Indus Tagirov

'Perestroika (reorganization) is a long-felt need that came out of deep processes of development in our socialist society. It had grown into a state of being ready for change. It can be said to have achieved change through suffering. A delay of perestroika for another moment could have led to the aggravation of the internal situation, which sincerely contained the threat of a serious social, economic and political crisis', – wrote M.S.Gorbachev [Gorbachev, 1987, p.11]. However, in his book 'Perestroika and a new way of thinking for our country and the entire world', there is no word about reorganizing the country's national state system. Meanwhile, precisely this issue was one of the most urgent issues in the life of the country.

A certain afterlight came to the party authorities a bit later. The theses of the CPSU Central Committee for the 19th All-Union Party Conference contained the necessity to take steps 'for the further development of the Soviet Federation' in the conditions of growing national self-awareness. De-centralizing and giving a lot of governing functions to the local authorities were admitted as the exigencies of the times. However, the following thesis that 'a key to further national development... in a harmonic union of the independent Union and autonomous republics... with their responsibility for the all-Union state interests' [Pravda, 1988, 27 May] actually denied the need of any significant changes in the state system. The democratization of international relations was dictated by the time.

There was a need for decisively breaking the stale unitarian relations of the Union Centre and the republics. Meanwhile, the current forms of the national sovereignty, the division into the Union republics and the autonomous republics did not amount to equality. The country faced a growing dissatisfaction with the existing governing form. This was demonstrated by the riots in Kazakhstan, cruel events in Nagorno-Karabakh and Ferghana, protests in Tbilisi.

In the USSR, the Union republics did not have real rights either. 'If the republican legislative bodies had the same power as the legislative state bodies, our federative relations would be significantly better, – said the Estonian professor J. Boyare. 'Authentic federalism means that all the subjects of the Federation in the Council of Nationalities are presented equally by a number of votes. The objection that there are more Tatars in the Union than Estonians but they will not be presented is not reasoned: Isn't it possible to convert an autonomous republic into a union one?', – asked the scientist 'Communist, 1989, no.6, p.74-75].

The scientist from Latvia A. Plotnieks stated that 'if there are no strong republics with the real attributes of the sovereign states, the Centre will continue substituting the governing mechanism of the republics by trying to solve everything but will not be able to do anything in the end'. Appealing to Lenin's political will, he offered to let the Union deal only with the questions of defense and international relations.

It was the Baltic republics who were to become the detonators of ideas of perestroika as they were included the USSR only in 1940. The peoples of the Baltic republics still remembered the times of independence very well. They felt the injustice of the totalitarian regime more painfully than others. That is why, mak-
ing use of the re-organization in the country, they were the first to fight for real sovereignty.

It is no coincidence that, 8-9 February 1989, the journal 'Communist' with the journals 'Communist of Soviet Latvia', 'Communist of Estonia' and 'Communist' (Lithuania) in Riga held a 'roundtable' conference under the motto 'Hearing each other'. The 'round-table' materials made an impression about how an authentic federation had started timidly knocking at the windows and doors and its knocking was getting louder and louder. Y. Kremnev, V. Nekhotin and A. Ulyukayev, who had prepared the 'roundtable' materials for publishing at the 'Communist', wrote: 'The circle of the problems being discussed in Riga is extremely wide. Besides, most of them are very urgent. There is no wonder that the statements spoken out were diverse and often controversial. A part of them was challenged during the discussions, the rest is given by the editorial to the readers for their own judgments. Although we are far from totally sharing the given points of view, we find a certain set of statements persuasive. At the same time, we try to provide a maximum complete impression about a collection of opinions that characterize the discussion that had taken place' [Communist, 1989, No. 6, p. 62].

With what were the Baltic Republics dissatisfied? With the fact that the owners of the lands and resources were not the peoples of the republics but the entire Soviet people. With the fact that the majority of the enterprises, banks, communication networks and means, transportation and energy systems of these republics was under the Union command and subordinated to Union ministries. With the fact, there was a growing migration from the Russian Federation and a decrease of the local population. With the fact that the sphere of usage of the native languages was shrinking, by the principle, noted by one of the participants in the discussion and the corresponding member of the Estonian Academy of Science, I. Apine: 'The faster is the switch to the Russian language, the better it is'.

What did the Baltic republics achieve? The acceptance of the lands and its resources as the property of the people, the refusal of the monopoly from the Union ministries, the change to complete economic independence, the cease of the migration of the Russian speaking population from the central regions of the country, the acceptance of the indigenous languages of the republics as state languages, the re-organization of the party by the federative principle and, at last, a significant expansion of the rights of the republics up to the level of true sovereign states.

Implementing these demands could turn the country into a real federation with the elements of confederation. Did the party take into account what was discussed at the 'roundtable'? Was there at this gathering, or were there frequent requests to withdraw from the USSR in letters and reports from numerous places where the current situation in the republics was being severely criticized?

Having declared ready to take decisive steps, the CPSU was not prepared to get rid of its monopoly on power and to re-organize the USSR. The so-called conception of perestroika, which was intensively talked about, did not have any clear goal, and no one knew about its policies. 'We, admitted even M. Gorbachev, have no ready recipes' [Gorbachev, 1987, p. 62]. The belated and evasive 'reforms' in governing the national economy did not solve even a single task from the agenda. They only introduced the disorganization in the relatively functioning command and administration system of governing the national economy.

In September, 1989, there was a plenary session of the CPSU Central Committee, which approved the platform 'National policy in modern conditions'. Its project was published in newspapers. In the Republic of Tatarstan, as everywhere in the country, there was lively discussion. The society was mostly interested in the issue of the status of the republics. The current situation was neither satisfying to the Union republics nor to the autonomous republics. However, society did not find the ways to solve the accumulated problems either at the platform of the plenary session of the CPSU Central Committee. There was an impression that the platform was in no way aimed towards re-building the
national policy. It reminded one of the attempt to patch a worn-out caftan. Here, there was not a word about the principles of the equality of the republics. The autonomous republics, especially the autonomous regions, and the national districts remained in the same state. Approving their sovereignty was out of question. In September 1989, the plenary session of the CPSU Central Committee, discussed fulfilling the current forms of the state system with 'real content'. However, the so-called 'real content' was revealed in no single document.

The platform did not take into account the materials of the 'roundtable', nor the results of tough discussions about the issues of the federative organization of the country. The requirements, aimed at the republics' gaining their real, not 'paper', sovereignty, (as the representative of Latvia A. Plotnieks figuratively said) was that the Constitutions of the republics not be carbon copies of the Union Constitution; so that the answer to the question 'How does the Latvian SSR Constitution differ from the USSR Constitution?' not be answered 'In its cover!' [Communist, 1989, No. 6, p. 75].

In the Union republics, not only in the Baltic ones, it was said that it was high time to revise the division of powers between the Union and the republics in order to turn the Constitutions of the Republics into the Constitutions of sovereign states within the USSR, which would confirm the fundamentals of political, economic and social systems, citizenship and constitutional status of all those citizens of the other republics located on its territory, the organizations and the forms of realizing state power [Communist, 1989, No. 6, p. 75].

At the platform, there was not a single word about the party refusal of monopoly and the changes of the relationships with the republics' party organizations. Meanwhile, at the mentioned 'roundtable' in Riga, they talked about the necessity to reorganize the CPSU along federative principles. Thus, the representative of Estonia K.Khallik explained it by the necessity to remove the party from the administrative system. Appealing to the decision of the 10th congress of the RCP (B) 'On Party Unity', he said that the presupposed division of the party and state functions did not occur, and the party started carrying out the administrative and governing functions [Communist, 1989, No. 6, p. 78].

The platform did not deal with the problems of national cultures and languages being in a disastrous state, although there were a lot of speeches about their 'harmonic development'. Within the current conditions, national culture was blurring into the dominant one and national languages were growing out of official and scientific usage. The researcher of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Academy of Sciences of the Tajik SSR, S.Abdullo shared his observations on the pages of the Journal 'Communist' about the case that had happened in the Tajik State Philharmonic Hall. One of the actors had to write an application request addressed to the chief. 'Those present, noted Abdullo, who turned out to be casual witnesses to this case, were helping him but, being really not good at writing in Russian, they were coming across obvious difficulties. He asked them: 'And your chief doesn't know Tajik?'. 'He knows. He is Tajik', was the answer. 'Then, why don't you write in Tajik?'. The reply: 'Speaking is prohibited' [Communist, 1989, No. 8, p. 68].

'What would occur to Ukraine in case 'the inviolable Union' remained inviolable 50 years more?.. asked post factum the former President of Ukraine L. Kuchma. ... Russia did not try to make "Malaya Rus" a colony, it tried to make turn it into a part of its own' [Kuchma, 2003, pp. 147, 270]. The same fate could happen to Belarus.

The concern of the destiny of its culture and language was also noted in other republics. At the congress of the Lithuanian communists, this issue was set on a larger canvas.. The General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.Gorbachev, who was taking part in the congress, was requested: 'Mikhail Sergeyevitch, decrypt, please, each word of the USSR anthem "the inviolable Union of free republics forever united in Great Rus". The delegates told the General Secretary who was lost for words: 'Do not let yourself get overworked with it, Mikhail Sergeyevitch. It can be your homework'.
At the same time, society was providing the material required for doing this 'homework'. Thus, at the 'roundtable conference 'Russia and the West', V.Khoros, Doctor of History, a leading researcher of the 'World Economy Institute of USSR Academy of Science, said: 'We should decisively reject the eternal Russian "Messianism", beginning with the statement "Moscow is the third Rome" and ending with the the provision about the international revolutionary hegemony of the USSR' [Communist, 1990, No. 11, p. 20].

The two alternative ways of the development of the Union (federative and confederative) were spoken and written about by the writer B. Oleynik. Giving the preference to the federation, B. Oleynik spoke out for a new union treaty, 'signed by not separate republic isolating themselves but by all the peoples living there'. In the given case, he meant the interests of the autonomous areas, 'which are willing to break loose from the custody of the union republics' [Communist, 1990, No.11, p. 30].

The union authorities required a certain political foresight in determining political relations between the union republics. However, they were at the tail-end of the events that were happening, often not even being able to understand what was going on. Here are some facts in demonstration of that.

On 11 March 1990, The Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR accepted the Act 'On restoring the independence of the Lithuanian State' and 'the Temporary fundamental law of the Lithuanian Republic' by abolishing the validity of the USSR Constitution in Lithuania. The same events happened to Latvia and Estonia. On 30 March 1990, the Supreme Soviet of Estonia accepted the Resolution 'On the state status of Estonia', declaring the current Soviet state power illegitimate on its territory. Latvia prepared a draft bill concerning citizenship, by which the citizens of the republic were considered the ones living in the republic since 17 June 1940.

On 30 January 1991, giving a speech at the meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, the first secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee of Lithuania M. Burokevičius said that the present republic governors 'were and are convincing people that Lithuania has already separated from the Soviet Union and that the Communist Party of Lithuania is a party of a foreign state' [News of Central Committee of Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1991, No. 4, p. 43]. The first secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee A. Rubiks, having mentioned the same situation in the republic, said that 'because of the moral terror, which is being carried out in the republic, not only are ranks of common communists falling away, but also prominent figures of our party' [News of Central Committee of Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1991, No. 4, p. 43].

Complicated processes were going on in the Russian Federation itself, where there was a war between Russian laws and those of the USSR. The RSFSR President Yeltsin opposed the Union authorities. By the first secretary of the CPSU Volgograd regional committee A.Anipkin, the governors of Russia 'are waiting for the moment when the centre itself will take some unpopular measures, and after that they will lead us to the bayonet assault' [News of Central Committee of Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1991, No. 4, p. 45]. And the first secretary of the Uzbekistan Communist Party Central Committee I.A.Karimov at the meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, 30 January 1991, characterized the policy of the Russian authorities as a means of the chauvinism of great-powers and called for taking decisive steps [News of Central Committee of Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1991, No. 4, p. 47].

In the Russian Federation, there was a growing protest also against the actions of the Russian authorities. After the Declaration of the sovereignty of the Russian Federation, 12 June 1990, the declarations of the republics within it were adopted. There were movements in the districts and regions, which expressed the discontent about their powerlessness and aimed at the equal rights with the republics. It is not by chance that at the beginning of the republic sovereignty process, the regional Ural
and Vologda republics were declared. Prepara-
tions for similar actions started in other Rus-
sian regions.

In order to stop this process, the state sec-
retary under the Russian President, G.Burbulis,
tried to urge the Sverdlovsk oblast governor
E.Rossel to speak out against the special rights
of the republics (this referred to converting the
republics into common administrative-terri-
torial units). However, E.Rossel managed to
wriggle out diplomatically. He strove for not
converting the republics into regions but, on
the contrary, for providing the republic rights
for the most developed regions. It was no co-
cidence that E.Rossel declared the Ural Re-
public, after which he was ousted from power
by B.Yeltsin. However, the idea of the repub-
lic turned out to be so appealing that during
the Sverdlovsk oblast alternative gubernato-
rial elections, priority was given to the same
E.Rossel. This fact and others prove that the
most economically developed regions were
straining after republics, and not after the poor,
subsided Russian regions.

The Tatar ASSR too had been one of the
powerless regions by 1989. From its heart
natural resources were being pumped out mer-
cilessly, its environment was in a catastrophic
state. The Tatar language was dying out, the
national culture was pitiful to behold. The
question of granting Tatarstan the status of a
union republic had become an urgent need.

The leaders of the republic of Tatarstan had
been able to include the republic in the number
of the six regions of the country involved in
the development and implementation of a re-
geonal system of self-financing. To implement
this in the country, the CPSU Regional Com-
mittee Office had set up a commission headed
by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers
M. Shaimiev. This also included scientists,
economists, representatives of labour collec-
tives and the public. In the Kazan branch of
the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, the
economic department had been established and
entrusted with the development of the concept
of republican self-financing. Several sociological
studies of international relations had been con-
ducted by studying the opinions and sentiments
of various sections of the population. First
Secretary of the CPSU Regional Committee
G.Usmanov at every meeting or session of the
leaders demanded that careful attention be paid
to the needs of the people, meeting regularly
with representatives of the public and studying
the views of experts. On his initiative, a Repub-
lic 'home bank' of ideas was established for the
entire structural rebuilding of the society. As a
result, by the opening of the September (1989)
Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU,
a considerable bank of ideas and projects had
been accumulated aimed at ensuring the transi-
tion of the republic to the principle of regional
economic self-financing.

To the party forum in Moscow, G.Usmanov
came with a deep awareness of public attitude
and needs of the country, with specific propo-
sals on the subjects under discussion. His re-
port published under the title 'Our Future is in
Unity' in the newspaper 'Sovetskaya Tataria' of
22 September 1989 reflected a condensation of
public opinion on all issues of socio-political
and economic development.

G.Usmanov on the CPSU Central Com-
mittee's Plenum had voiced the most urgent
problems of economic development and inter-
ethnic life. Among them, special attention was
merited by the proposals for improving the
status of autonomous republics. G.Usmanov
referred to the data of the sociological studies
showing that 67 per cent of respondents had
offered to give up the ranking of the repub-
lics as not meeting modern reality. In the con-
text of the development of the foundations of
USSR legislation, G.Usmanov had proposed
to determine the legal status of the RSFSR as a
sovereign federal state with the creation of the
Communist Party of the Russian Federation.
The speaker highlighted the question regarding
the status of the Tatar Republic, which, as he
had said, 'is able to ensure its development on
its own account settling all the while payments
to the state budgets both of the USSR, and the
RSFSR', stressing that its revenue was two and
a half times greater than its costs.

However, although a number of G.Usmanov's suggestions had been considered
within the CPSU Central Committee's plat-
form on the national question, the most important one, namely the rejection of the republics' ranking, had not been included.

Meanwhile, the possibility of giving autonomous republics, Tatarstan in particular, the status of the Union republics had been discussed at the said 'roundtable' in Riga ['Communist', 1989, No. 6, p. 75]. CPSU Central Committee's General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev expressed indecision in addressing the necessary reforms in this area.

Assessing the expectations placed by the public on the platform of 'National policy in modern conditions', the Secretary of the CPSU Tatar Regional Committee R. Idiatullin in an interview with the newspaper 'Soviet Tatarstan', said, 'The people were waiting for this document, acutely aware of its need and vital importance' [Sovetskaia Tataria, 1989, Sept. 14]. However, although the adopted platform contained a lot of good words, it was intended to leave everything as it had been.

The idea of raising the status of Tatarstan expressed in the oral and written statements of many well-known figures sounded after the Plenum just as it had before it. Thus, writer T. Minnullin from the podium of the I Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR stated the need to level 'the status of all national republics, without division into the union and autonomous ones'. And a classic Tatar literary figure G. Bashirov wrote in the newspaper 'Sotsialistik Tatarstan' that attribution of the status of a union republic to Tatarstan, 'would give new powers to the people allowing them, together with other peoples, to rise to a higher level of world civilization' [Isayev, Minibaev, Tukhfatullin, 1990, p. 35]. The fullest reflection of the public attitude had been provided in the article 'What We Expected' by A. Eniki in the newspaper 'Vechernaya Kazan' [Vechernaya Kazan', 1989, Oct. 16.]. As this elder wordsmith noted, the platform project did not meet with the aspirations of the peoples deprived of a union statehood regarding the attainment of the national state equality within the Union. A.N. Eniki had convincingly proved the legitimacy of the question of granting the status of a union republic to the Tatar ASSR and shown the advantages of doing this for all the peoples living in the republic.

However, A. Eniki had not intended just to condemn the approved document. No, not pessimism, but faith and hope in the future he wanted to inspire to his readers: 'And yet, in my opinion, one cannot completely lose hope. The draft platform on the national question reflects a new view on the national question, and contains a lot of practical proposals.' With this, the writer did not forget about the fate of more than 6 million Tatars living in different regions of the country. Having noted with regret that over the last 60 years, the autonomous Tatarstan practically could not give them any cultural, moral or material assistance', he pointed out that this had led to the gradual destruction of the people's integrity, to the closure in many areas of the Tatars' contiguous residences of national schools and other centers of national culture, and to the discontinued distribution of newspapers, and magazines in their native language.

Nevertheless, the writer believed that the tragedy of the people could still be forestalled. However, he placed his hopes on the incipient perestroika in the country and the platform of the national question: 'Our hopes are, of course, connected with the party's platform on the national question. It clearly states that representatives of any nationality, regardless of the place of residence, are entitled to cultivate their mother tongue, to teach it to his children, to satisfy their national, spiritual needs, to perform religious rites, to comply with national customs and traditions, and to preserve and further the native culture. Perhaps, in places of compact and prevalent residence of the Tatars, it is advisable to establish an administrative autonomy. In any case, such regions need to get assistance in the purchase of textbooks, as well as other manuals and literature in the native language, and in the provision of teaching staff and other professionals. In this regard, help can only come from Tatarstan, from Kazan, the common capital of all Tatars.'

The writer started a discussion with an associate professor of Kazan University B. Zheleznov, who had published in 'Pravda' on 24
August an article entitled 'What can the autonomous [republics] do?', which, essentially, approved and justified all the provisions of the party document.

B. Zheleznozv, who by that time had just defended his doctoral thesis on the issues of autonomy, decided, apparently, that he was already mature enough to give 'valuable advice' both to state and party leaders, and the public. He began an article in 'Pravda' by expressing doubts about the feasibility and advisability of giving Tatarstan the status of a union republic. The author believed that the autonomies' capabilities were quite sufficient to address the issues of national development and there was no need for the transformation of their status. Apparently, he did not wish to take note that not only autonomies but even Soviet republics were stifled by lack of authority, and that only decisive action on their empowerment could save the country from collapse.

The one closer to the truth was E. Tadevosyan, who was of the opinion that the new Treaty of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics could and should be based on Leninist principles of a free and sovereign self-determination of nations, their voluntary association and their full national equality [Communist, 1990, No. 6, p. 19].

A. Eniki drew attention to the timidity and hesitancy of the steps the Soviet leadership was taking in ensuring ethnic equality in the country. Indeed, after 1922, a number of autonomous regions, including the Caucasian republics, acquired the status of the union republics. A. Eniki concluded from very vague and flowery discourse of B. Zheleznozv that, in the opinion of the latter, Tatarstan had not fully used the capabilities of an autonomous status and was not entitled to the status of a union republic. The writer firmly and convincingly challenged that view, noting that the Constitution reserved the right of self-determination for the peoples themselves [Vech. Kazan', 1989, Oct. 16.]

Public sentiment also had been reflected in the activities of the regional committee of the CPSU, which after the election of G. Usmanov as Secretary of the CC CPSU, was headed by M. Shaimiev. Under these conditions, the new Secretary of the Tatar Regional Committee of CPSU had a hard time: the idea of the transformation of Tatarstan into the union republic had already penetrated in the public, it was the most popular in the republican party organization, and was not alien to M. Shaimiev himself. However, he was fettered to the platform of the CC CPSU on the national question, which prevented him from openly campaigning for the transformation of Tatarstan into a union republic. M. Shaimiev was likewise between a rock and a hard place.

§ 3. The Ideology of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Regional Committee in the Years of Perestroika

Oleg Morozov

At the time, an American expert on the Soviet Union had predicted that in Tatarstan, there would sooner or later inevitably be a major ethnic confessional clash. Russians and Tatars, Orthodox Christians and Muslims, the complications of history, differences in stereotypes, old offenses, and divergent interests ... In short, he could not see any civilized ways of resolving these contradictions in such a divided society. In his experience, he had not met with such exceptions. But it had appeared, and the Americans at the early 21st century, called this phenomenon 'a Tatarstan model'.

Of course, this model could not be born overnight. Its first foundations had been laid back in the mid 1980s, the period in Russian history known as perestroika. Moreover, the
leading and guiding force in the process, quite consistently, had been the CPSU represented by its Tatar Regional Committee.

But first of all, we should recall the situation during those crucial years for the country. Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms literally exploded in the society. And like any explosion, it generated a lot of debris. The pendulum had particularly sharply swung toward the awakening of national consciousness in all its manifestations, including extremist ones. The shadow of Karabakh hung over the entire country.

And at that time in the Tatar regional committee there came a new and, as it had turned out, last wave of party workers, among whom was the author of these lines. In fact we got to the regional committee, having no experience of party work, leaping over a dozen career steps, which was considered then a thing unheard of. For example, I, Associate Professor of the Kazan State University, had been at once entrusted with the leadership of the Propaganda Department (later transformed into the ideological department). My colleagues at the university, associate professors too – Vasily Likhachiyov and Andrey Busygin – also came to fill primary roles. In the end, we had managed to assemble a solid team of like-minded people consisting of an entire constellation of figures now widely known in Russia and Tatarstan. It included Rafael Khakimov, Nail Khusnutdinov Alexander Yurtayev Georgy Isayev, Rimzil Valeev ...

Today, so to say, in retrospect, I realize that our team devoted its service not to the regime, but rather to the changes taking place at that time. Another thing is that all of us, especially at the beginning of perestroika, sincerely believed that these changes could have been made by the party itself. In short, we were in the system and tried the best of our ability and capacity to influence these processes from within.

It is clear that our opportunities were not limitless. Moscow cautiously watched what Kazan was going to do, and if anything was ready to 'tighten the screws'. Good thing we had a reliable protection in the first secretary of the regional committee Gumer Usmanov and the Secretary for Ideology Nail Kadymetov. Naturally, we had different views with regard to many things (due to age, experience, mentality), but on the main thing, we largely concurred: it was necessary at all costs to maintain peace and tranquility in Tatarstan, and to reform society in a stable environment. That was, if I may say so, the ideology of the regional party committee, which we had been guided by in taking certain decisions.

Changes in the regional committee's style of work were in the first place felt by the scientists, cultural workers, and journalists, who had become our assets. On their advice, we began to conduct sociological research that ranked party officials. The secretaries of city and district committees, and these were people who had gone through the great school of life and party work, had been actually taken aback when shown what in fact people thought of them. We were the first to introduce monthly opinions of Party members and non-party people on those who held high posts.

Of course, the national question was the most acute one. The analysis showed that in the country where Tatar was the native language of a half the population, there were practically no schools, newspapers and magazines in the Tatar language. In short, this gateway had to be urgently opened. As a result, books and textbooks started to be published in the Tatar language, preparing personnel for Tatar schools. Based on our initiative, in Kazan, there began to appear a bilingual magazine 'Idel', the magazines 'Panorama' and 'Kazan', and the children's magazine in the Tatar language 'Salavat kupere', which is still published. All this was very, very difficult to achieve. Each edition had to literally be shoehorned through Moscow and the Central Committee of the CPSU. We were not always met with understanding.

Moreover, something had to be done with the national organizations. Thus, the most famous among them, the Tatar Community Centre (TCC) actually worked underground. Furthermore, none of the party workers actually knew what these organizations wanted. They examined them. Nothing in particular, as it had turned out: they demanded a union status for the country, opening up of national schools and institutions of social relations with
the Tatar diaspora, etc. After some deliberation, they decided to publish the TCC program in the 'Bloknat agitatora' ('Agitator's Notepad') magazine.

The resonance had been overwhelming. Can you imagine an opposition organization's program appearing in the official organ of the party's regional committee? However, all the fuss surrounding the publication had not been quite of interest to our team members: none of us even thought about becoming widely known as innovators, let alone to promoting ourselves. The purpose of the publication was very different: we just wanted to make it clear to national organizations that they could deal with us, and this goal had been achieved. The leader of the Tatar emigration in Europe, Ali Akysh had publicly stated that the national organizations were not to quarrel with the authorities in the country and that 'reformer communists are better than chauvinist democrats'. And in February 1989, when I was already working at the Central Committee of the CPSU, in Kazan, there the first congress of the Tatar Public Center was held. Thus, as it is customary to say now, the TCC was able to enter the system, and the sparks of national consciousness in Tatarstan had not fallen on combustible material.

And, so, gradually, without abrupt movements, by small steps, there formed a 'Tatarstan model'. In fact, we largely intuitively followed the conservative principle 'preserve and multiply!', trying to create something new while trying to preserve the best. And later on, this rule had been strictly followed in the republic: never 'cut to the quick', not to carry out reforms just for its own sake.

In parallel, the regional committee was working on another important task – to prepare administrative staff for Tatarstan and Russia as a whole. It had been a fantastic experience. It concerned the culture of working with documents and texts in general, the performance discipline, and an understanding how decisions are made and how they are carried through. And as for working with people, the Party School taught it in such a way, as today, none other school teaches. I think that without his experience of party work, it is unlikely that the first President of Tatarstan Mintimer Shaimiev would have become a politician of the highest caliber. The author of these lines too would not have been able to make a single step in the political life of post-Soviet Russia with no experience in the party work.

Of course, all of the above does not change the main thing. Our attempts to reform the CPSU in a particular country were a priori doomed. The party was dying before our very eyes, and the cause was clear: its structure did not meet the severity of the existing political situation, through its own rigidity, its dogmatism, and from the inability to change ideologically. This, perhaps, has been the most important lesson to be learned from the experience of the CPSU, including by the 'United Russia'. A party, if it wants to maintain itself as a ruling one, should be in motion, in development, and not just occasionally, but constantly. Attempts to change anything in the already ossified body of a party would only accelerate its suffering. It is unfortunate that the CPSU had died, taking into oblivion with itself also a great country.

§ 4. The Rise of the Tatar Ethno-National Movement in the late 20th century

Rinat Zakirov

By the mid-1980s, the Soviet Union had entered a period of social and economic crisis. A lot of problems had been accumulated in the sphere of international relations. The new General Secretary of the CC of CPSU Mikhail Gorbachev, putting forward a program of 'perestroika and acceleration' for the socioeconomic life of the country, initially did not attach much importance to ethnic issues facing the USSR. This is to some extent understandable if we bear in mind that by that time in the country there had been accumulated a
lot of problems associated with the bankruptcy of the old administrative system. In this situation the leaders of the CPSU never assumed that very soon it would be ethno-national issues that would come to the fore. Lack of a comprehensive national policy rather quickly led to the strengthening of centrifugal tendencies in a multinational state and the aggravation of interethnic relations. The unrest in the union republics had been seen by the authorities only as the cost of the price of democracy. Therefore, according to tradition in the official structures the focus had been made on searching out nationalists, extremists, and destructive elements. Instead of a serious and thoughtful analysis of these phenomena, priority was given to forceful methods to solve problems. It had been so at the time of the events in Kazakhstan, the Baltic republics, the Fergana Valley of Uzbekistan, Nagorno-Karabakh and other regions.

As for Tatarstan, the first informal movements in the republic began to appear in 1987. They were mostly aimed at solving environmental problems. Undoubtedly, the Chernobyl accident of 1986 had played an important role in this. In addition, the USSR Government without adequate examination and consideration of the public opinion started the construction of a nuclear power plant in Tatarstan. Another important factor in the birth of informal associations that can be considered was popular discontent at the lack of clear prospects on the part of authorities as to the development of the country in those difficult circumstances, including in the sphere of ethnic relations.

In the summer of 1988, following the example of the Union republics, the national movement too was born in Kazan. A group of representatives of the national intelligentsia initiated the creation of the Tatar Community Centre (TCC), mainly for the purpose of raising the status of the republic to the union level. The TCC's ideas had found broad support among the people. Tatar community centers began to appear in the regions and cities of the country, and the regions of concentrated Tatars' settlement across the country. As early as in the winter of 1988-1989, in the cities of the republic, particularly in Kazan, mass rallies were held, which, along with social problems raised also some ethnic issues. In particular, the idea of giving the republic union status had been supported not only by Tatars, but also by Russians, the Chuvashes, Mari, and representatives of other nations living in Tatarstan. To the rallies and meetings of the TCC, representatives of national movements came from many parts of the country.

Complex processes had also taken place in the party organization (CPSU) of Tatarstan. The Communists were about to split among themselves on the national question. Supporters of a 'muscular' policy insisted on the complete prohibition of national-ethnic organizations. However, their opponents who kept to a democratic platform, called for sticking with the people. There had appeared also a major turnaround in the republic's leadership. The ruling elite had evolved from complete rejection of existing national problems to the idea of revival of the sovereignty and statehood of Tatarstan.

Emerging national organizations held a wide variety of orientations. Problems related to the revival of a national culture and preservation of the native language had been actively raised by the Sh. Marjani society established in 1988. In the winter of 1990, the Vatan ('motherland') organization was founded dealing with the relations with compatriots living abroad. Prior to that, such organizations existed only in the union republics. The emergence of this organization was due to the fact that, since the beginning of perestroika, the Tatar diaspora abroad began to show great interest in the contacts with their historical homeland. At the same time, in Tatarstan too, there increased an interest in the compatriots abroad.

It is quite natural that the national movement from the very beginning was not uniform. A quite particular place within the Tatar national movement had been held by the Tatar National Independence Party 'Ititifak'. The surprising part was the fact that this party had been created under the CPSU's political monopoly and on the eve of the referendum on
preserving the USSR in the spring of 1990. The party was headed by writer and social activist Fauzia Bayramova. From the outset, the party had defined its goal of achieving full independence of Tatarstan. The founding congress had been held on the eve of the All-Union referendum. 'Ittifak' had made an appeal to the Tatars to vote against the preservation of the USSR, and then on the ruins of the empire to create an independent Tatar state. Of course, these slogans of 'Ittifak' were perceived as too radical. But after some time the idea of Tatarstan's independence, although in a more restrained form, became widespread among the Tatars. In the same spring of 1990, F. Bayramova was elected a people's deputy of the Supreme Council of the Tatar ASSR. The radicalism of the 'Ittifak' party certainly received a mixed response in the country, especially among the Russian-speaking population of Tatarstan and Russia.

In rather unusual social and political conditions during the winter of 1992, there had been established the Milli Majlis, which claimed the role of a national parliament of the Tatar people. Even in one of the first program documents of the TCC, the creation of Milli Majlis was provided by the legitimate election of its members. At regional and district organizations of the TCC, preparatory work was conducted for the registration in areas of large Tatar concentration, that is among the future voters of the Majlis. But the most radical leaders of the national movement had considered these efforts superfluous and decided not to set the establishment of the Milli Mejlis on the back burner. This led to a split in the national movement. It is telling that a hastily created Majlis failed to achieve any of the goals, and infighting within the 'parliament' itself virtually blocked its work. Leaders of the Milli Majlis got mired in their ambitions and mutual strife, so that the idea put forward by the national parliament of the Tatars from the beginning had been discredited in the eyes of the general public. In 2004, some political forces have attempted to revive the Milli Majlis. But from the day of its establishment, it had practically been unable to function, and therefore its re-establishment in its former form, in fact, did not have any significance. It should be also understood that the haste in creation of the Milli Majlis, had not least been due to the fact that a certain circle of radical leaders wanted to forestall the convening of the 1st World Congress of Tatars (WCT). This, as they had assumed, would have enabled them to have a certain advantage over the WCT. This assumption is likely to be correct, since it is true that the Milli Majlis made claims for the authority of the WCT. There had been voiced demands to make it the National Chamber of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Tatarstan. This was what the chairman of the Milli Majlis T. Abdullin had mentioned at the 1st Congress [World congress of the Tatars, 1992, p. 214].

This is an external outline of the plot and the partially key events associated with the Tatar national movement in the 20th and 21st centuries. It must be said that the Tatar question in Russia has a long and deep historical roots. This question, in fact, is a conglomerate of issues related to ensuring the rights and interests of the Tatar people.

It is no exaggeration to say that the twentieth century for the Tatars was marked by the struggle for national rights. The start of a real and powerful recovery of the Tatar national movement, as it is known, had been during the period of the First Russian Revolution of 1905 to 1907. The democratization of Russian society and the emergence of certain political freedoms allowed the Tatars to make significant advances in developing national education and culture in a short time. It was at this time, when an extensive network of Tatar periodicals, book publishers, and libraries emerged all over Russia, that a new Tatar literature was born, bringing together the traditions of Islamic and European cultures. Tatar professional theatre and musical art also appeared at this time. In the field of education, a huge step forward was made with the creation of an extensive network of Jadidi (new methodology) madrasahs.

The second wave of the Tatar national movement was catalyzed by the overthrow of
tsarism in Russia in February 1917. The Tatars welcomed the event with great zeal. This is how noted scholar and Tatar emigré activist Tamurbek Davletshin put it: 'The Tatars were well-prepared for the overthrow of tsarism in February 1917. By that time, they had already accumulated extensive experience of consolidating forces to fight for their national freedom.' [Davletshin, 1974, p. 55].

In our opinion, a notable feature of the events of 1917–1918 is that they were the Tatars' first attempts, after losing their state's independence in the 16th century, to restore their nationhood in the form of the 'Idel-Ural' State. Genuine nation state institutions were established in this period: democratic elections to the parliament, the Milli Majlis, were held; a government, the Milli Idare, was formed, as were military structures led by the Harbi Shuro (Military Council), a national monetary fund, and so on. It must be noted that these processes weren't finalised within the anticipated federal union of Russian peoples. However, after coming to power, the Bolsheviks were required to take into account the Tatars' powerful aspiration to restore nationhood. It was this very factor that in May 1920 facilitated the passage of a decree which founded the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.

The restoration of Tatar nationhood, albeit in the form of an autonomous republic with very limited rights, was certainly a major event in modern Tatar history. However, it caused fresh problems for the Tatars, as the Bolsheviks, having initiated the formation of the TASSR, mainly pursued their own agenda, which at times was quite far removed from the interests of the Tatar people. True, the formation of the Tatar Autonomous Republic allowed institutions to be founded for the urgent tasks of retaining and developing the language, education, and culture of the Tatar people. However, the Bolsheviks' approach to these issues was limited to meeting the needs of Tatars who happened to reside within the borders of the TASSR. They accounted for only a quarter of the Tatar population. Thus, by the end of the 20th century, the Tatar question in Russia took on a new dimension.

The tiered system of national states within the USSR created severe tension between ethnicities in the country. The Tatars were particularly sensitive to these issues. This was because at the beginning of the 20th century, the Tatars were among the most advanced of the empire's peoples to have started the process of nation-building in line with progressive 19th century European ideas. They went into 1917 with significant achievements in education and culture, which gave impetus to the formation of the modern Tatar nation. What then happened was that the Bolsheviks' 'autonomization' policy forced a large nation (the fifth-largest by population) with explicable and reasonable claims to advanced positions in the multi-nation state into the Procrustean bed of an autonomous republic.

As we know, autonomous republics in the USSR were deprived of many aspects of modern culture granted to other union republics. Thus, autonomous republics weren't supposed to have national cinematography (the art form of the 20th century), academic science, encyclopaedic publications, essential periodicals (supplementary literary magazines, for example), 'superfluous' book publishers, and so on. Meanwhile, being the fifth largest nation and possessing a rich history and traditions, the Tatars clearly demonstrated 'cultural redundancy', going outside the strictures of Soviet autonomy. This 'redundancy' manifested itself through many talented representatives of the Tatars serving the cultures of other nations within the USSR (particularly in the Middle Asian republics). The accumulated intellectual potential of the people quickly became apparent at the onset of Gorbachev's perestroika. Back in the autonomy, they began to break down all the barriers. Work on a multi-volume 'Tatar Encyclopaedia' was started; permission granted to publish a new literary youth magazine entitled Idel; a new publishing house, Magarif, sprang up; a new Tatar theatre formed in Naberezhnye Chelny, and so on. These were indirect indicators of the Tatars' rich cultural potential that had been held back by the Soviet autonomy.
It is well known that the prevailing ideology in the USSR was that of the CPSU. This was a considerable impediment to the development of national cultures. The problem was particularly acute for the Tatar people because, by the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, they had accumulated considerable spiritual and cultural capital. Today, the real cultural breakthrough of the beginning of the 20th century is rightly referred to as the 'Tatar renaissance'. However, in the USSR, all Tatar pre-revolutionary cultural achievements were declared 'bourgeois-nationalist trash', and access to them was practically prohibited.

As perestroika began, the Tatar intelligentsia raised questions about returning the cultural assets of the pre-Soviet era to the people. The most heated debates were over the work of a prominent Tatar writer and anticommunist emigré leader, Ayaz Iskhaki. Having thrown off the ideological shackles, Tatar society discovered pre-revolutionary authors had bequeathed it some outstanding examples of national literature. It should be noted that CPSU officials were especially sensitive to all these processes, seeing them as evidence of 'nationalist bias' and 'ideological subversion'.

It can therefore be concluded that the idea of enhancing the status of the TASSR to the level of a union republic did not come from nothing. To use a common expression, it fell on fertile ground. National movement activists organised a petition in support of union status for Tatarstan, collecting over 1,000,000 signatures over the course of 1989. TASSR deputies A. Konovalov and I. Kotov gave notice of this unique expression of the Tatar people's will in the USSR Congress of People's Deputies.

The Tatar national movement's active role had a notable impact within the TASSR. In Kazan, at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, meetings and protests were held by numerous national organizations on an almost daily basis. In the state press, there were passionate debates about the future of Tataria's current statehood and the Tatar people, with possible options for its status being discussed. These processes didn't escape the attention of the central authorities and top officials of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Dignitaries from Moscow became frequent visitors to Kazan.

With regard to the Tatar national movement at the turn of the millennium, the general public's involvement in addressing the questions of language, culture, religion, etc. should not be overlooked. Prominent members of the national intelligentsia set about developing concepts of national education and national culture in this way. They were announced in Parliament and discussed during parliamentary committee sessions. In its own way, the involvement of the Tatar intelligentsia put pressure on official institutions, aiming to coerce them to take measures to aid the development of the language, education, and culture of the nation.

There was also extensive discussion in the Tatar community about returning to the Latin alphabet, which proved its worth from 1920–1940. As we know, in 1997, the State Council of Tatarstan opted to return to the Latin alphabet. However, the Federal Government decided to undermine this decision, which was purely taken to address the linguistic problems of the Tatar language: the State Duma of RF passed a law obliging all peoples of the country to use the Cyrillic alphabet only.

The national movement also took an active part in the religious revival within the Tatar community. With the fall of communism, the Tatars' interest in their spiritual ancestry rose significantly. It is well known that the Tatar people have been rooted in Islamic civilization for over 1,000 years. Islam is de facto a fundamental element of Tatar ethnic-cultural identity. A deep awareness of this is clearly apparent in all policy documents generated by the ATCC, the Milli Majlis, the Magarif Komitesi (Educational Committee), and other institutions. In the Soviet era, many ancient mosque buildings were misused. Activists from Tatar non-governmental organizations made a significant contribution to returning those buildings to believers. They also often initiated the building of new mosques and cultural centres.

To sum up, we can say that the Tatar national movement was a significant phenom-
This might be an apt way to describe the initial establishment of Tatarstan's sovereignty. Non-governmental organizations in the republic and, above all, the TCC, compelled party and state authorities to fight actively for Tatarstan to gain union republic status. However, they did this without proposing a specific mechanism for implementing the idea. The republic's party and state leaders saw no way that it could happen other than by liaising with the top echelons of power. However, those at the top acted based on the provision of the Central Committee of the CPSU. This didn't provide for changes in the existing form of nationhood, but aimed at filling them with 'real content'. At the same time, no one was able to define what this meant. This climate of uncertainty spread to the local level.

Simultaneously, the old assumptions about the Party were overturned. Illusions about the 'honour and conscience' of the Soviet era were rapidly vanishing. A 'Democratic Platform' appeared within the CPSU, in effect becoming an alternative to the Party, although it only offered to modernise what had come before. A mass exodus from the CPSU indicated a crisis regarding its ideology and way of operating. It was also evidence of the impending fall of not only Soviet ideology but also the entire Soviet state.

Having set about reorganising public life, the party didn't abandon its underlying premise, however. It simply set itself the task of 'renewing socialism', while expressing a readiness to fight against 'vilification and crude, groundless attacks on the party'.

This was announced straightforwardly at the Plenary Session of the Tatarstan Regional Committee of the CPSU, held on 7 December 1989, to address the results of the September (1989) Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the CPSU and to prepare for the 28th Congress of the CPSU. The Communist Party had already begun to collapse when the session was held, and great concern was expressed about the possible results of the upcoming elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. The First Secretary of the Regional Committee of the CPSU, M. Shaimiev, stated in his report that 'every communist must realise that this is ultimately about who will hold the levers of power'.

The report focused on the National Question. M. Shaimiev, referring to the September Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the CPSU, commented on the need for fundamental reforms in this field, 'The Party faced a task of utmost importance — to devise a modern strategy on the national question, a clear programme of action in this challenging area of public life.' As an example of such a programme, he mentioned the CPSU platform, which, in his opinion, was a good basis for renewing the national policy in accordance with the principles of Leninism, for harmonizing national relations, and resolving other national issues. For these reasons, the programme had received the broad support of the Party and people [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 15, File 1299, Sheet 5]. M. Shaimiev stressed that this was about developing the

§ 5. Going in Circles around the Idea of Sovereignty

Indus Tagirov
federation and enhancing the rights and opportunities for all types of autonomy. Commending the previous national policy, he said that it had helped many nations to revive or instigate their nationhood and to develop different types of national and territorial autonomy, which in turn had created an opportunity to retain and develop national identity and to foster friendships between nations. 'However, since the 1920s, with the establishment of the command-administration system, distortions of Leninism have occurred, the consequences of which are still being felt,' stated M. Shaimiev.

After noting that Soviet Tataria's development had been long and complex, and that it owed its nationhood to the October Revolution, the speaker then elaborated on details regarding cultural ostracism, including the closing of many Tatar theatres, newspapers, and magazines, the replacement of the Tatar alphabet, etc. Taken together, these factors had resulted in many problems between different nations being formed, and 'hidden away'. Only perestroika and the processes of democratization and glasnost that it inspired revealed the true state of relations between different nations. M. Shaimiev identified the following questions as being the most critical: development of an international attitude, nation-state structure and development of native languages and culture, while highlighting the economic and legal relationship between the republic and the Centre [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 15, File 1299, Sheet 20].

The speaker didn't go beyond the national issues addressed at the September Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the CPSU, but talked about the need to strengthen and refine the socialist federation and expand the competence of autonomous administrative regions. Having mentioned the statements at the Congress of Peoples' Deputies of the USSR demanding to upgrade the status of autonomous republics and to transform them into union partners, M. Shaimiev noted that the idea, though very appealing, wasn't easy to implement. Besides, resolving the status issue wouldn't deal with many other problems. This is how he described the republic's position, 'Today, given the specific historical context with regard to the USSR as a national-state construction, we must firmly adhere to the policy developed at the Plenary Session of the Central Committee. It appears to be the most appropriate and constructive.' At the same time he cited M. Gorbachev's opinion that far-reaching changes to the federation must not lead to a redrawing of borders or a change in the forms of national bodies, and that at this stage it was important to fill those forms with real content. The First Secretary of the Regional Committee of the CPSU cited examples of this content: state autonomy, autonomy to resolve problems at an administrative-territorial level, and policy regarding national culture, language, and environmental protection [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 15, File 1299, Sheet 34]. 'Along with this,' M. Shaimiev emphasized, 'we strongly reject national narrow-mindedness and arrogance, fully supporting that provision of the CPSU Platform which states that communists must consider it their duty not to allow any ethnic division in Party ranks, labour collectives or non-governmental organizations.'

Having paid special attention to religious matters, as well as interethnic and interconfessional relations, the Secretary of the Regional Committee of the CPSU said, 'In our ideological work, we should reconsider the role and place of religion in interethnic relations, its influence on national identity. In no way should we set people in opposition to one another, let alone fuel ethnic hatred on religious grounds. Despite the fact that communists and religious believers have different world views and that atheist education has been, and remains, one of our most important objectives, we must value the peace-building role of people of faith and their equal participation in the renewal of society alongside everyone else.' As a priority, M. Shaimiev identified the necessity of addressing issues related to the harmonization of interethnic relations and the restructuring of international upbringing, and the initiation of research in this field. He criticized social scientists for their inadequate
study of interethnic relations and the little practical relevance of many scientific papers on the issue. The speaker noted, 'Interethnic relations require integrated and systematic research. It requires the participation of not only social scientists and ethnographers but also philologists, historians, lawyers, economists, art historians, musicologists, and others. Articles and collections of research papers published today as well as defended theses are often extremely specialised and too theoretical; their authors often deal in abstract notions and, above all, they are distanced from the real objective of improving interethnic relations.' M. Shaimiev reproached the Institute of ILLA of the Kazan Branch of the Academy of Sciences of USSR together with Kazan State University for their passivity. He emphasized that scientists should be involved in the resolution of current problems, and should be assigned long- and short-term tasks requiring academic research and the formulation of concrete recommendations [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 15, File 1299, Sheet 40].

The discussion at the Plenary Session of the Regional Committee centred on the issues raised in the report by the First Secretary of the Regional Committee of the CPSU. First Secretary of the Kazan City Committee of the CPSU, G. Zertsalov, opened the Plenary Session by immediately stating that without restructuring interethnic relations as part of an overall process of restructuring and democratizing society, no major issues would be resolved. The leader of the largest party in the republic was trying harder than ever to be careful and sensitive in his use of language. He emphasized that 'national relationships, as events in other regions of our country attest will not tolerate measures taken in a categorical, momentary fashion... whereas in our republic there is sometimes a desire to rush into things when the time seems right.' There followed a rhetorical question: 'Is this acceptable, when many people just don't realize how national issues are addressed, and some still have no idea of whether such questions are even appropriate? To unravel this tangle of interethnic problems without the informed participation of absolutely all citizens of the republic is asking for new and perhaps even more acute difficulties.'

G. Zertsalov cited bilingualism as one of the most challenging issues, as everyone cared about the fate of their native language. After quoting the CPSU Platform on the national question of the right of indigenous communities in all republics to establish their native language as their official language and to accord Russian language official federal status, Zertsalov drew attention to the difficulties in addressing issues related to bilingualism. It would be impossible, unrealistic, to coerce everyone into learning a language in a short period of time. Introducing hasty measures without an appropriate budget would not help to solve the language problem. As the saying goes: more haste, less speed. Being hasty with regard to this issue would be dangerous and harmful. After indicating the need for developing a mechanism to deal with national and language questions in a consistent way, G. Zertsalov stated that the measures identified for developing Tatar culture under the republic programme 'Miras' were insufficient, and an integrated programme for the unobstructed development of the Tatar language on a reasoned scientific and material basis was required. He also identified the equally complex question of the capital of the republic's unique national vibrancy, referring to an article on the problem by M. Magdeev in the Socialist Tatarstan newspaper on 5 December. 'It would be good if, together with us, the Council of Ministers and the republic's State Committee for Construction, their architects, designers, and artists showed real concern about Kazan's national vibrancy,' concluded G. Zertsalov [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 15, File 1299, Sheet 41].

A. Yakupov, a member of the Party's Regional Committee, and maintenance technician at the Kamaz Press and Stamping Plant, joined the discussion to describe inter-ethnic relations at Kamaz. The giant plant employed 160,000 workers representing over 60 ethnic groups. As a collective, they valued their colleagues by their attitude to work, not eth-
There is no point resisting it, as the indus-

tric identity. Even a good technical special-

ist would not be respected by his colleagues

unless he respected the ethnicities of other

workers. A. Yakupov spoke on the use of

language in Naberezhnye Chelny, 'Today we

are aware of certain mechanics restricting

the use of the Tatar language. In production,

let's say, in industry, Russian is the lingua

franca. That is a historically objective fact.

There is no point resisting it, as the indus-

trial lexicon is full of foreign borrowings and

technical terms, which are almost absent in

the Tatar language. Yet, we must not put up

with the limited cultural and everyday use

of Tatar. Unfortunately, one cannot watch a

feature film in Tatar at a cinema in our city,

since we don't have any art cinematography

of our own.' The speaker complained about

the lack of opportunities to send a letter or

telegram, or receive any document in Tatar

within Tataria. The language was out of use

in the city public transport and there were no

street name plates in Tatar. A. Yakupov main-

tained that an equal Russian-Tatar bilingual-

ism should be a law and a rule in the republic

but, like G. Zertsalov, he recommended an

unhurried approach to the problem with due

regard to financial, human resources, and oth-

er issues [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 15,

File 1299, Sheet 42].

Member of the CPSU Regional Com-

mittee, Director General of the Nizhnekam-

skshina Production Association N. Zelenov

attributed the successful performance of his

plant to the 'Leninist national policy imple-

mented consistently by the Tatar Regional

Party Organisation, its Regional Committee,

and the Presidium of the TASSR Supreme

Soviet.' As an example, he mentioned the fact

that higher education establishments in Kazan

and Nizhnekamsk had been offering training
to national engineers and technicians and the

fact that the plant entrusted to him employed

representatives of ten ethnic groups, of which

seven were represented in the management.

'We have experienced no inter-ethnic conflicts

among our employees since the plant was es-

established — we have had this staff composi-

tion for 19 years,' he mentioned emphatically,

We all have an equal right to work, use social

benefits, and develop our traditions, language,

and culture' [SA HPD TR, Inventory 15, List

15, File 1299, Sheet 61].

However, all the speeches were run-off-

the-mill and could not impress participants

in the Plenary Session. Neither Yakupov, nor

Zelenov, nor other speakers representing plant

personnels expressed their opinion on the re-

public's status, while demonstrating apprecia-

tion of the inter-ethnic work relations and sug-

gest a few further improvements.

Member of the CPSU Regional Commit-

tee, Secretary of the Party Committee of the

Kazan Bridge Construction Association G.

Ivanov also reported a good inter-ethnic atmo-

sphere among his staff and suggested a number

of improvements to it. Having expressed his

rejection of the previous ethnic policy, which

led to 'the scopes of the languages of many

peoples in our country, including Tatar, being

reduced to everyday communication', he sup-

ported the provision of the CPSU Platform,

under which the republics were entitled to
determine the official status of any language

on their own without prejudice to any rights

of other peoples. The speaker attributed the

aggravated ethnic problem to poor economy,

which, as he claimed, did not understand those

who had been escalating the conflict by work-

ing up people from different ethnic groups

against each other and tuging the national

heartstrings of the people instead of focus-

ing their efforts on improving the economic

mechanism, ensuring the republic's transition
to regional self-sufficiency, and saturating the

market with fast moving consumer goods. So

who benefited from 'splitting the country into

ethnic communities' The speaker's answer

was predictable: 'I remember the confusion

and even indignation when our staff received

the application by the Tatar Public Centre on

arranging a large-scale discussion of ethnic

non-issues from the Presidium of the TASSR

Supreme Soviet' [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, In-

ventory 15, File 1299, Sheet 70]. In the mean-

while, G. Ivanov did not shed any light on the

nature of the 'non-issues'. In fact, the TCC's

application was aimed at ensuring an official
status for the Tatar language and turning Tataria into a union republic.

The necessity of transforming Tataria into a union republic was so obvious that many scientists and artists of other republics supported the idea. For instance, a statement was made at the aforementioned round-table conference in Riga, that it would be 'a step forward in terms of increasing the nation's sovereignty' [Communist, 1989, No. 6, p. 75].

The speech by Driller at the Elekon Association A. Borodin was far more to-the-point and detailed. Unlike a number of senior party officials, this worker was able to highlight a range of issues that had to be solved. He expressed his disapproval of the lack of ethnic theatres and clubs in the republic and the television, which seemed to be excessively enthusiastic about football and hockey matches and demonstrated the same plays without a Russian translation, mentioning the fact that Tatar was seldom used in the service sector [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 15, File 1299, Sheet 55].

The speech by Director General of the Radio Pribor Production Association, Member of the Party Regional Committee Yu. Emaletdinov contained interesting references to his personal life. The introduction was as follows: 'I am Tatar. My father entered the Party in 1918. He established the regime in Meleuz district, Bashkoria. My step-father is Russian, a member of the Party since 1919. He participated in the establishment of the Komsomol in Udmurtia. I was a troublesome child, but I have never heard my Russian step-father mention my being Tatar in any negative way. So, why do we raise the question of inter-ethnic relations today? Why ruin traditions that were created,' and maintained that they should be corrected [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 15, File 1299, Sheet 89].

Party Committee Secretary of Yelabuga Pedagogical Institute A. Rybakov stirred the public by emphasizing the necessity of making radical changes to the forms, methods, and nature of the inter-ethnic awareness work in higher education institutions. Proceeding from the position that an ethnic question always has a specific historical nature and that no one-size-fits-all solutions could apply to all situations, stages of socialist development, country regions, and even to various personnels, Rybakov brought up a concern that new approaches to arranging ethnic sociological studies on the development of nations and national relations should be worked out [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 15, File 1299, Sheet 45]. However, the speaker failed to come up with any new approaches, restricting himself to the statement that the Russian-Tatar Department of the Philology Faculty and the Tatar Department of the Pedagogical Faculty of Yelabuga Pedagogical Institute, had been training teachers for Tatar schools. The speech suggested that the possibility of training History teachers to give instructions in the Tatar language and the establishment of Tatar groups within departments for Science and Maths were at the stage of discussion.

Speaking about language classes in comprehensive and Sunday schools in the republic, the TASSR Minister of People's Education R. Nizamov mentioned that a bilingualism-oriented system was necessary, which would ensure equal possession of Russian and mother-tongues by schoolchildren. The minister emphasised the fact that the People's Education Authorities had been taking measures to restore the Tatar people's need for their mother-tongue and, consequently, ethnic schooling. Efforts had been taken to restore the status of the ethnic school and overcome the psychological barrier demonstrated by the majority of parents, mostly urban dwellers, who were reluctant to teach their children their mother-tongue. R. Nizamov reported that a new subject called Domestic Culture, Literature, and
History was introduced to Russian schools and vocational schools, while people's education departments had been instructed to ensure mother-tongue classes for all pupils of kindergartens, secondary and vocational schools. The Council for Mother-Tongues, the Department for Ethnic Schools had been established under the Ministry to coordinate the development of ethnic-Russian bilingualism, and the Tatar Language and Literature Department had been founded under the Tatar Institute of Teachers' Improvement. R. Nizamov laid an emphasis on such issues as the relations between family and school, intensification of pedagogical training. Realising that a 'great leap' was no solution to the problem, he suggested that dedicated Tatar groups should be initially established in child care centres.

It is clear that people's education was not free of trouble. Many speakers mentioned tardiness instead of quick measures, lack of determination for founding ethnic schools and classes in secondary schools, and delayed supply of school textbooks.

Having mentioned the drawbacks, Chair- man of the Republic Writers' Union R. Muhamadiev stated that hardly any ethnic schools remained in towns and work settlements and that child care centres offering lessons in the mother-tongue of the indigenous ethnic group were extremely few even in the capital. He attributed the situation to the fact that the arrest of M. Sultan-Galiev in 1923 was the beginning of repressions against the national intelligentsia. Two compulsion revisions of the Tatar alphabet, as well as the notorious Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) dated August 1944, also contributed to it. As a result, the Tatar people became a 'population without kith or kin, without even an original name'.

'It is probably writers who, more than others, have to deeply feel and comprehend the situation when a man's spiritual and moral needs are neglected, which is especially violent when it comes to language as the cornerstone of the national culture,' Muhamadiev said. The speaker expressed confidence that 'the Supreme Soviet of the USSR will adopt a law on language to ensure constitutional equality, free development and unlimited use of all the country's ethnic languages within their ethnic areas one of these days.'

Emphasising the fact that the republic had to ensure linguistic and cultural development for all peoples forming dense communities within it, R. Muhamadiev stated that it was necessary to realise that Tatarstan was the world's only historical territory capable of providing unrestricted development for the Tatar nation, its culture and language, and that restoring the status of Tatar as the republic's official language was a burning issue on the agenda. Unlike the previous speakers, R. Muhamadiev finished his speech by expressing confidence that Tatarstan would soon become a union republic, and Tatar its official language [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 15, File 1299, Sheets 56–57, 59].

Director of G. Ibragimov Institute of Language, Literature, and History of the Kazan Branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Member of the Party Regional Committee M. Zakiev focused his speech on inter-ethnic relations and the research on them. Emphasising the fact that inter-ethnic relations had turned out to be very susceptible to various processes related to the progress of democratisation and Glasnost, the professor moved on to the republic's status, describing the CPSU Platform 'The Party's National Policy under the Current Conditions' as a big step forward as compared to other recent Soviet and party documents. M. Zakiev expressed his regret concerning the declarative approach to ensuring equality for the peoples of the republics. He presented the results of the Scientific and Practical Conference on the Issues of Controlling the Social and Economic Development of the Autonomous Republic through Self-Government and Self-Financing, which was held at the premises of Galimdzhan Ibragimov ILLA Scientists from eight autonomous republics had an unanimous opinion that the prerequisite for economic independence was a transformed political status of the autonomous republics. The scientists were very circumspect in criticising the following four national status cri-
teria specified in the CPSU Platform: social and economic development, population size, national consolidation level, and the previous experience of state-building.

M. Zakiev mentioned some curious facts, 'In terms of social and economic development, our republic is within the top 10, even among the union republics. In terms of population size, the Tatars are number six in the Union. However, only 26.5% of them live in Tataria (1.6 million); but the remaining 5 million inhabiting other territories across the Union, admit Tataria to be their spiritual homeland and, somewhat surprisingly, they are more concerned with the republic's status than anyone else. Having consolidated to form a nation back in the mid-19th century, which deals with the third criterion, and having a millennium-long history of statehood, if we refer to the fourth criterion, the Tatars have had all reasons to self-determine themselves as a sovereign republic within the USSR, thus raising their status by one step [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 15, File 1299, Sheet 65].

The discussion at the Plenary Session apparently shifted from the inter-ethnic relations to the issue of the republic's status. The demand that Tataria should be transformed into a union republic was becoming increasingly imperative.

President of the Tatar Public Centre M. Mulyukov was the first to criticise M. Shaimiev's report that suggested the negligence of the national question. He also disapproved of many speakers who had been downplaying the matter. M. Mulyukov maintained that the issue of the republic's status and that of inter-ethnic relations should be differentiated. He said that the Tatar social movement was a nation-wide movement for reconstruction. In response to the criticism by TCC, he said that over 40% of the delegates at the first TCC founding congress in February 1989 were communists and members of the Komsomol, 18 out of 21 members of the board being communists.

Speaking about granting Tataria the status of a union republic, M. Mulyukov criticised the senior officials of the CPSU Regional Committee for a lack of consistency: 'As you know, the former First Secretary of the Tatar Party Regional Committee Comrade Usmanov raised the question of improving our republic's status at the September (1989) Plenary Session of the CPSU Central Committee. Before his departure to Moscow, at the meeting with the Tatar Public Centre management, he maintained that Tataria had to be rewarded the union status. Why does the new management deviate from the line, thus failing to show any succession?' M. Mulyukov reported that 70% of the respondents in Tataria supported the idea of ensuring a higher status for the republic, mentioning the fact that the TCC had collected over 200,000 signatures in support of the demand, and maintained that the issue of transforming the republic into a union one should be discussed effective immediately and put on the agenda of the Tatar ASSR Supreme Soviet Session (the Plenary Session took part the day before it. - I.T.). The speaker mentioned the fact that the TCC had presented to the TASSR Supreme Soviet an outline of the law on language and the draft mechanism for the implementation of the law.

As an example of an efficient struggle to transform an autonomous republic into a union one, he mentioned the Bashkir ASSR, where the Board for the Development of Suggestions to Ensure the Status of a Union Republic for Bashkiria was founded in 1989. M. Mulyukov stated that the TCC had developed certain suggestions concerning the issue.

The speaker also criticised those who maintained that economy, cost accounting, and self-financing could improve the republic's status as such: 'Firstly, cost accounting and self-financing will not ensure complete economic sovereignty for the republic. Secondly, who would guarantee that by obtaining the right to cost accounting... we will catch up with union republics and ensure 32 deputies representing the Tatar ASSR to the USSR Supreme Soviet? Economy does not exist without politics and vice versa... Many speakers, including the famous writer Kugultinov, academicians Sakharov, Sagdeev, Valeev, and Larionov from Yakutia have said many times that the status of Tataria has to be upgraded..."
to that of a union republic. On 15 November 1988, the Buryat republican newspaper Buryaat Uten wrote that it was of primary importance for the Tatar socialist nation to obtain the status of a union republic. I shall not mention the fact that documents by the United Nations Organisation and other international documents entitle us to the union status... The anti–Perestroika forces have taken advantage of the people's unawareness,' Mulyukov went on, 'to deliberately mix the national question with inter-ethnic relations. By the way, one cannot distinguish one thing from another in the report of the Party Regional Committee. They want to present the solution to the innocuous distorted national question as an attempt of working up one nation against the other.' Like other speakers maintaining that the inter-ethnic controversy was not pronounced in the republic, unlike national questions, he focused the public attention on national training. 'In Kazan, there is not a single representative of the indigenous ethnic group among the management of city and district school boards. Out of 140 school principals in the city of Kazan, only 19 are Tatars. The new Trade Union Committee of the KamAZ Casting Plant does not contain a single Tatar, though Tatars account for 33.1% of the plant's personnel. At present, Tatars make the 40% of all KamAZ employees, but have no representation in the management. Speaking of the human resource policy, I would like to ask: how long is the position of the Party Regional Committee's Second Secretary going to be reserved (as termed by Belyaev) for representatives of a certain nation?'

M. Mulyukov suggested that some part of the income from oil production and sales should be used to create a high-frequency Tatar-speaking radio, mentioning the Svoboda Radio Station, which broadcasts its Azatlyk programme globally for three hours each day, as an example.

M. Mulyukov also shed light on the issue of cooperation with party authorities. Party and Soviet authorities clearly tended to eschew themselves from the TCC. Instead of cooperating, 'they force out, punish, or reject some TCC representatives.' As an example, M. Mulyukov mentioned the reduction with severe reprimand of the TCC Member of Board F. Badretdinov, the host of the Glasnost TV show, on the pretext of biased commentary on the TASSR Supreme Soviet Session. Mulyukov might have given a somewhat inaccurate account of Badretdinov's case. Chairman of the TASSR State Committee for Television and Radio I. Khayrullin reported Badretdinov and several other TV workers to have been punished for having a subjective approach the programme preparation. (He meant the report from the TASSR Supreme Soviet session, which I. Khayrullin claimed to have not included the speeches of a vast majority of deputies of the TASSR Supreme Soviet, in particular those in the Tatar language. I. Khayrullin might have been right in this case.) The Badretdinov incident was surely more than just accidental — when there's a will, there's a way. I. Khayrullin could not tell the whole truth for obvious reasons.

The First Secretary of the Vakhitovsky district CPSU Committee B. Leushin was opposed to Mulyukov. 'Unlike some activists of public organisations,' said B. Leushin, 'I fully support the provision contained in the speech by the First Secretary of the Regional CPSU Committee M. Shaimiev that believing that a change to the republic's status will automatically solve all of our cultural, economic, and social problems would be a dangerous illusion' [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 15, File 1299, Sheet 78]. The phrase 'some activists' clearly referred to M. Mulyukov, who maintained that economic issues and political status were directly interdependent. B. Leushin believed that 'simply replacing the administrative government from Moscow with that from Kazan would not provide a quicker solution. Becoming a union republic without

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3 M. Mulyukov was referring to the head of the Department of Scientific Communism at the V. Belyaev Aviation Institute in Kazan, who complained that the main leadership positions in the country were reserved for the representatives of one nation. However, he was referring to the Tatars.
having the economic basis relying on regional cost accounting is a meaningless, though seemingly attractive, form of democracy.' To prove that all the available opportunities had not been used yet, he referred to the draft land law, which he believed to stipulate equal rights for union and autonomous republics. B. Leushin also criticised R. Muhamadiev and M. Zakiev, who allegedly claimed that spreading the Russian language could cause a nuclear war [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 15, File 1299, Sheet 79].

People’s Deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet T. Minnullin also expressed his opinion on the republic’s future: ‘We will never be able to separate ourselves. We have intergrown. It is a history of millennia. We cannot imagine a different life... Our republic is a multi-ethnic one, and it cannot be any other way. Speaking of a union republic, we speak of a republic for all peoples within it. It is rather an economic issue than a national one.’ T. Minnullin clarified the situation with B. Leushin’s speech: ‘Comrade Leushin has said today that the draft land law includes autonomous republics. Do you know what it has cost us? You have only seen what has been broadcast on television. The committees did not discuss any autonomies within the framework of the draft laws initially suggested. The draft property law did not contain a single mention of autonomies. Neither did that on languages... Economic reforms alone are no solution to our problems. These all require a political solution.’ The writer mildly criticised M. Shaimiev, ‘This is why I cannot agree with Comrade Shaimiev in this respect, though I am positive that the report was well-presented. Comrade Shaimiev spoke about the economic issues, which were also related to the today’s agenda of the Plenary Session. These items are inseparable from each other, as we cannot address our national and inter-national issues without addressing the economic ones.’

T. Minnullin also tackled the burning language issue: ‘I would like to address our Russian comrades. When working with the population, we should interpret the matter in our favour. It is not about limiting a language but about preserving Tatar. Not only Tatar, in fact — it is about preserving all national languages.' Having mentioned that the USSR Supreme Soviet was preparing a draft law on the languages of the USSR peoples, the speaker defined those to blame for the linguistic decay as officials and ‘national bootlickers, national ladder climbers, and the cowardly intelligentsia’ [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 15, File 1299, Sheets 97–98].

The writer criticised the Movement deputy group advocating for proclaiming Tataria an open republic. ‘Many people and I,’ he said, 'have developed a negative attitude towards this movement. Why? I am aware of the open hearts of the people who live in the republic. But, comrades, an open republic is not a revolving door. The Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic is a national republic, where all peoples of the Soviet Union live perfectly well. This is what I want for the future.’

The head of the Department of Marxist-Leninist theory of the Kazan Conservatory B. Sultanbekov presented a well-grounded speech highlighting a number of controversial issues on the subject. He talked about two secretaries of the Central Committees of adjacent union republics, who were sitting next to each other at a meeting on national issues in Moscow and ignored each other completely. He also mentioned an episode in Georgia, where people dragged the monument to Kirov and Ordzhonikidze along the road by a rope around the neck, while the crowd was cheering them, and how in Kaunas, where the first T-34 tank to enter the city in 1944 was thrown off its pedestal, and the brutal murders and abuse of women in Sumgait and Fergana. The speaker stated that the seemingly isolated cases revealed a struggle. A struggle not only for power. 'We should take a civilized approach to crisis management without blowing up the walls or, most importantly, the foundation of our common house, for the roof will not differentiate between the guilty and the innocent when it falls down.' Sultanbekov gave a warning to those 'rocking the national boat in the troubled waters of these days of tumult.'
B. Sultanbekov criticized petty interference with the republic's affairs by the central authorities and their usurpation of all rights to regulate local life. As an example, he referred to the Decree by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet on Approving the Decree by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Tataria on Naming the New Naratlyk Village in the Territory of the Kazaklar Village Council, Vysokogorsk district. After naming the Chairman of the Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet who had signed the Decree, he asked the following rhetorical question: 'Does Comrade Vorotnikov, who signed the document of enormous national importance, have no other concerns?' Even the Governor of Kazan would address such issues on his own, without turning to St. Petersburg, by merely summoning a village gathering. B. Sultanbekov also criticized the Presidium of the republic's Supreme Soviet, which could also have addressed the issue on its own.

The speaker expressed approval of M. Shaimiev's speech on the need to add some real meaning to the republic's rights, supporting the suggestion that Stalin's first opponent on the national question, M. Sultan-Galiev, should be rehabilitated, thus expressing approval of the politician's idea to ensure the status of a union republic for Tataria [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 15, File 1299, Sheet 93].

First Secretary of the Regional Committee of the ALYCL M. Gadyshin supported B. Sultanbekov by claiming that the republic's youth were committed to ensuring sovereignty and an independent youth organization for Tatarstan, saying that 'all requirements concerning any changes to the republic's status should be reinforced by a clear idea of the legal and economic mechanism for overcoming the indefensible ranking of all nations within our country.'

First Secretary of the Oktyabrsky District CPSU Committee and candidate for member of the Party's Regional Committee Kh. Muradymov referred to many facts to prove that the region inhabited by 15 ethnic groups had an atmosphere of mutual trust. At the same time, Kh. Muradymov noted that they had to take extensive measures to introduce bilingualism to social and cultural life and expressed his regret about the loss of many arts and crafts, national sport and entertainment traditions, etc.

A. Konovalov, a representative of the Movement for Radical Reconstruction of Tataria, President of Kazan State University, USSR People's Deputy, and member of the Party's Regional Committee, also supported the idea of granting the status of a union republic to Tataria: 'In terms of economic and intellectual potential, the republic is at the same level or even higher than some of our union republics.' However, the deputy maintained that a general political approach to the problem was necessary to ensure a solution applicable to all nations and peoples in the Soviet Union, so that all national state entities, as well as nations, could enjoy equal rights and opportunities.

Encouraging participants in the Plenary Session to take a balanced approach to addressing pressing issues, A. Konovalov summed up his speech: 'We should not forget the good Tatar saying: 'Don't scratch a spot that's not itchy' [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 15, File 1299, Sheet 99]. At the same time, the speaker did not reply to T. Minnullin, who criticized his suggestion that Tatarstan should be transformed into an open republic.

Following a series of disputes, First Secretary of the CPSU Regional Committee M. Shaimiev answered a series of questions. They dealt with the issues on the Plenary Session's agenda. The most sensitive of them were as follows: 'When and how should rights and conditions at least equal to those of Russian be ensured to the Tatar language in the Tatar Republic? When and how should discrimination against Tatars in the republic during elections for deputies of the Supreme and city Councils, as well as trade union and other committees, be eliminated?' Here are some examples of discrimination against Tatars. Only 8 out of 28 USSR people's deputies representing the Tatar Republic are Tatar; there is not a single representative of the Tatar nation.
among the 34 members of the newly elected factory committee of the Trade Union of the KamAZ Casting Plant. The existing election system enables the majority to suppress the minority. As a minority in nearly all cities in Tataria, the Tatars are suppressed. We need constitutional guarantees of minority representation in elected authorities.’ M. Shaimiev replied: ‘I think that both the report and the discussion provided good coverage of the first question. Some clarification of the second issue is necessary, which Comrade Mulyukov has mentioned. The number of Tatars among the 28 people’s deputies representing the USSR from the TASSR is not 8 but 13. There are also 11 Russians, 2 Ukrainians, 1 Mordva and 1 Chuvash.

We might think this is fine. Well, it's not about what we think — it's about people's elections. We can and should understand the concerns about certain regions, in particular, about the city of Kazan, but I think that the Tatar civic center must make an effort to rectify the situation.’

In his closing speech, M. Shaimiev said: 'Speaking of the republic's status, we should bear in mind that we support the current well-considered platform of the Party's Central Committee, which we mentioned in the report. The question is ultimately about a federation that ensures equal political and economic rights for everyone. This should be our aspiration. According to Gorbachev's report at the September (1989) Plenary Session of the CP-USSR Central Committee, a platform had been developed to specify the solutions to national questions for all Communists in our country...

...I exchanged opinions with Bureau members during the break. Everybody likes the course that the Plenary Session has taken. It really is an open dialog, and, more importantly, one that is focused on the issue under discussion. This says that our regional party organization and all comrades participating in our Plenary Session today are mature. It should be emphasized that all fundamental provisions presented in every section of the report, as we can infer, are supported by the vast majority.

M. Shaimiev noted that national questions would have further coverage in the press, while the provisions of his report would be presented in greater detail. He reported that M. Sultan-Galiev had been legally rehabilitated and that preparation for his complete party rehabilitation had been initiated. As for meeting the requirements of Tatars living outside the republic, he expressed his hope that the transition to regional self-sufficiency, which was aimed at ensuring economic independence for the republic, would enable the government to allocate specific funds for these purposes [SAHPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 15, File 1299, Sheets 102–106].

As we can see, the Plenary Session could not restrict itself to discussing inter-ethnic relations. Any matter related to them seemed to depend on the republic's status. Without solving the latter problem, it would be impossible to make progress in implementing the Tatar language and the republic's equal development within the union state.

At the same time, it was becoming increasingly obvious that the problem could not be solved by decrees. An act of real self-determination by the republic's people had to take place. How could this be done? What was the realistic way to ensure full-fledged statehood for Tatarstan? Russia itself suggested the way by adopting the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the RSFSR at the 1st Congress of People's Deputies on 12 June 1990. The Tatar Republic could and had to go the same way. The Russian Declaration was the trigger of the so-called parade of sovereignties.
§ 6. The Development of the Idea of the Republic's Sovereignty

Indus Tagirov

The Plenary Session of the Tatar Regional CPSU Committee of 3 August 1990 took place against the backdrop of threatening events that had spread throughout the entire country. The local Soviets of Jelgava and three more Latvian towns had resolved that all monuments to Lenin and Soviet Army soldiers who had liberated the republic from the fascists should be torn down. Anti-army sentiment surged in the Baltic republics, Moldavia, Ukraine, Armenia, and Georgia. In many cases, military personnel and their families were helpless against abuse by the local authorities. The Supreme Soviets of Latvia and Estonia resolved to suspend the Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers dated 2 November 1989 'On Registering Military Personnel at the Deployment Site of Military Units'. The situation was similar in Ukraine, where employment was being refused to the wives of military personnel and those who did not speak Ukrainian were being dismissed. Cases of physical violence against military personnel were becoming increasingly frequent. In 1989–1990, 97 officers were murdered and 150 people suffered grievous bodily harm. The republics established national military units at the same time [News of Central Committee of Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1990, No. 12, p. 20].

The Congress of the People's Movement of Ukraine, attracting 2,100 delegates representing 632,800 members of the organization to the Ukraine Palace on 25–28 October 1990, proclaimed a struggle for 'a sovereign, independent, democratic, parliamentary Ukrainian Republic'. The Movement's program stated that the process of historical development had been violently interrupted, causing Ukraine to become part of the USSR with a single ruling party, which had brought the people to an economic and environmental crisis. It emphasized that it was impossible to prevent a nationwide disaster without changing the political system, eliminating the Communist Party's monopoly, and establishing political and economic pluralism. The Movement declared its mission to ensure independent statehood for Ukraine and establish a parliamentary republic through non-violent means [News of Central Committee of Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1991, No. 2, p. 62].

Persecution of communists began at the same time. On 18 October, the newspaper Za Vil' nu Ukrajinu (For Free Ukraine) published a resolution by the Presidium of the Lviv Regional Council of the Movement, which read as follows: 'We encourage those communists who value the national interests and human honor and dignity to dissociate themselves from the corrupt and criminal leadership of the Communist Party of Ukraine, which has reduced our rich republic to poverty, decay, and spiritual devastation, and quit the CPSU in protest to contribute to the dissolution of any work-related party organizations.' A campaign was initiated to force party committees even out of rooms and buildings outside of industrial plants. Passes to the plants' premises were withdrawn from dismissed party officials. Communists were banned from management positions. All activities of Party and Komsomol organizations at schools were banned in Ivano-Frankivsk district. For instance, the Session of the City Council refused to confirm the appointment of S. Sichova as the head of the civil registry office, because she had previously worked as an instructor for the Party's City Committee. Russians in Ternopil region were advised to head for Russia, and Ukrainians were told: 'If you want to work as a doctor, teacher or journalist, you have to turn in your party membership card.'

The political situation in Georgia was reported to have become difficult when the Communists won only 64 parliamentary seats in the elections to the Supreme Soviet. Round Table Free Georgia headed by Z. Gamsakhurdia won 155 parliamentary seats. The remaining nine blocs and parties had a total of 27 seats. Round Table Free Georgia was clearly
determined to cancel the USSR Constitution, reject the new Union Agreement, and proclaim Georgia a subject of international law. As urged by the Ajdgilar people's forum, the Abkhazian population refrained from participating in elections. The majority in South Ossetia also ignored them, since they were preparing for the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the South Ossetian Soviet Democratic Republic.

After winning elections to the local Councils, the popular fronts of Latvia and Estonia, as well as the Lithuanian Sąjūdis, became more active. The republics' Communist parties split up into separate Communist parties. New laws aimed at banning Communist parties as criminal organizations were being prepared. Some even called for a 'second series of Nuremberg Trials'.

In 1990, food prices increased in Estonia without causing much popular discontent: 50% of Estonians and 16% of Russians took it calmly. A senior official of the Department of Socio-Economic Policy of the CPSU Central Committee, I. Belistov, was sent there to study the situation. He reported on his trip as follows: 'It is a common fact that decentralization, which has become widespread in a number of regions of the country, is most pronounced in Estonia. The rightful desire to obtain true sovereignty, primarily in the economic sphere, has developed into open separatism that threatens to destroy our common economic space' [News of Central Committee of Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1990, No. 12, p. 94].

Complicated processes were also taking place in the Russian Federation, initially meant as the unifying link in democratizing the country. Parties and movements demanding true democratization through dissolution of the CPSU and elimination of its control over the country's life were springing up everywhere. The Democratic Russia movement was gaining momentum. It held a congress of 1,000,181 delegates representing 71 regions of the RSFSR in the Russia Cinema in Moscow on 20–21 October 1990. Presenting an alternative to the CPSU leadership was declared the fundamental principle of the Organizing Committee for the Congress. Avoiding any violent means of solving national or social problems and other issues was established as the organizational principle. The speakers' demands included resignation of the union government, and de-partization of the army, the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Although no general program document was adopted, addresses, declarations and resolutions specified the key political objective as destroying the USSR by withdrawing the RSFSR from it. The idea of Russia's sovereignty was the dominant concept of the Congress. More specifically, measures to destroy the USSR included preparation and holding of acts of civil disobedience to force the government of Gorbachev and Ryzhkov to resign, support of the Russian parliament and government's focus on radical economic reform, and participation in the development of a new Constitution of the RSFSR.

E. Tadevosyan, Head of the Department of Socialism of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Doctor of Philosophy, wrote in Communist magazine that the time had come to implement the expansion of the republics' rights declared at the beginning of Perestroika. He maintained that the republics should sign a new union agreement as soon as possible. Otherwise, he warned, the dissolution of the USSR could become a reality. The author referred to the resolutions to establish independent states beyond the USSR adopted by various forces in some republics. 'I am deeply convinced,' the scholar wrote, 'that an active discussion of the draft agreement, and particularly its adoption twelve to eighteen months ago, would have dramatically limited the opportunities for separatist forces. It is obviously much harder to reach to such an agreement today. Thus, it would be extremely unreasonable to delay its preparation and adoption.' The article appeared in April 1990. The scholar believed that a lot of time had been lost by then. The agreement should have been signed in 1988–1989 [Communist, 1990,
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No. 6, p. 19]. It had not been prepared, never mind signed, by August 1991.

The events in the country also affected the Tatar Republic. The party ceased to accept new members, and the current ones were withdrawing at an increasing rate. Whereas in 1989, 1,200 people in the republic quit the CPSU, in 1990, the number increased to about 2,500. The party's budget was reduced by over 40%. The clashes between the Soviet and Party authorities escalated. The slogan 'All power to the Soviets!' was ubiquitous. One of the suggestions was that the CPSU should be completely deprived of exclusive control over the state, and a multi-party system should be introduced.

The population's living standards dropped, the food problem was becoming increasingly urgent. Over 34.4% of respondents in opinion polls among communists in the TASSR reported certain inter-ethnic tensions. Public sentiment was affected by radio, television, and newspaper reports on the growing inter-ethnic tension in the Baltic states, Ukraine, Middle Asia, and Transcaucasia.

Apart from discussing the findings of the 28th CPSU Congress and the problems described above, the August Plenary Session of the Tatar Regional CPSU Committee was focused on national sovereignty of the Tatar ASSR. One of the speakers, First Secretary of the Regional Party Committee M. Shaimiev, referred to Secretary General of the Party M. Gorbachev, claiming the country's progressive forces to be taking a sweep 'towards humanism, democracy, and social justice,... overcoming the totalitarian Stalinist system as a society of free citizens based on socialist values is being formed.' He was optimistic that the 'over-centralized state will be transformed into a true union state, ... profound revolutionary processes are taking place.' However, the reality that was reflected to a limited extent in the information presented by speakers at the Plenary Session was evidence of the decay within the CPSU and the country.

According to M. Shaimiev, the rapidly escalating inter-ethnic conflict in the country motivated the 28th CPSU Congress to embark on a democratic national policy, voluntary alliance, and agreement among peoples, with regard to which he stressed the need to establish constitutional treaty relationships between the Center and the republic, based on the idea of a union of sovereign states under an agreement with a clear division of powers between the Union and the union republics. 'All national state entities, including autonomous ones, must be equal participants in the process,' the speaker noted.

The report later focused on justifying the need to address the republic's state sovereignty at the 2nd Session of the TASSR Supreme Soviet. Evidently, M. Shaimiev had given up on the idea of preserving Tatarstan only as an autonomous republic.

Concerning the political, economic, and legal factors determining the Declaration of State Sovereignty, the speaker mentioned the rapid growth of ethnic self-awareness and the civil movement for raising the constitutional status of the republic. M. Shaimiev noted that economic reform and the transition to market mechanisms would allow the government to settle the key set of disputes between the union and autonomous republics by eliminating any existing inequality in their economic relations. He also referred to the Declaration of Rights of the Working and Exploited People adopted by the 3rd All-Russian Congress of Soviets in 1918, which did not provide for any ranking of the republics and advanced the idea of a free union of free nations as the fundamental principle of the federation. M. Shaimiev called the adoption of the USSR Law 'On the Delimitation of Powers Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Constituent Entities of the Federation,' which proclaimed the autonomous republics Soviet socialist states — constituent entities of the Federation — of the USSR, the beginning of the restoration of this principle. The report stated that the meaning of the phrase 'the right of nations to self-determination' was free establishment by the republics of constitutional treaty relationships with any national territorial entities concerned. As an example, M. Shaimiev mentioned the adoption of the
Declaration of Sovereignty of Russia at the 1st Congress of the People's Deputies of the RSFSR on 12 June 1990. He noted that the adoption of the Declaration of State Sovereignty by the TASSR Supreme Soviet would contribute to real political and socio-economic independence, as well as to expanding the republic's competence and powers. 'I think that the document will be representative of the interests of all peoples in the republic and become the basis for new laws of the TASSR, including its Constitution, the republic's participation in preparing and signing the Union and Federative (with the RSFSR) agreements, without any prejudice to the RSFSR's territorial integrity,' he said. Taking into account the special historical, economic, cultural and other connections of the peoples inhabiting the RSFSR, M. Shaimiev stressed the need to establish treaty relations between the RSFSR and the Tatar Republic [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 15, File 1899, Sheets 4–34].

First Secretary of the Naberezhnye Chelny City CPSU Committee A. Logutov approved submission of the issue of proclaiming the republican sovereign to the Regional Committee's Plenary Session as one of the most critical problems: he also believed that the issue of the USSR's national state structure should have been discussed back at the 1st Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. If a clear concept had been adopted, it could have eliminated a number of local problems. A. Logutov gave a more direct and harsh estimate of the hurried adoption of the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Russia without due regard for the opinion of the autonomous republics. He considered it contrary to the USSR Law of 26 April 1990 'On the Delimitation of Powers between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Constituent Entities of the Federation', under which Tataria was both a constituent entity of the USSR and of the Russian Federation. Participants in the Plenary Session could not help but agree with the speaker when he said: 'At present, the standard of living in Tataria is not commensurate with the contribution made by the republic's industry and agriculture to the country's economy. Our city is a vivid example. Enterprises and organizations produce commodities with a total value of over 3 billion rubles. Over 700 million rubles go to the state budget. However, the city's current annual budget, for example, is 85 million rubles, although we need about 250 million to ensure normal development and reliable operation of municipal services.'

At the same time, A. Logutov complained about the lack of complete official information on the events in the country, which had provoked rumors and controversial opinions causing inter-ethnic tension. 'The outcome of meetings in party organizations after the Congress suggests,' he said, 'that people are mainly concerned about three issues. First. What will we have; how is it going to affect the republic's regions, its individual citizens? Second. What will the solution to the inter-ethnic problem be? Will it lead to refugees? Third. What will the solution to the language problem be? These three issues are critical today.' After noting that there was enough time before the Session of the Supreme Soviet of Tataria, he suggested that all mass media should be used to ensure that people could receive as much information as possible. In conclusion, the speaker said, 'When we proclaim sovereignty, it has to be absolutely clear based on a well-considered approach and strict economic calculations to prevent it from failing like regional self-sufficiency, which we have been discussing so much recently. As for my position, I advocate sovereignty based on a union agreement; I advocate sovereignty that would make the republic an equal among equals, ensure equal rights for all peoples, the unalienable right to a decent life, free development and use of one's native language, and satisfaction of national and cultural needs of every person. Sovereignty must foster common progress of the Union and the Russian Federation and strengthen them. In order to achieve these goals, we have to give up all superficial ideas, reach a civil agreement and join our efforts to work and create' [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 15, File 1899, Sheets 34–35].

M. Khasanov, First Vice Chairman of the TASSR Council of Ministers and member of
the Regional CPSU Committee, expressed his approval of the idea of sovereignty as well-justified and modern: 'Tataria has been living within the framework of autonomy for 70 years. Historically, this is a short period, but I think it is long enough to draw some conclusions, assess the events, and compare various forms of national and state structure in terms of how effective they are and how reasonable it is to preserve them any longer.' After mentioning that the republic's largest union— and federation-controlled machine building, petrochemical, power, light industry and processing plants were concentrated in Kazan, he complained that the republic controlled only 2% of them, which were of little importance. In 70 years of its existence, the republic had only had two of its own industrial ministries: for local industry, controlling the Arsk Ethnic Footwear Plant and a cardboard plant for the disabled; and for the fuel industry, which was responsible for distributing firewood to the population. They had recently ceased to exist. Thus, the Council of Ministers did not control any industrial ministries. 'How can the autonomous republic control its industry or enjoy any economic rights in such a situation?' the speaker demanded. 'The republic can only use 2–9% of the amount raised from union— and republic-controlled plants and organizations,' said M. Khasanov, 'to meet its socio-cultural and other needs. The republic does not have any real rights to carry out foreign economic activities, while the monetary fund of less than 1% of the republic's total exports amount is ridiculous.'

In conclusion, M. Khasanov said: 'Speaking of sovereignty, I should emphasize the fact that it deals not only with the Tatar nation but directly affects all peoples living in Tataria. We must avoid any nationalism and chauvinism, neglect of and prejudice to the interests of any nation when addressing it... It would be a mistake to say that there is general approval of the idea of state sovereignty. Some do not hesitate to advocate for it; others are on the fence; a third group views it as a scheme by the republic's leaders. People make wild, extremist statements, reporting an alleged plot of separation, of withdrawal from Russia, even from the Soviet Union. We should state decisively that state sovereignty granted to the republic does not mean any political separation or economic and cultural isolation from other republics and central governmental agencies, any changes to its borders, not to mention its withdrawal from Russia and the Soviet Union... We should make a firm and clear statement that Tataria has been and will remain part of the Soviet multi-national state. It is the cornerstone of our future national state construction. I suggest that we should essentially accept the draft resolution on the issue submitted by the Bureau of the Regional Party Committee and use our right to legislative initiative to submit the issue of the republic's state sovereignty to the next session of the TASSR Supreme Soviet for consideration' [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 15, File 1899, Sheets 41–42].

First Secretary of the Vakhitov District CPSU Committee B. Leushin, like many other party officials, was concerned about the intra-party situation. He was apprehensive about the outflow of a large part of the academic, artistic, and technical intelligentsia from the party. The speaker also discussed the economic issue, making note of measures fora transition to a market economy before the Union or Russian governments made any decisions. Among such measures, he mentioned privatization of enterprises and other public property, tax benefits and most favored treatment for business, widespread use of business forms, restructuring of banking, increased deposit interest rates, etc.

B. Leushin remarked that the Socio-Economic Department of the Republican Party Committee and the Communists in the republic's government should focus their efforts on developing a concept for Tataria's transition to a market economy as soon as possible, which would require them to engage new, young thinkers outside the box from the Kazan Scientific Center of the USSR Academy of Sciences, higher education establishments and research institutes.

However, B. Leushin was more kindly disposed towards the Russian government, say-
ing that 'we have to take into account' its approaches to these issues: 'If we only use our prospective economic and political sovereignty to fight with our neighbors, with Russia and the Union and re-divide our small public pie, it will be a step towards further aggravation of the crisis. We would only amplify our problems and that of Russia and the Union.' He called for a cautious, step-by-step approach to solving the difficult problem of gaining sovereignty, for a general national referendum on the matter to be preceded by a discussion on the issue in workers' associations and the mass media [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 15, File 1899, Sheets 43–50].

I. Kabanov, Farm Boss at the OGME 'Leninogorskneft', Secretary of the Shop Party Organization and Delegate to the 28th CPSU Congress, expressed the opinion of ordinary communists on the changes happening within the party and in the country. He said that people found the issues of socio-economic status and those related to the transition to market relations disturbing. I. Kabanov's speech concerning the republic's sovereignty was brief: 'I agree that each national republic should be an equal among equals... it is the republic's people who should determine its status under the historical conditions' [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 15, File 1899, Sheet 52].

Speakers supporting the idea of sovereignty for the republic mentioned a number of other important issues. Kh. Khayrutdinov, First Secretary of the Zelenodolsk City CPSU Committee, member of the Regional Party Committee and delegate to the 28th CPSU Congress, expressed confidence about the Party's future, despite the fact that 284 people had quit the CPSU in the district alone [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 15, File 1899, Sheet 53].

N. Muzafarov, Secretary of the Aznakayev City CPSU Committee and delegate to the 28th CPSU Congress, dedicated his speech to the republic's sovereignty. 'We understand sovereignty,' he stated, 'not as separation and complete self-isolation, but on the contrary, as enhancing the republic's diverse connections with other areas across the country ... The republic's higher status will undoubtedly increase its influence on all Tatars as a united spiritual and cultural center.' N. Muzafarov reported that meetings with workers' associations had been largely focused on the sovereignty issue. As a positive example, he mentioned the position of the TCC, whose representatives had fostered mutual rapprochement and rapport of the parties. 'We have to conduct a dialog and joint search, so that everybody concerned with the people's interests can do something of practical value instead of going to the opposition,' the speaker said emphatically.

N. Muzafarov did not overlook supply difficulties: 'It's hard to explain to farmers, livestock breeders, oil and transport workers why they have to receive their tobacco allowance cigarette by cigarette and pay an arm and a leg for ordinary consumer goods while they fulfil their plans and duties to the people honestly.' 'We are tired of the Centre's references to the events in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and other extreme events,' he said, 'and only view them as an evidence that central agencies are incapable of controlling the economic situation. People are not sure that tomorrow their kolkhoz chairman or factory director won't have to allocate matches in boxes and salt in spoonfuls.' Without mincing his words, he said that control should be exercised over the republic's leaders, ministries, and departments: they should resign if 'they do what they were appointed for badly' [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 15, File 1899, Sheet 58].

V. Salamashkin, Secretary of the Party Committee of the Kazan Aviation Institute and delegate to the 28th CPSU Congress, called for developing 'a renewed Tatar Republic ... along with the Russian Federation and within the Russian Federation under the Federal Agreement, and with the Soviet Union under the Union Agreement' [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 15, File 1899, Sheet 64].

Secretary of the Party Organization of the Etilen Plant A. Samarenkin noted that party membership had decreased and applications to quit the party had been submitted on a large
scale, and in his speech he focused on the issues that would emerge when the republic became sovereign: 'Periodicals, radio, and television have been discussing the future of the Tatar ASSR. Unfortunately, I think this debate is dominated by political ambitions and emotions relating to the fact that the republic has been drained of oil, agricultural products have been exported from Tataria in spite of food shortages, concerning the environmental crisis, etc. It is hard not to agree with these arguments. However, most of the published works and speeches are excessively emotional, and lack analytical data and figures to enable us, common toilers, to develop an opinion or a position of our own on this matter. Economic relations have become even more critical, because the republic is very close to entering regional market, which is largely connected with the supply of raw and other materials, spare parts, and components for all industries in Tataria. It is still not clear how much access to food citizens of the republic will have with sovereignty and market relations. We need a targeted, carefully considered program to stabilize agriculture by involving the republic's entire industrial and scientific potential.' [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 15, File 1899, Sheets 68–69].

Head of the Kukmor district Party Organization R. Zaripov justified the need for the republic to gain sovereignty using the example of economic development of the rural areas. 'As you know, Tataria produced over 60 centners meat [per capita] in 1989,' he said. 'The figures are 37 centners for the Volga region and 46 for the RSFSR. However, the consumption statistics is 69 kg in Tataria, 78 kg in the Volga region, 75 kg in the Russian Federation, and so on. Our workers are rightfully dissatisfied with the fact that their living standard is inconsistent with the republic's industrial, scientific and technical potential. So we face a question difficult to answer: why do we, as one of the republic's most advanced areas in terms of producing and processing animal products, have to beg superior authorities to enable us to meet our population's minimum demand for meat and dairy products? We cannot sell a single kilogram of meat to industrial plant workers. There is a constant shortage of dairy products. What is the use of the region's producing an average of over 4,000 kilograms of milk per cow? Our three factories — clothing, fur, and felt footwear, each employing over a thousand people — annually produce fast-moving consumer goods with a total value of over 0.9 million rubles, but the region is left with only 0.9% of the products. For instance, the felt footwear factory produces 1.5 million pairs of felt boots per year, while workers in our district only have access to 4,000–5,000.' The factories have hardly been involved at all in district budgeting. R. Zaripov rightfully complained about the Center's practice of taking valuable industrial and agricultural products from the republic, leaving an amount much smaller than the country's average per capita. The republic ranked 50th of 73 administrative units within the Russian Federation in meat consumption, 42nd in milk consumption, 62nd in vegetable consumption, etc. According to the speaker, in order to increase living standards the republic needed true independence, both political and economic: 'Tataria needs the status of a sovereign state to make the best use of its rich potential.' R. Zaripov expressed a clear opinion on the republic's relations with the USSR: 'I think that no communist would say that Tataria should withdraw from the USSR. The Tatars and all peoples in the republic need different relations with the Russian Federation within the USSR: justice, equal rights, and mutual benefits.' [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 15, File 1899, Sheet 72].

B. Zheleznov, Doctor of Legal Sciences and Associate Professor of the Department of State and International Law of the Kazan State University, attended the Plenary Session as an expert in national state construction. Since he was actively involved in developing the fundamental principles of sovereignty, we will provide a more detailed summary of his speech, in which he shed light on the most pressing issues of the relations between the Center and the republic:
As a lawyer, I've spotted some issues that in my opinion require legal clarification... The first is the issue of the relations between Tatarstan on the one hand, and the Union and the Russian Federation on the other hand. The situation is more or less clear when it comes to the Union. Since the Law of 26 April of this year (1990 — I.T.) 'On the Delimitation of Powers between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Constituent Entities of the Federation' was passed, ... we have been a constituent entity of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in which role we can and should sign the Union Agreement. But in order for Tatarstan to sign it not as a union republic, but as a full member of the Union federation, we must proclaim our state sovereignty. I should say that the draft Union Agreement, which is currently under development, includes a provision to this effect. Assume that the Azerbaijan SSR signs the agreement, and, say, the Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous district will sign it within the Azerbaijan SSR, and so on. I think we should move away from this rule. We should become a sovereign, equal party to the Union Agreement by signing it directly and not through and within a union republic. This does not mean that I advocate withdrawing from the Russian Federation. We can and should stay within the Russian Federation, and sign the Union Agreement directly as a sovereign state. This is essential.

Second, the tangle of problems concerning the relations between Tatarstan and Russia, which will emerge when we proclaim sovereignty, appears even more challenging. I have emphasized the fact that, according to Comrade Logutov, and to some other comrades who gave it a passing mention, we would be constituent entities within two federations, as they understand it — the Union and Russia. I think this point of view is ... acceptable. However, there has hardly been a case in the history of mankind where the same state was a constituent entity of two federations. Furthermore, assuming a confrontation between the federation, a state that is a constituent of both will clearly find itself in a very difficult situation. I think it would be reasonable, both legally and logically, to presume that by signing the agreement with the USSR as a constituent entity within the union federation, Tatarstan would cease to be a constituent entity of the Russian Federation and thus would not have to sign the Federal Agreement with Russia. What should the relations between Tatarstan and Russia be like? I think we should enter into a series of relevant specific agreements and treaties with the Russian Republic, delegating those functions that are more reasonable to delegate to Russia as a sovereign state. I think this is how we should interpret our legal status after the proclamation of sovereignty.

So we sign the Union Agreement. What we sign with Russia is not a Federal Agreement but a series of agreements and treaties, under which we delegate some of our functions to it. We can partly stipulate it in our Constitution. However, adopting the Declaration of Sovereignty of Tatarstan is just the first step, although a crucial one. The next essential step to take right after we proclaim sovereignty is to answer the question: what rights will we transfer to the Russian Federation under agreements? In order to transfer these rights, we have to have them. As an autonomous republic, we do not have many of them now under our Constitution. Thus, I believe that the first and most important thing to do, regardless of any current laws we develop on a number of issues — we have to pass at least 20–30 new laws during the first period following the proclamation of our sovereignty — is to analyze the Constitution of Tatarstan. This would enable us to establish our rights as a sovereign state and determine which ones to transfer to Russia. Otherwise we will be left hanging until our superiors sort things out for us under the superior Constitution, so there will be no difference between us and an autonomy.'

Unlike the previous speakers, B. Zhelezov did not call for autonomy. However, he seemed to negate whatever he had said before in his conclusion. He warned Tatarstan against any confrontation with the Russian Federation, claiming that there was no reason...
to feel apprehensive about the Declaration of Sovereignty of Russia. Without mentioning that the Declaration had been developed without due regard for the opinions and rights of the autonomous republic and was in complete contradiction to the international laws of nations, Zhelezov said that the document should not 'worry you in any specific way, as it is essentially a notebook standard, meaning it can be filled with any content,' stipulating that all peoples in Russia have a right to free self-determination [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 15, File 1299, Sheet 75].

Chairman of the Board of the TASSR Writers' Union R. Muhamadiev presented convincing arguments for sovereignty: 'A true social revolution is taking place in the country. That is, the lower classes do not want to live the old way, and the upper classes are unable to control them in any new way. The country is in pieces; it is suffering abnormal processes. On the one hand, we want to live in a state governed by the rule of law. On the other hand, it is suffering abnormal processes. On the one hand, we want to live in a state governed by the rule of law. On the other hand, the old way, we intend to keep referring any issues to party committees. We make enterprise economically independent, but create dozens of new obstacles in their way, and so on, and so forth. These perversions are especially blatant in our second-grade republic, because the legal status of autonomy has been reduced to an absurdity and the concept of a republic has become non-functional.

At first glance, we have a Supreme Soviet and even a Constitution of our own. Yet, we are legally the same as ordinary territorial entities. At the 1st Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR, I voted optimistically for Russia's sovereignty and supremacy of RSFSR law. But I was soon shocked to see that most of the deputies were unaware of a seemingly simple truth apparently implied by the adopted declarations: autonomous republics want to lift their heads, and constituent entities within the federation must have the same rights as Russia ... So I have little hope that the Supreme Soviet of Russia will be able to address the critical issues of autonomous entities in the near future. Please don't interpret my words as an expression of mistrust to either the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, of which I am a member of the Presidium, or its head B. Yeltsin. On the contrary, I have developed a much better attitude to our political leader following a series of meetings and discussions with him. The Russian parliament just has more important things to do. It is facing pressing issues on a Russia-wide scale. In this situation, the people and the Supreme Soviet of the autonomous republic must take care of their future in order keep up to date and not miss a historical opportunity. This is why I find it timely and appropriate to put the key issue of Tatarstan's sovereignty on the agenda of the 2nd Session of the republic's Supreme Soviet.

This requires full rapport among the representatives of all peoples within the republic and a consolidation of all sound democratic forces. What should unite us is our aspiration for national concord and civil peace. Excessive emotional pressure either by the Democratic Party of Russia, which seems to express its opinions through the newspaper Vechernyaya Kazan, or by the national intelligentsia, which has no daily periodical of its own. The only way to solve the national problem in favor of the peoples is sustainable democratization, which, in the national sphere, includes the recognition of the right of nations to self-determination.

We must be deeply aware that the root cause of inter-ethnic conflicts often lies in neglect of the national issue, the habit of ignoring the pressing needs of the people, who already have a distorted, flawed self-consciousness.

Today, any person of sound judgment must understand that proclaiming Tatarstan sovereign and raising its status to a union republic is no prejudice to anyone's rights and interest. On the contrary, it would finally harmonize inter-ethnic relations within the republic, since if the republic is deprived of rights, it means political and economic deprivation for each of us, for representatives of the peoples. The promise to substantially expand the rights of autonomous republics within the federation
framework has been proven to be nothing but an empty phrase.

The new status of Tatarstan should be enshrined in the Constitution (I fully agree with Comrade Zheleznov, who has presented a wonderful speech today suggesting that he understands the most cherished expectations of the republic's people), which we must develop right now, guided by the principles of profound political democratization and, most importantly, decentralization of power. A sound economic policy determined independently by the republic is of vital importance. Tatarstan cannot remain a mere supplier of cheap raw materials for all-Union ministries and departments any more. Is it right that Tatneft, which has produced as much as 2.5 billion tons of oil, is currently unprofitable to the best of my knowledge? In addition, the south-east of the republic has been reduced to an environmental disaster, while other countries producing as much oil have been wallowing in money and enjoying modern civilization. Their forex savings ensure the future of the generations to come. What can we hand down to our descendants? Devastated mineral resources, crippled fields, clogged-up springs, and hundreds of unsolved problems?4

As a representative of the Board of the republic's Writers' Union, R. Muhamadiev had to address the issue of culture and education in the republic: 'I have to make a few remarks concerning the problems of renounced ideology, neglected culture, and the progress in implementing programs for and solutions to the national problem. It is bitter to admit that a healthy Tatar language is still rarely heard on public transport and at railway stations. The number of copies of Tatar books, especially quality children's books, is dwindling quarter by quarter for a lack of paper. Idel has had nothing to print its issues on for many months. The city's Tatar newspaper Shâhri Kazan still does not have even temporary registration in the capital of Tatarstan ... It was recently announced that three Tatar grammar schools were to be opened. The republic's Ministry of Education (Comrade Nizamov) and the Urban Department of Public Education (Comrade Prokhorov) have demonstrated their reluctance and inability to solve pressing problems once again. It turns out that two grammar schools will be opened at Tatar schools already closed down; only the nameplates will change. As for the third one, it still has no place of its own. The teaching staff is complete. There are many potential students and then some in Kazan. But they have no place to accept parents' applications — they are still in the safes of the Writers' Union. Please note there is only a month, even less, left before the beginning of the new school year.' The speaker's main target was Yu. Prokhorov, Head of the Urban Department of Public Education, who, according to R. Muhamadiev, had been shifting the blame on others in his articles on the decay of national education in the newspaper Vechernyaya Kazan.

Chairwoman of the Republican Women's Committee D. Davletshina supported the idea of proclaiming Tataria a sovereign state and transforming it into the Tatar Socialist Soviet Republic within Russia [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 15, File 1899, Sheet 83]. Unfortunately, D. Davletshina did not justify her opinion either at the Plenary Session or during preparation and adoption of the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Tatar Republic. The position of TASSR Minister of Internal Affairs S. Kirillov was very clear: 'The proclamation of state sovereignty of our republic will be an act of national importance. I support the idea of sovereignty, provided that we stay with the Soviet Union' [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 15, File 1899, Sheet 88].

In recognition of the prospective consideration of the issue of state sovereignty for the Tatar ASSR at the 2nd Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Tatar ASSR, the Plenary Session passed the Resolution on State Sovereignty of the Tatar ASSR.

4 There could, of course, be no complete agreement since B. Zheleznov fully supported the Declaration of Sovereignty of the Russian Federation, while R. Muhamadiyev expressed the concern that it did not take the rights of the autonomous republics into account.
Chapter 1. Perestroika and Socio-Political Changes in the Country and in the Republic

The Plenary Session noted that the restructuring of the Soviet society had provided real opportunities to expand the rights of the autonomous republics and improve their constitutional status, while further development of autonomous entities was consistent with Leninist political principles — the right of nations to self-determination and equal rights, cooperation and mutual assistance — and in accordance with the policy for renewing the union of sovereign republics adopted by the 28th CPSU Congress.

The Plenary Session supported the idea of proclaiming state sovereignty for the republic to promote further development of its statehood, political and economic independence, and improvement of its legal status as a Soviet socialist state. Sovereignty was declared to be consistent with the inherent interests of the representatives of all peoples in Tatarstan, to promote equal conditions for the preservation and development of their culture, languages, national customs and traditions, the enhancement of friendship and inter-ethnic unity, and improvement of the living standards of working people, and to open the door for a new constitution of the Tatar Republic, its participation in the development and signing the Union Agreement on an equal basis, entering into the Federal Agreement (with the RSFSR), and establishing mutually beneficial relations with other republics.

The Plenary Session considered it reasonable for communist people's deputies to be actively involved in preparing the republic's Declaration of State Sovereignty and to focus on implementing its provisions [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 15, File 1899, Sheet 95].

In conclusion, M. Shaimiev answered questions. He began by stating that many periodicals had published articles suggesting that the republic's population was interested in the issue of Tataria's sovereignty. M. Shaimiev answered the deputies' question referring to the statement made by Chairman of the Political Council of the Democratic Party of Russia N. Travin that the Union center had imposed the idea of sovereignty on the Tatar population as follows: 'I think this is nothing less than a provocation. I talked about this on national television. Now I have to make this perfectly clear at the Plenary Session. A people's deputy of the RSFSR and the USSR should not toss around words lightly without exploring the life of the republic's population. When he, as Chairman of the Committee for the Soviets of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, was in Kazan, he did not deign to inquire about the procedure for forming new Soviets, even in the capital of the Tatar ASSR. If he came to establish another branch of his party, that's fine. But he should have stated his true intention. I'm inclined to attribute certain articles by people's deputies to this fact. Of course, this something to which each human being, each citizen is entitled, but I believe that articles signed by a people's deputy, even if rather frivolous, do deserve public assessment' [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 15, File 1899, Sheet 99].

A note by President of the Tatar Public Center M. Mulyukov also suggested that there was wide discussion among intelligentsia of issues related to the republic's sovereignty: 'We have prepared a draft constitution with respect to the sovereignty proclamation.' M. Shaimiev replied: 'We have many alternative versions of the Declaration itself now. I believe that the draft constitution will also be adopted by the Constitutional Commission to be established at the next session. It will definitely consider all versions of the constitution and suggestions' [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 15, File 1899, Sheet 99].

It is no wonder that the issues of sovereignty of republics, as well as the Constitution, were most widely discussed in the Tatar national community. Along with the TCC, the Ittifaq Tatar party for national independence, formed by R. Muxamettinov and F. Bajramova in April 1990, was extremely active. Ittifaq's provocative statements concerning sovereignty and international relations caused certain apprehension in the non-Tatar public. For instance, M. Shaimiev was asked the following question: 'Please tell us your opinion of the Tatar Party for National Independence, its program, in particular, its requirement that Tatar Communists
should quit the CPSU and join Ittifaq.' His answer was: 'We have party pluralism. It is a constitutional provision, a law. I'm unaware of the party's program. I think such a Muslim party existed back in 1906. It was a Muslim party then. I believe it spread beyond the TASSR throughout Russia. The name might be derived from it or be a mere coincidence. Parties are allowed. I just wouldn't like the national party to become a nationalist one.'

M. Shaimiev noted that many newspaper articles contained inaccurate information. For instance, a newspaper claimed that the republic exported 40 million kilograms of meat, that is, 40,000 tons. 'We have never exported this much meat, and we never will,' M. Shaimiev said. He emphasized the need for reasonable, well-founded, and accurate statements in times of trouble: 'We cannot just complain about our wasted oil and other losses every time we speak. That's the wrong approach. In the system we lived in and the conditions under which all peoples lived in the Soviet Union, we would still have approximately what we actually have even if we'd been sitting on a mountain of pure gold. It's like this everywhere. We have republics sitting on gold, oil, good coal or other resources. We're still sitting on oil — we have about 7 to 11 billion tons of it. We have all have been living under these conditions. Conditions for a new life are now being created. Perestroika allows us to take a different approach to the issue and provides other opportunities. So I totally agree with the speakers at today's Plenary Session who complained about low public awareness of sovereignty … The media still present directly opposing opinions in the form of speeches or articles. There are also a lot of articles of the type I've just described. However, I think that after today's discussion, when the republic's Communists adopted a resolution to express their opinion on the issue at their expanded Plenary Session, and now that the dedicated commissions of the republic's Supreme Soviet have almost completed the version of the Declaration to be published for public discussion, we must start expressing our opinion.' [SAHPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 15, File 1899, Sheet 100].

M. Shaimiev also stressed the need for public clarification of the republic's draft Declaration of State Sovereignty involving people's deputies of the TASSR, USSR and RSFSR and the local Soviets. M. Shaimiev said it was crucial for the deputies to present the Declaration to the public, consult them and bring the electorate's opinion when they come for the session.

In summing up the speeches on sovereignty at the Plenary Session, M. Shaimiev said: 'Comrade Zheleznov and other participants in the Plenary Session provided a very accurate legal description of sovereignty. The only thing I would like to say is that we are currently an autonomous republic within a socialist state under the Constitution. But what kind of state do we have if we build a law-based society without sovereignty? We cannot do this without sovereignty. What is important today is to proclaim the sovereignty of the republic. By proclaiming sovereignty, we will delegate the appropriate rights to ourselves. These are the rights that allow us to participate in developing and signing the federal union agreement. We delegate the rights to ourselves. We thus enable ourselves to determine which of our rights to give to Russia and which to the Union. If the party and Soviet authorities of the autonomous republic, which has changed greatly over the years, and which has developed enormous all-round potential, had not raised the question, had not declared sovereignty when the country returned to renewal, transformation, and perhaps even redevelopment of the Union Agreement for the first time since the revolution, neither you, nor the republic's population, nor the public would understand us.

The speaker who said we should start to "give away" these rights after we declare sovereignty was absolutely right. But how should we do it? We need to develop mechanisms, pass a number of laws and regulations and amend our Constitution. This will take time. But we cannot start until we have declared sovereignty. This is my answer to the question. We will discuss all issues concerning our relations with Russia and the Union. We do not
need to ask the simplified question of whether or not we are with Russia today. We are sovereign. We are determining our relations, but we cannot live without Russia — this is absolutely clear. Even if we want to, we can't. Why do we want something disadvantageous to us? I think it's clear [SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 15, File 1899, Sheets 100–101].

It should be noted that the Plenary Session failed to clarify the issue of sovereignty completely. Participants in it also lacked a clear opinion on their relations with Russia. The speech by B. Zheleznov did not make the situation any less vague. The speaker was obviously mired in controversy. On the one hand, he admitted that sovereignty was necessary for Tatarstan to ensure its right to sign the Unity Agreement independently. On the other hand, he maintained that the republic should remain within Russia. However, he claimed it was impossible for Tatarstan to be a constituent entity of two federations at the same time.

M. Shaimiev's assessment of B. Zheleznov's speech as 'legally clear' indicated that the republic's government was still not ready to state the republic's status in the Declaration. It was no coincidence that the draft Declaration prepared by the working party of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet defined Tatarstan as a constituent entity of the Russian Federation.

Thus, the republic was not prepared to declare itself sovereign without specifying its legal standing at that time. Although the opinion was expressed, it was very difficult for it to become dominant. However, it eventually prevailed.
CHAPTER 2
The Future of the USSR and Tatarstan's Status in the New Political Situation

§ 1. Democratic Platform

Vladimir Lysenko

When Perestroika began, the democratic forces in the USSR advocated social liberalization of the social system and federalism. The Democratic Platform of the CPSU, centered on the Moscow City Party Club, was one of the political leaders of this process. The ideologist of the democratic movement in the USSR was Alexander Yakovlev, the most prominent figure of that period.

The mission of the Party Club was to push for the convening of an extraordinary CPSU Congress. The agenda of the congress would be carry out reforms within the Communist Party, as well as advocate a multi-party political system and democracy.

In November 1989, the Moscow Party Club organized a working meeting with representatives of similar groups from 16 cities and regions, at which a number of appeals were developed and a decision was made to hold a founding conference in January 1990 to establish the Democratic Platform within the CPSU. The Platform's objectives soon became widely known throughout the country, attracting reformers not just from the CPSU, but society in general.

The Democratic Platform in the CPSU requested the writer of these words to speak at the next CPSU Congress, which also happened to be the last such congress. My speech was essentially a call on the party to switch to social democracy and liberalism, but orthodox Communists refused to compromise, and thus a real opportunity to establish a mass democratic party was missed.

A democratic revolution swept across the Soviet Union at the turn of the 1980s–1990s. In the spring of 1990, the position of President of the USSR, as the head of the executive branch of power, was introduced. When M. Gorbachev was elected to this office in March 1990, the center of an alternative Political Bureau and Central Committee of the CPSU was created. Elections of people's deputies of Russia and those to local Soviets took place against the backdrop of a CPSU crisis. The opposition democratic forces of such cities as Moscow, Leningrad, Gorky, Sverdlovsk, and others were acting in concord during these elections. However, the USSR was soon dissolved. Thanks to the democratic leadership of Russia, the dissolution of the Soviet Union was relatively peaceful, without repeating the Yugoslavian tragedy. A federal union of Russian regions replaced the USSR.

The first revolutionary stage of the 1990s was marked by the rule of B. Yeltsin. Under his rule, the Russian Federation was a decentralized, asymmetrical, and constitutionally agreed state. The elections brought changes, with new national and regional leaders coming onto the political stage. The Republic of Tatarstan became extremely active and independent. The example of Tatarstan is very instructive. Realizing that following a republic-wide independence referendum, any further steps in this direction were sure to result in a military conflict, the government of Tatarstan was able to in time check its ambitions, and entered into an agreement on essentially confederate relations with the federal government of the Russian Federation. The experience of Tatars was subsequently used by Georgia, Azerbaijan, Moldavia, and other regions.
Among the powerful constituent entities of the Federation (besides Tatarstan) also included such wealthy regions as Bahkhortostan, Khanty-Mansi and Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrugs, Krasnodar district, Belgorod, Lipetsk, Kemerovo oblasts, Krasnoyarsk district, and others. The Kremlin would not go as far as granting complete independence to the powerful republics (Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Yakutia). They became republics within the Russian Federation. At the same time, within the post-Soviet space, regions with lower status were formed — the Chechen Republic, North Ossetia, Abkhazia, Adzharia, and a series of republics, krais, and oblasts.

V. Putin came to power during the second stage (beginning of the 21st century), which was marked by a transition to a centralized, symmetrical, constitutional federation, characterized by increasing elements of unitarism and authoritarianism. Federalism in Russia is very young. Over the preceding centuries, Russia had always been a country with a totalitarian regime. The democratic revolution of the 1980s–1990s led to changes in the social order. The Russian Constitution is that of a super-presidential republic, dominated by the president. When V. Putin came to power, gubernatorial elections were abolished, and the governors of regions were appointed instead. Uniform rigid vertical of power was restored in the country, which is fundamentally contrary to the principle of subsidiarity. The political status of the leaders of constituent entities within the Federation was reduced to that of regional politicians:

- inter-regional associations were, in fact, frozen;
- the process of formation of the 'party of power', that is, United Russia, was completed;
- the political party system was now similar to that of the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan.

Twenty years have passed since the democratic movement emerged in our country. The Union of Right Forces, the Yabloko and Republican Parties, as well as other democratic parties, lost the elections to the parliament in the late 20th century, which was a reflection and the culmination of a deep crisis. A new democratic platform, taking into account the contemporary situation, would become necessary, which was to be developed by analyzing the defeats and mistakes that had brought the movement to a deep crisis, rather than to its victories.

§ 2. 'Parade of Sovereignties': Causes and Impact on the Formation of Federal Relations in the Country

Luybov Boltenkova

To speak about the Russian Empire, later the USSR, and then the Russian Federation since December 1991, the 'parades of sovereignties' which occurred in the country (regardless of theirs form) have certain things in common, in spite of epochs in which they occurred. This process had multiple reasons and diverse triggers. However, the historical pattern, as an objective cause, and administrative mistakes and flaws in national policy, as well as deliberate actions (mostly by the political elite) as subjective causes, all had a constant character. The historical pattern pertains to the process of emergence, development, and formation of the state, which regardless of its form, is referred to as Russia. Let us analyze its origins and Russia's full historical path to the present day. To put it succinctly, within the context of our theme, this path had 'gathered nations' under a single political enclosure, imposing common civilizational values on these peoples and their territories. The nature of the process was determined by the rate, depth, methods, and means by which the carrier of such civilizational values intruded into the lives of 'strangers'. The Russian people were the carriers of these values, until a certain historical moment, when they began to share their civilizational and
state creative work with other nations. This is to say, having created a state of their own, the Russians once again 'mastered' the territories that other nations had already 'claimed' before them, thus forming the state of Russia. In a manner of speaking, there was no such thing as a 'no man's territory. By the time the Russians came to any specific territory, other peoples, with a history of their own, had already been living there for some time. Sometimes these had no state structure, but they always had a history. They became subordinated to the Russians, either voluntarily or forcefully. Where the merging was voluntary, the idea of sovereignty became less thought about as time went on. Coercive subordination of peoples led to dreams of sovereignty, which certain parts of society believed to be their mission in life. This mission would be passed on from generation to generation, with occasional attempts of fulfilling it, when an opportunity presented itself. Thus this mission was hidden within the historical process, and the 'opportunities' would be the mistakes made by the ruling elites.

It is a well-known fact that Ivan the Terrible conquered Kazan, the capital of today's Tatarstan, through military action in 1552. The local population, which became united as the Tatars during the process of Eastern conquests and rule (which also prevailed in Rus' for a long time), had an an earlier centuries-long history, which is described in the previous volumes. The occupation of Kazan by the Russian tsar meant two things. Firstly, the Rus' turned into Russia. Secondly, the defeated party did not cease to think or dream of its sovereignty. The history after 1552 proved that it was not the entire society that was committed to preserving sovereignty; otherwise such a tight historical amalgamation of the Tatar and Russian elements into the Russian statehood would have been impossible. However, we should not underestimate the appeal of sovereignty on the part of the Tatar elites. The historical memory had been preserved for centuries as a form of historical common patterns. This memory was dormant until a historical opportunity presented itself in 1917–1918, pre-determined by the events of 1905–1914. We will not be looking at the whole range of conflicts, we will just say that the ruling elites also did make some mistakes in terms of national policy. Scholars have long presented the position of the autocratic government concerning the involvement of non-Russians in the state government, in particular, in the State Duma. 'The State Duma must be Russian, not only in spirit, but also in terms of its composition. Non-Russians can participate in its work, as long as they do not interfere when it comes to addressing purely Russian issues,' read the Manifest on the Dissolution of the State Duma dated 3 June 1907 [The laws of the Russian Empire, 1910, Vol. 27, No. 29241–29242].

Such demonstration of disrespect for the peoples of Russia implanted the seeds of distrust of the government. This, combined with a number of socio-economic reasons, brought about a struggle against the regime, causing those who remembered their previous statehood to fight for independence. By the time the Bolsheviks came to power, the Russian Empire had practically fallen apart. To gather the pieces together on a new political basis, a new principle slogan was introduced: the right of nations to self-determination all the way up to secession [Dekrety Sovetskoy vlasti, 1917, pp. 39–41]. Many made use of this right – though this took many forms. The RSFSR, Ukrainian SSR, BSSR, and TSFSR formed the USSR. The Tatars, the Bashkirs, the Yakuts, and others established ASSRs within the RSFSR. History thus provided an opportunity (occasion) to partly achieve the historical goals of achieving sovereignty of the Tatars and others. Even those who had not aspired for sovereignty and had no good reasons to do so, took advantage of this opportunity. However, the strategy of

5 On the subject of sovereignty in the early and middle ages of history, it should be borne in mind that the theory of sovereignty did not yet exist at the time. We use this term instead of 'self-government,' 'independence.'

6 The word 'dremala' ('dozed', 'slumbered') is given in quotation marks because in actual fact memory manifested itself in poems, songs, folk tales, and other forms of art and culture—about past glory, achievements, independence.
Chapter 2. The Future of the USSR and Tatarstan’s Status in the New Political Situation

The Bolsheviks only brought the nations together for a certain period. The further political and legal practice, in terms of national and state construction, was generally controversial. On the one hand, the very first Soviet Constitution of 2002 emphasized the freedom of nations, free union of national republics, and the freedom of union republics to withdraw from the USSR [Kukushkin, Chistyakov, 1987, pp. 283–313, pp. 315–365], while autonomous republics were regarded as states [Kositsin, 1968 a; pp. 519–555; Kositsin, 1968 b; pp. 137–148; Enikeev, 2002, et al.]. On the other hand, centralization and unitarization were a clear trend. Be that as it may, the autonomous republics, including the TASSR, preserved their trappings of states for years. Slogans, speeches, theory, and school and university textbooks nurtured the feelings of statehood. Those in the know were aware that where there was statehood, there was sovereignty.

This sovereignty trend gained momentum during Perestroika. It primarily had economic manifestations (transition of the republics to independent-accounting). Economic sovereignty inevitably led to the need for real, not only on paper, political sovereignty. At first, it led to the development of a new Union Agreement (Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kirghizia, Turkmenistan, Moldavia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Kazakhstan did not sign the 1922 agreement). The republics entered the USSR either under their Constitutions or under laws. The autonomous republics were also involved in the development of the Union Agreement (this fact drove a wedge between the two levels of government — all-Union and republic-wide). A trend of equalizing the rights of union and autonomous republics developed in accordance with party and governmental decisions. Both were to adopt declarations on state sovereignty to become founders of the new Union (parties to the new Union Agreement) [Abdulatipov, 1993 a, pp. 70–80; Supreme Soviet of the USSR, 1990, pp. 72–77, 140–143].

Thus, it is not in the masses of the population or at the level of autonomous republics where the idea of sovereignty emerged. The RSFSR Declaration of State Sovereignty was adopted on 9 June 1990, in accordance with the Union's resolution [Vedomosti s'ezda, 1990, No. 2, Article 22], Paragraph 9, which confirmed 'the need for a significant expansion of the rights of autonomous republics, autonomous regions, and autonomous districts, as well as krais and regions within the RSFSR'. It should be emphasized that the Declaration confirmed the decisions made at the Union level. In fact, it was preternatural for the RSFSR to aggravate the sovereignization of its constituent entities. Realizing how complicated and ambiguous the situation was, the RSFSR government ordered that the draft Federal Agreement should be worked on intensely — the signing of which could save Russia from falling apart 'in favor of' the new Union, the constituent entities of which many union republics were reluctant to become in 1991 (constituent entities of the old Union not under the Agreement, but under laws). The intention was apparently to replace them with new members of the Union — former ASSRs, which followed the RSFSR to adopt Declarations on State Sovereignty [Abdulatipov, 1993 b, pp. 20–57].

The adoption of sovereignty declarations was a manifestation of the 'parade of legal sovereignization'. It took place in accordance with decisions made by the all-Union authorities.

Analyzing the process historically, the trend towards such a semi-final solution had originated long ago, which we have proven above. The events of the summer-winter (August, December) of 1991 prevented the semi-final from developing into the expected final solution. Three Founding Republics of the USSR — Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus — exercised their right to freely withdraw from the USSR and proclaimed the Commonwealth of Independent States, constituent entities of which republics within the Russian Federation could not become, on 8 December 1991.

Republics within Russia, having been already sovereignized, the further policy could not be developed without taking this fact into consideration. The sovereignization of former ASSRs within Russia (when still part of the USSR) captured the minds of politicians and
At the same time, it ensured federalism in general, posing a threat to the country’s integrity. The Declaration provided a political and legal possibility for the republic’s government to enter into separate agreements with the RSFSR government, as an independent party. Continuing the policy introduced by the Declaration, Tatarstan would not make a single step backwards, and refused to sign the Federal Agreement (31 March 1992). Tatarstan viewed this as a correct political move, within the acceptable political and legal framework. The Federation viewed this as a dangerous precedent, posing a threat to the country’s integrity. Participants in this political process found the only correct way out of this situation — the Federation said, ‘take as much sovereignty as you can implement’, and Tatarstan agreed to sign a bilateral Agreement, which was compatible with the RF Constitution of 1993. Thus, the federal relations with Tatarstan took a constitutional form, although they were never free of certain ‘twists’ towards sovereignization of the republic in the context of the Russian Federation (Russian federalism), which were not a classical model but a result of a hard-fought historical struggle. However, it was not the ‘twists’ that determined the essence of the process, though they were, to some extent, positive, in terms of preserving and developing federalism, which was characteristic of and necessary for the Russian statehood. Most importantly, federalism, just as non-violence, just as democracy, has proven to be a powerful conflict settlement tool. All participants in the process had to realize the truth, which motivated mutual concessions to the extent of ensuring a politically and legally stable integrity (unity). This was secured in the relations with Tatarstan. At the same time, it ensured federalism in general for Russia. The rest was mere polishing of what was created during the transition period of instability. This includes the new Agreement with Tatarstan of 2007, which had been subjected to the necessary legal procedure in full, and the harmonization of the RF Constitution, the constitution and laws of RF constituent entities, and many other measures in the sphere of federal relations. However, it is pregnant with controversies, just like any process.

The issue of sovereignty within a federal state is one such controversial issue. The ‘parade of sovereignties’ has ended at this stage of Russia’s life. The future depends on the actions of the people, primarily politicians, in various situations. History suggests that two opposite trends — sovereignization and de-sovereignization — will persist in the nearest future. It is also clear that studies on government, law, and sovereignty, foster the hope for sovereignization in nations who live in federated and even in unitary states. However, the ‘activator’ of this in the Russian Federation is the very RF Constitution (Article 5 and others). Thus, amendments have to be introduced to the ambiguous, controversial regulations to ensure a sustainable development for the country. This would require once again an active involvement of Tatarstan in this process. What form will this take? It is up to the people of Tatarstan. The people should have access to correct information concerning the key aspects of both history and the contemporary situation.

The rapid globalization, large-scale computerization, the development of nanotechnologies, and other innovations, previously nearly inconceivable, will motivate us to rethink our ideas about the future. In terms of our subject, this means certain adjustments to our concept of sovereignty, taking into account the fact that nations and states had lived for centuries and millennia without even having such a word as sovereignty. It was coined for specific political purposes. An the ideal of the free humans has been cherished since the beginning of time.

The term ‘sovereignty’ can also be applied to it — primarily the sovereignty of the personality. All the rest are just derivatives of it. According to the great philosopher I. Kant, every person is the monarch unto himself. History will only justify those innovations, in particular in terms of sovereignty, which are aimed at forming a ‘sovereign’ personality, which will live in awareness and take responsibility for whatever happens in the world.
§ 3. The Status of Tatarstan under the New Political Conditions

Indus Tagirov

It is rare in human history, when the people and their government join efforts in a common aspiration. Yet, this is what happened in Tatarstan in the 1990s. At first, the population gathered at political meetings to demand that the republic should be raised to the status of a Union republic, while the party elites kept dragging their feet for a long time. The situation did not change until the RSFSR Supreme Soviet adopted the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Russia on 12 June 1990. Following the example, which was the beginning of the so-called 'parade of sovereignties', the republic's government embarked on a tough course to adopt a similar document.

In the middle of August 1990, the Chairman of the TASSR Supreme Soviet M. Shaimiev, who was at the same time the First Secretary of the Tatar Regional CPSU Committee, gathered representatives of non-governmental organizations in the Kazan Kremlin. They discussed the issue of adopting a Declaration. All participants in the meeting acknowledged that it had to be adopted. The only controversial issues were the date of the Session of the Supreme Soviet and the republic's subject status, that is, the republic's legal relations with the USSR and the RSFSR. M. Shaimiev proposed that the Session should be summoned in late August. The deputy group of the Supreme Soviet of Equal Rights and Justice disagreed, claiming that it would be impossible to consult the people during the summer holidays: 'The people will be traveling and enjoying their vacations. We need them to be back at their places. We cannot adopt an important document like the Declaration, without consulting the people.'

The deputies failed to agree on how the Declaration should present the legal relations between Tatarstan and the USSR and the RSFSR. Equal Rights and Justice deputies I. Grachyov and A. Shtanin insisted on proclaiming sovereignty within the RSFSR. Professor I. Tagirov expressed a different opinion.

In perfect conformity with the Declaration of Rights of the Working and Exploited People, as the only document to proclaim Russia to be a federation in January 1918 — a text which he was actually holding in his hands — he claimed that the Declaration should proclaim Tatarstan as fully sovereign. Subsequently in the process of its implementation, with due regard to the historical, geographic, geopolitical, economic, and other conditions, the self-limitation was to begin. That is, a number of powers were to be delegated to the Russian Federation under a bilateral Agreement.

No voting on the issues was necessary. It was important to engage the public in discussing the issues contained in the Declaration, and to initiate its preparation. A number of non-governmental organizations developed variants of the document.

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet adopted the Resolution in the Draft Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Tatar Soviet Socialist Republic and formed a working group for its preparation, which included TASSR people's deputies, Regional Committee officials, members of the republic's government, and scholars (including the writer of these lines).

As a result, several variants of the Declaration were submitted. They were essentially different in two aspects — the relations between Tatarstan and Russia and those between the Tatar and Russian languages within the republic. The draft Declaration by Associate Professor of the Kazan University, deputy of the republic's Supreme Soviet A. Shtanin specified that the republic was to be treated as part of the Russian Federation, while that by the republic-wide CPSU Committee contained no mention of the republic's legal standing, stipulating that sovereignty, according to the Declaration of Rights of the Peoples of Russia (the document under which the Russian Federation was established in January 1918), was to be proclaimed to the full extent,
after which the republic was to determine its relations with the federation. The drafts by the TCC and a group of writers and economic executives, headed by writer and people's deputy if the republic R. Valeev, were quite similar to it.

Thus, the gap between the public and the government had narrowed materially by the time of the Session of the Supreme Soviet was to take place, to which mass media contributed greatly. People shared an awareness of the need for qualitative changes to be made to the republic's status, which would transform it into a state guided by the principle of the people's freedom of self-determination.

On 27 August 1990, the Second Session of the 12th Convocation of the TASSR Supreme Soviet opened. Thousands of people had gathered on the streets around the Supreme Soviet building by that moment. Deputies had to work their way to the building, guarded by dozens of militia men, through a crowd that was demanding that they should adopt the Declaration of State Sovereignty immediately. 241 deputies out of 249 attended the Session. The Chairman of the republic's Supreme Soviet M. Shaimiev proposed an agenda of 12 issues, the third one of which called for a discussion on the state sovereignty of the republic. However, following a discussion, the sovereignty issue was moved to number 5 on the agenda, which provoked general displeasure.

Emotions ran high in the meeting room of the Supreme Soviet, consistent with the mood of people on the streets and squares of Kazan and across the republic. One of the deputies suggested to the chairman and the people's deputies that they should resolve to remove the police guard line from the entrance to the Supreme Soviet, stating that 'we should not ... be hiding from our people' [CA TR SC, Fund R–3610, Inventory 1, File 1915, Sheet 35]. M. Shaimiev replied that this did not require a resolution by the Supreme Soviet, and the police guard line remained where it was.

After a recess, deputy F. Bayramova spoke, 'Comrades! You have asked us to make the people on the street calm down. We satisfied your request, and during the recess, I think you saw the people walking away from the building hosting the Session of the Supreme Soviet. This does not mean, however, that there is no more tension there. As you know, we collected half a million signatures, which we handed over to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Tataria. Tatar hunger strikers in Naberezhnye Chelny, Nizhnekamsk, Ufa, and many other places are now demanding a decisive and urgent decision on the republic's state status ... My suggestion is that we should address the issue of the state status of the Tatar ASSR immediately. Should the discussion of our proposal be delayed or suspended for any reasons, we shall not be held responsible for any tension and ethnic conflicts that may arise' [CA TR SC, Fund R–3610, Inventory 1, File 1915, Sheet 183 a] (Translated from Tatar.-I.T.).

The public demanded that the agenda should be amended because of the complicated situation in the republic, and that the issue of the republic's Declaration should be addressed immediately [CA TR SC, Fund R–3610, Inventory 1, File 1915, Sheet 184]. Even though the discussion of the procedure went on, it was clear the discussion of the issue of the Declaration could not be endlessly delayed. It was impossible to ignore the public opinion, which was expressed in numerous telegrams and written addresses by the population.

In the afternoon of the second day of the Session, F. Mukhametshin, on behalf of the Secretariat, informed the deputies that certain documents addressed to the Session had been received. By 3:00 p.m., 685 documents, including 137 letters, 207 addresses and declarations, and 612 documents dealing directly with sovereignty had been registered. Geographically, the correspondence represented 50 republics, regions, towns, and other localities. The documents also triggered a struggle among groups of deputies. Deputy R. Siraziyev expressed his dissatisfaction with the fact that only part of the telegrams was read out, while 612 telegrams on sovereignty meant that 'it is not bread what the people are concerned about', but the form that the sover-
Each of us realizes how important the issue. This can have totally unpredictable effects. So I think we should dedicate the next day ... to this issue' [CA TR SC, Fund R–3610, Inventory 1, File 1915, Sheet 294]. The next speaker, R. Galeev, supported Siraziyev and said the following words, which stirred the public: 'Comrades, we began by putting the cart before the horse. Without having adopted the Declaration of Sovereignty, we adopted many documents, which we will have to amend for another two weeks if we adopt the Declaration. This is why I agree with Deputy Siraziyev that we have to address the key issue tomorrow...’ [CA TR SC, Fund R–3610, Inventory 1, File 1915, Sheet 295].

Some deputies at the Session had a different opinion. For instance, Deputy V. Kurylyov said, 'Today... some deputies are not ready to discuss sovereignty. Some deputies make statements, which are excessively categorical. We should address this issue in a very peaceful atmosphere. We have to adopt a document of extreme importance, which should be sound. Therefore, I have submitted a note suggesting that we address the general public in periodicals on behalf of our Session, and urge them to stop any meetings and hunger strikes ...

Chairman of the Supreme Soviet M. Shaimiev. Autonomous units are the most disadvantageous, as compared to Union republics.’ Yusupov remarked that Tatarstan was nearly deprived of national Tatar schools, had no Academies of Science or Art Film Studios of its own, and had only one book publishing house. Possessing enormous natural wealth and a great industrial potential, Tatarstan was not entitled to control its own property. The scope of the Tatar language had been narrowed, which posed a serious threat to the na-
tional everyday customs and traditions. At the same time, R. Yusupov warned the deputies against adopting any document under which Tatarstan would be a constituent entity both within the USSR and within the Russian Federation. R. Yusupov summed up his speech thus: 'Being a people's deputy, whose primary responsibility is to ensure and enhance good-neighbourliness among representatives of different ethnic groups in our republic, I consider it my duty to bring this to the notice to all of my colleagues in the parliament, ... to carefully consider each factor before voting for the Declaration, and take high responsibility for the future of 7.5 million Tatars. I encourage you to vote for true sovereignty for the people of Tatarstan' [CA TR SC, Fund R–3610, Inventory 1, File 1915, Sheets 412–416].

M. Shaimiev then read out the document, presented by a group of deputies, proposing that, taking into account how extremely difficult it would be to agree on the issue of sovereignty, they should begin by discussing the concept and key principles of the Declaration. Anyone willing to speak could do so. However, the deputies rejected the idea and decided on listening to the authors of alternative versions of the Declaration.

Deputy R. Siraziyev presented the draft Declaration prepared under the leadership of Deputy R. Valeev. It stipulated that the republic must not be a constituent entity of the two federations, which the speaker compared to sitting on two chairs at the same time. The document lay stress on the supremacy, independence, fullness, and indivisibility of the republic's power within its territory, its independence and equality in external relations, and the international legal standing of the republic [CA TR SC, Fund R–3610, Inventory 1, File 1915, Sheet 419].

Deputy of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet N. Makhiyev spoke in support of the speeches of R. Yusupov and R. Siraziyev. He named the following three factors as being crucial to the sovereignty issue: the close connection between Tatarstan and the spiritual and physical life of Russia; the political situation in the Soviet Union; and the national factor. N. Makhi-yanov attached the greatest importance to the national factor. He said that, by recognizing the right of nations to self-determination, the Bolsheviks once earned good political capital, so this was 'the right time that we generously collect on the political bills issued in the past'. The speaker maintained that the USSR had long ceased to exist, while the RSFSR was undergoing decay. However, a new structure to incorporate the emerging sovereign republics had not formed yet. Given the context, to withdraw from the RSFSR and enter the USSR, for Tatarstan would be no more than a transition 'from one prison cell to another'. Therefore, N. Makhiyanov suggested the following procedure: 'Recognize Tatarstan to be a sovereign republic. The Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Tatar Republic should not specify the Federation to which our republic belongs to. Stage Two: to determine the powers that Tatarstan is ready to delegate to the assumed Center, which will unite with the sovereign republic in the future. Stage Three: to specify our requirements to the new Union Agreement immediately.' The speaker mentioned emphatically that the acquisition of sovereignty by Tatarstan was not destructive but constructive, while the approach suggested would foster the creation of a conceptually new commonwealth of national state entities. Besides this, I. Makhiyanov suggested that they call the republic just a Soviet and remove the word Socialist as a step towards deideologization and democratization of society. He warned the deputies against any national, religious, and political discrimination against citizens and suggested that the international agreement on human rights be ratified and the republic's Constitution developed. [CA TR SC, Fund R–3610, Inventory 1, File 1915, Sheets 423–424]. It should be noted that a large part of the deputies and, accordingly, the population came to believe it would be unreasonable to define the republic as a socialist one. It took them long, however, to give up the reference to the Soviet regime. Yet, no special discussions on these issues took place at the Session.

The burning one was that of the relations between Russia and Tatarstan in those days.
The Deputies continued to refer to their electorate. For instance, Deputy Kosulin said that deputies of the Zelenodolsk City Council had instructed him to read their address, adopted at the session of the City Council before he went to the Session of the Supreme Soviet. The address mentioned that the adoption of sovereignty declarations by union republics undermined the very existence of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The document focused on proving that the adoption of the republic's Declaration of State Sovereignty was unlawful: 'Proclaiming Tataria a sovereign state would render ineffective union-wide and republic-wide (RSFSR) laws. The Supreme Soviet of Tataria would have to urgently develop and adopt a legislative package, regulating the republic's political and economic system as well as civil, criminal, and labor regulations of its own. A sovereign state needs to have a legislative body that would function continuously, which we do not have at present... We would like you to focus your efforts on issues of primary importance. Nothing prevents the republic from obtaining as much independence as we can manage. Nothing prevents us from taking measures to create favorable conditions for restoring the Tatar national culture, the distinctive identity of the Tatar nation. Since the issue of state structure is crucial to the people's life, the City Council of People's Deputies of Zelenodolsk believes that any issues concerning the determination of the republic's status, and the adoption of the Declaration on Sovereignty is too early to discuss, and should be addressed by the peoples through a referendum on the series of all the above bills. We encourage you to demonstrate governmental wisdom and civil responsibility.' However, the deputy himself appeared to have a somewhat different opinion, for his final words were as follows: 'Comrades people's deputies! I would like to ask you again to refrain from adopting a very strict attitude about what you have just heard. This might be an alternative, and I feel that the most important message of this address is how much it pains the people's deputies when it comes to the problems that affect us all. We are not the only ones who care about the future of our republic and the citizens living in the territory of our Tataria.' [CA TR SC, Fund R–3610, Inventory 1, File 1915, Sheets 425–428]. The speech by M. Mulyukov was long awaited. On the one hand, it was representative of the sentiments of a large part of the Tatar population. On the other hand, it served as a reference point for many in the meeting chamber. Therefore, the audience listened attentively. 'It has been three years since the Tatar Public Center, taking into account the public sentiment in our republic, that of the Tatars and other ethnic groups in our republic, and that of the Tatar population residing outside of our republic, which we know to be over 5 million people, came to recognize that the status of our republic had to be changed,' the speaker began. An inference followed — the framework of autonomous status has become too rigid for the republic, so it has to be raised, which is impossible within the Russian Federation. He then presented the key provisions of the draft Declaration of 36 paragraphs submitted by the Tatar Public Center. The audience was satisfied to hear him say the words: '...I can confirm the fact that the rights of all citizens living in our republic are ensured. The reason I say this, is the false allegation that the Tatar Public Center has raised the question of sovereignty for the republic, in order to force the Russian population out of our republic. Comrades, let me say it again: This is not true! You cannot find this in any document by the Tatar Public Center or in the Declaration.' This seemed a good omen that the speaker was advocating for civil accord and suggested that 30 August should be established as the Day of the Sovereign Tatarstan. [CA TR SC, Fund R–3610, Inventory 1, File 1915, Sheets 428–431].

For his part, Deputy P. Ionov spoke in recognition of every nation's right to unimpeded implementation of its national, political, and social interests, eliminating the possibility that any one nation will dominate another. He was also opposed to the idea of transferring part of the republic's powers to the USSR or the RSFSR, since sovereignty...
R. Khafizov was unable to keep from announcing his electorate's opinion concerning the sovereignty of the republic, which indicated that the deputies were to take into account a number of diverse, sometimes controversial factors to solve the problem of the republic's independence. An address signed by 400 electors contained the following demand: 'We, the workers and officials, representatives of the artistic intelligentsia, Tatars and Russians, Chuvashes and Hebrews, the people of Tataria, elected you deputies as we believed your election platforms and promises. Nearly each deputy platform contained slogans about transforming Tataria into a union republic. We demand that you fulfil your election promises and announce the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Tatar Soviet Socialist Republic at the Second Session of the TASSR Supreme Soviet. We demand that you vote on sovereignty by roll-call. The people have to know which of the deputies should be recalled for acting contrary to their election promises' [CA TR SC, Fund R–3610, Inventory 1, File 1915, Sheets 433–437]. Another document, signed by 1,500 people, reads as follows: 'The deputy group of Derbyshki Microdistrict hereby informs you of the following suggestions summarizing the opinion of the microdistrict community on Tataria's sovereignty before the opening TASS Supreme Soviet Session: The Sovereignty Declaration proposed by the Presidium of the TASSR Supreme Soviet should not be adopted. The Session should restrict itself to a short statement concerning the issue ... Voting ... should be by roll-call. Decisions to change the republic's status or those on the official language or any other issues should only be made by means of a referendum. Thus, a Referendum Law has to be developed first. Workers' associations of Derbyshki insist that Tataria should be only within the rejuvenated Russia. The republic's Supreme Soviet should implement the Resolution of the 1st Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies prohibiting council chairmen, at any level, to occupy another position at the same time.' In conclusion, the deputy suggested that two draft documents should be voted on when the Declaration had

should mean complete independence of the republic. Thus, P. Ionov suggested that the mention of Tataria's legal standing should be excluded from the draft Declaration. The deputy summed up by suggesting that they adopt the Declaration as a political document, proclaiming sovereignty, and elaborate further legal details in the future. The deputy's speech, which in fact was a call for the deputies to compromise, elicited applause from the approving audience.

Deputy R. Khafizov, speaking on behalf of the Permanent Commission of the Supreme Soviet for Legislation, Lawfulness, Justice, and Privileges, largely summed up what the preceding deputies had said. He reported that the Commission had held five meetings on the issue of sovereignty and submitted a proposal to the Ministry of Justice that it should present a draft Declaration of State Sovereignty. The draft Declaration by the Ministry of Justice was approved at the Commission's meeting with nine affirmative and seven dissenting votes. Many issues turned out to be controversial, and so the Commission had been unable to agree on all of them. An important finding of the commission was that the provision stating 'the sovereign Tatar Republic is a constituent entity of two federations — the USSR and the RSFSR' was legally invalid. The audience applauded at hearing this.

R. Khafizov laid special emphasis on the provisions of the draft Declaration that ensured supremacy of the republic's law and established agreement-based relations with Russia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. R. Khafizov then shed light on issues of property and suggested that the respective article of the Declaration should read as follows: 'The land, its minerals and other natural resources, within the territory of the Tatar ASSR, are property of the nation, which has the exclusive rights to own, use, and dispose of them. It is within the exclusive competence of the Tatar SSR to determine the legal status of all types of property. The Tatar SSR is entitled to a share of the all-Union property, depending on the contribution made by the people of the Tatar ASSR.'
been adopted — resolutions concerning the government’s objectives resulting from the adoption of the Declaration of State Sovereignty and the Address by the Supreme Soviet of the Tatar Republic to the Supreme Soviets of the USSR and the RSFSR, suggesting immediate negotiations with the sovereign Tatar Republic on entering into mutually beneficial agreements. These words elicited applause from participants of the meeting.

Deputy B. Vorobyov maintained that the general public had to be engaged in the discussion of essential documents. He referred to Articles 1 and 2 of the republic’s Constitution, according to which all power in the Tatar ASSR belonged to the people. B. Vorobyov informed the deputies that he had carried out a survey of, and held personal meetings with electors, and thus found out that 83.4% of the electors were demanding a referendum. Arguing against a statement that a referendum would destabilize the situation in the republic, the deputy noted: ‘...our people have enough awareness ... and are mature enough to decide on certain essential legal enactments on their own. And what question is more important than the issue of sovereignty and the republic’s self-determination, for both the Tatar people and the Russian people, as well as for all citizens of the republic? Thus, supporting the idea of sovereignty for the republic, I find it reasonable to develop a package of laws, and first of all, one on the referendum, as soon as the republic is proclaimed sovereign. Any further issues concerning the republic’s agreement relations with the Union or with Russia should be addressed by means of a referendum. The language issue and other key laws should also be dealt with via a referendum. Otherwise our election promises will remain unfulfilled’ [CA TR SC, Fund R-3610, Inventory 1, File 1915, Sheets 439–440].

B. Vorobyov shed light on such issues as the country’s management of economic crisis, the need for well thought-out agreement relations with the RSFSR and the USSR. The deputy inferred that the republic's Declaration of Sovereignty had to be adopted, while the issue of whether it should belong to one or another federation should be addressed by means of a referendum.

Deputy M. Shaykhiev presented an impressive speech in Tatar. He said that proclaiming the republic as sovereign would meet the expectations of the Tatar people and the multi-ethnic people of Tatarstan. Rejecting the idea of belonging to two federations at the same time, he maintained that the republic should be included in the USSR directly.

Deputy V. Mikhaylov tried to describe the mood of the electorate in Sovetsky district, Kazan, referring to a number of letters and addresses. The sampling method that he used to analyze the documents relied on the data of the Kazan Planning and Design Office (KPDO), where he himself worked, and the opinions of the deputies of Sovetsky district. The masses largely demanded sovereignty through a referendum. According to V. Mikhaylov, any discussion on withdrawal from Russia would be premature for two reasons. Firstly, the RSFSR Supreme Soviet had a detailed crisis management program for Russia, while Tataria had not developed one for economic development and transition to a market economy. Secondly, the Declaration of Sovereignty suggested was inconsistent with the international Declaration of Human Rights and did not stipulate any further democratization of life. Therefore, V. Mikhaylov suggested that they should develop packages to secure the economic and national development of the TASSR and specify its agreement relations with Russia before they returned back to the sovereignty issue.

The deputy then read out an address from the session of the Sovetsky District Council of People's Deputies to the Session of the republic's Supreme Soviet, which rejected the idea of Tatarstan withdrawing from Russia and expressed apprehension that the Russian, Mari, Mordvin, and Ukrainian people of the republic could suffer oppression. V. Mikhaylov concluded his speech with the following words, which elicited applause from the audience: ‘We have to live on this land, and none of us can go away. We have to ensure equal rights for everyone, so that we can move move for-
Deputy F. Safiullin began his speech by stating that the country had not yet ensured equal rights for different nations, though he believed the economic crisis to be the root cause of all misfortunes. He said, clearly meaning V. Mikhaylov, but without naming names: 'Some people say we do not have a program of our own. Why make up a program, if we have the one by Yeltsin? We will adopt it in its entirety, 100%, or even 110%, if it is suitable for us. However, the reason we will adopt it is not because we have been ordered to, but because we, of our own accord, find it reasonable, which is what sovereignty is all about.' F. Safiullin claimed the idea of entering two federations at the same time would be pointless. Speaking about the referendum, he said that many people had the wrong idea of it as a form of legal appropriateness. However, some part of the population was sure to be dissatisfied with the outcome, and thus a referendum could not appease the entire society. Assuming that Tatars did not constitute an absolute majority of the republic’s population, for which reason the referendum would possibly fail to achieve the desired results, the deputy said: 'This is about the people's national dignity, the revival of the national culture. We cannot proclaim sovereignty without the Tatar people willing to do so... However, this does not entitle the Tatar people from holding a Tatar-only referendum, excluding other ethnic groups. We have no right to do this either...'

F. Safiullin encouraged the deputies against naming the republic Soviet and Socialist, suggesting that it should be named simply as the Republic of Tatarstan. The audience was pleased to hear him say these words: 'We must have special relations with Russia, and we need a special way to formalise such special relations, after we adopt the Declaration. We are inside Russia. Even if we wanted to, we would be unable to separate ourselves from Russia. I think no one wants this, anyways.' F. Safiullin supported the idea of V. Mikhaylov that they should adopt a decree on government, which was to become 'the first cry of the newborn sovereign Tatar Republic.' One party has to demonstrate common sense, while the other party should make concessions. In my opinion, the Tatar people cannot be sovereign without reasonable concessions from the Russian people. However, the Tatar people will never repay such concession with evil, but with double, triple friendship. I encourage all citizens of the republic—Tatars, Chuvashes, Russians—to demonstrate such common sense,' the deputy concluded to great applause [CA TR SC, Fund R–3610, Inventory 1, File 1915, Sheets 445–450].

Deputy T. Shigabiyev agreed with F. Safiullin that sovereignty was the primarily responsibility to the people, which was necessary to ensure efficient control over the republic; to implement this, did not mean to break up with Russia: 'We are situated in the heart of Russia. Where can we go? Is there any way for us to become separate? We are not raising questions of establishing armed forces, customs borders, monetary circulation, or a Ministry of Foreign Affairs of our own.' In conclusion, he said: 'Nearly all of us have stated in our election programmes that we wanted sovereignty for our republic, and that we would struggle for independence. I know almost 90% of the people sitting here to have specified this in their programmes. Therefore, let us stay true to our word. I think we should vote by roll-call so that our electors can know which deputy has fulfilled his/her promise to the electorate.' He maintained that the deputies should support the draft Declaration submitted by R. Siraziyev and R. Khafizov [CA TR SC, Fund R–3610, Inventory 1, File 1915, Sheets 450–453].

RSFSR People's deputy M. Rokitsky happened to act as a mediator between the leaders of the Session and the deputy group 'Soglasie.' His position consisted in refraining from such extreme measures as demanding that the republic should be renamed in to the Kazan oblast or voicing the slogan of 'Tatars for Tatars.' He expressed support of M. Shaimiev's centrist views: 'Therefore, I cannot—I think those who know me well
might say this is for the first time—I cannot but celebrate the carefully worded and circumspect speech made by Mintimer Shaimiev.' M. Rokitsky maintained that the session should adopt the Declaration without specifying the republic's legal standing: 'We should not close off our paths. We had better wait.' The speaker recommended that the deputies should explain to their electors that a way towards a prosperous republic, which was not a form of oppression but a necessity as was national-state self-determination being the highest priority in a sovereign republic, saying that 'you cannot wear two yokes on one and the same neck.'

To the contrary, A. Kolesnik, who spoke after R. Fayzullin, supported the idea of entering the two federations, claiming that 80% of his electorate were opposed to any withdrawal from Russia.

Deputy V. Fakhrutdinov said that it was the individual and not the state who should be the highest priority in a sovereign republic. He viewed the people as the legitimate source of power. 'I believe,' he said, 'that we must not strive for prosperity by oppressing others, ... it is sure to bring about interethnic conflicts.'

Like many other deputies, V. Fakhrutdinov suggested adopting the Declaration without specifying the republic's legal standing, so that they could negotiate with Russia or the USSR after the people expressed their support.

R. Minnullin highlighted the necessity of promoting the republic to a normal civilised state, so that it could be an entity under international law, with representatives in other states and republics of the USSR. 'We will only accept complete independence, complete freedom. Pardon me, sovereignty is not like meat or sugar, which you can receive serving by serving,' he said. R. Minnullin encouraged the deputies to overcome their doubts and lack of self-confidence and concluded: 'This is the beginning of a new period in history. A new epoch, new challenges, and new problems, which we will have to solve on our own, lie ahead' [CA TR SC, Fund R–3610, Inventory 1, File 1916, Sheet 19].

The author of one of the versions of the Declaration, A. Shtanin, who spoke next, maintained that state sovereignty was necessary as was national-state self-determination for every nation. Just like V. Fakhrutdinov, he noted that the individual was the top priority.

General Director of Nizhnekamskneftekhim Production Association G. Sakhapov presented figures indicative of the republic's deprivation of economic rights. He reported that 80% of the industrial goods produced by the republic to be attributable to Soviet Union-controlled plants, those controlled by Russia were producing 18% of the total, and
only 1.5% were attributable to locally controlled plants. G. Sakhapov mentioned that Nizhnekamskneftekhim had been exporting its products under a license issued by superior authorities, claiming that Moscow received nearly all the profit. Emphasising the fact that the situation was even worse for other plants, such as Nizhnekamskshina, he said: 'What is clear is that we cannot put up with this anymore, and there is no going back for us. Which path can lead us to the wide expanses, to normal economic, and everyday human activities if not abundance? I mean independent plants, diverse forms of incorporation, a market economy, sovereignty, and territorial self-government. Our well-being is in our hands. It is not within another entity, not in subordination to someone that we can achieve this, but with someone, with sovereign republics, under agreements with equal, decent business partners.' G. Sakhapov laid special emphasis on international relations and citizenship, drawing the deputies' attention to the fact that people were concerned about compulsory learning of the Tatar language. The deputy said in conclusion: 'I will vote for a sovereignty that clearly specifies: 'The Tatar ASSR guarantees the right to comprehensive economic, social, and cultural development, freedom of conscience and worship, as well as other human rights and freedoms to all citizens within its territory, regardless of their ethnic status.' We, the people's deputies, must swear this like an oath. There's no other correct solution' [CA TR SC, Fund R–3610, Inventory 1, File 1916, Sheet 29].

Deputy of the Saby Electoral District F. Bayramova stressed the fact that she was representing the Tatar Public Centre and rejected the idea of holding a referendum, claiming that she had sworn to fight for Tatarstan's sovereignty: 'It has been many thousands of years since God has granted us this language, land, and faith. We have not conquered anyone here, and we have no such intention. What we are struggling for is our rights. We are struggling to preserve our nation. To put issues of statehood and language to a referendum, would be a gross violation of international law. We will have to look to the international public for protection...' [CA TR SC, Fund R–3610, Inventory 1, File 1916, Sheet 28]. F. Bayramova attached special importance to the issues of rural communities and national culture. In conclusion, she touched upon the relations between the Tatars and the Russians, which, to quote the speaker, 'have grown to be so intimately related that certain generations of them began to develop as if they were Siamese twins, ... the Russians and we have grown into each other.' She estimated such a fusion of the two peoples as a preternatural notion, suggesting an imminent national tragedy, which would result in the loss of the 'two major cultures, the beautiful features of the two nations.' 'The people who have neither ethnic roots nor perceptions are neither Tatar nor Russian ... This is the result of our fusing of the two nations,' she said [CA TR SC, Fund R–3610, Inventory 1, File 1916, Sheet 31].

Deputy from Yelabuga A. Vladimirov handed into the Session's Presidium an address signed by 3185 citizens of the town and outlined its contents. Supporting the idea of sovereignty, the citizens demanded that the republic should not withdraw from Russia, which they expected to cause a decay in the country's and the republic's economy towards collapse, and probably have unpredictable effects on international relations. Deputy N. Valeev disagreed with him. He said that the public was inclined to establish the republic's relations with the USSR and the RSFSR, as well as with other republics, under agreements, including under a Union Agreement.

In the meanwhile, the square around the building that hosted the Session remained crowded. People shouted demands that the Declaration should be adopted immediately. However, such sentiment might obstruct the work of the Supreme Soviet, so chairman of the Session M. Shaimiev reminded the deputies of the recently adopted special address to electors and reported a demonstration that had taken place on Svobody Square, contrary to the agreement. 'I think the Session should be suspended unless deputies representing the
Tatar Public Centre go (to the square – I. T.) and agree (with the demonstrators. – I. T.) that it should stop. I suggest that they should make the agreement an hour before the next recess,' he said. The words elicited applause from the audience, and the Session returned to meaningful activities.

RSFSR People's deputy, chairman of the Writers' Union of the republic, R. Muhamediev presented a speech that was both polemical and constructive. A small extract from it is presented below: 'A number of deputies, in particular Comrades Kosulin and Vorobyov, advocated vociferously for a referendum. No one has held an event like this in the country before. Russia, Turkmenia, Moldavia, and Lithuania—every republic that had proclaimed sovereignty—addressed this issue in the parliamentary way. What bothers many people about sovereignty is how our republic would survive. They warn us: What if Russia shuts off its oil pipelines, its canals, railroads and closes its airspace? Comrades democrats, I answer you this: the democratic law-governed Russia cannot undertake such steps. I think the time of force and dictatorial coercion is history. Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, Yeltsin, stated many times that RSFSR—and I am quoting here—'will give every encouragement to any form of Tataria's sovereignty and protect it against any encroachment.' By proclaiming itself sovereign, Tatarstan would not be triggering any confrontation with anyone, especially not with Russia. Suffice it to say, the number of Tatars living within the RSFSR, outside of Tatarstan, is over 3 million, while 1.5 million Russians live in Tatarstan. This apprehension is thus groundless. All people are sure to need amity and mutual understanding like all people need air. Independent republics with equal rights will enjoy previously unthought-of opportunities for economic, cultural, and political cooperation. To the contrary, agreements between sovereign republics will bring them closer together as a prerequisite for sound, truly democratic relations between nations ... As for the Declaration establishing Tatarstan as a constituent entity of the two federations, I agree with all the rest—that this is absurd. As for band-aid solutions and suggestions that we should wait, I would like to remind the honourable people's deputies that, first of all, we have been waiting for 70 years, or even more. Second, sovereignty either exists or does not exist. There is no in-between. Anyway, it is high time we realised that we can only leap over an abyss once. We will not be making a second attempt. I truly believe in the good judgment and political expertise of those representing the people of Tatarstan.'

Impressed by these words, deputy P. Ionov called for all the deputies, including those representing the RSFSR, to refrain from one-sided comments on the position of each individual deputy. This also applied to R. Muhamediev's speech because not only the Democratic Platform but also the Tatar Public Centre had been making one-sided, probably ill-considered, statements.

Emphasising his role as a lawyer and a scholar, and not a politician, B. Zheleznov tried to justify the relations between Tatarstan and Russia, as well as the USSR, thus supporting the idea of double membership. He maintained that within the RSFSR Tatarstan should be a constituent entity of the federation, while entering the USSR as a confederal member, following the USSR's gradual transformation into a confederation. 'We cannot think of ourselves but as an entity within Russia, not only for historical, economic reasons but because of our geopolitical situation in the heart of Russia,' he said [CA TR SC, Fund R–3610, Inventory 1, File 1916, Sheets 50–51].

Deputy from Aznakayevo R. Shakurov harshly criticised the draft Declaration by the working group of the Supreme Soviet and, essentially, the approach of B. Zheleznov: 'The two related principles underlying the Leninist national policy are self-determination and equality of nations. In terms of these principles the draft Declaration presented by the working party ... is amorphous and inconsistent. I would call it a Declaration of Pseudo-Sovereignty. As the saying goes, history repeats itself, first as tragedy, second as farce. Back in the 1920s the Tatar people fell victim to the first deception—that is, the autonomisation
process, 'Double subordination' and 'double status' followed in the 1990s. A new deception is being devised against all nations in our republic.' R. Shakurov also criticised A. Kolesnik's suggestion that they should not hurry to proclaim the republic as sovereign, claiming that with such an approach they would have to wait another 500 years. He finished his speech by saying: 'The sovereignty of Tatarstan is in no contradiction to that of Russia. In fact, it reinforces it.'

Writer R. Valeev expressed concern about a potential ethnic rift in the deputy corps and said that he was going to speak in Russian so that his 'Russian brothers and Russia-speaking Tatars' could understand him because 'if they do not understand me today, when I speak Russian, I am afraid we will never understand each other ... And if the Russian part of the Session blocks the acceptance of the Declaration of State Independence, I fear of becoming totally disappointed with them.' His speech was an attempt to persuade the deputies that the Declaration, as a document ensuring the republic's political economic sovereignty, and thus righting the wrongs done to the Tatar people, had to be adopted. R. Valeev rejected the idea of proclaiming Tatarstan a constituent entity of the two federations as well as that of putting the republic's status to a referendum vote. He stated that he would vote for complete sovereignty without any such terms as 'constituent entity' and 'as part of,' advocating for roll-call voting—the results of which should appear in print—and maintaining that a governmental programme should be developed urgently, in the context of sovereignty and market relations. The deputy set an ultimatum to the government. It was to resign if it proved unable to manage the crisis and form an independent economic policy of its own.

It should be noted that the government was actively involved in the discussion of issues related to political and economic sovereignty. First of all, the head of the government M. Sabirov delivered a number of speeches at the Session. Vice chairman of the Council of Ministers F. Khamidullin presented a report on the government's economic programme. Here is an excerpt from his speech: 'Among 73 regions and autonomous republics within the Russian Federation, Tataria ranks 9th by population size, 9th by industrial output, 8th by agricultural output, 7th by the amount of investments absorbed annually ... The republic ranks 1st among Russia's autonomous republics by industrial output per capita, which is much higher than the Russian average. The republic's agricultural output is also above the Russian average.' Having mentioned Tataria's being one of the leading economic regions, he shed light on the weak spots of the national economy. He laid emphasis on the republic's social backwardness, as compared to other regions of Russia. For instance, it ranked 91st by hospital beds per capita and 37th by housing per capita. F. Khamidullin maintained that the governmental policy, in the context of sovereignty, would consist in the maximum use of the republic's economic potential in favour of its multi-ethnic people. [CA TR SC, Fund R–3610, Inventory 1, File 1916, Sheets 73–75].

Deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet Yu. Krasilnikov was among advocates for sovereignty, especially in terms of the economy. The deputies were pleased to hear him say the words: 'What is the percentage of property owned by Tataria out of its total industrial capacity? One and a half percent! No colony has ever owned such a miserly amount of capital ... I advocate for complete sovereignty, meaning that Soviet Tatarstan should be recognised as an entity under international law.'

Secretary of the city of Kazan CPSU Committee G. Zertsalov and deputy M. Kazakov spoke on interethnic relations. While the former referred primarily to the opinion of the most active members of the party, the latter expressed the point of view of the average Communist. M. Kazakov's speech vividly represented the sentiment, deep emotional upheaval, and hesitation of the Russian deputies: 'The most important thing for the Russian-speaking part of the population is a guarantee of equal rights for all nations inhabiting our republic. However, I have been somehow hesitant about the decision taken since I ar-
rived in Kazan, since the very first days of our session … because these meetings, manifestations, slogans, posters, emotions, undisguised nationalism, and chauvinism, and people demanding that deputies should listen to nobody but them—all caused a very negative response in me. I even told some of my colleagues that we would probably have to vote for some proposals but not for sovereignty. Having given it a second thought and having realised that the meetings had been arranged by a small group of people, whom I believe to be present among the people's deputies, however, I decided to rise above the emotions, above the opinions of those who arranged the meetings, and vote for our republic to become sovereign … The only way to achieve success was to make sure that all social forces united for the sake of the people—that is, according to the 28th CPSU Congress, that the principles of partnership, tolerance, mutual respect, and civility are implemented [CA TR SC, Fund R–3610, Inventory 1, File 1916, Sheets 78–79].

Deputy A. Ziatdinov from Nizhnekamsk was able to dispel the doubts. His speech was representative of the sentiments of the Tatar part of the deputy corps. It was important for Russian-speaking deputies to hear a reputable person say that Tatarstan had no intention to break up with Russia but merely demanded equal rights. 'Russia needs Tatarstan,' the deputy said, 'as much as we need Russia. Ukraine, Moldavia, Estonia, Chuvashia, Uzbekistan, Yakutia … Sakhalin, need Tatarstan as much as we need them … We want to establish mutually beneficial economic relations in the world. Love cannot be forced … They say we have scarce natural resources. Does Finland, Israel, not to speak of Japan, have more of them? We should rely predominantly on work, mental work, physical work, creative work … The republic has an enormous intellectual, scientific, engineering, and technical potential, a wealth of human resources in industry and in agriculture. Our only task is to get them interested in working at full capacity.' A. Ziatdinov criticised the opinion that the republic had no economic concepts to justify state sovereignty and reminded the audience that back in the middle of 1989 a group of economists from the republic cooperated with experts from six autonomous republics to work out the key principles of economic self-reliance, which Moscow rejected as being applicable to union republics only. The deputy concluded his speech with the following words: 'I think there will be new executors for new tasks when we have the new opportunities. We do have economists and lawyers. Some of our colleagues have been trumpeting the danger of self-sufficiency. Indeed, our situation was like renting a room in someone's apartment. When the time came to receive an apartment of our own, they began to voice doubts as to whether we can live on our own. However, it is hard to prove that we can live on our own, before we have received an apartment' [CA TR SC, Fund R–3610, Inventory 1, File 1916, Sheets 80–82].

The speech by chairman of the Council of People's Deputies of Naberezhnye Chelny Yu. Petrushin, who announced the following instructions made by the deputies of the City Council, showed that the deputies were not inclined to vote for full-fledged sovereignty: '1. Accept the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Tatar Soviet Republic and transform it into the Soviet Republic of Tatarstan. 2. Exclude the provision that Tatarstan shall be a constituent entity of the rejuvenated Federation of Russia and the Union from the draft Declaration. 3. Proclaim Tatar and Russian as the official languages on the territory of Tatarstan. 4. Take into account remarks and suggestions presented at the session of the Council when discussing the Declaration.' The deputy suggested adopting a brief declaration specifying two official languages and ensuring protection for all three nations in the republic and citizenship [CA TR SC, Fund R–3610, Inventory 1, File 1916, Sheets 84–87].

In spite of expressing complete support for Petrushin, deputy S. Titov proposed that the republic's name should contain the definition 'Soviet Socialist.'

Like many other deputies, deputy of the Kazan Council M. Shamsutdinov and deputy
of the Supreme Soviet A. Akhatov proposed renaming the TASSR as the Republic of Tatarstan. In contrast to a number of deputies, First Secretary of the Kirov District CPSU Committee R. Sabitov stated that the people were not prepared to fathom sovereignty in terms of its legal and economic content and referred to the decision by the Kirov District Council of People's Deputies dated 28 August to suggest putting the issue to a referendum.

Expressing the opinion against double membership and holding a referendum, Attorney of Kirov district, Kazan, R. Vagizov appealed to Sabitov: 'As long as we are now 'ceremonially' burying the Stalinist policy of ranking nations by grades, as long as all deputies agree that double membership in federations is absurd, politically and legally, we have to dot our i's concerning the referendum. My arguments against holding a referendum are as follows: when issues related to the natural right of nations to self-determination, to establishing a national centre are put to referendum, the referendum should not take place. The second argument is that by proclaiming sovereignty, we ratify international laws on the right of nations to self-determination ... A precedent was established in the USSR, when the Supreme Soviets of the USSR, Ukraine, etc., were proclaimed sovereign. Why should Tataria set up an obscure experiment and establish the precedent of putting the issue to referendum? This is all the more true because a referendum could aggravate the situation in the republic. It would be quite a challenge to force the Jeanie of interethnic tension back into the bottle' [CA TR SC, Fund R–3610, Inventory 1, File 1916, Sheet 107].

The discussion of this issue turned out to be so long that the last speakers, Yu. Reshetov, R. Galeev, T. Abdullin, and I. Mustafin, had to deliver their speeches, though constructive, to a very noisy audience.


Since M. Shaimiev participated in the commission's work as its chairman, R. Shamgunov presided at the evening meeting of the Session.

The commission was able to agree on the republic's name without any long discussion. The phrase 'Soviet Socialist' was removed, yielding simply the Republic of Tatarstan.

However, M. Shaimiev was absent at that time. When he entered the room, hosting the commission, to see the shortened name in the draft Declaration on the table, he insisted on a double name for the republic. 'We shall adopt the Declaration and go home. However, I will have to take the document to Moscow tomorrow,' he said, adding that the right time had not come to remove the two words.

Membership in federations and official languages turned out to be the most widely discussed issues for the commission. At last, its members struck a compromise. They resolved that the Declaration should not specify Tatarstan's belonging to any federation and should establish Tatar and Russian as official languages.

When the commission's mission was complete, M. Shaimiev proceeded to preside at the meeting and said: 'The deputies' general mood suggests that they should expect the document to embody the full range of opinions, aspirations, doubts, and hopes ... I think they have been able to create a document as the work of a collective mind. As instructed by the commission, deputy Safiullin will speak on the draft Declaration of Sovereignty of the Tatar ASSR.'

We should quote some lines from F. Safiullin's speech: '...Fruitful work and mutual understanding have resolved the increasing
controversy ... in our parliament. Now that the tension has subsided, I am happy to be approaching an agreement. Whatever ice of mutual suspicion of scheming that remained has melted. We have come to understand that we have no bone to pick with each other, that we share a common history and a common future ... Speaking on behalf of the conciliatory commission, I can report 30 people to have almost unanimously, without any dispute on the key issues, arrived at a reasonable and wholesome conclusion, by taking the best from every draft declaration, which I am happy to present to you on behalf of the commission. I acknowledge that it might be not free of minor hiccups, not completely flawless. Comrades, this is a compromise, this is a concord. This is what is appropriate among people, among nations, among age groups in a normal society. Before I read it out, I appeal to you to support the document, memorialising the key ideas it has to be consistent with' [CA TR SC, Fund R–3610, Inventory 1, File 1916, Sheets 134–135]. The audience proceeded to discuss the draft Declaration read out by F. Safiullin, largely focusing on the provisions that dealt with property and supremacy of the republic's laws. They agreed to accept the draft without any amendments. The proposal that the 'the Tatar nation' should be omitted from the phrase 'realisation of the inalienable right of the Tatar nation, the entire people of the republic to self-determination' was rejected by the chairman of the Commission for Lawfulness, Privileges, and Deputy Ethnic R. Khafizov, who claimed the Tatar nation, as a party to state legal relations, was entitled to self-determination [CA TR SC, Fund R–3610, Inventory 1, File 1916, Sheet 140]. On 30 August at 10:00 p.m. the final version of the document was adopted. Chairman of the Counting Commission R. Altynbayev reported that 241 out of 242 deputies had voted for approval, Yu. Bakhteev being the only abstaining deputy. The report elicited a storm of applause and hurrahs.

The adoption of the Declaration was a major shift in the history of Tatarstan as it paved the way to dull-fledged statehood, and at the same time beginning Russia's transformation to a true federation. However, the entire revolutionary implementation still lay ahead.

The success of any revolution depends on the extent to which the society breaks with the old laws and adopts new legal rules. Tatarstan was also to adopt new legal rules regulating its relations with Russia and the rest of the world.

The republic was on its way to developing into a sovereign state. This made the Decree of 27 May 1920 on the establishment of the Tatar Republic no less important. In fact, it increased its significance because the people, who lost their statehood back in 1552, had finally acquired autonomy. Had the republic's territory not been outlined back then, the sovereignty of the 1990s would not have been possible. The Tatar ASSR became a stepping stone to true statehood.

Being an important document, the Declaration of State Sovereignty did not change the republic's status as such. Superior structures continued to determine the republic's rights. It could be dissolved or, at best, transformed into a regular administrative unit at any time. Nobody would be able to dispute the validity of such a decision. When adopted, the Declaration had to be formalised. That could be done in two ways. The first way was to put the issue to a republic-wide referendum as an indisputable expression of the will of the multi-ethnic nation of Tatarstan. The second way was to enter into a bilateral agreement, to the effect that the Russian Federation recognised the Declaration.

At first, such a bilateral agreement seemed a more beneficial solution. If the leadership of Tatarstan felt that they could convince the Russian government that they had been acting in accordance with the law, the republic would be able to establish agreement relations with the Russian Federation according to the formula of a 'revolution without quarreling with the public prosecutor.'

However, the Russian government appeared to be very hesitant about this question. Moscow seemed reluctant to recognise the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Tatarstan.
In those days the republic's Supreme Soviet received the draft Federal Agreement, which it considered and discussed at the session of 6–8 February 1991. The deputies rejected it as a document inconsistent with the republic's Declaration of State Sovereignty and issued a special resolution to order the delegation of Tatarstan to prepare a draft Agreement between the TSSR and the Russian Federation.

On 20 February 1991 M. Shaimiev sent a letter to this effect to chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet B. Yeltsin. At the same time, the Presidium of the TASSR Supreme Soviet sent a telegram to the 3rd Extraordinary Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies. It informed the Congress that the 3rd Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan had resolved to hold a Union Agreement independently and further enter into the Agreement with the RSFSR according to the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the TASSR and the USSR Law On Delimitation of Powers between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Constituent Entities of the Federation dated 26 April 1990.

However, it turned out to be impossible to address the issue of the procedure for signing the Union Agreement at the Congress of People's Deputies of Russia. The republic faced obvious difficulties connected with the forthcoming presidential elections in Russia and Tatarstan. Should Tatarstan participate in the RSFSR presidential elections?

In May 1991 the republic's Supreme Soviet resolved to elect presidents of Tatarstan and Russia. A large part of the population was confused to learn about the decision, while some protested.

F. Bayramova stated on 14 May 1991: 'I am going on a hunger strike in protest against the blatant violation of the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the TSSR and the ill-considered resolution by the republic's Supreme Soviet to hold RSFSR presidential elections on the territory of Tatarstan dated 13 May 1991.' The deputy's hunger strike involved 16 more people and lasted until 27 May. A number of meetings against the Supreme Soviet's resolution to hold elections of the Russian president took place.

On 27 May the protesting crowd carried F. Bayramova into the meeting room of the Supreme Soviet on a chair. On the same day the Supreme Soviet made a decision to the effect that the republic was not officially involved in the elections of the Russian president. At the same time, the document stipulated that an opportunity to vote must be ensured for anybody willing to participate in the elections of the president of the Russian Federation.

74% of the electors voted for M. Shaimiev during the elections for the president of Tatarstan. The elections for the president of Russia did not take place on the territory of Tatarstan because the requirement that over a half of all electors must come to polls was not met.

It was thus necessary to clarify the relations between Russia and Tatarstan as well as issues related to the Union Agreement. M. Shaimiev negotiated directly with B. Yeltsin.

On 12 August 1991 the two delegations sat down to talk in Moscow. The negotiations were very tough and ended on 14 August, when a joint protocol was adopted.

The talks began with welcoming speeches by heads of delegations. Then the floor was given to vice head of Tatarstan's delegation professor I. Tagirov. He started by reminding the audience that the Tatar people had cherished the historical memory of their statehood, without ever ceasing to struggle for its restoration. He noted that Tatarstan had never become part of Russia of its own accord. Special attention was paid to the proceedings of the 3rd All-Russia Congress of Soviets of January 1918, most importantly to the Declaration of Rights of the Working and Exploited People, which recognised the peoples of Russia to be sovereign and proclaimed Russia as a federation. The speaker attached special importance to the final provision of the document, which read, 'the 3rd All-Russia Congress of Soviets shall restrict itself to laying the foundation of the federation of Soviet Republics of Russia, delegating the power to decide at a plenipotentiary Soviet congress if and how they want
Chapter 2. The Future of the USSR and Tatarstan’s Status in the New Political Situation

to be involved in the federal government and other federal Soviet authorities, to the workers and peasants of each nation’ [Vasilyev, Gu- 
reev, 1972, pp. 9–11].

S. Shakhray expressed his appreciation of the long-awaited reference to the federation's founding documents. S. Stankevich made an attempt to reject the documents as 'Bolshe-
vik tricks' but failed to provide any argument except for 'Russia's millennium-long history.' He found himself at a loss of words when he was reminded that the millennium-long his-
tory originated in Kievan Rus, after which the speaker suggested that they should continue their negotiations in Kiev. Vice minister of Foreign Affairs F. Shelov-Koverdyaev tried to support S. Stankevich.

On the second day of negotiations G. Bur-
bulis admitted that Tatarstan's position was rightful. However, he was not prepared to enter his words into the minutes written following the negotiations. He also recalled that the elections of the president of Russia had been undermined in Tatarstan, which, he believed, aggravated the situation.

Quite naturally, the negotiations were centred, apart from the proceedings of the 3rd All-Russia Congress of Soviets, on the Decla-
ration of State Sovereignty of Tatarstan. G. Burbulis noted that he would prefer the delega-
tion of Tatarstan to have brought the results of a referendum on the republic's status. The Tatarstani party retorted that there was no need to hold a referendum since a voluntary merging with Russia had not taken place—not a single Tatar had signed a document on such a merging during the 438 years since Kazan was occupied, which was the exact reason why the Declaration did not specify Tatarstan to be a part of Russia. On hearing this, S. Shakhray left his table and began to talk as if on behalf of the Tatar party, while walking to and fro along the table. 'So, we are not going to withdraw from Russia; yet we are not going to be a part of it either.' He received this reply: 'Sergey Mikhaylovich, you have demonstrated a very deep understanding of our position.' A long time had passed before the question of withdrawing from Russia was raised again.

The Russian delegation then proposed that they should start from understanding the positions of each party. It was crucial for the Russian government to make sure that the negotia-
tions were confidential to prevent other union republics from finding out about them, since there existed the 'Nine Plus One' document, which was binding on the Russian party. They were also apprehensive lest other autonomous republics follow Tatarstan's example. The parties agreed to ensure confidentiality. There was no reason to fear lest Tatarstan would inspire other republics. First, the other republics had admitted that they had entered Russia on a voluntary basis. Second, their declarations of state sovereignty specified that they were parts of Russia.

A protocol was adopted following the negotia-
tions.

On 16 August the delegation of Tatarstan returned to Kazan hoping that the path to signing the Union Agreement, as an independent party, was now open to Tatarstan. A few days were left before the potential start date of its signing.

The two delegations had agreed that B. Yeltsin would meet with M. Shaimiev in the Russian White House on 19 August 1991 at 4:00 p.m. to finalise this issue.

However, this meeting never took place. Events took a different turn. Three days in August 1991 had changed the situation in the country dramatically.
§ 4. Conspiracy Against the Country and the People

Indus Tagirov

A conspiracy against the country and the people is what one might call the events of 18–21 August 1991. It was a conspiracy of the state authorities. It was against the people, not against each other, that they schemed. The events were associated with the State Committee for the State of Emergency (commonly known as the GKChP). To this day, many myths and speculations surround these events. As a result, the real events were pushed into the background, and coming to the foreground were the secondary ones, having no fundamentally significant facts.

Indeed, what were these events like? Why did they coincide with the date when the new Union Agreement was to be signed? The only thing that is beyond any doubt is that they were connected to it, and were in fact a resumption of the struggle over the document. At the same time, they were marked by the confrontation between the USSR president, Secretary General of the CPSU Central Committee, M. Gorbachev and the RSFSR president B. Yeltsin. Gorbachev wanted, as many rights as possible for the prospective Union and, accordingly, himself, while Yeltsin tried to arrange the Union as a confederation, the republics, primarily Russia and, accordingly, the Russian president, having the real power. Yeltsin maintained that the Union should have not more than two or three powers, while the rest should be delegated to the local authorities.

Who was right is a question of history. Today, beyond any reasonable doubt, it is clear that they both were largely to blame for the confrontation. The fact that Yeltsin's ideas prevailed does not mean he was right. Anyway, we should analyse the events chronologically.

Formally, the escalation of the conflict between Gorbachev and Yeltsin was triggered by the new draft Union Agreement, as it appeared in newspapers. Yeltsin's associates believed that it left many rights in the Union's centre, while Gorbachev's supporters, in particular the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR A. Lukyanov, viewed it as a deviation from the results of the All-Russia Referendum, at which the people voted for preserving the USSR. Tatarstan's position was very definite. Most of the republic's electors said yes to the Union.

Articles appeared in the newspapers criticising a number of provisions of the draft agreement, expressing apprehension, lest the Commonwealth of Independent States, which was to replace the USSR, be the beginning of the end of the Union State. President of Tatarstan M. Shaimiev also expressed concern about the integrity of the state, in relation to the document [Sovetskaya Tataria, 1991, 21 August]. It should be noted that he did much work to make sure that a document acceptable for all the republics was developed. He insisted, in particular when negotiating with the leaders of republics, on creating such a document in Novo-Ogaryovo, that all the republics, including the autonomous ones, should be equal parties to the agreement. At the same time, most of the union republic leaders were opposed to the idea, which was reflected in the so called '9+1 Declaration' (developed by nine union republics plus Gorbachev himself). The leaders of the autonomous republics in general said nothing.

An episode connected with the former mayor of Moscow Gavriil Popov is quite remarkable. One day in June 1991, when president of Russia B. Yeltsin was in America, he suddenly came to the US Embassy to meet with the US Ambassador in the USSR Jack Matlock. After several minutes of a trivial talk, meant for eavesdropping equipment, Popov took a sheet of paper and wrote: 'I have to hand a message to Boris Yeltsin immediately. A coup is possible. He should return to Moscow immediately.' Continuing to talk nonchalantly, the ambassador took the pen to write just one word: 'Who?' In response, Popov wrote three names:
Prime minister Valentin Pavlov, KGB chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov, and minister of Defence Dmitry Yazov. 'I will report to Washington immediately,' Matlock wrote in response [GKCHP, 2007, p. 27]. When reporting the conspiracy against Gorbachev to Washington, he added Lukyanov to the three names, suggesting that the ambassador had other sources of information. Thus, the Russian government was already aware of the conspiracy in June. Gorbachev was aware of it, too. Kryuchkov had informed him of it in secret notes. US Ambassador Matlock warned him about the conspiracy on the instructions of Bush.

It seems like both Yeltsin with his team and Gorbachev with his soon-to-be GKChP members knew everything. When in Foros, Gorbachev—to quote A. Chernyayev, who was assisting him with an article he was working on—‘was able to foresee the possible scenarios, including the 'emergency' one."

On 4 August Gorbachev went for a Crimea vacation to his dacha in Foros. Was it right for him to leave his place in those days, important as they were for the country's future? Before flying off to the Crimea, M. Gorbachev said at a meeting of the USSR Council of Ministers on 3 August: 'Bear in your mind that we have to take tough measures. We will go to great lengths and even introduce a state of emergency if necessary.' When already on the airfield, shortly before he departed, he said to V. Kryuchkov, who had come to see him off: 'Keep your eyes open. Anything can happen. If there is a direct threat, we will have to intervene.' He also warned vice president G. Yanayev: 'Gennady, you are going to be in control here. Take firm measures, if necessary, but do not spill blood' [Questions of history, 2003, No. 7, p. 78] The transcript record of the meeting contains his words: 'I am taking a vacation tomorrow, with your consent, to avoid interfering with your work.' The then chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR I. Laptev later wrote about the events of those days: 'I think the August vacation of the USSR president will always remain one of the greatest mysteries in the last days of Soviet history. It is no exaggeration to say that Gorbachev had taken enormous effort to make sure that the Union Agreement would be signed. He had already been informed about some action being prepared. Why did Gorbachev not heed the warning? What made him ignore it? He is the only one who knows.' Editor of Obshchaya Gazeta Egor Yakovlev did ask him. The question was: 'What made you leave the place so hastily, without even saying goodbye to president Bush Senior, who was staying in Moscow?' Gorbachev answered: 'I have to admit self-critically that I demonstrated over-confidence in that situation' [GKCHP, 2007, pp. 31, 36].

He left in order not to interfere in the work of his associates. And they worked. On his instructions, on 6 August minister of Defence Marshall D. Yazov met with the KGB head V. Kryuchkov at a secret KGB facility on the outskirts of Moscow. O. Baklanov and V. Boldin attended the meeting.

D. Yazov entrusted Commander of the USSR ABT P. Grachyov to develop the technical details of the emergency measures. It took them 7 days, until August 14, to get ready to introduce a state of emergency in the country. V. Kryuchkov, D. Yazov, Baklanov, O. Shenin, G. Yanayev, V. Boldin, and V. Pavlov were calling Gorbachev every day to keep him informed about the situation in the country and in Moscow.

Newspapers reported that an agreement between Kazakhstan and Russia had been ratified in Almaty; B. Yeltsin and N. Nazarbayev adopted two joint declarations of guarantees for the Commonwealth of Independent States. Periodicals also reported on protocols on cooperation and coordination between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Russia and Kazakhstan to have been signed. The heads of both states evaluated the condition of their relations. In particular, N. Nazarbayev said: 'We appeared to be unanimous during the referendum on the Union Agreement, so we currently want it to be signed as soon as possible.' The leaders stated at a press conference that the meeting in Almaty had 'laid a reliable foundation of the new Union' [Izvestiya, 19 August 1991].
On 18 August a delegation consisting of Baklanov, Shenin, Boldin, and Commander-in-Chief of the Army V. Varennikov arrived in Foros on a personal plane to inform Gorbachev that a state of emergency could possibly be introduced. Baklanov said that 'the Union Agreement would not be signed' and that Yeltsin would 'be arrested on his way.' He suggested that Gorbachev should 'stay here while we do the dirty job for you.' In conclusion, Gorbachev said: 'Damn you. Do what you want. But report my opinion!' [GKCHP, 2007, p. 36].

Early in the morning of 19 August the radio and television reported that a state of emergency had been imposed on the country, the State Committee for the State of Emergency (SCSE) had been established, and the presidential powers had been transferred, 'due to certain health problems' of M. Gorbachev to vice president G. Yanayev. The newly established committee included O. Baklanov (first vice chairman of the USSR Council of Defence), V. Kryuchkov (head of the USSR Committee for State Security), V. Pavlov (USSR prime minister), B. Pugo (USSR minister of Internal Affairs), D. Yazov (USSR minister of Defence), G. Yanayev (vice president of the USSR), V. Starodubtsev, and A. Tizyakov. The SCSE adopted the Declaration by the Soviet Government, the Address to the Soviet People, and Resolution No. 1. The documents emphasised the government's adherence to the ideas of socialism and perestroika. The 'Address' claimed that perestroika was at a deadlock, the authorities had lost public trust at all levels, as well as control over the country. The following phrase in the 'Address' became the keynote of all the documents: 'A mortal danger has come to loom large over our great Motherland!' Though the documents presented an adequate account of the situation, they contained certain dubious provisions. For instance, the following speculation seems rather vague: 'Instead of ensuring the safety and well-being of each citizen and the whole society, people in power tend to use it for no benefit of the population, as a means of unscrupulous self-affirmation.' Were these senior governmental officials not the ones who had the power? Whom did they mean? It is not clear.

The Russian government's response to the situation was decisive. It was manifested in the decrees by the RSFSR president and the joint address to the population by president B. Yeltsin, president of the Cabinet of Ministers I. Silayev, and vice chairman of the Supreme Soviet R. Khasbulatov, which appeared on the same day. The documents claimed the SCSE to be an unconstitutional organisation of criminals. According to the decrees, the all-Union authorities on the territory of the RSFSR, including the KGB, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Public Prosecution Office, were subordinated to the government of the Russian Federation until the USSR Congress of Soviets. Local authorities were instructed to refrain from executing any orders and decrees by the SCSE. A demand was put forth that M. Gorbachev should be enabled to speak to the people. Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR A. Lukyanov was demanded to call an extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies of the Soviet Union. The documents encouraged citizens to go on an indefinite strike until the requirements had been met.

On 19 August RSFSR president B. Yeltsin called a press conference, at which he delivered a speech stating that the removal of USSR president M. Gorbachev was an anti-constitutional act [Труба, 20 August 1991]. A political meeting of many thousands of people was held near the Russian White House for over three hours on the same day. Speaking at this meeting, B. Yeltsin called for calm and warned the military against taking any provocative actions.

It was easy to foresee the further course of development of the events. The conspirators were totally confused. Clueless and scared, Gorbachev removed himself from the matter, having infected the conspirators with his doubts, hesitation, and lack of confidence. Vice president G. Yanayev's hands were shaking at a press conference with journalists. Indecision and fear spread in the military, in the agencies such as the MIA and the KGB,
among everyone involved in the conspiracy. The conspiracy was doomed. The former Advisor to the US president, well-known Soviet etologist Z. Brzezinski commented on the poor organisation of the conspiracy: 'If the putschists had made careful preparations, they would have attached special importance to the sentiment in the army and would not have relied on the Moscow garrison but would have redeployed troops from the country's remote regions' [Komsomol'skaya pravda, 1991, 22 August]. Indeed, Yeltsin and his associates were able to turn P. Grachyov and some other generals, on whom the putschists had placed their hopes, to their side. It is no wonder that Oleg Shenin said at the trial of SCSE members that 'if they and Valentin Varennikov had been included in the SCSE in that cursed August, the outcome would have been very different' [quoted by: Garifullina, 1995, p. 253].

In turn, the interim USSR president G. Yanayev adopted a decree of 20 August as a response to the actions by the Russian Government, claiming Yeltsin's decrees to be inconsistent with the Constitution and not enforceable. The SCSE declaration claimed that most of the union and autonomous republics 'supported the measures, which were caused by the extreme situation' [Komsomol'skaya pravda, 1991, 22 August].

A war of decrees and orders thus began to confuse the people, especially the heads of local governmental authorities.

Decrees and orders by both the SCSE and the Russian government threatened those who refused to follow them with punitive measures. Even the USSR Constitutional Supervision Committee was unable to determine who was wrong and who was right, whose decrees were consistent with the Constitution and whose not. The local authorities found themselves in an even more awkward situation—their futures depended on who would eventually win. As the saying goes, success is never judged.

The Russian leaders also felt doubtful about their eventual victory. As R. Khasbulatov said on Radio Liberty on 19 August 2001, Yeltsin, feeling insecure, mentioned the US Embassy as a potential shelter. This is why most of the country's regions kept a low profile. Kazan supported neither the SCSE nor the Russian government actively. The republic's government had to overcome the two incompatible trends.

The Presidential Administration, the Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers, the republic's Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and the republic-wide CPSU Committee received encrypted telegrams from the SCSE. The content was the same. Some were secret and not to be disclosed, while the rest were published in the mass media.

On 36 August at 10:36 a.m. the Tatar Republic-Wide CPSU Central Committee received an encrypted telegram from the CPSU Central Committee, signed by Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee O. Shenin, which addressed the first secretaries of union republics' CP Central Committees, republic-wide, krai, and regional party committees. It read as follows: 'As a state of emergency has been imposed on certain areas of the USSR, please inform the CPSU Central Committee regularly about the regional situation, public sentiment, appeasement and disciplinary measures, and the public response to the measures taken by the USSR State Committee of Emergency.' Secretaries of the republic-wide committee R. Idiatullin, N. Baleshov, and V. Kandalintsev read it. After an hour, or to be more accurate at 11:37 a.m., an encrypted telegram from the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee was received, which read as follows: 'As a state of emergency has been introduced, please take measures to involve Communists in the assistance to the USSR State Committee of Emergency. Refer to the USSR Constitution for practical guidance. We will inform you additionally about the Central Committee Plenary Session and other events.' R. Idiatullin, N. Baleshov, V. Kandalintsev, R. Muslimov, R. Khakimov, S. Mukharlyamov, B. Shagiyev, Zinovyev, M. Sabirov, and V. Vasilyev read the encrypted telegram.

At the same time, telegrams from the Russian government ordered the authorities not
to follow any instructions and decrees by the SCSE.

The republic's power structures found themselves between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, encrypted telegrams from the USSR governmental bodies and the SCSE demanded that they should observe the latter's decisions and instructions. On the other hand, an increased inflow of those from the Russian government insisted that they should resist the SCSE. For instance, on 20 August the republic's Ministry of Internal Affairs received a telegram signed by KGB chairman V. Ivanenko and RSFSR minister of Internal Affairs V. Barannikov, which read as follows: 'All officials of Russia's state security apparatus and agencies of internal affairs should demonstrate firmness, reason, and a sober understanding of the situation in the country, providing every assistance to the legitimate government elected by the people to prevent military action and possible bloodshed at this moment, which is critical to our society. We feel positive that KGB officials and those of the RSFSR Ministry of Internal Affairs will refrain from any involvement in the anti-constitutional coup' [CA of the Procuracy of TR, File 109966, Vol. 5.] The telegram was presented to the republic's president and prime minister.

On the same day, they received the Address to the People of the Russian Federation from the RSFSR Government, the decrees by RSFSR president B. Yeltsin declaring the establishment of the SCSE as an anti-constitutional act qualifying as a coup d'etat. It declared any resolutions made by the SCSE as illegitimate and void on the territory of the RSFSR. Officials who executed them were to be legally persecuted under the RSFSR Criminal Code. One of the decrees stipulated that all USSR executive authorities on the territory of the RSFSR, including the KGB, the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the USSR Ministry of Defence, were directly subordinated to the RSFSR president, elected by the people, until the extraordinary USSR Congress of People's Deputies. KGB agencies and those of the Ministries of Internal Affairs and Defence were instructed to execute any decrees and orders from the RSFSR president and Council of Ministers immediately and take urgent measures to prevent any orders and instructions from the anti-constitutional Committee of Emergency from being executed. The order warned that officials who executed any resolutions by the SCSE were to be removed and held criminally liable.

On the same day, the Presidium of the TASSR Supreme Soviet met to discuss the social and political situation in the country, in the context of the emergency. It was noted that no state of emergency had been imposed on the republic, and that the governmental and administrative agencies exercised their constitutional powers. In order to ensure political and economic stability in the republic, its president was advised to enhance control over the execution of the effective USSR and TASSR laws, in particular those concerning the mass media. The editors of republic-wide and local newspapers were advised against publishing any materials aimed at destabilising the situation [CA of the Procuracy of TR, File 109966, Vol. 5.].

The top priority for the republic's government in such a challenging situation was to keep the situation stable. The question was how to preserve civil peace and international concord in the republic, rather than whose instructions to follow. Therefore, any activities by the president, the Government, and the Supreme Soviet were subordinated to this goal.

President Shaimiev was staying in Moscow, where he had previously arranged to meet with Yeltsin to agree on the procedure for signing the Tatarstan draft Union Agreement. However, the meeting never took place because of the developed situation. Anyways, Shaimiev was not to blame for this, as he was in the White House at the agreed upon hour. Only Yeltsin was not there. The leaders of 15 autonomous republics met with Lukyanov and Yanayev, which led to no satisfactory results. The latter two politicians prevailed. The meetings had no particular outcome. The situation resembled walking on thin ice. It
was important not to make a mistake. They needed to both avoid panic and not take sides.

Everyone was waiting for the president to arrive. Leaders of the government and a number of agencies met him at the airport. He said flatly that a state of emergency would not be imposed on the republic [CA of the Procuracy of TR, File 109966, Vol. 5., Sheet 89].

On 30 August at 10:30 a.m. M. Shaimiev held an extended meeting of the Presidential Council, which took about an hour and a half. It was also attended by members of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the Cabinet of Minister, headed by the prime minister, senior officials of the Presidential Administration and the Supreme Soviet, chairmen of district and city Soviets, the head of the Kazan Garrison, and the heads of two military schools.

The president provided a detailed account of his stay in Moscow. He declared that their principal goal was to keep the republic stable and prevent certain political forces from drawing the population into the vortex of confrontation, instructing his audience to avoid causing a state of emergency and to stay cool-headed [CA of the Procuracy of TR, File 109966, Vol. 5., Sheet 37]. The president shared the same clear opinion with journalists right after the meeting.

The president's address to the citizens of the republic calling for peace and calm also contributed to stability. The republic acted in accordance with the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Tatarstan. The republic's government demonstrated in every speech and through every action that the interests of Tatarstan, and its multi-ethnic people, were its highest priority. It refrained from supporting either the SCSE or the Russian government openly.

Those who prompted the republic's government to take sides expected just one outcome. Those responsible for the future of the republic and its people were prepared to face any scenario. The 'Narodovlastiye' group encouraged the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet to take sides by calling an extraordinary session of the Supreme Soviet to criticise the SCSE. However, it could cause fierce confrontation in the parliament between SCSE supporters and those siding with the Russian government. It would be sure to spread beyond the parliament and cover the entire republic and its capital.

The Volga Region Military District was preparing to support the conspiracy, which suggests that the republic's government had taken the right approach. On 19 August at 7:40 a.m. the Kazan Garrison was issued the command ROTOR—that is, to place its units in operational readiness and wait for further instructions. District Commander A. Makashev ordered that all army, detachment, unit, and institution commanders should be recalled from leave on 20 August. The head of the garrison Major General Timashev was ordered to supply a special operation team of 150 men and vehicles for them. The purpose was to occupy such important facilities as the TV centre, the Supreme Soviet Building, the Council of Ministers, airports, the city centre, the post office, electric power substations, three points in the water system, and the river port.

Teams of tank troop officers and local military units were to be joined by special operation detachments from Samara. Five platoons with a total of 150 men in 7 vehicles were to encamp along the line Kremlin – Lenina St. – Akcharlak Restaurant – Gvardeyskaya St. The troops were expected to cover the route four times. 150 soldiers with 7 vehicles, one ATC, and one tank were to take the line Vishnevskeogo St. – Gvardeyskaya St. – polygon and encamp near the railway station, the Central Department Store, along Kirova Street, and near the Officers' Residence. The following advancement schedule was established: 7 officers + 8 vehicles: 8:00 a.m., ATC: 10:00 a.m. and 12:00 p.m., vehicles with soldiers: 7:00 a.m., 12:00, 1:00, and 1:30 p.m. Besides this, columns were expected to move along the roads from Naberezhnaye Chely and Zelenodolsk 'as a display of power' [CA of the Procuracy of TR, File 109966, Vol. 6].

It was still possible that troops would appear on the streets of the city on 21 August. At 3:00 p.m. on that day, when the putsch had been suppressed, the garrison received a tele-
gram from the district ordering it to place the troops on alert. It meant that Makashev could risk it all even if the situation in Moscow was not favourable. When asked whether tanks could be possibly have been brought to the streets of the capital, the head of the garrison Major General G. Timashev answered that 'if I had been commanded to move tanks to any square of the city, I would render a salute and then resign.' If he had resigned and refused to follow Makashev's instructions, which is hardly possible, his successor would have executed the order.

It is thus remarkable that a series of orders received from the district, right after the SCSE conspiracy was suppressed, were destroyed. The apparent reason is simple—they laid the city authorities under obligation to fully obey any orders by the fascist Makashev, including Order No. 337 dated 20 August 1991, published in Komsomolskaya Pravda, which stipulated that 'any commissars, citizens, betrayers of the Motherland, of the Union shall be called in question and transferred to law enforcement bodies.'

However, even the scarce information currently available suggests that the republic's government took a careful and circumspect approach to the situation in the days of the SCSE. These and other similar facts prove the charges brought against the leaders of the republic at that time were groundless.
CHAPTER 3
New Relations between the Republic of Tatarstan and the Russian Federation

§ 1. Preparation for a Referendum and the Decision Made by the Republic's People

Indus Tagirov

The events of August 1991 not only set diverse political forces in motion but started the decay of the USSR. M. Gorbachev returned from Foros in total frustration. His closest associates, who had plotted the revolt, were in prison. The minister of Internal Affairs B. Pugo had shot himself. A number of senior officials of the CPSU Central Committee also committed suicide. M. Gorbachev acted to meet every requirement by B. Yeltsin, who forced him to sign the order, to the effect that the Communist Party was dissolved, in front of the eyes of millions of TV viewers.

The USSR was living on borrowed time. In December 1991 the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus signed a trilateral agreement on the dissolution of the USSR in Białowieża Forest. They not only acted contrary to the will of the country's people, who had voted for preserving the USSR at the All-Union Referendum, but violated the USSR Constitution by encroaching on the state's territorial integrity. M. Gorbachev, who remained the USSR president in control of all the country's law enforcement agencies and the guarantor of the USSR Constitution, was obliged to arrest the people and commit them to trial. He did not do this. That is, he is also to blame for the collapse of the USSR as a person who failed to fulfill his constitutional duty.

The only solution for Tatarstan was to reinforce its sovereignty and establish agreement relations with the Russian Federation.

The Tatar people were committed to obtaining full-fledged statehood and establishing relations with Russia under a bilateral agreement based on the adopted resolution. The referendum was not aimed at leaving the Russian Federation, which made a positive answer a more likely outcome.

The document did not satisfy the Russian government, so it turned to the wholly politicised Constitutional Court headed by V. Zorkin. On 13 March the Constitutional Court delivered a judgment that it would be illegal to hold the referendum in Tatarstan, and that it must be cancelled. The judgment was confirmed by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, which summoned chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Tatarstan F. Mukhаметшин to its meeting. The meeting was broadcast on television and radio.

V. Zorkin tried to put a scare into the Russian public by saying: 'Shall a positive answer be given to the question on the referendum, it will legally justify a proclamation of independence. Any lawyer would rightfully think so.'

Though he failed to put a scare into the public, he was heard, which resulted in the public opinion being formed that the referendum was aimed at breaking up with Russia. Moscow radio and television stations, newspapers, and journals promoted this idea of the referendum. Even when the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Tatarstan adopted a clarification on the matter, the campaign did not end. The campaign of casting aspersion on the republic gained momentum, causing a negative response in a large part of Russia and CIS population, of which numerous letters and telegrams to the Supreme Soviet and president of Tatarstan were indicative.
In her letter to president of Tatarstan M. Shaimiev, chairman of the Supreme Soviet F. Mukhametshin, and prime minister M. Sabirov, T. Volodina supported the scheduled referendum. This woman maintained that those opposed to T. Volodina supported the scheduled referendum.

In her letter to president of Tatarstan M. Shaimiev, chairman of the Supreme Soviet F. Mukhametshin, and prime minister M. Sabirov, T. Volodina supported the scheduled referendum. This woman maintained that those opposed to T. Volodina supported the scheduled referendum.

This simple woman thus expressed the sentiment of many citizens of the republic.

The Russians were also largely opposed to such pressure on the republic. Letters and telegrams of support came from Ukraine, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and the Baltic States.

Yet, a different mood was also present in the country. In Samara deputy Yudin of the Russian Supreme Soviet representing Samara oblast held intense anti-Tatar propaganda in Samara. A telegram by activists of the Tatar Public Centre—Abdulov, Galimov, and Nadirov—addressing the president of Tatarstan M. Shaimiev reported that this man had threatened to send volunteer detachments of imperialist chauvinists against Kazan, demanding that the activists of the Tatar Public Centre should criticize on television the idea of holding a referendum in Tatarstan. Otherwise he would have Tatars exiled and executed.

Political forces of every stripe and colour became active in the republic, which often led to fierce confrontation. For example, members of 'Public Rule' resolved to gather the Consultative Council of the Congress of Democratic Forces of the Republics and National State Entities of the Russian Federation in Kazan in February 1992. Viewing it as an attempt to obstruct the republic's sovereignty, the TCC disrupted the event. In response, the leaders of 'Narodovlastiye' published a declaration entitled 'Public Resistance to Extremism' in the newspaper Vechernyaya Kazan.

The signers of the declaration accused the republic's government of overlooking the infringement of freedom of speech and assembly by radical members of nationalist organisations, demanding that the law enforcement authorities should prosecute the 'organisers and executors of the sabbath' and the encouraging citizens of Tatarstan as well as the republic's non-governmental organisations and parties to make preparations to resist any attempts at violating the Constitution [Vechernyaya Kazan', 19 February 1992].

It was certainly unclear to the readers what kind of organised resistance was meant and what kind of defence of the constitution was meant. However, it fueled the confrontation and was aimed at creating interethnic tension in the republic.

Certain forces around the government of the Russian Federation were also not indifferent to the events in the republic. Young politicians surrounding the Russian president, lacking in political experience, spurred B. Yeltsin on to reckless actions, threatened him with impeachment forcing him to go back on his words 'Take as much sovereignty as you can manage!' Moreover, some of them suggested that he should send troops to Tatarstan. However, Yu. Skokov, Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, convinced B. Yeltsin not to take such ill-advised measure.

When preparing the referendum, the republic's government had to provide a very accessible clarification of the goals and objectives behind the matter to the general public. For this purpose, it resolved to call the 9th Extraordinary Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan of the 12th Convocation on 16 March. The agenda was to contain the issue of 'On the Clarification of the Wording of the Issue Put to the Referendum of the Republic of Tatarstan Scheduled on 21 March 1992.' Moscow kept a watchful eye on the session. It was apprehensive about the potential decision, which could determine the future of not only of Tatarstan but of Russia. The famous Russian politician R. Abdullatipov attended the session. All the deputy groups gave him a warm welcome.

The debate was lively and the opinions controversial. In his speech, deputy R. Vagizov noted that the resolution of the Constitutional Court of Russia was unjust and was in gross violation of both domestic and international law, thus stating: 'The convic-
tion relies on the argument that the Declaration, supplementing the Constitution, and the republic-wide law and regulation on the referendum are contrary to the provisions of the Constitution of the Russian Federation. It is puzzling that Russian parliamentarians all across Russia are saying loudly that the Constitution is a vestige of the command-administrative system, yet at the same time they are prepared to fight to the death for each letter of it. Russia, by signing intergovernmental agreements with Tatarstan, recognises it as an equal partner and immediately called into question the constitutionality of mutual agreement relations. It is common practice to be guided by the following fundamental principle. If the Constitution of Russia contains no relevant provisions, they should refer to a provision in international documents to ensure a legal solution to the conflict. However, the high court dismissed the idea.

R. Vagitov then further remarked that the voters tended to misunderstand the question of the referendum. The population wanted higher economic and political status and were for fair agreements with all the republics. However, they interpreted the formula 'entity of international law' almost as the republic's secession from Russia and attaching it to some foreign government. 'Our centuries-long friendship will be secured under the new Constitution, guaranteeing human rights, bilingualism, and dual citizenship' ... noted Vagitov. 'When our aspiration for sovereignty is finally satisfied, it will be a major accomplishment in the history of the people, which will in turn foster the improvement of the economic and political status of the republic. In the event of a negative result, the situation will favour the growth of nationalist and chauvinist sentiment ... The process of sovereignisation is irreversible; a return to the past is impossible... We need to adopt a resolution on the attitude to the decision of the Constitutional Court of Russia and confirm our commitment to hold a referendum to raise the status of our republic.'

Deputy N. Mansurov stated that the forces trying to calumniate the referendum by interpreting the decision as secession from Russia were thus attempting to smother sovereignty.

The parliamentary group 'Soglasiye' supported the resolution of the Constitutional Court of Russia completely and decided to boycott the discussion of this issue. 'I found myself in a difficult position ... because the 'Soglasiye' group decided not to participate in the discussion of this issue... It was definitely, beyond any doubt, about seceding from the Russian Federation and establishing a separate independent state... which fact the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation confirmed,' said the leader of the group 'Soglasiye' I. Grachyov. Yet, the fact that the leader of the group had to participate in the discussion indicated that the boycott was inefficient, and only involvement in the discussion could yield certain results.

The speech by chairman of the Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, R. Abdulatipov was able to change the sentiment of many deputies by saying that historically Russia is a federative state and suffers more from unitarism than from federalism. The speaker underscored that the process of sovereignisation is an objective process in the development of national self-awareness connected to the acquisition of national dignity and independence. The Russian republics had to undergo it so that the Russian Federation did not repeat the fate of the Soviet Union, whose dissolution was mainly due to the over-centralisation of power and government. R. Abdulatipov thanked the president of Tatarstan for demonstrating a circumspect approach to the matter and, admitting that any 'dictation by the Centre' was unacceptable, warned the audience against 'national dictation' at the local level. In conclusion, he encouraged the deputies to give each decision careful consideration so that extreme forces had no reason to doubt sovereignty and expressed the hope that the republic's parliament would pave the way for the rest to normalise their federal relations and national processes. The speech by the representative of the Russian parliament was interrupted several times by the deputies' applause.
Deputy F. Safiullin, speaking after R. Abdulatipov, found it easier to express his opinion, as the audience as a whole and not only individual deputies were prepared to criticise the actions of the Constitutional Court of Russia. Here is an excerpt from his speech: 'I would like to briefly analyse the decision by the Constitutional Court to prove that it is unsound. We are being tried not because we try to conquer, humiliate, or deprive somebody of their rights. The only reason why we are being tried is our insisting on and demanding equal rights, the right to enter into agreements as equal parties without prejudice to anyone's rights. They are trying us only because of that. For the right to be the masters of our mineral resources, our wealth. So we should not be ashamed of this 'criminal record.' I believe that soon others will be ashamed: the judges and their masters. The trial was held in gross violation of procedural norms. During the proceedings interested parties acted as experts. It turned out to be a trial where only witness for the prosecution were present.'

Deputy Yu. Alaev spoke in support of the key statements by R. Abdulatipov. He gave special attention to the issues of mutual respect of national dignity, maintaining that Tatarstan should establish independent contacts with foreign countries and enjoy economic sovereignty. Like many other deputies, Yu. Alaev was well aware that R. Abdulatipov was one of the authors and adherents of the Federation Treaty. Clearly intending to play up the fact, he said that the specified document provided for the independent implementation of international contacts, both at the interstate and intergovernmental level as well as at the level of entities under international law, for republics within the Russian Federation.'Yu. Alaev tried to convince the deputies that the most recent draft version of the Federation Treaty was materially different from the original versions and thus acceptable for Tatarstan. According to him, 'the change in the position of the Russian government results, in particular, from our consistent policy ... our intention to acquire sovereignty by using civilised methods.' The deputy admitted the possibility that in the future the republic would essentially be completely independent. However, in his opinion, it should still remain within the Russian Federation.

Deputies from the 'Soglasie' group were not satisfied with the course of the session and during a break decided to invite representatives of television. The deputies decided to boycott voting.

Speaking on behalf of 'Soglasie,' I. Salakhov announced that the deputies of the group had just received the decision of the Constitutional Court and the draft of the Federation Treaty, and in connection with this they would like to ask some questions to R. Abdulatipov and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. M. Mulyukov supported him by suggesting that they should submit the decision by the by the Constitutional Court to the Constitutional Review Board for consideration. The 'Soglasie' group unsuccessfully attempted to disrupt the meeting, but the audience resolved by a majority of votes to give the floor to president M. Shaimiev.

M. Shaimiev, in particular, noted: The referendum is a test for all of us, it should yield a good result, lay a reliable foundation for the friendship of nations in our republic to last for centuries. This should be the interpretation of the given issue... We have always valued the authority of the Supreme Soviet of our republic. And do not entertain any illusions. A unanimous 'for' in the referendum is the only way to concord. This imposes great responsibility on us and requires a common approach to interpreting the objectives of the referendum. There is no other solution...

I think that both the Supreme Soviet and the people of the republic are wise enough to make the right choice in the referendum to preserve the friendship of nations. It would enable us to make full use of the potential created by many generations to improve the well-being of our population, for which we have every opportunity. Thank you for your attention.'

The speech predetermined the outcome of the session. However, attempts to change the situation were made during the discussion of the resolution.

Following a long debate, the session passed the Resolution 'On Clarification of the Word-
Tatarstan. Voters E. Gazizova and R. Zakirova wrote: 'Please convey to president M. Shaimiev our thanks for the firmness that he and the republic's entire government demonstrated by standing up for sovereignty. We were afraid that they would have to yield to the pressure and cancel the referendum.' Some letters demanded that the government should resolutely hold its own. K. Nuretdinov wrote to F. Mukhametshin that if he was frightened by the leaders in Moscow and signed the Federative Agreement, then he would become traitor number one, and not a single Tatar would forgive him. 'If you fear the Russian government, you are no chairman. If you are gutless or imperialist, resign and do not disgrace the Tatar nation!,' he wrote in conclusion.¹ A letter from Agryz read: 'There is no way back now. Today the entire world knows us. The referendum must be successful... There is no way back, only forward, only forward.'

Those opposed to the referendum tried to hold back the tide at any cost. For instance, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic sent to the Republic of Tatarstan cars carrying leaflets addressing the population and various proclamations on the initiative of its chairman R. Khasbulatov. Such leaflets were put up in all house courtyards. However, in many cases it caused irritation rather than doubt and fear.

In one letter to first deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet Z. Valeeva, it was written that: 'In our house (and in neighbouring houses), in all courtyards and floors a proclamation, which is attached to this letter, has been neatly and firmly hung up. Can't we take some sort of measures against this action? I do not know, maybe we could also paste an anti-proclamation over it?'

War and labour veterans from Kukmor sent a letter written on the reverse side of the address by the committee 'Friendship' to pen-

¹ On the subject of sovereignty in the early and middle ages of history, it should be borne in mind that the theory of sovereignty did not yet exist at the time. We use this term instead of 'self-government,' 'independence.'
sioners. It contained the following lines: 'Our country seems to be breathing its last, the Nationalists are tearing it into pieces...' It then states in red capital letters: 'The Motherland is in danger!' The letter also stated the following: 'Shame on those who distribute the leaflets. We, labour and war veterans, will vote unanimously for' the secession from Russia. The toilers of Kukmor will support the government of Tatarstan headed by Shaimiev.'

Of course, letters of a different nature existed, too. For instance, the voter Sidorova wrote to F. Mukhametshin: 'Is the example of... other sovereign states not enough? Consider the Baltic states. Have their living standards improved since they became sovereign? Or the Caucasus, Moldavia... We have been living well without making differentiating between Tatars, Russian, Chuvash, etc. Because we have all been living in Russia.'

The letter is not angry. It is rather a protest against the collapse of the Union and apprehension lest the same happen to Russia. The author was sure that everybody in the republic would regret seceding from Russia, except for 'senior politicians and officials,' who need power and 'a larger portfolio.' From the letter of the Gusev family: 'We believe Shaimiev, but the Nationalists will not let him work, and he will yield to them just to stay in office. Up to 90% would vote for the referendum if not for F. Bayramova, M. Mulyukov, F. Safiullin. They are clearly nationalists and will do their best to remove the president and the Supreme Soviet... Sovereignty will not cause the people of Tatarstan to live any better, as it has been in other former republics... We should live in Russia.' Like many others, the author of the letter was annoyed by the leaflets: 'They have no paper for newspapers but have enough for that.'

What is more, the letters suggested that the awareness-raising measures by the organisers of the referendum had been insufficient. It appears that the author of the following lines to the republic's Supreme Soviet was right: 'If factory directors held meetings at their premises so that their personnel could vote on the question on the referendum, the percentage of votes would be up to 99%.'

The letters also reflect information about the work of the leaders of a number of companies, the heads of departments, and some deputies of the Supreme Soviet of Tatarstan to discredit the referendum. For instance, the letter by Vafin and Sadriev reported a meeting arranged by deputy M. Khafizov, at which he encouraged the audience to vote against the republic's sovereignty in the referendum on the pretext that the 'Cabinet of Ministers, the Supreme Soviet, and president of the Republic will lead the population to starvation; Tatarstan's oil will only last for 3 to 4 years, the size of pensions and salaries will be lower than in Russia.' The letter from the Nizamovs from Kazan reported similar statements by the deputy of the Supreme Soviet Yu. Reshetov, who encouraged voters to say 'no' in the referendum when speaking on republic-wide radio on 9 March 1992. The authors of the letter believed that the deputy contradicted himself because he voted for the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Republic of Tatarstan on 30 August 1990.

Many voters expressed dissatisfaction with the newspaper Vechernyaya Kazan. A letter by teacher and veteran G. Khamidi titled 'Kaynylar' ('They Boil') describes a day in the office of the head of the newspaper's Department for Interethnic Relations Ye. Chernobrovkina. The author writes that after the statement that the newspaper would publish materials with diverse opinions, the editorial office was given 3–4 letters in defence of the referendum. However, they were not published even after three weeks. Although, according to the author, at the same time they published materials of an opposing viewpoint. A proclamation encouraging women to cross out the word 'yes' on the ballot hung on the wall in Ye. Chernobrovkina's office. One of the visitors to the office held in his hands an entire packet of such proclamations. He gave some copies to the author of the letter and said: 'Distribute them to acquaintances!' G. Khamidi spent several hours in the editorial office, and during that time work, related to the referendum, was in full swing. R. Khusnullin wrote in his letter to F. Mukhametshin: 'Vechernyaya Kazan has been actively working to undermine the referendum. Each issue contains 2 to 5 arti-
pled, all titled 'Let's Leave Russia,' with a drawing of a frontier post with armed soldiers. It is a call to conflict, to a civil conflict.' The author was dissatisfied that no 'measures against this newspaper' had been taken.

All such letters expressed concern about the republic's future and the outcome of the referendum. At the same time, they are indicative of the fact that people are still unaccustomed to living in a democracy, they have not learnt to adequately appreciate different opinions and positions. The letters are also suggestive of a slow and troublesome development of democracy. They do not call for violence. To the contrary, the predominant aspiration is to maintain concord among the peoples of the republic, reinforce mutual trust among people, and improve their financial status. The letter by N. Sharifullin from Kukmor is curious in this respect. It contains six such suggestions: strengthening awareness among the population, especially in localities with a predominantly Russian population; presenting more speeches by common people in newspapers, radio, and TV programmes; impugning the decisions by the Constitutional Court and Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation in well-argued measures to make sure it is possible to apply to the International Court, if necessary; ensuring the legal prosecution of both chauvinists and nationalists; adopting laws; and taking specific measures to improve workers' financial standing. The last paragraph is very important—the author believes that the president of the republic should speak to the people 1 or 2 days before the referendum.

All letters to the president, the Supreme Soviet, and the Cabinet of Ministers were studied closely. They were used as references for important decisions. The head of the Correspondence Department of the Supreme Soviet Kh. Ishtiryakov collected and preserved them in a special 'Referendum' folder.

An analysis of letters and statements to the republic's Supreme Soviet and president shows that interethnic trust reigned in the republic. Even the most contradictory opinions and judgments on sovereignty were marked by a common understanding that Tatarstan is our common home, which should have very close relations with Russia. The majority of people in the republic and in Russia believed that the diverse economic, cultural, and familial connections should be preserved and enhanced. In fact, it was a mandate of the people.

22 March arrived referendum day. As chairman of the Supreme Soviet F. Mukhametshin recalled: 'It was a warm sunny morning. Everyone was on tenterhooks—both Moscow and the republic's government. I received an official call in the city apartment, where my wife and I stopped before going to the polling station at 9:30 a.m. They said that the head of the Presidential Apparatus of the Russian Federation S. Filatov wanted to talk to me. After a brief greeting he asked me to report on the situation in the republic. I answered that the situation was normal, that Russians and Tatars were going to the polling stations in a friendly fashion to vote in the referendum. Fortunately, no interethnic conflicts had happened in spite of all the threats. S. Filatov said, in what seemed to me an annoyed tone, that he was leaving for work and asked me to call him in an hour.

Moscow used every channel to monitor the events in the Republic of Tatarstan. I will always remember the day of waiting breathlessly for the outcome of the referendum, which fortunately turned out to be positive for our people. What could we say in case of a negative result? I think there would be mutual reproaches and mistrust. This is an altogether new path of development for the Republic of Tatarstan in the context of a new Russia!'

Indeed, a new Tatarstan was born on 22 March, and the way was paved for a new democratic Russia. This is why the prediction of increased interethnic tension in the republic and the speculation that Russians would wake up as second-class citizens in Tatarstan the morn-

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2 The materials of this folder were kindly provided to the author of this article by the head of the department of letters and reception of citizens of the Office of the President of the Republic of Tatarstan H. G. Ishtiryakov.
Arms were hastily withdrawn from garrisons in Tatarstan. Arms depots remained empty. Propaganda cars of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic were distributing provocative and menacing leaflets across the republic.

The voting was calm. Mutual trust reigned everywhere. Not a single interethnic confrontation occurred. To the contrary, the results of the referendum instilled confidence in the population that the right way had been chosen. This is how M. Shaimiev recalled those days: 'Several days before the referendum the Constitutional Court of Russia commenced a case claiming that the referendum was illegal and had to be cancelled. The Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation arranged a tumultuous hearing of our parliamentary speaker. A group of Russian prosecutors was sent to the republic. We had 2,611 polling stations at that time. The chairmen of all the polling stations were instructed in writing that they would be put on trial if they opened the polling stations on the day of the referendum. On the eve of the referendum (the reason is still unclear to me) president of Russia Boris Yeltsin addressed the Tatar people on television, encouraging them to boycott the referendum: 'If the people of Tatarstan say yes in the referendum, he claimed, it could lead to bloodshed.'

On the same evening, after his speech, I also addressed my own people. I explained that such pressure was non-democratic. I said that it was up to the people to determine their future. I maintained that a positive answer to the question on the referendum was the only way to ensure peace for every family. On 7 a.m. the day after the referendum I received the first report. All the polling stations were open to the voters. And more than 60% of those taking part voted 'yes.' The reason I am telling this is because I want to show you how hard our path to democracy was' [Mukhametshin, Izmaylov, 1997, p. 50].

A total of 61.4% of the republic’s voters at polling places said yes to sovereignty for Tatarstan.

A description of the atmosphere in Leninogorsk on the days of the referendum can be found in the letter by N. Egorov, who resided in the city: 'The house in Sadriyev Street where I live is a small one—there are only 14 apartments. But how many nations of our once glorious Fatherland it represents! Last March all of us—Tatars and Russians, Chuvash and Mordvin, Kazakhs and Ukrainians—voted for the preservation of the USSR. Unfortunately, our opinion was ignored. I think our task—to say 'yes' or 'no' to sovereignty for Tatarstan—was not too difficult this time. It looks like we all wanted peace and friendship, calm and happiness to reign both in the small house in Sadriyev Street and in the large house—Tatarstan—as it has been for many centuries.

Long before the referendum, they began to threaten us by saying that both 'yes' and 'no' in the referendum would cause the Russians and the Tatars to quarrel, maybe even to spill blood. That is, they encouraged us to boycott the vote. But last Saturday we went to Polling Station 15 in a friendly fashion to make our choice. We voted for a happy and peaceful life in a sovereign Tatarstan. May our ancient land enjoy it indeed! [Sovetskaya Tataria, 24 March 1992].

Loginov, a carpenter in the Helicopter Association, upon leaving the voting booth commented on the referendum as such: 'I think that Tatarstan's sovereignty is beneficial to everyone. We will have more opportunities to be prosperous. I am also convinced that our friendship will become stronger. Take my case. I am Russian. My best friend is Tatar. His name is IldusAbrarov. We work and go out together. We often argue about politics and sometimes disagree with each other but, as the saying goes, we are as thick as thieves.'

These words of ordinary citizens of Tatarstan fully reflect the mood of the majority of the republic's inhabitants. By no means they prove the suggestion that it was unreasonable to hold the referendum, and that it would hardly
have any effect. One of the DPR activists said: '...We do not recognise the results of the referendum to be legally valid, rather we consider it as an opinion poll. However, the referendum revealed the clear parity of two communities—Tatar and Russian—since a half of all citizens on the voter list (50.2%) voted approval. Consequently, the politicians will have to bring together the interests of these two communities.'

Several months before the events in question, a special correspondent of Rossiyskaya Gazeta Skukin wrote that it was due to the efforts of deputies from the 'Narodovlastiye,' supported by economic men from among the deputies, who convinced the Supreme Soviet of Tatarstan to accept the resolution on holding a referendum about the republic's status [Rossiyskaya gazeta, 28 November 1991]. Thus, there was a time when activists of the RDP and the 'Narodovlastiye' deputy group insisted on holding a referendum, apparently expecting the voters to say 'no' to sovereignty. When it had taken place and voters said 'yes,' they began to say that it was pointless, and that it should be interpreted as a mere opinion poll. They referred to the decision by the Constitutional Court of Russia, deliberately omitting the fact that the chairman of the Court V. Zorkin had stated that if the voters said 'yes' in the referendum, it would legally justify a proclamation of independence. Of course, none of Tatarstan's leaders intended to proclaim independence. But what is important in this case is that V. Zorkin recognised the referendum as legally valid. Therefore, the results, in the opinion of the referendum's opponents as a rule are discredited by dissatisfaction. For instance, according to the vice chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the republic A. Lozovoy, 'the referendum was aimed at legalising the Declaration of Sovereignty of Tatarstan through public will. After all, when it was adopted, the Union Centre and Russia pretended that nothing had happened. It hurts ones self-esteem, and besides, it is always preferable to have clearly-defined relations. Unfortunately, the Russian government—then and now—never carried out an analysis of the situation in Tatarstan. It did not explore the motivation behind the Declaration of Sovereignty. The result of the referendum will force politicians to make some conclusions.'

The Address by president M. Shaimiev to the people of the republic, in which he presented the nature and outcome of the referendum, was fully representative of the public sentiment. In particular it stated that: 'It is a historical fact that complete freedom has been acquired to ensure the fully-fledged development of a multi-ethnic Tatarstan in the fraternal family of Russia, the CIS, and the world...

Despite mass pressure exerted by certain circles, we have demonstrated the wisdom and enormous patience of our people.

Dear compatriots, while expressing my sincere gratitude for your support, your clear minds, and your kind hearts, I encourage you today, at this very hour, to reinforce peace and concord in our common home—Tatarstan. Relying upon your trust, I would like to confirm again before the face of the international community that we will do whatever we can to ensure prosperity for our native republic and to further reinforce the traditional centuries-long friendship between our peoples...

I repeat what I said before the referendum—our future is in our hands! How deeply we realise our great responsibility to history, to the future is dependent upon the fate of the nation and the fate of each one of us. Our legacy for our descendants should include a history of wise solutions to the complex problems of our existence. This includes a wise approach to rejuvenating and reinforcing our alliance with Russia, staying loyal to it and preserving its integrity, not in words but in deeds, adherence to the democratic principle of a civil society and state construction, and recognition and respect of human rights regardless of one's ethnic and religious status. It is our today. It is also our tomorrow' [Sovetskaya Tataria, 24 March 1992].

The interview with M. Shaimiev by a correspondent of Sovetskaya Tataria is curious in this respect:

'On the eve of the referendum an exercise was held in our military district. Had you agreed to the exercise? Do you interpret this as
pressure? Is this a violation of legal and moral norms?"

'If I interpreted these activities as pressure, I would have expressed my attitude to them. There were a lot of rumours, including arms being withdrawn and supplied. It is merely a regular replacement of obsolete arms, nothing more.'

'Do you expect any formal recognition by other countries? Will there be any kind of official statement on your behalf?"

'Perhaps it was unnecessary to raise the question of legal standing in the international context to referendum. Having attained sovereignty, we will possess this right. The sovereign state should have every attribute of an independent state, except for those which we will transfer to the Russian Federation. We can only be sovereign for a day. We'll have to check our ambitions in the future.'

'What political steps are you going to take next? Do you think extremist forces can come to power?'

'I am going to take into account the outcome of the referendum when taking a political step. It is necessary to draft an agreement with the Russian Federation before the Congress of People's Deputies of Russia and submit it to the Russian leadership. As for the seizure of power, I think we should not worry about it because the governmental authorities of Tatarstan enjoy high public trust' [Sovetskaya Tataria, 24 March 1992].

The path to an agreement turned out not to be so simple. The high public trust mentioned by Shaimiev was to be challenged many a time.

§ 2. The Referendum Results and their Formalization in Legislation

Indus Tagirov

The favourable outcome of the referendum on the political status of Tatarstan did not mean that the struggle for the sovereignty of the republic was over, quite on the contrary, it was entering the most important phase: first, the referendum results were to be summed up, second, they were to be enshrined in the Constitution, and third, a number of important laws intended to establish the sovereign state were to be adopted.

These tasks were addressed at sessions X, XI, XII, and XIII of the Supreme Soviet of Tatarstan. Representatives of different branches of the authorities of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan participated in the debates. Central Television stations, radio broadcasts, and the press presented diverse information about the events in Tatarstan. The president and the Supreme Soviet of the republic received letters and telegrams that reflected the whole spectrum of the public opinion not only of Tatarstan but of Russia and even CIS countries. Because the processes taking place in Tatarstan reflected, just like a drop of water, the most important political events throughout the entire territory of the former Soviet Union. Tatarstan, as one of the leaders of the Russian Federation expressed it, created a moral vector that was followed by others.

Session X of the Supreme Soviet, at the suggestion of the Presidium, apart from summing up the results of the referendum, was to discuss the draft constitution of the republic. The development of the agenda appeared to reflect the complex and challenging situation, which was created after the referendum. In essence, there was a struggle between two tendencies for the social development of the Republic: strengthening its sovereignty and its attack on the fundamental principles enshrined in the Declaration on the State Sovereignty and the results of the national referendum.

The parliamentary group 'Soglasiye' proposed its own variant of the agenda, in which the question about the results of the referendum was absent. According to one of active members of this group, assistant professor of the law faculty of Kazan University Yu. Reshetov, the referendum did not require any confirmation. Meanwhile, the discussion was about summing
up the results and not about confirmation. The opinions of the parliamentary groups 'Tatarstan' and 'Suverenitet' were directly opposed to this position. They thought that it was not enough to just sum up the results, that it was more important to determine the prospects for further development of the republic based on those results. Without taking into account the results of the referendum, it was impossible to adopt the Constitution of the Republic. The Declaration, referendum, and Constitution could be only considered in close interrelation. Therefore, at the suggestion of the deputy N. Mansurov, the question was formulated as follows: 'On the measures for the implementation of state sovereignty of the Republic of Tatarstan stemming from the results of the referendum on the republic status of 21 March 1992.'

The deputies of the group 'Soglasie' tried to replace the speaker, citing as a reason the change to the wording of the question. They proposed N. Mansurov as the speaker. This was like proposing an alliance between the parliamentary groups 'Tatarstan' and 'Suverenitet' to fight together against the official authorities. But this proposal was ignored since the gap separating the groups was yet to be bridged, which—as the sessions showed—was not an easy task. Nevertheless, everybody understood that consensus needed to be sought.

In connection with a change in the wording of the referendum the speaker, chairman of the Supreme Soviet, F. Mukhametshin requested to move the discussion to the next day in order to properly prepare for it.

At 5:30 p.m. a meeting of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet took place, where F. Mukhametshin brought up for discussion the following: how to deal with the additional issues. The discussion was particularly about the results of the referendum and the tasks arising from them. It was decided that the main speaker would be F. Mukhametshin, and one of the members of government would be a co-speaker. F. Mukhametshin stated that he had discussed this question with the first deputy prosecutor general of the Russian Federation, and they defined other questions of the prospective development of Tatarstan. These questions were reflected in his report [CA TR SC, Fund R-3610, Inventory 1, File 2073, Sheet 5].

It appeared to be rather difficult to include the question about the project of a new constitution in the agenda. Apart from discussion of the official project developed by the constitutional committee of the Supreme Soviet headed by the president of the republic M. Shaimiev, there were attempts to include two more projects into the agenda. The latter, differing from one another only in terms of presentation, were distributed among the deputies literally two days before the opening of the session by the 'Democratic Reform Movement' and the parliamentary group 'Soglasie.' The parliamentary group 'Tatarstan' regarded them as auditable results of the referendum and suggested removing them from consideration. The proposal was not accepted.

From the very beginning, the authors of alternative projects tried to create a negative perception about the official project. The deputy I. Grachyov stated that the 'Soglasie' group regarded the official project of the Constitution extremely negatively in terms of both power structure and on key issues: mutual relations with the Russian Federation, citizenship, the borders of the Republic of Tatarstan, etc. [CA TR SC, X, vol. 1, Sheet 44].

It is noteworthy that whatever question was discussed at the session it contained a motive of fight—in favour or against the sovereignty. Such was the question on the transfer of the law enforcement bodies under the jurisdiction of Tatarstan: everybody was well aware of the fact that its solution could be a positive step aimed at the implementation of the republic sovereignty. Moreover, a special preliminary committee, considering the viewpoints of the law enforcement bodies and the minister of Finance, D. Nagumanov, came to the conclusion that the transfer of the law enforcement bodies under the jurisdiction of Tatarstan was possible. There were draft laws prepared 'On the Judicial System of the Republic of Tatarstan,' 'On the Status of Judges in the Republic of Tatarstan,' 'On Militia,' 'On
the Prosecutor's Office,' 'On the Arbitration Court.' Reporter on this issue, group leader, A. Lozovoy emphasised that the transfer of the law enforcement bodies under the republic jurisdiction would require a radical change in the law enforcement structure itself, the procurement procedure, and allocation of about six billion rubles from the republic budget. Besides, he highlighted the necessity to include this question into the list of questions of the negotiation process with the Russian Federation [CA TR SC, X, Vol. 1, Sheet 61]. It was decided to bring up this question for discussion during the session.

The presence of two approaches to the budget system of the republic was also clearly defined during the discussion. Many deputies spoke in favour of a budget based on a single channel tax, while the 'Soglasiye' group deputies were against it in every way. D. Nagumanov's report about the approval of the 1991 budget implementation and about the law on budgetary system for 1992 as well as the report of the chairman of the Supreme Soviet Planning, Budget, and Finance Committee G. Kobelev appeared to cause the government's criticism for the uncontrolled use of funds and especially foreign exchange earnings. Further discussion turned into a debate about interest-free crediting of low-income citizens for the construction of private housing, while the correlation between the republic and local budgets did not ease the tension. The atmosphere became very tense. A temporary peace set in only after the interference of the president M. Shaimiyev and the chairman F. Mukhametshin, which lasted for a short while. Thus, the deputy group 'Soglasiye,' even after a voting on the draft law 'On the Budget System of the Republic of Tatarstan for 1992' was announced, tried to disrupt it. I. Grachyov stated that this budget should not be adopted in the form of figures, explaining that the figures would not be accurate, and that the relations with the Russian Federation were built in it in the form of a financial war, while the budget itself preserved a levelling principle of distributing financial provisions among regions and economy branches regardless of their contribution into the development of the republic [CA TR SC, X, Vol. 3, Sheet 335].

I. Grachyov's statement was rebuffed by the deputies. Thus, A. Kolesnik characterised I. Grachyov's definition of economic relations between Russia and Tatarstan as a financial war, which was beneath any criticism, reminding that during the preparation for the referendum I. Grachyov frightened the population by the beginning of the third world war in case it was conducted. Kolesnik grasped the subtle motive of Grachyov's antagonism to the republic sovereignty and said as if on his behalf: 'So it is bad, indeed, you see, the sovereignty is to blame' [CA TR SC, X, Vol. 1, Sheet 336]. Indeed, the disagreement with the republic sovereignty was concealed, maybe not completely perceivable out of all motives that members of the deputy group 'Soglasiye' were guided by in their actions.

Overriding contradictions on the issues of the budgetary system, which resulted in the adoption of a single channel budget and the accompanying verbal squabbles, was just a prelude to hot discussions on the referendum questions and the Constitution of Tatarstan. Tempers ran high during the breaks, were transferred to the offices, slopped over into the lobby, and were reflected in interviews.

The report of the chairman of the Supreme Soviet F. Mukhametshin was realistic and carefully worded. The main result of the referendum, as an indicator of achievements of a whole new level in the development of the republic statehood, the speaker named the completion of the next step in reforming the national and state structure. The importance of the referendum for the republic was defined as the establishment of a sovereign state, an international legal entity, as a new page in the centuries-old history of Tatarstan.

F. Mukhametshin noted that the referendum, as it was confirmed by representatives of international organisations, complied with all the rules of the international law, despite the improper actions of the Russian prosecutor's office that intended to disrupt it. 'This all could be well forgotten today. But just as one cannot take out a line from a song, so these un-
pleasant moments will remain in the memory of our multinational people. Now it is already a history. It is the history of a long, treacherous path of the Republic of Tatarstan towards enhancing its status, achieving equal rights in the state relations with Russia, other republics, and neighbouring and far-abroad countries,' said the speaker.

Based on the voting results F. Mukhametshin concluded that more than half of Tatarstan citizens supported the main idea of the referendum—the necessity and political expediency of enhancing the state status of the republic—gave credence to their parliament, and confirmed their commitment to the policy, which the republic had been following during the recent years. F. Mukhametshin pointed out to the presence of different approaches to the referendum assessment: some try to discredit its results, explaining that the voting results were affected by the nationality of the voters, others insist on declaring independence of Tatarstan immediately, and still others talk about the need to sign the Federal Treaty in its present format as soon as possible. F. Mukhametshin provided specific figures refuting the views that allegedly it was the village mainly consisting of Tatars that voted positively for the referendum question, and cities where Russian population prevailed spoke against it. In Kazan 46.8% of the voters said 'Yes' to the referendum question, in Naberezhnye Chelny those made 60.8%; in Almetyevsk, 71.4%; in Nizhnekamsk, 54.3%. 'I consider such arguments unsubstantiated and politically irresponsible,' said the chairman of the Supreme Soviet. 'The reality is as follows: there were those who voted 'No' among Tatars, and there were those who said 'Yes' among Russians.'

One of the most important conclusions of F. Mukhametshin's report was as follows: we should not rush into declaring independence because consultations, negotiations of Tatarstan delegations with the leaders of the Russian Federation have been taking place lately. An agreement to seek establishment of special relations between the Republic of Tatarstan and the Russian Federation by signing a bilateral contract based on mutual delegation of authorities has already been reached.

In F. Mukhametshin's report much attention was paid to economic problems of sovereignty. The main emphasis was placed on strengthening property rights of the republic, and especially on the use of oil produced in the republic. The reporter qualified the establishment of an independent budget of the republic and the creation of a national bank as an evidence of the economic sovereignty establishment.

The questions of the legislative recognition of the referendum results were treated ambiguously by the deputies. Mukhametshin emphasised that the contents of the draft Constitution introduced for consideration at the Supreme Soviet session would be supplemented during the discussion with a comprehensive, extended understanding of constitutional problems by the deputies and would absorb the current circumstances of the republic's legal development. As rights that should be secured to the republic, he listed eighteen most important authorities exercised by a sovereign state [CA TR SC, X, Vol. 3, Sheets 31–39].

Relations between Russia and Tatarstan were a subject of special disputes. The deputies held two positions: the first position was insisting on the establishment of an equitable relationship with the Russian Federation, and the second one was aimed at the sovereign development of the republic as part of the Russian Federation. Controversies arose from different interpretations of the Supreme Soviet resolution as of 16 March, which explained the referendum question by the preservation of the Russian Federation integrity.

The deputies of the 'Tatarstan' group blamed the president, the Supreme Soviet, and the government for delaying the resolution of questions related to the implementation of the referendum results. Deputies of the opposition groups, however, tried to ignore these results.

F. Bayramova hailed criticism on deputies of pro–Russian orientation, blaming them for attempting to revise the referendum results, turn the republic into a sovereign state valid only on paper, not in reality. She also re-
proached the republic leaders who, according to her, should have 'buckled down to the state affairs' as early as on the second day after the referendum and created a programme intended to implement the republic independence. She proposed the following measures: establishment of a reserve bank for the collection of taxes, an in-house monetary system, transfer of the law enforcement bodies under the republic jurisdiction, and adoption of several laws needed for the sovereign development of the republic. 'We need an army,' she said. F. Bayramova also demanded exit from the economic area of Russia, restriction on the import of goods therefrom, creation of an independent educational system of the Tatar people, and entry of Tatarstan into the UNO.

The speeches of F. Safiullin, M. Milyukov, and R. Valeev were in accordance with many propositions of F. Bayramova. However, they lacked sharp words, which were typical of Bayramova's speeches. Thus, F. Safiullin described the referendum result as an expression of mutual trust between the peoples of the republic. 'We,' he said, 'do not set a goal to separate ourselves from anyone, we do not set a goal to impinge on anybody's borders' [CA TR SC, X, Vol. 3, Sheet 388]. F. Safiullin pointed out to the need for adoption of a law on securing the rights of a sovereign state to the authorities of the Republic of Tatarstan and encouraged towards making all the steps for the implementation of sovereignty thoughtfully and in compliance with the people's needs. R. Valeev spoke for the establishment of an in-house national bank and the right to print money. At the same time, the deputy clearly stated that he did not have any extremist tendencies, and that he was against confrontation with Russia but advocated for an equitable agreement therewith based on the separation of authorities.

While supporting the proposition to transfer the law enforcement bodies under the jurisdiction of Tatarstan and establish an in-house monetary system, deputy M. Mulyukov cited some facts characterising actions against the referendum by adherers of the groups 'Narodovlastiye,' 'Soglasivye,' and 'Citizens of the Russian Federation.' According to him, the referendum opponents spent 60 million rubles to disrupt it, and three thousand agents were sent to the republic to perform the respective activities. They were paid 500 rubles a day to cover travel expenses. The deputy also named addresses and persons for the people sent on mission to the republic to contact. Among them were the editorial offices of the Vechernyaya Kazan, Kazanskiye Vedomosti newspapers and the people's deputies of the republic I. Grachyov, I. Sultanov, Z. Latypov, and V. Mikhailov. It is hard to say to which extent this information—not refuted by any of the deputies—was true.

The fundamental questions of sovereign development of Tatarstan remained in the deputies' focus during the discussion of other questions as well.

The question of submission of the draft Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan to the committees of the Supreme Soviet for preliminary discussion was considered at the meeting of its Presidium on 13 May 1992. It also concerned alternative draft Constitutions: whether they should be brought up at the session. It was decided to submit three draft Constitutions to the committees and create a work group, which would sum up the propositions and notes received during the discussion [CA TR SC, Fund P–3610, Inventory 1, File 2072, Sheet 57].

At the evening meeting the report of the president of Tatarstan M. Shaimiev on the new draft Constitution of the republic was discussed. The substantive part of the report was aimed at ensuring the provisions of the Declaration on the State Sovereignty supported by the nationwide referendum. M. Shaimiev began his speech stating that since the Declaration was adopted, enough time had passed needed for the comprehension of the political situation, position, and actions of Tatarstan intended to enhance the state status of the republic. 'Some people criticised us, and they keep doing it, for procrastination, and others, for undue hurry. Some people reproached us that we allegedly descended from Russia and broke off historical and other connections therewith, others criticised us for negotiating with Russia,' said the president. Assessing the Declaration as
a cementing instrument of international agreement in the republic, he defined it as the source of legal regulation of the republic life, political and legal basis for adoption of the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan.

M. Shaimiev's speech about the relationship between Russia and Tatarstan was listened to with great attention. Article 66 of the draft Constitution was defined as the key article in this aspect: 'The Republic of Tatarstan builds its relationship with the Russian Federation—Russia—based on the Agreement on Mutual Delegation of Authorities.' The president named special agreements as the mechanism of this fundamental document.

M. Shaimiev proposed to take the presented draft Constitution as a basis for discussion.

The deputies were mostly concerned with questions associated with the relations and agreement between Tatarstan and the Russian Federation as well as with the citizenship issues. While noting that the draft Constitution contained a provision on absolute equality of the rights of citizens regardless of any grounds, and, nevertheless, a limitation was allowed on the grounds of speaking two national languages in paragraph 6 of Article 14, I. Grachyov asked the president to share his views on this. M. Shaimiev's answer was brief: 'I think that this must be determined by the Law on Languages.' Then he added that there was a provision enshrined in the law that the president must speak two state languages.

The right to travel within the republic for citizens of Tatarstan was stipulated in Article 35 of the Constitution. I. Grachyov interpreted this provision as an implication of setting boundaries in future. It was obvious that this question was far-fetched because only the territory of the republic was meant in the Constitution of Tatarstan, as for the right to travel along the territory of Russia it was clearly enshrined in the Constitution of the Russian Federation. The president's answer was as follows: 'How can we restrict the right of a person to travel freely on the territory of our state?' However, Grachyov stuck to his opinion [CA TR SC, Fund P–3610, Inventory 1, File 2072, Sheet 413]. Such comprehension of Article 35 of the Constitution also implied incomprehension of provision 23 of the Article on dual citizenship, which actually meant the negation of the republic citizenship.
The citizenship issue was also addressed by the deputies of the 'Tatarstan' group in terms of a possibility to extend the scope of its action to Tatars, who wanted to have a Tatarstan citizenship. 'If anybody in Tatarstan is only a citizen of Russia, why not specify in the Russian Constitution that Tatars residing in the Russian Federation can also have Tatarstan citizenship?' F. Bayramova addressed this question to the president.

M. Shaimiev, citing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, according to which every person has the right to citizenship and cannot be deprived thereof, answered that it should be reflected in the agreement with Russia.

The deputies of the 'Soglasiye' group were mostly interested in the questions concerning the relations between different authority branches. I. Salakhov addressed the following question to the president: 'Which type of a state do you refer this draft Constitution submitted by the constitutional committee to: by regime, closer to an autocratic or democratic one, by the form of government, to presidential, super-presidential, or parliamentary?'

In reply to this question, the president said that the democratic regime penetrated into all the Articles of the Constitution, and the latter contained principles levelling all the three authority branches. However, he emphasised, 'it seems that the presidential form of government should prevail in the long perspective.'

Great importance was given to the question of the Deputy N. Mansurov regarding Article 66 of the draft Constitution on the mechanism of mutual delegation of authorities: 'Does this article imply the possibility of unilateral revocation of the delegated authorities?'

The answer was as follows: 'Yes, actually, in case of termination of fulfillment of obligations by one party the contractual relations automatically result in losing the agreement itself.'

In the alternative draft Constitutions of the deputies of 'Soglasiye' and 'Narodovlastiye,' who called themselves democrats and talked a lot about human rights frequently opposing them with group rights, in particular with people's rights, much attention was paid to the problems of democracy and human rights.

The first alternative draft Constitution was presented by 'The Movement of Democratic Reforms.' Z. Latypov delivered a report on it. He began his speech expressing satisfaction with the official draft Constitution and said that the draft Constitution submitted by him, which contained 59 articles and 7 chapters, represented the well-known principles of people power and forms of its expression, the system of elections, and law changes. As for the Constitution, it should be adopted by way of a national referendum.

In fact, no chapter or article of the draft Constitution presented by the speaker contained anything ultimately new, but they were only a random presentation of international pacts on human rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Some well-known statements were also defined in Latypov's report, for example, the permanency of the Constitution as assurance of its credibility both with the population and the authorities, with reference to the US Constitution, to which only 26 out of over three thousands proposed amendments were adopted during 218 years of its existence. However, this information, though important and interesting, was not directly related to the draft Constitution proposed. The presented draft Constitution, as Z. Latypov admitted, did not contain any specific rules: 'We do not introduce any specific rules here because we have no regulatory framework on many issues today. We only introduce principles, and all the rest is based on the living conditions, circumstances we will live in. Naturally, all this will be changing.' When referring to the US Constitution, the speaker should have reminded of the fact that there had been no regulatory framework either at the time when it had been adopted. It is not that the Constitution should adjust to any laws, which existed before, but the Constitution itself should become the basis for adoption of laws.

The only difference from the draft Constitution presented by Z. Latypov was in the definition of the republic status resulting from the unilateral interpretation of the Resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the republic of 16
March 1992: 'The Republic of Tatarstan is a sovereign democratic law-governed state within the Russian Federation.' It should be noted that when talking about Article 56 of his draft Constitution, without providing insight into the relations between Tatarstan and Russia, the speaker mentioned only in passing the principle of delegation of authorities between Russia and Tatarstan. It is anyone's guess whether the concept of mutual delegation of authorities dropped out of the report deliberately or unde-liberately.

The speaker failed to give a satisfactory answer to any of the questions, including those about the republic citizenship, the attitude of the state towards religious festivals, and the relationship between two state languages. The speaker became deadlocked when M. Mulyukov, pointing out to the inconsistency between the draft Constitution presented and the Declaration on the State Sovereignty and the referendum results, asked: 'Why do you try again to include Tatarstan into the Russian Federation in your draft Constitution, despite the people's will and the referendum?' Latypov answered that certain legal documents adopted in the Supreme Soviet and the referendum were a basis for defining Tatarstan as a constituent entity of the Russian Federation. It remained unclear what documents he was talking about because until then Z. Latypov's colleagues only referred to the Resolution of the Supreme Soviet of Tatarstan of 16 March 1992. As regards the reference to the referendum made by those who were against the consideration of its results at the session, it was surprising. The following words of Z. Latypov sounded all the more strange: 'If you really want to make sure that I am wrong, you can apply to independent lawyers, so they can make a conclusion.' Obviously, the speaker 'forgot' that just before the referendum, while speaking at the session of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, the chairman of the Constitutional Court of Russia V. Zorkin had already made a conclusion that the answer 'yes' at the referendum would be a legal basis for declaring the independence of Tatarstan. The mishap occurred when the speaker defined the concept 'sovereignty.' The deputies noticed that it was present in the draft Constitution only formally. Thus, A. Akhatov asked the speaker the following question: 'Is there such kind of a sovereign state on our planet that preserves its sovereignty being a part of another sovereign state?' The reply: 'Bashkiria, Chuvashia—they all adopted sovereignty,' raised a burst of laughter in the conference room.

V. Mikhaylov recited the fundamental principles of another draft Constitution from the 'Narodovlastiye' group. Much attention in his report was paid to human rights and their relation to group rights. Emphasising that human rights are the core of the law in general, he said: 'Any group rights can result from the rights of a person, and it is never vice versa... we abandon the tradition when the Constitution speaks on behalf of the people.'

In many respects the draft Constitution presented by 'Narodovlastiye' was very much like the draft Constitution of 'The Movement of Democratic Reforms': it was implied that the Supreme Soviet must not have any Presidium, which, in their opinion, was impossible to find in any constitution of democratic countries [CA TR SC, Collection P–3610, list 1, File 2072, Sheet 449], the same approaches were observed as regards the organisation of local self-government, description of the problems of separation of powers, election of administration heads. This draft Constitution represented Tatarstan as a parliamentary republic, where the government was accountable to the parliament not to the president. According to the deputies of the 'Narodovlastiye' group, the Constitutional Court was the last instance in solving the questions of compliance of laws and resolutions of the Supreme Soviet with the Constitution of the republic. It goes without saying that this quite democratic statement did not and could not receive any objections from the deputies. There were objections on other issues, though. Thus, the Deputy A. Kolesnik asked about the consistency of the presented draft Constitution with traditions and specifics of the Republic of Tatarstan, and it was for a reason since this draft Constitution equally suited
to any region of Russia. His answer sounded vague. A. Kolesnik called V. Mikhailov's attention to the fact that the judicial system of Tatarstan, according to the draft Constitution proposed by 'Narodovlastiye,' was to be liquidated and become entirely Russian. There was an argument in reply that citizens of Tatarstan were citizens of the Russian Federation, and they would demand protection of their rights in the name of the Russian Federation.

F. Safiullin asked several questions regarding the non-compliance of the draft Constitution proposed by 'Narodovlastiye' with the referendum results and suggested excluding it from consideration. I. Salakhov objected to this, saying that since none of the three drafts complied with the referendum results, all of them should be excluded from consideration. M. Shaimiev interfered with the discussion: 'I cannot agree with the view of Deputy Salakhov because the content of the draft Constitution proposed by the constitutional committee of the Supreme Soviet is arranged accurately with the articles in strict compliance with the referendum results. This is described in my report' [CA TR SC, Fund P–3610, Inventory 1, File 2072, Sheet 463].

The chairman of the Supreme Soviet F. Mukhametshin noted: since the draft Constitutions have not been discussed in the committees yet, they should be submitted there, and this will be the most sensible and real approach. The deputies of the 'Soglasie' group expressed an opinion that three key statements needed to be included into the official draft Constitution: it should not allow any discrimination on the language grounds, including restrictions on professions, it should contain an article on the preservation of Russian citizenship in Tatarstan and a clause on the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation.

F. Mukhametshin found that the deputies were getting so far ahead because one of the drafts should be taken as a basis first, and only after that any proposals should be introduced. M. Shaimiev viewed the proposition of 'Soglasie' rather as a political speech intended to have a certain effect and reminded that the group leader I. Grachyov was in the constitutional committee, where—after long discussions—the following wording of Article 23 was approved: 'Citizens of the Republic of Tatarstan are allowed to have dual citizenship, and the conditions for exercising this right shall be determined by a contract, agreement with the Russian Federation and other states. Citizens of the Republic of Tatarstan can preserve, at their option, the citizenship of the Russian Federation—Russia. Everyone has the right to choose citizenship and the right to change it. It is prohibited to deprive anyone of citizenship or the right to change it' [CA TR SC, Fund P–3610, Inventory 1, File 2072, Sheet 465].

V. Vakhitov reminded the audience that the draft Constitution, which had been presented by the president, had had a nationwide discussion within two months, and only this draft received proposal for amendments. The two alternative draft Constitutions became only available two days before. For this reason he noted that the draft, which had a nationwide discussion, should be preferred.

The members of the 'Soglasie' deputy group I. Grachyov, B. Kozlov, M. Khafizov, I. Sultanov, and N. Gorshunov tried to prevent taking the official draft Constitution as a basis and submitting it to the committee, insisting on the discussion of all three drafts. In their turn, the deputies of the 'Tatarstan' group F. Safiullin and R. Yusupov, while standing their ground that the two alternative drafts contradicted with the referendum results and the Declaration on the State Sovereignty, insisted on taking the draft Constitution of the Supreme Soviet as a basis [CA TR SC, XI, Vol. 1, Sheet 28].

It was decided to submit all the three draft Constitutions to the committee. The session discontinued its work to resume it on 6 July.

It seemed that the work was coming to an end. The main approaches to the critical articles of the Constitution were determined, its main articles were defined, a great work was done towards making amendments to the draft, which was discussed. It only remained to come to an agreement on the following key issues: relations with Russia and determining the citizenship. Naturally, this did not mean that the remaining questions had been resolved, and
there were no disagreements regarding them. They still remained but closely related to these two problems.

The XI Session of the Supreme Soviet, which opened on 28 September 1992, was marked up by a new stage in the discussion of the Constitution.

The chairman of the Supreme Soviet F. Mukhametshin read out a draft agenda consisting of 12 items in the Tatar language. The question on the draft Constitution was listed as number one in it [CA TR SC, XI, Vol. 1, Sheets 6–7]. However, there were still proposals on the agenda coming in. Sometimes there were questions rushing in from outside. The deputies tried to bring up for consideration of their colleagues issues on the rise in crime, unemployment, increased poverty of people, the privatisation process, and many more. Much prominence was given to F. Bayramova's question on the evaluation of actions of law enforcement bodies of Menzelinsk and Naberezhnye Chelny: it concerned the use of firearms by officers of these bodies on 20 August 1992 against activists of a national movement. During this operation 26 people were wounded, and then 68 people were arrested.

F. Bayramova's information aroused a stormy reaction of the deputies. The chairman interrupted the debates and put F. Bayramova's proposal to a vote, but it did not pass. Other similar proposals did not pass either. Sometimes it came to appeals not to discuss the draft Constitution but pay attention to people's needs and only discuss everyday problems. No doubt that in such appeals, apart from well understandable concern with people's fates, there was an intention to postpone the consideration of the draft Constitution. Thus, the Deputy V. Mikhailov suggested that the draft should be excluded from consideration allegedly due to its poor preparation, absence of independent examination, and amendments from the 'Soglasie' group.

It did not seem possible to override the draft Constitution by other questions whatever important they were. The price of this question was too high.

The speaker on the new draft Constitution of the republic, minister of Justice A. Salabayev stated that all the committees of the Supreme Soviet and many people's deputies participated in the improvement of the draft. 'Though we did not agree always and in everything, the introduced proposals and remarks helped the constitutional committee a lot, we believe they let it work out a number of fundamental provisions of the draft Constitution more correctly,' said the minister. He said that the draft Constitution had undergone the expertise of the Juris Doctors Christian Diki from Switzerland and Christian Weber from the Department of Public, Civil, and European Law of the Munich University. Amendments were made to six sections of the draft out of seven, to 59 articles out of 175. Three articles were newly adopted, and six articles were excluded. After that the speaker covered a number of critically important issues of the draft Constitution. One of these issues was to decide who would adopt the Constitution: the Supreme Soviet or the nationwide referendum?

The changes proposed by the committee had to do with chapter two on the economic system of the republic. 'The committee,' said A. Salabayev, 'assumed that democracy and sovereignty only make sense when they are supported by a respective economic base and the right of the people to dispose of their own property... Article 8 notably appeared in this exact chapter. It reads that the Earth, its mineral resources, water, forest, and other natural resources, plant and animal life, state budget funds, state bank assets, and the cultural and educational values of the peoples of Tatarstan, and other property that ensures the economic independence of the republic and preserves material and spiritual culture are a national asset.'

The minister's report gave much prominence to the citizenship question recorded in the draft with the consideration of the deputies' comments. The speaker noted that the remarks contained different, sometimes opposite stances, and this required more weighted approaches that took into account the existing reality and international rules from the constitutional
A. Salabayev described in detail the provisions Tatarstan should build its relations with Russia. The speaker answered that he had been concerned with the restriction of the words of the speaker and insisted on this right and live outside the country. Questions of whether the inhabitants of Tatarstan can also be citizens of other countries should be decided by agreement between Tatarstan and other countries [CA TR SC, XI, Vol. 1, Sheet 535].

A group of deputies referred to as 'Soglasie' was concerned with the question of nationality, but from a different perspective: will a person lose Russian citizenship if it has not yet been legally formalised? Of course, such concerns were groundless because first in the draft and next in the Constitution it was made clear that no one shall be forcibly deprived of citizenship, and citizens of Tatarstan shall retain Russian nationality. But at the same time, there was a sense that the group did not actually share a consensus on the matter.

The deputies' questions and A. Salabayev's responses got the blood stirring in the hall and in discussions between the individual deputies. Sometimes it took the chairman a while to get some deputies under control who got carried away. Thus, N. Mansurov, who was outraged that his amendment on the protection of sovereignty and territorial integrity had failed, posed the question: 'Does a sovereign state have the right to that protection?' A. Salabayev was in a bind. He attempted to refute the comment and the amendment of the deputy on the basis that the deputy only tried to address this issue by building up the armed forces of the Republic, while the protection of sovereignty actually takes place through the adoption of laws and economic and financial policies. According to the minister, the decision to build up the armed forces was premature [CA TR SC, XI, Vol. 1, Sheet 434]. N. Mansurov picked up on some of the confusion of the speaker and insisted on the inclusion of such authority in the Constitution. This time, A. Salabayev put a quick end to the dispute: 'I think that after negotiations have been concluded these issues will be resolved somehow.'
Deputies were concerned about the treaty between Russia and Tatarstan. Would it not be practical to abstain from adopting the Constitution until the completion of the negotiation process and the signing of the treaty with Russia? Would that open the door to discrepancies as a consequence that will be harder to resolve afterwards? The same question in various forms was posed by deputies of the 'Soglasiye' group. And it was not just the deputies who were interested in it. Numerous publications in newspapers as well as radio and television talks of representatives from different groups of the population and various nationalities indicated that it was necessary to avoid making a mistake in this matter.

The address by the president on the fate of the Treaty between Russia and Tatarstan was more than relevant. M. Shaimiev stated that the draft Constitution in accordance with the Declaration provided that relations between Tatarstan and Russia shall be based on a treaty, and the mechanism for its implementation will be based in separate agreements. The president added: 'If during the signing certain fundamental questions emerge, I do not think we should deprive ourselves the right to propose changes beforehand' [CA TR SC, XI, Vol. 1, Sheet 474]. This was relatively new to the approach to relations between Russia and Tatarstan because it made them more dynamic and was not a concrete result of the negotiation process.

Disputes on the rest of the agenda were triggered by an extreme emotional response: should they start an article-by-article discussion of the draft Constitution or conclude discussions on matters of principle before that. T. Abdullin proposed a consensus to hold an article-by-article discussion with emphasis on the issue of the republic's state structure. But the offer was not understood fully. Deputy Y. Reshetov was concerned that only 145 people voted for the draft Constitution at the May session of the Supreme Soviet, and that was not consistent with the Regulatory Norm of a two-thirds majority, so he proposed to conciliate the fundamental aspects of the draft. 'To reach an agreement and then move forward!' he said [CA TR SC, XI, Vol. 1, Sheet 485]. With the support of some other deputies, A. Efremov proposed to hear out the opinion of A. Salabayev on just three articles of the draft Constitution, about which the deputies had a principled disagreement, and hold a discussion only on these issues. The chairman agreed with this suggestion but with a compromise of his own: when focusing on the three articles, the speakers can also touch upon other articles of the draft.

Based on the voting results, the deputies began its article-by-article discussion.

Y. Reshetov calmed down and explained the stridency of his speech by saying it should be a question of the concerted will of the majority of deputies who are backed by voters. He offered to discuss policy questions regarding relations with the Russian Federation, the rule of law in Tatarstan, and the state languages. The preservation of the principle of the rule of law in Tatarstan in the Constitution, according to him, would mean its secession from Russia. This article, as the deputy pointed out, did not correspond to the international norm of the territorial integrity and political unity of the state, or to 60% of those interviewed who were in favour of sovereignty for the Republic within the Russian Federation. Y. Reshetov stated categorically that the article under discussion will never be approved by the Russian authorities. The question of languages, in the view of Y. Reshetov, also needed to be discussed. 'Despite the Declaration,' he said, 'here … they only voted for one official language to remain in the Republic—Tatar.'

That final sentence from Y. Reshetov caused president M. Shaimiev to react immediately. He stated that the draft Constitution contains Article 4, which states that the official languages in the Tatarstan Republic are both Tatar and Russian. This was to the same extent obvious for the majority of deputies as the rejection of Y. Reshetov's assertion, which was false. The noise in the hall demonstrated exactly that [CA TR SC, XI, Vol. 1, Sheet 491]. Y. Reshetov also heard the criticism expressed by deputy M. Mulyukov.
Y. Reshetov’s rendering of the superiority of the rule of law in Tatarstan was even criticised by his peers. One of them explained to Y. Reshetov that it was not a matter of secession from Russia: the laws of the Republic of Tatarstan on issues relating to its administration have supreme judicial authority, and regarding questions referred by the Republic of Tatarstan to the federal government the laws of the Russian Federation shall be in force in Tatarstan [CA TR SC, XI, Vol. 1, Sheet 504].

An artificial focus on the question of relations between Tatarstan and the Russian Federation outraged the women of the corps of deputies. ‘Every meeting,’ angrily stated deputy L. Zelenovskaya, ‘we start with the question: Are we leaving Russia or not. But we have already had a referendum in that regard. That referendum decided that we are a sovereign state. And sovereign states are subject to international law, meaning our economic rights are sovereign, and our political rights are sovereign… No, we are not going anywhere. Are we claiming any part of Russia, or is Russia taking any part of our territory?’ L. Zelenovskaya expressed herself on the issue of citizenship loud and clear: ‘By accepting our Constitution, we are all—according to our own wishes, of course—citizens of Tatarstan. And anyone who wants dual citizenship in Russia or anywhere else, they should announce their desire’ [CA TR SC, XI, Vol. 1, Sheet 555].

There was a sense that the positions of deputies from different political tendencies were gradually coming together. The proposal to put the three articles under discussion to a second referendum was not supported. Deputy A. Ziatdinova expressed the opinion of the majority: ‘The people expressed their opinion on 21 March clearly enough, so I plead that we do not reopen that issue’ [CA TR SC, XI, Vol. 1, Sheet 500]. And that is exactly what they did, never again returning to the topic.

After such boisterous debates, some deputies from ‘Soglasie’ focused on the issue of setting limits on the powers of the president. They insisted that the Constitution should contain a norm for the dismissal of the president from their office should they break the law and establish the right of the impeachment of the president by the Supreme Council, bearing in mind that ‘a collective body will always be more objective compared with any one person, no matter how many merit badges they have racked up, and so on’ [CA TR SC, XI, Vol. 1, Sheet 502]. The proposal was rejected as the Argumentation was unsuccessful: throughout history there have been many cases where one person was right, and the majority was wrong.

The situation among the deputies gradually became less tense. What emerged next was an illusion of full reconciliation. Someone even made the proposal to raise a white flag of reconciliation on behalf of the Republic. But F. Mukhametshin’s reaction to it was instantaneous: ‘We do not intend to raise a white flag above the building of the Supreme Council, I most strenuously object!’ [CA TR SC, XI, Vol. 1, Sheet 500].

A consensus agreement was still very far away. Before the Constitution could be adopted, it had to overcome a particular amount of resistance. Some deputies tried to completely downplay the results of the session. One of them stated boldly that there was no talk at the session about real sovereignty, it was simply the manipulation and deception of false sovereignty, and the level of understanding of human rights on behalf of the current members of the Supreme Council made it impossible to adopt a normal Constitution. He suggested that all voluntary organisations and parties should produce their drafts for the Constitution, so that it would not just be effective while M. Shaimiev was president of the Republic.

‘So will parties have their own Constitutions?’ This question from the president could not help but puzzle the immensely self-confident deputy. Everyone knew that except for the two already rejected there were no other projects.

That statement gave rise to displeasure in the hall. Even the deputies from ‘Soglasie’ stopped talking about how the president was backing a bad project. On the contrary, it was pointed out that the Constitution Commission did an excellent job, and normal discussion on the draft Constitution was convened just to cre-
ate a broad-based commission and correct any imperfections in the project [CA TR SC, XI, Vol. 1, Sheet 508].

The subsequent presentation provided an objective assessment of the draft Constitution, in which it was stated—more than in previous constitutions—that the rights of individuals and citizens were clearly separated. The idea of establishing a Conciliation Commission was supported, and it was ultimately decided to adopt a Constitution at the special session.

The president of the Republic M. Shaimiev offered to adopt a Constitution by referendum on the conciliation commission. But the representatives of the 'Soglasiye' deputy group, especially I. Grachyov, were strongly opposed to that proposal. The experience of the referendum on the status of the Republic led them to believe that an official draft Constitution would be supported by the people. For that reason, said deputy group agreed to adopt the Constitution by the Supreme Council, although earlier it testified that the current Supreme Council was inadequate for such a task...

The XII session of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Tatarstan was opened on 28 October 1992 and lasted for three days. The proceedings were devoted to an article-by-article discussion of the draft Constitution. Doctors of Juridical Science V. Likhachyov, B. Zheleznov and Candidates of Legal Sciences R. Biktagitov, A. Karimov, R. Tarnapolsky, G. Khabibulina, and Sh. Yagudin were invited to contribute as legal counsels. In the Conference Room were also Y. Yarov, the vice chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, and O. Rumyantsev, the executive secretary of the Constitutional Commission of the Supreme Council of Russian Federation. They not only followed the progress of the session but also arranged press conferences and consulted deputies from 'Soglasiye'.

The minister of Justice A. Salabayev spoke on the main issue of the draft Constitution.

Despite the agreements of the previous session, 'Soglasiye' deputies attempted to include some additional issues on the agenda. I. Grachyov said this was because none of the voters told him to adopt the Constitution on an urgent basis, but everyone was asking to sort out transport, prices, and pensions [CA TR SC, XII, Vol. 1, Sheet 6]. But deputies voted for the session to be completely focused on the discussion of a draft Constitution.

In his opening statement, the chairman of the Supreme Soviet F. Mukhametshin pointed out that since the adoption of the Declaration of State Sovereignty more than two years had passed. 'During this period,' he said, 'in this hall and in the media there have been various opinions. One blames us that the Supreme Soviet delays discussing the Constitution yet demands its immediate adoption, while another until now has taken the position that it is too early to adopt it. As chairman of the Supreme Soviet, I disagree with such judgments. The Constitution of a sovereign State is not the place for unnecessary haste or unwarranted slowness' [CA TR SC, XII, Vol. 1, Sheet 18]. By pointing out the historic scope of the document, F. Mukhametshin indicated that succeeding generations will have to live under the new Constitution too. He called on deputies who had different political views and beliefs to come together for the achievement of real statehood, unity, and the republic's prosperity [CA TR SC, XII, Vol. 1, Sheet 23].

But the deputies from 'Soglasiye' were reluctant to be included in this unity. They were running to maintain their concept of the Constitution by amending its formal draft: they submitted ninety-eight articles from the projects rejected on 21 May as amendments. The plan was to have a long discussion with the aim that the adoption of the Constitution would fail.

B. Kozlov started an attack by expressing surprise that the chairman of the Supreme Soviet gave the introductory speech and not the president—that is, an executor and not a legislator. F. Mukhametshin answered straight away: 'First of all, I am not an executive entity, I am the chairman of the Supreme Soviet, and I made the introductory remarks before the start of the discussions on the Constitution. I never said anything about the Constitutional Commission.'
Almost all the deputies from 'Soglasiye,' one by one, and sometimes even interrupting each other with references to regulations and procedural irregularities, began putting forth various claims to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in order to delay the adoption of the Constitution.

Finally, a member of the Constitution Commission and the minister of Justice A. Salabayev took the stand. He reported that since the previous session of the Supreme Council the People's Deputies wrote 140 amendments and comments on the preamble and 59 articles of the draft Constitution that related to citizenship, relations with the Russian Federation, and the activity of the Supreme Council, its Presidium, and their competence [CA TR SC, XII, Vol. 1, Sheets 39–40]. He reported that deputies from 'Soglasiye' made amendments contrary to the formal draft and relevant only to the position of the group that was rejected on 21 May. The minister described a number of amendments that were made by the Tatarstan deputy group, which did not receive consent from the Constitutional Commission, including the amendment proposed by F. Bayramova that only the Tatar language should be official in the Republic (defending her position, F. Bayramova claimed that where two languages are declared as official, there is only one used in practice. She gave an example from 1921, when two languages were claimed as official in the Republic, but in fact only Russian became official).

Unlike F. Bayramova, the deputies from 'Soglasiye' insisted on including two official languages in the constitution. The principle of equality for Tatar and Russian was stipulated in the draft Constitution.

The speaker A. Salabayev reported that the constitutional Commission, taking into account the relevant amendments, held the view that in the article on citizenship, which establishes citizenship in the Republic, the following provision should be set out: 'Citizens of the Republic of Tatarstan may hold citizenship in other countries, the conditions for the exercise of which are determined by treaties with the relevant states. Citizens of Tatarstan can maintain citizenship in the Russian Federation by their choice.' The speaker stated that the Commission on Legislation, where deputies from 'Soglasiye' prevailed, proposed that the last sentence should be formulated this way: 'All citizens of the Republic of Tatarstan are at the same time citizens of the Russian Federation.' They did not like the position where citizens of Tatarstan could retain Russian citizenship by their will, and the deputies from 'Soglasiye' proposed removing the phrase 'by their will.' 'I insist on that formulation,' said one of them, 'so if it (the formulation. – I. T.) is not accepted, for me it will be conclusive proof of the deprivation of Russian citizenship,' and categorically threatened not to participate in the voting. The Commission on Industry and other individual deputies also suggested removing the words 'by their will' and replacing them with the following more flexible phrase: 'they retain citizenship in the Russian Federation' [CA TR SC, XII, Vol. 1, Sheet 144].

A verbal dispute between the deputies of 'Soglasiye' and the reporter resulted in a showdown with the party 'Ittifak' and TCC. I. Grachyov said into the microphone: '...for the sake of meeting the requirement of 10 thousand people who want to renounce Russian citizenship you make two million or more write some statement to state their will in some way,' and threatened that the list of people requesting Russian citizenship must be given into 'Ittifak' and TCC [CA TR SC, XII, Vol. 1, Sheet 148]. It was hard to separate falsehoods from reality in those words; emotions were too closely linked with the substance of the matter. However, the question had begun to assume an ethnic overtone, there was no doubt in it. The further development of the situation spoke of the fact that the majority of deputies did not want that.

The noise of disputes and discussions broke out in the hall. O. Ermakova was very active and adopted the position of 'Soglasiye' deputies regarding the final step of discussions on Article 23 and its citizenship rules. Her vote sometimes overlapped with the votes of several other deputies, including the speaker and Chairperson.

After long and heated discussions the article was adopted in the version proposed by
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the Constitutional Commission. A conciliation commission headed by the president of the Republic was established, which—in addition to representatives of deputy groups—included professors I. Tagirov and B. Zhelezov. It succeeded in getting everyone to agree on disputed questions.

On 6 November the XII session concluded its work on the adoption of the new Constitution of the republic. It embraced the will of the people reflected in the referendum about turning the Republic into a sovereign state. The first lines of the document state that ‘...this Constitution is adopted and proclaimed according to the results of the popular vote (referendum) on the question of the Republic of Tatarstan’s Statehood. The first article brought life the integrity of the Declaration and referendum: ‘The Republic of Tatarstan is a sovereign, democratic state that expresses the will and interests of all the multinational people of the Republic. Sovereignty and the powers of the state emanate from the people. State sovereignty is the inherent status of the Republic of Tatarstan.’ Article 59 of the Constitution stipulated that the laws of the Republic of Tatarstan have precedence throughout its territory if they do not contradict with the international commitments of the Republic of Tatarstan, and Article 60 settled the inviolability of its territory. Article 61 established relations between the Russian Federation and Tatarstan: ‘The Republic of Tatarstan is a sovereign state and a subject of international law associated with the Russian Federation on the basis of a treaty on the mutual delegation of powers.’ It is important to stress that this Article was documented before the signing of the bilateral treaty.

The Ordinance ‘On the Procedure of the Introduction of the Constitution in the Republic of Tatarstan’ was issued, and it was also decided to submit the relevant bill to be considered during the XIII session. In terms of composition, the proposed draft legislation ‘On the Procedure of the Introduction of the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan’ included 13 articles. The most important among them was Article 11, which was expressed in the following way:

Taking into account the adoption of a new Constitution in the republic, Tatarstan will apply to the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation with a proposal for the inclusion of provisions on treaty/constitutional relations between the Republic of Tatarstan and the Russian Federation in the Basic Laws of the Russian Federation [CA TR SC, XII, Vol. 1, Sheet 95].

The struggle for the Constitution did not stop on there but also took on other forms.

The attack on the adopted Constitution was the continuation of the fight during its initial discussions. The ‘Soglasye’ deputies continued their consultations with well-known political circles in Moscow that were opposed to the Constitution of Tatarstan. On 12 November 1992 on the TV programme ‘Utro’ on Channel One, a presentation by the secretary responsible for the Constitutional Commission of the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation O. Rumyantsev was aired with a one-sided, tendentious interpretation of some of the articles of Tatarstan.

It gave birth to the development of the draft statement of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Tatarstan, which read: ‘The Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan legislatively strengthens the changes that occurred in its legal status, the commencement of which was enshrined in the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Republic of Tatarstan on 30 August 1990 and following the outcome of the national referendum on 21 March 1992.’ The course of action of certain groups was condemned in a statement aimed at discrediting the objective reformation and nation-building process of the Republic of Tatarstan in its bid for statehood. It stated that O. Rumyantsev’s statements were contrary to the continued negotiating processes between the leaders of Tatarstan and Russia and questioned his sincerity in finally entering into the long-awaited agreement between the republics. The statement concluded with the following: ‘We are convinced that the forthcoming signing of the treaty between the Republic of Tatarstan and the Russian Federation will satisfy the aspirations of our peoples. The adoption of the
Constitution of sovereign Tatarstan will contribute to this. It is founded on the principles of the self-determination of peoples and their equality, respect for human rights, territorial integrity, and the preservation of the historic patterns of a comprehensive linkage with the Russian Federation—Russia' [CA TR SC, XII, Vol. 1, Sheets 83–84].

F. Mukhametshin, at a meeting with R. Khashbulatov, the chairman of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR, before the Congress of the People's Deputies of the RSFSR, expressed his dissatisfaction with the statement of O. Rumyantsev and also some journalists, who tendentiously highlighted the developments in Tatarstan. F. Mukhametshin briefed R. Khashbulatov on the text of the Presidium of the Supreme Council statement and demanded that it should be featured in all media venues. R. Khashbulatov agreed to this only when they said that otherwise it will show up in the independent papers. Furthermore, F. Mukhametshin was featured on television. The chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan also spoke at the Congress of the People's Deputies of the RSFSR.

The truth about the Constitution of a sovereign Tatarstan blazed its own trail all the way up to the ears of the Russian public. The leadership of the Republic was flooded with telegrams of congratulations from everywhere. His words to the effect that Tatarstan set a moral standard and with its actions models the future of democratic Russia were confirmed. An important result of the meeting between R. Khashbulatov and F. Mukhametshin was a statement they made about the need to sign the treaty on the new strategic relationship between Russia and Tatarstan [CA TR SC, XII, Vol. 1, Sheet 90].

At the same time, the president of the Republic M. Shaiminov was in the midst of productive work on the Constitutional Commission of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR. The intensity of the political situation, compounded by known political forces, gradually lessened. The relationship between the leaders of Russia and Tatarstan fell into a normal pattern of business. All of this created conditions for the incremental establishment of the Republic Legislative Database.

In preparation for the regular session of the Supreme Council of the RT on its Presidium, issues on the relations between the Russian Federation and Tatarstan were only discussed a few times. The concepts of contractual/constitutional and constitutional/contractual relations were clarified, and the draft laws 'On the Prosecution Office of the Tatarstan Republic,' 'On the Election of Judges,' 'On the Election of the Supreme Arbitration Court' were discussed [CA TR SC, Fund R–3610, Inventory 1, File 2080, Sheets 63–66]. It was decided during the session to raise the question of the draft laws 'On the Constitutional Court of Tatarstan,' 'On the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Tatarstan Republic,' and 'On the Militia.' The draft laws 'On the Status of Judges in the Tatarstan Republic' and 'On the Judicial System in the Tatarstan Republic' were prepared by the vice chairman of the Supreme Court of the Republic M. Mavlyatshin, and the draft law 'On the Prosecution Office of the Tatarstan Republic' was developed by a legal team headed by the deputy prosecutor of the Republic K. Amirov. They were discussed and approved by the Procurator's Office collective of the Republic on 13 November 1992. In the explanatory memorandum of the Bill it is stated that its development 'is first of all aided by the establishment of a sovereign State, and the adoption of the new Constitution dictates the need for the legislative regulation of the activities of state authorities, including the Procurator's Office' [CA TR SC, Fund R–3610, Inventory 1, File 2080, Sheets 130–163].

All the bills described above were identified as part of the sixteen questions of the XIV session [CA TR SC, Fund R–3610, Inventory 1, d.File 2080, Sheets 81–82]. Their fate was anything but simple. Ultimately, these bills were not fated for success.

Following the adoption of the Constitution of the Tatarstan Republic, the situation was exacerbated. The opposition made sure that it would never come into effect or result in a struggle for sovereignty. Deputies of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR from Tatarstan
Morokin and Fakhrutdinov started to gather signatures to demand the devolution of the Constitution of Tatarstan for the consideration of the Constitutional Court of Russia. The members of 'Soglasie' began to develop what was called the 'Civil Forum,' where they tried to engage Russian political authority. For that hurriedly fixed, unlegislated, and in practice non-existent 'forum,' a document was prepared that condemned Tatarstan with accusations that it was attempting to dismember Russia.

From the Russian side, O. Rumyantsev, the secretary of the Constitutional Commission of the Russian Federation, was particularly active. Following his suggestion, on 16 September 1992 Moscow became the site of a meeting of the Supreme Council Commission of the Russian Federation headed by N. Medvedev on international relations and nation-state organization. Issues regarding the Constitution of Tatarstan were discussed. O. Rumyantsev invited deputies and members of the 'Narodovlastiye' group of the Supreme Council of Tatarstan to attend. The State Secretary under the president of the Russian Federation G. Burbulis was invited to make the report, the same person who previously led the delegation of the Russian Federation during talks with the Delegation of Tatarstan regarding the preparation of a bilateral treaty. At the same time, V. Likhachyov, who headed the delegation of Tatarstan in these negotiations, was not invited to the meeting. Therefore, it was intentional that only one party was actually heard. The aim was to condemn the Russian delegation for being so conformable towards Tatarstan and to make them harden their position.

Before coming to the panel session, G. Burbulis asked in a telephone conversation with V. Likhachyov whether some order might be adopted clarifying the 60th article of the Constitution of Tatarstan with an approach consistent with Article 70 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

Following the presentation of G. Burbulis, O. Rumyantsev demanded that the Constitution of Tatarstan should be brought into line with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, and that its implementation should be delayed. He also raised the issue of submitting the Constitution of Tatarstan to the Congress of the People's Deputies of the Russian Federation for their consideration. O. Rumyantsev's presentation also highlighted the requirement to refer the case of Tatarstan to the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation. In order to bring the Constitution of Tatarstan into full compliance with the Constitution of the RSFSR, Rumyantsev set a date of two months. It was nothing other than an ultimatum. In case these requirements were not observed, strict precautions had to be made in relation to the Republic. In this case they meant an economic and financial blockade of Tatarstan, which would entail a total cessation of salaries, student grants, and pensions. But Tatarstan citizens, who participated in this meeting along with R. Muhamediev, N. Makhiyanov, and the deputies of the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation resisted 'rumyantsev's attempts.' On hearing this news, V. Likhachyov demanded that he should also be heard at the meeting.

During 23–24 September 1992 a cross meeting between two commissions was held, involving individual members of the Constitutional Commission of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR. It was attended by a group of lawyers, who were experts in political science, international and constitutional law, and also foreign and Russian journalists. Deputies of the Supreme Council of Tatarstan A. Kolesnik, F. Safiullin, and vice president of the Republic V. Likhachyov were also present. Deputies from 'Narodovlastiye' distributed defamatory material to the meeting's attendees about the referendum, discussion, and adoption of the Constitution and the situation in Tatarstan.

The report of V. Likhachyov was heard first. He began his speech with proof that the Constitution is the logical end to the path endorsed by popular referendum that the Republic has travelled down since the adoption of the Declaration on State Sovereignty. V. Likhachyov stressed that Tatarstan changed its status in accordance with Article 70 of the Constitution of the RSFSR. The speaker reported that
in July the Russian Federation proposed drafting a series of bilateral treaties, but there was a breakdown after further negotiations. 'I have,' he said, 'the impression that the leadership of the Russian Federation does not want to be held accountable for determining the nature of the relationship with the Republic of Tatarstan, and of course, the initiative goes to the Supreme Council.' [CA TR SC, XIII, Vol. 1, Sheet 54]. To the question of whether Tatarstan disrupts the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and human rights, he answered 'no.' 'You have to be a pragmatist in politics and see the specific processes in social, legal, and other spheres,' claimed V. Likhachyov and made a detailed comment about his vision of the nature of bilateral treaty relations.

Afterwards, V. Likhachyov answered questions for an hour and a half. Most of them were asked by 'Soglasieye' deputies from the Supreme Council of Tatarstan. 'As though they could not just ask them in Kazan, they had to come to Moscow for it,' joked V. Likhachyov. That joke was met warmly, and the discussion, contrary to the reckoning of certain participants of the meeting, carried forward as a bilateral equitable dialogue. At the end of the four-hour meeting G. Burbulis stated: 'From the political, legal, and economic perspectives, taking into account all the realities, Tatarstan is the only subject today that has the right to a special status and special rights' [CA TR SC, XIII, Vol. 1, Sheet 56]. After that the Commission adopted a regulation with a paragraph that included the meeting of the presidents of the Russian Federation and Tatarstan.

This meeting took place on 25 September 1992. At the meeting the presidents of the Russian Federation and Tatarstan discussed workable approaches to the definition of relations between Russia and Tatarstan. The essence of the Constitution of Tatarstan was also set out at the Council meeting of the heads of the republics of the Russian Federation. Thus, the taboo that distinct political forces wanted to include in the Constitution of Tatarstan was removed. Real opportunities made themselves apparent for the consideration of implementing a Constitution. This task was fully completed by the XIII session of the Supreme Council of the RT.

The XIII session, by promulgating the Law on the enactment of the new Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan, summarised the results of the path the Republic had travelled since the adoption of the Declaration on State Sovereignty on 30 August 1990. It was opened on 30 November 1992 at 10 o'clock. F. Mukhamedshin, on behalf of the President of the Supreme Council, made the proposal to consider a draft bill of 'On the Procedure of the Introduction of the Constitution of the Tatarstan Republic.' On the basis that the views of various deputy groups were known, R. Sirazeev recommended listening to those who attended the representative meetings of the Commission of the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation, and that a law on the introduction of the Constitution should be put to a recorded vote. Deputies from 'Soglasieye' did not agree to this and tried to introduce an agenda with a number of other issues. They made every effort to defer the consideration of the draft law on the introduction of the Constitution by putting forth different arguments.

The agenda of the session was adopted with only one issue: 'On the Procedure of the Introduction of the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan.'

The first speaker was deputy A. Lozovoy. Although his report was short, the questions and answers following it were rather intense. For the most part, this encompassed relations between Tatarstan and Russia as well as citizenship. The speaker said that treaty provisions for the constitutional relationship must be negotiated with the leadership of the Russian Federation and established in the Constitution of the Russian Federation. The basis of the establishment was supposed to be a Treaty between the Republic of Tatarstan and the Russian Federation. Deputy F. Bayramova came out against it because, in her view, it would eliminate the principles of the rule of law in Tatarstan and, with that in mind, offered to remove Article 11 from consideration.

Although 11 people were registered for the debate, only those deputies were heard who
participated at the meeting of the Commission of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR. The story from F. Safiullin on the details of the proceedings was emotional and representative of an authorial vision of what happened at the meeting of the Commission. He precisely explained the purpose of the meeting: prevent the introduction of the Constitution of Tatarstan until it is brought into conformity with Russian legislation. In case of the failure to meet this requirement, the Republic will face economic and financial sanctions.

I. Grachyov, a representative of 'Soglasie,' had a different view of the meeting. He, they say, was more Catholic than the Pope himself, and he defended Russia more zealously than its official representatives themselves. I. Grachyov attacked the Constitution and referendum in Tatarstan, probably more than anyone even in Moscow itself. Moreover, by reflecting the position of the leadership of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR, he denounced the delegation of the Russian Federation in negotiations with Tatarstan, saying they were too compliant and insufficiently strong in upholding the integrity of the Russian Federation, which the leaders of Tatarstan took quickly advantage of when they passed their Constitution. By his words it seemed that the negotiation process broke down because of Tatarstan and not because of a conflict on the subject between the executive and legislative branches of the Russian Federation itself, which soon turned into a great tragedy. The following words from Grachyov resounded as a fearsome accusation of the leadership of the Republic: 'These actions of the leadership of the Tatarstan Republic can be considered an attempt to wildly deceive its people and the peoples of Russia. This is a path of pressure, ultimatums, and defiance that ignores the legitimate interests and rights of the Russian Federation' [CA TR SC, XIII, Vol. 1, Sheets 48–49]. It was strange and unclear which ultimatums and defiance ignored the legitimate interests and rights of Russia, and all the more what pressure could be put on Tatarstan.

The speech from V. Likhachyov in a way averted the impending disaster that I. Grachyov threatened. He explained the events in Moscow at the meeting of the Commission of the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation in detail and reported that after the completion of the Congress of the People's Deputies of the Russian Federation the negotiating process would be continued in order to bring about a bilateral treaty. The vice president expressed confidence that at the Congress the model of development of Tatarstan would be favourably received, despite possible attempts to put the issue on the Constitution of Tatarstan on the agenda.

Following the draft discussion, which was prepared by the drafting commission, the law was approved.

The XIV session of the Supreme Council of the RT, held 22–25 November 1992, was focused on bills aimed at putting the new Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan into effect. This first discussion was on the report of the minister of Internal Affairs of the Republic S. Kirillov on the draft Law 'On the Militia.' The speaker emphasised the importance of this law in relation to the adoption of the new constitution, indicating that crime knew no boundaries, and that the Republic of Tatarstan occupies one criminal procedure space with the Russian Federation. The questions to the minister were mostly about the relations between the militia of Tatarstan and the Russian Federation. The general response to this was the words of the minister that the Militia of the Republic is guided by the law of the Russian Federation 'On the Militia,' which does not contravene the legislation and Constitution of Tatarstan [CA TR SC, Fund R–3610, Inventory 1, File 2142, Sheets 455–456].

Deputy M. Kurmanov compared the work of legislators with attempts to 'work on that crossword that exists in the law 'On the Militia of the Russian Federation.' The decoding was in order to make the bill compliant both with the Russian law 'On the Militia' and with the principles for a new Constitution of Tatarstan. V. Mikhaylov found the adoption of the law respecting the new Constitution inap-
propriate because it was allegedly impossible to enforce in reality without laying down the boundaries of the Republic, and the law enforcement agencies of Tatarstan would not protect the rights of citizens of the Russian Federation, and so he proposed the resumption of all administrative links under the authority of the Russian Federation. This was consistent with the opinion of 'Soglasie,' whose members believed that the most positive features were taken from the Russian law 'On the Militia,' and the draft law broke the scope for the territorial operation of this law. Deputies of the 'Tatarstan' group in the debates on the report criticised the law because it stipulated that the Republic has a low level of authority, and it reminded regulators to implement Russian laws. At the end of the heated discussions the bill was adopted on its first reading [CA TR SC, Fund R.–3610, Inventory 1, File 2142, Sheets 170–235].

Another crucial issue was with the discussion of the report by chairman of the Supreme Court of Tatarstan G. Baranov 'On the Status of Judges of the Tatarstan Republic.' In his address he stated: 'The adoption of the Republic's constitution now constitutionally enshrined the principle of the separation of powers into legislative, executive, and judicial branches. Thus, as an ordinary organ of the state, the court has been transformed into a separate branch of governmental authority.' G. Baranov indicated that many provisions of the Bill—not contrary to the sovereignty of the Republic—were drawn from the Tatarstan law in effect 'On the Status of the Russian Federation.' Then a discussion followed about relations with the Russian Federation and citizenship.

The bill continued to come under attack. I. Sultanov, who blamed the leadership of the Republic for hastily adopting laws regarding law enforcement authorities, warned: 'This haste, with which we have started to adopt laws on the judicial system, prosecutors, and law enforcement officials, ensures... that we all experience the difference between the Constitutions of the Republic of Tatarstan and the Russian Federation as well as between the laws of the Tatarstan Republic and the Russian Federation.'

The argument between F. Safiullin and M. Khafizov was interesting as it concerned a significant portion of their available time being dedicated to the issues of using the Tatar language in the judiciary. This time the deputies held similar positions. They both defended the norm requiring judges to have knowledge of two official languages. The only difference was that F. Safiullin wanted its immediate implementation, and M. Khafizov believed that it 'cannot be introduced at the current moment.' M. Khafizov did not appreciate the words of F. Safiullin on how there was no one to defend their mother tongue. He took it to be aimed at him and said that 'when you lived well and did not object to the current situation of the Tatar language,' he, Khafizov, and his comrades wrote letters to the regional party, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and the Council of Ministers to express their abhorrence with the Tatar language's status in the Republic.

The developer of this concept did not pay attention to the issue of language in the draft law as vice president of the Supreme Court M. Mavlyatshin gave reasonable answers to the numerous questions and objections raised by deputies. At first, he swept aside the statements of certain speakers that this bill represents the copy of a Russian law and instead moved on to an explanation of the provisions of the draft law on bilingual judges. He stated that 70% of Tatarstan judges are already bilingual. The legality and necessity of the norm of bilingualism in the draft law, the judge reasoned, was intended to promote the objectivity of the proceedings and the professionalism of judges. He compared a judge who knows only one language to person who is colour blind.

Deputies were of the view that the pending bill will most likely be viable only under the condition of its consistency with the fundamental principles of the Constitution of the Republic and the principled positions of Russian law. The draft law concept was adopted on first reading.

Before moving discussions to the issue 'On the Draft Law "On the Organisation of Courts in the Tatarstan Republic,"' the president of
the Republic spoke on the language problem, explaining that the norm of bilingualism established in the draft law has to comply with the Law on Languages, which was allotted 10 years to be carried out, and does not apply to the current judges.

Deputies heard the chairman of the Supreme Court G. Baranov on the issue 'On the Draft Law "On the Organisation of Courts in the Tatarstan Republic."' The distinctive characteristic of the draft law in contrast to the current one was that it envisaged the introduction of the institution of justices of the peace, which brought judges closer to the people and contributed to the democratisation of society. According to the draft, the justice of the peace had to be appointed by the president of the Republic upon submission from the Supreme Court. Other judges had to be elected by the Supreme Court. The speaker made a detailed overview of the rights and obligations of judges, the structure of the court, and their relations with other branches of government.

Deputy V. Mikhailov referred to all the legislative work done to that point as the moat separating them from the Russian Federation, and this bill was judged to be an expression of the policy aimed at making all judges be of indigenous nationality [CA TR SC, Fund R-3160, Inventory 1, File 2143, Sheet 3]. In his presentation he used the expression 'so-called indigenous nationality' but then understood that he offended the whole nation and stated that he made a mistake and was ready to apologise.

The vice chairman of the Supreme Court M. Mavlyatshin highlighted the features of the proposed bill. The introduction of the justice of the peace he assessed as a fundamental reform of the judicial system. Before, the speaker stated, courts were created for the protection of existing state structures, for protecting the party, and now they intend to directly serve the people. He also substantiated the economic feasibility of judicial reform [CA TR SC, Fund RP-3160, Inventory 1, File 2143, Sheet 15].

The vision proposed by the Supreme Court was endorsed and sent to the Commission on Legislation in order to prepare a draft together with the Supreme Court to be considered in its first reading.

The next question was the draft legislation discussion of the RT 'On the Procurator's Office of the Tatarstan Republic.' The government prosecutor S. Nafiyev reported that the draft was written by a group of prosecution authorities in accordance with the wishes and statements of popular deputies of all levels, scientists, lawyers, and city and district procurator's officers. 'The project preserves all the valuable and currently enforceable laws in the Russian Federation, and during its development draft norms were used that are set forth in the Law on the Kazakhstan Procurator's Office Act of the former USSR,' he said [CA TR SC, Fund R-3160, Inventory 1, File 2143, Sheet 87]. The Prosecutor precisely described all the articles of the draft law and concluded that: 'The adoption of the Law 'On the Prosecutor's Office of The Republic of Tatarstan' will make it possible to create a system of public institutions with authority and complete the formation of the institutional and legal framework of its activities. Many practical questions were put to the speaker, and three popular deputies took the floor. The bill was adopted in its first reading.

The concluding address at the session was given to the chairman of the Supreme Soviet M. Mukhametshin. Observing that 1992 was not an easy one, he stressed that 'this year will go down in the historical chronicles of the multi-ethnic population of Tatarstan as a year of momentous achievements, deep societal transformation as well as the year when a sovereign State—the Republic of Tatarstan—was born [CA TR SC, Fund R-3160, inv.1, File 2143, Sheet 146].

As a whole, 1992 was a productive year, albeit not a simple one. Speaking generally, it was when the process of transforming Tatarstan from an autonomous national-state entity in the Russian Federation into a sovereign State with its own Constitution was finalised, which sets its relations with the Russian Federation on the foundation of a bilateral agreement.
But further developments showed that opponents to the formation of a sovereign Tatarstan would not give up.

The Constitution of Tatarstan brought about inaccurate reporting from certain quarters of Russia that did not want to enter into equitable relationships between Russia and Tatarstan. Since the opponents of Tatarstan sovereignty clustered around the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR R. Khasbulatov, a letter was sent to him signed by F. Mukhametshin reading: 'The democratic transformations that occurred in the Republic, responsive to the best interests of its multi-national people, did not satisfy certain political forces in the Russian Federation. The process of the establishment of sovereignty in many former autonomies continues to be largely perceived by them as a desire of the local ruling elites to maintain their power. A deliberate defamation of the objective process of reforming the national/state structure of the Republic of Tatarstan is in process, and it continues to give rise to a new statehood based on traditional friendship between its constituent peoples.

The media played an unhelpful role in this. For instance, the presentation on 12 November of the TV programme 'Utro' on Channel One, with a popular deputy of Russia, the responsible secretary of the Constitutional Commission of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, O. Rumyantsev. In his interview he gave an unceremonious explanation of several provisions to articles of the new Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan. 'We consider that some of his expressions are contrary to the continued negotiation process between the leaders of Tatarstan and Russia, calling into question their sincere wish to find a long-awaited consensus between the republics. Objectively, this contributes to an increase of the political turbulence in society and provokes interethnic discord between peoples.

In these circumstances, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan declared with full responsibility that no one will create conditions for political instability in the Republic or call into question traditional centuries-old bonds of friendship, fraternity, and understanding between the people of different nationalities.

We are convinced that the forthcoming signing of the treaty between the Republic of Tatarstan and the Russian Federation achieves the aspirations of our peoples. The adoption of the Constitution of sovereign Tatarstan will contribute to this. It is founded on the principles of self-determination of peoples, their equality, respect for human rights, territorial integrity, and the preservation of historic patterns of a comprehensive linkage with the Russian Federation.

This letter somewhat subdued the opponents of Tatarstan's sovereignty. But intimidating the public with the breakup of Russia never stopped. The newspaper published materials each worse than the next. And an article in the Argumenty i Fakty newspaper entitled 'Is Russia falling apart?...' gave a clear sign of the breakup of Russia, even providing a map.

The central issues blamed Tatarstan and other former autonomies along with it for seeking secession from Russia, supposedly facilitated by a treaty-making practice distributing competences between each republic and the Federal Centre. Finally, the republics were blamed for seeking financial incentives for themselves.

We will highlight just a few substantive comments regarding these accusations here. First, no republic, all the more Tatarstan, was intending to leave the Russian Federation. Second, treaties between them and the Federal Centre, by delimiting administrative abilities and authority, would make it possible to ensure respect for the rule of law in the republics in the implementation of competences, which would be a recognition of them in full accordance with the document that established the Russian Federation and with the Declaration of Rights of the Working and Operating People, where it states very clearly that the republics determine the nature of relations with the Federal Centre themselves. Third, there was no question of any financial benefit for the republics. The republics negotiated with the authorities of the Russian Federation not about benefits but about equitable financial relationships.
On 1 April 1993 a meeting of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Tatarstan was held, headed by the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Republic Z. Valeeva. F. Mukhametshin and the president of the Republic M. Shaimiev were not in attendance, and Z. Valeeva only spoke with them by phone. They discussed the issue of the referendum of the Russian Federation on 25 April 1993 in Tatarstan, which was authorised to be held by decision of the IX Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation. The issue at stake was whether or not to conduct it in Tatarstan itself. And if they were to conduct it, then what would it look like? All kinds of other smaller questions cropped up that flowed from this main one. On the basis of the laws of the Republic clearly defined in the Constitution of Tatarstan, the Russian Referendum should not be conducted on its territory because that would mean recognising Tatarstan as a subject of the Russian Federation. As a consequence, the sovereignty of the Republic would be violated. All the more, there was no treaty between the Russian Federation and Tatarstan for the establishment of relations between the republic and the federation. But on the basis of the rule of dual nationality stipulated by the Republic's Constitution, where residents of the Republic could also be citizens of the Russian Federation, the referendum had to be held on the territory of Tatarstan. Otherwise, the rights of people who also considered themselves citizens of the Russian Federation would be violated. The problem was to bridge these divides, to reconcile the contraries and the seemingly different conflicting principles.

Policies are a more subtle and flexible means than legal rules and concepts. They are intended to serve as the conciliating judge between contradictory legal norms. This meeting was an indication of how the reconciliation of particular issues regarding the suggestion to conduct a Russian referendum on the territory of Tatarstan was achieved.

Things got problematic straight away: How should they refer to the issue under discussion on the agenda? The vice chairman of the Supreme Soviet A. Lozovoy suggested naming it:'On the Regulation of the Congress of the People's Deputies of the Russian Federation on 25 April 1993.' This particular version was approved on the agenda. Z. Valeeva claimed that, except references to the documents of the Congress of the People's Deputies, we must proceed from the independent status of the Republic, and that Article 59 of the Constitution states that Tatarstan determines its status independently, the Republic did not sign the federal pact, and the Constitution of the Republic contains wording on dual citizenship.

The discussion began. Z. Valeeva pointed out the need to serve the rights of people who consider themselves citizens of the Russian Federation as a prevailing argument for the referendum. The members of the Presidium were not sure about the expediency and legitimacy of holding the referendum. They found themselves in a difficult situation because of the possibility of ambiguity in the Tatarstan Constitution on dual citizenship.

Two provisions contained in the Constitution clashed, namely: Tatarstan is a sovereign State where all inhabitants are only its citizens, and the rule on dual citizenship, where according to a certain interpretation people residing there can consider themselves citizens of only the Republic or only the Russian Federation. On the one hand, Tatarstan is a sovereign state and a subject of international law, and on the other, it is its citizens who are at once citizens of the Russian Federation. The sovereignty dictated to Tatarstan not to participate in the all-Russian referendum, along with dual nationality obligated them to adhere to the rights of the individual and citizen of the Russian Federation and thus to participate in Russian referendums. The members of the Presidium of the Supreme Council had to resolve these dilemmas.

A representative of the 'Tatarstan' group F. Safiullin placed emphasis on Tatarstan's sovereignty, which meant the Republic should not participate in the referendums of other states. I. Salakhov from 'Soglasiiye' on the contrary urged participation in the referendum on the grounds that citizens of Tatarstan are at once
also citizens of the Russian Federation. Then Z. Valeeva encouraged members of the Central Electoral Commission to consider the elections of deputies to the Supreme Council of the Republic. But its chairman I. Galliev stated that the Commission was unable to resolve these dilemmas. At the same time, he recalled that the Commission has experience taking part in Russian referendums gained during the presidential elections in the Russian Federation in June 1991, when conditions were created for anyone who wished to participate. Anyone who wanted to participate in the elections had the opportunity. In contrast to the situation at that time, in the current situation the Republic had its own Constitution, which incorporated dual citizenship. The Secretary of the Electoral Commission Zaripov drew the attention of attendants to the fact that Tatarstan has no law on citizenship, and that is why in accordance with the rule of dual citizenship stipulated in the Constitution a mechanism should be established to register those who would like to participate in the Russian referendum to vote. He offered to form the Electoral Commission as such a mechanism. The objections voiced about that approach were based on the absence of a treaty.

A consultation with qualified legal experts was required. The deputy minister of Justice R. Sayakhov stated that irrespective of the existence or absence of a treaty, 'we always have to ensure the right of citizens to express their choices on election day' [CA TR SC, Fund R–3160, Inventory 1, File 2143, Sheet 22]. The vice president of the RT V. Likhachyov concurred with the approach where human rights were put first and encouraged members of the Presidium to make the right decision, politically and legally.

In this difficult situation people were asking questions not just to each other but also to themselves. They were searching for an agreement both in society and in their own hearts. G. Kobelev suggested removing this issue from consideration as it supposedly should be considered with the participation of top officials. But the first officials of the Republic could not take sole responsibility for participation in the Russian referendum. The question did not have a legal point but rather a political one. First, the referendum itself was the result of a conflict between the legislative and executive branches of the Russian Federation. And second, after getting involved in the referendum, it needed to be said which side Tatarstan is on. R. Valeev supported G. Kobelev and offered to address this issue with the participation of the president and chairman of the Supreme Soviet. The president said by phone: 'Do you want this decision to be made by one person?' Of course, there should have been a solution from more than just one person, and possibly not even only the Presidium should have taken part but the whole Supreme Soviet.

Some members of the Presidium considered that in this fluid environment it is best not to 'get involved in this scrimmage' [CA TR SC, Fund R–3160, Inventory 1, File 2143, Sheet 27].

Following its in-depth discussion, the Presidium adopted a Resolution 'On Ensuring Citizen Rights to Participate in the Russian Federation Referendum on 25 April 1993,' which stated: 'The Central Electoral Commission of the elections of People's Deputies of Tatarstan is to create conditions for the expression of the will of the citizens in the referendum on 25 April 1993' [CA TR SC, Fund R–3160, Inventory 1, File 2143, Sheet 53].

In the autumn of 1993 the events surrounding the opposition of the legislative and executive powers—that is, president Boris Yeltsin and the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation Ruslan Khasbulatov—engulfed Russia. A vivid description of those events was relayed to the public in the article 'Democracy is only worth something if it is able to defend itself' by N. Dolgopolov in Komsomolskaya Pravda. The article featured such lines as 'October. A fateful month for Rus. The worst of all things that could possibly throw the country back into the past happened. But it only just looked that way. In 1993 we have found ourselves back in 1917, except now we have powerful tanks and murderous Kalashnikovs instead of broken down Mosin rifles. No matter how the events unfold, they
can only be called a tragedy or, without diplomacy, a civil war' [Komsomol’skaya pravda, 5 October 1993]. Indeed, it looked like the country was facing a full-fledged civil war. This was also reflected in the Address of President Boris Yeltsin to the people. '"...In the Russian capital gunshots are being fired, and blood has been shed. Gunmen brought in from all over the country and incited by the White House sow death and destruction.'

The leaders of the Supreme Soviet called an extraordinary session, and B. Yeltsin divested Parliament and Congress of authority by his decree. Newspapers were filled with breaking news from the Presidential Administration and the Supreme Soviet. The issue of Komsomol’skaya Pravda from 23 September published a chronicle of the events under the title 'Who needs Great Russia, and who needs the White House.' It featured mini-interviews with Vice President A. Rutskoy, who proclaimed himself acting president, and R. Khasbulatov. Both sides were consolidating forces, and eventually fighting erupted. Former president of the USSR Mikhail Gorbachev touched on the possibility of returning to big politics.

As we can see, the events unfolding in the country were provoked by government bodies. They started a fight among themselves in the capital. The newspapers featured lines like: 'One thousand armed Chechens leave Grozny to aid Khasbulatov; support battalions are forming in Moscow markets. Soldier salaries have been raised 10 times.' [Komsomol’skaya pravda, 23 September 1993].

The order to get the Dzerzhinsky Division into combat readiness was delivered. The Medical Department in Moscow announced the list of persons killed in the events of 3–5 October 1993: 90 identified and 49 unidentified bodies. The postscript stated that the exact number of dead was unknown [Komsomol’skaya pravda, 4 October 1993].

It was the wisdom of the Russian people that saved the country from dissolution and civil war. They passed the strength test by not following the footsteps of their maddened leaders. It could not have gone any other way. What happened in those days awakened Russia as a whole. Russia did not fall to pieces.

The Constitutional Commission of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation was dissolved. In December a new Constitution of the Russian Federation drafted in the interior of the Presidential Administration was adopted by referendum. Elections were simultaneously held in the State Duma, the lower house of the Federal Assembly established by the Constitution.

Tatar-Russian relations reached a qualitatively new level. But the republic did not manage to complete the transition of its law-enforcement authorities under its own jurisdiction and finalise the associated bills passed in the first reading at the XIV Congress of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation. All the difficulties could be traced to a treaty that had not yet been signed.

On 30 November 1992 M. Shaimiev officially petitioned the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation to formalise the constitutional relations between the Republic of Tatarstan and the Russian Federation in the Russian Constitution. But the path to that treaty was slow and arduous.

In December 1993, concurrently with the referendum on the new Russian Constitution, elections were held in the State Duma. In Tatarstan these elections, as well as the referendum, never ended up taking place. Only 367,000 citizens out of 2,600,000 attended the polls—that is, less than 25%. And only 88,000 of them voted to adopt the Russian Constitution. This was a statement of the frustration and dissatisfaction with negotiations on the bilateral Treaty meant to govern relations between Russian and Tatarstan.

Indeed, the Russian party was drifting further away from the agreed positions and pressuring the republic, particularly in matters of fiscal relations. During the preparation of the treaty between the governments of Tatarstan and Russia, 12 agreements were signed on issues such as customs, budget, defence, higher education institutions, etc. An analysis of these documents reveals that Tatarstan made conces-
sions in all the points without exception. As a matter of fact, those concessions were included in the Treaty signed 15 February 1994 in a concentrated form.

The time and conditions under which the Treaty was entered into were unfavourable for Tatarstan. That winter was a cold one. Houses and institutions were not properly heated. Russian pipelines decreased the amount of accepted Tatarstan oil, and as a result many oil fields stopped operating, causing layoffs and an overall staff reduction. This was real pressure on the republic.

Under such circumstances the country was forced to make concessions to the Russian side and back away from a series of previously agreed positions. Only the preamble stating that the parties were founded on the principles of self-determination and free will of the people was the most consistent and acceptable part of the treaty of 15 February 1994. The fact that Tatarstan was not directly recognised as a sovereign state and a subject of international law indicated that the treaty was a compromise. Such recognition was indirect—that is, via the preamble to the Tatarstan Constitution, which stated that Tatarstan was united with the Russian Federation on the basis of the present Treaty and the constitutions of the two states.

The recognition of the land, its subsurface, and the entire property of Tatarstan as the property of all its multi-national population was a positive point of the Treaty. Of great importance was also the recognition of Tatarstan's right to engage in international economic activity. Under the Treaty, the republic also received the right to enter into international economic relations with foreign states and also enter into treaties and agreements with them.

Tatarstan won the right to have its own citizenship. But unlike the project previously agreed upon, the Treaty established many areas of joint authority with Russia, and the police, court, and public prosecution office remained in Russian jurisdiction. The Treaty established 17 areas over which Russia would have exclusive authority, 15 areas over which Tatarstan would have exclusive authority, and 23 areas of joint authority.

The Treaty was met with intense criticism both in Russia and Tatarstan. In Moscow people accused the Russian president of being soft and tanking the country, and they even threatened him with impeachment. In Tatarstan M. Shaimiev was also accused of excessive pliability in his stances. Russian leaders managed to provide a true estimate of the Treaty. B. Yeltsin described it in the following terms: '... In 1994 in order to resolve the highly complex and contradictory issues with Tatarstan, for the first time ever we used a new constitutional element. By this I mean a bilateral Treaty on the delineation of authority between federal and regional bodies. At the time this mechanism functioned as a sort of 'political ambulance' and prevented the disintegration of the federation [Rossijskaya gazeta, 1 November 1997]. The prime minister of the Russian Federation V. Chernomyrdin gave a similar assessment, saying that the signed document saved Russia from dissolution [Krasnaya zvezda, 3 October 1997]. V. Putin also positively assessed the Treaty during his stay in Kazan on the eve of the election of the president of the Russian Federation. He named Mintimer Shaimiev one of the founders of the modern Russian Federation, which was essentially an assessment of the pioneering role Tatarstan played in the process of the democratisation of Russia.

The Treaty is undoubtedly ambiguous. Except for its significant violations of the original agreements, much of the Treaty actually contributes to strengthening the sovereignty of the republic. The economic independence of Tatarstan and securing the right to its property and ability to conduct international activity were the greatest achievements. And Tatarstan embraced these opportunities by starting to independently conduct foreign trade and opening representation offices in a number of countries. Particularly friendly relations formed between Tatarstan and Turkey. Foreign visits of official delegations of the republic and the reception provided them proved that the western world perceived Tatarstan as a state that had special relations with the Russian Federation.

But the beginning of the 21st century was marked by fundamental changes in the rela-
tions between the governmental bodies of Tatarstan and Russia. Certain circles of the Russian political elite were not at all pleased about the special status of Tatarstan. A clear trend towards establishing vertical authority and granting equal rights to all the subjects of the Russian Federation began to emerge. The State Duma, which works upon command of the Presidential Administration, was formed. Judicial instances, and the Constitutional Court above all else, also became an instrument in the hands of the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation. It was the Constitutional Court that in 2002 passed a decree abolishing the sovereignty of the republic. N. Firsov, famous historian, was indeed right when in 1869 he wrote that 'the central authority in Russia did not like ... subjects who did not live by its laws and directives' and noted that in Russia 'there have always been two parties, one of which advocates drastic measures towards merging' the national outskirts with 'the regions of Great Russia by establishing the same laws, administration, and courts in them, while others hope to arouse in those who have joined the Russian state ... a feeling of affection to the Russian authorities and the Russian government through the preservation of their special rights and privileges' [Firsov, 1869, p. 215]. To all appearances, nothing really changed in the 21st century. But adherents of the first party are gaining the upper hand, while representatives of the second party defend themselves. So it is no coincidence that prohibitive proposals requiring the curtailing of the sovereignty of republics and a reduction in the free self-determination of nations to empty national cultural autonomy without a solid financial basis start showing up. In one episode of Odnako, journalist M. Leontyev put things like this: the Russian people do not need republics if they have sovereign rights. National cultural autonomy should be enough for them. In what way were they better than the population of the Tambov oblast or some other area, he wondered. The governor of the Novgorod oblast M. Prusak spoke out with much the same opinion. The governor of the Penza oblast V. Bochkaryov did not agree that the National Question should be addressed according to Article 5 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation (relying on the well-established principles of the equality of rights and self-determination of nations) and offered to address it by the creation of nationalautonomies [Rossijskaya gazeta, 12 January 2000]. The reply of A. Zagorodnikov, professor, Doctor of Political Sciences, to the article of the chairman of the State Council of the Republic of Tatarstan F. Mukhametshin titled 'The treaty that strengthens Russia' published in the Russian Federation Today magazine meant that not only politicians but also honourary scientists were joining the struggle against the sovereignty of Tatarstan. The author demanded to harmonise the articles of the constitutions of the republics with the Constitution of the Russian Federation without excluding the possibility of using force to resolve the issue.

A. Zagorodnikov believed that the principle of unifying subjects as equals was a cornerstone of the federation itself [Rossijskaya Federacziya segodnya, 2000, p. 25]. But this contradicts well-established notions about the federation as the majority of scientists agree that the federation emerges where there is, on the one hand, a cultural, linguistic, and ethnic diversity, and on the other, a need to achieve state unity. A living classicist of American federalism Vincent Ostrom once wrote that the key elements of U.S. federalism were a contractual approach, a pluralism of government institutions, a constitutional system of government, competition as a means of conflict management, active involvement of citizens in public life, the establishment of relationship models intrinsic to open societies, and the ability to reform even in a complex society [Ostrom, 1993, p. 283]. However, these clearly established principles of federalism were not of much interest to Russian advocates for the revival of unitary practices. Their task was to prepare the Russian public to campaign on the abolition of the sovereignty of Russian republics. All these speeches resembled artillery preparations before an attack on the Constitution and the laws of the republic, and the attack
itself transformed into a volley of prosecutor protests and lawsuits.

Since 2000, when Vladimir Putin came to power, there has been an active war against the laws of Tatarstan. On 7 July the prosecutor protested against the Constitution of the republic. On 24 May 2002 the deputy of the general prosecutor for the Privolzhsky federal district A. Zvyagintsev filed a suit demanding amendments to the Constitution of the republic. In Nizhny Novgorod the newly established commissions started their long and tiresome negotiations on amendments to the Constitution. The representative of the president of the Russian Federation in the Volga federal district S. Kirienko headed the Russian side, and the chairman of the State Council of the republic F. Mukhametshin headed the Tatarstan side. As a result, on 19 April 2002 the State Council adopted the Law 'On Amendments and Additions to the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan.' Essentially, this was a new version of the Constitution different from the original in its significant disempowering of the republic. However, even after that, the lawsuits and prosecutor protests never ceased. Article 21 stating that the Republic of Tatarstan has its own citizenship was challenged; instead, the phrase 'citizens of the Russian Federation in the Republic of Tatarstan' was used in its place. As of 3 February 2005, 99 laws of the republic were brought into accordance with Russian law. They involved all the key sectors of the economic, cultural, and political life of the republic. Even the Law 'On the Languages of the Peoples of the Republic of Tatarstan' was challenged, and the use of Latin script was banned entirely.

One of the last protests was a protest against national symbols. It stated that the flying of the Russian flag was compulsory. The Russian flag above the Parliament had to be of the same size and at the same height as the Tatarstan flag. In the discussion of that protest at the session of the State Council on 25 May 2005 everyone defended the sovereign status of the republic and its national symbols, and only one deputy demanded the strict implementation of the prosecutor's protest.

Negotiations on the amendments to the Treaty of 15 February 1994 signed between Moscow and Kazan were brought to an end. New times requiring new relations between Tatarstan and the Russian Federation had come.

§ 3. The Historical Significance of the 1994 Treaty

Indus Tagirov

A document of historical significance—that is how I would describe the document signed in Moscow on 15 February 1994. First, this is the first treaty between Russia and Tatarstan after the troops of Ivan the Terrible took Kazan. Second, it establishes contractual relationships between the two states. And third, it is aimed at transforming Russia into a treaty-based constitutional federation. This was all because, following Tatarstan, the republics that signed the Federation Treaty indicated their desire to also sign a treaty with Russia.

Sometimes people stated that perhaps it would have been better for Tatarstan to have just signed the Federation Treaty rather than undergo such a difficult journey. We should immediately object to this notion as the Federation Treaty is the document that formally allocates the rights of federal authorities among subjects—that is, from top to bottom. Moreover, everyone sees that due to the lack of a mechanism to execute this document, the rights have remained unallocated and lay only with the Moscow authorities.

But our treaty is of another kind. From the very beginning it relies on the recognition of the sovereign rights of each party. There is no top-down distribution of power, only a horizontal one, even though the body of the document never mentions the sovereignty of Tatarstan. But this point only indicates a de facto recognition of Tatar sovereignty.
It is quite clear that the Treaty is yet to be understood as a historical document. This process takes place on two levels. To interpret the Treaty on the level of mass consciousness, no professional skills are required. It can be seen with the naked eye that this is not a treaty that fully recognises the principle of equality emphasised in the preamble. One does not need to carry on about this fact all over the world and demonstrate such an understanding as a sort of revelation. Nobody makes any secret of the fact that, judging by some of its points, the treaty resembles an agreement between a mother country and a break-away colony—that is, it relates to a certain stage of this dynamic process.

It could not have been otherwise, for Russia is a recognised subject of international law, whereas Tatarstan is only trying to achieve this status. Thus, the cause of weakly-worded points in the treaty cannot be drawn back to someone's mistake or omission but the initial inequality of rights. This is why the Treaty is what it is. It might have been better or worse in certain sections. An unwillingness to understand is the same as an unwillingness to see the forest for the trees.

It is therefore necessary to admit that certain power structures started to interpret the treaty as the fact of the complete recognition of the Constitution of the Russian Federation by Tatarstan. Such an interpretation in no way corresponds to the truth and contradicts the entire spirit of the Treaty. Reckless actions only bring grist to the mill of people who proclaim that the leaders of Tatarstan have sold the freedom and independence of the republic. Those people are convinced that Tatarstan is already an independent state and a subject of international law. However, it seems that this is not the case. From an impartial perspective, the treaty is indeed a significant step in this direction.

What gives us reason to assume that? We should start with the undeniable fact that someone in the State Duma is working to rescind the treaty in their belief that it will destroy Russia. In this article there is no need to prove to these 'democrats' that Russia requires democratisation and is still yet to become a democratic state. The treaty concluded between Russia and Tatarstan marks the beginning of such democratisation. Because democracy is not only the recognition of the rights of any person but first and foremost the implementation of regional rights and the refusal to submit to what the Centre dictates. President of Russia Boris Yeltsin, while fighting against the dictate of the Soviet Union's centre, said that it should be left with two-thirds of its important functions. He was right, of course. M. Gorbachev's mistake was not understanding it. And now we are where we are. Today, by signing the treaty, Yeltsin proves that he sticks to his previous position. He has probably learnt the notorious axiom that to save big things, you should concede the little things.

So what is the treaty about and what is its significance? I do not pretend to be the bearer of all truth, I merely want the reader to make their judgments on the issue knowing that this is just my own perception of it. The first thing I see in this document is the recognition of the initial sovereignty of Tatarstan. This is evidenced by the preamble to the Treaty, which highlights the unity of Tatarstan and the Russian Federation in a separate point. In order to unify two things, they must initially be separate. Therefore, the use of the notion of unity is in fact a recognition of Tatarstan's Declaration of State Independence. Simultaneously, the concept of both a singular and undivided Russia is being affected.

At the same time, the use of this vast notion takes Tatarstan beyond the status of a republic incorporated in the Russian Federation, for when the subjects of unification are clearly identified—that is, Tatarstan and the Russian Federation—it means that all other republics are part of it as well. And this is really so since they all signed the Federation Treaty. The relations between Russia and Tatarstan are beyond this document.

The agreement secured the referendum's results on Tatarstan status dated 21 March 1992. This can be proved by the following. First, the existence of agreements between Tatarstan and
Russia is a real fact. Second, via the recognition of Tatarstan's Constitution, sovereignty can be recognised in the form stated in Articles No. 1 and No. 61. Similarly, the legal standing of Tatarstan has been indirectly recognised in international law. In addition, it is reinforced by a number of articles of the agreement itself where the participation of Tatarstan in international organisations and relationships has been mentioned. And third, the recognition of the Constitution of Tatarstan will put an end to the requirements that it should be aligned with the Constitution of the Russian Federation on behalf of both authoritarians and those who refer to themselves as democrats. After all, this much is written in our Constitution in black and white about the rule of law of the Republic in Tatarstan. This is the main indicator and the main point of sovereignty.

It will not come as a surprise if anyone immediately objects to this, but let me ask you this: Is the unity of the Republic of Tatarstan with the Russian Federation only recognised in the Constitution of Tatarstan? Is this fact not also stated in the Constitution of the Russian Federation? And there is no doubt that these people will be right. The logic of their further thoughts on the matter may develop in the following way. Look at Article 65 of the Russian Constitution and you can see that Tatarstan is listed among other Federal subjects.

This is the very basis of how the unity of Tatarstan and Russia is expounded upon, and it is based on contradictory positions. The Constitutions of all states were considered as the legal framework of integration because a compromise needed to be found. This quite inevitable and rational compromise is an indicator of the reconciliation of contradictory documents. There is no doubt that the reference to both constitutions and the present Agreement is a mutual victory. Down the road, a lot of things will depend on the wisdom and competence of the people who implement it. From this point of view it is possible to consider that this is not just a weak point in the document but rather a weak point that can be turned into an advantage. And here are the reasons. If it is first and foremost a strengthening of a certain step forward towards interdependency, then secondly, the signing of the agreement makes Russia not a unitary but a federal state. This is even more the case with its elements of a confederation.

At the same time, the Agreement has a significant meaning for Russia itself as it was written to become an instrument for its democratisation via economic decentralisation, which president of Tatarstan M. Shaimiev has mentioned.

Will Russia develop as a single whole and an indivisible state with a highly centralised administration based on military force? Such a tendency is quite clear in the new military doctrine of Russia, according to which troops can be used to eliminate inner hotbeds of tension. Such a tendency can also be seen in the results of State Duma elections in the Russian Federation, primarily in the fact of the victory of the Party of V. Zhirinovsky. And not only in this. There are many people calling themselves democrats who uphold the slogan of a united and indivisible Russia. I would like to remind these people that the ideologist of this conception and the founder of the Cadet Party, professor of history P. Milyukov, eventually admitted that this very slogan killed them.

Meanwhile, the power and meaning of our Agreement is that it offers another chance for Russian development. To be exact, this means the chance to democratise using the principles of the asymmetry of the federation and economic decentralisation. However, this requires a certain amount of time as the matter in question is about overcoming known moods in the public consciousness. It is also about the necessity of certain changes in the Russian mentality.

The duty of the progressive public (primarily the humanitarian intelligentsia) is not to indulge backwards moods for the purpose of raising political capital but in the ability to distinguish and promote the aspects that correspond to the aims of stabilising society, getting the economy out of its slump, and ensuring social peace and international harmony.

The agreement between Tatarstan and Russia is exactly the document that may eventually become an instrument of social reorganisation based on democratic principles. No, of course
Chapter 3. New Relations between the Republic of Tatarstan and the Russian Federation

§ 4. The Meaning of the Legislation of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Tatarstan to Strengthen the Status of the Republic of Tatarstan

Farid Mukhametshin

At the turn of the 1980–1990s the Republic of Tatarstan was one of the first republics in the Russian Federation to really start to develop and implement in practice the concrete social process mechanisms to form a new model of the federal state system. The experience of Tatarstan in its enhancement of independence and in the legislative aspects of this process as well as in the creation of forms of interaction with the Federal Centre that are adequate to the features of a new epoch has been closely studied and adopted by many Russian regions since that time. The republic has acquired the status of a real contributor to the All-Russian political process, especially in regard to the generation of principles and mechanisms for the functioning of a democratic federative statehood.

There have also been symbolic changes in the Republic itself occurring simultaneously. Its own conception of social, political, and economic development, the emergence of a new statehood in the Republic, and the formation of an integrated legal and political system has been actively elaborated. This is why if one tries to group the events that make up the background of the developing political process in Tatarstan during the 1990s, a significant dynamic series of events emerges: the beginning of reforms in the economic and sociopolitical spheres; the process of increasing the state legal status of Tatarstan; the elections of the first president of the Republic; the development and legal accompaniment of the negotiation process with the Federal Centre. In addition, exactly during this period the declarations on the sovereignty of Tatarstan and the new Constitution were adopted, the Republic Referendum on increasing the status of Tatarstan was held, the Federal treaty was developed, and the delegation from Tatarstan participated in the Constitutional meeting.

At this time the developed legislative principles of interaction between the representative and executing branches of the state authorities of the republic passed the test on their strength and historical perspective with flying colours [News of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan, 1992, No. 1; No. 3]. Much experience was gained with the timely removal of contradictions and the exigent attitudes higher state authority institutions had towards one another.

From today's position compared to the ten-year period of the 1990s, three relatively independent stages can be distinguished in the contemporary history of the republic and subsequently in the development of the political and legal process. The first stage covers the period from April 1990 until November 1992, from the beginning of the 1st session of the XII Supreme Council of the Republic (1990–1995), until the adoption of the new Constitution of Tatarstan. Conventionally, this can be defined as the stage of the political self-determination of the republic.

Our Agreement must also become a developing factor for stability in the republic and its economy. Political events develop so rapidly that sometimes the public has no time to realise they are really happening. The signing of this agreement between Russia and Tatarstan is one such event. And its final evaluation can only come from life itself.
The second stage is the period of active work on the political and legal recognition of changes that took place in the republic. This stage is limited by the time frame from November 1992 through February 1994. Its final end point became the signing of the Agreement 'On the Delimitation of Jurisdictional Subjects and the Mutual Delegation of Authority between the State Bodies of the Russian Federation and the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan.'

The third stage started in February 1994 and was connected with the legitimisation of the principles of reforming the political structure of the republic and the beginning of the full-fledged socio-economic reform policy (recognised in accordance with federal, constitutional, and international law after signing the agreement 'On the Delimitation of Jurisdictional Subjects and the Mutual Delegation of Authority between the State Bodies of the Russian Federation and the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan').

At the basis of this periodisation are both purely exterior political and social factors. Within each stage the content of the activity of the Republican Parliament was much more connected with solving problems of a quite certain kind. In this respect the priority object of the stage has been the political self-determination of the republic and the republic's formation as a subject within the all-Russian political process. Accordingly, this is why the work of the higher bodies of state authorities was connected with the legislative and political guarantee of changes that took place in the republic.

The historical benchmark in the beginning of active politics on the reformation of the traditional foundations of the state system came on 30 August 1990, when the Supreme Council of Tatarstan proclaimed the Declaration on Sovereignty [News of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan, 1992, No. 1]. Special emphasis should be placed on the fact that the adoption of the Declaration was not just a contribution to the political fashion of the early 1990s for Tatarstan but rather a demonstration of its deep democratic processes. The trends in the renovation of the state and society at the end of the 1980s have been a powerful stimulus for the revival of national self-consciousness in the state's regions. Society in the republic persistently put forward demands to change the status of the republic, which for a long while no longer had any correspondence with the interests of its further sociopolitical and economic development.

The idea of sovereignty became a real organising factor. Most citizens of the republic supported the idea of changing the status of Tatarstan, which is rather clearly demonstrated by the voting results of the parliament of Tatarstan: 241 (1 deputy abstained from voting) out of 242 people's deputies, who were present at the Supreme Council of Tatarstan's meeting dated 30 August 1990, voted 'for' the adoption of the Declaration on Sovereignty of the republic.

The Declaration consolidated the rights of the Tatar nation and all the multinational people of the republic to self-determination, property, land, minerals, and natural resources. The Tatar and Russian languages were proclaimed as dual state languages, and all citizens were guaranteed equal liability before the law irrespective of their 'nationality, social status, or religious and political views.' Sovereignty was proclaimed with no reference to the initial legal standing that was in complete accordance with international legal norms.

It is quite telling that the Declaration on the sovereignty of Tatarstan was adopted soon after the Declaration on the sovereignty of the Russian Federation. This event served as a starting point for the national self-determination of nations in Russia and for the intensification of democratic reforms. The following sovereignisation process in the republics created the foundation for the formation of a democratic federation. In relation to this position, Tatarstan and its political and legal matters from that period should be considered in the context of Russian events, both past and future.

The course of the sociopolitical development taken in 1990 has passed the test of time. In contrast with many regions where sovereignisation led to international conflicts, the Declaration cemented the start of democratic reforms and preserved international agree-
ments with Tatarstan. It consolidated an observance of the interests of all citizens in the republic and the protection of their rights and freedoms as a main principle of development. After the end of the authoritarian epoch the image of the republic is more determined by the dynamism of innovative processes in the creation of a democratic and socially oriented state and by the real impact of the formation of a newly democratic Russian Federation. According to these two criteria, Tatarstan became an example of the consecutive politics of improving the independence of a republic.

Speaking about the meaning of the Declaration, one should note that its proclamation has been a timely answer to the historical challenge of the upcoming epoch. It has become an essential condition for Tatarstan to acquire self-independence and a guarantor of its advancing development; it has created powerful momentum for the formation of a new value system and guidelines for a world outlook across large swaths of the population. It accelerated the change of the forms of statehood and the stages of the national history of the republic.

Together with its adoption, the principles of a new democratic state formation—the Republic of Tatarstan—have been created. The establishment of the necessary political, legal, and social institutions and the formation of new kinds of international relationships have begun. The real breakthrough was the refusal of the republic from the federal policy of 'shock therapy' in the beginning of the 1990s and the development of its own strategy of a 'soft market entry.'

The declaration became the predominant factor for strengthening political stability and international unity. The republic managed to avoid social confrontation among the peoples of different nationalities. In accordance with the Constitution of Tatarstan, a multi-ethnic and multicultural society formed in the republic with the predominant aim of creating social conditions for the benefit of all multinational people. In addition, Tatarstan gained wide abilities for establishing direct partnership relations with Federal subjects and foreign countries, first of all in the field of economics, education, science, and culture. The republic fully integrated itself in the system of international relations.

This was precisely when the Supreme Council started working on legislation to provide a balance of national languages, cultures, and confessions in social life and state programmes for the development of national education, cultures, and the arts [News of the state council of the Republic of Tatarstan, 1996. No. 4, 8–10; 1998, No. 11; 1999, No. 8, 10]. The major role while making those decisions was granted to the strengthening of the role of the ethnic and sociocultural constituents of Tatar society in its way of life.

Said problems were considered priorities in the legislative sense as in the beginning of the 1990s on the eve of the Referendum (March 1992) the political situation in the Republic was rather strained. The condition of interethnic relations and the perception of related problems in that sphere in many respects were determined by the actions of a number of background factors that started becoming relevant as far back as Soviet times. Among them we can list: losses suffered by national cultures; extended negligence of authorities in the revival of the historical traditions of the Tatar people and of the entire country; the defect that took place in the personnel policy; the non-perception of the Russian-speaking population about the importance of national customs; the difficulties caused by the limited use of national languages. However, social consolidation processes can already be observed in the republic and have a tremendously positive influence on the socio-political climate in Tatar society.

This is why it is quite logical that on the day the Republic Referendum took place 1,309,000 people, or 61.3% of all people participated in the voting (that is 50.3% of the total number of all voters in the republic), answered 'yes' to the question 'Do you agree that the Republic of Tatarstan is a sovereign state and the subject of international law, and that its relations with the Russian Federation and other republics and states are built on equitable agreements?' Thus, more than half of the citizens of Tatarstan sup-
ported the key idea of the referendum, which is a necessity and encompasses the political expediency to increase the legal state status of the republic. The political strategy of the republic's authorities in the person of the president of Tatarstan, the Parliament, and the government for the achievement of equality with the Federal Centre found a lot of support.

The results of the Referendum let the republic make the next important step in the promotion of democracy and in the reinforcement of the economic independence of Tatarstan. It is also noteworthy that the Referendum contributed to the stabilisation of the political situation and the consolidation of international relations.

The most important step in the state sovereignty of the republic became the adoption of the Tatarstan Constitution dated 6 November 1992, where the basic human rights and freedoms that conformed to the Universal Declaration of Human rights were legitimised. The mutual responsibility of the citizen and the state with the priority of human rights as the highest social value was strengthened by Constitutional law. With the adoption of the Constitution in Tatarstan, a serious political step was made in developing an approach to the issue on the interaction of the Centre and its Subject in a democratic political structure, new approaches to the issues of nation-state building, civil society and constitutional state formation, and to the achievement and strengthening of interethnic agreements.

At the same time, the absence of a stable legal framework in developing relationships between the Centre and the regions could not but influence the intensification of contradictions between them when considering how Russian federalism was developing. Numerous attempts to get the negotiation process moving were made by both the Federal Centre and by the republics (which were much more active). Central authorities made a Federal agreement with the subordinate entities of the federation in April 1992. Only Tatarstan refused to sign it, and Bashkortostan signed it with the condition that the Federal agreement would be supplemented by bilateral agreement.

The main reasons for Tatarstan to refuse to sign this document were that less rights were provided in this document than the republic already had by that time. In fact, the Federal agreement was just an agreement for the delineation of authority between the federal government and its constituent members, so it did not determine federal nature of Russia and consequently did not warrant the preservation of independence of the republic in the implementation of the functions it stipulated. Further development of the federal political and legal process showed that during the preparation of the new Constitution of Russia the clause about the Federal agreement was in fact excluded from the constitutional process.

Contradictions that emerged between the Federal Centre and the Republic of Tatarstan during the Constitutional conference and that were not solved in negotiations resulted in the Tatarstan delegation announcing its incapability of further participating in it. The main controversial point was that the Federal Centre ignored the legislative initiative of the Republic of Tatarstan about the new perspective of federalism in Russia and the constitutionalisation in its main law charter of the constitutional and contractual relations between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan.

The second most important step in the contemporary history of the republic was logically related to the self-affirmation of Tatarstan as a subject of international relations. At this particular time the negotiation process between the Republic of Tatarstan with the Federal Centre began. The management of the republic always argued consistently for the signing of a bilateral treaty that acknowledges the rights of the republic and the results of the referendum, guarantees its brand new political and legal status, and asserts the idea of the formation of a new type of federal and international relations [see Šovetskaya Tataria, 18 December 1990; 16 February 1991, 11 July 1991; News of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan, 1992, Nos. 4, 5; 1993, Nos. 5–7, 11–12].

Its own system of law forming processes received an impetus during this period based on Tatarstan's Constitution, which became the initial legal base for the further development and enhancement of all branches of legislation of
Tatarstan. Supreme Commercial Court law, constitutional court law, civil service law, budget system and budget process law, and many other laws were adopted in regard to state construction. They were all intended to develop the statehood of the republic and reinforce its independence in the exercise of state authority functions.

Parliament adopted a number of laws that provided for economical transformations, land reform, and the privatisation and denationalisation of property in the republic. Creative approaches were used to come up with comprehensive solutions for social problems. First of all, this concerns laws and government programmes adopted by the Supreme Soviet and the republic government in its first years carrying out the reforms: National Economic Stabilisation and Transition into a Market Economy Programme; Targeted Social Protection of the Population Programme; Dismantling of Dilapidated Housing in Tatarstan in 1993–1995 and through 2002 Programme; State and Community Property Privatisation Programme; Republican Integrated Care Programme; Economic and Social Progress of Tatarstan Programme; Economic Demonopolisation and Product Market Development in the Republic Programme; and the Crime Prevention Programme.

Held on 12 December 1993, the All-Russian referendum on the new Russian Constitution project revealed that not only Tatarstan but many other member states of Russia were not at all satisfied with this project. After the Constitution of the Russian Federation was adopted, a controversial situation emerged. On the one hand, the basic laws of the federal state existed, but on the other hand, more than one-third of the regions did not accept them. The contractual process became a real way to settle this argument. The Treaty ‘On the Delimitation of Jurisdictional Subjects and the Mutual Delegation of Authority between the State Bodies of the Russian Federation and the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan’ revealed a new level of relations between Tatarstan and the Federal Centre—the level of the collaborative construction of a democratic federation where cooperation between the Centre and constituent entities is developed under due consideration for the interests of both parties.

Such a political and legal agreement had no precedent in the history of the Russian Federation. The further development of this political process both in the Russian Federation and the Republic showed that the position of Tatarstan to enter into a reciprocal agreement with the Federal Centre was correct, and the Republic itself was a leader in the development of integration processes in modern Russia. Later a number of agreements were signed with the other member states of the federation.

Considering the meaning of this document from the perspective of the second decade of the 21st century, it is important to note that this agreement was a triumph of political realism, when conflict and tension from the first years of Russian statehood between the Federal Centre and the federation’s subjects were solved by political means and compromises.

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This agreement meant the end of statehood and legal uncertainty between Moscow and Kazan and served as an important step in the reinforcement of the sociopolitical stability of society. Its signing appeased people of all nationalities in Tatarstan and knocked the feet out from under the political speculators of chauvinistic groups and extremist nationalists, not taking into account the possibility of tension in interethnic relationships. Conditions were created for the revival and all-encompassing development of the native language and culture of the Tatars and the other nations in the republic. Moreover, the fact of its appearance lent a powerful impulse to the evolutionary development of the Russian state on democratic principles. The government of Russia could then demonstrate to the world community its commitment to the legal methods of constructing a new Federation.

The Agreement reinforced the right of Tatarstan to deal independently with matters concerning the formation of a system of government authorities, the structure of its organisation, and its activity. But the main thing was to preserve mutual trust in society and to secure an environment that was free of antagonism from the various bodies of government. The Agreement intensified the process of creating the republic's legal base, taking into account the complexity of its specific character. In many spheres of law-making Tatarstan became an example of the active conquest of new political and legal grounds.

In the end, the Agreement was a major factor in the growth of the republic's economical independence. The State's social protection programme made it relatively easy for the population of the republic to endure the first blows of market disaster. A process of 'eased entry into the market,' the use of the government's regulatory role in the management of the economy and the social sphere, the evolutionary reformation of society with a particular focus on maintaining the population's standard of living, and many other measures made it possible to secure relative wealth for the republic's population, avoid disturbances and, ultimately, heated social conflicts. It is significant that many of Tatarstan's innovations were subsequently considered by the Federal Centre and spread as best practice among the republics and regions of the federation.

Moreover, the Agreement made it possible to influence the process of preparation and decision-making at the level of the Federal Centre with regard to issues that affected the interests of the republic. In this context very complex work on refining the model for mutually beneficial relations was started in 1994, which took into account the interests of the multinational population of Tatarstan and of the Russian Federation as a whole.

By the end of the second stage (November 1992–February 1994) of top-priority in the activities of the government and administrative bodies were issues concerning the comprehensive legal framework covering life in the Republic of Tatarstan as a competent political and state entity.

In evaluating the development of the political process in the post-agreement period as a whole, it should be emphasised that this development is associated with the appearance of an essentially new social situation, the removal of a lot of contradictions between Tatarstan and the federation, and the strengthening of social stability in republic. This in turn affected the attitude of the voters towards the policy pursued by the authorities. It is no coincidence that the main task to which the representative and executive authorities applied themselves as part of the third stage was the maximum possible reduction of the crisis period that started in the 1990s.

Thanks to the agreements reached with the Federal Centre, the republic was one of the first in the Russian Federation to embark upon the path of innovative transformations, having chosen a quite unique way of entering the market economy. What this refers to is a special approach to the development and adopting of a strategy for managing social processes. As a result of the social protection measures in Tatarstan during the first stage of the reforms, the negative consequences of the 'shock therapy,' caused by a breach of economic ties and a high level of inflation, were significantly mitigated.
The 'eased entry into the market,' provided for in law, allowed for stability to be maintained in society and social disturbances to be avoided. This all contributed to the formation of brand new approaches to the evaluation of the state of and perspectives for the development of the social and economic sectors and the content of the socio-economic strategies.

As a logical consequence of reforms started in 1996, the State Programme of Economical and Social Progress of Tatarstan was adopted, which defined a conceptual model for the development of the republic, specifying the aims of the next stage of reforms and the methods and mechanisms for their achievement. Enhancing the quality of life of the people and building a socially oriented market economy were declared the primary aims of this programme. As part of the federal economic area, Tatarstan had a duty to become a stable and dynamically developing part of it. Hence, the model for Tatarstan was an economy with a stable growth, integrated into the world economy of the future and brought into action by means of foreign investments at the expense of a high added value of goods and services under the active regulation of the government.

§ 5. Tatarstan: the Strategy of 'Eased Entry into the Market'

Filza Khamidullin, Vadim Khomenko

Throughout the 1990s the Republic of Tatarstan followed a policy of 'eased entry into the market.' A special legal basis was formed for this purpose. The 'Programme for Stabilisation of the National Economy of the TSSR and Transition to Market Conditions,' the 'Land Code,' the laws on land reform, peasant (farm) holdings, property in the TSSR, and on the budget structure and budget process in the republic were adopted as early as 1991.

But the Tatarstan model of entry into the market was quite specific. It was focused on the gradual adaptation of the socio-economic sphere to the new conditions of economic management for the purpose of preventing the destabilisation of the relevant vital processes within the republic. To a large extent, the opportunity for implementing this model arose during the process of concluding the treaty 'On the Delimitation of Jurisdictional Subjects and the Mutual Delegation of Authority between the State Bodies of the Russian Federation and the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan' dated 14 February 1994. There is still no unambiguous interpretation of the results of the 'eased entry into the market' by specialists, although it cannot be denied that the development of the republic during this period was free of essential cataclysms, and the republic differed posi-
tively from other regions of Russia on many key estimated figures.

In this regard it is important to establish what the positive potential of the Tatarstan model entailed as well as the parameters of socio-economic development that were not attained owing to certain drawbacks with the model. This is important not only from a historical perspective but also in terms of predicting the development of the Tatarstan and Russian society. It is difficult, however, to separate economical, social, and often political aspects, which in this case are interrelated and interdependent. In this connection, a full consideration of the results of the relevant stage of development in Tatarstan is required for a determination of the different positions that will objectively be essential as part of a prospective model for the development of the republic.

The period of 'eased entry into the market' should be regarded as including the crisis year of 1998 and the following 4–5 years, when a correction of the relevant management model was implemented based on an evaluation of its resistance to cyclical market fluctuations.

The Economy. Throughout the first half of the 1990s all the main branches of industry were characterised by a decline in output, which was only stopped in 1995—that is, earlier than in the Russian Federation as a whole, thanks to the measures taken in the Tatarstan Republic with the aim of supporting the manufacturers of goods. Industrial production started to grow in 1999. This was quite a dynamic process for Tatarstan, compared not only with its neighbouring leading regions but also with purely oil-extraction and production regions, such as the Khanty-Mansi autonomous district. Thus, by 2004 industrial production in the republic reached the level of 1990, while in a comparable autonomous region it was only 90% in the same year. This figure was lower in other relatively 'strong' neighbouring regions (Samara oblast, Perm krai, Bashkortostan Republic, Nizhny Novgorod oblast, Sverdlovsk oblast).

The dynamics of the development of industrial production in Tatarstan was determined by:

- Preserving the ability to manage the investment process constructively in the period of the privatisation of property, when there was no clearly expressed private interest for major development projects and qualified corporate management. This was achieved by keeping the necessary volume of shares in privatised major revenue-generating enterprises with the republic's government authorities and placing them in specialised state holding companies for the purpose of administration.
- Keeping the necessary and sufficient sources of investments in a treaty-making process between the Republic of Tatarstan and the Federal Centre, in which the tax-sharing rate corresponded to the reality of the federal state of that time.
- A definite positive growth in oil prices.

In spite of the depletion of its oilfields, Tatarstan set itself the task of stabilising its oil extraction and even a certain growth, for which a proportion of the tax revenues were used, and tax concessions were created, as provided for by the the Federal Agreement.

Such an understanding of the 'eased entry into the market' differs from its more widespread interpretation, which is ostensibly based on the existence of considerable economic resources and special fiscal relations with the Federal Centre. The government factor in the management of the investment process is lacking in such a definition (Table 3.1).

As can be seen in Table 3.1, between 1995 and 2003 the Republic of Tatarstan managed to increase its proportion of mechanical engineering considerably: from 20% to 24%, making it greater than in Russia as a whole. Nevertheless, it is important to note that, upon completion of the 'eased entry into the market,' Tatarstan failed to restore the high-technology cost structure of industrial production that existed in 1991, a time of exponential advances in mechanical engineering, chemistry, and petrochemistry.

Tatarstan, besides retaining its industrial positions, became one of the top five major agricultural producers and an important grain producer as well. In 1996 the republic occupied the leading position in the Russian Fed-
eration for the gross output of grain, outstripping such strong grain regions as the Stavropol district and the Rostov oblast. Special support programmes were targeted at both small newly-emerging and large-scale agricultural undertakings. Undoubtedly, it is important to realise that, in addition to subsidies, the survival of agriculture depended on the work ethics of the rural, predominantly Tatar, population. Villages in Tatarstan are better developed than those in neighbouring regions. The traditions of large-scale subsidiary farming have been preserved here. This contrasts with the deteriorating villages outside the republic, primarily in the Non-Black Earth Zone.

However, Tatarstan was not able to develop its services market adequately during the period of 'eased entry into the market.' The development of cellular communications and the Internet, which lagged behind the leading regions, was restrained. This situation started to change soon after the period of 'eased entry into the market,' when large-scale trading and hotel networks (including international) started to appear, the market for paid services improved, and consumer standards changed for residents of the larger cities of Tatarstan.

**Employment of the Population.** By preserving its industrial and agricultural potential, Tatarstan has managed to secure maximum employment and minimum unemployment rates. However, the nature of the unemployment trend reflected tendencies in the rest of Russia—an increase of its 1999 level to more than 11% with a subsequent gradual decrease by 2002 to a level of less than 6%, which represented the lowest value of this index among the neighbouring Russian regions, except for the Samara oblast.

The general tendency of changes in the structure of the working population bears witness to the fact that the number of people employed in trade and the services sector in Tatarstan is predictably increasing, which corresponds to the situation in countries with a market economy. At the same time, however, the proportion of administrative bodies has dynamically increased, approaching the general Russian level (Table 3.2), although the realities of the market economy assumed there would be an opposite trend.

A specific peculiarity in the formation of the Tatarstan labour market in the period concerned was the accumulation of hidden unemployment in rural areas at its officially low level. No more than 12% of all registered unemployed persons lived in rural areas. However, if on average there were two people to one vacancy in the republic, then in many remote rural areas there were more than 50. The population of the Tatar villages were less favourably inclined towards the practice of carrying out seasonal work in other branches of industry, which was developed in many Russian regions, and this was also a factor of the dynamics of this process. The situation was made worse by the fact that the proportion of unemployed persons was higher among rural women in Tatarstan than in Russia as a whole.

As a result of the changes in the structure of the industrial production in Tatarstan, as in other regions of Russia, there arose the problem of 'single-industry towns,' where production was represented by 1–2 main fac-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Power sector</th>
<th>Fuel</th>
<th>Chemistry and petrochemistry</th>
<th>Machinery construction</th>
<th>Foodstuff</th>
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<td>12</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
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<td>1995</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>24</td>
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</table>
Section III. The Republic of Tatarstan and the Tatar World at the Turn of the Millennia

Tatarstan has natural advantages (for instance, in the field of transportation, tourism, etc., determined by the republic's location at the crossroads of international transport corridors, its recreational potential, and so on), were subsequently exacerbated all the more acutely during the period of global depression of 2008–2009.

**The population's income and social development.** Throughout the period of 'eased entry into the market,' Tatarstan secured the necessary level of subsistence for its population, measured by the ratio of monetary income to the minimum subsistence level, which in 2003 had reached a level of 280%. According to this index, the republic was ahead of the majority of its strong neighbouring regions, such as the Nizhny Novgorod oblast (221%), the Perm krai (232%), the Republic of Bashkortostan (278%), yielding only to the Samara oblast, where this index was around 300% by 2003.

However, the mechanism for the maintenance of this level had essential differences. In this mechanism emphasis was placed on securing low tariffs on housing maintenance and utilities board (HMB), public transport, and subsidies on main foodstuffs. In this respect, in terms of salary and average income per capita, Tatarstan was not the leader. Such an approach was compulsory and had a clearly non-market character. But the method of such a 'manual regulation' was necessary because time was needed for the formation of the necessary ratios between wages and prices for services and goods. Under conditions of monopoly, the free movement of prices could lead to a general disproportionality and possible social tension. But here it was important to abandon such managerial impact in time and to secure the necessary market principle of interaction between business partners, ensuring normal market compe-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Agriculture</th>
<th>Construction</th>
<th>Transportation and communication</th>
<th>Commerce, catering</th>
<th>Housing maintenance and utilities board</th>
<th>Social sphere</th>
<th>Management</th>
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<td></td>
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<td>13.4</td>
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<td>12.1</td>
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<td>11.0</td>
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<td>4.9</td>
<td>18.1</td>
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Chapter 3. New Relations between the Republic of Tatarstan and the Russian Federation

... and a reduced dependency on the welfare state. This was subsequently accomplished. But the question of whether this point in time was the right choice remains unanswered because until recently Tatarstan lagged behind both the Samara oblast and Perm krai in terms of earnings. It is also apparent that an increase in salary at the initiative of employers is a longer and more complicated process than the regulation of prices and the introduction of subsidies.

The 'eased entry into the market' was accompanied by an attempt to restrict the excessive stratification of the population according to income level. However, it was extremely difficult to achieve this, and Tatarstan swiftly 'caught up with' Russia. Thus, in 2003 alone the ratio of the income of 10% of the wealthiest persons in the republic to 10% of the poorest increased from 11.8 to 13.1 times, while on average in Russia it increased from 14.0 to 14.3 times. The levels of income in the economic and social sectors were largely equal in Tatarstan. Thus, if in 2002 the ratio of the average pay in the agricultural sector to the average pay in the republic as a whole was greater than 40%, then in the Samara oblast it was less than 40%. In industry in the former region this index was a little over 120%, whereas in the latter one it exceeded 130%. Appropriate efforts were made to disallow the stratification of the population's income and earnings in terms of regions and centres of population (territories). But restraining such a process of differentiation in incomes was objectively impossible, considering the difference in the sectoral structure of the republic's regions and the gradual concentration of private capital in the profitable sectors of the individual territories. Thus, the oil-producing city of Almetyevsk, becoming increasingly separated from the other municipalities, assumed a leading position, whereas the situation in respect of earnings clearly worsened in the machine-building cities of Yelabuga, and in particular Zelenodolsk, during the 'eased entry into the market.' Thus, whereas the ratio of the average pay in Almetyevsk to the average pay within the republic in 1998 was around 150%, in 2003 it already approached 180%. By contrast, in Zelenodolsk, for example, this figure, which was around 90% in 1998, had decreased to 80% by 2003.

The sharp decrease in the influx of students into the sphere of professional education appeared paradoxical against a background of relatively well-preserved industrial production and agriculture, ensuring the population's income in the main sectors of the economy. At the beginning of the present century the number of students in professional educational institutions per 10 thousand people was the lowest in the Volga federal district. At the same time, more intensively than on average within the country, the number of students at universities increased 2.8 times between 1995 and 2004 (in the Russian Federation, 2.3 times). It was here where market relations in the field of higher education, having no special restrictions, were swiftly developed. The proportion of students at non-state institutions of higher education in Tatarstan in the 2003/2004 academic year was approximately 22%, compared with 13% in the Russian Federation. This led, on the one hand, to a certain devaluation of the level of education and, on the other hand, to a staffing imbalance, the consequences of which were felt much later.

The special approach to the regulation of the incomes and standard of living of the Tatarstan population was underpinned by the implementation of wide-ranging programmes of housing development and gas supply. Thus, gas supply became practically universal in the cities and rural areas (over 96%), central heating was provided in 97% of the housing stock in the cities and 80% in the rural areas. The introduction of mechanisms for the financial support of housing has allowed Tatarstan to become one of the leaders in housing construction per capita, where at the beginning of this century it remained behind only the Moscow, Astrakhan, and Belgorod oblasts, the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous district, and Moscow. Simultaneously, a programme of clearing derelict and dangerous dwellings was also implemented.

**Final demographic and integral indices of the 'eased entry into the market'**. The re-
sults of the socio-economic reforms are most accurately and comprehensively demonstrated by the demographic processes. From this perspective of evaluation, Tatarstan's position during the period in question differed positively against the background of 'demographic crisis' that had spread throughout the majority of the Russian regions, the consequences of which are still being felt.

By the beginning of 1990s the republic had maintained a higher level of natural growth than that of the central and north-west regions of Russia. But in 1993 the natural increase had already turned into decrease, which was defined by the global consequences of the 'shock therapy,' applied throughout the Russian Federation. However, in comparison with the other regions of Russia, the decrease in the population was moderate. Thus, the overall birth rate in 2003 did not differ from the national average (10.2 per mille), and the death rate was lower than that of Central Russia (13.8 and 16.4 per mille, respectively).

To a certain degree, the decrease in the population of Tatarstan was triggered by an increase in the child death rate in comparison with other strong Russian regions, despite its general decrease during the period of time concerned. Thus, whereas in 2002 this index in Tatarstan was 12 per mille, compared with over 13 per mille in the Russian Federation as a whole, in the Samara oblast it was just over 8 per mille, and in Saint Petersburg, less than 7 per mille. The reasons for this were the low level of urbanisation and the availability of transport in the rural areas of the republic.

Having the status of a socially attractive region, Tatarstan made up for the natural decrease of its population with a migratory influx of the population, which was greater than that experienced in the Trans-Volga federal district and in Russia as a whole. At the beginning of the 2000s the burdensome migrations from the CIS came to an end, and the volume of migrations to Tatarstan decreased noticeably. From this point it started to compensate for a little more than half of its natural decrease. However, in the neighbouring Samara and Nizhny Novgorod oblasts the volume of migration made up for only 5%-15% of the decrease in the population during this period.

At the same time, it should be noted that the degree of Tatarstan's attractiveness for the Russian and Tatar population migrating from nearby areas varied in favour of the latter. An active migration of the Tatar population within Russia to Tatarstan was also observed, which as a result was instrumental in changing the overall balance of the population in favour of the titular ethnic group. There does not appear to be any significant 'infusion' of the Russian population during this period, unlike previous periods, which saw the development of oil fields and the construction of great industrial complexes. In summary, whereas the Tatars accounted for 44.3% of the population by the time the Tatar ASSR was formed in 1920, in 2002 this figure had risen to 52.9%. The long-term forecast of this trend requires political and sociological, rather than economic, analysis.

It was very important that a viable network of rural settlements was maintained in the republic. Their average population size exceeds 300 inhabitants. Against the background of the 'extinction' of villages in the Russian Federation in general, such a situation was quite a unique event and had become the subject of the close attention of both native and foreign specialists.

There was an overall increase in the population of the cities, except for Chistopol (Table 3.3).

At the end of the day, it should be emphasised that Tatarstan was one of the very few regions of Russia in which the size of the population in 2004 exceeded that of 1989.

In the index for the development of human potential the republic was in the top three leading positions. This was mainly achieved through the index of the level of income and the somewhat higher index of longevity. Moreover, Tatarstan scored more highly in the 'critical' index of quality of life thanks to its social policies.

However, on the factorial indices ensuring the dynamics of high-tech development the republic's positions were rather mediocre. In
the standard of education it lagged behind the most developed regions. And on the innovation index the republic only occupied the 11th position by the end of the period of transition to a market economy, lagging behind the leaders in almost all aspects, except for the private indices of the number of university students and the spread of cellular communication.

Thus, the strongest package of measures of government social support for the economy and the population during the period of 'eased entry into the market' was obvious. It weakened the inevitable negative consequences of the fast-track 'shock transition' to a market economy, where the absence of structured mature market mechanisms for supporting the necessary socio-economic aspects of development and a general social business responsibility could lead to a general economic recession and social cataclysms. The issues of the timing, depth of content, and mechanisms of such governmental regulation will be an object of study for years to come and undoubtedly will be subject to a certain level of criticism because not everything is arranged according to the standard classical schemes, and the process frequently encounters legal discordance with the Russian legislation. It is probable that certain sectors of the market and market institutions were formed in Tatarstan at a later stage than in the other progressive regions of Russia. Just as the development of forms of democracy in the political sphere was delayed, which was reflected in the ratings and evaluations of specialists. But the necessity of an 'eased entry into the market' in general clearly finds more supporters than opponents in view of the high degree of pragmatism and orientation towards the social parameters of economic development.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cities</th>
<th>Population, in thousand</th>
<th>Dynamics, %</th>
<th>Ratio in general population, %</th>
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<tr>
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<td>875.1</td>
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§ 6. Federative Relations in 1990s and their Role in the Consolidation of Russian Integrity

Emil Pain

In the first years of the new Russia existence the forces interested in the preservation of its unity were extremely weak. The leaders of the national movements of the non-Russian nations attempted to achieve sovereignty for 'their' republics. However, Russian nationalists did little to support the consolidation of All-Russian unity since they dreamed of re-establishment of the USSR.

After the Russian republics demonstrated 'a parade of sovereignties,' the Russian districts and regions were overcome by an overwhelming desire to achieve a higher status. Even the administrative districts of some cities issued declarations of sovereignty. The momentum of the disintegration of the USSR began to gather strength. No one at that time knew when it would end and what level of territorial integrity would be finally realised.

To a significant degree the political situation required president B. Yeltsin to adopt a political strategy aimed at the regional elites, which at that time were the most active segments of society. It was a policy based on negotiation, compromises, and give-and-take on the part of the Federal Government and the leaders of republics. I believe this policy went a long way to overcoming the negativity federative relations. The agreements between the Federal Centre and governmental bodies of the regional Federation subjects as well as the social contract signed by all the federation subjects, except for the Chechen Republic, significantly restricted the republican, district, and regional leaders from declaring the independence from the federation. They all recognised that the '...achievement of rights of the federation subjects is possible only through the governmental unity of Russia, its political, economic, and legal unity' [Dogovor, 1994].

The new political order established in Russia from the end of 1993 assumed not only the formal but also verbal agreements between Yeltsin and the leaders of the republics. Since that time no demonstration of ethnic separatism has been observed, with the exception of the conflict with the Chechen Republic, which did not participate in the negotiations with the Russian leaders at that time.

These changes were noticed by Russian public opinion. In the collective Russian mind the confidence in Russian began to strengthen. Most importantly, the threat of armed conflicts, which is an inevitable companion of the disintegration of the country, also began to decrease. Sociological studies were indisputable evidence in support of this (Table 3.4).

The table shows that in 1993 there was an important change in the collective consciousness of the Russians. If in the first two years of the post-Soviet Russia more than a half of those interviewed lived in fear of armed conflicts, then by the end of 1993 the majority of Russian citizens demonstrated a certain optimism. The politics of negotiations and compromises produced a result. However, as time passed this policy began to be perceived in the consciousness of the majority of Russians as a strategy of one-sided compromise towards the republicans and the beginning of the disintegration of Russia. Some even saw malicious intent. 'Those people who undermined the USSR are now undermining Russia.'

For the most part such ideas did not coincide with reality. For instance, Yeltsin's celebrated phrase: 'Take as much sovereignty as you can swallow.' The phrase uttered by him in Tatarstan in 1992 was seen almost as the beginning of disintegration of Russia. However, it was said not before but after 'the parade of sovereignties,' thus far from encouraging the republic to take more sovereignty, it heralded the process of stabilisation of the regions and the Federal Centre.

From the year 2000 onwards the agreement between the Federal government and Tatarstan became a matter of growing criticism. However, in actual fact it was as beneficial to the
Republic as for the federation as a whole. It led to the significant weakening of the nationalistic tendencies in the republic, whose influence was almost totally founded on inciting fear amongst the population of the image of the 'Imperialist enemy.' The agreement between Moscow and Kazan strongly 'lessened' that image in the mind of the citizens of the republic. The agreement did not cancel any legislative acts that had previously been passed in the republic but in practice rendered them harmless in terms of the integrity of the country. The borders of admissible compromises to the republics on the part of the federal power were determined by its ability to control the main levers of influence on the regions: financial system, transport, main pipelines, and, of course, armed forces. Predictably, the radical Tatar nationalists took an extremely negatively view of the Agreement between the Federal Centre and Tatarstan.

At the second All-Tatar congress, on February 1994, 655 delegates judged the agreement as the capitulation in the face of 'an imperial centre.' As Fauziya Bayramova declared, 'we were defeated, and by signing the Agreement on 15 February in Moscow the republic was thrown back in 1989' [Politicheskie partii Tatarstan].

The widespread views of the injustice and the unfairness of tax remissions to a number of the republics are also a matter of dispute. For example, today not only public opinion but also the majority of professional economists take a negative view of the idea to set up an off-shore zone in Ingushetia. However, in my opinion, it is impossible not to agree with former secretary of the Security Council of Russia I. Rybkin, who emphasised that without such a zone it would have been impossible to prevent the involvement of Ingushetia in the Chechen conflict [Rybkin, Dubnov, 2003, p. 15]. Tax losses from the off-shore zone are insignificant when compared with the possible losses to the budget from a war with Ingushetia, not to mention the inevitable human losses.

When assessing the influence of social perceptions on politics, the extent to which they are realistic is not so important. If perceptions occur and enter the mass consciousness, then they can influence the political process no less than reality. The famous sociological Thomas theorem says: 'If people determine situations as real, they are real according to their consequences' [Thomas, 1918, p. 79]. I consider that such a reality, formed on mass and mainly mythological ideas, gave rise to the modern strategy whose key ideas were based upon the formation of 'a single executive vertical line' and restriction of the political role of the regional elites, primarily the republic leaders. Voters want things to be ordered, so there is nothing easier than to imitate this by creating federal districts led by generals. The voters were dissatisfied with the 'regional barons' assuming too much power for themselves, so an effective approach was used to remove leaders of a given region from the Council of the Federation.

Chechen politics in many respects determined the approach and methods of resolving a series of regional and national (ethnic) problems. The method consists of pressure (not necessarily military), but harsh pressure, which guarantees absolute obedience on the part of the regional leaders to the Kremlin. If in 1990s the Federal Centre divided the regional

**Table 3.4**

| Breakdown of Answers to the Question: 'In your Opinion, what is the Likelihood of Armed Conflicts in the Coming Months in Russia?'* |
|---------------------------------|---|---|---|
| Answer options                  | 1991 December | 1992 December | 1993 December |
| Probable (to this or that extent)| 55 | 51 | 27 |
| Improbable                      | 25 | 30 | 50 |

* According to materials from studies by the Russian Public Opinion Research Centre.
leaders into 'friends—democrats' and 'foes—communists,' then in 2000s a new strategy was adopted—that of the total subordination of the regional elites. These changes, in my opinion, were characterised by the former governor of the Novgorod oblast Mikhail Prusak, who said that earlier governors were white and red for Kremlin, but now they are the same—'everyone is bad' [Quotation according to Tsukanova, 2000].

The question which needs to be asked now is: Whether there was a real danger of the disintegration of the state?

As already mentioned, from the mid-1990s in the Russian regions there was no serious demonstration of separatism, except for the Chechen separatism, which still exists today. This is a period when according to V. Putin the 'scattering of the state organisation is in the past.'

The sustainability of the Russian federative system underwent a test of strength during the period of an economic crises in 1998, despite initial fears that it would push the federation towards inevitable disintegration.

After the declaration of default by the federal government, practically all the regions began taking economic self-defence measures that seemed to be a real threat to the preservation of the economic unity of the country. Thus, according to the materials of the Russian Federal State Statistics Service, by September 1998, 79 regions introduced administrative price regulation on foodstuff and prohibition (or limitation) of its removal from a corresponding region. The press started saying that 'food separatism is stronger than a political one' [Konovalov, 1998, p. 1]. The actions of a number of regions to isolate a regional finance system and refuse to pay taxes into the federal budget looked even more terrible (Table 3.5).

Such actions gave cause for Russian politicians to speak about the disintegration of Russia, as though it was a fait accompli. CIS Executive secretary Boris Berezovsky spoke of the real danger 'of losing' Russia on 2 September 1998 [E` xo Moskvy', 1998]. Following him, on 3 September the Krasnoyarsk governor Alexandr Lebed admitted the same danger [NTV, 1998]. One week later the leader of pro-government duma fraction of NDR Alexandr Shokin directly accused the president of Russia (at that time it was possible) of his incapacity to preserve a financial economic and, as a result, the political unity of Russia. As for publicists and scientists, they literally competed with each other for the most gloomy forecasts of disintegration of Russia. If the journalist A. Venediktov based his assumption that disintegration was a momentary act and called 17 August as the day 'when the Russian territories and regions will start living a separate life from Moscow and the Federal Government' [E` xo Moskvy', 1998], then the historian V. Loginov accepted the disintegration of Russia as the inevitable process and gave it an entire epoch [REN-TV, 1998].

At the same time, the ideas of introduction of the extreme administrative measures to standardise the situation became popular. The Sakhalin governor Igor Farkhutdinov offered the abolition of republics and the introduction of a province form of government. The governor of the Yaroslavl oblast Anatoly Lisitsyn offered to fill a vacuum of power by the formation of 'federal districts' within eight regional associations of economic cooperation. It was, according to the governor's idea, 'to help the Russian State, Government, and Administration of the President to form a vertical line of power which would be working and mutual-obliged. That idea much resembles the form that was realised by Putin in 2000. The same words about 'a vertical line of power' and the same level of communication of the federal power not with 89 leaders of the federation subjects but with the leaders of just a few regional districts. It is true that Putin formed just seven districts instead of the suggested eight ones, and not within economic associations but within military districts. Lisitsyn's idea of mutual obligations between the centre and regions also was not realised, instead of that the system of direct submission of subordination was created. However, this is not the most important element. Neither then nor later has there been any need for extreme administrative measures since Russia already possessed ordinary, I
would even say, classical mechanisms which surely ensured unity of the federation.

Even three weeks after the default and shock, which paralysed the entire executive system, the federal government implemented the ordinary legal mechanisms to overcome the economic autonomy. The usage of them led to an unexpectedly rapid breakthrough. So on 23 September Yury Skuratov ordered the public prosecutor of the regions of the federation to review the legality of the actions of the local authorities [TASS, 1998]. On the very next day there were appeals against them. Many officials, albeit not the leading ones, but just executive officials, were charged with criminal offences. Even earlier (on 10 September) the Central Russian bank revoked the license of the Kalmykiya Bank, in fact liquidated it. The republic paid an expensive price for attempting to take funds which were aimed for paying the federal taxes.

The market quite quickly and inflexibly dealt with ‘agricultural separatism.’ Those districts and regions that had restricted the removal of provisions in response no longer received fuel and lubricants (this was in September during the harvest campaign), so they had to cancel their decisions on their own. The experiment of administrative price freezing did not turn out well in any region. Two months after the August crisis, by October 1998, there was no trace of demonstration of an economic separatism in Russia, and today only analysts remember about that episode. Even during that period one may confidently speak about the end of ‘disintegration of the state system.’

### Table 3.5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Autonomous actions</th>
<th>Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Establishing a pool of regional banks, limiting an activity area of Moscow banks</td>
<td>Samara oblast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Isolating a regional cash system</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introducing 'a regime of extreme economic situation'</td>
<td>Kaliningrad Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishing a regional gold reserve</td>
<td>Kemerovo oblast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interrupting tax payments to the federal budget</td>
<td>Bashkirlia, Kalmykia, Tataria, Tomsk oblast, Khabarovsk krai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax revenues to the federal budget are independently deducted to the republican budget.</td>
<td>Kalmykia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* According to materials from the Russian mass media in August—September 1998.

§ 7. The Establishment of the Worldwide Tatar Congress

*Rinat Zakirov*

By 1992 the Tatar national movement had a mass character. Of course, national organisations had different political orientation, offered different ways to solve accumulated problems, but all of them served the mutual great purpose—the revival of the state system and the preservation of the national Tatar originality. It should be admitted that a major change occurred at that time within the views of the Tatarstan authorities. Obviously, the republic leaders realised that delay of solving national problems was fraught with loss of control over
the situation. Under the conditions of a radical turn-about the decision was made to hold the First Worldwide Tatar Congress in 1992.

The First Worldwide Tatar Congress was opened on 19 June 1992 in Kazan. More than 1,000 delegates arrived from different regions of Russia and other countries. Among them there were the representatives of the Tatar nation from the U.S.A., Canada, Australia, China, Japan, Turkey, Finland, Poland, Romania, etc. The Worldwide Tatar Congress caused an extraordinary rise of the national spirit, it was perceived as a holiday of unity of compatriots. All the participants admitted with one mind that Kazan was the centre of national culture and Tatar civilisation.

For the first time, on such a high forum vitally important problems of the Tatar nation, scattered along the whole world, were called into question. The basis of a principally new approach to the national problems was laid, which some time later formed a new revision of the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan.

At the Congress the question of the status of the official languages in Tatarstan and Russia was raised. The main topic was the status of the Tatar language. As the president of the Tatarstan Academy of Sciences M. Khasanov noted in front of the whole cultural public opinion the question complexly appeared about the elaboration of a scientific basis and methods to make the Tatar language a real component of the official language [World congress of the Tatars, 1992, p. 214].

There is no doubt that the first Congress took place in an atmosphere of an emotional elation. It was difficult to combine such sentiments with the necessary efficiency and precise working agenda. Nevertheless, the resolution of the first Worldwide Tatar Congress has a great historic interest. Both the evaluation of the situation in the country and the idea of revival of the state system, national originality of the Tatar nation, preservation and development of the native language were reflected within that. The complete support of the government sovereignty of Tatarstan and observance of the human and nation rights were expressed in the resolution. It was a call to unite the Tatars all over the world under the banner of national revival.

At the plenary session of the Congress the Executive Committee was formed. I. Tagirov was elected as its chairman, while under the Executive Committee the Foundation was established. Without exaggeration, one may argue that the Congress opened a new era in the long history of the Tatar people. The organisational structures of the Worldwide Tatar Congress have been successful for two decades.

The superior Congress body is a conference convened not less than one time during 5 years. During the period between conferences the Executive Committee, elected by the Congress with a term of office in 5 years, manages the Congress activity. The Executive Committee is a constantly active governing body of the Congress. The chairman of the Executive Committee of WCT, who at the same time is a member of Bureau, is elected during the session of the Executive Committee by the majority of its members with a term of 5 years. The chairman organises the sessions of the Executive Committee, of its Bureau, coordinates the work of his deputies and expert groups, commissions, and councils, and represents the WCT and its Executive Committee in state bodies, public associations, and international organisations.

The Congress includes public associations—legal persons who act according to their own statues and also to the Congress statute. The Congress may form sections and open representative offices both in the Russian Federation and abroad; they realise their activity on behalf of the Congress.

The main Congress goals are:

– Consolidation of the Tatar nation and its social associations
– Assistance to the social, economic, national, cultural, political, and spiritual development of Tatarstan, consolidation of its state system
– Participation in the development of programmes and mechanisms of realisation of the cultural national autonomy of the Tatar nation in regions where they live
– Participation in research and peacemaking activity
The Congress must perform the following tasks:

– Comprehensively assist the social, economic, national, and cultural development of Tatarstan

– Participate in the activity of solving the ethnic-regional problems of the Tatars on the basis of observance of general democratic principles, rules of international law, and statutes of the countries in which the Tatars live

– Develop and support the implementation of special programmes in the field of national cultural development—language, science, education, culture, historic heritage, national pedagogics, demography, and so on

– Participate in the preparation and realisation of analytical, research, and expert works, elaborate practical recommendations for the governmental and public organisations as well as law projects and international agreements

– Regularly interact with the Tatar diaspora, non-governmental international organisations

The fundamental principles of the Congress activity:

– Recognition of the rights of the Tatar nation and other nations on self-determination, preservation of the national language, education, culture, customs

– Recognition of the priority of national unity over ideological and class beliefs and prejudices

– Recognition and an absolute observance of the laws of the Republic of Tatarstan, the Russian Federation, and other Tatar lands of living as well as the norms of the international right and requirements of international agreements

– Solution of the national and political problems on a rightful basis through civilised democratic means

The objectives of the Congress activities are:

– Collection and analysis of information on social, cultural, and legal status of the Tatar population in the regions of the Tatar living regions and, if necessary, providing them with legal assistance

– Participation in practical work to resolve ethnic-regional problems of the Tatars, cooperation with state and municipal structures, public, cultural, educational, and research organisations, media, international humanitarian organisations working on the national and cultural development

– Participation in the development and assistance in realisation of target programmes in the field of cultural development

– Participation in the development of practical recommendations for the public and other organisations as well as making the laws and international agreements

– Collection and spreading of information on the Republic of Tatarstan and Tatar nation, the publication of newspapers and magazines, audio and video products, interaction with media in the Tatar living regions

– Summarisation of the experience of the local Congress organisations, their propaganda and dissemination

The Executive Committee of the WCT as a non-governmental organisation, while not replacing the functions of public administration, realises communication with national associations of the Tatars over the world. Within the framework of the relationship between Tatarstan and other regions of Russia and countries, this organ of WCT makes efforts to develop and unite the Tatar nation and to manage the national cultural movement of the Tatars.

While implementing the main goals and tasks, WCT collaborates with state organs, cultural educational institutions, national cultural associations, political parties and movements, religious organisations of Tatarstan, Russian regions, and CIS countries, and also with individual citizens.

Within the structure of the apparatus of the Executive Committee of WCT, sections were formed to work with Tatar public organisations of foreign countries, with the Tatar communities in the Russian regions, with the Tatar republic sections of WCT, and also the analytical section was formed. The sections form a database about the Tatars in regions, keep them in constant contact, monitor the processes taking place in the field, coordinate
the activity of the local Tatar communities with the authorities involved in solving specific problems.

The link with the general public and its support are very important for the Executive Committee of the Worldwide Tatar Congress. In this regard it is necessary to emphasise the role of the Executive Committee of the WCT committees that develop ways of implementing the tasks set by the Congress. The committees are formed of the Executive Committee members and progressive specialists in various fields of the WCT activity.

At the present time 8 Committees are active in the structure of the Executive Committee of the Worldwide Tatar Congress: the Committee for the Strategy of Development of the Tatar Nation, which forms the conceptual directions for development; the Committee of International Relations and Protection of Human Rights; the Committee of the Development of Business Undertakings among the Tatar Population, as the economic basis of the work of the national organisations on the ground; the Cultural Committee; the Educational Committee; the National Media Committee; the Committee of the Tatar Youth; the Committee of Religious Affairs. The Committee of Religious Affairs was formed to regulate the complicated situation in the Tatar religious organisations. By the beginning of the 21st century disunity prevailed in that field, religious figures were quite often in conflict with each other. Frequently in the regions of the Russian Federation artificial obstacles were put in the way of mosque-building. Many applications were submitted to the Executive Committee of the Worldwide Tatar Congress with the request to help in resolving of difficult emergent situations. Currently, thanks to the Worldwide Tatar Congress, most of the problems and conflict situations in the Russian Tatar religious organisations have been resolved.

At the present time in the Russian regions, CIS, and other foreign countries there are more than 450 active local organisations adopted in the WCT. As a rule the Congress admits only officially registered Tatar organisations, for which the Executive Committee of WTC widely use all the mechanisms that regulate relations with both national communities and with official structures representing the interests of Tatarstan.

In practice the official Tatarstan representatives quite often successfully resolve problems of the Tatar communes. On the one hand, those questions were not within the mandate of republic representatives. However, going beyond the formal approach, it was necessary to organise their activity based on a knowledge of the history, culture, customs, nation, and processes of modern national revival.

§ 8. 'Model of Tatarstan'

Rafael Khakimov

Regions populated by the peoples very different in culture and religion as a rule become conflict areas. Bosnia is a typical example. The conflict took place between Orthodox Serbs, Catholic Croats, and Muslims, although all of them speak the dialects of the same language, have been living together for many centuries, and there are a lot of mixed families among them. M. Shaimiev made a comment on that: 'The very serious Bosnian crisis on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, which we witnessed, is a lesson and a warning that there are no winners in a fratricidal war. To conduct the negotiations can be extremely difficult, but it is easier and more ethical than to kill each other' [Khakimov, Belaya kniga, 1996, p. 5].

The post-Soviet territories after the collapse of the USSR became an area of military conflicts and remain a territory of a potential conflict. Georgia with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Moldavia with Transnistria, Tajikistan, Nagorno-Karabakh, the Crimea, and then Kyrgyzstan with Uzbekistan were involved in lingering confrontations. Tatarstan in this aspect
was an exception. There are few such exceptions in the world, which is why there is no coincidence that the term 'Model of Tatarstan' was born. This model was formed during a visit by M. Shaimiev to a political forum at Harvard University in 1994, where the presidents and political leaders of different countries were presented.

The speech of M. Shaimiev lasted 3 hours. It made a deep impression and was broadcast on one of the National USA channel. After the forum American newspapers started talking about Tatarstan as 'An Island of Stability,' although it had been called 'An Island of Communism' before.

A number of international experts were convinced that Tatarstan would face a conflict, similar to the one in Chechnya, as Russians and Tatars in the republic are representatives of quite different cultural traditions, related not only to religion but also to language, behaviour, history that left a profound trace in the psychology of the two peoples. There were reasons for the concerns of the experts since Tatarstan was a typical 'divided' society with a potential for conflict. However, the authorities of the republic managed to avoid confrontation owing to a lot of factors, including the development of satisfactory situation in terms of policy and specific of socio-economic development.

In the 21st century it is difficult to imagine that at the beginning of 1920, Tatarstan was overcoming an extremely complicated period in its history. The economic mess, non-stop demonstrations with demands to expand the rights of the Tatar population, the confrontation of democrats and communists, the absence of clear strategy in the Federal Centre led to the creation of an extremely tense situation. The policy of 'Glasnost' led to a situation in which the mass media were criticised everything and almost without any constructive proposals. People could be easily understood as they had been waiting for the possibilities to speak out for years. However, the complaints from Tatars created tension among the Russians who looked hopefully towards Moscow.

By the end of the 20th century the political atmosphere stabilised, although the socio-economic field was in crisis that had isolated the region and impoverished the population, but it was overcome. Nowadays, people in Tatarstan see no reason for conflict between Russians and Tatars, why the Muslim leaders during festivities stand next to the Orthodoxies, Jews, Catholics, Protestants. The guests of the republic are often surprised that the Kazan Kremlin places the Mosque 'Kul Sharif' and the Annunciation Cathedral next to each other, symbolising the ethno-confessional mutual understanding between the peoples of the republic. This is a result of thorough work.

The 'Model of Tatarstan' is being built on several principles that determine its efficiency. The first and the main one is an interethnic consensus that is a basis of stability in the republic. No one nation should feel that their rights are being infringed. The Russian mass media and researches often pointed out to the percentage of the peoples. That is methodologically incorrect. No matter how numerous any nation may be, they deserve respect. The UNO Statute states in the 'Declaration on the Principles of International Law Concerning Amicable Relations between the States in Accordance with the United Nations Organisation Statute,' which contains a separate chapter called 'Principles of Equality and Self-Determination of Peoples.' In this important document the right for self-determination is interpreted widely, not simply as an intention to acquire independence but as a possibility to set up confederate, federate, associate relations or even dissolution in another state: 'Creating a sovereign and independent state, free joining to an independent state or a union with it or setting up any other political status, freely determined by the nation, are the ways to make use of the right for self-determination by this nation' [Rezolyucii OON, 1971].

The 'International Pact on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights' and the 'International Pact on Civil and Political Rights' are such 'firm' international documents binding on the states that sign them. Article 1 of these pacts
Section III. The Republic of Tatarstan and the Tatar World at the Turn of the Millennia

states: 'All peoples have the right for self-determination. By this right, they freely set up their political status and conduct their economic, social, and cultural development' [Adamishin, 1989, pp. 292–293].

Among the European documents the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities is especially notable, and it includes 4 norms:

1. The parties are obliged to guarantee any person, belonging to a national minority, the right of equality and equal protection by law. Thus, any discrimination based on any national minority relation is prohibited.

2. The parties are obliged to take relevant measures in cases of necessity in order to encourage in all the fields of economic, social, political, and cultural life the complete and actual equality between people belonging to the national minority and people belonging to the majority of the population. Thus, the parties must comply with the position of people belonging to national minorities' [Shaykhutdinova, 2000, p. 107].

Until now the international documents do not contain an exact definition of the concepts 'people' and 'national minority,' but the trend in developing legislation is moving towards the expansion of the rights for ethnic groups regardless of their calling themselves as a 'people' or a 'national minority.'

Following legal norms per se does not lead to interethnic consensus, which is not restricted only to tolerance. A general policy to satisfy ethno-national needs is also important. In the Republic of Tatarstan this is formulated as keeping the balance of interests of confessional and ethnic groups and political powers. The sense of this principle was expressed in the centric approach of the authorities and in the condemnation of extremes political relations on the part of the leaders of the republic, politicians, and intellectuals. Years later this approach became a part of the culture in Tatarstan.

Balance in these complicated issues is especially important as the role of the Islamic factor is constantly growing all around the country. The adoption of Islam as a state religion by the Bulgar state in 922 is nowadays celebrated quite solemnly by an enormous number of pilgrims. On the other hand, after the conquest of Kazan by Ivan the Terrible, the missionary activities of the Orthodox priests became an important part of the Russian policy. Kazan became a centre of studying for the peoples of the Orient, a base of Christianisation of the region and promoting Orthodoxy in Siberia and Asia. With such traditions, it is extremely important to conduct internal politics very carefully since the issues of Islam and Orthodoxy are embraced by the interests of all the Russian Federation, while Tatarstan is located on the very cusp of the two leading religions. With the exception of the extremes, it is always possible to find a compromise; something which was successfully achieved in the republic.

Another basis of the 'Model of Tatarstan' is the Treaty between the republic and the Federal Centre on mutual authority delegation from 15 February 1994. It led to stability in the relations between Kazan and Moscow. The significance of the signed Treaty is especially clear against the background of the events in North Caucasus. In Tatarstan, despite a complicated situation in the early 1990s, there was no open conflict owing to the work of numerous experts and officials in the republic. Besides a political constituent, there was also an important socio-economic part in the Treaty. Due to the Treaty and stability, Tatarstan managed to develop its own economic policy, develop from a medium region into one of the leading areas in socio-economic development. The complete gasification and telephonisation, road and house construction, Internet networking development, etc., built up a relatively good infrastructure and prepared the republic for the market economy, investment attraction, a transition from resource dependence to high technology production. A new Treaty in 2007 was more an expression of a good will from both parties in the political field. It did not give any tax or other benefits, but it confirmed an importance of the treaty relations themselves.

The treaties and agreements signed between the state bodies of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan supported the development of federative relations. M. Shaimiev
Chapter 3. New Relations between the Republic of Tatarstan and the Russian Federation

spoke out about it quite clearly: 'The Treaty is of huge importance not only for Tatarstan but also for the Russian Federation, and it is proved every day. If there had not been a treaty between Tatarstan and Russia, it would be difficult to define what path the state policy of Russia would have taken today. After signing the Treaty with Tatarstan, Russia set up a robust defensive mechanism to prevent the return to the unitary state and set out on the path of developing as a Federation.' [Khakimov, Belaya kniga, 1996, p. 11].

Federalism is the destiny of Russia which historically developed as a union of peoples, and as such it will remain. The role of Tatarstan in decentralisation and federalisation of Russia was and still is very significant. Many people would still like to see Russia as a unitary state, and in recent years opinions have been voiced that federalism is ruining the country. The 'Model of Tatarstan' is an example of federative relations beneficial both to the centre and to the republic that do not interfere with the interests of other regions. Of course, nothing is as simple as it seems in such a complex process. If during the political office of Yeltsin many issues had not been resolved, and not everywhere was a state of order, then when V. Putin came into power, a process began of overly detailed regulation of relations between the centre and the regions. It sometimes happened that the federative centre interfered in some issues exclusively within the competence of the authorities of Tatarstan (for example, the issues of the Tatar language and the national component in the system of education), thus breaching the Russian Federation Constitution. In reply to the complaints of the Republic of Tatarstan, the Constitutional Court passed a verdict based on political and legal grounds rather than upon the Russian Federation Constitution. Despite all the difficulties of a changeable political situation, Tatarstan remains an initiator of the federalisation of Russia.

The third principle of the 'Model of Tatarstan' is based on the international activities of the republic. Traditionally in Russian, the USSR, and the Russian Federation, it was prohibited for the provinces, the regions of the federation to conduct their own foreign external policy. After World War II Ukraine and Belarus became UNO members but were under the strict control of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Union republics nominally had ministries of foreign affairs but actually carried out the functions of protocol.

The situation changed when perestroika began. Not only the Union republics, primarily the Baltic Republics, but also certain autonomous republics sensed a certain freedom. In the Russian Federation Tatarstan was the first to set up contacts with other republics, countries, and international organisations. By the time the Treaty was signed in 1994, there had been sufficient experience to formulate it and to confirm by law. Tatarstan made a real breakthrough in external relations. The approaches developed by Tatarstan in international activities were later included into the federal legislation and became a norm for all the regions of the Russian Federation.

These are the main principles of the 'Model of Tatarstan.' It should be added that the 'Model of Tatarstan' was noted not only by journalists but also by specialists of different research centres in the Russian Federation and in the west as well as by conflicting countries of the post-Soviet territory. There have been many conferences and seminars with this theme, but the most significant were the 'round-tables' called 'The Hague Initiative.' They were held in the late 1990s in The Hague Peace Palace supported by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The organisers were the Republic of Tatarstan and Harvard University. In The Hague there were representatives of official agencies of the Russian Federation, Chechnya, Moldavia with Gagauzia and Transdniestria, Ukraine with the Crimea, Georgia with Abkhazia, and a set of international organisations [see Khakimov, Belaya kniga, 1996, p. 112]. The 'Model of Tatarstan' was not useful to all the participants due to the individual features of the countries, but Transdniestria and the Crimea attentively studied our experience. A particular variant
was offered to Chechnya to reconcile a dispute, formulated in the 'Memorandum about Chechnya,' containing the following conclusions and recommendations:

1. There is no military solution of the crisis in Chechnya, and ceasing military actions is urgent.

5. Creating optimal conditions for carrying out free and fair elections in Chechnya with announcing a general amnesty.

7. To solve the issue of the political status of Chechnya on the basis of a deferred decision and by taking into account the world experience' [Khakimov, Belaya kniga, 1996, p. 111].

The principle of deferred decision required negotiations to be conducted about exact, vitally important questions without determining the status of the republic since the discussion about the independence of Chechnya forced the Federal Centre into a dead-end. Some years later, in the opinion of the participants of the forum, after the stabilisation of the situation, it was possible to come back to this question and to document the relations between Chechnya and the Russian Federation.

The materials of the 'round-tables' were used by a number of countries. At the same time, certain weaknesses were revealed in the procedure of negotiations between conflicting countries. While preparing the Treaty, Tatarstan was cooperating with a very wide circle of the specialists in the fields of political, social, and economic sciences; not only with the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation but also with the Government of Russia and numerous ministries. Meanwhile, the authorities of the Republic of Tatarstan regularly informed the population about the negotiating process by mass media. In Georgia and Moldavia the meetings were of behind-the-scenes character, and it led to the suspicion of surrendering positions and the state interests.' For this reason opposition appeared even in the closest entourage of the governors of the countries. At the time of E. Shevardnadze, Georgia could have become a federative state, and he spoke about this idea in the mass media. However, the unprepared population and political circles rejected this state system. As a result Georgia simply split.

The 'Model of Tatarstan' leans upon the historical traditions and modern policy of the republic. It would not be possible without democracy and federalism. The Tatar renaissance always coincided with the periods when the elements of democracy were born. 1905, 1917, the 'defrosting' of Khrushchev's times. Perestroika for the republic was a new stage. At the same time, it should be noted that the Tatars were always supporters of a firm state. They had been reformers in Ancient and Medieval Ages, had participated in the establishment of the Russian state, and remain the same until now. Together with Russians, who are also supporters of a strong state, they created a solid base for social, economic, cultural, and political development of the republic on the principles of the 'Model of Tatarstan.'
Chapter 4. Priorities of External Relations of the Republic of Tatarstan

CHAPTER 4
Priorities of External Relations of the Republic of Tatarstan

§ 1. Practice of External Relations of the Republic of Tatarstan

Ildar Nasyrov

The Republic of Tatarstan, being one of the most economically developed regions in the Russian Federation, actively takes part in international cooperation in order to encourage economic development, to attract investments and technologies, to strengthen scientific, educational and cultural contacts, and to support compatriots.

Tatarstan combines the majority of factors (excluding a border zone) to encourage international integration. This is an economically developed region with energy resources, petroleum production, petrochemistry, and machinery production based on international cooperation and oriented towards external markets. There is practically no sector of the economy in the republic that, directly or indirectly, would not have with the external world. About 60% of the production from Tatarstan are exported [Semerkin, 2010].

Tatarstan develops relations not only with the economically developed countries of Europe and America but traditionally gravitates towards strengthening trading and cultural relations with the countries of the Middle East and Asia. The reason for this is its location in the centre of Eurasia, at the crossroads of trade routes between the Orient and the West, the north and the south, in combination with the historically formed multi-ethnic and multi-confessional population.

When considering the range of external relations of Tatarstan, the ethnocultural factor should be taken into account. Together with economic interests, it is an important moving force in the international cooperation of the republic, it supports cultural and humanitarian contacts as well as compatriots as one of the priorities in this field. Spiritual closeness and common cultural interests form the basis for centuries-long relations between Tatarstan and the Muslim countries of Asia and the Middle East. Nowadays, when Russia is playing a more noticeable role in the regions of the Middle East and Asia, they have obtained a new content and gained an additional impulse [Nasyrov, 2008].

The modern practice of external relations of Tatarstan started in the early 1990s. The adoption of the Declaration of State Sovereignty (1990) and the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan (1992) encouraged international activities to develop. In the latter half of the 1990s, after adopting the federal legislation regulating international and external economic relations of the Russian regions, the formation of legal and organisational fundamentals for their implementation was completed. The international relations of the Republic of Tatarstan are conducted in accordance with the principles of the external policy of the Russian Federation, on the basis of the Russian and international legal norms, in tight interaction with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia [Akulov, 2006, pp. 272–286].

The main feature of the legislative base for external relations of Tatarstan is the Treaty issued on 26 June 2007 ‘On the Delimitation of Jurisdictional Subjects and the Mutual Delegation of Authority between the State Bodies of the Russian Federation and the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan,’ containing a separate article about international and external economic cooperation of the Republic of Tatarstan. This Treaty is a successor in a bilateral agreement about a division of jurisdiction and
mutual delegating of authorities from 15 February 1994, which in its own way became a form of the legitimisation of the Russian Federation Constitution in Tatarstan.

In Tatarstan, in accordance with the republican Constitution, the head of the Republic defines the directions of external activities, presents Tatarstan while implementing international and external economic relations [Konstituciya RT, 2005]. An important role in acquiring international recognition of Tatarstan as a worldwide known factor of international relations was played by the first president M. Shaimiev.

The State Council of the Republic of Tatarstan as a supreme body of the legislative branch forms a regional level of statutory base of international cooperation and also defines amounts of the budget financing of international and external economic activities. Within its competence, the Republic of Tatarstan forms a statutory legal base of external relations that can be divided into two groups:

– The first group: the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan, the laws of the Republic of Tatarstan and other legal acts
– The second group: international treaties of the Republic of Tatarstan

The first international treaties in commercial, economic, scientific, technological, and cultural cooperation (Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan, Hungary, Lithuania, Belarus, Bulgaria) were signed in 1991–1992. In total, over 50 documents were signed; some of them are terminated at the moment.

External activities is a responsibility of the Government of the Republic of Tatarstan carried out by the Ministry for Industry and Commerce. The republican ministries, supervising agriculture, culture, education, science, tourism, sport, other fields, also develop international cooperation.

The authorities of the Republic of Tatarstan support not only the large enterprises in developing long-term international projects and expanding outlets but also small and middle businesses by carrying out consultations and trainings, presentations and business-missions, implementing the measures of financial stimuliations for export-oriented productions, introducing innovative projects, and setting up competitive production.

In the second half of the 1990s the representative office system of the republic was formed abroad and in the Russian regions. The trend of the next stage was emphasis on strengthening the foreign trade cooperation, which defined the organisational form of foreign missions as a trade and economic representative office or a trading house. At the present time (considering Russian regions) the Republic of Tatarstan has 20 functioning missions and about 30 trading houses.

Representative offices and in part trading houses provide the implementation of top-priority tasks in the foreign relations sphere, including the promotion of the Tatarstan enterprises production, attraction of investments for projects within the Republic, initiation for the Tatarstan enterprises of direct ties with economic entities of a host country/region, coordination with the authorities in implementation of joint projects, organisation of visits, and the compatriots’ support.

Significant assistance for the development of the whole complex of bilateral relations with Turkey and Iran is rendered by the Consulate General of the Republic of Turkey (established in 1996 in Kazan) and the Consulate General of the Islamic Republic of Iran (established in 2007).

Foreign trade cooperation of the republic is flourishing. With trade ties with over 100 countries around the world, Tatarstan looks forward to striking a balance between cooperation with the Western and Eastern countries. The development of foreign economic ties with France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the United States, and other Western partners is coupled with strengthening relations with Turkey, the Republic of Korea, China, India, United Arab Emirates, and other Eastern countries.

The foreign trade turnover, having increased twentyfold since 1992, reached its maximum volume in 2008 and totalled 21.3 billion US dollars, including export amounting to 18.4 billion US dollars. The share of engineering products in the republican export
was amounted to 6.6%; 5.4%, synthetic rubber; 1.7%, plastic products; 0.9%, tyres. In a similar vein, the high proportion of crude oil (66.0%) and petroleum products (14.8%) continued to form a considerable part of the Republican export. The ensuing global crisis has led to the significant reduction of foreign trade turnover volumes primarily due to a decline of crude oil and refined products prices.

However, the volume of foreign investments, on the contrary, reflected an upward trend even during the crisis in 2009 (for 9 months Tatarstan received more than 1.5 billion US dollars, or 119% compared with the same period of the last year). The structure of the cumulative foreign investments included (according to the type of foreign trade activities), first, real estate operations amounting to 66.8%; second, the manufacturing sector has accumulated 23.9% of the investment; mining operations ranked the third place (4.1%). [Activity of enterprises and organizations of the Republic of Tatarstan, 2009].

One of the economic growth and joint ventures development area has become Russia’s largest Special Economic Zone (SEZ) of industrial type 'Alabuga' located within the territory of Yelabuga district, Tatarstan. Investors are allocated pre-prepared facilities with all the necessary infrastructure within the territory of the SEZ. The residents of the SEZ are represented by three key groups: production of cars and car components, processing of polymers into end products, manufacturing of construction materials. As of the end of 2009, 9 residents were registered in the SEZ 'Alabuga.'

Visits by foreign political leaders to Tatarstan proved the acknowledgment of its high international authority. As early as in 1993 the Hungarian president Árpád Géntys visited the city of Kazan. In terms of the largest international events held in Tatarstan in recent years, they are a CIS summit (August 2005), the annual meeting of the EBRD Board of Governors (May 2007); heads of states visits from the following countries: China (Hu Jintao, March 2007), the Czech Republic (Václav Klaus, April 2007), Turkmenistan (Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov, June 2008), Turkey (Abdullah Gylul, February 2009), as well as the Secretary of State (Hillary Clinton, October 2009) and the head of the Palestinian National Authority (Mahmoud Abbas, January 2010). In 2009, 18 foreign ambassadors to the Russian Federation visited Tatarstan. Foreign visits of the Republic of Tatarstan official representatives are also held at a high level.

According to the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan (Article 14), strengthening relations with the Tatar diaspora in the Russian regions and abroad is among the international cooperation top-priority of the republic. Currently around 1 million Tatars live outside Russia, and the most numerous Tatar diasporas have historically formed in the Middle Asian countries of the CIS. The support of compatriots, in close cooperation with federal authorities and Russian foreign institutions, reflects in all forms of international cooperation, from cultural to economic, making them specific.

One of the most significant projects in this area is the World Congress of Tatars (WCT) that has been regularly held in Kazan from 1992 in order to address persistent ethnocultural issues in Russia and among compatriots living abroad. The initiatives implemented by Congress include: the adoption of the State Programme for the Preservation, Study, and Development of the State Languages of the Republic of Tatarstan, the establishment of trading houses on the territory of Tatars dense residence, the development of satellite television and radio aiming at forming a Tatar-speaking common information space.

The Executive Committee of the WCT works with around hundred and fifty Tatar organisations in 35 countries, and this interaction helps to determine the most urgent issues that concern compatriots [Nasyrov, 2007, pp. 179–185].

Tatarstan has been at the centre of international attention at various stages of the contemporary history, in the focus of key socio-economic events. In recent years Tatarstan has been actively involved in international processes focused on the development of inter-
civilisation dialogue, the empowerment of the tolerance principles in public life.

Islamic countries have expressed positive interest in strengthening contacts with Tatarstan. This can be explained not only by the fact that significant number of Muslims reside here but also the successful implementation of the balanced domestic policy in the multi-ethnic republic, with approximately equal Muslim and Orthodox population.

In general one can say that Tatarstan has created the basic principles and approaches to the development of its international activities as well as the necessary legal and human resources and the infrastructure of foreign contacts. It has also improved its collaborative mechanism with the federal authorities.

Tatarstan has accumulated a wealth of experience in international and foreign economic relations, known as 'Tatarstan diplomacy,' or the the effective use of international cooperation for socio-economic development of the republic, the spread of the tolerance principles, and coherent consideration of various social interests as well as the preservation of regional identity in a multicultural modern society.

International cooperation of Tatarstan is multidimensional and multidirectional. The geographical coverage, forms, and participants of this cooperation are constantly expanding. These developing international contacts along with extensive foreign economic relations closely integrate Tatarstan into the world.

Having aimed at strengthening international cooperation for the development of a diversified economy based on advanced technologies, including enhancing the level of raw materials processing and the increase of the region's competitiveness, the Republic of Tatarstan is contributing to the solution of national socio-economic development problems in the age of globalisation. The need for a consolidated response to new external challenges and the increasing interdependence of domestic and global processes require more precise coordination of regional authorities in the sphere of international cooperation with the national government and other key players in international relations.

§ 2. Cooperation of the Republic of Tatarstan with International Organisations

Ildar Nasyrov

Tatarstan's cooperation with international organisations has become an important form of maintaining foreign contacts in all its main directions, embracing the implementation of both economic and humanitarian projects. In addition, the Republic of Tatarstan is engaged in working with not only international organisations consisting of regional representatives from different countries but interstate associations as well.

In the first half of the 1990s Tatarstan took part in selected events of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation and later became a member of the Assembly of European Regions. The Executive Committee of the Worldwide Tatar Congress gained an observer status with the Interparliamentary Assembly of the CIS. The republic established contacts with such major international organisations as the UNO, UNESCO, UNIDO, ILO, EBRD, the Council of Europe, the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, the International Union of Local Authorities, the Council of European Municipalities and Regions, and a number of other international and regional organisations. The republican actions are reconciled with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation [Akulov, 2000, pp. 61–66].

In this regard it is interesting to note the assessment the significance of Tatarstan's international contacts for the Russian Federation given by the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations: As K. Graney
notes, the activity of Tatarstan in the European regional institutions, UNO's Development Programme, and UNESCO contributed to the deeper integration of Russia into the European and global community in the post-Soviet period. Supported by international organisations, Tatarstan has taken important steps to preserve the ethnic, linguistic, and cultural uniqueness of the Tatar people in the Republic of Tatarstan and in Russia as a whole [Graney, 2001, p. 39].

In January 1994 UNO Under-Secretary-General Joseph Reed visited Tatarstan. At the same time, the president of the Republic of Tatarstan M. Shaimiev delivered the speech at Harvard University (USA), which has become a landmark for understanding the processes taking place in our republic by Western politicians. From then on the term 'the Model of Tatarstan' has been coined.

At the turn of the century cooperation between the Republic of Tatarstan and UNESCO intensified. However, it should be noted that even as early as 1983, after a resolution made by UNESCO, celebrations were held to mark the 800th anniversary of the most significant representative of the 13th century Eastern poetry Kul Ghali. In 2001 the Kazan Kremlin was included in the UNESCO World Heritage List. A significant result of cooperation with UNESCO was the holding of 'Tatarstan Days' at UNESCO headquarters in Paris in June 2001 dedicated to the 1,000th anniversary of Kazan. The Bulgarian Historical and Archaeological Complex and Sviyazhsk Historical-Architectural and Natural-Landscape Complex are also included in the Tentative List of the UNESCO World Cultural Heritage. Work on including the traditional Tatar holiday Sabantuy in the UNESCO Intangible Cultural Heritage List is underway. In 2003 UNESCO Director General Koichiro Matsuura visited Kazan. The anniversary of Kazan (2005) and the 200th anniversary of Kazan State University (2004) were included in the calendar of memorable dates of UNESCO. Under the auspices of UNESCO and the Council of Europe the international project 'The Volga Trade Route' (2001–2005) was started in Kazan [Akulov, Nasyrov, Savelyev, 2006, pp. 196–210]. Since 1998 an international UNESCO faculty, coordinating scientific and socio-educational projects, has been functioning in one of the leading private universities in Kazan. Since 2007 the Federation Commission for UNESCO in the Republic of Tatarstan has been coordinating the cooperation with this international organisation. In October 2010 M. Shaimiev took part in the 185th session of the Executive Board of UNESCO as the State Counselor of the Republic of Tatarstan, where he presented a project designed to restore the ancient city of Bolgar and the island-town Sviyazhsk.

In recent years the Republic of Tatarstan has strengthened its cooperation with the UNO's Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) and the UNO's Economic Commission for Europe. Having started in the mid-1990s with an intensive exchange of information with UNIDO regarding the access to the world market of investments, Tatarstan signed the Memorandum of Cooperation between the Government of the Republic of Tatarstan and UNIDO in 2009. The memorandum is aimed at developing cooperation in the sphere of energy efficiency and energy saving, environmental protection and rational use of water resources, industrial development, application of modern technologies for processing and recovering of waste with the aid of recycled materials to the Republic of Tatarstan. In May 2010, during a working visit to the Republic of Tatarstan by UNIDO Director General Kandeh Yumkella, the parties agreed to establish a UNIDO Project Office in the Republic of Tatarstan designed for implementing the prospective avenues for cooperation and providing training concerning document preparation in compliance with the requirements and standards of international financial institutions.

Within the framework of Tatarstan cooperation with the UNO European Economic Commission, the possibility has been considered to use alternative energy sources, including the feasibility of using biomass and the implementation of this project in the republic. The
efforts to develop innovative technologies and bioenergy in the Republic of Tatarstan are being made within the framework of the interdepartmental working group on coordination of Tatarstan cooperation with the UNO ECE [Deyatel’nost’ Pravitel’stva Respubliki Tatarstan, 2010].

By 2010, 20 representative offices of international organisations and public associations, aimed at promotion of bilateral humanitarian relations with foreign states, were opened in Kazan.

Cooperation with international organisations plays an important role in improving state management, the promotion of democracy, the formation of civil society, the preservation of cultural diversity, and the protection of human rights.

Among international organisations promoting such a multi-directional cooperation, we should note the Council of Europe, which supported a series of international conferences and scientific seminars regarding the issues of local government, federalism, intrastate relations, human rights, cultural heritage, intercultural and inter-religious dialogue held in Tatarstan.

Human rights defenders of Tatarstan actively interact with foreign colleagues. The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights Alvaro Gil-Robles turned attention in his report to the initiatives of the Republic of Tatarstan aimed at promoting harmony among ethnic groups as well as open cooperation and dialogue supported by political and community leaders of the republic [Robles, 2004].

Strengthening the international position of Russia in conjunction with the need to develop a dialogue with Islamic countries led to the expansion of the activities in this direction [Nasyrov, 2008, pp. 2687–2692]. The Republic of Tatarstan, which historically strives for diverse contacts with the Middle East countries, is actively involved in the development of the Eastern trajectory of Russian foreign policy. Here we can also note the visits of the republican officials to the Middle East countries, which were held at the highest level, and the contribution of Tatarstan to building relationships with the leading organisation uniting Islamic countries—the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the Secretary General of which Ekmeleddin Īhsanoğlu has repeatedly visited Tatarstan. While in Kazan in August 2005, the OIC Secretary General Ekmeleddin Īhsanoğlu said that Tatarstan constantly cooperated with the organisation, and many joint activities had been held. This cooperation acquired a systematic nature after the Russian Federation was granted observer status in the OIC.

Kazan hosts major international events organised with the direct support of the OIC affiliated institutions. Among them there are the International Investment Conference, organised in 2008 in Russia for the first time jointly with the Islamic Development Bank under the auspices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. In 2009 and 2010 this event was held in the format of the International Summit of Islamic Business and Finance. In the field of scientific cooperation we can highlight the holding of the 16th International Conference of the Islamic World Academy of Sciences in Kazan. The representative forum, which was attended in 2008 by more than 100 leading scientists of the Islamic world, was the first event of its kind that took place in Russian. The acquired experience of cooperation with the Islamic Academy of Sciences showed that its activity has evident practical character. The primary focus was on the development of new technologies, environmental protection and health, social affairs [Nasyrov, 2009, pp. 6–10].

On 25 September 2009 the Organization of the Islamic Conference celebrated its 40th anniversary. The two major events were held in anticipation of this occasion in the Republic of Tatarstan: the 27th meeting of the Administrative Council of the Organisation of Islamic Capitals and Cities and the International scientific-practical conference 'Islamic Education in Russia and Abroad,' organised together with the Islamic Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation (ISEESCO) and the Federation of the Universities of the Islamic World, whose members include the Russian Islamic University in Kazan.
Considering the problem of cooperation with Islamic financial institutions, it must be taken into account that the current status of Russia in the Organization of the Islamic Conference does not allow the Islamic Development Bank to carry out its activities in full within its territory. This problem cannot be solved without the support of the Federal Centre. In this situation the Islamic financial community and the Central Bank of Russia need to find common ground and make the appropriate changes to the current legislation and regulations. In this regard, it can be noted that at an investment conference in Kazan Ahmad Mummmed Ali, president of the Islamic Development Bank, highly appreciated the contribution of the Russian Islamic Institute in promoting the study and implementation of the Islamic financial system in Tatarstan and Russia, noting in particular the seminar 'Islamic Finance – Banking and Insurance.'

In March 2010, together with the Islamic Development Bank and partners from Islamic countries, the Tatarstan International Investment Company was established, the shareholders of which have determined the priority areas for investment: infrastructure development, telecommunications, agriculture, finance, small-scale power generation, and halal industry.

Cooperation between Tatarstan and the World Bank was also efficient. The first negotiations for the provision of the loan, which began in 2002, ended in February 2005 with the resolution of the World Bank to grant Russia a loan of $125 million for the needs of municipal development of Kazan (that means that at this stage the project was carried out through the Federal Centre). In the future the cooperation continued on the basis of the Memorandum of Understanding between the government of the Republic of Tatarstan and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (which is part of the World Bank) signed in June 2006. Among the promising directions of the cooperation are asset management, technical assistance and loans provision, assistance in the development of the Alabuga Special Economic Zone, and reformation of HMB sphere. The work on improving the investment attractiveness of companies of Tatarstan is also conducted with the assistance of the World Bank experts. The Memorandum of Strategic Partnership between the government of the Republic of Tatarstan and the IBRD, which lasted until 2015, was signed in June 2009.

Since 1992 the Republic of Tatarstan has been an observer of the International Organisation for Joint Development of Turkic Culture and Art (TÜRKOY), and since then artistic groups, pop and opera singers, and artists of Tatarstan participate in international cultural programmes carried out under the auspices of TÜRKOY. Since 1993 Tatarstan theatre groups have been participating in Nowruz, the International theatre festival of Turkic peoples. In 2009 Kazan hosted the festival for the fourth time. TÜRKOY takes part in the International festival Golden Minbar in Kazan with a special prize For Contribution to the Development of Turkic World Cinematography. In 2009 the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Tatarstan jointly with TÜRKOY held the Turkish Film Festival. 2011 was proclaimed the Year of Gabdulla Tukai since it was the 125th anniversary of the poet's birth.

European organisations, among all international organisations of the regional level, most actively cooperate with Tatarstan. Since 2001 the chairman of the State Council of the Republic of Tatarstan F. Mukhametshin has been the member of the delegation of the Russian Federation in the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe (CLRAE), thus participating in the work of the governing bodies of this representative organisation. Among the most significant projects initiated with the participation of Tatarstan are the development of intercultural dialogue and the preservation of the languages of national minorities in the modern world, facilitating the integration of the young people from problem areas into society, as well as the introduction of e-democracy in the ongoing work of local government bodies.

In November 2010 F. Mukhametshin was also elected to one of the oldest European
Section III. The Republic of Tatarstan and the Tatar World at the Turn of the Millennia

International cooperation—the Assembly of European Regions (AER) (founded in 1985, brings together 270 regional members from 33 European countries and 13 interregional member organisations). Support for cultural diversity, sharing of experience, and the training of public officials are among the priority directions of the work of the AER, in addition to the formation of the regional course in European politics. Tatarstan has been a member of the AER for quite a long time, but the election of F. Mukhametshin to the AER took the cooperation with the organisation to a new level.

The capital of Tatarstan is involved into the activities of international organisations. I. Metshin, mayor of Kazan, is vice president of the Organisation of World Heritage Cities (OWHC Eurasian regional office is located in Kazan), International Assembly of Capitals and Big Cities; Russian Union of Historic Towns and Regions (he is also the chairman of the Chamber of historical cities). Kazan is an observer of the Organisation of Islamic Capitals and Cities as well as of the Community of European cities blessed by the appearance of the Mother of God. Events organised within the framework of the UNO's Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) are held in Kazan. Kazan was awarded honorary diplomas of UNO-Habitat for the implementation of the Programme for the Demolition of Dilapidated Housing in 2005, and Bugulma, for the Clear Water project in 2008.

Cooperation with the international organisations is also carried out by ministries. In addition to the joint projects with TÜRKSOY, the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Tatarstan cooperates with the World Congress of Writers, in whose activities the Association of Writers of the Republic of Tatarstan, the Tatar Pen Centre, regularly takes part. The Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Tatarstan has established contacts with the International Federation of Library Associations and the Library Assembly of Eurasia. The Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Tatarstan collaborates with the International Police Association.

Kazan has become a recognised venue for holding events at the level of major international organisations. Kazan hosted a meeting of the Council of Heads of States of the CIS in 2005, the 16 Annual Meeting of the EBRD Board of Governors in 2007, the 6 Meeting of ministers of Culture of SCO member states, the 50th Meeting of the Council of Heads of Customs Services of CIS Member-States, the International Conference on Competition under the auspices of BRIC in 2009, the Meeting of Heads of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Police) of the CIS countries, the 12 Meeting of the EU-Russia Permanent Partnership Council on Freedom, Security, and Justice, and the 5th Meeting of the Council of Justice ministers of the CIS member States in 2010.

Undoubtedly, the development of the modern tourism and transport infrastructure of the capital of Tatarstan contributes to such dynamics of the expansion of international contacts, which is significantly related to the preparation of the city to a number of major events: in 2005 Kazan celebrated its 1,000th anniversary, and in 2013 the city is preparing to hold Summer Universiade and matches of the World Cup in 2018. These two events would be impossible without the fruitful work of Tatarstan with FISU and FIFA, the leading sports organisations, which was carried out within the framework of the requests of Russian Federation to hold these sports world class events.

When summing up the participation of the Republic of Tatarstan in international organisations, it can be concluded that the organisational form of cooperation allows the expression of regional interests in the international arena in a more precise way. It promotes the development of institutional mechanisms and the legal base for the participation of the regions in international cooperation. The increasing dependence of the socio-economic development of the country and its regions on global processes shows the need for further strengthening of international cooperation, including at the level of international organisations.
§ 3. The Authorised Representative Office of the Republic Tatarstan in the Russian Federation as Part of the System of International Relations of Tatarstan

Nazif Mirikhanov

After the formation of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (TASSR) in 1920, the Tatar People's Commissariat of Nationalities (Narkomnats) was renamed the representative office of the Republic of Tatarstan in the capital. Mirsait Sultan-Galiev became its first head. In 1938 the representative office of the Republic of Tatarstan was closed, and Mirsait Sultan-Galiev was subject to repression. The representative office of the Republic of Tatarstan in Russian Federation was reopened only in 1991.

The authorised representative office of the Republic of Tatarstan in the Russian Federation is a public body, a legal entity carrying out activities in accordance with the Regulations approved by the president of the Republic of Tatarstan.

The authority of the representative office of the Republic of Tatarstan in the Russian Federation comes from the federal structure of the Russian state—every federal state has representative entities in the capital.

The plenipotentiary representative office of the Republic of Tatarstan in the Russian Federation works in a number of areas: assistance and overall control of the implementation of political and economic issues raised by the leaders of the Republic of Tatarstan to federal agencies; support for international relations, above all working with the embassies of foreign countries; public relations and media, protocol services.

Tatarstan is gradually acquiring experience of cooperation with foreign countries: France, Germany, Italy, Austria, Turkey, Switzerland, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Iran, regions and administrative units of the United States, Canada, and others. The cooperation with China is increasing.

The Republic of Tatarstan, while putting into practice its constitutional provisions for legal identity, is also making significant efforts to implement a number of international programmes and expand its capabilities to act independently in the system of bilateral and multilateral (together with Russian federal structures) international relations.

The successful visits of the president, prime minister and chairman of the State Council of the Republic of Tatarstan to foreign countries and the signature of a significant number of bilateral agreements make it possible to expand the international recognition of the republic, raise the authority of Tatarstan, and intensify all forms and levels of the international cooperation.

The authorised representative office in the Russian Federation is one of the links that connects the structure of the bodies of state power of Tatarstan with the federal authorities of Russia and foreign diplomatic representative offices in Moscow in the sphere of international relations. It carries out international work in the following areas:

– Establishment and development of business contacts and relations with diplomatic, sales, and culture representatives and missions of foreign states, international organisations, foreign firms, and companies.

– Participation in the preparation of foreign visits of heads of state and government delegations of the Republic of Tatarstan, decision making with regard to consular, passport and visa issues; coordination of visits by delegations and signature of documentation with the relevant federal authorities and foreign representative offices, providing the delegation with the necessary information and reference materials.

The authorised representative office of the Republic of Tatarstan in the Russian Federation ensures the participation of the representatives of ministries and departments of the republic in cooperation with foreign partners representing major intergovernmental and non-governmental international organisations,
such as the UNO, UNESCO, UNIDO, ILO, Council of Europe, the CLRAE (Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe), IULA (International Union of local authorities), CECR (Council of European Communities and Regions), AER (Assembly of European regions).

It is involved in the development of contacts with the largest banks, including the World Bank, and foundations (Adenauer, Ebert, Seidel, Soros, Ford), international entrepreneurs' organisations and travel agencies (World Union of Wholesale Markets, the annual Leipzig Trade Fair, etc.).

Co-operation with the majority of countries is clearly not limited to foreign trade activities and expands in the direction of cultural and educational programmes.

More active participation of the Republic of Tatarstan in the technical assistance programme of the Council of Europe and the European Community is also a priority programme element. Participation of the chairman of the State Council of the Republic of Tatarstan as a member of the official delegation of the Russian Federation in the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe (CLRAE) and his work in the Chamber of Regions of CLRAE allow Tatarstan to expand its influence in the European representative body as regional issues are regularly discussed at sessions of this Chamber.

Participation of Tatarstan representatives in programmes and activities of the Council of Europe, the Assembly of European Regions, negotiations and contacts with the leadership of the Council of Europe and the leaders of the Assembly of European regions confirm the recognition of Tatarstan in regional European circles.

The external relations of local authorities, business leaders, and entrepreneurs representing all types of property are extremely important in the international system of contacts of the Republic of Tatarstan. Provision of assistance to this category of participants of international relations has a very positive influence on the economic health of the republic. Within the framework of the development of international relations of cities and regions of Tatarstan, there are significant opportunities for the implementation of the main provisions of the European Charter of Local Self-Government and the European Charter of Regional Languages and Cultures and the Languages and Cultures of Minorities in the republic.

Major economic projects were carried out under the auspices of the Council of Europe under the programme of technical assistance to the CIS (TACIS) on the basis of international agreements. Restructuring state-owned enterprises, private sector development, agriculture, infrastructure (energy, telecommunications, transport), the reform of management systems, services, and education are the priority sectors of this programme.

Employees of the authorised representative office in the Russian Federation have special relations with the structural units of the Russian MFA. This allows for the efficient resolution of current issues of the international activities of the Republic of Tatarstan. The International department of the plenipotentiary representative office of the Republic of Tatarstan in Russia is increasingly becoming a 'working body' in Moscow, helping the Presidential Administration, the Government, the State Council of the Republic of Tatarstan, certain ministries with the preparation and holding international events.

The authorised representative office of the Republic of Tatarstan in the Russian Federation, along with the implementation of the important functions of an internal nature, acts as the main liaison between Moscow and Kazan in international activities of the Republic of Tatarstan and is becoming an important element in the implementation of the programmes of External Relations of the Republic.

It has become customary to hold meetings with ambassadors and trade representatives of foreign states in the plenipotentiary representative office of the Republic of Tatarstan in Moscow within the framework of preparation for overseas visits of the heads of Tatarstan as well as the reception of foreign delegations in Kazan. The authorised representative office of the Republic of Tatarstan in the Russian Federa-
tion works on the coordination of bilateral draft treaties and agreements, which are planned to be signed during forthcoming visits by leaders of the Republic of Tatarstan with the MFA of Russia.

Thanks to the active international activity of the leaders of Tatarstan, the personal authority of the president of the Republic M. Shaimiev in the Russian Federation and on the international arena, and his regular statements on complex regional and federal problems in the mass media, the authorised representative office of the Republic of Tatarstan in the Russian Federation in Moscow is becoming increasingly recognisable amongst the federal authorities, the diplomatic corps, and foreign partners. The leaders of the authorised representative office of the Republic of Tatarstan in the Russian Federation receive invitations and participate in official protocol events organised by foreign embassies, trade representatives, and federal agencies included in the international activity. The authorised representative office of the Republic of Tatarstan in the Russian Federation participates in almost all international forums and seminars organised by the MFA in Moscow, and sometimes abroad.

Important work on the implementation of the programme of External Relations of the Republic of Tatarstan, both independently and in collaboration with federal entities of the Russian Federation, continues. The authorised representative office of the Republic of Tatarstan in the Russian Federation contributes significantly to this process, which is a worthy factor in the international authority of Tatarstan.
CHAPTER 5
The Tatar World at the end of the 20th century

§ 1. The Tatars in Neighbouring Countries and Beyond: the History of Settlement and the Current Condition

Rustem Gaynetdinov

The Tatars are among the world diaspora nations and are represented in the leading countries of five continents of the planet.

According to quite approximate data, the total number of the Tatars living outside the Russian Federation is just over 707 thousand people, including 634.9 thousand in the neighbouring countries and 72.5 thousand, beyond. There are ethnic communities and groups of Tatars in more than 50 countries.

According to most modern scholars, the Tatars people formed in the depths of the Golden Horde in the latter half of the 14th–early 15th centuries. Geographically, these were the regions of the Volga-Urals, which are traditionally considered to be the historical area of the formation of the ethnic Tatars. At the same time, linguistic and cultural integration of regional ethnic communities, components and sub-ethnic groups of the Tatars took place within a single state. By the time of the breakup of the Golden Horde State into independent Tatar khanates, the Tatars had a clear ethnic identity, a common literary language, based on the Turkic-Kipchak dialects, a common religion—Islam, common national-psychological characteristics, and even similar anthropological signs. The Slavic, Finno-Ugrian, and other ethnic infusions, which followed over the next centuries and influenced the ethnogenesis of the Tatars, were not so significant as to change the inherent identification characteristics developed in the late Middle Ages.

As an active mobile people, the Tatars have been engaged in trade and business from time immemorial. Even in the pre–Mongol period of Volga Bulgaria, Bilyar, the capital of the state, was a world centre of trade, and Bulgarian merchants and their products were known in many countries of the Orient and the West. During the time of the Golden Horde the Volga and the city, situated on it, including Bolghar, were famous for its bazaars, which attracted merchants from many countries. During the period of the Khanate of Kazan, Kazan was a major trade centre linking Europe with Asia. In the 16th century the loss of statehood in the the majority of the Tatar Khanates, the displacement of historically inhabited lands as a result of steadily increasing policy of forced Christianisation forced part of the people to leave their traditional habitats and move to new territories.

Active interethnic contacts of the Tatars in the following centuries led to the strengthening of integration processes within the nation. The local names of ethnic groups, inherited from medieval Tatar states (Kazan (Volga), Siberian, Astrakhan, Kasimov Tatars), were replaced with national ethnonym 'Tatars.' Their linguistic and cultural differences disappeared in the 20th century once and for all. Now these ethnonyms are preserved only as a secondary local names.

The diaspora parts of the Tatar nation developed in a different way. After 1552, when the Kazan Khanate joined the Russian state, a process of the forced resettlement of the Volga Tatars began. They were mainly resettled to the Orient and South, Bashkir, and then in the Kazakh steppes.

The territorial movements of the Tatars, who made up the population of Astrakhan
and Siberian Khanates, which fell after Kazan and the Nogai Horde, which was peacefully adjoined, were insignificant. They mainly remained in places of their historical habitat. Only at the end of the 19th century there was a relatively large migration of the Tatar rural population from Siberia to Turkey.

In the 18th–19th centuries the Tatars were used actively by Tsarist Russian administration in the process of setting the recently annexed territories of Kazakhstan and Semirechye (Turkestan). They mainly performed mediating functions due to their linguistic and religious affinity with the indigenous peoples of these lands. Intensive trade with the new territories at the same time led to the creation of considerable trading capital amongst the Tatar settlers. This later enabled the Tatars to fulfil a broad educational and cultural function for the Turkic-Muslim population of Central Asia, with their traditional patriarchal way of life.

Having settled the neighbouring parts of the Turkestan, Tatar pioneer traders went further to Xinjiang, and at the end of the 19th century they went into Afghanistan and even in India (Kashmir). As a rule their families and compatriots also moved after them, actively occupying a market niche or acting as landowners in the new settlement areas.

South-East Asia (Manchuria, Japan, Korea) became one of the quickly settled territories in the 20th century, where a powerful urban culture of the Tatars was forming and consolidating due to the wide participation of the Tatars in construction and settling of the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER).

Communities of Polish, Lithuanian, Belarusian, and Dobruja (Romanian) Tatars were formed in their own way. Their withdrawal from the Golden Horde state began in the 15th and 16th centuries. In the following centuries they evolved quite apart from the main part of the Tatar ethnic group (Polish-Lithuanian Tatars even lost their own language during their emigration—‘osadnichestvo’). Until the end of the 20th century the connection of these peripheral (diaspora) parts with the ethnic core of the nation, concentrated in the Ural-Volga Region, was maintained at the level of irregular cultural and information contacts.

The Tatars of the Crimea, who retained their statehood until the middle of the 18th century, decided to integrate with ethnic Turks, and for this reason their national and psychological distinctions from Kazan and Siberian Tatars are currently the most significant. During the All-Union census in 1989 Crimean Tatars identified themselves as a separate ethnic group, and their consolidation with the Volga Tatars and other ethnic groups into a worldwide Tatar nation might only be a long-term historical prospect.

At the end of 19th–early 20th centuries the Tatars created modern institutions for cultural and educational development, becoming one of the most advanced and educated peoples of the Russian Empire. In particular, before the October Revolution the Tatars were second after the Russians in the number of books published in native language in Russia. They have made a significant contribution to the culture of the peoples of the Ural-Volga, Central Asia, the Caucasus. As a result of the intellectual capacity of the Kazan Tatars, they developed modern education, book printing, newspapers, and magazines.

Tatar bourgeoisie in the new territories owned gold mines, tanneries and woolen mills, soap factories, wool and fur processing enterprises, hotels, shops, public catering facilities. Everywhere they sought to increase their prosperity.

According I. Tagirov, in 1914 Tatars owned 141 more or less large enterprises, including 90 enterprises in the Volga and Cis-Ural regions; 19, in Central Asia; 18, in Kazakhstan; 8, in Central Russia; 6, in the Caucasus. The industrial enterprises belonging to Tatar capitalists annually produced goods to the value of 10 million roubles [Tagirov, 1999 b, p. 23].

According to many academics researching the sociopolitical history of the peoples of the Volga and the Urals, in the early 20th century the Tatars were ‘a completely formed and defined Russian nation of bourgeois type’ [Khasanov 1977].
According to D. Iskhakov, the Tatars ‘from the 18th until the beginning of the 20th centuries had a nationwide (so-called ‘high’) culture with a developed literary language’ [Iskhakov, 2002, p. 2]. This layer of culture had very segmented institutional mechanisms (national press, the educational system, theatres, publishing houses, etc.), and they served the entire nation.

The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 interrupted the evolutionary development of the nation. In Soviet Russia and then in the USSR a command-administrative system began to develop. In many cases this system applied a truncated, fictitious form of federalism, which ignored contradictions in the national-state structure of the country and the real needs of its people. It rejected forms of national-state building that did not fit in with the views of the Soviets. It physically destroyed adherents of these views or forced them to emigrate. These people included well-known social and historical figures, who did not accept the communist ideology of the Bolsheviks. Many peoples of the USSR, including the largest Russian people, were divided by Soviet ideologies into the ‘right’ (Soviet) and ‘harmful’ (emigrant) part.

In addition, the literary traditions and continuity of Tatar culture were greatly damaged by the third forced change of the Tatar alphabet in the 20th century: from the 15th century until 1929 the written language was based on the Arabic script, in 1929–1939 Latin alphabet was used, and since 1939 Cyrillic letters have been used for this purpose.

In foreign countries the diaspora of the nation developed autonomously a ‘maternal’ ethnos in this period. Interaction between the two ethnic groups was allowed by the Soviet political superstructure only in its immediate interests. According to L. Usmanova, ‘the relations between the homeland and the diaspora were cast into oblivion due to the impossibility of emigrates returning as a result of ideological differences’ [Usmanova, 2004].

It is important to note that the Tatar diaspora is heterogeneous in its social origin. In the regions of Russia and CIS countries the diaspora was formed as a result of labour migration in pre-revolutionary and Soviet periods, and its representatives are inseparably linked with the historical homeland.

A vivid example of labour migration is the massive migration of the Tatars of the Ural-Volga region, where in the 1920–1930s they provided additional manpower. They also migrated to the south-eastern Ukraine to work in mines and to work on the construction of the Dnieper Hydroelectric Station and iron and steel works. To a large extent it was caused by the famine of the 1920s in the Volga region, the beginning of repression against the peasantry and the active Communist propaganda, which called upon the population for industrial and socialist construction projects.

In the 1930s and during the war and post-war years the Tatar diaspora in Uzbekistan was significantly replenished by immigrants from starving regions of Russia, who always considered Tashkent an ‘abundant south.’

In the 1950–1970s rapid industrial development in all Central Asian republics was an attractive motive for the resettlement of the Tatars. In Kazakhstan the Tatars headed to the mines of Karaganda and Ust-Kamenogorsk, mining plants in Temirtau, Jezkazgan, Shymkent, Dzhambul (modern Taraz). The peak time for mass migration of the Tatars from the central part of the country became the years of development of the Kazakh virgin soil. The Tatars continued to arrive to Uzbekistan to restore Tashkent affected by the earthquake of 1966 and the ‘Hungry Steppe’ land improvement schemes. Together with the Russians and the Ukrainians, they were the backbone of the labour collectives of the advanced Uzbek industry: mining and metallurgical complex in Navoi, polymetallic plant in Almalyk and Angren, aircraft building and tractor plants in Tashkent. In Tajikistan the Tatars came to work in the mines and processing plants, light industry, construction of meliorative facilities and hydroelectric power plants, including the largest Nurek HES as well as the Tajik Aluminium Plant (TadAZ), the most advanced industry of the republic.
Tatar experts arrived in the 1960–1970s to Krasnovodsk in Turkmenistan (modern Turkmenbashi) to develop the deposits of salt and minerals of Kara-Bogaz-Gol. In Chardzhou (Turkmenabat) they worked at the chemical plant, in Nebitdag they extracted oil and gas and worked at the refinery. In Kizil-Arvat they worked at the largest car-repair plant named after 26 Baku Commissars. Karakum canal from the Amu-Darya River to the Caspian Sea was built with the mass participation of the Tatars.

As a result of these migrations the Tatar population of the Central Asian republics increased severalfold (the maximum 'peaks' were fixed by All-Union census of 1979: 531.2 thousand people in the Uzbek SSR, 312.6 thousand in the Kazakh SSR, 78.2 thousand in the Tajik SSR, 71.7 thousand in the Kirghiz SSR, and 40.3 thousand people in the Turkmen SSR). These diasporas are still the largest in the post–Soviet territories.

The formation of the communities of the Volga (Kazan) Tatars in Belarus and the Baltic States (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia) is also associated with the post-war participation of the Tatars in large industrial construction projects in the region. Later they became the intellectual sector of the executive and engineering personnel there.

As a result of the collapse of the USSR, the groups of Tatars in the former Soviet republics instantly became diasporas (except in Russia).

In the new post–Soviet countries they faced an acute problem of integration into the civil society of their countries in conditions of dominant role of the titular nations in all spheres of economic and social life. Unfavourable socio-economic and political situation in the early 1990s caused massive migration and declining fertility of non-titular nations, as a result of which the Tatar population in the neighbouring countries everywhere began to decrease. It is especially noticeable in the countries of the Central Asian region, where the destruction of the existing cultural and economic ties, ethnic tension, deteriorating economy and social vulnerability of the majority of the population at the end of the first millennium had the greatest consequences.

The migrant population reacted to changes in the living conditions in the Russian Federation and former Soviet republics.

For a period of 10 years, from 1989 to 1999, the number of the Tatars decreased by 32% in Uzbekistan, by 18% in Kazakhstan, by 35% in Kyrgyzstan, by 80% in Tajikistan, by 54% in Turkmenistan, and by 46% in Azerbaijan. Ukraine and Belarus lost 16% of the Tatars between censuses, the Baltic States lost about 30% or 35% of the Tatars.

Most of the Tatars went to Russia, especially to the Ural-Volga region. Tatarstan, along with Bashkortostan, became places of distinctive migration inflow for the Tatars. From 1992 to 1997 the Tatars made up 73% of 100 thousand people who came to the Republic of Tatarstan. At the same time, the outflow of the Tatars went not only to Russia but also to the neighbouring countries (for example, in Kazakhstan from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) and to far-abroad countries. In the following years the flow of migration from the CIS and Baltic countries greatly decreased: if in 1994 12.5 thousand settlers came to the Republic of Tatarstan, in 2001 this number was only about 800 people.

Those Tatars who remained found themselves in complex historical conditions. Nevertheless, they demonstrated their inherent restraint and a sense of reality, finding a civilised way of national revival, preservation and development of their culture, language, traditions, as well as of painless integration into the new civil society of the states, which became independent as a result of the collapse of the USSR.

The Tatar diaspora in far-abroad countries has more than six hundred years of history. The Polish-Lithuanian Tatars were a part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and began to settle in modern eastern Polish lands in the 14th century. The Dobruja Tatars, another fragment of the Golden Horde, settled in the Danubian provinces in the 15th century, and in the 19th century Tatars went to China, Turkey, and Finland.
In some countries the diaspora was formed in the 20th century as a consequence of social disruptions: revolutions and wars, which forced people to leave their traditional place of residence in search of a safer place to live.

Part of the diaspora is made up of Muslims (not only Tatars) who left Russia for religious reasons as a result of a number of sporadic waves of forced conversion to Christianity in the Ural-Volga Region and Siberia (the largest wave of 'religious' emigration of the Tatars to the Middle East was registered in the late 19th and early 20th centuries).

In Soviet times the diaspora in the far-abroad countries was represented by two strata: labour emigration (which explored new commercial markets and the sphere of labour application) and political emigration from pre-revolutionary Russia and the USSR (Turkey, Germany, USA). Political emigrants were represented by Tatar-emigrants of the Civil War period in Russia, who did not accept the socialist choice of their country (representatives of trade and industrial capital, public leaders, clergy, and Tatar warriors who fought against the Red Army on the side of the White Guard), as well as defectors of the period of Great Patriotic War. A relatively large group of Tatars, who studied in religious and secular educational institutions in Europe, Asia, and America, by virtue of their ideological and civil position joined different political groups or remained indifferent. A small amount of dissidents of the 1970–1990s, who went abroad for ideological beliefs, could also be conditionally considered as the representatives of political emigrants.

These waves of Tatar emigration provided the world with much ready-made talents. Many of them would acquire international acclaim (for example, Rudolf Nuriev).

The process of the formation of the diaspora in Australia in the late 1940s is very interesting. These were Russian emigrates from South East Asia (mainly Manchuria), who had fled from the persecution of the Soviet government and then Communist China. Thus, the Commonwealth of Australia became the second resettlement area for these migrants.

At the end of the 20th century, in the era of globalisation, mass communications, and the emergence of the conditions for free movement in the world, there began to form new diasporas in the countries of Europe, Asia, and America, where the Turko-Tatar population never lived before.

Currently the largest diasporas in foreign countries are in Romania (over 23 thousand), Turkey (20 thousand), China (5.6 thousand), and Poland (5.5 thousand). Diasporas in the United States, Canada, Germany, a number of European countries are rapidly growing because of the immigrants from the former Soviet republics.

Representatives of the diaspora who went abroad in the post–Soviet period to study or work and started a family with citizens of foreign states are as a rule politically neutral.

Today the boundaries between the categories of diaspora are actually blurred. The descendants of the labour and political migrants are now natives of the countries of residence and as a rule pay little attention to how and why their ancestors arrived in their new homeland.

It should be noted that the migration of people to other states should not be thought of as the search of a lucky land for themselves and future generations. 'In any case this is a tragedy not only of one person but also of all the people,' said the academician I. Tagirov [Tagirov, 1997, p. 9].

The Tatar diaspora is one of the most structured Russian diaspora. There are registered communities, national-cultural associations, sustainable ethnic groups in 44 countries around the world. The tendency to create their micro-environment and familiar traditional socio-psychological climate, designed to compensate for the spiritual distance from the historical homeland, is the strongest in the Tatar community.

For the Tatars living in foreign countries as a minority, the traditions and customs of previous generations serve as a means of self-preservation as an ethnic group. Therefore, elderly people try to convey to their children and grandchildren the national customs and
traditions, cultivating them as not only the national values but also as a means of protection from assimilation.

The compatriots abroad maintain close contacts with each other, gradually strengthening the cultural community and the unity of the community. Living in a society where their mother tongue and Tatar songs can be heard, and where there are elements of the traditional way of life and thought allows the compatriots to preserve their identity with the rest of the Tatars. This eases the psychological adaptation to a foreign language environment.

The national and cultural communities of compatriots preserve the Tatar national self-consciousness, the most important aesthetic values, ideals and objectives, cultural, moral, and historical experience of the nation, the norms of behaviour.

The Tatars are one of a few Russian peoples, who have centuries-old experience of peaceful coexistence with other peoples in a foreign language and cultural environment. Once in different countries abroad because of the historical events, the Tatars have a high international sense of justice, respect for social and political system of the countries of resettlement and decently fulfill their civic duty. The Tatars in foreign countries traditionally honestly execute the laws of their countries of residence, with respect for their traditions and cultures. Wherever they live, they are not a source of conflict and misunderstanding. As citizens of their countries, who make a significant contribution to their economic and cultural development, our compatriots are worthy representatives of the ancient Tatar people. They are interested in peace, stability, and prosperity of their countries and in extending of their full cooperation with the historical homeland of the Tatar people. Regardless of where they live and their religion, belonging to different ethnocultural and religious groups, the Tatars of countries outside the former Soviet Union consider themselves as a part of a single and indivisible Tatar people, the integrity of which is based on common history, culture, language, and national awareness.

According to the modern researcher L. Usmanova, 'not only the intellectual level of these people but also their ethnic identity in a totally alien, non–Tatar environment, is overwhelming. This is an example of the survival of a nation in the context of globalisation' [Usmanova, 2004].

Thus, during several centuries the Tatar diaspora in neighbouring countries played a historically important role in the pioneer settlement of newly discovered territories. At the same time, due to their developed ethnocultural abilities, they always exercised peacekeeping and peace-building functions, providing broad mediation in the search and establishment of interethnic compromise and transferring the practice of civil contract to their new territories. Modern Tatar diasporas in all the post–Soviet territories have such potential. The task of politicians and social scientists is to use it correctly for the progressive development of the nation.

The homecoming of this part of a diaspora is still the most complex problem. In our opinion, policy of this area needs to be based on a distinctive ethnic community since the artificial and hasty connection of the parts of the ethnic group, united mainly by historical memory in many ways, seems very doubtful. If unregulated, this may lead to social tensions between the 'parent' and the returned part of the nation. At the moment there is no clear or pressing need to undo the mosaic of the Tatar world.

Most of the Tatar cultural and national societies in foreign countries actively cooperate with the Republic of Tatarstan and its state and public institutions. Many are collective members of the International Union of Public Associations Worldwide Tatar Congress. The strengthening of the role of the diasporas of CIS countries and Baltic States in the establishment and expansion of mutually beneficial cooperation of Russia and Tatarstan with foreign countries is still an urgent problem since there is still little participation of the diaspora in large-scale economic operations.

Thus, the main task for the historical homeland in this context is the systematic and methodical creation of regulatory and
bureaucratic procedures. This will ensure the self-sufficiency of the diaspora, the maximum satisfaction of its national and cultural needs, the development of effective mechanisms of interaction between the Russian state with the foreign diaspora in order to protect the rights and freedoms of compatriots and preserve ethnic and cultural identity.

Major historical events, which took place at the turn of the millennium, have dramatically changed the situation of the Tatar people. As a result of the fall of the 'Iron Curtain,' the diverse world of compatriots abroad has opened up to the Russians. Foreign diasporas have become an object of the wide public and academic interest. Their history has become a part of the historical past of the people, and there is a real chance to bring together the scattered pieces of the ethnic group. Therefore, today the creation of an objective and truthful history of the Tatar people (taking into account the history of the diasporas) is one of the most urgent tasks of social scientists in our country.

§ 2. The Position of the Tatars in the Russian Federation and Abroad.

The role of All-Tatar Events in Consolidation of Nation

Rinat Zakirov

There is almost no place in Russian Federation that does not have a Tatar population. The only question is how many of them live there. However, there are some regions with a significant number of Tatars. These are The Republic of Bashkortostan (over 1 million people), the Republic of Udmurtia (110 thousand), the Tyumen oblast (over 230 thousand), the Perm krai (over 150 thousand), the Sverdlovsk oblast (100 thousand), the Chelyabinsk oblast (around 250 thousand), the Orenburg oblast (over 160 thousand), the Ulyanovsk oblast (160 thousand), the Samara oblast (over 120 thousand), the Penza oblast (130 thousand), Moscow and the Moscow oblast (over 200 thousand).

Obviously, the position of the Tatars in each region has its unique features related to historical, social, economical, political, cultural, interethnic, and other factors. However, generally speaking, one must recognise that everywhere there are serious problems in preserving the mother tongue, national education system, fulfilling spiritual and cultural requirements, and the provision of information in the mother tongue. In the places with active national communities truly exercising their citizenship, the position of Tatars is markedly better than generally across the country. These include Ulyanovsk, Samara, Saratov Regions and the Republic of Udmurtia.

The position of the Tatars in the Republic of Bashkortostan deserves special consideration. It is commonly known that three-quarters of the Tatars in the Russian Federation live outside the Republic of Tatarstan. To a large extent this situation has arisen as a result of administrative split of pretty compact areas with Tatar population settled mainly between Volga and Urals. It is no secret that current administrative divisions and their borders Russian Federation were inherited from the Soviet Union, when the Bolsheviks quite randomly defined and created administrative units, including subnational entities.

The largest number of Tatars from the Ural-Volga region (about 1.5 million people) was included in the Republic of Bashkortostan by Bolsheviks in 1919. In 1920 the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was established by decree on the territory of Kazan, partially Ufa, Vyatka, Samara guberniyas. In particular, it included the Menzelinsk uyezd of Ufa guberniya. Other parts of this guberniya inhabited by Tatars were due to hold a referendum for territorial self-determination. However, the referendum did not take place, and the fate of the majority of the Tatar ethnos was actually determined by a 'poll' of communists from the party cells of the CPSU(B). Thus, already at the beginning of the period of the for-
mation of the USSR grounds were being laid for the serious interethnic problems, which are significant in the present day.

It should be also noted that ever since the times of the development of the Volga region and Cisurals the tsarist government was skilled at creating interethnic conflicts and playing them off against each other. As the American researcher Dmitry Gorenburg states, according to an edict issued by the tsar in the 16th century, the Bashkirs were granted special privileges in land ownership and payment of various tributes [Gorenburg, 2004, p. 109]. These privileges encouraged the conversion of representatives of other nations into the Bashkir strata, especially many Tatars from Cisurals were converted. 'As indicated by sources of various ages, such sub-ethnic groups of Tatars as the Mishar Tatars and Teptyars quite often registered themselves as Bashkirs to get land and tax exemption' [Gorenburg, 2004, p. 109].

The American researcher considerably broadens the framework of concepts applied to the study of ethnicity and interethnic relation problems specific to Russia. In addition, he draws attention to the fact that 'censuses and formation of administrative borders as well as provision of privileges to separate ethnic groups often lead to occurrence of new ethnic groups and ethnic-cultural changes in existing ones. This theory, often called constructivism, was developed by Lorey Vial (Vial, 1989) and his colleagues who considered European colonialism as the main reason behind tribalism in South Africa: Europeans erected ethnic barriers between cultures for ease of ruling their colonies. ... the same situation was observed between Tatars and Bashkirs, two Turkic-Islamic ethnoses of Volga-Ural region' [Gorenburg, 2004, p. 107].

It should also be mentioned that there are two worldwide recognised scientific approaches to the ethnicity phenomenon. The first approach is called as primordialism, its followers consider the nationality as an invariant (constant) and important component of ethnic identity. The second approach is called as situativity. Followers of this concept consider ethnicity as a variable phenomenon depending on one or another political and economical benefits that bearers of 'mobile ethnicity' hope to acquire. Considering the metamorphoses of national identity of Tatars and Bashkirs in the Republic of Bashkortostan, we think it logical to introduce the term 'changing ethnicity' in order to adequately explain the situation.

From the early 1970s the Soviet authorities in Bashkortostan began persistently and consistently to amend the situation which was, as they saw it, 'unfavourable.' A major concern for the leaders of the Bashkir Regional Committee of the CPSU was the dominance of Russians (32% of the total population) and Tatars (24%), which would lead to the impossibility of any sharp increase in the Bashkir population (21%) without applying any statistical and demographic manipulation. Basing their views on ethnicity related motives of self-interest, these functionaries endorsed an administrative campaign to convert Tatars into Bashkirs by rewriting the nationality column in their passports. At the same time, this questionable practice was supported by some scientific explanation. Some scientists of the republic were empowered to find evidence backing idea that results of a 'scientific' inspection reveal 'Bashkir roots' in a part of localities inhabited by Tatars. Furthermore, the cases of conversion of Tatars into Bashkir strata were used as a questionable historical proof of modern 'ethnic metamorphosis' in favour of titular nation.

Later statistical-demographical manipulations of the population of ethnic groups of Tatars and Bashkirs are well tracked through the results of censuses. For instance, according to the results of the 1989 census, conducted amid emerging democracy and freedom of expression, Tatars in the Republic of Bashkortostan constituted 1.3 million people (28.4% of total population), while the number of Bashkirs was around 1 million people (21.9%). However, the 2002 census 'changed' the situation to the opposite. It turned out that in 13 years between censuses Tatar population fell by 300 thousand and constituted 1 million (their share to total population reduced to 21%). On the contrary, the number of Bashkirs increased by 300 thousand constituting 1.3 million. Howev-
er, there is much to be taken into consideration. If such a large part of population—300 thousand people—changes its national identity without much difficulty between two fraternal nations, then this obviously is a case of ‘changing ethnicity’ phenomenon.

However, from the scientific point of view, it would have been incorrect to close one’s eyes to political, social, and economical circumstances associated with this phenomenon. For instance, a number of those identifying themselves as Tatars increases amidst administrative pressure. However, the number of Bashkirs increases amid administrative pressure. Regrettably, we have to admit that in the last 10–15 years the position of the Tatar population in Bashkortostan has become more difficult in terms of the preservation of native language, national education, and culture. We have to admit that it is a fault not only of the leadership of Bashkortostan but also a part of the Tatar community who adopted a radical position and refused the possibility of dialogue with the authorities of the republic. As a result, the situation of confrontation has gone so far that contacts between writers, scientists, men of art, representatives of communities of the two very close fraternal brother nations have ceased.

This situation has clearly encouraged the sensibly-minded forces in the Tatar and Bashkir community to focus on searching a way out of the dead-end, based on the principles of consent and mutual understanding. The 4 World Congress of Tatar held in December 2007 took a decision about the necessity of taking actions to overcome the crisis in relationships between Bashkirs and Tatars. The Congress was also marked by adoption of a Message to Bashkirs calling for cooperation and good-neighbourly relations based on mutual respect. Broad circles of Tatar and Bashkir community regarded these developments as quite positive.

Contacts between the Worldwide Tatar Congress and the World Kurultai of Bashkirs were resumed in 2008. The same year in summer a meeting was held in Kazan for leaders of social movements of people living in the Volga region and Urals. The meeting resulted in the adoption of the Joint Claim in support of national education of people living in Russian Federation, which had been invalidated by infamous Law No.3 09 adopted by the State Duma of the Russian Federation.

The constructive cooperation of representatives of Tatar and Bashkir communities resulted in a gradual reduction of tensions in relationships between the two nations and the resumption of contacts between creative community, writers, musicians, and artists. Theatre groups of Bashkortostan resumed their tours to Tatarstan, and Tatar theatre groups to Bashkortostan. The population of both republics regarded these changes as very positive. For instance, tours of G. Kamal Tatar State Academic Theatre, ‘Kazan’ dance group in Ufa and other cities of Bashkortostan were always sold out. Tours of Bashkir Kajit Gafuri Academic Theatre and Mirage folk music group were also very successful.

The Republic of Bashkortostan underwent leadership changes in 2010. The first steps of new leadership taken in the sphere of Tatar-Bashkir relationship can be regarded as positive. For instance, TV channel 'Tatarstan-New Age' resumed broadcasting to the entire territory of Bashkortostan, while TV viewers of Tatarstan for many years already had an opportunity to watch programmes of 'Bashkir Satellite Television' (BST) channel. At the present moment the two republics resumed their parliamentary contacts. They hold parliamentary programmes for the sharing of experience in the area of legislation.

This is a brief description of the situation regarding the biggest ethnic group of Tatars outside Tatarstan. The position of the Tatars in Bashkortostan is constantly within the sight of The Executive Committee of the World Tatar Congress and wide Tatar community. The experience of the last two decades has shown that in fact any confrontation, fueling tensions, exaggerated ambitions lead nowhere and do not promote national development of people.

When analysing the position of Tatars in the Russian Federation, it will be appropriate to remember the meeting of the president V. Putin with delegates of the 3rd Worldwide...
Tatars found themselves in foreign diaspora. The head of state to consider the interests of national schools in the process of developing federal education standards. Of course, they also raised the question of the need to federal radio and television in the Tatar language for the second largest nation in the country. V. Putin was receptive to expressed calls and publicly charged the Government of the Russian Federation to find ways to solve these issues in the shortest possible time. However, even after 8 years these issues are still unresolved. That, generally speaking, eloquently describes the position of Tatars in the modern Russian Federation.

As for the position of Tatars abroad, there are a range of totally different situations depending on the general political, social, and economical climate in the country of residence. Following the collapse of the USSR, 1 million Tatars found themselves in foreign diaspora. People in the CIS countries and Baltic states experienced the post-Soviet transition period differently. For instance, Tatar communities in Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) quite successfully adapted to market economy and transparent civil society. They actively interact with each other and productively cooperate with their historical homeland in the Republic of Tatarstan.

In general, the following conclusions can be drawn. There has been increasing interest in the lives of Tatar communities and Tatars in general in recent years in European countries. For instance, in Finland it has become a tradition for heads of states (especially from Islamic countries) to come to the country to visit the Tatar Cultural and Religious Centre of Finnish Tatars 'Islamia' in Helsinki. The leaders of Finland many times declared that they are proud of their Tatars-Muslims making decent contribution to national prosperity. The head of the Finnish state meets with representatives of Tatar community on an annual basis.

Indeed, the Tatar community in Finland already has a two-century history, Tatars put down their roots here long ago. The Finnish Islamic Association was established in 1925 and still successfully functions bringing organisational principles to lives of Tatars in the country. The 'Islamia' Tatar Cultural and Religious Centre, located in the centre of Helsinki, incorporates a mosque with a prayer hall, Association of the Finnish Turks, youth centre, 'Yoldyz' sports society, library and reading hall. Not only Tatars but also other Muslims living in Finland (mainly diplomats from Islamic countries) come here for Friday Prayers. Religious and national holidays, musical evenings, and joint tea parties are conducted throughout a year. The full and organised life of the Tatar community in Finland can provide an example for all Tatars, living beyond the borders of historical homeland.

Tatars of Poland, Lithuania, and Belarus with common historical roots represent quite an interesting and unique sub-ethnic group of Tatars. The total number of Tatars in the three countries constitutes 16 thousand people. The Tatar population of these three countries represents ancient relic of the Golden Horde Tatars, who moved here over 600 years ago (in the 14th century) to the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to serve in the military. Later, following the establishment of Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (Rzeczpospolita), they were included into Polish nobility, and Polish kings offered them title of nobleman. Unlike the Russian state, the Tatars did not have to reject Islam in order to become nobleman. Thus, Polish Muslims in the Middle Ages had already formed authentic religious group representing Islam civilisation in Europe.

As a result of partition of Poland at the end of the 18th century, Polish-Lithuanian Tatars became subjects of the Russian Empire. This continued up to the 1918 until Poland recovered independence. The first president of independent Poland, prominent figure of the Polish national liberation movement, Jozef Pilsudsky
was very happy for Tatar political emigration at the beginning of the 1920. It is commonly known that Tatar opponents of Bolshevik regime were headed by a social leader Gayaz Iskhaki, who was exiled together with Yu. Pilsudsky to Arkhangelsk in 1907–1908 for anti-state activities. At the beginning of the World War II G. Iskhaki was in Poland. At the beginning of September 1939 he had to flee from the flames under the bombing of Warsaw.

Following the fall of Communist regime in the 1990s, Gdansk became a centre of national revival of Polish Tatars, where following the World War II a significant Tatar community was formed. There was a concentration point of intellectual forces of Tatar nobility of Poland, leading to the progressive revival of Tatar (Islamic) part of Polish society. The Association of Polish Tatars, which existed before the World War II, was restored in 1990. It was headed by a famous scientist-Turkologist and poet, professor Salim Khazbievich. In 1991 the People's Centre of Culture of Tatars of the Republic of Poland was opened in Gdansk with the active support of the Pomorskoje Voivodeship. It was located in an old mansion in park areas in the central part of the city. Nowadays the entire cultural life of Polish Tatars revolves around this centre.

A great event in the lives of Polish Tatars and entire Tatar nation was the opening of a monument to the Tatar soldier, defender of Polish homeland in Gdansk in 2010. The president of the Republic of Poland Bronislaw Komorovskiy gave a speech at the celebrations on this occasion. His impressive and powerful speech was full of respect and gratitude to Polish Tatars and in their person to entire Tatar nation.

A considerable number of Tatars (official figures, 23 thousand people) live in Romania, one more country of the European Union. Tatar life here is centred around Constanta, a city on the Black Sea coast with headquarters of the Democratic Union of Muslim Turk-Tatars of Romania. The Union publishes a monthly magazine Karadeniz (The Black Sea). There are many prominent academic, educational, cultural figures, members of diplomatic corps of the country among Romanian Tatars. Tatars have fixed representation in the Parliament of Romania.

According to different estimates, 10 to 25 thousand Tatars live in Turkey. Due to linguistic and cultural affinity, common religion, local Tatars to a greater extent have assimilated than Tatars in other countries. Many representatives of Tatar emigration managed to distinguish themselves in the social, political, and scientific areas of the Republic of Turkey. They are Yufus Akhura, Sadri Maksudi, Akhmat-Zaki Validi-Togan, Abdulbari Battal, Gayaz Iskhaki, Sagadat Chagatai, Khamit Kushay, Rashit Rahmati Arat, Akhmet Temir, Aksas Kurat, etc. Even now many people of Tatar origin play a prominent role in the social and political life of Turkey. For instance, a famous social figure and journalist Ali Akysh, an author of books about the Soviet regime and position of Muslims in Volga-Ural region. Also professor Nadir Davlet, a prominent specialist on the history of Turkic nations of Russia, professor Gyunul Pultar (granddaughter of Sadri Maksudi), a specialist on international law. Turkey has functioning centres of Tatar culture in Ankara, Istanbul, and Eskişehir.

Among more distant countries with an active Tatar communities one needs to mention Germany and the Czech Republic in Europe as well as Australia, USA, and Canada. Certainly some CIS countries have quite a big number of Tatar population. According to the censuses, there are 70.3 thousand Tatars in Ukraine, 203.3 thousand Tatars in Kazakhstan, 219.1 thousand Tatars in Uzbekistan. A total of 60 thousand Tatars live in three other states of Middle Asia—Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. China occupies special position with large Tatar community living in Uyghur autonomous region of Xinjiang (over 5 thousand people).

All in all, to complete the topic of Tatar diaspora, it should be stated that the experience of Tatarstan in cooperating with compatriots abroad was a requirement at the federal level. In recent years the Russian Federation began to pay much attention to relations with compatriots abroad. The International Council of...
and content of the Sabantuy festivals have significantly improved. Up to 100 thousand people visit Sabantuys in such regions as Moscow, Samara, Chelyabinsk, etc. The Federal Sabantuy has been held since 2002, and every year the baton is passed to new region. The Federal Sabantuy has already been held in the Mari El Republic, the Republic of Udmurtia, the Republic of Mordovia, the Ulyanovsk oblast, the Nizhny Novgorod oblast, the Astrakhan region, the Chelyabinsk oblast. It was very popular among representatives of all nations living in one or another region. Sabantuys are also held abroad in more than 30 countries. Thus, one can say that in the last two decades the Sabantuy festival has become a mass ethnic-cultural movement of Tatar nation, not only domestically but internationally as well. It is no coincidence that UNESCO proposed that this festival should be included in the List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity.

Since 2004 the Executive Committee of the Worldwide Tatar Congress has held the World Tatar Youth Forum (WTYF). In summer 2010 the 4th forum was held. Even during the Soviet period there was a spontaneous Tatar youth movement. Young people from the villages would meet in the evenings in parks and open areas of such cities as Kazan, Naberezhnye Chelny, Ufa, Izhevsk, Moscow, etc. They would meet and interact with new people, and in this way the ethnic and cultural identity of Tatar youth was expressed. Certainly, this can also be considered as one of important elements of socialisation of national youth.

Today the spontaneous youth movement has acquired certain structural forms. The Tatar Youth Forums elect its executive body—Coordinating Council (until the 4th Forum in 2010, Bureau) of WTYF. It organises various national activities for youth: theatre and music festivals, KVN (Comedy Club) tournaments, sports competitions, youth trips to memorial sites related to the history of Tatar nation, etc. Tatar youth was very enthusiastic about the decision of the International University Sports Federation to hold the World Summer Universiade 2013 in Kazan. All in all, it must be said that especially university students are
very active. University student clubs of Tatars successfully function in Kazan, Ufa, Moscow, Saint Petersburg, and other big cities. Today club-type work is the most popular form of work among Tatar youth. In 2010 there were more than 100 organisations of Tatar youth in regions of the Russian Federation and abroad.

The Tatar women's movement also has long and glorious history. Since the very establishment of the Worldwide Tatar Congress various women organisations such as White Kalfak (type of women headdress, 'Ak kalfak'), 'Tatar family' ('Tatarskaya semya'), etc., were formed within the Congress. They greatly contribute to education of youth, preservation of reliable family foundations. Today the teaching staff in country mainly consists of women. Five meetings of Tatar language teachers and heads of regional Tatar schools in the Russian Federation have already been held within the framework of the Worldwide Tatar Congress. Tatar women's organisations took an active part in them.

Life has shown that the Worldwide Tatar Congress can remain indifferent to questions of religion. Islam is one of the most important basic elements of ethic-cultural identity of Tatars. When this area of modern life became affected by complex conflicts, Islamic clergy itself began to ask the Executive Committee of the Worldwide Tatar Congress for help in organising a neutral platform for negotiations. Such trust of Islamic religious leaders led the Executive Committee of the World Congress of Tatars to create a special commission on spiritual renewal. In 2005 and 2010 the meetings of religious leaders of Tatar communities in the Russian Federation were held in Kazan. They were a great success. Religious figures were able to share views and come to an agreement on many burning questions. It must be said that there are regions where national organisation are headed by influential religious figures. For instance, the National-Cultural Autonomy of Tatars in the Ivanovo region is lead by Farit hazrat Lyapin, a religious leader of Islamic community. Thanks to the authority and organisational skills of F. Lyapin, life of Tatar community in the region may serve as an example for many regions in the Russian Federation.

Due to their cultural identity over more than 1,000 years, the Tatars have been an integral part of Islamic civilisation. The Tatar nation always had a deep understanding of importance of the historical event when the predecessors of the modern Tatars officially adopted Islam as a state religion of Volga Bulgaria. This took place in May 922 on the banks of the Volga River, with participation of an embassy from Baghdad Caliphate headed by Ibn Fadlan. Every year at the beginning of summer Muslims of the Volga region come together in ancient city of Bolgar to commemorate those events. At first, these activities took place under the aegis of the Muslim Spiritual Board of European Part of Russia and Sibera (MSBPS) led by mufti Talgat Tadzhutdin. However, when other mutfiyats also joined these activities, religious figures considered it necessary to engage into them the Worldwide Tatar Congress as well. The Executive Committee of the Worldwide Tatar Congress had actively engaged with this work, and in recent years up to 20 thousand people come to meetings of the Volga region Muslims in ancient Bolgar. This meeting is called Izge Bolgar zhenyen ('The meeting in sacred Bolgar'), it is very popular among people and serves to underpin Tatar spiritual unity.

In recent years the Worldwide Tatar Congress is committed to undertaking concentrated efforts to develop a national business community. The results of this work are already evident. Successful and self-sustainable business structures run by Tatar businessmen have emerged in regions of the RF and CIS countries. It allows them to independently finance many local projects related to national life. Today the needs of business require serious consolidation, which is why the Association of Tatar businesspeople was created under the Tatar Congress. There is no doubt that the establishment of such a structure will contribute to the successful implementation of many national projects.

Many projects of the Worldwide Tatar Congress are connected with supporting the nation-
al culture. For instance, All-Russia festivals of Tatar folk music groups Tugerek uen ('A round game') are held since 2008. Moreover, on an annual basis more than 20 festivals of Tatar song are held by Tatar communities in regions of Russia and CIS countries. On the one hand, these festivals serve to preserve deep layers of music culture of nation, while on the other, they help to resolve the practical issues of providing the music for national holidays.

National sports are also very popular among Tatars. For this reason, in 2005 the Executive Committee of the Worldwide Tatar Congress established Russian National Kordsh Wrestling Federation 'Tatarça köräş.' On an annual basis this federation organises Russian championships, various tournaments, it opens children sections of national wrestling. Teams from 32 regions of Russia participated in 2010 Russian championship.

In summary, we can say that today all-Tatar events have gained wide scope and great power. Certainly, they play an important role in consolidation of modern Tatar nation.
CHAPTER 6
Ethnocultural Processes in Tatarstan and Tatar World
at the end of the 20th–beginning of the 21st century

§ 1. Dynamics of Ethnocultural Policies of the Federal Centre
and the Republic of Tatarstan in the 1990–2000s

Guzel Makarova

Before addressing the issue of ethnocultural and national civil identities of Tatarstan's population, one needs to explain the content, examine the process of establishment and development of the ethnocultural policies of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan, in the context of which these identities were formed and evolved.

In the 1990–2000s Russia was studying new models of building ethnocultural policies. These studies were connected to the tremendous social, economical, political, and cultural processes happening in the society. These strategies were reflected and took into account the ethnic and civil identities already formed and implemented by that time in society. In return, federal and regional strategies were aimed at sustaining and developing or constructing new sociocultural communities.

We will interpret the term 'cultural policy' using treatment already established in sociocultural practice in Russia and majority of Western countries. Thus, this policy means a form of influence of state and related social institutions upon the process of cultural production and formation of sociocultural norms, views, values of people, and this form is declared, officially stated in laws, conceptions and programmes of cultural development. Ethnocultural policy in particular is a part of both cultural policy and ethnic policy at the same time. It is formed at their intersection point and associated with preservation, reproduction, and development of ethnic languages and cultures, ethnocultural groups interaction process management. Together with national policy, it aims to guarantee the consolidation of population based on general civil values [see Makarova, 2009, pp. 35–49].

In order to determine the historical and political conditions, under which the Federal Centre and regions of Russia formed their attitudes towards ethnocultural development during the post–Soviet period, we will briefly describe the state national-cultural policy in the USSR. It had a dualistic nature. On the one hand, the official version of Marxism, on which the country's ideology was based, contained a thesis about the gradual 'levelling' of differences, including ethno-national differences. On the other hand, and in reality, the policy was adjusted to actual practice. When the Bolsheviks came to power, they were already using ethnic component to win positions in national regions.

Later ethnocultural variety was not suppressed but rigidly directed and managed. The slogan of the equal development of cultures of country nations was declared, and their function as 'national (ethnic) by form and international by content' was cultivated. Moreover, a policy was introduced to ascribe each individual to a given ethnic group, wherein ethnic affiliation was determined by official documents as well as by the help of census policy. Finally, another characteristic feature of the Soviet period was the extreme centralisation along with concentration of all main functions of control over cultural life in hands of central authority that implemented this contradictory.

The late 1980s and early 1990s were marked not only by dissolution of the Soviet
Union but also rise of ethno-national movements in regions of Russia. They were critical of the strategy of the centre and putting forward new slogans for ethnocultural development. This was also the period of the ‘parade of sovereignties’ staged by republics that had previously been autonomous within the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR). Under these conditions significant changes were made in the ethnocultural sphere by the national republics in cooperation with the leadership of Russia. Russia was obliged to implement a policy of ‘concessions and consensus measures’ [Drobizheva, 2003, p. 34] ‘and consideration of an increase in the activity of the national and regional elites’ [Zorin, 2003, p. 126],

For instance, aspiration of regions for independence in resolving culture related issues was reflected in Fundamental Principles of Legislation of the Russian Federation for Culture (9 October 1992, No. 3612-1). The distribution of competences between federal and regional bodies of state power and regional governing bodies acquired legislative recognition. According to article No. 39 of the Fundamental Principles, the determination of cultural policy and adoption of republican legislation on culture related issues became a competence of state power and governance in republics of Russia. That was a principal step towards regional autonomy in this sphere. Under conditions of the extreme escalation of ethnicity related issues, this document could not avoid special articles devoted to rights of ethnic communities in culture related issues—that is, group (collective) rights (part III of Fundamental Principles).

The Constitution of the Russian Federation of 12 December 1993 and the Federal law ‘On National-Cultural Autonomy’ (No. 74-FL, 17 June 1996) formed the basis of actually ‘multi-ethnic model of our society’ [Zorin, 2003, p. 129; Drobizheva, 2003, p. 29] realised in two forms: ethno-territorial autonomies and national-cultural autonomy (NCA). According to the constitutional charter of Russia, a multinational population was recognised as the only sovereignty holder in the Russian Federation (article No. 3)—that is, all ethnic communities of country were declared as state-forming. The Constitution also provides the right for preservation and use of native language, ‘for free choice of language of communication, upbringing, education, and creative work’ (article No. 26), and bans propaganda of racial, national, and religious supremacy, hatred, and strife (article No. 29).

In the 1990s the nature of development of national-territorial form of multi-ethnic model of our society was set out in such documents as the Agreement ‘On the Delimitation of Jurisdictional Subjects and the Mutual Delegation of Authority between the State Bodies of the Russian Federation and the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan’ dated 15 February 1994 and the Law of the Russian Federation ‘On the Principles and Order of Delegation of Authority between the State Bodies of the Russian Federation and the State Bodies of the Federal Subjects’ (No 119-FL, 24 June 1999). By securing rights and relative autonomy of the Russian regions, they indirectly contributed to preservation of their ethnocultural identities as well as establishing regional identities. At the same time, the aforementioned documents set the framework for the level of independence of federal subjects, limiting the ‘syndrome of regional self-will,’ which was so typical for the beginning of the 1990s [Abdulatipov, 2008], including in the ethnocultural sphere.

In turn, the Russian law ‘On National-Cultural Autonomy’ legitimised the formation of extraterritorial ethnocultural associations of citizens. Thus, it included all ethnic groups into the scope of national policy ‘irrespective of availability or lack of own administrative formations’ [Zorin, 2003, p. 133]. This document contained certain contradictions and drawbacks, which were to hinder its subsequent implementation. For instance, according to the comment by A. Osipov, national-cultural autonomy is limited to the preservation and development of language, education, and national culture, while excluding human rights, research, and other activities [see Osipov,
Articles relating to provision of financial support from the state and local authorities to national cultural communities do not clearly define which authority shall provide this, what are the enforcement mechanisms for its implementation and the volume of designated resources [Osipov, 2004, p. 130]. V. Gushcha also mentions that the law does not clearly define specific forms of association of national groups and the order of their registration [Gushcha, 1997, p. 5]. Thus, according to the comments of aforementioned authors, ethnic minorities did not acquire 'adequate scope' for the realisation of their needs in the linguistic and cultural sphere.

Nevertheless, the adoption of the law 'On Ethnic-Cultural Autonomy' has ultimately contributed and contributes to a certain extent to the preservation of original languages and cultures, and thus to the reproduction of ethnocultural communities in Russia. However, this last circumstance in particular as well as the 'imposition' of collective affiliation instead of implementing 'the liberal principle of cultural freedom of individual' [Filippova, Filipov, 2006] and the further institutionalisation of ethnicity resulting from provisions of the law have become the target for criticism and fundamental rejection by some other researchers.

One more basic document of this period intended to set out the target and tasks, principles, and content of the country strategy towards ethnic communities and their cultures is the Conception of State National Policy of the Russian Federation approved by the Decree of president of the Russian Federation (15 June 1996, No. 909). It verifies the multi-ethnic and multicultural model of Russian policy of the 1990s, although this does not mean 'multiculturalism' per se. Here, the Russian Federation is recognised as one of 'the biggest multinational states in the world, where over 100 nations live' (part I). Providing 'conditions for equal social, national, and cultural development of all nations of Russia,' along with consolidation of all-Russian community, was declared as the main aim of state national policy (part III).

At the same time, the Conception almost makes the state responsible for the 'survival,' preservation of ethnoses, ethnic minorities, and their cultures. It states that besides expanding ideas of moral integrity and friendship of people it has to contribute to the preservation of their historical heritage, development of traditions and originality, languages of all nations of Russia, improvement of 'national comprehensive school as a tool for preservation of culture and language of every nation...' (part III). In fact, this option of building country policy should have contributed to the reproduction of multiplicity of all linguistic-cultural identities of Russia. Although in reality this document has not led to wide public resonance and was not consistently implemented [Drobitsheva, 2003, p. 33; Makarova, 2009, pp. 94–95], the very direction in support diversity would have an affect on the further development of ethnic-identificational processes in Russian society, in the so-called national regions of the Russian Federation.

Some points of the Conception already begin to articulate the importance of consolidation of a single Russian community (part III), and certain statutes refer to 'the unifying role of the Russian people' (part I) and importance of its national feeling as a state-forming (part IV). However, these elements, which are aimed at the formation of unity, are still poorly represented.

Besides conceptual basics, some specific aspects of Russian ethnocultural policy were formed at that period. Let us briefly describe laws and programmes of the Russian Federation associated with the preservation and development of one or another elements of culture or with activities of institutions, whose functions include the formation of sociocultural values important for society.

The frameworks of the Russian ethnolinguistic policy were set out in the Law 'On the Languages of the Peoples of the Russian Federation' (25 October 1991, No. 1807-I). It states that 'languages of the Peoples of the Russian Federation are national treasures of the Russian State' and 'are protected by the state' (introduction). It states the right of Russian
citizens to receive basic general education in native language (Article 9, item 2), which is secured by establishment of required number of relevant educational institutions, classes, groups' (item 2, edition 24 June 1998).

The law also affirms the right of republics of Russia to publish their own adopted laws in republic's official language together with official language of Russia, use them together with Russian during preparation and conducting elections and referendums (Article 13, item 1; Article 14, item 1), in legal procedures, and records management (Article 18, item 2). The law provides the ability to use official languages of republics and other languages of peoples of Russia when applying to state bodies, organisations, companies, and institutions of Russia (Article 15, item 4) as well as to mass media in subjects of the Russian Federation (Article 20, item 2), etc.

This all means recognition and support for ethnolinguistic diversity of Russia as well as the relative autonomy of the regions in resolving language and culture related issues.

Traditional folk culture is an important element of culture that often acts as a marker of ethnic identities. Another form to support this was the Federal Law 'On Crafts' (6 January 1999, No. 7-FL), declaring their preservation, renewal, and development as an important state task.

In turn, education acts as an important social instrument that helps to implement the national-cultural and ethnocultural policy of state. On 10 July 10 1992 Russia adopted the Federal Law 'On Education' (No. 3266-1), which among the main principles of associated state policy secured the following twin principle: 'unity of federal cultural and educational space. Protection and development of national cultures, regional cultural traditions, and features by the education system under the conditions of multinational state' (Article 2). It also enshrines the main points of the Russian Law 'On Languages...' related to languages of study and education (Article 4).

The law also enshrines the nascent delineation of powers between the Russian Federation and subjects of Russia in the field of educational policy (articles 28, 29). For instance, recognition of the right of federation subjects (later annulled) to determine national-regional components of state education standards' demonstrated the tendency in the 1990s to embrace regional and ethnic linguistic-cultural diversity in the field of education policy of Russia (Article 29, item 8).

State policy in the field of religion to a certain extent also impacts these ethno– and national-cultural processes, including identification processes. The Federal Law 'On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations' (26 September 1997, No.125-FL) guaranteed the rights of citizens to profess... any religion or not to profess at all' (Article 3, item 1), equality before the law regardless of religious affiliation (Article 3, item 4) and also declared that in Russia 'no religion can be established as a state one...' (Article 4, item 1). Obviously, all of these elements influenced the confessional self-determination of citizens and were essential for social well-being of representatives of ethnic communities considered as historically associated with Islam and other non-Orthodox confessions. Thus, they demonstrated recognition not only of diversity of religious but also, though indirectly, freedom of choice and equality of ethnocultural identities.

In turn, ethnocultural strategies of Russia in the 1990s to a certain extent were reflected also in laws involving the sociocultural aspects of life of separate ethnic communities of Russia or groups of people suffering discrimination, violence and racial, ethnic, linguistic, or religious harassment as well as compatriots abroad. These are the laws such as: The RSFSR Law 'On Rehabilitation of Repressed Peoples' (26 April 1991, No. 1107-I) and the next Russian Law 'On Making Amendments and Additions to the RSFSR Law "On Rehabilitation of Repressed Peoples"' (1 July 1993 No. 5303), 'On Guarantees of the Rights of Numerically Small Indigenous Peoples in the Russian Federation' (30 April 1999, No. 82-FL); 'On the State Policy of the Russian Federation Concerning Compatriots Abroad' (24 May 1999, No. 99-FL), etc.
For instance, the RSFSR Law 'On Rehabilitation of Repressed Peoples' recognised actions of the Soviet Union against them as policy of 'tyranny and anarchy' (introduction), 'despotism and genocide' (Article 2). Thus, the law declares a set of measures related to territorial, political, economical, sociocultural rehabilitation of these peoples. Article 11 notably provides 'an action plan for restoration of their spiritual heritage and satisfaction of cultural needs.' Adoption of such law was aimed at showing in practice a declaration of equality of all peoples in the country, without which continuation of ethnocultural pluralism policy in Russia would seem fiction.

In the meantime the Federal Law 'On Guaranteeing the Rights of Numerically Small Indigenous Peoples in the Russian Federation' set out additional preferences for numerically small peoples to preserve 'traditional way of life, economic management, and crafts' (Article 1). Such 'special legal rules' (Article 5) were directed against forcible assimilation of these peoples and levelling their sociocultural identity and, as V. Tishkov reasonably comments, should had 'given additional protection to the communities most vulnerable from the sociocultural point of view' [Tishkov, 2007].

The Law 'On the State Policy of the Russian Federation Concerning Compatriots Abroad,' adopted already at the end of the 1990s, declared helping them to fulfill 'their civil, political, social, economical, and cultural rights preservation of identity' as an 'important direction of external and internal policy of the Russian Federation' (introduction to the law). Moreover, its adoption was aimed not only at encouraging the preservation of ethnocultural identities of our country peoples abroad. Demonstrating care on the part of the state for its citizens and compatriots, living beyond Russia, with regard to their rights, ethnicity, culture, and education, was also an important step for their consolidation and the establishment of single all-Russian identity within country.

Let us examine how the Republic of Tatarstan was building its ethnocultural policy during that period.

The turn of the 1980–1990s was marked by the rise of the Tatar movement stimulated by national elites. The Leaders of titular ethnic group associations were aiming for the renewal of the cultural-civilisational identity of Tatars through their national-state self-determination, ethnic consolidation, and sociocultural rehabilitation [Gabidullin, 1997]. Under these conditions, the republican leadership began to support slogans for the national-cultural revival of Tatars. When they had achieved recognition from the ethnically section of the Tatars, they 'seized the initiative' from the activists of Tatar non-governmental organisations. Using the weakness of the federal authorities [Farukshin, 1994, pp. 67–79] and basing their strategies upon the aforementioned ethno-national slogans, their aim was to achieve a relative level of autonomy for the region from the centre, including with regard to ethnocultural development.

With the support of the ethno-national elites standing up for idea that the 'sovereignty of Tatarstan comes from sovereignty of Tatar people' [Gabidullin, 1997, p. 3], the 'Declaration on the State Sovereignty of the Tatar Soviet Socialist Republic,' adopted on 30 August 1990, contained a controversial item about the 'realisation of inalienable right of Tatar nation, entire population of republic for self-determination' [Khakimov, Belaya kniga, 1996, p. 4]. However, the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan, adopted on 6 November 1992 (No. 1665-XII), records already that Tatarstan 'expresses the will and interests of multinational population of the republic' (Article 1).

Thus, the territorial authorities gradually began to emphasise their centrist positions, declaring the equality of the entire population of the republic in programme related documents and newly-created laws. However, the marked duality persisted during the 1990s, including in the ethnocultural policy of the republic. For instance, polyethnicity and polyculturality of the region were emphasised in language and culture-related laws and programmes adopted in that period. Certain of these emphasised the support for the language and culture of the titular ethnic group of the republic (explaining
that especially for a long period of time have not have an opportunity for full development. For instance, the Law of the Republic Tatarstan 'On Culture' (3 July 1998, No. 1705) declares that one of the main tasks of cultural policy is 'to encourage the development of Tatar national culture, culture of multinational nation of the Republic of Tatarstan' (chapter 1, Article 2).

A series of official documents set out the aims, tasks, and tools for the implementation of linguistic policy of Tatarstan, whose essence was in making the Tatar language, as an important component of ethnic identity of Tatars, an official language along with Russian, in creation of real conditions for expanding its social functions.

Thus, the Law of the Republic of Tatarstan 'On the Languages of the Peoples of the Republic of Tatarstan' (8 July 1992, No. 1560) declared social, economical, and legal protection for both official languages of the republic. It also outlined the possibilities for their equal usage in different spheres of life, enshrining a statement about the equal teaching of Tatar and Russian languages at preschool institutions, comprehensive school, and secondary specialised colleges (Article 10, item 2). However, the Law also contained some special items related to promotion of the Tatar language as a language of Tatar diaspora (Article 7, item 3), ensuring translation of different kinds of literature and films into the Tatar language as well as translation of 'famous Tatar books into the Russian language' (Article 23, items 1, 2), etc. The 'State Programme on the Preservation, Study, and Development of the Languages of the People of the Republic of Tatarstan' for 1994–2003 was adopted to ensure consistent implementation of items of the Law (20 July 1994).

The Law of the Republic of Tatarstan 'On Education' was also an important document explaining republican strategy related to formation of identities in the 1990s (19 October 1993, No. 1982). Freedom 'to choose the language of study' (Article 4, item 8) was declared as one of the main principles of Tatarstan policy in the respective field. It outlined that activity of the national-educational institutions is 'aimed at the renewal of the national identity of an individual based on the priority of universal human values,' and that education and upbringing in such institutions are provided 'on the basis of Conception of Tatar National Education' (Article 5). According to the latter, the Tatar national school should be built upon national-moral traditions of Tatars with native language teaching.

In turn, Article 7 of the Law 'On Education' states that: 'The Republic of Tatarstan sets state education standards determining, inter alia, requirements to every step of education and upbringing in comprehensive schools...'. Accordingly and based on the Federal Law of RF 'On Education,' the republic also developed a regional component in the school system. For instance, in 1993 the subject 'The History of Tatars and Tatarstan' was introduced into all schools of the Republic of Tatarstan. Again, Article 6 (item 2) of the Law once again enshrined the equal teaching of the Tatar and Russian languages in general education institutions and specialised secondary institutions in Tatarstan.

One more document aimed at influencing the further development of the Tatar language and the Tatar national school was the Law of the Republic of Tatarstan 'On the Construction of the Tatar Alphabet with a Basis in Latin Graphics' (15 September 1999, No. 2352). It was adopted as a result of discussions of Tatar humanitarian intellectuals about the issue of substitution of the Cyrillic alphabet for the Latin or Arabic alphabet. A primary reason for the substitution was the phonetics of the Tatar language. However, another not insignificant factor in the ambitions of the national elites was, according to L. Sagitova's reasonable commentary, the 'new identity formation factor, including an attempt to assert its difference from the Russian culture' [Sagitova, 1998, p. 114].

At that time the efforts of local national elites were also aimed at making Tatarstan the centre of cultural attraction of Tatars all
around the world. From this perspective, one should note the work of the Worldwide Tatar Congress established in 1992 (with support of the establishment of the Republic of Tatarstan), including activities related to consolidation of Tatar youth living all around the world (organisation of the World Forum of Tatar Youth, summer camps for Tatar children from different regions of the world), creation of web-sites in Tatar language [see Tatarskij internet, 2010], organisation and holding in Kazan the Nuriyev International Festival of Classical Ballet (since 1987), etc. The aim of these measures was not only to create local processes of ethnocultural renewal of Tatars but also global processes, which in turn would positively influence the identity of Tatars from Tatarstan.

A series of culture related laws, adopted in the region in this period, did not specifically set out the republican strategy in the ethnocultural sphere. For instance, the Law of the Republic of Tatarstan 'On Protection and Use of Cultural and Historical Values' (1996), 'On Archive Fund of the Republic of Tatarstan and Archives' (13 June 1996, No. 644), etc. The characteristics of ethnocultural policy of Tatarstan of that period are reflected in the analysis of 'The Republican Programme for the Development of Culture in the Republic of Tatarstan between 1998–2000.' One of the aims of the programme was to 'encourage the development of the culture of the peoples of Tatarstan.' However, one of the specific objectives was described as the 'preservation and development of Tatar traditional culture and culture of people of Tatarstan...'. In other words, the priority of the culture of the titular ethnic group is still not excluded. This fact has been confirmed by a system of specific planned activities arising from the Programme.

For instance, the sub-programme entitled Support and Development of Professional Art contains measures related to development of literature of Tatarstan in general. At the same time, a series of special events are aimed at improvement of Tatar art, beginning with 'Organising Tatar opera and ballet performances through social commissioning' (item 1.2, sub-programme No. 1) and ending with 'Tatar curt' competition ('Tatar song') and 'Tatar p'esasy' ('Tatar play') (items 3.2, 3.3, subprogramme No. 1). The subprogramme entitled the 'Preservation and use of historical-cultural heritage' highlights 7 archaeological and architectural monument complexes related to the history of Tatars and two, to the history of Russian, etc. The third part of the programme 'Support and development of international and interregional cultural cooperation...' was aimed at, first of all, support of culture of Tatar diaspora.

In the 1990s Tatarstan pursued a policy of 'levelling' the development of Tatar and Russian cultures, a programme which is confirmation of this. That was explained by the necessity to level out the trends of the Soviet period, during which the Russian language and culture were predominant and official. They were accorded priority throughout the entire territory of the country, while the language and cultures of other ethnic groups were ascribed a secondary role. In the conditions of extremely limited resources allocated to education and culture during the first decade following the declaration of sovereignty, this objective in republican policy resulted in temporary inequality to the detriment of the Russian language and Russian culture.

The Law of the Republic of Tatarstan 'On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations' to a certain extent also characterises the ethnocultural policy of Tatarstan, region where religion traditionally acts as one of the main markers of ethnic boundaries (14 July 1999, No. 2279). It highlights the importance of two religions, Islam and Orthodoxy, for the cultures of Tatars and Russians (as the main ethnic groups by number in the republic). At the same time, specific forms of centralised administration of Islamic religious organisations and Orthodox church acquired legislative consolidation in Article 10 (item 5). Moreover, the Law reserved for the republican authorities the right to manage certain issues in the management of religious organisations. In particular, a separate article in the law (Article 7) approved the functioning of a special state religious affairs body in the Re-
public of Tatarstan. The aim of this body in a multi-confessional region was to analyse and forecast the development of the religious situation, encourage the strengthening of mutual understanding between religions, and develop contacts between the state authorities and religious associations. The policy of the Republic of Tatarstan of that period begins to emphasise the multi-confessional nature of the republic, and it actually declares official recognition of two main religions—Islam and Orthodoxy. Furthermore, the discourse between the authorities to a certain extent helps to strengthen the ties between religious and ethnic identities in the minds of people.

In turn, a series of special measures were aimed at formation and strengthening of regional identity of population of the Republic of Tatarstan, for instance, the declaration of 30 August (the date the Declaration on State Sovereignty of the Republic of Tatarstan was adopted) as a holiday—the Day of the Republic of Tatarstan. On the main holiday of the Republic of Tatarstan the president traditionally congratulates population of the region on holiday, nationwide celebrations ending with evening fireworks are held.

The implementation of these policies in the ethnocultural strategy of Tatarstan are reflected in statistical data on the development of languages and cultures in the republic. For instance, in the 1990s in order to 'put into practice' the linguistic policy of the Republic of Tatarstan, 170 schools and gymnasiaums were opened or restructured with study programmes being taught in the Tatar language. Prior to the end of the 1980s the Tatar language was not taught at Russian schools. Following the adoption of the Law 'On Languages,' compulsory learning of the Tatar language and literature was introduced in all schools of the republic.

These years are marked by development of the regional component in the system of general secondary education of the Republic of Tatarstan. Since 1993 a new subject entitled 'The History of the Tatar people and Tataristan' was introduced in schools of the region (8–11 forms). At the same time, the 'History and Culture of the Tatar people' was studied in educational institutions (and classes), where teaching was conducted in the Tatar language (5–7 forms). In turn, art universities and colleges opened departments of Tatar art.

The revival of the rituals, customs, and traditions of Tatarstan ethnic groups played an important role in the republic’s cultural policy. In 1991 the State Centre of Tatar Folklore separated from the republic's scientific and methodological centre and formed an independent organisation. In 1995 the Centre of Russian Folklore was established at the Kazan Department of Culture.

Finally, the ethnic aspects of the cultural policy implemented in the Republic of Tatarstan in the 1990s were also reflected in the following statistics. Out of 43 museums in the republic, which were operating in the early 2000s, an equal numbers of exhibitions were devoted to the life and work of Russian and Tatar workers of culture and art—A. Gorky, Ye. Boratynsky, I. Shishkin, B. Pasternak, G. Tuqay, B. Urmanche, K. Nasyri, G. Iskhaki, et. al. These parity indicators were also due to the opening of a number of institutions associated with the work of representatives of the Tatar art school. In the aims of reviving the identity of the Tatars, the first institution to be established was the Kazan National Cultural Centre (NCC), in the facilities of the Kazan branch of the Lenin Central Museum.

Thus, a number of external indicators of the cultural development of Tatarstan in the 1990s demonstrate that Tatar culture gradually began to catch up with Russian culture. According to certain quantitative data, Tatar culture even began to outstrip Russian culture. At the same time, there remained spheres in Tatarstan where the Russian and Russian-speaking culture continued to occupy a firm and even a dominant position. For example, as of 1 January 2001, 547 mass media were registered in the country. More than a half (55.8%) of the press mass media more conducted their activities in Russian, one quarter of them (25.1%) worked in both official languages of the Republic, and only one-eighth in Tatar (12.2%).
There were also editions issued in other national languages (Chuvash, Udmurt, etc.). In this situation of linguistic asymmetry the media policy of the authorities was primarily aimed at supporting the Tatar-speaking media.

The status of the Russian-speaking school remained high. The Russian-language continued to occupy a leading position as the main language of communication at work and at home. In turn, the works of Russians composers, playwrights, and artists still played an important role in the programmes of theatres and concert halls, in exhibitions in museums and exhibition halls of Tatarstan. Although the share of works of Tatar playwrights, musicians, and artists in them increased over the years of the post-perestroika development.

As to the development of cultures of so-called 'ethnic minorities' of Tatarstan, it should be noted that at the initiative of the republic authorities and with the support of leaders of national-cultural societies, the first Congress of Peoples of Tatarstan was held in Kazan in 1992. The Congress created the Association of National Cultural Societies of the Republic of Tatarstan (ANCS RT). On 26 May 1999 to provide state support to public national-cultural organisations within above ANCS RT, a House of People's Friendship was opened in Kazan. From the moment the Law on Languages in the republic was adopted, a network not only of Tatar national schools but also schools of other peoples of Tatarstan began to expand.

The turn of the the millennium was marked in Russia by new alignment of the legal vertical structure. This also affected the ethnocultural sphere. The centre's steps to strengthen its own positions in the human resources and financial spheres were designed to promote further unification of the political and legal as well as the socio-economic relations in Russia. Such transformations became possible after a decline in the activities of ethnopolitical movements in the 1990s, the relative stability achieved in the centre's relationships with the so-called 'national regions of Russia' and the gradual improvement in the economy after the deep economic depression of the 1990s.

In this context, there was an evident strengthening of the desire of the Russian political leaders to mobilise ideological efforts to integrate ethnically and culturally diverse population of the country. The task of forming a single Russian identity became part of the context of federal political discourse. Thus, in his speeches, the Russian president Vladimir Putin began actively to use such terms as a 'Russian nation,' 'united people of Russia,' 'united nation' [Putin, 2007]. Dmitry Medvedev (the president of Russia in 2008–2012) emphasised that the nation's unity is one of the most valuable spiritual treasures of the country [Medvedev, 2008].

In this regard, particular attention should be paid to the legislative recognition of Russian state symbols. It was symptomatic that at the beginning of the 2000s, when Russian statehood and the national unity were being strengthened, the following laws were adopted in the country: 'On the State Flag of the Russian Federation' (25 December 2000, No. 1-FCL), 'On the State Coat of Arms of the Russian Federation' (25 December 2000, No. 2-FCL), and 'On the Anthem of the Russian Federation' (25 December 2000, No. 3-FCL). The newly approved flag and coat of arms demonstrated a rejection of revolutionary symbols (the red flag and the coat of arms with a hammer and sickle). They revived (with some changes) the symbols of the period of Russia's development, when it was a strong and firm state, and were aimed at embodying continuity of Russian history, recognition, and pride for the old country's victories. The same spirit runs through the new text of the anthem. Although written by S. Mikhalkov for V. Alexandrov's music of the Soviet anthem written, it incorporates expressions typical of Russian pre-revolutionary high style, such as 'our sacred state,' 'native land secured by God.' At the same time, there are 'traces' of the Soviet era in the following lines: 'coming years open a wide space for dreams and for life,' 'a centuries-long union of fraternal peoples,' etc.

Thus, the emergence of the new Russian statehood in the 1990s began with a search for symbols and images capable of uniting
Russian citizens. The stage of its strengthening was marked by legislative recognition of such symbols. At the same time, the adoption of the above laws was intended to balance the strengthening regional identities typical of the previous period. In turn, the laws were facilitated by the policies implemented by the governments of the national Russian republics.

The Russian intellectual elite actively discussed the issue of forming a Russian civil nation. The country began to implement certain 'ideological integration projects' based on one or another idea: 'the victory in the Great Patriotic War,' 'Orthodoxy,' 'Russian achievements in sports,' 'victories in international pop competitions,' etc. They were actively popularised and promoted by the Russian media in the aims of uniting, combining, and forming a single Russian identity.

Let us consider how these trends were reflected in documents adopted by the Federal Centre in the field of culture and ethnic and cultural development. First of all, the adoption of the new Federal Law 'On the State Language of the Russian Federation' (1 June 2005, No. 53-FL) was very indicative since it finally recognised the Russian language as the state language of Russia. The law guarantees its use throughout the territory of the entire country (introduction) and defines the spheres of its mandatory use (Article 3), it provides for the right of Russian citizens to use the state language (introduction) and stipulates measures to be taken by federal public authorities for its security and support (Article 4). It also provides for liability for the adoption in the Russian Federation and its constituent territories of any laws or regulations 'aiming at limiting use of the Russian language as the state language in the Russian Federation' (Article 6).

Other steps in this direction included adoption of federal target programmes Russian Language' for 1996–2000, 2002–2005, and 2006–2010. They emphasised the integration function of the Russian language as a means of 'strengthening the statehood' as an element that unites 'political, economic, and cultural spheres of life on the territory of the Russian Federation,' 'as one of the most important sociocultural components of consolidation of the Russian civil society' [Federal naya czelevaya programma, 2007].

The desire to preserve and strengthen the unified cultural and symbolic relations of the country was a basis for approving the Federal Law 'On Amendments to the Law on the Languages of the Peoples of the Russian Federation' (11 December 2002, No. 165-FL). According to it, the alphabets of the state languages of the Russian Federation and its republics shall be based on the Cyrillic graphic system. In fact, it was a reply to the Law 'On Restoration of the Tatar Alphabet Based on the Latin Graphics' adopted by the State Council of the Republic of Tatarstan in 1999, which was regarded by the federal authorities as separatist and not contributing to integration of Russian peoples.

The shift of the emphasis in the ethno-national strategy of central authorities from diversity to integration influenced the sphere of education. Thus, the law of the Russian Federation 'On Amendments to Some Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation in Terms of Changing the Concept and Structure of the State Educational Standard' (No. 309-FL), adopted on 1 December 2007, set out its new meaning: the state educational standard is not now divided into federal or regional components, but is a single federal state standard. Accordingly, a paragraph concerning the establishment by the constituent parts of the Russian Federation of 'regional (national and regional) components of the state educational standards' (Article 29, p. 8 of the Federal Law 'On Education') was removed from the Law 'On Education.' A guarantee of 'unified educational policy in the Russian Federation' (Article 3, p. 7 of the new edition of the Law 'On Education') was set out as one of the major functions of these standards.

The new strategies of forming identities in Russia that emerged at the beginning of the 2000s became evident in the course of preparing censuses of the population in 2002 and 2010. In the Soviet period there was a policy...
to attribute a person to a certain ethnic group in accordance with the official 'list' based on primordial ideas about ethnicity. In the 2000s this policy was replaced by a strategy of emphasising the freedom of choosing ethnic identity, making it more subjective. Thus, the 'list of nationalities' was expanded in the process of preparing for all-Russian censuses, and the issue of the native language was excluded from the census form in 2002. All this was done simultaneously with the authorities' efforts to strengthen the all-Russian identity in respect of the ethnic one. The categories thus incorporated civic categories instead of ethnic ones ('Russian citizen,' etc.).

In turn, in the 2000s there were federal efforts to overcome the trend of politicising ethnicity. This has been characteristic of the 1990s, when the regulatory bodies of the Russian regions connected the issues of ethnic and cultural development with solutions of political problems as well as the establishment and maintenance of the relative independence of territories. First, the centre began to emphasise the importance of replacing the term 'national policy' with 'ethnic and cultural policy,' when concerned with policies 'related to Russian nationalities' [Tishkov, 2003a]. Accordingly, the term 'national policy' became free to be used to mean the 'policy of ensuring national interests of the country...' [Tishkov, 2009]. Second, the federal authorities wished to distinguish between the issues of state and territorial division of Russia, independence of Russian constituent territories, and ethnic and cultural development. This was aimed at viewing ethnic and national problems in the light of ethnic and culture and expressing ethnic and cultural interests of the population not at the institutional level (that of constituent territories of the Russian Federation) but at the individual, personal, and group level [see Musina, ed. 2009, pp. 371–372]. This also discloses the federal strategy of making ethnicity gradually more subjective. It also attempts to remove sources of ethnic renewal. At the same time, it was an attempt to reduce the importance of regional identities, which were mainly based on the idea of maintaining and developing ethnic languages and ethnic cultures and a strengthening of the all-Russian identity.

In connection with the above objectives, the task of maintaining multi-ethnic diversity was also gradually modified. At the federal level it began to be formulated not as an independent value but as a way of 'integrating citizens of any ethnicity into an all-Russian socio-economic and cultural space...' [Tishkov, 2003a].

Thus, in the late 1990s and early 2000s a number of federal programmes in the field of culture were adopted in Russia: 'Development and Conservation of Culture and Art of the Russian Federation' (1997–1999); 'Culture of Russia (2001–2005); 'Culture of Russia (2006–2010). An increasingly prominent place in the system of principles and objectives of the state's cultural policy and of specific activities was given to those policies that were aimed at the consolidation and integration of the Russian society. The wordings of principles that encouraged diversity were gradually refined. Focus moved away from the state-funded development of languages and cultures of various ethnicities and the national education system and towards support for ethnic and cultural initiatives of the citizens themselves, promoting their mutual contacts, dialogue, and exchange.

This trend was partially evident in the analysis of a new draft Concept of the State national policy of the Russian Federation [see Naczional'nya politika Rossijskoj Federacii, 2007], which, on the one hand, contained certain features of continuity in relation to the Concept of 1996, while on the other hand, embodied the strategy of ethnic and cultural development characteristic of the 2000s. In particular, the wordings of state policy objectives in the cultural and educational spheres included such paragraphs as 'cultivating patriotism and forming the all-Russian civil identity,' 'respect for the history of Russia and the state symbols,' and strengthening a positive international image of Russia' in the international sphere, which was also important for the development of a national identity of the Russians. At the same time, the objective of
strengthening and improving national general education as a tool of preserving and developing culture and language of every nation...' (see Concept of 1996) was omitted from the above version of the Concept. The conceptually significant principle of Russian ethnic and cultural policy of the 1990s—‘promoting the development of national cultures and languages of Russian peoples’—was also absent. In fact, it provided for the state's function of promoting ethnic and cultural diversity of the country, making it responsible for the survival of ethnic groups and their cultures. At the same time, the draft Concept under review included a principle connected with Russia's international obligations, namely 'protection of rights of national minorities.' However, this addition would have made sense only if politicians and academics had come to an agreement on the question of what nations in our country should be considered national minorities.

In other words, in the 2000s the federal authorities did not reject the policy of recognising ethnic and cultural differences. Nor did they reject certain forms of creating conditions for the citizens to achieve their requirements in this area (see section 'Major Directions of Implementing the State National Policy') of the draft Concept. However, a gradual deviation from the strategy of promoting diversity was seen at the federal level. At that time paternalism was characteristic of the state policy with respect to such groups of the population that were the most vulnerable in the sociocultural terms. Such groups primarily included small indigenous peoples of the country. In the period under review a number of federal laws and programmes were devoted to them (Law of the Russian Federation 'On General Principles of Organising Communities of Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia, and Far East of the Russian Federation' (20 July 2000, No. 104-FL), 'On the Territories of Traditional Nature Management of Small Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia, and Far East of the Russian Federation' (7 May 2001, No. 49-FL), etc.), they were emphasised in the documents newly developed in the Russian Federation, in particular in the above-mentioned new draft Concept. In addition, the Russian Germans repressed during the Great Patriotic War became a special object of the state ethnic and national policy of the Russian Federation. In particular, two federal target programmes were directed at supporting their socio-economic and cultural development for 1997–2006 and 2008–2012 [Razvitie soczial'no-e'konomicheskoi i kul'turnoj bazy', 1997; Razvitie soczial'no-e'konomicheskogo i e'tnokul'turnogo potencziala rossijskix nemecev, 2007].

Finally, faced with ethnic conflicts, manifestations of fundamentalism and terrorism in the North Caucasus, an increase in the number of migrants and individual outbreaks of xenophobia and migrantophobia on the part of the host population, in the early 2000s Russia began to articulate objectives that ineluctably accompany the policy of ethnic and cultural pluralism: the creation of tolerance amongst the population by means of intercultural and inter-religious dialogue, finding a balance between differences and unifying features; managing interethnic relations and preventing interethnic conflicts; opposing extreme manifestations of nationalism and extremism. The following instruments were directed at solving these tasks during period under review: the Federal Law 'On Countering Extremist Activities' (25 July 2002, No. 114-FL), the Federal Target Programme 'Formation of Tolerance and Prevention of Extremism in the Russian Society (2001–2005) (adopted by a decree of the Government of the Russian Federation on 25 August 2001). The draft Federal Law 'On the Principles of State Policy in the Sphere of Interethnic Relations in the Russian Federation' should be also be noted. All of these documents demonstrated a strengthening the centre's position in regulating the relevant issues.

In the republics of the Russian Federation some of the above-mentioned changes in the centre's ethnic and national strategy initially caused hidden or explicit dissatisfaction amongst the elite and certain intellectuals. In particular, they were concerned with the issue of recognising or not recognising the ethnic
factor as a basis for the federal division of the country. In the early 2000s the nationality-based territorial structure of the federation was supported not only by national and political leaders of Tatarstan but also by a number of academics. They warned that the 'destruction of national statehood of peoples' [see Farukshin, 2009, p. 107; Khakimov, 2009, p. 94] can lead to 'political destabilisation with unpredictable consequences for the country and its multinational population' [Farukshin, 2009, p. 107]—that is, the problem of ethnicity is inextricably connected with the issue of regionalism. To prove the efficiency of the model of ethnic federalism, they provided examples of a number of Western countries (Canada, Switzerland).

The regional elite expressed its objections to the subjectivisation of ethnicity as implemented in the Russian Federation and hence the weakening of the ethnic identity in the process of preparing and conducting census campaigns of the 2000s. In particular, the problems of the 'peoples list' and 'fragmentation of the Tatar ethnic group' became acute in the Republic of Tatarstan in the early 2000s [see Sokolovsky, 2002, pp. 207–237; Iskhakov, 2002, pp. 235–249]. They were associated with determining in the 'list' such ethnic groups as the Krayshens, Siberian Tatars, and others, which had been earlier classified—in censuses of the Soviet period—as the Tatars. The political and national leaders considered this innovation as a means to decrease the number of the Tatars in order to 'abolish' national republics and make them Russian governorates. The policy of carrying out the census in connection with the problem of 'Bashkirisation' of the Tatars in the Republic of Bashkortostan was also criticised [see Iskhakov, 2005] as well as the complicated methods of defining the issue of the native language (the same questions were raised during the census of 2010 [see Iskhakov, 2010; Galeev, 2010, etc.], but their discussion was not so heated).

While the federal authorities were implementing projects aimed at the formation of the all-Russian national identity, the leaders of the regions continued (although to a lesser degree and in part on a different basis) to make efforts aimed at strengthening regional identities. Thus, the Law 'On the State Symbols of the Republic of Tatarstan (14 July 1999, No. 2284) was adopted in Tatarstan even before the adoption of federal laws on the language, anthem, and flag. These symbols refer us primarily to the history and culture of the titular ethnic group of the republic. Although the regional community itself was considered as a unifying factor for the entire population of the Republic of Tatarstan, by the middle of the first decade of the 2000s it was part of the all-Russian community.

It is important to note that in the first decade of the 2000s the regional authorities tried to preserve the achievements of the 1990s in respect of development of national languages and cultures. In particular, Tatarstan tried to adhere to the main directions of the ethnic and cultural policy related to the strengthening of the status of the Tatar language (along with Russian) as a state language of the republic, developing the Tatar national schools, supporting Tatar culture, and thereby developing the ethnic and cultural identity of the Tatars. Thus, on 28 July 2004 the republic adopted the Law 'On Amendments and Supplements to the Law of the Republic of Tatarstan "On the Languages of the Peoples of the Republic of Tatarstan"' (No. 44-LRT). It provided a new edition of the Law and prescribed new measures aimed at increasing the spheres of functioning of the Tatar language in the society. It also preserved a provision that is fundamental to the language policy of the republic, stipulating that the Tatar and Russian languages shall be taught in schools in the Republic of Tatarstan in equal amounts (Article 9, Article 10 of the Law). Also, in 2004 the republic approved the State Programme of the Republic of Tatarstan on Preservation, Study, and Development of State Languages of the Republic of Tatarstan and Other Languages in the Republic of Tatarstan for 2004–2013 (11 October 2004, No. 52-LRT) aimed at implementing new tasks in the language strategy.

The Tatar culture remained one of the priorities in the ethnic and cultural policy of the re-
They create a problem for no reason at all, not Valeev. 'Who is bothered that the Tatars study the Tatar language, Chuvashes, Chuvash, etc...'

At the beginning of the 2000s the development of the Tatar national school was also supported by the regional authorities. Thus, by the end of 2004 pupils were taught in 1,210 schools of the republic in accordance with the curriculum of Tatar schools. Of these 94 were granted the status of 'educational institutions of a new type' since they were schools with in-depth studying of the Tatar language. In addition, by this period 403 schools in Tatarstan had classes teaching in either Tatar or Russian.

However, upon the adoption of the Federal Law 'On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation in Terms of Changing the Concept and Structure of the State Educational Standard (1 December 2007, No. 309), which repealed the possibility of constituent territories of Russia independently establishing regional components, the situation became more complicated. The republic's elite expressed its concern that this innovation would lead to a 'restriction of the rights of the peoples of the Russian Federation for their national and cultural development' [Prava narodov Rossii, 2008], to the gradual closure of schools with an ethnic and cultural component, and to the reduction of the volume of the Tatar language and literature, the history of the Tatar and other peoples studied in schools.

In particular, R. Khakimov noted as follows: As a politician with a solid experience, I do not understand why the regional component should be abolished. Does Russia lack problems?" 'They create a problem for no reason at all, noted the chairman of the Committee on Culture, Science, Education, and National Issues of the State Council of the Republic of Tatarstan R. Valeev. 'Who is bothered that the Tatars study the Tatar language, Chuvashes, Chuvash, etc...'

The adoption of the above law was treated as preparation 'for abolition of multinational-
and Victory Days of the Republic of Tatarstan’ (14 October 2010, No. 74-LRT), the day of official adoption of Islam in Volga Bulgaria (21 May) was established as a celebration date in the region.

With regard to the religious policy implemented by the republican authorities, it should be noted that the equal status of Islam and Orthodoxy in Tatarstan was in every way emphasised at the official level in the 2000s, with recognition of other religions professed by the population of the region. Moreover, the regional political elites emphasised the specifics of the ‘local’ Islam, which was referred to as the ‘Euro-Islam,’ ‘peaceful Islam.’ Such actions were evidently aimed at pacifying the attitude of the federal politicians towards Russian Muslims, to whom most of the titular ethnic group of the Republic of Tatarstan attribute themselves in one way or another. Russian Islam was articulated as ‘own,’ different from the traditional Islam of Arab countries [see Sagitova, 2009, pp. 125–162].

It should be stressed that while trying to preserve the main principles and priorities of the cultural policies of the 1990s after the early 2000s and given the balance of forces, which was not favourable for them, the authorities of constituent territories of the Russian Federation were forced to adjust their positions. In particular, after the harmonisation of the constitution, statutes, and laws of republics with federal legislation, the gradual alignment of the legal hierarchy also affected the legislation concerning issues of the ethnic and cultural life. Thus, during the period under review Tatarstan introduced amendments and supplements to a number of respective laws, adopted new laws and editions, which contained obligatory references to the relevant federal laws. The relationship between the Russian and Tatarstan legislation in the sphere of language and culture was described more clearly than in the 1990s. A number of issues relating to the interaction between the central and regional authorities and regulatory bodies in the indicated sphere were clarified, while a number of provisions contradicting to the federal legislation were excluded. For example, the new edition of Law ‘On the State Languages of the Republic of Tatarstan and Other Languages in the Republic of Tatarstan’ No. 44-ZRT as of 28 July 2004 now prescribed that the republic law on languages should be ‘based on the relevant provisions of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan, and the Law of the Russian Federation ‘On Languages of the Peoples of the Russian Federation’ (Article 1).’ The wording of the third article on language, which stated that the Republic of Tatarstan was a state, was withdrawn. Finally, a clarification was introduced concerning the language of official correspondence with addressees of the Russian Federation and its constituent territories, namely the Russian language (Chapter III, Article 15).

The adjustment of the ethnic and cultural strategy of the Republic of Tatarstan with relation to the Russian language and Russian culture was its characteristic feature of the first decade of the 2000s. Thus, in November 2002 there was a meeting between M. Shaimiev, the president of the Republic of Tatarstan, and the leaders of Russian national and cultural societies and centres, which was widely covered by Tatar mass media. During the meetings they discussed issues of developing the Russian language and culture in the region. On 20 May 2003 the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Tatarstan adopted a Decree on Holding a Republican Holiday of Russian Folklore ‘Karavon’ (No. 274). Shrove Day was celebrated more actively than in the previous years.

In 2001 the republican target programme Russian Language in Tatarstan for 2001–2005 was developed (dated 22 February 2001). The republican target programme Development of Culture in the Republic of Tatarstan for 2004–2007 (subprogramme Preservation and Use of Immovable Historical and Cultural Heritage) included certain churches in the cities and certain districts of the Republic of Tatarstan along with such large Orthodox architectural monuments as the Cathedral of the Annunciation the Kazan Kremlin and the architectural complex of the Sviyazhsk Island.
Certain specific measures in the cultural policy of the republic in the period under review were obviously designed to demonstrate the parity of developing Russian and Tatar cultures in Tatarstan, as declared by the regional authorities. These are the two cultures of the two largest populations in the country; Islam being associated with Tatarstan, and Orthodoxy, with Russia. In particular, such activities included the almost simultaneous opening of the renovated Cathedral of the Annunciation and the newly constructed Kul Sharif Mosque in the Kazan Kremlin (2005) [Mechet' Kul Sharif i Blagoveshenskij sobor, 2010]; successive decisions on supporting the development of historical and architectural complexes in Sviyazhsk (the historical stronghold of Orthodoxy in Tatarstan) and Bolgar (a city historically founded by Tatar ancestors) [see Bulgarian state, 2007; Renewal of Sviyazhsk, 2007], which were united in 2010 in the project Cultural Heritage of the Republic of Tatarstan: Ancient City of the Bolgar and the Island and Town of Sviyazhsk, etc.

The proclamation of the principles of multiculturalism in a number of official documents had been a characteristic feature of the ethnic and cultural policy of the republic in the last years. In particular, the aims and objectives of the programme Development of Culture in the Republic of Tatarstan for 2004–2007 prescribe the principles of 'supporting diversity of the cultural life' and 'creating conditions for a dialogue between cultures in the multinational country' (programme passport). Moreover, these objectives, declared at the very beginning of the programme, were further consolidated in subsequent sections. The Law of the Republic of Tatarstan 'On National and Cultural Autonomies in the Republic of Tatarstan' No. 15-LRT as of 12 May 2003 was aimed specially at protecting the rights of citizens of the Russian Federation Living in the Republic of Tatarstan and Attributing Themselves to a Certain Ethnic Community Being in the Position of a National Minority' (Article 1). It specified measures taken by the public authorities of the region to support the initiatives of the national cultural autonomy.

In 2007 the 3rd Congress of the Peoples of Tatarstan adopted a Concept of the State National Policy of the Republic of Tatarstan (approved by Decree of the president of the Republic of Tatarstan No. DP-312 as of 3 July 2008). It specifically provided not only for the principles of observing individual rights 'for free ethnic self-determination,' 'for satisfying ethnic, social, cultural, living, religious, spiritual, and moral needs' [see Naczional`naya politika Respubliki Tatarstan, 2010], which were characteristic of the strategy of recognising ethnic and cultural diversity, but also for the principles of 'promoting the development of national cultures and languages, preserving the traditional lifestyle, people's crafts and trades, customs and rites,' 'cautiously treating the historical heritage and national heritage of the peoples,' which were typical of the policy of 'ensuring identity' [see Naczional`naya politika Respubliki Tatarstan, 2010], etc. Furthermore, based on the establishment of the rights of all peoples of Tatarstan for free ethnic and cultural self-determination, the republic's authorities have attempted to construct a regional Tatar identity.

Thus, the trend that emerged in the region at the end of the first decade of the 2000s can be described as a strategy of ethnic and cultural pluralism, or identity policy, as it is called in the West. As already noted above, the cultivation of tolerance for 'other' languages, cultures, and their bearers was a very important factor and ideological component.

However, it should be noted that the Republic of Tatarstan has always articulated the absence of any problems in the sphere of interethnic and inter-cultural relations, when the policy of multiculturalism was already interpreted as an essential condition for mutual recognition, mutual understanding, as well as social and political unity of the ethnically and culturally diverse population. Nevertheless, Tatarstan's authorities gradually began to understand the importance and necessity of making special efforts in this direction at the regional level. Thus in 2008 a special Republican target programme on the prevention of
Section III. The Republic of Tatarstan and the Tatar World at the Turn of the Millennia

terrorism and extremism in the Republic of Tatarstan was adopted for 2009–2011 (Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Tatarstan No. 956 as of 31 December 2008). It provided not only for actions to prevent terrorism and extremism but also a number of preventive measures aimed at cultivating tolerance and mutual understanding between representatives of different ethnic and religious communities.

Thus, the policy implemented in the 1990s was characterised by the following aspects.

1. Given the extremely weak centre in the early 1990s, there could have been no discussion of a strategy of purposeful and consistent formation of particular identities at the federal level. Nevertheless, in the course of negotiations with the leadership of national republics of the Russian Federation the fundamentals of a new ethnic and cultural policy were laid in this period. This policy was multi-ethnic in its essence, characterised by recognition and support of ethnic and cultural identity, and was carried out in two forms—ethnic-territorial and national-cultural autonomy. As a policy of 'institutionalisation and sponsoring' and 'multi-nationality' in Russia [Tishkov, 2003a], it actually helped to represent the diversity of ethnic and cultural identities. Integrative issues were badly developed at that time.

2. Given the forced transfer by the Centre of some of its authorities in the field of the ethnic and cultural development to the regions, the refusal to concentrate the management of cultural life in the hands of the central regulatory authorities, the situation itself indirectly contributed to strengthening of regional identities.

3. Taking into account the decentralisation processes taking place in Russia as well as the proclamation and approval of Tatarstan's sovereignty, the republic developed a new relatively independent ethnic and cultural policy. In the conditions of the growing importance of ethnicity stimulated by the national elites, the policy was ethnicity-oriented and primarily contributed to the revival and development of the Tatar language and culture, improvement of the Tatar status. Therefore, this strategy was not only based on the population needs in preserving their ethnic identities, but also it was aimed at strengthening their importance, increasing the interest of representatives of various ethnic groups of the Republic of Tatarstan, especially the titular population, in their traditions and culture.

4. The republic's policy, including the policy of ethnic and cultural development, was also oriented to building a single regional Tatar identity in those years.

The ethnic and cultural policies of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan in the first decade of the 2000s also had their own characteristics in terms of their focus on forming ethnic and cultural identities.

1. In that period the centre's efforts were primarily focused on strengthening the political, legal, and sociocultural space of the country, on forming a single Russian nation. This kind of strategy was implemented in the following way:
   – Bringing in line the legislation of the constituent territories of the Russian Federation, including those in the ethnocultural sphere with federal legislation.
   – The legislative consolidation of Russia's national symbols, confirming the status of the Russian language (and Russian culture) as the foundations for Russian identity, the formation of a unified state educational standard, as well as other similar measures.
   – Developing and implementing of a number of specific ideological projects for integration.

2. While preserving the principle of recognition for ethnic and cultural diversity, the Russian authorities gradually abandoned its sponsorship, instead favouring to support the sociocultural development of small indigenous peoples and some other marginal population groups. They also strove to lead the country away from the tendency of politicising ethnicity, which was characteristic of the 1990s, and to transfer ethnic and national problems into the ethnocultural mainstream. All this should have lead to a certain subjectivity of ethnic identities (when their selection and maintenance had become a personal matter and subject for an initiative by the ethnic groups...
The article discusses the changes of Tatarstan Tatar culture, and a Tatar national school. At the same time, the Federal Centre undertook the responsibility to cultivate tolerance in the population, to regulate interethnic relations in the country.

3. The policy of the Republic of Tatarstan in the 2000s was largely a reaction to the requirements and regulations of the Federal Centre, and the region's authorities were trying to stick to the direction of the ethnicultural strategy of the previous period. This concerned the preservation and development of the Tatar language, Tatar culture, and a Tatar national school. At the same time, a number of additional measures were undertaken to develop Russian language and culture in Tatarstan, which led to confirmation of parity between Tatar and Russian culture. On the one hand, such actions should have contributed to the preservation of a high status and actualised self-consciousness of the republic's titular ethnic group, and on the other hand, improving social welfare and strengthening the positive identity of Russians in the republic of Tatarstan.

4. A regional Tatarstan identity had begun to be articulated during this period as part of a general Russian identity, to be based upon the declared and prescribed at the programme level, policy of multiculturalism.

§ 2. The Dynamics of Interethnic Relations and Identities in Tatarstan in the 1990–2000s

Gulnara Gabdrakhmanova, Rozalinda Musina

The era of Perestroika followed by the collapse of the USSR, and the collapse of the Soviet ideological system marked a cardinal transformation of social values in the entire former USSR. A particular marker for change was the actualisation of the ethnic factor, which in the Russian Federation in the 2000s remained a significant element of the political, social, and cultural sphere. The dramatic element of preserving the role of the ethnic factor in the country lies in the fact that ethnicity showed the highest mobility during the 20 years of post–Soviet history, including through formation of ethnic solidarity, its inclusion in the matrix of everyday social identity of the population and in the processes of state development. This identification and ideological mobility of ethnicity was especially evident in the history of Tatarstan of the 1990–2000s and above all among Tatars. The article discusses the changes of Tatarstan identities during this period. For comparative purposes, the problem is also discussed with regard to the Russian part of the republic's population, which allows showing the role of ethnic identity in the processes of maintaining interethnic tolerance and the formation of a civil identity.

The ethno-sociological research, conducted in 1989–1990 in the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic towards the end of the Soviet period, showed the existence of a latent conflict in the ethnic sphere of the region. Along with the positive results of the national policy of the USSR (an increase in the rate of social mobility among the non–Russian population, the growth in the education level, the development of national professional art and science, the formation of national creative intellectuals, etc.), there was asymmetric social and cultural development of the peoples. Thus, an imbalance in the ethnic structure of the urban and rural population against a background of training in higher and secondary specialised institutions exclusively in the Russian language predestined disproportions in the educational, social, and professional structure of the region in favour of the Russian part of the Tatarstan population. The Tatar language was virtually not used in the sociopolitical sphere, the sphere of material production and was restrictedly used in the spheres of servicing,
education, mass communications, information, and advertising. In the Soviet period Islam was lost as the integral world view of the Tatar people, having been preserved only at the level of ritual practice.

The process of democratisation of society of the second half of the 1980s contributed to the fact that various social groups received the opportunity to express their interests. In Tatarstan, as in other regions of the USSR, national movements to attain greater political, economic, and ethnocultural rights by peoples began to form. The ethnic and political situation in the entire post–Soviet expanse, the national movements in the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic at the turn of the 1980–1990s led to the actualisation of ethnic self-awareness among Tatars. The subsequent strengthening of the relative political independence of Tatarstan, thanks to the adoption in 1990 of the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Republic of Tatarstan and in 1992 the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan as well as the signing of a bilateral Treaty on the Delimitation of Authority Between the Organs of Power of the Republic of Tatarstan and the Russian Federation secured for Tatars ‘...the possibility to publicly express a sense of stigma of their own identity’ [Makarova, 2010, p. 94]. The use of a modified Kuhn–McPartland test in a 1994 study (try to answer the question 'Who am I?' five times) showed the actualised ethnic identity to be over 40% (41.2%) of Tatar city-dwellers surveyed. The actualisation of the ethnic identity was even more evident because many respondents supported the proposition ‘I never forget about my nationality.’ 50.5% of Tatars surveyed in the cities of Tatarstan (to determine the degree of actualisation of ethnicity, the respondents were asked to choose one of two statements: 'I rarely think what nationality I am' and 'I never forget about my nationality'). During this period the Russian part of Tatarstan had a weaker sense of their ethnic affiliation than Tatars: only a quarter of them (24.6% among the townspeople) emphasised their ethnic identity in the identification matrix, and 27.2% supported the statement ‘I never forget about my nationality.’ The reasons for quite an indifferent treatment of their ethnicity among the Russians in this period lay in the social and psychological discomfort and confusion related to the loss of the state-creating function and the alignment of their social status with other nations, in the long-term instability in the Federal Centre, in the policy of Tatarstan concentrated around the issues of preserving and developing the Tatar language and culture, in statements of radical leaders of Tatar national movements and their support by a part of the Tatars. All of these feelings were supported by information about the deteriorating position of Russians in the republics of the former Soviet Union.

The 2000s were marked by an increase in the importance of ethnicity both for the Tatars and for the Russians living in Tatarstan. A more significant actualisation was fixed among the Russian part of the population. While 51.9% of Tatar townspeople supported the statement ‘I never forget about my own nationality’ in 1999; 61.2%, in 2002; 77.5%, in 2011 (in 2012, 86.4% of villagers), the following percentage of the Russians supported it: 37.8%, 41.7%, 64.9% (71.0% of Russian villagers), respectively. If almost two decades ago the degree of ethnic actualisation of Russians was almost half that of Tatars, then at the beginning of the second decade of the 20th century the difference was even less significant. The growth of ethnic identity among Russians in the 2000s was recorded across the country as a whole [Drobizheva, 2011, p. 19], which is associated with new trends in federal policy aimed at strengthening the vertical power and the positions of the Russian language and culture, by appeals of individual politicians to strengthen ethnic nationalism as the nationalism of a dominant nation, which stimulated the development of a sense of their own ethnicity.

Language, culture, and religion are important components of the ethnic identity for Tatars (Table 3.6). In the 2000s, in comparison to the 1990s, the Tatars' interest in religion and traditional ritual and holidays increased. However, there was a decline in their relationship to their national professional culture. In the 1990s more than half of Tatars preferred the
works of Tatar authors (with the exception of fine arts). From one-third to two-fifths relied upon Russian and general Russian artistic culture. In the 2000s the proportion of the Tatars, who preferred their own national professional culture, significantly decreased. Now less than half of them, and in the sphere of fine arts, only a tenth, demonstrate an interest in the works of Tatar artists, writers, and composers. At the same time, the share of those who prefer Russian and general Russian culture is gradually increasing and is approaching half of the Tatar population [Makarova, 2010, p. 177].

Against the backdrop of a rise in ethnic identity among Tatars and Russians living in Tatarstan, a new territorial identity has begun to develop, including Russian and regional ones. In the first years of post–Soviet Russia a significant portion of Tatars and Russians living in Tatarstan felt that they were 'inhabitants of the USSR.' In 1995, 21.3% of Tatars and 35.2% of Russians in Tatarstan named the USSR as their homeland [Stolyarova, 2008, p. 167], in 1998, 33% of Tatars and 38.1% of Russians living in Kazan felt to some degree connected to the inhabitants of the USSR. However, our studies of the mid-1990s shows that one-third of the Tatars and Russians living in the republic felt that they were Russian citizens and Tatarstan citizens (Table 3.7). The new identity 'We are Tatarstan citizens,' constructed during this time by the political elite of Tatarstan, found wide support among population of the republic and above all by Tatars. In 1994, 90.6% of Tatars and 54.3% of Russians considered themselves Tatarstan citizens in one way or another, of whom about 60% of Tatars and every fifth Russian bound up their identity more with Tatarstan. However, one-third of Russians felt that they were Russian citizens only.

The identity 'We are Tatarstan citizens' in the republic was built on the ethnic and regional consolidation but declared and had some local and civil foundations: 'The government and the Tatar elite... acted on behalf of the multinational people of the republic rather than only on behalf of the Tatars... In Tatarstan they promote an ideologeme 'Tatarstan is a nation,' meaning a community of compatriots.'

**Table 3.6**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Options</th>
<th>1994</th>
<th>2011/2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>city</td>
<td>countryside</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language</td>
<td>74.9</td>
<td>69.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultures, customs, rituals**</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>49.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customs, rituals**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home land, nature</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>40.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Features of character, psychology</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>43.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical legacy</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common sovereignty</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appearance</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>24.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nothing brings together</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Respondents could choose several answers.

**In the 1994 study, respondents were proposed the answer 'culture, customs, rituals', and in the 2011-2012 study, it was divided into two variants – 'culture' and 'customs and rituals'.

Section III. The Republic of Tatarstan and the Tatar World at the Turn of the Millennia

The authors did not put in any thought to eth-

nicity in the given project and thereby ensured the
equality of various ethnic groups in the
economy [Ishkakov, 1997, p. 113]. The maga-
zine 'Ideal' became an intellectual platform for
discussing the issues of the economic and eth-
nic revival of Tatarstan. Its pages offered a va-
riety of strategies for developing the republic. Historians bound the economic development
of Tatarstan with the trading traditions of the
Tatar people and the educational potential of the
Tatar diaspora (R. Amirkhan); economists and
political scientists, with the possibilities of
practical implementation of contractual
relationships with the Federal Centre and the
creation of a political system as a basis for
the economy (M. Galeev, R. Mukhametshin,
R. Kurchakov, R. Khakim); and ethnologists,
with the formation of intellectual Tatar centres
(D. Ishkakov) [Modeli e’konomicheskogo raz-
vitiya Tatarstana, 1995, pp. 2–3, 52]. The bal-
ance of interests of various layers and groups of
Tatarstan was later reflected in the formula
of the republic's strategy: ‘Economics means a
decent life in the place where you were born’
[Kurchakov, 2012]. It was this formula that en-
forced the smooth transition of Tatarstan to the
market economy, the political and social inte-
gration of ethnic groups and laid the principle
division of the economic and ethnic policies
in the republic. And as a result, it stimulated
the solidarity of the Tatarstan population on
the supra-ethnic, civil basis.

The regional identity 'We are Tatarstan
citizens' was supported by a significant part
of the population in the early 1990s thanks to
the policy of 'eased entry into the market'
implemented by the authorities of Tatarstan. To
some extent, it protected the population from
a sharp deterioration of the economic state,
which was characteristic of Russia at that
time, having ensured relative well-being in

### Table 3.7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer options</th>
<th>1994</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equally resident of Tatarstan and resident of the Russian Federation</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>52.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More a resident of Tatarstan</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>34.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More a resident of the Russian Federation</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A different answer (difficult to say, neither one not the other)</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
comparison with other regions of the Russian Federation. The priorities of regional identity were also strengthened by a higher trust in the authorities of Tatarstan: 41.2% of Tatars and 20.8% of Russians living in Tatar cities surveyed in 1994, and 59.1% and 21.3%, in villages, expressed their trust to the republican government, while only 4.2% and 11.2% of townpeople (0.5% and 4.9% of villagers), respectively, trusted the federal authorities. This also demonstrated the recognition of the economic success of Tatarstan and of the fact that the authorities had not allowed the radicalisation of the national movement, the ethnisation of the economy and labour sphere, which took place in some regions of the former Soviet Union. However, it should be noted that more than a quarter of those surveyed (26.6% of urban Tatars and 28.7% of Russians, and 29.8% and 21.3% of villagers) trusted neither of the authorities, and each fifth surveyed was undecided about the question trust in the authorities. And this was connected with the general political instability of the period.

As was shown by the last ethno-sociological survey of 2011/2012, the choice of only Russian identity by Russians and Tatars remained at the previous level; the regional one, declined; and the double one (or parity one), Russian and regional, increased (Table 3.7). This means that it remained important for a significant portion of the ethnic groups of Tatarstan to feel that they were Russian citizens, while maintaining the importance of identification with the native region. These feelings were filled with positive content: answering the question 'What do you feel when you realise that you are a Tatarstan citizen?', 94% of Tatars and 79.5% of Russians chose the answer 'the feelings of pride and dignity.' The identification with Russia evoked the same feelings among Tatars and Russians (88%–89%). The all-Russian identity of the Tatars and Russians of Tatarstan combines both the state one (belonging to Russia, its symbols), civil one (responsibility for the fate of the country), and national one (language, culture, customs, holidays, historical past). At the same time, the ideas of the republic's ethnic groups did not widely differ (Table 3.8).

The regional identity of Tatarstan preserved in the 2000s, despite the absence of clearly declared ideologies by the political elites, was filled with new content. Today it

### Table 3.8

**Russian Identity Components in the Russians and Tatars, 2011/2012 (%)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer options</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Countryside</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>tatars</td>
<td>russians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common state</td>
<td>87.7</td>
<td>88.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility for the destiny of the country</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>39.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family relations and friendship ties</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>46.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical legacy</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>45.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home land, territory, nature</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>59.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>48.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>41.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common symbols (flag, coat of arms)</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>42.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customs, festivals</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>38.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Features of character</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nothing unites</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Respondents could choose several answers.*
plays a symbolic role. Half of the Russians and 60% of the Tatars, who participated in the study of 2011/2012, identified 'proclamation of sovereignty by the republics of the Russian Federation' as a positive event in Russian history (Table 3.9). At the same time, 'the strengthening of Tatarstan's independence' as a necessary condition for the development of its people was considered only by a fifth of the Russians and the Tatars living in the republic (Table 3.10). Over the last 15 years the level of support of this position has decreased almost twice. Sovereignisation is perceived by both Tatars and Russians as a significant phenomenon in post–Soviet Russia (60%), which today plays only a symbolic role and does not have a separatist component. At the same time, almost half of our respondents—both Tatars and Russians—demonstrated a high level of activity and interest in the development of Russia, a readiness to be useful to the country. The same number was potential leaders who felt responsible for what was happening in Russia (Table 3.11). However, solidarity contains a negative symptom—it is to a large extent based upon grievances. In 2011/2012, 36% of Tatar townspeople and 44.5% Russians living in the cities of the republic joined the opinion that 'people of my nationality have lost much over the past 15–20 years.' It is not only grievances for real and imaginary ethnic-cultural losses that unite but also for the unfulfilled expectations from the real, positive, and large-scale political, socio-economic development of Russian society.

In the 2000s the regional identity in Tatarstan began to organically complement the all-Rus-
sian identity. This organic regime of operation can be primarily explained by the considerable subjective importance for any person for their environment, place of birth, local traditions—that is, a system of valued images, which meet the basic needs of a person, and on the basis of which more high-order needs are built (A. Maslow). In the first decade of the 2000s these primary needs of individuals, associated with the history and culture of the republic, formed a basis for the policy of regional symbolic management in Tatarstan. Its tools were as follows:

– Ethnic and religious symbols: facts and monuments to the ethnic history of the republic (1,000th anniversary of Kazan, 900th anniversary of Yelabuga, Bulgar archaeological site and the Sviyazhsk Monastery, the Kul Sharif Mosque, the icon Our Lady of Kazan), of individual municipalities and villages; elements of traditional and religious culture: holidays (Tatar Sabantuy, Russian 'Karavon,' Kryashen 'Petrav,' Chuvash 'Uyav,' the Spasskaya Fair, etc.), myths and legends (sacred places, springs)

– Cultural symbols: masterpieces of classical music culture (the Nuriev International Festival of Classical Ballet, the Chaliapin International Opera Festival, the literary and music festival 'Akoven Fest'), the modern musical art (the International Live Music Festival 'Creation of the World'), prominent figures of culture and science (A. Pushkin, G. Tukay, M. Jalil, S. Altshuler, A. Butlerov, E. Zavoysky, N. Lobachevsky, etc.)

– Social symbols: charity and benefactors (the monument to a benefactor in the centre of Kazan), sports and a healthy lifestyle (the 2013 Universiade, FIDE Chess Grand Prix, horse races for a prize of the president of the Republic of Tatarstan, the football team 'Rubin' and the hockey team 'Ak Bars')

As the experience of Tatarstan shows, the combination of qualitatively different symbols (ethnic, religious, cultural, social) and their use in a single regional development strategy testify to the significant potential of 'pragmatic pluralism.' The 'capital of diversity' has become the special resource for the development of the Republic of Tatarstan and Russia as a whole. The growth of tourism, entrepreneurs' initiative, the strengthening of identities, stimulating to creativity, improvement of Russia's image as a state possessing culture and science of global importance—all these are the dividends of symbolic management, having national importance. In addition, the use of symbols increases the social and interethnic sustainability of Tatarstan by forming a regional identity among the representatives of various social, ethnic groups, and confessions. The first president of Tatarstan M. Shaimiev, speaking at the presentation of the Republican Fund of Reviving the Monuments of History and Culture on 20

Table 3.11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Options</th>
<th>Tatars</th>
<th>Russians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>totally agree</td>
<td>mostly agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To be proud of your country</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td>33.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To tell the truth about your country no matter how difficult it is</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>34.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not saying that your country has drawbacks</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>27.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To feel responsible for what is going on in the country</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>38.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To do something, to be useful to the country</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>38.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

March 2010, noted that 'our strategic goal is to make the complexes of historical monuments of the Bulgarian state (Bilyar, Suvar, Chistopol, etc.) and the city of Sviyazhsk become a common heritage. Bolgar as the first capital of the Golden Horde, the history of the Sviyaga River, the architectural constructions of Sviyazhsk became a reflection of the history and symbols of our territory (our emphasis–G. G., R. M.)' [Shaimitiev, 2010 a].

The research materials of 2011/2012 allow us to present the modern matrix of identities of the republic's Tatars. 'We identification' among the Tatars includes a system of complex social roles, the significance of which is not always the same (Table 3.12).

For the majority of the Tatars living in Tatarstan, macro-territorial communities (identification with the country and the republic) are less important than macro-communities reflecting the manifold spiritual closeness of people (identification with socio-economic, professional, religious, and other groups). At the same time, the national and ethnic factor turned out to be much more important within the system of 'we identification' than the civil one. And as has been shown by studies of the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, this situation was typical for Russia as a whole until the mid-2010s. In the following years Russian identity had begun to prevail a little over the ethnic one against the background of the preserving the importance of the latter. This allows the researchers to make a conclusion about a lack of competition between all-Russian and ethnic identities [Drobitsheva, 2011, p. 204]. Why does the civil component of the 'we identification' lag behind among the Tatars of Tatarstan?

As the materials of ethno-sociological studies show, the overall positive attitude towards the values of democracy on the part of ethnic groups is combined with a skepticism of its instrumental capabilities. Russian democracy was implemented at the level of a normative model but did not grow into a real participatory democracy. When ethnic groups talk about equality, they mean not only the declared equality in the law (it is recognised by the Constitution of the Russian Federation) but the actual practice of expression of the equality of peoples' rights. Nearly 90% of Tatars and Russians living in the cities of Tatarstan noted the importance of protecting peoples' rights in modern Russia as well as the necessity of ensuring the equality of rights of the representatives of various nationalities and religions (Table 3.13).

Table 3.12

To Whom and to What Extent the Tatars of Tatarstan feel a Sense of Community, 2011 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>'With whom do you feel a sense of community?'</th>
<th>To a large extent</th>
<th>To some extent</th>
<th>No sense of community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>city</td>
<td>countryside</td>
<td>city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With people who strictly follow the law</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>55.1</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With citizens of Russia</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>30.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With people of the same financial circumstances</td>
<td>71.3</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With people of my ethnic group</td>
<td>78.9</td>
<td>79.4</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With residents of my city</td>
<td>69.0</td>
<td>75.1</td>
<td>27.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With residents of Tatarstan</td>
<td>62.6</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>34.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With people of my faith</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With people of my occupation</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With people who share my views</td>
<td>70.4</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Options</th>
<th>Tatars</th>
<th>Russians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overcoming social inequality, achieving social justice</td>
<td>88.3</td>
<td>89.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bringing order in the country, ruthlessly tackling corruption</td>
<td>89.9</td>
<td>91.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense of national dignity, equality of people from different ethnic groups and faiths</td>
<td>89.1</td>
<td>86.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are grounds for such concerns. The 2000s was a period of initiation by the Federal Centre of a number of strategies in the ethnocultural sphere. In particular, as it relates to Tatarstan, this was the requirement to bring the legislation of the Republic of Tatarstan in the ethnocultural sphere in conformity with federal legislation. During the period of the census campaigns of 2002 and 2010 there was also a subjectivisation of ethnicity. Finally, a decision to confirm uniform state educational standards and revoke the national component in education. The latter led to a loss of effective means for the development of a national education. The introduction of a test system for the final assessment of students’ performance (USE, SFE), conducted in the Russian language, had negative consequences on the development of national education. Attempts to revive the system of higher educational institutions in the Tatar language in the Republic of Tatarstan and beyond were not successful, although a lot was done in this sphere. Serious problems arise in the provision of regional textbooks and other course books in the Tatar language in connection with a change in the order of expertise and classification of textbooks, which deprived regional educational regulatory bodies of the relevant powers. Currently, the Republic of Tatarstan is deprived of the opportunity to influence the situation with the development of Tatar schools in regions of the Russian Federation with a small number of Tatars and provide them with the necessary textbooks. At the same time, they are not being developed by either the local authorities or the federal government. The constitutional right of citizens to a free education in their native language is violated in the regions of the Russian Federation.

Accepting the 'new rules of the game' and recognising the importance of the integration processes, in the 2000s Tatarstan's political and national Tatar elite tended to adhere to the major directions of the ethnocultural strategy that were developed in the Republic of Tatarstan in the previous period [Makarova, 2010, p. 232]. Welcoming the participants of the All-Russian Gathering of Entrepreneurs of Tatar Villages on 24 March 2012, Tatarstan president R. Minnikhanov said: 'We are all interested in the issue of supporting and preserving the culture of the Tatar people, its consolidation, preservation of traditions and customs of the Tatars' [Minnikhanov, 2012]. The ideology of supporting the Tatar culture and identity in the 2000s was implemented through a series of practical actions. This is the adoption by the State Council of the Republic of Tatarstan on 15 September 1999 of the Law on the Transition of the Tatar Language to the Latin Alphabet, which was rejected by the State Duma of the Russian Federation (16 November 2004). These actions also included the development and adoption of a Concept of State National Policy of the Republic of Tatarstan approved by the Decree of the president of the Republic of Tatarstan on 3 July 2008. These also included the development and adoption of a Concept of Preserving the Ethnic Identity of the Tatar
People on 8 December 2012 at the 5th Worldwide Tatar Congress. These also included criticism of the concept of historical education that has been implemented in modern Russia and which, according to experts, ‘is based on the domination of the state identity (the term 'national' as understood in the west) over ethnic identities, with their subsequent assimilation (up to the suppression of local identities)’ [Gibatdinov, 2012]. As an alternative to the situation, several textbooks and course books on history and religious studies based on a different concept of humanitarian education were prepared and published in Tatarstan at the end of the first decade of the 2000s.

However, a firm position of the Tatarstan authorities with respect to state status of the Tatar language and its teaching in schools of the republic is perhaps the most significant measure of maintaining the political course of the 1990s. Some regions of Russia gradually moved away from the state status of national languages and eliminated them from the educational system at the end of the first decade of the 2000s. In Tatarstan, on the contrary, the strengthening of the status of the Tatar language (along with Russian) and preserving its teaching in schools of the republic in volumes equal with the Russian language as well as support of the development of the Tatar national school have been observed. All this happened in a climate of an unstable legal status of the national school in the field of education of the Russian Federation [Mukharyamova, 2008, pp. 81, 89, 99].

Tatarstan's wish to preserve the position of the Tatar language is quite justified. Upon introduction of the Tatar language as a school subject along with Russian in the early 1990s, the process of language assimilation of the Tatars stopped. So, according to the data of our research, while 88.7% of Tatar townspeople noted knowledge of the Tatar language as good (including 68%, fluent) in 1999, in 2011 their share amounted to 94.6% (72.9%, fluent). Besides this, during the years of ethnolinguistic reforms a new generation of Russian youth grew up that to one degree or another know the Tatar language (Table 3.14).

Knowledge of the language and culture of ethnic groups in contact with one another promotes their mutual loyalty. As our research shows, more than half of the Russian townspeople surveyed would like their children to know the Tatar language, and more than 50% of them believe that the Tatar language should be a compulsory school subject. However, a significant part of those surveyed believe that a fewer number of academic hours should be devoted to it. Note that there is a fewer number of those supporting the teaching of this subject as an elective course, and the portion of those negating the necessity of its teaching is negligible (Table 3.15).

The actualisation of ethnic identity, as discerned in the ethno-sociological research of the Tatars and Russians living in Tatarstan, raises the question about its constructive/destructive nature. Long-term studies in Tatarstan showed that the processes of strengthening ethnic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer options</th>
<th>18–24</th>
<th>25–34</th>
<th>35–49</th>
<th>50–59</th>
<th>60 and above</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Completely fluent</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good but not fluent</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannot speak it all</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>66.3</td>
<td>67.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refusal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.14

The Degree of the Tatarstan Tatars' Proficiency in Russian, 2011, Urban Areas (%)
identity do not mean a growth of ethnic exclusiveness. The idea of ethnic exclusiveness did not find support among the Tatars or Russians of Tatarstan: the position 'titular nations should possess more rights than Russians and other nations in the republics of the Russian Federation' or 'Russia is a multinational country, but Russians should possess more rights since they make up the majority' was chosen by not more than a third considered the adherents of neighbouring confessions as close, and a large part (each fourth Tatar surveyed and each seventh Russian) did not want to answer this question. Research conducted in 2011/2012 shows an increase in the number of respondents who reported inter-ethnic (90%) and inter-confessional (over 60%) closeness (Table 3.16).

In the Republic of Tatarstan the indicators of inter-group (interethnic) trust are also very high. More than 91.7% of the Tatars surveyed in the cities of the Republic of Tatarstan in 2011 trust Russians, and 93.2% of Russians trust Tatars (the answers 'completely trust' and 'rather trust' are combined there) (Table 3.17). The study revealed no statistically significant differences in the level of the Tatars' trust to Muslims and the Russians' trust to Orthodox people (81.4% of the Tatars trust Orthodox people, and 88.6% of the Russians trust Muslims). Such a situation is also observed in other national regions and suggests that ethnic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer options</th>
<th>18–24</th>
<th>25–34</th>
<th>35–49</th>
<th>50–59</th>
<th>60 and above</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes, it should be a mandatory subject for everyone</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, it should be a mandatory subject for everyone but with fewer hours given to it than now</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, it should be an elective subject</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>41.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, it should be a mandatory subject only for Tatars</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It should not be in school at all</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.15
Breakdown of the Tatarstan Russians' Answers to Support for Compulsory Teaching of the Tatar Language in Russian-Speaking Schools, 2011, Urban Areas (%)
Section III. The Republic of Tatarstan and the Tatar World at the Turn of the Millennia

### Table 3.16
**Evaluation by the Respondents of a Socio-Cultural Distance (How Close) to the Peoples and Religions, Urban Areas of the Republic of Tatarstan (%)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very close</th>
<th>Close</th>
<th>Far</th>
<th>Very far</th>
<th>Difficult to say</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994 Tatars</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With Russians</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With Orthodoxes</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011 Russians</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With Tatars</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>63.7</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With Muslims</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 3.17
**The Level of Confidence (Trust Completely or Rather Trust) of the Russians and Tatars, Urban Areas, 2011, %**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Russians</th>
<th>Tatars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Towards neighbours</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>72.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towards work colleagues</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>61.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towards bosses at work</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>53.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towards the President of the Russian Federation</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>71.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towards the Government of the Russian Federation</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>60.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towards the President of the Republic of Tatarstan</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>70.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towards the Government of the Republic of Tatarstan</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>64.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towards the head of the local administration</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>58.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towards judicial bodies</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>45.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towards representatives of big business</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towards representatives of small business</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>39.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towards the Orthodox Church</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>46.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towards Muslim organisations</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>74.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towards international organizations</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>36.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towards Tatars</td>
<td>88.6</td>
<td>89.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towards Russians</td>
<td>93.1</td>
<td>93.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
categories, not suppressing other social identities, expand and strengthen social connections and trust relationships. Modern sociological concepts state that ‘...the stronger the mutual trust, and the more reliable the relations of mutual assistance, the broader and the more intertwined social networks, the more secure connections between people, the more stable, united, and efficient the society, and the stronger their democratic foundations’ [Kozyreva, 2012, p. 165]. A wide radius of deep and enduring trusting relations—institutional intergroup (interethnic) and interpersonal—is the key to the further successful development of Russia. Therefore, a positive ethnicity is becoming the practical platform for forming further social development and reconstruction of the Russian Federation as it deepens the support by the citizens of their values and norms, allows them to interact on a clear, equal, and mutually beneficial basis.

Real interethnic contacts between the Tatars and Russians of Tatarstan are large-scale. Even in the period of actualisation of national movements in the republic during early 1990s, 88.1% of Russians and 79.7% of Tatars in cities and 96.9% of Russians and 93.7% of Tatars in villages were ready to deal with a representative of any nation, despite of racial and ethnic differences (Table 3.18). During

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Readiness to accept a person of another ethnic group as a</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Countryside</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Citizen of the republic</td>
<td>tatars</td>
<td>77.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>russians</td>
<td>83.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close partner in a joint endeavour</td>
<td>tatars</td>
<td>61.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>russians</td>
<td>74.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Line manager</td>
<td>tatars</td>
<td>46.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>russians</td>
<td>59.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbour</td>
<td>tatars</td>
<td>68.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>russians</td>
<td>80.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>tatars</td>
<td>56.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>russians</td>
<td>71.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouse of your children</td>
<td>tatars</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>russians</td>
<td>54.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your spouse</td>
<td>tatars</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>russians</td>
<td>47.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.18

Orientation on the Inter-Ethnic Cooperation in the Republic of Tatarstan, 1994 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Readiness to accept a person of another ethnic group as a</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Countryside</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Citizen of Russia</td>
<td>tatars</td>
<td>93.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>russians</td>
<td>94.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resident of Tatarstan</td>
<td>tatars</td>
<td>95.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>russians</td>
<td>95.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colleague, work partner</td>
<td>tatars</td>
<td>94.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>russians</td>
<td>92.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Line manager</td>
<td>tatars</td>
<td>92.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>russians</td>
<td>92.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbour</td>
<td>tatars</td>
<td>97.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>russians</td>
<td>97.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close friend</td>
<td>tatars</td>
<td>96.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>russians</td>
<td>95.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouse of your children</td>
<td>tatars</td>
<td>69.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>russians</td>
<td>85.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your spouse</td>
<td>tatars</td>
<td>63.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>russians</td>
<td>76.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.19

Orientation on the Inter-Ethnic Cooperation in the Republic of Tatarstan, 2011/2012 (%)


the last years, the readiness of Tatarstan to accept a person of a different nationality as a resident of the republic, colleague at work, boss, neighbour, close friend has risen up to 99%–92% (Table 3.19).

The E. Bogardus scale, shown in the tables, which permits to determine the nature of interethnic interaction, demonstrates that this readiness is different in various spheres of contacts: it manifested itself the most in the sphere of civil, business, friendship, neighbourly communication and considerably less in family and marriage communication. This sphere of human relationships is the most private and intimate, and the tradition of ethno-national endogamy has the primary impact here, especially for Tatars. However, according to our studies, in the 2000s there appeared a gradual softening of ethnocentric trends of the former decade manifested among the considerable part of Tatars in their attitude towards interethnic marriages.

It is natural that city dwellers, whose interethnic contacts are determined by their lifestyle, entertain the possibility of interethnic marriages more often. In villages, especially in Tatar ones, the number of people orientated towards these contacts is considerably less: village-dwelling Tatars express the readiness to accept a representative of another nationality as a spouse of their children over 50% less than city-dwelling Tatars (42.6% and 69.3%); the proportion of village-dwelling Tatars with similar trend is 1.7 times less than Russian village-dwellers (42.6% and 73.9%). Russian city-dwellers are the most open to family and marriage relations (85.9%). A more distinct trend of Tatars towards the ethnic endogamy is also related to the recognisable danger to lose the ethno-national culture and assimilate in case of heterogeneous marriages of future generations. About 2/3 of Tatars surveyed in the republic agreed with the assertion (among whom 33.3% fully agree, 30.7% rather agree) that interethnic marriages lead to the extinction of the nation (2011/2012 research data).

Sociocultural and psychological closeness, projective and actual practices of interethnic interactions in Tatarstan have been formed during the centuries-long common life of Tatars and Russians by virtue of many loans and identical traditions, cultural elements resulted from similar economical-and-cultural and geographical living environment. Longtime neighbourhood within the same territory, long-standing economical and cultural relations, close interaction in domestic and working environment were bound to leave an imprint on the nature of interethnic attitudes and contacts. The established comonality of values of the various ethnic groups, especially in cities, is also a factor for their convergence and consolidation. Research materials from 1990–2000s, accountable for the allowable statistical error of 4% to 5%, show almost a complete match,

Table 3.20

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Options</th>
<th>1994</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>tatars</td>
<td>russians</td>
<td>tatars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To be respected by people</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>61.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To have an interesting job</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>52.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To have a good family</td>
<td>76.8</td>
<td>74.0</td>
<td>83.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To have power, social status</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/ to have the right to freedom of political opinions*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To live comfortably</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>70.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The 1994 and 1999 studies included the answer 'to have power and social status'. The 2011/2012 studies – 'to have the right to freedom of political opinions'.
especially in cities, in the life priorities of ethnic groups in Tatarstan (Table 3.20).

In early 1990s one of the popular western theories was S. Huntington's idea of the clash of civilisations. The researcher considered religion as the basis for potential global fractures. Certain materials of mass surveys in the 1990–2000s could serve as a basis to justify such a position. During the last 20 years there has been a positive, dynamically developing trend for growth in the religiosity level among Tatars and Russians in Tatarstan. So, in 1990, 34% of Tatars and 28% of Russians surveyed in the cities of the republic regarded themselves as believers. In 1994, 66% and 56% of city-dwellers, respectively, among whom there were set aside the believers observing rituals and rites (practicing believers), 32% and 23%, and non-observing them (nominal believers), 34% and 33%. In the villages the proportion of persons regarding themselves as believers was 86% among Tatars and 75.4% among Russians; 64.5% and 55.4% of them regarded themselves as practicing believers. In 1997, 81% of Tatars and 72% of Russians called themselves believers, a part of whom (41% and 43%, respectively) considered themselves as rather believer than non-believer. In 2011/2012 about 84% of respondents (both Tatars and Russians) in cities considered themselves believers, half of whom were trying to observe religious rituals and rites; in villages, above 90% (91.4% of Tatars and 91.% of Russians), practicing believers were 59.8% and 48.5%, respectively, among them.

The growth of religious consciousness is most noticeable among youth: notably, the smallest proportion of non-believers is in youth groups below 35; with this, among Tatars there show up young believers trying to observe rites; among Russians, believers non-observing the rites (Table 3.21).

The trends in the growth of religiosity are manifested in the performance of religious practices, especially in cities. So, according to the research data of 1990, even among city-dwelling believers only 7.9% of Tatars and 31% or Russian attended a mosque or a church, respectively; 15.4% and 10.1% of respondents prayed at home, but the major amount of polled (76.4% and 68.7%) did not observe those religious commands. Their attitude towards the religion was determined by the inner self-awareness ('internally, I feel myself a muslim or an orthodox').

The research materials for 2011–2012 show a positive dynamic in the expression of religious behaviour. Every fifth urban Tatar (19.3%) and every sixth Russian urban-dwellers (16.7%) prayed daily, and about a half of those surveyed (46.1% and 49.1%) did prayers occasionally. 43.2% of Tatar and

Breakdown of Answers Given by the Tatars and Russians to the question 'Are you a believer?' in Different age Groups, 2011, Urban Areas (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answers Age</th>
<th>'Actively' religious</th>
<th>'Passively' religious</th>
<th>Not sure</th>
<th>Non-religious</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>tatars</td>
<td>russians</td>
<td>tatars</td>
<td>russians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>43.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18–24</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>51.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25–34</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>52.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35–44</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>40.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45–54</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>46.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55–64</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 and older</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
27.7% of Russian respondents never attended temples, while 56.6% and 70.7% answered the question of attending a mosque or church positively. However, only 2.5% and 4.1%, respectively, answered that they attend it at least one time a week and a little more, 3.1% and 7.1%, from 1–2 times a month. Comparatively low activity of Tatars in attending mosques may result from the fact that Islam does not contain a command to attend mosques on a mandatory basis but merely mentions the pious nature of collective praying. Respondents associate a rather low level of regular attendance of religious temples to participate in services or seek the advice of priests with insufficient professional level and sometimes the manifestation of human qualities in the ministers of religion.

The experience of Tatarstan in the regulation of inter-confessional relations as well as the particularities of Islam among Tatars have shown the unsoundness of the theoretical position of S. Huntington. Even in conditions of actualising religious self-conscience, inter-confessional tolerance and the positive coexistence of different religions are possible, especially in the regions with the experience of longtime interethnic interaction. This is confirmed by the study of D. Furman and K. Kaariainen conducted in Russian regions, including Tatarstan, in 1999. According to the researchers’ data, the positive attitude towards Islam was detected in 92% of Russians living the Republic of Tatarstan, and the negative, in only 3%; while in the all-Russian selection it was 57% in the first case and 21% in the second, respectively [Furman, Kaariainen, 2000, p. 214].

During the 2011/2012 study over 95% of Russian city- and village-dwellers defined their attitude towards Islam as positive (57.9% and 38.5%) or rather positive (37.9% and 56.8%). Similar accounts towards Orthodox were identified in 96% of surveyed city-dwelling Tatars (among them 63% mentioned positive attitude, and 33%, rather positive) and in 90% of village-dwelling Tatars (38.9% and 51.2%, respectively). Only 4.2% of Russians and 3.7% of Tatars living in cities as well as 4.7% and 10% of village-dwellers, respectively, admitted a negative attitude towards the religion of the ethnic neighbour.

The high level of tolerance is also typical for the believers themselves. So, in 1994 among the Russians of Tatarstan believers somewhat often expressed the wish their children knew the Tatar language (73% against 64% among non-believers). When determining the social-and-cultural distance, the higher degree of closeness was then identified in Tatar believers towards Orthodox Christians as well as in Russian believers towards Muslims. Study materials from 2011/2012 confirmed a higher tolerance of believers in comparison with groups of other world views.

A higher level of religious consciousness is characteristic for the Tatars and Russians of Tatarstan than Russian national average. This is accounted for by longitudinal close ethnic-confessional contacts, amplifying the importance of the 'us – them' opposition. However, neighbouring ethnic groups and their confession are perceived as rather close: while it is different, it is not foreign, but one's own. The development of favourable inter-confessional relations in Tatarstan is largely affected by the traditions of Islam practiced by Tatars—that is, open, gentle, and characterised by the term 'Euro-Islam' as well as by the confessional policy of Tatarstan that focused on the equal support of traditional religions. Over the last few years problems in the religious sphere of the republic have been concentrated inside the confessions themselves.

The studies placed special attention on the interethnic relations of youth, who as a rule demonstrates more maximalist views and critical acceptance of reality, but due to the absence of life experience it is often exposed to destructive actions and becomes involved in various radical communities. The 2011/2012 study showed that the opinion of good neighbourly relations in the region prevails among the young generation. Thus, among urban youth over 70% of Russians below the age of 35 (70.5% in the 18–24 year group, 74.4% in the 25–35 year group) and over 80% of Tatars (78.6% and 86.1%, respectively) assess the relations in the republic as favourable or
calm. Among village youth the proportion of proponents of such assessment is even higher. It should be noted that the assessment of interethnic relations in specific cities and villages—places of residence of the respondents—as well as in their work or study groups is 10% to 12% higher. About 90% of Russians under 35 assess the cultural and psychological distance with Tatars as rather close (30% among them, as very close); up to 60% of the representatives of this group perceive Muslims rather close (24% among them, very close). Up to 90% of Tatar youth consider Russians rather close, with up to 66% of those who feel the same towards Orthodox Christians.

A characteristic indicator is the attitude towards the religion of the ethnic group being contacted. The 2011/2012 study materials showed that 85% to 90% of Russian youth in cities and villages of the republic noted a positive (including rather positive) feeling towards Islam; 3% to 5%, negative; 8% to 10% were undecided. A positive relationship towards Orthodoxy was identified among 90%–92% of Tatars in cities and villages; negative, 2.5%–6%; 3% to 5% of those surveyed were undecided. It should be noticed that in the 1999/2000 youth study, with the same proportion of negative assessments for the religion of the neighbouring ethnic group, the proportion of positively assessed respondents was significantly lower—that is, 69.9% of Tatars positively assessing Orthodoxy and 62.5% of Russian similarly assessing Islam (about one-third of those surveyed then were undecided) [Sovremenny’e e’tnokul’turny’e processsy’, 2000, pp. 54–55].

Along with the high level of interethnic and inter-confessional tolerance, characteristic for the majority of the young generation of Tatarstan, the materials of ethno-sociological surveys also record a part of youth in the republic who have a negative perception of interethnic relations. Thus, according to data from 2011/2012, about 20% of Russian and 12% of Tatar youth in cities as well as about 10% and 16% in villages of the republic, respectively, selected the following position when assessing interethnic relations in the RT: ‘Outwardly calm, but there is internal tension.’ A further 1% to 3% considered these relations as tense. Such a critical assessment of the condition of interethnic relations is associated with the growth of ethnic self-awareness (about 60% of Russians surveyed and over 80% of Tatar youth support the statement ‘I never forget my nationality’), against which many social problems take on ethnic overtones. Problems related to ethnocultural issues, issues of social status, the status of ethnic languages and cultures are perceived as especially painful. The necessity of equal rights for all Russian nations prevails in the public consciousness. The proposition that ‘Russia is the common home for many nations. All the nations of Russia should have equal rights’ was completely supported by 3/4 of Russians and about 70% of Tatar youth surveyed. At the same time, among Russian urban youth surveyed 10.3% aged 18–25 and 17.1% aged 26–35 as well as 2.4% and 2.7% of rural youth, respectively, completely agreed with the statement ‘All means are fair in defence of the interests of my nation.’ Among Tatar youth this statement found complete support in 22.6% and 14.9% of the age groups under consideration in cities and 4.8% and 13.3% in villages. But, it is apparent that people meant peaceful, non-violent ways to address problems since over 60% of both Russian and Tatar youth consider violence inappropriate in interethnic and inter-confessional disputes, and about 10% of those surveyed definitively support the statement ‘Violence is acceptable if fairness to my nation or faith is violated.’

Ethno-sociological studies make it possible to track the dynamic of changes in the interethnic relations during the last 20 years. In the middle of the 1990s, 15.1% of Russians in cities assessed the interethnic relations in the republic as tense. Among Tatars this assessment was 7.6% of Tatars in cities (in villages, 1.6% and 5.2%, respectively). The twofold difference in pessimistic assessments of interethnic relations in the first half of 1990s between Russian and other nations was also observed in other regions of Russia [Ryzhova, 2011, p.
59]. In the late 1990s (according to research data from 1999) almost every fifth Tatar surveyed in cities of the republic (21.5%) and every third Russian (33.4%) assessed interethnic relations as outwardly calm, mentioning the internal tension, and further 3% and 5%, respectively, called them tense.

Currently interethnic relations in Tatarstan can be characterised as favourable. That is how they are assessed by the majority of participants in the 2011/2012 survey—that is, 73% of Russians and 80.5% of Tatars among urban-dwellers and 88.9% of Russians and 83.9% of Tatars among villagers (Table 3.22).

Over the course of 20 years of post–Soviet history a massive, robust, and considerably strong ethnic identity has been built among the Tatars of Tatarstan. It is coupled with the high level of interethnic and inter-confessional tolerance and is perceived by Tatars themselves as the element of national and civil identity, consolidating the Russian political nation. The national and civil identity of Tatars contains a high level of interest in the development of Russia and activist policies. The ethnocultural and socio-economic development of Tatarstan in 1990–2000 and a generally positive perception of the republic's model experience by the Russian part of the region show the possibilities to efficiently include ethnic identity into state-building processes. Here it becomes important to reinforce the ethnic sentiments with actual political and ethnocultural rights. Only in this case ethnic identity is capable of ensuring interethnic accord and become an effective resource in the development of the country.

§ 3. Islam in the sociopolitical life of modern Tatarstan

Rafik Mukhametshin

The main phases of the revival of Islam in Tatarstan. The 'Islamic' factor in the sociopolitical life of Tatarstan became the most significant phenomenon in the late 1980s. Initially it was not directly related to revival of Islam itself but to the emergence of national socio-political organisations, which consider the Islamic factor as the most important component of the national self-awareness and the essential attribute in the struggle for the sovereignty of Tatarstan. Therefore, the emergence of the first religious institutes in the republic resulted from the actions of these organisations. The independent Muslim Spiritual Board of the Republic of Tatarstan was established in 1992 (MSB RT), on the one hand, as one of the manifestations of the national movement of the Tatars, and on the other hand, as the quite inevitable in those conditions decentralisation of administration of muslim communities. This period became the first phase of the revival of Islamic values to Tatarstan society; therefore,
1988–1992 can be conventionally called the legalisation period. The further proliferation and operation of Islam in the sociopolitical life of Tatarstan can also be conventionally divided into the next three periods.

1992–1998 became the period of institutionalisation of Islam. It is namely this period when the basic institutes of Islam emerged in the republic:

a) The establishment of Islamic communities. This process, which had begun earlier, culminated exactly in this period. Thus, if in 1988 there were 18 Islamic communities, by 1992 there were over 700 of them. Although the number of communities is still growing even now, the growth rate has considerably lowered. In 2000 there were about 950 of them, and in 2001, about 1,000. By early 2003 these figures had almost not changed.

b) The first Islamic educational institutions were established; by 1992 there were more than 15 of them. The largest and most authoritative among them for muslims are the madrasahs 'Muhammadiya' and Millennium of Adoption of Islam (Kazan), 'Yoldyz' (Naberezhnye Chelny).

c) The revival of the Institute of Islamic Clergy. Generally, this process followed the path of turning unofficial and uneducated village mullahs into officially registered clergy. Nevertheless, one can say that the clergy was established as a separate societal layer (of around 3 thousand). However, it was too early to talk about special distinctive world-viewing policies and behavioural patterns of the clergy since it was rather eclectic. Those young people who had studied in Islamic countries, mainly in Saudi Arabia (their number exceeded 100 by the early 1990s), were not game-changers in the Islamic clergy environment.

d) The political activation of the muslims of Central Russia pertains exactly to this period. Efforts were made to establish Islamic and public organisations and political parties. This process started with establishment of Tatar Community Centre (TCC) in 1989, which took a firm stance, considering Islam as the most important component of a spiritual revival. The first all-Russian Islamic party, the 'Party of Islamic Revival,' appeared in 1990. Efforts were made in 1991 to create regional Islamic parties: the Islamic Democratic Party of Tatarstan, the Pan-Islamic Democratic Party in Ufa. In the same year Abdulvakhid Niyazov organised the Islamic Cultural Centre in Moscow. In 1995 the Union of Muslims of Russia and the All-Russian Islamic movement 'Nur' emerged. In 1996 the mufti of Tatarstan Gabdulla Galiullin organised the movement 'Muslims of Tatarstan.'

However, the political spectrum of Islam in the Volga-Ural region turned out to be very unstable. One of the reasons was the rather week social basis of the sociopolitical movements and parties (and not only religious ones). Their influence, even during the rise of the national movement from 1989–1992, according to sociologists, was insignificant. Thus, in August 1991, 6% of those surveyed considered themselves supporters of the TCC; 2.5%, of the 'Ittifik' party (this could explain where, by whom, and when it was established, its goals, size, and the nature of its activities, and how the TCC differed from other parties). It should be also taken into account that all other parties, working within the Volga region (there were around 10), gathered only 10.6%. And 46.9% of those surveyed did not sympathise with any party or organisation. In November 1997, 0.6% considered themselves supporters of TCC (and in Kazan it was even 0%); 0.6%, of 'Ittifik.' It is possible that these indicators better characterise the general situation in the region and in Russia than the influence of individual parties and movements on the political consciousness of the masses since 'by the end of 1997 about 68% of those surveyed were not able to name any party they would give their preference to.' This data attests to the 'continuing political disorientation of the mass consciousness,' the inability of a 'majority of citizens to identify themselves politically with any movement or party.'

e) This period saw the establishment of the main elements for the administrative struc-
ture of Islamic communities (the mahallah – mukhtasibat – MSB RT).

However, this period is characterised by the unsystematic appearance of multiple Islamic institutes. They were connected to one another rather conventionally but mostly functioned independently.

The next phase, III, covers the period from 1998–2002 and was the period of structuralisation. This phase covers the period between the February congresses of 1998 and 2002.

This phase is characterised by the creation of the operating administrative system for the Islamic communities and other institutes of Islam. MSB RT became the only supreme body for muslims of the republic. It has its structural subdivisions, the mukhtasibats that organise the activities of one thousand local Islamic societies in all 45 districts of Tatarstan.

During this period all Islamic educational institutions became structural subdivisions of MSB RT, which in turn provided them with educational standards, the use of which led to the reduction in the number of educational institutions that had emerged. Only 8 of them remained; this was quite sufficient to meet the demands of the Islamic communities for imams. More than a thousand shakirds (students) studied in them, full and part-time (excluding students at Sunday schools).

It can be said that a functioning body was established in Tatarstan in the form of MSB RT, which, with some minor exceptions, generally controlled the local situation.

The IV period of internal mobilisation covers the period between II and III congresses (from 2002 to 2006), which confirmed the completion of the phase of radical structural-and-organisational transformations and focused primarily on addressing the internal issues of the Islamic communities of the republic:

a) The training of religious leaders, adaptation to local conditions, being aware of the centuries-long traditions of muslims of the Middle-Volga region, able to organise local work within the framework of the Hanafiyah madhab, traditional for Tatars

b) Determining the internal reserves for operation of Islamic communities, using economic leverage in the form of various taxes appropriate for muslims, the development of a branched network of charitable organisations, active use of the property (waqfs) transferred to the muslims of Tatarstan.

Today the Islamic communities do not have the opportunity finance clergy and educational institutions to build or repair mosques and madrasahs. Therefore, it can be concluded that although the Islamic communities of Tatarstan received state registration, they have not become an independent cell of Islamic society. For this reason the II congress of the Muslims of Tatarstan in 2002 prioritised the task of the creation of fully-operational Islamic communities. However, the question of their main operational principles in fact remained open. In which form should it be recreated in a modern environment? The point is that the classical Islamic community is the product of traditional agricultural society. Today one can talk about their revival in an environment of an industrial or industrially-centred society. With this, one should take into account that in the environment of an industrial society people are connected not so much by traditional personal mutual relations and ties within their religious community as by goals and symbols molded into an ideology. Islam today has ceased to be only a form for family and community self-awareness and has become the most important element of ethnic self-awareness and ideological comprehension of modern reality.

Religious leaders have not yet produced any ready-to-use recipes to address the arising issues. However, there was understanding that they should be solved by means of internal reserves, without the creation of a consumerist psychology.

The V period of determining the ideological and theological reference points. After the 2006 congress the muslim society of Tatarstan entered a very important phase of its development. It was organisationally and structurally formed, but the ideological and theological reference points and general principles of its existence were not determined. The special significance of this step lies in the fact that it was necessary to apply great intellectual ef-
forts in order to clearly define the future orientation of the Islamic revival in Tatarstan.

**The establishment and operation of Islamic institutes in Tatarstan.** The ambiguity and difficulty of the process of the revival of Islam in Tatarstan to a certain degree were also reflected in the activities of the Muslim Spiritual Board of the Republic of Tatarstan (MSB RT).

The establishment of the MSB of the Republic of Tatarstan in 1992 was determined by multiple factors. First, the processes of ‘democratisation and sovereignty’ as well as the collapse of the USSR (December 1991) largely facilitated radical transformations, which took place within the framework of official religious institutes in the former USSR and Russia. Second, the calls for the necessity to transfer the Spiritual Board from Ufa to Kazan in the Tatar national movement were sounded more and more frequently, especially after the Declaration of the State Sovereignty of the Republic was adopted on 30 August 1990 [Garayeva, 1994, p. 197]. It was also true that the question of the establishment of an independent Muslim spiritual board of the republic had not yet been raised. As it was mentioned in the second revision of the Tatar Public Centre’s (TCC) platform, it ‘proposed to continue the work in close coordination with the Muslim Spiritual Board of the European part and Siberia.’

However, due to the adoption of the Declaration of the State Sovereignty of the Tatar Soviet Socialist Republic, as it was mentioned in the TCC programme, the organisational form for the administration of Muslims in the Republic of Tatarstan should be changed, and the centre of the Spiritual board should be transferred to Kazan. Should the official structures of MSBPS act against this transfer, the TCC reserves the right to commence the creation of independent structures of the Muslim Spiritual Board of the Republic of Tatarstan with inclusion of Tatar Muslims from other regions, who gave their consent for this’ [Millät, January 1991]. During the 200 year history of the Muslim Spiritual Board the question of its location had been repeatedly raised by religious leaders and Tatar intellectuals. As early as in 1897 Sh. Marjani wrote that ‘after the opening the Spiritual Board worked in Orenburg. But in three years ... it was transferred to the rundown city of Ufa. However, it is more than obvious that Kazan is the most appropriate place for this organisation’ [Marjani, 1989, p. 211].

Galimdzhan Barudi, being a mufti of the Muslim Spiritual Board of Russia in 1920, wrote that ‘in ancient times Catherine, with the goal of conquering the Kazakhs and Bashkirs and bringing them to her side, ... opened the Board in a remote and tiny town... If Muslims, of their own volition, transfer the Board to Kazan, there should not be obstacles on the part of the government. The proclamation of the Tatar republic in Kazan and the first steps in its creation are especially beneficial for this task. Its implementation will increase the authority of the Republic in the eye's of the people...

The question is as follows: Since the Spiritual Board is the only high religious capital of Muslims, naturally its place is in Kazan, the recognised centre of religion and city of science’ [Barudi, 1998, p. 25].

As already mentioned, the adoption of the Declaration of the State Sovereignty of Tatarstan played a large role in determining the attitude of the representative of the Tatar national movement towards MSBPS. Before its adoption MSBPS was considered as one of the incumbent organisational structures, capable to unite Tatars around it and revive the traditional ethno-confessional self-awareness of the people. For the national sociopolitical organisations and movements the adoption of the Declaration was an interim result in the struggle for national independence and opened certain opportunities for its continuation. Therefore, in relation to the Spiritual Board it should be first understood as an essential attribute of statehood. At the same time, the problem of national unification of all Tatars remained relevant. Therefore, from the perspective of the national movement, the transfer of the centre of the Spiritual Board from Ufa to Kazan remained a more acceptable idea rather than the creation of a new religious organisation.
In this situation in order to prevent cardinal changes to the MSBPS, Talgat Tadzhutdin came to Kazan for a meeting with the leaders of the national movement in the summer of 1992. Damir Iskakov, one of the participants in this meeting, recalled this in one interview that 'the transfer of the Spiritual Board to Kazan was earnestly suggested' to Tadzhutin. Instead of this, however, he organised a mukhtasibat (department) here' [Kazanskoе vremya, 12 February 1998]. The mukhtasibat administration in Tatarstan did not introduce any changes to the activities of MSBPS. This further aggravated the internal crisis in MSBPS that had been evolving over many years. The rapid growth in the number of Islamic communities, requesting solutions to multiple organisational, staffing, financial problems, the increase of contradictions between regional religious organisations and the centre accelerated the natural process of establishing of independent Spiritual Boards.

Gabdulla Galiulla, imam-khatib of the Kazan mosque Nurulla, 'elected mufti of MSB RT, noted that 'there were several reasons for the collapse of MSBPS. One of them is the adoption of declaration of sovereignty by former autonomies... In the republics new presidents were elected, and new power structures appeared. It was natural that spiritual structures, independent from the Central Muslim Spiritual Board of Russia, should have appeared. Each republic had its own interests and its subtlety in interactions with the federal authorities. Talgat Tadzhutdin at that time continued to take the hard line of Moscow those days' [Vremia i Den'gi, 3 October 1996]. According to him, the process of the collapse of MSBPS should not be considered as a 'loss of unity for the Muslims of Russia. Conversely, today they (Muslims.–R. M.) are getting rid of the totalitarian ideology, considering everyone's interests, look for new—based on democratic principles—ways for consolidation [Vatamyн Tatarstan, 3 February 1995].

Talgat Tadzhutdin had his own version for the schism of MSBPS and the emergence of independent Spiritual Boards. He argued that 'this, of course, is a reflection of the processes occurring in society, but primarily it was imposed externally... In this case I feel there was a negative influence of our foreign Muslim brothers. A few so-called 'Islamic charitable societies,' which are far from charitable activity, pitied us, living behind the 'iron curtain' back then. However, when it came to the construction of mosques and madrasahs, it turned out that their activities were aimed in an absolutely different direction... The activity of these organisations in both Middle Asia and at the North Caucasus introduced a schism within the Muslim environment [Sahri Kazan, 18 September 1996].

Official authorities acknowledged the 'fact of the formation of a Muslim Spiritual Board in the Republic of Tatarstan, whether anyone likes it or not' is already a reality [Terentieva, 1993, p. 14].

The establishment of the Higher Coordinating Centre of newly emerged Muslim Spiritual Boards of Russia (HCC MSBR) in 1992 was dictated by the need to create a single organisation capable of coordinating the activity of Spiritual boards and counter MSBPS. From the very beginning this assumed creation of a conceptually new, as distinguished from it, structure, consolidating religious organisations on a democratic basis.

Potential opportunities for the creation of such a centre actually existed since the HCC MSBR was built on a confederative principle, consolidating completely independent Spiritual Boards both structurally and organisationally. However, the HCC MSBR did not translate this opportunity into practice and gradually turned into a terminal Moscow organisation, although Gabdulla Galiulla, a mufti of MSB RT, was elected its chair. The Council of Muftis of Russia was established in Moscow in July 1996 under the chair of Ravil Gaynetdin, mufti of the Spiritual Board of the Central-European region of Russia [Vatamym Tatarstan, 12 July 1996].

The situation in Tatarstan was additionally aggravated by the meeting of imams of 14 Islamic communities of Kazan, where a resolution was adopted on the creation of a new Muslim Spiritual Board of Tatarstan lead
by Gabdulkhamit Zinatullina, imam of the mosque of the city of Zelenodolsk [Iman, 1 November 1994]. The existence of two Spiritual Boards created a certain tension between the Islamic communities of Kazan. As for Islamic communities beyond the boundaries of the capital, the emergence of a new religious organisation did not make them very enthusiastic as well since for many people it was clear that this was another structural unit of the HCC MSBR, gradually losing its influence and almost incapable of providing financial help for local religious communities. Above all others, the newly emerging Islamic communities were in need of such support. However, neither the still weak and structurally unformed MSB RT nor the HCC MSBR, withstood the test of time and were incapable of reorganising its structures in a new political environment, could become a reliable support for them.

The extraordinary Congress of Muslims of the republic, held in Kazan in January 1995, took upon itself the implementation of the idea of consolidation. Representatives of the national movement and scientific intellectuals actively participated in the preparation of the congress and its documents. Over 80% of Islamic communities sent their representatives to the congress, thereby acknowledging it as their supreme body and its resolutions as mandatory for implementation.

One can say that the Islamic communities of Tatarstan were formally consolidated. The Congress almost reached its goal. However, the following course of events showed that the organisers of the congress, somewhat over-emphasising the necessity to consolidate the Muslims of the republic around the MSB RT, missed a rather significant moment regarding specific measures on renewal of its structure and organisation of its activities on a new foundation. Although the convention discussed these issues, it did not adopt any specific resolutions. For this reason, the achieved positions were lost relatively fast since, as it turned out, the congress rather reflected the hopes and plans of Tatar intellectuals more than those of the clergy and, moreover, the management of the Spiritual Board.

Events surrounding the occupation of the Muhammadiya madrasah's buildings in the autumn of 1995 largely highlighted the actual situation, which formed in the management MSB RT: in the absence of clearly thought out work on strengthening its position locally through actual help for Islamic communities, if not monetary than with staff, religious and educational literature, etc., mufti G. Galiulla triggered an open conflict with official authorities with his actions. The preconditions of this conflict emerged in 1992 when G. Galiulla became the head of the newly emerged spiritual administration, to which the authorities reacted rather cautiously, not without reason, considering him a representative of the radical wing of the clergy connected with oppositional organisations of the national movement.

The restrained reaction of official authorities mainly meant their recognition of the suitability of a single spiritual administration functioning in the republic and fear of the emergence of an open conflict between the Islamic communities of Kazan. However, the MSB RT was unable to use this opportunity to establish normal relations with official bodies. It was not able to use the intellectual potential of Tatar intelligentsia, who showed their willingness to cooperate with the Spiritual Board after the extraordinary congress of 1995. The Council of Ulama (Golamalär şurası), comprised of renowned scientists of the republic, was established under the MSB RT in March 1995. This public organisation determined the primary areas of its activities as 'participation in the development of the fundamental directions of the activities of MSB RT in the fields of religious education, the training of religious staff, moral upbringing of citizens, especially youth; the provision of theoretical and methodological support for Islamic educational institutions to elaborate the concept of development of the national-type Islamic education, prepare academic programs, write text books, study guides,' etc. However, the Council of Ulama
had no time to start its activities, and the events surrounding the building of the Muhammadiya madrasah demonstrated the unattainability of the goals set since the management of MSB RT prioritised other goals that focused on real estate (pre-revolutionary waqf property in the form of buildings, plots of land, etc., belonging to the Muslims of the region), which they intended to receive from the state. Political short-sightedness, the absence of a well-thought-out action programme eventually translated into almost complete isolation for the leadership of the MSB RT in the autumn of 1995: the official authorities openly condemned its actions, filing criminal charges against the organisers of the occupation of the Muhammadiya madrasah building, including mufti G. Galiulla himself; intellectuals refused to cooperate, preliminarily declaring their position in an open letter [Vatanim Tatarstan, 24 November 1995]; local Islamic communities, while not condemning the mufti’s actions openly, did not support them and gradually distanced themselves from the Spiritual Board, understanding that the standoff between the leadership of MSB RT and official bodies could deprive them from almost the only relatively permanent source of existence. Indeed, almost all mosques in the republic, especially in villages, were built with significant support of local authorities or kolkhozes. Their more or less unimpaired operation largely depended on them as well. Keeping in mind that about 200 mosques were under construction in the republic at this time, the corresponding local reaction, associated with this conflict, is quite understandable.

The end of 1995 and the first half of 1996 were a period of waiting. The leadership of the Muslim Spiritual Board of the Republic of Tatarstan (MSB RT) expected the results of the criminal case, initiated in relation of the seizure of Muhammadiya madrasah building, unsuccessfully trying to arrange some support for themselves from local Islamic communities. The latter also took up a wait-and-see attitude, not without reason, hoping for the solution of this conflict during the next Congress of the Muslims of the Republic by means of electing new leadership of the MSB RT.

It is possible that was the reason why many processes, connected with the rebirth of Islam in Tatarstan, developed independently of the activity of the MSB RT. Thus, the system of Islamic education, the necessity of which was mentioned by mufti G. Galiulla at the second Congress of the Muslims of Tatarstan in January 1995, was not created. The MSB RT did not become a scientific, methodological, coordinating, moreover, financially supportive centre for the existing Islamic educational institutions of varying status. Nevertheless, despite the absence of a coordinating centre, the first Islamic educational institutions appeared in Tatarstan in the 1990s: starting with elementary courses at the mosques (many of them, especially village ones, were called madrasah), specialised secondary schools (Madrasah ‘Tanzilya,’ ‘Yulduz in Naberezhnye Chelny, etc.), and up to advanced ones (Madrasah ‘Muhammadiya,’ Kazan Higher Islamic Madrasah named after the 1,000th anniversary of Islam, etc). Even though there were more than 10 registered Islamic educational institutions, ones actually working were less. Among them were the Kazan Higher Islamic Madrasah ‘Muhammadiya,’ the Kazan Higher Islamic Madrasah named after the 1,000th anniversary of Islam, ‘Yulduz,’ the Madrasah ‘Tanzilya’ for girls in Naberezhnye Chelny. This could not but provoke the concern of the religious community and intelligentsia. During these years more and more publications appeared in the periodical press, regarding the necessity of strengthening and expansion in Tatarstan of the Hanafi madhab, which is traditional for the Volga region. In connection with this, the undertaking by the intelligentsia (with the participation of the clergy) at the beginning of 1998 in attempting to create a Centre for the Study of Traditional Islam is quite understandable. Paradoxical as it may seem, G. Galiulla, while still being a mufti, did not take any serious steps towards the creation of educational institutions, nevertheless, he warned that ‘in the near future I do not exclude even more profound schisms in our environment, and not only on political
The president of Tatarstan Mintimer Shaimiev would take place, thus making it clear that the (or truce, to be more precise) of the clergy, from Tatarstan alone are studying in religious institutions; the Congress repeatedly stated that the Congress elected Gusman Bikchantayev, and deputy of the mufti of the MSB RT Gusman Iskhakov. The Organising Committee prepared a new draft of the charter of the Muslim Spiritual Board of the Republic of Tatarstan, which significantly limited the powers of the mufti and was designed to coordinate the work of permanently functioning structures of religious administration.

The Organising Committee could clearly define the most important aims of the preparation for the Congress: the development of a new version of the charter with a focus on collective work of the Muslim Spiritual Board of the Republic of Tatarstan through the participation of all the Islamic communities of the Republic; the elections for a new mufti and a renewed Plenum.

The Congress was held according to the suggested plan on 14 February 1998. At the Congress there were 718 delegates, 653 of them were the representatives from the 686 officially registered Islamic communities of the republic, 43 muftis from 44 muftis, and representatives of religious educational institutions; the Congress elected Gusman Iskhakov as the new mufti.

At the Congress the president of the Republic of Tatarstan M. Shaimiev named those problems that troubled the muslims of the republic. In connection with this, the issue about the interference of the state in the internal affairs of the Islamic community of Tatarstan was raised in the central and local mass media before and after the Congress. Indeed, the official circles of the republic were interested in holding a Unification Congress and electing a new mufti: the activity of the MSB RT with its insufficiently considered and at times extremely oppositional policy, and the unpredictable action of the mufti G. Galiulla himself worked.
against the political image of Tatarstan. The MSB RT could indeed create new problems, adding to the already existing ones (the preparation of religious ministers, the financial situation of the Islamic communities at the local level, etc).

Speaking at the congress, M. Shaimiev clearly expressed his attitude to the issue of the mutual relations between the state and religion: 'Lately such comments can be heard as 'Why does the government interfere in our religious affairs?'... We are not speaking of interfering, of forcing something to be done, hindering the work of the religious ministers, the governing bodies of muslims, but of collective service to people. While religion is separated from the state, religion and religious organisations are not separated from society' [Vatanym Tatarstan, 17 February 1998].

The Congress indeed became a unifying one. However, some central mass media outlets hastened to announce the deepening of the schism among the clergy of Tatarstan. Russky Telegraph, referring to the opinion of a few 'experts in Islamic studies, wrote that 'the schism has become completely evident, and the Tatar Islam, very politicised... Galiulla is preparing to become the standard bearer of the Tatar nationalists' [Russkij telegraf, 24 February 1998].

After the unifying Congress, the new membership of the MSB RT undertook vigorous measures for turning it into a fully fledged body, governing the muslims of the republic. While G. Galiulla had no permanently functioning structures, except for two or three secretaries, the new mufti considered their establishment as the most important task. The authorities provided the corresponding conditions: an old mansion in the city centre was renovated and assigned as the administration building of the Muslim Spiritual Board of the Republic of Tatarstan. The Russian Islamic University, which opened in September 1998, was also given a large building. In July 1999 the republic's law 'On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations' entered into force. Article 10 stated that 'Islamic religious organisations in the Republic of Tatarstan are represented and governed by one centralised religious organisation—the Muslim Religious Board of the Republic of Tatarstan' [Zakon RT, p. 25]. This law, particularly Article 10, caused great controversy in the republic and beyond. As R. Nabiyev, the chairman of the Council for Religious Affairs under the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Tatarstan, pointed out, 'Many consider us to be in violation of Russian law' [NG-religions, 27 October 1999]. However, he explained that the issue only concerned taking into account 'the desire of Tatar Muslims to create one religious board for the Republic of Tatarstan' 'since Russian legislation, as though intentionally, specifies that three religious communities have the right to establish a centralised religious organisation. And... in each Russian republic two, three, and sometimes more muftiates have been created. There were constant conflicts between them' [NG-religions, 27 October 1999]. What was mainly implied in this case concerned the situation between 1994 and1998 in Tatarstan itself.

Without dwelling on the legal ramifications of the law that had been passed, it can be said that it did in fact contribute to stabilising the situation within the Muslim community, and for that reason the Muslim Spiritual Board of the Republic of Tatarstan fully supported it.

Having gained the authorities' legal backing and political allegiance, the Muslim Religious Board of the Republic of Tatarstan set about resolving its organisational problems. Departments were created for statistics, architecture and construction, education, international affairs, outreach (da'wah), and science. Attempts were made to restore the Ulama Council as a functioning body. Speaking at a conference in October 1999, Mufti G. Ishkakov stated that 'the structure of the Muslim Spiritual Board of Tatarstan has reached the level needed to solve the tasks we face... However, work to create a properly-functioning vertical structure must continue as we cannot work directly with religious communities, of which there are already thousands' [Ishkhai, 1999, p. 3].

Overall, the Muslim Spiritual Board of the Republic of Tatarstan's review of the process of Islamic rebirth in Russian society and its
contemporary issues were based on the understand- ing that it had entered a new phase, one which demanded clarification regarding what their main tasks were, and how they could be resolved. Along with unsolved internal confessional problems, the new phase had revealed another, just as important facet of the process. As Mufti G. Iskhakov pointed out, 'the lack of understanding that exists regarding Islam and its role in the spiritual rehabilitation of Russian society, the ceaseless attempts to turn it into a bugbear for the believers of other confessions—these are reflections of the Islamic revival's unsolved problems. It must be acknowledged that successes in returning Islamic values to the life of society mainly concern those that can be quantified... We must note that at present we do not have at our disposal the necessary intellectual resources to provide convincing evidence of the untapped humanitarian potential of Islam, its place in the history of Russian society, or the regional particularities of Islam' [CA MSB RT, p. 3].

One reason G. Iskhakov gave for his point of view was that 'in essence, the Muslim ummah of the country, with rare exceptions, is still a prisoner of its unattractive and primitive soviet-era public image: Islam as a complex of rituals-cum-dogmas, whose rigorous observation defines the true nature of a Muslim. But what of the meaning and moral weight of these rituals? How have they changed and how are they changing in different regions? How accurate or justified is it to equate the essence of Islam only with these rituals? How can we showcase its powerful intellectual potential accumulated over many centuries? Where exactly is Islam's peace-building mission in evidence today? These any many other questions, unfortunately, remain unanswered. Of course, we must also understand that to destroy the established stereotypes and move on to a new phase in the religious and moral rehabilitation of society will require a re-imagining of the concept of the Islamic revival. It has to be more specific and deal more precisely with the burning issues in our society' [CA MSB RT, p. 3].

The next Congress of the Muslims of the Republic of Tatarstan took place in February 2002. It went smoothly. This was natural as in the four years following the unifying congress of 1998 no serious premise for drastic structural change had arisen. By then Muslim unification had taken place. Both the authorities and the Muslims themselves (who had tired of insert hierarchical structures and hoped that a capable unified Religious Board would emerge) had striven towards this aim. In 1999 unification was reinforced by the republic's law 'On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations,' which legally secured the priorities of the unified Religious Board and removed the possibility of officially registering any parallel Muslim government structures.

The few who opposed the law soon fell by the wayside. Even though the experience the Muslim Religious Board of the Republic of Tatarstan had gained since 1992 was limited, it had taught them a lesson in pragmatism: Contemporary Muslim communities require neither fine slogans nor multifarious religious boards that argue over their interrelationships. What they need is a body that could at least help to resolve their problems in some way.

Among the main problems voiced at the Congress was the issue of financial provision of Muslim communities at a local level and religious organisations in general. According to the Muslim Spiritual Board of the Republic of Tatarstan's calculations, 75 million roubles per year is needed for these purposes. Of course, it does not have this money.

The Religious Board sees a solution in restoring access to the ummah's traditional sources of funding, those that had served for centuries as the main sources of income for Tatar Muslim communities: tithes (gosher), zakat, income from performing religious rites and use of waqf (religious endowment) properties, etc. However, on solving the financial problems, the congress expressed its unanimity mainly by stating their existence.

There was an impression created that many imams still placed their hopes in local authorities, sponsors, and other sources of funding.
There was still no understanding that the current main task at the local level was to establish strong Islamic communities, mahallas, which exist not simply to unite fellow believers but also to become centres for the spiritual rehabilitation of society.

The absence of permanent and reliable sources of finance in Muslim communities in essence deprives them of the opportunity to engage young educated imams. As was mentioned during the congress, only 8% of the 3,000 Muslim clergymen possessed a theological education.

Of course, graduate employment is not the only problem the religious education system faces. It is still at a crossroads today. One might say that the time of thoughtlessly copying the educational standards in Arab countries has passed. Madrasahs are trying to formulate educational models that suit the local conditions. This is quite natural as they must be formulated taking many factors into consideration, while also being based in solid theory. The necessity of this has long been discussed, unfortunately with no success so far. Jadidism and Qadism, as educational systems functioning in the Tatar community, have not been studied at all. It is therefore entirely understandable that the clergy is apprehensive of Jadidism, blaming it for undermining the basis of traditional Islamic society. Many people, not only religious figures, have serious doubts about the prospect of using Jadist traditions to revive Islamic values. Of course, the congress gave no clear instructions in this respect, though it underlined the need to study and to make use of the people’s spiritual heritage.

Others issues of concern to Muslims can be singled out, but these two have proven to be the most major and significant. It is probably for this reason that, in one form or another, they can be found in all of the resulting documents. In ‘Main Lines of Activity of the Muslim Spiritual Board of the Republic of Tatarstan in 2002–2006’ [State Duma of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, 2004] a strategic goal was set: to form a strong community capable of gathering sensible Muslims who have a decent appreciation of the current environment and are active participants in solving society’s vital problems. An issue concerning waqf property, which requires a legal basis to function fully, was raised in the report to the State Duma. A request to support the Islamic University as a scientific methodological and educational centre in the Volga region was addressed to the president of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin.

The next Congress of the Muslims of the Republic of Tatarstan took place in 2006. There were no rows or serious disagreements between minor opposition representatives at the Congress. Taking into account that Muslim society had entered a new phase, that of defining its theological and legal guidelines, there can be no doubt this was a deep-reaching process, of which there were few visible signs. However, most important of all was that action over problems voiced at past congresses was put back to a later date. They were mentioned at the following congress in 2010 and seriously discussed after the resignation of the Mufti G. Iskhakov in 2010.

It was no accident that these became significant events for all Russian Muslims. The resignation of Mufti Gusman hazrat Iskhakov of the Muslim Religious Board of the Republic of Tatarstan at the end of 2010, after being its head for twelve years, and the election of Mufti Ildus hazrat Fäizov were no coincidence.

In drawing conclusions about Gusman Iskhakov’s 12-year tenure, it should be noted that a vertical power structure in the Muslim Spiritual Board of the Republic of Tatarstan was formed. Its effectiveness may require special analysis, but nevertheless, the Muslim Spiritual Board of the Republic of Tatarstan can serve, in a way, as an example to the rest of the religious boards of Russian Muslims. Muhtasibats in all regions of the Republic of Tatarstan, six qadiyats, and an Islamic education system that includes nine educational institutions testify to the formation of an administrative infrastructure. No other Religious Board in Russia has succeeded in creating a similar administrative system. It could be said that Tatarstan took a more serious approach to the problems of institutionalisation and struc-
turing of Islam than other regions. The fact of the matter is that in Islam there is no division between the secular and the religious. This is why Islamic institutions operate in close contact with the power structures in Islamic states. However, as Russia is a secular state according to its constitution, forming institutions is problematic for Muslim communities. The creation of an optimal model, one which is also functional, is undoubtedly very important. It has been created in Tatarstan.

Nevertheless, a year after being unanimously elected Mufti of the Republic of Tarstan, he resigned. This cannot have happened by accident. The most likely reason is that in recent years the Muslim Spiritual Board of the Republic of Tatarstan and the system for governing the Muslim community that had been formed around it with the support of state bodies had been trying independently to implement its own vision of the development of the republic's Muslim community. State government bodies also took a view on this issue as defining strategic goals for the functioning of the Islamic community is a major aspect of confessional policy. In recent years the state and the Muslim Spiritual Board of the Republic of Tatarstan noticeably differed in their views regarding the future functioning of the Islamic community. Moreover, they were officially in disagreement. The key problem in this context proved to be the understanding of the prospects of the Islamic revival in the republic. The Muslim Religious Board of the Republic of Tatarstan viewed the Islamic revival as a process of bringing Islam back into the spiritual life of society, but without emphasising the role of Islam in the revival of spiritual values. The state authorities in turn saw Islam as a tool to build a mature confessional policy, aiming to use it to return traditions and values to society that over many centuries had helped to foster relationships within and between confessions, something which is to be welcomed in a multinational society such as Russia's.

At the initial stage of Islam's reintegration to society, the process of institutionalisation masked the different approaches. However, in recent years complex theological issues, ones requiring a clearly defined position, came to the fore. The Muslim Religious Board of the Republic of Tatarstan could not define its position. To be more precise, it was unable to adjust its operational strategy. Religious experts had long observed the development of the relationship between the republic's state authorities and the Muslim Spiritual Board of the Republic of Tatarstan, noting a cooling in their relations and emphasising the serious underlying reasons. A solution to the disagreement was expected to be found at the next Congress of the Muslims of Tatarstan in 2010. However, the congress only took a half-measure on this issue: a role was created—first deputy to the Mufti of the Muslim Spiritual Board of the Republic of Tatarstan—whose responsibility was to define new directions for the board to move in. This was clearly indicated in president of the Republic of Tatarstan M. Shaimiev's congress speech. He drew attention to the fact that the process of returning traditions to Tatar society has not yet become a factor influencing spiritual consolidation. On the contrary, we see that views of traditions are becoming increasingly polarised. Moreover, the phrase 'Hanafi madhab' is increasingly being used by people as a cover to spread religious ideas that are alien to Tatars, otherwise they would not be able to work in Tatarstan's mosques. It states in the charter of the Muslim Spiritual Board of the Republic of Tatarstan that the republic's Muslims are the followers of the Hanafi madhab. Our clergy must adopt a firm position on this matter. The Muslim Spiritual Board of the Republic of Tatarstan's next term will be key in resolving this' [Shaimiev, 2010 b].

The authorities' harsh critique of the negative aspects of the Muslim Religious Board's activities was voiced by the president: 'Criminal cases against members of radical religious groups and numerous complaints from citizens that imams in districts and towns are not performing rites and sermons in accordance with the traditional rules of our people—these attest to negative developments in Tatarstan's Muslim society. This is becoming quite a seri-
ous problem, and immediate measures are required. The Muslim Religious Board, the mufti, and imam-muhtasibs are the ones who must act in the first instance [Shaimiev, 2010 b].

However, the Muslim Spiritual Board of RT did not make any major conclusions. Mufti G. Ishkakov once again voiced his position regarding graduates of foreign institutes of higher education. In essence, he was countering on them to spread Islamic values: 'Young men who have returned with a madhhab that is alien to us need at least a two to three year rehabilitation period before they can be assigned a post of some kind. However, we should not turn our backs on them, distance them from us, or immediately accuse them of Wahhabism, Salafism, or Sufism. We must work very patiently with them, explaining the postulates and advantages of the Hanafi madhhab—the most moderate, the most tolerant school of thought. It is a delicate matter and should be treated with care and attention so as not to allow any accusations to be made or confrontations to arise. Yes, there are supporters of various organisations banned in Russia (Hizb ut-Tahrir, Tabligh Jamaat), but they are individual cases, and they are not reactionary. Do not confuse terrorism with theological disagreement! If we continue to fight with them, instead of peacefully guiding them to the true path, then relations may become more tense' [Ishkakov, 2010 b].

After the events of November 2010 in Tatarstan's Nurlatsky district, disputes about the accumulated problems became increasingly frank and bitter. An armed group of radical Muslims in the district was eliminated by law-enforcement agencies and special forces.

The Muslim Religious Board of the Republic of Tatarstan adopted a position on the events that was extremely vague but predictable. In the 'Address of the Mufti and chairman of the Muslim Spiritual Board of the Republic of Tatarstan Gusman hazrat Ishkakov to the Muslims of Tatarstan in connection with the events in the republic's Nurlatsky district' it was heavily emphasised that 'recent events in the republic's Nurlatsky district have once again given us serious pause for thought' [Ishkakov, 2010 b]. What was being thought about was not specified, however. Still allusions were made to political forces in the country that 'reject our peace and calm and strive to sow hostility and turmoil amongst us however they can' [Ishkakov, 2010 b]. The conclusion of the address was vague to say the least: 'We should not give in to these provocations! The Muslim ummah has been noticeably damaged as a result of recent events' [Ishkakov, 2010 b].

The conclusions drawn by the authorities were more concrete and clear than those of the Muslim Religious Board of the Republic of Tatarstan. A. Safarov, minister of the interior of the Republic of Tatarstan, declared that 'With regret, it must be acknowledged that the republic is in danger of being infiltrated by a different, unnecessary, and to put it mildly, extremist ideology. The first attempt to infiltrate Tatarstan was made in the 1990s, in the guise of religious figures. You remember the notorious madrasah Joldy'z... Nowadays the process is different. Groups of followers of the so-called Salafi movement (Wahhabists) are especially active. Unlike usual organised criminal organisations, they have no concept of being in conflict with rival groups: they are united and support each other' [Safarov, 2011].

M. Gallyamov, director of the MIA for Counter-Extremism in the Republic of Tatarstan, also emphasised that 'Salafism has been much talked about of late. In our opinion, this movement represents the greatest threat to the republic's stability. The events in the Nurlat district, the elimination of the armed group... showed that the situation is not simple. We knew this previously and have worked on it... but perhaps we have not been active enough in engaging the general public to warn them of such expressions of religious extremism. Religious community representatives would sometimes say to our staff: 'Why are you making a fuss? We are fine. You are acting in other parties' interests.' Other reputable figures supported them, convincing us not to make a fuss because 'it could harm the republic's reputation.' We have been working without compromise in our field, uncovering plotters and averting imminent crimes. How-
ever, with regard to creating an attitude of intolerance to such things in society, I admit that we have not been very active. Management of public opinion is not one of our objectives' [Regnum, 2012].

The problem of theological disagreement in Russian Muslim society has objective causes. They originated not only in the early 1990s but possibly earlier.

One of the causes of the theological disagreements is easy to see. In the early 1990s young people, who were gradually returning to live in Russia, travelled abroad to acquire a religious education. There is no doubt that they grew up in totally different traditions. The young people who returned were perhaps true Muslims. However, they went abroad immediately after school, having no religious background. They were re-educated from scratch in that environment, believing that they had been taught the basics of true Islam. Young people like these can be found all over Russia today. They are practically the most highly-educated section of the Muslim clergy. The other side of this problem is that if in the 1990s there were complaints about a negative external influence, today the influence is an internal problem. Foreign Islamic charitable foundations and academics from other countries hardly do any work in Russia today. However, many young people who studied in religious institutions have returned from abroad. Young Russians educated in Islamic countries are the bearers of the same ideology that the Arabs once used to spread. Representing the most educated part of the Muslim community, this group of the Muslim clergy has more influence on young people than the less numerous adherents of the Hanafi tradition. In society there is an understanding that reviving these traditions is the major task today, and that it requires significant intellectual and theological efforts. However, today's Islamic community has not yet fully comprehended the deeper essence of the Hanafi madhab theological traditions. Perhaps this is linked to the fact that there is virtually no Islamic intelligentsia capable of discussing serious theological matters.

Nevertheless, some publications that have appeared in recent years make it possible to assert that research regarding Islam's future in Russian society has risen to a new level. The euphoria, which was quite natural for the first years of religious renewal, is gradually giving way to serious considerations about the essence of the form of Islam that is needed by Muslims and, most of all, Tatars. Differing and occasionally opposite points of view are expressed. This is quite natural because no single society (not only Muslim ones) has ever been unanimous about how religion should manifest itself, where it should be applied, or how it should develop in future.

Disputes between representatives of Qadism and Jadidism unfolded in Tatar society in the 19 and the beginning of the 20th centuries. But today the situation here is far more complicated. Before the beginning of the 20th century the disputes took place amongst the Islamic intelligentsia, who analysed the proceedings from within and from the point of view of Islam. Therefore, there was much in common between its various groups, even between ideological opponents. But the Tatar intelligentsia today is ideologically more diverse and mostly secular, so the attitude to Islam and to developments around it is, in essence, an outsider's perspective. This undoubtedly has a negative effect on the disputes because it gives many opportunities to create artificial concepts, which have an internal logic but do not always take into account the peculiarities of the dogmatic and ceremonial part of Islam.

Nevertheless, the appearance not only of discrete ideas but also of whole concepts about the paths of Islam's development in Tatar society is, of course, a timely and positive phenomenon. They create a specific intellectual environment, where heated arguments and a search for the essence of Islam and for optimal forms of its implementation and use in Tatar society take place.

That is why theological disagreements amongst the Muslims of Tatarstan originate from the current difficult situation in Islamic society. The situation is complicated by the
fact that the spread of theological ideas un-
characteristic of the Tatars has a somewhat
ambiguous nature. Complex aspects of world
views are hidden by a single cover of law:
following the Islamic legal principles of the
Hanafi madhab, some Muslims adhere to to-
tally different world views. Therefore, among
Muslims declaring themselves Hanafis, many
are against majlis on certain dates, visiting an-
cient Bolgar sites, etc.

The results of these disagreements, unfortu-
nately, reach far beyond strictly theological
disputes. Today theology with various ap-
proaches is an effective tool in raising Mus-
lim youth in Islamic educational institutions,
mosques, and different official and informal
clubs.

The complexity and ambiguity of the situ-
ation in the region lies in the fact that radicali-
sation takes place at the level of changes to
the ceremonial structure. These changes are
presented to an unprepared person, not well-
formed about the specifics of the ceremonial
structure, as a return to the fold of true Islam.

Since radicalisation mainly occurs only
within the confines of theological concepts,
government bodies had no serious grounds for
taking any measures regarding these commu-
nities. Official Islamic institutions represented
by the religious boards also do not deal with
this problem on a practical level. They them-

selves are far from the Islamic values tradi-
tional for Russian Muslims. They associate
the 'export' of theological traditions alien for
Russian Muslims with religious values, which
have been formed in a full-fledged Muslim
society and therefore capable of being a form
of an Islamic revival. Being separated from
centuries-old theological traditions of Russian
Muslims, the main body of modern Muslim
leaders cannot evaluate foreign traditions criti-
cally because they do not know what other val-
ues to rely on.

It is no coincidence that the election of the
new mufti in Tatarstan in 2011 was called a
milestone. A new team came to the manage-
ment of the Republic of Tatarstan's Muslim
Spiritual Board, which understands the need
for cardinal changes in the conception of theo-
logical traditions. Only time will tell whether
these changes will become a new stage in the
Islamic revival in Russia.

§ 4. The Transformation of the Tatar Holiday Culture
in the Post–Soviet Period

Raufa Urazmanova

The calendar of holidays was changed af-
ter the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The
modern holiday calendar in Tatarstan differs
slightly from the Russian national calendar
due to additional holidays related to landmark
sociopolitical events in the republic. They
commemorate the adoption of Tatarstan's con-
stitution (6 November) and the proclamation
of sovereignty (30 August, Republic Day). In
addition, the Islamic festival of Eid al-Adha
was declared a public holiday alongside the
federal Christmas holiday (7 January). Since
2011 the second most important Islamic fes-
tival—Eid al-Fitr, which marks the end of the
fasting month of Ramadan—has also been a
public holiday, as in Russia's other Muslim
republics. Due to the structure of the Islamic
calendar, these holidays' dates are announced
every year. For Tatars who since time imme-
orial have been concentrated in the Russian
regions outside of Tatarstan between the Oka
and Sura Rivers, in the Middle Urals, and in
Western Siberia the holidays have not become
official.

Some 'red calendar' holidays remain wide-
ly celebrated and loved, particularly New
Year's Day and International Women's Day (8
March). However, the scale of the celebration
of the latter is more modest. Mainly, it is a day
off, as a rule, with presents for women and cel-
brations both at work and at home.

The form of celebration and the scale of
all other holidays established ('presented') by
the state depend on the organisers as well as
on financing from local authorities. Especially spectacular can be Republic Day, with celebrations not only in Kazan but also in other cities in Tatarstan. It is the spectacle of the festivities—decorations at the venues, the participation of famous performers (professionals and amateurs), demonstration events by athletes, children’s playgrounds, many shopping areas—that attracts thousands of local residents and visitors.

In the post–Soviet period the multicultural and integrating character of the summer festival of Sabantuy has become more evident: the holiday has become an ethnic representation of Tatars both within and outside Russia.

With the establishment of an active World-wide Tatar Congress (WTC), whose administrative centre is in Kazan, much work is being carried out about to broaden connections between Tatars in Tatarstan and Tatars from different regions of Russia and outside the country, including connections in the field of culture. V. Tishkov called this work ‘a political project of ‘the Tatar diaspora’ beyond the borders of the associated republic,’ acknowledging that the project has a sound foundation because modern Tatarstan is the main centre of Tatar culture supported by the republic’s autonomy. [Tishkov, 2003 b, p. 438]

Its legal foundation was the Agreement on Cultural, Economic, and Scientific Cooperation signed on 4 June 1999 by Tatarstan’s Cabinet of Ministers, the WTC’s executive committee, and the Council for the Federal National Cultural Autonomy of Russian Tatars (FNCAT). The ties connecting the Republic of Tatarstan with regions where the Tatar population is concentrated were formalised on this legal basis. This process was strengthened and consolidated in 2002 when Article 14 ‘On Assistance of the Republic of Tatarstan to Tatars Living Outwith the Republic’ was added to the Tatarstan constitution. Work pertaining to the participation of representatives of the Republic in organising and conducting the Sabantuy festival proved to be the most productive.

Training courses for the festival’s organisers and directors were launched in Kazan, which have been attended by representatives of Tatar communities. For example, in 2006, 168 people attended these courses, coming from 112 regions and cities in 42 territories of the Russian Federation and also from two cities in Turkey and Kazakhstan, respectively.

Since 2002, by a resolution of the Republic of Tatarstan’s government, a schedule of visits to Sabantuy celebrations in different regions of Russia has been created for delegations from Tatarstan. In 2005 the schedule included 59 regions, to 57 of which delegations were sent. The delegations include—alongside officials from the Executive Office of the president of Tatarstan, the Cabinet of Ministers, deputies of the State Council, and representatives of leading district administrations—amateur artists, athletes, winners of different Sabantuy competitions, and often famous performers. As a rule, the participants assume the greater part of the trip’s expenses.

Directors of national and cultural authorities and of WTC branches are local organisers, and Sabantuy is held there as a regional event. Along with regional Sabantuy celebrations, a federal Sabantuy has been held annually since 2001, an initiative of the FNKAT Council. The first federal Sabantuy was held in Saratov, then in Tolyatti in the Samara oblast; Dimitrovgrad in the Ulyanovsk oblast; in Yoshkar-Ola, the capital of the Republic of Mari El; in Nizhny Novgorod; in Saransk, Republic of Mordovia; Chelyabinsk; Astrakhan; Ulyanovsk; and in 2010 in Izhevsk, Udmurtia.

The very description ‘federal’ testifies to the increasing scale of participation. Delegations from eight Russian territories (the Ulyanovsk, Samara, Saratov, Orenburg, and Volgograd oblasts, the republics of Mordovia and Mari El, and the Khanty-Mansi autonomous district) took part in the second federal Sabantuy in 2002 in Tolyatti, which was celebrating its 265th anniversary. [Sharafutdinov, 2004, p. 315]. In the federal festival held in Ulyanovsk in 2009 the participating territories numbered more than 50, including Karelia, Chuvashia, Republic of Mordovia, Buryatia, the Komi Republic, and the regions of Irkutsk,
Arkhangelsk, Nizhny Novgorod, Ryazan, Che- 
lyabinsk, Kaluga, Volgograd, Krasnodar, Perm, 
and Sakhalin, among others [Mädäni cemga, 
10 July 2009]. This is a vivid testimony of the 
rising interest in Sabantuy on the part of Tatars 
dispersed by the hand of fate over all Russia, 
as well as on the part of regional leaders. Many 
not only actively help and support the festival 
but also participate themselves.

Evidence of the true popular character of 
Sabantuy is the fact that after the weakening 
of the governing (Party) bodies in the post–So- 
viet period, it was revived on residents’ initia- 
tive in the villages where it had ceased to be 
celebrated for various reasons [Urazmanova, 
1984, p. 66; Sharafutdinov, 2004, p. 273]. 
Additionally, celebrations of Sabantuy both 
in far-flung Russian regions and in foreign 
countries confirm this idea of its existence. 
For example, according to WTC data, in 2007 
Sabantuy celebrations occurred in 18 different 
countries. Local residents and representatives 
of different Muslim communities take part in 
the festival along with Tatars, learning about 
the spiritual heritage of the Tatar people [Za- 
kirov, 2009].

Sabantuy remains an active manifesta- 
tion of Tatar ethnic culture. It is an effective 
mechanism for bringing up youth, maintaining 
ethnic identity in a modern world subject to 
globalisation, which has already touched and 
transformed many sides of Tatar life; a mechani- 
sm for the intergenerational transmission of 
ethnic culture. Not without reason do regional 
delegation members, many of whom grew up 
in a non-ethnic environment, note that this 
participation, for them, is not only a way to 
meet and develop relationships with their fel- 
low Tatars but to gain experience in holding 
the festival [Fâxretdinova, 2009]. The mod- 
ern Sabantuy is also an effective mechanism 
(a means and a way!) to bring Tatars together 
on a district and regional level—and finally in 
Russian Federation as a whole. No less impor- 
tant is the fact that Sabantuy is a unique way of 
presenting Tatar culture to other peoples.

Making the Islamic festival of Eid al-Adha 
an official holiday at a time when there were 
practically no functioning mosques—places 
where the festival could culminate in ceremo- 
nial services—and no clergy as such could 
not immediately change the situation in Tatar 
festival culture that had existed in the Soviet 
period. Nevertheless, it was accepted with en- 
thusiasm, especially among the creative intel- 
ligentsia and the numerous ‘fighters for na- 
tional freedom.’ The creative intelligentsia became 
the pioneer in finding ways to revive interest 
in significant dates of the Islamic calendar, as 
in specific, distinctive elements of Tatar ethnic 
culture and of their emotional enrichment. An 
aspiration arose to take the holidays out of the 
short framework of domestic celebrations— 
the Quranic majalis—and give them public 
 exposure.

The first decade of the post–Soviet pe- 
period was characterised by the appearance of 
‘Evenings of Munajats’ in the concert halls of 
Kazan and in the circus arena, with the par- 
ticipation of famous professional Tatar singers 
and performers. These concerts attracted the 
public’s attention by their novelty and unusual 
character. 

New ‘shows for the masses,’ with an Is- 
lamic flavour, began to appear, performed at 
Kazan Central Stadium. A grand staging of the 
mystery play ‘The Dastan of Ancient Bolgar— 
Mahdi’ was performed before an audience of 
thousands on 22 August 1989 and dedicated 
to the 1,100th anniversary of the adoption of 
Islam by Volga Bulgaria. The music and script 
were written by M. Shamsutdinova, the direc- 
tor and producer was D. Sirazeev, and the solo- 
ist was A. Asadullin from Leningrad.

A concert by the popular folk singer Il- 
ham Shakirov, which took place on a Friday 
(a festive day for Muslims!) in the summer of 
1990, started with a sermon and greetings for 
the approaching festival of Eid al-Adha. More 
than 25,000 people were at the stadium for the 
concert [Socialistic Tatarstan, 3 July 1990]. 
This was a new development, not previously 
allowed.

The unusual nature of such events also lay 
in the fact that it gathered a monoethic au- 
dience—only Tatars, as a rule, who exhibited 
their national identity with elements of their 
national (Tatar-Islamic) costume: it became
fashionable for men to wear the tyubeteika, while women were dressed in colourful conservative clothing covered with headscarves, scarves, and shawls, often brought from Turkey and Arab countries since it was a time of active 'shuttle trading.'

People attempted to organise special concerts dedicated to specific Islamic festivals, which also intended to intensify the festivals' emotional impact. The Tatarstan State Music and Dance Ensemble (artistic director Lima Kustabayeva) prepared a special show, 'Eid al-Adha' (music by Masguda Shamsutdinova), where, by using artistic means, including a light show by Bulat Galeev, the creators tried to show the festival's essence, an appeal to beneficence, and its universal significance. The show was timed to coincide with the first World Congress of the Tatars, which in its turn coincided with the holiday itself. The show's second part was dedicated to demonstrating Tatars' place in the Turkic world. The concert took place in the Palace of Sports and received the sincere appreciation of thousands of spectators, among which were the congress delegates who had come from many regions of Russia and other countries. According to Kustabayeva, the ensemble receive an official message of thanks from the administration of the Tatarstan Muslim Religious Board. Gali Akkesh, a famous Tatar public figure living in Germany, attended the concert and not only gave a high appreciation but particularly stressed that it was the first time he had seen anything like it in either the Turkic or Islamic world. However, Kustabayeva's sincere desire to continue work in that direction was cut short by the Tatarstan Culture Ministry, which explained the prohibition due to state secularism.

The K. Tinchurin Tatar Theatre of Drama and Comedy was sold out when the administration of the Islamic cultural youth centre Iman organised a celebration of one of the significant dates of the Islamic calendar, Mi'raj.


In the countryside an opening of a mosque would be a celebration not only for the residents of the village but for the whole local area. One could talk about the creation of a ritual. The opening of a mosque was a reason and chance for aul residents of all ages and their guests—relatives and friends from neighbouring villages—to dress well and to gather around the mosque. It was also an opportunity to demonstrate one's generosity, when a special energy was displayed by natives of an aul who had managed to establish their lives in another place. Along with invited representatives from the Muslim Religious Board, secular officials also took part in the festivities of an official opening, presenting gifts for the mosque appropriate for the occasion—carpets, books, etc.

The sounds of a professional reading and performance of separate surahs of the Quran amplified by a loudspeaker, collective salat, frequently a special offering (kurban chalu), and collective treats for the participants—an unusual occurrence—leave nobody indifferent and go deep into the souls of all participants.

Tatarstan press started to publish information prepared by local journalists about times and dates, the essence of significant events of the Islamic calendar, articles on festivities dedicated to the laying of a foundation, or more often to the opening of a new mosque in an aul, a village, a district centre, or a town not only in Tatarstan but also in regions of Russia with a Tatar population.

Special programmes on religious topics appeared on the radio and television. The creators of these programmes were those same secular journalists, many of whom were among the first to attend courses on the fundamentals of Islam at mosques, together with teachers, doctors, and creative professionals. These believers came to the mosque on a massive scale not
because of someone's sermon or missionary activities but in search of a new identity and a new system of world views and values, instead of the discredited socialistic ones,’ V. Yakupov noted impartially [Yakupov, 2005, p. 32].

Since 1994 a unique calendar called the 'Tatar möselman kalendäre' has been published, featuring profoundly religious topics: indicating significant holy days and describing their specifics; giving month names in Arabic; showing dates in Hegira (AH); prescribing the exact times for daily salat for every month, etc.; along with articles regarding literature and art and character sketches of prominent cultural figures. The authors and publishers of the calendar are the husband-and-wife team of journalists Sh. Zabirov and F. Khuzakhmetova. Later calendars, having only specific Islamic editions prepared by clergies, began to be published in the Tatar language, particularly 'Dini kalendäre' by Farid Salman, 'Möselman kalendäre' by Valiulla Yakupov, and others. Interestingly, the first publishing company specialising in Islamic literature in Cyrillic in post–Soviet Tatarstan was Iman, established in 1990 and founded by Yakupov, the head of the Iman Islamic cultural youth centre and later one of the deputies of the mufti of Tatarstan.

At that time the celebration of Eid al-Adha, particularly in Kazan, was not confined to ceremonies in mosques where men took part. The feast turned into rallies and demonstrations in squares, where Allah and the Prophet Muhammad were praised not only by believers but also those inspired by new opportunities to demonstrate their national feelings. A festive atmosphere was established with accompanying features, such as a market and performances by artists and amateur talent groups.

By the end of the second decade of the post–Soviet period, also the first in the 21st century, both of the major Islamic holidays have become significant events in the life of Tatar society. These holidays are recognised throughout Russia particularly thanks to live coverage of public worship services by Russian TV channels from the cathedral mosques in Moscow and Ufa. The satellite TV channel Tatarstan — New Age (TNA) offers the chance for anyone who wants to watch online the services in the Kul Sharif Mosque in the grounds of the Kazan Kremlin. In 2011 they took place in the Marjani Mosque.

Currently the development of a Muslim subculture as a part of Tatar spiritual culture is flourishing, a vivid expression of which is the widely celebrated holidays and holy dates of the Islamic calendar. The driving force of this subculture is the ever-increasingly active and multidisciplinary work of the numerous re-emerging mosques and Muslim administrative structures.

The work of mosques organizing a month of fasting for Ramadan has become a new significant event in the life of the Tatar society. It is becoming a tradition, especially in urban mosques, to have an evening supper (or the first meal after fast), which is now more often called by the Arabic word 'iftar'. And if ten years ago iftars were one-time events, now there are many mosques where they are held every evening during the month of fasting and not only in the cities of Tatarstan. For example, over the last years, having iftars organized by the mosque and held every evening on behalf of (and funded by) certain residents has become a tradition in the town of Mozhga in the Udmurt Republic, with its relatively small Tatar population. Relatives and friends of these residents, along with everyone interested, are invited to the meal. The programme of iftar events is prearranged, sometimes they can be held on behalf of two or three benefactors at the same time. There are special structures in mosques organizing and serving these supper parties under Halal rules. On 26 August 2011 for the first time in Tatarstan, the first republican iftar 'Ramadan 2011' was held in one of the central squares of Kazan, namely Millennium Square, by means of the Muslim Spiritual Board of Tatarstan in cooperation with the Presidential Administration of the Republic of Tatarstan, Kazan authorities, and the Association of Muslim Entrepreneurs. Lower-income families were invited to this iftar. Political, public and religious figures, along with more than 1,000 people, were there. [Halyal’ gid, 2011, September, No. 6 (08)].
The so-called aviz açtıru remains a home dinner party in the countryside, although there people began occasionally to organize iftars in mosques as well. As a rule, they happen when money is sent specifically for this purpose by certain descendants from villages has been received.

The number of people who offer a sacrifice (Korban çalu) on the date of another important holiday in Islam, called Kurban Bayram, has increased dramatically.

The new trend is the arrangement for a collective festive meal in mosques, called Korban aşı. Meat and other products donated by private individuals are used to prepare the meal.

Some work is being done to mainstream one of the most significant holy dates of the Islamic calendar, namely mawlid, the celebration of Muhammad’s birthday. According to communicants, the hosting of a dinner party, on this occasion at home, that had been typical for the second half of the 20th century, vanished into thin air in the post-Soviet period. One of the reasons for this is found in the fact that the generation of women who knew the essence and the legend of the holiday and histories about the Prophet, such as mărhabā, salavats, mawlids, and so forth, had passed away. At the same time, it has become one of the most important and widely-commemorated events in the practice of mosques, where people began to organize celebrations involving children attending Sunday schools, popularly called madrasah, to learn the basics of Islam. The festive atmosphere is created by the presence of mothers and grandmothers, dressed in appropriate costumes (dresses, kerchiefs, etc.). The main points of the action are short stories about the Prophet, demonstrations of acquired knowledge by children, who are inspired by not only the approval of the attendees but also small gifts which they receive for their skills. A festive dinner is often arranged with packages of treats gifted at the end of the event. In such cases, the initiators and organizers are women who are working as teachers on a voluntary basis in these madrasahs. As a rule, they are pensioners — former doctors, teachers or journalists — who had received systematic knowledge of the basics of Islam at madrasahs opened in the premises of mosques during the 1990s.

In addition, for several years the G. Tukay Tatar State Philharmonic Halls and Culture Palace 'Saydash' in Kazan hold holiday parties, which are scheduled by specialists, on the occasions of Kurban Bayram and Mawlid, with funding from the well-off. The religious clerics as well as professional artists and members of amateur groups take part in the concert program. The performances have breaks to conduct regular namaz in time, in which everyone interested can participate. Holding these evenings is also a new thing in the social life of Tatarstan.

The activity of new cultural intermediaries, who not only support Muslim subculture but also contribute to its expansion and make it more stable and productively functioning, has emerged, and it is becoming widespread. Those are special print media, such as the Din va məgyuşat, 'Umma', published by the MSBR T, and the Russian-language newspaper of Muslims, 'Medina', that has been published since 2004 with the assistance of the Fund for the Support of Islamic Culture, Science and Education. There is also a diversified infrastructure for serving this subculture, including the service sector offering assistance in organizing and conducting Muslim ceremonies and holidays. The advent of vocal groups, which present themselves as Muslim ones, such as 'Medina' (Moscow), 'Raiyan' (Kazan), and others, consisting of professional musicians, is a landmark.

A unique phenomenon has emerged in the culture of the Tatar world, which is a folk holiday based on a symbiosis of religious and civil features. It grew up in the forefront of people's historical memory maintenance as a result of aggravation on the ethnocultural identification issue, which has finally achieved the recognition of its religious component. In the summer of 1989, thousands of Tatars from different regions of Russia, having travelled a long way, for the first time crowded simultaneously in the territory of the Bulgar State Historical
and Architectural Reserve (BSHAR) to com-
memorate the 1100th anniversary of the of-
official adoption of Islam by Volga Bulgaria. It
was an initiative of the MSBPS of European
part of Russia and personally of its mufti, T.
Tadzhutdin.

Starting from this year, T. Tadzhutdin con-
tinues to gather Muslims annually in June,
coming here under the command of muftis and
imams, who have retained their submission to
the MSBPS and later, the CMSB. The cere-
mony of this holiday has gradually formed. The
sermon (‘vägaz’) remains the main part dedi-
cated to historical memory, which was denomi-
nated by the term ‘Täübä’, and the venue is the
territory near the Small Minaret. The highlight
of the ceremony is a collective midday namaz
in situ of the Cathedral mosque foundation,
that makes an indelible impression on the au-
dience, not least of all by its mass.

One of the Russian village streets turns into a
real fair, where not only Islamic parapherna-
lia (tasbihs, prayer rugs, religious books, rous-
ans, Tatar skull-caps, gowns, etc.) are sold but
also other consumer goods, foods, including
horse meat sausages ‘Kazylyk’ brought from
Tatar villages of Republic of Mordovia, Penza
oblast, Nizhny Novgorod oblast, as well as chak-chak and others.

The executive committee of the World
Congress of the Tatars took the lead in Is-
lamic reunification. Upon its initiative in 2006,
the Russia’s Mufti Council and the MSB RT,
along with the CMSB, became participants in
this holiday. Congress undertook the arrange-
ment of a cultural programme, and by doing so,
it made significant changes not only in the
external form of the event but in its essence.
The number of participants has increased. Lo-
cal organizers become not only muftis but also
heads of Tatar, sometimes Tatar and Bashkir,
cultural community centres from various re-
gions of Russia. It is treated not only as the
integration of Tatars into the world Muslim
ummah but as the long-awaited unification, a
concerted action of all muftiates in favour of
the Tatars.

20 years later, in 2009, the official open-
ing of the holiday — a representative greeting
on behalf of the President and the Government
of Tatarstan, the World Congress of Tatars, the
regional authorities, representatives of the re-
gions, etc. — was added to the ceremony of
the holiday.

Not only the persistence of CMSB leaders,
and most importantly, the annual participa-
tion of ordinary folks wanting it wholeheartedly,
the assistance of Congress of Tatars and other
muftiats in its organization, the regularity of
its observance make it possible to assert the
traditionalization of the holiday. There has
been a rethinking of not only goals but also
the essence of visiting holy places, that have
been typical of all the Turkic Islamic world for
centuries.

The names of certain holy men and ob-
jects of holiness, in this case, were replaced
by broader term ‘ İzge Bulgar’, which can mean
both ‘holy’ and ‘sacred’ — the name of a partic-
ular place and a reminder of the Tatar people’s
ancestors’ history. Often, the word dzhien,
which has a number of meanings, is added
to the title of the holiday (for example, İzge
Bulgar ceni). It can mean an ancient public
institution of kinship, national holiday of the
Kazan Tatars, people’s gathering or meeting,
people of the same blood, and a community.
The uniqueness of this holiday is emphasised
even by the ‘specialisation’ of the fair, ar-
ranged on this day, where people from many
regions of Russia come with their goods. The
main thing is an opportunity that has emerged
to join with this land, the history of the Tatar
people, and its spiritual culture through reli-
gion [Urazmanova, 2010, pp. 69–83].

The family and household rituals are also
transforming. The wedding rituals of the Ta-
tars continue to evolve the phenomena that
have become prevalent in recent years. First
and foremost is the search for new forms of
ritual, or, more precisely, certain actions high-
lighting the unusual, uncommon, and special
festeve features of the wedding ceremony. It
is promoted by the dynamism of the emerg-
ing organisations, offering their services to or-
organise and hold not only the highlight of the
event, the wedding itself (a feast, a banquet,
an entertainment), but also the preceding ac-
tions, including those associated with the official registration of marriage, creating a special package (depending on the customer preferences), decorations, symbols, background music, taking special photos as mementos, video, etc. This phenomenon is mainly urban, and it is all-Russian rather than uniquely Tatar. Moreover, it is becoming popular in urban areas to conduct nikah in a mosque, and a wedding reception is then held in one of the halal cafes and restaurants.

In the last years of the Soviet period, it took a day or two, a week at most, to carry out a nikah before the official registration of marriage, but now the time gap can be longer.

The emergence of Muslim weddings, whose main features are being alcohol-free and having a halal meal, has become a new phenomenon. It combines religious ceremonies, which are led by an invited cleric from a mosque — imam (mullah), — with the wedding reception hosted by a professional organiser and musicians for a wide range of relatives, friends of the older and young generations, married couples, and youths. The initiators of this wedding, as a rule, are the young couples themselves, who have become practising Muslims. The holding of a religious ceremony of naming has become more widespread. It is becoming more diverse in terms of types of venue and the number of participants in the ritual. The prevailing traditional form is to hold isem kushu at home a few days after the return of a new mother from a birthing home. An official mullah, or 'baba', from a mosque is invited to the ceremony; it concludes with the festive dinner in which relatives and neighbours, as a rule, of both sexes (male and female) take part, and they bring a present and some kind of meal, according to the tradition.

Hosting this ceremony in a mosque, where the child's parents receive its Islamic birth certificate, is gaining popularity in cities.

The ongoing transformation processes in the sphere of funeral and memorial rites are primarily connected with the increased activity of legal religious structures and their ministers and are aimed mainly at the Islamic education of the people. It is leading to an even greater harmonisation of Tatar funeral and memorial rites. On the one hand, the sacredness of the elements of folk ritual actions and their necessity, along with the strict order of their execution, which beforehand was quite consistently maintained in some regions of the countryside, are loosening. In particular, the use of certain indulgences (yavaplama, cavapnâmä), written in Arabic type on a piece of paper and called 'correct answers of a Muslim' for the test in front of special angels (sööl fâreštâlâre) who visit the grave of the deceased immediately af-
ter the burial, which were put in the garments of the dead. It also includes a ritual däver sözü, däver itü: a walk around the deceased, praying and for this receiving from their family a small amount of grain (rye, wheat) — börtkele äüber — in the remission of the sins of the deceased. On the other hand, there is a rejection of the Soviet innovations, such as burial in a coffin, burial cloths, and participation of a wind orchestra in the funeral. In other words, it has just about happened. Nowadays, we hear more frequently that the women in villages ceased to visit the graves of relatives and the cemetery in general. Once again it is perceived and treated as being a taboo for them. The attempts of certain imams, who, as a rule, obtained their religious education in Arab countries, to list funeral rites as sinful innovation — bidgat — have failed. It is the combination of the funeral rites and commemoration that is still perceived by the believers as a Muslim and by the others as Tatar one.

§ 5. The science Development Priorities in the Republic of Tatarstan

Akhmet Mazgarov

Science has long-standing and rich history in our republic. Kazan has traditionally been famous as a centre of education and science. The city has survived in the historical memory of people as being the capital of the powerful Kazan Khanate, where numerous madrasahs and well-stocked libraries were located. In subsequent eras, the Tatars has always lived in the hope of a revival of ancient glories in the scientific and cultural spheres. In the latter half of the 19th century, prominent scholars S. Mardjani, R. Fakhretdinov, K. Nasyri, H. Faizkhanov, and others informed the Islamic world through their works that there is still a Muslim component in Russian science. They set the stage for the accelerated development of Tatar culture at the beginning of the 20th century. The foundation of Kazan University contributed to the emergence of internationally acclaimed mathematical, chemical, astronomical, physical, and oriental schools. The international scientific reputation attracted scientists, such as the brilliant mathematician N. Lobachevsky; V. Engelgardt, who built and presented the Observatory to the Kazan University; an expert in Arab studies, the founder of Eastern Numismatics in Russia, C. Fren; a turcologist, A. Kazem-Beg; a founder of the linguistic school, J. Baudouin de Courtenay; a chemist, K. Klaus, and many others. Over the entire period until 1917, there were 19 academicians and 43 honorary members in the Russian Academy of Sciences, from Kazan.

The Society of Archeology, History and Ethnography, founded in 1878 at Kazan University, undertook the role of being a specific coordinator on knowledge of the humanities.

Under new social and political circumstances, a number of scientific fields were further developed in the Tatar ASSR. By the end of the 1920s, the republic came close to developing its own Academy of Sciences. The Academic Centre at the People's Commissariat of Tatarstan, which is responsible for coordinating scientific research, creating research structures, writing monographs, textbooks, and training scientific personnel, played a major role in this process.

Such scientists as A. Arbuzov, N. Parfentyev, N. Chetaev, A. Aminov, H. Mushtari, G. Kamay, N. Chebotaryov, and others have achieved great success in the fields of physics, mathematics, and chemistry. Following Professor Chebotaryov's initiative, since 1929 a group of Kazan mathematicians and engineers had been working on stability theory, which was of great practical importance when addressing the issues of engineering airplanes and high speed trains. By the end of the 1930s, the Kazan School of mathematics and mechanics dealt with scientific defense-related challenges.
In the 1920s, A. Arbuzov's laboratory developed the methods for the synthesis of phosphorus and carboxylic acids, creating esters of diphosphoric acid, as well as being the first to isolate subphosphoric and pyrophosphoric acids. As a result of these discoveries, the republic became the centre of studies on organophosphorus compounds.

At the end of the 1920s, the Physiology Department of the Kazan University, led by Professor A. Samoylov, became internationally recognised. In terms of accuracy and precision in the detection of electric currents through an organism, this laboratory not only ranked first in the USSR, but also it had an opportunity to compete with similar foreign institutions.

The foundation of the Tatar ASSR stimulated the development of local history research, contributed to the expansion of their topics, training specialists, provided by the Kazan University, Eastern Pedagogical Institute, and the Tatar Communist University. In 1925, the Scientific Organisation of Tatar Studies was created, whose goal was 'to unite persons who work on the comprehensive scientific study of Tatars and Tatar culture...'. The formidable piece of scientific and organisational work was carried out by the chairman of the community and a professor of the Kazan University, N. Firsov, and his deputy G. Ibragimov. M. Khudyakov, E. Chernyshev, and G. Rakhim were involved in capacity of secretary over different years. The publications on local history were given particular emphasis in the periodical publication 'The Bulletin of the Scientific Organisation of Tatar Studies'. The 3rd issue of the 'Bulletin of the Scientific Organisation of Tatar Studies', dedicated to the 5th anniversary of the Tatar ASSR, had a selection of documents from 'The materials and documents on the national question and the organisation of the Republic of Tatarstan' that marked the beginning of the documentary development over the TASSR's foundation history.

At the end of the 1920s, the study of local history was refocused. By the decision of the TASSR Council of People's Commissars, it was decided to establish the Scientific Society of Tatar Studies, the purpose of which was 'the comprehensive study of Tatarstan, that is, of its nature, population, way of life, history, culture, and the productive forces', which meant localisation of Tatar studies within the borders of the Autonomous Republic. Based on the Scientific Organisation of Tatar Studies, it united 98 scientists, including 14 honorary members, 74 full-fledged members, and 10 employees, maintaining close ties with more than 120 scientific institutions within the USSR. Being an equivalent of the Tatarstan Academy of Sciences, the Society ceased to exist in 1931, when it was integrated into the Tatar Scientific Research Institute.

The 1920s became a time of high achievements in the humanities. Regarding the field of history, the study of the Tatar medieval history was intensified. Monographs such as 'Essays on the history of the Kazan Khanate' by M. Khudyakov and 'Revisiting the origin of Volga–Kama Bulgars' by V. Smolin were released. Thanks to the works and research of F. Balodis, the question of revising the established views on the Golden Horde as a nomadic and barbaric state was raised. Major works in the sphere of Turko-Tatar literature written by G. Rakhim, G. Gubaydullin, and G. Sagdi evolved into the concept of Turko-Tatar culture study in general and became the basis for the development of the cultural history of the Turkic peoples in Russia.

However, the resolutions of the Central Committee of CPSU(B) on the journals 'Under the banner of Marxism' (January 1931) and 'About the work of the Communist Academy' (March 1931) put social sciences under the strict control of the party. The unwarranted repression of leading scientists, who had launched the study of new scientific fields (G. Ibragimov, F.-S. Kazanly, M. Korbut, A. Rakhim, G. Nigmati, Dzh. Validi, G. Gubaydullin, M. Khudyakov, V. Smolin, and others), did serious damage to the development of science in the republic.

During the Great Patriotic War, the tasks given to the national science were solved in close collaboration between local scientists
and the best scientific staff of the country, who were representatives of the Academy of Scientists of the USSR. The decision to relocate academic institutions was made on 16 July 1941. 33 academic institutions and 1884 research officers, including 39 academicians and 44 corresponding members of the USSR Academy of Sciences, were transferred to the city in a short space of time. Among the scientists who received international recognition were A. Poray-Koshits, B. Grekov, Ye. Tarle, G. Krzhizhanovsky, S. Vavilov, A. Ioffe, A. Nesmeyanov, S. Obnorsky, P. Kapitsa, M. Keldysh, N. Zeilinsky, and others.

The area of research was determined by the need to resolve defensive issues. The theoretical studies of academics L. Mandelstam, N. Papaleksi, V. Fok, and others were used to create radio-technical devices in the laboratories of the Institute for Physics and Mathematics of the USSR Academy of Sciences (IPM UAS). Scientific officers worked to improve methods of combating radio frequency interference control and enhancing the direction finding system, which helps to identify the location of enemy artillery positions, etc.

The defense issues were the main priority at Leningrad Physics and Technology Institute. The research of an academician A. Ioffe contributed to the successful implementation of many state tasks.

Important issues were handled in the laboratory of material dynamics, led by V. Kuprienko. When Professor Kurchatov arrived in Kazan in January 1942, laboratory management was devolved to him. An entirely new aircraft armour, based on a change in the structure of the protective metal layer, was proposed and implemented in the production facility there. V. Kurchatov continued the pre-war experiments on nuclear chain fast-neutron reactions studies: these experiments laid the foundation for the creation of national nuclear industry.

Significant work was carried out at the Institute of Mechanical Engineering (IME) in order to implement new production technology for aircraft parts, develop improved alloys for engine construction, etc. New weapon systems were developed by designers such as A. Tupolev, S. Korablev, V. Glushko, and others.

The activity of Kazan scientists was primarily focused on creating new materials and products that were necessary for front lines and back areas. Thus, the researches conducted by the famous chemist, Professor B. Arbuzov, enabled improvements in the quality and frost resistance of rubber, which had a great significance as it ensured smooth operation of military vehicles in winter. Professors G. Kamay and M. Belyaeva were involved in developing new types of a surgical suture material technology — catgut. The academician A. Arbuzov, when addressing the problems of organophosphorus compounds, obtained the substances which played an important role in the production of optical devices for artillery systems, as well as in the creation of new types of medicines.

The discovery of electron paramagnetic resonance by Kazan physicist Ye. Zavoisky in May 1944 was an outstanding event in world science. Having become a powerful research method, it laid the foundation for a new scientific field: the magnetic radiospectroscopy.

Major efforts were made by biologists. By the summer of 1942, Professor M. Markov completed his research into the wild medicinal plants of the region. Professor N. Livanov, together with employees of the Academy of Sciences Commission for Studies of Natural Productive Forces, suggested a production technology for extracting food proteins and vitamins from shellfish caught in the rivers of the republic, which was a great help in the context of food shortages.

Scientific researches of the republic's geologists were also of a great importance for the national economy. Professor L. Mirosky was the first to make an attempt to identify the possibility of the production of new building materials. In particular, he was the one who initiated a more extensive use of gypsum both in construction and in agriculture for the production of mineral fertilizers. An assistant professor E. Tikhvinskaya, who completed her doctorate thesis during wartime, studied...
the problems of oil-bearing capacity in the region’s subsoil resources.

Professors V. Gusynin, F. Mukhamedyarov and A. Teregulov developed effective methods for treating the wounded. The local anesthetic method and the procaine block, introduced by a Kazan surgeon A. Vishnevsky, were a real breakthrough.

The foundation of the Institute of Language and Literature under the Council of People's Commissars in Tatarstan in 1939 was of particular importance for the republic. The task of researching the history of the Tatar people and the region was imposed on it. Since February 1941, the Institute was granted the status of the Tatar Scientific and Research Institute of Language, Literature, and History.

Thus, during the Great Patriotic War, scientific thoughts in Tatarstan were primarily used for defence purposes. The recognition of the scientific community's contribution to the protection of the motherland was the creation of the Kazan Branch of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR on 13 April 1945, the current legal successor of which is the Kazan Scientific Centre, working together with the Academy of Sciences of Tatarstan.

In the post-war period, the rapid development of industry in the republic contributed to an increase in the number of scientific institutions aimed at ensuring scientific and technical progress in the priority areas of the national economy. In 1950–1960s, there were: the foundation of the Kazan branch of the Leninograd Optical Institute named after S. Vavilov; the Kazan branch of the Moscow Research Institute of Technology and Production Organization; the Scientific, Research, and Design Institute for Introduction of Computing Technologies in the National Economy; the All-Soviet Union Research Institute of Raw Hydrocarbons; the branch of the All-Soviet Union Research Institute of Synthetic Rubber; and the Research and Design Institute of Vacuum Engineering.

At the forefront of research there was the Kazan school of physics, particularly the research by S. Altshuler, who laid the foundations of quantum acoustics. B. Kozylev and N. Garifyanov developed the widespread use of magnetic radio spectroscopy in chemistry, biology and technology. At the end of the 1950s, a new scientific field emerged: polymer physics. The Laboratory of Nuclear Physics was established, and molecular physics began to develop intensively; radio physics emerged. A school of optics and spectroscopy began to be formed as well. Fundamental scientific problems were addressed by physicists K. Sakikhov and I. Khaybullin. In 1988 the State Prize was awarded to the team of physicists for their discovery of laser annealing. Researches in the mathematical fields of mechanics and geometry were actively conducted. The achievements of V. Alemasov, A. Dregalin, and A. Zemlyakov in the field of thermal engineering and drive engineering were marked by two State Prizes of the USSR. The works of the scientific officers and the department of astronomy and geodesics of the V. Engelgardt Astronomical Observatory have been widely recognised within international academic circles.

Thanks to the works of A. Arbuzov, Yu. Samitov, and B. Arbuzov, who received The Stalin Prize in 1951, the Kazan chemical school has become a major research centre of organophosphorus compounds. The new method of electrolytic metal machining, which had great practical significance, was developed under the leadership of F. Fayzullin. Chemists P. Kirpichnikov and A. Konovalov, along with biochemist I. Tarchevsky, have achieved great success. In 1978, the hero of socialist labour, an organic chemist B. Arbuzov, and an organic chemist A. Pudovik were awarded the Lenin Prize in science and technology.

In relation to the discovery of oil deposits in the territory of Tatarstan ASSR and the neighbouring Volga and Ural regions, studies of geology were increasing. At the intersection of geomorphology, physical geography and geology, a new scientific direction emerged: the study of karst. The background work to enable the formation of the Kazan school of microbiology was created. On the request of Tatneft association, a large group of scien-
Section III. The Republic of Tatarstan and the Tatar World at the Turn of the Millennia

A. Samoylov laid its foundation. The most Tatarstan Academy of Sciences upon the De-

lic. One such event was the creation of the led by A. Khalikov, the systematic ancient his-

Mintimer Shaimiev, on 30 September 1991.

mation of the ethnogenesis of the Volga and Ural regions was also answered.

The Tatar folklorists’ efforts resulted in the creation of 12 volumes of a scientific work, ‘Tatar folk art’, which is a treasury of the oral legends of the people. Tatar linguists published a ‘Glossary of the Tatar language’ in 3 volumes.

The turn of the 20th centuries was marked by many important events and processes in the scientific and cultural life of the republic. One such event was the creation of the Tatarstan Academy of Sciences upon the Decree No.DP-138 of the President of Tatarstan, Mintimer Shaimiev, on 30 September 1991. Having formed the Centre for Coordinating Scientific Institutions, the republic has managed to preserve and increase its scientific potential, while also directing intellectual capacity to address the primary social and economic problems faced by the republic.

At the time of the creation of the Academy of Sciences of the RT in Tatarstan, there were 700 Doctors of Sciences. The scientific potential of the republic set the pace and high standard of entry requirements for the newly established Academy. Today, the republic has more than 1,100 Doctors of Science working in the vineyards of science. The Academy of the republic includes 40 academicians, 84 corresponding members, 8 foreign and 31 honorary members. 7 affiliates are working, too.

Nowadays, the most important task for the scientific community is to make the greatest possible contribution to the scientific, technical, and innovative development of the republic. From this perspective, the highest priority directions of scientific development are established.

Over 30 million tons of oil per year is made in the Republic of Tatarstan. The extraction of recoverable oil remains the most important scientific problem. The comprehensive and highly effective programme of difficult oil reserve extraction was created by virtue of new developments in the field of oil exploration and production, that allowed Tatneft OJC to maintain a high level of oil production. For example, the exploration of Romashkinsky reservoir, discovered 60 years ago, is still being carried out in the process of the continued support of oil reserves replacement.

The problem of natural bitumen development in the republic is an urgent and prioritised one for all republican scientists and oil experts. Under the auspices of the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Tatarstan, solvent technology for processing bitumen oil was invented to produce a high-quality unoxidised road bitumen and lightweight oil.

Scientists from the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Tatarstan lead the world in the refining of oil, gas, and oil products from sulphur compounds. Among the latest developments, one can mention the alkaline catalyst technology for cleaning associated petroleum gas from hydrogen sulphide, which produces electrical energy (the process called 'Seroks-Gaz'), which is recognised as effective in the Volga-Ural region.

At the turn of the century, the breakthrough in medicine was the work of an academician D. Zubairov on microvesiculation in the blood of both healthy and sick people. The implementation of stem cell transplantation methods in the treatment of hepatic cirrhosis and vascular diseases, genetic modification of
stem cells from umbilical cord blood, that significantly improved the efficiency of cell therapy, are the breakthrough areas for Tatarstan, and Russia in general. The new methods of magnetic resonance and X-ray computed tomography for the diagnosis of early stages of the disease by measuring blood flow have been developed and introduced in conjunction with the physicists.

The top-priority goal for the Republic of Tatarstan is in the sphere of nanotechnology. The formation of a nanotech industry should be the most important strategic direction, defining new approaches to the transformation of national industry. An integrated program of nanotech industry development in the Republic of Tatarstan up to 2015 has been developed and approved to achieve this objective.

Kazan Astronomical Observatory, led by N. Sakhibullin, has received the status of the leading Russian school in the field of astrophysics. Opportunities have emerged for the development of research in connection with the creation of a telescope installed in Turkey, where Kazan astronomers are working together with colleagues from the Space Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the National Observatory of Turkey.

In the republic, unlike in many regions of Russia, the agro-industrial complex is steadily growing. The republic is self-sufficient in terms of grain, dairy, and meat processed products. These achievements are certainly not possible without science. One of the top priorities is selection of cultivars, based on a fundamental knowledge of the most important branches of biology. Currently, the register of breeds that are approved for cultivation in Russia includes more than 30 varieties of grain, legume, cereal crops, perennial grasses and regional fruit plants.

Kazan mathematical school is famous around the world. Most notably, the mathematicians solved the Slaman's problem, obtained significant results in algebra and in the topology of convergence, created the optimal approximate methods of integral equation solution, etc.

In the field of compressor manufacturing, oilless bearings and consolidators were implemented in production-release design series for the first time in Russia. The computational models of heat-exchange equipment and the methods of high-efficiency heat exchangers development were created on the basis of virtual and experimental studies.

Humanitarian research takes a special place in the activities of the Academy of Sciences of the RT. Academic research institutions do great work in that direction. The result of their joint activity is the publishing of a 6-volume edition of the Tatar Encyclopaedia, the first five volumes of which are already available for the readers. The Tatars, for the first time, have had an opportunity to bring to the attention of the world community the original material and spiritual culture of the Tatars, along with prominent figures of science, art, the economy, and other areas, in encyclopaedic form.

An important event in the national historiography was the implementation of the project to write a 7-volume 'History of Tatars from ancient times to the present day', where the national history is considered on a Eurasian scale, the place of the Tatars in the history of the Islamic world, the Turkic peoples, and Russia is determined, as well as the collected studies 'Tatars' and the 'Tartarika Ethnography' atlas, which represent the result of many years of research concerning the rich cultural heritage of the Tatars. The 'Archaeological Map of Tatarstan', in 6 volumes, was the result of more than thirty years of work by the republic’s archaeologists.

In recent years, archaeological research is being conducted outside of Tatarstan. This enables new knowledge of the medieval history of the Tatars to be obtained. Among the achievements of the archaeologists there should be noted the proof that Kazan and Yelabuga are 1,000 years old.

These examples show that in Tatarstan there are serious scientific developments in natural, technical, and humanitarian directions. It is difficult to overestimate the important contributions of our scientists to the develop-
ment of the scientific, technical, industrial, and defence potential of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan, along with the enormous role played by scientific figures in the spiritual life of the country’s multi-ethnic nation. The image of Tatarstan is inextricably linked to its perception as a major scientific and educational centre.

Tatarstan has great intellectual wealth. This is its national heritage, which should be treated very carefully. Today, the support for the scientific and university centres of the country, and the maintenance of their capacity to create the conditions for fruitful scientific and creative employees are among the most important national priorities. By contributing to the development of science today, we are laying the foundations for the future of our country.

§ 6. The 200th Anniversary of the Kazan State University and the Development of the Higher School of Tatarstan

Myagzyum Salakhov

The need for a comprehensive understanding of the problems of the development of higher education is a question which became especially important due to the processes of modernisation of the higher school in general that have started in the country. It is particularly important, since it is not about some arbitrary decisions of the respective bodies. There is an idea, that has firmly established in this country lately, that the development of professional education is critically important for the modernisation of society. This is a matter of survival in the rapidly changing world, because those who create knowledge will successfully go ahead, and all the rest will remain in the periphery and will not have any serious chances for development. This means that today education literally determines society’s future.

At the same time, this problem — both on the Russia-wide scale and on the regional level, particularly in the experience of our republic — is still poorly studied. As a rule, one can count on there being some informational materials in encyclopaedic or information publications, or can refer to basic formal descriptions of the changes in the education system within any stage of social development contained in many related works.

I will not go deeply into the reasons of such, not other, circumstances, I will merely offer an example. Now, in 2010, when this text is being written, the scientific and teaching communities of the Republic of Tatarstan and its capital — the city of Kazan — are celebrating the 80th anniversary of the establishment of the Kazan State University of Architecture and Building Construction. According to the order issued by the People’s Commissariat for Education of the USSR on 13 May 1930, it was decided to ‘establish a building institute as part of the building department of the Kazan Polytechnic Institute and transfer it under the supervision of the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs’. In fact, after a short while, the management of the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs transferred the newly created Building Institute to the supervision of the People’s Commissariat for Municipal Services. However, the initial decision to ‘give away’ the builders to the supervision of the NKVD definitely implied an intention to use the Building Institute, not least, for the Gulag (Central Administration of Prison Camps) economy. It should be understood this way: after good reasoning, it was still decided not to make a direct connection between the training of engineer-builders and the structures of the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs.

The example given is an additional case in the point proving that the higher school history in the twentieth century appears to be a critical issue. What can be said about it? At the very least, that today specialists-humanists should
not and cannot avoid difficult issues, since there are many knots tied in our past which need to be untied today.

I assume that there is a long-standing need to establish a scientific and research institute in our republic which would address the problems of the higher school. Here we can rely on the capabilities of both the Academy of Sciences of Tatarstan and those Kazan higher education institutions that joined the elite higher education institutions of the country — Kazan (Volga region) Federal University and universities conferred the category 'National Research University': Kazan Technical University and Kazan Technological University.

Here I will also share my views on some trends in the higher school development in our territory, along with an account of their historical development.

The system of higher education in our region began to be established due to the founding of Kazan Imperial University in 1804, which soon turned into one of the major training and scientific centres of Russia. Later, in the 1870s, the Kazan Veterinary Institute and the Kazan Teaching Institute were founded, and the Kazan Higher Women's Courses — the first higher education institution for women in the city — were organised. This was how the higher school started in the territory which now is a part of the Republic of Tatarstan.

In order to understand the peculiarities of the process of establishing the system of higher professional education not only in the mid-Volga region but also generally in Russia, one should have an idea of how the relation between science and education was historically formed in this country. It is considered that the 'Humboldt University' model served as the prototype for traditional universities in Russia, including Kazan University. To be more precise: as regards Russia, there was a crossing of the 'Humboldt University' with the French model, which was transferred to Russia by Peter the Great under Leibniz's influence. The specifics of the French model implied exclusion of research from the university and its transfer to the academy.

However, the bipolar pattern of the sciences in Czarist-era Russia should not be overemphasized. The renowned medical professional and backer of science N. Pirogov said that, in fact, 'there was no difference between the academy and the university. Those who moved science forward were also the ones who taught'.

Scientific societies promoted interaction between scientific currents in the Academy and university professorship. Shortly before the twentieth century, they numbered more than 300, nine of which were founded at Kazan University. They included a physics and mathematical society, a psychiatric and neuropathological society, an archaeological society, a historical and ethnographic society, etc.

As this process was gaining ground, the Academy of Sciences began to invite university scientists with increasing frequency to participate in its meetings; many of them were elected its members. Fifteen full members of the Academy and 33 honorary members and associate members graduated from Kazan University. They included a physics and mathematical society, a psychiatric and neuropathological society, an archaeological society, a historical and ethnographic society, etc.

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created as faculties and departments of Kazan State University.

But one should see the other side as well. The new government set a course for the development of single-discipline higher education institutions. In this situation, the 'old' universities, with their pluralistic outlook and academic freedoms, came into collision with the new political principles. Eventually, by the beginning of the 1930s, ten out of eighteen existing universities were closed, including Kharkov University, which was founded in the same year as Kazan University. The remaining universities were on the verge of liquidation. In this vain, the staff of Moscow State University took the collegial decision to close the university as a 'relic of the bourgeois and feudal era', among other examples.

In 1931, only two departments remained at the Kazan University: the physics and math department and the geology and biology department. The head of Kazan University, the distinguished scientist and chemist Kamay, later said at a meeting in Moscow: the new institutes founded at Kazan State University swept away everything, 'including the director's chair'. His words sounded ironic and bitter: 'Kazan University was wealthy and renowned. Its wealth was carried away, but its fame remained'.

The need for the industrial and cultural development of the country eventually called the university system into existence again, though the tendency to bring higher education and academic science closer together, as mapped out before 1917, did not continue. The development of fundamental sciences was assigned to the Academy of Sciences system, while the 'old' and newly founded universities mainly focused on applied sciences, if any. Thus, it is hard to say that the conditions for fundamental sciences at universities were favourable. For example, it is well-known what serious obstacles had to be overcome at Kazan State University by associate professor E. Zavoysky, who made the most outstanding discovery in modern physics in 1944: the phenomenon of electronic paramagnetic resonance. This made the contributions of scientists from Kazan University, along with researchers from other traditional universities in the country, to the development of world science all the more significant.

Such periods of historical development, or eras, which are characterized by incompetent interference in intellectual processes, inevitably leave a trace with noticeable consequences to the present day. It is no wonder that the share of higher education institutions involved in RTD to slightly over 10% of all organizations involved in those spheres. Even in these conditions, traditional universities in Russia manage to maintain a set high standard in the sciences, but today this is clearly not enough. What is the distinguishing aspect of modern education? The fact is that we are the heirs of the educational system of the industrial era, and without its modernization, we set ourselves up to lag behind as civilization.

Meanwhile, today we face a contradiction between the capabilities of the higher school and the needs for the development of modern society. Our country is not the only one facing this situation. An increased gap between the quality of education and the rise in requirements for the competencies and personal qualities of employees is typical for education around the world generally. The system of education simply cannot catch up with the speed with which knowledge is increasing because information and technologies develop through a snowball effect.

We became aware of this long ago. The first time that the crisis of education was proclaimed was in 1967 at the famous International Conference in the USA, in which representatives of over 50 countries participated. The character of the crisis was said to be global and affected both developed and emerging countries.

Thomas Perkins, a globally known venture entrepreneur, who, by the way, was one of the managers of Hewlett-Packard, made the following conclusion at the conference in his summary report: the nature of the crisis lies in the lack of correspondence between society's needs, on the one hand, and the capabilities of the system of education, on the other.
Since then, the world education system has been trying to resolve this contradiction, which has not always been successful. Education as an institution was formed to solve specific social problems; therefore, its internal capacity is not sufficient to get out of the crisis. It cannot pull itself out by its own hair, like Baron Munchausen.

Therefore, under the current conditions, which one scientist called 'flowing modernity', the educational system will be, to a greater or lesser extent, constantly modernized according to the plans and estimates of the state. But it is important to learn from the lessons of the past and launch the modernization processes according to the principles and conditions of a free society striving for creative scientific inquiry, where human capital is held as the main value.

§ 7. Development of the Education System of the Tatar People in the post-Soviet Period

Marat Gibatdinov, Lilya Murtazina

In the last decades of the twentieth century, the Tatar system of education experienced rapid development. This was caused by a number of factors: liberalization and democratization of society, removal of ideological restrictions, extension of the rights of regions in the sphere of education, etc.

More than ever before, people became interested in questions about the present and past of their country and began to ponder over the past of their people, culture, traditions, and history. The need for studying many chapters of history, which have remained unknown until now, has grown dramatically. The understanding and interpretation of the history and cultural heritage of peoples have also changed. Education and culture have taken central stage in public discussions directed at finding solutions to the problems of social development, initiating a 'spontaneous search for a new paradigm of the national school' [Zamaletdinov, 2006, p. 98]. The revival of the national system of education was one of the priorities in reforming education in the Republic of Tatarstan. It is also the main course of development of the pedagogical mind of the Tatar people in the specified period [Murtazina, 2012a, p. 16].

The Tatar community began a struggle for the revival of the Tatar language and national school as crucially important factors in the national revival of any people [Dautov, Sadykov, 1994, p. 5]. As part of this movement, a great number of concepts, programmes, and other documents have been worked out to determine the main direction of the development of Tatar education [Şahri Kazan, 1991, 15 March; Ofik, 1991, No.8; Mägrińät, 1997, 27 August; Naczional’nya doktrina, 1999; Mägrińät, 2000, 19 February; Gayfullin, 2002, p. 4]. Their developers and initiators have been state and social institutions and organizations, scientific groups, individual teachers-enthusiasts and self-motivated citizens, etc. [Valiev, 2001, pp. 8–9]. The situation in the country and in the republic, characterized by democratization and the development of pluralism of opinions and approaches, gave rise to an extensive discussion about the projects. In the 1990s, the Tatar Community Centre announced a competition for the best concept of national education. Twenty works were submitted to the competition. The winner was I. Amirkhanov, who later was instructed to create a new document. The concept he developed, 'Theoretical and practical basics of the Tatar school', was adopted on 22 June 1996 at session 7 of the 2nd Tatar National Assembly (Milli Mäclese). In 2000, at the All-Tatar Kuriltai (Assembly) of Tatar education staff held in Kazan, 'The conceptual framework of the national education of the Republic of Tatarstan' was hotly debated.
The range of views on the national school expressed during the discussion about the concepts was extremely diverse: some people understood the Tatar school as a Tatar-language version of the Russian school ('unitary school with the Tatar as the language of instruction') [Amirkhan, 2003, p. 129], while others viewed the development of Tatar education outside the official school system and independent from the Russian system of education: 'the whole education system should be in the hands of the nation; it should be organized bottom-up by initiatives of individual schools, teams, people, etc.; in this case, the education and pedagogic system is supported by folk pedagogy and successes in world education' [Amirkhan, 2003, p. 157].

In the majority of the conceptions, the main message was the idea of raising the national consciousness by using the traditional educational means of the Tatar people: 'today, as never before, society faces the problem of establishing an education system with an entirely different direction of cultural development' [Mågrifât, 2000, 19 February], supported by the bygone traditions of folk pedagogy. Referring to the traditional spiritual values of the people becomes crucially important: 'Only a combination of scientific and technical progress and time-tested ethnic, spiritual, cultural, and national traditions can ensure a sustained development of the society. Today returning to spirituality is not only a need of the soul but also a vital necessity. In fact, it is about returning to the cradle of spiritual civilization' [Mågrifât, 2000, 19 February]. Unlike Russian doctrines, where the main priority is placed on preserving and developing a common education framework, the Tatar doctrines emphasize interests of Tatarstan and the peoples living therein, and the development of their culture and distinctive character. At the same time, much attention is paid to the modernization of the education system in general.

Despite diverse interpretations, [Måxmiitov, 1996, p. 5] what was common for all the conceptions was acceptance of the need to take immediate measures for preserving and developing the Tatar language and culture and the importance of the role of the education system in the process [Kharisov, 2000, p. 3]. The law-making process in the Republic of Tatarstan developed in the same vein. The education policy of the republic was designed to take into account regional and national differences concerning education and upbringing in the republic.

The republic independently solved questions related to the creation of a national education system (from the legal and regulatory framework to scientific research). The laws on the languages of the peoples of Tatarstan (1992), on education (1993) [News of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan, 1993, No.10], the plan for the development of Tatar education, and other documents adopted in the Republic of Tatarstan allowed the development of national education to become a priority of state policy in the republic. The state policy on education took into consideration national and cultural traditions in teaching, ensured the freedom to choose the language of instruction, and guaranteed the right to study in the pupil's native language, not only in the Republic of Tatarstan but also for the Tatars residing outside of Tatarstan (Article 14, which regulated this process, was included into the Constitution of Tatarstan).

All of this resulted in an increase in the number of national schools in the Republic of Tatarstan and was conducive to their innovation. While in 1988, in the republic, education and upbringing activities were conducted in the Tatar language in 995 schools (11.8% of the total number of students), by 2002, their number reached 1,220 (49.3%).

With the expansion of innovative activities, Tatar schools of the innovative type (gymnasiums and lyceums) were established. Besides, in the majority of schools with Russian as the language of instruction, so-called 'mentality' classes (classes with an ethnic and cultural component) opened, where the educational process was performed in Russian, but the upbringing process was performed in the Tatar language. However, in fact, this principle works only formally. Unfortunately, the creation of classes where the upbringing process
was conducted in the native language did not contribute to the development of a national education (actually, it was a palliative to national education).

At that time, federal legislation [Federal Laws 'On the languages of the peoples of the RSFSR' (1991) and 'On education' (1992)] also assisted in the development of national education. Having destroyed the Soviet system of methodical and organizational control over national schools, the federal government actually refrained from solving this problem, thus giving an opportunity to the regions to determine the scope of the National–Regional Component (NRC) of education independently. As a result, the teaching of the Tatar language and literature, the history of the Tatar people and of Tatarstan, and the geography and ecology of Tatarstan (elective courses in Area Studies were created) was conducted in Tatarstan. Regional textbooks reflecting the ethnocultural specifics of the region were developed.

The establishment of the Tatar language as the official language of the Republic of Tatarstan in the Constitution of Tatarstan (1992) allowed it to be included in the list of compulsory subjects taught in secondary school, which despite the existing problems of teaching methodology, resulted in a rise in language proficiency among the younger generation in comparison to the older one. An analysis of Tatar language proficiency among school children and their parents in the cities and regions of Tatarstan demonstrates that 10.9% of Russian high school students and 2.3% of their parents speak Tatar. As a result of the support of the Tatar language, Tatars are seen to have preserved their ethnic language competence (77.4% of Tatar high school students and 78.1% of their parents speak Tatar fluently). Despite some protests, in general, the population accepted the official education policy of the republic positively. The compulsory teaching of the Tatar language at schools is observed to receive substantial support. In 2011/2012, only 0.2% of Tatars and 1.2% of Russians believed that the Tatar language should not be taught in school at all. 4.9% of Tatars and 7.7% of Russians believed that the Tatar language should be compulsory only for Tatars. The rest (46.5% of Tatars and 25.8% of Russians) insist on preserving its compulsory subject status at school. 21.3% and 24.0% respectively propose to reduce the hourly load, and 23.9% and 36.2% propose to teach it as an optional subject. Around 82% of school-age youth admitted the necessity of speaking both Russian and Tatar on a mandatory basis for those who are employed in the public or service sector (survey 2011/2012) [Musina, ed., 2006; Musina, ed., 2011]. However, the Russian population have not become functionally bilingual.

Despite the well-known autonomy and absence of actual control over this area from the federal centre, the education system in Tatarstan has always remained within the common educational system of Russia. Substantively, the republic strictly followed the federal education component. Tatar schools were based on the common curriculum and programmes and textbooks for Tatar schools on all major subjects were translated from Russian, taken from the federal list of textbooks approved by the Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation. The textbooks published independently were textbooks on the history of the Tatar people and Tatarstan [Khuzin, 2006; Gilyazov, 2004; Khuizin, 2005; Piskarev, 2012; Sultanbekov et al., 2006; Istorinya i kul’tura tatarskogo naroda, 2011; Tatar xalkı tarihı, 2012; Zagidullin, Gibatdinov, 2010; Istorinya tatarskogo naroda, 2012], the geography of Tatarstan [Taysin, 2003], and the Tatar language and literature. Several unique science textbooks for secondary school were also published [Gayfullin, Islamsin, 1993; Gayfullin, Gabidullin, 1997; Gayfullin, Gabidullin, 2005; Gayfullin, 1996; Gayfullin, 1997; Xäliullin, 2001; Xäliullin, 2002; Kazyikhanova, 2002]. Attempts to create a fully independent, autonomous system of national education were confined to projects developed as part of the Tatar national movement.

Despite certain achievements, including the expansion of the network of Tatar schools
and pre-school educational institutions and the publication of educational materials in Tatar, the Tatar education system failed to become fully implemented due to several factors. Students began to gradually withdraw from Tatar schools, in many respects, that was caused by the low practicality of the Tatar language in modern society. Tatar schools failed to become attractive and competitive in the common education system.

Despite the high priority given to the development of education in the Republic of Tatarstan, many provisions of the regional and federal laws still remained declarative, which has even been acknowledged at the official level: 'Among... restraining factors, the following can be outlined: gaps in legal regulation of the language policy; the descriptive and declarative nature of certain articles of the RT Law "On the languages of the peoples of Tatarstan"; inadequacy of the mechanism intended to implement provisions of this Law and State Program on Preservation, Learning, and Development of the Languages of the Peoples of Tatarstan; lack of additional regulations in language communication and penalties for violation of the laws on languages; absence of developed infrastructure intended to ensure implementation of the State Program on Preservation, Learning and Development of the Languages of the Peoples of Tatarstan not only in terms of specific events but also in terms of achievement of the goals set and performance of the tasks of the respective stage' [Gosudarstvennaya programma, 2005, p. 24].

As noted by experts, 'implementation of a wide-scale project, such as the establishment of a Tatar national (ethnonational) system of education: occurs in the conditions of insufficient funding of this sector' [Mukharyamova, 2011, p. 194]. Additionally, the Republic of Tatarstan had low performance indicators in the academic year 2004/2005 according to the education development rating of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation: by the level of education of the population (31st place out of 89 entities), in social and economic conditions of education development (53rd place), in accessibility of education (22nd place), and in the quality of education (25th place). Tatarstan only managed to get into the top ten in three categories: state of pre-school education (10th place), state of general education (7th place), and health of children and teenagers (3rd place) [Gokhberg, Zabaturina, 2006, pp. 33, 35, 38, 41, 45, 47, 50, 53, 57, 61].

All this made the leaders of the republic pay closer attention to education; a number of ambitious projects were launched. In 2010, the wide-scale Strategy of Education Development in Tatarstan for 2010–2015 was adopted in the Republic of Tatarstan. This included 'Kılaçık' ('Future'), 'Bäläkäč', and the grant programs 'Our Best Teacher', 'Our New Teacher', 'Algarış', and others. However, they were basically intended to implement and update the pedagogic technologies of the teaching of native languages as part of the national education strategy. If in 1990–2005 bilingualism was the topic of the day, afterwards, the emphasis shifted to multilingualism: education in Russian, Tatar and a foreign language (English). However, as it has been noted, actual bilingualism has never been achieved.

It is also noteworthy that the indicators of national school development and level of language proficiency with regard to the native language were not taken into account in the federal ratings. The federal education authorities still do not give prominence to the development of the languages of the peoples of the Russian Federation or the system of national (ethnonational) education and consider the question of preserving native languages to be the prerogative of parents and bodies of local self-government. Thus, such provisions of the Federal Legislation as article 72 paragraphs b and e of the Constitution of the Russian Federation also have a declarative nature. They refer 'the general questions of education, culture and language as its components to co-supervision by the Russian Federation and its constitutive entities'; guaranteeing the right for all peoples of the Russian Federation to preserve their native language, providing conditions for its learning and development (Article 68 p. 3), allowing them to choose freely their language for communication, upbringing, education,
and creative works (Article 26 p. 2). Article 2, p. 2 of the Federal Law 'On education' declares the following state policy guideline for the sphere of education: 'development of the education system of national cultures, regional cultural traditions and peculiarities in a multinational state', Article 6, which guarantees for all citizens of the Russian Federation the right to receive general education in their native language, choose their language of instruction within the possibilities provided by the education system (p. 2); and provides assistance to the representatives of the peoples of the Russian Federation residing outside of its territory in receiving general education in their native language (p. 4).

In our opinion, the main factor thwarting development of national education is the general reduction of its prestige. The Tatar language is not granted the real status of being the second state language in society. Despite the Law of the Republic of Tatarstan, 'On the languages of the peoples of Tatarstan' (1992), the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers 'On high priority measures for implementation of the RT law "On the languages of the peoples of Tatarstan"' (1992), and the State Program 'On the preservation, learning and development of the languages of Tatarstan' approved by the RT Parliament in 1994 and 2004, which provide for additional payments to specialists fluent in two state languages (Russian and Tatar), the government have not taken any actual steps to implement this law. No public office except for the President of the Republic of Tatarstan is required to speak two languages. The Russian language still prevails in everyday communication and in official record management. During the last two decades, the communicative function of the Tatar language hardly changed. Only 8.5% of Tatars who participated in the survey of 2011/2012 noted that they used the Tatar language at work. In 2001, their number was 9.6%. No respondent among Russians chose this answer. 42.3% of respondents spoke Russian and 2.6% spoke Tatar at their workplace (in 2011/2012). In 2001, the figures were 41.5% and 1.2% respectively.

The records show that the number of Russians interested in learning Tatar has fallen twofold. While in 1994 this amounted to 63% of Russians, and in 1997, 59% considered it important for their children to know and learn Tatar, in 2011/2012 this included only 23% of respondents. Low motivation for learning the Tatar language is the major problem. As an instrument of social mobility, Russian was chosen in first place (81.3% of interviewed school children in 2011/2012), then foreign, European languages (77.2%), and only after that the Tatar language (34.3%) [Musina ed., 2011].

While national education provides obvious advantages to students in the early stages as it is easier for children to learn in their native language, later on, when they advance to higher education, they encounter problems (students who finish Tatar schools find themselves disadvantaged as they have to write essays and take exams in Russian). Between 1990 and 2000, each prospective student in Tatarstan, regardless of their chosen university, had the opportunity to select their language when taking entrance exams. The problem got worse with the introduction of the USE (Unified State Examination). In Tatarstan, attempts were made to address the issue by introducing the UNE (Unified National Exam), valid only for universities in Tatarstan, in which the Federal Control—testing instrumentation (CTI) and USE tasks were translated into Tatar. But the attempts failed. The number of graduates wishing to take the USE or SFE (State Final Examination) in the Tatar language has been steadily declining. In 2011, the EGE on Tatar language and literature was taken by 40 people (57 in 2010), of which 37 took the exam on Tatar language (55 in 2010), and 3 took the exam on Tatar literature (2 in 2010) (see Table 3.23). In 2012, in 25 out of 43 municipal districts of Tatarstan, there was not a single graduate who chose to take the SFE on the Tatar language. Not a single application for the GIA in elective subjects in the Tatar language was received from the 16 municipal districts of Tatarstan. In Kazan, only graduates from one school in the Moscow district applied. In all of the republic,
only 500 graduates expressed a desire to take their exams in Tatar.

The incompleteness of national education and lack of graduate education negatively affect the situation as well. The question of the establishment of a Tatar National University, which the Tatar intelligentsia has been dreaming of for so long, was firstly raised by the Supreme Council of the RT in 1991 and 1994, discussed by the State Council of the RT in 1998 and at the second meeting of the World Congress of Tatars in 1997. However, such a university has not been established. After the Tatar State Humanities University (TSHU) and then the Tatar State Humanitarian and Pedagogical Institute (TSHPI) were liquidated with the establishment of Kazan Federal University, the question was de facto excluded from the agenda.

Even in the already existing universities, instruction in the Tatar language was not approved. In the 1990s, Tatar groups opened in nearly every university in the republic (the first ones appeared in 1993 at the agricultural academy, the civil engineering academy, and Kama Polytechnic Institute). In 1997, the Inter-University Scientific Methodological Council was established. Its major objective was to provide the teaching process with necessary literature and to develop scientific terminology in Tatar.

There are two basic approaches in selecting which subjects should primarily be taught in Tatar. According to R. Yusupov, Tatar should primarily be the language of instruction in pedagogical universities. Humanitarian subjects related to culture, music, and arts should be taught in two languages. Programmes for specialists who will work in the country-side or public service (medicine, transportation, etc.) should also be bilingual [Yusupov, 1998, p. 12]. The necessity of Tatar-language instruction in technical universities, in Yusupov's opinion, raised serious doubts, for ‘the majority of engineering terms were international, and the graduates of those universities would have to work for large-scale enterprises where Russian was the language of communication’ [Yusupov, 2002, p. 3].

N. Tuktamyshev had a different perspective on the issue. He developed the idea of bilingual higher education aimed at expanding graduates' opportunities in the job market [Tuktamyshev, 2001, p. 43]. On the basis of teaching practices at Kazan State University of Architecture and Engineering (KSU/AE), he proved that instruction which took into account peculiarities of bilingual education yielded positive results on students' academic performance and social adaptation. During further work, this principle was fully supported by other researchers in the field [Murtazina, 2012b]. Presence of the Tatar language in the higher education system is regarded as not only the logical termination of a complete loop of continuous education in the native language but also as the requirement for the viability and development of the language, which allows it to fully function in the academic sphere [Yagfarov, 1993, p. 3].

A number of ideas for developing higher education in the Tatar language and projects on its theoretical foundations were worked out [Fätxullin, Şakircanov, Narbekov, 1999, pp. 10–15; Yuldashev, 1998, p. 38]. How-

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**Table 3.23**

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<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>2006</th>
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<th>2008</th>
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<tr>
<td>No. participants</td>
<td>Av. grade</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tatar Language</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>60.39</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>59.70</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>61.16</td>
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<td>Tatar literature</td>
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Av. grade
ever, due to shortages of qualified personnel and absence of necessary course books in Tatar at the first stage, of dedicated policy on higher vocational education in Tatar, of effective mechanisms of its implementation, and in recent years, also due to a reduction in those wishing to study in the native language, these groups managed to survive and gain a foothold only in those universities where there were enthusiasts captivated by the issue (primarily technical universities and some faculties of the TSHPI (Faculty of Mechanics, Faculty of Physics, and others).

Another aspect of the problem is the learning of Tatar. The Tatar language began to be taught in all technical training colleges and technical institutions from the 1989/1990 academic year; enrollment in Tatar groups in pedagogical institutes increased by 2.5 times [Gataullina, 2002, p. 21]. From the 1991/1992 academic year, the implementation of bilingualism in Tatar universities began. In the TSHPI and later in other universities, the Tatar language was taught as the official language of the Republic of Tatarstan, along with Russian. A 64-hour course in Tatar as a foreign language was introduced at all of the faculties [Kharisov, 1998, p. 40]. The teaching of Tatar as a native language was already included in the 1988/1989 academic year. Tatar language departments opened in almost all universities [Valiev, 1998, p. 84].

A problem with the methodology of teaching Tatar as a foreign language to Russian-speaking groups was a major issue, as was teaching it at comprehensive schools [Salekho, 1993; Safiullina, 2010]. It was particularly acute in comprehensive schools, where due to an inefficient teaching methodology focusing primarily on the cramming of grammar rather than listening comprehension, real functional bilingualism of graduates who studied both official languages was not achieved.

Instead of focusing on the methodology and quality of teaching, education bodies got lost in the purely external, formal side of the issue, trying to expand the 'reach of education in Tatar' and 'reach of studying Tatar'. According to the official statistics of the Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Tatarstan, the percentage of Tatar pupils receiving education in the Tatar (native) language went from 17% in 1989 to 59% in 2007. However, as the analysis suggests, this growth was achieved by means of 'mentality classes', which, technically, combined the statistical data of those being 'educated' and 'raised' in the native language. To this end, 'the reach of education and upbringing' euphemism was coined. After 2007, the percentage of Tatar pupils receiving education in Tatar was decreasing and reached 46.1% in 2010. By 2000, the number of pupils studying Tatar ('reach of studying') amounted to 99.1%; by 2009, this number rose to 100%, changing only a few tenths of the percentage point. At the same time, the quality of education leaves much to be desired. As a result, parents opt for Russian language schools, graduates of which hold higher chances of being accepted to any Russian IHL.

In the 1990s, the number of schools and gymnasiums providing education in the native language rose at a comparatively fast pace as well as the number of pupils enrolled. However, by the beginning of the 21st century, the situation changed. Both the number of pupils in Tatar schools and the number of Tatar schools decreased (through 'optimization', that is, closure of under-filled rural schools and transition of some schools to Russian-language instruction, etc.). As of 1 September 2006, in the Republic of Tatarstan there were 1,075 schools with Tatar-language instruction (1,093 in 2005). Between 2008 and 2011, this number went down from 1,138 to 852. In addition, the number of pupils enrolled also decreased from 76,500 to 71,400 respectively. We should also highlight a trend toward decrease in the number of Tatar educational institutions of the new type (lyceums and gymnasiums) from 98 to 69, though the number of pupils in them increased from 23,000 to 26,500. There is a clear trend towards increase in the number of mixed (Tatar-Russian, Russian-Tatar) schools from 356 to 371, whereas the number of pupils enrolled decreased from 22,000 to 15,000. All this has a lot to do with decline in the total number of...
students in Tatarstan in general and Tatar students in particular (from 202,900 in 2008 to 180,600 in 2011). The percentage of pupils receiving education in their native language fell from 47.6% to 44.41% within this period.

The transition to per capita funding of educational institutions poses additional difficulties to the development of national education. Supporting under-attended national schools and classes, especially in rural areas, becomes economically inefficient. It goes without saying that, if the region grows, schools with Russian-language instruction are founded.

The situation is even worse with Tatar education outside the Republic of Tatarstan.

Article 14 of the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan, as well as the Treaty ‘On the delimitation of jurisdictional subjects and powers between bodies of public authority of the Russian Federation and bodies of public authority of the Republic of Tatarstan’ provide that the Republic of Tatarstan shall assist in the development of national culture, language, and the preservation of the identity of Tatars living outside the Republic of Tatarstan. However, the implementation of this faces a range of significant obstacles. In practice, Tatarstan is de facto deprived of effective leverage over the preservation and development of the Tatar language and system of Tatar education beyond the Republic of Tatarstan.

Even though from 1998 to 2008 the number of Tatar-language schools in the regions of the Russian Federation doubled (from 13 to 26), and by 2009 rocketed (to 416), mainly owing to Tatar schools in Bashkortostan (357), in 2010–2011 there was a decrease (from 371 to 345). The number of pupils enrolled decreased from 16,600 (2009) to 15,600 (2010) and then 14,300 (2011). As of the 2010/2011 academic year, the greatest number of pupils receiving an education in the Tatar language was in Bashkortostan (9,800), Perm district (1,700), and the Chuvash Republic (1,500).

In the regions of the Russian Federation, there are educational institutions where Tatar is taught or is the language of instruction, but their number is also decreasing. Thus, from 2009 to 2011 the number of educational institutions in which the native (Tatar) language in RF was taught went down from 1,300 to 1,300. The majority of such schools operated in Bashkortostan (962 and 929 respectively), Ulyanovsk oblast (68 and 56), Tyumen oblast (57 and 57), and Orenburg (60 and 57). The number of schools did not change only in 13 regions; in all the other regions, it went down. A positive trend is observed only in the Chuvash Republic (7 and 10) and Astrakhan (11 and 12).

Recent statistical data from the Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Tatarstan confirms the downward trend in the regions of Russia. In the 2011/2012 academic year, the number of educational institutions where the native (Tatar) language is taught further decreased (to 1,000), whereas the number of schools offering instruction in the native (Tatar) language dropped drastically (to 294).

In 2009–2011, the number of pre-school educational institutions with Tatar as the language of instruction slightly decreased (from 480 to 479), with most of them operating in Bashkortostan (371) and Perm district (38). In the regions of Russia, the number of Sunday schools offering instruction in the native (Tatar) language has remained unchanged since 2009 (there are 12 schools in 10 regions).

At the same time, the attendance numbers of Tatar classes in the regions of Russia is an acute problem. Due to the absence of pupils and the unwillingness of parents to educate their children in their native language, Tatar schools do not open (Chelyabinsk oblast, Magnitogorsk; Sverdlovsk oblast, Yekaterinburg; etc.); while Sunday schools (Komi Republic) and under-attended Tatar schools and classes close.

An analysis of the situation in the regions of the Russian Federation shows that the proportion of educational institutions where the native (Tatar) language is taught or is the language of instruction, as a rule, accounts for about 1–2% of the total number of educational institutions in the region (less than 1% in 11 regions). Exceptions are Bashkortostan (37.3%), Tyumen oblast (10.7%), Ulyanovsk oblast (10%), Perm district (6.3%), Orenburg (5.2%), Republic of Mordovia (5.3%), the Chuvash Republic (4.8%), and a few others.
The massive shift to Russian-language education is observed in Tatar schools in many regions of the Russian Federation. According to the information provided by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Bashkortostan, in 2000 there were 604 schools with Tatar-language instruction, 404 in 2005, and 298 in 2011. At the same time, the number of schools where Tatar is taught went from 553 in 2000 to 715 in 2005 and 929 in 2011. The teaching of the Tatar language remains the only characteristic feature in a number of Tatar schools; meanwhile, the basics of folk pedagogy and cutting-edge pedagogical technologies are not sufficiently applied in the education of children.

The policy of ‘optimization’ of educational institutions also negatively affects the system of national education. In Bardymsky district of Perm krai, for instance, there used to be 68 Tatar schools. Today, due to the optimization of budget funds, they are merged into 29 educational institutions. Amalgamation often occurs through the incorporation of Tatar schools into Russian-language schools. At the same time, the legitimate interests and requirements of pupils themselves, as well as their parents’ opinions, are not always taken into consideration.

Serious problems are encountered in the training of Tatar teachers. Traditionally, national pedagogical personnel were trained in a number of higher schools of the subjects of the Russian Federation besides the Republic of Tatarstan (Moscow State Pedagogical University, Orenburg State Pedagogical Institute, Astrakhan State University, Bashkortostan State Pedagogical University, Sterlitamak State Pedagogical Academy, Tobolsk State Social and Pedagogical Academy, Bashkortostan State University, Mordovia State Pedagogical University, Tyumen State University). But the number of students applying to Tatar departments and classes in these universities is gradually decreasing.

Even though applicants from the regions of the Russian Federation are offered the opportunity to enroll in the universities of Tatarstan on the basis of a recommendation letter from the Ministry of Education and Science of Tatarstan Republic (MEandS TR), the republic itself is not able to provide enough pedagogical personnel to all Tatar educational institutions in the regions of Russia without restoration and development of Tatar departments in the universities located in the regions with large numbers of Tatar residents.

The factors that drove the explosive growth of Tatar national education at the end of the 20th century were: the overall democratization of society and development of Tatar national identity, the rich cultural and pedagogical heritage of Tatar educators of the beginning of the 20th century, and the significant scientific and pedagogical and economic potential of Kazan and the Republic of Tatarstan.

In order to reform the educational system in Tatarstan, the initial goal was to exempt it from the totalitarian hangover and to democratise. The evidence shows that this task was more or less completed. While acknowledging some progress in the implementation of Tatar as the official language of education, we should also admit that many of the tasks declared in state documents were not fully implemented. Thus, the next stage of the process is the development, perfection, and integration of the national education system into the modern domestic and global educational space and the multi-cultural Russian society. Despite all the problems and failures of the past years, the post-Soviet era has seen considerable progress in the way that Tatars view their native language and culture; young people have ceased to be shy about speaking in their native language. Tatarstan is one of the few regions in Russia offering secondary education entirely in the native language.
CHAPTER 7
Place of Tatarstan in the Global Coordinate System of Socio-Economic Development of the Volga Region and Russia

Vadim Khomenko

§ 1. Overview of the Level of Socio-Economic Development of the Republic of Tatarstan

The Republic of Tatarstan is one of the few regions in Russia where the stability of the socio-economic situation is based on a combination of a rich natural resource base and a high level of scientific and human capital.

Tatarstan is one of the most economically advanced regions in the Russian Federation today. For instance, since 2002, the republic has ranked first in the Volga federal district in terms of per capita gross regional product (GRP). Starting from 2006, the difference between Tatarstan and the other developed regions in Volga federal district has noticeably increased for this indicator. Even in the crisis year of 2009, when oil prices decreased, the volume of per capita GRP in Tatarstan amounted to 234,300 roubles; in comparison, this indicator was 201,300 roubles for Perm district; 196,200 roubles, for Orenburg oblast; and 182,600 roubles, for Samara oblast [Regiony' Rossii, 2011, p. 354].

The most intensively used natural gift of the region is oil. Proven reserves amount to 900 million tons. Associated gas is also mined in the republic; there are promising petroleum bitumen reserves (36% of the total reserves of the Russian Federation).

The republic also possesses commercial reserves of limestone, dolomites, mortar sand, and clay. They are used for production of brick, building stone, gypsum, sand and gravel mixes. There are reserves of coal, oil shale, zeolite, copper, and bauxite.

The traditionally intensive agricultural sector is based on a temperate continental climate and a significant area of agricultural land, which amounts to 4,503,400 hectares (8.7% of the corresponding indicator for the Federal Volga district), including 3,455,300 hectares of arable land (9.7%).

The republic holds strong industrial potential. The leading industries are oil production and petrochemicals, aircraft construction, mechanical engineering, and instrument making. The fundamental structure of Tatarstan's diversified economy was formed in the Soviet period. Industrial enterprises and industrial cities include: Tatneft OJC, KAMA Z OJC and the city of Naberezhnye Chelny, the Nizhnekamsk petrochemical complex, including the tire industry and the city of Nizhnekamsk, Kazan aviation complex, which manufactures airplanes and helicopters (Tu-160, Tu-204, Il-62, Mi-17, ANSAT, Aktai, etc.), and many others — among them, enterprises which were evacuated here from European Russia during the Second World War.

The republic has a well-developed transport network, including highways, railroads, four navigable rivers (the Volga, Kama, Vyatka, and Belaya), oil and gas pipelines, and airlines.

Tatarstan has long positioned itself as Russia's high-end educational and scientific center, forming the potential necessary for the region's innovative development. The Tatarstan Academy of Sciences, RAS Kazan Scientific Center, and more than 60 branches of research and design institutes operate in Kazan. Along with an extensive network of state and private institutions of higher education, there are two national research institutes and one federal university in the republic, which are significant factors in determining the region's unique research and education base.
§ 2. Tatarstan in the Transition from the 20th to the 21st century and the Modern Assessment of the Socio-economic Development of the Volga Federal District

Tatarstan's historical trading profits, based on its unique geographical location, were lost or substantially replaced by other means of economic development since industrial production was moved here during World War II, and, more importantly, due to the discovery of rich oil reserves in the 1940s. However, historical memory stipulates a careful examination of the centuries-old opportunity of obtaining rent payments based on geography in conjunction with organic industrial development. During Russia's integration into the international economy, this fact should form the basis of business forecasts and strategies for regional and federal development. It is also necessary to note the fact that after the republic obtained limited sovereignty at the turn of the 20th century, it made an attempt to preserve its existing industrial potential and achieve modernization based on innovation in the context of developing market relations in order to become a powerful trade and industrial centre. Similarly to the Russian Federation, Tatarstan declared all the natural wealth in its territory as the assets of the nation. The main provisions of national sovereignty were enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan. The republic entered into negotiations with the Centre with a view to establish contractual relations on matters dealing with administration, ownership and activities in the international arena. On 15 February 1994, the treaty between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan was signed on the mutual delegation of powers between Russia's governmental authorities and the authorities of the Republic of Tatarstan. In furtherance of this Treaty, more than a dozen intergovernmental agreements on ownership, military construction, banking, and budget relations, training, and other areas have been signed.

The republic's development at this stage was characterized by a 'soft entry into the market', possibly offsetting the social consequences of 'shock therapy'. Efforts were made to support production and ensure social protection. An important feature of the transition to the market economy was the specialized mechanism of property privatization in the republic. The difference was in the fact that NPA (Name-bearing Privatisation Investment Accounts) were used in Tatarstan along with vouchers; they were registered in the banking system and, consequently, did not appear on the speculative market. The second feature was the fact that the valuation of the property of privatized enterprises was carried out by taking into account the property revaluation factor, which was higher than the Russian one by 26 times. The high price of objects under voucher privatization in Russia at the first stage allowed Tatarstan to keep most of the property and manage it.

By the end of the first decade of the 21st century, there were 33 long-term and 60 departmental programmes in the Republic of Tatarstan. In addition, the republic has been actively involved in the implementation of the federal target program (FTP) and the federal address investment program (FAIP). In 2010, the republic was included in 20 of 53 existing federal programs. By 2010, federal funding for the organization of events in the Republic of Tatarstan reached more than 27 billion rubles, including approximately 11 billion rubles for the Universiade [Murakaev, 2010].

Due to tax benefits and the adoption of the Law on investment activities of the Republic of Tatarstan, the list of companies that implement large investment projects in the republic has increased significantly. Among them are: Taneko, OJC (complex of refineries and petrochemical plants in Nizhnekamsk), the cost of the project amounted to 265.9 billion rubles; 'Development of Kazanorgsintez, OJC', the cost of which consisted 21.5 billion rubles; Severstalavto-Kama, LLC (construction of a plant for the production of FIAT cars in Nabere-
zhnye Chelny) the cost of which – 36.5 billion rubles, as well as many others. The republic's Investment Memorandum as of the beginning of this decade included 120 investment projects, totaling more than 1 trillion rubles.

Governmental guidelines of recent years have been aimed at creating a balanced, highly developed industrial complex with capacious foreign economic relations. It's significant number has been implemented but some problematic issues remain as is, it can be seen from the analysis below.

One of the enduring foundations of Tatarstan's modern economy, as noted above, was formed more than half a century ago—the mining industry (tables 3.24 and 3.25). Before the crisis, about 30% of gross added value was produced here. During the crisis period in 2008–2009, this share declined by about 25%, amounting to 22.5% in 2009. However, it was the result of lower oil prices. As it can be seen, at the countrywide level there was also a noticeable reduction in the share of extractive industries—from 12.8% to 9.7%. In 2011, the share of fuel and energy mineral extraction rose again and amounted to 28.0% of the volume of shipped goods produced by regional enterprises (organizations) in the Republic of Tatarstan; the chemical industry accounted for 15.2%, the manufacture of vehicles and equipment for 15.0%, and the production of petroleum products for 11.9%.

As it is shown in Table 3.26, Tatarstan stands out significantly by generalized gross indicators of economic development among the best-performing regions of the Volga federal district. With a wide margin, the republic is ahead of the Republic of Bashkortostan, Samara oblast, Nizhny Novgorod oblast, and Perm krai in the all-Russian ranking by: Gross regional product per capita; investments in fixed capital per capita; receipt of taxes, fees and other mandatory payments to the Russian Federation's budget per capita; commissioning of the total housing area per 1,000 people; number of students of educational institutions of higher education per 10,000 people. Tatarstan leads the way in agriculture as well. Such results provide the foundation for intensifying economic and innovative development and the growth of the population's welfare.

However, certain raw materials essentially determine the specificity of different output parameters. By the volume of manufacturing enterprises, Tatarstan lags behind Bashkortostan and Nizhny Novgorod oblasts, by per capita income—Samara oblast and Perm krai, by retail trade turnover per capita—Bashkortostan and Samara oblast, by the number of personal passenger cars per 1,000 people—Bashkortostan, Samara oblast, and Nizhny Novgorod oblast. By the ratio of roads paved and the total length of public roads Tatarstan is behind all of these regions.

From the above we can draw the following challenges of Tatarstan's economy:

1. The production of raw materials 'depletes' investment resources while minimizing the utilization of the republic's intellectual potential and the redistribution of tax revenues to the federal budget, which can be classified as 'natural rent'.

2. The given model is sufficiently stable, thus limiting the possibility of expanding the range of manufacturing industries, individual infrastructure areas and household incomes, which are distributed among other alternative areas of life.

The republic undertakes certain steps to solve these problems: Additional refining facilities are under construction in Nizhnekamsk, automotive production development and modernization plans are being developed, etc.. However, the factors preventing fundamental changes in the situation include the following: The general concentration of Russia's capital in the raw-materials branches of the economy, the impact of that capital on the federal government's activities and the absence of clear federal plans for the development of technological production with a clear territorial strategy for disbursing production capacity, the entry of Russian big capital into the economic structures of previously semi-independent 'locomotive' regions, the functioning of the fiscal intergovernmental system, etc. Nevertheless, the Republic has the ability to limit the effect
|                      | Total | Agriculture, hunting and forestry | Fishing, fish rearing | Mining operations | Processing industry | Production and distribution of electric energy, gas and water | Construction | Wholesale and retail trade; repairing vehicles and household goods | Hospitals and clinics | Transport and communication | Finance | Real estate operations, renting and service delivery | State administration and military security, mandatory social security | Education | Health care and social services delivery | Delivery of other communal, social and individual services | Delivery of water, gas, electricity and communication | |
|----------------------|-------|----------------------------------|----------------------|-----------------|-------------------|--------------------------------------------------|--------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------|----------|-----------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|-----------|---------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------| |
| Russian Federation   | 100   | 5.2                              | 0.3                  | 12.8            | 18.5              | 3.8                                              | 5.7          | 21.8                                                           | 0.9                  | 10.6                                           | 1.1      | 9.0                                           | 2.9                                               | 2.8       | 3.1                                         | 1.5                                             |                                           |
| Volga Federal District| 100   | 8.3                              | 0.0                  | 15.1            | 24.0              | 4.0                                              | 6.2          | 13.4                                                           | 0.7                  | 10.4                                           | 0.3      | 7.3                                           | 2.9                                               | 3.1       | 3.2                                         | 1.1                                             |                                           |
| Republic of Bashkortostan | 100   | 10.4                             | 0.0                  | 12.7            | 27.7              | 3.4                                              | 6.6          | 10.5                                                           | 1.1                  | 10.1                                           | 0.2      | 7.0                                           | 2.5                                               | 3.4       | 3.3                                         | 1.1                                             |                                           |
| Mari El Republic     | 100   | 19.4                             | 0.0                  | 0.1             | 20.2              | 8.1                                              | 6.7          | 11.4                                                           | 1.2                  | 10.3                                           | 0.0      | 4.7                                           | 5.9                                               | 5.6       | 5.0                                         | 1.4                                             |                                           |
| Republic of Mordovia | 100   | 20.2                             | 0.0                  | 0.0             | 24.4              | 5.9                                              | 11.5         | 10.8                                                           | 0.5                  | 6.4                                           | 0.0      | 5.7                                           | 5.2                                               | 4.3       | 4.0                                         | 1.1                                             |                                           |
| Republic of Tatarstan| 100   | 7.8                              | 0.0                  | 30.9            | 16.9              | 1.9                                              | 10.0         | 11.2                                                          | 0.5                  | 7.3                                           | 0.5      | 4.8                                           | 1.8                                               | 2.6       | 2.3                                         | 1.5                                             |                                           |
| Udmurt Republic      | 100   | 6.8                              | 0.0                  | 26.7            | 21.3              | 3.4                                              | 6.8          | 9.8                                                            | 0.6                  | 9.4                                           | 0.0      | 4.2                                           | 2.7                                               | 3.5       | 3.5                                         | 1.3                                             |                                           |
| Chuvash Republic     | 100   | 13.7                             | 0.0                  | 0.1             | 23.0              | 7.5                                              | 10.5         | 14.3                                                          | 1.0                  | 8.1                                           | 0.3      | 5.7                                           | 4.6                                               | 4.6       | 4.9                                         | 1.7                                             |                                           |
| Perm district        | 100   | 3.3                              | 0.0                  | 15.7            | 29.4              | 4.1                                              | 3.2          | 14.1                                                          | 0.7                  | 10.2                                           | 0.1      | 9.9                                           | 2.5                                               | 2.8       | 3.2                                         | 0.8                                             |                                           |
| Kirov Oblast         | 100   | 16.4                             | 0.0                  | 0.2             | 21.1              | 5.8                                              | 4.1          | 12.4                                                          | 1.1                  | 15.5                                           | 0.0      | 6.2                                           | 5.9                                               | 4.9       | 5.1                                         | 1.3                                             |                                           |
| Nizhny Novgorod Oblast| 100   | 5.5                              | 0.0                  | 0.0             | 30.6              | 3.8                                              | 4.8          | 21.0                                                          | 0.8                  | 11.4                                           | 1.0      | 10.8                                          | 3.3                                               | 2.8       | 3.3                                         | 0.9                                             |                                           |
| Orenburg Oblast      | 100   | 8.8                              | 0.0                  | 37.0            | 16.0              | 3.6                                              | 3.9          | 8.2                                                           | 0.7                  | 7.7                                           | 0.0      | 4.0                                           | 3.0                                               | 2.6       | 4.0                                         | 0.5                                             |                                           |
| Penza Oblast         | 100   | 13.3                             | 0.1                  | 0.8             | 18.9              | 4.3                                              | 5.7          | 16.3                                                          | 0.7                  | 16.9                                           | 0.0      | 8.1                                           | 4.6                                               | 4.7       | 4.5                                         | 1.1                                             |                                           |
| Samara Oblast        | 100   | 4.5                              | 0.0                  | 10.8            | 29.9              | 4.0                                              | 4.6          | 14.9                                                          | 0.7                  | 12.0                                           | 0.4      | 10.1                                          | 2.4                                               | 2.5       | 2.3                                         | 0.9                                             |                                           |
| Saratov Oblast       | 100   | 15.0                             | 0.0                  | 4.0             | 16.8              | 8.3                                              | 7.8          | 14.6                                                          | 0.6                  | 14.7                                           | 0.1      | 5.4                                           | 4.1                                               | 3.9       | 3.6                                         | 1.1                                             |                                           |
| Ulyanovsk Oblast     | 100   | 10.9                             | 0.0                  | 3.3             | 19.8              | 5.3                                              | 4.4          | 20.3                                                          | 0.5                  | 13.9                                           | 0.6      | 7.3                                           | 4.5                                               | 3.8       | 4.2                                         | 1.2                                             |                                           |
### Sectoral Structure of Gross Value Added in 2009 (at Current Basic Prices; in % of total) *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Agriculture, hunting and forestry</th>
<th>Fishing, fish rearing</th>
<th>Mining operations</th>
<th>Manufacturing</th>
<th>Production and distribution of electric energy, gas and water</th>
<th>Construction</th>
<th>Wholesale and retail trade, repairing vehicles and household goods</th>
<th>Hotels and restaurants</th>
<th>Transport and communication</th>
<th>Finance</th>
<th>Real estate operations, renting and service delivery</th>
<th>State administration and military security, mandatory social security</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Health care and social services delivery</th>
<th>Delivery of other communal, social and personal services</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation from the sum of subjects</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volga Federal District</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
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<td>Mari El Republic</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>9.4</td>
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<td>6.7</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>4.6</td>
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<td>Perm district</td>
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<td>26.5</td>
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<td>0.1</td>
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<td>5.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
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<td>8.0</td>
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<td>5.0</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>1.7</td>
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<td>0.1</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orenburg Oblast</td>
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<td>Penza Oblast</td>
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<td>15.8</td>
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<td>6.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
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<td>4.2</td>
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<td>3.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
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</table>

* Comp. by: [Regiony' Rossi, 2011, p. 367].
Chapter 7. Place of Tatarstan in the Global Coordinate System of Socio-Economic Development of the Volga Region and Russia

Table 3.26

The Place of the Republic of Tatarstan Regarding Main Socio-Economic Indicators in the Russian Federation in 2010*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. in sequence</th>
<th>Index</th>
<th>Republic of Tatarstan</th>
<th>Republic of Bashkortostan</th>
<th>Samara oblast</th>
<th>Nizhny Novgorod Oblast</th>
<th>Perm district</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Gross regional product per capita</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>The volume of shipped goods of own production, completed works and services of own forces by types of economic activities:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>mining operations</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>processing industry</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Products of agriculture</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>29</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Investments in fixed capital per capita</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Receipt of taxes, imposts and other compulsory payments into the budget system of the Russian Federation per capita</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Average monetary income (per month)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Retail turnover per capita</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Number of cars per 1,000 people</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Ratio of paved roads in total length of public roads</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Total area of housing per capita</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Total area of new housing per 1,000 people</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Number of students of higher education institutions per 10,000 people</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table compiled by: [Regiony' Rossi, 2011, pp. 34–35].

of these factors by engaging in political dialogue with the federal government, focusing on breakthrough models and schemes of social and economic development, and using a critical approach towards previously adopted strategic assessments and decisions through consultation with the science and business communities.
§ 3. Tatarstan's Cooperation-Based Positioning as the Global Vector of Historical and Future Leadership

The most evident path of sustainable innovative development of Tatarstan's economy is associated with increased output of high-tech products for the domestic market, CIS countries, and the Customs Union. The large domestic market and the markets of neighboring countries are strategically important for Russia's economic security and anti-crisis policies. In addition, they serve as an intermediate stage for the accumulation of competitive advantages on technological markets and gaining a foothold in developed countries. Tatarstan is able to simultaneously perform its traditional role as a bridge between Europe and Asia as well as a domestic inter-regional cooperative center, thereby strengthening its technological leadership and utilizing historical trade advantages, bolstered by promising new methods of cross-border transportation and logistics services. The use of a modernized cooperation-based trading position, the contours of which were set in the 19th century, improved by the addition of industrial cooperation—this is the basic thesis that will determine the future competitiveness of the region. The genesis and problematic positions of the corresponding setup are determined by the following analytical cross-sections.

As can be seen from Table 3.27, in the structure of exports and imports with non-CIS countries, Tatarstan is predominantly positioned as a producer of raw materials. The share of raw materials in total exports is more than 80%, while the share of products of chemical, petrochemical, machine building, and mechanical engineering industries is less than 20%. In regards to imports, the ratio is reversed: The share of products of machine building, mechanical engineering, chemical and petrochemical industries approaches 89%.

The situation is different in relation to the CIS countries. In this case, Tatarstan's profile is formed as a high-tech region. Here, the share of products from the chemical and petrochemical industries, machine building and engineering make up about 50%, which is even slightly higher than the share of mineral products. In regards to imports, there is a significant decline in the share of products from machine building, mechanical engineering, and the chemical and petrochemical industries—65%. Obviously, this structure is more balanced; it reveals equal development levels and the prospect of fully equal partner relations, in which each country can accumulate a positive supply of raw materials as well as high-tech industrial competitive cooperation.

However, as can be seen from Table 3.28, the ratio of exports and imports of products by the republic's enterprises and organizations reveals a huge advantage in favor of non-CIS countries. The total exports and imports of these countries exceed the corresponding total for CIS countries by approximately 8 times. The levelling of this imbalance is a promising sphere of the Republic's strategy for economic and foreign trade development. The development dynamics of neighboring countries, Russia's 'soft underbelly', will further increase the relevance of this task.

Interregional trade defines an even more advantageous position for the republic. In 2011, certain types of products in Tatarstan's structure of exports were presented as follows:

- Trucks—25.5%;
- Synthetic resins and plastics—18.5%;
- Tyres—8.2%;
- Oil—7.5%;
- Diesel fuel—3.6%;
- Steel pipes—1.4%;
- Fuel oil—1.3%;
- Synthetic rubber—0.9%;
- Other—5.2%.

In this structure, the share of raw materials and primary products of processing is less than 10%. At the same time, the share of technological products appreciably exceeds 50%. As for the structure of imports to the Republic of Tatarstan, consumer products accounted 42%, for the most significant share of imports from other Russian regions in 2012. It indicates the
Chapter 7. Place of Tatarstan in the Global Coordinate System of Socio-Economic Development of the Volga Region and Russia

Table 3.27

The Share of Individual Products in the Export and Import Structure of Enterprises and Organizations in the Republic of Tatarstan in 2010*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product item</th>
<th>Export</th>
<th>Import</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-CIS countries</td>
<td>Countries CIS</td>
<td>Non-CIS countries</td>
<td>Countries CIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mineral products</td>
<td>83.0</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>products of chemical and petrochemical complex</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>machinery, equipment, tools and transportation means, and their parts</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>73.9</td>
<td>59.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table compiled by data: [Respublika Tatarstan, 2010, p. 487].

underutilized production of end productions in the republic.

The top ten regions that are deeply engaged in trade and economic activities with Tatarstan include the city of Moscow, the Moscow and Samara oblasts, the Republic of Bashkortostan, the Chelyabinsk, Nizhny Novgorod and Sverdlovsk oblasts, St. Petersburg, the Chuvash Republic, and the Volgograd oblast, accounting for more than 55% of Tatarstan's interregional trade. However, with the exception of separate average figures for the development of regions, for example, the Chuvash Republic, Tatarstan itself is not the leading partner in most cases. This is especially relevant for large 'locomotive' regions. The republic's interregional trade turnover in 2010 amounted to 328.5 billion rubles, which provides a basis for presenting the following cumulative total turnover structure that goes beyond Tatarstan: Non-CIS countries—56.2%, CIS countries—7%, Russian regions—36.8%. That is, the amount of inter-regional commodity turnover and commodity turnover with the CIS countries is substantially less than that with non-CIS countries. This indicates that the benefits of the sectoral structure of the Republic of Tatarstan have not been used in full in interregional commodity turnover and commodity turnover with CIS countries. Moreover, the range of non-CIS countries involved in active trade relations with the republic is quite narrow. Dominating

Table 3.28

Structure of Total Exports and Imports of Products by Enterprises and Organizations of the Republic of Tatarstan per Group of Countries in 2010*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Export</th>
<th>Import</th>
<th>Total (export and import)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Volume (mln USD)</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Volume (mln USD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-CIS countries</td>
<td>14596.3</td>
<td>89.8</td>
<td>2148.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS countries</td>
<td>1661.6</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>428.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>16257.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>2577.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table compiled by data: [Respublika Tatarstan, 2010, pp. 487–489].
positions are held by European countries and a limited number of Asian countries, with Turkey in a traditionally prominent place. As of 2010, the structure of countries accounting for 1% or more of Tatarstan's foreign trade turnover was as follows: Poland—16.3%; Germany—9.7%; the Netherlands—9.2%; Italy—8.4%; Turkey—8.0%; Hungary—6.3%; Belarus—4.9%; Latvia—2.9%; France—2.6%; Croatia—2.6%; Kazakhstan—2.5%; China—2%; Belgium—1.9%; Ukraine—1.9%; Great Britain—1.8%; Bulgaria—1.5%; the USA—1.4%; Finland—1.3%; Sweden—1.2%; Bosnia and Herzegovina—1.1%; Canada—1.1%; Egypt—1%. In short, positive associations with Tatarstan's function today as the 'bridge between Europe and Asia' cannot be established. However, the objective course of economic development on Asian markets and an increase in the share of high-tech production in the Republic of Tatarstan will shift it towards a well-balanced structure of trade turnover. This process will substantially accelerate the formation of the largest international transport corridor projects passing through the territory of the republic. This relates to the existing 'West-East' ITC (Transsiberian), the 'North-South' ITC under formation, and the new 'Europe-Western China' ITC, in the phase of construction.

In particular, the international transport corridor 'North-South' will connect Central Europe and Scandinavia with South Asia and the Middle East. An agreement on establishing such a corridor was signed on 12 September 2000 at the II International Euro-Asian Conference on Transport, held in St. Petersburg, by the Minister of Transport and Communications of Russia, the Minister of Transportation of India, and the Minister of Roads and Transportation of Iran.

The idea of creating the 'North-South' transport corridor appeared in the early 1990s. The project is of strategic importance for Russia. The 'North-South' corridor is intended to return the direction of foreign trade cargo flows along the Caspian Sea coast and Iran, and to significantly increase the volume of trade flows with Kazakhstan, Central Asia countries and China. Up to 15% of the cargo transportation between Western Europe and East Asia can be carried out through Russia. The Russian budget will annually receive payments for transit. At the same time, the carriers themselves, as it is written in the agreement, will be exempt from paying taxes.

After the 48th session of the UNO Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, a comprehensive project for the development of land transport infrastructure in Asia was approved. The Russian Federation has started to develop a national plan for the implementation of the goals set out by the participants of the project. Considerable attention is paid to the development and improvement of routes in the 'East-West' direction with the use of road networks, linking Russia with Kazakhstan, Mongolia, China, and the Korean peninsula. Ongoing studies will determine the optimal and mutually beneficial international routes for transit. In general, the deployment of transport corridors in eastern and south-eastern areas has certain advantages in comparison with the southern direction, given the rapidly developing Chinese economy and the complex geopolitical situation in South Asia.

One of the routes being considered to develop international highways in the North Europe–Central and East Asia direction is the 'St. Petersburg–border of the Republic of Kazakhstan' route within the new road corridor 'Europe–Western China'.

The special role of the Republic of Tatarstan in the system of international transport corridors is secured by a number of circumstances. Tatarstan is one of the most economically developed regions of Russia. At the same time, the republic has an exceptionally favorable economic and geographical position, being located almost in the center of the economically developed Volga federal district, between the industrial regions of Central Russia and the Urals. The region occupies a favorable position with respect to important raw material bases in the Urals and Siberia, and agricultural areas in the Volga region.

Tatarstan has a cost-effective transport and geographical position, being at the intersection of air, rail, road and river routes of stra-
The words of the President of Russia, said at a meeting dedicated to the 1000th anniversary of Kazan on 26 August 2005, should be viewed in this context: ‘...building strong and lasting relationships with the Kazan Khanate, Russian rulers began to consciously shape Russia as an integrated Eurasian power. I would like to stress: here, in the Volga region, the role of Russia as a bridge between the two great civilizations—European and Asian—is more obvious than anywhere else’ [Putin, 2005].

Road transport plays a particular role in the modern world. Companies in virtually all sectors of the Republic of Tatarstan prefer this mode of transportation for their goods. Road transport is chosen 3.7 times more frequently by Tatarstan's industrial production enterprises than rail by using the complex parameter 'transport speed/cost of transportation'. Road transport is an absolute priority for industries such as textile, food, dairy, as well as all branches of the agricultural complex of the republic. On average, the share of costs spent on truck transportation in recent years was about 6% of the total cost of production in the material-manufacturing industry, while rail and inland waterway transport modes accounted for much smaller figures and did not exceed one percent. This clearly demonstrates the high demand for road transport. Based on this, it can be argued that the Republic of Tatarstan has the ability to provide effective management and organization of large sections of international road corridors. The Kazakh government is positive about the participation of the Republic of Tatarstan in the 'Europe-Russia-Kazakhstan-China' highway project. After a meeting attended by the Prime Minister of the Republic of Tatarstan R. Minnikhanov (current President of the Republic of Tatarstan), the Prime Minister of Kazakhstan D. Akhmetov reported about the unique possibility to build the shortest possible road, which would include Kazan along with St. Petersburg, Orenburg, and several cities in Kazakhstan.

Tatarstan's participation in the construction of this route was supported by the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev, and governors of the regions, the territory of which was included or in the vicinity of the corridor, including the Vologda, Leningrad, Kostroma, Kirov, and Orenburg oblasts, and St. Petersburg.

Given the republic's economic potential, it can play a leading role in the formation of the central company to develop and operate the Russian section of the road corridor under consideration. The corresponding shares in the company's authorized capital may be made by KAMAZ, OJC and a number of other national companies, including Tatneft, OJC. The company's functions may include cargo shipping within the road corridor, maintenance, and refueling. Cars manufactured by the Tatarstan-based enterprise are suitable for the transportation of goods all over the Russian section, as well as over large parts of the Kazakh and Chinese sections, taking into account the quality of roads and the nature of goods being transported through the territories of these states. In the case of direct rehandling of container cargos at (mainly western) border control points from foreign vehicles to Russian ones, the time spent on customs examination of the vehicles will be lower, which will significantly reduce the time spent during border-crossing operations and will increase the efficiency of the total transport cycle.
§ 4. Interbudgetary Relations as a Strategic Incentive in the Development of the Republic of Tatarstan

Interbudgetary relations, both in theory and in practice, are the main mechanism for financial interconnection, ensuring the existence of the country’s fiscal system, capable not only of maintaining but also of destroying the integrity and unity of the federal government as a result of the weakening of regions, and then of the federal center itself. In this sense, these relations are not only an economic but also a political aspect of social life in Russia.

The current level of development of intergovernmental relations is marked by reasonably clear eclecticism, complexity and subjectivity, which reduce the efficiency of the entire system of power relations between the center and the regions and between the region and the territories of local governments, and which largely determine the lack of strong and effective state regional policies. Ten years ago, these shortcomings and problems could be explained by the short duration of Russian federal relations, but now it can only be described as one of the characteristics of long-term neglect of the problem of Russian federalism by the country’s authorities, leading also to the weakening of relevant scientific, social and political potency. Much of the scientific research in this case is limited to modernizing the existing construction rather than changing its backbone foundation.

Developed and effective interbudgetary relations are one of the most important criteria of the maturity of a federal state. As international practice shows, these relationships are constantly evolving and acquiring specific features in each country. But it would be very shortsighted to fail to see the similarities inherent in them.

The formation of Russia’s model of budgetary federalism is associated with a number of fundamentally unique conditions. For this reason, the process cannot be reduced to mechanically copying the Swiss, German, American, etc. options in the early stage. Nevertheless, it is important to identify a number of similarities that unite the Russian model with relevant counterparts. It is necessary to take into account that tax systems of developed countries are strongly differentiated. The differentiation is characterized either by the predominance of characteristics of federalism or unitary government (the USA and France), or the nature of the initial processes that led to the formation of the federal state—’bottom-up’ (the USA) or ‘top-down’ (Germany). Both unitarianism and the ‘top-down’ formation of a federal state determine a reduced autonomy of regional and local budgets, as well as the strengthening of interbudgetary redistribution processes.

It is of great significance to define the appropriate targets or groups of targets that determine the initial orientation of the entire process of forming the basis for budgetary federalism, no less than the terms and conditions of it. They include:

- Balancing territorial development;
- Solving of public problems and meeting national interests (in terms of production and transport infrastructure, defense capability, providing basic levels of education and health, etc.);
- Creating incentives for the development of initiatives made by individual territories.

In Russia, the list of targets is being, or may be, expanded:

- Policies for social and cultural development of individual nations and peoples (which was not originally observed in the formation of, for example, German and American interbudgetary models);
- Creating additional centripetal economic gravitation, without which the largest Russian territorial space is doomed to decay under the influence of market processes.

While Russia’s first additional goal determines the strengthening of fiscal decentralization processes, the second one focuses on their flow in the opposite direction.

The contradiction between the ‘compression’ of tax revenues to regional budgets and the relatively small volume of ‘secondary’ re-
source reallocation in favor of the country's regions was characteristic of the late 1990s. It remains in force at the beginning of the new century as well. In 2001–2002, the ratio of tax revenues to be distributed between the federal treasury and regional budgets was about 50/50. By 2006 Russian regions were receiving just over 30% of the taxes collected. As a result, in 2006 the share of internally-raised funds in regional budgets decreased to 13% [Budget circulation, 2007] (revenues from regional and local taxes as early as 2005 were only 13.2%). The situation did not change much even when it came to strong regions. Thus, by the end of 2011, the distribution of taxes collected in the territory of Tatarstan for the federal and republican budgets was as follows: 68% of those taxes went to the Russian budget, 32% of them remained in the republic's consolidated budget. And in reverse: even in the prosperous year of 2007, intergovernmental transfers accounted for more than one-third of federal spendings. The same concept was applied in the formation of municipal budgets.

Excessive 'compression' of budget capabilities of Russia's regions takes place not only in quantitative but also in qualitative terms. This is reflected in the fact that the vast majority of tax revenues from regional and local budgets is formed at the expense of deductions from federal taxes. It is important to note that in the tax structure of regional budgets, the majority is represented by so-called 'hard-to-collect' taxes. This sharply distinguishes Russia from most other federal states.

The gradual compression of the formal budgetary capabilities of the Russian regions, as well as the avoidance of the federal center to take direct responsibility for the state of socio-economic processes in these regions, gave rise to the situation in which non-budget forms of financing began to intensively develop in the country's regions in order to fulfill the commitments and responsibilities of regional authorities.

This makes them 'dependent' on the interests of regional financial and industrial groups, decreasing the possibility of objective assessments of the region's level of socio-economic development and the development of market management principles. On the other hand, given the shortage of formal possibilities for financing of social and economic development, regional administrations can shift the responsibility for the state of their region's finances to the federal center. 'Federal budget lobbying' has been intensively developing, becoming the primary tool for assessing the quality of regional officials. It is impossible not to notice that all of this forms the prerequisite for total dependency and corruption. One of the consequences of the situation with territorial budgets has been increasing interterritorial differentiation in the budgets for socially-important expenditures and in providing the population with basic budgetary services. The differences among all categories of expenditures are declining, but very slowly, despite all formal 'efforts' to equalize regional levels via significant transfer reallocations. In 2010, this difference was approximately 13 times (Chukotka autonomous district–333,882 thous. rubles, Bryansk oblast–26,45 thous. rubles) [Calculated according to: Regiony' Rossi, 2011, pp. 54, 55, 838, 839]. Even if this figure is recalculated by the budget spending index (BSI), which takes into account price levels and real purchasing power, it will be at least 3-4 times. It is often said that this situation is the fate of Russia, as it lies in different climatic zones. But then we should look at it from another point of view: transfers should have a stimulating effect aimed at equalizing the levels of territorial development in Russian regions as a result of their own economic development, defined as the volume of GRP per capita. However, in 1998, the difference in levels was 9.44 times, while in 2008 it was 12.24 times (and if the Chechen Republic is considered it was 15 times) [Federal'naya služba, 2008]. Ultimately, there are regions that are extremely restricted in their capabilities; they cannot form a fully-fledged regional budget in general. This logic applies to Tatarstan in full.
However, one cannot say that nothing has been formally done. There are important developments:

1. In 2001, a plan for reforming intergovernmental fiscal relations was approved within the framework of the Budgetary Federalism Development Program of the Russian Federation for the period until 2005. As part of it, authorities attempted to make income directly dependent on the success of local 'tax bases' (local economies); success in attracting investors, promotion of entrepreneurship and growth of small businesses. Here we need to single out the principle of the division of powers between different levels of government. A limited number of commitments (mandates) were entrusted to regions and municipalities; obligations not backed by funding sources were eliminated.

2. In 2005, the Law "On amendments to certain legislative acts of the Russian Federation in connection with improvements in the division of powers" was adopted. Accordingly, the creation of the "Institution of Voluntary Powers" was declared, which the regions could utilize unilaterally, even in the absence of funding sources.

3. In 2006, the Concept for improving the efficiency of interbudgetary relations and the quality of managing public and municipal finances in the Russian Federation was adopted. In 2007, the methodology for assessing 'the efficiency of regional authorities' work' in terms of expenditures of regional budgets was adopted; it included 43 indicators to evaluate the work of governors in the previous year as well as their plans for the next three years.

However, the principle of developing a tax base, including their structure and scope of initiatives, was not affected much. There was an attempt to substitute the accountability reports of regional governors to their regions' populations based on their electoral platforms with an assessment of the governors by the federal government in the conditions of a tightening power vertical.

In many aspects, responsibility for budgetary expenses has been simply lost or deliberately replaced with the creation of more points of responsibility (that is, in principle, the same thing). We are talking about the provision of major services. Let's take school education, for example. A school, formally a municipal institution, is financed from three different budgets at the same time. In this way, classroom management is provided for by the federal budget, salaries—from the regional budget, and the cost of repairs of school buildings and technical maintenance—from the municipal budget. As they say, too many cooks spoil the broth...

Close to the start of the electoral process in 2011, the federal government introduced a package of bills, securing serious changes in the allocation of powers and budgetary resources in favor of regions and municipalities. Additional income of regions, in this case, is expected to account to up to a trillion rubles. The practical implementation can begin in 2013 and last for three to five years. The structure of the proposals is approximately as follows:

1. a number of taxes to be paid not to the federal centre but to regions directly, the tax burden will differ from region to region;
2. a limited number of commitments (mandates) is entrusted to regions and municipalities; obligations, not backed by funding sources, are eliminated.
3. a corporate income tax at a rate of 2% and a water tax, which will allow increasing the revenues of regional budgets, are transferred to the regional level additionally;
4. it is expected to develop a mechanism of incentive grants to regions, 'which reached the best results in entrepreneurship and investment development';
5. benefits for regional and local taxes, established by federal laws, are partially cancelled;
6. it is probable that excise duties on ethyl alcohol, tobacco products, alcohol products, motor gasoline, diesel fuel, etc. will be transferred to regions.

Of course, the transfer of certain taxes in the order of splitting them, and the cancellation of certain benefits increase incentives for regions. It fits into the concept of 'improvement', not the 'fundamental change' in the ideology of intergovernmental relations, as mentioned above. Therefore, we consider it possible to offer a different approach to solving the problem.
§ 5. Interbudgetary Relations Organisation Model

1. Interbudgetary relations are based on the distribution of the rights and powers of the federal centre, regions and municipalities. The minimum amount of powers conferred on each level is mandatory. Further scope of the powers is stipulated by a special agreement between the higher and lower levels of the government. This way, the amount of taxes (duties) that go to a higher budget, decreases. The failure to execute the mandatory scope of powers is seen as a temporary situation, to be eliminated during the regulatory period. It is necessary to proceed from the conditions of the need and possibility to ensure the profitability of economies throughout the country. The potential effectiveness of the regional economy should be determined on the basis of zoning and defining baseline standards for assessing the effectiveness of potential resource groups.

2. The federal budget is replenished at the expense of a single federal tax on gross regional product, or the amount of produced and sold goods and services, to cover the general needs of the state. This guarantees that the federal budget will be replenished and limits the excessive impact on the cost aspect ratio, which is the prerogative of the market regulator. In some cases, during an additional stimulation of certain sectors of the economy, sectoral taxes on manufactured goods and rendered services may be introduced instead of general federal taxes. In any case, the introduction of a reduced sectoral tax rate will determine the minimising of interbudgetary transfers.

3. Regions with a gross regional product per capita above average in fixed percentage terms pay a supplementary fee, which does not undermine their interest in further enhancing of the regional product.

4. The size of the federal tax on the GRP share or goods and services with the nature of rent is established separately. Its size is greater than the size of the standard duty, defined in Clause 2.

5. General state functions are met via federal taxes, which also ensure the financing of general federal development projects and the temporary transfer assistance to regions.

6. Regions with a GRP per capita below the average level by more than a certain percentage, which is defined as excess deviation, receive temporary transfer assistance. Such a region receives this transfer for a limited period of time with the obligation to reach the prescribed level in a certain period of time.

7. Interregional infrastructure projects should be funded at the expense of normative distribution of the total amount between the federal budget, regional budgets and private investments. Intraregional projects have to be covered at the expense of regional budgets, collective investment funds, and private investments. At the same time, the funds of regional bonds and instruments of regional security should be actively used.

8. A special place in the system of budgets at each level should be taken by reserve funds. These funds should be used as a reserve for unforeseen expenses, as well as to secure guarantees and form the interbudgetary lending system. In this case, an important area of the budget should be horizontal interaction between constituent entities of the federation, municipal districts, as an alternative to the vertical transfer system, which is based on the regional initiative of cooperative interaction.

9. General federal projects that are alternatively implemented in different regions should be performed via tenders only, based on formal criteria, determined by the state expert council, with an obligatory final evaluation of the selected algorithm by the public through the mass media.

10. Regions themselves determine the structure of internal taxes, which is one of the foundations of the election platform for regional governments. A limited list of taxes that are socio-political in nature and define the general socio-political stability in society may be required (for example, a progressive scale of taxation of incomes and property).
11. A similar scheme operates in the relations between regional and municipal budgets. However, it is necessary to prevent the duplication of regional and municipal taxes.

12. The total amount of allocated taxes and duties should have a clear priority – a lower budget level, which is determined during the development of appropriate standards.

11. It is necessary to set deadlines, when the region should reach the desired level of gross regional product per capita, as well as the level of profitability (ratio of the difference between total regional income and losses to the gross regional product), thereby providing extra-transfer financing of regional social standards, some of which have federal foundations (minimum social standards), while the other part is determined by a mandatory election platform of the regional administration. If this deadline is exceeded and no corresponding values are achieved, we can then talk about the need for a series of reorganisational measures (as well as in the case of exceeding the critical volume of overdue regional loans). The first of these is reduced to elective replacement of top officials of the region and, in the absence of the corresponding effect of the measure (within a certain period):

- Submission of the region to direct federal administration;
- Inclusion of this region in the neighboring stably developing one;
- Inclusion of the region in the management jurisdiction of the lender region.

It is possible to expand the list of these re-organisational measures. But in any case, they should be based on business guidelines for this region. A similar scheme can be applied to the level of municipal administration.

However, when forming the structure of Russia's interbudgetary organisation that raises the status of regional financial autonomy, it should be borne in mind that, if the federal government, for political or other reasons, is not able to withstand severe budget constraints, the decentralisation of power will lead to an increase in economic efficiency, but it also could undermine macroeconomic stability.

It is necessary to form target programs on the development of territories and territorial development funds ("development budgets") with increased investment shares in every region. That is, the priority of mechanical alignment of socio-economic levels of the regional development at the expense of centralised redistribution of budgetary funds should be changed in favour of the alignment, based on the accelerated development of areas, where a higher-level budget ensures the implementation of interregional infrastructure development programs and the required regime of guarantees for regional industrial development projects. In today's Russia, when the corporate financial and banking market is not able to dramatically increase its involvement in this field for many reasons, this approach is extremely necessary.

This model is able to give a strong impetus to 'locomotive' regions, broadcasting their potency of the cooperative development system to similar systems in peripheral regions. In this perspective, the configuration of Tatarstan's leading position, coupled with the responsibility for the integrated economy system of the Volga region and Russia's economy as a whole, will be reinforced. This corresponds to a full-scale response in terms of creating effective alternatives of federal relations, positively perceived by both domestic and foreign political and business communities, civil society organisations and the public.
Chapter 8. State Development of the Republic of Tatarstan at the Beginning of the 21st Century

§ 1. New Treaty Meets Modern Realities

Indus Tagirov

On 26 June 2007, Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation, and Mintimer Shaimiev, President of the Republic of Tatarstan, signed an updated version of the Treaty between the federal centre and the Republic of Tatarstan. This act was a continuation of the contractual principles, laid in the foundation of Russia's statehood.

Due to historical conditions, unitarianism and federalism have always coexisted in Russia. By 862 AD, the ancient Russian state consisted of more than a dozen principalities, most of which were in "thoroughly set" contractual relationships.

Turkic-Tatar states, starting with the Turkic Khanate, also functioned on a federal basis. All of this was inherited by the Muscovite state. It evolved from a complicated relationship between Russian principalities, above which the Muscovite principality was steadily rising. Some of the principalities became part of the Moscovite State by virtue of the existing contractual relations, others were included in it as a result of armed clashes. A decisive role in the rise of Moscow played the Golden Horde, khans of which patronised Moscow princes. The Tatar factor was constantly present in the subsequent periods of the Russian state's development.

As Russia transformed into an Empire, the beginning of which dates back to the merger of Tatar states and Bashkiria's voluntary entry into the country's structure, the elements of the contractual relations intensified.

The Soviet state, which appeared after the October Revolution of 1917, was also developing on the basis of contractual and federal relations. The Declaration of Rights of Working and Exploited People, adopted by the 3rd All-Russian Congress of Soviets in January 1918, proclaimed: 'The Soviet Socialist Republic is established on the basis of a free union of free nations, as a federation of Soviet national republics' [Dekrety Sovetskoj vlasti, 1917, p.341]. The Congress's decision on the main provisions of the RSFSR Constitution stated that delimitation of the scope and activities of the federation of republics should be determined by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Central Executive Committees of such republics.

Established in 1922, the USSR was also founded on the Union Treaty. However, the principles of free will, first enunciated in the documents of the Soviet Power, remained valid only on paper. Vladimir Lenin agreed to recognize the federation out of necessity, he realised that it was an alternative to the country's disintegration. In his theory, he brilliantly combined the principles of federalism, centralism and unitarianism, absolutely incompatible in practice. Despite their centrist beliefs, the Bolsheviks extended the life of the Empire for another 80 years by formally declaring the federation.

But it is impossible to deceive the history, and this pseudo-federation faced the threat of disintegration. Lenin's companions, especially after his death, did everything to eliminate the national republics and convert them into ordinary administrative units.

During the perestroika years, the issue of using contractual relations in the country was
first designated by Tatarstan after the adoption of the Declaration on State Sovereignty. During the discussions on the republic's status, which lasted for three years, the delegation of the Russian Federation regularly had to deal with the issue of establishing contractual relations between Russia and Tatarstan. As a result, such a treaty was concluded on 15 February 1994. More than forty constituent entities of the Federation, which concluded treaties on the delimitation of powers and jurisdiction with the Russian government, followed Tatarstan's lead. Thus, Tatarstan was able to put the formally federated Russia on truly federal rails.

Not everyone was pleased with the practice of contractual relations in the Russian Federation. It endured violent attacks, resulting in the fact that all constituent entities of the Federation, which entered into treaties with the federal centre, refused to extend them. Tatarstan alone remained faithful to the contractual practices. The republic's government believed that it was necessary not only for Tatarstan but for the whole Russia as well. Evidence suggests that the Republic of Tatarstan, while relying on the powers, recognised by Russia in the Treaty of 1994, came to the forefront of social and economic development.

The Summit of heads of the CIS countries, held in 2005 in Kazan in the celebration of the 1000th anniversary of the republic's capital, showed the effectiveness of the social and economic policy of Tatarstan's government. It served as a proof that the Treaty of 1994 played a huge role in the development of federal relations in Russia.

A new stage of the struggle for the continuation of the republic's contractual development took place in the context of Tatarstan's achievements. The aim was to multiply these advances, which were a model for other regions. Negotiations on this issue began in Nizhny Novgorod. The delegation of the Russian Federation was headed by Dmitry Kozak, Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation. The delegation of the Republic of Tatarstan was headed by F. Mukhametshin, Chairman of the State Council. The negotiations, which lasted two years, proved to be difficult. Positions, set out in the previous version, were conceded one by one.

However, it turned out that the most difficult was yet to come. Supporters of the unitary imperial development became active again. They tried to scare the public, stating that the treaty would destroy Russia and strengthen centrifugal tendencies.

However, Russian President Vladimir Putin supported the draft treaty and submitted it to the State Duma. The Duma approved it by a majority vote. Those who were dissatisfied with such an outcome tried to change the situation. Sergey Mironov, Chairman of the Federation Council, made an official statement that he opposed the treaty, which was politically dangerous, threatening the integrity of Russia, though neither Russia's president nor the State Duma had seen any political danger or a threat to Russia's integrity in the document.

The discussion took place in the Federation Council in accordance with the ready-made program, contained in the statement of Sergey Mironov, the Chairman of the Federation Council. It should be noted that such a statement was contrary to the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, as reflected in the preamble and in Article 5 of the Constitution of RF. It is also in contradiction with Article 11, which stipulates that the delimitation of jurisdiction and powers between the government and the authorities of Russian regions shall be carried out within the Constitution, federal and other treaties on the delimitation of powers. As it is known, Tatarstan did not sign the Federal Treaty, and the delimitation of powers between the federal government and Tatarstan was carried out on the basis of a bilateral treaty, dated 15 February 1994.

Of course, opponents of the document could add their commentary, although the draft treaty had already been repeatedly examined at the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation and by the State Duma. But the Federation Council member-opponents of the draft treaty presented their 'philippics' against it, based not on the position of the President.
and the State Duma, but on a planned goal, pursued by Sergey Mironov, who sought to 'sink' the new treaty come what may.

Before proceeding to the analysis 'article by article', the Federation Council members had to decide on the possibility or impossibility of contractual relations in the current Russian state. No lawyer could speak up against it, since this would be contrary to the constitutional provision. But the fundamental question strangely remained 'behind the scenes'.

The Federation Council members, however, moved to the article by article analysis of the proposed bill, coming to the conclusion that it had nothing new but merely repeated the provisions of the Constitution of the Russian Federation. In fact, the draft treaty specifies those provisions, thereby creating a mechanism to implement them. And the federal Constitution becomes a working document. Unfortunately, the Federation Council failed to notice merits of the draft treaty at this stage.

During the discussion, some senators, including our compatriot R. Altynaev, tried to prove that Tatarstan lacked any particular features that would open up the possibility of establishing contractual relations with the federal centre. The question arises, if Tatarstan lacks such features, then what region has them? Altynaev himself, serving as the Head of the Naberezhnye Chelny City Administration and a member of the Supreme Council of Tatarstan, said a lot about them. Thus, during the adoption of the Declaration on the state sovereignty of Tatarstan and the referendum, he defended the special status of the republic and strongly supported Tatarstan's contractual relations with the federal centre.

If we talk about features, they can be divided into two groups — historical and contemporary, originating from modern realities.

The main historical feature is the role, played by the Tatars in the formation of the Russian state. It is enough to look at the relevant works by N. Karamzin, S. Solovyov, V. Klyuchevsky, and a number of contemporary authors such as V. Tishkov, A. Fursov, Yu. Pivovarov. They testify to the importance of the Tatar factor in the development of the Muscovite state.

The second historical feature of Tatarstan is its entry into Russia. Part of the Tatars, for example Ryazan, Kasimov and Nizhny Novgorod, became part of Russia voluntarily, as we know. However, the Kazan Khanate, as it is written in numerous works of domestic and foreign historians, was annexed by Russia in an aggressive way. Therefore, Tatarstan does not celebrate it today as the other republics, which entered Russia voluntary, do. The historical value of the Treaty of 15 February 1994 lies in certain legitimising of its relations with the federal centre. The new treaty is intended to bring these relations in line with the modern realities.

The third feature is the historical memory of the Tatar people, which preserves the thousand-year history of its statehood. The Tatars have always dreamed of equality and a decent life in Russia. Relations with the Russian population evolved a special way after 1552. At the upper level, there was a gradual merging of Tatar ruling groups with the elite part of Russia's society, while strong neighborly, friendly relations developed at the level of the lower classes, as a result of centuries of cohabitation, withstanding the test of time. This is the capital, which you cannot neglect or jeopardise in any case.

The fourth historical feature is the wounded national pride of the Tatars, resulting from accretions of injustice towards them by the state. In school textbooks and works of historians, the Tatars are presented as wild, barbaric people, who caused a lot of troubles to Russia and the Russian people, for example, the myth of the 300-year-old Tatar yoke, which became the cause of Russia's centuries-old backwardness from the West. The treaty is designed to remove these accretions and eradicate the remnants of the 'status' of the conquered people. The previous treaty, in addition to the benefits that had emerged to promote Russia on its path of the federal democratic development, worked in this direction as well.

As for contemporary realities, it is known that only a quarter of the Tatar population of
the Russian Federation lives in Tatarstan. The rest of them are mainly concentrated in Russia and in neighbouring countries. For them, Tatarstan is a centre, where their national culture develops, the sole basis for preservation of the Tatar language, traditions and customs, ultimately, a guarantee for their ethnic survival.

For example, a little more than 2,000–3,000 Tatars remain in the Ryazan region, most of them preserve their nationality only in their historical memory and in some traditions, they do not know their native language. There are a lot of such regions in Russia. They do not have any schools or cultural institutions, nobody is concerned about establishing them.

The early years of the perestroika returned the Tatars the hope for the revival of their language, customs and traditions. More than 50 national organisations, aiming at national revival, appeared in the country’s regions. More than 20 of them, including ones in Moscow, are registered under the name “Tugan Tel” (“Native language”), which is a reflection of the Tatars’ concerns over the state of their culture, language, and by and large – their future.

All these organisations have been ‘drawn in’ Kazan, which they regard as their spiritual capital, in the hope that Tatarstan’s capital will help them in the revival of the Tatar language, national schools and cultural centres. The Treaty of 15 February 1994 was in conformity with these sentiments of the Tatars. As a result of implementing its provisions, Tatarstan started assisting them in all possible ways.

The establishment and activities of the Federal National Cultural Autonomy of the Tatars of Russia, headquartered in Kazan, became an important stimulus of our nation’s spiritual unity. However, as it is well known, the autonomy of the Tatars, as well as other national and cultural autonomies, does not receive anything from the federal budget. Only the efforts of the Council of the autonomy and local national organisations ensure that some small amounts to carry out certain activities are provided. In other words, the Federal National Cultural Autonomy of the Tatars functions only thanks to Tatarstan’s support.

The Federation Council members criticised the principle of Tatarstan’s co-participation in the implementation of the Russian government’s policies in respect of compatriots abroad. Meanwhile, several million Tatars live in the neighbouring countries and abroad. The republic maintains close contacts with compatriots living abroad, it has a number of interesting projects and thus contributes to the strengthening of Russia’s positions in these areas.

The discussion of the draft treaty between Tatarstan and the federal centre, held in the Federation Council, to some extent resembles the story of the Constitutional Court of Russia, which denounced the referendum in the republic for political rather than legal reasons at the time. At the time the court appeared a politicized institution that stopped responding to their problems and was dissolved for that reason.

Tatarstan was forced to continue fighting for the treaty. It was necessary to prove its significance not only for Tatarstan, but also for Russia. First of all, it was necessary to overcome the veto of the Federation Council. It could be done by a repeated vote in the State Duma, but Tatarstan’s President Mintimer Shaimiev chose a different path. He disagreed with the fact that the Federation Council remained opposed to the treaty. As a supporter of the search of mutual understanding, he called for holding a new discussion in both houses of the Federal Assembly. And this approach proved to be fruitful.

Previously, a few minor changes were made to the draft in accordance with the comments made in the Federation Council. The draft treaty was first approved by the State Duma, then discussed in the Federation Council, and finally got his approval. The President of the Russian Federation signed it, and thus, the treaty was signed into law.

In certain social strata of the republic’s community, the treaty was viewed with a critical eye, being allegedly pointless and giving nothing to the republic.

Of course, the new treaty differed from the previous one in content. However, the essence is different. Unlike the previous agreement, the new document underwent all legal procedures
The treaty of 1994 was signed only by the heads of the governments of the Russian Federation and Tatarstan, and therefore it could not have full legal force. It could be appealed at any time. The new treaty is legally flawless, it is approved by the State Council of Tatarstan and both houses of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, signed by the Presidents of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan. The President of the Russian Federation signed a corresponding law as well, by virtue of which no claims can arise against the Public Authority of the Republic of Tatarstan”,

The treaty makes Tatarstan Russia’s only contractual republic, that is a republic with special status. Russia, since it retains the contractual principle, continues to be a federated country.

The treaty of 2007 provides for developing the principles laid down in the treaty of 1994. The preamble of the document states that it is concluded in view of 'the experience of applying the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan "On Delimitation of Jurisdictional Subjects and Mutual Delegation of Powers between Bodies of Public Authority of the Russian Federation and Bodies of Public Authority of the Republic of Tatarstan", dated 15 February 1994, concluded on the basis of the referendum in the Republic of Tatarstan, held on 21 March 1992, and in accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan.' Consequently, the treaty overrode the decision of the Constitutional Court of Russia, and now the referendum results are legitimate. This is of fundamental importance.

Adding Tatarstan’s cultural and other specific features to the text of the treaty, firstly, disavows the statement about the absence of any special features, secondly, it creates incentives for further national and cultural development.

According to the treaty, Tatarstan retains the right to establish international and foreign economic relations, which today have reached a significant scale.

There is a very important point, which legalises an article in the Constitution of Tatarstan, which refers to the republic’s right to provide 'state support and assistance to compatriots in the preservation of their identity, in the development of their national culture and language'. There was no such provision in the previous version of the treaty. Meanwhile, it is one of the most important conditions for the development of the Tatar nation as a single cultural and ethnic community.

The treaty recognizes the official status of the Tatar language, functioning as an equal to the Russian language in the republic. This makes illegitimate any lawsuits over the status of the Tatar language, which took place in the republic in the past. People of non-Tatar nationalities are incentivised to learn the Tatar language by the fact that the republic’s senior official, i.e. its President, is obliged to master both official languages. After all, the position of the President of Tatarstan is open to any citizen of the republic, regardless of nationality.

Thus, the new treaty corresponds to present-day realities. Explanation and implementation of the provisions of this treaty create tremendous opportunities for strengthening Tatarstan’s economic and legal framework.

The historical significance of the treaty lies in the fact that it overcomes certain pro-imperial tendencies in Russian society today, clearing the way for the country’s democratic development and strengthening its contractual and federal foundations.
§ 2. Legislation of the Republic of Tatarstan under a New Policy in Federative Relations

Farid Mukhametshin

The modern stage of the development of the federative Russian state is characterised by the strengthening of parliamentarism as a system of democratic civil management. In Tatarstan, this institution plays a historic role in forming the legal framework of civic society, developing a multi-party system and determining the strategies and trends of social and political development of society.

In the early 2000s, the State Council of the Republic of Tatarstan continued carrying out legislative activities under the conditions of the 'new federalism', a typical feature of which was to bring the legislation of Federation subjects into accordance with the Constitution of Russia and federal legislation as well as to build up 'a vertical power structure' in relations between the Centre and the regions.

The political power relations and processes that took place in the Russian Federation during recent decades led to the establishment of the main institutions, norms and rules of accepting political decisions, and to the birth of the political elite with powers of authority. Under these conditions, the Parliament of Tatarstan made a lot of efforts to set up a required regulatory legal basis to improve federative relations in general and to improve the effectiveness of constructive interaction between the republic and the federal centre. However, at the turn of the 2010s, within political transforming processes, there are unresolved questions related to ethnic factors of the policy, the federative structure of the Russian state, in general, and 'centre-region' relations, in particular.

In the transition, federalism as a principle of a state structure and a means of supporting stability between the Centre and the Federation subjects is at the top of the agenda. The issue at hand is the forming of a type of federalism that presupposes the organization of relations between the Centre and the regions and, in particular, the Republic of Tatarstan, on the basis of partnership, the division of jurisdiction and authorities. At the same time, each level of power relations should possess the rights, obligations and resources that will correspond to its tasks and functions. In this case, the process of social reforms in the regions will be stable and dynamic.

Another important task within the context of implementing federative relations is to understand and form an adequate perception of the interests of the federal centre and the Federation subjects as regional policy should not and cannot be limited only to issues of transfers or of material support for regions. First of all, it should embrace the development of the social sphere in the subjects, the organization of resource production, the arrangement of the conditions for small and medium-sized business activities, and promote the regions' use of their own natural advantages. The solution of these problems requires the development of a state doctrine of an economic leveling-off in regions, forming a unified system for assessing the level of economic self-sufficiency in the Federation subjects, introducing a methodology of inter-budget relations based on normative principles, distributing functions of state administration bodies of different levels and mechanisms of the participation of regions in taking decisions on the federal level.

In recent years, the government of Tatarstan has done much to allow representatives of local authorities to play an equal part in outlining a general course of state policy. A significant role is given to the Council of Legislators at the Federation Council, set up to provide a unified legal space and to coordinate activities and experience exchange among regional legislators. A conception to improve interaction between the Federation Council and legislative bodies of the Russian Federation subjects has been prepared and approved, and it stipulates mechanisms for taking into account the opinions of the subjects while outlining and conducting...
Chapter 8. State Development of the Republic of Tatarstan at the Beginning of the 21st Century

federal and legislative policy, including by way of introducing consolidated initiatives.

Unfortunately, regional politicians have not yet succeeded in establishing a balanced system of interaction between the centre and the regions. About 4% of the legislative initiatives of the subjects were adopted by the State Duma, meaning that they became federal law, which speaks volumes in itself. Simultaneously, since the early 2000s, a general tendency of limiting regional powers vested by the Constitution has become more pronounced. It objectively led to an excessive centralisation of competences in many fields at the level of the federal centre and it is actually a violation of the principles of federalism. This negative tendency was developed in the Budget, Water and Forest Codes of the Russian Federation. Federal legislation reduced the powers of the subjects in the fields of subsurface use. Truly inefficient centralization of powers is evident in the field of ecology.

Many experts note that if this trend continues, the reformation of regional legislation may ultimately reduce the powers of regional bodies to the passing of their own budgets. The problem of finding human resources and appointing them to positions is quite acute. This means finding heads of federal territorial bodies, who mostly duplicate the functions with the republican organizations.

It is necessary to require by law the mandatory participation of regional governors in appointing the chiefs of territorial federal bodies. The candidatures for the heads of the security agencies should also be debated by regional parliaments. It is also necessary to establish in law the double subordination of the heads of federal bodies, as it was not so long ago. At the same time, they can be subordinated to their ministries and a supreme officer of the region.

On 9 February 2007, the history of modern Russia began a new period of federal development. After a long and complicated period of agreements and political discussion, both in state bodies and among politicians and academics, the President of the Russian Federation introduced to the Federation Council a draft of the Treaty 'On the division of jurisdictions and powers between the bodies of state power of the Russian Federation and the bodies of state power of the Republic of Tatarstan'. On 4 July 2007, at the plenary meeting, the State Duma voted to adopt the Federal law ratifying said Treaty. On 11 July, the project of the Federal Law was approved by the Federation Council, and, on 24 July 2007, it was signed by the President of the Russian Federation.

As noted in the preamble to the Treaty, the state power bodies of the Russian Federation and the state power bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan, acting in accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan, take into account the experience of applying the Treaty of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan 'On the division of jurisdictions and powers and the mutual delegation of authorities between the state power bodies of the Russian Federation and the state power bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan' from 15 February 1994, included on the basis of the referendum of the Republic of Tatarstan held on 21 March 1992.

The Treaty materialises and clarifies the provision of the Fundamental Law of the Russian Federation, stating that, in accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan, the Republic of Tatarstan (state), being a subject of the Russian Federation, is empowered with full state authorities (legislative, executive and judicial) out of the jurisdiction and authorities of the Russian Federation.

In the development of the provisions of the Treaty, the Government of the Russian Federation and the Cabinet of the Ministers of the Republic of Tatarstan can conclude agreements about solving jointly issues related to economic, ecological (as a result of a long-lasting exploitation of oilfields within mining and geological conditions of hydrocarbon production), cultural and other specific features of the Republic of Tatarstan, including by introducing joint legislative initiatives to the Federation Council of the Russian Federation.
Taking into account the experience accumulated over the last 15 years, the Republic of Tatarstan, within its authorities in accordance with the Treaty, will be able to carry out international and foreign economic relations more actively, to provide state support and assist fellow people of the republic in preserving identity, and in developing a national language and culture.

Also vitally important to us is the article of the Treaty that states in particular that in accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan, the status of official languages and the order of their usage are confirmed.

The provisions of the Treaty establish an additional requirement for candidates to replace supreme officers that demands a command of the official languages of the Republic of Tatarstan, and the article, stating that the citizens of the Russian Federation living in the Republic of Tatarstan have the right to obtain the main identification document (the Russian Federation civil passport) with the supplement in Tatar, an official language of the Republic of Tatarstan, with an image of the state coat of arms of the Republic of Tatarstan. These provisions are of the utmost importance to Tatars, residents of a multi-ethnic republic, bearers of the ancient Tatar culture and traditions.

Today, more and more regional politicians are coming to believe that Russia is strong not only by being united but also by being different in its parts. And in this lies its power. That is why the regulations of the interaction between the Federal Centre and the Federation subjects should be formed in order to make their implementation politically, economically and socially beneficial and reasonable to all the participants of the interaction.

Developing a treaty practice between federal and regional bodies is an important constitutional tool to strengthen federative relations, to set up a balanced system of mutual rights and obligations for the parties, and to create effective mechanisms of interaction between state power bodies at different levels. That is why, though coming across all the juridical collisions of the established system, it is quite evident that the treaties concluded earlier functioned and strengthened the consent and mutual understanding of both sides.

At the turn of the century, during the transition stage, federalism in general and state national policy remain a milestone yet to be achieved to a large extent in the social, political and economic development of Russia. However, a range of legislative solutions have been adopted in this area, these solutions actually are the first steps to true federalism, a constitutional state and democracy, and political pluralism. It is also obvious that at the moment there has been a step back from those modest results that were achieved in the 1990s.

That is why when evaluating the results of the last decade from the perspective of implementing a state national policy, it can be said that in this arena we have lived through ten years of stagnation.

The Russian Federation is one of the world's largest multi-ethnic states, where there is over a hundred peoples, each of them possessing unique peculiarities of material and spiritual cultures. Over centuries, the majority of the state's peoples coalesced into ethnic communities across the territory of Russia. In this sense, as it is emphasized in the Conception of the Russian Federation state national policy, 'they are indigenous peoples, who played a historic role in the formation of Russian sovereignty. Owing to the uniting role of the Russian people on the territory of Russia, there is an extraordinary unity and variety, a spiritual community and a union of different peoples.'

Unfortunately, until now, a new version of the Conception of state national policy has not yet been implemented. Federal legislation develops quite slowly in terms of ensuring the rights of Russia's numerous ethnic groups. Under these conditions, the Republic offered its own conception of development for the multi-ethnic population of Tatarstan.

The state national policy Conception of the Republic of Tatarstan (further, the Conception) is a systematized collection of political legal views, valuable key points, principles and priorities regulating the activities of the bodies
of state power and local self-government, national civic organizations, residents of the republic in the area of ethnic development and inter-ethnic relations.

The Conception is built upon two legal components: federal and republican, as well as by taking into account generally recognised principles and norms of international law, such as the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of the Council of Europe (1950), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), the European Charter for regional or minority languages (1992), the Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities of the United Nations (1992) and the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities of the Council of Europe (1995).


The Conception relies upon awareness of the historical traditions of the representatives of the peoples living in the republic, the natural, climatic and economic conditions, the social, psychological, cultural and daily features of their life, the geopolitical and national environment, and the experience of interaction with neighbours. It reflects ethno-historical features and the current ethno-social situation in the Republic of Tatarstan.

As a political legal act, the Conception is aimed at ensuring general social, political and economic stability, effective cooperation between bodies of state power and local government, at developing traditions of inter-ethnic consent and civil peace, religious tolerance and national cultural inter-enrichment of the representatives of peoples living in the republic. It is designed to be a reference point for all branches of authority, local government and civic organizations involved in national development and inter-ethnic relations, in supporting constitutional human and civic rights, developing and implementing targeted projects and programmes related to state national policy.

Another important area in the national policy of Tatarstan is a range of language issues in the broadest sense. In accordance with the main principles of state policy related to the official languages of the Republic of Tatarstan and other languages in the Republic of Tatarstan, presupposing the development and harmonious interaction of languages, 1 July 2004, the State Council of Tatarstan adopted the Law 'On introducing changes and amendments to the Law of the Republic of Tatarstan "On the languages of the peoples of the Republic of Tatarstan"'. On 9 September 2004, the Law of the Republic of Tatarstan approved the State programme of the Republic of Tatarstan for preserving, studying and developing the official languages of the Republic of Tatarstan and other languages in the Republic of Tatarstan in 2004–2013. It is aimed at the next stage of developing cooperation in the sphere of languages of the republic, taking into account societal changes.

Under the aforementioned law and the programme originating from it, being the heritage of the republic, the official languages in Tatarstan are protected and supported by the state. The language policy as one of the constituent parts of state policy aims to support the optimal functioning of the languages in all areas of society, their interaction and further development. The main tasks of the Programme are to create
the conditions for achieving true equality between the Tatar and Russian languages as the official languages of the Republic of Tatarstan, to preserve and develop the Tatar language as the basis of the national culture and a real means of the communication and consolidation of the Tatar people, to preserve and develop the Russian language as an official language of the Republic of Tatarstan, to promote the preservation and development of the languages of the representatives of the other peoples living in the Republic of Tatarstan, to increase a general level of communicative culture and inter-linguistic tolerance, and in accordance with Article 14 of the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan, to support the preservation and development of the Tatar language in the regions of the Russian Federation and the CIS countries with a Tatar population.

In accordance with the state programme for preserving, studying and developing the official languages of the republic and other languages in Tatarstan, the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Tatarstan and the relevant Ministries have already developed and are still developing drafts of a range of legal documents: on the procedure for using the official languages of the Republic of Tatarstan in records management, interdepartmental activities; on the procedure for using the official languages of the republic in the consumer sphere, by organizing and carrying out popular events; on educational courses to learn and improve knowledge of the Tatar language, and a host of others.

Within the Protocol in the field of applying information technologies between Microsoft Rus LLC and the Cabinet of the Ministers of the republic, there was a pilot localization project of Linux and Microsoft products into Tatar. By the decree of the Cabinet of the Ministers of the republic, a glossary of computer terms in Tatar was developed and approved. This glossary was handed to the Microsoft Corporation, developing the software products maintaining the Tatar language.

In developing this area, in 2005, there was a localization project of the operating systems AltLinux and communication applications Mozilla Firefox and Mozilla Thunderbird into Tatar. These software products were the first on the market of the global information technologies and developed for e-mailing and Internet browsing. Their development allowed users to learn and use the Tatar language for work and communication on the Internet, which is especially important for the Tatars living or working outside Tatarstan.

The Parliament of the Republic has always paid a lot of attention to improving relations with the federal centre. Within the federative state system and self-government independence, special attention should be given to the mechanisms of managing social and economic processes at the federal, regional and local level, ensuring unity of goals, tasks and actions of all public authority bodies. This requires achieving aims for improving federative relations and local self-government, first of all, by terminating the process of the division of the authorities between bodies of state power and bodies of local self-government, and setting up a system of appropriate implementation. In turn, this will make it possible to a large extent to fulfill another strategic aim of regional policy—setting up an efficient and compact state.

Within this context, on 6 October 2003, after adopting the Federal Law 'On general principles of the organization of self-government in the Russian Federation', the main area of the activities of the State Council of Tatarstan became a legislative support for large-scale municipal reform. Within the tight deadlines, the boundaries were defined and the status of all 43 municipal districts of Kazan and Naberezhnye Chelny was established. The following republican laws have been adopted: 'On local self-government' (new version), 'On the referendum', 'On municipal elections', 'On municipal service', 'On conferring on bodies of self-government in the Republic of Tatarstan powers for state registration of acts of civil status', etc.

During the legislative support for the reforms of the local self-government, there were over 120 republican laws adopted which regulate the procedure for organising the municipal service, defining the borders and the status of the municipal establishments, and giving the
state powers to the districts. In particular, it should be noted that the Republic of Tatarstan was included in the Russian Federation subjects, where, since 1 January 2005, Federal Law No.131-FL 'On the general principles of local self-government' was realized in full.

The current legislative priorities are, first of all, the formation of a democratic state with high living standards, based upon a civic society and a growing and diverse innovative economy with a large middle class. The republic must persistently follow a path of economic growth, based on using new technologies and accumulating scientific and technical potential.

Achieving this large-scale goal depends on a set of factors. However, the leading role will be played by local self-government, the sovereignty of the people. Without exaggeration, it can be said that after the state level of representing the interests of different social groups, municipalities are becoming a powerful political leverage of the state development and a new tool for acquiring norms of democratic society. It is quite natural because only the bodies of the representative power as a basis of their legal and political activities have such an unyielding backbone, which acts as recognition of the people as a sovereign and unique source of power.

In 2010, Tatarstan celebrated the 90th anniversary of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. It was a time for looking back at the results of the republic's previous development as well as for determining the priorities and perspectives of the next stage. The agenda of the parliament includes the issues of the formation of a constructive and politically mature opposition, the weakness of the civic community, the development of the mechanisms for civilized compromises, the implementation of the idea of the government of the parliamentary majority, and the formation of an active multi-party system, as the parties are supposed to become a driving force for modernising society.

The development of the Russian political process demonstrates the formation of a stable trend of concentration of the most significant powers and the 'astriction' of the most profitable resources at the federal level. Federal law of 29 December 2006 'On introducing changes to legislative acts of the Russian Federation caused by improving the division of jurisdictions' again redistributed the powers between the Russian Federation and the subjects, but 'from the top to the bottom' this time.

At the same time, it is quite evident that without making use of the objective distributive criteria as well as the mechanisms of the agreement about the interests of the Russian Federation and Tatarstan in particular, further improvement of federative relations will be carried out only on the level of interaction between the state power federal bodies responsible for the affairs in some areas of society, and the administration bodies of Federation subjects. Meanwhile, federative relations are always a complex convergence of interests and needs of the regions and the Centre that presuppose a wider dialogue and a functioning system of interaction between their participants. Otherwise, there is a direct transfer of powers and no interest from Russian Federation subjects in the quality of their implementation.

In other words, the formulation and solution of problems in state organization require a complex approach. The government of Tatarstan has always adhered to the conceptual approach of the three-part political unity: parliamentarism–democracy–genuine federalism. Political relations based on these principles unite different interests in harmony. The Russian Federation is a huge country, and federalism in Russian is the territorial framework of democracy. In defending federative principles, we also support democracy, which is in need of protection today. The best protector of democracy in turn is a parliament that speaks the will of the people and voters.
CONCLUSION

The 20th century is complicated and contradictory. At the same time, it is a crucial period in the history of the Tatars. The bourgeois changes that took hold of the Russian empire helped to develop the nation's capital, its intelligentsia and its civic institutions. This period was known for the formation of the publishing houses network, of the mass media system, and of cultural, educational and charitable organizations. The national school was experiencing a time of radical reorganization. Religious reform continued the traditions of G. Kursavi and Sh. Marjani and opened up for Muslim society new ways to expose Tatars to the achievements and values of European civilization.

During the period of social revolution that shook up the foundations of autocracy, Tatar society was compelled to start dealing with issues of national self-determination caused by an urgent need to preserve and defend confessional rights, culture, language and traditions. All of these processes meant the renaissance of the political life of the Muslims in Russia, who established the party 'Ittifak al-muslimin', their parliamentary party in the State Duma, a set of monarch, liberal and left-winged organisations.

Outstanding national leaders in the early 20th century were constantly formulating and promoting ideas of national unity, religion and culture preservation, and recalling the thousand-year history of Tatar sovereignty. The attempt to implement the projects of the 'Ural-Volga State', the Tatar-Bashkir Republic reflected a creative and quite complicated search of a form of national state under the conditions of the revolutionary chaos, the Civil War and the Bolshevik dictatorship.

Thus, the formation of the Tatar autonomy within Soviet Russia expressed a centuries-long ambition of the Tatars and became the result of persistent activities of the representatives of sections of society: politicians, intellectuals, military, workers and peasants. It should be noted that the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was a unique polyethnic formation that reflected the interests of Russian, Finno-Ugrians and other peoples living in friendship for centuries in the Volga and Ural region. Despite some negative ideological influence, the Soviet period of the sovereignty of Tatarstan was characterized by the establishment of a powerful industrial potential, the development of agriculture, the flourishing of science and all forms of the arts. The peoples of the republic honourably overcame the hardships of the Second World War and demonstrated an incredible self-sacrificing attitude both at home and on the battle field. An immortal feat performed by M. Jalil became an eternal symbol of the endurance, patriotism and courage of Soviet people.

The achievements of Soviet Tatarstan built up a strong base for the comprehensive development of the republic during the period of democratic reforms, helping to implement independent social, economic and cultural policies. The activities of the first President of the Republic of Tatarstan M. Shaimiev, aimed at preserving the unity of the Russian state, raising the living standards of the population, keeping a balance between the interests of different social groups, strengthening the union of peoples and confessions, gained honorary acceptance both in the country and abroad.

Today, Tatarstan is a leader of the economic, cultural, innovative, scientific and educational development of the Russian Federation regions. The republic's ambitious aims required the consolidation of all of society. They cannot be realised without the solidarity of the peoples, traditions, friendship and creativity, excluding any traces of xenophobia and extremism. Determining breakthrough directions in social and economic policies, President of Tatarstan R. Minnikhanov pays attention to humanitarian aspects of modernisation processes. Preserving the values of traditional Islam, restoring historical and cultural legacy, uniting creative powers of Tatars for solving pressing modern problems, respecting the language, customs and culture of all the peoples of the republic are defining factors of its progress and prosperity. In works and creations, the Tatarstan of the 21st century continues to craft its own history, a history facing the future.
Appendices
No. 1
A letter of Abdul-Gamid Apanayev to the editorial board of the newspaper Kazansky Telegraph [Kazan telegraph] on the necessity of exempting the Muslim clergy from conscription

21 January 1905.

The voice of a Tatar man
(Letter to the editor)
Dear Sir, Mr. Editor!

As I know that the Kazansky Telegraph is neutral in matters concerning the Inorodtsy (indigenous people of Russia), I kindly ask you to publish my short note.

I would like to put forth the following question: why has no one paid attention yet to the fact that our Muslim clergy must serve military duty from which mullahs have not been exempted. It is barely possible, that they have not been exempted from the soldiery because we lack soldiers, while Jewish rabbi, Polish priests of the Roman Catholic Church and clergymen of other confessions are excused from service along with the Orthodox clergy.

It offends us, when thousands of Mohammedans die on the battle field, defending their motherland against the foe, when representatives of his and our spiritual father—the intermediary between us and God—are forced to fight in the ranks of the army. Russia will scarcely become more vulnerable if ten miserable mullahs do not join the army.

Our common and fair wish is that the rights of our clergy must be made equal to the rights of clerics belonging to other confessions.

Abdul-Gamid Apanayev
Kazansky Telegraph, 1905, 21 January.

No. 2
Leaflet of the Kazan Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party calling upon Russian and Tatar prikazchiks [clerks, administrators] to unite with workers in order to fight for improvements in their living conditions

3 April 1905.

Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party

Workingmen of all countries, unite!

To all prikazchiks of the city of Kazan, Russian and Tatar

Comrades! It has been a month since we greeted with loud applause the Duma resolution for the holiday. You welcomed your success; it was richly deserved. Indeed, the question on the holiday is not new: for several years, gentlemen from the Duma, most of whom were owners of commercial-industrial enterprises, delayed the resolution. The question was also raised in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and did not produce any results. It would have dragged on for a long time if you at last had not begun to improve your lives yourselves, following the example of our workers.

When your thousand-strong crowd marched along the streets of Kazan, your masters humbly closed their shops. When you gathered in the Duma hall, your masters kept silent, no one dared to say a word against the holiday you rightly deserve.

But it still does not mean your bosses really wanted to make concessions to you: they had beforehand decided to crush the Duma resolution at the first opportunity. Hiding behind religious reasons, Muslim
bosses attempted to provoke discord between the Russians and Tatars; they protested against the Sunday holiday, arguing that their workers did not agree with this. This is wrong: Muslim prikazchiks have no objections to the common day off on Sunday, because they, thanks to their masters' trick, remained at a disadvantage—neither on Sunday, nor on Friday do they have a day off. Russian bosses also schemed.

And here the government, the perpetual enemy of working people, in the name of the local administration rushed to help entrepreneurs. The Governor and the Governorate administration protested the Duma resolution, disputing minor points. Yes, our government is skilled at playing with laws. When it is necessary, they shamelessly flout them, but the law is always here to help them, when they want to deceive and oppress the people! Hypocrisy and deceit are the weapons of our government and its officials. They care neither for you, nor for your needs. They do not hear you moan, neither do they see the tears of the oppressed. They only give way to strength, and you must be strong.

Where does your strength lie? What is the power of the workers?

The power lies in unity, the key to victory and a better future lies in the common struggle.

Prikazchiks of many cities achieved not only the festive holiday, but also the reduction of their working day along with other rights. But they managed to achieve it not through complaints and petitions, but through courageous and friendly struggle—strikes and demonstrations. You should also act in this way. Go to the streets, every holiday gather at 11 in the morning in Prolomnaya Street and close the shops with your crowd. Up to now you have been asking, now you must demand:

1. A complete termination of trade on public holidays at all commercial enterprises, Russian and Tatar.
2. A 12-hour working day, including one hour and a half for lunch and half an hour for breakfast.
3. Bakeries must be open during holidays from 12 to 4 pm and a shift system must be organized,
4. so that those on duty will be free the next day.
5. In case of illness, preserving the working position and treatment at the employer's expense.
6. In case of dismissal, the employer must notify you two weeks before.
7. You must be provided with an annual two-week leave with preservation of the working position.
8. A committee must be organised, half of which would consist of employers and the half of workers. The committee would review and resolve disputes.
9. Moreover, we must be provided with the freedom to organize meetings, unions and strikes.

Here are your demands for the first time. Stick to them, do not let the bosses sow discord in your ranks through promises and tricks. Remember that the interests of all prikazchiks, both Russians and Tatars—are the same. All of you suffer from the same deceits and oppressions.

Muslim prikazchiks, against the assurances of their hypocritical religious masters, now stand for their days off on Sundays and on festive holidays.

The foundation is laid. Do not stop, step by step claim a better fate for yourselves, but remember that you can achieve stable improvements in your life only through joint struggle, side by side with the whole working class.

Kazan Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party


No. 3
Terms of the Committee of Ministers on strengthening grounds of religious tolerance, approved by His Imperial Majesty will on 1905 April 1905.

The Committee of Ministers, in the form of the paragraph 6 of the Supreme Nominal Decree dated 12 December 1904, performing the Highest Will on preservation of tolerance in the matters of faith, delivered the following judgment:
On the general grounds of religious tolerance:

1) Recognize that rejection of the Orthodox faith in favour of another Christian confession or doctrine is not liable to prosecution and must not cause any disadvantageous consequences towards personal or civil rights; in addition, an individual who rejected Orthodoxy upon reaching adulthood is recognized as belonging to the confession he or she has chosen for themselves.

2) Recognize that if one spouse changes his or her Christian faith to another, all underage children remain in the faith of the other spouse; if both spouses change their religion, their children under 14 follow their parents' faith. Children who are older than this age remain in their previous faith.

3) Decree in addition to the above mentioned terms (paragraphs 1 and 2) that individuals, who are recorded as Orthodox but who in fact profess a non-Christian faith to which they or their ancestors, had belonged before being baptized, are subject, at their will, to not be counted among the Orthodox. <...>

1) Order the special council on religious tolerance (section VIII of the decree hereof), on the grounds which are explained in the register of the Committee of Ministers, to develop the following questions and prepared bills without any delay and present them to the judgment of the State Soviet, without any prior communication with offices:
   a) on construction of prayer houses of different confessions;
   b) on the procedure for the election and appointment of officials belonging to the Mohammedan clergy—parish and supreme;
   c) on exemption from conscription into active military service for some representatives of the Mohammedan clergy remaining in the reserve;
   d) on the procedure for opening Mohammedan spiritual schools—maktabs and madrasahs;
   e) on the foundation of special spiritual administrations for the Kyrgyz people of the Akmolinsk, Semipalatinsk, Uralsk and Turgay oblasts, along with the Mohammedan communities in the North Caucasus, the Stavropol guberniya, Turkestan krai and the Trans-Caspian oblast, and
   f) on the possibility of raising abandoned children in the religion of those families of other faiths who take in these children. <...>

On religious tolerance. Law of 17 April 1905. – Moscow: The Typography of I. Sytin, 1905. – pp. 7, 14

No. 4

The petition of political prisoner G. Iskhakov to the Prosecutor of the District Court

19 June 1907
Kazan

Due to the fact that my mother, wife and sister know not a word of Russian, the gendarme does not allow them to speak in the Tatar language. I am illegally deprived of the pleasure to speak to the people who are closest to me. I consider such a state of affairs illegal and an abuse of my nearest and dearest and thus I ask you to take measures and give permission for visits in the Tatar language.

Mukhametgayaz Iskhakov

I have the honour of presenting this on approval to the Head of the Kazan guberniya gendarmerie administration. The 22nd day of June, 1907

Prosecutor (signature)
Secretary (signature).

National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 199, Inventory 1, File 538, Sheets 48–49
No. 5
A note from the newspaper Kazansky Telegraf about a Tatar dramatic performance

10 June 1907

From the Islamic world. Tatar dramatic performances, which began to develop relatively recently, are starting to win the sympathies of the Muslims, who eagerly attend them. Several plays which were staged at the new club in the winter drew their interest. With onset of summer, the troupe of male and female Tatar performers moved to Russian Switzerland, where they performed their first play on 25 May, which attracted many Tatar people. After such a success, the same Tatar troupe of artists is planning to give a performance on 15 June (on the Tatar holiday) with participation of widely known actor Gazizov. The performance includes the play 'Tushenu' ('Povetie') and then a vaud[eville], 'The batman short-sold', translated into the Tatar language. It is highly desirable, that actors focus their attention upon plays reflecting the typical Islamic way of living, which Russian people can rarely observe, and thus could attract attention of the latter.

Kazansky Telegraf. – 1907. – 10 June. – No. 4292

No. 6
A note of a peasant T. Ivanov from the village of Nizhne-Alkeev of the Spass uyezd about his trip to the Volynsky district with the aim of getting acquainted with resettlement and farming in the khutors.

September 1909.

We, a group of four people from the Alkeevskaya volost of the Spass uyezd, departed from Kazan on 18 September and on 23 September we arrived in the town of Zhitomir where we appeared before the Land Management Committee. After our visit to the Committee, we hired horses and headed to the village of Kamenka, along the route the Committee provided us with. The village was of a common land possession and there we were met by local peasants who, after learning the intentions of our trip, suggested that we should visit their authorized agent. They showed us the new plan of acreage allotment and explained that they, with the consent of the whole society, decided to divide the land into separate lots and at that moment, 29 lots had been allotted; the areas of the lots vary from 9 to 16 desyatinas. They explained the reason for switching from common land possession to separate lots by the fact that many villages in their region passed to voloks (khutors or hamlets) which live much better than they do, for their land is concentrated in one place and they do not waste, as they say, time on travelling from one field to another when reaping and fertilizing their land. After spending a night in Kamenka, we departed for the village of Vilsk in Pulenskaya volost. Khutors were scattered everywhere along the road. We came to many of them and asked how well their owners lived, the answer was the same everywhere: we live much better than when we had the common land possession. Their livestock is grazed by teenagers and elderly people in their own fields. They let horses and cows graze and do not allow the same thing for other livestock. Their horses are similar to ours, but their cows are of an improved breed. They possess their land in different quantities, from 3 to 30 desyatinas. Each of them has a clean hut (izba), with two rooms, with the walls being pargeted both from the inside and the outside. Each inhabitant of the khutor keeps geese and therefore has a stack of pillows. Apart from these living quarters, they also have sarais (sheds) for storing threshed crops and other buildings for keeping cattle—and all of these structures are not connected with any fence between each other, which is good in respect of fire safety. Both outdoor and living quarters are roofed with straw, but in such a good way that their soundness are equal to our plank roofs. <...>.
From here, we headed to the village of Reshevka and on our way we examined many Little-Russian and German khutors; the latter cultivated land better than the local people, they also had horses and cows of better breeds. how they lived at the khutors. They replied that they lived very well at the voloks and one of them, Mikhailo Leshchenko, added that if he were asked to come back to the community and were offered 40 desyatinas of land instead of 20, he would still reject the invitation. how they lived at the khutors. They replied that they lived very well at the voloks and one of them, Mikhailo Leshchenko, added that if he were asked to come back to the community and were offered 40 desyatinas of land instead of 20, he would still reject the invitation.

And thus, we went on horses around 100 versts from the town of Zhitomir and throughout all of this space, almost all peasants live at the khutors, and, having examined these khutors, we confirmed that it is much better to live there than at the communities, because if the land is located in a single place, it is possible to fertilize it without difficulties, and the fertilized land gives more profit. Besides, it is possible to get rid of the useless fallow. The land of the above mentioned peasants is much worse in comparison with our land. Thus, in our region, 5 desyatinas of our land go for 10 desyatinas of theirs, thus we can settle in smaller agricultural possessions.

If any readers treat the described khutor life with distrust, he or she may direct a letter to the above mentioned individuals.

Peasant of Alkeevskaya volost of the village of Nizhne-Alkeevo
Timofey Andreev Ivanov.

National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 712, Inventory 5, File 90, Sheets 329–330, 332–333

No. 7
Letter of Kazan governor M. Strizhevsky to the head of the Kazan guberniya gendarme administration about the exile from the Kazan guberniya of peasants of the Laishevo uyezd who protested against the transfer from the community to bran lots

16 December 1910.

With the notification #80346, the police department on the 9th day of December of this year notified me that upon examination by the Special Council, which had been founded in accordance with the article 34 of the Statute on state security, of the factual background of the peasants of the Laishevo uyezd of the village of Kurgachina, who are currently held in custody at the Laishevo uyezd prison: 1) Minnigaley Nazmutdinov, 2) Nasybulla Khamidullin, 3) Khasan Galimov, 4) Mukhammet-Vafa Gaynullin who were exposed as members of the gang which aimed at creating obstacles for peasants, who intended to leave from the community into separate lots. And, in order to achieve the set aim, members of the gang used violent methods which were expressed in the arson of those peasants who had transferred land lots into their own property, Minister of Internal Affairs decreed: 1) to exile Minnigaley Nazmutdinov to Olonetskaya guberniya so that he stays under the public supervision of the police for three years and 2) ban Nasybulla Khamidullin, Khasan Galimov and Mukhammet-Vafa Gaynullin from residing in Kazan guberniya for two years.

The Police Department added that the term of Hazmutdinov's exile and police supervision over him, along with the period of ban for Khamidullin and others from living in the Kazan guberniya should be calculated from 1910 November 1910.

<...>.
A. Boratynsky stated that... We should be careful when speaking about a hostile attitude of aliens towards us, since the more repeatedly we point to the discord, the stronger becomes the feeling of mistrust towards us. If you wish to sow love to the Fatherland in the heart of an alien, reach the unity of tribes who inhabit Russia, do not make disaffection acute. Remember what results were spurred by our aspiration to the Russification of the Tatar nation. Although at the same time as were opened 24 Russian-Tatar schools of Ministry of Education aiming at Russifying the alien and Muslim population, at the same time, the Tatars founded 852 their own confessional schools - maktab and madrasahs, i.e. schools to which parents send their children with great pleasure, but which remain out of state control. These maktabs and madrasahs create and develop the Tatar culture. As a counterweight, we should create schools which would attract the Muslim population and teachers, who would clearly understand our ideals and aspirations, teachers who could make these ideals come true. We can achieve favourable results on the issue of aliens only through including aliens in our culture.

Journals of the Kazan regular meeting of the nobility recorded during the session of 1911. – Kazan, 1913. – pp. 25–26.

No. 9

Speech of Deputy of the State Duma of the 3rd convocation S. Maksudov in the course of the discussion of the bill 'On adaptation of the Statute about zemsky entities dated 12 June 1890 in Orenburg guberniya'.

23 January 1912

Dear sirs, I will not make a convenience of your attention. As a representative both of the people and the Muslim population, I cannot help sympathizing with regard to the introduction the zemstvo system [county council] into Orenburg guberniya, but unfortunately, I have to say that the sympathy of Muslims has to remain almost platonic. In fact, Muslims will not be able to benefit from the advantages of the zemstvo, and I shall explain why: as you know, in accordance with the existing law of 1890, in all zemstvos, all voters are divided into three groups: 1) nobles, 2) other stratas excluding peasants, and 3) peasants; the bill is composed in such a way that in all uyezd zemsky councils, the noble strata prevails. In 355 uyezd zemsky councils, the number of nobles dominate, while peasants are given a minimal number of places; this is a fact you must agree with. There are no members of the nobility among us, Muslims: our old nobility is not recognized, the new has not been born yet and will possibly never be formed. But we do not regret that, that is not the issue, dear sirs (Novitsky 2, from his place: the new has not been born, but it looks like Maksudov). I am not a noble man, and I am not sorry about that.

1 A. Boratynsky, a Chairman of the Nobility Assembly of the Kazan guberniya, he is also leader of the nobility of the Kazan guberniya.
Well then, dear sirs, therefore in fact, Muslims cannot take advantage of the benefits the zemstvo system provides; we may elect and may send our representatives to the zemstvo only through representatives of village communities, they are given an insignificant number of places, and this amount is distributed between the Orthodox and Muslim population. That is why in all Governorates, even where Muslims are in the majority, as in Orenburg, Ufa and Kazan guberniyas, we have only two or three councilors both in the uyezd and governorate zemsky councils. We have borne this statute until today, because we thought that the Statute of 1890 was a product of the bureaucratic creativity, that it would change soon and after a wider spectrum of opportunities would be open to representatives of the broad mass of the population. We have waited for that and considered that after the change we, Muslims, would also be allowed to truly participate in the zemstvo system, but sirs, when such deprivation, depreciation and limitation of the electoral rights of the peasantry and thus the Muslim population is carried out by the State Duma, representatives of the population, then we cannot help objecting. We will object, sirs, firstly, as representatives of the population in general and secondly, as representatives of Muslims, because they can only take part in the system as peasants. In Orenburg guberniya, places are also distributed in accordance with the former recipe—that is, the bulk of places is given beforehand to representatives of the rich stratas: city entrepreneurs, landowners and the like, while the poor peasantry is provided with a truly insignificant number of places. Meanwhile, in the explanatory letter, the government itself states that there are really few landowners in this guberniya, thus in that single uyezd officials could not give prevalence to representatives of land ownership even if they wanted, because there are physically not enough of them. In the same manner, there is an insufficient number of landowners in other uyezds. On these grounds, I present you with my amendments related to distribution of places in zemsky councils of Orenburg guberniya. Previously, i.e. according to the Committee's suggestion, 24 places were given to representatives of the rich stratas and 15 to poor peasants. I suggest to change 24 to 13, and put 26 instead of 15. In Orsk uyezd, the committee provides the rich with 13 places and the peasantry with the same number. I propose 8 positions for representatives of the rich strata and 18 for those from village communities. In Chelyabinsk uyezd, the committee suggests giving 18 places to representatives of the rich strata and 20 to peasants; while I propose 13 and 25. Dear sirs, I believe that the state presented some reasons for distributing places in this way, that the government explained these numbers in its explanatory letter. In good faith I examined this report, but it does not contain any explanations or justifications. Rather, I found there data which totally contradict what the committee and the government have suggested. The report says that there are three principles of distribution of places—that is, of councilors in zemsky councils: the principle of land size occupied by the given strata, the principle of the number of the population and the principle of the cultural level. The first principle is not applicable to Orenburg guberniya, as the size of the peasants' land is far larger. The second, the principle of number, will not do either, because the amount of peasants exceeds the number of landowners; and finally, the third principle, of the level of culture, is left. In this respect, representatives of rich layers and stratas stand undoubtedy higher than peasants; therefore, only one principle allows landowners to prevail in all zemsky councils. Sirs, I understand that the zemsky matter is difficult; it is clear that there must be educated and enlightened leaders. But not only leaders are needed in the councils, education is not obligatory to be a councilor on a zemsky council. Peasants may be great spokesmen for their district, and we know many cases when they appeared to have been wonderful councilors. Based on all these reasons, I suggest that you adopt my amendments and I believe that they will do, because they are fair.

State DumA. Third convocation. Stenographic records. Fifth session. – St. Petersburg, 1912. – Part 2. – Col. 834–836

I take the courage to appeal to Your Excellency in this letter, hoping for your wise attention. The aim of my note is my rehabilitation in the eyes of Your Excellency, because my convictions and my former activities were obviously presented in a false manner and showed through the prism of bias and superstition, which gave ground to present me as an ill-intentioned and almost a harmful person who would be dangerous to the public peace and the joint cultural work of my fellow Muslims with Russians. In the meantime, my acquaintance with the history of nations and my personal observations during my travels throughout the East have fostered a deep conviction in me that there is no greater happiness for the nation to which I belong than being part of the great Russian people, who are more large-hearted than any other nation, be it of the same faith with us or connected with us by the ties of blood. Only here, in Russia, we, Tatar Muslims, can achieve a level of well-being which is ever possible on Earth, both material and spiritual. Could I, who adheres to these convictions not out of fear, but being true to my conscience, who wished only good to my people, behave and act, even in my thoughts, in a hostile way towards the interests of Russia, without causing greater harm to my nation, because the welfare of my people is irrevocably tied to the greatness of this country, our Motherland given to us by God. In times when the minds of the dark masses are clouded by badly comprehended or poorly explained orders of the government, I tried to the best of my weak abilities to enlighten these dark masses in word and in deed. Thus, in 1894, after the decree issued by the censor committee about the withdrawal of schoolbooks from circulation, which were mostly handwritten at that time, there began a fairly strong movement and even migration to Turkey. In order to keep people away from this ill-considered action and explain to the supreme authorities the reasons for Muslims' confusion, who have viewed this decree as an invasion into the freedom of their religion, I, together with my deceased father Mokhamedzhan Galeev and mullah Abdulbadigov, went to St. Petersburg to visit the then Minister of Internal Affairs. The result of this trip was the explanation given to us by the Ministry, which pacified the population and stopped the migration.

During the latest census, in 1898, as a result of instigation by dark and ill-intentioned people, the dark masses attempted to resist this census, because they considered it, as the same ill-intentioned people put it, to have been a measure leading to Russification. My ceaseless and persistent exhortation explaining the real meaning of the census made these people so angry, that I even had to leave for Saratov guberniya for a while, because a threat to my personal security hung over me. This circumstance may be attested to by everyone who knows me in Kazan.

In the period of intellectual ferment of the studying youth in 1904–1905, I took great pains to resist penetration of adverse ideas into the madrasah at the 5th mosque. And after noticing objectionable elements, I always removed them and one day I expelled 50 students at once, who were keen on new fashionable ideas.

These facts, along with other similar cases, sufficiently portray both my personality and my convictions as a supporter of order, and my constant loyalty.

Now let me proceed to presenting my pedagogical activity which began in 1882. In this sphere of my activities, not a single instance was found which ran counter to the views of the government and interests of Russia. Knowing by my personal bitter experience the heaviness and imperfection of the existing system of primary education in parochial schools and medieval Scholasticism at madrasahs, I started introducing more contemporary methods of training and teaching in the school at the 5th cathedral mosque of Kazan, which is under my management. On the one hand, my aim was to give students the opportunity to receive the highest amount of knowledge with the smallest expenditure of time,
thus allowing them to get rid of the unnecessary burden which our hidebound mullahs loaded on their heads under the guise of teaching science. On the other hand, I attempted to prove that if desired, we still have enough time for learning the Russian language, which is necessary for us, Russian Muslims, because upon demands to demonstrate its knowledge, our opponents, who treat learning of the Russian language as one of the stages of Russification, constantly refer to complexity and length of learning Islamic theological disciplines so that there is no time left for learning the Russian language. In place of the incompetent teaching, which had existed at all madrasahs, I introduced in my school training led in accordance with programmes and also personally created many study guides in order to get rid of the need to fall back upon foreign guides of the kind and thus anticipate various reproaches on the part of my school superiors who treated foreign schoolbooks with suspicion. And in this sphere of my activities, the common threat was the idea, to which, I repeat, I adhered not out of fear, but following my conscience, that Tatar Muslims have to aspire to an everlasting loyalty to Russia, their Motherland, because their material welfare could not be possible outside of it. It was not discord that I preached, but unity, and I led youngsters to it, following my own convictions.

My work and efforts were misunderstood and misinterpreted, and my aspirations to demarcate the truth from the popular established opinions brought me only unpleasantness and grief. The dark, unenlightened masses, obedient to similar unenlightened mullahs, virtually saw heresy and apostasy in the innovations I introduced. These adherents to routine started spreading rumours that I had been bribed by missionaries, that I went hand in hand with them in the matter of Russification of the Tatars, and other similar tall tales. No matter how bitter it was to listen to and read such a false evaluation of my activities which was expressed in letters sent to me and my father, I withstood everything with tolerance, I trusted and that my work would be appreciated by my fellow Muslims and would be properly valued by the authorities, though I worked not for fame or praise, but I was incentivised by love and sympathy for my minor neighbours, sunken in ignorance, superstitions and bias.

How bitter my disappointment was. My ideological opponents who had used all means at their disposal to compromise me and my deeds in the eyes of my fellow Muslims, and being already unable to stop and prevent the ignited fire of the truth, relied on the last means—false denunciation.

What happened to me in May 1908 was even more shocking. Without dwelling upon moral sufferings, this event so distressed my parents at their advanced age, that their remaining number of days on this earth decreased. I am far from murmuring against God, who sent me such a hard challenge. I bore it humbly, but independently of my will, it produced a bitter awareness of two things. First of all, awareness that it is extremely hard to prove right-mindedness and loyalty of Muslims to the government, as there still exists such a vexing prejudice.

The second relates to me personally. I spent all of my 50 years reading books, doing science and teaching, having neglected the trading occupation of my father. My vocation lies in this, and I would like to devote the rest of my life to this great matter of enlightenment of my brothers and thus deserve mercy of God in my future life; I would like to leave this world with a pleasant feeling of my fulfilled duty to Almighty God and to people.

This is my sincere confession, my heart is open to the eyes of Your Excellency, and I trust that my hope will not be vain, and my senile voice will not be the voice of wailing in the desert.

Galeev.
No. 11
From the extract from undercover agents information, obtained by the Kazan guberniya gendarme administration, about the funeral of Tatar poet Abdulla Tukaev

6 April 1913

Today, on 4 April, was held the funeral of Tatar national poet Abdulla Tukaev, who died on 2 April after suffering from chest trouble [tuberculosis]. Due to this fact, the following Tatar bookshops were closed today: Sabax, Gasr, Yul, and Maarif; Sharaf and Co. – a resident of the Maarif bookshop. The deceased left, apart from his literary works, money in the amount of 500 rubles. But in spite of this, booksellers raised circa 400 rubles. A part of this sum was directed to funeral expenses and the rest together with the deceased’s 500 rubles, will be directed to a scholarship fund in his name. Today—on the funeral day—classes were cancelled at almost all madrasahs. Students of the madrasah collected money, part of which was sent to the above mentioned fund and another part was used for laying wreaths. Many people attended the funeral ceremony. The following people delivered speeches over the grave: Abdulla Gismetullin, Fakhrel’islam Ageev (a teacher), Shaykhulgattar Imanaev (a barrister), Gilmetdin Sharaf—a representative of the publishing house Maarif, and student Abdurakhman Mustafin on behalf of Vakt and Shuro. At the end of the last orator's speech, shouts were heard: 'Long live Vakt and Shuro!' and 'Long live our nation—mililyam.' In their speeches, the orators visibly attempted to influence the national feelings of Muslims. Money will continue to be raised by the publishing houses Maarif, Sabax, Gasr and Yul.

/Zhitel [Citizen] /

National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 199, Inventory 1, File 923, Sheets 21–22 reverse.

No. 12
Opinion of M. Pinegin, head of the Kazan Committee for Press, about Mohammedan educational institutions

20 October 1913

<...> the matter of national education among the Mohammedans is strongly organised and represents such a sound organisational system, that it will be a highly complex and difficult task to change it or implement other principles into it. Tatar schools have existed for a long time, they have their own traditions—quite specific and purely national, and bear a religious-moral character; scholarly mullahs, heads of madrasahs and their shakirds are the people's honour; madarisses, mullahs and teachers (mugallims) bear the idea of holiness of their pedagogical work, because they teach free of charge, in the name of God and in the name of spreading and consolidation of Islam, and according to the ShariA. This explains the Tatars' strong attraction to their madrasahs and receiving education at their national institutions.

Because of the literature, which comes from the same environment, the Muslim clergy and school create such strong fanaticism, that we will be able to achieve success in Russification—only secular in the near future—only through the repeated energetic and systematic activity directed to planting ideas of the Russian enlightenment in Islamism. Only in the event that we build a similarly sound and logical system which Muslims now have can we possibly expect favourable results.

It is also necessary to add to the above stated that the described type of madrasah and maktab is the most widespread. But 20 years ago, innovations were introduced to Tatar madrasahs which, however, touched few schools in Kazan guberniyA. The changes lie first of all in the external cir-
cumstances of institutes: classrooms now have an academic environment and are even furnished with school desks, colleges are divided into separate departments and forms, a timetable of classes and separate teachers for different courses were introduced; apart from the very theological sciences, secular subjects were also introduced: history and geography, arithmetic, even geometry, basics of natural science and physics. Mullah Galimzyan Galeev was the one who laid foundation of such a new-method institution in Kazan; after becoming head of this madrasah, he at first widened its territory by building new premises, which were funded by donated money and then started to carefully introduce these changes. This is the first innovative madrasah, where secular sciences unfamiliar to Tatar confessional schools began to be taught. Some time later, a similar madrasah was opened in Orenburg, its foundation funded by millionaire Khusainov who, under his will, donated a building with shops located at the Nizhny-Novgorod fair with the income of ten thousand rubles a year to the Kazan madrasah of Galimzyan Galeev. Mullah Galeev invited teachers (mugallims) of the new stream to his madrasah; Yusuf Akchura was distinguished among them. He came from the Simbirsk Tatars, but was educated in Turkey. At the beginning of the 1900s he was appointed as one of the leading masters of that madrasah and quickly started to turn it into a secondary educational institution. The same Akchurin, having persuaded the Kazan Tatars to join the cadet party, held the presidency of the pedagogical committee at the Muslim congress in Nizhny Novgorod and presented his report on the necessity of conducting national education for the Tatars in their native language. The goal of mullah Galeev was to train teachers at his madrasah for nationalistic new-method schools. The alumni of his madrasah dispersed throughout the whole Volga-Kama region as mugallims. At first, they were accepted reluctantly and they often came into conflict with local village mullahs, but in order to consolidate the position of his former students, Galeev raised money and gave salaries to the best mugallims from various villages. The teachers who were educated at the new madrasahs of Galeev and Khusainov (in Orenburg) started pushing for the opening of independent schools in villages, which would not be influenced by mullahs. Whenever a mullah died anywhere, Kazan initiator mullah Galeev made arrangements at the parish so that his alumnus would be appointed to the vacant position. Muslims of all the Volga region were enraptured by this movement. Mullahs would be divided into two camps: adherents of the new methods and adherents of the old methods. The progressives released a range of works in which they revealed different prejudices rooted among the masses and accused the old school mullahs of stagnation in Tatar life; at the same time, conservatives argued that the new-methodists shook the foundations of the faith. A whole community "El-Islax" (reform) was formed, the aim of which was to spread the educational institutions and literature of the new generation. A newspaper with the same title was established, which devoted all of its pages to the reform of the Tatar education; this newspaper was published by shakirds of Kazan madrasahs, who discovered in themselves a strong motivation for studying the Russian language and persistently proved the need to learn it. Three book firms for publishing and spreading of the literature of new-methodists were opened. As mullah Galeev was one of the main figures involved in attracting the Tatars to the cadet party and a famous disseminator of ideas of Pan-Islamism and as he provoked strong anger among conservative Tatars, in order to stop the harmful agitation, he and other two mullahs were exiled to Vologda guberniya for two years. After his departure, the madrasah retained its forward-looking nature, though the spirit and direction of its teaching were changed, as it absorbed a business character without a trace of the bold anti-state (cadet) policy. Today, mullah Galeev, who was restored to his rights, has again taken up management of the madrasah.

It is clear from the above described that until today the most widely spread type of Mohammedan colleges have been old confessional (i.e. for teaching religion) schools, but there has already appeared a new type of these educational institutions—the so-called new-method maktabs and madrasahs at which general courses are taught along with religion. In addition, some of such madrasahs (Galeev’s in Kazan, Khusainov’s in Orenburg, Bobinskaya in Malmysz (Sarapul – Ed.) uyezd of Vyatka guberniya) aspire to be some kind of teachers’ seminaries from which mugallims graduate, who then begin their work at
Mohammedan colleges in the new direction. If the new-method schools are not yet widely represented at the moment, we can state with confidence that they could gradually replace the old-method madrasahs and maktabs in the near future under favourable conditions. This way, Tatar youngsters would continue being taught diverse subjects at their national schools in the spirit of isolation from everything Russian and without any control from the state.

Is such state of affairs permissible from the government’s point of view? Undoubtedly, no. Public school in Russia has to remain the same for all tribes and nations, and all courses except for religion must be taught in the Russian language.

This is one of the pillars of the state body, the key to its unity and strength. If the law recognises the existence of madrasahs and maktabs at mosques, they have to fulfil a single role: teach Mohammedan children their religion; therefore it should by no means be allowed to present general education courses there. But since the Tatars have recently started to feel a lack of real knowledge and general education, it is necessary for the sake of satisfying this legitimate need to make it easy for the Tatar youth to receive such education in the Russian language. The following things are necessary to do this: first of all, it is necessary to open a greater number of Russian-Tatar colleges, of one or two form years, and even higher junior colleges—handicraft, agricultural, etc. where all courses, except for the Mohammedan religious doctrine, would be taught in the Russian language.

Secondly, for those Tatar Mohammedans who desire to study at secondary educational institutions, the process of enrolment must be made easier through increasing the age threshold by at least 2 years, which is caused by the difficulty of preparation in their native language.

Thirdly, the Russian language requirements, established by the Ministry of the Mass Enlightenment dated 30 December 1890, must be raised for candidates applying to the position of village mullahs, in particular, no later than since 1 January 1916 the above mentioned candidates must know the Russian language at the level adopted at state single form year Russian-Tatar colleges. This measure would prompt the Mohammedan population to call for the opening of Russian-Tatar colleges in their villages in order to teach their children the Russian language there. Under the current conditions, when candidates for the position of village mullah can pass the Russian language examination after preparing for only 3 to 6 months through taking personal lessons, the number of Russian-Tatar schools cannot increase quickly.

Fourthly, adopt the requirements for the level of the Russian language and grammar set out by the rules of 26 March 1870 on the measures towards educating Inorodtsy and apply them to the Mohammedans elected to public positions (zemsky, city and village) and implement them as soon as possible (approximately from 1 January 1917).

The latest measures are undoubtedly desirable for the needs and goals of the administration and will have special significance as a means of the rapprochement between Muslims and the indigenous population of the empire. The need for knowledge of the Russian language will prompt the Muslim population to take heed to open Russian-Tatar colleges in their villages and send their children there to be educated. Learning the state language and other general education courses in the Russian language will distract the Mohammedans’ thoughts from the exclusive interests of Islam, show them the world of new ideas and contribute to softening that inflamed religious discord which up to the present moment has been brought up and supported by the teachings of Islam dominating Islamic schools and brought Russian Mohammedans spiritually closer to Turkey rather than to Russia.

M. Pinegin.
Kazan guberniya is one of the centres of Russian Islam not only by the number of Muslims living within it, but because of the significance of the city of Kazan and the local Tatar intelligentsia in the matter of development and consolidation of contemporary movements, first of all, of the nationalistic character which is observed in the environment of the Russian Muslims in general.

According to the latest statistical data, the total number of the Mohammedans of both genders living within it is 820,000 people, which amounts to 33% of the overall population of the governorate. The prevailing nationality among the Mohammedans is Tatar, amounting to 819 of both genders, and in some uyezds, Tatars amount to 71–73% of the overall population and they do not inhabit the two uyezds (Kozmodemyansk and Yadrin), where Inorodtsy live. Thanks to this ratio, Tatars dominate both in the economic and social lives of many uyezds. A characteristic feature of the ethnographic composition of Kazan guberniya is that the Russian element does not form the majority in any of its uyezds, and Sviyazhsk, Spass and Laishevo uyezds, which in this respect are in the most favourable conditions, are inhabited by 68 to 56% Russians. The percentage of the same persons is insignificant throughout all other uyezds.

If, regardless of the statistical data, we take into consideration that Kazan, which used to be the capital of the Kazan tsardom, is surrounded by a halo of great historical national memories, the logical consequence is that Kazan Tatars could not stay indifferent to the evolution which has recently been observed among Muslims all over the world and, due to the historically formed cultural domination and influence of the Volga Tatars upon Muslims Inorodtsy [aliens] of Russia, the former have occupied something of a leading position.

Famous Turkish activist Mahmud Esad Efendi who in previous years visited some Russian regions including Kazan, said the following in conversation with an employee at 'Sabax' newspaper issued in Constantinople about the role played by Kazan and Kazan Tatars in public enlightenment: 'Kazan and its neighbouring region spread the rays of enlightenment among the Muslims inhabiting the areas to the east from the Chinese borders. Wherever you go, everywhere you meet ulamas (scholars), muallims (teachers) and businessmen of the Kazan region. Everywhere among the population you see striving for progress and a serious work in this arena. Kazan and its suburbs are the most enlightened cultural centre of the Muslim world. Unfortunately, we have not understood it well enough until today.'

We can have the idea of how advanced the Tatar publishing industry is in Kazan by the fact that Kazan's four Islamic typographies printed and issued 456 non-periodical publication in 1908, 412 in 1909 including 108 study guides, and 319 in 1913. This scale of publishing corresponds to the quantity of Tatar bookshops, of which there are now nine in Kazan.

However, the influence of Kazan over the intellectual life of the Russian Muslims and the formation of Muslim social thinking is not limited to issuing of schoolbooks and books of various content. Three newspapers are printed here ('Bayanulxak'—Expression of truth, 'Koyash'—Sun, 'Yulduz'—Star (of a progressive character) and three magazines 'Ang' (Notion), 'Mektebe' (School) and 'Xokuk va Xayat' (Right and life). On the pages of periodical publications issued in the city of Kazan, Tatar publicists preach the necessity of brotherly unity of Muslims as an essential condition of the preservation of Mus-
lums' significance and the rights which belong to them. The same publicists, who present themselves as adherents of European education, at the same time advocate for the necessity of preserving and developing national identity in all spheres of life.

Parallel to this, publications often speak about the Tatars as members of the same family of nations, in particular, the Turkic one, and also point to the necessity of learning the common Turkic language in Tatar schools.

At the same time, it is noteworthy that last year, during the celebration of the 300th anniversary of the Romanov dynasty's happy reign, all Kazan newspapers sympathized with the jubilee; all of their editions were filled with articles and poems referring to the celebration and described the Russian Muslims' loyalty to the throne and the Russian tsars' merciful attitude to their Islamic subjects. [...].

Published: Special Council for Muslim affairs, 1914: magazines / compiled by I. Zagidullin. – Kazan: Ixlas publishing house; Sh. Marjani Institute of History of the Tatarstan Academy of Sciences, 2011. – pp. 41–42, 44–45

No. 14
Letter of Head of Kazan city V. Borinin to Kazan governor P. Boyarsky about organisation of aid for refugees

4 August 1915

In order to properly resolve the issues which will be caused by the expected arrival of refugees in Kazan, I called a meeting of the city committee on Monday 3 August, which came to the following conclusion: in order to provide proper help to refugees, representatives of national organizations have to be included in the committee—three from each—the Polish, Latvian, Jewish and Islamic committees; the executive commission has to be detached from its structure, so that one representative of each national committee participates in its sessions. The commission has been given broad powers in terms of practical work, so that in case of difficult situations, it can appeal to the city committee.

In order to fulfil this task, the executive commission met on 4 August and issued the following orders: 1) in order to clarify the issue of refugees' accommodation, examine city Baraks in the Tatar part of the city, the building of the former tea house of the Temperance Society, the city tea house at the Ustinsky wharves, etc. and analyze whether they are suitable for accommodating refugees and if their reconstruction and alteration are possible; 2) clear up the question of the possibility of renting rooms and separate apartments for educated refugees and those who have families. In order to do this, enter into agreements with hotel owners and publish advertisements in local newspapers targeted at house owners saying that the committee needs cheap apartments and asking them to notify the city administration in case of their presence and availability; 3) start making up straw mats which could be used instead of mattresses; 4) paste up notices in the Russian, Tatar, Polish, Latvian and Hebrew languages in different parts of the city, at the railway station and wharves which would inform refugees where they can find shelter and displaying the addresses of national committees; 5) arrange catering for refugees at city canteens and by the Latvian committee which will serve lunches and dinners; 6) provide arriving refugees with the ability to use banyas [steam houses] and provide them with clothes for changing; 7) medical assistance will initially be carried out by the Duma doctors. Further arrangements are to be made by the city sanitary commission; 8) provide refugees with returnable financial allowance on the most favourable terms. The appointed allowance is to be given by the city committee in accordance with the degree of need. Up to 1500 people may be accommodated in the buildings prepared for refugees. Regarding resources needed for organizing aid for refugees, the committee decreed to ask Your Majesty whether you consider it possible to transfer 3,000 rubles belonging to Your Excellency to the committee in order to provide first aid to refugees and, moreover, ask Your Excellency to petition for
giving the whole sum, which was collected in favour of the desolated outskirts to the committee. The petition has been organised on behalf of the committee which is under patronage of Her Imperial Highness Grand Princess Tatiana, keeping in mind that Kazan had already provided help to the desolated areas last year, in November of 1914.

I have the honour of presenting the propositions of the committee stated above to the consideration of Your Excellency.

Chair of the Committee,
head of the city, V. Boronin

National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 419, Inventory 1, File 1297, Sheets 19–20


No. 15
The article 'Imams' from a Tatar newspaper, translated by Professor N. Katanov

1915.

The financial situation of our rural and urban imams is not secured and will possibly continue to be not secured for a long time. Imams live on the funds of parishes, but the amount of these funds, which are directed to the imams, are undefined. In recent years, imams have been put into a more uncomfortable situation. Their cares have increased. Because of the war, they have to submit different metric statements and various information sheets. They need paper for these documents, and fairly good paper at that. And thus, a rural imam spends his last money, which was supposed to buy tea and sugar, on papers. And so it happens sometimes that an imam, after spending his last money buying papers, is forced to live without tea and sugar. And the conditions of living for such imams are the most acute.

The harvest has been excellent this year. That is why some people say rural imams' earnings have been increased this year. But they are mistaken. I made enquiries about more than fifty imams and muezzins. 48 of them received between 8 and 20 carts of the ushur (an ushur is one tenth of all grain which was supposed to be granted to poor people and at the moment goes to benefit imams and muezzins), two people were given 35 carts each, one muezzin was given 35 carts, and the mullah of the same parish received only 1.5 carts. Only one mullah received 50 carts of the ushur (gushur – Ed.).

On average, one mullah is given 14 carts. If we count in poods, that is 84 poods of grain. If an imam could wait until grain goes up in price, he would possibly earn as much as a village shepherd earns in 8 months. But his material conditions do not allow him to wait for a long time. He needs to sell rye as soon as possible in order to pay off his debts to Altunbaev. His belongings are pawned to this Altunbaev.

Finally, he owes A[n]drey for tea and sugar. So he also needs to be paid. Therefore, the poor mullah in the peak of field work has to sell all 84 poods at the price of 50 kopecks a pood. This will give him 42 rubles. From this money, he takes 10 rubles to pay workers who would grist his crops. Now, 32 rubles are left. In such a state of affairs, he should even against his will think in the following way: 'Surely, it would be great if that merchant died. Something would be left after him so that I could repair holes.' What morality can be taught by such a mullah?

Now let us turn to the muezzins themselves. If I say that 2/3 of all muezzins are worth their title and the rest are absolutely not, I will hardly be wrong. At the moment there are papers from different muezzins at my disposal. Many of these muezzins commit grave errors in writing. Three of them do not know how
to write at all. Among mullahs, some even have nine children. How can a mullah who earns 32 rubles feed them?

Today everything is expensive. Therefore, salaries of all representatives of labour were increased. In the meantime, this year mullahs’ earnings are lower than usual. Moreover, this year mullahs were forced to pay back the 25 rubles, which they borrowed from the government through the Spiritual Assembly in the year of hunger. Those who could not make the payment had their property seized. Back in the day, people would get married and marriages would provide mullahs with some income. No more marriages are concluded, as men have gone to war. There are no bridegrooms left for girls, and the birth rate has fallen, because the men are gone.

The only thing a mullah has to do in such conditions is to preach sermons which would be beneficial to some village kulak, or butter up some rich men if he is in the city.

Undoubtedly, there are fair people among mullahs. It is possible that the one who received 1.5 carts when another got 35 carts, as we have described above, is a really honest man. He never sells himself, even for millions.

The press is also sinful in this respect. The press has portrayed mullahs as gluttons, fleecers of people. The mullahs have not said a word against it. But why, fathers, do you not protect yourselves? Can you not count? Or perhaps you have not noticed the newspaper articles? You clearly see what a great influence the press can have. If we do not take efforts to defend ourselves, who will? You are not angels, but neither can you live without eating, drinking or dressing yourselves. Moreover, you should not forget that you all have children to raise.

Akhun Giniyatulla, son of mullah Gizatulla.

National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 969, Inventory 1, File 46, Sheets 5–9 reverse.

No. 16

From the review of the economic and living conditions the population of Kazan guberniya has found itself in over the period of 9 months since the beginning of the war—about the aid to the families of conscripts or those who volunteered for service in the active army

20 July 1915

Among all sources which have provided help to the families of those who were called up for military service or who joined the active army as volunteers—the allowance provided by the state in accordance with the law of 25 June 1910 is undoubtedly the most valuable. All other types of aid almost without exception are of a temporary nature. Public organizations rarely dispose of sufficient resources and therefore their aid ends too early, and in a lot of cases it is limited to one-time payments. The only exception here is the aid organized by the Kazan city municipality which is provided from the city funds. It is similar in character to the state allowance, which we will discuss below.

Since the beginning of the first military conscription of reservists and militia fighters through May 1915, the state treasury provided allowances to cities with the total amount of 270,171 rubles 15 kopecks and to rural areas amounting to 5,683,068 rubles 56 kopecks. In total, the treasury spent 5,953,239 rubles 71 kopecks a month. In urban settlements, allowances are granted monthly, and in rural areas—every three months.<...>.

The initial size of the ration was set for Kazan at 2 rubles 24 kopecks and for the uyezds with their cities—depending on prices for groceries: from 2 rubles 9 1/2 kopecks for the Kazan uyezd to 2 rubles 34 kopecks for the Spassk and Chistopol uyezds, moreover, in the majority of uyezds, the ration was set at an amount of 2 rubles 17 kopecks. <..>
Therefore, at the existing sizes of rations, an average family of four members aged over 5 years-old, who had the right for receiving a full ration, must have been granted the allowance of 9 rubles 4 kopecks from the state treasury, if the family lived in Kazan from September to June; the minimum allowance for those living in uyezds was supposed to be 8 rubles 60 kopecks with the ration of 2 rubles 16 kopecks, and the maximum sum of the allowance was to be 9 rubles 36 kopecks with the ration amounting to 2 rubles 34 kopecks—that is, in this case even higher than for people of Kazan. In accordance with the reports of tax inspectors, some families, because of the big number of their members, received allowances amounting up to 17–22 rubles a month—that is the sum, which had not even been earned by their conscripted breadwinners. In general, the amount of the state allowance for inhabitants of villagers is considered to be normal and enough to keep conscripts’ families and even allowing sometimes to save money, deposit the rest in the bank, settle conscripts’ debts, etc., according to the words of the tax inspector of the Yadrin uyezd who himself was a witness of this. Tax inspector of the Spassk uyezd provides a more explicit description of the state allowance. He considers the amount of state allowances to be totally sufficient and suggests that in case of its increase, some families’ energy and labour abilities would be artificially decreased.

If the state aid could be insufficient for some peasant families in the rarest cases, then it was complemented with charity which helped them buy clothes for children, for example, or bring logs to the families where no more men were left, and so forth.

Moreover, civil public funds were sometimes spent not on the requirements of the families of conscripts, but on satisfying the needs of the latter. Thus, for example, some village communities of the Tsarevokokshaik uyezd assigned 2650 rubles for the needs of reservists and militia soldiers. <<...>>

If peasant families received the amount of allowance equal to the urban families, or somehow smaller, the former would always find themselves in better material conditions than the latter. Peasant families with some minor exceptions have their own izba [hut], are often supplied with fuel if not in the form of logs from the public forest, then in the form of straw. The most essential groceries from private farms will help survive if not until the new harvest, then at least for some time. At last, in peasant families we can often come across items of clothing and shoes of their own production (linen, valenoks, bast shoes, etc.).

Families of conscripts who lived in cities as workers, craftsmen, serving to private individuals and the like who were sustainably self-sufficient through their own labour, found themselves in a difficult material condition. The situation was even more grinding for those families who were left without the breadwinner.

Apart from worries about daily bread, such families had to find a way to provide themselves with living quarters, fuel, clothing, etc. The state allowance which had been intended to be given to reservists’ families surely could not provide an advantaged living to any family if it had not been provided with property or profits through some investment or family business which could be continued after the head of the family was recruited (trade, for instance). Very few families of conscripts found themselves in a comparatively good situation. Some rich trading-industrial companies, as well as private individuals who sympathized with the conditions conscripts’ families were in, provided the latter with a free temporary dwelling and in some cases lived in the same apartments where they used to live with the conscripts who, thanks to their service, could take advantage of a free-of-charge apartment. Some companies allowed conscripts’ families to receive part of their breadwinners’ salaries.

Thanks to such a state of affairs, a difficult task was set before the cities: they had to ease the need, which had encompassed the families of the urban population in a broad wave.

The Kazan city public administration was one of the first who stepped on this path and allocated 100,000 rubles for covering the needs of conscripts’ families. By April 1915, 55,064 rubles 73 kopecks were spent from this sum. In order to implement this measure, the city organized a special committee which, in addition to city counselors, included representatives of various strata of the society. This city committee has provided help in four spheres. First of all, it grants allowance in the amount...
set by the state to individuals who by law do not have a right for that, for example, to civilian wives and their families who were sponsored by conscripts, if it is proved by the examination conducted by special district protectorships, by which the city was divided in accordance with the number of police departments. In general, the city granted allowances to 2706 families which amounted to 13,384 rubles 33 kopecks for the period since 17 July 1914 to March 1915. The second most widely spread type of aid is granting the housing benefits which during all the time have been given away in the amount of 21,991 rubles 16 kopecks to 10,398 families. These benefits were only granted to families who, after the local examination, appeared to be in a strong need. And it was granted at the rate of 75 kopecks per person a month, but no higher than 3 rubles per one family even if it included more than 4 members.

During December and January, the city provided reservists' families with 1,200 sazhens of logs amounting to 6,690 rubles 48 kopecks. These logs came from the private storage of the city woods. Since it was really difficult for the city organize distribution of logs, the last one was made with the support of church protectorships as public organizations, which were really close to the local population and well acquainted with the material prosperity of certain members of their parish. Thanks to this agreement, logs were brought to church protectorships and the latter then defined the degree of need certain families were in. And on the basis of such examinations, they distributed fuel material approximately by 1/2 sazhens per a family. At last, with the broad support of the local community, the city managed to organize free canteens, and 13 of them currently operate in the city. The city spent 12,998 rubles 26 kopecks before April for its keeping. This sum does not cover all spendings on canteens, as they also receive many private donations by products and money, the overall amount of such voluntary contributions is hard to calculate. Every day canteens feed children of reservists whose family are in the greatest need. In extreme cases, for example, because of a disease or another reasonable excuse, lunches are served outside of the canteens.

Apart from their direct purpose, city canteens also pursue pedagogical purposes. Local genteel ladies who de facto manage everything at these canteens, strive, where possible, to eradicate bad habits and inclinations noticed in children's behaviour; to cultivate in them love of religion and the Motherland, to interest them in various scientific disciplines suitable for their age, etc. The result of such activities is quickly apparent, and the children become more polite.

The activity of the city in the discussed sphere would be insufficient if we did not mention the organization of collection of items at the end of 1914 in favour of our fighters, with broad participation of the local community. This collection exceeded all expectations. There was collected a great number of various items which, because of their character, could not be used as intended. This way, for example, articles of female and some items of male clothing were given out immediately to families of reservists through church protectorships.

Apart from the mentioned city organization, several other organizations operated in the city of Kazan which pursued the same purpose—provide material help to the families of those called to arms. First of all, we should mention activities of local church protectorships, which give away circa 1 ruble per month from their own funds to the families of over 1 member, who are in a special need or burdened with a great number of members. Activities of such protectorships have always been efficient because their spheres touched small areas and thus, examination of financial situation of reservists' families was not a difficult matter for members of protectorships, as they are inhabitants of the same areas.

The Kazan department of the society of general help, which is under protection of His Highest Imperial Majesty, has the task of providing help to Russian warriors injured at the battlefield and their families, and expressed a noticeable activity in the matter of aiding those called up for active service. In 1914, the department examined with the help of its members 1,115 families and gave away aids amounting to over 4,000 rubles, and it has given away 2,000 rubles more in the current year. Moreover, through fiduciaries, the department gave away over 700 items of clothing and underwear to the poorest families of reservists. The department's activity is vividly broadening, because the number of
its members increases and the amount of in-payments gets higher. Local public entities made the following donations in order to strengthen the department's work: the zemstvo gave away 300 rubles and Kazan—500 rubles.

Among other cities of the Governorate, the highest activity at taking care of reservists' families was expressed by the town of Chistopol which in the period through April 1915 provided the following aid: with money amounting to 6,905 rubles, with groceries—tea, sugar, flour amounting to 683 rubles 63 kopecks, with petrol—3,000 rubles and water for 400 rubles, with the total sum of 10,988 rubles 63 kopecks.

Apart from that, since January of this year, children from families of reservists, from 3 to 14, were provided an opportunity to be fed at canteens. During the first three months of existence of these canteens, their expenditure has been set at circa 1,500 rubles, while they take care of 709 families with 2,359 eaters.

The activity of other city self-administrations in the defined area was expressed to a lesser extent—as far as their resources allowed.

In the uyezd cities, various charity organizations also functioned as far as their resources gave possibilities for that.

If we calculate the sum given away to reservists' families, who were called up for military service through March, it will be 6,128,597 rubles 46 kopecks, including grants: from the treasury—5,953,239 rubles 71 kopecks, from the zemsky and city unions —21,015 rubles 70 kopecks, from the zemstvos—37,708 rubles 83 kopecks, from the cities—74,202 rubles 15 kopecks, from the population—17,894 rubles 44 kopecks, from the volost protectorships—754 rubles, from parish church protectorships, the association of general help and diverse charity organizations—23,782 rubles 93 kopecks.

Head of the department       I. Spassky
National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 3, Inventory 1, File 10137, Sheets 292–195 reverse, 213.


No. 17
From the message of head of Kazan guberniya P. Boyarsky to the Police Department about the resentment among Kazan inhabitants due to the economic crisis

17 October 1915

It seems to be calm on the surface, but from the inside, hidden irritation and exasperation are felt very strongly, which are particularly caused by growing living costs, from rent bills to essential goods. With these rising costs, they see the speculation of entrepreneurs who relish the opportunity to line their pockets. And the anger towards them is very potent. The efforts of the city administration to fight rising living costs by introducing competition cannot be fulfilled because there are no resources, and the city's petition for a million loan was rejected.

Dissatisfaction shows through even in the most unexpected circles, where we would least expect, and talks of revolution as the finale of the war have become an ordinary phenomenon.

National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 1, Inventory 4, File 6259, Sheet 28.
No. 18
Telphoned message of the assistant to the Kazan guberniya commissar to Mamadysh uyezd commissar about adoption of measures against the peasants of the village of Yambay of Abdinskaya volost, who vandalized the estate of landlord Yunusov

16 May 1917

Abdulvaley Ikhsanovich Yunusov is telegraphing that at the estate of Yambay of Abdinskaya volost, peasants from neighbouring villages revolted, beat the prikazchik [clerk or assistant], defaced the estate, took money and the like, he fears for his life; the fate of the family is unknown, he himself fled to safety, there is still grain in the estate stored for the army. I ask you to take the most energetic measures to reinstate law and order, even if that means sending a military group, scrupulously investigate the case and bring the perpetrators to justice. Please inform me of any developments.

Assistant to governorate commissar Chernyshev.

National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, Fund 1246, File 51, Sheet 151.


No. 19
A note in the newspaper 'Kzyl bairak', 'The goals are different, or everyone has their own goals' about the real purposes of the war loan

18 June 1917

What is a soldier's purpose in war and what responsibilities are laid on the shoulders of a bourgeois? The government's announcement of a war loan gives a clear response to this question.

It reads: 'The Army has fulfilled its purpose before the Motherland—it has gone on the offensive. You must also fulfil your responsibilities—sign up for the loan of freedom, help the Army.'

Indeed, a soldier's responsibility to his Motherland is to receive wounds, be injured and die in war, while the responsibilities of the bourgeois are to stay at home and acquire bond loans, make 6% profit and count their other lucres. The poor bourgeoisie, what a heavy burden rests on their shoulders! Comrade soldiers headed for the battlefield, have a mercy upon the poor bourgeoisie!

Social-democrat

Kzyl Bairak, 18 June 1917, No. 3.


No. 20
From the report of the department of labour of the Commissariat for Muslim affairs of Inner Russia under the C[ouncil] of P[eople's] C[ommisars] for the period since 15 April to 1 May

4 May 1918
The bourgeois organization 'Milli Shuro' of the Moscow Tatar bourgeoisie has been destroyed. In place of the bourgeois organization, the department of labour together with the Central Muslim Socialist Committee founded the Moscow Commissariat for Muslim Affairs of the city of Moscow and the Moscow oblast under the Soviet of workers, soldiers and peasant deputies.

State Archive of the Russian Federation, Fund 1318, Inventory 17, File 4, Sheet 1.

No. 21
Report of the Khvalynsk Muslim subdivision of the Saratov gov. division for national affairs dated from April 1919 to 15 June 1920.

Not earlier than 15 June 1920

The Islamic division was organized in April 1919. Data was collected from volosts of the uyezd on the number of Muslim inhabitants. Political literature, newspapers and magazines were distributed among Muslims. Muslims express a friendly attitude towards the Soviet government. They are very interested in the newspaper and magazine. The Muslim division ordered Islamic typography fonts in Kazan. The Tatars love the theatre. They accommodate orphan children in orphanages. But there are no resources. Not so long ago, we received a notification from the Saratov gov[ernate] division for national affairs about the approval of the cost sheet for 1920, but the credit has not been lodged yet. Instead of three employees, only one has been approved. It is extremely hard for one instructor-agitator to carry out work among the 70,000-strong Muslim population.

Manager of the subdivision
Alimzhan Nurmukhamedov

State Archive of the Russian Federation, Fund 1318, Inventory 17, File 92, Sheet 177.

No. 22
From the Resolution of the 1st All-Tatar Founding Congress of Soviets

26–27 September 1920

Upon becoming familiar with the report of the People’s Commissariat of Education about its activity which due to several reasons is in miserable conditions, the 1st Foundation Congress of the Tatar ASSR still has successes which were achieved by a long and persistent struggle of agencies for enlightenment under adverse conditions of the economic collapse of schools and lack of teaching staff.

At the same time, the Congress has found that the People’s Commissariat of Education which united the whole enlightenment and ideological work of the Tatar Republic, has to manage its activities on the basis of regional peculiarities, so that all workers and peasants themselves were creators and participants of the proletarian culture in all of its spheres.

The agenda of the Congress included:
3. Food question.
4. Economic development.

2 Dated as per the document.
3 The first All-Tatar Constituent Congress of Soviets was opened in Kazan on 26 September 1920. The Congress proclaimed the formation of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic within the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. After the formation of the secretariat of the Congress, the election of the Mandates Commission and the editorial board, three sections were set up—agriculture, education, and healthcare, which were instructed to prepare reports to the Congress on their respective areas of management.

Along with suggesting the future People's Commissariat of Education to conduct its practical work through implementation of all the orders in the sphere of social education, as well as school and preschool education, the 1st Congress of Soviets suggests the People's Commissariat to pay close attention to organization of professional and technical education, which has up to date faced almost insuperable obstacles in its implementation.

In this respect, the Congress finds it necessary to: 1) start an intensive preparation of the teaching staff, 2) necessarily organize groups of teachers who could teach not only in Russian, but also in other languages of the Tatar ASSR, for which it is suggested to appoint some of the teachers to send on special courses, 3) prepare a stock of equipment for professional schools and workshops, 4) either unite weak schools with stronger ones, or organize in the latter: a) boarding schools and b) preparatory groups for individuals of different nationalities, 5) begin intensive translations of special books in the Tatar and Chuvash languages, 6) finish as soon as possible the development of study plans and programmes, 7) focus on the development of professional and technical knowledge among adults thus organizing courses not only at factories, but also at well-equipped schools.

Moreover, in terms of organization, the Congress recommends the future People's Commissariat of Education to establish more long-lasting connections with other Soviet departments: establish stable contact and natural integration of the work of all bodies subordinate to the People's Commissariat of Education, in particular, the work with the city department and, at last, properly and soundly organize labour tracking and distribution of enlightenment workers, to the possible extent provide them with favourable material conditions and simultaneously increase labour discipline among them.


No. 23
From the report of the Siberian Tatar subdivision of the department for nationalities at the Siberian Revolution Committee dated December 1920.

No earlier than December 1920⁴

Issue a weekly newspaper in the Tatar language, publish brochures of no less than 20 printed sheets a month which would respond the questions of the Tatar masses.

Head of the Siberian Tatar subdivision of the department for nationalities under the Siberian Revolution Committee

State Archive of the Russian Federation, Fund 1318, Inventory 17, File 108, Sheet 2

⁴ Dated as per the document.
No. 24
From the report of the publishing house of the Siberian Tatar department
of the Kirghiz bureau of the department for national minorities under the Sib[erian] bureau
of the CC WPP (B).

6 December 1920

<...> 15 issues of 'Krasnaya molodezh Vostoka' [Red Youth of the East] were published in the Tatar language.

In Tomsk

72 issues of the newspaper 'Kyzyl Sharyk' were published twice a week with a circulation of 600–700 copies. At the moment the circulation is 1700 copies. The editor is Khalil Sayfullin.

In Semipalatinsk,

after the Red Army troops arrived, the newspaper in the Tatar language 'Eşçe xalik soyuzi' has begun to be issued.


No. 25
From the report about the activity of the subdivision for national minorities
of the Tsaritsyno guberniya department for national education

Not earlier than 1921.

According to the data at our disposal, the number of the non-Russian population in the Tsaritsyno guberniya amounts to circa 40 thousand, 25 thousand of them speak the Tatar language.

In 1920/1921 academic year, in the town of Tsaritsyno, there were opened 22 schools of the 1st degree, where the teaching is carried out in the Tatar language; 3 Tatar People's Houses, 4 Tatar schools for adults and 1 Tatar kindergarten. The number of Tatar school employees amounts to 57. There are 2000 Tatar pupils in total.

Secretary
Miskarev


No. 26

661The decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Soviet of People's Commissars
of the Tatar ASSR about introduction of the Tatar language into records management
of Soviet institutions of the republic\(^5\)

25 June 1921

In view of the opportunity of a peaceful construction of the Tatar Republic, which has finally appeared after longstanding escalations of the civil war, the Tatar Central Executive Committee and the Tatar Soviet of People's Commissars, decrees in respect of the Tatar labour population:

\(^5\) The question of the implementation of the Tatar language for use in documentation was considered at a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the TASSR on 14 February 1921, when a resolution was adopted on the need to adopt the Tatar language. (National Archives of the Republic of Tatarstan. Fund P-732. Inv. 1, File 6, Sheet 45).
1. To introduce the Tatar language as obligatory at all Soviet state organizations.

Note: Public, cooperative and professional organizations introduce the Tatar language at their discretion.

2. In order to implement the given decree systematically and as soon as possible at the Tatar Central Executive Committee, for the purposes of its department, a special committee for Implementation of the Tatar language has to be founded. The committee should use and develop all the Tatar cultural forces through their tracking and distribution both in the Centre and locally; moreover, the Tatar People's Commissariat of Education has to hold take measures for hiring Tatar cultural staff who know the Tatar language and the national lifestyle of workers. The committee's decrees are obligatory for all Soviet institutions and can only be protested at the Tatar Central Executive Committee and at the Soviet of People's Commissars.

3. When Implementating the Tatar language, the new orthography—developed by the People's Commissariat of Education—is obligatory. The People's Commissariat of Education is also ordered to found a special committee for developing an appropriate terminology for state communications and the Tatar alphabet for telegraph communications.

4. The People's Commissariat of Education is ordered to immediately organize courses of the Tatar language for all volunteers from the rows of workers of the national communications service as well as Soviet workers. It is necessary to introduce the course of the Tatar language at the 2nd degree schools for everyone who wishes to study it, and adopt the same language course of Russian at 7 Tatar schools.

5. The People's Commissariat of Education is ordered to re-open the Tatar schools which were closed the other day, and intensively develop Tatar national theatres, besides, all Soviet institutions must provide support of all kinds to the People's Commissariat of Education.

6. In accordance with the practical agreement between the Tatar Central Executive Committee, the People's Commissariat of Justice and their bodies, Tatar courts should be immediately organized in the areas where the majority of the population is Tatar, so that proceedings and verdicts would obligatory be held in the native language of the accused. As and when necessary, bodies of the people's courts hire interpreters approved by the Tatar Executive Committee and the People's Commissariat of Justice, or their local branches.

Notice 1. Texts of interpretations are appended to the minutes and are read to the accused and witnesses, in addition, interpreters bear responsibility for wrong or felonious interpretations before the court of the Revttribunal (Revolutionary tribunal).

Notice 2. The People's Commissariat of Justice is ordered within a period of one month to develop the decree on mixed records management.

7. Reception and transmission of telegrams at telegraph offices must be immediately introduced in the Tatar language with the use of the Russian font in accordance with the agreement between the Tatar Central Executive Committee and the post and telegraph department where it is necessary, until the Tatar font is developed and until the Committee for Implementation of the Tatar language, the Tatar Central Executive Committee and the Tatar Soviet of People's Commissars issue their decrees. All telegraph offices immediately start accepting correspondence where addresses are written in the Tatar language. At the same time, the Committee for adoption of the Tatar language is

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6 A resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the TASSR dated 13 May 1922 approved the regulation for the canton committees to implement the Tatar language. They were entrusted with the management of the work of all Soviet institutions within the canton to adopt the Tatar language for use in documentation. (National Archives of the Republic of Tatarstan. Fund P-732. Inv. 1, File 2. Sheet 136. Original).

7 By a resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the TASSR dated 24 May 1921, it was proposed to the People's Commissariat of Education of the TASSR that courses in the Tatar language should be arranged in Kazan, the cantons, and volosts by 15 June 1921. The courses were to be made available, first, to responsible workers, second, to Soviet officials, and third, to anyone interested. (National Archives of the Republic of Tatarstan. Fund P-3682. Inv. 2. File 436. Sheet 44).
suggested to take urgent measures to introduce free transfer of simple correspondence, containing Tatar addresses.

8. All decrees and statements of the Tatar Central Executive Committee, the Soviet of People's Commissars and Soviet bodies which are subject to be published, are to be issued in the Tatar and Russian languages.

9. Given the high percentage of the Russian proletarian and peasant population inhabiting the city of Kazan, for whom adoption of the Tatar language may become highly difficult, the Russian language should be implemented as a state language along with the Tatar.

10. Correspondence between state institutions and records management within them must be carried out in one of the state languages, besides, in both cases bureaus of translation should be organized at these institutions, which would provide assistance in any of the state languages.

Notice 1: Bureaus of translation must be arranged by a special order of the Committee for Implementation of the Tatar language and cannot hire more than three translators/interpreters if there are no special chancelleries at the central people's commissariats and 1–2 at local branches on the same terms.

Notice 2. The Committee for Implementation of the Tatar language is entrusted with the responsibility of hiring translators and interpreters for all bodies, where the need for organizing bureaus of translation was found.

Notice 3. In case of absence of translators/interpreters, bodies adopt the Tatar language by their own means within the limits of feasibility.

11. All difficulties and misunderstanding when implementing the present decree are settled by the Committee for Implementation of the Tatar language.

Head of the Tatar Central Executive Committee Burkhan Mansurov

Head of the Tatar Soviet of People's Commissars S. Said-Galiev

Secretary of the Tatar Central Executive Committee X. Gamzat

National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, f. P-732, List 1, File 67, Sheets 1–1 reverse.

No. 27

Decree of the Academic Centre of the People's Commissariat of Education of the Tatar ASSR

3 December 1921

1. General provisions

The Academic centre is in charge of general theory and programme management of the scientific, educational (educational-pedagogical and educational-technical), enlightenment and artistic activities of the People's Commissariat of Education.

The primary objectives of the Academic Centre are:

a) Development of the general plan of people's enlightenment for one period or another in accordance with the projects presented by the centres and head commissars of the People's Commissariat of Education.

b) Development of private plans for one or another sphere of enlightenment on special instructions of the collegium of the People's Commissariat of Education.

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8 The regulation was approved at the board meeting of the People's Commissariat of Education of the Tatar ASSR on 3 December 1921 (National Archives of the Republic of Tatarstan. Fund P-3682. Inv. 2. File 432. Sheet 388).
c) Development of plans and programmes of activities at scientific institutions as well as programmes of teaching at all types of educational institutions of the TASSR.

d) Direct management of institutions the objectives of which include purely scientific, theoretical and artistic-academic work.

e) Management, direction and coordination of work of centres and chief commissars of the People's Commissariats of Education at the bodies which carry out academic work.

f) Development of plans and projects directed to organization of scientific expeditions, researches and convocation of scientific conferences.

g) Acquiring of scientific works, books, schoolbooks, literary works and fiction via declaring contests and gathering teams of interested individuals.

h) Tracking and registration of the existing scientific communities as well as organization of new ones.

i) General management by the institutions stated in the paragraph 3 hereof.

II. Structure of the Academic Centre

3. There are scientific commissions at the Academic Centre: 1) scientific and political, 2) scientific and technological and 3) scientific and pedagogical, 4) artistic with five sub-commissions: a) literary, b) theatrical, c) musical, d) of visual arts and e) cinematographic. Moreover, it includes the Main Archive and the Main Museum, along with the Secretariat of the Academic Centre.

4. The Academic Centre is managed by the collegium, which consists of 5 people.

1) head of the Academic Centre, 2) head of the State Scientific Soviet, 3) head of the main committee for arts, 4) head of the Main Archive and 5) head of the Main Museum, along with one representative of TTsSPS (Tatar Central Soviet of Trade Unions).

5) head of the collegium managers the Academic Centre and bears full responsibility for the work of the Academic Centre.

6. The manager of the Academic Centre is appointed by the People's Commissariat of Education and approved by the Soviet of People's Commissars.<...>9.

People's commissar of enlightenment of the Tatar ASSR  Sh. Akhmadiev
Secretary of the collegium of the Tatar People's Commissariat of Education.


No. 28
Data on the Tatar nationality on the territory of the RSFSR.
Data from 1920

13 February 1922

Petrograd: The bureau translates political books into the Tatar language.
There operate two schools of the 1st degree and two preschool groups within schools.
Orenburg: 16 schools of the 1st degree and 74 schools of the 2nd degree. Three-year pedagogical courses were opened. There is the Institute of Eastern Studies with the following faculties: of Eastern philology, geography, biology, history and physics and mathematics. There were opened clubs for workers and peasants and People's Houses. There were opened libraries with reading rooms in 23 locations. Clubs for peasants and workers were opened at 5 schools for adults.

9 Information about the staff of the Academic Centre is omitted.
Data from 1921

Saratov. The Tatar section publishes the newspaper 'Yalkin'. 5–6 million Tatars are scattered outside the Republic of Tatarstan. Only 1,700,000 Tatars live within the republic.

100 people work in Siberian mines. 100 people in Donbass.

The overall number of population inhabiting Ufa guberniya is 1,790,572 people. The Tatars represent 50% of this number—966,619 people.

Up to 20 people of Tatar nationality (circa 20% of the overall population) live in Samara guberniya. 250 Tatars (10% of the overall number of population, while there are no Tatars working at administrative bodies) live in Saratov.

Siberia is inhabited by 1.5 million Tatars (its administrative bodies do not include Tatar people).

Data is taken from the newspaper Zhizn Natsionalnostey [Life of nationalities] of 1920–1921.

Record keeper of the Tatar department A. Babushkina.

State Archive of the Russian Federation, Fund 1318, Inventory 17, File 4, Sheets 16–16 reverse.

No. 29

Distribution of the Tatar nationality throughout guberniyas of the RSFSR (people).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>guberniya</th>
<th>number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Altay</td>
<td>—1,445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Astrakhan</td>
<td>—10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vyatka</td>
<td>—17,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yekaterinburg</td>
<td>—26,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuban</td>
<td>—100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazan</td>
<td>—798,910</td>
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<tr>
<td>Penza</td>
<td>—120,000</td>
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<td>Perm</td>
<td>—36,205</td>
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<td>Novgorod</td>
<td>—100</td>
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<td>Olonetsk</td>
<td>—100</td>
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<td>Ryazan</td>
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<td>Tambov</td>
<td>—17,865</td>
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<td>Tomsk</td>
<td>—41,900</td>
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<td>Tsaritsyno</td>
<td>—5,745</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chernomorskaya</td>
<td>—100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>—1,393,450</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<…>

Settlement of the Tatar nation throughout uyezds of the RSFSR (people)

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10 Dated as per the front page of ‘File 4.’
Moods among employees of Soviet organizations are calm, some only express discontent because of the failure to provide dry goods and essentials in general. They, however, treat the Soviet regime with sympathy and perform their duties in an honest manner. Meanwhile, peasants are in an oppressed mood because of the current situation. They keep grumbling that the Soviet regime takes away the last they have and wants to starve them to death, because the harvest have been bad this year and despite this, in their opinion, the tax assessment did not take this into account. Moreover, peasants are dissatisfied because they are not provided with items of urban production and, first and foremost, dry goods. Moreover, there have been cases in the canton where peasants have begun to eat acorns. At last, the peasantry complaints that the regime ignores everything—knowing that there is nothing to feed horses, they are anyways used in carts daily and, in the majority of cases, the kulaks have a dominant influence, as they skillfully find a way into local Soviets [councils] and try their best at exploiting poor people, because, in the opinion of the kulaks, the poor were the ones who had imposed the emergency tax upon them and thus they try to take revenge and arrange it this way that the Soviet regime would be blamed for everything—that is, for various taxations and duties. Cases have been recorded where tax assessment for livestock would be done incorrectly, because of these kulaks who had squeezed themselves onto

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11 The signature is illegible.
the village Soviets [councils]: during taxation, the class principle was not observed. The peasantry also
complains that some organizations and village Soviets force them to cut and chop wood and, as they
say, this duty has never existed even in the time of landlords and now even a watchman does not want
to work, not to mention Soviet employees. The peasantry is particularly dissatisfied when they are sent
to chop wood for Sovkhozes [state owned farm], because in the majority of cases, wood chopping was
carried out for the apartments of employees at sovkhozes. In view of this, peasants say: we have not a
single minute for working for ourselves, because everyone tries to ride on a labourer's neck, our farming
is being destroyed and if we keep being forced to perform these duties, we can say with confidence that
by spring the peasants will not be capable of sowing fields, recuperate their farming and so on.

The poor respond in the following way to the question why the population of the above mentioned
canton treats the Soviet regime and the Communistic party with suspicion: Soviet power is our power
and we do not want another one. But the problem is that locally its orders are not carried out in the
proper way.

SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 1, File 197, Sheet 3.
Published: Shaydullin, R. 'Sovetskaya vlast` razdevaet krest`yan dogola' (Social`no-politicheskie
nastroeniya krest`yanstva respubliki 20-x gg.) ('The Soviet Government Strips Peasants Bare' (Socio-
political sentiment of the republic's peasantry in the 20s)) // Gasırlar Avazı = Echo Vekov.—1998.—No.
3/4.—pp. 300–301.

No. 31
Data from cantons of the Tatar Republic according to Circular Telegram No. 475
dated 14 December 1921

As of 22 January 1922

1. ARSK CANTON. 388,735 [people] starving; 347,376 adults have no access to canteen; 2,287
adult evacuees by now; 19 school canteens, each having a capacity of 50 to 100 people; 325 ARA can-
tees having a capacity of 50 to 100 people; 94 Pomgol canteens having a capacity of 50 to 200 people;
2,000 children to be evacuated; weekly deaths: 30 [people] due to famine, 15 [people] due to typhus;
weekly typhus incidence: 150 people; weekly famine incidence: 360 people.

2. BUGULMA CANTON. 240,310 [people] starving; 132,000 adults have no access to canteen;
2,188 adult evacuees by now; 10 meal stations for ill children and adults, each with a capacity of 50, and
123 school canteens having the following capacity have been opened: 121 canteens, each with a capac-
ity of 50–150, 2 canteens with a capacity of 600–1,200 each, which provide meals for 25% of the all ill
and disabled people; 2 ARA canteens to host 479 people and 2 isolation units are available in the city;
129 Pomgol canteens to host 13,000 people; 1,334 children evacuated; 2,000 to be evacuated; deaths
from 1 December to 22 January: 1,266 [people], 101 [people] due to typhus; total typhus incidence over
the entire period: 3,063 [people]; total famine incidence: 5,112 people.

3. BUINSK CANTON. A total of 147,428 people starving; 88 public canteens available to host
1,700 people; 5,859 evacuees; 115 school canteens to host 4,368 people; 206 ARA canteens to host
15,376 people; weekly deaths: 57 [people] due to famine, 10 [people] due to typhus; weekly typhus
incidence: 576 people; weekly famine incidence: 655 people.

4. LAISHEVO CANTON. 28 locally funded canteens to host 944 people. A total of 165,512 people
starving, including 72,051 children; 75 school canteens to host 3,390 people; 156 ARA canteens to host
15,000 people; weekly deaths: 28 [people] due to famine, 15 [people] due to typhus; weekly typhus
incidence: 118 people; weekly famine incidence: 764 people.

5. MAMADYSH CANTON. 26 public canteens to host 1,326 people; a total of 152,935 [people]
starving; 29,111 adults evacuated; 336 children's meal stations to host 8,648 people; 75 Pomgol can-
teens to host 13,000 people, and 171 ARA canteens to host 14,200 people opened; 685 children evacuated; 300 children to be evacuated; total deaths over the entire period: 2,371 people due to famine, 121 people due to typhus; typhus incidence over the entire period: 1,699 people; famine incidence: 21,616 people.

6. MENZELINSK CANTON (data as of 15 January). 19 adult public canteens to host 1,237 people; a total of 175,530 people starving; 2,900 adults evacuated; 4 children's meal stations to host 800 people; 60 Pomgol school canteens to host 3,100 people; 161 ARA canteens to host 13,032 people; 832 children evacuated; total deaths due to famine over the entire period: 1,926 people.

7. SVIYAZHSK CANTON (data as of 15 January). A total of 165,309 people starving, including 20,591 people from Chuvash region; 23,035 adults evacuated; 101 ARA canteens to host 12,500 people; 384 Pomgol canteens to host 33,897 people; 204 children evacuated; 200 children to be evacuated; weekly deaths: 100 [people] due to famine, 40 [people] due to typhus; weekly typhus incidence: 110 people; weekly famine incidence: 641 people.

8. SPASSKY CANTON 34 public canteens to host 2,100 people; a total of 158,271 people starving; 19,411 adults evacuated; children's meal station to host 382 people; 165 school canteens to host 3,750 people; 184 ARA canteens to host 17,500 people; 2,309 children evacuated; deaths from 1 to 22 January: 277 [people] due to famine, 201 [people] due to typhus; total famine incidence over the entire period: 8,288 people.

9. TETYUSHI CANTON. 181 public canteens to host 7,289 people; a total of 174,720 people starving; 25,515 adults evacuated; 66 children's meal station to host 28,322 people; 154 school canteens to host 7,653 people; 302 ARA canteens to host 17,500 people; Pomgol canteens to host 7,622 people; 12,662 children evacuated; total deaths due to famine over the entire period: 12,662 people; total typhus incidence over the entire period: 15,000 people; total famine incidence: 32,500 people.

10. YELABUGA CANTON. 1 public canteen to host 300 people; a total of 141,133 people starving, 109 ARA canteens to host 9090 people; 71 Pomgol canteens to host 2,952 people; 693 children evacuated; weekly deaths due to famine: 106 people; total famine incidence over the entire period: 4,366 people.

11. CHISTOPOL CANTON (data as of 15 January). Adult public canteens to host 2,300 people; a total of 279,901 people starving; 13,793 adults evacuated; 244 ARA canteens to host 18,000 people; Pomgol canteens to host 6,650 people; 1,604 children evacuated; 10,000 children to be evacuated; weekly deaths: 2,016 [people] due to famine, 40 [people] due to typhus; weekly typhus incidence: 226 people; total famine incidence over the entire period: 39,008 people.

12. CHELYN CANTON. 35 adult public canteens to host 1,275 people; 13 locally funded canteens to host 601 people; a total of 260,872 people starving; 131,894 adults without access to canteens; 197 ARA canteens to host 13,120 people; 123 Pomgol school canteens to host 7,098 people; 994 children evacuated; 1,000 children to be evacuated; total deaths due to famine over the entire period: 11,308 people; total famine incidence over the entire period: 35,046 people.

13. AGRYZ CANTON. A total of 37,943 people starving, including 17,073 children; 715 adults evacuated; 77 ARA canteens to host 4,909 people; 32 Pomgol canteens to host 1,335 people; 65 children evacuated; total deaths over the entire period: 269 people due to famine, 47 people due to typhus; incidence of typhus: 180 people; incidence of famine: 4,994 people.

TOTAL STARVING POPULATION OF THE TATAR REPUBLIC: 2,462,599 people; 1,181 Pomgol canteens hosting 101,234 people; 2,237 ARA canteens hosting 191,586 people; 798 children's meal stations hosting 47,306 people; 448 adult canteens to host 16,201 people; 41 locally funded canteens to host 1,545 people; 651 school canteens to host 34,361 people; 392,233 people in the cantons get nutrition.

The cantons' total deaths from 15 to 22 January: 3,333 people due to famine, 533 people due to typhus

Head of Information Foreign Department signature
SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 1, File 197, Sheets 98, 98 reverse.
Published: Akhmetzyanova, L., Vasadze, V., Rakhimov, S. Golod osobenno svirepstvoval v
derevnyax... (Famine was especially rampant in the country...) // Gasırər Avəz = Echo Vekov. Aḥ-

No. 32
Report by the Far East Department for Public Education on the Size
of the Tatar Population of the Far Eastern District According to the 1923 Census.

Not earlier than 1924\textsuperscript{12}.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Governorate names</th>
<th>In towns and urban settlements</th>
<th>In rural localities</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>In Trans-Baikal guberniya</td>
<td>1718</td>
<td>1070</td>
<td>2788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>In Amur guberniya</td>
<td>1197</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>1572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>In Primorskaya guberniya</td>
<td>1264</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>1618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4179</td>
<td>1799</td>
<td>5978</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tatars account for 0.9% of the total urban population of the Far Eastern district. A large number of them live in the cities Chita, Khabarovsk, Blagoveshchensk, and Vladivostok.

Turko-Tatars live scattered in rural communities in Amur and Primorskaya guberniyas; only in Trans-Baikal guberniya are there two exclusively Tatar localities: Novo-Kurchataysk village, Aksha uyezd (51 families, 325 people) and Yelizavetinskaya village, Chita uyezd (40 families, 180 people).

The Tatar literacy rate is not lower than among the Russians. For instance, in Trans-Baikal guberniya, accounting for about 50% of the total Tatar population of the Far Eastern District, both Tatar and Russian literacy rates are 32.7%.

The network of Tatar institutions in 1924–1925

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Governorate names</th>
<th>Schools</th>
<th>Instructors</th>
<th>Students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1   | In Trans-Baikal guberniya
   a) in Chita | 1       | 2           | 57       |
   b) in Novo-Kurchatay village | 1       | 1           | 32       |
| 2   | In Amur guberniya
   a) in Blagoveshchenskoe | 1       | 2           | 35       |
   b) in Surozhevka settlement | 1       | 1           | 60       |
| 3   | In Primorskaya guberniya
   a) in Vladivostok | 1       | 1           |          |
   b) in Nikolayevsk | 1       | 1           |          |
|     | Total | 6       | 8           | 242      |

Instruction is provided in Russian and Tatar in Blagoveshchensk and Chita, which thus have two teachers. In other schools, instruction in the indigenous language only. All schools are funded from the local budget. Text books and training aids are procured at the cost of students’ parents from the Tatar Republic.

\textsuperscript{12} Dated as per the content of the document.
There are clubs in the city of Chita. No other education institutions for Tatars are available. Adult alphabet books in the Tatar language were received from the Main Political Education Committee of the People’s Commissariat for Education (Glavpolitprosvet) and distributed among governorate departments for public education in the 1st quarter of this year. ‘Nasha sila—nasha niva’ (‘Our Field is Our Power’): 125 copies; ‘Rabochij bukvar’ (‘Workers' Alphabet Book’): 125 copies.

Deputy Head of the Far Eastern Department for Public Education
Head of the Sub-department for Social Education
Inspector for Ethnic Minorities

RF State Archive, Fund A.–296, Inventory 1, File 88, Sheet 30–30 reverse.

No. 33

Situation in Popular Education in Ethnic Groups in the RSFSR (except for Autonomous Republics) as of the 1925–1926 Academic Year

Not later than 1925\textsuperscript{13}.

The RSFSR total ethnic minority population (except for regions and republic) is approximately 19 million people, including about 9 million in autonomous regions. The following ethnic groups are the largest: the Mordvins (1,500,000), the Tatars (1,360,000). The Tatars are scattered across 41 governorates and districts.

Local ethnic employment

By comparison…\textsuperscript{14} For instance, 806 Russian social education institutions training services to 70,819 students functioned in Ulyanovsk Governorate in 1923–1924. A total of 158 ethnic minority institutions offered training to 10,374 people. The ratio of Russian students is about 65 per 1,000, the ratio of ethnic minority students in Ulyanovsk guberniya being about 36 per 1,000. That is, ethnic minorities have access to education which is about two times lower than the total value. No material changes were introduced in the school year 1924–1926, as the records of the inspection dated January 1925 suggest. According to the inspections statistics, 27.81% of the governorate’s Mordvin children and 28.0% of its Tatar children receive education services, while the percentage of Russian children is at least 46.61%.

RF State Archive, Fund A.–296, Inventory 1, File 184, Sheets 86–88 reverse.

No. 34

Application to the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) dear Comrade Stalin and all Central Committee Members by workers of factories and plants of the centre of the Tatar Republic, the city of Kazan, and delegates to factory committees

1924\textsuperscript{15}.

We hereby inform our dear Comrade Stalin, Executive Secretary of the Central Committee of our woe.

\textsuperscript{13} Dated as per the content of the document.
\textsuperscript{14} Omitted text.
\textsuperscript{15} Dated as per the content of the document.
In 1920–1921, in spite of the heavy famine, industry improved, and labour force increased. Salaries were paid on time, and illiteracy rate was reduced. As industry improved and workers’ and peasants’ consciousness cleared, the friendship between workers and peasants grew firmer. When our representative Comrade Mukhtarov and his colleagues, who had ensured a lot of achievements through great efforts, were removed from our environment, the industry and agriculture of the Tatar Republic deteriorated, and the output of factories and plants reduced dramatically. Redundancy happened at factories, plants, and other industrial establishments; thousands of workers were put out on the street. An increasing number of plants and factories was closing down. Even in years of famine, we have never witnessed redundancy or factory closing.

As for schools, a dramatic reduction has been happening: 5–6 auls share one school. Schools that used to be quite active and provide knowledge to thousands of workers’ and peasants’ children are out of operation. Children, the stars of our future life, are deprived of knowledge and left ignorant.

Speaking of peasants, their situation is even worse. The current People’s Commissariat for Agriculture does not implement the serious undertakings previously introduced by the old one. For instance, nothing has been done to increase the number of horses and agricultural tools, which are the 'heart' of agriculture, in the republic. Agriculture is in challenging circumstances at present. Unless measures are taken, our Republic could relapse into the conditions of the famine year, leaving education, improvement of peasant economy, and industry enhancement out of the question.

To speak of cooperation, kulaks and bloodsuckers head most of cooperatives in auls and volosts. Thus, they are not only inefficient but often of no use for the peasantry. Neglect by local authorities has been causing the peasants’ situation in general to deteriorate.

We would like to send back Comrade Mukhtarov, who is of value and importance for our republic, and his colleagues, who used to work among us hard to save us from famine, improve our industry and contribute to the improvement of the peasant economy, thus correcting the mistakes made and put an end to our current difficult situation. We can only put an end to this situation with the help of the above comrades and their skillful work taking into account the actual situation in our republic.

For some reason, the number of orphanages and nurseries has reduced dramatically, causing thousands of proletarian children to be put on the cold street and starve. Their vision of the future is rather obscure now. They roam the streets, stretching out their hands to passers-by and begging for handouts.

We do not submit the present application locally. We send it to you directly, as we trust in you greatly thus secure our future.

The original bears signatures of workers of (the Gunpowder, Alafuzov, Pugachyov, and other plants).

Muxamedzhanov
Avkhodiey
Safiulyain
Valiullin, delegate of the factory committee,
Valiullin
Khaybullin
Khayretdinov
Muxametimy'
Minullin

16 Here and hereinafter: crossed out in the document.
illegible
Sagidov
Xalimov
Musina, delegate
Nurlu-Banat Xalzhdullina, delegate
Marfuga Gabraxmanova, delegate
Rashitova, delegate
Maxi-Kemal, delegate
Mar'ям Safarova, delegate
Xadicha Tuktarova, – // –
Xody'cha Xalfeva, – // –
Abdullina, – // –
Xatmullina, –II –
Shashtollina, –II –
...(Signature illegible) – //– of the factory committee
Shakirov—factory committee member
Fatxullin
Kadirov
Xabibulin
Danbaraeva
Galiokbarov
Bajramov
Safullin
Gashullin
Davletkshi

Published in Valeev, R., 'My' prosim Vas vernut’ k nam v nasetu K.Mukhtarova' ('We ask you to send K. Mukhtarov back to our environment' // Gasirlar Avazi = Echo Vekov.—2004.—No. 1.—Pp. 99–100.

No. 35
Minutes of Public Meeting of the Baltashi vol[ost] party unit of the CPSU(B) attended by poor people, labourers, medium-income peasants, and young military trainees

20 November 1926.

Attendees: 124 people and 26 young military trainees.


Reports: Report on the party's activities in the village (reported by Comrade Ivanova).
The following questions are asked by attendees from the floor:
1). We welcome the Soviet government. We will not spare anything to restore the Soviet government. We have sent our children to the Red Army and supplied crops and livestock. We are satisfied with all activities and measured by the Soviet government. We only wonder why schools cannot be established to give religious instruction to children?
2). The situation with access to loans for the poorest stratum of the population is bad. Loans are only given to wealthy peasants, while poor ones cannot benefit. Are any measures being taken to ensure long-term loans for poor people?

3). Is the cooperative association right to issue a loan of 30 rubles to wealthy peasants, while poor people cannot obtain any loan?

4). Farm workers have no opportunity to form an opinion on political issues and cannot stay up-to-date with the situation. A lack of literature is the reason. Are any measures being taken to provide the country with Tatar literature?

5). The network of schools available is insufficient to provide education to all people of school age. The existing schools want new equipment. New schools have to be established, too. Are any measures being taken to expand the school network?

6). A lot of bridges and fire extinguishing equipment fell into disorder during the civil war. The Soviet government has to take measures to build tractor* bridges and provide the settlement with fire extinguishing equipment, which is of utter importance in the country.

7). People disabled during the civil war have not been provided with timber, though they are entitled to it.

This problem should be solved.

8). The situation is bad with the repayment of the seed loan received by poor and medium-income peasants for sowing. An overdue interest of over 50% per pood has accumulated over 2 years. Having obtained a sowing loan of 3–4 pooods, the poor peasant has to repay 7–8 pooods, which is very difficult. Measures should be taken to prevent such high overdue interest or any overdue interest on seed loans from being accrued. The interest accrued should be deducted.

9). Poor and medium-income peasants in Baltasi village are recorded to have obtained a seed loan of 250 pooods of rye in 1921. Though we have never obtained the rye, they want us to repay it. Measures have to be taken to clarify the situation.

10). It should be noted that the 1926 elections to the Soviets were successful. Poor farm workers used to be insufficiently involved in the Soviet election campaign, so the percentage of participants yielded a material non-enlargement.

11). Cooperative shops sell groceries at prices as high as in private shops. Measures should be taken to reduce prices for cooperatively produced goods.

12). The Mutual Help Committee in our volost was very inefficient. It is attributable to an unfit worker, who was replaced during the re-elections.

13). Peasants who have 1 horse, 1 cow, and two pairs of sheep often suffer dramatic need for lack of crops, and in cases when they have to pay for medical drugs for their sick horses and cows. We would like to know the concrete definition of a medium-income peasant.

14). The poor peasant is dissatisfied, because he gets no free medical aid. We cannot afford medicines, which we often need. Issuing medicines to poor peasants free of charge is a proper solution to the problem.

15). Peasants and poor people complain about a lack of midwives at rural feldsher stations. Village midwives are often unable to provide the help which female workers can receive in town. Rural feldsher stations should employ a staff of midwives.

16). A connection has been established between the poorest stratum of the peasantry and the party unit. The party cell, as well as individual party members, never refuse aid to any poor people who apply for it.

17). Certain party members have been found to be violently anti-religious. This should be eradicated.

18). The people's judge, who has arrived to Baltasi volost, is a bit too rude to peasants again. Such behavior of the people's judge should be checked too.

19). Last year, young military trainees were housed by individual householders, for which a daily rent of 2 kopecks per trainee was to be paid. We would like to know if the money will be paid.
20). Some of out poor and medium-income peasants are willing to move. Can they expect any benefits?  
21). A vocational school opened in Baltasi volost which is poorly supplied. It needs aid from the Soviet authorities.  
22). People make vodka at home. What measures will be taken to prevent further vodka production in the country?  
A greeting telegram Ivanova answers all questions to the attendees' satisfaction.  
The audience is in a good mood. <...>

Published: Shaydullin, R. 'Sovetskaya vlast` razdevaet krest`yan dogola' (Social`no-politicheskie  
nastroeniya krest`yanstva respubliki 20-x gg.) ('The Soviet Government Strips Peasants Bare' (Socio- 
political sentiment of the republic's peasantry in the 20s)) // Gasrular Avazi = Echo Vekov.—998.—No.  

No. 36  
Resolution on National Culture by the Bureau of the Tatar Regional Committee  
of the CPSU(B)

14 June 1927.

Taking intoaccount the discussion on the further development of the Tatar national culture among  
party organizations in the Tatar Republic, the Bureau of the Regional Committee finds it necessary to  
essentially establish its policy for the issues raised during the discussion:  
1. The camp of classes defeated by the revolution, naturally trying to impact the working masses, has  
grown more active against the backdrop of increased socio-political activity among all social groups  
and stratA. The perseverance of anti-revolutionary bourgeois ideology, expressed as a promulgation  
and spreading of nationalist ideas (great-power chauvinism in the Great Russians and bourgeois na-  
tionalism in other USSR ethnic groups), an intensified religious movement, and attempts to establish  
ideological influence over the most backward strata of workers and peasants.  
A number of additional reasons contribute to it in national republics:  
a) small proletariat, which reduces the ability of the working mass to resist the pressure of bourgeois  
and petite bourgeois ideology;  
b) a peculiar situation and special conditions, under which party and Soviet activities take place  
(mostly in terms of implementation of the national policy);  
c) the ability of the bourgeoisie to use common language, script, and ethnic origin to influence the  
backward working strata.  
As the party and Soviet agencies grew more concerned with issues of cultural construction, cultural  
activities became more intense in every aspect. The population has been found to be more actively in-  
volved in cultural activities.  
Thus, bourgeois nationalist elements have been taking attempts more often to propagandize separate  
development of the national culture and common interests for all social strata within the ethnic com-  
unity in terms of cultural construction. The propaganda is ultimately aimed at directing our entire  
practical work to develop the culture of the USSR peoples, improve the cultural services provided to  
the working masses of all ethnic groups (especially backward workers) in their mother tongues, and en-  
gage them in the socio-political life and socialist construction under the aegis of the proletariat towards  
national separation and ethnic alienation of workers from proletarian internationalism, from the USSR  
working class, and the government of the Communist Party.  
2. Speaking of further development of the national culture, we have to admit that all attempts at  
revising or 'amending' the existing resolutions by party governmental bodies (the10th and 12th Party
Congresses, the 6th National Meeting) in this aspect are groundless. Any reference to the end of the recovery period and the changed economic situation, any mention of the epoch of socialist construction, which allegedly requires a new approach to national culture at this stage, rely on no facts and data to confirm the 'novelty' and the necessity of revising the existing party decisions. Our approach to national culture is in full accordance with Comrade Stalin's rule that the culture should be 'proletarian in its content and national in its form.'

To the contrary, bourgeois ideologist rely on dominance of form over content, that is, in fact, on hollowing out our cultural construction of its proletarian content.

We have to attribute the views, popular among indigenous party members, especially among the youth, that rely on a simplified approach to the issue and underestimate and understatement of importance of national culture as a means of engaging the working masses in socialist construction, to a response to such approach, to the intensified bourgeois nationalistic activity. The camp's statement that other ethnic groups have to be introduced to the superior Russian culture immediately is in fact assimilation-oriented and suggest a series of anti–Leninist conclusions. Comrade Vaganyan expressed a similar opinion in his recent book 'On National Culture'.

Statements made by Comrade Atnagulov during the discussion in the party organisation of the Tatar Republic are somewhat similar to those presented by Comrade Vaganyan.

3. The following should be viewed as Comrade Atnagulov's principal mistakes:
   a) incorrect and superficial contrasting of spiritual and material culture;
   b) a simplistic approach to the issue of what role the language should play (reference to the changes in the language of the Penza, Saratov, and Siberia Tatars, as well as the decisive impact of technical terminology, which is becoming increasingly international (radio, tractor, etc.) on the language);
   c) overestimating the influence of the superior (Russian in this case) culture, to which Comrade Lenin was opposed especially resolutely;
   d) ignoring the role of national culture not as a goal in itself but as a means of engaging the working masses of certain ethnic groups (especially backward ones) in the Soviet socialist construction;
   e) summarizing the separate ideas as a clearly assimilation-oriented system, which is sure to repel the Tatar working masses and enable the bourgeoisie to take advantage of the public fear and mistrust to enhance its influence on it;
   f) corrupting the nearest prospect in terms of the party and Soviet government's local practical cultural measures, since assimilation as a goal would require our work to favor elements of assimilation as opposed to national culture development, which is clearly inconsistent with the interests of the working class and the party's main objectives.

All this is clearly inconsistent with Lenin's ideas and resolutions by party congresses. Therefore, the Bureau of the Regional Committee believe the petition by Comrade Atnagulov and other comrades sharing his ideas to be absolutely wrong.

4. Though somewhat closer to the party's official policy for the issues of natural culture, the statements by Comrade G. Ibragimov contain a number of significant drawbacks, of which the following are the most important:
   a) overestimating the independence and somewhat idealising of the forms of national culture ('the special way which the Tatar culture will take', the extraterritorial cult[ural]-nat[ional] community), which altogether reminds of the old disputes on cultural-national autonomy;
   b) downplaying the role of the proletariat in the development of the Tatar national culture and overestimating that of the national intelligentsia;
   c) focusing on anti–Left political blows combined with a clearly insufficient and vague separation from right bourgeois nationalist ideas, which yields a goal of the entire brochure that makes it downplay the promulgation and pressure of the bourgeois nationalist ideology to aim a blow solely on the incorrect statements by the author's party colleagues, thus ensuring a warm reception among bourgeois ideologists;
d) unacceptable approaches to the party discussions like comparing a number of party members and honest Soviet-oriented non-partisans to mirzas - tsarist officials who implemented the violent Russification policy, the memory of which is repulsive to the large Tatar working masses. This being the keynote of the brochure, it is natural that it not only failed to clarify the situation to comrades mistaken but, to the contrary, caused the discussion and controversies to escalate, applying old disputes between groups to the newsphere of ideological struggle.

Taking into account these facts, the Bureau of the Regional Committee finds it necessary to express its negative attitude to the brochure by Comrade G. Ibragimov.

5. At the same time, the Bureau of the Regional Committee believes that any further discussion in terms of where the Tatar culture is going is an unreasonable waste of the party’s energy to distract the party organisation from more pressing challenges presented by the political and economic situation. The discussion also distracts us from practical measures to develop the national cultures—work, that requires results and achievements far better than what we currently have. Overcoming the assimilation twist resolutely as a clearly anti-party trend, standing up against any pressure of the bourgeois nationalist ideology, the party organization must focus its hardest efforts on the practical issues of national culture (combating the religious movement, building schools, improving the language, literature, art, theatre, opening a house of national culture, etc.), enhancing Soviet and party organizations in charge of the tasks, gathering around the party representatives of the Tatar Soviet intelligentsia willing to fill the forms of national culture with proletarian content, and explaining the meaning of our general policy for this matter and the meaning of certain practical measures to the public.

6. Suggest that the APD of the Regional Committee of the CPSU(B) should develop a number of measures to enhance practical work for national culture under the present resolution. It is to submit its suggestions to the Bureau of the Regional Committee not late than August 1 of this year.

SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 8, Sheet 119.

No. 37
Report on the success of the Saniya opera exhibits at the exhibition abroad by the newspaper ‘Krasnaya Tataria’

23 July 1927.

The Tatar People’s Commissariat for Education has received a letter by the Society for Cultural Connection with Foreign Countries, which reads as follows:

‘Dear Comrades! The Soviet Department of the international music exhibition in Frankfurt am Main opened the other day. It was a success. Thousands of people have come to visit the department. Our representative has reported the manuscript of the first Tatar opera Saniya, which suggests a considerable rise in musical culture in Tatarstan, has aroused the greatest interest among the Soviet exhibits. You can find extracts from German newspapers here.’ <...>

Krasnaya Tataria.—1927.—23 July.
No. 38
An extract from S. Sagidullin's speech at the 4th Plenary Session of the Tatar Regional Committee of the CPSU(B)

17 September 1927

I have to speak on Sagidullin, as many other subjects are taboo to me. I have not delivered a single speech in two years. However, my name has been on people's lips all the time. A greeting telegram from Comrade Boyarsky, as a speaker of the Regional Committee, declared officially on behalf of the RC at the Verkhnegorodsky District Party Conference of 13 November this year that Sagidullin had not spoken yet and that he had not brought any charges against me, or accused me of anything yet. The mobbing continues, however.

As you know and can see, I have been acting in accordance with my statement. Comrade Boyarsky did not deny it. But I have to protest against my statement expanding in every direction. Comrades have been introducing new paragraphs and new obligations without my signing them. They have made a contract out of my statement and a 'contractual communist' out of me. It is a new way to hold an activist prisoner. If I keep silent and don't speak, they say I violate the contract, I have to speak against Shaymardanov; if I go to my homeland for a vacation, they say it is a breach of an obligation, and so on and so forth. I claim that I have never undertaken to refrain from coming to Menzelinsk or to criticise Shaymardanov. I am absolutely opposed to this expanded interpretation of my statement...against inappropriate references to my statement aimed at paralyzing my activities, I ask the RC Bureau...the question is whether I am the only one on this path. No, I am not alone on this path. Our situation forces every indigenous promoted worker to walk this path. Having reached the Regional Committee, having obtained a top job, he is labeled a 'sectionalist'. The trend is abnormal, and it has to be eliminated. I believe my statement to be limited to a certain period and a certain situation. I have to protest against people using my statement, that is, a document of credit, as a 'permanent passport' to keep me prisoner. I have to, and I will, struggle for equal rights in the party, I will demand that my statement should not be used to ostracise me.

SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 3, File 1457, Sheets 43–45.

No. 39
An extract from a report by Executive Secretary of the Central Committee for the Implementation of the Tatar Language Valeev. On the State of Korenization of Government Institutions and Engagement of Tatars in Educational Establishments in the City of Kazan

1 November 1927

Implementation of the Tatar Language issues generally reduce to the following:

a) organisational issues;

b) staffing governmental apparatus with officials proficient in both official languages;


18 Omitted text.
19 Omitted text.
20 Omitted text.
c) engaging the Tatar proletariat in industry;
d) training workers proficient in both official languages;
e) adjusting the recording technique to Tatar records management <...>. We have to present the following figures of the rate of mass apparatus korenization:

The figures suggest that both the total number of officials and the number of Tatar officials have decreased; but the percentage of Tatar officials in the total staff has increased by 2.7%.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Territorial indicators</th>
<th>As of 1 July 1926</th>
<th>As of 1/ 1927</th>
<th>Changes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Tatars</td>
<td>% Tatar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In central bodies and in Kazan bodies</td>
<td>14,425</td>
<td>2395</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The increase of Tatar percentage is attributable not to junior service staff, as it used to be, but to middle technical staff and high-ranking officials, who have the greatest involvement in providing services to the working masses and peasants. For instance, the percentage of Tatar high-ranking officials in central\textsuperscript{21} and Kazan bodies over the period in question has been 1.4 %; that of middle technical staff being 3.14 %; the percentage of junior service staff has, to the contrary, decreased by 1.2 %. The situation is the same in the cantons <...>. The following central institutions have witnessed a material increase over this period: People's Commissariat for Justice—by 8%, People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs—by 9%, People's Commissariat for Finance—by 6.6%, and Tattorg Trade Association—8.3%. The percentage of Tatar employees has decreased in the People's Commissariats for Labour and Social Welfare—by 6.7%, in the Tatar Union—by 2.4%, in the Soviet for People's Economy—by 1.2%, and in Khleboprodukt (Bread Production Association) —by 1.6%.

The figures thus suggest a lack of pre-planned normal progress in the korenization of state apparatuses, since some institutions, such as the Tatar Union, Khleboprodukt, and the People's Commissariat for Labour, witness a steady decrease of the percentage.

If we analyse the figures by the Regional Bureau for Labour Statistics on employees of institutions and organisations from 1 October 1926 to 1 July 1927, we will see a relative increase of [the percentage of] Tatars.

The figures suggest a general increase of the number of Tatars, both relative and absolute. <...>

Let us now briefly study the issue of training workers proficient in both official languages in general and indigenous Tatars in particular.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>As of 1 July 1926</th>
<th>As of 1/ 1927</th>
<th>Changes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Tatars</td>
<td>% Tatar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>77,719</td>
<td>16,390</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In particular, by trade unions</td>
<td>25,058</td>
<td>4,959</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We have several ways to train such employees. The main way it to train employees at permanent educational establishments. In addition, provisional courses offering training in various spheres of construction can be useful in exceptional circumstances. In our situation such courses are predominant.

\textsuperscript{21} The term ‘central institutions’ refers to: The People’s Commissariat of Justice, The People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs, The People’s Commissariat of Finances, The Tatar Union, The Council of National Economy, Hleboprodukt (Bread Products), The People’s Commissariat of Labour.
Therefore, figures [on this method] should be used to prove the state of our cultural construction. It is as follows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic composition of students of all types of educational establishments</th>
<th>In the academic year 1925/1926</th>
<th>In the academic year 1926/1927</th>
<th>Changes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary and secondary schools offering 7–9 years of training, peasant youth and adult schools</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Tatars</td>
<td>% Tatar</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>161,284</td>
<td>84,847</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>174,422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In professional technical and vocational schools, professional courses and factory schools.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Tatars</td>
<td>% Tatar</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8,870</td>
<td>3,319</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>7,795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At workers' faculties and the Tatar Communist University</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Tatars</td>
<td>% Tatar</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,390</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>1,286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In all IHLs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Tatars</td>
<td>% Tatar</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,464</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>4,539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>176,008</td>
<td>89,115</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>188,042</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures give a clear insight into the state of our educational establishments in terms of offering occupational training to backward indigenous Tatar youth. The data suggest that the number of pupils in primary schools corresponds to the ratio in the population of the Tatar Republic. The situation in professional technical schools is also more or less favourable. As for the ethnic composition of IHL students, no progress has happened or is likely to happened in the coming years. Even though the admission for the current academic year yielded a certain increase (by 41 people), the preparation of the Tatar youth for entering IHLs is far from brilliant, since Tatars account for as little as 22.8% in secondary schools and only 14.9% in nine-year schools. Apart from the small Tatar percentage, the schools' approach to the issue makes any well-prepared experts trained in accordance with IHLs' requirements unlikely to appear. Workers' faculties is another, more reliable source to supply more or less suitable students to enter IHLs. But what is the situation in such educational establishments? Last year, 164 of 337 newly admitted students were Tatar, while this academic year Tatars account for 104 of 322 newly admitted students, or 32%. That is, the number of Tatars has decreased by 60 people, reducing the percentage by 16.6%. This cannot be normal. <...>

Executive Secretary of the ITL Central Committee

Valeev.
No. 40
Ethnic Composition of City Soviets in the TASSR in 1926–1927

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Tatars</th>
<th>Russians</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kazan City Soviet</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>146—28.7%</td>
<td>324—63.5%</td>
<td>41—7.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>157—31.7%</td>
<td>307—62.0%</td>
<td>31—6.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City soviet</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>141—22.6%</td>
<td>472—75.8%</td>
<td>10—1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>144—24.56%</td>
<td>426—72.69%</td>
<td>16—2.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlement Soviets</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>67—29.4%</td>
<td>158—69.3%</td>
<td>3—1.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Not later than 1928\(^{22}\).

National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan, f. R-732, Inventory 1, File 1794, Sheet 1.

No. 41
An extract from the Report on Ethnic Minority Activities\(^{23}\) by Astrakhan guberniya

1928\(^{24}\)

<...> Concentrated Tatar and Kazakh population is present in the city and the following districts: Zatsarevo, Krasnoyarsk, Marfino, Zelenchino, Kharabuli, Nizny Baskunchak, and Bokhuny.

In Zatsarevo district, Tatar-Nogays account for over 50% of the total population, thus representing the dominant ethnic group. They are mainly engaged in gardening and melon growing.

In Krasnoyarsk district, Tatars, who constitute the lower part of the population, are engaged in livestock breeding, seasonal work, fishing, and the salt industry.

Cultural level

Zemsky Russian-Tatar schools were established in Astrakhan guberniya after the revolution of 1905: 5 zemsky schools and 2 ministries. Tatar is the language of instruction. The indigenous language has been introduced to records management in 10 districts and 3 village soviets this year.

RF State Archive, Fund 296, Inventory 1, File 336, Sheet 13.

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\(^{22}\) Dated as per the content of the document.
\(^{23}\) Sic in the document.
\(^{24}\) Dated as per the content of the document.
No. 42

From reports by Kazan scientists on the activities of the laboratories they manage, published in the newspaper 'Krasnaya Tataria'

Professor A. Samoylov

I should gratefully mention our talented university mechanic A. Nikolaev, with whom we cooperated to control devices which were to attract some attention even abroad. In terms of accurate recording of electric currents in the animal body, our laboratory is not only the USSR's number 1 but can compete with foreign institutes. <...>

We have studied certain responses of muscles, nerves, and glands at the laboratory. We have lately used data on muscular electrical response to study reflex processes.

A number of works which I co-authored with my colleagues have appeared in various Russian and foreign journals. I have given papers on them at many international congresses. Various foreign scientific societies have invited me to deliver lectures concerning our laboratory's studies in Holland (Utrecht), America (Harvard University Physiological Society, Boston). Last year, I presented a lecture at the Week of Russian Natural Scientists in Berlin, in which I expressed my opinion on the transition of excitation from cell to cell with a chemical agent. I relied on the data of a study on nerve and muscle currents.

I attribute the fact that I have been invited to attend the Harvey Meeting in London to our laboratory's achievements. It is true. But what is the practical outcome of all the studies? First of all, I should say the following. There is no natural-historical branch of science that would not yield practical results sooner or later. Any theoretical knowledge should have practical implications. We should be reasonable, though, and keep from shaking the tree before the fruit is ripe. The science of animal electricity is a most vivid example. We are lucky to witness the historic moment when a theory that seemed to be purely academic, somewhat aloof from life and thus unjustified, for 100 years, has come to demonstrate its power in practical matters. Our heart produces an electrical current with each beat. When recorded, the beats reveal such intimate details about its life, both healthy and ill, that the so-called electrocardiography (recording heartbeats) is essential to cardiac clinical practice. Our laboratory was the first in Russia to record the heart's electrical current. We contributed significantly to developing the issue. The Lenin Institute for Advanced Training of Physicians, where I have been teaching a course in electrocardiography, was the first in Kazan to rise to the call. When in America, I taught the same course to physicians at the invitation of the administration of the General Hospital in Boston. Such institutes are currently being established under clinics and hospitals across the USSR. Botkin Hospital, Moscow, has a well-equipped electro-physiology laboratory, which I guide. I am also assisting the Obukh Institute of Occupational Diseases in equipping an electro-physiology laboratory. I have trained the assistants of the institutions here in Kazan. I have received numerous invitations to deliver lectures on heart currents, and requests to accept young experts for training. Our health resorts are also interested in heart currents. They send their assistants here to study the technique. This summer I worked in a cardiographic laboratory with advanced equipment at the Kislovodsk Cardiological Clinic, which invited me as a consultant. Thus, our laboratory has grown far beyond its actual limits. However, the Kazan laboratory, which remains central to my work, as my most important scientific work is connected with it, is growing old. It's actually cracking, sinking. It seems like the large amount of equipment it has received has only made it smaller. It is nearly impossible to continue to work in the building. A building and funds to match its importance should be provided to the laboratory.

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25 Professor A. Samoylov, a world-renowned scientist in the field of physiology. In Kazan he started working at the Department of Physiology, Physics, and Mathematics of the Kazan State University in 1903. Made important discoveries in the field of electro-physiology.
Professor A. Arbuzov said when talking to our employee,

'I expect it to be difficult to fulfil the many requests by the editorial office of the newspaper 'Krasnaya Tataria', that I should describe my scientific activities and the working conditions of the organic chemistry laboratory that I manage.

My predecessors Academics N. Zinin and A. Butlerov and my teacher Professor A. Zaycev raised the Organic Chemistry Laboratory of the University of Kazan higher that it had even been; they made it globally famous.

As a nusling of the laboratory, I happened to be far from Kazan at the first stage of my academic career, which must be the main reason why most of works show little connection to the Kazan Laboratory in terms of subjects and range of issues.

For nearly 30 years, my research has been centred on underexplored organic phosphorus derivatives, which are difficult to find.

I think at least ten of over 100 new organic phosphorus derivatives produced by my colleagues and me could be tested as pharmaceutical drugs. This issue has been put on the agenda many times, but each time it was postponed for various reasons.

When our connection to the West had been restored after the war and the revolution, I was happy to find out that Swedish chemists from the Chemical and Pharmaceutical Institute of Uppsala had found my research interesting and continued it. Apart from phosphorus compounds, our laboratory has been studying so-called acetals for the recent 10–15 years. The studies are closely connected to phosphorus research.

Hopefully, some of the experts will be able to suggest a practical application. Liquid camphor acetal is of special interest in this respect. When introduced into the blood, the agent is expected to slowly decompose into alcohol and camphor. Animal studies of camphor acetal are being carried out.

I cannot mention our laboratory's activities in establishing chemical production even briefly for a lack of space.

However, I cannot but provide more details on our laboratory's research on resins and turpentines.

Theoretical and practical activities in the sphere are simultaneous.

I have carried out a number of pine tree studies in the woods, which yielded a discovery of interest for both plant physiologists and, partly, wood growers—the fact that tar in the tree trunk is under enormous pressure. The way in which a damaged tree oozes tar is attributable to the pressure, which underlies the theory of bleeding (artificial tar production). Our laboratories has adopted advanced West European approaches (mainly those developed by Institut du Pin (Pine Institute), Bordeaux, France) to studying the composition of turpentines and tars. The research is unparalleled in our Union so far.

The studies by our laboratory have been reported to the Supreme Soviet of the National Economy many times and partly funded by it.

Theoretical development of certain aspects of studying bleeding as well as turpentine and tar composition evolves directly into practice. For instance, my colleagues and I have developed the project for bleeding young pine forests in Mari region on the instruction of the Tatar Supreme Soviet of the National Economy. We further study the composition or turpentine and turpentine at the plant put back in operation by the Supreme Soviet of the National Economy.

Dulyovo Works of the Porcelain Trust Company had entrusted us with a difficult task—to establish turpentine acceptance standards, which the works need for porcelain gilding.

This fragmented list of activities, although far from being complete, suggests that our laboratory functions not only as a chemical laboratory under a higher educational establishment but as a research institute.

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26 A. Arbuzov, an academicians of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, world-renowned scientist in the field of organic chemistry.
Unfortunately, certain drawbacks in the laboratory’s equipment prevent us from working at a more intensive pace. Unstable power supply and the fact that we don’t have even a small gas plant can reduce to nothing a day’s work if not more. The lack of premises is also considerable, preventing the laboratory from engaging gifted students in its scientific and technological activities.’

Professor E. Lepsky

Professor E. Lepsky, Head of the Pediatric Clinic, Lenin Institute for Advanced Training of Physicians, said to our colleague, ‘Our clinic emerged in very difficult times in 1920. It was impossible to receive a well-equipped proper room and the necessary devices for scientific research at once. We had to equip the clinic and ensure more or less favorable research conditions on the go, during intense treatment and educational activities. However, medical journals began to report our studies about two years after the clinic was founded.

All of our studies address certain life challenges that we face during work. For instance, our clinic received many children with famine-related diseases such as scurvy, edema, and so on during the famine in the Volga region. We had to study the unexplored aspects of the conditions, develop new methods of treatments, etc. My colleagues and I published the findings in medical journals. I reported them to the 2nd All-Russian Pediatric Congress as suggested by the Organizational Committee of the Congress.

As tuberculosis gained momentum following the country’s hardships (epidemics, famine, etc.), we studied its incidence among children, tested new diagnostic, prevention, and treatment methods.

In additions, a number of printed reports by our clinics deal with malaria in children, epidemic meningitis, diphtheria prevention, and other issues.

Some of my colleagues and I have been studying rickets, which is widely spread among children in Kazan, especially in the Tatar community, in the recent years. We carried out a series of scientific experiments by causing animals to develop the disease (to the best of my knowledge, no similar experiments had been carried out in the USSR before). This yielded important implications for rickets treatments.

In particular, we found out that seal oil, large amounts of which are produced on the Caspian shore, and dolphin oil, which is also produced in large amounts on the Black Seas shore, are efficient in preventing rickets and can replace cod-liver oil, which is hard to find and used to be imported from Norway. The application of seal and dolphin oil in our country used to be limited to industry. Prevention might be even more important in pediatrics than in other branches of clinical medicine. Therefore, we have been trying to establish connections with prevention institutions since the clinic was established. At present, the following institutions function under the clinic (unprecedented in Kazan): children’s consultation service, diet kitchen for infants issuing up to 300 servings daily, and day-time sanatorium for preschool children.

These institutions have enabled us to carry out a number of studies on children’s health. For instance, consultancy data yielded the first normal weight and height curves for Kazan infants. People had been using those relying on examination data from Leningrad, Kharkov, and even abroad. However, the population of different regions is characterised by different anthropometric data (measures), so standards established for one region are not applicable to another. Our clinic employees 20–30 full-time physicians taking one-semester advanced training at the institute and 10 young employees who have been staying here for several years. Most of physicians working in motherhood and infancy protection institutions in Kazan and the Tatar Republic have received training at our clinic. I also participated in the construction of the network of motherhood and infancy protection institutions in Kazan—first as the Head of the Preparation Department in the Governorate Health Department, then as a Consultant at the Tatar People’s Commissariat for Health.

27 Professor Ye. Lepsky, a renowned expert in the field of pediatrics.
The tasks that our clinics has to face are increasingly challenging. Another reason why the clinic has been employing more physicians is to ensure smooth operation, which also requires new equipment—in particular, the laboratories want expansion and improvement.

Awareness-raising is essential to the science of pediatric diseases. The better the mother understands the child's physiological needs, the healthier it will be. For this purpose, the clinic offers short-term courses in physical childcare to mothers. The system of public lectures for non-experts has met with no success. It would be good to arrange excursions and work demonstrations at treatment facilities.

Krasnaya Tataria.—1928.—6 November; Krasnaya Tataria.—1928.—16 November.

No. 43

Report by the newspaper Krasnaya Tataria on the Latin alphabet

The new Turkic alphabet has an advantage even over Russian in terms of diversifying printing types, as it can adopt all Latin typefaces.

The New Turkic alphabet makes book production quicker and cheaper, bringing the East closer to the technical wealth of the West European printing industry.

Ars.28
Krasnaya Tataria.—1928.—9 December.

No. 44

An extract from the Resolution by the 8th Congress of Soviets of the Tatar ASSR29* of the report by the People's Committee for Education and Yanalif State Committee10 ** on the Introduction of Yanalif in the Republic

8 May 1929

1. The 8th Congress of Soviets of Tataria declares that the transition to Yanalif is a major step forward in fulfilling the objectives of cultural revolution. The transition to a new alphabet to replace the backward, flawed Arabic alphabet, associated with medieval vestiges, is of great political and cultural importance. Yanalif enables the working masses to master the socialist international culture sooner and ensures accelerated development of the Tatar workers' culture.

2. The Tatar working and peasant masses as well as the working Tatar intelligentsia have expressed full support of the new alphabet, realizing the revolutionary meaning of the new one, and did not hesitate to break with the part of the top intelligentsia, who had been influenced by bourgeois nationalist elements and was thus opposed to the Yanalif movement. Spreading rapidly, the Yanalif movement turned into a mass revolutionary movement among Tatar workers. The government of the Tatar Republic formalised the movement as a natural and timely expression of the workers' will and requirements.

3. The first Yanalif introduction measures revealed an enormous appeal of the new alphabet to workers, great enthusiasm in the Soviet society, and active association of the Tatar intelligentsia, in particular comrades, who had broken with those in opposition to Yanalif to work sincerely for Yanalifization. The workers of Tataria supported the new alphabet unanimously.

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28 Signature in the Latin script.
29 The VIII Congress of the TASSR was held 3–8 May 1929.
30 The State Committee "Yanalif" was established under the Central Executive Committee of Tatarstan 22 February 1928 to organise the work on the introduction of a Romanised script.
4. Approving the resolutions and measures by the government of the Tatar Republic in this aspect, the 8th Congress of Soviets finds it necessary to accelerate the promotion of Yanalif in order to complete Yanalifization before the 10th anniversary of the Tatar Republic.

5. The following essential measures ensure further successful Yanalifization:

a) While celebrating the success of the current elimination of Yanalif illiteracy in workers who can use the old Arabic alphabet, the Congress finds it necessary to pay as much attention as possible to the elimination of Yanalif illiteracy in old alphabet users next year, for which purpose a number of governmental measures is scheduled, ensuring large-scale involvement of public forces and funds. In addition, training must be provided for more eliminators of Yanalif illiteracy, for which purpose budget funds must be allocated both to illiteracy eliminator training and to their salaries.

The next Yanalif illiteracy elimination campaign is to cover 100000 workers possessing the old Arabic languages, taking into account the drawbacks of the current year's campaign (poor involvement of women, farm workers, and Kryashen people in illiteracy elimination).

Kryashen Yanalif illiteracy liquidation should be a major focus, since it is of great political importance for fusing Kryashen workers with the general Tatar masses, enabling wide access to the riches of the Tatar culture for Kryashen workers.

b) Full transition to Yanalif at regular likbez centres of the People's Commissariat for Education in all cultural and educational institutions of Tataria must be completed before the beginning of the academic year 1929/30. Full transition to Yanalif must be ensured in Tatar schools since the same academic year. To ensure proper supply of Yanalif literature to Tatar schools and other cultural and other educational institutions, the 1929/30 budget must allow for enhanced Yanalif publishing.

c) In order to enhance and improve Yanalif literacy rate, special attention should be paid to distributing mass Yanalif literature among the population and engaging wide working masses in the Down with Illiteracy society. Make sure that all plans in terms of publishing and printing as well and translating periodical and non-periodical literature into Yanalif are fulfilled both by Tatizdat and by other publishing offices in the Tatar Republic. Take measures to expand Tatizdat's plan in terms of cheap mass Yanalif literature, especially fiction.

g) Immediately ensure transition to Yanalif in the records management of all Soviet, cooperative, and public institutions, and develop measures to ensure that the institutions introduce Yanalif records management before the 10th anniversary of the Tatar Republic (employee training, typewriter supply, development of Yanalif shorthand and training in stenography).

6. Being aware of individual cases of neglect of Yanalifization by certain organisations and institutions in the Tatar Republic, the Congress of Soviets finds it necessary to enhance supervision to ensure smooth and timely fulfilment of the Yanalifization plan and increase liability for negligence of the matter as undermining and sabotage of socialist construction.

Resolutions by the 8th Congress of Soviets of the ATSSR. 8 May 1929—Kazan, 1929.—pp. 21–23.

No. 45
Resolution by the Bureau of the Tatar Regional Committee of the CPSU(B)
on Training Tatar and Ethnic Minority Research Scientists

18 October 1929

The problem of training research scientists from among Tatars and ethnic minorities in the Tatar Republic is of large political importance as a measure determining the extent to which the national policy is implemented in practice.

The RC [Regional Committee] Bureau reports the work to have been poorly planned and indecisive both in IHLs and in the party organization.
The RC Bureau states that a staff of indigenous experts fit both for scientific activities and for managerial positions in IHLs has formed.

Therefore, the RC Bureau suggests the following:

a) the RC APD should develop a series of measures to ensure systematic and well-planned training for research scientists from among ethnic minorities, which it should submit to the Bureau within a month.

b) As specific measures for the nearest future, the issue of replacing of a number of IHL managers by ethnic minority representatives should be discussed and addressed immediately; a staff of scientific workers should be presented.

a) appointing one of the most well-trained Tatar teachers as Professor of the Tatar Language Department; b) appointing a number of ethnic minority representatives associate professors and assistants at the National Department of the Institute; c) appoint Comrade Kudoyarov the rector of the Institute.

Signed by Deputy Executive Secretary of the RC of the CPSU(B)—Garifullin

Correct:
Secretary of the RC Bureau: (Grojsman)

An extract from the report by M. Razumov, Executive Secretary of the Tatar RC of the CPSU(B) presented at the 3rd Plenary Session of the Tatar Regional Committee of the CPSU(B) on training for ethnic Tatar staff and the state of apparatus korenization

3–9 November 1929

... National proletarian staffing is one of the most important objectives of the national policy. What is the situation in this sphere? We have witnessed an increase of 1.25% over the last year. Ethnic employees now account for over 25 percent of the total staff. If we analyze such economy branches as sovkhozes, the percentage of Tatar workers is as small as 9%. Tatar workers are the same in railroad transport. It should be stated that we have been treading water in terms of the ethnic proletariat's share of the staff, because all party organizations have failed to be persistent. We want to ensure a Tatar percentage in our industry of at least 30% next year. It is a challenging objective to fulfil. It would require us to set the limit value of at least 40–45% Tatars of the total new employees for all industrial plants, in particular those newly established. We believe that this should be a strategic industrial objective.

The implementation of the Tatar language is the second issue. I cannot provide any figures on this matter, but the situation is even less favorable, even though we have raised the issue many times at plenary sessions and conferences. Canton centres and Tatar volosts maintain correspondence in Russian. We are aware of a number of cases where institutions demonstrate negligence of the issue. We have to admit that even in central institutions we still have a red-tape approach to this essential aspect of our policy. We can supply most curious examples concerning the policy of central Tatar institutions. For example, the Tatar Workers’ Faculty and the Tatar Pedagogical Technical Professional School, their teaching staff and students being 100% Tatar, issue orders—everything—in Russian. As for the boards for the implementation of the Tatar language, I should say that they do nothing to enhance the activities,
being nothing but a screen for whose reluctant to seriously execute the party’s guidelines on language implementation. We should oblige institutions to maintain correspondence with volosts and between themselves in Tatar by establishing most severe liability for violating such guidelines. We should be able to overcome the conservatism in this matter.

The issue of apparatus korenization. The number of Tatars in canton apparatuses has increased by 4.5% over two years to make 36.8%, Tatars accounting for 55% of the cantons’ population. It is beyond doubt that apparatus korenization and Soviet official training should be enhanced to ensure a better social composition. In order to be able to regulate our work correctly at this stage, local organisations should separate accounting for junior technical workers (guardians, coachmen, and firemen) from that for medium- and high-ranking groups in the Soviet apparatus.

I would also like to shed some light on the issue of local expert staffing. What is the current situation? 29.7% out of 202 agronomists and instructors are Tatars; 4.1% belong to ethnic minorities. 31% out of 238 land planners and surveyors are Tatars; Tatars account for 8% of veterinarians and 5% of feldshers.

8.5% of experts at the People's Commissariat for Health are Tatars; only 5 of 116 local industrial experts are Tatars. It is clear that the situation is bad. It is also clear that we have to enhance our expert training, inspect all our measures, develop a number of additional measures to ensure the proper pace of expert training in various branches.

Educational establishments have achieved a number of improvements in this respect. 35% of workers' faculty newly admitted students, 51% of those in professional technical schools, and 20% of those in IHLs are Tatars. The situation used to be especially unfavorable in the Agricultural Institute. However, it has been able to achieve a value of 20% this year, as compared to 13% last year. But comrades, this is not enough to ensure the force that we need. Thus, we have to be resolute in ensuring every condition to enable IHLs to admit a higher percentage of Tatars in the following. We should expand the network of institutions offering preparation for IHLs, take decisive measures to prevent the dropout of Tatar worker and peasant students that we often face.

Regarding scientific staffing. At present, only 90 of 600 research scientists in the T[atar] R[epublic] are Tatars. A minor achievement has been made in the recent years—22 more Tatars have been employed. Last year, we obtained two Tatar professors for the first time. It seems like we have been able to suppress the opposition of our higher and other educational establishments recently. But comrades, out relevant organisations working in IHLs, in universities, in institutes have been even more persistent to ensure quicker progress and ethnic scientific staffing <...>.


No. 47

Memorandum

by the Central ITL Board to the Department of Nationalities under the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on the Progress in State Apparatus Korenization and Occupational Training in the TSSR

1931

The state of korenization is a key issue related to state apparatuses. Lenin's national policy in the context of the Tatar Republic is implemented through ethnic staffing and state apparatus korenization, reconstruction and adjustment central and district institutions to provide services in the mother tongue
of the indigenous population, and ensuring services for national minorities in their mother tongue. The main method of korenization is establishing governmental positions to be re-filled within the framework as korenization, which are to be established by the ITL Board for central institutions and by district boards for district ones.

The following figures are available on state apparatus korenization.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>As of 1 January 1931</th>
<th>As of 1 July 1931</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total number of employees</td>
<td>Including Tatars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In central institutions of 2 People's Commissariats:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) senior officials</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) middle technical staff</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) junior service staff</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>797</td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In general, the situation with apparatus korenization has not changed materially in central People's Commissariats in the recent time. Certain institution demonstrate a growth trend like the apparatuses of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissariat of Education—57% as compared to 51.5% as of 1 January 1931; the People's Commissariat for Education—50% as compared to 44.8%, and the People's Commissariat for Finance—47% as compared to 45%. A certain shift has taken place in the apparatus of the State Planning Committee (Gosplan)—16.9% as compared to 10.8% as of 1 January 1931. The People's Commissariat for Justice has shown a reduction trend—37% as compared to 34.6% as of 1 January 1931. Apparatus korenization in branch offices of all-Union central institutions (9 institutions) is 21%, the USSR Meat Administration and the USSR Fish Administration being the weak link—only 10% of their employees were Tatar as of 1 January 1931.

The state of apparatus korenization in the trust management apparatus is also unsatisfactory, the average korenization rate being 19%. The weakest trust companies are Tatkozhtrest (Tatar Leather Trust Company) (7.1%) and Tatstrojob’”edinenie (Tatar Construction Association) (10%).

Korenization of trade cooperative institutions accounts for 32.8% of the total growth of engagement of Tatar employees, Tataptekoupravlenie (Tatat Drugstore Administration) being somewhat behind.

Apparatus korenization in bank institutions (State Bank and Tatar Bank Office) is 25% as compared to 34.3% as of 1 January 1931. The percentage of Tatar workers in the Kazan Office is 19% as compared to 21.2% as of 1 January 1931; the figures for the Tatar Bank are 39% as compared to 51.7% as of 1 January 1931. These institutions have a rate of korenization lower than average, because they have peculiar Tatar involvement against the backdrop of a general increase of employee count as compared to the past.

28 TR districts (out of the total 45) were found to have a predominantly Tatar population, that is, a percentage of the Tatar indigenous population of over 84.5% of the total Tatar population in districts, within the framework of division into districts in 1930.

The TR Central Executive committee resolved that the districts should have records management and correspondence in the Tatar language to provide services to the indigenous population in its mother tongue; village soviets in such districts are to maintain records management in Tatar as well.
The following list suggests which districts and village soviets have introduced the indigenous language\textsuperscript{31} to their records management:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. Item</th>
<th>District name</th>
<th>Total number of village soviets</th>
<th>In particular, ethnically</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tatars</td>
<td>Russians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Agryz</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Aktanysh</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Alkeyevsk</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Almetyevsk</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Apastovo</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Arsky</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Atnya</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Bavly</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Buinsk</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Chelnin</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Drozhzhanoye</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Dubyaz</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Kama-Ustinsk</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Kaybits</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Krasnyi Bor</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Kukmor</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Mamadysh</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>Menzelinsk</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>Muslyumovo</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>Nurlat</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>Pervomayskoye</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>Rybnaya Sloboda</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td>Saby</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.</td>
<td>Sarmanovo</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.</td>
<td>Shugurovo</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.</td>
<td>Takanysh</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.</td>
<td>Tumutuk</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.</td>
<td>Tyunteyevo</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1337</strong></td>
<td><strong>902</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, the percentage is 65.2% of the districts' Tatar village soviets and 88% of the total village soviets.

These districts mostly practice both internal records management in district institutions and correspondence with central institutions in the indigenous language. However, the Tatar language is not being implemented completely in certain districts (Kamsko-Ustyinsky, Tyunkeyevsky, and Atinskiy).

\textsuperscript{31} Style of the document.
Some district institutions practice records management in Russian, while certain central institutions send materials in Russian.

The TR CEC Resolution of 22 November 1930 specifies that records management in two ethnic minority districts (Aksubayevsky and Oktyabrsky) must be in Chuvash language to ensure service provision to the ethnic minority (the Chuvash people) in its mother tongue. The following regulations on service provision to ethnic minorities in their mother tongues in general have been adopted within the framework of language implementation: a) all village soviets within the TR that provide services to a linguistically homogeneous ethnic minority population shall practice internal records management in the ethnic group's language; b) village soviets that provide services to a linguistically heterogeneous population can practice records management in the language of the majority of the population served at their discretion.

No complete data is available on the state of apparatus korenization in district institutions. The statistics submitted by individual districts suggest the following state of apparatus korenization:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District name</th>
<th>Tatar percentage of the total population</th>
<th>Tatar percentage of the total employee count</th>
<th>Percentage of employees representing ethnic minorities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arsk</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dubyaz</td>
<td>72.3%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drozhzhanoye</td>
<td>64.7%</td>
<td>35.1%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kama-Ustinsk</td>
<td>61.3%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Menzelinsk</td>
<td>56.1%</td>
<td>32.4%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslyumovo</td>
<td>77.2%</td>
<td>75.5%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nurlat</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>58.1%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarmanovo</td>
<td>89.2%</td>
<td>78.3%</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tumutuk</td>
<td>90.7%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tyunkersk</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data suggests a poor engagement rate in Drozhzhanov district, where high korenization rate is attributable to ethnic minorities.

State of Ethnic Proletarian Staffing

The RC Plenary Session in November adopted exhaustive guidelines on indigenous staffing. According to the guidelines, a percentage of Tatar workers of 38–40% must be achieved in 1931. Statistics as of 1 January 1931 report a total of 26,726 workers at all-Union and trust industrial plants, of which 8,527 are Tatar, yielding a percentage of 31.9%. Thus, the task is to supply several more thousands of new Tatar workers within 1931. Apart from increasing the growth rate, it is necessary to improve the qualifications and political awareness of Tatar workers through courses, clubs, etc.

Tatars account for 33% of all attendees of the existing courses. Besides, specialized Tatar courses host 181 people. Taking into account the need for industrial training within the framework of staffing, the goal is to make sure that various courses and clubs cover up to 50% of all Tatar workers within 1931. However, plants hardly implement the measures in practice. For instance, the Brick Plant has arranged courses to host 34 people without engaging a single Tatar; the courses at the Mullanur Vakhitov Plant only provide instruction to 2 Tatars out of 37 students. Of 64 water transport course students, only 8 are Tatar. <...>

Therefore, the rate of engagement of skilled Tatar workers is 69.5% of 2790 people.
The total count of workers in trust industry, except for apprentices and junior service staff, is 15,782 in [19]31, which suggest a growth rate of 6.9% as compared to [19]30. The growth rate for Tatar workers is 51.8%. The expected Tatar percentage in the total worker count by the end of 1931 is 38.15%.

FTA are the main source of training and labour force engagement. The Union Trust Industry statistics for FTA reports 2658 students, of whom 64.2% are male and 35.8% female; 46.1% are Tatar, 46.3% Russian, and 7.6% belong to other ethnic groups. The figures for social origin are as follows: workers—53.6%, farm workers—1.6%, low-income peasants—18%, medium-income peasants—6.1%, office workers—11.6%, handicraftsmen—4%.

In spite of a significant growth, FTA will only be able to supply 12% of the total demand for labour force in 1931. Therefore, it is an industrial objective to increase the number of students by 2500 in 1931. Engineers and technicians are a weak point in the TP industry. A private study on trust industry revealed 3.6% of 110 engineers and 9.7% of the total 154 technicians to be Tatar.

The statistics available claims the percentage Tatars to be 36.5% of managers of trust companies and plant within such companies (54 presented), while representatives of ethnic minorities accounted for 1.8% and other ethnic groups for 9.2%.

Though the general Tatar engagement rate is satisfactory, the share of ethnic minorities in the management is too small. <...>

On behalf of Chairman of the ATSSR Central Executive Committee (Khakimov) Executive Secretary of the CC ITL (Bulatov)


No. 48
An extract from a memorandum on cultural services to ethnic groups in Far Eastern Krai

Far Eastern Krai is a diverse region in terms of economy, ethnic composition, cultural level, and living standards. 92 ethnic groups are represented here. The following data on school services provided to different ethnic groups is available:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary school</th>
<th>2nd level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1931/32 1932/33</td>
<td>1931/32 1932/33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatar</td>
<td>458 600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Far Eastern International Pedagogical Institute, the Communist IHL, and the Soviet Party School offer training in culture and popular education in the krai.

State Archive of the Russian Federation, Fund A-296, Inventory 1, File 544, Sheets 59-60.

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32 Refers to ‘amalgamated industry.’

33 Dated as per the content of the document.
An extract from the article by P. Dulusky on the art of Tatarstan at exhibitions abroad, published in Krasnaya Tataria

The fact that Soviet artists participate in international exhibitions abroad is undoubtedly important, which importance is not restricted to art. The shows are of enormous political significance as they prove and confirm the growth and development of the proletarian culture, the Soviet country's advance at the front of cultural revolution. Taking into account the large-scale objectives that are characteristic of our epoch and progress in visual arts, which have taken the way of socialist realism, artistic representation abroad is an undeniable need of the Soviet art to present the success of arts in our country to the international proletariat.

It would be too bad to omit any depiction of the life in Tataria in this important undertaking. Back in 1929, Europe's best magazine 'GebrauchsGraphic' (1929, No. 2), which appears in two languages—English and German—showed interest in the extraordinary works by artists from Tataria in a dedicated article. When the article was published, Los Angeles, California, invited 'Tatar artists to participate in a graphic exhibition at a public library, specifying a preference for ultramodern items. The artist sent their works soon. This means that the article about 'Tatar artists in 'GebrauchsGraphic' impressed the distant America as something very straightforward and expressive.

The year 1925 is of special importance for Tatar art as a milestone in introducing the art of the Tatar Republic to the West. A giant board was provided for exhibits from Tataria at the Landmark International Exhibition of Decorative Arts in Paris in 1925. Craft items dominated the show—fabrics, dyed leather articles, embroidery, jewelery, partly contemporary Tatar book design. Unfortunately, it did not quite represent the experiments of young Tatar artists. However, famous art critic YA. Tugenhold did note the poignancy of certain book ornaments and presented the work by Faik Tagirov in his article 'L'elementnationaldans l’artdel'URSS'.

It should be noted that the period 1924–1925 was the dawn of the national revolutionary graphics of the Tatar Republic. It was not until the big anniversary Exhibition of Arts of the Peoples of the USSR in Moscow (1917–1927) that a group of Tatar appeared as the founders of the contemporary book art.

Having won a name for themselves, the Tatar artists were invited to participate in a very important exhibition in Paris—Book Art—in 1930. The exhibition represented a number of countries, and the VOKS (All-Unity Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries) established a Soviet department. Our ambassador in Paris M. Dovgalevsky headed the Soviet department. 'UniondesRepubliques-SocialistesSovietiques' presented up to 150 works by the most prominent Soviet graphic artists. Some of them were made by famous artists from TatariA. Works by G. Yusupov, F. Tagirov, compositions to the books 'October and the Young Generation' and 'Mysterious Hut' by Muxametzhyanov, covers for the book of poems 'Days of Shock Work' by Tlyashev, etc. A number of linoleum printing celebrating 1905 by Kozlov, graphic works by N. Sokolsky and his cover for '10 Years of Socialist Construction in Tatarstan', 'Tractor Station' by Nikitin (photomontage). Besides, the exhibition represented Tatizdat, the Art Technical Professional School, the State University, and the Printing School. Foreign printed media covered our contribution to the exhibition. The Times published an especially valuable article.

In 1933, the VOKS sent a Soviet art exhibition including works by artists from the Tatar Republic to America. The exhibit first visited Chicago and opened in Philadelphia in the summer of 1933. An article by famous American art scholar X. Brenton, who had visited the Soviet Union may times and was well familiar with art, appeared in a guide.

An exhibition illustrating the achievements of the Social Union is to open in Paris to celebrate the October holidays of this year, in which Tataria will play a major role—the visual arts of Soviet Republic will be represented by kolkhoz photos taken by Soyuzfoto this summer.

We do not claim our review to cover all materials ever exhibited by the Tatar Republic in the revolutionary period. We have not mentioned international exhibitions attended by individual artists from
the Tatar Republic (the International Exhibition in Venice in 1924), but what we have said is enough to prove that Tatar keeps up-to-date with this sphere of art. In conclusion, we still have few indigenous graphic artists—far too few to supply the high demand that we have because of the developing book production.

We need to restore the Graphic Department of our Art Professional Technical School (now closed), which was the major contributor to the education of those young people who now participate in exhibitions abroad.

Krasnaya Tataria.—1933.—22 November.

No. 50

An extract from the Special Report on Deviations in Crop Requisition in the Tatar Republic

1. Unrealistic crop targets for certain districts.

Crop requisition rate in the Tatar Republic was essentially satisfactory at the first stage of implementation (the June plan was 125% fulfilled). The republic-wide bread requisition plan is also generally realistic. However, the dramatic impact of drought during the ripening of spring crops has caused major variations in crop yield depending on the district and settlement. Therefore, some crop balances proved to be unsustainable, while target figures for crop requisition for June and July and for certain districts appeared unrealistic and had to be revised in detail recently. <...>

SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 2, File 1008, Sheet 7.

No. 51

Extracts from Report No. 13 by Bavlky District Apparatus of the TASSR Plenipotentiary Representation of JSPD (Office of the Joint State Political Directorate) as of July 1, 1933

The peasants' sentiment in Krupskaya Kolkhoz, of Malaya Dubovka, Rykovsky Village Soviet has changed completely as compared to 1931–1932. They will not believe anyone praising the kolkhoz life. Some kolkhoz members reply, [']Stop fooling us, we can see that life gets harder as we live in the kolkhoz.['] The yield was much worse in 1931 than in 1932, but life was better; the kolkhoz had no crops of its own and was permitted to sell horses to buy some crops. The canteen offered dinners to workers. They were thus able to survive until the new harvest. The 1932 being abundant, kolkhoz members still had to starve—they took most of the crops away, leaving us famished. There were public food funds and a school fund. They took all the crops away, leaving only the insurance and sowing funds. We applied to the District Executive Committee for allocating some of the insurance fund to kolkhoz member nutrition several times, but the DEC categorically forbade us to spend the insurance fund<...>

SA HPD TR, Fund 23, Inventory 1, File 67, Sheet 276.

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34 Compiled on the basis of materials of the republic’s regions as at 27 March 1931.
No. 52
Data on Collectivisation in the T[ASS]R by Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Report date</th>
<th>Number of kolkhozes</th>
<th>Number of households in kolkhozes</th>
<th>Collectivisation percentage</th>
<th>Increase over the report period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 May 1928</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>2,647</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>2,647</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 June 1929</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>7,812</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>5,165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 October 1929</td>
<td>724</td>
<td>18,674</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>10,862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 October 1930</td>
<td>1756</td>
<td>48,568</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>29,894</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 October 1931</td>
<td>3952</td>
<td>318,221</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>269,653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 October 1932</td>
<td>3707</td>
<td>292,703</td>
<td>58.7</td>
<td>25,518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 October 1933</td>
<td>3779</td>
<td>357,319</td>
<td>74.7</td>
<td>64,616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 October 1934</td>
<td>3800</td>
<td>382,056</td>
<td>77.2</td>
<td>24,737</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 November 1934</td>
<td>3800</td>
<td>384,789</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SA HPD TR, Fund 15, Inventory 3, File 4771, Sheet 17.

No. 53
An extract from a report on dekulakization in the Tatar Republic

15 March 1930

Mistakes and Deviations

The main drawback of all the dekulakization measures is insufficient awareness-raising among poor peasants and farm laborers. Few measures are taken to clarify the slogan 'liquidate the kulaks as a class' to the people. Instead, authorities limit themselves to administrative measures, often without any clear connection to collectivization. The examples below are a clear illustration.

Secretary of the Arbor volost committee, Arsk canton, summoned the kulaks of the Shuda village and suggested that they should turn in their property 'of their own volition'. The Chairman of the Tryokhovsky volost executive committee, Spassk canton, in Porfir'evka village made lists of those to be dekulakized himself and confiscated their property without discussing it at a meeting. The situation was similar in Shonguty volost, Buinsk canton, and other localities.

In Chershely volost, Bugulma canton, all the kulaks were arrested and exiled from the volost before the dekulakization meeting.

At the same time, there are cases where party cells, volost committees, and appointed representatives do not lead the intensified dekulakization activities of the poor population but tail on, accepting any dekulakization decisions made at meetings of the poor; that is why there are fairly numerous instances in all the cantons where medium and merited households are subjected to dekulakization, as well as the victims of the White counter-revolutionary groups. This is confirmed by numerous facts:

In Kalinin volost, Arsk canton, 20 medium households were dekulakized; the figure for Novy Kishit volost is 25. Naberezhnye Chelny canton, Afanasyevo volost, Probuzhdenie village. Medium peasant Zotin was dekulakized because his father had a woollen mill. He was an active participant of the October Revolution, who spent the entire Civil War period at the Baltic Fleet front. The Whites confiscated his house and property. In Tyaguzino village, medium peasant Mutyashin was dekulakized for buying a feather bed in a famine year. He had one horse, one cow, and served in the Red Army. He was wounded twice, and his brother was killed during battle with the Whites. In Isenbaevo volost, Chelny canton, a
medium peasant was dekulakized for speaking out against grain procurements; in Aktash volost dekulakization was carried out because of the 'kulakification trend'. Similar cases took place in Tarkhan volost, Buinsk canton, Semiostrlov volost, Menzelinsk canton, etc. There are also isolated incidents where not only medium peasants, but poor peasants are subjected to dekulakization. For example, the Vakhitov volost executive committee, Mamadysh canton resolved to 'make up lists of all peasants, including poor and medium ones'. Or the incident in Mamaylov volost of the same canton, where an inventory was compiled of the property of poor and medium peasants as part of preparation for dekulakization.

Unnecessary arrests of medium peasants, and sometimes even poor ones took place in certain localities (Aktash, Afanasyevo and Chelny volosts; in the villages of Betki and Suksy of the Chelny canton, etc.). Medium peasants are sometimes subjected to dekulakization to settle personal scores.

At the same time, the authorities overlook actual kulaks, and they avoid dekulakization by disguising themselves as medium peasants in certain localities. For example, in Aktanysh village, Menzelinsk canton (December 1929), a kulak sold 14 heads of cattle and 2 horses. He was able to avoid dekulakization on the pretext of having one horse.

Certain volost committees and party units are apparently unaware of the fact that the dekulakization process is part of collectivization and should strengthen the kolkhoz movement. In fact, they interpret dekulakization as an extension of the policy of the Poor Peasants' Committee. Therefore, there are several cases where poor peasants divide amongst themselves kulak property and personal items. This distribution is so inefficient that it causes disaffection among poor peasants, causing resistance in individual cases. The following facts are a clear illustration.

In Mashkaush village, Menzelinsk canton, 10 houses are taken away from kulaks. Poor peasants are forced to move into these houses, furthermore, a widow's potatoes were frozen. In Baltayeyvo and Kildurazy volosts, Buinsk canton, Panovka and Tyulyachi volosts, Arsk canton, Zainsk volost, Chelny canton, and Agryz district, the property taken away from kulaks was divided amongst poor peasants. In some villages, poor peasants were forced to move into kulak homes.

It was also observed, that several small low-value items were taken away from kulaks—clothes, bast shoes, children's skates, and clutter.

Kulak Resistance

In order to avoid property confiscation or mitigate the impact of dekulakization, the kulak hurried to liquidate his property before dekulakization was announced, hiding things at the homes of friends and relatives in nearby villages and towns (Ten'ki), actively disposing of governmental loan obligations and withdrawing deposits from savings banks, selling valuables, silverware, and old coins (Menzelinsk). In certain localities the Kulaks resort to threats, terrorism and sabotage. Recently, the Kulaks have been using women, mostly their family members, as petitioners to protect themselves. The kulak mainly refers to mistakes and drawbacks in the activities of our authorities, mostly in terms of collectivization, to stir women. Here are some facts. Tatarskoye Imenkovo village, Laishevsky district. The dekulakization of 13 households triggered campaigning against the kolkhoz by those dekulakized and their families. On 3 March of this year, 75 women forced the Chairman of the village Soviet to sign them out of the kolkhoz by use of threats. Their slogan is 'Kill all the Commissioners'. Urmanchekoevo village, Mamadysh canton. Women demanded that dekulakization be stopped and the kolkhoz be dissolved. In Baysarovo village, Menzelinsk canton, a kulak set fire to his property which had been confiscated within the framework of dekulakization.

Manifestations of Rightism

Both locally and in some central institutions, dekulakization revealed a number of cases where low-rank party organizations (volost committees, party units) and soviet, cooperative institutions had been showing rightism in their practice. Informational Letter No. 12 by Tatsoyuz is a vivid example — it contains the following instructions for its network: 'All kulak activities have been suppressed, the kulak has
been defeated’. However, the same letter states below that in Mendeleyevsk Propaganda Department the kulaks had tried to make a decision against workers referring to peasant oppression, while in Urymovo the kulaks had arranged a counter-revolutionary women’s demonstration to undermine dekulakization.

A number of volost and village officials claimed that there were no kulaks in their localities, that is, there was nobody to dekulakize. Some even tried to suspend dekulakization or abolish property confiscation that had already been carried out. The following cases are a clear illustration.

The Baltasino volost executive committee, Arsk canton ordered that dekulakization should be suspended, while the Kalinin volost executive committee denied having any kulaks in the volost. In Kodyakovo village, Novoye Mazino volost, Menzelinsk canton, party cell Secretary Gafurov supported kulaks by claiming ‘we have no kulaks here, there is nobody to dekulakize’, and personally abolished the confiscation of a kulak’s property because they often drank together. The Chairman of the Kuzaykino volost executive committee, Chelny canton, Tkachev sent a letter to a kulak informing him in advance of dekulakization.

In addition, certain authorized officials and heads of low-rank Soviet authorities deviated from the guidelines for dekulakization by acquiring confiscated items by bidding, misappropriating such items, and even taking bribes. For example, in Gorokhovoye Pole village, Mamalayevka volost, Mamadysh canton, authorized official Golov misappropriated a fur coat, a pair of trousers, and a hat. In Tukayev village, Nurlat district, Assistant Public Prosecutor Sadykov misappropriated items confiscated from kulaks—gloves and a razor—and took a feather bed and pillows as a bribe. In the same district, the Head of the Administrative Department and a People’s Judge acquired items confiscated within the framework of dekulakization by bidding. Such actions cause discontent with the local population, enabling the kulaks to discredit the local officials responsible for dekulakization.

It should be noted that senior local authorities do not take efficient measures to stop such incidents.

Head of the Information Department of the Regional Committee (Belyaev)

SA HPD TR, f. 15, l. 2, f. 831, s. 13–15.

Published: I. Galiullin ‘... Kulak dlya vozbuzhdeniya zhenshhin ispol’zuet oshibki i nedochyoty’ v rabote nashikh organov...’ (‘The kulak refers to mistakes and drawbacks in the activities of our authorities to stir women...’) // Gasırlar Avazı = Echo Vekov.—1998.—No. 1/2.—Pp. 94–96.

No. 54

Letter of Instruction by the Tatar Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) to canton and district committees of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on the Anti-Kolkhoz Movement in the Republic’s districts

24 March 1930

We hereby inform you of local reports on an ongoing serious anti-kolkhoz movement in Arsk, Spassk, and Chistopol cantons as well as Laishovsky, Nurlatsky, Agrzyzsky, Rybnoslobodsky, and Kaybitsky districts. The movement has reached a relatively insignificant amount of villages in other cantons. There are few cases of explicit counter-revolutionary slogans. The Regional Committee has made the following decisions today: to continue the persistent struggle relying on mass activities in order to preserve villages of total collectivization. In case of any large-scale kolkhoz quitting it is imperative that the stable part of kolkhoz members should be preserved by rallying them around the most active members of the group, and viewing them, organizationally and economically, as a kolkhoz to make sure that the group continues its determined struggle to restore full collectivization of the village, winning back
dozens of peasants and individual ones. After correcting all the overreaches, the property of liquidated kulak households shall remain at the disposal of such kolkhozes. As an experiment, start allocating the land to the remaining kolkhoz members in individual localities without any overreaches. Resort to all convincing methods to resist and delay seed privatization until sowing time. Explain to poor and inefficient peasants and warn them that seed privatization poses a direct threat to the sowing of their fields.

Avoid harmful forcing of actual horse collectivisation until favorable conditions are ensured.

As the period established for canton and district committees to return wrongfully confiscated churches and mosques to believers has expired, figures on the execution of this instruction shall be reported immediately. Present recommendations to canton and district committees to send brigade members and conscripts who interfere with the implementation of the party's anti-overreach policy back to Kazan. The Regional Committee states that several local organizations have been delaying the correction of overreaches, based on a false understanding of the authority of governance. Such a mindset, which often verges on sabotaging the party's policy, is a direct means of support for the kulaks. Raise your requirements for village volost authorities and their responsibility as much as possible; check their everyday practical measures to correct overreaches. Inform all lower organizations of any prosecution for overreaches immediately.

Tatar Regional Committee (Razumov).

SA HPD TR, f. 15, l. 2, f. 785, s. 117.

Published: G. Faezova, S. Elizarova’Vse krichali, chto kolxoz ne zhelaem’ ('Everybody shouted they did not want kolkhoz') // Gasirlar Avazi = Echo of Centuries.—2009.—No. 2.—P. 70–71.

No. 55

An extract from the internal memorandum by agents of the Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on the anti-kolkhoz movement in Arsk canton

10 April 1930

<...> Causes and Nature of the Movement.

First of all, we should categorically repudiate the myth that the anti-kolkhoz movement was triggered by Comrade Stalin’s article and the Central Committee's resolution on combating overreaches. In Arsk canton, the movement is present not only in every volost, but in every village. Its root cause is an outbreak of long accumulated dissatisfaction among the canton's medium and poor peasants. General overreaches, characteristic of the excessive pace of collectivization in the TSSR, have worsened in Arsk canton due to a specific practice. This practice has manifested itself mainly in the taxation sphere and the recovery system, in the administrative anti-religious campaign and re-dekulakization.

It is beyond doubt that in the context of Arsk canton the CC policy only caused the decisions to relieve the tension, which would otherwise have ended up as an explosion, thus ensuring a less serious outcome. <...>

On Overreaches in Arsk canton.

During the Kolkhoz Establishment Period.

Not a single gathering over the period in question has omitted to claim that they were brought into the kolkhoz by force. It is beyond doubt that such statements are exaggerated. However, a recent study on specific approaches during the kolkhoz organization procedure revealed coercion and intimidation with all types of hardships, even to the extent of dekulakization in Siberia. Such perfunctory engagement was interpreted as the art of kolkhoz forming. It was common practice to ignore any transactional offers by peasants who were at least slightly inconsistent with the approved policy introduced by the kolkhoz organizers. The best proof of this is the following: only 126 villages out of 612 now have a naturally formed kolkhoz nucleus, which contains as few as 12–15% of the canton's households. <...>
Dekulakization. Dekulakization was carried out on the basis of not only economic, but also political and religious indicators; routine squabbles also influenced the process. An approximate allotment figure was given for volosts which was unrealistic, eventually stirring up the quantitative appetite. As a result, some volosts, like Arsk, were initially dekulakized up to 5%. Preliminary adjustments reduced the canton’s total to 2.5%, while an actual inspection revealed a rate of 1.17%. Naturally, those rehabilitated included poor peasants, medium peasants, and non-kulak mullahs, people with a long past with no economic signs of being kulaks in the present. It did not occur to the canton committee that they should take into account the lack of land (the canton had no vacant land) and the general poverty of the district when determining the number of kulaks for the district. The telegram by the secretary of the canton committee to the Novoye Churilino volost committee, dated 17 March, is suggestive of his competitive enthusiasm on excessive dekulakization. In the telegram comrade Safarov, referring to the article by comrade Stalin and reporting cases of unacceptable overreaches, at the same indicates a reduction in the target value for dekulakization, from 60 to 55. In fact, 23 kulaks of all categories were detected in the volost. Such an attitude to work is described as ad-libbing.

SA HPD TR, c. 15, l. 2, f. 842, s. 3–5.
Published: G. Faezova, S. Elizarova 'Vse krichali, chto kolxoz ne zhelaem' ('Everybody shouted they did not want kolkhoz') // Gasirlar Avazi = Echo Vekov.—2009.—No. 2.—Pp. 72–74.

No. 56
An extract from a confidential letter by the Tatar Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) to the secretaries of canton, volost, and district committees of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on combating deviations of the party policy in the kolkhoz movement in Tataria.

17 April 1930

The outflow of people from kolkhozes, that has taken place in the RT during the last month, causing a dramatic reduction in the peasant household collectivization rate, has stopped by now. It is safe to say that the situation in the village has been reversed. Poor and medium peasants in kolkhozes and individual poor and medium households outside of kolkhozes are approaching the sowing period, which will open the next stage of our work to intensify socialist reconstruction of agriculture in RT.

From November 1929 to March 1930, the number of collectivized peasant households increased rapidly in the RT. It is beyond doubt that the kolkhoz movement in the RT, as well as in other regions of the Soviet Union, is essentially indicative of a shift of poor and medium peasants towards the path of collectivization, and the attraction to this path of the broad masses of poor and medium people in general. Undoubtedly, if all of our practical kolkhoz building measures had been in full compliance with the CC instructions, we would have been able to achieve a much broader and stabler success in the kolkhoz movement than we actually have at present.

However, there is factual evidence that blatant violations of the party's policy in the village have been occurring within the framework of collectivization in respect of the key issue—that of medium peasants—in the RT as well as in some other regions of the Soviet Union. The basis of these mistakes is the substitution of organizational and explanatory work with violence against medium peasants in terms of kolkhoz building. Here in the RT, the mistakes have affected many aspects of kolkhoz building on a large scale...

These overreaches have primarily brought about the violation of the key principle of collectivisation, that is the principle of voluntariness, as there were practices in the form of coercion in order to join the

35 Examples of excesses and corrective measures in carrying out the collectivisation are omitted here and hereinafter.
The most blatant, downright criminal deviations from the party's policy are associated with dekulakization. For instance, over 6% of all households in Laishevo district were dekulakized. An entire settlement (Voskhod) was dekulakized. Medium households were mainly affected. Dekulakization was sometimes determined not so much by economic considerations, but by the political standing of a specific medium peasant, or even a poor one. All religious workers, Lishnets (disenfranchised citizens), some families of workers employed in the town were subjected to dekulakization, which was even used to settle personal scores and in some cases took the form of looting. The directive of the Regional Committee dated 9 January of this year, under which dekulakization cannot affect medium households, and the resolution of the Tatar Central Executive Committee dated 16 February, according to which those found guilty of dekulakizing medium peasants are to be prosecuted, were not adhered to.

Taking into account that this situation, occurring in a number of regions of the Soviet Union, posed a threat to break our alliance with the medium peasantry, the party's Central Committee decided to embark on a fierce struggle against the deviations from the party's policy detected in the kolkhoz movement by introducing amendments to the Charter of the Agricultural Artel, published in Comrade Stalin's article 'Dizzy from Success' and, finally, issuing the Resolution of 10 March, which appeared in Pravda on 15 March. But did everyone understand the directives of the Central Committee? Were party organizations able to adjust their practices to the Resolution? As far as we know, it never happened. The Salikhovsky volost committee, Bugulma canton, delayed the distribution of the article by Comrade Stalin among the population, as it had been deemed harmful. The Levashovo volost committee, Spassk canton resolved that the article by Comrade Stalin and the new Charter of the Agricultural Artel did not apply to it. As of 17 March, the Arsk canton committee limits its efforts to correct dekulakization mistakes to reducing the number of households dekulakized from 60 to 55 in one of the volosts, though an inspection has revealed a total of only 23 households to be dekulakized. Certain activists are still unaware of the importance of the Central Committee directives for the anti-overreach campaign and there are attempts to discredit these directives. Such sentiments are the reason why most of the low-rank party organizations took a passive approach to correcting their overreaches until the kulak began to correct them. The kulak was able to take the lead in a number of localities, making use of the mistakes and inactivity of the party organizations, and proceeding to give false interpretations of the Central Committee directives. Thus the way was paved for the mass outflow of kolkhoz members, which we have witnessed during the past month.
concord and frequent disputes between kolkhoz members. No reply was given to their application until April. They have recently been informed that they are considered to be excluded from the kolkhoz with all the ensuing implications (no land for sowing, no horses, tools, etc.).

2. Troubled relations between old and new kolkhoz members (less seeds demanded from old members, etc.) and the suppression of any criticism in regard to the actions by the kolkhoz board, as well as its poor performance, caused 29 householders to quit the kolkhoz of Nizhny Shendyr village, Mamatdysh district.

3. Kolkhoz 'Kyzyl Uryak 3', Rybnyoslobodsky district, which was founded in May 1931, unanimously, along with the board, resolved to switch to individual husbandry. The minutes of the general meeting, where the question of withdrawal was raised, state: '1. Taking into account the dramatic decay of the kolkhoz and the fact that it is generating low income to the Socialist state and to our householders, the general meeting of 25 attendees voted unanimously to present a petition to the Tatar Central Executive Committee calling for withdrawal from the kolkhoz. <...>'

4. Pervomaysky kolkhoz (Bogorodok settlement, Chirpy village soviet, Laishevsky district) contained 50 households in April 1931. Now 45 households have withdrawn since after working there for one whole year, they have seen that our economic establishment provides no opportunities in terms of workers' and peasants' rights and that they have achieved nothing as kolkhoz members. <...>

7. 30 kolkhoz members from Panovo village, Nurlatsky district have withdrawn from 'Krasny Oktyabr' kolkhoz. 'The kolkhoz is mismanaged and chaotic. They burned rye on the drier. The fire did a lot of damage, but they never compensated the losses of the peasants. The field had 4 desiatinas of rye, cut down, in formations under hay, 7 hectares of oats, also in seams under snow, and 75 hectares of oats in bundles—they lay there until Christmas, all scattered. They probably scattered it all across the barn when they brought it there. The rotten oats were given to horses instead of fodder. 60% of the crops was lost. We were only able to turn in the full amount of unripe crops, and now we are starving. This is why we don't want to be in the kolkhoz', they write.

8. 19 people withdrew from the kolkhoz of Sergeyevki settlement, Chirnovka village soviet, Laishevo district. 'It is exactly a year since we joined the 'Krasny Dol' kolkhoz on 28 April 1932', their application states. 'Now that we have worked there for one whole year, we understand that the kolkhoz offers no opportunities in terms of workers' and peasants' rights. We, however, did our best to be useful to the state'.

9. 'Udarny' kolkhoz, Arsky district, used to contain 160 households. 54 householders are currently withdrawing from it, because they are dissatisfied with the board's poor performance, crop allocation, payment for labor days, and the drinking of local workers.

10. 'Markis' kolkhoz, Maly Shinar village, Saby district used to contain 110 households. 50 households are currently leaving the kolkhoz. The leavers attribute their reluctance to stay in the kolkhoz to economic mismanagement that has lead to dramatic cattle mortality, disruptive behavior by the kolkhoz chairman, and a general lack of any mass work.

SA HPD TR, c. 15, l. 2, f. 1176, s. 74–76.

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No. 58
Eyewitness Accounts of Collectivisation in the TASSR

From a letter by E. Kungurova

'... In August 1932, they put our mother and her five children on a cart and took her to an unknown destination. They sent 3 families out of the village. One of the families stayed in Irkutsk. They took us, two families, to the north of Irkutsk region—to the Stalin kolkhoz, Ilyino village, Kirinsky district. It
was already snowing when we came. Our clothes were no good for such cold weather. But there was no way out. We had to survive. And so we suffered in the freezing cold, without knowing why we were being punished...'

From a letter by V. Savelyev

'My knowledge of those distant years 1930–1932 is limited to what my grandmother Darya Bezenova, my grandfather Dementy Bezenov, and my mother Agakhina Savelyeva told me. My brother Mikhail Savelyev, born in 1931, died of starvation and disease when he was about four years old. My paternal grandfather Sergey Savelyev and all his children, who lived apart from him, were dekulakized and exiled to the town of Magnitogorsk. They would not give them any clothes, so they remained in what they were wearing.

My father went to prison; my mother returned to her parents with me and my little brother. Then, my maternal grandfather was dekulakized and sent into exile along with my grandmother and my mother with her two babies. But they sent them back from Bugulma station for some reason. They probably were not fit to work—my grandparents were old. When we returned to our house, other people were living in it. They wouldn't let us in.

My grandmother took me and we went roaming from village to village, begging; my mother went away with my younger brother. After these wanderings, Grandpa's brother gave us a bath near the river. We reconstructed the bath to resemble a house. Having an area 9 square metres, it hosted the five of us, later four.

My grandfather had an oil-mill, which the kolkhoz had used for several years. Shortly before dekulakization started, a mill was built on the Ik river in Kyzylyarovo village, Bavly district, where I was born. Grandpa destroyed the mill lest the kolkhoz should use it...'

From a letter by M. Galiullin

'... Before exile to Siberia, our Galiullin family lived in Chuma Yelga village, Arsky district, Tatarstan. It was a large family: my father Zinnatulla Galiullin, born in 1874, my mother Fakhrilbanat Galiullina, born in 1877, and 9 children. We lived in peace and friendship. Both parents and we the children worked our fingers to the bone from early morning till night. We built a two-storey house, various farm buildings, and a bath. We had 2 horses, 2 cows, 15 sheep, agricultural tools, a 'Singer' sewing machine (we made hats), etc.

But in the spring of 1929 they 'dekulakized' us, confiscated everything and sent our parents and six siblings into exile to Siberia. At first, we worked in the 'Luzhenki' and 'Butan' mines, Far Eastern Krai. I remember some names: the Shilka river, Kularka village, Sretensk district (it might be somewhat inaccurate—it has been a long time since then).

We lived in dugout shelters. They brought us to Krasnoyarsk after two years. We worked in the mines and built roads in the taiga. We lived in dugout shelters and tents there too.

In 1935, we arrived in Yeniseysk to live in cramped baraks. My sister Darya (born in 1916) died of cold and starvation. My brothers Malik (born in 1906), Abrar (born in 1911), and Nasyr (born in 1918) went to the front in 1942. I was conscripted into the labor army in the same year, where I served until 1944. I worked in Krasnoyarsk. Then I returned to Yeniseysk and worked at the same plant until I retired...'

From a letter by L. Lushnikova

'When the tsar was overthrown, mayhem and gossip began in the village; the elderly gathered to discuss events and read the Bible, and agreed that Satan's time had come, which would not last long.

My parents had separated from their parents by that time and had been able to build their house by selling personal belongings, clothes. The livestock allotted to my parents produced offspring. By the time dekulakization began, my parents had a stable household and a lot of land. They worked their fingers to the bone, getting only 4 to 5 hours of sleep. They had six children at that time.
The robbery began with crop confiscation—they brushed all the granaries clean, leaving no single sowing seed. Then they summoned everyone to the kolkhoz, suggesting that they should turn in all cattle, agricultural tools and machines. Father refused. On the following day his cousin Lavrenty, who had entered the kolkhoz and lived next door to us, and two other kolkhoz members (Mother never mentioned their names) came to take household items, livestock and everything we had in the house to the kolkhoz. They even checked the oven. My uncle began to tear out window frames; but Mother took the axe and said, 'Don't you dare tear out the window, or else I'll cut off your head'. This stopped him. They took everything from our house—my father's sheepskins, bags of wool, the sewing machine, the clock, and so on. The two other men were catching sheep, tying up their legs, and putting them onto a cart. My elder brother Pyotr (born in 1923, he was 8–9 years old) was untying their legs, and the sheep were running away. So they caught him and gave him a beating. Mother slaughtered our hens and hid them in the manure. They did not hesitate to take our cows, calves, and horses (I do not know how many there were) to the kolkhoz herd. On the following day they told my father: 'Either you enter the kolkhoz or you leave the house'. Father answered, 'If I enter the kolkhoz, they'll make me take what others have earned away from them. I will not go, so I won't become a kolkhoz member'.

Mother took the children to Bugulma, first to her brother's, then to her sister's place. Both brother and sister were threatened, 'If you shelter the kulaks, we'll send you away too'. Father was hiding at that time. He worked secretly for the miller until he was dekulakized. Then he hid in a dugout shelter. They were looking for Father. Mother said that he had abandoned them. Father came to her in the night to bring whatever food he could get.

Father chanced to meet the Chairman of the village soviet Uvarov, who issued a certificate stating that he was a medium peasant. They used it to go and find a job in Siberia'.


No. 59

Letters by Eyewitnesses on Repressions in the Villages of TASSR in the 1930s

From a letter by Zaynap Nabiullina (Lukmankhakimova) from the town of Magnitogorsk

I was born in 1936 in Magnitogorsk where my parents lived in exile. Unfortunately, neither is alive now. My grandmother and my brother Sultanakhim Lukmanov could not stand the starvation and died in Magnitogorsk in 1935. If I had known that we were to live to see such times, I think I would have asked them for more details, but they were afraid to talk...

I remember going with my grandfather in 1951 to his native village Urazayev, Aznakayevsky district. He sent me into his house (it was hosting a kolkhoz brigade) to see in what conditions the house and the outbuildings were. He was afraid to enter it himself. I could see him looking at his house through the neighbours’ window. Such were the times. Our neighbours, who witnessed everything, said that during dekulakization, all was taken: the house, the cattle, the samovar from the table, and weight clocks from the walls. My grandmother Nazelya was wearing a new dress. The village activists demanded that she take it off and put on an old one; they were pulling her dress. Poor Grandma should have worn the new dress beneath an old one.

From a letter by Mariya Koledina

<...> Our parents were dekulakized; they lived in Udelno Yenoruskino village, Aksubayevsky district. Father and Mother lived with my paternal grandparents. Our grandparents were old. They had a large house, they called it a five-wall house, a horse, a cow, a heifer, and some sheep. Father's friends said, 'They will be dekulakizing you today'. So Father ran away without even changing his clothes. When they came, they looked for him, but he was gone. They took Grandfather and everything we had,
leaving only the clothes that we were wearing. My grandmother was wearing new felt boots. They took them off, sent her out of the house, took all cattle—there was no inventory...

Father came for Mother after six months; but somebody saw him arriving, although it was nighttime. At once they came to search my grandmother’s place, shouting, 'We shall kill him! We shall kill him... ’ But my family had hidden Dad in a chest, under cloths, and they did not find him. Mother’s brother took Father to the station. Father then reported his whereabouts to us. Mother went to the Urals, to the town of Karabash, Chelyabinsk district. Dad worked in a mine. They lived in an apartment for several years, then they made a frame house, and we lived there during the war. We had no vegetable garden. Rainwater came down from the mountains and flooded our place. Dad was at the front throughout the war. About two years after he returned from the war, we bought another house. He was a disabled person of group I and he had a lot of orders. Dad would often say until his last breath, 'We have had to live in the hardest times'.

From a letter by Kamil’ Bagautdinov

I was born on 15 October 1931 in Biyabashi village, Kaybitsk district. The details that I am going to share are from my mother Bibikhazyar Bagaveeva (1907–1981), as well as my neighbours and fellow villagers—very few of them are alive now. This is what they said about the total lawlessness in regard to my parents in 1931.

My father’s name is Zalyaletdin Bagautdinov, also Zalyal Bagaveev, also Zalyali Bogovov. His birth years are 1897 and 1894, respectively.

Can one same man have this many names and surnames or be born and re-born after several years?

The dekulakization 'board' raided our village suddenly in October or November 1931. They dismiss and arrest Father, although there is no resistance on his part. They make an inventory of our property. All this happened during the night.

The following morning, they began removing our belongings. They took everything—my mother’s dowry, clothes, and items stored in a chest, women’s and men’s jewelry, decorations, bed sheets, downy mattresses, even our everyday towels. They dismantle the house and install it between two Russian and Tatar villages—Verkhneye Biyabashi and Sredneye Biyabashi—to use it to host the village soviet administration and the board of the ‘Trudovoy Put’ kolkhoz. The house remained in this guise until the 1960s. They dismantle and take away five-wall granaries (having a total lengths of about 40m) to use them as a kolkhoz grain warehouse. They seize several horses, cows, and other livestock, as well as the apiary consisting of several dozen beehives. Everything was to be for collective use. It would have been more or less fine if that had even happened. However, members of the 'board' divided whatever plunder they could take home.

They threw the baby (me), a few weeks old, onto the bare boards of the wooden bed. Mother had wrapped me in a blanket and put me to bed. One of the 'board' members pushed Mother aside to grab the bed sheets with one hand and unwrap the blanket with the other—and so I fell heavily on the wooden boards, spraining my wrists and breaking my fingers on both hands. The deformities are still visible today. Mother was reluctant to recall these events and did not tell anyone up until the year she passed away. Maybe she did not want to instill hatred of the regime in us, or probably she was still in fear of the 'board', which terrorized the neighbourhood for several years, always at night. They continued to frighten, threaten and victimize people in every way. They would not leave us children in peace, as we were stigmatized as kulak children until we left the village for different places. Father was released (although he was not really free) only after Stalin’s article 'Dizziness from Success' appeared.

Not until now did I realize what terror Mother had to bear and why she would often jump up at night as if touched by red-hot iron. And this continued until her hour of death. Have you ever seen a woman cry without tears? We, her children, saw her cry and sob. But there were no tears left in her eyes after all these years. As I write these lines with a lump in my throat, I picture to myself the horror of what she went through.
Published: N. Sharangina ‘Dostalos’ nam samoe tyazhyoloe vremya’. (O repressiyax 30-x godov v derevne) (‘We have had to live in the hardest times’. (On Repressions in the Village in the 1930s) // Gasrilar Avazi = Echo Vekov.—2000.—No. 1/2.—Pp. 91–93.

No. 60
An extract from the application to the CPSU Central Committee
by G. Fominys

August 1931

<...> I hereby request the relevant Soviet authorities to rehabilitate me and restore all my civil rights, relieve me of the disgraceful, immensely tormenting labels ‘kulak’ and ‘enemy of the people’ <...>

We, Fomin brothers, have never been kulaks or despised enemies of the people. We have never been amongst the opponents and enemies of the Great October Revolution, the CPSU, or the Soviet regime. We have never obstructed or undermined the creation of the kolkhoz or collectivisation in our Shishur village, Orshansky district, or any other places <...>

We both left military service in 1923 and rolled up our sleeves to restore the ruined agriculture. While we were fighting, our elders, wives, and children were at home <...>

We were interested in arable farming, machinery, horticulture, gardening, beekeeping, poultry keeping, and industrial crops. We were agronomists, livestock experts, mechanics, and economists in our farm units. We knew no rest.

We had no meadows. We only had some angular clover patches for horses to graze. So we had little livestock. We had 2 cows and some bull calves, two horses, 5–6 sheep, a couple of pigs, and 15 hens. We also had 5 beehives.

And so the Fomin brothers unwittingly gained a good reputation and popularity throughout the district. At first, the local, district authorities encouraged and praised us. They were proud to have such an exemplary household. Later, when the policy changed, they got an order to enlist us as ‘kulaks’ and liquidate us.

In the spring of 1928, they made an inventory of stacks in the field—ours and those of our neighbours. We had a stack of oats, which they forced us to grind. We were instructed to supply the crops—oats. We did it three times—we supplied a total of 100 poods. They demanded more in the summer of 1928. We protected and wanted to prove that we had no more crops.

They put my brother Timofey to an isolation cell in the yard of the Orshansk Executive Committee and kept him there for a week. I spent some time there, too. They released me under travel restrictions.

In March, my brother Timofey was convicted of failure to supply crops for public needs under Article 61 of the Criminal Code. He was sentenced to three years of ‘free exile’ in Kazan, where he went at his own expense, never to return to his homeland.

They arrested me a week after my brother Timofey and sent me to the district prison at first, where I spent a week. Then I was sent to prison in Yoshkar-Ola until 1 August 1930.

They took Timofey’s family—his wife and children—from Shishur village in July 1930 and brought them to Yoshkar-Ola. They took me out of the prison so I joined my brother’s family, his wife and children. They put us into a cart, where two other families were sitting. We travelled to the Urals under harsh conditions for three days. <...>


Published: ‘Bezumnaya zhetskost’ pri raskulachivaniii... ’ (‘Awful cruelty during dekulakization... ’) // Gasrilar Avazi = Echo Vekov.—1995.—No. 1.—Pp. 198–199.
No. 61

To all authorized agents of the District Committee and the Regional Executive Committee
and cell secretaries of the CPSU(B)

5 July 1932

We suggest that assistance should be ensured for labor force recruitment under the personal liability
of cell secretaries of the CPSU(B) and authorized agents of the [district] C[ommissariat] and the District
Executive Commissariat. Your cell of the CPSU(B) and All-Union Leninist Young Communist League
is to supply ' _____ ' members, cand[idates] of the CPSU(B) and members of the All-Union Leninist
Young Communist League. It is imperative that you fulfill the demand. In case you are unable
to supply members and cand[idates] of the CPSU(B) and members of the All-Union Leninist Young
Communist League, you must supply the demand with individual householders and kolkhoz members
by conducting mass explanatory work.

The District Committee demands that the specified allotment be provided.

Deputy Executive Secr[etary of the] d[istrict] C[ommissariat] of the CPSU(B)   signature 36
Administrator Shatalina

SA HPD TR, c. 253, l. 1, f. 42, s. 98.

No. 62

From materials provided by local TASSR industrial plants.
On the implementation of the resolutions of the December Plenary Session
of the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) in regard to the Stakhanovite movement.

For the first time in recent years, the TASSR local industry was capable of early execution of the
plan in 1935. Its output in terms of constant prices for 1926/1927 (except for agricultural milling) made
133,986,000 roubles compared to the target value of 129,324,480 roubles, that is, 103.6% of the target
value.

The labor productivity plan for 1935 was executed at 102.5%. That of reducing product cost was
executed at 101.9%, as a result the local industry by the end of 1935 was in over-fulfillment of the sav-
ings plan (22 million compared to the target value of 14.6 million roubles).

It should be noted, however, that the RSFSR People's Commissariat for Local Industry expects
the total gross product to increase by 22.3% in 1936. The fact that the growth rate of the ATSSR local
industry is lower than the RSFSR average is explained by the fact that a number of local industrial
plants, mostly those relying on imported difficult-to-obtain raw materials, are growing at an extremely
slow rate or even diminishing in comparison to the level reached in 1935.

The following data suggests the growth pattern of the Stakhanovite movement: the total av-
erage list-based number of plant workers varies between 15,300 and 16,200 people. The number of
Stakhanovites as of 1 November, 1935 was 237 people, that is, 1.8[%] in terms of the total number of
workers. The figure as of 1 January, 1936 was 1,165 people, or 6.8%. The figure as of 1 February, 1936
was 2,410 people, or 15.2%. On 1 March 1936, there were 3,060 people, or 19.4%. On 20 March 1936,
there were 3,260 people, or 20%. <…>

SA HPD TR, c. 15, l. 3, f. 1402, s. 1, 2, 3.

36 The signature is illegible.
No. 63
Data on the number of Stakhanovite workers as of 20 March 1936
for TASSR local industrial plants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of workers as of 1 March 1936</th>
<th>In particular Tatars as of 1 March 1936</th>
<th>Number of Stakhanovites as of 15 November 1935</th>
<th>Number of Stakhanovites as of 10 March 1936</th>
<th>Number of Stakhanovites as of 20 March 1936</th>
<th>Percentage of Stakhanovites as of 20 March 1936</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>15,798</td>
<td>6,238</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>3,060</td>
<td>3,260</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SA HPD TR, c. 15, f. 3, f. 1402, s. 26.

No. 64
An extract from Minutes No. 17 of the Meeting of the Bureau of the Tatar Regional Committee of the CPSU(B) dated 27 August 1938

Reports: On the Transition to a New Tatar Alphabet (Comrades Mukhametov, Mangushev, Matveev, Alemasov).

It was resolved: taking into account numerous petitions by Tatar workers to introduce a new Russian-based Tatar alphabet, request the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) to admit the measure.

Signature37

SA HPD TR, c. 15, f. 4, f. 96, s. 24.

No. 65
Pages from Musa Dzhalil's Diary,

12 January 1942

I don't fear death. It's not an empty phrase when we say that we despise death. It is true. The noble sense of patriotism and full awareness of our public duty kill fear.

When a thought about death comes to you, you think there is life after death, not the 'life in the other world' that priests and mullahs used to advertise but life in the people's consciousness and memory. If I have done something important, something that people need, I deserve another life—a 'life after death'. People will remember me, speak and write about me. Why fear death if I deserve it? That's the purpose of living—to do it in a way to ensure another life after death.

So I think to die bravely in the Great Patriotic War would be a good death. My existence has to end some day, the thread of my life has to tear. It is the law of nature. If I am not killed, I will die in my bed. Yes, I might live to be very old and be able to do good things and be very useful to society for 30 or 40 years. Of course, it is true. To live more means to work more, to be more useful to society. Thus, the fact that we don't fear death doesn't mean that we don't want to live long. That's not it at all. We love life, we want to live. This is why we despise death! If death is necessary, and it can serve as much use as those 30 to 40 years of work, then there is no reason to fear an early death.

'He lived and worked for his Motherland and, when it was needed, died for his Motherland'. To die in such a way is to become immortal!

37 The signature is illegible.
In fact, death is not that scary. However, we don't only think but feel, sense things. Thus, we have the awareness in our nature, in our blood.<\ldots>38

Musa

Sovetskaya Tataria.—1956.—14 February.

No. 66
An extract from the letter by commanders of Belarus partisan detachments to the workers of Tataria39

November 194240

The partisan movement in Belarus is gaining momentum. The ground is burning under the German robbers' feet. Hitler's gangs are approaching their final defeat.

Our brothers—Russians and Tatars, Ukrainians and Uzbeks—are behind Germans' lines shoulder to shoulder with us Belarus partisans. We are proud to know that brave sons of glorious Soviet Tataria have joined us against the German invaders. The partisan sniper Gaynulla Ulengov from Bilyarsky district, Tatar ASSR, shot dead 83 Germans with his rifle in a Belarus partisan detachment. The government awarded the Red Star Order to comrade Ulengov.

A greeting telegram Suleyman Khaliulov from Drozhzhanoye district, Tatar ASSR, blew up the railroad ground work in a Belarus partisan detachment. When Hitler's troops arrived, comrade Suleyman Khaliulov came to blows with them and killed 10 Germans. The commanding staff of the partisan detachment is going to grant a decoration to comrade Suleyman Khaliulov.

We could provide numerous examples of heroism and courage demonstrated by sons of the glorious Soviet Tataria in our partisan detachments. This joint struggle against the abominable German occupiers is evidence of concord among all nations in our Soviet Socialist Motherland. <\ldots>

We strongly believe that the enemy will soon suffer new heavy blows by the Red Army on the front and partisans behind its lines. Our land will be free of Hitler's occupants.

The enemy will be crushed. The sun will shine on us.

With greetings,

Commander of the Belarus partisan detachment group
Hero of the Soviet Union
V. Kozlov

Commander of Partisan Brigade holder of order
A. Marchenko

Commander of the 'Belarus' Partisan Brigade holder of order
YA. Pokrovsky

Commander of Partisan Detachment No. 277 holder of order
S. Mazur

Commander of Partisan Regiment, standard bearer
YA. Korolev.

39 The letter is addressed to the Tatar Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party and the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the TASSR.
40 Understood from the text of the document.
Tatar jigits [valiant ones]!
The Tatar people send their ardent salam to you who do not spare your energy and life to contest every inch of their native land on the fronts from the White Sea to the Black Sea, you who march in the forward lines of guard regiments and divisions, to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the glorious Red Army, our troops’ brilliant victories!

Fearless, honest, unflinching sons and daughters of the Tatar nation! Your mothers, who nursed you, and your fathers, who left you a legacy of generosity, send you greetings as hot as the sun and bless you to move on tirelessly for merciless revenge!

May your fathers’ blood burn in your hearts as the quenchless fire of hatred for our enemy!

May your mothers’ love protect you against the enemy’s bullets!

Heroes whose deeds will become songs and legends! Your children follow your lead and, entrusting their future to you, send you a bow of hope and confidence in you.

Jigits who inflict death on beasts above the clouds, in the sea, in the mountains and in valleys! Your faithful sweethearts, your families and neighbours, who proudly repeat your names, send you bows as numerous as stars in the sky.

The Tatar people send a fraternal salaam and best regards to your brave comrades-in-arms, your senior and junior commanders, heroes of all nations in the Soviet land. Tatar jigits who fight shoulder to shoulder, heart to heart with the sons of those who struggle for the liberty of Soviet peoples!

You do not fear death. Death has to retreat in the face of your adamant courage.

You love life, and it will not turn its back on you. Life is on your side, comrades! The people are on your side!

As the saying goes, every battle has a brave jigit. Your compatriot Hero of the Soviet Union Ildar Mannanov is such a brave jigit. Dozens of enemy tanks have attacked the land protected by our arms. Artillery men held off the attack courageously. But the Germans were many, and defenders fell one by one until Ildar found himself standing at his gun all alone. He loaded and directed it all alone to shoot enemy tanks, working like a whole gun crew. Ildar made one hundred eight shots. He shot until the German tanks turned into a mass of metal on fire.

All honour to our batyrs [valiant ones]!
All honour to the sons of the Tatar nation—selfless heroes of the great war of liberation: brave aircraft pilots, sharp-eyed snipers, courageous reconnaissance officers, skillful anti-tank riflemen and anti-aircraft gunners, fearless artillery and mortar men, masters of machine-gun fire, cavalrymen with their never-rusting swords, valiant tank crew officers and sailors—everyone who exterminates the enemy and crushes its arms.

All honour to you, Bolshevik machine gunner Abrar Zalyaleev! By destroying over a hundred fascists in a single battle, you showed the world what a Tatar jigit can do to defend his fatherland.

All honour to you, Akhmet Khalimov, who turned 19 foe tanks into charred logs!

On the North-Western Front, aircraft pilot Kamaletdinov stayed in the burning plane and bombarded the enemy, decimating German soldiers and officers. On the Western Front, fearless tanker Abutalipov

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41 The title of the document.
42 The date of publication in the Pravda newspaper.
crushed 25 German trucks with munitions, 6 guns, 8 mortars, and up to 200 soldiers and officers with his powerful machine.

The Great Patriotic War has given birth to hundreds and thousands of Tatar heroes. We saw them among the guardsmen who repelled the enemy's tank attack near Moscow. We saw them among the brave warriors who held on to the important high ground near Stalingrad. Wave after wave of German soldiers were marching, firing their machine guns incessantly. Seeing nearly 300 fascists advance, Mikhail Kabiriov, who commanded the detachment defending the heights, spoke to his ten warriors, Tatars, Uzbeks, and Kazakhs,

'There are thirty Germans per bayonet. Those who are afraid, front and center!' Not a single warrior moved. 'We will die but not retreat!' they say. When they had run out of cartridges, each killed 10–15 fascists with his bayonet. Fighting heroically, they were able to keep the important hillock at the cost of their lives. This is how one should defend one's Motherland. [...] Over three thousand sons of the Tatar nation have been awarded USSR orders and medals at the Patriotic War, Red Army soldiers, commanders, and political officials.

In the Don steppe, three warriors—Russian Fyodor Lipatov, Ukrainian Stepan Mikhno, and Tatar jigit Farrakh Bikbulatov—defended a field-readied earth and timber bunker. All of a sudden, two German tanks and about forty automatic rifle men attacked them. The Soviet combatant realized that the enemy will enter the rear area of the adjacent Red Army Unit if they refuse to fight and retreat. None of the heroes lost control. None retreated. They fought like lions. They burn down a tank, kill half of the attacking Germans, and put the rest to flight. Three brave common soldiers keep a seemingly small but very important part of the line. This is how one should contest every inch of one's ground!

Evidence of how the unbreakable bonds of friendship between the peoples of the Soviet State. The example recalls the ardent lines by the Tatar national poet Ğabdulla Tukay:

The Russian nation has been our friend since ancient times. Can the friendship ever end? We were born, and we grow taller Like beads on the same thread. We are stronger than tigers in the battleground And work harder than sturdy horses.

This is not the first time that the Tatar nation has faced German invaders. The joint forces of Russians and Tatars have won every battle. <...>

Dear sons and daughters!

We strongly believe that you will hold the enemy's forces at bay, driving them all back to the west till you have exterminated all the fascist invaders.

Today we shall stand on the banks of our mother Volga, in the manner of our forebears, and swear as we kiss the earth that suckles us,

'Whatever front we are on, whatever arms we fight against, we will not spare our lives to protect our Motherland, its honour and freedom!

The sun is our witness, dear Volga! We will not sheathe our swords until we have liberated our homeland.

Long live our Motherland, where every inch of ground, every blade of grass, every drop of water are sacred!

Long live our Red Army!

This letter has been signed by 1,511,137 people.

Pravda.—1943.—5 March; Krasnaya Tataria.—1943.—6 March; Kzyl Tatarstan.—1943.—6 March.
<...> Comrade Stolyarov has performed 96 successful sorties on an IL-2 plane on the front of the Patriotic War. He has been awarded the 1st Class Order of the Patriotic War and the Order of the Red Banner for excellent performance in 28 sorties in the Belgorod and Kharkov airspace. He has performed 40 sorties after the second governmental award. During combat operations he has exterminated 24 tanks, 115 automobiles carrying foot troops and cargo, 10 anti-aircraft artillery batteries, blew up 2 fuel storage houses, and killed up to 450 soldiers and officers.

He has participated in 14 air fights against foe fighters. He has crashed 6 fighters in a group fight. He has led a reconnaissance group of two IL-2 planes to study enemy troops and machinery 10 times, each time with excellent performance. He was able to provide valuable information on groups of enemy tanks and automobiles on every occasion.

The Supreme Command has issued 6 commendations to him for excellent fulfillment of combat missions. A whole series of commendations have also been issued by the commanders of the Air Army, Air Corps, and Air Division. <...>

Every sortie by comrade Stolyarov was a heavy blow to the enemy's manpower and equipment. He is a fearless strike pilot and a brilliant reconnaissance officer.

Comrade Stolyarov deserves the highest governmental award—the title of Hero of the Soviet Union—for excellent performance in 96 sorties on an IL-2 plane, 6 foe fighters crashed in a group fight, and excellent strafing attacks in the Velikiye Luki, Demyansk, Belgorod, Kharkov, and Kirovograd directions, for courage and heroism. Fit for the highest award in the form of the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

<...> Comrade Stolyarov has performed 185 successful sorties on an IL-2 planes with strafing and bombing attacks on the enemy's manpower and equipment on the front of the Patriotic War.

<...> He has been awarded the Order of the Red Banner for 30 successful sorties of excellent strafing and bombing attacks in the Battles of the Dnieper, Poltava, Kremenchuk, and Kirovograd.

He has been awarded the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal for courage and heroism shown in 96 successful sorties, excellent strafing and bombing attacks in the Belgorod, Kharkov, and Kirovograd airspace, and enormous damage to the enemy's manpower and equipment.

He has been awarded the 2nd Class Order of the Patriotic War for 24 successful sorties in cooperation with the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front to exterminate a German group in Korsun-Shevchenkovsky District, during the liberation of Uman, and in the Battles of Chișinău and Iași.

He has been awarded the Order of Alexander Nevsky for 30 successful sorties as the leader of groups of 6–18 IL-2 planes, excellent strafing and bombing attacks, assistance to the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front in the January offensive, skillful management of subordinates, pro-activity and perseverance in fight.

He has performed 89 efficient sorties on an IL-2 plane since he received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union as a government award on 12 January, 1944.

[Signatures]

No. 69
An extract from the commendation lists of Hero of the Soviet Union G. Gafiatullin on his feats of arms

14 January 1944

<…> Second-in-Command of a rifle regiment unit Sergeant Gazinur Gafiatullin has acted as a true patriot of our socialist Motherland in offensive battles; being a communist, he encouraged the soldiers of his unit and fulfilled the battle mission successfully.

When his troop was attacking Ovsishevo village, he and his unit were the first to enter it, got to the earth-and timber bunker near the enemy's anti-tank gun battery, grenaded it, captured one German prisoner and exterminated the rest.

Sergeant Gafiatullin took the lead of common soldier Alexander Matrosov advancing to occupy the village of Ovsishevo, he was checked by an enemy machine gun in an earth-and timber bunker, which was preventing infantry troops from moving any further.

The German machine gunner continued to fire at our infantry. Sergeant Gafiatullin, with an automatic rifle and a grenade in his hand, crawled up to the earth-and timber bunker. When he was close enough, he threw the grenade, rushed to the earth-and timber bunker, and blocked the embrasure with his body so that the mission could be fulfilled.

Sergeant Gafiatullin died with over 20 ballistic wounds. He died but was able to defeat the enemy. The heroic deed of Sergeant Gafiatullin enabled the foot troops of the rifle regiment to attack and occupy Ovsishevo village, inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy.

Sergeant Gafiatullin deserves to be awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, the Order of Lenin, and the 'Gold Star' medal for his deed of arms against the German mob.

Commander of the Rifle Regiment [Signature].


No. 70
A. Alish's letter to his family from a fascist torture chamber

28 January 1944

18/19 Dzerzhinskogo Street, Apt. 1, Kazan, Soviet Union
to Rukkiya Tulpanova

My dear helpmate, beloved mother, my dear children, family and friends! It is probably the last time that I am able to send ardent greetings to you!

I, Abdulla Alish, the writer A. Alish, Red Army soldier, was surrounded and taken prisoner near Bryansk on 12 October 1941. I traveled from camp to camp until I arrived in Czechoslovakia, where I worked as a polisher at a factory. I met poets Musa Dzhalil and R. Sattar (from 'Kızıl yaşlar' newspaper) in a camp near Berlin in late 1942. In August 1943, I was arrested on charges of distributing leaflets among Tatar prisoners of war, legionnaires as they called them.

45 Date of the heroic deed.
46 Biographical data is omitted.
Along with me were arrested the following people: 1. Musa Dzialil, a poet from Kazan, 2. Garif Shabaev, a financial officer from Tashkent, 3. Sayfulmukhamedov, Deputy People's Commissar for Trade of Uzbekistan, 4. Fuat Bulatov, an engineer from Kazan, 5. Akhmet Simayev, a journalist from Moscow, and 20 to 25 legion members.

We spent six months in prison in Berlin. The trial is to take place in Dresden on 7 February 1944.

I came, I fought, and I left. It must be our destiny. We remain true to our people until we draw our last breath. O, how badly do I want to see you, my dear ones, and tell you what I have been through. (R. Sattar escaped in June 1943, and no information is available on his further life). Many of the things that we write and think fall with us into oblivion. Many, many kisses to you all. Especially to my Almaz and Ayvaz. Please make sure they get an education. Goodbye.

Your faithful son, husband, and friend A. Alish.

Sovetskaya Tataria.—1957.—5 October.

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**No. 71**

*The letter from Base N to the parents of Hero of the Soviet Union V. Piskunov on his feats in arms*

19 October 1944

Gorky Kolkhoz, Bondyuzhsk district, to Grigory and Yekaterina Piskunovs.

On 18 September of this year, the officers' meeting of our unit celebrated the 150th sortie by your son Vasily, the glorious falcon of our aviation.

He has taken the long path of glory while defending his Motherland from the German invaders since March 1942. The battles of Staraya Russa were his baptism by fire. Since then this warrior of the air has walked the path of immortal glory of heroic deeds. He carried the courage and valor of the Russian officer on the wings of his powerful attack plane in the battles of Stalingrad, Soviet Ukraine, the Donbass, Crimea, Sevastopol...

Comrade Piskunov is famous as an expert in strafing attacks. The glorious pilot proudly wears the Order of Lenin, two orders of the battle Red Banner, and the 1st Class Order of the Patriotic War. He has been awarded the honorary title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

We appreciate the valour, courage, and heroism of your son. We are proud of him.

Mr. and Mrs. Piskunov! Thank you for raising a fearless warrior, a brave officer, and a true patriot of our Motherland.

Stakhanovets.—1944.—19 October.

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**No. 72**

*Letter of Response by Workers of Tataria to Combatants, Sergeants, and Officers of The Tank Corps*

December 1944

Dear friends and brothers!

We were extremely proud and satisfied to read your letter about the glorious deeds of the tank corps possessing the powerful machines presented by the workers of the order-bearing Tataria.

We were happy to learn that you had covered over 1500 km on tanks bearing a signature 'Kolkhoznik of Tataria', fulfilling your battle mission, and had been the first to cross the silver Dnieper to continue your victorious westward advance.

We were immensely grateful and overwhelmed by love for you as we read that 71% of the corps had been awarded for heroism and courage and that 37 warriors had been awarded the title of Hero of the
Soviet Union. We found the names of our brave fellow countrymen, the faithful sons of the Tatar nations Sharipov and Fatykhov, on the list of the glorious tankers.

All honour to our batyrs [valiant ones]! All honor to the brave tankers—selfless heroes of the Great Patriotic War!

Our whole nation welcomes you and glorifies you. The people have entered the names of the fearless tankers who committed a heroic deed for their Fatherland to its chronicles in letters of gold. The generations whose future you determine in the battlefield utter your names with veneration and compose ardent songs and legends about your immortal glory. [...]

Here on the far home front we can see, hear, and feel out steel tanks approach with the words 'Kolkhoznik of Tataria' glowing on their turrets as a symbol of the rock-solid unity of the front and the rear. We can see and hear our courageous tankers in the thick of a powerful attack crush any obstacles in their way, slay German invaders with the shattering of Soviet weapons, making your way along the poor spring roads to advance further westwards. People in the western regions of Ukraine can already hear the squeal of your steel treads. Our sisters and brothers' hearts across the line already echo with the rustle of the victorious banners of the tank corps. The further you move to the west, the closer the longed-for victory. <...>

All honor to our courageous tankers, who struggle heroically for the honour, freedom, and independence of our Soviet Fatherland!

All honour to the heroic tank corps, which is advancing victoriously to the west!

Chairman of the Presidium
of the TASSR Supreme Soviet G. Dinmukhametov.

Chairman of the TASSR
Council of People's Commissars S. Sharafeev

Secretary of the Tatar Regional
Committee of the CPSU(B) V. Nikitin


No. 73
N. Zagitov's commendation certificate on his feats of arms

1 May 1945

1. Name: Gizy Zagitov
2. Military rank: Senior Sergeant
3. Position, military unit: Head of the flash-ranging platoon station of Reconnaissance Division, 136th Army Cannon Artillery, Rēzekne Red Banner Brigade.
4. Birth year: 1921
5. Ethnicity: Tatar
6. Party membership: member of the CPSU(B) since June 1942.
7. Participation in the Civil War, further military actions to defend the USSR, and the Great Patriotic War: Patriotic War since 22 June 1941
10. Recruiting district military commissariat: Mishkinsky District Military Commissariat, Bashkir ASSR.


12. Permanent residential address of the soldier and his family: Yanagush village, Mishkinsky district, Bashkir ASSR.

1. A concise summary of personal feat of arms or merits

As our troops were approaching the centre of Berlin, the Reichstag Building, Comrade Zagitov expressed willingness to participate in its assault and be the first to plant the victory banner on the Reichstag. On 26 April 1945, Zagitov and Sergeant Minin, Senior Sergeant Bobrov, and Senior Sergeant Lisimenko began to perform the battle mission. Marching against of the advancing foot troops, Zagitov developed approaches to the Reichstag Building, thus helping our foot troops to advance.

On 28 April, reconnaissance officers entered the German rear and came across a German sentry. They acted bravely and resolutely to shoot the sentry dead and break into the cellar, where they captured 25 German soldiers.

On 29 April, Zagitov and his comrades got into the German camp and cued our artillery on the Reichstag Building. The Germans surrounded their building, but the heroes did not give up. They used automatic rifles and grenade to kill 40 Germans and keep the house until our infantry arrived.

On 30 April, Zagitov and his comrades found a channel 100 m away from the Reichstag Building which, was not on the maps, and a crossing on it. They reported the findings to the Commander of the 79th Corps immediately on the radio.

On 30 April, during the attack on the Reichstag Building, Zagitov was the first to break into the Reichstag but received a trough-and-trough wound in the chest; the bullet penetrated his party membership card. Wounded, Senior Sergeant Zagitov and Sergeant Minin climbed the Reichstag tower and planted the first victorious banner.

Comrade Zagitov deserves the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for displaying courage, valour, and heroism during the assault of the Reichstag Building.

Commander of the Reconnaissance Division, 136th Army Cannon Artillery, Rēzekne Red Banner Brigade Major Maksimov
1 May 1945

2. Decision of superior commanders:

Fit for the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Commander of the 136th Army Cannon Artillery, Rēzekne Red Banner Brigade Colonel Pisarev
2 May 1945

Fit for the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Commander of the Rifle Corps Major General Perevyortkin
3 May 1945

3. Resolution by the Army Military Soviet

Fit for the highest award in the form of the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Artillery Commander of the 3rd Shock Army
Guard Artillery Major General Morozov
6 May 1945

4. Resolution by the Army Front Military Soviet
Fit for the highest award in the form of the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Commander of Troops of the 3rd Shock Army
Colonel General Kuznetsov

Member of the Military Soviet
Major General Litvinov
1 May 1945

5. Resolution by the Award Board of the People's Commissariat for Defense
6. Note of award
Awarded the Order of 'Red Banner' under Order to the troops of the 1st Belarus Front No. 576/n dated 18.05.1945.

Senior Associate Administrator of the Personnel Manager Office of the Artillery Commander Department, 1st Belarus Front
Lieutenant Colonel of the Administrative Service Vasilyev

Published: Gasırlar Avazı = Echo Vekov.—1996.—No. ½.—Pp. 102–103.

No. 74
Greeting by Commander of Troops of the Leningrad Front
Marshal of the Soviet Union L. Govorov

June 194547

I sincerely greet and congratulate the workers of Tataria on the republic's 25th anniversary on behalf of generals, officers, sergeants, and combatants of the Leningrad Front.

The sons and daughters of Tataria are famous as selfless warriors immensely loyal to the Soviet people, the party of Lenin and Stalin, who do not spare their lives to fulfill their duty to our Motherland on the battlefield. They demonstrated commendable valour and courage during the heroic defense of the town of Lenin, when breaking the Leningrad blockade, cleansing Leningrad and Kalinin regions of German occupants and liberating the Soviet Baltic states.

I am happy to tell you that many Tatar warriors have become much celebrated heroes of our front. We utter the name of the courageous son of the Tatar nation guardsman Akram Valiev, who was the first to cross a water barrier with a group of combatants, destroy the enemy's firing-points and thus enable our units to advance successfully in that part of the line. Akram Valiev was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. The sergeant woke up as an officer. The warriors of our front hold sacred the memory of hero of the Soviet Union Sergeant Gazinur Gafiatullin, who repeated the indelible feat of Alexander Matsosov by sacrificing his life for victory. The warriors of our front are proud of the brothers Mugalimsabirovs. One has been awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. The second brother carries six governmental decorations on his chest. I could name dozens of Tatar warriors who have won high credit by glorifying their people, their republic <..>.

47 Understood from the text of the document.
Commander of Troops of the Leningrad Front, Marshal of the Soviet Union L. Govorov


No. 75

Political Report by the TASSR Military Commissariat to the Volga Military District on Patriotic Uplift in the Republic

29 June 1941

The republic has been witnessing a major patriotic uplift over the six days of mobilization. The following evidence is available. Patriotic men and women willing to serve in the Red Army have submitted up to 5,000 applications to military commissariats.

Here are some moving patriotic applications and memoranda submitted to district military commissars and directly to the TASSR Military Commissariat, both on the first day of mobilization and more recently.

Participants in the struggle against the Finnish Whites, husband and wife Nikolay Makarov and Evdokia Fusova, sent the following telegram to Moscow:

'We, husband and wife, hereby earnestly request you to send us to the Army in the Field to defend our socialist motherland against the overweening brazen fascist bandits of Hitler'.

Signatures: feldsher Fusova, reservist Makarov.

Participants in the struggle against the Finnish Whites Comrades Anatoly Molkin, Ivan Makarov, Rakhim Khayrullin, Mukhutdinov, and Zhuravlyov submitted similar applications to the Volga district Military Commissariat.

Twin brothers Aleksandr and Arkady Krupnovs from 'Krasny Klyuch' kolkhoz, Tyulyachi district said to the District Military Commissar at the conscript parting ceremony, 'We will hold our rifles firmly. We shall combat fascism to glorify the great, invincible people of our socialist Fatherland'.

Patriot Aleksandra Lyvina, communication agency employee, communist, said:

'The low act of the fascist mob who dares attack our Motherland has engendered hatred towards our worst enemy in me. The government awarded my brother I. Ivanov the Order of Lenin for crushing the Japanese samurai. During the struggle against the Finnish Whites, my sister E. Ivanova volunteered to the Army in the Field and was awarded the Order of the Red Start for valor in the battlefield. I took nursing courses twice, am a good motorcycle driver, and know telegraphy. Comrade Military Commissar, please send me to the Army in the Field. I will not spare my life for my dear Motherland'.

The request by patriot Lyvina has been fulfilled. She is to join the Army in the Field.

The queues in the Drozhzhanoye district Military Commissariat [on these days] never end. We can see Chairman of the Staro-Duvzlovsky village soviet Rafikov standing at the desk. He has brought along the conscripts of his village soviet and insists on going to the front himself. Comrades Dzhaliilov, Serazetdinov, Salakhov, Khramov, teacher Fedorova, and kolkhoz farmer Valeev join him at the desk. They have a very brief conversation with the military commissar. 'We all want to stand up for our Motherland', they say.

The Chistopol Conscription Centre is always crowded, specially during radio broadcasts by the Soviet Bureau. The faces of the conscripts and their parents show strict determination after each programme. They all are eager to crush the fascist vermin.

'I want to hold arms again', said participant in the war against the Finnish White Guard Stepan Polyakov. 'Send me to the front lines'.
'I volunteer to defend my native Soviet land', member of the CPSU(B) Comrade Levushkin wrote in his application. 'Please send me to the front. I will not spare my blood and even life to crush the enemy, as I want to measure up to the heroic glory of the great Red Army'. <...>

This indicates an exceptional patriotic surge on the sixth day of mobilization in the order-bearing Tatar Republic. Kolkhozes and kolkhoz farmers lovingly provide their best horses and motor vehicles for the Army in the Field. To conclude:

1. Mobilization takes place in the context of a large political uplift.
2. The sentiment of both conscripts and the population in general is sound. Everyone is willing to go to the front.
3. We carry out all activities in close cooperation with local party and Soviet organizations.
4. All reception and delivery stations and conscription centres work as planned.
5. All units are fully provided with political staff.
6. Five hospitals are prepared to receive casualties.
7. I will submit an additional report on the departure of all units.

Head of the Political Propaganda Department of the TASSR Military Commissariat [Signature].

SA HPD TR, c. 7130, f. 1, f. 10, s. 111113.

No. 76
Minutes of the Party Meeting of the Communist Members of 'Unysh' Kolkhoz, Novo-Pismyansky District on Establishing the Defense Fund

6 July 1941

Agenda:
1. Establish the defense fund.

Reports: 1. Report by Comrade Garayev. He says that it is necessary to establish a defense fund to aid our country against German fascism.
2. Speaking on the same subject, Comrade Mavlyudov reads out the Pravda newspaper and says that the fund to be established by us is the victory fund.

Therefore, the meeting passes the following resolutions:
1. Every communist must pay a daily salary per month until the end of the war.
2. Every communist must participate actively in establishing the defense fund.
3. All propagandists and deputies must meet no later than tomorrow.

Chairman
Secretary
Presidium members

SA HPD TR, c. 5616, f. 1, f. 23, s. 72–73.


48 The signatures are illegible.
No. 77
Memorandum by the Tatar Regional Committee of the CPSU(B) to Chairman of the Soviet for Evacuation under the USSR Soviet of People's Commissars N. Shvernik on Accommodating Evacuees in Tataria

26 July 1941

I report the following in response to your telegram:

According to the resolution by the Soviet for Evacuation under the USSR Soviet of People's Commissars, the Tatar ASSR is to receive and provide accommodation to 115,000 people evacuated from Moscow and 34 trains, that is, at least 34,000 evacuees from other cities. Besides, according to the telegram by member of the Board of the People's Commissariat for Lines of Communications Comrade Martyshev dated 24 July 1941, 6 trains, that is, about 6,000 evacuees from various localities have been sent to us. According to the telegram by Authorized Agent of the Ivanovo Region Soviet for Evacuation under the USSR Soviet of People's Commissars comrade Konovalov dated 24 July 1941, we are to receive 10 more trains, that is, about 10,000 people. Thus, over 165,000 people are coming to the Tatar ASSR.

Besides, a large amount of evacuees who were not received in Kuybyshev, Ulyanovsk, and other towns are arriving to the station and pier of Kazan. Head of the Kuybyshev Region Department for Evacuation Comrade Begel refers to your order to send 185 families to the Tatar ASSR on the Volodarsky steamship. Over 150 families of officials of the USSR People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs assigned to Kuybyshev but rejected there have arrived on the 'Uritsky' steamship.

As the result, 10,000 people aside from the above 165,000 are staying in the Tatar Republic. Crossshipments overloaded the transport, and the planned quartering has been upset.

Evacuees are accommodated in districts of the Tatar ASSR according to the plan approved by the Soviet for Evacuation under the TASSR Soviet of People's Commissars at the railway station and the Kazan pier. 56,789 people have been accommodated in districts as of 1 August 1941. Vacant houses of kolkhoz farmers, school and club buildings, etc. are used to accommodate evacuees.

Evacuation centres at the pier and station of Kazan provide evacuee provisions. There were some interruptions in provisions at the Kazan station at first, but they have now ceased. On the first day, evacuees receive hot meals twice a day (breakfast and lunch) and 500 grams of bread per person. Steamship and station cafeteria provide bread and catering on the way. Many evacuees complain about a lack of bread on the way from Arzamas to Kazan and a lack of boiled water. That is, railway travelers spent 3 to 4 days without bread or boiled water.

When in districts, evacuees get provisions for 5 to 7 days. An additional bread fund to ensure an allowance of 500 grams per person has been allotted to evacuee transit points. Evacuees from the immediate battle area get free meals. Evacuees from Moscow and Leningrad receive food at their own cost. Financial and welfare aid to evacuees from the immediate battle area is provided to those most needy and controlled by the Soviet for Evacuation. A dedicated board presided by Vice Chairman of the Presidium of the TASSR Supreme Soviet—Vice Chairman of the Executive Committee of the District Soviet of Worker Deputies in districts—is responsible for estimating the degree of need and determining whether manufactured goods should be issued. The evacuee financial aid money has been allocated to districts according to the evacuation plan. District health departments have been instructed to provide medical aid to evacuees. All trains arriving at the railway station and pier of Kazan are inspected by assigned physicians. Parenting rooms with pediatricians on call provide aid to children. An isolation ward of 50 beds is being established on the Kazan pier.

Speaking of evacuee cultural services, they are unsatisfactory because for lack of funding. Evacuation centres hardly provide any cultural services to evacuees. Even mass propaganda among evacuees
takes place on an extremely small scale. The scope of activities being broad, trade unions have been keeping aloof of such cultural services.

The Regional Committee of the CPSU(B) met to address the issue of evacuee accommodation, provisions, and mass work on 23 July. <...>

Secretary of the Regional Committee of the CPSU(B) S. Mukhametov.


No. 78
Report to Head of the Military Department of the Tatar Regional Committee of the CPSU(B) Sidaev on Activities of Anti-Soviet Déclassé Elements

4 September 1941

Data supplied by secretaries of district committees of the CPSU(B) and heads of military departments suggest an intensification of the activities of anti-Soviet declasse elements in certain districts, who are trying to cause mass panic and undermine our home front work, and a number of cases where conscripts evade service in the Red Army in various ways. For instance, citizen Kashaf Galimov, a member of the CPSU(B), from Almetyevsk district, became a school principal in 1928. He began to spread anti-Soviet rumours after he was drafted to the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army. Consequence: expelled from the CPSU(B), sent to prison.

In Yutazinsky district, conscript Garay Abdullin from ‘Rosa Luxemburg’ kolkhoz arrived at the reception centre under the influence of drink, fell behind his team on the way to the base, and returned home on the same day. Consequence: sent to prison, committed to trial by the military tribunal. Son of a kulak, A. Teneshev from ‘Zarya’ kolkhoz in the same district, refused to serve in the Red Army and said, ‘When I was the son of a kulak, the government did not need us. Now it does. I won't serve in the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army’. Consequence: sent to prison.

Citizen I. Chebotaryov (formerly a kulak) from Aktash village, Aktashsky district says, ‘Let the Germans destroy Moscow’. V. Kildushev from Buton village says, ‘The Soviet government will fail soon. Hitler will win and introduce corvee. We need to encourage kolkhoz members to quit kolkhozes as soon as possible. Otherwise Germany will send landlords to kolkhozes. They are very nasty. They will beat kolkhoz farmers with sticks’. A. Tikhonov (Bukharay village), A. Kuzmina (Nizhny Yelan), M. Tokarev, Isayev, and others say that ‘Communists must be exterminated’ and show a defeatist attitude.

A citizen of Bekchantaevo village from Kalininsky district spreads anti-Soviet propaganda, ‘Soviet citizens are poor, naked, barefoot and without the strength to defeat Germany’. When a meat tax was introduced on a per hectare basis, he said that it was meant to reduce animal breeding and not develop it. A citizen from the Apasovo village of the same district Salikh Garipov said during loan implementation at the meeting of the village soviet, ‘They robbed kulaks and wealthy people 10 years ago. Now they are robbing poor people’. Worker of Kirov sovkhoz Khobi Khabibirakhmanov said, ‘May Germany win soon and put an end to the Soviet regime’. <...>

The fact that such cases are concentrated in certain districts is attributable to poor mass enlightenment and insufficiently resolute combating of counter-revolutionary elements.

I consider it necessary to inform you of this.

Instructor of the Military Department of the Tatar Regional Committee of the CPSU(B) N. Gafarov

SA HPD TR, c. 15, f. 5, f. 228, s. 46–47.
No. 79
An extract from the Minutes of the Meeting of the Bureau of the Tatar Regional Committee of the CPSU(B) on Collecting Warm Clothes for the Red Army

9 September 1941

Reports: Resolution by the Central Commissariat of the CPSU(B) dated 5 September 1941 ['On Collecting Warm Clothes for the Red Army'].

It was resolved:
1. Refer to and execute the Resolution by the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) dated 5 September 1941.
2. To ensure practical collection of warm clothes and underclothes for the Red Army, establish a board with the following membership:
   a) Comrade Mukhametov (Secretary of the Regional Committee of the CPSU(B), Board Chairman),
   b) Comrade Tinchurin (Vice Chairman of the TASSR Council of People's Commissars),
   c) Comrade Evdokimov (TASSR Military Commissar),
   d) Comrade Doronin (Secretary of the Regional Committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League),
   e) Comrade Kolesova (Chairman of the Regional Committee of the Medical and Sanitary trade union).
3. Suggest that the regional board should instruct city and district committees of the CPSU(B) on the procedure for receiving, recording, storing, and transporting warm clothes collected for the Red Army.
4. Suggest that city and district committees of the CPSU(B) should establish board presided by the secretary of the relevant city and district committee of the CPSU(B) with the following membership:
   Vice Chairman of the District Executive Committee (Vice Chairman of the Executive Committee of the City Soviet in cities), District Military Commissariat, Secretary of the District or City Commissariat of the Komsomol, and a trade union representative for practical collection of warm clothes and underclothes for the Red Army.
5. Oblige city and district committees of the CPSU(B), city and district committees of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League, and professional bodies to carry out large-scale mass education concerning the collection of warm clothes and underclothes for the Red Army at factories and institutions, in kolkhozes, sovkhozes, dormitories, and residential houses.
6. Oblige regional and district newspaper editors to ensure regular and large-scale coverage of the progress in warm clothes collection for the Red Army.

[Signatures]


No. 80
Resolution by the TASSR Soviet of People's Commissars on the Introduction of Blackout

12 October 1941

The TASSR Soviet of People's Commissars hereby resolves:
1. Introduce full blackout in the cities of Kazan and Zelenodolsk, in the area of the Umary-Zelenodolsk-Yudino-Kazan-Vysokaya Gora railway line and the Yudino, Vysokaya Gora, Zelenodolsk, Stolbishchye, Verkhniy Uslon, Nurlat, Kaybitsy, Tenky, and Dubyaz districts of the Tatar ASSR from 13 October 1941, 6 p.m., until further notice.
2. Approve the Resolution on the Blackout Procedure in the Territory of the Tatar by the TASSR People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs and immediately put it into effect in the Tatar ASSR by publishing it in a newspaper.

3. Oblige the head of local defense systems—chairmen of city and district executive committees of soviets of workers' deputies, plant, institution, and organization directors, chairmen of village soviets and kolkhozes—in the cities and regions specified in Paragraph 1 of this resolution to make sure that all measures specified for full blackout are carried out in a timely manner under their personal responsibility.

4. Oblige the local air defense systems and bodies of the Workers' and Peasants' militia to ensure accurate and timely implementation of this resolution.

Chairman of the Soviet of People's Commissars of the Tatar ASSR S. Gafiatullin

Administrator of the Soviet of People's Commissars of the Tatar ASSR D. Aseev.

Krasnaya Tataria.—1941.—12 October.

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No. 81
Address by the workers of the Kazan Machine Building Plant to Encourage the Citizens of Moscow to Spare Nothing for the Front

23 October 1941

A rough time has come for our Motherland. In spite of dreadful casualties and losses in equipment, the blood-thirsty fascist mob is stepping over their dead soldiers and officers to get to the country's very heart—our much loved capital Moscow.

At this difficult time when the capital is in danger, we speak to you, dear citizens of Moscow. We are by your side, the entire country, all Soviet people! We have been doing our best to help the front, to support the people of Moscow in their heroic struggle against the fascist hordes.

Our plant, just as ant plant in the great Soviet Union, is engaged in an intense pre-October socialist competition. An increasing number of workers have been fulfilling the plan by 200%. We are producing 2 to 3 times as much as planned to increase our output. There is still more to come. We will continue to improve our performance.

Keep strong and brave, comrades in Moscow! Exterminate the enemy mercilessly! Let German fascism be buried at the threshold of the capital.

The plant's 200% and 300% Stakhanovites
M. Benderov, G. Sharifullin, A. Battalov, A. Pavlov, and A. Naumov.

Krasnaya Tataria.—1941.—23 October.

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No. 82
Report by 'Krasnaya Tataria' on the establishment of the Kazan Defense Committee

26 October 1941

In order to ensure complete concentration of civil and military power and a stringent order in the city of Kazan and its suburbs, the USSR State Defense Committee has established the Kazan Civil Defense Committee. <...

The Defense Committee has commenced to work.

Krasnaya Tataria.—1941.—26 October.
No. 83
An extract from the memorandum by Acting Prosecuting Attorney of the Tatar ASSR Nadeev on the measures taken by investigation authorities within the framework of implementing the decree on the workers and employees' accountability in military production,

22 January 1942

A check of the implementation of the decree 'On the Liability of Workers and Employees in Military Industry for Unauthorized Leave' dated 26 December 1941 by the TASSR Public Prosecution Office revealed cases of excessive delays in executing and submitting to public prosecution agencies' reports on those abandoning their work posts without authorization (defectors).

The administration of Plant No. 387 had taken no measures to commit to trial worker I. Sukhanov, who left work without permission on 2 December 1941 and did not appear until 2 January 1942. Shortly before Sukhanov left work, he received work clothes, which he sold for drink and then went for a month working nowhere.

On 2 January of this year, Sukhanov came to the plant. It took the Head of the HR Department Nalyotov 10 days (until January 12 of this year) to address the issue of whether he should be admitted to work and how he could be used instead of submitting his case to public prosecution authorities.

Worker P. Izharin deserted the same plant on 3 January of this year. Being well aware of the fact, the administration took no action. When the Public Prosecution Office intervened upon revealing the facts on 17 January of this year, Izharin was found and arrested on the following day. He was committed to trial by the military tribunal on 19 January.

178 cases of violation of the Decree were submitted to court between October and December 1941.

Acting TASSR Prosecuting Attorney Nadeev

SA HPD TR, c. 15, f. 5, f. 472, s. 2–3.

No. 84
Record of the conversation with Vice President of the USSR Academy of Sciences Academician E. Chudakov on aid to Tataria's national economy by institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences

28 January 1942

Now that our dear Motherland is suffering through a time of war, scientists of the Soviet nation are well aware of their duty to take every effort and apply the best of their knowledge and expertise to provide as much assistance and ensure as much success as possible on the home front. Love for our Motherland and hatred for the dehumanized enemy inspire scientists to come up with new discoveries and improvements for the sake of our socialist country.

49 By the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated 26 December 1941 ‘On the Responsibility of the Workers and Employees of Military Industrial Enterprises for the Unauthorised Withdrawal from the Enterprise,’ all workers and employees, employed in the military industry and in enterprises associated with it, were declared mobilised for the period of the war and were given permanent work with the enterprises they were working for. When it was found necessary, these workers were subject to compulsory evacuation. Those who left the factories without permission and ‘persistent absentees’ were regarded as ‘deserters of the labour front’ and were punished in corrective labour in camps and colonies for a period of between 5 and 8 years. If serious accidents occurred as a result of negligence, the perpetrators were sentenced to execution by a firing squad. These cases were considered by military tribunals.
Apart from a number of purely defensive tasks, institutes of the Academy of Sciences have been addressing issues related to the TASSR national economy, in particular that of Kazan. Though little time has passed, the Academy of Science can already share some achievements with the workers of Tataria.

Before I present a summary of Tataria-related works by the USSR Academy of Sciences, I would like to mention that the TASSR is to play a special role in the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people. The performance of its factories largely determines the supply for our brave Red Army.

Tataria is a region in our great Union that has every prerequisite to brilliantly meet the requirements that the party has set for industrial, agricultural, and cultural workers. The peoples of Tataria possess a wealth of minerals, which it has not yet been used at a satisfactory scale. Therefore, the USSR Academy of Sciences initiated a research to detect such reserves and develop measures to make sure that they are used efficiently.

The proclamation in 1918 In 1941, the Academy of Sciences (the Institute for Fossil Fuels) largely focused its research on oil presence, which was of great use for local organizations.

The Soviet for the Study of Production Forces was able to present a number of maps containing various data on the territory's geologic structure and the occurrence of certain minerals in the republic. The maps are expected to underlie Tataria's natural resource exploitation plans.

When finding and studying natural resources, the Academy of Sciences also wants to determine their applications. For example, it has developed a technique for purifying glass industry sand of harmful contaminants, a process diagram for a cement plant relying on locally produced raw materials, etc. A laboratory study revealed the possibility of using dolomites, which are common in Tataria, to produce cement with features similar to that of Portland cement. The institution is preparing to test the war materials under production conditions. The dolomites turned out to be good raw material for the production of white water paint, which can be used for winter camouflage.

A study on the waste and refuse of certain plants in Kazan revealed that they could substitute for deficient raw materials (the waste of Vakhitov Combine Plant and others). Common floridin clay is a promising raw material both for petroleum refining and for other industries, such as soap production.

Large-scale measures have been taken to utilize local fuels in particular (coal, peat, schist) for rail transport.

The introduction of domestic fuel gas generators is undoubtedly of economic importance far beyond the TASSR. Economy gas generator designs have been developed.

Small water plants are very numerous in Tataria, which brings up the issue of their efficient use. To this end, the republic's People's Commissariat for Agriculture developed and proposed an instruction for kolkhozes on making simple units to enable power plants to thresh crops.

Working in close cooperation with 'Kazenergo', the Power Institute of the Academy of Sciences studied the electrical facilities of Kazan and developed measures for short-notice increases power station capacity.

Importantly, we provide continuous aid to plants and organizations. Nearly all plants in Tataria have been enjoying a close productive cooperation with the Institute of the Academy of Sciences. In some cases, the cooperation takes the form of consulting assistance, when scientists help the plant address an issue of production on site. Sometimes it takes the form of regular joint work by employees of academic institutes and industrial plants to solve specific problems. To ensure such cooperation, some plants have provided the Academy of Sciences with laboratory and production facilities.

Many members of the Academy and research fellows of its institutes are actively involved in political and educational activities, delivering lectures and reports to a broad audience. The scientists' lectures and reports are very popular in Kazan.

Krasnaya Tataria.—1942.—28 January.
No. 85
An extract from the application by mother teachers of the Kuzbas Primary Middle School,
Chistopol district, TASSR to the District Committee of the CPSU(B)\textsuperscript{80}

17 February 1942

We, teachers and single mothers, have minors aged 5 months to 4 years. Sizova has a five-month-old baby and a 3-year-old, Polteva also has two children, aged 17 months and 4 years. At present, our children are in need of food. We have no household of our own and live on our school salary. There is no side work for us in the countryside. Our governmental ration is limited to 9 kg rye flour per month, on which we basically exist. We are unable to buy food on the market, since our salary is too low for the growing market prices. Malnutrition and constant undernourishment has been causing severe wasting and diseases in our children. They develop rickets, but we have nothing to support their health.

Please consider our application and ensure proper nutrition for our infants and children, at least partly, to prevent them from dying. In town, people had ration cards for dry goods, sugar, soap. They can obtain dried pretzels and gingerbread for their children, not just rye. Employees' children go to kindergarten, which provide proper food for the children. A mother in the country who works as a school teacher does not have such opportunities. Every district organization ignores our application. This is why we turn to the District Committee of the CPSU(B), to you, Comrade Semyonov. <...>

Teachers:  
A. Polteva
A. Sizova

SA HPD TR, c. 48, f. 3, f. 291, s. 249.

No. 86
An extract from the memorandum to the Tatar Regional Committee of the CPSU(B), the TASSR Soviet of People's Commissars, and the Presidium of the TASSR Supreme Soviet on the evacuee situation in the TASSR (according to data provided by the Public Prosecution Office)\textsuperscript{81}

26 March 1942

The TASSR Public Prosecution Office possesses extensive evidence of local authorities demonstrating an inappropriate approach to the conditions of evacuees' everyday life.

Though superior organizations have instructed district and village ones to take appropriate care of evacuees, their children and families, employment and fuel supply, such local organizations neglect to respond to evacuee complaints in time. <...>

The TASSR Public Prosecution Office submitted a memorandum to the TASSR Soviet of People's Commissars concerning the revolting cases of cruel attitude of local organizations (district soviets) to the living conditions of evacuees on 2 February 1942. On 13 October 1941, it reported extremely poor sanitary and disease prevention services for evacuees in Kazan to Chairman of the TASSR Soviet

\textsuperscript{80} The document contains a resolution: ‘Call in Comrade Fedorovsky for questioning, with the data on the supply of teachers in rural areas. 25/III. Semenov.’

\textsuperscript{81} The document contains two resolutions. The first is addressed to Comrade Mukhametov: ‘I request that you take measures in respect of the organisations allowing such intolerance towards the evacuees’. The second is a directive of Mukhametov to inferior authorities: ‘1) On the issue of children living in dormitories of plant 22 an instruction is given to the City Health Department and the Urban Department of Public Education. 2) Those responsible for the squandering of foodstuffs intended for the evacuees are to be brought to justice by the Prosecutor’s Office.’
Health had been taking no proper measures to improve the medical and sanitary services provided to evacuees or against violators of sanitary regulations. However, no shift has taken place in evacuee medical and sanitary services on the initiative of any agencies of the Tatar People's Commissariat for Health.  

1. On 15 March this year an inspection of the employee dormitory of the evacuated Plant No. 22 in the centre of the city, at the Kremlin premises, hosting 1,430 people, including 283 children of preschool age and 155 children of school age, revealed revolting facts concerning evacuee medical services as well as housing and utilities. The dormitory is cramped, cold, unsanitary. There is no boiler room, no laundry, no warm lavatory or running water. <...>  

The building has only been heated once over the heating season. The temperature can be as low as -5 to -10°C. There is hoarfrost on the walls. The wallpapers, transoms, floor, and doors decay. Most of the residents say that they have to sleep in outdoor clothes for a lack of firewood and heating. They cannot go to the bath several times a month, so they have to do the laundry and dry their linen in the room. <...> The building is crowded above the sanitary limit. The overcrowded accommodation without any running water, firewood, laundry, and boiler room has caused completely unsanitary conditions, dirt and lice infestation resulting in fatalities and cases of camp fever.  

Both the City Soviet and the plant administration neglect the living conditions of employees. A number of families live in cold corridors (Sosnovskaya, Lytnev, and others).  

This is characteristic that Comrade Lytnev, with a family of 7 members, including a nursing infant and sick wife, lives in a cold corridor. He has raised the question of improving their living conditions many times, but neither the factory administration nor local organizations have provided any assistance to him. Lytnev's wife said that she gave birth to her children under such conditions (in a cold room) without any aid from either the District Health Department or the Housing Administration. <...>  

2. Data submitted by the Yudino district Prosecuting Attorney contain evidence that the Yudino district Health Department neglects to provide medical aid to evacuees. A closer investigation revealed gross negligence and inconsiderateness of evacuees by the authorities of Yudino district in terms of evacuation employment, medical and financial aid.  

For instance, evacuees assigned to Yudino district for evacuation did not receive proper medical aid. On 16 January 1942 Vice Authorized Agent for Evacuation denied sanitary treatment and medical examination to 25 Estonians demobilized from the Red Army. Chairman of the Yudino district Executive Committee Comrade Ermishin entrusted Head of the District Health Department Galimov to allocate them, without any preliminary sanitary treatment and medical examination, dirty, sick, and lice-ridden, among 4 kolkhozes in the district, which he did. Most of the newcomers were ill-dressed, bare-footed; but Chairman of the District Executive Committee Comrade Yermishin, having an outstanding amount of 9700 roubles, did not provide any aid or ensure footwear or clothing for them. <...>  

In conclusion, in spite of numerous instructions by superior policy-makers, chairmen of executive committees of district soviets of workers' deputies, secretaries of district party committees have neglected to take proper care of evacuees, ensure adequate control over the condition of evacuees accommodated in districts, provide employment, fuel, and accommodation for evacuees or secured proper medical services, take measures to engage schoolchildren in studying, or control the application of dedicated occupational funds.
No. 87

An extract from the Report by the Party Bureau of V. Ulyanov-Lenin Kazan State University on mass-political activities among the University’s Students and Researchers,

26 August 1942

The patriotic war of the Soviet people against German fascism has compelled the university staff to provide everyday assistance to the front, mobilize the students and researchers to solve the most burning problems.

The beginning of the academic year was marked by students’ and researchers’ involvement in autumn agricultural activities. Over 700 people worked in kolkhozes in Pestrechinsk district in September 1941. In October, 500 people were engaged in potato harvesting.

Political mass education events as well as measures to improve discipline, efficiency, and performance were part of the student engagement. Faculty meetings widely discussed the outcome of student participation in the 1941 harvest campaign. The meetings had great educational importance due to public criticism of students’ poor performance or discipline during the kolkhoz work.

In late October, 550 students and researchers undertook building defenses. They remained on site until 1 February 1942. It is quite obvious that all the agit-prop measures were aimed at improving work performance and labor discipline. Political briefings on the reports by the Soviet Bureau of Information took place daily.

The university's staff did a great deal of work on the road. As the students went through the mill of hard work, those who were too weak and lacked perseverance were revealed and consequently quit the university.

Student dropout rate was high in the first semester.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Students,</th>
<th>1st year</th>
<th>2nd year</th>
<th>3rd year</th>
<th>4th year</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>As of the date of</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>1158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1941</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As of the date of</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 March 1942</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reasons for dropouts vary: [the largest] part was conscripted to the Red Army; some went to factories for financial reasons; some did not have confidence that the course of study would proceed normally.

When the 2nd semester began, agit-prop measures were taken to mobilize the staff so that they could assist the front and to enhance academic discipline, improve lecture attendance, and ensure timely preparation for tests and examinations. Non-governmental organizations had to do a big job of consolidating the university and setting straight the academic activities.

Secretary of the Party Bureau of the Kazan State University B. Rozhdestvensky

No. 88

Telegram by the Tatar Regional Committee of the CPSU(B), the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and the TASSR Soviet of People's Commissars to Chairman of the State Defense Committee on Fund-Raising for the Establishment of the 'Kolkhoznik of Tataria' Tank Column,

Swelling with deep patriotism, male and female kolkhoz members of our republic have initiated a fund-raising effort to build the 'Kolkhoznik of Tataria' tank column. They have contributed 100,000,000 roubles from their personal savings. Contribution are continuing to arrive. May this New Year's gift by the freedom-loving people help the brave Red Army bring closer the day when we crush the German occupiers.

Secretary of the Tatar Regional Committee of the CPSU(B) Kolybanov

Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Tatar ASSR Dinmukhametov

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Tatar ASSR S.Gafiatullin

Krasnaya Tataria.—1943.—3 January.

No. 89

An extract from the Resolution by the TASSR Soviet of People's Commissars on Training Tractor and Combine Harvester Operators, Mechanics, and Tractor Brigade Foremen for the Republic's MTS's and Sovkhozes,

The Soviet of People's Commissars of the Tatar ASSR and the Regional Committee of the CPSU(B) hereby resolve:

1. Refer to and implement the Resolution by the USSR Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) 'On Training Tractor and Combine Harvester Operators, Mechanics, and Tractor Brigade Foremen for the Republic's MTS's and Sovkhozes' dated 9 January 1943.

2. Confirm the plan for machine operator training for MTS's in the Tatar ASSR approved under the decision of the Bureau of the Tatar Regional Committee of the CPSU(B) dated 9 November 1942: 8,100 tractor operators; 1,700 combine harvester operators; 1,370 assistant combine harvester operators; 225 mechanics; 450 tractor brigade foremen; 175 drivers; 400 mechanics. Suggest that the People's Commissariat for Agriculture of the Tatar ASSR should make reasonable preparations to arrange individual training in tractor operation during field activities for kolkhoz members operating trailers.

Approve the following training plan for sovkhozes: 791 tractor operators; 126 combine harvester operators; 188 assistant combine harvester operators; 10 mechanics; 22 tractor brigade foremen; 65 drivers; 54 mechanics. Oblige sovkhoz trusts to report the machine operator training plan to sovkhozes until 17 January 1943.

3. Mobilize male and female kolkhoz and sovkhoz members, workers of MTS's, and individuals able to work not employed in industry and transport, at least 16 years of age, for mechanization courses
and schools according to the Resolution by the USSR Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the CPSU(B). <...>52

7. Recommend kolkhozes to pay kolkhoz members who attend mechanization courses and schools for up to one labor day per training day. Pay the specified scholarships to attendees of mechanization schools and courses by the People's Commissariat for Sovkhozes <...>53.

The Soviet of People's Commissars of the Tatar ASSR and the Regional Committee of the CPSU(B) stress the fact that to ensure timely and complete staffing of MTS's and sovkhozes with well-trained tractor and combiner harvester operators, mechanics, and tractor brigade foremen is the principal task of Soviet, party, and land authorities in terms of preparation for the agricultural work of 1943. They demand that the machine operator training plan be fulfilled unconditionally.

Chairman of the Soviet of People's Commissars
of the Tatar ASSR S. Gafiatullin

Secretary of the Tatar Regional Committee of the CPSU(B)54


No. 90
The TASSR Network of Evacuated Orphanages

March 1943

The total number of evacuated children's institutions within the system of the People's Commissariat for Education is 76. They host a total of 7119 children.

The total number of evacuated children's institutions within the system of the People's Commissariat for Health is 11. They host a total of 1120 children.

The system of the People's Commissariat for Education contains:
38 orphanages housing 3,877 children
Including 20 from Moscow (2,046)
38 foster homes (3,242)
Including 13 from Moscow (839)
24 from Leningrad (2,262)

Pre-school-age evacuees
from the full number of those in orphanages (10):
1,097
School-age evacuees in 28 orphanages: 2,780.

The system of the People's Commissariat for Health contains:
8 homes for infants and nurseries (895 children)
Two sanatoria for 225 children
(aged 3 years and more)

52 The clauses of the resolution on the formation of a commission for the organisation of courses and curricula are omitted.
53 The clause of the resolution specifying the forms of payment for students of the mechanisation school is omitted.
54 The signature is missing.
The Soviet and party organizations of the Tatar Republic did the great work of providing aid to service families in February–March 1943 under the Resolution by the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) dated 22 January 1943.

In 32 village districts of the Tatar Republic alone, needy families received the following: 4,008 centner foodstuffs and vegetables, 16,389 items of clothing and footwear, 401,582 rubles in money (lump-sum allowance), 116,153 cubic metres of firewood, a large number of cows, calves, and sheep. Families numbering 2,952 of those serving on the front received new and redecorated apartments, 240 children entered kindergartens and day nurseries.

In Baltasi district in February 1943, 419 families received 1,295 cubic metres of firewood; kolkhozes issued a total of 9,400 kg bread to 690 families, 993 centners of fodder to 637 households, 51 pairs of felt boots, 150 pairs of underclothing, and more industrial goods, all amounting to 40,000 roubles, were sold through the District Consumers' Union.

In Kuybyshev district, service families received 3,326 cubic metres of firewood, 350 centners of potatoes, a lump-sum allowance of 9,900 roubles for 75 families, clothes for 247 families, and various footwear for 271 families.

Many kolkhozes in Chistopol district allocate calves, cows, lambs, and sheep to kolkhoz service families.

The Tatar Republic was enthusiastic to support the initiative of the non-governmental organizations of Ivanovo regions that arranged a Week of Assistance for Red Army Service Families. The ten-day campaigns for service families held in a number of cities and districts in the republic yielded material results.

The outcome of the ten-day campaign in Kazan was as follows: 15,907 service families received 34.3 tonnes of potatoes, 16,908 items of clothing and footwear, 4,689 metres of fabric, 10,802 cubic metres of firewood, and 337,000 roubles in cash. 425 apartments were re-decorated and re-allotted. 377 children entered childcare institutions. 1,892 people were assigned to canteens.

A total of 2,532 front service families were inspected in Agryz district within the ten-day campaign. 1,487 families received firewood (a total of 3,442 cubic metres); 830 families got food aid. 1,160 livestock-owning households got fodder aid. 31 families received a total of 5,200 rubles in money. Besides, 200 pairs of footwear were repaired for combat veterans' children; 70 children entered day nurseries and 42 kindergartens.

55 Dated as per the content of the document.
A fund of manufactured goods was established for very needy families in Chistopol during the local ten-day campaign. The fund included 5,620 pairs of footwear, 4,553 items of knitwear and underclothing, etc. Reserves for further supply of service families' needs, funds of manufactured goods or food were also established in Atnya, Baltasy, Vysokye Gory, Krasnoborsk, Buinsk, and other districts in the Tatar Republic.

Within one day, members of 'Iskra' kolkhoz, Buinsk district contributed 37 poods of bread, 125 poods of potatoes, 10 poods of butter, 120 litres milk, and 4,800 roubles in money from their personal savings to the service family fund. Besides, the kolkhoz permitted them to sow 10 more hectares spring crops than planned to add the harvest to the fund.

Soviets of senior officers' wives make an essential contribution to improving the financial status and living conditions of service families. This work established under the Sovetsky District Military Commissariat of Kazan (presided comrade Shestakova) is especially active. Its members have inspected 1500 front service families. Following the inspection, 30 families received apartments with more modern conveniences. Very needy families received 2,400 clothing items. 1,800 families got firewood. A total of 19,000 rubles was issued in money.

Head of the Organization and Instruction Department of the Tatar Regional Committee of the CPSU(B) Arnautov.


No. 92

An extract from the report by the Chairman of the Presidium of the TASSR Supreme Soviet G. Dinmukhametov at the meeting of front-line propagandists in Moscow on providing assistance to Stalingrad and Stalingrad Region

3 August 1943

<...> The workers of Tataria are enthusiastic to join the patriotic movement of the country's advanced regions to help Stalingrad. The workers of our republic have taken under their patronage the Dzerzhinsk city district, Stalingrad, and Gorodishchensk and Krasnoarmeysk districts, the Stalingrad region. The workers of the Tatar Republic have sent several trains of equipment, tools, and personal care items collected in Tataria to Stalingrad.

For instance, the workers of the Tatar capital—Kazan—have sent the following to Stalingrad: household equipment and clothing having a total value of 2,859,000 roubles and 2,593,000 roubles in money. They have sent 11,900 pairs of shoes, 20,000 books, underclothing and clothing amounting to 153,000 roubles, 65 cinema films, 20,000 children's toys, and more.

On 24 June 1943 Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Stalingrad Region Workers' Soviet Comrade Zimenkov wired to Secretary of the Molotovsk City District Committee of the CPSU(B), 'Please send Bolshevist thanks from the workers of Stalingrad and our region to those of Molotovsk city district, Kazan for supplying materials and equipment for the reconstruction of our much-loved city.

We will be able to revive our city Stalingrad with your help and the help of all workers in our country'. <...>

The following activities of high defensive importance were performed according to design by prisoner experts of the 4th Special Department of the USSR People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs at Factory No. 16 of the People's Commissariat of Aviation Industry of the USSR:

1. RD-1 jet liquid engines, designed by V. Glushko, were built to be installed on planes as accelerators. RD-1 prototypes showed satisfactory performance in production flight and joint bench running tests. Plant No. 16 is currently producing a prototype batch of RD-1 jet engines to address any issues concerning application and further development of the engine model.

2. High power aviation engines MB-100, having a takeoff power of 2200 hp, and MB-200, having a takeoff power of 2450 hp, have been built according to the design by A. Dobrotvorsky by merging two standard M-105 engines. The M-100 engines are currently undergoing a flight test on a Yer-2 plane, while the M-102 engines are being prepared for installation on a 102 plane.

Besides, experts of the 4th Special Department of the USSR People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs provided material technical assistance to Plant No. 16 during its construction and mounting. In particular, an experiment mechanical air engine production unit was built at Plant No. 16 according to the design by and under the supervision of experts of the 4th Special Department of the USSR People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs. A group of skilled workers of the 4th Special Department of the USSR People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs possessing senior technical positions at the plant made a large contribution to the plant's successful production.

According to People's Commissar for Aviation Industry comrade Shakhurin, prisoner experts of the 4th Special Department of the USSR People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs have done work of high value in terms of technical novelty and an efficient approach to a number of technical and design problems.

Taking into account the importance of the activities, the USSR People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs finds it reasonable to release the most distinguished prisoner experts, restore their pretrial status, and assign them to work in the aviation industry. Please find the attached list of 35 imprisoned experts and provide instructions.

People's Commissar for Internal Affairs
of the Soviet Union L. Beria

Published: People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs

No. 94
On the Progress and Improvement Measures of Political and Ideological Work in the Tatar Party Organization

9 August 194456

In the Central Committee of the CPSU(B)

The Central Committee of the CPSU(B) has adopted the Resolution 'On the Progress and Improvement Measures in Mass Political and Ideological Work in the Tatar Party Organization'. The Central Committee of the CPSU(B) has noted the general negligence of political and ideological work in the Tatar ASSR and estimated that control of such activities by the Tatar Regional Committee of the CPSU(B) is unsatisfactory. According to the Resolution by the Central Committee of the CPSU(B), party organizations in Tataria neglect to ensure that party, Soviet, and Komsomol officials have a deep knowledge of the Marxist-Leninist theory. The Tatar party organization neglects the method of individual study of Marxism-Leninism by party and Soviet officials, arranging too few lectures and consultations for those studying the history and theory of the Bolshevik party. A large number of political classes has been imposed on the staff in spite of a lack of well-trained propagandists. The Tatar Regional Committee of the CPSU(B) has not ensured Marxist-Leninist training and re-training for district and party officials, propagandists and newspaper editors, resulting in dramatic theoretical backwardness that prevents the staff from performing efficient political work among the population. The Regional Committee, city and district committees of the CPSU(B) have been overlooking the harmful practice of distracting propaganda and newspaper employees from their direct responsibilities by assigning them to village soviets and kolkhozes on a long-term basis as authorized agents, thus, in fact, liquidating the propaganda apparatus in party organizations and undermining mass political work. Party organizations do not make full use of the Soviet intelligentsia for political as well as public cultural and educational work.

The Tatar Regional Committee of the CPSU(B) has failed to ensure proper control over republic-wide and district newspapers. The republic's newspapers have not developed to be true organizers of public political work. They provide poor coverage of top performance in industry and agriculture as well as the activities of the Party and the Komsomol. The republic-wide newspaper 'Krasnaya Tataria' has made serious mistakes in articles on military-political and international issues. The Tatar Regional Committee of the CPSU(B) has been carrying out poor supervisions over writers and artists, insufficient control over the repertoire of art institutions, and little, if any, ideological and political education for intelligentsia, resulting in serious ideological mistakes concerning the history of the Tatar people and well as in Tatar literature and art in the republic.

56 The date of adoption of the resolution by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party.
The Central Committee of the CPSU(B) obliged the Tatar Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) to eliminate any drawbacks of political and ideological agit-prop detected, suggesting that the Regional Committee and party organizations of Tataria should put an end to the negligence of propaganda by embarking on a large-scale mass political campaign and improving the ideological and political-educational work within party organizations and for the republic's intelligentsia. The Central Committee of the CPSU(B) specified that a radical improvement of political and ideological work must be the key means of mobilizing the working masses to fulfill the economic and political missions that the Tatar ASSR is facing.

In order to improve the ideological and political level of the republic's party and Soviet officials and intelligentsia, the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) suggested that the Tatar Regional Committee of the CPSU(B) should embark on large-scale measures to make sure that party members and member candidates study the history and theory of the Bolshevik Party, re-introduce the method of individual study of Marxism-Leninism by party, Soviet, and Komsomol officials, arrange lectures and consultations on issues of Marxism-Leninism to assist those studying the theory, introduce Marxist-Leninist educational work for the rural and urban intelligentsia, establish departments for researchers and artists in the Evening University of Marxism-Leninism in Kazan, arrange lectures and consultations on issues of the Marxist-Leninist theory for intelligentsia in city and district centres by engaging lecturers from the Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and university teachers.

The Central Committee of the CPSU(B) also recommended the Tatar Regional Committee of the CPSU(B) to establish district part-time party schools for party and soviet officials in district centres, secretaries of grassroots party and Komsomol organizations.<...>

Noting that poor theoretical training for party and propaganda officials had impeded proper agit-prop work in the Tatar ASSR, the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) suggested that the Tatar Regional Committee should establish a republic-wide one-year part school to re-train district and city senior party officials. The school is to have a propaganda department to re-train district propaganda and newspaper employees and a Komsomol department to re-train secretaries of city and district committees of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League.<...>

In its resolution the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) stressed the need of truly transforming newspapers into important centres of political work and obliged the Tatar Regional Committee of the CPSU(B) to enhance its control over the activities of republic-wide, city, and district newspapers and supervision over newspaper editorial offices. The Bureau of the Regional Committee of the CPSU(B) should meet to discuss the work plans of republic-wide newspapers. The Propaganda Department of the Regional Committee is to ensure control over the activities of all newspapers by submitting reviews of each newspaper to district committees at least once in three months, regularly publish reviews of district newspapers in republic-wide ones, and introduce practical training for editors and editorial office secretaries of district newspapers in the editorial offices of republic-wide ones to ensure experience exchange and upgrading skills for district newspaper employees. The Central Committee of the CPSU(B) suggested that the Regional Committee of the CPSU(B) should restore the departments for party activities and propaganda departments in republic-wide newspapers of Tataria, recommending that they should publish (3–4 times per month) articles and consultations on theoretical, political, and economic subjects as well as other aid for propagandists.

The Central Committee of the CPSU(B) also recommended that the republic's newspaper limits should be revised to make sure that at least ¾ of all copies of each republic-wide newspaper goes to districts, grassroots party organizations, village reading rooms, village soviets and kolkhozes. Newspaper show-cases should be made in all village soviets and kolkhozes.

Believing that the most important mission of party organizations in terms of political work is to inform the population of military, political, and international events correctly and in a timely manner, the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) obliged the Tatar Regional Committee of the CPSU(B) to
ensure regular training for propagandists, including briefings in the current policy to be held at least once a week, district or branch propagandist meetings at least once in two months (all-plant meetings at least once a month for large plants) to present instructive political reports as well as those by secretaries of district committees of the CPSU(B) or plant party committees on economic and political objectives, workers’ and employees’ meetings at plants and institutions at least once a month to present reports by city and district party and soviet senior officials, plant and institution directors on the current military, political, and international events. Control over the ideological and political content of reports and lectures delivered at plants and in kolkhozes as well as discussions on the content of reports at reporters’ meetings must be ensured. The Propaganda Department of the Regional Committee of the CPSU(B) must make sure that district reporters and propaganda team leaders receive aid in the form of proceedings, shorthand records of the best lectures as well as instructive reports by lecturers and reporters from the Regional Committee of the CPSU(B) to take place at least once per month and a half.

In order to improve the performance of political-educational work in the Tatar ASSR, the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) suggested that the Regional Committee of the CPSU(B) resume the operation of all idle village reading rooms, culture houses, and district libraries; prohibit using village reading rooms and libraries for any purposes not provided for; provide fuel for all the republic’s political educational institutions; embark on a large-scale scientific and educational propaganda campaign engaging intellectuals to deliver public lectures for non-experts; arrange 6-month courses for political-education staff; have any idle cinema equipment repaired and make sure that films are showed in every village soviet at least once a month; ensure local radio broadcasting in all districts before the end of 1944, secure smooth operation of radio stations and adjust all telephone equipment in village Soviets to radio broadcasting.

The Central Committee of the CPSU(B) obliged the Tatar Regional Committee of the CPSU(B) to ensure scientific research on the history of Tataria, eliminate serious nationalist flaws and mistakes made by certain historians and writers in terms of the presentation of the history of Tataria (flattering the Golden Horde, popularizing the khanist feudalistic epic of Edigu), focusing on research on and presentation of the history of the joint struggle of Russians, Tatars, and other USSR nations against foreign invaders, tsarism, and the oppression of capitalist landlord, as well as the history of Tataria’s socialist transformation under the Soviet regime and popularizing prominent Tatar politicians, scientists, and revolutionaries, as well as sons of the Tatar nations—heroes of the Patriotic War.

The Central Committee of the CPSU(B) also obliges the Tatar Regional Committee of the CPSU(B) to materially improve its guidance of youth political education, ensure organizational-political enhancement of Komsomol organizations, and make sure that a Komsomol organization is established in every kolkhoz of the republic, and secure regular coverage Komsomol organizations’ activities by republic-wide newspapers. According to the Resolution by the Central Committee of the CPSU(B), the Regional Committee, city and district Committees of the CPSU(B) are obliged to provide assistance to Komsomol organizations in youth agit-prop, supply propagandists to manage clubs and deliver reports, lectures, moderate discussions.

No. 95
Memorandum to the Soviet for the Russian Orthodox Church under the USSR Soviet of People's Commissars on the Number of Believer's Petitions for New Churches and Prayer Houses in the TASSR

28 December 1944

I hereby report the requested information on the number of believers' petitions for new churches and prayer houses:

- a) petitions dated 1943, unconsidered: 13,
- b) submitted in 1944: 46,
- c) consideration denied for any reasons: 4,
- d) dismissed by the bishop: none,
- e) considered by the Council of People's Commissars of the Tatar ASSR: 21.

In particular, dismissed:

- Accepted: 3; one approved by the all-Union government; 2 decisions delayed and submitted to the Soviet.
- Redundant petitions by believers to different addresses on the same church: 17.
- 357. No complaints have been submitted concerning the decisions made by the TASSR Council of People's Commissars.

4. All submitted petitions for new churches have the following district representation:

- a) the republic contains a total of 70 districts, of which 69 have no functional churches;
- b) petitions for new churches have been received from 27 districts without any functional churches;
- c) petitions for new churches have not been received from 42 districts without any functional churches and one district with a functional church.

5. 68 visitors have been received over the reporting period to discuss church opening issues and 7 chairmen of executive committees of district soviets to discuss issues related to the Russian Orthodox Church.

6. Three site visits to verify petitions for new churches have been performed in 1944.

Authorized Agent of the Soviet for the Russian Orthodox Church under the USSR Council of People's Commissars in the Tatar ASSR

Gorbachev


No. 96
An extract from the article by TASSR People's Commissar V. Prokushev on the activities of the healthcare authorities of the Tatar Republic during the war period

January 1945

The patriotic war against German fascist invaders determined the new missions of healthcare authorities, in particular to maintain the quality of public medical services, ensure better medical services for families of servicemen and disabled veterans of the Patriotic War.

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57 The numbering of the document begins with the third clause.
58 Dated as per the text of the document.
In spite of the difficult situation and wartime hardships, the healthcare authorities of the Tatar Republic have not only preserved the existing network of healthcare institutions but even expanded it over the period of the Great Patriotic War.

Five city hospitals re-opened during the war. The Republic-Wide Hospital of Plastic Surgery was re-established and fitted out with equipment for all advanced treatment techniques to host 300 disabled veterans of the Patriotic War.

The hospital has provided treatment to over 1500 disabled soldiers in 1944. About a half of them have resumed military service. Over one quarter have returned to work. The hospital was able to achieve such success due to proper treatment structuring and by engaging skilled professionals (orthopaedists, physiatrists, neuropathologists, general practitioners) to work under the aegis Distinguished Doctor Professor of the RSFSR L. Shulutko.

The hospital has developed and successfully implementing innovative therapies for ballistic wound recuperation. The hospital offers training to young doctors. Fifteen district surgeons have taken specialized courses on its premises and now work in plastic surgery in their district hospitals.

Healthcare authorities have been paying special attention to the rural healthcare network. Eight rural hospitals have re-opened since the beginning of the Patriotic War. The total number of rural hospitals has thus reached 100.

At present, the Tatar ASSR has a total of 9461 hospital beds (apart from psychiatric, clinical, and other agencies). The expansion of hospital farms is of great importance for hospital performance. While in 1941 no hospitals engaged in agriculture by 1944 they harvested 680 tonnes of grain, 224 tonnes of potatoes, and 119 tonnes of vegetables. Hospitals have a total of 356 head cattle, 855 sheep and goats, and 532 swine.

Outpatient care has been improved in wartime as well. Five outpatient care institutions and 65 medical assistant and first aid/obstetric centres have re-opened. Local kolkhoz-funded medical aid stations have been established in dozens of kolkhozes.

Seventy district centres (except for Kazan, Chistopol, and Zelenodolsk) have a total of 55 clinical laboratories, 67 dental offices, 11 X-ray rooms, and 12 physiotherapeutic rooms. Surgical aid is available in 31 districts. There are 44 surgeons, 24 ophthalmologists, 21 obstetrician-gynaecologists, and 53 pediatricians in the districts.

The healthcare authorities of the Tatar ASSR have done a great deal of work of providing mobilization-related services, establishing evacuation hospitals, receiving casualties, providing medical aid to plant workers, and maintaining proper sanitary and epidemiological conditions behind the front.

Our best surgeons have been sent to the front. They have been fulfilling their honorary duties brilliantly, for which many have been awarded governmental decorations (Mukhamedyarov, Samoylov, Osipovsky, S. Smirnov, Leyzerovsky, and others). A large part of the doctors and professors at our IHLs has been engaged in the activities of evacuation hospitals in Tataria.

Experts in various spheres have enabled the Tatar ASSR to establish a large network of specialized hospitals. Apart from locomotor injury hospitals, we have those treating cranial, cerebral, neural, thoracic, abdominal, ear, eye, and jaw injuries.

The authorities have done great work in providing advanced training for physicians, training in surgery for pediatricians, gynaecologists, etc. A large number of doctors have been promoted to chief surgeons. The following appointees have proven to be well qualified for their high positions: Baybekova, Kalgatina, Medvedev, Lyubimova, Efremov, Garfinkel, and others.

While in the 1st war year only 20% hospitals offered mud and paraffin therapy, all hospitals have well-equipped electrophototherapy rooms and practice mud and paraffin therapy as of 1 January 1945.

Hospital physiotherapeutic rooms have performed over 8 million treatment sessions over the 3.5 years of war. In the first war year, 40% of wounded patients had access to such therapies, a figure increasing to 70% by the second half of 1944. The session ratio was 8 per patient in the second half of 1941, the 1944 value being 33 sessions per patient <...>.
The following professors are influential hospital researchers: Sokolov, Shulutko, Ratner, Gusynin, Meleshchenko, Pechnikov, Murzin, Lozanov, Rusetsky.

Now that the Tatar Republic is approaching its 25th anniversary, it can be proud of its achievements in treating wounded soldiers and commanders of the Red Army. The entire staff of evacuation hospitals has been mobilized to ensure maximum success in restoring the health of wounded soldiers and officers of our heroic Red Army in the happy days of final victory over the fascist beasts.

Healthcare authorities have been paying special attention to medical and sanitary services at plants in operation over the years of the Patriotic War. Closed-type polyclinics have been established under all occupational health facilities. Two hospitals have opened to host a total of 125 people. The network of factory health stations has grown. Night care tuberculosis sanatoria to host 280 patients have opened at factory facilities. A factory has established a general sanatorium of 60 beds. Factory polyclinics have become much better-equipped with specialized devices. Highly specialized rooms have been established. The doctor and nursing staff has grown.

General practitioners have been re-trained to specialize in tuberculosis, malaria, industrial health, laboratory science, gynaecology, and dermato-venerology while on the job. It is a common practice for well-trained employees of IHLs and republic-wide institutions to offer consultation.

Therapeutic and prevention measures resulted in a reduction of the number of cases by 14% in 1944 as compared to 1942, while the number of lost work days decreased by 17.5%. No cases of occupational poisoning and disease were reported for all plants in 1944.

The healthcare authorities of the Tatar Republic have done great work in the prevention and anti-epidemic measures since the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. As the result, cases of typhoid fever have decreased by 26% as compared to 1944, and dysentery has been reduced by a factor of 5. Pediatric disease incidence has also decreased: by a factor of 2.5 for diphtheria, 3 for scarlet fever, and by 30% for measles. No typhoid fever epidemics occurred in the republic, any local disease outbreaks were eliminated immediately.

TASSR People's Commissar of Health V. Prokushev.


No. 97

An extract from the article by TASSR People's Commissar U. Kontyukov on the state of the republic's public education system during the Great Patriotic War

January 1945

In spite of wartime hardships, schools in Tataria have been successfully struggling to implement Stalin's Vseobuch Law (the Law on Universal Compulsory Education). The Law on Universal Compulsory Education has become especially important since the Great Patriotic War broke out. Our leader comrade Stalin's invitation to transform and adjust any work to defending the country against fascist invaders applied to school activities directly. The defense of the country required of the schools, as well as of teachers and public education authorities, an education for all children of school age without exception. Schools in Tataria provide universal compulsory education to children aged 7 years and older.

The approach to school-level educational activities, the teaching system and quality have changed radically as well.

59 Dated as per the text of the document.
A key issue of school quality improvement is the approach to Russian language classes in Russian and non-Russian schools and well as those in the indigenous language in the cases of Tatar and other ethnic schools. The highest priority in language teaching is to improve students’ spoken and written language and ensure good grammar.

Major changes in the life and work of the Soviet school have favored improved educational activities since the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War. The introduction of military physical primary and pre-service training for students, sex-segregated school education (in Kazan), the implementation of the Student Regulations, a series of measures to enhance school discipline and order, the cancellation of socialist competition in school teaching, the transition to the five-mark numerical grading system for knowledge and conduct, measures to improve school instruction quality under the Resolution by the USSR Soviet of the People's Commissars dated 21 June 1944—these measures required the schools and teachers to do a great deal of organizational and educational work both within the school and in the parent environment as well as with the wider Soviet public. The quality of school education improved greatly when school-leaving examinations for graduates of primary and seven-year schools, secondary school final examinations, and gold and silver medals for outstanding academic performance and excellent conduct were introduced. It should be noted that the schools and teachers of Tataria have been able to fulfill their most important missions superbly.

The Soviet country appreciates the labor of teachers. In 1939, 85 people's teachers in Tataria were awarded USSR orders and medals for selfless work and outstanding performance. In 1945, that number stood at 139. Exemplary national teachers are renowned across Tataria for brilliant performance in providing academic and Communist education to Soviet children. These include Khabibullin, Lastochkina, Seloustyeva, Tarasova, Saydasheva, and many other exemplary teachers who have received high governmental rewards. Being skilled teachers, they provide all-round education, solid knowledge and good practical skills, instilling selfless devotion to the Motherland and the Party of Lenin and Stalin in children, who feel confident to enter the adult life with a certificate of mental and moral maturity. <...>

As public education develops, the number of teachers increases in Tataria. While in 1913 the number of school teachers in the territory of today's Tataria was as few as 3,500 people, the figure had reached 18,170 by 1 September 1944, that is, five times as many as in 1913.

These are, in particular, 6,998 primary school teachers, 7,688 incomplete secondary school teachers, and 3,484 secondary school teachers. Among them 3,159 teachers have received higher education.

Out teachers do not confine their work to school, to the children's environment. They perform a great deal of community work. The timid, cowed, narrow-minded school employee of the past has turned into, under our conditions, a pro-active enthusiast of the cultural front, both a teacher and a community worker. Teachers in Tataria have demonstrated heroism on the front and selfless work behind the lines over the years of the Great Patriotic War. Along with their pupils, school teachers have been doing all kinds of community work, thus enhancing the front and rear and becoming one with many millions of Soviet patriots. In 1943 alone, 157,065 pupils and 8,287 teachers participated in agricultural activities. The pupils worked a total of 3,302,350 work days, and the teachers 389,927.

The schoolchildren of Tetyushi district completed 46,458 work days in 1943. Those of Agryz district were able to keep snow on 5,500 hectares of land, take over 1,300 carts of fertilizer to the fields to complete 65,218 work days.

The teachers and pupils of Chistopol district raised 139,000 rubles for school reconstruction in the liberated district, for which they received a citation from Comrade Stalin. Schoolchildren were enthusiastic to raise money for the Victory Fund as well. Schools in Verkhniy Uslon district raised 26,000 roubles, in Kukmor district, 17,884 roubles, and in Agryz district, 65,246 roubles.

Teachers and schoolchildren of Kazan took great efforts to improve the appearance of their home city. They participated in numerous voluntary clean-up events and other community activities.

Many schools in Kazan successfully collected scrap metal. For instance, Secondary School No. 15 collected 15 tonnes, School No. 83, 7 tonnes, etc.
Young teachers graduate from courses at higher or vocations pedagogical educational institutions regularly, thus expanding Tataria's teaching staff. At present, three higher educational establishments in Tataria (Kazan State Pedagogical and Teaching Institutes, Yelabuga Teaching Institute) and 10 secondary ones offer pedagogical training.

The number of students at pedagogical secondary education establishments is as follows:

1. Teaching vocational schools train 3,035 people
2. The Pre-School Care Pedagogical Vocational School trains 298
3. The Library Technical Professional School trains 90 people

Total: 3,423.

All pedagogical educational establishments have farming facilities, which are a great financial and economic help for them.

TASSR People's Commissar for Education U. Kontyukov


No. 98
An Extract from the Report by the Kazan City Committee of the CPSU(B) and the Tatar Regional Committee of the CPSU(B) to the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) on the Victory Day Celebration in Kazan

9 May 1945

With the speed of lighting spread the news about Germany's unconditional surrender and about the end of the war. Hardly had the voice of the announcer ceased that the German Instrument of Surrender had been signed when the people of Kazan broke into ardent jubilation. Though it was late in the night, there was hardly a house not festive with bright lights. Jubilant, happy people began to fill the streets and squares of the city. They shouted, 'Hoorah for the Red Army!', 'Hoorah for the Victory!'. People were exchanging hugs, kisses, congratulations on the victory.

At 4 a.m., the chief management of the city's worker community met in the building of the City Committee of the CPSU(B). This included secretaries of district committees of the CPSU(B) and All-Union Leninist Young Communist League, party organizations of large enterprises, etc. A brief meeting was held, at which the City Committee of the CPSU(B) ordered that Victory Day should be celebrated. Similar meetings took place in district committees of the CPSU(B).

Even though everyone knew 9 May to be a day-off, all workers of the city, students, officials—everyone was eager to visit his or her enterprise, organization, or educational institution to share the good news.

Factories began to hold meetings in the morning. Kazan had never seen such numerous meetings, nor had they been so enthusiastic. The Mechanical Plant carried out its meeting at 4 a.m. It was opened by Party Committee Secretary Comrade Zhukov, who congratulated the workers, employees, and intelligentsia of the plant on the day of the Red Army's historic victory. Then comrade Zhukov gave the floor to Secretary of the Regional Committee of the CPSU(B) comrade Muratov.

Stakhanovite technician and assembler comrade Kozlov also spoke at the meeting. He said, 'In the tough years of the Great Patriotic War, we workers behind the lines took every effort and applied all knowledge to reinforce our brave Red Army and help it crush the German fascist invaders. Now we can
proudly say that our humble effort was not in vain. By working honestly, we will help our much-loved Motherland heal its wounds and recover'.

A greeting telegram Lych, Deputy Operations Manager, said in his speech, 'We shall never forget the years of the Soviet people's great heroic war against German fascist invaders. We will never forget the sanguinary invasion of our sacred land. We will always remember how German barbarians tried to enslave our free people... Trough its labour and knowledge the Soviet nation will help the country reconstruct its ruined plants, factories, and agriculture, putting them into working condition'. <...>

The city celebrated for the whole day of 9 May. Orchestras played on its central streets and squares. Young people danced on the street. Theatre actors, circus performers, members of the Tatar State Philharmonic Society and corporate amateur art clubs performed on improvised stages in the open air. Each club and red corner held festive events of its own.

Secretary of the Kazan City Committee of the CPSU(B) Baryshnikov.


No. 99
Statistics on Savings Bank Performance in the Tatar ASSR from 1940 to April 1945 in Terms of Governmental Loans, Private Deposits, Cash and Prize Lotteries, and the Savings Bank Network

Not earlier than May 1945

I. Governmental Loans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Loan Item</th>
<th>Cash inflow (rub. USSR, thousands)</th>
<th>Including</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Workers and service employees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>3rd Five-Year Plan Loan (3rd Year Issue)</td>
<td>91,021</td>
<td>68,942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>3rd Five-Year Plan Loan (3rd Year Issue)</td>
<td>105,825</td>
<td>82,267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>1942 Governmental Military Loan</td>
<td>268,133</td>
<td>122,659</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>Second Governmental Military Loan</td>
<td>366,842</td>
<td>159,121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>Third Governmental Military Loan</td>
<td>326,238</td>
<td>165,306</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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60 Understood from the text of the document.
II. Private Deposits (rub. USSR, thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Deposit balance</th>
<th>Number of depositors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>City</td>
<td>Countryside</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As of 1 January 1940</td>
<td>37,800</td>
<td>10,019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As of 1 January 1941</td>
<td>34,252</td>
<td>11,413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As of 1 January 1942</td>
<td>35,198</td>
<td>8,592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As of 1 January 1943</td>
<td>29,204</td>
<td>8,052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As of 1 January 1944</td>
<td>27,071</td>
<td>6,747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As of 1 January 1945</td>
<td>29,677</td>
<td>5,630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As of 1 April 1945</td>
<td>33,304</td>
<td>5,774</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

III. Cash and Prize Lotteries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Lottery Names</th>
<th>Cash inflow (rub. USSR, thousands)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>1st Cash and Prize Lottery</td>
<td>25,440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>2nd Cash and Prize Lottery</td>
<td>76,813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>3rd Cash and Prize Lottery</td>
<td>94,169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>4th Cash and Prize Lottery</td>
<td>78,374</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Published: E. Krivonozhkina, I. Khanipova Sel’skoe naselenie Tatarskoj ASSR nakanune i v gody Velikoj Otechestvennoj vojny’ (1937–1945) (Rural population of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic on the eve and in the days of the Great Patriotic War (1937–1945)).—Kazan, 2011.—P. 419.

No. 100
Resolution by the Bureau of the Tatar Regional Committee of the CPSU(B)
on the Establishment of the Kazan Branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences,

7 June 1945

As resolved by the policy-making authorities. The Soviet of People’s Commissars of the Tatar ASSR and the Regional Committee of the CPSU(B) hereby resolve:

1. To establish research institutes for the following 5 branches of science within the Kazan Branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences: 1) Mathematics, Physics, and Mechanics; 2) Chemistry; 3) Geology; 4) Biology; 5) Literature, Language, and History, and the Sector for Water Resources Issues and Energy under the Presidium of the Branch of the Academy of Sciences61.

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61 Clauses 6–13 on the material and technical base of Kazan affiliate of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR are omitted.
2. Request the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences to approve the Presidium of the Kazan Branch of the Academy of Sciences with the following membership: Academy Member A. Arbuzov, Corresponding Member N. Chebotaryov, Corresponding Member B. Arbuzov, Professor L. Miropolsky, Doctor of Geological and Mineralogical Sciences, Professor N. Livanov, Doctor of Biological Sciences, Professor G. Kamay, Doctor of Chemical Sciences, Professor A. Trufanov, Doctor of Technical Sciences, Professor P. Tikhonov, Doctor of Agricultural Sciences, Assistant Professor K. Sitnikov, Assistant Professor M. Gaynullin.

3. Recommend Professor L. Miropolsky as Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the Branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences and Professor G. Kamay as Academic Secretary.

4. Recommend an Academic Board of the Kazan Branch of the Academy of Sciences with the following membership: Academy Member Academy Member A. Arbuzov, Corresponding Member N. Chebotaryov, Corresponding Member B. Arbuzov, Professor L. Miropolsky, Professor N. Livanov, Professor G. Kamay, Professor A. Trufanov, Chairman of the TASSR Soviet of People's Commissars S. Sharafeev, Secretary of the Regional Committee of the CPSU(B) G. Shafikov, Secretary of the Kazan City Committee of the CPSU(B) A. Grzhegorzhevsky, Rector of the Kazan State University K. Sitnikov, Chairman of the State Planning Committee under the TASSR Soviet of People's Commissars A. Polyanovsky, TASSR People's Commissar for Agriculture S. Talyrov, Professor P. Syrnev, Doctor of Agricultural Sciences, and Professor A. Teregulov, Doctor of Medical Sciences.

5. Request the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences to approve Academy Member A. Arbuzov as Director of the Chemical Institute, Corresponding Member N. Chebotaryov as Director of the Institution for Physics, Mathematics, and Mechanics, Professor L. Miropolsky as Director of the Geological Institute, Professor N. Livanov as Director of the Biological Institute, Assistant Professor M. Gaynullin as Director of the Institute for Language, Literature and History, Professor A. Trufanov as Academic Manager of the Sector for Water Resources Issues and Energy under the Presidium of the Branch of the Academy of Sciences <...>.

[Signatures]


No. 101

Literary and Artistic Works by Authors from Tataria during Wartime62,

25 June 1945

The Great Patriotic War against the German invaders roused our entire country. The Tatar people demonstrated their heroism in a way more powerful than any ever before in that unprecedented battle. The Tatar literature followed the nation through the hardships of wartime and thus reached its maturity. The voice of Tatar poetry sounded as a call for heroic struggle against the enemy, for victory. Wartime poems developed more specific images and vivid, impressive psychology. Some poets went to the front. Poems and songs by Tatar front poets reveal enormous patriotism and an ardent love for their Soviet Motherland.

Let death not make you grieve
Think, instead, of the Fatherland.
So long as home is prized more than life,
You will triumph and you will live!...

62 Headline in a newspaper.
These are lines by F. Karim. Another poet crossed paths with him. He wrote to his friend,

Who knows what will befall us,

But now, to stave off the end,

We will not sheathe our dagger

So long as a drop remains.

Whatever comes, Comrade, clear

The road to victory extends...

Poet of the front, Musa Dzhalil, the author of this verse, never returned. Neither did Fattykh Karim, who died heroically during the storm of Königsberg. Their images will live forever in the heart of the victorious people.

The most noble theme of love for one's Fatherland, international friendship, and, most importantly, friendship with the great Russian people is the keynote of each Tatar poet's verses.

Journalistic style was common during the Great Patriotic War. Many books on the heroic everyday life of the front and homefront were published. A valuable work titled 'The Book of Heroes', edited by Kavi Nadzhami, appeared.

The Tatar nation had no composers, except for a few self-taught melodists, before the revolution. Now a major shift is clearly coming in the development of Tatar musical arts. Talented musicians have grown. The name of Salikh Saydashev is widely known. His soulful songs are utterly delightful. The Tatar State Opera and Ballet Theatre, which was established six years ago, is closely connected with the name of Nācip Cihanov. His talented and emotional operas 'Altınçäç' (libretto by M. Dzhalil) and 'Qaçqun' (libretto by A. Fäyz) are broad and free, as is the epoch itself.

The œuvre of talented composer D. Fäyz is marked by a bracing and fresh sense of novelty, a heartfelt passion and noble patriotism. His musical comedies and numerous songs are suggestive of his excellent composing skills. Mansur Muzafarov and Z. Khabibullin created many valuable works. The young composer Färit Yarullin managed to create the first Tatar ballet 'Şürâle'.

Composer A. Klyucharyov is one of the best experts in Tatar musical folklore. The composers V. Vinogradov and Yu. Vinogradov made a great contribution to the development of Tatar music culture.

The opera 'Färída' by Professor M. Yudin, based on the libretto by K. Nadzhami, is a valuable contribution to Tatar lyric opera.

The art of performing is also representative of the general growth of Tatarstan's musical culture. Nationally recognized artist Gulsum Suleymanova is famous for her brilliant performance of Tatar folk songs. The development of Tataria's vocal culture is connected with the names of TASSR People's Artists M. Rakhmankulova, G. Kaybitskaya, and A. Izmaylov. The wonderful singer Ştidik Aydarov authored a number of outstanding works. Merited artists S. Sadykova, F. Nasredinov, M. Bulatova, and Kh. Zabirova are very popular with the Tatar audience. U. Âlmeev has chosen an unusual way of combining vocal art with subtle humour and genre scenes.

Everyone has heard about All-Union Vocalist Competition prize winner N. Rakhmatullin. Representatives of ballet art—Gatsullina, Romanyuk, Akhtyamov, Aydaraska, Karamysheva, Tagirov—are highly appreciated by the audience.

The G. Kamal Tatar Academic Theatre is truly a Tatar highlight. It will celebrate its 40th anniversary in 1946. Thanks to party and governmental nourishment, the Tatar theatre has been able to become one of the country's most influential. It has been home to such prominent artists as Kh. Abzhalilov, F. Ilskaya, Z. Sultanov, G. Bolgarskaya, and N. Tazhdamirov. During the Great Patriotic War alone, the theatre staged the following plays: 'Mariam' and 'Hoja Nasreddin' by N. İsənbat, 'The Taymasovs' and 'Yalqın' by T. Gıyzzät, 'Minnikamal' by M. Amir, 'Hajji Gets Married' by Ş. Kamal, 'Bançrupt' by Ş. Kamal, 'Tukay' by A. Fäyz, 'Kayyüm Nasyri' by M. Gali and Kh. Urazikov, and others.

The painter B. Urmancheev, sculptor S. Akhun, architect Gaynutdinov, and graphic artists B. Almenov and D. Krasilnikov have made significant contribution to the development of Tatar visual arts.
Paintings by A. Ishmametov and R. Ponomaryov are also marked by talent. Artist P. Speransky enjoys great popularity as well.

The Tatar State Philharmonic Society is of great importance to popular aesthetic education. The Tatar people's choir established as a successor of the Song and Dance Company (director Z. Akhmetova) and the Folk Song Group (director F. Askarov) deserve to be mentioned here. A folk instrument orchestra, including bayan, harmonium, dombra, and gusli players has been established. The Philharmonic Society has done a lot for Red Army units. In 1945 alone, its artistic groups presented over 200 concerts on the front and visited Red Army units in Germany. The Philharmonic Society sent dozens of groups to kolkhozes across Tataria.

Russian writers, composers, artists, and performers work in close cooperation with Tatar writers and artists. Wonderful plays by the Russian Great Drama Theatre, where such masters of the stage as F. Grigoriev, Ardarov, Yakushenko, Preobrazhenskaya, and Gusev perform, are widely appreciated by workers. Paintings by N. Sokolsky, Zhitkov, Maksimov, Badyul, Timofeyev, tales by M. Bubennov, L. Golosnitsky, songs and poems by Bruno Zernit are also famous in TatariA. <...

Out party has taken great care of Tatar literature and arts. The Resolution by the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) dated 9 August 1944, titled 'On the Progress and Improvement Measures of Political and Ideological Work in the Tatar Party Organization' contains clear instructions for our writers and artists.

Tatar Soviet literature and arts have made major achievements. Yet, they owe a great debt to their people. The literature and art of Tataria have not yet been able to depict our life as full and as diverse as it is. We still face a lot of serious drawbacks. It is our duty and responsibility to take every effort to eliminate them to ensure a further rise of Tatar literature and arts.

Secretary of the Soviet Writers' Union of the Tatar ASSR A. Erikeev.

Krasnaya Tataria.—1945.—25 June.

No. 102
An Extract from the Report by the Labour Reserve Administration of the Tatar ASSR on the Performance of the Republic's Labour Reserves during the Patriotic War

October 1945

A new Inflow into the Working Class

On 1940 December 1940, FWT schools opened their doors to the people of TatariA. Youth came from both the cities and kolkhozes alike. Such towns as Kazan, Chistopol, Zelenodolsk, Bugulma, and Bondyuga, as well as the settlement of Yudino now offered high qualification training for young metal workers, chemists, builders, and railway workers. Five trade schools opened to host a total of 1,800 people, and 10 FWT schools admitted a total of 3,000 people. An active and diverse academic and production life began.

But suddenly the war broke out, imposed on the Soviet people by German fascists. Workers gave up their machines for weapons and went to the front to defend their Motherland. The labour reserve system was facing the new challenge of training new well-qualified plant, factory, and transport workers. The network of FWT schools began to grow continuously. While new soldiers were going to the front, FWT schools called for new detachments of Soviet youth.

63 Dated as per the publication.
Wartime hardships determined the need to receive and provide accommodation to students from western regions and arrange for their studies and proper living conditions. From 1941 to August 1942, FWT schools in Moscow, Leningrad, Pskov, the Donbass, Stalingrad, Yefremov, and Kalinin regions admitted a total of 10,150 students. Besides, 3,315 people from Smolensk, Tula, and Kalinin regions entered trade, railway, and FWT schools in Tataria after an end was put to the German occupation of the areas.

In 1942, 15 additional one-off factory training schools hosting 5,000 students were established in the Tatar Republic.

An enormous number of teenagers with different characters, academic performance, and natural abilities found their way to the future. The young people have studied industriously and worked for the sake of their Motherland in acknowledgment of the care of the party and government. Over five years, Tataria's labour reserve system has been able to train a total of 11,697 well-qualified young railway trade school students and 37,564 mass trade workers from FWT schools and ensure their employment in industry, construction, and transport.

Industrial plants have provided employment to 49,260 young workers, which includes 33,035 metal workers, 1,913 chemists, 8,282 builders, and 1,540 railway and water transport workers.

They came to machine shops and factories to revitalize the working class. These young men and women were not novices but confident experts at their machines. The youth have met the government's expectations as decent successors to their fathers and elder brothers. Many letters of recommendation and other documents on the selfless labour and excellent performance of these young workers have been produced over the years.

SA HPD TR, c. 4034, f. 26, f. 162, s. 5–7, 12–13.

No. 103
An Extract from the Report by the Republic Board for the Collection of Gifts for Soldiers and Commanders of the Red Army in the Field

December 1945

In late 1941 and early 1942, sending gifts from plant employees and the working population of the Tatar ASSR to the Red Army became a mass-scale activity requiring centralized management and accounting of gifts to the Red Army by the population and corporate teams.

This determined the necessity of establishing the Republic Board for Red Army Gift Collection.

Under a Resolution by the Bureau of the Regional Committee of the CPSU(B) and a Resolution by the Presidium of the TASSR Supreme Soviet, presided by the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, a republic-wide board of 5 people (Secretary for Propaganda of the Regional Committee of the CPSU(B), Head of Department of the Regional Committee of the CPSU(B), Secretary of the City Committee of the CPSU(B), and Secretary of the Regional Committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League) and district boards was established.

Workers transferred a total of 31,436,336 roubles 82 kopeks in cash to the current account of the Republic Board and 6,802,899 roubles 40 kopeks to other destinations over the period from January 1942 to 1944.

Thus, the total inflow amount is 38,239,236 roubles 22 kopeks. The amount was used to acquire and send gifts (food, clothing, sweets and tobacco products, cologne, etc.) to the following forces:
- the Red Army (23,237,914 roubles),
- Ukrainian partisans (6,362,536 roubles 54 kopeks)
- Belarus partisans (3,537,863 roubles 61 kopeks)
- partisans in Leningrad (700,493 roubles 58 kopeks)

This does not include New Year presents (1 January 1942) having a total value of 500,000 roubles and presents for the 24th anniversary of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (1942) having a total value of 666,737 roubles 40 kopeks.

Besides, workers from Tataria provided a very large amount of food (meat, eggs, poultry, butter, honey, vegetables, rusk, biscuits, tobacco products) and clothing amounting to tens of millions of rubles over the Patriotic War. These were sent to soldiers and commanders of the Red Army, partisans of Ukraine, Belarus, and Leningrad.

Worker delegations from Tataria were sent to deliver gifts to soldiers and commanders at the Kalinin Front and carry out major mass political work among the soldiers, which is of great significance in terms of the front-rear connection. Members of such delegations told warriors about the heroic labour of Tatar workers behind the lines.

The front command and units expressed their gratitude to the workers, kolkhoz members, and intelligentsia of the republic for taking care of the warriors many times, expressing their confidence that the workers of Tataria would help the Army even more and provide a growing amount of munitions and victuals for the front.

Having returned from the front, delegation members spoke at numerous meetings at plants, institutions, and kolkhozes to report on their trip to the front and feats of arms committed by our front soldiers.

The meetings were of great importance for further performance and the improvement of labour discipline.

The Republic Board for Red Army Gift Collection did a big job of improving the morale of frontline soldiers and commanders and improving the performance of the republic's plants, factories, transport institutions, and kolkhozes.

Chairman of the Commission of the Republic
for the Collection of Gifts for Soldiers and Commanders of
the Active Red Army G. Dinmukhametov


No. 104
An Extract from the Report by Deputy Secretary of the Kazan City Committee of the CPSU(B) Ilyin on Industrial Operations in Kazan over the Period of 1941 to 1945

16 September 1946

The city's industry faced the challenge of providing the front with the necessary arms and munitions after Nazi Germany's treacherous attack on our country and the entrance of Soviet people into the Great Patriotic War.

Factories had to switch to war operation mode as soon as possible. Apart from this production transformation of active enterprises, the big job of re-locating evacuated ones had also to be done.

Over 20 large plants of great importance for the country's defense capacity, including Plants No. 22, 16, 387, 230, 448, 237, 144, 543, 708, 10, 3, Factories No. 13 and No. 14, and other institutions, were brought to Kazan.

A number of central design offices and scientific institutions were also evacuated to the city. These included Central Design Offices 4, 17, 19, 32, Central Research Institute 45, and others. A total of 150
workers, engineering and technical staff, and employees along with their families were evacuated to our city <...>.

Yet, the transformation was not easy for our factories. It took them about a year to achieve the military product output specified in the State Plan. Even though production output grew by a factor of 1.5 in 1941 (as compared to 1940) and by a factor of 2.5 in 1942, the city plan was not fulfilled in those years. The commercial product plan was fulfilled by 81.6% in 1941 and by 96% in 1942. All branches except for the food industry failed to fulfill the plan.

In 1941 and 1942, our largest facilities, such as Plants No. 22, 16, 230, 144, 543, 708, 741, the Cat-gut Plant, the Rendering Plant, and other facilities, were unable to fulfill the plan.

The City Part Committee and the entire party organization of the city were greatly concerned about the fact that the city and a number of large plants had been unable to fulfill the plan. Every measure was taken to rectify the situation <...>.

The city's transformed industry was able to fulfill the plan every year by increasing its output from 1943.

The industrial statistics are presented as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1941</th>
<th>1942</th>
<th>1943</th>
<th>1944</th>
<th>1945</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>commercial products (USSR roubles, millions)</td>
<td>840</td>
<td>1,118</td>
<td>2,348</td>
<td>2,825</td>
<td>3,220</td>
<td>2,284</td>
<td>10,524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual output (% of plan fulfillment)</td>
<td>97.5</td>
<td>81.6</td>
<td>90.6</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>102.6</td>
<td>103.7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 1944, our products amounted to 3.2 million roubles. We were able to multiply the output by almost 1940 as compared to 1940.

The total wartime output of the city's industry amounted to 10,5 million roubles, including defence products amounting to 8.6 million roubles, which is 4/5 of all wartime commercial products.

Kazan's plants and factories produced over 600 items of critical weapons and munitions, which included airplanes, motors, devices of different applications, cartridges, detonating fuses, mines, explosives, and other military products.

The following munitions were produced during the war years:
- 822 trench coats,
- 2,350,000 sets of wide trousers and a high-collared blouse,
- 8,169,000 sets of underclothes,
- 6,000,000 pairs of felt boots,
- 5,000,000 pairs of army boots,
- 118 fur coveralls,
- 197 pairs of mukluks,
- 4,400,000 hats,
- 113 tonnes of soap,
- 21 tonnes of rusk.

Industrial cooperation artels fixed over 1 million sets of clothing. About one million grenade bags and 250 park accessory sets have been produced.

The number of plants and factories increased by 18 over the war period to amount to 157 by the end of the war. Plant No. 15, the Motor Repair, Bearing Repair Plants, Children's Footwear and Primary Wool Processing Factories, seven district industrial combined plants, and some other facilities were re-established.
The number of industrial workers in the city grew from 80,000 to 127,000 people. Direct labour grew proportionally from 52,000 to 90,000 people. Worker productivity was increasing year by year. Gross output per worker for the city's industry was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Output (roubles)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>32.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Workforce productivity increased by 60% over the war period. The reason behind such workforce productivity was intense measures taken at our plants to introduce new labour organization methods and devices.

The introduction of production flow lines was of special importance. 165 flow lines involving up to 8,000 workers were established. <...>

Inventors and efficiency experts played a major role in the plant's technical growth. Efficiency innovations saved a total of 177 million rubles over the war period.

By practicing social competition and using new forms of labour organization, our Stakhanovite workers made a major contribution to improving workforce productivity.

It was a common practice at plants and factories to establish youth Komsomol and front teams. The number of Stakhanovites was growing year by year. While the total number of Stakhanovite and shock workers in 1941 was about 27,000, or 41% of the total direct labour, the amount had grown to about 45,000, or 58% of the total direct labour, by 1944 <...>64.

Our youth and women played the important part of replacing male workers who had gone to the front. The pre-war percentage of female workers being only 18%, the figure had grown to 49,500, that is, 44.5% of all workers, in 1944. The percentage of women in the consumer goods industry was as high as 83%. The young constituted more than a half of the staff at many facilities, including our leading plants, such as No. 16.

Plants in our cities were engaged in the All-Union Socialist Competitions and came out high in the rankings several times. Of 47 plants engaged in the All-Union Competition, 42 were prized 334 times for high performance. 14 plants took the Red Banner of the Central Committee of the CPSU(B), the SDC, and the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions 144 times.

The city's following 6 largest plants were awarded governmental orders for uninterrupted supply of weapons and munitions to the Red Army:
1. Plant No. 16—the Order of Lenin
2. Plant No. 237—the Order of Lenin
3. Fur Factory—the Order of Lenin
4. Plant No. 22—the Order of the Battle Red Banner
5. Plant No. 387—the Order of the Battle Red Banner
6. Plant No. 8—the Order of the Labour Red Banner

Deputy Secretary of the City Committee of the CPSU(B) Ilyin

SA HPD TR, c. 26, f. 18, f. 17, s. 38–48.

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64 Specific examples of Stakhanovite labour in industrial plants are omitted.
No. 105
An Extract from the Resolution by the Tatar Regional Committee of the CPSU(B)
‘On Mistakes and Drawbacks in the Work of the Tatar Scientific and Research Institute for Language, Literature, and History’

6 October 1944
Top secret

Instead of carrying out scientific research on the history of Tataria, studying and widely presenting the history of the joint struggle of the Russian, Tatar, and other peoples of our country against foreign occupants, against Russian tsarism and oppression by capitalist landowners, as well as the history of the social transformation of Tataria over the Soviet period, instead of popularizing prominent people, revolutionaries of the Tatar nation and heroes of the Patriotic War, the institute has been primarily engaged in studies on the history of the Golden Horde and literary records of the 12–16th centuries. <...>

In its works <...> the institute has made serious mistakes. They largely consist in presenting the Golden Horde as an advanced state, a country with a well-developed economy and culture, which is undoubtedly inconsistent with the historical truth. While preparing the works, the institute ignored such features of the Golden Horde as its being an aggressive state that initiated wars of conquest and campaigns to rob the land of the Russian nation and its neighbours, a state where peoples were heavily oppressed and impoverished. <...>

It was a fundamental mistake to fully equate the history of the Golden Horde with that of the contemporary Tatar people. <...>

The institute also made a serious mistake in studying, estimating, and popularizing the feudalistic khan epic of Edigü. The institute has been popularizing an entirely false concept of it as a heroic epic of the Tatar nation across Tataristan. The institute has omitted the fact that the ‘Edigü’ epos expresses ideas alien to the Tatar people, as well as any other USSR people—hatred for the Russian people and the ideas of uniting all Tatar tribes in all steppe areas across the Desht-i Kipchak. <...>

Works by some historians (Bashkirov, Cherepnin) present the annexation of Kazan by Moscow only as a conquest and occupation while ignoring the historically progressive meaning of the event.

The Bureau of the Regional Committee believes that the institute's mistakes consisting of embellishing the Golden Horde, completely ignoring its aggressive nature, presenting the Golden Horde as the origin of the Tatar people, which is unscientific, misinterpreting the feudalistic khan epic of 'Edigü', and taking a biased approach to the annexation of Kazan by Moscow—interpreting it as a conquest—are nationalist mistakes aimed at undermining friendship between the Russian and Tatar peoples.

The Bureau of the Regional Committee has also found serious mistakes in the institute's materials on the history of Tatar literature. The circular note on the periodization of the history of Tatar literature, accepted in 1940, ignores the enormous progressive influence that Russian culture has had on Tatar literary works and fails to present either the negative way in which Islam affected the development of Tatar literature or the struggle of advanced representatives of the Tatar people (K. Nasyry, G. Tukay) against religionism and the Islamic clergy.

The institute has also made mistakes in studying Soviet Tatar literature. The work 'Tatar Literature over 25 Years' essentially denies that Tatar literature has improved ideologically and artistically over the Soviet period. <...>

The Bureau of the Regional Committee of the CPSU(B) hereby resolves:
1. To remove from office the Director of the Tatar Scientific and Research Institute for Language, Literature and History Comrade Kh. Yarmukhametov for failure to cope with his work and overlooking grave nationalistic mistakes in the institute's works and issue a reprimand to him. <...>
2. Suggest that the Management of the Tatar Scientific and Research history should rectify the mistakes and radically transform the institute's scientific and research activities in full concordance with the Resolution by the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) 'On the Progress and Improvement Measures of Political and Ideological Work in the Tatar Party Organization'.<...>

3. Request the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) to establish a permanent board for the history of Tataria under the Historical Institute of the USSR Academy of Science, which is to be responsible for both studying the most difficult and under-researched issues related to the history of Tataria and editing the most important scientific and popular scientific works by the Tatar Institute for Language, Literature, and History. <...>

SA HPD TR, c. 15, f. 5, f. 1143, s. 51–55.
Published: Gasurlar Avazi = Echo Vekov.—1996.—No. 3/4.—P. 101–104.

No. 106
An Extract from the Resolution by the Bureau of the Tatar Regional Committee of the CPSU(B) 'On the Textbook in Tatar Literature for the 8th Form of Secondary School'

2 September 1948.
Top secret

The Bureau of the Regional Committee of the CPSU(B) hereby notes that the textbook (chrestomathy) in Tatar Literature for the 8th grade of the secondary school, finalised for publication in 1946, was published in 1947 without any radical revising in spite of serious mistakes and corruptions in it. No. 19 of the newspaper 'Kul'tura i zhiz'n' ('Culture and Life'), dated 11 July 1948, contained the entirely correct remark that the compilers of the textbook 'lack a critical approach to the literature of the past, omitted to mention mistakes by some writers, and deliberately included wrong and harmful works'.<...>

The textbook provides a poor coverage of Russian classical literature and contains too little information on the influence that Russian literature has had on the development of the Tatar national culture. The sections on ancient Tatar literature and that of the 17th–18th century are badly written and confusing. The text lacks consistency and cohesion. Many historical events are presented in a corrupted manner.

The textbook includes harmful works (the poem 'Saxipcamalga' by G. Kandaly, the drama 'Raddy biçara Kiz' by F. Khalidi, etc.), which idealize the life of mullahs, beys, and merchants, while overestimating such writers as Utyz Imyani, Maulya Koly, and G. Kandaly and failing to correctly depict their works as idealistic, primitive, and unrepresentative of the popular interests. The textbook fails to cover the negative way in which Islam and Sufism affected the history of the Tatar people's culture and misinterprets Jadidism, which eventually turned into a counter-revolutionary movement.<...>

The Bureau of the Regional Committee of the CPSU(B) hereby resolves:

1. To declare that the textbook of Tatar Literature for the 8th form of the secondary school, 1947 edition (written by L. Zalyay, edited by Gazi Kashshaf), fails to meet the requirements of a communist upbringing of pupils and contains grave misinterpretations of Tatar literature and harmful works; and to forbid the textbook for secondary schools of the Tatar ASSR. <...>

SA HPD TR, c. 15, f. 29, f. 155a, s. 26–29.
Published: Gasurlar Avazi = Echo Vekov.—1997.—No. 1/2.—Pp. 88–92.
No. 107
An Extract from the Resolution by the Bureau of the Tatar Regional Committee of the CPSU(B) 'On the Mistakes in Textbook in Literature for the 8th grade of the Secondary School'

18 January 1952
Top secret.

The Bureau of the Regional Committee of the CPSU(B) hereby notes that the Ministry of Education of the Tatar ASSR and the Institute for Language, Literature, and History of the Kazan Branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences have shown neglect of the resolution by the Bureau of the Regional Committee of the CPSU(B) dated 2 September 1948, under which they were obliged to make sure that a textbook meeting the requirements of communistic upbringing of pupils was published through wide engagement of leading teachers and academic workers. <...>

In contradiction to the historical truth, the textbook still idealized the religious and mystical works of the early 17th–late 18thcentury's Sufi Maula Kuly, who praised the most retrograde Islamic sects in his poems, namely Sufism, Ishanism, which advocated for keeping aloof from earthly concerns, surrendering to fate and oppressors. <...>

The textbook also misinterprets works by Utyz Imyani, the author of the poem 'The Clarification of Thoughts.' The poem is religious and mystical, that is, retrograde in nature. Yafarov has corrupted the content of the poem heavily. He took advantage of the text being not widely known in the academic community to give a false assessment of the poem as containing messages which it by no means contains and to present Utyz Imyany as a person who praised the friendship of peoples, namely the Tatars and the Russians, while the poem praises Islam and teaches hatred those of other faiths. <...>

The textbook omits to clearly identify Jadidism as a bourgeois nationalist movement. The Jadid movement originated with the Tatar bourgeoisie to protect the local market from any 'foreign' bourgeoisie. Its ideology was that of pan-Islamism, pan-Turkism, class peace within the Tatar nation for the sake of 'national unity', which would sever the Tatar nation from Russia and turn it into an appendage of the corrupt empire of Turkish sultans.

After the October Socialist Revolution, Jadidism became part of the national counter-revolution, its representatives fighting against workers and peasants in alliance of White Guardians and intervenors. What remained of them later joined Trotskyist-Bukharinist nationalist gangs as agents for capitalist intelligence services. <...>

The Bureau of the Regional Committee of the CPSU(B) believes that the occurrence of bourgeois nationalist opinions and mistakes in Tatar literature and history suggests that historians and literary scholars of Tataria have not made any conclusions from the Resolution by the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) dated 9 August 1944, and have taken a formalist approach to executing it <...>. Literary scholars and historians have not transformed their activities in accordance with the instructions by Comrade Stalin specified in 'Marxism and the Problems of Linguistics'. <...> The Bureau of the Regional Committee of the CPSU(B) hereby resolves to:

1. To expel B. Yafarov from the CPSU(B) for grave nationalist mistakes and falsification of literary records.

2. Issue a reprimand to the Director of the Institute for Language, Literature, and History of the Kazan Branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences M. Gaynullin for negligence of the Resolution by the Bureau of the Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) dated 2 September 1948. <...>

5. Oblige the TASSR Ministry of Education (comrade Valiullin):
a) to develop and report to all Literature teachers methodology guidelines for correcting the mistakes in the textbook. Withdraw the Tatar Literature textbook for the 8th form as soon as the academic year ends <...>.

SA HPD TR, c. 15, f. 33, f. 108, s. 113–117.

No. 108
An Extract from the Letter by N. Sokolov to Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR
Supreme Soviet N. Shvernik

17 January 1949

I, Nikolai Sokolov, am a young Communist. I was born in the time of the Soviet government, brought up at a Soviet school, and I am currently being brought up by the great party of Lenin and Stalin. I am true to the Komsomol idea in every cell of my body, to the bone.

<...> The truth of our propaganda about the past and the future is pure and great; it appeals to every Soviet heart. However, our propaganda about the present is runs over with stinking dirt and impedes, oppresses, and ruins our trust in the future. <...> Newspapers describe and depict our kolkhoz members as 'rolling in cheese and butter' <...>. What is the actual situation?

<...> Expecting to get some grain, even a little, kolkhoz members have worked hard. But when harvest time was over and the specified amount was handed in to the government, there was hardly anything left for them. However, 'chief' commissars issued an 'obligation' to J. Stalin to oversupply crops. They wrote 'in behalf of kolkhoz members'; but kolkhoz members did not read the obligation until it appeared in 'Pravda'. In the meanwhile, cars and carts came to kolkhoz granaries with orders to confiscate any crops, and kolkhoz members were never rewarded for their hard work, they have to feed on potatoes grown on their household plots; some have processed orach.

<...> This is the sentiment of the kolkhoz. They curse our party, our leader J. Stalin, and our Central Committee, blaming Moscow for their suffering, their hunger. <...> Where is our Communist conscience, our truth? They say one thing and do another. It is the 3rd letter that I have written to you; dozens of people have written to you and the Central Committee of the CPSU(B), but no measures have been taken. People are famished, fraud, subservience, lies, and deception are blatant <...>.

<...> I think you never get to read the letters, for 'censorship' must be 'honorably' destroying them.

<...> Urban workers and dwellers have enough bread now, because the country of our breadbasket is severely famished. This is especially true in the Apastovo district of our republic. We cannot stand it anymore; people do not hope to see the spring; it is brutal, a hundred times worse than imperialism <...>. The attitude to working peasants is not Communist-like; its imperialistic and even worse; it's brutal <...>.

Suggestions:
Since kolkhoz members have lost faith in a happy future, as they previously lost faith in God, the following has to be done to get them interested:
1. Abolish the practice of 'trudodni' and payments in kind.
2. Introduce task work with monthly monetary payments.
3. Introduce free cooperative governmental grain trade in the country, as it is in the town. It would bring about the following benefits:
4. All kolkhoz workers would be a hundred times more motivated.
5. All people would be equally well-nourished.
This would eliminate fraud, subservience and deception. <...> People keep thinking and saying that even the serfdom of the past was a hundred times better than the present moment, for people had enough food and their masters did not lie to them.

SA HPD TR, c. 15, f. 30, f. 1, s. 6–7.

No. 109
An Extract from the Protocol by the CPSU Regional Committee 'On the Progress and Improvement Measures of Russian Language Teaching at the Republic's Primary Schools'

The Bureau of the CPSU Regional Committee hereby notes an unsatisfactory state of the practice of teaching the Russian Language at the republic's ethnic schools. The scope of knowledge of pupils of primary, seven-year, and secondary schools still does not meet the requirements specified in the Resolution by the USSR Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) dated 13 March 1938 'On Compulsory Training in Russian Language at Schools in National Republics and Regions'. Russian Language academic performance at the republic's ethnic schools remains low.

This results from the fact that the TASSR Ministry of Education and its local agencies, as well as party city and district committees, executive committees of city and district soviets of workers' deputies have neglected to draw the necessary conclusions from the instructions by the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) and the USSR Soviet of People's Commissars that, given the multi-ethnic community of the USSR, Russian skills must be a powerful means of communication among the peoples of the USSR to ensure their further economic and cultural growth, improvement of national human resources in terms of academic and technical knowledge, and that Russian skills are a prerequisite for successful military service in the Soviet Army and Navy for every citizen of the USSR.

An inspection has revealed the low ideological, theoretical, and academic level of Russian teaching at many national schools. Russian grammar is studied separately from the living spoken language. This practice often consists in the mechanical learning of definitions and rules without any systematic exercises to reinforce knowledge. Too little attention is being paid to correct pronunciation and representative readings. Students' requirements are low while the marks they get are often high. Many national schools teach Russian Language without any connection to the grammar of the native language.

Out-of-school activities and out-of-school Russian reading have been underestimated and underdeveloped. School libraries at national schools have a very poor choice of literature in the Russian language. The Regional Committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League, Komsomol district and city committees have failed to make sure that Komsomol organizations at ethnic schools take measures to ensure successful development of Russian skills in pupils or initiate enough themed literary evenings, readers' conferences, or group film watching.

The TASSR Ministry of Education has been exercising no systematic control over and profound analysis of the state of Russian Language teaching at national schools. It has failed to apply proper requirements to inspectors of the Ministry of Education as well as heads of schools and departments for popular education in terms of improving academic performance in the subject. As a result, the state of Russian Language teaching has not been checked in any district of the republic for a long time. Intraschool control is also poor.

SA HPD TR, c. 15, f. 37, f. 153.
No. 110
An Extract from the Anonymous Letter by Oil Industry Workers to N. Khrushchev

'Tataria has become a major oil-producing area. But why is Tataria not taken into account? Towns and settlements that are built here look like prisoner camps. There is nothing but baraks. No streets, running water or electricity. It's very much like camps of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Schools have 2 to 3 shifts. There are no proper hospitals. There are no cinemas or cultural centres. If Ukraine, Uzbekistan, or Georgia had Tatar oil, I think the regions would have everything. But nobody seems to care about the Tatar people. It looks like someone is mocking us'.

SA HPD TR, c. 15, f. 7, f. 28, s. 20.

No. 111
Report by First Secretary Z. Muratov to the CPSU Central Committee on Anti-Soviet Leaflets Found in Kazan, 30 April 1956.

The Tatar Regional Party Committee hereby reports that 35 letters were found in post boxes in the city of Kazan on 30 April of this year, each consisting of 5 pages and containing an anti-Soviet bourgeois nationalist proclamation. The letters address various establishments and figures of the Tatar and Bashkir ASSRs, Arzamas, Chkalovsk and Kuybyshev regions, primarily to the Tatar pedagogical institutes, academies and schools.

The proclamation is signed by I. Bikbulat on behalf of a 'committee for the organization of opinions on the question of national freedom'. The proclamation is handwritten in block letters in the Tatar language and copied by one person using copy paper.

The proclamation says that the Tatar people have been suffering for 400 years. 'The sanguinary centuries have been marked by every kind of misfortune, including poverty, famine, suffering, exile, forced baptism, torture... It applies not only to the past but to the present. The Bolsheviks try to look like liberators of oppressed peoples. But what is the difference between the 'freedom' that they have given to the Tatar people and the burden brought by bloody Ivan's Oprichniki?'

How many sons and daughters of our nation have they destroyed over the past 30 to 40 years? How many people have died in prisons, mountains in the Far East, steppes in Siberia, concentration camps in the Ural Mountains, in Vorkuta, innocent sons and daughters... The Tatar people suffer as heavily as they did before the October Revolution, heavy forced labour and grinding poverty.

The author then writes that a policy of pressure, Russification, and persecution for national traits has been implemented in education. Children have no access to higher education in their mother tongue; secondary schools provide poor education. The number of secondary schools has been gradually decreasing even in Kazan. No Tatar schools offer instruction in the native language in Ufa and Tatar-populated districts... One cannot discuss any issue related to Tatar culture freely. Over the past 20 to 30 years, many sons and daughters of the Tatar people have become victims to the Bolshevik terror for saying out loud, 'I am a Tatar'. Tatars living in other districts of the Union have no access to books, newspapers, magazines, and fiction in their mother-tongue... Newspapers and magazines in the Tatar language were issued, Tatar clubs and libraries worked in Moscow, towns in the Volga Region, the Urals, Siberia, and other republics for a long time; but now everything is gone... Where can our people find food for though to enrich their national culture under such conditions? These are the fruits of the Leninist-Stalinist
policy for the Tatar people. Even though we have not tasted the fruits of the ethnic policy meant for the peoples of the Crimea and the Caucasus, the Bolshevik policy here is the same as it is in the Crimea and in the Caucasus. Works by such writers as G. Ibragimov, K. Tinchurin, and F. Amirkhan must not be mentioned, not to speak of their being published. The only purpose of this is to keep the Tatar people completely dependent and instill a lack of self-confidence in them.

The proclamation ends as follows: 'What has to be done to put an end to this unfair practice? Some people think that we should turn to the CPSU Central Committee. Waiting for something from the Central Committee or their hirelings in the regions is a form of self-deception... The current leaders are wrong to blame all the atrocities of some 30 or 40 years on Stalin alone. Their hands are also covered in blood, shed throughout the years of Stalin's dictatorship. They contributed to the establishment of a bloody dictatorship. Stalin's supremacy, based on terror, survived with their help, and the Tatar people do not care whether there is one dictator leading the Russian government, or 10 to 15 party aristocrats, or whether the national policy of the ruling communists is called that of Leninist or Stalinist. Their policy relies on Russian chauvinism... We can only trust in the people, who have suffered a lot. We should turn to them, mobilize their pure, fresh power. We have to explain the basics of the Russian chauvinists' policy to our people now. We have to take measures to make our people unite against the policy. Our people should be ready to take their future in their hands when the day comes'.

The proclamation contains the following request: 'To begin with, please copy the proclamation and distribute it. Hide the original as far as possible. It will prove your participation in the movement when the time comes'.

Measures are being taken to prevent further distribution of the proclamation and to find its author.

Russian State Archive for Social and Political Information, c. 556, f. 14, f. 55, s. 15–17.

**No. 112**

An Extract from the Speech by Director of the Local History Museum Dyakonov at the Meeting of Party Activists of Bauman district, Kazan

27 January 1956

Visitors arriving in Kazan find it extremely hard to find a hotel room. We have 4 hotels. Part of the rooms are occupied by permanent residents /it's outrageous!/ Part of the rooms in the 'Kazan' Hotel are being repaired. They are meant to be used for foreign tourists in the future. Just imagine, Kazan has 4 hotels now, while there were 34 before the revolution! The population of Kazan was only 120–140 thousand people back than. Now it is almost 5 times as large.

We need to build at least 2–3 more hotels. Maybe we should rather build 2–3 nice residential houses to accommodate residents of the dedicated hotel buildings in the city centre. This might be a bad idea, but the issue of increasing the hotel capacity of Kazan is a burning one and has to be addressed.

Let me make a couple of remarks and mention some issues as soon as we are talking about construction. Firstly, comrades say that the construction of the House of Soviets has been temporarily shut down. Why is it so? We prepare designs, discuss and approve them, arrange sites, provide equipment, make foundation pits, spend large amounts of governmental money and... nothing happens! This seems to be a common practice in Kazan. If a decision has been made, we should persevere, we should complete the construction to prevent the notorious theatre story from repeating.
Secondly, a group of French journalists visited the State Museum of Tataria in the autumn, and we felt uneasy again as we had to provide explanations concerning our famous 'Begemot' (museum building) to foreign journalists, and—mind it—those of a retrograde French newspaper. Did the Germans throw bombs on it? No.

So what's the matter? We find ourselves in the same situation whenever a group of visitors comes to Kazan. We shouldn't deceive the public and the Kazan people anymore. We have no money. So we have to put in order the awfully dilapidated building in the city centre.

Directive guidelines are issued concerning the construction of the Kazan–Gorky gas pipeline. We are happy to know that Gorky people will soon be using our Tatar gas. However, we are not happy to know that it is apparently Gorky and not Kazan where most of apartments will have gas supply first. The population is beginning to view our City Gas Service as a second opera theatre. The city's gas supply network is developing poorly and at a very slow pace. If we made a competition board for cities struggling to ensure gas supply, I'm afraid our City Soviet would be riding a turtle. Isn't it going to unmount the turtle as a symbol of backwardness even at the end of the five-year plan?

I should make a television remark, too. We need to consider building a TV centre in Kazan. That amateur centre is ridiculous. We need to establish a new centre, which is a need of ours.

SA HPD TR, c. 19, f. 45, f. 72, s. 19–21.

No. 113
An Extract from the Speech Delivered at the Meeting of Party and Economic Activists of Bauman district, Kazan, on the Issues of Development of the Republic's Historical Science and State Museum

22 March 1956

We hardly ever have arguments and discussions. I can think of only one episode when we were engaged in really enthusiastic discussion. It seems like some leading historical academicians of Kazan are eager to protect their historical backstage from any fresh breeze, or maybe it's their esprit what they are protecting. Maybe someone doesn't want to upset their relations with friends.

Consider the issue of the Kazan Khanate. Comrades from the branch of the Academy of Sciences believe it to be very clear and unambiguous. But some comrades in Moscow disagree with these comrades from Kazan. Why not have a round-table discussion? Don't shrug it off. As the saying goes, truth is sprout in discussions.

A Society of Historical and Archaeological Ethnography once existed in Kazan. The society united historians residing in the city and regularly published its 'Izvestiya' journal, which contained many works on the local history, for many years. Both the society and the journal ceased to exist in the 1930s. Why not re-establish these bodies now that the historical community of Kazan has grown a lot and its need for such a journal has become pressing?

It is no secret that many comrades here have manuscripts finalised for publishing, which nobody is willing to print, though. Why? We should call a spade a spade. They are afraid lest something goes wrong... They want to play it safe!

Several years ago, the museum finalised a volume of its proceedings for publishing. We had several reviews per article. The Tatgiz Publishing House, in its turn, began to look for more reviews. Everything was fine. However, that was not enough: Tatgiz did not trust the reviewers and sent the manuscripts to the Regional Party Committee—just in case.

Every trace of our work was lost until after a year or a year and a half. Nobody seemed to mind publishing it, but nobody took any measures to make is appear sooner. The so-called cautiousness caused many works in local history to be buried in secret collections, withdrawn from academic use, sometimes for petty reasons; access to archives was impeded; candidate's theses on collectivisation,
industrialisation, the history of the Stakhanovite movement relied on newspapers and not archive references. In a manner of speaking, serious reprimands to historians announced at the meeting oblige us to make the appropriate conclusions. Institutions engaged in historical academic activities need fresh air.

Speaking of opening archives for academic studies, we should mention the declassification of some cases which, I think, have never been secret. Once, we made a model of self-propelled combine harvester produced by a plant of ours. We invited representatives of the Glavlit to see it. They refused flatly on the pretext that is was a secret. We file a complaint to Moscow, because we even had posters on the streets in Kazan, reading like, 'Today the Club of the Self-Propelled Combine Harvester Plant...'

'Moscow sends a paper to Kazan. Another no. 'Ogonyok' appears with a color photo titled 'The Kazan Self-Propelled Combine Harvester Plant... ' Yet, it's a no. 'Ogonyok' has already reached London and Washington, but the instruction is no.

The situation was the same with the outboard motor, the 'Zvezda' TV set, and even the ill-fated washing-machine.

We still mustn't mention the Compressor Plant here in the museum, while trams are running on the streets with a banner reading, 'Kuybysheva Str. - Compressor Plant,' but the Oblit (official censorship organ) says, 'why, there's no compressor plant in Kazan'. So our exhibits here are soap and candles, women's shoes, fur articles and cakes. These are lawful, so we get a false mirror.

I would therefore like to raise another issue—that of publishing at least rough plans of the Kazan city centre for tourists. Of course, I can see Oblit faces express fear. Is there anything to be afraid of? Once in Leningrad I saw a blue-water sailor, who, by the way, came from Kazan, hold a beautifully printed plan of Kazan in English. He had bought the plan in a New York tavern. Last year, a French tourist used the same plan for his tours around our city. However, we prefer to lie low. Is it really what we should hide?

Scholars, propaganda workers all have been banned from viewing statistics. Try and get a trifle of a reference from the Central Statistical Directorate, for instance, how many passengers the Kazan tram carried in 1947. No way! You have to get a special permission, executed in writing and bearing the stamp and signature of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers.

SA HPD TR, c. 19, f. 45, f. 72, s. 117–122.

Published: A. Gallyamov. 'U nas chrezv'yachno redko zatevayutsya spory', diskussii v obshhestvenno-politicheskoi zhizni Tatarstan' ('We hardly ever have arguments and discussions in the socio-political life of Tatarstan') // Gasrirlar Avazi = Echo Yekov.—2006.— No. 2.—Pp. 100–104.

No. 114

'On the Future of Tatar Culture!'

An Extract from the Letter to the Editorial Office of Literaturnaya Gazeta
(The Literary Newspaper) by Readers Gumer Enverov and Shamil Fakhruislamov

1956

Our country is a multi-national socialist state. The backward and downtrodden nations within the Russian Empire, which was the prison of nations, soon were able to develop their economy and culture to an unprecedented extent after the October Revolution. Thus applies to our Tatar people. Tatar literature and art, national by form and socialist by content, have been created. A Tatar intelligentsia has formed; we have national composers and writers, many of whom are popular not only with their nation, but also across the Soviet Union and even abroad. Our republic is currently preparing for the Decade of Tatar Literature and Art in Moscow to demonstrate the cultural achievements of the Tatar Republic.
The classic theorists of Marxism-Leninism expected nations to cease to exist under the conditions of Communism. However, this is to happen over a large period of time, after each nation has enjoyed its prime. This also applies to our people.

However, to ensure further development of the national culture, the youth has to become the successor to the past generations, inherit the best traditions of our culture.

It is obvious that the younger generation not only does not have any knowledge of the native literature and art, but it cannot even express its thoughts correctly in its mother-tongue; it is not uncommon for our young people to have vague knowledge of even the colloquial language. But we had famous writers and poets, such as G. Tukay, G. Ibragimov, M. Dzhali, and many others. What causes these adverse trends? The reason is that most Tatar children, even in some villages, go to Russian schools, which offer no classes in Tatar language and literature. Don't we have national schools? Yes, we do, and each citizen can send his or her children to such a school. However, no matter how much the parents love their language, they will rather send their children to a Russian school for the sake of their future, since IHLs and technical schools carry out their entrance examinations and provide instruction in Russian. Taking into account the current competition, it would be difficult for a Tatar school leaver to enter an institute. This is why Tatar schools are not widely popular and have been gradually losing pupils.

For instance, School No. 18 had to establish forms with instruction in Russian because of poor admission statistics. At the same time, Tatar percentage is high at Russian schools.

It would be reasonable to introduce an optional examination in Tatar at Kazan IHLs. This would be helpful for gifted young people from rural areas, where opportunities of mastering the Russian language can be scarce. The role of Kazan as the cultural centre of the entire Tatar nation would therefore become more important, since a large part of the Tatars lives in rural areas.

Since a large part of Tatar young people attend Russian schools, where their percentage is considerable (sometimes they even constitute the majority), it would be reasonable to introduce classes in Tatar Language and Literature to Russian schools. This is the only way to make sure that the young generation develops good knowledge in its native language, script, and literature. It is also a common fact that IHLs in unity republics carry out entrance examinations in national languages. Russian schools also teach national languages. The TASSR is as big by area and population as the union republics. The only difference is that it does not border on foreign states. It is this minor aspect of bordering on foreign states what determines the difference between our schools and entrance examinations to IHLs and those in other republics. We believe it to be wrong. There was a period when all schools in our republic offered classes in Tatar Language and Literature, but the practice was abolished for some reasons. Our republic has a larger population than the Kyrgyz, Turkmen, Tadzhik, Armenian, Moldavian, Estonian, and Latvian union republics. The Tatar population of the TASSR alone is as large as 2 million people. There are over 600,000 of them in Bashkiria and many in other republics and regions.

The thing is, however, that all nations in the USSR have equal rights. The TASSR Constitution stipulates that the Tatar language along with Russian is an official language of the TASSR. How can comprehensive schools not provide classes in the republic's official language? What kind of a republic is it, by the way? The republic is the USSR's largest oil producer and has well-developed industry of all-Union importance and advanced agriculture. The Tatar percentage of TASSR workers is high; most of our republic's kolkhoz peasants are also Tatars.

Most of school and technical school leavers become workers at plants, MTS's, kolkhozes (collective farms) and sovkhozes (state farms), where knowledge of Tatar will not prevent but rather favour close connections with the masses. Many go to the virgin land of Kazakhstan, where the population speaks Tatar, for those who know Tatar can easily express their thoughts in any Turkic language. The population of five union and several autonomous republics, largely concentrated in the country's east, speaks Turkic languages. These areas are our country's future. They develop rapidly, shifting the gravity centre of our industry to the east, which has been causing and will continue to cause youth migration to the regions.
So we suggest that an entrance examination in Tatar (for Tatars) should be introduced to increase the percentage of Tatar students in IHLs in our republics and refill the Tatar intelligentsia with fresh force coming from the deepest of the people. We also suggest that Tatar Language and Literature subject be introduced at schools in our republic, which will ensure more polytechnic education and bring the Soviet school closer to life as intended by the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

SA HPD TR, c. 15, l. 38, f. 191, s. 65–67.

No. 115
The Letter by Sh. Mannur to First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee
N. Khrushchev

18 May 1957

Dear Nikita Sergeevich!

Even though I know you to be very busy, I would like you to dedicate 10 minutes to this letter. I considered turning to you for a long time but would not dare to, since I was afraid that I could be wrong. Then the Hungarian events prevented me from doing so. Now that it is over, I can write to you a letter about the most burning issue for me. It is that of the situation in the Tatar ASSR.

We, the common ‘national’ Communists believe that the 20th Congress was a Leninist shift of our Party turning its face to the peoples of the Soviet Union. Its greatest concern have been the union republics: their political, economic, and cultural rights have been extended; many plants and institutions have been transferred to them, national human resources have been grown and they are encouraged to administer their republic. Shortly speaking, measures have been taken to ensure truly equal rights for all the 15 union republics with time.

We were also happy to hear the 6th Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet declare the restoration of rights of smaller nations, which had been recently abolished without any legal justification. That act will wipe the disgrace off the socialist country in the face of history. (It remains unclear, however, why the Crimean Tatars have to remain in exile.)

We find these measures taken by the party very inspiring. Locally, however, the situation is less favourable. The life is especially tough in certain autonomous republics and regions. It seems like the rights of autonomous republics have been limited increasingly over the recent 25 years. The present situation in the Tatar ASSR has aroused concerns in a number of Communists, in a number of honest people.

Firstly, the republic’s kolkhoz peasantry is facing a serious economic challenge. Most of the peasants never have enough bread, which they make themselves. The majority has been receiving an average of 200 to 500 grams of grains per workday over the past 18–20 years. They largely rely on their potato gardens and had to feed on grass during the war and for some time after it ended. A generation of stunted teenagers called ‘potato generation’ has grown. Of course, we have up to 50 million-strong kolkhozes and several dozens (even up to one hundred) of medium kolkhozes. They do not determine the situation, though. Once again, the vast majority are backward kolkhozes. They have no monetary income and poor animal breeding. Lack of fodder in the winter causes considerable stock losses. For instance, one of the districts lost 1500 heads of livestock from October to March this winter. Swine breeding farms in most Tatar kolkhozes are not only unprofitable, but also in a sad condition.

To make it even worse, croplands, especially in the north-east, are heavily impoverished. The entire right bank of the Kama River is hilly fields with many deep ravines, where red clay soil contains very little crop nutrients and where spring-autumn streams is increasing soil erosion year by year, putting more and more land out of use. Though the south and south-east of Tatarstan are characterised by better
soil, the area is mostly occupied by the oil industry. Even those areas, just as the rest of Tataria, are too
dependent on climatic conditions. If we see no rain in June, we get no crops.

In spite of this, the crop supply rate for our republic is rather high. They say we have to supply twice
as much as our neighbours do in Chuvashia, which, by the way, has better and more fertile soil than we
do. In some years, kolkhozes are unable to keep their seed stock or any fodder—everything is taken
away to fulfill the crop supply requirement. Payment for workdays is out of question. Another reason
why our kolkhozes are so backward is the lack of truly gifted, pro-active, and skillful human resources.
The republic's authorities have practiced a superficial, aloof approach to kolkhozes. For instance, I know
a rural district where the Secretary of the Regional Committee has not been for 6 years.

Therefore, our kolkhoz peasantry is economically far behind that of Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Uzbeki-
stan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Baltic republics, and many regions within the RSFSR. ... The question
I would like to raise is why should the kolkhoz peasant of the Tatar Republic suffer so heavily in eco-
nomic terms when compared to its brothers from other republics and regions? (I think the situation is
pretty much the same with the Udmurt, Mari, and Bashkir ASSRs).

Secondly, the living conditions of urban workers in Kazan, Chistopol, Yelabuga, Mamadysh, Bu-
gulma, Tetyushi, etc. also leave much to be desired. The city of Kazan, as the capital of autonomous
republics, has a much poorer supply of articles of prime necessity when compared to Kiev, Kharkov,
Sverdlovsk, Tashkent, not to mention Moscow and Leningrad. A vast majority of Kazan's population
buys food on the market at the double or triple price. Rural areas are not even properly supplied with
tea and sugar. This is especially hard for Tatars. Housing is inadequate in Kazan. There are many emerg-
cy houses, in very poor condition, buildings, requiring a capital master plan, where large families
of workers and employers live in precarious conditions. The City Executive Committee workers don't
care much about it, residential construction in the city is miniscule. Only the outskirts are growing with
numbered plants. The city is utterly neglected; its streets are in a horrible condition; splendid buildings
are rotting and falling apart because of inadequate roofs, guttering, basement repair.

Thirdly, the percentage of national production and academic staff is ridiculously small. There are
hardly ever any Tatar managers and senior staff in the republic's state apparatus, ministries, institutions,
plants, factories, railway and water transport, oil industry and numbered plants, IHLs in Kazan, and no
training is offered, though it would be logical if they occupied key positions. At least 90% (if not more)
of the engineering and technical staff in our oil industry come from other areas. About 40 oil industry
workers come from other areas, while even larger labour force leaves Tataria for other regions and areas.
Characteristically, Bavly, Almetyevsk, and Aznakayevsk, which constitute the centre of oil industry, are
all-Tatar areas. However, the percentage of Tatar oil industry employees there is as low as 40%. Thus,
the engagement of population in production is extremely poor.

Most industrial workers in Kazan have low or middle qualifications. Nobody cares to ensure training
for highly qualified Tatar workers to constitute the core staff of their plants. I am saying this because the
Tatar worker had no access to machines in the tsarist times. Now we should ensure a maximum involve-
ment in advanced technologies for him.

Tatar doctors and candidates of sciences, professors, and teachers are very few in IHLs in Kazan.
There is not a single Tatar member of the Academy of Sciences. Secondary school teachers are also
poorly trained. At least 50–60% of the staff has to be replaced. Most of our secretaries of CPSU regional
committees and chairmen of district soviets are outdated and have no higher education. Many of them
can only control people and communists through administration and tongue-lashing. Unfortunately,
they include some officials of the Tatar Regional CPSU Committee.

Fourthly, we have a lot of confusion and perversion in the sphere of enlightenment, language and
literature, culture and art. All records management and even legal proceedings in Kazan and many other
districts are based upon the Russian language. Our leaders make all their public speeches in Russian.
They keep cutting down on Tatar Language and Literature in Tatar secondary school curricular. The
hours are used either for polytechnisation or to reduce the number of subjects and reinforce training in
the Russian language. However, Tatar secondary school leavers are mostly unable to enter IHLs of Kazan because of their poor Russian skills. Part of the Tatar people have come to view the Tatar language as outdated and unnecessary, for everything is in Russian, as it used to be in the old time.

As a result, there are only 4–5 Tatar schools in Kazan. They will also cease to exist soon. Parents are reluctant to send their children there. However, such issues as education in the native language and cultural development in the national form were among the people's revolutionary achievements of the Great October.

The aforementioned facts arise the following questions:

Does the great Russian people need us, or does the Party demand us to fully switch to Russian and gradually replace our mother-tongue?

Will the languages of the peoples of the Soviet Union die, and do they have to die, even before Communism comes, and do the peoples have to achieve Communism through the Russian language, that is to say, by losing their most important national trait?

Are the peoples of the Soviet Union entitled to instruction in their native languages at IHL and is this nationalism, lack of unity, backwardness in science and culture?

If yes, what is wrong with European peoples, who get education in the native language without falling behind the general level of development and communication?

Furthermore, many village schools, clubs, and district cultural centres are in a poor state. Most of them need capital repair or complete re-construction. The clubs practice no cultural and educational activities. Our Ministry of Culture does not care to control them. Most importantly, we lack funding to meet the needs.

During the post-war decade, Tatar literature and art made very little progress. The Tatar drama theatre is in a particularly difficult situation. Every year it loses its best old actors, but does not train new ones. In this decade, the secretaries of the Regional Committee supervised literature and art only through clamour, elaborations, expulsions and stentorian resolutions. That is why the development of literature and art is far from being encouraged, it is actually being artificially restricted. The tragedy of the situation is that these comrades do not read and do not understand their own literature. Hence, the lack of vivid party leadership in this area.

Fifthly, it is especially oppressive that, for some reasons, there exist two laws, namely that of union republics and that of autonomous ones. Attitudes to them are also different. Union republics have more advantages in any aspect, more political, economic, and cultural rights, more budget and other funding, etc. Let me provide some minor examples.

All union republics are always properly represented during trips abroad, while everyone seems to forget about autonomous ones.

Even at meetings and congresses in Moscow, delegates from union and autonomous republics get different accommodation. 'Union republics' get rooms in hotels like the 'Moscow', while representatives of autonomous republics have to stay in the 'Ural' and the like.

Writers, composers, artists, and playwrights in autonomous republics get 30% less for their work than those from union republics.

Publishing houses in Tataria yearly allocate 200,000 rubles to the literary fund, but the USSR Literary Fund has been allocating to us as little as 40,000 rubles annually.

All speeches by our political leaders are warm with care about the union republics, which does not always apply to our autonomous republic. RSFSR leaders tend to forget about us.

The sad impression is that we, representatives of autonomous republics, are second-rate people. Is this true?

Dear Nikita Sergeevich, I have one more question. The thing is, there are over three million Tatars beyond the TASSR. They live as the indigenous population of Ulyanovsk, Kuybyshev, Ryazan, Penza, Gorky, Satarov, Moscow, Astrakhan, Stalingrad, Chkalov, Molotov, Tyumen, Omsk, Tomsk, Kemerovo, Novosibirsk, and other regions, the Bashkir ASSR, and the Uzbek, Kazakh, Kyrgyz and other SSRs.
Before 1935, over 10 newspapers and 3–4 magazines were issued for them in various cities; they had access to national schools, cultural institutions, and theatres. Now everything has been abolished. Even some rural primary schools are closed to be replaced by mixed-type or Russian schools. Thus, an enormous number of Tatars is artificially severed from their culture and mother-tongue. I will only provide one example. I have found out recently that there are 515 Tatar permanent residents in Moscow alone. No work is done for them; they have access to no cultural services. At the same time, the clergy work there. They have mosques of their own. This means that they remember to take care of their flock, while we, Communists, seem to have forgotten about it! Is it not a grave deviation from the Leninist national policy?

Secretary of the Party Regional Committee Batyev has recently told us that somebody distributed a leaflet on behalf of a 'Society for the Recovery of Tatar Culture'. He did not mention, however, why it was possible. I think the reason why it happened is that both officials of our regional committee and we, Communist members of the intelligentsia, have ceased to take care of the people, provide spiritual guidance for them and supply their cultural and political needs. So the enemy has taken the responsibilities.

Finally, here is the last question. Tataria produces millions of tons of oil for the country, but the people hardly have access to the riches. It would be nice if the RSFSR or other authorities allocated a large amount of the oil money to improving the living standards of the Tatar people and meeting their cultural demands.

These are the questions that have been bothering me. It is possible that I am entirely wrong, but I do believe that you will correct me in a paternal way, if I am.

I earnestly ask you not to send my letter to the Tatar Regional Committee. They will rather tongue-lash the author of this letter than address the issues raised in it.

With deep respect yours,
Signature Sh. Mannurov, party member since 1944, No. 04269603.

Published: A. GallyamovA. Sh. Mannur ‘... Nam kazhetsya, chto prava avtonomny'kh respublik za poslednie 25 let vsyo bol' she i bol' she svyorty'vutsya' ('It seems like the rights of autonomous republics have been getting more and more limited over the recent 25 years'.) // Gasiralk Avazi = Echo Vekov.—2007.—No. 2.—Pp. 77–81.

No. 116
S. Ignat'ev's speech at the meeting of the bureau of the Tatar regional party committee held prior the May 1958 Plenary meeting of the Tatar regional party committee devoted to the development of the Tatar schools

April 1958

Last year in autumn, I happened to receive some writers who were very emotional telling me about the state in which our culture is developing. At that time, I had not realized how things were with the language, its teaching and how useful the language was for a party worker to be able to get home the party's message in their native tongue. As I started looking into the matter more closely and in greater detail, I felt scared. Never before, during all the time I had worked in the national republics, had I had to face such a bad situation as here—disrespect for one’s native tongue and lack of support, poor work on its development and improvement; what's more, the high-ranking officials were ashamed of speaking their native tongue even when they had to. After all that, we took counsel and decided to raise this question properly—we needed to encourage people to start speaking and writing slogans and messages in Tatar, and have Tatar people make reports in Tatar, etc. In order not to go to extremes, however, as we did not
consider ourselves experts, we informed the party Central Committee and asked for help. We wanted to send Faseyev there for consultation. However, the Central Committee treated us like small children and said: What good will it do if one of your officials arrives with a bundle of documents? What will he be told? Would not it be better to do otherwise: you yourselves will examine it in greater depth do research in schools, IHLs and cultural facilities; you will gather more information which will enable you to arrive at the right decision. As far as we are concerned in the Central Committee, when the time is right we will send you a team of well-qualified comrades who are knowledgeable about the problem, and together you will examine the matter and make proposals to be considered by the centre—by the party Central Committee. This is because the party bodies in other autonomous republics and districts are also worried by these issues, including the party Central Committee. You know that the party Central Committee has always attached and attaches great importance to the issues of language and national culture. Here is the history of the problem, about which comrades Derbinov, Maksimenko and others came to us. They were kind enough to look into the school affairs and do extensive research into our achievements, and mainly our drawbacks which need to be eliminated at once or gradually, after they have been revealed.

What kind of problems did we have? Comrades Faseyev and Batyev, not to mention Vasily Ignatiyevich who has made an in-depth report, have revealed the main reasons. It’s good that our local party workers were self-critical and agreed that it was the result of a one-sided solution to improve Russian language learning with disregard for their native tongue whose learning is fundamental as a basis for the Russian language to grow and develop, and as access to Russian and world culture. This was an accidental but serious blow to the native tongue and the development of national culture. I might be mistaken, I don’t know, but I see the problem like that.

A greeting telegram Batyev says they were not afraid to be accused of being nationalistic. He was not, but I know the sort of comrades who fear the damned word ‘nationalism’ like death, and because of this word they betrayed the interests of the whole Tatar people. What was really hidden behind it? The desire to be see as innocent and educated so as not to have a single stain on their reputation; instead, there was one huge stamp on the reputation of many bodies and institutions. That was the end of it.

Which is the most outstanding feature of a nationality?—The language! Why should one be afraid of their native tongue? Why not learn it? Why not improve and enrich it? Why should it be tolerated that even national party and Soviet leading personnel have lost the ability to speak to their people in their native tongue? How can remain silent seeing that a Tatar mother does not understand her 3-year-old son, just because the mother does not know Russian and the child does not know Tatar? I insist that such facts are on record. A mother takes her child to a nursery or a kindergarten where he stays there with Russian children until 8 pm; in the evening she picks him up and quickly puts him to bed; and early in the morning again back to the kindergarten. He is always surrounded by Russian children.

I want only one thing—I want our language to develop, I want it to be loved, otherwise, we will come to see a day when we will speak to our people in an incomprehensible language; I don’t want the culture, which has been created for centuries, to fall into oblivion. Without knowing the language, you can’t do what the people and the party Central Committee entrusted you with; you can’t train new personnel. One can’t live like that. Therefore, once again I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to the Central Committee and the comrades who helped us examine things in greater depth and address the problem properly. We will continue this work until the very end, whatever the cost.

Time frame? We can’t be slow in doing it. If we use a magnifying glass or any special optical devices and start scrutinizing every single thing separately, trying to find out what is hidden there, everything will remain as it is. Since we have started acting, let us do it with resolve and persistence. No draft decision reached by the regional party committee can give answers to all the questions, but the draft decision presented by the bureau addresses the problem correctly. It provides guidelines and routes for our work. From 12–16 May, we will convene a plenary meeting of the regional party committee, so we
will prepare a more detailed and clear decision, the way it should be. So, we can start doing practical work in the latter half of May.

We need to develop our activity training personnel, supervise construction of school buildings, and do our best to make everybody participate in school construction. If we set up the base, if not by the beginning of this academic year, but next year, and if during the next 5 years we manage to radically improve the situation, the people will be grateful to us. However, it does not mean that we have to wait for 5 years. Everything that can be done today ought to be done. As for all those party ultra leftists and nihilists who demand that Russian schools be built, because somebody’s son has to start school, will be made to change their ways. Is that man a high lord or something? Why can’t he place his son in a boarding school? There is no need to set up classes because of 2–3 pupils. No need. Let the comrades stand the Central Committee’s tasks. However, if a man does not understand that, then he won’t be able to understand other things and can lead people astray from the party line.

I’m not going to raise special issues, like methodology and other things. I mean to say that it is with resolve and persistence that we must take the line reflected in the draft resolution. We must do it just not for no particular reason but because we have all been exposed to grave danger, faced by none other than the republic’s whole Tatar population.

On setting up Tatar-speaking groups in the nurseries and kindergartens. I think it is the right thing to do. We don’t need to enter this in the draft resolution now, but we must immediately set up pilot groups in 2–3 kindergartens and then develop this initiative.

Copies of the draft resolution have been given to Bureau members. There haven’t been any special remarks, but it will need to be improved after the local party organizations have exchanged their opinions. I propose that Batyev, Faseev, Bashirov, Tabeev, Shakirzyanova, Zaripova, Kremenskaya, Tuishev, Nuzhin, Valiullina and Shadrina work it up for 2 days and then submit it to the bureau.

SA HPD TR, c. 15, l. 39, f. 70, s. 41–49.

No. 117

Excerpt from the resolution of the plenary meeting of the Tatar CPSU regional committee ‘On the state and measures aimed at the improvement of the Tatar general schools’ performance’

21 May 1958

<...> A fundamental principle of the Soviet national school, which predetermines its success, is the fact that education and upbringing is carried out their native tongue, the language which is more intelligible and familiar to children. The rich Tatar vocabulary ensures profound and fast acquisition of all kinds of knowledge by Tatar youth that school provides. At the same time, the national school creates favourable conditions for the acquisition of the Russian language and access to Russian and world cultural achievements. In a Tatar school, Russian is the main and integral element of education and upbringing which is entirely in line with the great thirst for the Russian language displayed by working Tatars, which facilitates closer relations between Russians and Tatars and their future stronger friendship.

The 20th Congress of the CPSU defined the new tasks of the general school as the school which is labour and polytechnic, and required that all party and Soviet organizations as well as local education authorities should improve the quality of children’s education and upbringing and correct the fundamental mistake in the school performance—the gap between education and real life. It also sets the goal of introducing schoolchildren to socially useful work in industry and agriculture on a mass scale.

The decisions of the 20th Congress of the CPSU still greater enhance the responsibility of the party and Soviet bodies for further consolidation of the national school.
In addition to that, the plenary meeting of the Tatar CPSU regional party committee points out that recently the republic’s party and Soviet bodies have paid considerably less attention to the Tatar schools, to educating and upbringing children in their native tongue. Some party workers have an erroneous impression that the problems of the national school and language have apparently been completely resolved and that now the national school does not require serious attention and constant care. As a consequence, in recent years there has been a stronger desire on the part of the indigenous communities, especially among the intellectuals, party and Soviet workers, to have their children taught in Russian schools instead of Tatar ones. While in the 1947–1948 academic year, 95% of Tatar children were taught in their mother tongue, only 70% of them do it now. In Kazan, only 16.8% of Tatar children are taught in their mother tongue. Many rural secondary schools have opened up Russian classes where the overwhelming majority of pupils are Tatars.<...>

In this way, the school enrollment in the national school has started to decrease, which violates the fundamental principle of the Soviet school—teaching must be done in one’s native tongue. The Russian schools admit children who do not know Russian. This makes it difficult for children to learn general subjects and causes them to stay down and repeat the year, and drop out. There are Tatar residential communities in the republic with incorrectly situated schools. Quite often Tatar pupils have to walk 5 km or more to reach their school. Kazan and other towns of the republic have seen national schools where one teacher supervises 2–3 classes because of their small sizes.<...>

Russian and Russian literature teaching is especially badly done in the Tatar schools, particularly the primary classes. A considerable part of teachers are bad at Russian and are unable to provide pupils with sound knowledge. The unsatisfactory teaching of Russian in the Tatar schools is not in line with the working Tatars’ aspirations to master the Russian language, which depreciates the role of the national school causing parents to send their children to Russian schools.

There are also grave shortcomings in teaching Tatar language and literature. The plenary meeting considers it inadmissible that the majority of Tatar children studying in Russian schools, absolutely do not know or learn their native language and literature. As a consequence, the number of Tatars, who know badly or do not know their native tongue at all, is growing. They are alienated from their culture created by the Tatar people which is centuries old. They are unable to do socio-political, educative and organizational work among the Tatar people.<...>

The grave shortcomings revealed in the Tatar schools have made their school-leavers inferior to those who graduated from Russian schools due to the low level of teaching of a number of general subjects, especially Russian. In recent years, the Tatar schools have deteriorated in the preparations for their school-leavers for life, production activity and entry to higher and secondary educational establishments. Besides, on admission of applicants, the republic’s IHLs did not take into account the specifics of the Tatar national school, which made it much more difficult for the Tatar school leavers to be accepted.

The Plenary meeting of the CPSU regional party committee does not consider it normal that in recent years, the republic’s secondary specialised schools have stopped setting up groups consisting of indigenous students. This has almost led to the discontinuation of training such specialists as workers in the commerce sector, agro technicians, live stock experts, doctor’s assistants, nurses, etc., who have a good command of the Tatar language necessary for work in the Tatar communities.

Attaching great political importance to the national school as the most important basis for further development of the language and culture of the Tatar people, for the training of nationals and with the aim of eliminating shortcomings in this matter, the plenary meeting of the Tatar CPSU regional committee has decreed:

1. That the bureau of the party regional committee, the Soviet of Ministers of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, the district and city party committees, the executive committees of district and city Soviets, the Ministry of Education and its local bodies be obliged no longer to underestimate the role and significance of the national school; to contribute in every possible way to enhancing its
prestige; to take under its unremitting control the Tatar schools’ performance; to take greater care of
them. <...>

4. The Ministry of Education of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and its local bodies
be obliged to resolve the issue of the chaos and anarchy in the supervision of the Tatar schools and to
carry into effect the following measures:

<...> d) to radically improve the quality of the Tatar language and literature teaching; to have chil-
dren display more interest and respect to them; to reintroduce a school leaving state examination in
Tatar literature; to revise the school curricula and textbooks in the Tatar language and literature in the
line of their perfection; to improve the academic staff by employing university graduates; to introduce
the Tatar language and literature teaching with subsequent exam taking for the Tatar children, studying
at the Russian schools and Russian classes of mixed schools. <...>

SA HPD TR, c. 15, l. 39, f. 140, s. 5–15.

No. 118
Some performance data of the Tatar schools in the city of Kazan, as presented by Rogova,
head of the department of propaganda at Kazan city party committee

14 May 1958

In the 1957–1958 academic year, there are 119 schools of general compulsory education, out of
which there are: 3 Tatar schools (No. 49, 106, 89) and 17 Russian–Tatar schools (No. 82, 57, 26, 35, 113,
91, 92, 118, 30, 95, 18, 80, 76, 12, 13, 114).

180 Tatar classes have 4,026 pupils.
On average, the class size is 18–25 pupils.
The enrollment of Tatar pupils in the Tatar schools decreases with every year. While in the 1947–
1948 academic year, the city schools had 6,650 pupils taught in the Tatar language (there were 12 Tatar
and 2 Russian–Tatar schools), then in the 1950–1951 academic year, there were 10 Tatar schools left,
and 13 Russian–Tatar schools and the number of pupils have reached 6,932; but in the 1954–1955 aca-
demic year, there were only 7 Tatar schools left, and 5,500 pupils were taught in their native tongue;
in the 1956–1957 academic year, there were 6 Tatar schools. 10 Russian–Tatar schools, and the school
enrollment was 4,246; in the 1957–1958 academic year, there were 3 Tatar schools, 17 mixed schools,
and the school enrollment was 4,026.

At present, the number of Tatar pupils studying in all the schools of the city of Kazan is 23,676, out
of which only 4,025 pupils are taught in their mother tongue, which is 17% of the total Tatar pupils.
Recently, due to the general growth of the school enrollment in the city, there has been a marked
shortage of school buildings. With every year, the Tatar schools have introduced more and more
Russian classes, and as a result, a number of Tatar schools have been transformed into Russian
ones.

Some of the existing mixed schools (No. 35, 57, 91 and others) are housed in badly adapted build-
ings or have limited classroom space, in comparison with Russian classes, as they don’t have necessary
facilities for the teaching and educational process which should guarantee training necessary for the
pupils’ future practical activity.
The instructional plans and syllabus for the Tatar schools are far from being ideal. The pupils’ work-
load in the Tatar schools is much heavier than that in the Russian ones.
A serious factor is that teachers who teach in the Tatar schools have a small teaching load. As a con-
sequence, those teaching in the national schools are less fixed financially, as compared to the teachers
working in the Russian schools.
The local education authorities show little interest in the Tatar schools. The performance of the Tatar schools is not studied and the positive experience has not been reviewed. Native language teaching is not popularized among the rural communities.

The Urban department of public education has only one employer who is a Tatar, and district education authority No. 5 employs 2 inspectors who are Tatars.

The city is able to widen the network of the Tatar schools and improve their working conditions. More attention should be paid to this matter. First and foremost, the local education authorities need to be consolidated by employing nationals. All Tatar secondary schools need to be provided with self-contained standardized school buildings and more attention and interest to their work needs to be shown.

SA HPD TR, f. 15039a, f. 77, s. 44–44 reverse.

No. 119

Extract from the report of K. Faseev, Chairman of Presidium of Supreme Soviet
at the 8th Plenary session of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic Oblast
[Provincial] Committee of the CPSU

21 May 1959

In the construction of ethnic Tatar culture, the Party and Soviet bodies as well as creative workers base their work upon the achievements of both global and, overwhelmingly, the advanced Russian culture.

Russian culture and language exert an extremely salutary influence over our culture. The majority of the Soviet Tataria cultural luminaries have a deep understanding of this.

Along with the above, we currently dare not pass by in silence that a certain part of our intelligentsia hold unhealthy and demagogic sentiments about the condition and development of Tatar culture. This undermines the firm foundation of our culture and is an attempt (be it conscious or unconscious) to antagonise Tatar culture against the cultures of other peoples, retreat into their shell, position themselves above all and, if possible to impose their culture upon other peoples.

Certain representatives of our intelligentsia seem to possess an unjustifiable feelings of conceit, arrogance, dedication to everything Tatar, limited point of view, and ideological world view restricted to everything which is Tatar.

Yes, we heartily wish the prosperity of out ethnic culture, language, literature and art. We wish to raise standard of culture of the Tatar people in every possible way. This is a crucial task for all the Party, Soviet, Komsomol and Labour bodies.

However, we are opposed to any localistic tendencies, self-absorption and national narrow-mindedness. Since this does encourage the development of our culture, but hinders it.

<...> How then are these unhealthy phenomena manifest in our culture development?

First and foremost, the question at issue lies in the position of some part of the Tatar intelligentsia, in particular, the writers N. Fattakh, Sh. Mannur, G. Latypov and the others over the years who have tied hard to assert that the Tatar culture, language, literature are at the alleged risk of elimination and extinction. They claim that the present-day Tatars learn the cultural achievements of Russia, the Russian language, that Tatar children study in Russian schools, that republic government neglect the cultural advancement of the Tatars inhabiting other republics, districts and provinces in terms of the ethnic Tatar culture. They also claim that these Tatars have ceased to be Tatar and that the field of Tatar cultural influence has been restricted.

Could we agree to such a contention? Certainly not. It is an explicitly erroneous and harmful point of view. It is nothing short of an attempt to rekindle the previously debunked theory of ethno-cultural autonomy which is radically antagonistic to the Leninist national policy of the Communist party.
The Tatar language as well as any other can continue to develop, enrich and improve on a daily and yearly basis by virtue of both the new linguistic realities of its own and linguistic borrowings. It is a naturally determined process. However, as strange as it may seem, certain people persist in attempts to oppose the enrichment of our tongue, in favour of the Russian language, while polluting the Tatar language with subliminal and alien borrowings from Arabic.

However strange it might sound, certain printed media have taken an unacceptable position. Arbitrarily, at the insistence of certain writers and journalists, the magazine ‘Azat Khatyn’ substituted generally accepted Russian words which have long existed in our language with Arabic words incomprehensible which are incomprehensible to any but for elder generation who have studied in the madrasah. The magazine prints ‘râis’ instead of ‘predsedatel’ (chairman), ‘säyasät’ instead of ‘politika’ (policy), ‘sänä-gat’ instead of ‘iskusstvo’ (art), ‘yugari sovet’ instead of ‘Verkhovnyi Sovet’ (Supreme Soviet). <...>

Such impermissible liberties, I regret to say, are also taken by the children’s magazine ‘Yalkm’.

The ‘Sovet Tatarstani’ newspaper’s editorial office allocate too much paper space for writers who repeatedly misinform the readership and antagonise them towards terms and definitions borrowed from Russian. Comrades, this is intolerable since such connivance and failing to take timely measures is likely to lead to very bad consequences.

While some of the comrades oppose the very use of definitions derived from Russian, others, for instance, N. Fattakh, support the position of Tatarisation, that is, adapting them to the local Tatar pronunciation. They keep trying to make us spell and write ‘kalhuz’ instead of ‘kolkhoz’, ‘satsializm’ instead of ‘sotsializm’, ‘prisidØtel’ instead of ‘predsedatel’ (chairman), ‘abkum’ instead of ‘obkom’ (the Party oblast [provincial] committee), ‘gözet’ instead of ‘gazeta’ etc.

They claim that the Tatar people are used to speaking this way. How little they know about this people! Workers and peasants have long mastered these definitions, use them properly and have a deep understanding of them. Nevertheless, certain linguistics amateurs are trying to pull us backwards which, without saying, might lead them to defeat.

We, comrades, should safeguard the integrity of our language, avoid doing violence to, distorting and debasing our tongue by anybody. The Party, Soviet, Komsomol, trade-union officials, representatives of art and literature communities, media people need to be active in this ‘war of words’ for the further advancement and enrichment of the mother tongue using it as a powerful instrument for communist education of toiling masses.

The transition of the Tatar script to the Russian-based alphabet is considered to be an act of great significance which contributed to the further positive advancement of the Tatar language. Therefore, certain appeals to restore the Latin alphabet or even the Arabic script uttered heard at the linguistic conference affiliated with the KBAS USSR, must be castigated.

SA HPD TR, c. 15, f. 40, f. 134, s. 123–129.

No. 120

From reports of the TASSR Chief Department for Literature and Publishing

1958

There have been cases when certain employees of some publishing houses have tried to encourage certain harmful publications. To exemplify the above said one could cite a collection of poems by the poet Sh. Mannur ‘Evening melodies’. The case surrounding this book is very scandalous. Prior to being submitted for editing we had discussed the volume several times at the editorial board gatherings of Tatknigoizdat (The Tatar Book Publisher) where the author had been given warnings regarding political and ideological inconsistency of certain verses. Alas, Sh. Mannur showed no desire to defer to any opinion. The matter came to the attention of the Regional Party Committee. There the verse collection was
discussed in the culture department. The author remained of the same mind. Thus, Sh. Mannur's book reached us. I. Muzafarov, the chief censor, read the work and informed the Director of the Department that the collection contained certain individual works with political and ideological defects and that he was not able to authorise this book for printing in its present state. Thereafter the entire censor board of the Department became familiar with this collection of verse. This led to an operational meeting of censors who all agreed that the book could not be published as it stood. They decided to submit an official letter to the Party Regional Committee Secretary Batyev.

S. Batyev delegated the task to Faseev who in turn gathered a special conference. Others present at the conference included officials from Tatknigoizdat, Party Regional Committee officials, the Director of Tatoblit (Regional Department dealing with literature) and censor Muzafarov. The key objection related to the poem ‘Past Life’ and the epigram ‘About stunted poets’. The poem's contents revealed that the poet who had spent all his conscious life in the USSR, painted his entire path in life in black tones, and with a single stroke of the pen he had erased everything bright and positive which the Soviet system had given to the ordinary people, including Sh. Mannur.

The verbatim translation of the epigram read as follows:

The times of Tukay and Taktash when they wrote their verse have passed
And they are not unlikely to return
Oh you, the last Gullivers, give way!
The Lilliputs have invaded poetry

The poet bewails the passing years, the times when Tukay was writing, while overlooking the fact that of the depravity of the Tsar's autocracy. Our Party nurtures the young talented generation of poets with care while Mannur labels them as Lilliputs. Moreover, this epigram clearly reveals the idea that Mannur and other of his kind are the last Gullivers, the last of the Mohicans and that after their death no real poetry would exist.

Those present at this conference unanimously condemned the verses by Sh. Mannur and the decision was taken to remove them from the collection. Only after this decision had been taken was the collection authorized for printing.

Another example. In the run-up to the All-Russian Constitutive Congress of Writers, Tatknigoizdat prepared a monograph by Kh. Usmanov for publication. It was entitled ‘About Modern Tatar Literature’ which was also filled with an abundance of politically wrong statements. The monograph claimed that the Tatar writers had consolidated their connection with the masses only during the Great Patriotic War. Many of the Tatar men of letters were not even mentioned therein, while the literary activity of some of them was misinterpreted. After the Regional Party Committee intervened to improve the situation the work underwent significant revision.

However, it should also be said that the Obkom (Regional Party Committee) did not share our negative position regarding the play by Yunus Aminov ‘Roots’. Censor Z. Aminov found that it accusatory of the collective farm system. He submitted a report to this effect to his senior official. All the censors had read the play and a conference was held on the matter at which they subsequently criticized it sharply. However, the Regional Party Committee found that although the play was poor, there were no grounds to remove it from the repertoire and permitted that it be staged. Censor Aminov sent an official letter to the Glavlit (the USSR Head Office for Literature) of the USSR. Glavlit gave orders that the play be halted in a letter to the regional committee. Again the Obkom got its own way. If truth be told, the play was met with recognition from the theatrical public.

In 1959 there was an increase in the number of plays being performed without the permission of the censors. Umetbaev, stage director in the Menzelinsk collective-and-state farm theatre clearly stepped out of line when he staged the uncensored play ‘She’ by Emma Shamil, ‘Çulpan’ (Venus) by Sh. Khu-

The Republican House of Folk Art, despite more than one warning, persisted in allowing uncensored plays to be part of the repertoire and to be published. Duplicate copies of ‘Ramay’ by G. Zaimasheva and ‘Jafalar’ by Ishmuratova were disseminated. The Almetyeysk republic kolkhoz theatre staged the play ‘The Stars Shine’ by S. Kalmetov. Those facts were highlighted in an official letter addressed to the Obkom Secretary Tabei, putting an end to this practice.

The satirical magazine ‘Çayan’ published a poem ‘Who is He’ by Kh. Tufan which from a political point of view was quite underhand. The same magazine published a cartoon that interpreted the essence of revisionism from a non-Marxist standpoint. After the intervention of the Obkom the items in question were removed.

1961

The editorial office of the newspaper ‘Tatarstan yaşaları’ published on 12 December 1961 the article ‘Two Letters, Two Points of View’. The article incorporated the author’s letter rejecting everything which was new in the country and tried to revise and rebut the decisions of the 22nd Party Congress. He writes: ‘There is no end or edge in sight of the path towards Communism. In order to satisfy and improve the living conditions of the Soviet people, the government has recently adopted a detailed seven-year plan. However, I assume that we are unlikely to be able to fulfill it in time and in full. I dare say that we lack people who work honestly and to the full extent of their power. We have to listen on the radio and read in the newspapers all the positive comments about honesty and conscientiousness typical of the Soviet people, the builders of communism. However, I cannot agree with this and I would like to give a few examples…

Editorial comments on it are lacklustre and unconvincing in comparison with the author of the letter. The editorial office does not face up to the author of this letter. After an urgent demand the editors made corrections to the text.

The Kazan State University issued a monograph ‘The Soils of Tatary’ under the editorship of M. Vinokurov. The book is written from the point of view of the travopo’e [crop rotation] supporters. It contains given tables, comparisons and evidence to show that perennial grasses are good predecessors for wheat and rye.

1962

In 1962, a book by lieutenant general G. Safiullin was published entitled ‘On the Roads to Victory’. It was a book of memoirs. With the consent of the Regional Party Committee over fifty references to Stalingrad were removed from the book. Serious political and ideological interventions were made in the materials which were due to be broadcast on television. Two films were banned: ‘20 years later’, and ‘Turn Beauty into Reality’. The article ‘Alexander Blok’ was reworked before approval by the censor for broadcasting.

At the beginning of 1961, Tatknigozdat published a booklet by N. Aitov ‘Peasants’ coming together with the Working class during extensive Building of Communism’. The booklet was abundant with subjectivistic speculations. According to the author, Socialism is one stage and Communism—quite another.

On 26 November censors removed the poem ‘The Sun’ by N. Belyaev from a television broadcast. The verses had been authorized by editor R. Kutuy and editor in chief R. Mustafin. The verse was dedicated to defending the rights of an unknown person. It suggests that people were not allowed creative freedom, that the sun was falling and fading, while the creator was disobedient and angular. The poem offers such ideas as ‘mistrust has not yet been stifled in man, while the poet passes from the collective apartments’. As it later emerged, the ‘individual’ referred to was the abstract artist Anikienok. By
removing ‘The Sun’ from the broadcast, the censors had done the right thing, while those editors who defended the abstractionist were not right.

In September 1962, a booklet by R. Rakhmatullina and I. Yafaeva ‘On the use of Local Folk Materials in Economic Geography lessons’ was authorized for printing. Censors Shamsutdinova and Galeyeva approved it. The brochure was stopped after an urgent telegramme from Glavlit of the USSR signed by Avetisyan. The entire press run in stock, as ordered by Glavlit of the USSR, was destroyed. Shamsutdinova was reprimanded. Galeyeva was given a serious administrative warning.

Librarians put 155 thousand copies into storage. Confiscated literature included works by the anti-party group of writers Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, the short biography of Stalin, booklets by Enver Hoxha ‘The Albanian People for Peace and Socialism’, ‘The People’s Republic of Albania’. Literature related to the dissemination and propaganda of political science published between 1953 and 1955 was removed from many libraries. As a rule, this concerned works of Marx and Engels imbued with the spirit of personality cult.

1963

In March 1963, the Regional Department for Literature approached the Regional Party Committee with a letter that concerned the book ‘The Formation of the Tatar ASSR’ (collection of documents and records). The book of 32 quires was presented by the Tatar Book Publisher. The publication of the book was not a matter of necessity, especially in the context of the recent publication of the two-volume ‘History of the Tatar ASSR’. The text contained incorrect wordings, a 20-page long name index, certain documents aggrandized the cult of personality of Stalin.

From the lyrics of musical comedy by Sh. Zayni ‘Irrelevance of being humorous’ a duologue was withdrawn where the longing for primeval communism shone through.

In July an article by literary critic R. Mustafin entitled ‘Thoughts about literary criticism’ was removed from ‘Sovet Ôdebiyat’ magazine. It promulgating the ideas of jadidism (a reactionary pre-revolutionary trend of the Tatar bourgeois intellectuals).

On 21 October 1963, the Department officially wrote to Tutaev concerning the book by Karimullin ‘The Bibliographical Guide to the Tatar Fine Literature’. The book contained many book titles and collections of verses related to the Stalin’s personality cult. Although bibliographical year books were exempt from preliminary control, the Publisher decided to refer to us for advice. However, with regard to the second book by Karimullin ‘Bibliography of literary Collections and Almanachs’, we were unable to exercise operative control. We were too late to advise the Party Obkom of our mistake. Not all the facts about political and ideological interference can be mentioned here.

1964

While monitoring the book ‘Consolidation of Soviet Power’, the censor Timergalina committed a political-ideological error. At the instructions of Glavlit of the USSR, two extracts were removed. The name ‘Sultan-Galeev’ was deleted in four places.

Extract from the USSR Glavlit’s analysis of the report of the TASSR Glavlit:

The annual report specified the reasons for the oversights in the book, ‘Consolidation of Soviet Power in Tatarstan’. The entire print run was confiscated and the necessary corrections were made at the instructions of the Tatar Obkom of the CPSU.

Articles and books unauthorized for print:

16. R. Muzafarov ‘Tatar Folklore Associations with East Slavs’ (Publishing House of the Kazan State University). The book was submitted to the Department for ideology of the CPSU Obkom for approval. The printing was stopped due to the erroneous interpretation of the nationalities question.
No. 121
Letter from Gaptelkhalim Khusniev, a worker from the ‘Khimenergostroy’ trust

2 February 1960

My request

Soon it will be 40 years from creation of our Autonomous Republic. During these glorious years Tatarstan became a blossomed garden. Through the visionary wisdom of our party, all branches of national economy tread with the fast and a broad steps. Our national culture has also achieved a high level. Tatar literature and art which give great talents: Gabdulla Tukay, Salix Säydäșev, Galimjan Ibrahimov, Hadi Taktash and Musa Dzhaliil day by day achieved a new successes.

Before the approaching jubilee, I am a simple worker, want to express two of my wishes. If the 'Literature and Art' newspaper will be published soon in our native republic. The readers will be happy about this.

In my opinion, it is urgent and important to find a film studio in the capital of our republic—Kazan, in order to shoot movies in the Tatar language. It is time to start doing it, because a millions of people for a long time have impatiently been waiting for the possibility to watch national movies.

By doing this, we will give a great stimulus for development of Tatar culture.

Written by: Gäptelxälim Xösniyev worker of the ‘Khimenergostroy’ trust.

SA HPD TR, f. 15, inv. 41, c. 221, s. 12, 13.

Published: A. Gallyamova, I. Abdrakipov ‘V TASSR net i duxa ot leninskoj naczionalnoj politiki' // Gasırlar Avazi = Echo Vekov.—2007.—No 1.—Pp. 94–98.

No. 122
From the record on the communal and everyday services of the population of Nizhnekamsk, the town under construction,

11 January 1966

Population of the town of Nizhnekamsk is growing rapidly'. On 1 January 1966, its population reached 27,000. Everyday services are provided by Nizhnekamsk industrial complex. 200 people work in the complex, 80% of them are engaged in servicing the town population. The main operating units of the complex are located in the public town centre. The premises for sewing, shoe-making, watch, knitwear workshops and the hairdresser's shop are very limited. Since November 1965 the sewing workshop with 30 employees has occupied two unadapted cold carriages in the temporary settlement. The only photographer's studio in the district with one employee has been placed in the basement of a building since December 1965.

At present there is only one hairdresser's and barber's shop in the whole district.

The repair services for household appliances, radio equipment and communal dwellings, dry cleaning and dyeing the clothes and shoes etc are not organized.
The history of the Tatars

The branches of the industrial complex which provide only part of the services, are located only in two built-up areas of the district—in Sheremetyevka and SheshmininskA. <...
There are only two booths for long-distance calls, <...> the town's provision of shopping facilities can satisfy only 50% of the demand. There are two bakeries and one furniture shop in the town, and no specialised shops selling sport and recreational goods, vegetables, meat and diary products. <...

In the functioning schools of Nizhnekamsk, which have 2,404 places for pupils, 4,000 pupils are being taught. According to the existing norms, there must be 4050 pupils' places, therefore, the provision of school facilities constitutes 59%. The pre-school institutions meet the demand by 33%.

The communal services are organized unsatisfactorily. Prior to the 5 January 1966, the heating was not sufficiently supplied to the houses, the temperature in the rooms was 10–12 degrees <...>. Electricity is often cut off, as a result the water and heating are cut off as well, and canteens, shops, saunas and telephone lines stop working. There is no hotel and laundry in the town, and the sauna, which accommodates 26 people, absolutely does not satisfy the needs of the population <...>.

The demand in hospitals and polyclinics is met by 32% <...> There are drawbacks in the town planning and landscaping. Completed buildings are approved without planning or landscaping of the surrounding grounds. In spring and autumn the town is barely passable even in special rubber boots.

No. 123

The report of A. Bichurin, the KGB Chairman of the Soviet of Ministers of TASSR, to the First Secretary of the Tatar Obkom (Regional Committee) of the CPSU comrade F. Tabeev

dated 3 February 1966
Confidential

In the elapsed time, the Cheka investigation of Zaynullin, Aydeldinov, Mukhamedzhanov and Yakupov in connection with clarifying their plans and precluding adverse actions had been carried out.

Since the information was received about the presence of documents (manuscripts) of operational interest in the flat of Aydeldinov, a secret inspection of his flat was undertaken. As a result, many manuscripts and copies of the letters, addressed to different authorities, were discovered, in which he referred to numerous statistics and other information, trying to show the 'humbled' position of the Tatar nation and the 'absence' of the conditions for the growth and development of the national language and culture.

Although these handwritten materials cannot give grounds for initiating a criminal case against Aydeldinov, they are rich in skillfully selected numerical data, accompanied by tendentious, erroneous conclusions, and, undoubtedly, have a politically harmful character, capable of producing certain negative influence on an ill-informed reader.

As it can be seen, Aydeldinov is erudite, very diligent and hard-working. He systematically reads a lot of various literature, starting from the Party documents and periodical press of the national Republics, up to the works of G. Iskhaki and religious editions about the 'prophet' Muhammad. Probably, this is why Aydeldinov has a reputation of a 'theorist' and an advocate of the 'interests' of national culture among the Tatar youth, acquainted with him. The main methods of Aydeldinov's activity are collection and summarizing of official numerical data, allegedly supporting his demagogic statements, compiling and sending letters, addressed to the State Party authorities, both anonymously and on behalf of a group, aspiration to identify like-minded people among the Tatars in other districts and persuade them to send similar 'addresses' of Aydeldinov to the authorities.

The negative views and actions of Aydeldinov might be to some extent caused by an unhealthy influence of Maneev, an inhabitant of the town of Baku. According to their correspondence, discovered dur-
ing the secret inspection of Aydeldinov's flat, and to the documents of 'PK', Maneev has a nationalistic mindset. He advises Aydeldinov on composing and distribution of tendentious letters, misrepresenting the matters of national policy.

The local KGB authority was informed by us about the materials concerning Maneev. Simultaneously, measures on cutting their correspondence and coordinated actions in the future have been taken.

Together with the research regarding Zaynullin, Aydeldinov, Mukhamedzhanov and Yakupov, arrangements have been made for limiting their harmful influence on their surroundings. Thus, a preventive conversation with Yakupov about his unhealthy statements and behaviour deviations was held by comrade Zamoryanov, the Secretary of the factory Partkom (Party Committee), p/ya [restricted access facility] 157, with participation of operational officials. During the conversation Yakupov admitted his mistakes and assured not to make them in the future. Further monitoring showed that he had understood our conversation in a correct way and had cut off all relations with Mukhamedzhanov and his friends.

According to our recommendation, the literary and anniversary evenings, conferences of readers and meetings with creative professionals, carried out by the Palace of Culture of Sovetsky district (in Derbyskhi), were taken under immediate control of the Partkom of the factory p/ya [restricted access facility] 157. Prominent writers and journalists, who were able to influence the course of the public events in a necessary way, rebuked or explained the erroneous statements by Zaynullin, Mukhamedzhanov and others, were specially invited to such events.

At the same time, the Partkom of the factory enhanced the monitoring of their behaviour at the factory and involved them into beneficial social work. As a result, the possibility of them using the tribune of the readers' conferences and literature evenings for openly tendentious speeches was eliminated.

The acquired information testifies that Mukhamedzhanov and his friends in private started to express opinions about the necessity to change the tactics of open actions and follow some conspiracy rules. In Mukhamedzhanov's opinion, there is a need to organize work among the Tatar youth, studying in Kazan IHLs. He gives special importance to the Tatar students from the Agricultural Institute, who go to the countryside after their graduation and can carry out the work among the Tatar population.

Mukhamedzhanov, Aydeldinov and Zaynullin undertook some attempts to practise meetings with the Tatar youth, interested in the history and culture of their people, in such places, that would guarantee the absence of social control to their 'events'.

That was the underlying motivation of the collective trip to Bulgar, organized by them in June. The people were selected to the group on the basis of national origin and well acquainted with each other. According to the idea of the trip organizers, the given 'event' was supposed to a cover-up for making unhealthy conversations about the history of Bulgar and for aheating up the national sentiments of the group's participants. A special role in this matter was assigned to F. Valeev, a research assistant of the Kazan Institute of the Language, Literature and History of the USSR Academy of Sciences, as to a like-minded person, well-informed on the history of Bulgar. On the surface, Valeev did not express any active initiative in organizing the trip to Bulgar, but he prepared to act as a guide in Bulgar. Valeev had undergone a preventive conversation in the past for his nationalistic views, and his trip to Bulgar as the leader of a team of Tatars was extremely undesirable. Moreover, according to available data, although he has stopped speaking openly speak of nationalistic views after the preventive measures, but in private he continues to express discontent about the 'humbled position' of the Tatar language and culture. Furthermore, Valeev sometimes gives Mukhamedzhanov various literature, which proves, in his opinion, the 'unequal' position of the Tatar nation.

Taking into account all the above-mentioned, Valeev was excluded from the trip to Bulgar, by the influence through the Institute directorate.

The writer N. Fattakhov and the actor G. Shamukov acted as tour guides on the way to Bulgar and during the sightseeing. In their explanations they made some politically harmful, nationalistic statements.
According to the received information, the writer N. Fattakhov, despite the preventive conversations he had in the past with the KGB at the Cabinet of Ministers of TASSR, continues to nurture nationalistic sentiments. The actor G. Shamukov also expresses opinions about the allegedly unequal position of the Tatar nation. By the request of Mukhamedzhanov and his friends, he edited some of their letters to the authorities, concerning national matters.

Taking into account the circumstances, we deem it reasonable to carry out other preventive conversations with Zaynullin, Aydeldinov, Mukhamedzhanov, Fattakhov and Valeev by summoning them to the KGB at the Cabinet of Ministers of TASSR. At the same time, beneficial influence should be exerted on Aydeldinov, Mukhamedzhanov and Zaynullin by our means.

With the purpose of additional positive influence, the corresponding conversations should be carried out (in the Partkom of the factory p/ya 157) with the wives of Mukhamedzhanov (member of CPSU) and Zaynullin.

We also deem it necessary to take preventive measures in relation to Shamukov via the Party bodies.

SA HPD TR, f. 15, inv. 7, f. 85, s. 11–16.

No. 124
The letter of T. Idrisov to the editorial office of the newspaper 'Pravda' ('Truth').

13 April 1982

Dear 'Pravda'.

I wonder why the Tatar television broadcasts in Russian. Are two All-Union channels not enough? The programs are varied, to every taste and at any time.

The television programmes in Kazan last for only 3-4 hours. They can be and should be in the Tatar language.

Our people, who know Russian poorly or do not know it at all, suffer the most. Rare TV programmes in the Tatar language become real small celebrations for them. I do not want to think (as I often hear), that it is done on purpose, so that the Tatar language slowly gets out of use. It cannot be forgotten that the language is spoken by the people, who occupy the fifth place in terms of their number among more than a hundred nations in the USSR.

The people of many regions of the Republic are completely deprived of the opportunity to watch the Tatar television programmes.

The student of the Kazan Pedagogical Institute Tagir Idrisov.

Confidential information on the letter of T. Idrisov.

The letter, signed with the name 'T. Idrisov', about increasing the number of the television programs in the Tatar language has been considered by the staff of the State Committee of TASSR on television and radio broadcasting 1982

As the analysis of the Republic television shows, the programs are broadcast both in the Tatar and Russian languages, that is, taking into account the national composition of the Tatar ASSR. The programs in the Tatar language take up the average of 50%, and literature, drama and musical content take up to 60–70% of the daily broadcasting time.

The author of the letter was invited for a discussion to the Obkom (Regional Committee) of CPSU, but our letter was returned by the post with a reply: 'the addressee does not live at the indicated address'.
By our request, the Partkom of the Pedagogical Institute engaged in the identification of 'T. Idrisov', but such a comrade was not found among the students of this educational institution.

SA HPD TR, f. 15, inv. 8, f. 1573, s. 33–34.

No. 125
The letter of D. Kasimov to the First Secretary of the Tatar Obkom of CPSU (Regional Committee)

1982

In all your speeches you say, that Lenin's national policy is being carried out in TASSR. What is happening to our people today, the young people do not know their native language, despise, do not respect their native language, native culture, people have diverged from their nation, everything native has become alien.

Tatar children, raised from the very early years in Russian nurseries, Russian kindergartens and Russian schools, lose their national feelings, native language, native culture, way of life etc. Intensive Russianisation of the Tatar people, the indigenous people of our land, has been going on and still is. This is what V. Lenin said about the national policy of the Russian Marxists:

'He, who does not accept and does not defend the equality of the nations and languages, does not fight with any national oppression and inequality, is not a Marxist, not even a democrat'.

'National programme of workers' democracy: absolutely no privileges to any nation, any language'. However, in TASSR all rights are given only to the Russian language, our language has become a dead weight. If you are a Marxist, you have to fight for equal rights of the languages.

The Russian Marxists say that 'the absence of state language at the schools for the people, teaching in all local languages' is necessary. What does a compulsory state language mean? What does the language of the Great Russians, who constitute the minority of Russian population, mean? (V. Lenin)

A compulsory state language in a multinational state is violence, it destroys national features. The compulsory Russian state language is set in TASSR, but according to Lenin, we should have Tatar. The path to life, labour, bringing-up, education is laid only via the Russian language. The significance of the Tatar language has been reduced to zero.

'There is a unified school system, therefore, do not dare teach in other language, besides Russian! In my opinion, such a communist is a Great Russian chauvinist'. (V. Lenin) The Tatar schools have gradually closed and are closing even in the villages, because there is no way in life for our language. The present fate of the people of the Volga region, the future fate of the people of the Union republics and not only <…>.

According to the data of the census of 1978, 1,200,000 Tatars have rejected their nation and language. The television programmes in the Tatar language are strictly limited in TASSR, to no more than 40%.

There is no spirit of Lenin's national policy in TASSR. Those, who say, that we put into practice Lenin's national policy, are lying with Lenin's Party card in the pocket.

The crusade against national minorities has led the nations to a national catastrophe.

V. Lenin was against Russianisation. 'The policy of tsarism, landlords and the bourgeoisie towards these nations was to extinguish any dawn of statehood, cripple their culture, oppress the language, keep in ignorance, and, finally, Russianise them, when possible' (V.Lenin.).

The national policy, carried out in TASSR, is 100% contradictory to Lenin's principle. V. Lenin wrote in the resolution on the national matter: 'Special laws have been issued, that provide for the usage of the native language in all state bodies'.

You all know this very well, there is no use writing to you about it'.
The information on the letter of D. Kasimov. A letter signed by D. Kasimov without a return address was received by the Obkom (Regional Committee) of CPSU

The author writes that Lenin's principles of national policy are not followed in TASSR, young people of Tatar nationality reject their native language, that there are few television programs in the Tatar language.

Due to the absence of the return address it is impossible to reply to the author. I request that the matter of this letter be closed'.

Deputy Head of the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Regional Committee of CPSU R. Nogmanov.

SA HPD TR, f. 15, inv. 8, f. 1573, s. 63–68.

Published: A. Gallyamova, I. Abdrakipov 'V TASSR net i duxa ot leninskoj naczionalnoj politiki // Gazirlar Avazi = Echo Vekov.—2007.—No 1.—Pp. 94–98.

No. 126
The letter of a Tatar, resident of Almaty, Rashid Akhmetshin in the Tat[ar]
Regional Commissariat of CPSU

1982

Dear Rashid Musinovich!

I have carefully read your article entitled 'Education by making strict demands' published on 22 March 1982 in 'Pravda', and cannot but share some thoughts. I will be brief, not trying to embrace the unembraceable.

Your article does not contribute to further increase of the prestige of the Tatar people among other nations of the USSR, to the growth of its national consciousness. On the contrary. And this problem (you know this better, than me) along with the development of internationalism, will not be removed from the agenda any time soon. Is it possible, that in all Tatarstan, no other more worthy Tatar leader could be found, except for such a rogue as I. Akhmetsafin? Why such self-flagellation, who needs this?

Being aware of numerous facts, I state that no official document, say nothing of a publication for central press, is approved by the Party, and Soviet administration of Almaty without positive examples involving the representatives of the native nationality. If necessary, far-fetched examples are given. I am sure, you would not need them.

Two years ago I had a business trip and was lucky to go for the first time in my life to the homeland of my ancestors, Tataria, and, of course, to Kazan. What a glaring contrast with Almaty! Almost all the visual propaganda, advertisements, all the banners, titles of cultural and social facilities and others are only in Russian. If it was not for the greeting in the railway station 'Raxim itegez Tatarstanga!' ('Welcome to Tatarstan!') and the sweet chattering of the old women in buses and trams, I would not have believed my luck.

And the registration of a the million resident of Kazan? I do not think, that the happy mother comes from the Christian Tatars. Even if it is so, it cannot be explained to everyone. In Almaty, where there are only 12% of the native population at the time of the 250th anniversary of Kazakhstan's voluntary annexation to Russia, the Party authorities selected a young Kazakh couple.

Why and on behalf of whom does comrade R. Sabirov suggest in the pages of 'Pravda' that the future city for the builders of the Tatar nuclear power station be named Kamskie Polyany' (Kama Meadows)? Are Nizhnekamsk, Naberezhnye Chelny, Zelenodolsk, Chistopol, Spassk, etc. not enough?

Why not name the city, for example, Dzhaliil? There is the city of Dzhambul in Kazakhstan, the city of Salavat in Bashkiria, etc.!
Is it by chance, that even after the things said here, young people, some Komsomol activists, whom I met in Tataria, do not know the history of their own people, prefer to speak Russian, change their names, so that they sound Russian? Moreover, they are not going to teach (I mean not only in school) their children the native language. You see, they are ‘afraid that the children will have Tatar accent’.

Is it by chance, that the reporter of APN (Agency of Political News), when publishing an article on the 150th birth anniversary of I. Shishkin, writes that he was inspired by the most powerful Russian nature? This happened in Alabuga, the very heart of original Volga Bulgaria.

Is it by chance, that the First Secretary of Bashkir Regional Committee of CPSU comrade M. Shakirov in the article in 'Pravda’, dedicated to the 100th birth anniversary of Akmulla, has not said a single word about his connections to the Tatar people, that he studied and created in the Tatar language? While he mainly writes about his Odyssey across the Kazakh steppes.

Bearing in mind my promise to be brief, I will say in the end, that your initial was not changed by accident in 'Pravda', dated 22 March 1982. Instead of R., it was typed V. Musin. Does it not speak of the attitude?

Dear Rashid Musinovich, please, do not think, that I am narrow-minded or limited by my national views. Usually, various 'schizos' annoy the Party Committees with such long and discursive letters. I perfectly understand that the process of convergence and then merging of the nations (in very distant prospect) is irreversible, dialectic and objective. But do we have to urge this process and artificially speed it up?

Respectfully yours, Rashid Akhmetshin. 28 years old.

Almaty.

P.S As far as possible, do not limit the circulation of the magazines 'Chayan', 'Azat Khatyn', 'Kazan Utlary', 'Yalkyn', do not deprive us (more than three million), who by an evil fate left Tataria in the past, of the opportunity to excel in the native language, and know modern life of our beautiful homeland.

Thank you so much for the literature in the Tatar language, which is sold in Almaty in the shop 'Otan' (in Tatar Vatan), for regular tours of the masters of the Tatar culture.

SA HPD TR, f. 15, inv. 8, f. 1573, s. 20.

Published: A. Gallyamova, I. Abdrakipov 'V TASSR net i duxa ot leninskoj naczionalnoj politiki' [There is no spirit of Lenin's national policy in TASSR] // Gasırlar Avazı = Echo Vekov.—2007.—No 1.—Pp. 94–98.

No. 127

The letter of a student of Kazan State University I. Ilyin to the editorial office of the magazine of the CK ALYCL (Central Committee of All-Union Leninist Young Communist League) Komsomolskaya Zhizn’

9 September 1985.

Dear editors, This letter is written to you by Ilyin Igor Petrovich, a student of Kazan S[tate] University. I shall directly formulate the matter about which I am writing without introductions et c[etera], in order not to take up much time (by the way, always lacking before the end-of-term exams).

Do you consider that the title (or brand perhaps) of Komsomol member has been devalued? Say, as compared to the 1930s? Or even the 1950s? I think it has65. The title of Komsomolets, putting it mildly, has become lacklustre and has somewhat lost what it had. Well, ask anyone, who comes by, about it. Of course, quite naturally, he will answer, that Komsomol is a militant body, having an important meaning.

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65 Hereinafter underlining is used to reflect the highlighting in the document.
I personally met more than once such Komsomolets (and not only), who openly spoke of Komsonol with disregard and disdain. And there is a grain of truth in it. 

I expect your negative reaction to all this. But is it not high time to raise the question of further promotion of Komsomolets name? 'To make it shine again', so to say (like Mayakovsky wrote, remember?)

I will give (maybe not exactly adequate) an example of an engineer's job becoming less prestigious. A rather suitable analogy, in my opinion.

You may say: we all can talk and reply.

1) Strictly limit the admission to the membership in ALYCL in many cases the admission is almost forced. The indifference for everything begin with a dialogue:

— What, are you a redhead? Everybody joins and you don't.

You will talk of voluntariness. However, while such 'propaganda' will be carried out in the primary organization, the ALYCL District Committees will get information about everybody's great desire to join the ALYCL.

2) Exclude from the members of the ALYCL all those unworthy of the name.

You may say: they should be re-educated. Well, re-education is another question. In my opinion, the re-educated ones are very few compared to those being re-educated. And this is good, you will say. And I think, the foundation to all is laid at a very young age, and the emphasis should be put on re-education. And we, let's say it straight, do not pay enough attention to the organization under patronage. (Leave the re-education out for some time as a last resort).

3) I suggest that the conditions for joining ALYCL be set. To cut a long story short, I think it's too early (for many) to join Komsomol at 8–9th grade.

4) It's time to start effective campaign against bureaucracy and red tape.

5) It's time to end window dressing in many cases.

With this, I finish, sending my Komsomol regards, Ilyin I[gor] P[etrovich].

P. S. I apologise for this unusual letter. However, if I'd started to re-write it, I'd have softened and sugarcoated many things. And like this, I've blurted out what I had on my chest.

SA HPD TR, f. 4034, inv. 47, f. 21, s. 34–35.

Published: A. Bushuev 'Zvanie komsomolca, myagko vy'razhayas`, potusknelo i neskol`ko utratilo by`loe... ' ('The title of Komsomolec, putting it mildly, has become lacklustre and has somewhat lost what it had... ') // Gasrlar Avazi = Echo Vekov.—2011.—No. 3/4.—Pp. 127–128.

No. 128

From the letter of a member of the Tatar Youth Union 'Azatlyk' A. K. to the editorial office of the newspaper 'Suverenitet' ('Sovereignty')

January 1992
Nizhnekamsk.

Even if the homeland is in the desert,
still she is the most beautiful.

There cannot be several homelands,
the homeland is one for many years.

(R. Fayzullin)

Nationalism originally was defined in the English Political Dictionary as a national liberation movement of the Irish. […]
1902, the draft of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party programme says: 'item 7 The recognition of the right to self-determination for all nations, constituent in the State'; 1913 'item 5. It is inadmissible to mix up the issue of the right to self-determination for all nations with the issue of feasibility of separation of some nation from the state'.

And so the democrats decided to shape the destiny of a great ancient nation, which had acquired its culture and script several centuries earlier.

You want an 'emblem and flag'—you can get them from us, a variant of imperial design. You need 'independence'—take it. Here are empty carriages, you need a namestnik representative—we will send him. The Parliament does not work well—we will send you [...] Kashchey, Zmey Gorynych (Russian fairy tale characters) and Bluebeard. You have much land—we will make a referendum and divide it between the 'centre' and the 'empire'. You want freedom—we will send OMON (Special Purpose Mobility Unit): [...] 

However, the democrats have forgotten, that any humiliation or deceit towards another—is a weakness of mind and inferiority of their heads, if they have any [...].

Our people will not let anyone suffocate and destroy the Tatar people. The people, who had been creating their culture, language and script for centuries, having made its contribution to the development of world culture; who [...] lived in friendship with all people, famished equally with Russians, Bashkirs, Ukranians..., preserved the warm feelings to everybody, now are being portrayed to humanity as 'outcasts' and 'deficient people'.

Bayramova, Mulyukov, Makhmutov are the ideals of moral unity and solidarity of the people, the guardians of a great clan.

It is hard for us to fight for sovereignty, but I am sure, that the 'empire' will fall under the purity of the Tatar people's ideals. [...] 

People of Tatarstan, let us unite in the rows of defenders, [for] freedom of the independent state of Tatarstan.


A. Fatkhutdinov, Member of T[atar] Y[outh] U[nion] 'Azatlyk'.

SA HPD TR f. 8245, inv. 2, f. 6, s. 7–8 reverse.

Published: A. Bushuev 'Zvanie komsomolca, myagko vy`razhayas`, potusknelo i neskol`ko utratilo by`lo...' (The title of Komsomolec, putting it mildly, has become lacklustre and has somewhat lost what it had...') // Gasırlar Avazı = Echo Vekov.—2011.—No. 3/4.—P. 128.

No. 129

Declaration on the State Sovereignty of the Tatar Soviet Socialist Republic

Supreme Soviet of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic,
– being aware of the historical responsibility for the destiny of the multinational people of the Republic;
– showing respect to sovereign rights of all people, inhabiting the Russian Federation and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;
– marking the inconsistency between the status of the Autonomous Republic and further political, economic, social and spiritual development of its multinational people;
– implementing the inalienable right of the Tatar nation, all people of the Republic to self-determination;
– striving to create a democratic state of law,

66 ‘Bulenmes’ in the Tatar language translates as ‘indivisible.’
67 ‘Cir yözendağə soñğɨ imperiya’ in translation from the Tatar language is ‘the last empire on Earth.’
1. Declares state sovereignty of Tataria and reorganizes it into the Tatar Soviet Socialistic Republic—Republic of Tatarstan.

2. The soil, subsoil, natural and other resources on the territory of the Tatar SSR are all the exclusive property of its people.

3. The Tatar SSR guarantees all citizens, living on its territory, irrespective of their nationality, social origin, religious and political affiliation and other differences, equal human rights and freedoms.

   Equal functioning of Tatar and Russian as state languages, preserving and developing the languages of other nationalities are guaranteed in the Tatar SSR.

4. Henceforth, the 'Tatar Soviet Socialistic Republic' ('Tatar SSR' or 'Republic of Tatarstan') is to be used as an official name of the State in the Constitution, other legal acts and in state life.

   The supreme body of the Republic state authority is to be named the 'Supreme Soviet of the Tatar Soviet Socialistic Republic', and the acts, promulgated by it—acts of the Supreme Soviet of the Tatar Soviet Socialistic Republic.

5. The present Declaration is the basis for drafting the Constitution of the Tatar SSR, development of the Tatar SSR legislation, participation of the Tatar SSR in preparation and signing the Union Treaty, treaties with the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic] and other republics, putting forward for discussion with its people the most important questions of the Tatar SSR state building, its relationships with the Union of SSR, RSFSR and other republics. The constitution and laws of the Tatar SSR have the supremacy on all territory of the Tatar SSR.

6. Before adopting the new Constitution of the Tatar SSR, other laws and normative acts of the Tatar SSR, the laws and by-laws of the Tatar SSR, RSFSR and the Union of SSR, that do not contradict the Declaration on the State Sovereignty of the Tatar SSR, are in force on the territory of the Tatar SSR.

   The present Declaration shall enter into force upon the moment of its adoption.

The Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Tatar Soviet Socialistic Republic
M. Shaimiev
Kazan, 30 August 1990.

Sovetskaya Tataria.—1990.—31 August.

No. 130
The Resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the Tatar SSR on the Draft of the Union Treaty

The Supreme Soviet of the Tatar SSR, expressing the will of the multinational people of the Republic of Tatarstan for creating a voluntary Union of the Sovereign States:

 – based on absolute priority of human rights and universal human values;
 – supporting the historical right of the people to self-determination and equal rights;
 – preserving and deepening the historically developed economical and political connections between all nations and nationalities of the Soviet State;
 – marking the necessity to acknowledge the sovereignty of the republics and distribution of competences between the Union of SSR and its subjects on constitutional and contractual basis;

1. Takes the draft of the Union Treaty as a basis. Considers that the soonest signing of the Union Treaty is an urgent socio-political task, a condition for achieving economical stability, harmonization of transnational relations, respect for the human rights and freedoms, individual rights, guarantee for civil peace and concord. Division of property is considered a necessary condition for signing the Treaty.
2. In accordance with the Declaration about the state sovereignty of the Tatar SSR dated 30 August 1990 and the Law of USSR dated 26 April 1990 'On Delineation of Competencies Between the Union of SSR and the Federation Subjects', declares its readiness to become a co-founder of the Union of Sovereign Soviet Republics, independently sign the Union Treaty and enter into the resulting high commitments.

3. To organize a plenipotentiary delegation of the Republic of Tatarstan for preparation of the official text of the Union Treaty and its further signing. To entrust this delegation with the preparation and signing of the Treaty with the RSFSR and other Sovereign Republics.

4. To instruct the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Tatar SSR to summarize the proposals and comments, expressed during the discussion on the Union Treaty draft, and to submit them to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR together with the present Resolution.

The Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Tatar SSR
M. Shaimiev
13 December 1990.

Socialistic Tatarstan.—1990.—14 December.

No. 131
The Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Tatar Soviet Socialistic Republic

We live in difficult times, times of change and hopes.

The commonwealth of the people of our country, united by thousands of live threads, is at a brink. As the events in some regions of our country show, one incorrect, unconsidered move of any republic, region, district, town, political leader of any rank—and something irremediable may happen. And it is impossible to predict, how much time our descendants will need to collect again the parts of the still integral society, split by political ambitions and shortsightedness.

Is there a chance to preserve this integrity? Yes, there is a chance! It is in the hands of each person, nation, republic, it is in wisdom, a sense of reality, flexibility of governmental bodies and their leaders.

There is also a means for this—the Treaty of the Union of Sovereign Republics. It guarantees the renewal of the Union State, observance of human rights, irrespective of national, religious and other affiliations. It is the real way to social and economic well-being, civil peace and concord. Therefore, we appeal to the Republics to co-operate more actively in working over the completion of the Treaty and its soonest signing.

We confirm with great satisfaction, that to the question of the All-Union Referendum, whether the new Union should be or not, the multinational people of Tatarstan answered: 'Yes!'. This is the will of the people, and it is the supreme law to us.

Being guided by this declaration of will, based on the Declaration of the State Sovereignty of the Tatar SSR, the Supreme Soviet confirms the readiness of the Republic of Tatarstan to sign the Union Treaty immediately and independently. We see this as our contribution to the building of a renewed Union, where each Sovereign Republic will be a monolith, without which our future home cannot be constructed.

Our desire to make a Treaty with the Russian Federation is dictated by the same holy and pure intentions; it will be an embodiment of democratic principles of self-determination and equal rights, cooperation and mutual help.

Our position is clear and constructive. It has been communicated to the President of the USSR, Soviet of the Federation, administration of the RSFSR. We hope for a just evaluation of this position
and its support on behalf of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR and all fraternal republics.

16 April 1991.

Sovetskaya Tataria.—1991.—17 April.

No. 132
Joint Statement of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Tatar SSR, Soviet of the Ministers of the Tatar SSR, the Tatar Republican Committee of the CPSU, the Tatar Republican Soviet of Trade Unions, the Tatar Republican Committee of ALYCL 'On Participation of the Republic of Tatarstan in signing the Union Treaty

To the President of the USSR Comrade M. Gorbachev
To the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR
To the Constitutional Review Committee of the USSR
To the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR and to the Presidiums of other Union Republics,

on 25 April 1991 the Joint Statement of the leaders of nine Union Republics and the President of the USSR 'On urgent measures for stabilizing the situation in the country and overcoming the crisis'. The people of the Sovereign Republic of Tatarstan share the concern, reflected in the Statement, caused by a deepening crisis of our society, which has penetrated all areas of its political, social and economic development; support the parties of the Statement in their aspiration along with the attempt to analyze the situation, to talk openly not only about the errors of the historical past, difficulties of the transition period, but also the errors, made during the course of perestroika, the fundamental purpose of which was to restore historical justice.

At the same time, some provisions of the statement about the ways to overcome the current situation raise serious concern.

While advocating universal restoration of the Constitutional order, the Statement parties came into conflict with the existing laws, in particular, with the Law 'On distribution of competences between the Union of the SSR and the Subjects of the Federation', and also with the Resolution of the 4th Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR 'On general conception of the new Union Treaty and procedure of its conclusion'.

The Statement about signing the Treaty by 'the delegations of the named Republics' in essence de-bars the Republic of Tatarstan from signing it, though the draft of the Union Treaty has been developed in common collaboration with the plenipotentiary representatives of the nine Union and all former Autonomous Republics. In fact, a narrow circle of the leaders of the Union Republics is trying to decide the fate of Tatarstan and other Autonomous Republics, which voted at the Referendum on 17 March 1991 for the renewed Union of Sovereign Republics with equal rights.

The essence of decisions of the Tatar SSR Supreme Soviet, taken after the adoption of the Declaration on State Sovereignty, is that the Republic of Tatarstan considers itself an independent co-founder of the Union of SSR equal to all Union Republics. This position is not separative, it is directed at eliminating the division of the Republics into Union and Autonomous ones, and at strengthening the USSR as a Union of Republics with equal rights.

The Tatar SSR has a developed economy, trade surplus, high level of integration of national economy with all Republics of the country. An attempt to preserve former structures nowadays means noth-
ing but a return to the failed national and state structure of the country. Our position does not mean breaking connections with Russia, which have been formed in a natural historical way. The session of the Supreme Soviet of Tatarstan has taken a decision to strengthen these relationships on the basis of a treaty with the RSFSR.

Tatarstan declared its intention to become a co-founder of the Union of SSR back in 1922, when the USSR was being created, then during the adoption of the Constitution in 1936. However, the personal stand of Stalin hindered the implementation of the will of the people of the Republic. Attempts to change the status of Tatarstan were undertaken in the 1960s and 1970s. Finally, on 30 August 1990, the Supreme Soviet of Tatarstan unanimously accepted 'The Declaration on State Sovereignty of the Tatar Soviet Socialistic Republic', which became a form of international and civil concord in the Republic.

As a result of the legal and organizational conditions which have arisen in the recent years, the Republic of Tatarstan has travelled the path from autonomy to sovereign statehood, which does not contradict the Constitution of the USSR. Therefore, any attempt not to take into account the reality of what has happened is unfounded, excludes 'rigorous adherence to the laws in force', and contradicts the founding principles of a state of law.

The Joint Statement in this part not only downgrades the sovereignty, but also humiliates the dignity of the people of Tatarstan.

Guided by the people's will, expressed at the Referendum, by the Declaration on the State Sovereignty, we declare the firm determination and readiness of the Republic of Tatarstan to sign the Union Treaty immediately and independently.

Sovetsкая Татария.—1991.—8 May.


No. 133
Resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the Tatar SSR on the Act on State Independence of the Republic of Tatarstan

Based on the Declaration on State Sovereignty of the Tatar SSR, taking into account the current situation, when the Republic of Tatarstan is deprived of the quota in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and of the right to participate in signing the Treaty on Economic Commonwealth of Independent States, the Supreme Soviet of the Tatar SSR decides:

1. The Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan confirms its adherence to the principles of the Declaration on State Sovereignty of the Tatar SSR, that are not to be revised in any way. Realization of these principles, real implementation of the sovereignty is a duty of all bodies of state authority and government.

2. The Republic of Tatarstan, as a Sovereign State, expresses its will and determination to have plenipotentiary direct representation in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, other state and trans-republican bodies of the Union of SSR, their structures, and also declares its right to participate in preparing and making agreements between the Repubsics, that affect the Republic of Tatarstan.

3. Taking into account extreme importance of the Act on State Independence of the Republic of Tatarstan, being aware of the liabilities that are imposed on the supreme authority bodies of the Republic, on its multinational people, to instruct the Cabinet of Ministers in a month's time to submit for consideration by the Supreme Soviet of the Tatar SSR an analysis-forecast on the change in political, legal, social and economic position of the Republic of Tatarstan resulting from the adoption of the Act on State Independence.
4. On the basis of the submitted materials, the Supreme Soviet is to prepare and carry out a nation-wide vote (Referendum) for the citizens of the Republic of Tatarstan concerning the state status of the Republic of Tatarstan.

The Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Tatar SSR
F. Mukhametshin


Sovetskaya Tataria.— 991.—26 October; Socialistic Tatarstan.—1991.—26 October.

No. 134
The Declaration on the Republic of Tatarstan Entering the Commonwealth of Independent States

Based on the need to find a solution to the political and economic crisis, caused by the dissolution of the Union of SSR;
sharing the aspiration of the independent and sovereign republics for uniting into a commonwealth of states with equal rights;
expressing the will of the multinational people of the republic of Tatarstan to preserve the united family of people, where the human rights and freedoms will be fully guaranteed to people of any nationality;
implementing the Declaration on State Sovereignty of the Republic of Tatarstan,
the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan declares its entering the Commonwealth of Independent States as a founder member.

Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan
Kazan, 26 December 1991.

Sovetskaya Tataria.—1991.—28 December.

No. 135
Resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan 'On carrying out the Referendum of the Republic of Tatarstan' about the issue of the state status of the Republic of Tatarstan

Taking into account that the definition of the state status of the Republic of Tatarstan is the most important question of the state life, in that it affects the interests of each citizen of the Republic of Tatarstan, and implementing the constitutional principle of exercising the state power by the people directly via the Referendum, the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan decides:
1. To put forward the question about the state status of the Republic of Tatarstan, to be determined in a Referendum of the Republic of Tatarstan.
2. The Referendum be carried out on 21 March 1992.
3. To include in the ballot papers the following phrasing of the question, being put forward at the Referendum, and the variants of the voters' answers:
'Do you agree that the Republic of Tatarstan is a sovereign state, and a subject of the international law building its relations with the Russian Federation and other republics and states on the basis of equitable treaties?'

'Yes' or 'No'.

4. To determine that in accordance with the Article 19 of the Law of the Republic of Tatarstan 'On Referendum in the Republic of Tatarstan', the power of the Central Referendum Commission of the Republic of Tatarstan carried out on 21 March 1992, shall be exercised by the Central Commission for the elections of the people's deputies of the Republic of Tatarstan, and the powers of district and city Referendum Commissions are exercised by the corresponding district and city Election Commissions for electing people's deputies of the local Soviets.

5. To determine that people who do not have permanent residency in the Republic of Tatarstan do not take part in the Referendum.

6. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan, local Soviets of People's Deputies in strict accordance with the Law 'On Referendum in the Republic of Tatarstan' are to provide free expression of will for the citizens on the question asked in the Referendum, exclude the possibility of any influence on the citizens which may hinder the execution of their right for participation in the Referendum.

7. To invite the representatives of the CIS States, Republics of the Russian Federation and representatives of international organizations, who want to take part in monitoring the Referendum as observers.

8. The district and city Soviets of People's Deputies are to ensure the organization of the stations and station commissions of the Referendum no later than 25 February 1992.

9. The Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Tatarstan upon the proposal of the Central commission of the Republic of Tatarstan is to handle the issues of material and financial provision for the Referendum of the Republic of Tatarstan, its servicing by the enterprises and organizations of transportation and communication by the 1 March 1992.

10. To recommend the civil-society associations, mass media, their editorial offices to provide a thorough and objective explanation of the substance of the issue, being put forward to the Referendum, and the voting procedure, in a way, easily accessible for general public.

11. To calculate the results of the voting for the Republic of Tatarstan as a whole.

12. In accordance with the Article 1 of the Law of the Republic of Tatarstan 'On the Referendum in the Republic of Tatarstan', the decision, taken by means of the Referendum of the Republic of Tatarstan is final, is binding on all territory of the Republic of Tatarstan and can be cancelled or changed only by a new Referendum of the Republic of Tatarstan.

Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan
F. Mukhametshin

Sovetskaya Tataria.—1992.—25 February.

No. 136
The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan received numerous letters from labour collectives and citizens' requests for clarification of the issue submitted to a referendum on 21 March 1992, and acts on the state sovereignty of the Republic of Tatarstan.
Following clause 7 of Article 101 of the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan presents the official interpretation: the question submitted to the referendum on 21 March 1992, provides for neither secession nor non-secession of the Republic of Tatarstan from the Russian Federation, nor Tatarstan's state separation from Russia.

The referendum seeks to determine observance of the interests and will of the people of the Republic of Tatarstan in the transition constituted by the Constitutional Law of the Republic of the previously autonomous Tatarstan to the status of a sovereign state remaining within the common economic and geopolitical space with the Russian Federation, but which on the basis of the generally recognised principle of self-determination and equality of peoples, correspondingly builds its relations with the Russian Federation and other states, and republics in a new way, on the basis of equal rights treaties and the delegation on that basis of certain power to the authorities of the Russian Federation.

The definition of the state status of the Republic of Tatarstan referred to in the first paragraph of the Resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan of 21 February 1992, 'In the holding of a referendum in the Republic of Tatarstan on the state status of the Republic of Tatarstan', should be construed as elevation of its status provided for by the Declaration on the State Sovereignty of the Republic Tatarstan.

Given the existing economic, cultural and other ties between the Republic of Tatarstan and the Commonwealth of Independent States, which due to the legal nature of the Commonwealth are in fact of an international and legal character, and considering developing relations with foreign countries, the Republic of Tatarstan as a state should have the necessary and corresponding scope of international legal personality, which, actually, is reflected in the question submitted to referendum. These powers are not meant to be put beyond the scope of constitutional law.

All the more so, since the question of the referendum on 21 March 1992, does not provide for changes in the current constitutional law of the Republic of Tatarstan, which is already based on the sovereign status of the republic, the basic provisions of the Law of 29 November 1991 'On referendum in the Republic of Tatarstan' is not incompatible with the international practice of elections and plebiscites, as well as with the relevant provisions of the Law of 16 October 1990, 'On referendum in the RSFSR'. Article 35 of the Law of the RSFSR, as well as the Law on a referendum in the Republic of Tatarstan, establish that resolutions made on the issue of referendum shall be deemed as adopted, if they are voted for by more than a half of the citizens who participated in the referendum. These powers are not meant to be put beyond the scope of constitutional law.

The necessity of transition from the old subordination relationships to the relations of coordination with the Russian Federation has been repeatedly confirmed in the course of negotiations between the official delegations of the Republic of Tatarstan and the Russian Federation. So, in the Protocol, following consultations between delegations of the RSFSR and the Republic of Tatarstan held on 12–15 August 1991 in Moscow, it is stated that the Russian Federation understanding and respecting the desire of the Republic of Tatarstan to renew and upgrade its status, agreed to focus on the use of contractual forms in regulation of its relations with our country taking into account the priority interests of both parties. The agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of Tatarstan on economic cooperation of 22 January 1992 provides that the parties are to carry out their foreign trade activities independently and conclude agreements on other issues of mutual interest.

As regards the legal nature of decisions passed by the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan on 24 October 1991 and 21 February 1992, they in general are enforcement regulations issued pursuant to the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Republic of Tatarstan, the current Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan, the Law on the referendum in the Republic of Tatarstan, and Article 4 of the Declaration of state sovereignty of the RSFSR, and focused on the practical organization of the referendum.

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet particularly notes that the regulations on State Sovereignty and referendum of the Republic of Tatarstan in no way impinge on the state and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation. They neither discriminate nor divide the citizens of the republic on the ethnic or religious basis, and are based on the legal equality of citizens regardless of their ethnicity or religion es-
establishing Tatar and Russian as official languages, and unconditionally preserving the Russian Federation citizenship for all citizens of the Republic of Tatarstan, including the right of citizens to voluntarily change their nationality.

All these above-mentioned acts of the Republic of Tatarstan are in compliance with the principle of a free nation-state self-determination of peoples enshrined in Article 4 of the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the RSFSR, and the international legal obligations of the Russian Federation.

Sovetskaya Tataria.—1992.—10 March.

No. 137
Address of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan to the people of the Republic of Tatarstan in connection with the Address of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation to the Supreme Soviet, President and people of the Republic of Tatarstan

Dear fellow citizens!

On 21 March 1992, in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan, for the first time in our history, there will be held a referendum on the state status of the Republic of Tatarstan as an expression of genuine power of people.

The main purpose of the referendum consists in confirming through the direct and free will of citizens the provisions of the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Republic of Tatarstan unanimously adopted by the Supreme Soviet, and which became the basis for democratic transformation, preservation of interethnic harmony, and respect of human rights regardless of nationality. The principles and ideas of the Declaration are reflected in the current Constitution, laws, and intergovernmental agreements between the Republic of Tatarstan and the Commonwealth countries, including the Russian Federation.

The referendum will help to make a decisive step towards the development of democracy, protection of human rights in accordance with international standards, genuine self-government and economic independence of the country.

The referendum is a promise of new, equitable and mutually beneficial relations between the peoples of Russia, the prospect of a genuine Union of Tatarstan and Russia based on the historical ties between Russia and Tatarstan.

It is incomprehensible why the clear and precise objectives of the referendum, as well as the democratic procedure of its holding evince rejection on the part of the Supreme Soviet of Russia, particularly since the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet has repeatedly stated its commitment to the ideals of democracy, and its leaders have repeatedly called on the Supreme Soviet of Tatarstan to solve problems regarding the republic’s status through a referendum.

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Tatarstan categorically rejects the accusations of separatism made against the Republic in an effort to ‘break the centuries-old ties with the Tatars and other peoples to secede from the Russian Federation’ expressed in the Address of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation.

Tatarstan has always solved and will continue to solve all the existing problems only in a civilized way. We reiterate our readiness to continue full-scale talks with Russia on political, economic and humanitarian issues, and express our confidence that they will result in the signing of the Treaty, which will be a significant contribution to the renewal not only of the Russian Federation, but also in the creation of a Union between Tatarstan and Russia.

Holding a referendum on the most important questions of life is an inalienable constitutional right of the people to be exercised in accordance with the law.
Dear fellow citizens!
The fate of the republic, peace and harmony in our multinational home, and well-being of each of us depends on the conscious, responsible and balanced approach of citizens to the issue regarding Tatarstan's future.

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan
Kazan, 6 March 1992

Sovetskaya Tataria.—1992.—10 March.

No. 138
Resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan On clarification of the wording of the referendum question of the Republic of Tatarstan, scheduled for 21 March 1992

In connection with numerous formal requests from citizens and labour collectives to clarify the subject matter of the referendum of the Republic of Tatarstan of 21 March 1992, as well as in confirmation of the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Republic of Tatarstan, and in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan, the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan decides to:
1. Explain that the purpose of the referendum of the Republic of Tatarstan, 21 March 1992, consists in a confirmation of the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Republic of Tatarstan.
2. Questions regarding separation of the Republic of Tatarstan from the Russian Federation, as well as the changes in its territorial integrity and borders shall not be the subject of the held referendum.
3. The Republic of Tatarstan is in favour of reforming its relations with the Russian Federation on the basis of a Treaty on the delegation of authority.
4. The Republic of Tatarstan guarantees within its territory the equality for all its citizens, and respect for universally recognized human rights, regardless of ethnicity, religion and other characteristics.
5. The Republic of Tatarstan provides within its territory dual citizenship, equitable functioning of the Tatar and Russian languages as official languages, as well as preservation and development of other national languages and cultures.
Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan
F. Mukhametshin
Kazan, 16 March 1992

Sovetskaya Tataria.—1992.—18 March.

No. 139
Resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan 'On the measures for realization of the state sovereignty of the Republic of Tatarstan arising from the outcome of the referendum on the status of the Republic of Tatarstan held on 21 March 1992'

Having heard and discussed the report of the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan F. Mukhametshin on the measures to implement the state sovereignty of the Republic of Tatarstan, arising from the outcome of the referendum on the status of the Republic of Tatarstan held on 21 March 1992, the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan decides: 1. State bodies, officials and
public organizations in the Republic of Tatarstan located within its territory in their activities shall pro-
cceed from the fact that based on the outcome of the referendum, the Republic of Tatarstan is a sovereign
state, and a subject of the international law building its relations with the Russian Federation and other
republics and states on the basis of equitable treaties. 2. To appeal to states and international organiza-
tions to build relationships with the Republic of Tatarstan according to its new state status.

Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan
F. Mukhametshin
Kazan, 21 May 1992

No. 140
Report by the Central Referendum Commission on the outcome of the referendum
of the Republic of Tatarstan of 21 March 1992

| The total number of district and city committees | 60 |
| The total number of polling stations | 2611 |
| The number of sites at which the information is available | 2611 |

Based on the protocols of district and city referendum commissions on the voting results of the
referendum of the Republic of Tatarstan on the following question: 'Do you agree that the Republic of
Tatarstan is a sovereign state, and a subject of the international law building its relations with the Rus-
sian Federation and other republics and states on the basis of equitable treaties?'

Central Referendum Commission has determined:

1. The total number of citizens eligible to vote in the referendum 2,600,297
2. The number of citizens who received ballots 2,134,271
3. The number of citizens who participated in the voting 2,132,351
4. The number of citizens who answered ‘Yes’ 1,309,056
5. The number of citizens who answered ‘No’ 794,444
6. The number of ballots pronounced invalid 28,851

Based on the foregoing, and in accordance with Article 33 of the Law of the Republic of Tatarstan
‘On referendum in the Republic of Tatarstan’, the Central Referendum Commission of the Republic of
Tatarstan has established:

The question submitted to the referendum of the Republic of Tatarstan, 21 March 1992: 'Do you agree
that the Republic of Tatarstan is a sovereign state, and a subject of international law building its relations with the Russian Federation and other republics and states on the basis of equitable treaties?’ shall be deemed accepted as voted for by more than a half of the citizens of the Republic of Ta-
tarstan that took part in the vote.

Chairman of the Commission I. Galeev
Deputy Chairman of the Commission N. Naryshkin
Commission Secretary D. Zaripov
The legislative initiative of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan

To the Chairman of the Constitutional Commission of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin

Dear Boris Nikolayevich,

In connection with the development of the new Constitution of the Russian Federation—Russia, the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan, using the right of a legislative initiative, in accordance with Article 110 of the current Constitution of the Russian Federation shall make the following proposals:

1. To exclude the following words from Article 56: 'Republic of Tatarstan (Tatarstan)'.
2. To add Article 56.1 with the following wording: 'The Republic of Tatarstan is a sovereign state, and a subject of international law, associated with the Russian Federation, Russia, on the basis of the Treaty on mutual delegation of powers and jurisdictions'.

Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan
F. Mukhametshin
Kazan, 4 June 1993


Statement by the President and Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan

We, the plenipotentiaries of the Republic of Tatarstan, express our concern with the progress of the first phase of the work of the Constitutional Council and its bodies. Taking an active part in the discussion of the draft of the Constitution, we proceeded from the fact that the new Constitutional Law would reflect and legally consolidate those irreversible political changes that had occurred in recent years in the country.

The leadership of the Russian Federation, becoming a pioneer of political reforms in the historically outmoded principles of state and legal structure of the country, marked the beginning of deep democratic reforms in all the republics and regions. The Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Russian Federation confirms rigorous commitment to its universally recognized norms of international law in upholding and respecting the interests of indigenous peoples. As declared in the name of the higher aims of the Russian Federation, state sovereignty had become the guarantor of the inalienable right of every nation to self-determination in their national and state forms. A strong impetus had been given to irreversible changes in the former autonomies. The historical will of our peoples, and the age-old aspirations of achieving genuine statehood have achieved their representation in the adopted Declaration on
the State Sovereignty of the Republic of Tatarstan, the outcome of the referendum on the state status of Tatarstan, and newly adopted Constitution of the Republic.

At the same time, in the draft prepared at the first phase by the Constitutional meeting, there appears a desire to belittle, and discredit the very idea of establishing a qualitatively new type of federal relations. It ignores the legislative initiative of the Republic of Tatarstan on the new vision of federalism in Russia, and on constitution in its Fundamental Law of a provision on contractual and constitutional relations between the Republic of Tatarstan and the Russian Federation, Russia.

It is impossible to create a new Russian Constitution determining the fate of its multinational people, which is in favour of the ambitions of certain political circles, and which does not take into account the interests of the republics.

All this gives rise to reasonable doubts as to the commitment of the authors of the draft to the ideas of new statehood and reforms in the Russian Federation on genuinely democratic principles. It is impossible from the standpoint of yesterday to undertake policy decisions contrary to the will of the multinational people. The constitution of the renewed Russian Federation should be established by taking into account the current objective realities rooted in the minds of people over the years of perestroika. Only such a Constitutional Law can become a reliable guarantor of the rights and freedoms of individuals and nations.

Considering it impossible in these conditions, to continue our participation in the work of the Constitutional Council and its bodies, we express our confidence that in the future the political wisdom and good will prevail in dealing with crucial issues, and remain committed in our efforts to build relations between the Republic of Tatarstan and the Russian Federation on the basis of the Treaty on mutual delegation of powers.

President of the Republic of Tatarstan
M. Shaimiev

Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan
F. Mukhametshin

24 June 1993

Sovetskaya Tataria.—1993.—26 June.

No. 143
The results of a nationwide vote on the draft of the Constitution of 12 December 1993 in the Republic of Tatarstan Protocol of the Regional Commission for electoral district 16 of Tatarstan

Based on 2614 protocols on the voting results from precinct election commissions, the district commission found:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The total number of citizens eligible to participate in the nationwide vote registered in the district</td>
<td>2,638,886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The number of ballots issued on the day of the nationwide vote and left by the citizens who voted earlier</td>
<td>367,088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The number of ballot papers found in the ballot boxes</td>
<td>366,220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of invalid ballots</td>
<td>13,434</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The number of ballots deemed valid 352,786
The number of valid votes cast for the adoption of the Constitution of the Russian Federation 264,028
The number of votes cast against the adoption of the Constitution of the Russian Federation 88,758

Chairman of the Commission L. Guseva
Deputy Chairman of the Commission F. Garayev
Commission Secretary L. Ibragimova
Members of the Commission:
N. Belov A. Gelmutdinov
I. Gifanov A. Zhadobov
V. Zaycev A. Zyuza
V. Komissarov L. Kuznetsova
F. Safina D. Timirgaleev
M. Khabibullina F. Khaliullin


No. 144
Official letter of the President of the Republic of Tatarstan M. Shaimiev to Russian President B. Yeltsin

Dear Boris Nikolayevich, In accordance with the agreement with you, I am hereby sending you the list of the official delegation of the Tatar SSR to address the issue on the procedure of signing the Union treaty by the delegation of the Tatar SSR, and preparation of a bilateral Agreement between the Republic of Tatarstan and RSFSR.

1. Head of the Commission V. Likhachyov
   Vice-President of the Tatar SSR, Doctor of Law, Professor
2. F. Gazizullin
   deputy Prime Minister of the Tatar SSR, Candidate of Economic Sciences
3. B. Zheleznov
   Doctor of Law, Professor, member of the Committee for Constitutional Supervision of the Tatar SSR
4. R. Khafizov
   Chairman of the Standing Commission of the Supreme Soviet of the Tatar SSR, Candidate of Legal Sciences
5. I. Tagirov
   Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor, Dean of the History Department of Kazan State University

At the same time, I would like to ask you after determining the appropriate group for this purpose to designate the start of its work.

President of the Tatar SSR
M. Shaimiev
30 July 1991

No. 145
Order of the President of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic
On the composition of the delegation of the RSFSR for coordination of the positions
with the Tatar SSR on economic and legal issues

For consultation and coordination of the positions on economic and legal issues with the Tatar SSR, an official delegation shall be hereby confirmed as consisting of:

Gennady Eduardovich BURBULIS – State Secretary of the RSFSR, the Secretary of the State Soviet under the President of the RSFSR (head of the delegation)
Yury Mikhailovich VORONIN — Chairman of the Committee for Budget, Planning, Taxes and Prices of the Republic Soviet of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet
Oleg Ivanovich LOBOV — First Deputy Chairman of the Soviet of Ministers of RSFSR
Sergey Borisovich STANKEVICH — RSFSR State Councillor for cooperation with non-governmental organizations
Nikolay Vasilyevich FEDOROV — The Minister of Justice of the RSFSR
Sergey Mikhailovich SHAKHRAY — RSFSR State Councillor on Legal Policy
Fedor Vadimovich SHELOV-KOVEDYAEV — Chairman of the subcommittee on the inter-republican relations of the Committee on inter-republican relations, regional policy and cooperation of the Supreme Soviet of RSFSR

Management Department of the Administration of the Presidential Administration of the RSFSR shall implement the necessary organizational and technical measures to ensure the work of the delegations.

President of the RSFSR
B. Yeltsin
9 August 1991


No. 146
The protocol on the results of the consultations with the delegations
of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic and the Republic of Tatarstan,
held on 12-15 August 1991 in the city of Moscow

During the consultations, the sides exchanged views on a wide range of political, legal and economic relations of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic and the Republic of Tatarstan.

Taking into account the principles of the Declarations of State Sovereignty of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic and the Republic of Tatarstan,
considering the historical, economic, cultural and other relations of their peoples,
and understanding the need to build their relations on a new basis and striving towards their further development, the delegations agreed as follows:

1. Understanding and respecting the desire of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic and the Republic of Tatarstan as the Parties to the Treaty on the Union of sovereign states to renew and improve their status, and focus on the use of contractual forms of regulation of relations of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic and the Republic of Tatarstan, taking into account their priority interests without infringing the interests of other republics and the Union as a whole.
2. To deepen and improve economic relations and mutually beneficial cooperation on the basis of a single economic zone, and development of market relations, with stimulation of entrepreneurship and social protection of population.

3. To ensure the observance and protection of the rights and legitimate interests of citizens regardless of their national, religious and other differences.

4. To foster the development of national cultures and languages.

5. To deem it appropriate to continue consultations in Moscow and Kazan.

The consultations were attended by:

from the Russian Federation
O. Lobov
S. Stankevich
N. Fedorov
S. Shakhray
F. Shelov-Kovedyaev
R. Khakimov
G. Burbulis

The head of the delegation

Of the Russian Federation

from the Republic of Tatarstan
F. Gazizullin
B. Zheleznov
F. Safiullin
I. Tagirov
R. Khakimov
V. Likhachyov


No. 147

The protocol on the results of the consultations of the working group of the Supreme Soviet and the Soviet of Ministers of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic and the delegation of the Republic of Tatarstan held on 3-4 October 1991 in the city of Kazan

In accordance with the protocol on the results of the consultations between the delegations of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic and the Republic of Tatarstan, held in Moscow on 12-15 August 1991, on the basis of an agreement on deepening and improvement of economic relations and mutually beneficial cooperation on the basis of a common economic zone, the participants of the consultation agreed as follows:

1. To recognize the need to focus on the development of relations between the RSFSR and the Tatar SSR on a contractual basis.

2. To consider it expedient to adopt as agreed decisions on the following issues of mutual economic cooperation in 1992:
   – provision of the supply of industrial products (including raw materials) and consumer goods;
   – implementation of pricing policy;
   – reorganization of the budget and tax system;
   – implementation of foreign economic activity, including setting of quotas and product licensing;
   – development, production, and sales (including exports) of natural resources, primarily of oil and gas;
   – environmental policy.

Furthermore, it is necessary to proceed from the need to reach agreements on a wide range of socio-economic and political issues regarding development of relations between the RSFSR and the Tatar SSR.

3. The participants confirmed their readiness to continue consultations in October 1991, in Moscow.

The consultations were attended by:
The Russian Federation Government and the Government of the Republic of Tatarstan, further called 'Parties', on the basis of the existing traditional links between them, taking into account the interests of both Parties in the further development and deepening of the mutually beneficial economic cooperation on a long term and stable basis, have agreed on the following:

Clause 1. The Parties confirm that the land, its minerals, waters and natural resources located on the territory of the Republic of Tatarstan, are the property of its people. The Parties recognize the presence on the territories of the federal, republic (belonging to the Republic of Tatarstan), and co-ownership property, established on the basis of mutual interest and by their voluntary consent.

Clause 2. On the basis of mutual economic interest and responsibility, the Parties are in favour of preserving the common economic zone and developing the existing economic relations between enterprises, associations and economic entities. The Parties will assist them in keeping the volume of product supplies in 1992, as a rule, not less than its volume in 1991. The range and volume of mutual supplies of basic products for public use are regulated by a special agreement.

Clause 3. Supporting the expansion of inter-republican relations, the Parties confirm the need for the implementation of joint target complex programmes on science and technology, conversion, ecology and other spheres of social and economic development. Russia provides funding for the conversion of the production of enterprises and organizations, wherein the feasibility of conversion of which will be recognized by the Parties.

Clause 4. The Parties believe that the military units, military institutions and educational institutions, located in the Republic of Tatarstan, are provided with all kinds of material, food and energy resources from the funds of the United Armed Forces. The Parties are involved in the formation of these funds. On the territory of the Republic of Tatarstan, the lands, assigned to locate them, remain the exclusive property of the Republic of Tatarstan.
Clause 5. The transfer of goods and services on the territory of the republics and between them is carried out on a free basis. Each Party ensures on their territory the mode of unimpeded and duty-free movement of transport, goods and products that are sent by the other Party (or the economic entities) to the Party or to third parties (including abroad) by air, sea, river, highway routes and railway, as well as pipeline transport.

Clause 6. The Parties recognize that the Republic of Tatarstan independently controls the development, production and sale of natural resources, especially oil and the products of oil, gas and chemical processing on its territory. The deliveries of them to Russia are organized on the basis of mutually beneficial annually signed agreements. The volume of oil supplies for 1992 is determined in accordance with the Annex to this Agreement.

Clause 7. The Parties carry out foreign trade activities independently, except for quota and licensed products. The Parties annually approve the agreed quotas for the export of products, manufactured in the Republic of Tatarstan. The issuance of licenses within the agreed quota is carried out by decisions of the Government of the Republic of Tatarstan by the authorized Committee of Russian Foreign Economic Relations in the Republic of Tatarstan. In the event that the agreed quotas are exceeded, the RSFSR suspends the licenses issued. A unified customs system operates on the territory of the Parties.

Clause 8. The Parties implement coordinated policy in the field of employment and social guarantees: make special agreements on the regulation of migration processes, undertake mutual commitments on social protection, pensions and social insurance.

Clause 9. The Parties cooperate in the spheres of science, education, health and culture. The jurisdiction of the corresponding institutions and organizations located on the territory of the Republic of Tatarstan, and the participation of each of the Parties in the insurance of their activities are determined by agreements of the Parties.

Clause 10. The Parties, on the basis of integrity and indivisibility of the environment, and, maintaining full autonomy in making appropriate decisions, coordinate measures to prevent environmental disasters, jointly develop a single comprehensive approach to assessing the state of the environment and take measures for its stabilization and protection.

Clause 11. The Parties agree that special agreements for areas of cooperation of mutual interest, described by this Agreement, will be signed in the agreed time.

Clause 12. The permanent representative authorities of the Parties with equal powers are formed in the governments. The Parties shall provide premises and create the necessary conditions for their work.

Clause 13. The Parties will jointly consider the problems arising in the implementation of the Agreement, and take action to solve them. To monitor the implementation of the Agreement and coordinate the actions, an intergovernmental commission is established, which holds joint meetings alternately in Moscow and Kazan.

Clause 14. This Agreement is signed for five years and shall become effective on the day of its signing. In the event of the non-fulfillment of the commitments, the Agreement may be terminated by either Party with prior notice to the other Party not less than 12 months. Executed in Moscow on 1992 January 1992, in two copies, each one in the Russian and Tatar languages, both texts having equal validity.

Vice Chairman

Prime Minister

of the Russian Federation Government

of the Republic of Tatarstan

E. Gaidar

M. SABIROV

No. 149

The protocol on the results of the consultations of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan delegations 30 March—2 April 1992, in Moscow

During the consultations, the Parties exchanged views on a wide range of political, legal, economic and humanitarian relations between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan.

Taking into account the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Russian Federation and the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Republic of Tatarstan and the processes of their implementation, considering the historical, economic, cultural and other relations of their peoples, guided by the desire to preserve the integrity of the Russian Federation, based on the understanding of the need to build their relations on a new constitutional and contractual basis and seeking for their further development, delegations agreed on the following:

1. On the need to establish a special relationship with the Republic of Tatarstan of the Russian Federation.

2. On the early implementation of the intergovernmental agreement of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan on Economic Cooperation of 22 January 1992, and its further development in order to strengthen the economic sovereignty of the Republic of Tatarstan on the basis of common economic space.

3. On the guarantees of the human rights and freedoms irrespective of national, religious and other differences, including the regulation of questions of citizenship, equitable functioning of the Tatar and Russian languages.

During the consultations the Parties discussed a draft of a bilateral agreement on the delegation of authorities, submitted by the delegation of Tatarstan, and the proposal of the Russian delegation on the accession of the Republic of Tatarstan to the Federal Treaty.

The sides agreed to continue consultations in Kazan and Moscow in April–May 1992.

The consultations were attended by:

On the side of the Russian Federation:
S. Shakhray, V. Tishkov, S. Stankevich, V. Podoprigora, V. Shamshurov, E. Kuzmin, A. Kirin, A. Krichevsky

On the side of the Republic of Tatarstan:
A. Kolesnik, R. Khafizov, I. Tagirov, R. Khakimov, F. Gazizullin, I. Yusupov, G. Kobelev, F. Safiullin

Head of the delegation of the Russian Federation G. Burbulis
Head of the delegation of the Republic of Tatarstan V. Likhachyov


No. 150

Communiqué of the meeting of the working commissions of the state authorities of the Russian Federation and the state authorities of the Republic of Tatarstan

On 2 July 1992, a regular meeting of the working commissions of the state authorities of the Russian Federation and the state authorities of the Republic of Tatarstan took place, in which the draft of the Agreement, proposed by Tatarstan, was discussed.

During discussion of the draft of the Agreement, the Parties have agreed on the following: on the need to create expert groups for the detailed preparation of the Agreement; on giving dynamism to the negotiating process with a view to completion of them in July–August of the current year; on the recommendation to the experts in their further work on the draft of the Agreement to proceed from the sover-
eign status of the Republic of Tatarstan; from the need to consolidate its international legal personality; from the principles of territorial integrity; from the unconditional respect for human rights, regardless of ethnicity, religion and other differences; from the respect for history, traditions, culture, language and national dignity of the peoples; from the agreed mutual distribution of powers on a wide range of issues.

Heads of working Commissions:

on the side of the Russian Federation

Vice Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation. Yu. Yarov

Vice-President of the Republic of Tatarstan V. Likhachyov

Sovetskaya Tataria.—1992.—4 July.


No. 151

Order of the President of the Russian Federation on the delegation of the state authorities of the Russian Federation Government for negotiations on the delineation of powers with Tatarstan

To form a delegation of state authorities of the Russian Federation to negotiate with the Republic of Tatarstan consisting of:

BURBULIS Gennady Eduardovich—State Secretary at the President of Russian Federation, head of delegation

YAROV Yury Fyodorovich—Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, deputy head of delegation

TISHKOV Valery Aleksandrovich—Chairman of the Russian State Committee on National Policy, Minister of the Russian Federation, deputy head of delegation

ABDULATIPOV Ramazan Gadzhimuradovich—Chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation

GEN Nikolay Leonidovich—Deputy Chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities Commission on the national policy and international relations of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation

STANKEVICH Sergey Borisovich—Advisor to the President of the Russian Federation

GRANBERG Aleksander Grigorievich—Advisor to the President of the Russian Federation

TURBIN Vitaly Borisovich—Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation

KOROLEV Stanislav Andreyevich—Deputy Minister of Finance of the Russian Federation

MIRONOV Valery Ivanovich—Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, Colonel-General

MIROSHIN Boris Vladimirovich—Deputy Head of the Department of State Legal Directorate of the President of the Russian Federation

YUSUPOV Magomed Yusupovich—Deputy Minister of Economy of the Russian Federation

Empower the delegation of the Russian Federation with full authorities to negotiate and initial the agreements.

The results of the negotiations are to be submitted to the President of the Russian Federation.

To ensure the activities of the delegation of the state authorities of the Russian Federation Government to approve a group of expert advisers:

SALIKOV Rashid Abdulovich

KOSIKOV Igor Georgievich

BOLTENKOVA Lyubov Fyodorovna
I ask for your consent to send on a mission for a period of 3 days (13–15 August 1992) to participate in the work on the draft of the Agreement on the delimitation of powers between the federal bodies of state authority of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan, the following experts from the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, of the State-Legal Directorate of the President of the Russian Federation, the Russian Ministry of Defense, the State Committee of the Russian Federation for National Policy, the Constitutional Commission and the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology:

1. BOLTENKOVA Lyubov Fyodorovna—the head of Legislative Activity Office of the Soviet of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, the head of the group
2. GRISHCHENKO Gennady Petrovich—an expert of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation
3. DANILOV Evgeny Alekseyevich—an expert of the Constitutional Council
4. DUBININ Anatoly Vasilevich—an expert of CPA of the President
5. SALIKOV Rashid Abdulovich—an expert of the State Council for Inter-ethnic Relations of the Russian Federation
6. KOSIKOV Igor Georgievich—an expert of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology

Deputy Chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities V. Syrovatko
12 August 1992

VALEYEVA Zilya Rahimyanovna—First Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan—Deputy of the Head of the Delegation
KHAMIDULLIN Filzya Garifovich—Vice-Prime-Minister of the Republic of Tatarstan—Deputy Head of the Delegation
KOBELEV Gely Vasilevich—Chairman of the Permanent Committee of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan
KOLESNIK Aleksey Alekseyevich—Chairman of the Permanent Committee of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan
KHAFIZOV Rustem Shamilevich—Chairman of the Permanent Committee of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan
KHAMIDULLIN Filzya Garifovich—Vice-Prime-Minister of the Republic of Tatarstan—Deputy Head of the Delegation
KOBELEV Gely Vasilevich—Chairman of the Permanent Committee of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan
KOLESNIK Aleksey Alekseyevich—Chairman of the Permanent Committee of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan
KHAFIZOV Rustem Shamilevich—Chairman of the Permanent Committee of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan

ARSLANOV Shaukat Raufovich—Minister for Foreign Economic Relations of the Republic of Tatarstan
NAGUMANOV Dmitry Nagumanovich—Minister for Finance of the Republic of Tatarstan
SAFIULLIN Fandas Shakirovich—Head of the Permanent Committee of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan

TAGIROV Indus Rizakovitch—Professor, Dean of the Department of History of the Kazan University

To invest the delegation with full authorities for negotiations and initialing of the treaty and agreements. The result of the negotiations shall be reported to the President of the Republic of Tatarstan.

In order to provide the activity of the delegation of the Republic of Tatarstan the following group of experts-advisers is approved:

GALEEV M.
GAREEV M.
ZHELEZNOV B.
TARNAPOLSKY R.

The President of the Republic of Tatarstan, M. Shaimiev
13 July 1992


No. 154

The draft of the treaty on mutual delegation of competences and authority of state power

[Plenipotentiaries of the state power of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan], {1) We, plenipotentiaries of the federal body of state power of the Russian Federation and the bodies of the state power of the Republic of Tatarstan—version for experts of the Russian Federation; (2) the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan—version for experts of the Republic of Tatarstan; (3) the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan represented by corresponding plenipotentiaries of the state power—version of experts of the Republic of Tatarstan},

respecting the right of people to self-determination, the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Russian Federation, the Federal Treaty as a part of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, [and also acknowledging—version for experts of the Republic of Tatarstan] the Declaration on the State Sovereignty of the Republic of Tatarstan,

[guided by a desire to maintain the integrity of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan—version for experts of the Republic of Tatarstan]; [proceeding from the principle of territorial integrity—version for experts of the Russian Federation];
relying on the recognition of principle of equality, voluntary and freedom of will;
in the aims of maintaining a common economic zone;
facilitating the preservation and development of historical and national traditions, cultures, and
languages;
providing for civil peace, inter-ethnic harmony, and the overall security of the peoples;
effectuating the precedence of fundamental rights and freedoms of the person and citizen, regardless
of ethnicity, religion, place of residence, or any other differences;
[strengthening the international personality of the Republic of Tatarstan, its own participation in
international and foreign economic relations as a sovereign state—version for experts of the Republic
of Tatarstan]; [based on the legal personality of the Republic of Tatarstan, its own participation in in-
ternational and foreign economic relations as a sovereign state—version for experts of the Republic of
Tatarstan];
reaffirming independence in exercising its authorities by the Russian Federation and the Republic of
Tatarstan, now hereby agree as follows:

CLAUSE I.
The Republic of Tatarstan—a sovereign state—indepedently exercises all the authorities of state
power [including—version for experts of the Republic of Tatarstan]:
1) adopts the Constitution, provides for its implementation;
2) establishes legislation:
   with regard to [its own—version for experts of the Russian Federation] budget and budget process,
taxation, banks;
   judiciary, public prosecution service;
   criminal, civil, administrative, labour, family, housing and water law;
   regulation of intellectual property;
   criminally-remedial, civil, arbitral, administrative law;
   the legislation regulates and implements amnesty and free pardon of persons, who were convicted
by courts of the Republic of Tatarstan;
   land, forest, subsurface, environmental and natural management laws;
   3) possesses land, subsurface, natural resources, [as well as state-owned enterprises, institutions,
other movable and immovable state assets located on the territory of the Republic of Tatarstan, which
are particular property and possessions of the people of Tatarstan and are under the jurisdiction of the
Republic of Tatarstan—version for experts of the Republic of Tatarstan].
   [state-owned enterprises, institutions, other movable and immovable state assets, located on
the territory of the Republic of Tatarstan become the particular property and possession of the
people of Tatarstan as prescribed by additional Agreements—version for experts of the Russian
Federation].

In accordance with interests upon voluntary and mutual consent the objects of property of the Re-
public of Tatarstan and the Russian Federation, having remained under their laws, can be transferred to
joint usage. The forms and procedures of joint administration of the specific possessions are determined
by separate agreements;
4) establishes the state institutions system of the Republic of Tatarstan, the order of its structure and
activities;
5) resolves citizenship issues of the Republic of Tatarstan;
6) maintains mutual relations and concludes treaties with CIS states, as well as republics, territories,
regions, autonomous regions, autonomous areas, the city of Moscow and St. Petersburg of the Russian
Federation;
7) establishes relations with foreign states and concludes treaties, participates in the activities of
international organizations, [exchanges diplomatic and consular agents—version for experts of the Re-
public of Tatarstan], [resolves the issues of appointment to diplomatic and consular missions of the
Russian Federation the representatives of the government of the Republic of Tatarstan—version for experts of the Russian Federation];
8) forms its state budget, sets and collects its taxation;
9) establishes National Bank and conducts a monetary policy;
10) pursues foreign policy, including specifying a licensing procedure, quota allocation and export supply quota, sets and collects custom duty;
11) engages in the payment of the external debt of the former USSR; Tatarstan's share is determined by agreement between the Parties concerned;
12) collects the share of their debt to the former USSR from the debtor countries; the proportion of debt and debtor countries are established by agreements between the Parties concerned;
13) has its share of gold reserves and diamond resources of the former USSR; the size of the share of Tatarstan in gold reserves and diamonds are set by intergovernmental agreements;
[14) exercises other authorities arising from its status as a sovereign state and those which are not covered by a joint powers of this Treaty—version for experts of the Republic of Tatarstan].

CLAUSE II.
The following powers arising from the sovereign rights of the Russian Federation and the sovereign rights of the Republic of Tatarstan, are implemented jointly:
1) providing for the rights and freedoms of the person and citizen, and the rights of ethnic minorities;
2) protection of sovereignty and territorial integrity;
3) [provision of defense and security of the Parties; organization and management of the development and production of armaments and military equipment in the territory of the Republic of Tatarstan; sale of weapons, ammunition, military equipment and other military property; shapes and proportion of the Parties in the implementation of the relevant powers are determined by separate agreements—version for experts of the Republic of Tatarstan]. [Establishment of procedures for recruitment and military service; making of military policy, as well as addressing issues related to the activities of the troops, the dislocation of military facilities of the Russian Armed Forces, affecting the interests of the Republic of Tatarstan; organization of mobilization preparation of the national economy; managing defense enterprises; joint implementation of the conversion—version for experts of the Republic of Tatarstan]
4) coordination of international and foreign economic relations and their implementation. [In foreign policy and foreign economic activities the Parties are guided by the undiminished security principle for each party —Russian experts are proposed to be moved to the preamble to the corresponding edition].
[Customs Service of the Republic of Tatarstan and of the Russian Federation shall work on the basis of a separate agreement.
Representation of interests of the Republic of Tatarstan in relations with foreign states and international organizations, where there is no proper mission of Tatarstan—version for experts of the Republic of Tatarstan];
[representation of interests of the Republic of Tatarstan in relations with foreign states and international organizations;
resolution of issues on secondment of representatives of the Government of the Republic of Tatarstan to diplomatic and consular missions of the Russian Federation—version for experts of the Russian Federation];
5) coordination of the basis of pricing policy;
6) formation of regional development funds;
7) pursuing of coordinated policy in the sphere of money emission;
8) implementing common principles of statistical and business accounting;
9) coordination over issues of geodesy, cartography, meteorological office, standards, metric system and time keeping;
10) the creation of common funds for the financing of joint programmes, the removal of consequenc-
es of natural disasters and accidents. In order to implement special-purpose programmes of the Russian
Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan payments of funds are made on the basis of mutual agreement;
11) coordination of management of the common energy system; mainline railways, pipeline, air and
water transport;
12) the transfer of goods and services on the territory of the republics and between them is carried
out on a free basis. Each Party ensures on their territory the mode of unimpeded and duty-free move-
ment of transport, goods and products that are sent to the other Party (or the economic entities) to the
Party or to third parties (including abroad) by air, sea, river, highway routes and railway, as well as pipeline transport;
13) elaboration of common complex approach for assessing the condition of environment quality,
stabilisation and reclamation efforts; coordination of actions in the sphere of water resources utiliza-
tion, including water law and specially protected areas; provision of ecological security, coordination of
events aimed at preventing of ecological catastrophes;
14) implementation of policy in the sphere of social guarantees and employment of population, mi-
gration processes, social protection, including social benefits;
15) coordination of issues in the sphere of health, protection of the family, motherhood, fatherhood
and childhood, education, science, culture, physical culture and sports. Training of national employees
for schools, educational institutions, cultural institutions, the media and other institutions and organiza-
tions; provision of preschool facilities and educational institutions with literature in native language.
Coordination of research in the sphere of history, culture of peoples and their languages;
16) coordination of the law enforcement and security agencies activity, development and implemen-
tation of special-purpose anti-organized crime programs, vehicle theft, crimes in railway, air and water
transport, drug trafficking and corruption; [ensuring of legality, public order and safety—version for
experts of the Russian Federation];
17) criminally-remedial, civil, arbitral, administrative law;
18) conflict of laws;
19) other powers, established by mutual agreement. {Experts of the Russian Federation and the
Republic of Tatarstan offer to formulate a separate article on the mechanism of implementation of the
joint powers};

CLAUSE III.

The legal documents issued by the bodies of authority, agencies and officials of the Russian Federa-
tion and of the Republic of Tatarstan within the power of these bodies, institutions and officials, are
recognized over the whole territory of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan.

CLAUSE IV.

The Federal Government of the Russian Federation as well as the authorities of the Republic of
Tatarstan cannot issue legislative acts on matters not falling within their jurisdiction. The State Bodies
of the Republic of Tatarstan, as well as the Federal State Bodies of the Russian Federation shall have
the right to suspend and appeal the activities on its territory of laws of the Russian Federation and the
Republic of Tatarstan if they violate this Treaty. The debates on the implementation of the powers in the
sphere of joint jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan shall be resolved
in accordance with [legislation of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan—version for
experts of the Russian Federation] present Treaty through mediation procedure. {Experts of the Russian
Federation offer to add an article on the powers of the federal authorities of the Russian Federation}.

CLAUSE V.

State Bodies of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan by mutual agreement establish
[plenipotentiary—version for experts of the Republic of Tatarstan] [permanent—version for experts of
the Russian Federation] missions in Moscow and Kazan respectively.
CLAUSE VI.

The Treaty or its specific provisions can not be canceled, modified or amended unilaterally. [The Treaty shall enter into force upon signature—version for experts of the Republic of Tatarstan]. The duration of the Treaty of... year. The Treaty is made in two copies in Russian and Tatar languages, both texts are authentic and have equal legal force.


The head of federal bodies and state authorities experts of the Russian FederationL. Boltenkova
The head of the Republic of Tatarstan expertsF. Khamidullin
15 August 1992


No. 155

The order of the President of the Russian Federation on the composition of the negotiations on 21 January 1993, among representatives of the supreme bodies of the government of the Russian Federation with representatives of the highest authorities of the Republic of Tatarstan over the state-legal status of the Republic of Tatarstan and reciprocal distribution of competences and powers between the authorities of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan

To approve the composition of the negotiations on 21 January 1993, among representatives of the supreme bodies of the government of the Russian Federation with representatives of the highest authorities of the Republic of Tatarstan over the state-legal status of the Republic of Tatarstan and reciprocal distribution of competences and powers between the authorities of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan:

Yeltsin Boris Nikolaevich>—President of the Russian Federation
Chernomyrdin Viktor Stepanovich—Chairman of the Soviet of Ministers of the Russian Federation
SHAKHRAY Sergey Mikhailovich—Vice-Chairman of the Soviet of Ministers of the Russian Federation
Yarov Yury Fyodorovich—Vice-Chairman of the Soviet of Ministers of the Russian Federation
The President of the Russian Federation, B. Yeltsin
15 January 1993


No. 156

The communique on the meeting of the delegations of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan

The meeting of the delegations of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan was held on 21 January 1993 in Moscow.

The negotiation was attended by Russian President B. Yeltsin, President of the Republic of Tatarstan M. Shaimiev, the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan F. Mukhametshin, Vice-Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation N. Ryabov, Chairman of the Soviet of Ministers of the Russian Federation V. Chernomyrdin, Prime Minister of the Republic of Tatarstan M. Sabirov, Vice-President of the Republic of Tatarstan V. Likhachyov, Vice-Chairman of the Soviet of Ministers of the Russian Federation S. Shakhray, Vice-Chairman of the Russian Soviet of Ministers of the Russian
Federation Yu. Yarov, People’s Deputy of the Republic of Tatarstan G. Kobelev, Advisor to the President of the Republic of Tatarstan R. Khakimov.

The draft of the Treaty was discussed at negotiations between the bodies of state power of the Russian Federation and state authorities of the Republic of Tatarstan on the mutual delegation of competences and powers. The Parties exchanged views on the political and legal, and economic issues. It was noted that under current conditions the relations of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan should be developed on the contract and constitutional basis.

It was agreed about top-priority preparation at the talks within the framework of the draft of the Treaty on economics of environmental issues, foreign trade and others. Particular attention was paid to the fight against crime.

The President of the Russian Federation B. Yeltsin and the President of the Republic of Tatarstan M. Shaimiev appreciated the work of the delegations and experts. Mutual understanding was achieved over the questions considered at the session. It was noted that the participation of the presidents at the talks gave a fresh impetus to the work on the draft treaty.

The next meeting of the delegations is scheduled at the mid-February of the following year.

Sovetskaya Tataria.—1993.—22 January; Tatarstan.—No. 2.—P. 1.

No. 157
The order of the President of the Russian Federation on the composition of the negotiating parties on 27 May 1993 by the representatives of the supreme bodies of state power of the Russian Federation with representatives of the supreme bodies of state power of the Republic of Tatarstan

To approve the composition of the negotiating parties on 27 May 1993 by the representatives of the supreme bodies of state power of the Russian Federation with representatives of the supreme bodies of state power of the Republic of Tatarstan:

YELTSIN Boris Nikolaevich—President of the Russian Federation
LOBOV Oleg Ivanovich—First Deputy of the Chairman of the Soviet of Ministers of the Government of the Russian Federation
RYABOV Nikolay Timofeyevich—Vice-Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation
FYODOROV Boris Grigorievich—Vice-Chairman of the Soviet of Ministers of the Russian Federation
SHAKHRAY Sergey Mikhailovich—Vice-Chairman of the Soviet of Ministers of the Russian Federation

The President of the Russian Federation, B. Yeltsin
27 May 1993


No. 158
The report about the meeting of the delegations of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan

The meeting of the delegations of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan was held on 27 May 1993 in Moscow.
The negotiation was attended by Russian President B. Yeltsin, President of the Republic of Tatarstan M. Shaimiev, the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan F. Mukhametshin, Vice-Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation N. Ryabov, First Deputy of the Chairman of the Soviet of Ministers of the Government of the Russian Federation O. Lobov, Prime Minister of the Republic of Tatarstan M. Sabirov, Vice-President of the Republic of Tatarstan V. Likhachyov, Vice-Chairman of the Soviet of Ministers of the Russian Federation B. Fyodorov, Vice-Chairman of the Soviet of Ministers of the Russian Federation S. Shakhray, Chairman of the Committee on projects and budgets of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan G. Kobelev.

The procedure of drafting certain agreements between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan was discussed at the talks. It was noted that agreements on cooperation in the field of environmental protection, in the field of higher education, on the implementation and transportation of oil and petrochemical processing products, as well as property issues are prepared and the heads of government will sign them in the near future. The work on the agreements on custom regulation issues, on relations in the sphere of banking activity, taxation policy, budget and other will be continued.

The course of preparation of the draft treaty between the Republic of Tatarstan and the Russian Federation on mutual delegation of competences and powers of public authorities was discussed at the negotiations.

In addition, the Parties exchanged views on the development of the constitutional process in the Russian Federation.

Mutual understanding was gained over the questions considered at the meeting.

The President of the Russian Federation B. Yeltsin and the President of the Republic of Tatarstan M. Shaimiev appreciated the work of the delegations and experts.

Moscow, 27 May 1993

Sovetskaya Tataria.—1993.—29 May.

No. 159

Draft Treaty between the Republic of Tatarstan and the Russian Federation

'On Delineation of Jurisdictional Subjects and Mutual Delegation of Competences and Powers between State Bodies of the Russian Federation and State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan'

Plenipotentiary representatives of the Federal State Bodies of the Russian Federation and the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan;

having regard to the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Russian Federation and of the Republic of Tatarstan;

pursuant to the Constitution of the Russian Federation and to the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan;

proceeding from the universally recognised right of peoples to self-determination, principles of equality, voluntary participation and freedom of will;

striving to preserve the territorial integrity and the common economic space;

facilitating the preservation and development of historical and national traditions, cultures, and languages;

providing for civil peace, inter-ethnic harmony, and the overall security of the peoples;

effectuating the precedence of fundamental rights and freedoms of the person and citizen, regardless of ethnicity, religion, place of residence, or any other differences;

taking into account that the Republic of Tatarstan is a sovereign State Body subject to its international and foreign economic relations; have agreed as follows:
CLAUSE I.

The Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan are united (associated) on the basis of this Treaty. The Republic of Tatarstan shall independently exercise state powers other than those for which the procedure of execution is provided herein.

CLAUSE II.

The Federal State Bodies of the Russian Federation-Russia and the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan jointly execute the following powers:

1) providing for the rights and freedoms of the person and citizen, and the rights of ethnic minorities;
2) protection of sovereignty and territorial integrity;
3) establishing the procedures for recruitment into the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and military service by citizens of the Republic of Tatarstan [providing defense and security for both Parties —version for experts of the Republic of Tatarstan]; organizing the mobilization of preparation of the national economy, guidance of the development and production of weapons and military equipment in the territory of the Republic of Tatarstan; the sale of arms, ammunition, military equipment and other military property; and issues concerning conversion of the defense industry. The forms and the share of participation of the Parties in the execution of the appropriate powers are determined by separate agreements;
4) general and confrontational issues of citizenship;
5) coordination of international and foreign economic relations. Customs Service of the Republic of Tatarstan and of the Russian Federation shall work on the basis of a separate agreement;
6) coordination of the basis of pricing policy;
7) the formation of regional development funds;
8) conducting of monetary policy;
9) administration of possessions of the Russian Federation or the Republic of Tatarstan, which can be transferred to joint administration with respect to interest in a voluntary and mutual agreement. The forms and procedures of joint administration of the specific possessions are determined by separate agreements;
10) coordination of the activities of law enforcement, judicial and prosecutorial authorities and security agencies, the development and implementation of targeted programs to combat crime; education and training of judicial, prosecutorial, and law enforcement agencies;
11) Coordination on geological surveying activities, the meteorological service, standards and measures of time;
12) the creation of common funds for the financing of joint programmes, the cleanup of consequences of natural disasters and accidents on the basis of mutual agreement;
13) coordination of management of the common energy system, roadways, railways, pipeline, air and water transport, communications, information systems;
14) providing for the duty-free and unhindered movement of transport, cargo and goods by air, sea, river, railway, motor road, as well as pipeline transport;
15) assessment in accordance with international standards of quality of the natural environment, the implementation of measures for its stabilisation and reconstruction; providing environmental security, coordination in the use of land, water and other natural resources; prevention of ecological disasters; issues concerning specially protected natural areas;
16) implementing a common policy in the social sphere: employment, migration, social protection, including social security;
17) coordination of health, protection of the family, motherhood, fatherhood and childhood, education, science, culture, physical training and sports; training of state personnel for schools, educational
institutions, cultural institutions, the media and other institutions and organizations; provision of pre-
school institutions and schools of literature in the native language; coordination of research on the his-
tory and culture of peoples and their languages;

18) [administrative, administrative–procedural, labour, family, housing, water, and forest legisla-
tions; legislation on subterranean and environmental protection—version for experts of the Russian
Federation]; [the foundations of criminal–procedural, civil–procedural, arbitral–procedural, adminis-
trative–procedural law—variant for experts of the Republic of Tatarstan];

19) conflict of laws;

20) legal regulation of intellectual property;

21) other authorities as established by mutual agreement.

CLAUSE III.

Legal documents issued by the governments, agencies and officials of the Russian Federation enti-
ties and of the Republic of Tatarstan within the power of these bodies, institutions and officials, are
recognised by the parties without additional identification of their authenticity.

CLAUSE IV.

The Federal Government of the Russian Federation as well as the authorities of the Republic of Tatarstan cannot issue legislative acts on matters not falling within their jurisdiction. The State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan, as well as the Federal State Bodies of the Russian Federation shall have the right to suspend and appeal the activities on its territory of laws of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan, if they violate this Treaty. Disputes on the implementation of the powers in the sphere of joint jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan shall be allowed in a consistent manner by the parties.

CLAUSE V.

In the aims of fulfilling this Treaty, the Russian Federation—Russia and the Republic of Tatarstan may make additional agreements, build up joint structures; on a parity basis they establish a permanent Joint Commission, the structure of which is determined by the Presidents of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan.

CLAUSE VI.

State Bodies of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan by mutual agreement establish plenipotentiary representatives in Moscow and Kazan.

CLAUSE VII.

The Agreement or its provisions cannot be cancelled, modified or amended unilaterally. This Treaty shall come into effect upon signature. Executed in Moscow on __________1994 in two copies, each one in Tatar and Russian, both texts being authentic and having equal validity.

The President of the Russian Federation, B. Yeltsin

The President of the Republic of Tatarstan, M. Shaimiev

Prime-minister of the Russian Federation, V. Chernomyrdin
Prime-minister of the Republic of Tatarstan, M. Sabirov

The draft Treaty was signed by:
The members of the delegation of the Russian Federation, V. Mikhaylov, L. Boltenkova.
The members of the delegation of the Republic of Tatarstan, R. Khakimov, F. Safiullin.

Moscow, 1 February 1994


No. 160
Agreement between the Governments of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan on Budgetary Relations between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan

The Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan, on the assumption of necessity of financial support for social and economic development of the Republic of Tatarstan, the efficient use of the natural and economic potential of the Republic of Tatarstan, and participation in financing the federal program for the benefit of both parties, having considered the budgetary relations, have agreed as follows.

Clause 1. The Republic of Tatarstan for the execution of the authority delegated by the Russian Federation, as well as the execution of joint programs, makes a contribution to the national budget of the Russian Federation on the basis of the following regulations and agreements: – corporate tax at the standard of 13%; – income tax on individuals at the standard of 1%; – the value added tax at the standard defined in the annual agreements by the Ministries of Finance of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan.

Clause 2. For the purposes of financial support for the implementation of the Republic of Tatarstan environmental programmes related to the need to restore the natural resources and environmental protection, to keep in the budget of the Republic of Tatarstan the excise tax on alcohol, vodka and distillery products, oil and gas excise, fee for land, income privatization, a special tax for the financial support of the most important sectors of the economy.

Clause 3. The Parties bear mutual responsibility for breach of obligations under this agreement. Amendments to this Agreement may be adopted by mutual agreement of the parties and issued by a special protocol.

Clause 4. This Agreement shall come into effect on the day of its signing and is valid for 5 years.
For the Government of Russian Federation V. Chernomyrdin

For the Government of the Republic of Tatarstan M. Sabirov

15 February 1994

Evening Kazan.—1994.—14 October.
No. 161


Plenipotentiary representatives of the State Bodies of the Russian Federation and the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan:

pursuant to the Constitution of the Russian Federation and to the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan;

proceeding from the universally recognised right of peoples to self-determination, principles of equality, voluntary participation and freedom of will;

ensuring the preservation of the territorial integrity and unity of economic space;

facilitating the preservation and development of historical and national traditions, cultures, and languages;

providing for civil peace, inter-ethnic harmony, and the security of the peoples;

effectuating the precedence of fundamental rights and freedoms of the person and citizen, regardless of ethnicity, religion, place of residence, or any other differences;

taking into account that the Republic of Tatarstan as a state is united with the Russian Federation by the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan and the Treaty on Delineation of Jurisdictional Subjects and Powers between State Bodies of the Russian Federation and State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan, is involved in international and foreign economic relations, have agreed on the following:

CLAUSE I.

The delineation of jurisdictional subjects and powers between state bodies of the Russian Federation and state bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan is effected by the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan, and the Treaty.
lic of Tatarstan; 11) participate in international relations, establish relations with foreign states and
sign agreements with them, not contradictory to the Constitution and the international obligations of
the Russian Federation, the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan and the Agreement, participate
in the activities of relevant international organizations; 12) create the National Bank in accordance
with a separate agreement; 13) independently carry out foreign economic activity. Separation of pow-
ers in the field of foreign economic activity is executed by a separate agreement; 14) in the manner
determined by a separate agreement, resolve the issues of conversion of enterprises, owned by the
state of the Republic of Tatarstan; 15) establish state awards and honorary titles of the Republic of
Tatarstan.

CLAUSE III.

The State Bodies of the Russian Federation and the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan
jointly exercise the following powers: 1) providing for the rights and freedoms of the person and
citizen, and the rights of ethnic minorities; 2) protection of sovereignty and territorial integrity; 3)
organising the mobilization of preparation of the national economy, guidance of the development and
production of weapons and military equipment in the territory of the Republic of Tatarstan; the sale of
arms, ammunition, military equipment and other military property; and issues concerning conversion
of the defense industry. The forms and the share of participation of the Parties in the execution of the
appropriate powers are determined by separate agreements; 4) general and confrontational issues of
citizenship; 5) coordination of international and foreign economic relations; 6) coordination of the
pricing policy; 7) the formation of regional development funds; 8) conducting of monetary policy;
9) administration of possessions of the Russian Federation or the Republic of Tatarstan, which can
be transferred to joint administration with respect to interest in a voluntary and mutual agreement.
The form and procedures of the joint administration of the specific possessions are determined by
separate agreements; 10) coordination on geological surveying activities, the meteorological service,
standards and measures of time; 11) the creation of common funds for the financing of joint pro-
grams, the cleanup of consequences of natural disasters and accidents on the basis of mutual agree-
ment; 12) coordination of administration of common: energy system, roadways, railways, pipeline,
air, and water transport, communications, information systems; 13) providing for the duty-free and
unhindered movement of transport, cargo and goods by air, sea, river, railway, motor road, as well as
pipeline transport; 14) assessment in accordance with international standards of quality of the natural
environment, the implementation of measures for its stabilization and reconstruction; providing envi-
ronmental security, coordination in the use of land, water, and other natural resources; prevention of
ecological disasters; issues concerning specially protected natural areas; 15) carrying out a common
policy in the social sphere: employment, migration, social protection, including social security; 16)
coordination of health, protection of the family, motherhood, fatherhood and childhood, education,
science, culture, physical training and sports; training of national personnel for schools, educational
institutions, cultural institutions, the media and other institutions and organizations; provision of
pre-school institutions and schools of literature in the native language; coordination of research on
the history and culture of peoples and their languages; 17) personnel of the judicial and law enforce-
ment authorities; 18) advocacy, arbitration and notaries; 19) coordination of activity of law enforce-
ment bodies, the interaction of security bodies, the development and implementation of targeted pro-
grammes to combat crime; 20) the establishment of common principles of organization of the system
of state authorities and local self-government; 21) administrative, administrative—procedural, labor,
family, housing, land, water, and forest legislation; legislation on subterranean and environmental
protection; 22) issues of land sharing, subsoil, water and other natural resources; 23) other power,
established by mutual agreement.
CLAUSE IV.

The following shall be under the administration of the Russian Federation and its bodies: 1) adoption and amendment of the Constitution and Federal laws, control over their observance; Federal structure and the territory of the Russian Federation; 2) regulation and protection of the rights and freedoms of the person and citizen; citizenship in the Russian Federation; 3) establishment of the system of Federal legislative, executive and judicial authority, the procedures of their organization and activities; formation of Federal State Bodies; 4) Federal state property and its management; 5) establishment of the principles of Federal policy and Federal programs in the sphere of state, economic, ecological, social, cultural and national development of the Russian Federation; 6) establishing the legal framework of the single market; financial, currency, credit, customs regulation, money issue, the principles of pricing policy; federal economic services, including Federal banks; 7) the Federal budget; Federal taxes and fees; Federal funds of regional development; 8) Federal power systems, nuclear power, fissile materials; Federal transport, railways, information and communication; activities in space; 9) Foreign policy and international relations of the Russian Federation, international treaties of the Russian Federation; issues of war and peace; 10) foreign economic relations of the Russian Federation; 11) defense and security; military production; determination of the procedure of sale and purchase of arms, ammunition, military equipment and other military property; production of poisonous substances, narcotic substances and rules for their use; 12) determination of the status and protection of the state border, territorial sea, air space, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of the Russian Federation; 13) the judicial system; the prosecutor's office; criminal, criminal-procedural and criminal-executive legislation; amnesty and pardon; civil, civil procedure and arbitration procedure legislation; 14) Federal conflict of laws; 15) meteorological service, standards, metric system and time measurement; surveying and mapping; names of geographical entities; official statistics and accounting; 16) state awards and honorary badges of the Russian Federation; 17) the Federal public service.

CLAUSE V.

Legal documents issued by governments, agencies and officials of the Russian Federation entities and the Republic of Tatarstan within the powers of these bodies, institutions and officials, are valid.

CLAUSE VI.

The bodies of state power of the Russian Federation, as well as the authorities of the Republic of Tatarstan may not issue legal acts on matters not within their jurisdiction.

The state authorities of the Republic of Tatarstan, as well as Federal authorities, have the right to challenge the laws of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan, if they violate this Agreement.

Disputes on the implementation of the powers in the sphere of joint jurisdiction of the state authorities of the Russian Federation and state authorities of the Republic of Tatarstan are resolved in a consistent manner between the Parties.

CLAUSE VII.

For the purposes of fulfilling this Agreement, the State Bodies of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan may make additional agreements and establish joint structures and commissions on a parity basis.
CLAUSE VIII.

The State Bodies of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan by mutual agreement establish plenipotentiary representatives in Moscow and Kazan.

CLAUSE IX.

The Agreement or its provisions cannot be cancelled, modified or amended unilaterally.
The Agreement comes into effect 7 days after it signature and publication.
Executed in Moscow on 15 February 1994 in two copies, each one in Tatar and Russian, both texts being authentic and having equal validity.

President of the Russian Federation  
B. YELTSIN
Prime Minister  
V. CHERNOMYRDIN
President of the Republic of Tatarstan  
M. SHAIMIEV
Prime Minister of the Republic of Tatarstan  
M. SABIROV
The Republic of Tatarstan.——1994.—19 February

No. 162
Official letter

To Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin

To the Constitution of the Russian Federation project

The stance of the Republic of Tatarstan towards the draft Constitution of the Russian Federation is based on documents that have been adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan, in particular 'The Declaration on the State Sovereignty of the Republic of Tatarstan' and the new 'Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan'. According to these documents, relations between the Republic of Tatarstan and the Russian Federation are defined as treaty-constitutional. Under article 61 of the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan it is noted: 'The Republic of Tatarstan is a sovereign state, and a subject of international law, associated with the Russian Federation, Russia, on the basis of the Treaty on the mutual delegation of powers and jurisdictions'.

The Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan, following the adoption of the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan, appealed to supreme Russian state authorities with a proposal 'on the institutionalization in the Fundamental Law of the Russian Federation the provision about the contractual constitutional relations between the Republic of Tatarstan and the Russian Federation—Russia'. However we are still waiting for an official response.

Russia's leaders have repeatedly expressed their commitment to the democracy and the formation of the statehood taking into account the will of the people and the republics. The free will of the people of Tatarstan and its political priorities as of a sovereign state were legitimately reflected in the Republic of Tatarstan presidential election of June 1990 and in a referendum held on 21 March 1992 about the legal federal status of the republic (61.4% per cent voted in favour). We are also aware that the Russian referendum of 25 April 1993 is not considered as binding in the republic as voter turnout was only 22.8%. These political facts must be considered with regard to the constitutional definition of the relationship between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan.
Negotiations between the official delegations of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan concerning the conclusion of a treaty on mutual delegation of powers and jurisdictions were carried out on the combined initiative of the Russian Federation President, B. Yeltsin, and President of the Republic of Tatarstan, M. Shaimiev, with the participation of the representatives from the Supreme Soviets and Governments. Over this period, a draft treaty and a series of agreements were drawn up. However, more recently, the negotiating process was halted and the reached agreements were not realized. This was not the fault of Tatarstan. This situation has created doubt among the population and international community representatives that the commitment of Russia's leadership to the ideas stated in the 'Declaration on State Sovereignty of the Russian Federation' and to the reform of the Federation based on new democratic principles. Moreover, this uncertainty in regulating our bilateral relations may create further real difficulties when forming new power and administrative structures in the Russian Federation and also result in a lack of representation for the Republic of Tatarstan within the federal system. The Republic of Tatarstan considers that the time has come for formal recognition of the new state status, and incorporation into the draft of the new Constitution of the Russian Federation of a separate provision for treaty-constitutional relations between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan in accordance with the association set out in the Treaty and bilateral agreements.

President of the Republic of Tatarstan
M. Shaimiev
Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan
F. Mukhametshin

Kazan, 10 May 1993.

No.163

26 June 2007
Moscow

State Bodies of the Russian Federation and the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan, governed by the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan, by the federal laws, and laws of the Republic of Tatarstan;
on the basis of historical, cultural, economic, environmental and other specificities of the Republic of Tatarstan,
have agreed on the following:

CLAUSE 1

Delineation of jurisdictional subjects and powers between state bodies of the Russian Federation and state bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan is effected by the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan, and this Treaty.
CLAUSE 2


2. Taking into consideration that the use and protection of land, subterranean resources, water, forest and other natural resources inside the territory of the Republic of Tatarstan constitute the basis of life and activity of its multinational people, the Government of the Russian Federation and the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Tatarstan conclude agreements providing for the joint resolution of the issues related to economic, environmental (resulting from the long use of oil deposits taking into account the mining and geological conditions of hydrocarbon extraction), cultural and other specificities of the Republic of Tatarstan. The Government of the Russian Federation and the State Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan introduce the corresponding draft laws pertaining to issues mentioned in this clause to the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation.

3. The Republic of Tatarstan, within its competence, handles international and foreign economic relations with constituent entities and administrative and territorial divisions of foreign states; participates in the activities of bodies of international organizations specially created for these purposes; signs agreements for the implementation of international and foreign economic relations and handles communications with foreign states' public authorities as agreed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation in accordance with the procedure established by the Government of the Russian Federation.

4. The Republic of Tatarstan, with the approval of the Government of the Russian Federation, provides state support and assistance to its compatriots in the preservation of identity and in the development of national culture and language.

5. State languages in the Republic of Tatarstan are the Russian and the Tatar languages, the status and procedures for the use of which are determined by the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan, federal law, and law of the Republic of Tatarstan.

   In order to be nominated for the supreme official position of the Republic of Tatarstan, an additional requirement to those introduced in accordance with the procedure stipulated by federal law is established, providing for competence in the state languages of the Republic of Tatarstan. Competence in the state languages of the Republic of Tatarstan is established in a declarative way.

CLAUSE 3

The Russian Federation citizens residing in the Republic of Tatarstan shall have the right to obtain a primary identity document (a Russian Federation citizen domestic passport) with an inserted page in the state language of the Republic of Tatarstan (Tatar) and bearing the State Emblem of the Republic of Tatarstan.

CLAUSE 4

The Republic of Tatarstan public authority bodies shall have a corresponding representative office under the President of the Russian Federation in Moscow.

CLAUSE 5

1. This Treaty is valid for 10 years from the date of its coming into force.
2. The procedure for renewing this Treaty, as well as the procedure and the grounds of its early termination (cancellation) are determined by federal law.

CLAUSE 6

Executed in Moscow on 26 June 2007 in two copies, each one in the Russian and Tatar languages, both texts having equal validity.

President of the Russian Federation	V. Putin

President of the Republic of Tatarstan	M. SHAIMIEV


№ 164
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF TATARSTAN (Excerpts)
(as amended by the Law of the Republic of Tatarstan on 19 April 2000 No.1380,
on 15 September 2003 No.34-LRT, on 12 March 2004 No.10-ZRT;
on 14 March 2005 No.55-LRT, on 30 March 2010 No.10-ZRT;
on 22 November 2010 No.79-LRT; on 22 June 2012 No.40-ZRT)

The present Constitution, expressing the will of the multinational people of the Republic of Tatarstan and the Tatar people,
embodies the priorities of human and civil rights and freedoms,
proceeds from the universally acknowledged human right to self-determination, principles of equality, voluntariness and freedom of will,
contributes to the preservation and development of historical, national and spiritual traditions, cultures, languages, maintenance of civil peace and interethnic harmony,
promotes the strengthening of democracy, the social and economic development of the Republic of Tatarstan, and the preservation of the historical unity of the nations of the Russian Federation on the basis of the principles of federalism.

SECTION I. FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER
CLAUSE 1


<...>

CLAUSE 3

1. The holders of the Republic of Tatarstan sovereignty and the only source of power in the Republic of Tatarstan are its multinational people.
2. The people shall exercise power directly, as well as through the state bodies and local self-government bodies.

3. The supreme direct expression of the people's sovereignty shall be a referendum and free elections.


5. No one may usurp power by themselves in the Republic of Tatarstan. The seizure of power or the arrogation of the State competences shall be prosecuted by federal law.

CLAUSE 4

1. Outside the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation, and the joint competence of the Russian Federation and its subjects, the Republic of Tatarstan shall exercise its own legal regulation, including adoption of statutes and other normative legal acts.

2. In case of inconsistencies between a federal law and a normative legal act of the Republic of Tatarstan issued on subjects belonging to the jurisdiction of the Republic of Tatarstan, the normative legal act of the Republic of Tatarstan shall prevail.

CLAUSE 6

The Republic of Tatarstan shall be entitled within its powers to enter into international and foreign economic relations with constituent entities, administrative and territorial units of foreign states and with foreign states, conclude international agreements, arrange reciprocal diplomatic representation, and participate in the activities of international organizations.

CLAUSE 7

The Republic of Tatarstan shall be entitled to enter into relations with constituent entities of the Russian Federation, to conclude contracts and agreements, arrange reciprocal representation and participate in the activities of joint organizations.

CLAUSE 8

1. The Tatar and Russian languages shall be the state languages in the Republic of Tatarstan.

2. The official languages of the republic of Tatarstan shall be used on equal terms in all governmental organisations, self-government bodies and official institutions.

CLAUSE 9

1. State authority in the Republic of Tatarstan shall be exercised on the basis of the division of powers into legislative, executive and judicial. The legislative, executive and judicial powers shall be independent.

2. State authority in the Republic of Tatarstan shall be exercised by the President of the Republic of Tatarstan, the State Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan, the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Tatarstan and the courts of the Republic of Tatarstan.

3. The executive authority of the Republic of Tatarstan shall be constituted by the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Tatarstan, ministries, state committees of the Republic of Tatarstan and other executive bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan.

4. In the exercise of their competencies, the authorities of the Republic of Tatarstan shall take into account historical, national and other characteristics of the Republic of Tatarstan.
The Republic of Tatarstan shall recognise and guarantee local self-government. Local self-government shall be independent within its powers. Local self-government bodies shall not belong to the system of state authority.

CLAUSE 11

1. The Republic of Tatarstan is a secular state.
2. Religious associations shall be separated from the state and equal under the law.

CLAUSE 12

1. The Republic of Tatarstan recognises ideological diversity. No ideology may be established as state or obligatory.

CLAUSE 13

The Republic of Tatarstan is a social welfare state, pursuing a policy aimed at the creation of conditions that provide dignity and human liberty.

CLAUSE 14

The Republic of Tatarstan shall assist in the development of the national culture, language, and the preservation of the identity of the Tatars living outside of the Republic of Tatarstan.

CLAUSE 15

1. The Republic of Tatarstan rejects violence and war as a means of settling disputes between states and peoples.
2. War propaganda is prohibited in the Republic of Tatarstan.

CLAUSE 16

1. The land, mineral resources, water, wood and other natural resources, the fauna and flora shall be used and protected in the Republic of Tatarstan as a basis of life and activity of the people.
2. The public funds of the Republic of Tatarstan, state property, cultural and historical assets and other assets that contribute to the economic self-sufficiency of the republic and preservation of material and spiritual culture shall belong to the people.

CLAUSE 18

1. In the Republic of Tatarstan, private, state, municipal and other forms of property shall have equal recognition and protection.
2. Land and other natural resources may exist as private, state, municipal and other forms of property.
CLAUSE 19

1. Property shall be inviolable. No proprietor's rights regarding possession, use and management of lawfully acquired property should be restricted except otherwise provided by the federal law.

<...>

CLAUSE 21

1. The Republic of Tatarstan has the right to accord its own citizenship.

CLAUSE 22

Citizens of the Russian Federation shall in the Republic of Tatarstan possess all rights, freedoms and equal duties, according to the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan, conventional principles and the norms of international Law.

<...>

CLAUSE 25


<...>

President
of the Republic of Tatarstan

M. Shaimiev

Kazan,
6 November 1992
No.1664-XII

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CA TR SC, X — 10th session of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan (12th convocation): Verbatim record

Current Archive of the Muslim Spiritual Board of the Republic of Tatarstan (CA MSB RT)


Current Archive of the Procuracy of Tatarstan Republic (CA of the Procuracy of TR)


Central State Archive of historical and political documentation of the Republic of Tatarstan

Fund 15 — Tatar regional committee of CPSU(B)
Fund 19 — Bauman district committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Kazan
Fund 26 — Kazan city committee of CPSU(B)
Fund 36 — Department of the party history of the Tatar regional committee of CPSU(B), Kazan
Fund 262 — Local Organisation of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union at the factory «Communars», Kazan
Fund 273 — Almetyevsk district committee of CPSU(B), Kazan
Fund 292 — Party collegium at the authorized Party Control Committee at the Central Committee of CPSU(B) in TASSR, Kazan
Fund 840 — Party Committee of the factory No.22 named after S. Gorbunov (at present — Kazan aircraft manufacturing group), Kazan.
Fund 868 — Kazan guberniya committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), Kazan
Fund 4034 — Tatar regional committee of All-Union Leninist Young Communist League
Fund 7130 — Political department of the Tatar regional military commissariat
Fund 8237 — Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev — chairman of the Central Islamic commissariat at People's Commissariat of Nationalities of the RSFSR
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**Abbreviations**

AARR: Association of Artists of Revolutionary Russia  
AAW: Architectural Artistic Workshops  
ABT: Airborne Troops  
Academcentre: Academic centre  
ADURP: ‘All-Russians Dubrovin’s Union of Russian People’  
AEC: All-Russian Extraordinary Commission  
All-Russian Central Executive Committee  
ALYCL: All-Union Leninist Young Communist League  
ANCS: Association of National Cultural Societies  
APD: Agitation and Propaganda Department  
ARMC: All-Russian Muslim Congress  
AS: Academy of Science  
ATC: Armoured Troop Carrier  
ATCC: All-Tatar Civic Centre  
BIUS: Board of the Idel-Ural State  
BRIC: Association of the Group of Countries: Brazil, Russia, India, China  
BSHAR: Bolgar State Historical and Architectural Reserve  
BSI: Budget Spending Index  
BSSR: Belarus Soviet Socialist Republic  
CA of the Procuracy of TR: Current Archive of the Procuracy of Tatarstan Republic  
CARC: Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults  
CA TR SC: Current Archive of Tatarstan Republic State Council  
CC: Central Committee  
CC: City Committee  
CC: Criminal Code  
CC ITL: Central Commission on the Implementation of Tatar Language  
CC WPP: Central Committee of Workers’ and Peasants’ Party  
CEC: Canton Executive Committee  
CECR: Council of European Communities and Regions  
Central Executive Committee  
CERT: Chinese Eastern Railway  
CETW: Constructive Experimental Theatre Workshop  
CIS: Commonwealth of Independent States  
CLRAE: The Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe  
CMCA: Committee of Members of the Constituent Assembly  
CMSB: Central Muslim Spiritual Board  
CP: Culture Palace  
CPA: Chief Political Administration  
CPC (Sovnarkom): Council of People’s Commissars  
CPH (Sovnarkhoz): Council of People’s Household  
CPSU(B): Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)  
CPSU: Communist Party of the Soviet Union  
CRA: Council for Religious Affairs  
CSC: Central Supervisory Commission  
CTI: Control–testing instrumentation  
DC: District Committee  
DEC: District Executive Committee  
DP: Decree of the President  
DRAFF: Department of Religious Affairs for Foreign Faiths  
EBRD: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development  
EC: Electronic Computers  
EC: Emergency Committee  
EC: Executive Committee  
ECE: Economic Commission for Europe  
EM: Engineering Manpower  
EU: European Union  
FCL: Federal Constitutional Law  
FIDE: International Chess Federation  
FIFA: International Federation of Association Football  
FISU: International University Sports Federation  
FL: Federal Law  
FNCAF: Federal National Cultural Autonomy of Russian Tatars  
FTA: Factory Trade Apprenticeship  
FTIP: Federal Targeted Investment Program  
FTP: Federal Target Program  
FWT: Factory Trade Training  
GMP: Gross National Product  
Gosstroy: State Committee for Construction in the USSR  
GRP: Gross Regional Product  
HATS: Higher Art and Technical Studios  
HC: House Committee  
HCC: Higher Coordinating Centre  
HES: Hydroelectric Station  
HMB: Housing Maintenance and Utilities Board  
IBRD: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development  
IHL: Institute of Higher Learning  
ILO: International Labour Organization  
IME: Institute of Mechanical Engineering  
ISESCO: Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization  
ITC: International Transport Corridor  
JSPD: Joint State Political Directorate  
KAI: Kazan Aircraft Institute  
KamAZ: Kama Automobile Plant  
‘Kazan Association of Sobriety’  
KBAS USSR: Kazan Branch of the Academy of Sciences of USSR  
KDRA: Kazan department of ‘The Russian Assembly’  
KFEI: Kazan Finance–Economic Institute  
KGB: Committee for State Security  
KGD: Kazan Guberniya Department  
KICE: Kazan Institution of Civil Engineering  
KICT: Kazan Institute of Chemical Technology  
KIE: Kazan Institute for Energy  
KPDO: Kazan Planning and Design Office  
KPI: Kazan Polytechnic Institute  
KRPRS: Kazan ‘Royal–Popular Russian Society’  
KSA: Kazan Spiritual Academy  
KSORW: ‘Kazan Society of Orthodox Russian Women’  
KSPI: Kazan State Pedagogical Institute  
KSU: Kazan State University  
KSUA: Kazan State University of Architecture and Engineering
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<td>KTTS: Kazan Tatar Teaching School</td>
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<tr>
<td>LIAZ: Likino Bus Plant</td>
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<tr>
<td>LLC: Limited Liability Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>LMA: League of Militant Atheists</td>
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<td>LRT: Law of the Republic of Tatarstan</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDC: Military District Committee</td>
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<td>MEandS TR: Ministry of Education and Science of</td>
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<td>Tatarstan Republic</td>
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<td>MFA: Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIA: Ministry of Internal Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIC: Military Industrial Complex</td>
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<td>MinHIE: The Ministry of Higher Education</td>
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<td>Institutions</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPE: The Ministry of Public Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSB: Muslim Spiritual Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSBPS: Muslim Spiritual Board of European Part</td>
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<tr>
<td>of Russia and Siberia</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSC: Muslim Socialist Committee</td>
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<td>MSU: Moscow State Institute of International</td>
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<td>Relations</td>
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<td>MTS: Machine–Tractor Station</td>
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<tr>
<td>Narcomtruda: People’s Commissariat for Labour</td>
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<tr>
<td>Narkomnats: People’s Commissariat for Nationalities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Narkompros: People’s Commissariat for Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>Narkomzem: People’s Commissariat for Agriculture</td>
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<tr>
<td>NA RT: National Archive of the Republic of</td>
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<td>Tatarstan</td>
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<td>NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCA: National Cultural Autonomy</td>
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<td>NCC: National–Cultural Center</td>
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<td>NDR: ‘Our Home — Russia’</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEAEE: National Economy Achievements Exhibition</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEP: New Economic Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>NKVD: People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>NM RT: National Museum of the Republic of</td>
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<td>Tatarstan</td>
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<td>NPA: Name-bearing Privatisation Investment</td>
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<td>Accounts</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRC: National–Regional Component</td>
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<tr>
<td>OGE: ‘Leninogorskneft’: Oil-gas mining enterprise</td>
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<tr>
<td>‘Leninogorskneft’</td>
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<td>OIC: Organization of the Islamic Conference</td>
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<td>OJC: Open Joint–Stock Company</td>
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<td>OMSA: Orenburg Mohammedan Spiritual Assembly</td>
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<td>OWHC: Organization of World Heritage Cities</td>
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<td>PHP: Personal Household Plot</td>
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<td>PIAS: Physical Institute of the Academy of</td>
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<td>Sciences of the USSR</td>
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<td>PNA: Palestinian National Authority</td>
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<td>PRC: People’s Republic of China</td>
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<tr>
<td>Profsoyuz: Labour Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAS: Russian Academy of Sciences</td>
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<tr>
<td>RC: Regional Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCP (B): Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks)</td>
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<td>RCP: Reinforced Concrete Products</td>
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<td>RDP: Russian Democratic Party</td>
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<td>Rescom: Republic Committee</td>
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<td>Revcom: Revolutionary Committee</td>
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<td>Revshatab: Revolutionary Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>RF: Russian Federation</td>
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<td>RO: Register Office</td>
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<td>RIPIS: ‘The Royal–Popular Islamic Society’</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPRS: ‘Royal–Popular Russian Society’</td>
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<td>RPUAM: ‘Russian People Union of the name of Arch-</td>
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<td>angel Michael’</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSDLP(B): Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party</td>
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<td>(Bolsheviks)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSDLP: Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party</td>
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<td>RSFSR: Russian Soviet Federative Socialist</td>
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<tr>
<td>Republic</td>
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<td>RSHA: Russian State Historical Archive</td>
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<td>RT: Republic of Tatarstan</td>
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<tr>
<td>RTD: Research and Technological Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>SA HPD TR: State Archive of the Historical and</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political Documentation of Tatarstan Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAMP: School for Apprentices in General Trades</td>
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<tr>
<td>SC: State Archive of the Russian Federation</td>
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<td>SC: State Council</td>
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<td>SC: Street Committee</td>
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<td>SCO: Shanghai Cooperation Organisation</td>
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<td>SCFT: ‘The Society of churchwardens and parish</td>
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<td>trustees of the city of Kazan</td>
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<td>SCSE: State Committee for the State of Emergency</td>
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<td>SD: State Duma</td>
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<td>SDB: Special Design Bureau</td>
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<td>SDC: State Defence Committee</td>
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<td>SEZ: Special Economic Zone</td>
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<td>SFE: State Final Examination</td>
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<td>SIATD: State Institute of Advanced Training of</td>
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<td>Doctors</td>
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<td>Sovkhov: Soviet farm</td>
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<td>SRI: Scientific and Research Institute</td>
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<td>TACIS: Programme of Technical Assistance to the</td>
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<td>countries of CIS</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAPW: Tatar Association of Proletarian Writers</td>
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<tr>
<td>TASSR: Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic</td>
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<td>TCBRM: Temporary Central Bureau of Russian</td>
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<td>Muslims</td>
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<td>TCC: Tatar Community Centre</td>
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<td>The Kolkhoz: communal household</td>
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<td>TNA: ‘Tatarstan — New Age’</td>
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<tr>
<td>TPP: Testelektrotsentral (thermal power plant)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSFSR: Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet</td>
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<td>Republic</td>
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<td>TSHPI: Tatar State Humanitarian and Pedagogical</td>
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<tr>
<td>Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>TTC: Technical Training College</td>
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<td>TV: television</td>
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<tr>
<td>TÜRKSOY: International Organization on Co-devel-</td>
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<tr>
<td>opment of Turcic Culture and Art</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDPE: Urban Department of Public Education</td>
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<td>UNE: Unified National Exam</td>
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<td>UNESCO: United Nations Educational, Scientific</td>
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<td>and Cultural Organization</td>
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<td>UNIDO: United Nations Industrial Development</td>
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<td>Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNO: United Nations Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>URP: ‘Union of Russian People’</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA: United States of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>USE: Unified State Examination</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR: Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>VEC: Volost Executive Committee</td>
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<td>VFD: Volga Federal District</td>
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<tr>
<td>WC: Women’s Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>WCT: World Congress of Tatars</td>
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<tr>
<td>WTYF: World Tatar Youth Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>YPT: Young People’s Theatre</td>
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THE HISTORY OF THE TATARS SINCE ANCIENT TIMES
In Seven Volumes

Volume 7
Tatars and Tatarstan in the 20th–Beginning of the 21st Centuries

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Factory and plant of the Alafuzovs’ commerce and industry company.

Stearic soap, glycerine and chemical plant
of the Krestovnikov brothers commercial factory partnership.
Owners and workers of the Alafuzov commerce and industry company factory. Kazan. Photo from the 1890s. National Museum of the Republic of Tatarstan

Non–Russians residing in Kazan guberniya.

Kazan Tatars in a folk costume.

R. Fakhretdin with his family.
Kazan University.
Early 20th century.

Group of students and teachers of the ‘Galiya’ madrasah.
Ufa. 1915–1916. State Archive of the Historical and Political Documentation of the Republic of Tatarstan
Students at the Tetyushi Russian–Tatar school.
Tetyushi. 1907–1908. State Archive of the Historical and Political Documentation of the Republic of Tatarstan
G. Tuqay, poet

F. Amirkhan, writer

G. Kamal, playwright, theatrical and public figure

G. Kariev and S. Gizzatullina-Volzhskaya, founders of the Tatar professional theatre.
Kazan. Early 20th century.
National Museum of the Republic of Tatarstan

Tatar theatre troupe ‘Sayar’.
V. Kachalov, drama actor. Kazan. 1897.

F. Shalyapin, opera singer

Yu. Akchura, public and political figure

S. Maksudi, one of the leaders of the Tatar national liberation movement, deputy of the 2nd and 3rd State Dumas

M.-Z. Ramiev (Dermend), poet, public figure, gold miner

M. Kapustin, professor at Kazan University, deputy of the 2nd and 3rd State Dumas

Members and organisers of the Islamic labour group at the State Duma of the 2nd convocation. 1907.
N. Yershov, one of the leaders of an armed rebellion in Kazan

M. Vakhitov, political figure, one of the leaders of the Muslim Socialist Committee. Kazan. State Archive of the Historical and Political Documentation of the Republic of Tatarstan

K. Yakubov, one of the leaders of the struggle for establishing Soviet power in Kazan. State Archive of the Historical and Political Documentation of the Republic of Tatarstan

Meeting of soldiers. Kazan. 1917. State Archive of the Historical and Political Documentation of the Republic of Tatarstan
Soldier demonstration near Kazan University.
17 March 1917. State Archive of the Historical and Political Documentation of the Republic of Tatarstan

Group of Red guards of the Kazan state-owned plant.
Kazan. 1917. National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan
Celebration of the first anniversary of the October Revolution.
Chistopol. November 1918. State Archive of the Historical and Political Documentation of the Republic of Tatarstan
Ships of the Volga Military Fleet on the Kama.
Kazan. 1917–1918. State Archive of the Historical and Political Documentation of the Republic of Tatarstan

Entry of the Red Army in Kazan, Gruzinskaya street (present-day Karl Marx street).
1918 State Archive of the Historical and Political Documentation of the Republic of Tatarstan
Participants of the revolutionary events of 1917–1918 in Kazan.
1918–1919. State Archive of the Historical and Political Documentation of the Republic of Tatarstan
Cavalry unit formed in Kazan departs from the Kazan Kremlin to fight against Kolchak.
April 1919. National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan

Participants of the 2nd All-Russian Congress of communist Muslims.
Moscow. December 1919. State Archive of the Historical and Political Documentation of the Republic of Tatarstan
S. Said-Galiev,
the first head of the Soviet
of People’s Commissars
of the TASSR
(1920–1921).

B. Mansurov,
the first head of the Presidium
of the Central Executive
Committee of the TASSR
(1920–1921).

M. Sultan-Galiev,
political and state figure,
head of the Central
Islamic Commissariat

1st Founding Congress of the Soviets of workers, Red Army men and peasant deputies

National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan


R.-S. Sabirov, head of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee (1921–1924). Kazan. 1922. State Archive of the Historical and Political Documentation of the Republic of Tatarstan


Standing from left to right: 1) V. Dogadov, 3) Kudryavy, 4) A. Dogadov, 6) M. Yendakov.

Sitting from left to right: 1) I. Kazakov, 2) A. Bochkov, 3) M. Vladimirsky, 5) I. Khodorovsky, 6) S. Said-Galiev, 7) B. Goldberg.
Presidium of the 3rd Congress of Soviets of the TASSR.
Kazan. 5 December 1922. State Archive of the Historical and Political Documentation of the Republic of Tatarstan

Meeting at the Theatrical square in Kazan dedicated to the 2nd anniversary of the Tatar Republic.
Kazan. 25 June 1922. State Archive of the Historical and Political Documentation of the Republic of Tatarstan
3rd All-Union conference of Tatar–Bashkir workers at the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). 31 May 1926. Moscow
Group of delegates of the Tatar party organisation with J. Stalin at the 14th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Moscow. 1925.
State Archive of the Historical and Political Documentation of the Republic of Tatarstan

Delegation of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Social Republic at the 16th All-Russian Congress of Soviets with members of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks).
Central State Archive of the Historical and Political Documentation of the Republic of Tatarstan.
From left to right in the first row: 1) B. Abdullin, secretary of the Regional Committee of the TASSR and delegate of the congress, 3) N. Krupskaya, 5) M. Kalinin, 6) A. Emukidze, secretary of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee; 7) G. Baychurin, head of the Central Executive Committee of the TASSR.
Funeral for those who lost their lives during the 'Pitchfork' uprising.
Menzelinsk. 1920. State Archive of the Historical and Political Documentation of the Republic of Tatarstan

Isolation ward for starving children.
Spassk canton of the TASSR. 1922.

Employees of the medical train of the People’s Commissariat for Social Welfare organised to help starving children.
1920s. State Archive of the Historical and Political Documentation of the Republic of Tatarstan
Members of the first Tatar agricultural commune 'Legacies of Ilyich'. Laishevo canton of the TASSR. 1926. State Archive of the Historical and Political Documentation of the Republic of Tatarstan

Automobiles—a gift to Tataria’s districts distinguished in collectivisation. 1930s. State Archive of the Historical and Political Documentation of the Republic of Tatarstan

First tractor column of the Cheremshan Machine and Tractor Station. Kazan. 1930. State Archive of the Historical and Political Documentation of the Republic of Tatarstan
Opening of the Yudino–Zelenodolsk railroad.
Kazan. 2 June 1933.
State Archive of the Historical and Political Documentation of the Republic of Tatarstan

Construction of the main building of the Kazan State District Power Station (TPP–1). Kazan. 1930.
National Museum of the Republic of Tatarstan

Members of the shock brigade of bricklayers at the construction of the Kuybyshev Kazan Chemical Plant.
Kazan. 1930s. State Archive of the Historical and Political Documentation of the Republic of Tatarstan
Tataria’s first oil producers. Almetyevsk District of the TASSR.
1939. State Archive of the Historical and Political Documentation of the Republic of Tatarstan

State Archive of the Historical and Political Documentation of the Republic of Tatarstan
The Kazansky Komsomolets plane constructed by Komsomol members of the Kazan aviation plant preparing for take off. 1942. National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan

Delivery of grain to the state at the Vysokogorsky District unload point of the TASSR. 1943. State Archive of the Historical and Political Documentation of the Republic of Tatarstan
Injured soldiers undergoing treatment at evacuation hospital No.1665.
Kazan. 1943. State Archive of the Historical and Political Documentation of the Republic of Tatarstan

Group of actors from Tataria on tour at the 3rd Baltic Front.
1943. State Archive of the Historical and Political Documentation of the Republic of Tatarstan
M. Dzhaliil, poet

F. Karim, poet

War correspondents of Tataria. 1946. Institute of Languages, Literature and Arts.
In the first row from left to right: 2) S. Khakim, 3) M. Khusain.
In the second row from left to right: 1) Sh. Mannur, 2) A. Fayzi, 3) A. Yerikey. In the centre of the 3rd row, A. Iskhak.
Transfer of the banner of the 202nd sponsored bomber aviation division of the Supreme Council of the TASSR.

1944. State Archive of the Historical and Political Documentation of the Republic of Tatarstan

Victory Parade attendees in Moscow.

1945. State Archive of the Historical and Political Documentation of the Republic of Tatarstan
Standing from left to right: 2) G. Dinmukhametov, head of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the TASSR;
4) Z. Muratov, 1st secretary of the Tatar regional committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

N. Khrushchev during his visit to the TASSR.

The first astronaut in space Yu. Gagarin and the 1st secretary of the Tatar regional committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League R. Belyaev at the opening of the Soviet–Japanese festival.
National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan.
Delegation of the TASSR at the anniversary session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Moscow. 1972. Central State Archive of the Historical and Political Documentation of the Republic of Tatarstan. Sitting from left to right: 1) G. Usmanov; 3) V. Shashin; 4) F. Tabeev; 5) A. Dadzhal-Teregulov; 6) F. Panin; 7) B. Martynov.
Z. Muratov, 1st secretary of the Tatar regional committee of the CPSU (1944–1957).

S. Ignatyev, 1st secretary of the Tatar regional committee of the CPSU (1957–1960).

F. Tabeev, 1st secretary of the Tatar regional committee of the CPSU (1960–1970).

Meeting to discuss the project of the USSR Constitution. 1977.

Central State Archive of the Historical and Political Documentation of the Republic of Tatarstan.
Wellsite No.3 is the discoverer of the Romashkino oil deposit.
Almetyevsk District of the TASSR. 1950s.
State Archive of the Historical and Political Documentation of the Republic of Tatarstan

Team of oil riggers with a vial of oil during the meeting dedicated to the extraction of 2 billion tons of oil.
Almetyevsk District of the TASSR. 1981.
State Archive of the Historical and Political Documentation of the Republic of Tatarstan

Laying of the first stone of the Kama Automobile Plant. 1969.

Member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR A. Kosygin at the KamAZ construction site. Naberezhnye Chelny. 24 December 1971. Photo by M. Shakirzyanov. National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan

Kazan organic synthesis factory. 1975. State Archive of the Historical and Political Documentation of the Republic of Tatarstan

Delegates of the 1st congress of atheists of the TASSR, 1920s.
State Archive of the Historical and Political Documentary of the Republic of Tatarstan

Dismantling of Nurulla Mosque’s minaret.
Kazan. 1930s. National Museum of the Republic of Tatarstan

Rite 'isem kuşu' ('name-giving') with participation of I. Mushhtareev, imam of the 'Marjani' Mosque.

Janâzah (funeral prayer) at the 'Marjani' Mosque.
G. Ibragimov, writer

A. Kutuy, writer
Kazan, 1930s. Institute of Languages, Literature and Arts

Writers of Soviet Tataria at the 1st All-Russian Soviet Writers Congress.
Moscow. August 1934. Sitting from left to right: K. Nadzhmi, A. Tolstoy, M. Gorky.
Standing from left to right: 2) Kh. Tufan, 5) G. Nigmati
K. Tinchurin, playwright
T. Minnullin, playwright

Scene from I. Nurullin’s drama 'Tuqay in Petersburg'.
Kazan. 1960. State Archive of the Historical and Political Documentation of the Republic of Tatarstan
S. Gabashi, composer

F. Yarullin, composer

Union of composers of the TASSR. Kazan. 1948.
Sitting from left to right: Yu. Vinogradov, N. Zhiganov (head), S. Sajdashev, M. Muzafarov and A. Klyucharev.
Participants of the Tatar ten-day art festival in Moscow. 1958.
Central State Archive of the Historical and Political Documentation of the Republic of Tatarstan.
From left to right in the first row: 1) O. Loginova, Honoured Artist of the TASSR and Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic; 4) S. Sadykova, composer and singer.

Opening of the Literature and Art Days of the TASSR in Moscow.
Dance suite 'Sababtuy' performed by the State ensemble of song and dance. Moscow. 17 December 1980.
National Museum of the Republic of Tatarstan
Members of the Tatar regional committee of the CPSU with builders. 
National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan

Deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the Tatar ASSR of the 12th convocation who accepted the Declaration of the state sovereignty of the TASSR. 
At the meeting on the eve of the opening of the 4th session of the 12th convocation of the Tatar ASSR’s Supreme Soviet.
At the forefront: M. Mulyukov, President of the Tatar public centre. Kazan. Liberty square. 16 April 1991.
Photo by I. Yusupov. National Museum of the Republic of Tatarstan

Meeting on the opening day of the 6th extraordinary session of the Tatar ASSR’s Supreme Soviet of the 12th convocation, where events related to the attempted coup in the USSR on 19–21 August 1991 were discussed.


Leaflets reflecting the attitude of different political powers to the referendum on the status of the Republic of Tatarstan. 1992. State Archive of the Historical and Political Documentation of the Republic of Tatarstan
F. Mukhametshin and A. Lozovoy at Tatarstan’s Presidium of the Supreme Council during discussion of the constitution project.

Participants of the negotiations between the Republic of Tatarstan and the Russian Federation on the delimitation of powers and areas of responsibility.

Meeting between the President of the Republic of Tatarstan M. Shaimiev and President of the Senate of France R. Monory during the delegation of the Republic of Tatarstan's visit to France. Paris. 1994.

President of the USSR M. Gorbachev in the Kazan Kremlin. 29 August 2005.

M. Shaimiev transferring the presidential standard to R. Minnikhanov during the inauguration of the President of the Republic of Tatarstan. Kazan. 25 March 2010.
President of the Russian Federation V. Putin and President of the Republic of Tatarstan R. Minnihanov at the opening of Universiade Village in 2013.
Kazan.

4th International summit on ‘Economic cooperation between Russia and countries of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC): KAZANSUMMIT 2012’.
Kazan. 17 May 2012. Photograph by R. Kadyrov.
President of the Russian Federation V. Putin, President of the Republic of Tatarstan R. Minnikhanov, State Councillor of the Republic of Tatarstan M. Shaimiev in the lands of Old Bulgar.
28 August 2012. Photograph by M. Kozlovsky.

President of the Republic of Tatarstan R. Minnikhanov and President of Turkey A. Gül during the Tatarstan President’s official visit to Turkey.
Ankara. 30 May 2012. Photograph by R. Kadyrov.
President of the Republic of Tatarstan R. Minnikhanov and CEO of PJSC Tatneft Sh. Takhautdinov at the construction site of PJSC TANEKO.
Nizhnekamsk. 2009.
Mayor of the city of Naberezhnye Chelny I. Khalikov with deputies of the State Council of the Republic of Tatarstan accepts a house built as part of the Affordable Housing programme. Naberezhnye Chelny. 31 May 2006.

'Nizhnekamskneftekhim'. General view. 2000s.

The oil refining factories of PJSC TANEKO.
Nizhnekamsk. 2012.
Head of the State Council of the Republic of Tatarstan F. Mukhametshin in the republic’s fields. 2012.

Laying of the capsule in the foundation of the Innopolis IT town.  
June 2012. Photo by E. Khayrullin.

Prime Minister of the Republic of Tatarstan I. Khalikov at an enterprise in the Yutazino District of the Republic of Tatarstan.  
2012. Photo by R. Safin.

At a conveyor of the Kama Automobile Plant.  
President of Azerbaijan I. Aliyev visiting the Kazan Helicopter Plant.
2011. Photograph by R. Kadyrov.

The Tatarstan patrol ship.
The Gorky Zelenodolsk Plant. 2000s.

High-speed Aeroexpress train.

President of the Russian Federation B. Yeltsin and President of the Republic of Tatarstan M. Shaimiev near the monument to G. Tuqay.

Tour around Kazan’s historical centre. From left to right: Mayor of Kazan city I. Metshin, President of the Republic of Tatarstan R. Minnikhanov, assistant to the President of the Republic of Tatarstan O. Baltusova, public prosecutor of the Republic of Tatarstan K. Amirov. September, 2012. Photo by R. Safin.


Opening of the White Mosque in Bolgar. 10 June 2012. *Photograph by M. Kozlovsky.*

Secretary of State H. Clinton at the meeting with Kazan scientists. 2009. Photograph by M. Kozlovsky.
World renowned scientist of astrophysics and academician of Russia’s Academy of Sciences R. Syunyaev visiting Kazan. 3 September 2012. Photo by R. Safin.

First deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of Tatarstan R. Muratov and President of the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Tatarstan A. Mazgarov grant the degree of Academician of the Tatarstan Academy of Sciences to R. Khakimov, head of the Sh. Marjani Institute of History of the Tatarstan Academy of Sciences. Kazan. 19 November 2010.
Opening of a new Tatar gymnasium in Kazan.
1 September 2011. Photograph by R. Kadyrov.

The Sozvezdie festival.
Kazan. 2007. Photograph by M. Kozlovsky.
At the Sabantuy in Kazan. 2000s. Photograph by M. Kozlovsky.

Victory Day: nobody is forgotten, nothing is forgotten.
May 2012. Photograph by R. Kadyrov.

Day of the Republic of Tatarstan.
30 August 2007. Photograph by M. Kozlovsky.