THE GOLDEN HORDE IN WORLD HISTORY


This monograph presents research into the history of the Golden Horde that represents its role in world history, and contains key contemporary studies by leading scholars from the Russian and foreign academic centres.

The cover design features the image of ‘Mounted Batyr’, which belongs to the brand ‘Cultural and historical heritage of Tatarstan’.


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Foreword

Rafael Khakimov

Full-scale research on the Ulus of Jochi (the Golden Horde) did not begin until as recently as the 1990s, when ideological restrictions imposed by the government were finally lifted. This primarily concerned the Resolution on the State and Measures for Improving Political and Ideological Awareness Raising in the Tatar Party Organization by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), dated 1944, which prohibited studies on the history of the Golden Horde and Tatar khanates, as well as any popularisation of the epic ‘Edigü’. The Falsification of Tatar history was remarkably crucial to the success of Soviet policy. It was during the height of the WWII, with all of the country's resources already tied up, and long before the conquest of Berlin that the government found it necessary to prohibit research on the Golden Horde. Stalin believed Tatar history to be as important as achieving victories on the front. This ideology was designed to confine Tatar history to covering local events in the Volga Region and presenting the Tatars as descending from the Volga Bulgars, known for their heroic resistance to the Tatar-Mongol invasion. But at the same time, Tatars also acquired a negative image as Asians who had interrupted the natural course of Russian history. These doctrines was powerful enough to give rise to a Bulgarist political movement to rename Tatars to Bulgars and Tatarstan to Volga Bulgaria. The most zealous of its advocates wanted passports stating ‘Bulgar’ instead of ‘Tatar’ as their nationality, and would also register as Bulgars, not Tatars, during censuses. Ultimately, it was Perestroika that brought about a decline in Bulgarist activities, and nowadays the movement is seen as a rather exotic rudiment of the Soviet era when historical myths ran rampant.

The turbulent political events of the 1990s stirred up the public, causing a surge in Tatar self-awareness, and Perestroika lifted the restrictions on research regarding the Golden Horde and Tatar khanates. This signaled the end of governmental ideological control. Academic institutions independent of the Russian Academy of Sciences were thus established in Tatarstan, while the Russian academic community endured the time of turbulence without any real interest towards Tatar history. Moreover, a number of Russian historians advocated for an unbiased approach to the Golden Horde.

After state sovereignty of Tatarstan was declared in 1990, followed by the bilateral agreement on the division of powers between Kazan and Moscow in 1994, Tatarstan enjoyed an economic and cultural upswing. Borders were opened, international connections to academic centres were consolidated, and now that the republic was engaged in extensive foreign relations, self-consciousness of Tatars and Tatarstan's inhabitants was growing stronger every day. Tatars wanted an unbiased history for themselves, as textbooks and periodicals continued to be printed with barbaric images of their people, still presenting the Golden Horde as a source of savagery, humiliation to the Russians and a threat to Europe as a whole. A number of Russian politicians even tried to promote the Battle of Kulikovo to the status of a Russian national holiday, which was promptly prevented by Tatarstan's government.

It was under these circumstances that large-scale research began on the Golden Horde, the first major milestone of which was The International Scientific Seminar titled ‘Source Studies on the History of the Ulus of Jochi (the Golden Horde). From Kalka to Astrakhan. 1223–1556’ on June 23–26, 1998. [3]. In later years it was followed by a series of conferences that eventually transformed into the ‘Golden Horde Forum’, a regularly held conference. The varied and diverse approaches to issues related to the Golden Horde ultimately yielded the dedicated volume titled ‘The Ulus of Jochi (Golden Horde). 13th Century–Mid–
15th Century’ (Editor In Chief: Professor Mirkasym Usmanov) in the seven-volume History of the Tatars since Ancient Times [1]. Together with Volume 4, titled ‘Tatar States (15–18th Centuries)’ [2], it formed a detailed depiction of the development, prosperity, and decline of the Golden Horde and the history of the post-Golden Horde territory. The Center for Research on the Golden Horde and Tatar Khanates in the Sh. Marjani Institute of History, the Golden Horde Review journal, and yearly periodicals including The Golden Horde Civilisation, Golden Horde Numismatics, and Medieval Turkic-Tatar States have done their duty to promote academic connections to leading research centres in Russia and around the world to find solutions to various issues in the history of the Golden Horde. This current multi-authored monograph serves as the culmination of years of international academic research.


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Marie Favereau

During the rule of the Golden Horde, multiple regions and the heterogeneous population of Central Asia were for the first time integrated into a political unit. Like most empires, the Golden Horde was made up of composite part of diverse cultures. It was home to various religious communities, not only those who co-existed, but cooperated and traded with each other as well, which caused an unprecedented intensification of mutual exchange, especially in the Volga Region central to the Golden Horde. The Golden Horde influenced the commercial expansion of the mid 13–mid 14th centuries immensely, its economic and political rule promoting the globalisation of the Old World to quite a remarkable extent.

Historians have thoroughly shown the phenomenal trade boom following the Chinggisid conquest which encompassed transformative effect on Eurasian human society and the cultural landscape. What is known as the Fur Road joined up with the Silk Road in the Lower Volga Region to form the beginning of two key routes: the eastern route leading through Central Asia to China and India and the western one through the Crimean Peninsula to the Mediterranean and Middle East. The Golden Horde served as the arena for the unfolding of this dramatic exchange, and Jochid khans and begs played a crucial role in the new international order. Quite naturally, this was a period of prosperity for cities and settlements in the Volga Region and the Crimea, as well as along the steppe arterial route connecting Siberia and Hungary. The conversion of the nomadic elite to Islam made khans' courts central to the Islamic world, and the Ulus of Jochi welcomed traveling scholars and craftsmen from Anatolia, Central Asia, Egypt and Syria.

The political structure of the Golden Horde largely determined the political, economic and cultural map of today's Eurasia. Scholars have in fact been able to study the unique way in which Islam brought people together on the foundations of unity and social integrity, thus
forming both a public life and a collective memory by effectively combining Shamanistic practices with local Sufism. The history of the Tatars and other communities in Central Asia date back to the time when Berke Khan and Öz Beg Khan converted to Islam. Many Muslim communities in the Russian Federation of today can trace their history back to that period. Indeed, Islamisation is a key element in the Golden Horde's legacy.

The Golden Horde is part of the common heritage of mankind, as it created the very framework for the new sophisticated culture of the 13–14th centuries due to interactions between the nomadic and sedentary worlds. Although Western scholars did not admit the importance of this notion until recently, the Russian-speaking academic community has long been aware of the unique nature of the Golden Horde's legacy. It has been of great interest not only to historians but also to archaeologists, art historians, and numismatists across the Russian Federation, especially in Tatarstan. Their works, statements, and findings have transformed research on the Golden Horde into a full-fledged field of academic interest. Western experts would do well to better familiarise themselves with studies of this type. To a certain extent, history textbooks in the USA, Great Britain, France, and Europe as a whole should provide coverage of the Golden Horde as a historical period. Global history must always be taught through a non-European lens to ensure a more integrated approach to our common past, without which we cannot but fail to understand the historical roots of today's globalised world. However, it is no less critical that historiographic debates and concepts developed by historians across the world should be taken into account for current research on the Golden Horde.

In fact, ‘world’ is a category of global history that historians have lately started to identify as a concept with multiple meanings extending beyond that of a mere empire. Indeed, empires and kingdoms were not isolated, but instead dependent on the larger world. Contemporary global history is meant to define these worlds and in turn clarify their mechanisms. The Golden Horde survived the dissolution of the Mongol Empire to grow stronger and exert influence on the rest of the world, which includes states that succeeded the Mongol Empire in China, Afghanistan, India, Persia, and Anatolia, as well as Byzantium, Rus', Europe and the Middle East. Extensive contact all the way from the Mediterranean to the Caspian Sea and even up to China suggest that the Ulus of Jochi had close ties to the larger world. Thus, it would be a mistake to view the history of the Golden Horde as separate from more overarching formative global phenomena.

Nationalist historiography tends to pervert history in order to produce and promote cliches that serve their needs exclusively. For modern historians, the most important task is to dismiss and dismantle the misnomer ‘Mongol-Tatar Yoke’, instead promoting research on the following very vital issues: How should we understand the concept of general history when it extends beyond today's nations? And what is the Golden Horde's role and legacy in world history in this respect?

The multi-authored monograph ‘The Golden Horde in World History’ offers a number of answers to these most crucial questions. It serves the purposes of presenting the findings of innovative research hardly known beyond a small group of experts to a wider academic community, and likewise integrating the findings into a more general view of global history. This work combines different approaches and issues not only for a comprehensive presentation of the current state of research, but also to single out the most promising areas of study and make the public aware of the most promising developments. This new comprehensive summary resulted from the cooperation between leading scholars from such outstanding academic institutions as the Sh. Marjani Institute of History of the Tatarstan Academy of Sciences, the University of Oxford, and the Institute of Russian History of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

I would furthermore like to express my deepest gratitude to those who were able to turn this ambitious project into the impressive and fundamental multi-authored monograph it is
today: Rafael Khakimov, Ilmir Mirgaleyev, Roman Hautala, and Vadim Trepavlov. Due to the unbelievable vigor of our colleagues from the Sh. Marjani Institute of History of the Tatarstan Academy of Sciences and its Centre for Research on the Golden Horde and Tatar Khanates, Kazan has received recognition as the ideal work location for historians, archaeologists, and numismatists studying the Golden Horde and open to comparative approaches. To understand the world of the Golden Horde between Asia, Europe, and the Middle East requires a healthy dialogue between the experts of different fields. Multi-authored international works are necessary to both extend and develop complex areas of study; the writing of history is essentially collective and thus benefits immensely from cooperation among academic institutions, especially beyond the confines of a singular state. The present international monograph presents the findings of studies by leading experts on the history of the Golden Horde and the most recent concepts of global history.

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The Name Index and Geographic Index were compiled by R. Abyzova, A. Aksanov, L. Giniyatullina, Sh. Sady'kov, E'. Sayfetdinova, and others, the Sh. Marjani Institute of History of the Tatarstan Academy of Sciences.

The maps in the colour insert (p. 8–15) were provided by A. Astaykin, Moscow; figures were provided by the respective authors of the sections.
Introduction

Vadim Trepavlov

This book takes as its subject one of the largest and most powerful states in the Middle Ages. Most of today's readers associate the name ‘Golden Horde’ with purely negative images, and in Russia in particular, with the dark period of the ‘Mongol-Tatar Yoke’. Russian schools and universities continue to present the 1230s–1470s as a period when the Russian land was brutally enslaved by conquerors who drained the life out of Rus’ as they conquered and destroyed it. The khan's baskaks would squeeze tribute out of people, princes could not succeed to their fathers' thrones without a yarliq from the ‘Tsar'-Khan of the Golden Horde, cruel Tatar horsemen would raid peaceful cities and settlements; the list of torments seemingly had no end. The general impression lifted from these representations is one of terrible lawlessness and humiliation that stretched on for two and a half centuries.

This historical cliche, which was adopted by numerous generations of schoolchildren and students, can be traced back even deeper than the formal historiography of the Russian Empire, owing its foundation to Karamzin and Solovyov. Such an attitude to the Golden Horde, its rulers and population had begun to be carefully crafted by Russian thinkers even in the 13th century according to other medieval ideologies, outlooks, and political and cultural stereotypes. In fact, most chronicles (the primary source of information on the history of this period) were written by clericals, where priests and monks presented reality through the lens of familiar Biblical images and analogies.

This unique type of worldview from medieval authors was based mostly on the historical circumstances of the 13th century. The Eastern Christian World hardly had recovered from the shattering crusade to Constantinople in 1204 when suddenly a new foreign conquest struck another heavy blow to Orthodoxy. The Mongol Conquest of Rus' was interpreted as a sure sign that God had turned away from Holy Rus', denying it His mercy and grace. Slaughterous infighting among princes, unscrupulous plots, squabbling throughout the previous centuries, and the practice of sending 'wild Cumans' against enemy princedoms had all caused the Russian people to lose intercession with God. Punishment was dolled out as foreign conquests. Comparisons to Biblical precedents were clearly obvious: did the 'chosen people' of Israel not serve as slaves to the Pharaoh? Did they not suffer through exile in Babylon? The only way out seemed to be to pray and hope for the Lord's mercy, and before His grace finally shined on them again, the ‘yoke’, as clerical writers denoted the Mongolian regime in Rus', was simply to be endured.

1 ‘Mongol-Tatars’ is an artificial term first created by historians in the 19th century. The word ‘Tatars’ (the name of an ethnic group in Eastern Mongolia) was used in the East to commonly denote Central Asian peoples and tribes, including the Mongols proper, several centuries before the Mongols even began their conquests. Upon learning from the Kipchaks that Mongol troops were indeed encroaching on their home countries, the Russians and Europeans of the 13th century adopted the common Eastern name for Mongols—‘Tatars’, based on what their informants related. This is why medieval Russian texts, just as many from Western European, do not contain the ethnonym ‘Mongols’, instead employing the term Tatars to describe what was in reality a multi-tribal Mongol army. Turkic peoples within the Golden Horde who had adopted the name of their conquerors according to ancient tradition began to refer to themselves as Tatars as well in addition to their tribal names, which they perceived as synonymous to Mongols.
Clerical authors, as well as their audience, therefore perceived the lifting of the ‘yoke’ in the 15th century as the result of divine mercy. The Horde's slide into historical oblivion was viewed as punishment for its long abuse of Orthodox Christianity^2.

Muslims shared a similar attitude to this expansive and all-encompassing catastrophe as well. From among the numerous examples available, we find the words of a wise theologian who had witnessed the Mongols' atrocities in Bukhara in 1220 to be particularly enlightening. His response to his co-believers' complaints was as follows: ‘[This is] the wind of the divine wrath sweeping in, and the saman (chopped straw—Author's note.) [which it scatters around] has nothing to say!’ [15, p. 81].

Contemporary studies tend to represent a less emotional and unbiased approach to the Golden Horde, moving away from its interpretation as a power that was simply unconditionally hostile to Rus'. Indeed, in the territory of Kazakhstan, as well as the modern borders of the Russian Federation, Uzbekistan, Ukraine and Moldova, the Golden Horde was the ethnic cradle of many Turkic peoples, making its population and culture the part of these peoples' history and, consequently, the general history of Russia.

However, public representations as well as courses of academic study remain dominated by the traditional image of the Horde as an oppressor. The content of school textbooks (see: [11]) suggests that their authors are interested only in this subject as it concerns how the ‘yoke’ system was organized (yarliqs, tribute, jams, etc.), the intrigue surrounding the great throne of Vladimir, as well as the gradually intensifying Russian struggle for independence. This overtly laconic attitude also spans into the issue of the heirs and fragments of the Golden Horde, namely the Tatar khanates, whose role is presented as no more than a problem area on Russia's borders doomed to ‘just’ punishment (annihilation). This brings to light the standard set of reasons underlying the conquest of the 1550s: the end of Tatar raids, the release of numerous Russian captives, new land in the fertile sub-paradise land of Kazan to be distributed among noblemen, and the acquisition of the Volga trade route. It should be noted that all of these but the last apply to the conquest of the Khanate of Kazan (and also that each and every one of them remains controversial among researchers), but not to Astrakhan, which was relatively not hazardous for Russia at that time, as it was relatively remote and surrounded by semi-deserts, not arable land.

The authors of the present monograph believe that the well-established traditional perception in Russian historiography of the Golden Horde as no more than an episode in Russian history is outdated and is in need of further study. (However, this approach is attributable to the available sources, as Russian medieval texts contain a wealth of information on the ‘Mongol-Tatars’). In fact, this powerful state had a historical value of its own, and in and of itself should be considered an individual historical subject. By no means should it ever be viewed exclusively in terms of its impact on Rus'.

The Golden Horde first made it on the map as part of an even larger state entity of truly unprecedented size, namely the Mongol Empire (Eke Mongol Ulus). Sitting as the crown atop a millennium-old succession of great nomadic powers, this Empire was able to perfect the mechanism of uniting nomads that had been developing slowly over the previous 15th centuries.

The Mongol conquest was a key prerequisite for the integration of the land annexed by the Empire as a united organism in order to form a common state area with a relatively unified (at the upper levels) administrative structure. Many Arab and Persian contemporaries are in agreement that the form of government in Eke Mongol Ulus, in particular its western areas, which separated from it in time to become the Golden Horde, operated quite smoothly. In contrast, European historiography from the Middle Ages tended to be generally Mongol-phobic, although a number of 13th century travelers and missionaries had a neutral to positive

^2 For more on the Russian attitude to ‘Mongol-Tatars’ through the lens of Christian providentialism [see: 1, Chapter 1; 10].
opinion on the Chinggisid Empire. ‘The Book of Marco Polo’, very well-known in the West, provided information on the distant, all but mythical ‘State of the Great Khan’ without ever emphasising the Mongols' role in its establishment. Thus, the idea of that state, which in fact was a large source of inspiration for Christopher Columbus to undertake his own voyage, was by no means associated with the Mongols as a nomadic people in Central Asia.

What was capable of uniting so many countries and peoples within Eke Ulus? Cruel governmental oppression of any protest and the growing weakness of victims in opposition to a large army associated with the Mongol invasion, or fear and punitive executions, clearly could not suffice alone for the long-term existence of the Empire and its ulus khanates. As stated above, medieval observers believed that the Mongol's successful military campaigns were proof that divine favour indeed rested with the conquerors and their rulers. The Chinggisid dynasty was thus perceived (and perceived itself) as a clan chosen by Heaven to rule the world, and other kings on earth were naturally doomed to subjugation or annihilation if they resisted. Loyal rulers would be allowed to keep their high status and administrative structure, but as subjects and vassals of the Mongol Khan or that of the Golden Horde, by means of a document traditionally known as a yarliq, or a license to rule.

One noteworthy phenomenon can in particular account for both the rapid establishment and growth of the Mongol Empire, and the long absence of any ‘national liberation movements’ in it. The idea present in the term ‘...philia’, which is often exist when young empires are developing, affected the overall course of its establishment. However, this idea is yet still not completely analysed by historians. The notion of ‘empirephilia’ is representative of the complex dialectics of political and cultural development among communities. Even though some empires were created through mere conquest, a large part of such state entities relied on various agreements and mutually beneficial obligations. The appeal of empires consisted, first and foremost, in its rigid state structure in contrast to the fragmented and unstable neighbouring countries, secondly, in the opportunity to enjoy military protection against one's old enemies and confront them as part of a powerful state, and thirdly, in their access to the accumulation and distribution of enormous resources that were beyond comparison with those of any annexed lands.

Turkophilia is known to have spread in the Near East and France in the 16th century, Russophilia, in the Caucasus in the 18th century, and so on. A type of Mongolophilia likely emerged during the first foreign campaigns of the newly-born Mongol army when Chinggis Khan acquired power over the Turkic peoples of Central Asia, Southern Siberia, and Eastern Turkestan. But to gather them all together into a single empire proved to be much more complicated than to simply conquer them, or rather force them into submission.

It was not uncommon for ethnic consolidation to take place within imperial political entities before the era of national state formation (the 17–18th centuries), and the Golden Horde was no exception as the ‘ethnic cradle’ of many of today's Turkic peoples. The multi-faceted identity of the empire's subjects must also be taken into account in research on the period. The requirement of belonging to a specific ethnic community did not come to the foreground as a criterion for state building until modern nations were first formed. Before this trend, the concept of class, confessional, regional, or clan identity was of a much greater importance. Diverse ethnic communities were not a stumbling block to the imperial organism's ability to grow and function; loyalty to the state order and the throne was instead what united subjects who spoke different languages.

For the dwellers of Desht-i Kipchak (the steppe part of the Golden Horde), a group of clans descending from a common ancestor, whether real or fictional, proved to be the most stable and long-lasting union they identified themselves with. Historians commonly term such groups as tribes. Depending on the period and the specific Turkic people, the terms boj (buj), ru, yryu, and others were used, and in late medieval Desht they were known as el.
In the 11th century, the great Turkic linguist Mahmud Kashgari wrote in his ‘Dictionary of the Turkic Languages’: ‘When two men meet who do not know each other, one of them greets the other and asks, buj kim—that is, of what clan and tribe are you? After that, they either start a conversation or hurry to part ways, as each of them knows which group the other represents’ [9, p. 844]. This rather curious question can still be heard nowadays as well, especially among the Bashkirs and Kazakhs, who ask during introductions: ruving kim? or qay eldensin?

Along with the memory of an el's ancestors, common burial places where tribesmen from different clans met periodically, were likewise of great importance. Clan and tribal identity formed the most basic and stable layer of individual and group self-awareness, while ethnocultural belonging to the nomadic world, an understanding of the unique nature of the cattle breeding lifestyle, and the ways in which it differed from that of sedentary farmers and forest hunters represented the next. As sparse as they may be, primary sources indicate the word Uzbek to have denoted nomadic self-identification in the 14–18th century without referring to any specific ethnic communities or eponym (Oz Beg Khan of the Golden Horde). The last Khan of the Golden Horde, Sheikh Ahmad, noted similarities between the tribal nomads of Desht-i Kipchak and migrants from Ulus of Jochi in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania at the beginning of the 16th century, as he spoke about ‘our Uzbek people’ (bizniñ özbaq ta'ifisi) [13, 1992, p. 96, 124, fig. XII]. Turkic and Persian works of the 16th century referred to the Nogai Horde as Uzbekistan, and to its dwellers as Manghit Uzbeks (uzbakan-i manghiti) [14, p. 201, 347]. A number of other sources also referred to the subjects of the Khanate of Kazan as Uzbeks or Uzbek-Cossacks. According to ethnograph A. Khoroshikhin in a recording from the 19th century, a Kazakh discussing their historical roots would typically say, ‘My ancestors and my family comes from the Uzbeks’ [8, p. 251, 252].

However, one should not interpret Sheikh Ahmad's words about the Uzbek people as evidence of their existence as an ethnic group, as the word ‘Uzbek’ might have a different meaning in this case. In the 18th century, a Djungar Khong Tayiji (ruler) told the Kazakh Khan Abu'l-Khayr: ‘... in front of this crow (the Russian empress—Author), we will not stand on our knees, because they (Russians—Author) are with horse carts and we are Uzbeks (i.e. nomads—Author) [7, p. 306].

The term Tatars, whether interpreted as an ethnonym, a polytonym or a socionym when applied to the Golden Horde era, undoubtedly carried with it a certain level of ethnic regulatory potential. Ethnic consolidation and the formation of a Golden Horde Tatar ethnic community could be clearly observed in the Right wing of the Ulus, which enjoyed a well-developed urban civilisation while preserving powerful centres of the old sedentary culture (Volga Bulgaria, the Crimea, Moldova). It had far-ranging inter-regional connections and a far-reaching professional state apparatus, all ruled authoritatively and efficiently (until the late 14th century) by the khan. It is beyond any doubt that this community continued to exist for some time into the 15th century. However, the plague epidemic in the mid-14th century and the wars and migration of nomads from the other bank of the Yaik in the east put an end to this process. The ‘Uzbeks’ of the Left wing, or rather the carriers of archaic social and cultural norms, firmly held to their tribal system and stimulated renewed tribalisation in the western part of the Ulus of Jochi. Its successor states (the Kazan, Crimean, and perhaps Astrakhan Khanates) therefore witnessed the formation of local ethnic communities based on the earlier relatively united Tatar ethnicity of the Golden Horde.

The next level was that of political awareness—that is, self-identification as a subject of a specific ruler and, respectively, as a dweller of a specific political entity (khanate, yurt). This was marked by the emergence of a political culture manifested to the largest extent in

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3 For more information on the development and transformation of the ethnocultural identity of the dwellers of the Golden Horde and its successive khanates, see [3; 4; 5, p. 349–365; 6, p. 185–198].
equal respect for shrines demonstrated by all subjects regardless of their tribal affiliation, occupation, and lifestyle. Piety towards capitals and dynastic necropoleis was a form of political identity that developed a sense of belonging in the community of subjects of the Ulus of Jochi. Capitals and khans' tombs were linked directly to the life and death of representatives of the ruling dynasty, thus forming the legacy of the clan [see: 12]. The Jochid clan was able to rise above all subject tribes (which eventually formed the special class of Kazakh aristocracy later known as tore). Thus, all Turkic tribes in Desht-i Kipchak had respect for this clan as the holder of divine charisma and a monopoly that had the right to rule, and also recognized its sanctuaries.

Historians are confronted with considerable difficulties when researching the Golden Horde. Only a small fraction of the chronicles, acts, and record keeping documents created during the Golden Horde period have survived to this day. Nearly all known sources of information on it were instead written by those living outside of its confines, and usually by people who had never been there themselves. The works mostly deal with the acts of rulers in respect to certain cities and main camps of the khans. The vast majority of the state's population—including nomadic communities of Kipchaks, other Turkic peoples, and Turkicised Mongols—was well beyond their scope. However, scholars have been able to reconstruct certain milestones in political developments and the key economic, social, and cultural features of the Ulus of Jochi, so the general history of the state is nonetheless known to us. Archaeological methods have also provided great insight into the lifestyle of common subjects of the Golden Horde. Excavations of records of 13–14th centuries, including both cities and burial sites, have filled some of the gaps. Considerable numismatic data is also available. A large volume of historiographic information has accumulated over two centuries of scientific research on the Golden Horde, the analysis of which requires both a specific approach and a dedicated monograph. Today's historians have to face the challenge of not merely expanding our knowledge of the past as it concerns the Golden Horde, but also facilitating efforts to overcome its traditional negative stereotypes. We sincerely hope that this book will contribute to the development of a non-biased idea of the state.


See the list of key works of the 18th–early 21st centuries on various issues related to the Golden Horde [see: 2].


Chapter I.
Central Asia and Eastern Europe
in the 12th–Beginning of the 13th Centuries

§ 1. Nomadic Empires of Central Asia

The nomadic peoples of this area lived in rainless steppes and semi-deserts, where farming the land was nearly impossible. Instead, they opted to breed grazing animals, which proved an effective practice given the natural surroundings. The key nomadic staple were dairy-based foods; meat, whether slaughtered or harvested from dead animals, including wild game, was less common. It therefore comes as no surprise that nomadic interests in these areas were focused on cattle as both their source of subsistence and major indicator of wealth. As cattle need to rotate grazing lands every so often, breeders had no choice but to move several times a year. This mobility brought about the need for nomads to live primarily in highly portable structures that were easily set up and torn down, and usually covered with wool or leather (referred to as yurts or tents). For the same reason, nomads usually had few household items, with their tableware made mostly from non-breakable materials (such as wood and leather). Leather, wool, and fur were also the most common materials for clothing and footwear. The economic system of nomads was undoubtedly fragile and highly dependent on the natural environment, as a drought, blizzard (dzhut) or animal epidemic (epizootic) could strip a nomad of every source of his subsistence overnight. Nomads thus developed an efficient system of mutual assistance to confront such natural disasters, with each tribesman providing one to two heads to any victim, keeping them alive and enabling them to subsist. The victim, in turn, was also obligated to render the same service to his affected kin [4; 18; 19; 30; 33; 36; 38; 39].

The unique character of nomadic tribes and their numerous dissimilarities with early state entities established by sedentary farmers have long spurred historians to discuss the essence of the nomadic social order. While some authors denied that nomads ever crossed the barrier into statehood and others asserted they reached the same level as any other early state, a third group expounded on a special type of ‘nomadic feudalism’. Indeed, this debate is still far from over. Adding to those three opinions, there is also the idea of the unique social evolution of nomads [6; 13; 15].

What actually spurred nomads to undertake mass migrations and devastating campaigns against farming civilisations? This is undoubtedly the single most intriguing question of the nomads’ history [14; 24]. A multitude of diverse opinions have been offered, but they can be summarised as follows: 1) various changes in the global climate (desiccation according to A. Toynbee and G. Grumm-Grzhimaylo, humidification according to L. Gumilyov); 2) warmongering and avarice among nomads; 3) overpopulation in the steppe; 4) growth in productive forces and class struggle, weakening of farming communities due to feudal fragmentation (Marxist concepts); 5) the need to replenish the extensive cattle-breeding economy by raiding more stable farming communities; 6) the reluctance of sedentary peoples to trade with nomads (inability to sell off the surplus products from cattle production); 7) the personal traits of steppe community leaders; 8) ethically integrating impulses (asabiyyah according to Ibn Khaldun, passionarity according to L. Gumilyov).
Most of these factors are reasonable to a certain extent, yet some of them seem exaggerated. For instance, modern paleographic data fail to confirm any rigid correlation between global periods of steppe desiccation/humidification and the decay/prosperity of nomadic empires [8; 9]. The idea of a ‘class struggle’ within the nomadic community has also proved to be false [18; 33]. The role of demography is somewhat vague because cattle grew at a faster rate than the human population, which typically caused an overgrazing and a crisis in the ecosystem. The quantity of animal stock and size of the cattle breeding population instead fluctuated according to the predator-prey model by Lotka-Volterra, which represents the predator to prey ratio as two cycle curves, one lagging a little behind the other. It is beyond any reasonable doubt that nomadic way of life can indeed foster certain military qualities. However, farmers were many times more numerous, operated under a more environmentally complex economy, lived in strong fortresses, and had a superior handicraft and metallurgical base.

What was it then that ultimately caused nomads to raid other communities and establish ‘steppe empires’? O. Lattimore, an outstanding US geographer and anthropologist, who himself spent a long time among Mongolian cattle breeders, wrote that a nomad could well subsist on just the products of his own herd, but a pure nomad would always be poor [35. p. 522]. Nomads needed food from farmers, goods produced by craftsmen, silk, weapons, and exquisite jewelry for their tribal leaders, wives and concubines.

In the end, there were two ways to obtain these items— by war or peaceful trade, and nomads employed both of these means. When they were sure of their superiority and invulnerability, they would mount their horses without a second thought and start a campaign, but when their neighbour happened to be a powerful state, cattle breeders preferred peaceful trade. However, quite often the governments of settled states hampered such trade, as it was outside of all state control. In these cases, nomads had to take up arms and forcibly assert their rights to trade.

A number of important periodisation concepts are applied to the relations between Chinese dynasties and imperial confederations in the Inner Asian steppes. For instance, Japanese historian J. Tamura put forth the idea that the history of Northern Eurasia could be broken down into the following two long cycles: (1) Ancient nomadic empires in the drought-ridden area of Inner Asia (2nd century BCE—9th century CE): the Xiongnu, Xianbei, Rourans, Turks, Uighurs; (2) Medieval conqueror dynasties from the taiga (Jurchens, Manchu) or steppe (Khitan, Mongols) areas (10—early 20th centuries): Liao, Jin, Yuan, Qing. Communities of the first cycle interacted with China from a distance, while those of the second conquered the agricultural South and formed symbiotic state structures with dual administrative systems and original forms of culture and ideology [41].

A somewhat similar opinion was presented by N. Di Cosmo, who divided regional history into the following four periods based on the way income was earned from the outer world: 1) the period of tributary empires—from the Xiongnu to the Rouran (209 BCE–551 CE); 2) the period of Turkic, Khazar and Uighur trade-and-tributary empires (551–907), when nomads learned to earn income through external exchange; 3) the period of dual administration empires (907–1259), when nomads learned to conquer agricultural civilisations (the Khitan, Jurchens, and Mongols before Kublai); and 4) the period of mature empires (1260–1796), which used direct taxation in addition to other means of exploitation (the Mongols and their Western Asian successors, the Manchu) [7].

N. Shiraishi presents steppe history as a concisely constructed spiral. He views the evolution of nomadic empires as part of a spiral of evolution from disunity to centralisation, and finally a gradual decentralisation. Each turn from the Xiongnu to the Mongols is represented by an even wider arch of power, reaching its maximum spread in the 13th century [26].
T. Barfield developed one of the most intriguing periodisation concepts for the history of the Inner Asian steppes [1]. He believes the processes of growth and decay proceeded in a quite similar manner between nomadic empires and China, and in fact that nomadic empires mirrored Chinese dynasties. T. Barfield [2] views them as shadow empires because they arose in the shadow of existing civilisations and empires (this term is quite accurate in modern terms, as it emphasised the shadow economy of such parasitic structures). Nomads preferred to exploit their southern neighbour at a distance rather than conquer their territory directly. The collapse of centralised power in China brought about a crisis in the steppe, relieving the latter of pressure from both the nomads and the Chinese. When free of external pressure, the peoples of Manchuria then established their own state entities and conquered the farming areas in the south. T. Barfield believes the cyclical structure of political relations among the peoples of China, Central Asia, and Far East repeated a total of three times over 2,000 years: from the Xiongnu to the Rouran people, from the Turks to the fall of the Yuan Dynasty, and from the Ming Empire to the Xinhai Revolution, which eventually put an end to this form of circular evolution [29].

A number of scholars have criticised this concept for allegedly misrepresenting certain facts [4; 22; 43]. Indeed, only the Xiongnu-Han cycle was more or less identical, while the subsequent rise and fall of Chinese dynasties and steppe empires instead appear asynchronous. This can be largely attributed to T. Barfield's unfortunate failure to include the size dynamics of the steppe confederation's elite, which is a key internal factor. As far back as the 14th century, Ibn Khaldun was the first to remark that dynasties established by nomads did not last more than three or four generations, as they lost their potential for group consolidation (asabiyya) from generation to generation.

This argument is quite compelling, as historians have long acknowledged and studied the cyclical nature of the history of Chinese dynasties (which actually applies to all pre-industrial states). The early stage is marked by economic development, population growth, and a period of robust cultural growth. Then the state's economy gradually decays while bureaucratic bribery increases, bringing about widespread disorder and eventually causing the dynasty to crumble under its own weight. The nature of these cycles can be explained according to the structural demographic theory, which states that the elite and state apparatus expand and consolidate when the economy grows (particularly true in Confucian China according to Parkinson's First Law). Then as a result, producers are unable to pay the enormous amounts of taxes required of them, thus effectively dragging the dynasty into a crisis and, eventually, complete collapse [21; 23].

It should also be noted that A. Frank undertook an effort to bring these natural rhythms in line with Kondratyev's macroeconomic trends. In his opinion, the pre-industrial trend was actually longer, namely from 200 to 500 years. Frank and Gills singled out four major cycles: the pre-classical (1700–100/50 BCE), classical (100/50 BCE to 200–500 CE), medieval (200–500 to 1450/1500), and modern (from the 16th century) cycles. Each cycle contained an up (A) and down (B) phase according to Kondratyev. For instance, the medieval cycle contained two separate subcycles: the A-phase (500–750/800): the zenith of Byzantium, the Arab world, China (the Sui and Tang dynasties), the Turkic Khaganate; B-phase (750/800–1000/1050): the decline of the Carolingian, Abbasid and Tang dynasties, the fall of the Uighur Khaganate; A-phase (1000/1050–1250/1300): the Mongol conquest and the establishment of the pre-modern world-system according to Abu-Lughod; B-phase (1250/1300–1450/1500): the decline of Afro-Eurasia as a result of epidemics [32].

To put it more simply, different parts of the world have been interacting through various connections since ancient times. Today's scholars traditionally focus on four types of major communication networks: bulk goods networks (BGN), prestigious goods networks (PGN), political and military networks (PMN), and information networks (IN) Information and pres-
tigious goods networks are the most extensive among them [25; 31]. However, it was information exchange networks that were most crucial to the above processes. There are a number of coincidences in the history of mankind that cannot be attributed to synchronous historical processes alone, including the emergence of military chariots, which made nomadism an important factor of historical processes, the so-called iron revolution, which caused the iron industry to spread from the Pacific to the Atlantic Ocean, and the Axial Age as the intellectual turning point of the last centuries before Christ, etc. [17].

This brings to light quite a new view of the role of nomads in world history. While classic philosophical works presented them as destroyers of civilisations, or perhaps historical scavengers at best, the world-system approach assigns them the role of compiling and translating information among sedentary civilisations. The domestication of the horse and the spreading of wheeled transport served as a catalyst for the faster dissemination of information and of prestigious goods. Even though nomads did not change a lot over time, they still formed about new commercial contacts, spread religions and geographical knowledge, and fostered the development of information networks, as well as the exchange of technology among civilisations [17]. Though nomads often seemed to only have a place in the background, they in fact accelerated historical processes.

T. Allsen rightfully presented the nomads' role as in large part confined to being no more than mediators in such processes, yet it was not uncommon for nomads to be the initiators of certain borrowings either. It was not because stable and safe routes were available after the establishment of the Mongol state that a cultural exchange between the Muslims of Middle Asia and the Confucian Far East became possible, but because the ruling elite of the steppe empire called for it. For over a century nomads acted as the major initiators, promoters, and translators of cultural exchange among Old World civilisations [28, p. 210–211].

That is to say, nomads acted as important mediators between regional ‘world-empires’. Just like sea voyagers, they provided a connecting element between the flow of goods, finances, and technological and cultural information among sedentary economic areas and urban civilisation [15]. The extent to which nomads were centralised was directly proportional to the size of the neighbouring farming civilisation; in each local regional area, the political structuredness of the nomadic semi-periphery was directly proportional to the size of the sedentary farming base. The nomads of North Africa and Western Asia would unite into tribal confederations or chiefdoms to either trade with oases or attack them. The nomads of the East European steppes established semi-imperial state entities on the periphery of Greco-Roman world, Byzantium and Rus'. The nomads of Inner Asia were part of the Chinese (Far Eastern) world-system, thus the nomadic empire was used here to adapt nomadic life to the ways of the outside world.

The dynamic ‘bipolar’ structure of political relations among farming civilisations and the nomads surrounding them (barbarians and Rome, the Scythians and states in the Black Sea region, Central Asian nomads and China, etc.) was repeated in multiple cycles during the pre-industrial period. Its beginning was the Axial Age [27], when powerful farming empires (Qing in China, Maurya in India, Hellenistic states in Asia Minor, the Roman Empire in the west) arose in regions where large territories were available for cattle breeding (Black Sea region, Volga River steppes, Khalkha Mongolia, etc.), and the nomads had to maintain long-term and active contacts with better-organised urban farming communities (the Scythians and ancient eastern as well as antique states, Central Asian nomads and China, the Huns and the Roman Empire, the Arabs, the Khazars, the Turks and Byzantium, etc.). The world's reaction to the existence of farming world-empires was the emergence of nomadic empires and semi-imperial polities.

The first bipolar elements of the regional system in Inner Asia were the Xiongnu Empire (209 BCE–48 CE) and the Han dynasty. The famous treatise by Chinese historian Sima Qian
‘Shiji’ (‘Historical Records’) describes the Xiongnu economy: ‘[They] move from one place to another in search of water and grass, and though they have no cities surrounded with inner and external walls, nor permanent residents, nor do they farm, each of them has an allotment of land... Boys can ride sheep, shoot birds and mice with their bows; older boys shoot foxes and hares, which they then eat; all mature men capable of bending a bow become mounted armour-clad warriors. ‘According to their custom, in peacetime they follow their cattle while also hunting birds and animals, thus maintaining their livelihood; in years of turmoil, everyone learns the military science of carrying out attacks’ [20, p. 34]. Chinese eunuch Zhungan Yuè, an immigrant who built his career when the second ruler of the Xiongnu Empire was ruling, added further information to Sima Qian's description: ‘According to the Xiongnu custom, the people eat the meat of domestic animals, drink their milk, and wear their skins; their cattle feeds on grass and drink water, migrating from one place to another depending on the season’ [20, p. 46].

If we compare the population of the Xiongnu Empire with that of China, the steppe-dwellers, although usually presented as fierce and pugnacious, seem to be no more than a small ethnic group. The nomads numbered no more than 1.5 million (roughly equal to the population of one Han district), while the Han Empire boasted a population of almost up to 60 million. How could the Xiongnu ‘David’ ever put up a fight against the Chinese imperial Goliath for as long as nearly three centuries? Here there were two main reasons: the original organisation of power in the form of a ‘nomadic empire’, and the no less authentic borderline policy of the nomads towards China.

Sima Qian recorded a detailed description of the administrative system of the Xiongnu Empire at the turn of the 3rd century BCE. He claimed that the ruler Modu divided the empire into three separate parts: the center, left and Right wing. The wings were then subdivided into sub-wings. Supreme power was concentrated entirely in the chanyu's hands, and he also ruled the center, or the tribes constituting the steppe empire's mother country. Twenty-four higher officials were subordinated to him, who managed large tribal unions and held the military rank of temnik (‘the head of ten thousands’). The Left wing was usually commanded by the chanyu's eldest son, who was the successor to the throne. The ruler's three closest relatives were his co-ruler, the manager and head of the Right wing, and they were the only ones who carried the title of ‘princes’ (wangs). These ‘princes’ and six more temniks of the most noble status were regarded as ‘powerful’ and commanded at least 10,000 horsemen. The rest of the temniks in fact had less than 10,000 horsemen [20, p. 40].

The fact that the Chinese historian used both military (temnik, thousand head, hundred head) and traditional (princes of various ranks, duweis, donghus, etc.) terms to describe the administrative and political structure of the Xiongnu society indicates the military and civil hierarchies existed at the same time. They both held their own unique functions. The non-decimal system of ranks was used for civil tribe administration, and decimal ranks were used during wartime when a large number of warriors from different parts of the steppe gathered together in one or several armies [30, p. 38].

The well-balanced rank system developed during Modu's reign only to fall out of use in later years. Personal relations grew weaker with time and were eventually replaced with federal ones, of which the transition from trial administrative and territorial division to the dual system was indicative. Military hierarchy then moved to the background to make way for the genealogical relations of ‘superior’ and ‘inferior’ tribes. The throne was passed not from father to son, but according to the agnatic seniority model from brother to brother and from uncle to nephew [14, p. 216–231].

The Xiongnu developed a unique doctrine of international policy [30, pp. 45–67] based on the nomads’ awareness of the benefits of their mobility, which enabled them to strike unexpected blows to Chinese territory and then rapidly retreat into the steppe. As they were
much less numerous, the nomads had a reason to keep a safe distance from their mighty neighbour. To increase their revenue, the Xiongnu tried alternating war and raids with periods of peaceful co-existence with China. The first raids were aimed at accumulating riches for all members of the nomadic imperial confederation, regardless of their status. The chanyu needed the support of most tribes in the confederation, thus making every warrior entitled to the spoils of war. After a devastating raid the chanyu would send ambassadors to China with offers of a new agreement ‘of peace and kinship’, or the nomads simply continued raiding until the Chinese proposed a new treaty.

The system of the Silk Road acquired its final form in antiquity and was of great importance for anyone involved in trade. Roman women of fashion flaunted the Chinese silk they wore. The Chinese army received famous horses ‘with the sweat of blood’. As mediators, the nomads were able to earn an income and access new technology and weapons. In addition, trade routes facilitated the spreading of religious ideas, in particular Buddhism and Manichaeism [3, pp. 187–188]. But nonetheless the newly established contact among civilisations of the Old World did carry certain negative consequences with it as well. For instance, pathogens spread quickly in the 2nd–3rd centuries, causing epidemics that brought about a population decline that had a general weakening on ancient civilisations [37, p. 106–147].

The Xiongnu Empire existed for nearly two and a half centuries and split into the Northern and Southern Confederations in 48 CE. The Xianbei (approximately 155–180) succeeded the Xiongnu as the leader of the Mongol steppes, raiding and plundering North China for several centuries. However, the Xianbei people preferred to simply devastate China's borderline districts instead of developing more intricate power schemes, which is most likely why the Xianbei confederation just barely overlived its founder Tánshíhuái. It was about this period when a large-scale rebellion that was to become the beginning of the dynasty's end broke out in the Han Empire.

The peoples of Manchuria built their states at the Chinese border for 150 years after the fall of the Han Empire before a new bipolar system of international relations was formed in the region. The luckiest of them (the Murong and Toba people) were successful in subjugating farmers' territories in North China, and it was not until that moment that the nomads in the Mongol steppes officially established a centralised union, the Rouran Khaganate (early 5th century–555). Although they remained unconsolidated for a long time, their unification can be contributed to Chelun, who integrated separate Rouran chiefdoms into an imperial confederation in 402. He assumed the title of khagan and reorganised the military and administrative structure of the Rouran society dramatically by dividing the army population into hundreds and thousands, introducing the mandatory recording of warrior numbers, and establishing strict rules of conduct on the battlefield as well as punishments for violating them. The Khaganate was also divided into a left and Right wings, with the ruler of the left (eastern) wing enjoying a somewhat higher status. The Rouran Khanate covered an enormous territory in its heyday. The Khaganate's western borders reached the Ili River and the Tarim Basin, its eastern borders stretching as far as the Khitan frontiers and the Goguryeo territory, while the northern borders reached Baikal and the upper reaches of Amur, and in the south the Gobi Desert [34].

The Rouran people used traditional nomadic strategies against their southern neighbours, alternating raids with demanding gifts during peacetime. Yet the Toba people also were the nomads and they knew how to resist the steppe-dwellers, and their cavalry eventually reaching the Gobi. The horsemen would grab their rations, leave their carts behind and cross the desert on foot rapidly for a blistering raid on undefended Rouran nomadic camps, striking horror into their residents. Toba raids on Rouran camps were a regular occurrence from 429 to 470.
In 464 the Juan-juan (Rouran) khagans borrowed the practice of using regnal title from China. They also employed Chinese scribes for diplomatic correspondence with North Chinese dynasties. In the 6th century, the Rouran people built the capital Mumochen and surrounded it with two rows of walls. Unfortunately, historians have been unable to agree on its location. During the reign of Khagan Anagui (519, 521–552), the influence of Chinese culture was even greater. He came to power during a time of infighting and conflicts among the ruling clan, yet his willpower was enough to check those processes for three whole decades. In 552 the Rouran army suffered a devastating defeat at the hands of the Turks, and Anagui committed suicide, thus bringing an end to the Khanate. Several khans replaced one other over the following three years, all of which met with violent ends. In 555 the ruler of the Western Wei Tsardom betrayed the surviving several thousand Rourans and gave them up to the Turks, who cruelly executed everyone save children under 16 years of age. Part of the Rourans fled to North China, and the rest went west. Many historians associate the latter group with the Avars, who brought to Europe mounted combat techniques and new weapons—the bow, probably of the Mongol type, long swords, and stirrups. These novelties gave them a critical advantage over the locals.

After Turks defeated Rourans and Sui dynasty formed in the south (followed by the Tang House), the bipolar structure was restored in Inner Asia. It determined by the new macroeconomic growth of the then-leading world empires: the Tang dynasty in China, the Abbasid Caliphate in the Near East, and Byzantium in Asia Minor. Political stability enabled trade routes to be restored quickly. Although it is impossible to accurately determine the volume of trade operations, it was obviously much larger than in ancient times. The Turkic khagans (552–630 and 683–734) continued the Xiongnu policy of extortion from a distance. They forced China to send them expensive gifts, establish borderline markets, and fulfill other similar demands. Control over the transcontinental silk trade was important to the nomadic economy. The first Turkic khaganate was the first true Eurasian empire; it connected China, Byzantium, and the Muslim world through a network of trade routes.

In the late 560s, the Turks joined the struggle to control the western part of the Silk Road. They had a large, powerful, and well-trained mounted army, as well as heavy cavalry armed with long spears, which was a major Turkic innovation. Ultimately, they were able to defeat the Hephthalites, also known as the White Huns, and establish diplomatic relations with Byzantium, with a Sogdian merchant named Maniah serving as the ambassador. The emperor sent his embassy, headed by Strategus Zimarkh to the Turkic khagan's camp, while the Byzantines were more interested in an anti-Persian alliance. Moving farther to the west, the Turks reached the Caucasus and the Black Sea region, which marked the beginning of the golden age of the Khaganate.

The Khaganate was divided into a left eastern (telis) and right western (tardush) wing to ease the process of administration. The ruler of the western wing had a lower status. Ancient Turkic runic inscriptions mention two parallel hierarchies—a tribal group (bodun) and a military and administrative group (el), the latter being based on the decimal system. The former was used within the system of administration and integration of tribes headed by tribal leaders (irkin) and chiefdoms (iltieber). The latter was used during wartime and united warriors belonging to different class groups within military detachments according to the decimal system. The Turks, like the ancient Huns, had a well-developed system of titles for the leaders and commanders of various levels, including shad, yabgu, buyuruki, tarkany, tuduny, and others. There were also a multitude of names used for the key social groups, such as kaghan and begs (the nomadic elite), ers (warriors), kuls (slaves), and many more. [10, 11].

In the Turkic Khaganate, power was passed on from brother to brother, and then to the oldest nephew (the agnatic seniority system). As a result, the imperial confederation had split into the Eastern and Western Khaganates by the beginning of the 7th century. The centre of
the Eastern Khaganate lay in the Orkhon Valley, and in the Western Khaganate, Semirechye held a similar position. The Eastern Khaganate existed for nearly three decades after the separation. During that period, China re-united under the auspices of the Sui dynasty (581–618), followed by the House of Tang (618–907). In 629 the Turkic troops were defeated in modern-day Shanxi Province. A Toquz Oghuz rebellion sparked up in its wake, and the Tang army undertook a response campaign into the steppe in the following year, where the steppe-dwellers were resolutely crushed and the khagan taken prisoner. The Khaganate thus collapsed.

To prevent it from ever reviving, the Chinese implemented the forced deportation of nomads. Many Turks were forced to move toward the northern borders of the Tang Empire, to Ordos and Shanxi, where they were under the control of frontier officials. A lot of steppe-dwellers experienced the need to join the Tang army against other countries. The Tang Empire exercised full control over the Turks for half a century, making their life in a new land full of deprivation and suffering.

It was not until 679 that a rebellion broke out and the Turks managed to regain independence after ten years of desperate struggles against the Chinese. Qutlug (Oghul Qaimish) was declared the Khagan, the closest associate of whom was the famous Tonyukuk, the man responsible for inscribing the history of the Turks into famous walls in ancient Turkic runic script. The centre of the Khaganate lay in the foothills of the Khangai (the Otyuk forests). After Qutlug died in 691, Qapaghan Khagan became the ruler, and remained so through the Khaganate's golden age. He undertook a number of successful campaigns against the Chinese, and also restored Turkic rule over the Khitan in the Barga steppes and the Kyrgyz people along the Yenisei. The Turkic troops reached as far as Semirechye, where Arabs finally checked their advance.

Qapaghan Khagan was ambushed while suppressing a rebellion of Toquz-oghuzes in 716 and did not live to see another day. His nephew Bilge then became the Khagan, with the brave Kul Tigin commanding the army, and the wise Tonyukuk advising the Khagan. Thus he was able to rectify the situation. In 718 the Turks defeated the Chinese army sent to put an end to the ‘northern threat’. The Turks remained politically central to the Eastern Eurasian steppes for another two decades. When Kul Tigin died in 731, many ambassadors came from different countries from Balhae to Byzantium to attend his funeral.

This tragedy was truly out of the blue, as the steppe elite practiced polygyny. Each khan therefore had many wives and children and the number of their descendants grew at an exponential rate. The situation only became critical in the third to fourth generation (Ibn Khaldun's Law). The Second Turkic Khaganate experienced quite a similar situation. About 60 years after it was established an inner tension rose to the surface and Bilge Khagan was poisoned in 734. The new Khagan died soon afterwards as well, transferring power to Tonyukuk's daughter, who was officially regent for the underage Khagan. At her own command, a number of influential claimants to the throne were systematically killed, thus escalating the internecine conflict. In 744 the Uighurs defeated the weakened Turkic Khaganate to become the new hegemon of the Mongol steppe.

But unlike the Turkic Khaganates, the Uighurs hardly ever raided China, as it was enough for them to simply demonstrate the power of their weapons. The nomads not only pressed for costly yearly ‘gifts’ but wanted even more special tribute on any occasion (commemoration, coronation, etc.). The Chinese had to establish borderline markets for nomads to exchange their cattle for Chinese agricultural and crafted goods. But the Uighurs were a crafty bunch, and they would sell off their old and weak horses for unreasonably high prices. This method of trade put China at a perpetual loss, exposing the fact that it was merely a form of disguised payments to the steppe-dwellers for peace at the borders, as were the more regular gifts. It was not until 778 that the Chinese Emperor protested, as the horses by that time were
truly good for nothing. Of the ten thousand offered him, he only bought six thousand. The Uighurs then embarked on a devastating raid on the borderline Chinese provinces at once and waited for the emperor's embassy to arrive. When the delegation arrived shortly after, the usual extortion of China's resources continued as it always had [30, pp. 50–159].

On top of all this, the Chinese also had to bear the burdensome costs of receiving numerous Uighur embassies. In the end it was not even about the financial expenses, but rather the nomadic attitude of conquerors that irritated the Chinese most of all. Drunk Uighur men would pick fights and raid cities, vandalise things on their way back, and abduct Chinese women and girls. During An Lushan's rebellion in China, they offered the Tang dynasty help against the separatists, and because the house was experiencing a crisis of its own, it had to agree. Yet the assistance proved to be of a rather particular nature, as Uighurs, participating in military campaigns at the territory of China in the 750–770s, often forgot about their obligations as allies and still plundered from civilians, taking them in as slaves [30, pp. 50–159].

The Uighurs created a runic alphabet script of their own based on the Sogdian version. They built the Khaganate's capital in the Mongol steppe in the Orkhon Valley, Karabalghasun, which was truly immense when compared to other cities of that time, spreading to over 20km. The Khaganate of course also had other cities and fortresses. The Uighurs converted to Manichaeism and borrowed other elements of Middle Asian culture [12].

In the late 770s–early 780s, the Khaganate witnessed a dynastic crisis because of excessive reproduction among the elite. The relations between the Uighur elite and Sogdian merchants were also decaying at that time, which led to many Sogdians being killed as a result. Consequently, the flow of goods delivered through Karabalghasun dwindled, resulting in the loss of an important economic resource of power. The disturbances did not end until 795 when another clan supporting Manichaeism came to power.

In the 820s the confrontation between the Uighurs and the Yenisei Kyrgyz people began to escalate. In order to protect themselves from the neighbours, the Uighurs built a line of defensive fortresses in Tuva. The Kyrgyz people then managed a series of military victories, the defeats of which brought with them weakened central power and a new principle of inheritance (brother to brother). Yet this confederation also had too many potential claimants to the throne once again, bringing rise to new conflicts. An unexpected raid from the Kyrgyz army on the Khaganate's capital put an end to all this squabbling, all but reducing the city to ashes after the assault was over. What remained of the Uighur tribes then settled near the Great Wall to live a life of robbery on the borderline territories of China until the Chinese finally lost patience and sent troops to destroy them. Another part of the Uighurs migrated to the Turpan oasis, where they gradually become sedentary.

When the Kyrgyz people destroyed the Uighur Khaganate and the Tang Empire fell not long after, the peoples of Manchuria had the opportunity to become political leaders in the region. The Khitan people ultimately succeeded and founded the Liao Empire (907–1125). The nucleus of the Chinese world economy thus shifted southward when compared to the 10th century. Since this caused another shift in the commodity flow, Central Asian nomads and their neighbours from Manchuria were forced to establish buffer states in the territory of North China (40). The Khitan people acquired several small states formed on the ruins of the Tang Empire. In the early 10th century, the Khitan people established the Liao Empire (907–1125), covering a large part of Northeast China, under the auspices of Abaoji. Numerous small Chinese Tsardsoms and the state of Balhae were conquered in the process. Then the Khitan people initiated a series of wars against the Chinese Song dynasty, demanding the Song people pay them 200,000 cuts of silk and 100,000 liangs of silver annually starting in 1005. This amount was increased to 200,000 coins and 300,000 cuts of silk after the war of 1042. At the same time, the Khitan people expanded a great deal into the Rouran territory in the northeast against Jurchen, where they invaded Kore a number of times and were able to
neutralize Mongol nomads (Shiwei people). In its heyday Liao had a population of 3.8 million, including 0.75 Khitans, 2.4 million Chinese, 0.45 million Balhaeans, and 0.2 million representatives of other groups [42, p. 58].

As their domain expanded, the Khitan people understandably came to need a more complex administrative apparatus. An authentic dual system was finally implemented in 947: the Northern Administration managed the Khitans and other northern peoples, while the Southern Administration was expected to deal with the Chinese. Apart from the central, regional, and local authorities, there were also the administrations of the empire's five capitals. Liao had a total of five capitals, six regions (fus), 156 districts (zhous), provinces (juns), and towns (chengs), 209 uyezds (xians), 52 tribes (buzu), and 60 vassal territories (shu gos). Each of the five capitals had a separate administrative apparatus with its own civil and military institutions, and the capitals had vicegerents and commanders in chief of the respectful region. There was no unified capital administration system among all of them. The Western Capital was dominated by military officials responsible for border defense, while the Southern and Middle Capitals were mainly governed by financial and tax officials. The Eastern, Middle and Southern capitals were subordinated directly to the administrations of the right and Left wing prime ministers [16, p. 224–248].

Khitan crafts were developed to a high level in the Liao era, where Liao craftsmen smelted metals, built city walls, palaces, temples, and luxurious mausoleums for emperors. They also produced salt and coal, made silk brocade and chinaware, watered warships and laid roads. The Khitans relied on craftsmen from their conquered countries—China, Balhae, etc.—which fostered the rapid development of crafts in the empire. Whenever new territories were captured, captive craftsmen were sent to the Khitan lands. The Khitan Empire traded with China (the Southern Tang, Song, and other Chinese states), Xi Xia and Goryeo. The Khitans exported to China sheep and horses, felt, copper, iron, and precious metals, and the Liao imported Chinese luxury goods like silk, chinaware, tea and medicines [16, pp. 119–223].

The major Khitan achievements include the creation of their own script. In 920, Tulyuy-bu and Yelü Lubugu created this large Chinese-based script in a period of nine months. In 925–926 Abaoji's brother Dela, after familiarising himself with the Uighur language and script, created the improved small Khitan script, the symbols of which, 'few as they were, still covered everything'.

Paintings and frescoes in the tombs of Khitan noblemen that survived to this day are representative of the artists' mastery. Many of the above aspects of Liao culture reveal an obvious Chinese influence. The more intensely acculturation and sedentarisation were taking place in Khitan society, the harder it was to resist the raids of Mongol nomads from the north and west. The Khitans gradually adopted the Chinese strategy of passive defense. It was then that the so-called Northern Chinggis Khan's Wall was built, stretching for about 700 km across Northeastern Mongolia, China and Trans-Baikal Region.

The Khitan Empire then suffered a period of decline in the latter half of the 11th century due to increased private land ownership and reduced tax income to the treasury, eventually spreading out to affect every other Chinese dynasty. It was during this period that the Jurchen people, who had long been struggling to put an end to the Khitan rule, finally consolidated. In 1114 the Jurchen people waged war with the Khitan Empire, and in 1125 the dynasty breathed its final breath. Part of the Khitans, headed by Yelü Dashi, then headed westwards towards Eastern Turkestan, where they established the Kara Khitan Empire. The Khitans were included in the Jurchen Empire, and later also in the Mongol Yuan Empire. Among its rulers, Yelü Chucai was especially famous as a close associate of the rulers of the Mongol Empire, Chinggis Khan and Ögedei.
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§ 2. Khwarezm, the Eastern Kipchaks and Volga Bulgaria in the Late 12–early 13th Centuries

Dmitry Timokhin, Vladimir Tishin

The political history of Khwarezm at the turn of the 13th century is associated with two outstanding representatives of the Anushteginid dynasty, Khwarezm Shahs Ala ad-Din Tekish and Ala al-Din, who brought the state to become one of the largest and most powerful countries in the Islamic East. The expansion and strengthening of the state entity begins already in 1157, following the death of Seljuq Sultan Sanjar (1118–1157) [11, pp. 153; 10, pp. 32–33], when Khwarezmian rulers became actually independent. The reign of Khwarezm Shah Abu-I-Fath II Arslan (1156–1172) was marked by their joining the struggle over the Seljuqid legacy. It is beyond doubt that Khwarezm had numerous rivals, who did their best to take advantage of the power vacuum, trying to expand their territories as far as possible and thus succeed the Seljuq rulers. In spite of Khwarezm's military success in Khorasan, Gorgan, Dihistan, and the Persian Iraq, the Kara Khitan people and regional rulers of Transoxiana dependent on them became the most important opponents of II Arslan [10, pp. 35; 9, p. 398]. It should be noted that Khwarezm Shah II Arslan allied with Karluk tribes [34, p. 131] or, according to later sources, the Kipchaks [83, vol. 1, p. 239] in order to enhance his military power and confront the enemy. The former variant appears more plausible. It is more important, however, that Turkic nomads were crucial to the Khwarezmian military apparatus already during Il Arslan's rule. Please mind that Khwarezm's military alliance with Turkic tribes was to become very typical during the reign of his descendants, which practice is described in detail below.

When part of Karluk tribes began to serve Khwarezm, the tension between Khwarezm and the Kara Khitan people began to build as the latter's emperor viewed the Turkic tribes as his subjects taking II Arslan's side because of the threat of being forced out of Transoxiana to Kashgar, where Ali ibn al-Athir reports the Kara Khitans to have expected to adopt a sedentary lifestyle [3, pp. 267–268]. Khwarezm Shah II Arslan died in 1172, in the thick of the conflict between the Khwarezmian state and that of the Kara Khitans [3, p. 270]. Since his youngest son Sultan-Shah Mahmud inherited the throne, an internecine war broke out between him and Ala ad-Din Tekish [75, pp. 90; 66, J. 3, p. 158]. Both parties to the conflict turned to the Kara Khitans for assistance, and Sultan-Shah Mahmud enjoyed support from the Ghurid rulers, whose ambition was to weaken Khwarezm as much as possible and gain power [3, pp. 276–277]. Unlike his brother, Ala ad-Din Tekish was not concentrated on the infighting exclusively but tried to strengthen Khwarezm and annex new territories. One of the Khwarezm Shah's most important military accomplishments of that period was the conquest of Nishapur in 1187 [67, p. 90] and the expansion of the Khwarezmian domain in Khorasan along the Talakan–Merverud–Herat line [10, p. 41].

Thus, the time of troubles in Khwarezm following the death of II Arslan had not only negative, but also some positive effects. After Sultan-Shah Mahmud died in 1193, Ala ad-Din Tekish was able to fully concentrate on the struggle against his neighbours without having any concerns about the claimants to the Khwarezmian throne.

When Sultan-Shah Mahmud was alive, Ala ad-Din Tekish was able to achieve certain rapport with the sultans of Ghur, though the latter were apprehensive about Khwarezm's pres-
ere in Khorasan and the state's general strengthening. Nevertheless, Ala ad-Din Tekish was able to not only gain a footing in Khorasan but force Ghiyath al-Din al-Ghuri to admit the fact [66, J. 3, p. 170]. Of equal importance were the political effects of annexation of Tabaristan [70, pp. 115–118], most of Khorasan and Transoxiana [66, J. 1, p. 275; J. 2, p. 109] by Khwarezm, and Husam al-Dawla Ardashir, the ruler of Ghilyan and Mazandaran, admitting his dependence on Ala ad-Din Tekish which also meant these lands to be actually annexed by the Khwarezmian State [66, J. 1, pp. 275; 78, pp. 375–403; 64, pp. 47, 71, as well as Khwarezm's active interference with the affairs of Kerman [71, p. 134].

The struggle over the Persian Iraq against the last Seljuq sultan Tughril III and Caliph Al-Nasir was to become another important aspect of Ala ad-Din Tekish's foreign policy. He was able to establish peaceful relations with Caliph al-Nasir following a series of combats, and the latter had to recognise Khwarezmian rule over the Persian Iraq [3, p. 282; 12, p. 211], whereas the confrontation with Toghrul III proved to be much more violent and ended in a battle near the city of Rey on 4 March 1194 [59, p. 176], on which field the last Seljuq sultan fell and, quoting Sadr ad-Din al-Husaini, ‘of the glowing embers of the Seljuq clan only one remained to be and scattered away by the wind!’ [34, p. 164].

The last thing to be mentioned concerning Ala ad-Din Tekish's military and political activities is his short-term annexation of Kerman and the war against Alamut Ismaists, which ended in a truce following a series of Khwarezmian victories, as well as an enormous monetary ransom [12, p. 219].

During the rule of Ala ad-Din Tekish, the Turkic presence grew even stronger in the Khwarezmian army, which applied both to rank and file and senior positions, as well as in the country's administrative apparatus. The trend is attributable not only to the continued policy of Khwarezm Shah II Arslan but, primarily, to Ala ad-Din Tekish's marriage, according to Z. Buniyaytov [10, p. 62] with the Terken Khatun, daughter of Kipchak Khan Jankishi. Together with wife he brought about a lot of relatives and, as some scholars believe, whole Turkic tribes for Khwarezmian service [67, pp. 130–131]. In a way, the situation is attributable to the Khwarezm Shah's unchanged idea of the Kara Khitans as his major opponents and a threat to his northern borders, which made him rely on Turkic tribes to counter-balance the threat.

This sheds some light on Ala ad-Din Tekish's actions, who took every effort to strengthen the Turkic presence on his northern borders, in particular in Jand and the adjoining areas. Even though the region was already a traditional Turkic centre, the Khwarezm Shah ordered those who had apparently been in Khwarezmian service for a short time and had not been assigned to any location yet, to move there [49, p. 158]. This refers to the events of circa 1181, when a large number of Kipchaks and other nomadic Turkic tribes, commanded by Alp Kara and his son Kyran, whom the Khwarezm Shah intended to use against the Kara Khitans, came over to Ala ad-Din Tekish [10, pp. 46; 49, pp. 156–161]. The nomadic Turkic element was so important to the Khwarezm Shah's army that, according to Juvayni, when Ala ad-Din Tekish started a campaign against the Turkic tribes of Sygnak and the adjoining regions in 1194/1195, the Turks of the Uran tribe serving in the Khwarezmian army took the enemy's side to avoid fighting against their tribesmen. As the result, the Khwarezm Shah lost a large part of his army (actually, the centre of it left him), suffered a heavy defeat and had to flee [12, p. 212].

Speaking of Terken Khatun, it should be noted that historical sources disagree on her origin and, consequently, her relying on this or that Turkic nomadic tribe. According to Al-Nasawi, she 'came from the Bayat tribe, which is a branch of the Yemek tribe' [24, p. 87], while M. F. V. Y. Bmagig 67] who then reports that she was the daughter of Khan Jankishi, a Turkic ruler [24, p. 87]. Terken Khatun's belonging to the tribe (ashirat) (baywut), which was a branch of the Yemek tribe, is denied by other Arab-Persian records. For instance, Juvayni, followed by Mir-Khwānd [60, p. 23, note 78], once
mentions her to come from the Kangli tribe [56, vol. 2, p. 465] and in another place, from that of Uran (Uranian) [12, p. 266], whereas Juzjani's work reports her to be the daughter of Kipchak Khan Yqrân [83, p. 254]. In his commentary to a translation of Al-Nasawi's work, Z. Buniyaytov states that 'the name of the Mongol tribe was confused with that of the Turkic tribe Bayat' [10, p. 326]. However, historiographers have been unable to agree on the descent of Terken Khatun, which they are unlikely to do because of considerable differences in sources [67, pp. 130–131; 77, p. 171 Anm. 1; 2, pp. 252; 25, pp. 65, 82; 10, pp. 61, 202, note 157; 4, pp. 206, 235–236]. For instance, P. Golden, being confronted with the challenge of determining the relations among the tribal names, interpreted Byâwût and Uran/Oran as related clans or tribes within the Ŭlberli tribe (see below), which he believed to be a Yemek subdivision [60, p. 23, note 78]. However, it seems that the issue is much more complex and can hardly be addressed with such an approach. Controversial issues also include that of the relations among the tribal names Byâwût for the Kipchak-Kanglis, Bayat for the Oghuz people and Baya'ut for the Mongols [see: 8, p. 271, note 1]. To make it even more confusing, Mahmud al-Kashgari and Fakhr-i Mudabir only mention the name Byâwût [43, p. 115].

The foreign policy of Khwarezm Shah Ala ad-Din Muhammad (1200–1220) was aimed primarily against the most powerful and dangerous neighbours of Khwarezm, the Kara Khitan state and the sultans of Ghor. At first the Khwarezm Shah was able to use one of the enemies against the others: it was the assistance of the Kara Khitan army, along with those of the Kara-Khanid rulers of Otrar and Samarkand what determined the defeat of the Ghurid army and its flight from the battlefield when Shihab al-Din al-Guri's troops besieged Gurganj in 1204 [3, pp. 304–305; 12, pp. 225–227; 32, Vol. 1, Book 2, p. 140]. After Shihab al-Din al-Guri died in 1206, his state dissolved, and Herat, Balkh, and other major cities of the Ghurid state became part of Khwarezm [32, vol. 1, book 2, p. 155; 44, s. 123b–124b]. It was apparently then that Sistan was subjugated by Ala ad-Din Muhammad, to prove which the army of Sistan was sent to besiege Herat in assistance to the Khwarezm Shah in 1207 [37, p. 366].

As for the confrontation with the Kara Khitans, the initial situation did not favour Khwarezm. After Ala ad-Din Muhammad annexed Bukhara in 1207, the Kara Khitan army defeated the Khwarezmian troops heavily and captured the Khwarezm Shah, who was able to run away eventually [3, pp. 329–330; 12, pp. 233, 246–247]. However, as soon as in 1210 Ala ad-Din Muhammad was able to crush the enormous Kara Khitan army commanded by Tayangu, which actually undermined the state's power [9, p. 420; 12, pp. 240–242, 252–253, 339; 74, p. 23]. Following that battle the Khwarezm Shah assumed the laqîb 'Iskandar-i Sâni' ('the second Alexander the Great') and introduced the nawba of Dhul-Qarnayn (the 'Two-Horned One'—that is, Alexander the Great) to be performed by captive rulers [12, pp. 242; 10, p. 76], and assumed the throne name Sanjar [34, pp. 167; 17, pp. 117; 12, p. 242]. The Kara Khitan problem was finally solved for Khwarezm when the Naiman ruler Kushlu Khan came to power in the Kara Khitan state, causing its weakening and enabling the Khwarezm Shah to annex a number of its territories [24, pp. 49–52; 73, pp. 11–13; 72, pp. 12–14].

Apart from the aforementioned military and political activities, Ala ad-Din Muhammad strengthened his state considerably through expansion: in 1212, he annexed Samarkand, and the last Kara-Khanid sultan Usman of it was killed [3, pp. 333–335; 12, pp. 278–279]. Besides, in the Hijra year 606 (1209–1210), Khwarezm was able to acquire, without any considerable combats, Mazandaran [68, p. 391], where Ala ad-Din Muhammad took advantage of the power vacuum to annex the region. In 612–1215, the Khwarezm Shah's army invaded Kerman, after the annexation of which it conquered Balochistan and Mekran; Hormuz also accepted the rule of Ala ad-Din Muhammad [24, pp. 45, 61; 10, p. 80].

The Khwarezm Shah's most important political achievements in the west and northwest were the conquest of the Fars region, Atabeg Uzbek of Azerbaijan recognising his dependence of Khwarezm, and the final annexation of the Persian Iraq [10, p. 81]. The lat-
ter region was to become crucial in the relations between the Khwarezm Shah and Caliph Al-Nasir, whose support of Ala ad-Din Muhammad's enemies, Ghurid sultans and the Isma'ilis of Alamut, could not remain unpunished by the Khwarezm Shah [52, pp. 184; 72, pp. 16; 68, p. 509]. After a number of attempts at settling the conflict diplomatically and Ala ad-Din Muhammad claims to ‘such control and power over Baghdad as the clan of Seljuqs had’ [24, p. 57], the latter became clearly pro-Shii and began to prepare his army for a campaign against Baghdad [52, p. 184; 72, p. 16]. Though the Khwarezmian army outnumbered the enemy and the Khwarezm Shah's actions were resolute as ever, the 1217 Baghdad campaign was put off because of unfavourable weather, and Ala ad-Din Muhammad never tried to solve the problem in a military way again [24, pp. 64; 10, pp. 64; 68, p. 397; 44, s. 132a–132b].

Yet, the failure does not detract from the remarkable military success that the Khwarezmian state enjoyed during the Khwarezm Shah's rule. Al-Nasawī was right in a way to describe Ala ad-Din Muhammad's actions as follows: ‘He acquired the lands without effort, struggle, violence, and destruction, by merely being fearsome. He acquired the land of the Khitais and other Turkic rulers and lords of Transoxania—he destroyed some of them and made those who hid take shelter in the remote areas of China. He annexed a total of about 400 cities. Another person could not have achieved this, but his lawful acquisition came to embellish him without being called for’ [24, p. 45].

Ala ad-Din Muhammad proved less independent in his domestic policy, as Arab-Persian sources report him to have obeyed his mother Terken Khatun completely [10, p. 128]. She not only owned lands and had unlimited financial opportunities, but enjoyed full control over the capital Old Urgench, because the Khwarezm Shah mostly exercised his power from Samarqand. The further strengthening of Turkic presence on the key military and political positions in the Khwarezmian government is attributable to the Khwarezm Shah's mother, because many of them were Terken Khatun's relatives [24, p. 73; 77, p. 171, anm. 1; 2, p. 252]. Thus, Ala ad-Din Muhammad's political helplessness and reluctance to object to his mother is understandable as most of his commanders were related to her. The viceroy of Otrar Inal Khan, or Inalchik, titled Gair Khan, illustrates the tendency as ‘a relative of the sultan's mother Terken Khatun’ [55, vol. 1, p. 60]. The viceroy, who in fact triggered the war against the Mongols, was not given up to Chinggis Khan and even continued to rule Otrar and the adjacent area, having an immunity to the Khwarezm Shah's power due to his relations [24, p. 80].

It should be admitted that, while Ala ad-Din Muhammad's engagement of nomadic Turkic tribes in the Khwarezmian army strengthened Khwarezm in military terms, Terken Khatun's activities and the activities of her appointees significantly weakened the state and Ala ad-Din Muhammad's personal power. The separatism of Turkic emirs, Terken Khatun's relatives and appointees weakened the military potential of Khwarezm greatly during the war against the Mongols, especially after Ala ad-Din Muhammad died in 1220.

Speaking of Terken Khatun and Khwarezm's Turkic military and political elite, the confrontation between the Khwarezm Shah's mother and his eldest son Jalāl al-Dīn Mingburnu was of special importance. Today's scholars rightfully refer to Terken Khatun's hatred for Ay-Chichek, Jalal ad-Din's mother, to infer that they belonged to different Turkic tribes, which Arab-Persian sources do not confirm [10, p. 129]. It was typical for Jalāl al-Dīn Mingburnu to turn for assistance to nomadic Turkic tribes in his military and political career, though there is no indication of that being a single tribe. For instance, during the resistance to the Mongol conquerors in 1220–1221, he mainly relied on the Kangli Turks, to whose leader, Amin Malik, Jalal ad-Din was related as his daughter's husband [24, pp. 125–126; 56, vol. 2, pp. 405, 407–408]. In another case, during military operations in the South Caucasus, the Khwarezm Shah forced the Kipchak army to deny assistance to the Georgian army: ‘Having called for Koshkar, he gave him bread and salt and sent him to the Kifchaks to remind them about their
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obligation to him. During his father's rule, they had been chained and humiliated, and he had acted as a mediator to save them and interceded for them. Was it not a violation of their obligations to unsheathe their swords? So the Kifchak troops chose not to fight and left the battlefield immediately to encamp aside from everyone” [12, p. 311].

Thus, the conflict between Terken Khatun and Jalal ad-Din apparently had nothing to do with the confrontation among Turkic tribes serving to Ala ad-Din Muhammad, but rather was a manifestation of rivalry among groups of the Turkic military elite, a part of which supported the Khwarezm Shah's mother, while the other rooted for his eldest son. Ala ad-Din Muhammad was probably unable to put an end to the conflict, so he had to cede the throne to his youngest son, Qutb al-Din Uzlaq Shah, Terken Khatun's appointee, and not the eldest son, Jalāl al-Dīn Mingburnu, even before the Mongol-Khwarezmian war [9, p. 500; 10, p. 129].

The confrontations and fighting among Turkic groups over the Khwarezm Shah's throne weakened Khwarezm both in military and political terms, preventing it from uniting against the common enemy. The Mongols took advantage of Khwarezm's disunity. Large and powerful as it was, the latter proved to be a ‘colossus on clay legs’ as compared to Chinggis Khan's strong centralised state.

The first mention of the Turkic group named Kipchak (Kifchak) among others near Khwarezm's borders belongs to Beykhaki and is dated 1030 [23, vol. 1, p. 234; 1, p. 104; 5, p. 98; 4, p. 181]. Various authors then used the word as an umbrella term for different nomadic groups on the other bank of the Syr Darya. This primarily applies to a number of tribal groups that were established in the first half of the 11th century, after the Kimek Khaganate fell as the result of migration of nomadic tribes from the east. Apart from that, the word Yemek was used as a phonetic form of the name of the previously dominant Kimek tribal group. Mahmud al-Kashgari mentioned them as a subdivision (jīl) of the Turks [see: 21, pp. 40–41], but located them on the left bank of the Irtysh River only [21, pp. 39, 87; 54, C. I, s. 97]. The author identified them as Kipchaks, though he mentioned that the Kipchaks identified themselves as another subdivision [54, C. III, p. 29]. The name Yemek was mentioned as a Kipchak tribe by Muhammad al-Warraq (latter half of the 12th century), Al-Dinashqi (early 14th century), and Abu Hayyan al-Andalusi (14th century) [77, p. 157; 21, pp. 39–40; 61, p. 121]. Thus, having lost their dominant position, the Kimeks~Yemeks became a common subdivision within the newly formed tribal groups. However, some Muslim authors continued to use their name to refer to all Kipchak tribes in the Kazakhstan steppes along with ‘Kipchak’ until the mid-13th century. Yet, certain authors began to use ‘Kangli’ in the same meaning in the late 11th century.

Reporting the word Kangli to mean ‘a cart for carrying heavy loads’, Mahmud al-Kashgari also provides the meaning of ‘the name of a great Kipchak man’ [54, C. III, p. 379; 53, p. 638]. Fakhr-i Mudabbir (1206) did not know the Turks to have such a tribal name while being aware of the Yemek [43, p. 115]. Rukn al-Din Baybars (died in 1325), to whom al-Nuwayri referred for the list of Kipchak tribes, did not mention the name Yemek, but included Kang (or Kangar?) ogly; the same list according to Ibn Khaldun contains the form Kangrogly [38, vol. I, p. 539, 541; 61, p. 115]. The Chinese source ‘Bei Shiji’, which presents the data provided by the Jin embassy, sent to Chinggis Khan in 1220 and returned in 1222, mentions among other tribes of Central and Middle Asia the name Hangli 航里 to represent Kangli, without mentioning the Kipchaks [51, vol. I, pp. 27–28, note 48]. The biography of commander Subetei in ‘Yuanshi’ (juan 121) mentions the Hanjin 航斤 and the Kangli, probably in the form *Kanghit (Mongolian plural) along with the Kipchaks [63, vol. I, p. 115; 45,
Kangit p. Kangar — about 10 thousand stayed on the banks of the rivers of the aching Jand) in 1181 and enjoyed the honour of kinship by the medieval European aut

interpretation of the second hieroglyph (Juan 121), 1175 mentions the head (Dashi (1124 according to Juvayni, the Kangli people were first subjugated by the Kara Khitan people of Yelüably be associated with the White Irtysh [compare: 32, vol. 164–179; 4, p. 238]: Kangli, literally ‘dwellers of Kang’, which was later re-interpreted according to the meaning of the Turkic homonym for ‘cart’.

In spite of separate mentions of Kipchak and Kangli as synonymous tribe names in Juzjani's work in the context of the first Anushteginid sultans [83, pp. 233, 235], accurate and detailed information on Khwarezm's relations with its northern steppe neighbours date back to the last quarter of the 12th century.

Kyan, who arrived accompanied by a large retinue of ‘sons of begs of the Yugur tribe’ to express his willingness to obey Khwarezm Shah Tekish (on behalf of his father, Kipchak Khan Alp-Kara Uran, who was approaching Jand) in 1181 and enjoyed the honour of kinship [65, p. 180; 69, pp. 233–234, note 22; 10, p. 46; 4, pp. 214–215] might be identified as Khan Akran (Ikran), mentioned by Juzjani as the father of Khwarezm Shah Tekish's wife (Terken Khatun) [83, p. 240], which is possible with the names Kyran and Ikran (variant: Akran) corrected [69, pp. 234–235; 4, p. 216]. In 1182, he participated in Tekish's campaign against the Kara Khiitans.

In another place, Juzjani referred to Terken Khatun's father as Kadr (< *Kadir) Khan [83, p. 254], which is the reason why S. Akhinzhanov [4, p. 216] found it possible to identify him as Kadir Buku Khan, the ruler of Sygnak and Jand, against whom Juvayni reported Tekish to have started a campaign in 1195. Al-Nasawī refers to Terken Khatun's father as Khan Jankshi [25, p. 82]), the title of which I. Marquart, supported by P. Peglio, believes to represent the Chinese title of zhang shi 長史, meaning palace officials, though it was often awarded to vassal leaders of nomadic Central Asian tribes [77, p. 167 ann. 6; 63, pp. 89–92]. At least, Mahmud al-Kashgari recorded the word changshi, which he interpreted as ‘the title of amīr-a Hotan’. He added that ‘the country was conquered due to him. They say that he was subverted by Jamshid’ [54, s. III, p. 378; 53, p. 426].

Abu al-Ghazi reports many representatives of the Kangli tribe, relatives of Ala ad-Din Muhammad's mother Terken Khatun, to have arrived to the Khwarezm Shah and converted to Islam. According to a historian khan from Khiva, 50 to 60 thousand Kangli people moved to the Khwarezm Shah's domain, while about 10 thousand stayed on the banks of the Chu and Talas Rivers [6, pp. 294, 296]. They were awarded high positions and privileges. It is thus noteworthy that both editions of the report of the Franciscan mission to the court of the Mongol Khan of 1245–1246 (Giovanni da Pian del Carpine, Benedict of Poland) describe the bissermens—that is, the Khwarezmians to be ‘Saracens who spoke Coman’ [30, pp. 46; 47, p. 111].

The eastern borders of the tribal group can be estimated according to Rashid al-Din's report that the Kangli people were neighbours of the Naimans near Kök Irdış [32, vol. 1. book 1, pp. 136–137. Compare: 6, p. 295], literally meaning ‘blue Irtysh’, which should probably be associated with the White Irtysh [compare: 32, vol. 1, book 1, p. 73, note 4]. According to Juvayni, the Kangli people were first subjugated by the Kara Khatan people of Yelü Dashi (1124–1143), which fact Chinese sources confirm [51, pp. 223, 229, note 586]. ‘Jinshi’ (Juan 121), 1175 mentions the head (zhang 長) of the tribe (bu 部) Kangli (Kanli 康里)

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1. R. Khrapachevsky suggests that this should be interpreted as *Kangar based on the possible interpretation of the second hieroglyph F (Yuan *kin [82, p. 156]) as gen. However, the form suggested by the medieval European authors below supports P. Peglio's version.
named Bo Gu (孛古), who sent an embassy to the Jin court along with the Naimans (Nanbæn 粘拔恩) to ask for citizenship, refusing to be Kara Khitan subjects, which they were forced to become during the rule of Yelü Dashi [51, p. 223]. The leader's name might be associated with Kadir Buku Khan mentioned by Juvayni², though this challenges the dating. On the other hand, taking into account the fact that a Naiman leader known as Sa-Li-Ya撒里雅 (modern sā-lī-yā, late Middle Chinese *sat-li-nja:* [82, pp. 271, 188, 254] < *?) is mentioned first and titled jun-zhang 君长, literally meaning ‘the principal leader’, or, traditionally, ‘ruler’, ‘monarch’, this probably refers to a Kangli group subjugated by him, probably connected with the previously reported left-bank Yemeks.

Speaking of the 1195 Khwarezmian campaign against Kadir Buku Khan, Juvayni mentioned Tekish's army to contain Turks of the ywrān tribe, who came over to the enemy [9, pp. 406–407, note 1; 23, p. 448]. According to V. Bartold, the form in which the name of the tribe appears as that of Tekish's wife and Ala ad-Din Muhammad's mother in Juvayni's work as edited by Kazwini and, probably with reference to it, in Rashid al-Din's work [32, vol. 1, book 2, p. 209; 61, p. 110, note 48, pp. 117–118] is clearly identifiable as part of the name of Kara Alp Uran, in which spelling the name of a Turkic tribe is presented by Fakhr-ı Mudabbir (1206) [9, p. 407, note 1; 69, p. 228, 4, pp. 217–218]. According to P. Golden, it could represent the Turkic *Uran/*Orān [61, pp. 117–118]. S. Akhinzhanov remarked that the spelling (uram according to his transcription) fits the word ‘wrān meaning ‘snake’ as recorded in a Mamluk Turkic-Arabic dictionary of the 14th century [4, pp. 122–125, 225]. Indeed, the source mentions the word ‘wrān [58, p. 11, line 17 (Arabic text)], which J. Clawson read as *ewre:n, meaning ‘adder’ (as-šu bān), which correlated with the Ottoman Turkish evren ‘big snake, dragon’ [53, p. 15].³

Rashid al-Din, who presented a shorter account of Tekish's failed campaign of 1195, referred to his opponent, named Kayr (< *Kayur) Taku (variant: Tuku) Khan as Uighur [32, vol. 1, book 2, p. 137]. S. Akhinzhanov associated it with Juzjani's mention of 'sons of begs of the Yugur tribe' (ywgywr zādagān), which he identified as the Uighurs, supporting V. Bartold that there was a ‘Yugur country’ mentioned by the same Persian author to refer to the Kipchak area [4, p. 217, 235; 9, p. 434]. V. Minorsky believed Juzjani to mean the ‘country of the Yigurs of Turkestan’ [65, p. 309].

Juzjani's work mentions a Kadir Khan of Turkestan, referred to as the son of Yusuf of the Tatars in one place and the son of Takaftan (or Sakaftan) of the Yemeks in another [9, p. 434, notes 5; 77, pp. 129; 4, p. 224]. According to the Persian author, he was from whom Khwarezm Shah wanted to plunder in the steppe in 1218. However, we should probably turn to I. Marquart's hypothesis that the Persian author not just confused him with the Merkit Khan Toqta-biki, failing to understand that, while the Khwarezm Shah was marching against the Merkits, he encountered the Mongols, to whom Juzjani refers as the Tatars, purchasing the Merkits, but confused the Kadir Khan with a Karakhanid ruler of the same name [77, pp. 129–131; 39, vol. 2, p. 15, notes 1, 3]. P. Peglio showed that nobody in that period could have the title Kadir Khan but the vicegerent of Otrar, Terken Khatun's cousin Inalchu Kayir Khan, known as Ha Zhi Er Zhi Lan Tu 哈只兒只闊秃 according to ‘Yuanshi’ [80, pp. 53–54; 69, pp. 232–233, note

² Bogu (孛古), modern bō-gǔ, late Middle Chinese *pout-kuś* [82, c. 40, 111] < *buqa, compare: Karakhan: buqa, Kipchak: boqa, buqa [53, p. 312]; this contradicts P. Peglio's opinion that Juvayni's Buku stood for the Turkic *bogū [80, p. 22].

³ The length in the second syllable marked by J. Clawson probably does not apply because the alif should mean a broad vowel. Compare with the Turkic stem evir- ‘to turn’, ‘to revolve’, derived from the hypothetical root *eb- ~ *ev- and also reported in Orkhon eibir-, Ancient Uighur evir-, Karakhan evir-, Chagatai evir-, Ottoman Turkish. evir- [53, p. 14; 35, pp. 227, 228–229, 499]. The etymologisation for the Kipchak evrān (no long vowel despite Clawson's remark), ‘snake’ (< evrān) can be determined as follows: evir- + action result affix -lān (explaining the broad vowel in the second syllable) > ev(i)r-ān.
The Chinese transcription has enabled scholars to accurately reconstruct his title as *jy’nalchuk with an affricate consonant and a labial vowel in the last syllable and the initial iotising sound typical of certain dialects of Karluks languages, which is generally reduced in some Oghuz and Kipchak dialects: in this form the title *jy’nal has only been recorded in an Oghuz environment, compare with Mahmud al-Kashgari’s İnal Öz as the personal name of a Kipchak ruler [50, pp. 6, 10–11; 54, s. I. p. 361]. Here kajy’r is the Kipchak sound of the common Turkic stem *d-: compare with: Turkic qazır < qađır < qađir > qazır [57, bd. 3, c. 378–380; 53, pp. 603–604, 678]4.

According to V. Minorsky, al-Nasawī, when speaking of the same campaign of Muhammad, mentions the Irgiz River, while Juwayni mentions the Kara-kum area belonging to the Kangli people, which locations V. Minorsky believes to be the same as ırghîs savuq and qara qum, as mentioned by Abu al-Ghazi as territories within the Ulus of Shiban [65, pp. 309–310]. According to Rashid al-Din, a town named Karakum (in another manuscript by Rashid al-Din: Karakorum) later hosted Jochi’s main camp [9, p. 482, note 9; 48, p. 12, note 24]. In another place in his work, he reports Jochi’s main camp to have been situated on the Irtysh bank; Abu al-Ghazi refers to it as Kok Horde, meaning ‘blue horde’, which denotes the ‘eastern camp’ [32, vol. 2, p. 78; 36, p. 199]. According to Abu al-Ghazi, Batu gave to his brother Orda ‘the land where your father lived’, near the Black Irtysh and Lake Alakul’. It was between the Black Irtysh and Lake Alakul’ that Giovanni da Pian del Carpine found Urdu’s main camp during his travel. However, Karakum is known as one of Shiban’s winter main camps (the Irgiz River east of the Yaik is mentioned as a summer one), while the eastern border of his ulus lay near the mouths of the Chu and Sarı su rivers [36, p. 217]. The Karakum in the north of today’s Almaty Region, in the Balkhash-Alakol depression, lay north-east of the Kara-Khitan domain. Thus, the Karakum, mentioned by Rashid al-Din, might be localised in the lower reaches of the Black Irtysh (compare with the village Karakum in today’s Ayagoz District, East Kazakhstan Region, Republic of Kazakhstan), identifying it as the same place-name in Juwayni’s work. Consequently, the theatre of the 1218 military operations was probably confined to the lands north-east of Otrar and Jand, that is, the middle reaches of the Syr Darya, along Lake Balkhash at the southern border and up to the Irtysh River (the White Irtysh), beyond which lay the ancient Kimek land, which can be identified as the territory where the Kangli group nomadised, the borders being formed by the Zaysan Valley up to the Black Irtysh in the east and the Tian Shan slopes, beyond which lay the Uighur domain, in the south and south-east. Juwayni mentions a Kangli bandit named Ozar, who was even able to get control over Olmalıq in 1218 [6, p. 296], while identifying Kadir Khan as belonging to Juzjani’s Turkestan and Rashid al-Din’s Uighurs, combined with Juzjani’s mention of ‘sons of begs of the Yügur tribe’ and a ‘Yügur (variant: Yigur) country’ [83, vol. I, p. 267, note 1; 9, p. 434, note 6], which can be identified as synonymous to the placename Yui-yu玉岐 from ‘Yuanshi’ (Juan 122) [80, p. 24; 45, p. 499; 46, p. 73, notes 125, 126] (also compare with variant: Yui-gu玉谷) [79, p. 154, note 2], suggests that the tribal group contained some Uighur elements, which has already been mentioned by scholars [also compare: 63, pp. 104–105; 15, pp. 135; 4, pp. 188–189, 202, 235; 61, p. 121], while the title of Terken Hatun’s father, *drankshe directly indicated the group to have been connected to the cultural and, probably, political traditions of the Eastern Turkestan Uighurs [see also: 51, pp. 244–245, 251–252]. Characteristically, ‘Hei-da shi lue’ identifies the Kipchaks (ke-bi-shao克鼻梢) as a

4 This weakens P. Peglio’s somewhat more recent hypothesis. The transcribed name from ‘Yuanshi’ (Juan 151) I-na-si亦納思 as*inas, which he believed to represent the title (or personal name) ınal, of which ınalıq is a diminutive form. P. Peglio found it possible that it should refer to the above viceroy of Otrar, though he admitted the hypothesis to have phonetic limitations [63, p. 102]. For other opinions see: [15, pp. 134–135; 48, pp. 9, 16–17; 46, pp. 23–25].
Muslim state (huei-huei go 回回國) and refers to them as a ‘clan’ (zhung 种) of the Uighurs (huei-he 回纥) [see: 46, p. 71].

In 1198, Alp Derek, Kadir Buku Khan’s nephew (the son of his younger brother), who had arrived in Jand, turned to Tekish for help. The Khwarezm Shah sent him, accompanied by his son Qutb al-Sin Muhammed (to be later known as Khwarezm Shah Ala ad-Din Muhammed) to the steppe for a campaign, which resulted in capturing Kadir Buku Khan. However, Alp Derek soon began to raid Khwarezm, so Tekish set the captive free and sent him with troops against his nephew. However, he was defeated. The mention about Khwarezm celebrating the news enabled V. Bartold to question the general accuracy of the report [9, p. 407; 69, p. 236–237; 4, p. 218–219]. Juvayni reported ‘the rests of those who used to be Kadir Buku's subjects’ to have raided the suburbs of Jand in 1210, when Khwarezm Shah Muhammad was off for a campaign against the Kara Khitans [4, pp. 222, 224]. Though S. Akhinzhanov’s reconstruction of the events is not free of limitations, it enabled him to suggest that Alp Derek could be identified as Inalchuk [4, pp. 219–222]. Sourced provide no more information concerning the Khwarezmians’ interactions with the Kipchaks before the advent of the Mongols.

Persian historian Juzjani listed the names Kibchak, Kangli, Yemeq, and al-b.ri as peoples subjugated by Batu. Noteworthily, a representative of the latter group, the Kipchak ruler of the Delhi Sultanate Ulug Khan-i Ajam (Ghuyath al-Din Balban, ruled 1266–1287) is referred to as the Khan of the Al-b.ri and the Shah of the Yemeqs’ [77, pp. 171–172; 63, p. 107]. P. Golden has proven this to refer to *ölberli*/*ölbürlı* (weak, having poor health) [60, pp. 12–14, 24, note 79; 61, pp. 116–117]. Leaving aside various hypotheses on the origin of the tribe and its relatedness to other tribal groups [79, p. 161; 63, pp. 104–105, 107; 60, p. 13, note 29, p. 22 note 74, p. 24; 46, p. 27, note 16, p. 80, note. 150], it should be noted that the key data on ölberi refers to the Volga-Ural interfluve. It was in the lower reaches of the Volga River where its representative Bachman, known both from Persian (Juvayni, Rashid al-Din) and Chinese (Yuanshi) sources fought against the Mongols [compare: 51, vol. I, pp. 310–312; 31, pp. 185–186; 48, pp. 17–20; 60, pp. 28–29]. Bachman’s name has come down to us in Tatar folk legends. According to the dastan ‘Tülläh hám Susilü’, the people ruled by Bachman lived near the Ural River, while ‘Däftäre Çingiz-namâ’ identifies his domain as Ak Tuba; a legend recorded by Orenburg official P. Rychkov attributes the building of the city of Aktyuba to Bachman. The data correlates with the reports in Persian sources, which enables us to associate the Akhtuba River, the left arm of the Volga, with Bachman’s territory [41, p. 116; 14, pp. 14, 16].

In that period, Volga was rather a strategic border than a geographical one. At least the discovery of an ancient town dating back to the Golden Horde (Akhtubinsk) at the very beginning of the Akhtuba mouth, and the presence of another ancient town right opposite to it, across the Volga (Mechetnoe, in today’s Volgograd) suggests that there was a frequently-used crossing in the time of the Golden Horde, especially one leading to Dubovskaya Portage Place, which was the closest to the mouths of the Volga and the Don [13, pp. 110–111] and was always of strategic importance [see: 20, pp. 28–29]. Besides, a number of ancient towns dating back to the Golden Horde, downstream the Akhtuba River, indicate that farming was intense in these areas [13, p. 118]. The situation was probably similar in the pre-Mongol period. For instance, William of Rubruck described the surrounding steppe as a desert ‘where
there is no city, apart from some settlements not far from the place where the Etilia [that is, Volga–Author] joins the sea [30, p. 119].

In the 9–first half of the 10th centuries, the Volga separated Oghuz and Kipchak territories, whereas at that time Kipchak tribes were divided into Cumans (or Cuman) and Kangli [5, pp. 98–99]. Mahmud al-Kashgari already referred to the Etil as the river that flew in the Kipchak land [54, s. 1, p. 73]. Based on indirect reports, K. Kudryashov determined the situation of the eastern Cuman (Western Kipchak) border as stretching along the Ural mouth from the Caspian Sea to today's city of Uralsk and farther westward, approximately along the Kamelik and Bolshoy Irgiz rivers [20, pp. 130–131].

It is quite doubtless that Kipchak camping grounds existed in the lower reaches of the Volga. However, a number of issues remain controversial regarding Saqsins, as the information on it in sources is extremely fragmented and does not provide a holistic image [26, pp. 108–113]. Mahmud al-Kashgari refers to Saqsins as ‘the city near the Bulgars’, identifying it as Suar, but providing no further details [54, s. 1, p. 437]. However, this identification is hardly acceptable. Abu-Hamid al-Gharnati, an Arab traveler who visited Saqsin in 1150, mentions its population to have included ‘forty tribes (kabila) of Guzzes’ living in tents, each having an emir of its own, and other Muslim peoples—each group of which wanted to have a mosque of its own—in particular, several tribes of ‘Khazars’, ‘Bulgarians’ (ānm min al-bulgārīyyan), headed by their emir (amīr min ahī al-bulgār, literally ‘the emir of the dwellers of Bulgar’) and ‘the dwellers of Suar’ (ahī suwār), as well as a number of migrants from Arabic countries [29, p. 27]. The mention of Guzzes—that is, the Oghuz people within the multi-cultural population of Saqsins is important, because in other cases the Arab author just spoke of ‘Turks’ without specifying their tribal affiliation. Al-Garnati’s contemporary Persian geographer Najib Hamadani, whose report had been mistakenly attributed to Ahmed al-Tusi [see: 29, p. 111], also mentioned the dwellers of the city to live in tents, specifying that they all were Muslims and bothered by ‘the tribes of Yimeks (yymk) and Kipchaks (qfčāq)’ [84, p. 205; 2, p. 162, note 1]. Speaking about the rule of Khwarezm Shah Qub al-Din Muhammed (1097–1127)—that is, a somewhat earlier period, Juzjani, whose available data is generally controversial, mentioned the Khwarezm Shah's successful defense of his borders against ‘Saqsin, Bulgar and Kipchak infidels’ [83, vol. 1, p. 234]. Characteristically, Persian sources describing the Mongol conquest (Juvayni, Rashid al-Din), as well as Russian chronicles continued to differentiate between the Kipchaks (or Cuman, respectively) and the Saqsins [see: 48, pp. 12–13, 15]. This disproves the hypothesis that Russian chronicles used the term Saqsins to denote the Lower Volga Cuman group [42, pp. 149–150; 27, pp. 116–117].

Kipchak tribes apparently came into contact with the Bulgars in the late 11th century, when their summer camps happened to lie not far from the Bulgar borders. There were no clear political borders between the Bulgars and their nomadic neighbours in the south and south-east. Since that period, new elements of material culture began to appear in the Middle Volga Region, in particular in the lower reaches of the Kama River. Similar records have been found in the Southern Ural, Southern Siberia, and even Far East. The ratio of the nomadic Turkic-speaking—probably mostly Kipchaks—population continued to grow at a varying rate until the mid-14th century [16, pp. 69, 70, 33, pp. 25–29].

5 Al-Garnati’s manuscripts being rather fragmented, historians have long believed that (speaking of Saqsin) the Arab author reported a Khwarezm Shah named Ala ad-Daula to have tried to conquer the city for forty years [76, pp. 87–88] which naturally motivated attempts at interpreting it [7, pp. 588–589; 40, p. 275]. However, further reconstruction of the text showed the extract to deal not with the Khwarezmian’s attempts at conquering the city, but rather with a historical anecdote glorifying the riches of Saqsin [29, pp. 47–48, 52–54, 80, note 173], which probably did reflect Saqsin’s connection to Middle Asia.
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A copy of the work of al-Gharnati, who visited Bulgar during 1135–1136, reports many ‘Turkic tribes’ (umm al-tūrk) to dwell around the city [76, pp. 236–237]. D. Rasovsky surely associated it with Cuman—that is, Kipchak tribes [31, p. 160]. Apparently, the existence of such cultural contacts within the Middle Volga Region was reflected in al-Idrisi’s geographical work (1154). Though the author had never been to Bulgaria and referred to the old tradition for his reports, he mentioned the dwellers of Suar to spend the winter in wooden buildings and the summer in tents [19, p. 120].

Accurate data on the Eastern Kipchaks did not appear until much later. At least, ancient Russian chronicles mention the Yemyak Cumans—just once, in the context of the 1184 anti-Bulgarian campaign arranged by Prince Vsevolod Yuryevich of Vladimir-Suzdal, to whom they came along with a Bulgar prince to offer assistance. Scholars do not doubt that the above name should be interpreted as Yemek [31, pp. 160–161, note 38; 81, pp. 343–344; 61, p. 121; 62, p. 307]. D. Rasovsky believes it to refer to the Cumans who had migrated from across the Ural River to the upper reaches of the Kama in the summer season. O. Pritsak accepted the interpretation, regarding them as an eastern group within the Kangli conglomerate. D. Rasovsky referred to the map by Mahmud al-Kashgari with only the Bashkurts’ steppes lying between those of the Yemek tribe (in the Irtysh Valley) and Bulgar. Taking into account the data available on the location of Kangli-Yemek camps between the Lower Syr Darya and the lower reaches of the Black Irtysh in the late 12th century, Ali ibn al-Athir’s report (1043), mentioning a group of Turks who ‘spent the summer near Bulgar and the winter near Balasagun’, to have converted to Islam, after which they ‘scattered across the country [the territories of the khans of Balasagun and Kashgar—Author.]; a thousand carts in each region, more or less [depending on] their safety, for they had united for the sole purpose of protecting each other against Muslims’, [22, p. 60] might be interpreted as an indirect proof that north-west routes did exist.

Even though the relationships between the Kipchak groups of the Volga-Ural Ölberli people and the Kazakhstani Kangli/Yemek remain vague, their relations with Volga Bulgaria should be viewed as contacts of geographically adjacent political entities. At least ‘Yuanshi’ (Juan 120), mentioning the advance of the Mongols to the Kang-li 康裡, or Kangli land in 1223, names the city of (Chen 城) Bo-ji bo-li 孛子八里 as one of their destinations, which name R. Khrapachevsky, accepting P. Peglio’s identification of bo-li 兀里 as the transcription of the Turkic word baliq, interprets as representing Bolgar-baliq [79, p. 162; 63, p. 105; 45, p. 522, comment VII; 46, p. 77, notes 142, 143].

Thus, the history of the Khwarezmian state was closely connected with that of Kipchak tribes, in particular the Kangli group with its land adjacent to Khwarezm, east of the lower and middle reaches of the Syr Darya, from the very beginning of the Anushteginid dynasty. The group’s domain, at least in the last quarter of the 12–early 13th century, apparently stretched westward up to the Ural River and farther, probably up to the lower and middle reaches of the Volga, where Kangli subdivisions contacted Saqsin and Volga Bulgaria. The relations between the ruling clans of Khwarezm and the Kangli became especially close when the Khwarezmian political standing was the highest during the rule of Khwarezm Shahs Ala ad-Din Tekish and Ala ad-Din Muhammad, bringing about, in particular, a considerable increase of the ratio of Kipchaks in the military and administrative structure of the Khwarezmian state, who eventually occupied all key positions until the Mongol conquest.


35. Sevoryant E’. ‘E timologicheskij slovar’ tyurkskix yazykov (Oobshchyturkskie i mezhyturkskie osnovy na glasny’e) (Etymological dictionary of Turkic Languages [Common Turkic and Inter-Turkic Stems Beginning with Vowels]). Moscow, 1974. 768 p.


70. Marashi Zahir ad-Din. Tarih-e Tabaristan va Ruyan va Mazandaran. Tehran, 1966. 393 s.
75. Nishaburi Zahir ad-Din. Salguk-name. Tehran, 1953. 100 s.
§ 3. The Nomads of Eastern Europe in the Early 13th Century

Vladimir Ivanov

The dissolution of the Kimak Khaganate, weakened by internal conflicts, was accelerated in the early 11th century by pressure from the Central Asian Kuns (Cumans) and Kai tribes in the east. This brought about ethnopolitical changes in the areas adjacent to the Khaganate in the west, meaning the steppe Cis-Ural and Trans-Volga regions. Relying on medieval authors such as al-Marwasi, al-Biruni, Ibn al-Athir, and others, researchers present the process as follows: the Kun tribes living in North China suffered a Khitan attack in the 1030s, ceded to the aggressor, and moved westward. On their way, they were attacked by the Kai tribe and had to retreat further, descending on the Shary (Sary) tribe or the Polovtsians. Moving further to the west along their migration route, a Kun and Shary group came to Kipchak land where they began to integrate with them. As a result, the Kipchaks became dominant political power in the nomadic union, though the Kuns (Cumans) and the Shary remained the actual military force [14, p. 346]. A Kun-Shary-Kipchak group attacked the Ghuz people in the Aral Sea and Trans-Volga regions, forcing them to cross the Volga [17, pp. 124–126; 15, pp. 136–138]. The Shary (Sary)-Kipchaks thus came to dominate the Cis-Ural and Trans-Volga steppes.

This apparently failed to eliminate the problem of finding new territory, because the Cis-Ural steppe was in the final stages of aridization (drying out), and its climate was very similar to how it is today [9], meaning there was a pronounced continental climate with frequent droughts and low river water volumes in summer, but frosty winters with occasional thaw periods. This caused ice to form which prevented livestock from grazing. It can therefore be assumed that the Sary-Kipchaks crossed the land between the Ural and the Volga rivers without stopping. Evidence of this is provided by the limited number (41 in total) of pre-Mongol (late 11th to 12th century) nomadic burial sites scattered across the vast Steppe Trans-Volga Region and Southern Ural. The ethnic affiliation of the Polovtsian-Kipchaks with the population that created the burial mounds is confirmed by the fact that archaeological evidence of the burial ceremonies is comparable with similar Polovtsian (Sary-Kipchak) finds in the Eastern European steppes [13, p. 138–141].

As far back as the 1960s, G. Fedorov-Davydov relied on accounts by medieval authors, in particular Rashid al-Din, in attributing 12–13th centuries burial mounds in the Lower Volga Region (Saqsin) to the Polovtsians-Cumans [26, p. 150]. Subsequently, R. Kuzeyev used
historical ethnographic data to infer that a mass Kipchak migration onto the territory of today's Bashkortostan began in the 13th century [16, pp. 171–172, 184].

However, data contained in written sources (especially texts written by Ibn al-Athir) enabled S. Akhinzhanov to develop another hypothesis concerning the time when the Kipchaks re-settled in the Southern Ural steppes. In particular, this author believes that as far back in the 11th century, the Kipchaks, who 'owned nearly all of Central and Western Kazakhstan', had jailau—summer pastures—in the lower reaches of the Kama River, from where they travelled to winter camps near Balasagun [2, p. 51].

On the whole, information about the tribes living east of the Volga in general, and the Sary-Kipchaks in particular, is so meagre and fragmentary that researchers have had to resort to the cross-analysis of different documents in order to derive relevant information.

As a separate ethnocultural entity from contemporaneous neighbouring tribes, the Kipchaks (Turk-Kipchaks) were first referred to in the 8th century on a stele erected in memory of Moyun-Chur, which mentioned them as being political opponents of ancient Turkic tribes. In the late 9–10th century, Arab-Persian authors (Ibn Khordadbeh, ‘Hudud al-Alam’) listed the Kipchaks among the following key ethnopolitical groups: the Kimeks, the Oghuz people and the Pechenegs, who were settled in the eastern part of the Eurasian steppe.

In the early 11th century, following a period of rapid socio-political development, the Kipchaks became neighbours to the Khwarezm (Beykhaki). They succeeded in wars against the Khwarezm Shahs for grazing lands in the Aral Sea Region, forcing their opponents to make concessions and even agree to dynastic marriages with the nomads [1, p. 61]. At that time, Kipchak tribes formed a confederation, which was uniform in its material culture and social development. The confederation was headed by khans from the Olburlik (Elbari, Ilbari) clan who occupied an area known as Yuyliboli. Scholars have located this area in the steppes of Northwestern Kazakhstan and the Southern Urals [1, p. 61]. This territory is the same as the area where burial mounds of 12–13th centuries are to be found in the Southern Cis-Ural Region.

Apart from the Kipchaks, Yemek (Kimak) tribes living in the western part of the Southern Ural steppe (including the steppes of Bashkiria) were important members of the union [3, p. 89]. Despite using different ethnonyms, medieval authors (Mahmud al-Kashgari) emphasised the genetic and linguistic similarities between the Kipchaks and the Yemeks [16, p. 43]. The Yemek territory also corresponds with the areas where the records under discussion were located in the Trans-Volga and Cis-Ural Regions.

Medieval authors mention that the nomads migrated in two directions when the Kipchaks gained power. The Kipchaks moved west and north-west, while the Yemeks (Kimaks) went south and south-west [16, pp. 43–47].

A number of scholars (B. Kumekov, S. Akhinzhanov) believe that the nomadic Mongolian-speaking tribes (the Bayandurs, the Tatars, the Eymurs), who became part of the Kimak and Oghuznomad union as soon as the Uighur Khaganate fell in 840, were also included in the Kipchak confederation [17, p. 47; 3]. Ya. Pilipchuk has studied Polovtsian-Kipchak ethnonyms in depth and agrees that the Bayandurs (Bayauts) were a Mongolian-speaking tribe [19, p. 17–19]. Moreover, the scholar believes that another Mongolian-speaking tribe joined the Eastern Kipchak group in the 12th century, namely the Olberlik (Ilbari, El Borilu) people [13, p. 261–262].

12–early 13th century burial sites containing stone structures—a stone, or stone with earth mound, a stone super-structure, a stone ring or fence around the tomb, or a stone ‘shell’ on the earth mound—are indicative of the presence of Central Asian (Mongol) groups in the Kipchak-Cuman ethnopolitical union. Such burial mounds are distributed sporadically across the steppes of Eastern Europe from the upper reaches of the Tobol in the east to the mouth of the Danube in the west, accounting for 9.1% of the 428 burial sites that we have registered.
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These burial mounds, as well as burial sites containing complete horse carcasses (10.5% of all Kipchak-Polovtsian burials), can be attributed to the arrival in Eastern Europe of nomads descended from Central Asian Turkic-Mongol tribes. The Kipchak-Polovtsians are known to have formed an ethnocultural entity in the pre-European period of their history. It came into existence under the influence of western Turkic culture, then under the Kimeks, to whose state—the Kimek Khaganate—they belonged in the 8–10th centuries. It is also well known that the building of stone structures over tombs and the burial of complete horse carcasses with the person in the tomb [25, p. 29–45] were characteristic features of both ancient Turkic and Kimek burials.

In the 11th century, the above-mentioned tribes and others (Kai, Durut, Burdzh-Ogly, Toksoba, etc.) were integral to the Kipchak ethnopolitical union [19, pp. 20–26]. R. Kuzeyev defined it as Kipchakisation, which became a kind of ‘ethnic tradition’ in the Golden Horde era [16, p. 176].

Thus, medieval written sources reported that Kipchak tribes had long lived and been concentrated in the steppes of the Southern Cis-Ural and Trans-Volga Regions. It was no coincidence that after the disintegration of the Golden Horde [4], a state of ‘nomadic Uzbeks’ formed in Western Kazakhstan. Later it became part of the Middle Zhuz, where most Kazakh families in the Kipchak tribe (13,500) were concentrated [18, pp. 70–75]. It was there, in the foothills of the Southern Urals by the Sakmara River Basin, where Bashkir Kipchak clans such as the Kara, Ak, Sankem, and Suuni Bushman-Kipchaks settled in the late 14–15th centuries [16, p. 185].

If we use the historical ethnographic data available to compare the tribal composition of nomads in the eastern part of the Eurasian steppes from the latter half of the 7th century to the 14–16th centuries, we see that the largest, most significant tribes (among whom the Kipchaks seem to have been the most stable ethnocultural unit) were there permanently, while smaller ethnic units constantly came and went. The percentage of Kipchaks in any of these ethnopolitical unions might change, but they never assimilated into other ethnic groups.

The dominant role of Kipchak tribes in the steppe is also proven by the fact that Kipchak clan and tribal unions were present within other ethnic groups in the Great Steppe Zone and its periphery, such as the Uzbeks, Karakalpaks, and Tatars.

Thus, both written and historical ethnographic sources clearly indicate that the Kipchaks were the dominant substrate determining the ethnocultural situation in the Southern Urals and Cis-Ural Region in the 12–16th centuries.

A chronology made of nomadic written sources based on archaeological material has not yet provided scholars with information in sufficient detail to trace the course and speed of the Kipchaks' migration to Eastern Europe. However, written sources are helpful in resolving this question, as the information they contain provides an insight into the stages of the process.

It is obvious that the Sary-Kipchaks/Polovtsians were not forced out of the drought-ridden steppes of the Trans-Volga Region and the Southern Cis-Urals but chose to leave them. First, no archaeological written sources from the pre-Mongol period indicating the arrival of a nomadic population have been found, aside from those mentioned above. Second, the Sary-Kipchaks' nearest northern neighbours in the Volga-Ural Region were tribes who left Mryasimovo-type written sources in that region, dating from the late 10th to the early 13th century. They are located in the northern part of today's Bashkortostan (Karanayevsky, Bakalinsky, Mryasimovsky, and Burlinsky burial mounds) and in the Trans-Urals (burial mounds at Lake Smolino)—that is, in the forest zone. They are relatively small earth mounds—5–8 m in diameter—containing 2 to 32 bodies. An important ethnographic feature of Mryasimovo-type burial mounds are horse skulls and leg bones buried in the bottom of mounds. Some burial sites contain the remnants of a birch-bark wrap covering human bones.
Horse humerus bones are common in graves, an element which scholars believe was a tribal feature of the people that made these monuments [7, p. 16].

All the archaeological evidence (plicate-cord ornamented ceramics, elements of the burial ceremony) suggests that the Mryasimovo people should be ethnically identified as Ugric [8, p. 25]. By the end of the 12th century, Mryasimovo-type written sources from the region disappeared as a result of the assimilation of the Mryasimovo Ugrians and related tribes representing the Chiyalik culture, who had come to the Cis-Ural Region from the Cis-Kama Region in the north, with the ancient Bashkirs, who had also come there, having been forced out of the Cis-Ural steppes by the Sary-Kipchaks. As a result of this process, mound-type burial sites dating back to the 14th century are to be found in the forest-steppe of Cis-Ural Region. They are 'in no way different from other underground early Islamic Cis-Ural tribe burial sites in terms of ceremonial features' [7, p. 20]. As they were few in number, and their economic and domestic traditions were unsuited to the conditions of the steppe, they were unable to compete with the Kipchaks/Polvotsians in that region.

Researchers studying medieval nomadic written sources from Eastern Europe traditionally refer to Armenian historian Matthew of Edessa. His chronicle, written in 1050, mentions a rivalry between ‘the red-haired Khardesh people’ (the Shary-Sary) and the Kun and Kai (serpent) tribes over grazing land in the North Caucasian steppes. Five years later, a Russian chronicler reported in a 1055 entry the first time that the Cumans, led by Khan Blush, approached, peacefully, for the time being, the borders of Kievan Rus'.

The Russian practice of applying the ethnonym ‘Polvotsians’ to the new nomadic tribes in the East European steppes was maintained by the Polish and the Czechs (‘Plauci’), the Germans (‘Valewen’), and the Hungarians (‘Palóc’). However, the Hungarians often referred to the Polovtsians as Kuns-Cumans. S. Pletnyova believes this to be attributable to the geographic location of two closely-related ethnoes—the Kun-Cumans and the Shary/Sary-Kipchaks (Polovtsians). The former led a nomadic life west of the Dnieper and were better known by the Byzantines, the Hungarians, and other European nations. The latter migrated westward and were therefore better known by the Russians, who referred to them as ‘Polvotsians’ [22, p. 40]. However, some scholars believe the gentilic signifier ‘Cumans’ or ‘Plovotsians’ to be merely a construct produced by chroniclers and historians [19, pp. 7–14].

S. Pletnyova used the distribution of stone statues known as ‘Plovotsian women’ to determine the extent of the Kipchak-Polovtsian camping grounds. She singled out the oldest of them—stele-like flat bas-relief sculptures with faces and other details (such as hands, breasts, pots held in hands) — that were similar to the Kimak-Kipchak sculptures in Semirechye. The vast majority of them are concentrated in the steppe triangle formed by the right bank of the Siverskyi Donets, the lower reaches of the Don, and the Azov Sea [24, p. 153], where 181 Polovtsian burial sites have been registered so far (77.6% of all known burials of this type).

The fact that east-oriented burial sites (a characteristic feature of Polovtsian-Kipchaks) on the banks of the Siverskyi Donets, the Don, the Samara, the Oreli and the Manych have been found in the same area as early Cuman sculptures clearly indicates that this was the ‘area first inhabited by Polovtsians in the Southern Russian steppe’. From there, they actively took over the Southern Russian steppes.

It is no coincidence that experts pay most attention to the locations of stone sculptures in identifying the borders of the ‘Cuman Field’ as ‘being part of the sanctuaries built to commemorate dead ancestors, [they] were naturally placed where more or less fixed Polovtsian camps (in summer and winter) appeared and permanent roads were made in the steppe’. That is to say, the concentration of sculptures is another sign of the Polovtsians' transition into the second stage of nomadism [21, p. 249, 255]. A comparison of the distribution of Kipchak-
Polovtsian archaeological records and data provided by written sources, both Russian and Byzantine, indicates that the Kipchaks conquered the Cis-Danube River lands in 1091 [19, p. 57–58] (where an area containing typical Polovtsian burial mounds lies between the mouths of the Danube and the Dniester). At the very beginning of the 12th century Khan Otraq’s horde temporarily migrated to Georgia. When it returned to the steppe, the Northern Caucasion local group of Polovtsian-Kipchak archaeological records in the Kuban basin was apparently formed. ‘Vezha’ camps appeared in the Crimean steppes at approximately this time [21, p. 253].

The borders of Kipchak-Polovtsian ‘vezha’ camps (the borders of the Cuman Field) in the Eastern European steppes have been established quite precisely based on archaeological records: they extended from the mouth of the Danube and the lower reaches of the Dniester to the middle reaches of the Dnieper, then along the upper reaches of the Siverskyi Donets, Khoppyor, and Medvedita, up to the southern curve of the Samara Bend. The Trans-Volga Steppe Region and the Cis-Ural region made up the eastern periphery of the Polovtsian Field, or Desht-i Kipchak (Figure 1). It truly was a Polovtsian Field, ethnoculturally-speaking: the results of a comparative typological analysis of written sources in the steppes of Eastern Europe pertaining to the Pecheneg and Polovtsian periods fail to provide support for those attempting to ‘populate’ the territory with Oghuz people and Pechenegs who in theory were supposed to be there [5] [13, Table 4, 5, 9]. This clearly suggests the following conclusion: no such thing as a Pecheneg-Oghuz-Polovtsian ethnocultural community existed in the steppes of Eastern Europe in the pre-Mongol period. A series of migrations (invasions) by Pecheneg, Oghuz, and Kipchak-Polovtsian hordes took place, each group possessing a set of ethnocultural features (presumably including languages) that made each of them distinct from their predecessors. This has affected the morphology of the respective archaeological records.

The Kipchak-Polovtsians were assertive in establishing themselves in the steppes of South Russia. Only six years after Khan Blush, another Polovtsian khan, Sokal, brought his horde ‘to the Russian land to fight the first war’ (Hypatian Chronicle). From then until 1235 (when Polovtsians fought a major battle near Torchesk against troops led by Prince Daniil of Halych) it was the Russian-Polovtsian adversarial relationship that determined the political history of the Southern Russian steppes. Regular Polovtsian raids on Russian borderlands were followed by years of peace and even the establishment of alliances. The latter is especially typical of the early period of feudal disunity in Rus'.

A detailed discourse on the history of the relations between the Kipchak-Polovtsians and Rus' as well as other neighbours has been published in two major studies by Ya. Pilipchuk [19, 20]. They are very informative in establishing the facts and chronology and for this reason there is no need to repeat what is already well known. We shall therefore limit ourselves to outlining the general ethnopolitical situation.

Polovtsian raids on Rus', which became especially frequent in the 12th century, were aimed specifically at establishing a tributary relationship [10, p. 192]. This ambition was based on the military and political situation in the ‘Polovtsian Field’ at the time. By the end of the 11th century, the Cuman Field had been divided among the major Polovtsian hordes (chiefdoms according to Ya. Pilipchuk), each led by its own Khan. The Dnieper, Lukomorye, and Donets Polovtsians caused the most annoyance to the princes of Kiev: the former occupied the trade route ‘from the Varangians to the Greeks’, which was of special importance for Rus', and the latter severed the Principality of Tmutarakan in the lower reaches of the Kuban from Kiev. It was thus quite natural that when Vladimir Monomakh, who understood the nature and tactics of wars on the steppes, decided to conduct a preemptive strike against the Polovtsians, his druzhinas crushed the Dnieper Polovtsians in 1103.
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Khan Tugorkhan and Urusoba fell when trying to beat back the Russian attack. Given the situation, Khan Bonyak hurried to ally with the head of the Donets Polovtsians, Khan Sharukan, for further joint actions against Rus’ [21, p. 259]. The parties spent the next seven years in conflict until Vladimir Monomakh organised a large-scale campaign of united Russian druzhina detachments in 1111. They travelled deep into the steppe to destroy the Polovtsian towns on the Donets and scatter most of the Polovtsian hordes across the steppe (Khan Atrak's Horde went as far away as Georgia, and 'many hordes were crushed and scattered, with the remains of them forming groups the chronicler calls 'Wild Polovtsians') [21, p. 261].
As a result, clan-based relations were broken, and the Polovtsian Hordes dissolved into smaller ones, which were not based on clans. After Vladimir Monomakh's steppe campaign, a Polovtsian hordes of Toksobyches and Otpelryueviches formed on the left bank of the Siverskyi Donets; the Cumans of Lower Don settled near the former Khazar town of Sarkel (Belaya Vezha), and the Yeltukoves occupied the interfluve of the Don, the Khopyor, and the Medveditsa. An interesting feature of this latter development is that their northern borders appear to have been marked with stone sculptures and burial sites along the Bityug and Khopyor Rivers [27]. The monuments are adjacent to similar monuments created at the same time along the right bank of the Volga River in what are now the Saratov and Samara Oblasts, south of the Samara Bend [8, pp. 217–228]. This area was once very close to the southern borders of the Volga Bulgaria. The Yeltukovich Polovtsians were the nearest steppe neighbours of Volga Bulgaria. They are remembered for their raids on the Principality of Ryazan in the latter half of the 12th century [27].

Unfortunately, we do not know how Bulgar-Polovtsian relations developed, and it is unlikely that we ever will as no relevant sources are available.

Quite naturally, the almost permanent state of war prevented the Polovtsians from having commercial connections with Rus'. The relevant archaeological material provides convincing evidence of this [23, p. 90]. However, the same archaeological material also indicates an absence of trade between the Yeltukovich Polovtsians and the Volga Bulgars. The author of this work initially attributed this to Bulgar cities possibly being hostile to Kipchak-Polovtsians in the second half of the 11–13th century. The descendants of the nomads of the Oghuz-Pecheneg circle, whom the Kipchaks had forced out of the Volga-Ural steppes, were prominent in these cities [11]. However, an equally likely reason is that the mindset of nomadic steppe-dwellers meant they were indifferent to strange, sedentary aesthetic traditions—the complete absence of any Russian-crafted objects in Polovtsian burial sites is evidence of this [12, pp. 140–145].

Polovtsian-Byzantine relations in the period in question were different, however. S. Pletnyova relies on archaeological data, albeit scattered, to infer that the Polovtsians would mostly receive gifts or plunder in the form of costly fabrics from Byzantium, remnants of which have been found at certain Polovtsian burial sites. Moreover, Polovtsian social relations changed as a result of their regular contact with Byzantine merchants and diplomats in cities on the Black Sea [23, p. 103].

In the late 12th century, the disparate hordes that had formed in the Polovtsian steppes following Vladimir Monomakh's campaign began to merge into larger unions. The largest of them were Togly Khan's Lukomorye Horde, which roamed around the Azov and Black Seas and in the lower reaches of the Dnieper; the Dnieper Horde (the Burcheviches), led by Osoluk and Izay Khans, which roamed the banks of the Dnieper south of the Samara River (a left tributary of the Dnieper); and Khan Konchak's Don union. The latter was the largest of the steppe unions.

The Eastern Polovtsians were most united at the very beginning of the 13th century when two large unions of Cuman hordes—the Dnieper Horde and the Don Horde—finally joined near the southern border of Russia: 'two large state unions that were undoubtedly going to merge into one state' [21, p. 60]. However, the Mongols, who appeared soon after in the west of the Eurasian steppes' Great Belt, had a severe affect on how the Polovtsian-Kipchak relationship would develop.

Small, and scattered across the steppes of the Trans-Volga and Cis-Ural Regions, nomadic Kipchak clans are unlikely to have had any significant affect on the ethnocultural processes in the region in the 12th–13th centuries, and judging from the archaeological material in areas near to the Southern Urals, they did not.

Thus, during the Mongols' conquest of Eastern Europe, there was no one for them to vanquish in the steppes of the Trans-Volga and Southern Cis-Ural regions.


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23. Pletnyova S. Otnosheniya vostochnoevropeiskix kochevnikov s Vizantiej i arxeologicheskiye istochniki (Relations of the Eastern-European nomads with Byzantium and the archaeological resources) // SA. 1991. No. 3.


§ 4. The Kingdom of Hungary and the Cumans Shortly before the Western Campaign of the Mongols

Roman Hautala

French scholar Jean Richard noted in one of his numerous works [29, p. 212] on the relations between the Latin world and the Chinggisid Empire that the appearance of the Mongols near the frontiers of Western Christianity in the 1240s was in fact an unique opportunity for the Catholics to contact the previously unknown world of Eastern European nomads. István Vásáry came to a similar conclusion [35, p.8], affirming that the ethnographic reports of the first western ambassadors to the main camps of the Mongol khans helped Western European chroniclers form a complete picture of the lifestyle of the Cumans and the territories they inhabited.

In this context, however, it is worth mentioning the following fact reported by Franciscan William of Rubruck, indicating close interaction between the Kingdom of Hungary and the Cumans before the first diplomatic contacts with the Mongols. During the western ambassadors' five-week trip along the Volga with Batu's main camp, which took place from 14 August to 14 September 1253, an unnamed Cuman visited the Franciscan embassy and, much to Brother William's surprise, greeted the Catholic diplomats in Latin, attributing his knowledge of languages and his familiarity with the Order's activities to him having been baptised by Hungarian Franciscans before the Mongol invasion of 1241 [21, pp. 100–101].

The Hungarian campaign of the Mongols, followed by the formation of the Golden Horde, definitely influenced the establishment of close contacts between Europeans and the nomads of Eastern Europe. On the other hand, the spread of the influence of the Latin world in the east, which preceded the westward expansion of the Mongols, also fostered contacts between Western Europe and the nomadic empire [28, p. 83]. Close contacts between the Kingdom of Hungary and the Cumans, and the standard models of the former's relations with
nomads took shape several decades before the Mongol conquest of Eastern Europe and directly affected the subsequent evolution of contacts between the Latin world and the Mongol Empire.

The Period of the Teutonic Knights’ Presence in Transylvania (1211–1225)

King Andrew II clearly invited the Teutonic brothers to Hungary for the purpose of ensuring the effective protection of Transylvania against Cuman raids, which had become increasingly frequent. The initial 1211 charter of Andrew II [36, pp. 162–163] granting the Burzenland on the south-eastern margin of Transylvania to the knights contains very brief information in this regard, indicating the need to protect the region against the Cumans. However, the subsequent letters of Pope Gregory IX [36, pp. 198–199, 201–204, 206–207] were more informative; they reported that the Cumans had regularly invaded Transylvania through Burzenland before the knights came, causing ‘great turmoil’ in the Hungarian Kingdom. The Pope's letters thus suggests that the decision of Andrew II was motivated by the increased frequency of Cuman raids, and the Hungarian monarch's chief purpose was to prevent nomad attacks by establishing firm control over the Burzenland [22, p. 157; 10, p. 22].

Thus, the papal epistles indicate a significant surge in the Cumans' military activity in Transylvania in the early 13th century. The regular Cuman invasions of the Burzenland demonstrated the ineffectiveness of the region's old defense system, meant to repel sporadic raids by small detachments of nomads. The defense of Burzenland largely consisted in securing the territories close to mountain passages through which the nomads could enter the region; it had been previously entrusted to Pecheneg guardian detachments, who proved incapable of checking the increased pressure from the Cumans [22, p. 157; 10, p. 33; 25, p. 182]. The King of Hungary therefore assigned the defense of Burzenland to the Teutonic Order, whose military potential was considerably greater.

However, the Teutonic brothers were expected not only to provide defense, but to expand the king's domain. The Hungarian monarch gave a clear indication of the direction in which the knights could spread, mentioning in his charter that he sent them ‘to the Burzenland, which lies beyond the woods towards the Cumans’, meaning that the Kingdom was to grow through the conquest of the Trans-Carpathian territories referred to as Cumania in Hungarian sources. The term ‘Cumania’ in this context was different from the catch-all name of Desht-i Kipchak and referred to the nomadising regions of the Western Cumans, situated in southern Moldova and north-eastern Wallachia [9, p. 164, nota 2; 33, p. 145; 32, pp. 422, 426, 437; 1, pp. 28–29; 31, p. 28]. It should be noted that contemporary studies have been unable to identify the Cumans whose invasions of Transylvania caused the King of Hungary to settle the Teutonic knights in the Burzenland. It might be reasonable to revise the assumption of some scholars that Cumania was controlled by the Danube Cumans, who migrated to the Carpathian territories in summer and returned to the Lower Danube River Region in autumn [3, p. 124; 5, p. 44], based on the following royal charter of 1212 [36, pp. 164–165].

In his second charter, Andrey II reports that the Teutonic knights suffered ‘the constant attacks of the Cumans, not fearing to expose themselves to mortal danger every day’. The

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6 ‘...A(ndreas), illustris rex Vngarie ... eorum domui terram Borze pia liberalitate donasset ... per quam Comanis regnum Vngarie multiplicantibus frequens introitus et exitus habebatur’ [36, pp. 198–199].
7 ‘... cruciferis de hospitali sancte Marie ... terram Borza nomine, ultra silvas versus Cumanos ... contulimus ...’ [36, p. 162].
8 Compare with the fragment of the ‘Chronicle’ by Alberic of Troyes-Fontaines on the Battle of Kalka [11, p. 911].
9 ‘... assiduos Cumanorum patientes insultus ... de die in diem morti opponere non formidant’ [36, pp. 164–165].
mention of constant raids by nomads indicates that the Cumans invaded the Burzenland not only in the summer months, as the Danube Cumans would be expected to have done according to the above scholars. This more likely refers to year-round attacks by nomads inhabiting the territories adjacent to south-eastern Transylvania. The Cumans must have increased the frequency of their raids to prevent the Teutonic knights from entrenching themselves in the Burzenland.

The next royal charter, dated circa 1215 [36, p. 166] and confirming the right of the Teutonic knights to the ‘recently built fortress of Kreutzburg’\(^{10}\) demonstrates that the brothers had established firm control over the Burzenland and started to expand their domain. Even though the location of the fortress remains unclear, one may assume that Kreutzburg lay beyond the territory that Andrew II had granted to the Teutonic knights in 1211 [36, p. 39; 22, pp. 157–158; 31, p. 51; 23, p. 352].

The last charter of Andrew II, granted to the knights in 1222 and bearing the King's Golden Bulla [36, pp. 169–172], is the most informative of all the records related to the presence of the Teutonic brothers in Transylvania. Most importantly, this document provides extremely valuable information regarding the brothers' territorial expansion. In his charter, the Hungarian monarch granted to the rulers of Byrsa new territories stretching ‘to the borders of the Brodnici’\(^{11}\)–that is, to Southern Moldova [33, p. 141; 32, p. 417, nota 19, p. 426; 31, pp. 28–29, 106–109], as well as to the Danube in north-eastern Wallachia.

Further information on the Teutonic brothers' activities in the last years of their presence in Transylvania is contained in letters by Pope Gregory IX on the expulsion of the knights from the Kingdom of Hungary in 1225, the analysis of which lies beyond the scope of the present article. In his letter to the Prince of Hungary dated 26 April 1231 [36, pp. 198–199], as well as in three subsequent letters to Andrew II, his legate in Hungary Jacob, and the Partiarch of Aquileia Berthold von Andechs-Merania, respectively [36, pp. 201–204, 206–207], the pontiff reports that the brothers had built in Transylvania ‘five strong fortresses through hard work and by spilling their own blood’\(^{12}\). Apart from the above-mentioned fortress of Kreuzburg, Gregory IX is undoubtedly referring to the fortresses of Marienburg (the residence of the Transylvanian komtur), Schwarzburg, and Rosenau. However, scholars disagree on the fifth fortress, which they identify with either Heldenburg, Kronstadt, or Terzburg [36, pp. 40–41; 24, pp. 190–191; 19, p. 35]. Of even greater interest is the Pope's report that the Teutonic knights had built a ‘perfectly fortified fortress’\(^{13}\), situated in Cumania and apparently erected shortly before their expulsion from Transylvania [36, pp. 40, 75; 32, pp. 418; 31, pp. 52; 23, p. 352]. According to Gregory IX, the appearance of a powerful Teutonic outpost in their domain troubled the Cumans, as it prevented them from entering Transylvania, so they gathered ‘a countless multitude of warriors’\(^{14}\) and attempted to capture the fortress, but failed. The Pope also reported that some Cumans had ‘attained the grace of baptism’ following their defeat. Even though the pontiff indicated clearly that the nomads converted to Christianity after being captured ‘along with their wives and children’\(^{15}\), this can be viewed as the first documentary evidence of successful Catholic proselytism in Cumania.

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\(^{10}\) ‘... castrum quod Crucpurg nominatur, quod cruciferi de Borza de novo construxerant’ [36, p. 166].

\(^{11}\) ‘... a fine terre Cruceburg terram, quae vadit usque ad terminos prodnicorum...’ [36, p. 170].

\(^{12}\) ‘... ibi cum multo labore ac proprii effusione cruoris [quinque] castra fortiia construendo’ [36, p. 199].

\(^{13}\) ‘... dicti magister et fratres castrum munitissimum construxissent...’ [36, p. 199].

\(^{14}\) ‘...congregata ingenti multitudine bellatorum...’ [36, p. 199].

\(^{15}\) ‘...quidam ex illis dictis fratribus se reddentes, cu[m uxoribus et] parvulis ad baptismi gratiam convolat...’ [36, p. 199].
Information Regarding the Establishment and Further Activities of the Diocese of Cumania

In one of his letters to Prince Béla, dated 26 April 1231 [36, pp. 198–199], demanding that the Teutonic knights be allowed to return to Transylvania, Pope Gregory IX refers to the fact that the territories previously controlled by the knights had become part of Béla's domain. This statement of the pontiff indicated that Béla, whom Andrew II granted the title of Duke of Transylvania in 1224 or 1225, had come into the possession not only of the Burzenland in south-eastern Transylvania, but also of the more recent territorial acquisitions of the knights beyond the Carpathians. Thus, Béla was to lead further Hungarian expansion in Cumania after the Teutonic knights were expelled from Transylvania in 1225 and probably succeeded in enlarging the domain of Arpads [4]. Useful as they are for studying the past activities of the Teutonic knights, the Pope's documents contain very little information on Béla's presumed military success. However, even though the sources fail to provide a detailed account of Hungarian expansion in Cumania, letters by the Pope and contemporary Western European chronicles contain extensive alternative reports on missionary outreach to the nomads, thus testifying to the further development of relations between the Kingdom of Hungary and the Cumans.

All available sources emphasise the Order of Preachers' contribution to introducing the nomads to the Catholic faith. The deployment of a Cuman apostolate was clearly only possible after the Dominican province of Hungary was established in 1221 and the first convents of the new religious order, dedicated to preaching Christian doctrine to representatives of alternative religions, were founded in the Kingdom [32, p. 420; 18, XII, p. 970; 27, pp. 25–26].

The first missions to the Cumans are described only in late Dominican works, while contemporary sources do not mention them, possibly because the initial attempts at preaching the Gospel to the Cumans failed. The Hungarian Dominicans established the first missions to the Cumans during the late period of Teutonic presence in Transylvania [32, p. 422; 13, c. 227, nota 6]. However, according to the Hungarian work written by Peter or Svipert of Porroch in 1259, the first Dominicans who came to Cumania in 1223 or 1224 were ‘repelled by pagans’ [26, p. 306], while two members of the next mission to reach the Dnieper were killed by local ‘infidels’ [26, p. 306].

The first factual evidence of successful proselytism among Cumans appears in the informative letter by Gregory IX to the Archbishop of Esztergom, dated 31 July 1227 [7, pp. 206–207]. In his letter, the pontiff quotes a previous report submitted to the Roman Curia by Robert, Archbishop of Esztergom, which contained the encouraging news that a Cuman leader named Bortz was willing to receive baptism from the Hungarian prelate.

The letter of the pontiff suggests that the intention of Bortz was a result of previous proselytism by Dominican friars preaching in Cumania. However, the Cuman leader, who was ‘the fourth most powerful’ among the Cuman rulers (according to a later remark by Emo of Wittewierum) [17] insisted that an authoritative Hungarian prelate should participate in the baptism, as his presence would emphasise the importance of his decision. The Archbishop of Esztergom reported to Gregory IX that he had baptised several ‘nobles’ [18] including the son of Bortz, who, according to the later report of Alberic of Trois-Fontaines [11, p. 920], converted to Christianity after informing the Hungarian prelate personally of his father's intention. Thus, the Cuman ‘nobles’ preferred to take baptism from the Head of the Hungarian Church, challenging the status of the Dominican friars, which accounts for the failure of the first Dominican missions, who then turned to the Archbishop of Esztergom for assistance. This was clear-

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16 ‘... fratres ... repulsi sunt a paganis’ [26, p. 306].
17 ‘...Boricius quartus de maioribus principibus Chunorum ...’ [16, p. 511].
18 ‘Aliqui enim nobiles gentis illius per te ad baptismi gratiam pervenerunt...’ [7, p. 206].
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ly why Gregory IX stated in his letter that ‘dignity has been always venerated in Cumania’\textsuperscript{19} when assigning ancillary powers as an apostolic legate to the Archbishop of Esztergom for his next mission beyond the Carpathians.

The 1227 letter by Gregory IX clearly indicates that the pontiff favoured the Cumans, who, as he says, expressed ‘the pious desire’\textsuperscript{20} to convert to Catholicism, at the same time implying that the relations between the nomads and the Kingdom of Hungary had changed quickly after the Teutonic knights were expelled from Transylvania. According to the Pope, Cuman ‘nobles’ began to cross the Carpathians in order to see the Archbishop of Esztergom, and the Hungarian prelate soon paid them a return visit. In his letter to Béla dated 21 March 1228 [15, p. 108], Gregory IX expressed his gratitude to the Duke of Transylvania for supporting the Archbishop of Esztergom by accompanying him to ‘the land of the Cumans’\textsuperscript{21} with his military retinue.

According to the pontiff, the visit resulted in ‘quite a large number of Cumans’\textsuperscript{22} converting, which was confirmed by a parallel letter from Gregory IX to the Archbishop of Esztergom [7, p. 208]. However, the exact number of nomads baptised remains vague, and the ‘quite large number’ of Cuman converts might include those nomads who had become Christians before the Archbishop of Esztergom arrived in Cumania or who did so after he returned to Hungary. In any case, the figures contained in later reports by Western chroniclers [11, p. 920; 12, p. 636; 20, I, pp. 269, 505] seem to be exaggerated and clearly inconsistent with the report by Svipert of Porroch that only several members of Bortz's clan followed his lead [26, p. 306; 32, p. 424].

Of greater importance is the first mention of the establishment of the Diocese of Cumania in Gregory IX’s letter to the Archbishop of Esztergom dated 21 March 1228 [7, p. 208]. The pontiff’s letter expressed approval of the Hungarian prelate's resolution to use his powers as the legate of the Apostolic See to appoint a Dominican named Theodoric, who according to the Pope had fostered the efficient promulgation of Christianity among the nomads, head of the new diocese. The actual boundaries of the jurisdiction of the Bishop of Cumania remain the subject of lively discussion among scholars, as contemporary sources provide no definitive information in this regard [14, p. 25; 2, pp. 72–73, note 35; 30, p. 25, note 22; 31, p. 52; 4]. However, the assumption that the Diocese of Cumania was initially established in the territory previously controlled by the Teutonic knights seems well-grounded. The jurisdiction of the Bishop of Cumania was apparently later expanded both in southern Moldova and Transylvania. Thus the statement of Richard de Morins that the nomads within the Diocese of Cumania were divided into parishes ‘headed by bishops and presbyters’\textsuperscript{23} does not seem to be accurate. The name of the Diocese of Cumania reflected the direction in which proselytism was subsequently conducted, but that does not necessarily mean that Cumans formed the majority of subjects under bishop of Cumania's jurisdiction [33, p. 156; 30, p. 25].

Establishing an apostolate in the Cuman community presented certain difficulties inherent in missionary activities among nomads, which Gregory IX mentioned in his letter to the Archbishop of Esztergom of 21 March 1228 [7, p. 208]. In his message, the pontiff quoted the Hungarian prelate's affirmation that the Cumans expressed a clear willingness to adopt a sedentary lifestyle. It is obvious that the Archbishop of Esztergom was being overly optimistic [32, p. 429]; however, his affirmation shed light on the key problem with organising missionary activities among the Cumans. The nomadic lifestyle of the Dominican apostolate's target

\textsuperscript{19} ‘... cum auctoritas semper consuevit multum favoris habere in Cumania ...’ [7, p. 207].

\textsuperscript{20} ‘... si piis eorum desideriis condescendas...’ [7, p. 207].

\textsuperscript{21} ‘...ut pro Cumanis convertendis ad ipsum cum venerabili fratre nostro [...] Strigoniensi Archiepiscopo, apostolice sedis legato, terram illorum intraveris...’ [15, p. 108].

\textsuperscript{22} ‘... conversionem videlicet non parve multitudinis Cumanorum’ [15, p. 108].

\textsuperscript{23} ‘... episcopis et presbyteris ibidem per parochias ordinatis’ [8, III, p. 112].
audience naturally did not facilitate the rooting of Christianity in the steppe. Apart from the Christian prejudice that nomads were religiously fickle, which is expressed indirectly in the pontiff's letter, the Cumans' seasonal migrations within the steppe hindered year-round church services greatly. This is apparently why Gregory IX, acknowledging the considerable problem, complied with the request of the Archbishop of Esztergom and granted him the power to distribute indulgences, which were supposed to help build churches in every seasonal location of the Cumans. However, the consequences of the Pope's resolution are unclear, and a work by Svipert of Porroch is the only source indicating that a “chapel of the Holy Virgin” was erected in the Cuman-populated territory, unfortunately without specifying its location.

It is beyond doubt that the baptism of the Cuman ruler helped to increase the worldly influence of the Hungarian crown in Cumania. In his letter of 21 March 1228 to Béla [15, p. 108], Gregory IX clearly indicated that the prince of Hungary had participated in the Cuman ruler's baptism ritual, while his request to foster the further promotion of Christianity 'with all his forces' suggested that Béla had troops in Cumania to protect missionaries against potential Cuman attacks. However, the only definite evidence that part of the Cumans were subjugated by Hungarian crown is contained in a later letter of Gregory IX dated 1 October 1229 addressing ‘the Cuman rulers and their people’25, in which the pontiff mentions a not survived royal charter bearing a golden bulla granted to the Cumans by Andrew II as a guarantee that a number of their privileges and the right to the inalienability of property would be observed as long as they recognized their feudal dependence on the Arpads [17, III/2, p. 217].

The Arpad secular authorities had extremely complicated relations with the Bishop of Cumania. On the one hand, the Pope's letters clearly stress the importance of Béla's military support for the unhindered expansion of missionary activities in Cumania [15, p. 108; 32, pp. 426–427] or forcing the locals to recognize the jurisdiction of the Bishop of Cumania [37, p. 61]. Furthermore, the letter of Gregory IX to Béla dated 25 October 1234 clarifies the importance of financial support from the Duke of Transylvania for ensuring the functioning of the Diocese of Cumania [7, pp. 283–284]. On the other hand, the Bishop of Cumania soon realized that the aims of the Arpad monarchy in Cumania did not fully coincide with the interests of the Dominican prelate. For example, the letter of Gregory IX sent to the 'Cuman rulers and their people' on 1 October 1229 as a response to a likely complaint by the Bishop of Cumania mentioned that Hungarian secular authorities had encroached on the Cumans' possessions following their conversion to Christianity, in spite of the guarantees granted to them under the king's bulla [17, III/2, pp. 216–217].

The deterioration of relations between the Cumans and the Hungarian crown apparently weakened the Cuman apostolate considerably. For example, the letter of Pope Gregory IX of 24 January 1237 addressing the Dominicans in Cumania [34, p.150] suggests that the Dominican friars had to attempt a re-Christianisation of the Cumans ten years after Bortz's conversion. In this letter, the pontiff depicts the Cumans as ardent pagans strongly opposed to Catholicism, at the same time expressing unadulterated joy because it had been recently reported that the nomads were willing to convert to Christianity.

Most likely, the beginning of the Western Campaign led by Batu influenced the new success of the Dominicans in proselytising the Cumans. It is quite possible that in the second half of 1236 the nomads of Cumania grew concerned about the imminent Mongol attack and tried to win Hungarian support in case of Mongol aggression. Conversion to Christianity seemed to be the most effective way of building rapport with the Kingdom of Hungary, which accounts for the increasing activity of the Cuman apostolate starting in late 1236. A later letter

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24 ‘... capella beate virginis, quam fratres ... edificaverant...’ [26, p. 306].
25 ‘...intendens totis viribus, sicut princeps catholicus et sincere devotionis alumnus, gentem illam ad catholicam fidem adducere...’ [15, p. 108].
26 ‘...Ducibus et populis Cumanorum ...’ [17, III/2, p. 216].
by Dominican friar Benedict to the master of the Order of Preachers, dated circa 1238 [26, p. 309] reports the friars to have achieved considerable missionary success among the nomads. According to Benedict, Christian Cumans demonstrated laudable religious zeal ‘both in abstaining from food during Lent and in other Christian rituals’, and, in general, the Dominican friar’s letter reflected the nomads’ efforts ‘to observe the Catholic faith with all their strength’\(^\text{27}\). It is quite possible that the Cumans’ conversion was motivated by their sincere desire to convert to the Christian faith. However, Benedict’s subsequent mention of the Cumans’ evident concerns about the approaching Mongols and their fear that the Mongols intended to attack them soon is also worth noting.


\(^{27}\) ‘... tam in ieiuniis quadragesimalibus, quam alii christiani ritus observanciis fidem catholicam pro viribus imitantur’ [26, p. 309].
§ 5. The Mongol Empire and Its Role in World History

Nikolay Kradin

Scholars from many countries have been fascinated with the history of the Mongols and their deeds for a long time. The Mongols established one of the largest empires in the history of the world. Their campaigns and conquests, as well as the consequences, had a huge impact on the history of mankind. The most intriguing question that experts have puzzled over is how and why a small, little-known people created an enormous world empire and then quickly faded into the background.

The Otuz-Tatars (Chinese: Shiwei) were the Mongols' distant ancestors. They lived in Eastern Mongolia and the Trans-Baikal Region [6]. Among the names of Shiwei tribes are such ethnonyms as Tatan (Dadan) and Mengu. Following the collapse of the Uighur Khaganate in the mid-9th century, Mongol nomads gradually populated most of the Mongol steppe area. Chinese chronicles commonly referred to them as Zubu on the eve of the second millennium. According to the legend of the Mongols' original homeland, a long time ago their ancestors fled to the inaccessible area of Ergune Kun ('Steep Range', probably derived from Argun). In time they grew in number and became masterful blacksmiths. They collected a lot of firewood and, while making offerings, they melted the mountain and were able to enter the steppes [19, Book 1, p. 154].

An ethnically diverse population resided in the Mongol steppe at the turn of the 13th century. Nomadic tribes that can be referred to as Mongols lived in the eastern part of today's Mongolia, in the Ono and Kherlen valleys. They included the Darlekins, the Niruns, the Tayichiuds, the Khonkirats, and others. The Tatars lived east of them in the Trans-Baikal Region and Inner Mongolia. The Keraites lived in Central Mongolia in the foothills of Khangai as well as the Orkhon and Tola valleys. Their chieftdom, headed by Khan Tooril (Wang Khan), was one of the most powerful nomadic unions in that period. The Merkits lived along the banks of the Selenga River in Northern Mongolia. The western part of Mongolia was occupied by the Naimans. Many scholars classify them as Turkic- and not Mongol-speaking nomads [6; 11; 17; 40].

The culture and everyday life of medieval nomads in the Mongol steppe were hardly different from those of earlier nomads [4; 11; 13; 38]. They bred the so-called ‘five types of livestock’ (tavan hoshuu mal)—horses, camels, sheep, goats, and cattle. The horse was the most valuable animal and the measure of a nomad's wealth. Sheep generally accounted for 50–60% of all livestock. Horses and cattle made up about 15–20% of the herd. The rest were goats and camels, which were the smallest groups of livestock [9]. Nomads also hunted and practiced primitive farming. Battue hunting was especially valuable as a good way to learn military skills. The nomads divided into two groups and formed a ring stretching over many kilometers. As they gradually tightened the ring, they chased many wild animals into the circle.

The Mongols practiced division of labour based on sex and age as well as gender domination. Men's responsibilities included watching over the domesticated animals and making arrows, bows, and other tools. They spent the rest of their time hunting, practicing archery, and in military campaigns. Women did the remaining work including household chores, milking cattle and processing animal products, and caring for children. When the men were absent, the women did their work as well. However, the role of women in Mongolian society was not merely that of a house slave. Women could enjoy considerable influence in public life. Widows in particular were highly regarded. Take Hoelun, for example, who, as the wife of Yesugay-bahatur and the mother of Chinggis Khan, had immense influence on her sons, as did other khan's wives in later times.
Several types of Mongol families existed. Relatively poor cattle breeders apparently had small nuclear families, consisting of parents and their underage children. The eldest son received his share of the herd and property when he married. The youngest son (otchigin) remained with his parents to take care of them when they were old. He inherited his parents’ ger (yurt), property, and domestic herd. Richer Mongols had extended polygynocial families. Those who could afford the bride-price (kalym) had several wives. Raids and military campaigns offered chances to obtain concubines, who also did housework. The nomads of the Mongol steppes were Shamanists and believed in the Tengri cult of the sky. Apart from the ‘Eternal Blue Sky’, they worshiped the earth goddess Etugen, spirits of fire, and used sheep shoulder blades for divination. The Keraites and the Naimans were familiar with Christianity.

It was typical for nomads to travel in ails of 5 to 10 families. They could form larger units (kuren) when necessary, but this was unwise from an environmental standpoint because then the animals would overgraze pasture land. A number of ethnographers report intra-group conflicts are minimal at these levels. If any tension arose within the group, the dissatisfied ones would go their own way at once. Ails formed higher level taxa known as linidzh (uruk) and exogamic clan (obok)—tribe, chiefdom (irgen, ulus). Ethnic and potestary terminology was usually the same across different peoples at that time. The same terms could refer to an ethnopolitical group and its constituents [22].

Inequality and hierarchy were practiced in Mongol society. Tribes and chiefdoms were headed by khan with retinues of nökers. Social dominance in Mongol society was based on the terminology of tribal society as a contrast between older and younger relatives (father and son, elder and younger brothers), of genealogical (including fictitious) inequality between certain linidzhes and segments (‘white bone’ and ‘black bone’) labeling relatives of lower statuses with slavery terms (bogol) [11; 22; 38].

Nomadic tribes often attacked each other to steal cattle as well as capture women and children. An anonymous Mongol chronicler wrote an vivid description of the ‘dark times’ of the Mongols in the Middle Ages: ‘The starry sky turned, and the whole nation fought. People did not sleep in their beds, everyone robbed (plundered) each other. The global battle made the entire surface of the earth shake’ [7, §254].

These were the conditions into which Chinggis Khan was born, the future founder of the Mongol Empire. His father was a descendant of the powerful standard bearer of the Mongols in the first half of the 12th century Khabul Khan along the cadet branch—Yesugay-bahatur. His mother was Holuen of the Olkhonut tribe. She had been married to a Merkit, but Yesugay abducted her and made her his wife. The child was named Temüjin after an enemy vanquished by his father.

When Temüjin was nine years old, his father brought him to the Khonkirats to find a bride, and they chose Börte, the daughter of Dei Sechen, the local tribal leader. On his way home, Yesugay encountered Tatars who gave him a poisoned drink. After the death of Yesugay, Temüjin had to return home to his mother. By that time most of Yesugay's companions had decided to abandon his family and split off after dividing up his cattle. This was the typical way that nomadic cattle-raising chiefdoms dissolved. The betrayal of his tribesmen deeply traumatized Temüjin. As a result, he was always suspicious of his relatives, even immediate ones, and preferred to rely on faithful friends and loyal nökers [31, p. 193–194]. The life of Temüjin’s mother and family became hard, for they had to survive in the severe Mongol climate without any livestock. Holuen had to forage while her children fished. This was unheard of for nomads, their descendants aren't enthusiastic about eating fish even today.

During this time a conflict arose between Temüjin and Behter, his half-brother by another wife of Yesugay. Both teenagers probably felt that one of them would be the head of the family one day. The conflict ended dramatically. Behter was shot with a bow and arrow. His remote relatives did not ignore the crime. Tayichiuds captured Temüjin and made him wear
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stocks as a punishment. The boy proved to be extremely resourceful and brave. He was able to escape and return to his family.

Another courageous deed soon followed—he pursued horse thieves and won back a herd of his horses. He was aided in this by a young man from the next camp, Bo'orchu. He effectively became Temüjin's first nöker and remained one of his closest companions. Encouraged by this victory, Temüjin set off for Dei Sechen for his bride. Börte's dowry consisted of an elegant dokha hat of sable. Temüjin brought the dokha to the main Keraite camp. He presented it as a gift to the leader of the Keraite confederation Tooril (Wang Khan). In return, the quick-thinking young man asked for protection. Wang Khan was moved to think of his late friend Yesugay and promised the young man assistance.

However, Temüjin did not stay in his young wife's arms for long. The Merkits, who had been scheming to avenge Yesugay or his relatives for years, suddenly attacked his camp. Temüjin had to abandon his young wife and hide in the thicket of the sacred Mount Burkhan Khaldun. His mighty protector came in handy. Temüjin turned for help to Wang Khan and Jamukha, another influential Mongol leader. Jamukha was his relative and sworn brother (Mongolian: anda). As children, the boys had exchanged gifts and promised to stay loyal to each other for the rest of their lives.

The Merkits were not expecting an attack and were crushed. The coalition received a bountiful plunder. But Temüjin only wanted his beloved wife. This is one of the most moving scenes from his biography. Unfortunately, Börte was expecting her first child at the time they set her free. In spite of the delicate situation, Temüjin recognized Jochi (literally 'guest') as his son.

Temüjin moved with his old friend Jamukha for some time after their victory over the Merkits. They would sleep under the same cover as they had done in childhood. Yet, they gradually became rivals, and Temüjin split off from his anda. Ultimately, they became enemies. Somewhat later Temüjin's companions decided to make him the Khan. It was at this time that he assumed the name of Chinggis Khan. He attracted loyal nökers. The germinal 'apparatus' consisted of as few as 26 nökers, headed by Chinggis Khan's most intimate companions—Bo'orchu, Jelme, and Subutai Bahatur.

Unfortunately, there is no accurate chronology of the early Mongol history from the mid-1180s to 1204. Different sources provide different accounts of the events. Only the milestones can be restored, though their dates and even order remain debatable. We know that Jamukha's younger brother was killed in a cattle raid shortly after a quarrel. This caused an armed conflict between the sworn brothers. Chinggis Khan suffered a defeat, but was able to make use of it. As a deterrence, Jamukha had 70 Chonos tribal leaders boiled alive in pots. This repelled numerous tribes, who split off from him to the anda. Chinggis Khan was already known to be a fair and quite generous leader who distributed most of the plunder among his companions. Moreover, his reliance on loyal nökers and not relatives gave representatives of other tribes an opportunity to reach high positions.

What followed was a whole series of raids and wars between different nomadic chiefdoms and tribes. Chinggis Khan was all but defeated more than once. Yet, he was able to stick it out. It was his enemies that fell. Wang Khan died first. Then the coalition of the Naimans and Jamukha was defeated. Jamukha fled, but was soon betrayed by his nökers. Chinggis Khan dealt cruelly with the traitors while opting for a honourable execution for his anda. His spine was broken without any blood being spilled.

Chinggis Khan was declared ruler of the Mongol State (Eke Mongol Ulus) on the banks of the Onon River in 1206. He attempted to abandon the traditional tribal system and create an innovative structure based on personal loyalty. This resulted in the introduction of the decimal system, in which military detachments were divided into tens, hundreds, and thousands. Initially 95 ‘thousands’ were established. They were both military and administrative units of
the imperial confederation. The tribes of Chinggis Khan's old associates and the chiefdoms that voluntarily entered the confederation were able to keep the old clan structure. The rest were re-divided into new thousands. Bo'orchu commanded the Right wing of 38,000 warriors. The Left wing was entrusted to Muqali. It consisted of 62,000 warriors together with the center [19, Book 2, p. 266–278].

Chinggis Khan also established a druzhina (keshik) of 10,000 warriors. Its members were expected to guard the Khan's residence, property, and main camp; manage the servants of the court; provide food for him; participate in his battue hunts, etc. The druzhina was a kind of talent pool for the future administration of the Empire. To a certain degree, its members formed the basis of the officer corps in the army and the administrative apparatus.

Chinggis Khan was less generous to his relatives. His mother and younger brother got 10,000 yurts, his brother Khasar got 4,000, and his sons Jochi, Chagatai, Ugadei and Tolui received 9000, 8000, 5000, and 5000 yurts respectively. What's more, vicegerents were appointed to watch them and keep Chinggis Khan informed of every step they took. The reason was the events recounted earlier from Chinggis Khan's childhood, when he was confronted by treacherous relatives who abandoned his family after his father died. Chinggis Khan could never forget this, and relied on loyal nökers but not relatives.

Shikhikhutug was entrusted with judicial affairs. Chinggis Khan also introduced new rules of conduct commonly known as the Yasa. However, modern scholars disagree on what Yasa actually was [30; 35]. Its original has not come down to us. Only retold pieces and reports by Oriental authors like Juvayni, Rashid al-Din, Makrizi, and Ibn Battuta are available. The Yasa does not appear to have been a written code of law like the early medieval ‘barbarian’ ones (Visigothic, Saloc, Russian, etc.). It was rather a compilation of resolutions, rules, and taboos introduced by Chinggis Khan and amended during the reign of Ögedei. The text was never available to the public. As Juvayni said, 'The scrolls are known as the Great Book of Yasa and lie in the treasury of the oldest princes'. Whenever the khan takes the throne or gathers a large army, or princes come and [discuss] state and administrative affairs, they bring the scrolls and execute all decisions in accordance with them, whether to form an army or to destroy countries and cities’ [36, p. 25].

In 1210, Jurchen ambassadors demanded Chinggis Khan pay tribute (the Mongols were formally vassals of the Jin Empire). However, the actual balance of power between the north and south had changed dramatically, so the event was used as a pretext for war. In the following year the Mongols invaded the Jin Empire with two armies. This began the epoch of the great Mongol conquests. The Jurchen had 1.2 million soldiers. Chinggis Khan had 139 thousands. This gives a ratio of about 1:10. However, the Jurchen army was scattered among garrisons, while the Mongols were able to concentrate their forces depending on the direction of their attack. They crossed the Wall and conquered the western capital. The very first victories brought defectors to the Mongol troops.

The typical Mongol tactics were as follows. The Mongol army formed several lines. The first lines consisted of heavily armed horsemen. Mounted archers were in the rears. When the battle began, the light cavalry, situated on the flanks or alternating with leading detachments, rode ahead and started to rain arrows down on the enemy. A solid wall of arrows falling from the sky was a powerful psychological weapon, especially when whistling arrows were used, and could damage a poorly armed infantry. Yet, such shooting was somewhat ineffective if the enemy wore armour [5, p. 213].

The Mongols' favourite trick was the famous false retreat, when they sent several detachments ahead who imitated a clash with the enemy and then would pretend to retreat. When the enemy started to pursue in hopes of plunder, the Mongols would stretch out the enemy's lines of communication. Then the archers came in, pouring arrows on the enemy. The Mongols preferred remote fighting until they had a critical advantage over the enemy. This is
probably attributable to the fact that lightly armed archers made up the bulk of the army. The heavy cavalry finished the battle, first galloping ahead and then crushing the tired and disarrayed enemy [18, p. 52].

Each Mongol warrior was expected to carry a complete set of gear, including defensive and offensive weapons, ropes, transport animals, etc. If a soldier was found to have inadequate gear during army inspections, he would receive a severe, sometimes capital, punishment. Chinggis Khan maintained rigid discipline and collective responsibility. If one man fled from the battlefield, the whole ten was punished. Cruel as it was, the system proved extremely effective [18, pp. 50–51; 36, p. 31].

The Mongols employed total war tactics, using large-scale intimidation to dampen the enemy's fighting spirit and demoralize him. Unless a city surrendered without a single shot, they took no captives except for skilled craftsmen [16, p. 67]. When besieging cities they forced the local population (hashar, literally 'crowd') to set giant mechanisms in motion, collect stones and trees, and build siege structures [19, book 2, p. 207; 16, p. 67].

When the Mongols first confronted the Jurchens, they lacked experience and specialized means for a siege of cities. During their first anti-Tangut campaign they failed to flood the Tangut capital—water broke the dam, which flooded the Mongol camp instead. However, the Mongols were quick learners in military science. They began using Jurchen, Chinese, and Muslim engineers and craftsmen, which soon proved beneficial. They were able to master advanced military technology in no time to build siege towers, in particular with catapults, and various throwers that shot arrows, stones, and propellant powder, carry out large-scale artillery reparation before assault, build dams to flood the enemy's cities, undermine fortress walls, etc. [18, pp. 53–54].

Opinions differ on the Mongol army's relative advantage over other medieval troops. Nomads are widely believed to be 'natural warriors'. Nomads stood out for their were outstandingly tough, hardy, and sharp-sighted nature; they had a good sense of direction and learned the art of horse-riding and archery from childhood. The Mongol bow was the most powerful of medieval bows. Long training in battue hunts determined the high agility and efficient coordination of Mongol military detachments, their high mobility in the territory of operation. These were their key advantages over their enemies [5, p. 91].

At the same time, two important facts should be taken into account. Nomads were not as good as professional warriors from sedentary farming countries (the military class, personal guards, and trained military detachments of mamluks, janissaries, etc.) at using short-range weapons. Besides, the sense of direction and the ability to move with a large number of led horses was beneficial only in steppe areas or very close to them (as it was in Rus'). It was another matter if military action was conducted in unfamiliar conditions. Here the nomads lost their home field advantage and had to play by the rules of their opponent. This is what happened during the two Yuan maritime campaigns against Japan. This was the case in the Middle East, where they were defeated by the mamluks.

The Mongol army used the so-called decimal system. That is, troops were divided into detachments of ten (urban), one hundred (zuur), one thousand (myangan), and ten thousand (tumen) warriors. ‘Chinggis Khan decreed that ten men should be headed by one (we called him ten head), and ten ten-heads by one called hundred head, and ten hundred heads by one called thousand head, and ten thousand heads by one, which number they call tumen’ [18, p. 49]. ‘Each Emir of a tumen, a thousand, or a hundred had to maintain his troops in full order and prepared to set off for a campaign any time a firman or an order came, whether it is night or day!’ [19, Book 2, p. 264].

The discovery of the hierarchical principle (including the decimal system) played no less an important role in military affairs than the invention of the wheel for technical developments. Better-organised troops had a considerable tactical advantage over an army that was not or one that was organised poorly. Military history offers numerous examples of small
armies defeating larger troops due to better organisation alone. The aforementioned might seem banal nowadays, but the principles of social organisation were very different in tribal societies as compared to state ones.

A rigid military hierarchy means strict discipline. This principle was hardly acceptable to separatist tribal leaders. Giovanni da Pian del Carpine wrote that if, during a battle, 'one, or two, or three, or even more men flee, they all are killed; if the ten flee and the other one hundred do not, all are killed; shortly speaking, everybody who flees is killed unless it is a general retreat; similarly, if one, or two, or more men join the battle bravely and ten more do not, they are killed as well; if one or more men out of ten people are captured and their fellows fail to set them free, they are also killed' [18, pp. 49–50].

The decimal system and collective responsibility requires no special controllers. 'Army inspections and counting is arranged in such a way that it is not necessary to record the results (daftar-i arz) or have dedicated positions and assistance,' Juvayni reported, 'because troops are divided into tens, and one man is appointed to command the other nine; one out of ten heads of tens had the rank of hundred commander, and the whole hundred is subordinate to him. This applies to each thousand, and to ten thousand men, led by a commander known as a tumen commander. According to this rule, whenever an object or person is required, the temnik (ten thousand head) gets the assignment, which he delegates to the ten thousand head, as so on up to tens. This is truly just; each person works as much as any other, and there is no difference between them regardless of their wealth and power [36, p. 31; compare: 5, pp. 90–91].

Judging by the 'Secret History of the Mongols', Chinggis Khan's army numbered at least a hundred thousand horsemen in 1206. §202 enumerates 95 thousand heads which were entrusted to command his detachments. The source also notes that this does not include the so-called forest peoples. At the time of the founder's death, the Left wing consisted of 38 thousand and the right of 62 thousand. If we count the thousand of bodyguards known as gol and the 40 thousand already divided among immediate relatives, the total army counted 141,000 horsemen [19, Book 2, pp. 266–278]. Though the calculations may lack accuracy, they reveal the number of nomads that engaged in active military operations had grown by a factor of nearly 1.5 despite the casualties from previous campaigns. This is only attributable to the fact that the human resources grew as the steppe state expanded. Recruits from the territories newly annexed by the Ulus replaced those fallen on the battlefield.

Supposing that adult men accounted for about one fifth of the population, the total nomadic population of the Mongol steppe of the 1220s numbered at least 700,000 people. Nomads became more numerous during the empire's golden age. A part of them went to Europe, Central Asia, and Iran. According to the statistics for 1290, Mongols proper in the Yuan State numbered approximately 1 million people; migrants from Western and Central Asia (Semu, Semuren) were about as many; 10 million people lived in Northern China (Hanren); 60 million people lived in Southern China (Nanren).

The division of the army into decimal units was not a one time action. That would have been impossible. Any military detachment participating in military operations needs replenishment or reorganisation. The introduction of the decimal system as the basis of Eke Mongol Ulus in 1206 must have been a political declaration. In fact, the so-called myangans were often larger than one thousand warriors. This is reported by Rashid al-Din in his 'Compendium of Chronicles'. The Jalair thousand which was commanded by Muhali, consisted of 3 thousand people. The thousand of Baaritai-kurchi-noyon consisted of ten thousand Baarins, and that of Naya-noyon was 3,000 Baarins. Khonkirat thousand detachments consisted of 5,000 people; Ongut ones, of 4,000; Jalair ones, of 2,000. The thousand commanded by the brothers Kekhtai and Buchin also consisted of 3,000 people, while the Kara Khitan and Jurchen thousands contained 10,000 warriors each, and so on and so forth [19, Book 2, pp. 269–274].
Moreover, there are cases of ‘tribal unit’ rearrangement, when their hierarchical status had been changed. ‘A thousand consisting of Oirat tribes. There were [in fact] four thousands, but [they] are not known in detail. Their emir and ruler [padishah] was Kutuka-beki. When he submitted to Chinggis Khan, the whole Oirat army was assigned to him as was the [established] custom; the thousand emirs were those people who he wanted to have. His sons commanded [these thousands] after he died [19, Book 2, p. 269]. The text clearly indicates that the Oirat myangan consisted of a large number of warriors and later a more hierarchical unit was formed based upon it. Similar information is contained in the same source on the troops of Baaritai-kurchi-noyon [19, Book 2, p. 269].

The Mongol army could mobilise in two ways. In the first case, all men of specific tribal and clan units were considered warriors and expected to participate in military campaigns. This method of replenishment was apparently used during the early stages of the existence of the Mongol Empire. According to the other variant, recruits were conscripted into the Mongol Army from each tribe and chieftain where necessary. For instance, in 1235 one warrior of each Mongol ‘ten’ was conscripted for the western campaign and one for that against the Song Empire. One person per ten households was recruited from the former Jurchen Empire for the campaign against the Song Empire and Goryeo [2, p. 354]. For his 1247 campaign against Batu, Güyük drafted one person per hundred [2, p. 300; 28, p. 21]. According to ‘Yuanshi’, the whole male population aged 15 to 70 was drafted into military service in China during the Mongol rule. In fact, the call-up age varied from 15 to 20 depending on the need [37, p. 17]. Mobilisation was carried out in secret to prevent third parties from finding out. According to Marco Polo, when Kublai needed to gather a large army, he was able to do it so quickly and in such secrecy that nobody suspected anything [5, p. 100].

The Mongols continuously replenished their army from newly conquered countries. The more they conquered, the more powerful their armed force became. The first campaigns yielded enormous plunder. The Jurchen emperor paid a considerable contribution of 10,000 liang silver and 10,000 bars of gold. After that Chinggis Khan directed his gaze to Khwarezm Shah's domain in the west. In September 1219, 150 thousand Mongol horsemen approached Otrar. The fortress was taken after five months. In time other cities in Central Asia fell, including Bukhara and Samarkand (1220), Gurgandj (1221). The Tangut state Xi Xia fell in 1226–1227.

Chinggis Khan died in 1227 during the siege of the Tangut capital. According to one version, shortly before he had hurt himself by falling from a horse. Others claim that he died of a brief illness. The third version is that the Tangut ruler put a spell on him. According to an exotic legend, he was killed by a young captive Tangut princess, which is similar to the death of the Hun leader Attila. Chinggis Khan's burial place is also unknown. There are reports that he was buried in the Altai Mountains. According to another version, he was buried in his homeland near the sacred Mount Burkhan Khaldun. Buddhist monks believe Ordos to be his burial place.

The funeral was held in secret. According to legend, all participants of the ceremony were killed immediately after it and a herd of horses was made to run across the grave so that nobody could ever find the burial place of the Conqueror of the universe. Though the information is both legendary and controversial, archaeologists have been unable to find the grave of any of great khan's or their immediate relatives.

Even Chinggis Khan failed to abandon the tribal system completely. It was his brothers and sons who made the key decisions at the first kurultai after Chinggis Khan's death in 1228. Chinggis Khan's third son Ögedei (1229–1241) was declared Khagan of the Mongol Empire.

Chinggis Khan appointed him his successor while he was still alive. He consulted his close associates and relative concerning the candidate. His first son Jochi would be a ruler of dubious legitimacy because of his vague heritage. The second son Chagatai seemed too impulsive and this called forth possible danger. The fourth son Tolui was the otchigin and thus was expected to
inherit his parents' house. Thus, the third son Ögedei was the most widely acceptable figure. Ögedei was calm and even-tempered, a generous pleasure-seeker.

Yet, Ögedei's main advantage was in his not interfering with the natural course of events. He would drink wine, hunt and have fun with his numerous wives while Mongol warriors conquered new cities and annexed new countries. The Empire spread from the Volga to the Amur during his reign. The general chronology of the Mongols' key military campaigns is as follows. The conquest of Northern China continued with occasional breaks. In 1233, the Mongol Tumens reached Primorye and conquered the Jurchen state of East Xia; the Jin dynasty fell completely the following year. The Empire's last outpost, the city of Caizhou, was conquered. The Jurchen Emperor hanged himself. He ordered that his body be burned lest his enemies get it.

The campaign to the Korean Peninsula, completed in 1231–1232 put an end to the Silla dynasty. A number of successful campaigns to Iran followed in the 1230s–1240s. The war in China resumed in 1234, this time against the Song dynasty. After only three years, the Song people agreed to pay 200,000 bars of silver and 200,000 pieces of silk annually. Möngke Khagan continued military operations in 1251, but the conquest of China was not completed until 1279, when Kublai was the ruler [for more details on the campaigns see: 23; 39].

The 1235 kurultai shaped the future of many peoples in the Old World. A resolution was taken to continue the conquest of Europe and Asia. Volga Bulgaria was conquered in 1236. The Mongol army invaded Russia the following winter. Ryazan, Vladimir, Suzdal, Rostov Veliky fell one by one as Batu's troops advanced. Casualties were heavy, and it took the Mongols several years to gather troops for another campaign. They conquered Chernigov in 1239; Kiev was besieged and was taken by assault in the autumn of 1240. In January 1241, the Mongols invaded Poland and Hungary. The campaign terrified the European population; only the death of Khan Ögedei saved them [for more details on the Russian campaigns see: 25].

The active expansion policy stipulated that the stability of Mongol Empire directly depended on the Khan's ability to secure external sources of surplus produce. Already in his youth Chinggis Khan was known to be a generous leader. His children and grandchildren had even more of this quality. Juvayni writes that, Ögedei is to have overshadowed the preceding steppe Khans. He divided all the plunder from campaigns among his associates without even requiring an inventory [20, pp. 19, 35, 41, 53, 55, 58, 59, 62, 63; 36, pp. 188–189, 198, 202].

The following quote regarding avarice was attributed to him: 'Those who relish in it, they lose a portion of their intellect, for there is no difference between earth and a buried treasure—both are equally useless. Since [treasure] is of no use when one's hour of death arrives and there is no returning from the other world, we shall keep our treasure in our hearts and give whatever we have and have prepared or [whatever] is to come to our subjects and the needy to glorify our good name' [20, p. 49; 36, p. 204].

It was during Ögedei's reign that the bureaucratic apparatus of the enormous empire began to form. It should be noted that for nomads the institutions of the treasury and state financial system were perceived as incomprehensible and strange. They did not try to accumulate riches in their treasuries for further use as a resource of power. On the contrary, generosity was what nomads expected their steppe leaders to demonstrate. This is why Khans would give away their property to win over nomadic tribes. As a result, the Chinggisids often found the Khan's treasury empty. Therefore, when the troops returned from a Central Asian campaign to see that warehouses had run out of crops and silk, adherents of the pro-military party suggested that Ögedei should completely annihilate the population of Northern China and turn its arable fields into pastures. Luckily, Yelü Chucai interfered to prevent large-scale genocide. However, the controversy between the two court factions remained. Followers of the other group, headed by Yelü Chucai, believed taxes to be the most efficient way of raising income from the conquered territories.
Yelü Chucai was able to persuade the Mongol Khan that levying taxes on the conquered population was more beneficial. This was the occasion on which Yelü Chucai famously said: ‘Even though [you] have acquired the Celestial Empire on horseback, you cannot manage [it] on horseback’ [quoted from: 14, p. 44–45, 73, 106, 190]. Seeing the potential rewards, Ögedei appointed Yelü Chucai as chairman of the state secretariat (Chinese: zhong-shu shen). The Khitan effectively became the supreme chancellor of the imperial government. It made crucial decisions and prepared edicts for further distribution, and issued paizas, seals, and other attributes of imperial power. However, the body was not clearly structured until Kublai took the throne.

In the early stages, Yelü Chucai was able to establish a stable tax system. Apart from standard land taxes, various duties and additional charges were introduced. The duty to provide provisions to Mongol messengers and officials traveling in the Empire was rather burdensome. The successes are largely attributable to Chucai’s active measures to form a state apparatus composed of former Confucian bureaucrats. He referred to their extensive knowledge and administrative experience to persuade Ögedei. Censuses were carried out in Northern China in 1233 and 1234 to optimise the taxation system.

By suggesting that taxes should be introduced, Yelü Chucai intended not only to fill the khan's treasury but to restore the country's economy. The pious Confucian lost his influence towards the end of Ögedei's life. In the winter of 1239/1240, the Muslim merchant Abd ar-Rahman suggested farming taxes, promising to double the inflow to the treasury. Though Chucai was strongly opposed to the idea, Ögedei and his associates agreed. Under pressure from the nomadic aristocracy, Ögedei gave away a large portion of the conquered territories of Northern China as appanages (fen di) in 1236. Again, Yelü Chucai could not prevent the move. He was only able to ensure that dedicated supervisors would be attached to every Mongol leader.

On Ögedei's order, officials (baskaks) accompanied by scribes (bitikchis) were sent to the conquered countries. The word baskak is of Turkic origin (Turkic: bas—to press). It is a calque from the Mongol darughachi (Mongolian: daru—to press). Both terms literally refer to the person who applies the seal on behalf of the khan. The functions of the Darughachis' apparently included a wide scope of administrative, military, and judicial powers.

The yam service was established in 1235 to strengthen the Empire's infrastructure. On average, post stations were situated at intervals of 40km, depending on the region. Out of every thousand people, managers were selected to provide for the upkeep of the post stations (yam). They supplied fresh horses, food, and housing to messengers and other officials. This enabled messengers to cover 350–400km a day by changing horses often [5, p. 121–122; 36, p. 33].

The time came for the main camp to be transferred from Eastern Mongolia to a new location. It was resolved that the new capital should be built in the Orkhon Valley. It was named Karakorum (Mongolian: Kharkhorin). The location of the new capital was determined primarily by geopolitical advantages. It was much more conducive for controlling both China and the trade routes through Gansu as well as for launching campaigns into Dzungaria and Eastern Turkestan. The founding of the capital was also influenced by the necessity to concentrate craftsmen from the conquered countries in one location. The Mongols carried out a large-scale mobilisation of human resources in the first decades after the establishment of the empire. 100,000 craftsmen were brought to Mongolia following the conquest of Khwarezm. Craftsmen were again forcibly deported as a result of the military campaign against the Jin. As a result, many skilled craftsmen and artisans were brought to Karakorum. They decorated the private chambers of the palace and made its furniture and interior decorations.

All representatives of the elite were directed to build palaces and houses in the city. Ögedei's palace Wananggong (‘the palace of ten thousand years of peace’) was built in 1235. A famous wine tree crafted by Guillaume of Paris grew in front of it. Four silver lions stood in front of it, with koumiss pouring from their mouths. Four tubes shaped to resemble gilded
snakes branched off from the trunk of the tree. They poured various alcoholic beverages. The tree's branches and leaves were made of silver. An angel with a trumpet sat on the top [18, p. 158–159].

The palace complex adjoined the city walls in the south. The city's shape was almost rectangular, and it took the shape of an isosceles trapezoid in the southern part. Its longer sides (about 2.5km long) were oriented along a north-east to south-west axis. The barrow was 1.6km long in the north and about 1.3km long in the south. The city was divided into several sections. One section was comprised of aristocratic estates and the khagan's palace, another was populated by Jurchen and Chinese craftsmen, and the third by Muslim merchants. The city had at least four markets as well as churches and temples of various confessions.

The Mongols were religiously tolerant. Chinggis Khan and his immediate descendants had no preference for any world religion and respected all existing ones. In many states, religious ministers (Taoists, Buddhists, Orthodox Christians) were exempted from paying taxes. In part, this policy may be attributed to the pragmatic aim of securing Mongol rule over the conquered territories. It is also entirely possible that in doing so, the Chinggisids wanted to protect themselves from any supernatural forces [8; 15].

The Mongol conquest triggered large-scale migration processes, new cultural contacts, tastes, and fashions, as well as the development of cosmopolitanism. The Mongol emperors patronized Chinese arts. The Yuan court was the centre of cultural exchange of the different civilisations. Elements of Chinese painting and decorative arts became part of Central Asian art, just as Middle Asian brocades came to the Far East. The national cuisines in the area were enriched by dishes and recipes from nearby peoples. The Chinese elite developed a taste for mutton in the Yuan period, with rice falling in importance. Noodles from the Near East came to China and Italy, where they become a national staple [33].

Europeans became acquainted with spirit distillation technology (probably through Arab mediation) as well as such crucial discoveries as the compass, gunpowder, and book printing. The Mongol world influenced military science and even clothing. The so-called Tatar dress became fashionable in Europe. The Mongols also fostered the promulgation of medical ideas across Eurasia. They also influenced the spread of various religions, and the development of cartography, language learning, and dictionary making [10; 27; 28; 32].

The Mongol conquest dramatically changed the geopolitical balance of powers in the Old World. In the eastern part of the Islamic world, regional centers shifted from Baghdad to Tabriz, in Central Asia, from Balasagun to Olmaliq, in Eastern Europe, from Kiev to Sarai and then to Moscow, and in China, from Kaifeng to Beijing. The Mongols re-united China, and the administrative divisions that they introduced have been maintained to the present day. Moreover, they paved the way for the Chinese state in its current confines, including Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, and Manchuria. Today's Chinese historiography is persistent in emphasising the multi-ethnic composition of the Yuan society as crucial to the national construction of the People's Republic of China [32, pp. 354–355].

The Mongols played a major role in Russian history. They mediated the borrowing of various Chinese practices by the Rus', such as prostrating oneself when talking to the ruler and punishing tax evaders by hitting their heels with sticks. It was the Mongols who paved the way for the Muscovite state to rise as the successor of the Golden Horde, and the subsequent formation of Russia, which many Eurasianists have written about in their works. The Mongol post service was preserved in China, Iran, and Russia. Mongol military schools were developed in China in the Ming and Qing periods. Russian princes used Mongol principles of military construction, strategy, and tactics until the advent of firearms [3; 12].

Such borrowings were numerous in the Mongol Empire, too. This created opportunities for expanding new connections and developing new fashion trends and tastes. It should be noted, however, that it was not the Mongols' ambition to create a network of global information communications. They were obsessed with the idea of conquering the world, so many of the results of their contacts with other cultures and civilisations were unintended. The
transfer of high technologies was more the result of the political will of the Mongol rulers than of internal economic and commercial development. This brought about large permanent networks of cultural and technological contacts between craftsmen, engineers, artists, and other intellectual workers among different peoples and states. They facilitated fruitful technological and cultural exchange bringing about new opportunities and unique discoveries which were to turn the world upside down several centuries later [10; 11; 24].

The Mongols also fostered the promulgation and advance of various religions. Ultimately, Islam profited most of all: the Ilkhans of Iran, the Chagataids of Middle Asia, and the Jochids of Desht-i Kipchak all converted to the religion sooner or later. This may be the result of a predisposition of nomads towards Islam, as the religion of warriors and merchants.

The visual expansion of Eurasia’s horizons and the development of cartography was another consequence of the large-scale cultural exchange. To some extent, this spurred the Europeans to look for new maritime routes to India and eventually led to great geographical discoveries. The Mongols’ contribution to the development of linguistics was considerable, too. the Empire was a multi-national state and the Mongols used different languages to manage the conquered territories. They established specialized translation schools and encouraged the creation of multilingual dictionaries, which began to appear in different countries along the Silk Road from China to Europe in the 13–14th centuries [32, p. 352, note 44]. Needless to say, Mongol words are numerous in many languages, as the Mongols fostered linguistic interaction. The Russian language alone borrowed such words from the nomads as argamak, bazaar, den’gi (money), kazna (treasury), tamozhnya (customs), tabun (herd), t’ma (tumen or a large number of something), yamshhik (post coachman).

To sum up, it is beyond reasonable doubt that the Mongol Empire’s most important contribution to world history consisted in linking chains of international trade to form a network of land and marine connections [1; 26]. This ensured the mass-scale mobilisation and migration of communities and peoples, creating unprecedented conditions for broad exchanges of commodities, ideas, and technology. For the first time ever, all major regional elements of the medieval world-system (Europe, the Islamic world, India, China, and the Golden Horde) were integrated within a common informational, macroeconomic, and cultural space. It is safe to call the phenomenon the medieval, or Mongol, globalisation of the 13–14th centuries.

Chapter I. Central Asia and Eastern Europe in the 12th–Beginning of the 13th Centuries

Chapter II.
The Formation of the Ulus of Jochi

§ 1. Jochi—The First Ruler of the Ulus

Ilmar Mirgaleyev

Chinggis Khan was still alive at the time his son Jochi received a separate ulus along with those lands that Jochi himself had conquered. However, following his conflict with Chinggis Khan, Jochi was virtually excluded from the Khwarezmian campaign. This schism occurred, as described by one of the most important source—The Secret History of the Mongols, during a family convocation. Jochi's resentment only grew towards his father after this meeting and, already having an allotted ulus, decided to retreat to it following his dismissal from his position as commander-in-chief and subsequent subordination to Ögedei. He was then allegedly instructed to organise a hunt for Chinggis Khan; a decision that was clearly dictated by the conflict among the Chinggisid sons and, most importantly, between Chinggis Khan himself and Jochi. Chinggis Khan undoubtedly realised that Jochi was displeased and probably wanted to give him some time to cool down. And yet Jochi crossed the line when he shunned Chinggis Khan's orders and criticised the methods of his father and brothers. Such accounts as these don't simply fall onto the pages of the authors. On the contrary, considering the critical tone to the events, one must properly understand the given psychological situation. But suddenly the problem resolved itself at just the right time with Jochi's unexpected death. And while such a conclusion to the advancing problem may have been 'favourable' for the dynasty, the empire's future, and Chinggis Khan's reputation, the quick settlement of the conflict provides food for thought to researchers. Why exactly was the situation solved so 'feliciously' and well–timed?

And so, who really was the first ruler of this Ulus, whose appellation went down in history bearing his name?

Even today the date and circumstances surrounding Jochi's birth (most likely around 1182–1183) are up for debate. The questions surrounding his birth, it seems, were not seen as decided by Chinggis Khan's family. Jochi was even once publicly called a 'legacy of the Merkit captivity' at a family convocation. Accordingly, depending on the purpose of the source, the time and circumstances surrounding Jochi's mother's Börte captivity and release from the Merkit captivity are described differently. It is unclear, exactly how long did she spend in the Merkit captivity? Evidently though, the time period made it equally possible to treat Jochi as either the son of Chinggis Khan or Merkit Chilgir. ‘The Secret History of the Mongols’ provides a detailed description of the Merkit captivity and release of Börte. And yet, it omits to mention that Jochi was born on her way home, as is attested by later sources. According to Rashid al-Din, Jochi was born after his mother had been liberated from the Merkit captivity:

‘When Chinggis Khan fought against the Merkit tribe and it defeated [him], Börte Üjin was pregnant with Jochi. The Merkit tribe then captured her. Since the Merkit [tribe] was on peaceful terms with Ong Khan at that time, they sent her to Ong Khan. Ong Khan demonstrated respect and veneration to her ... When Chinggis Khan found out this fact, he sent Sab to Ong Khan ... Ong Khan ... delivered her to him ... and Jochi drew his first breath [was born] while on their way back’ [7, pp. 68–69].
Despite these circumstances, Chinggis Khan raised Jochi as if he were his son. It is difficult to say what relations Jochi held with the Khan's family while growing up, but there are indirect indications that the ‘Merkit story’ was not forgotten. According to some sources, Jochi's relations, at least with his brothers, were strained, often leading to conflicts. Rashid al-Din provides several indications that Jochi did not get on well with his younger brothers: ‘When [Jochi Khan] had grown up, he always accompanied his father and stuck to him, in happiness and misery. However, there was constant quarreling, squabbling, and confrontation between him and his brothers, Chagatai and Ögedei’ [8, p. 65]. And this is what the anonymous ‘Genealogy of the Turks’ reports: ‘Chagatai and Ugetai [Ögedei] were always denigrating Jochi in terms of his descent’ [10, p. 203].

Jochi's reputation as the most humane of Chinggis Khan's sons reached even his enemies. Al-Nasawi described Jochi as a kind conqueror, mentioning his mild treatment of the conquered population: ‘He sent to them (the citizens of Khwarezm) people to warn them and give them caution, and promised them mercy if they abandoned it (Khwarezm) without a fight, and said that Chinggis Khan had presented the [city] to him and that he was not going to destroy it, but wanted to keep [the city] for himself. To prove this, the troops did not raid the countryside during their stay near (Khwarezm), instead, granting more care and mercy to Khwarezm than to other regions, dredging lest the city by chance be damaged or touched by the hand of destruction' [12, p. 132]. On the other hand however, Juzjani accused Jochi of cruelty towards the civilian population of Urgench [10, p. 14]. Nevertheless, it is beyond doubt that he was a skillful commander and a good diplomat, acting accordingly to the complexities of the situation.

Jochi's military career began during Chinggis Khan's campaigns against the Tayichiud, Tatar, and Keraite people, against Jamukha and Wang Khan. In 1207, Chinggis Khan ordered Jochi to lead his first unaided campaign against the 'forest peoples' in the west. The Secret History of the Mongols states, ‘In the year of the Hare (1207), Jochi was sent with the troops of the Right Hand to the Forest Peoples’ [9, p.123]. Jochi was apparently able to conquer them without a single battle, proving to be not only a good commander but an efficient diplomat: ‘Khudukhabeki of the Oirats, accompanied by his Tumen-Oirats, was the first to pay homage. Having arrived there, he became Jochi's attendant... Having then subjugated the Oirat, Buryat, Barkhun, Ursut, Khabkhanas, Khankhanas, and Tuba peoples, Jochi took to the Tumen-Kirghiz people. Then the Kirghiz noyons Yedi, Inal, Aldiyar, and Olebekdigin came to see Jochi. They payed homage to the ruler and prostrated themselves in front of him... Jochi took all the Forest peoples under Mongol power ... the Shibir, Kesdiin, Bait, Tukhas, Tenlek, Toyeles, Tas, and Bachzhigi. He took with him the Kirghiz Noyon temniks and thousand men1, as well as the Noyons of the Forest peoples, and having introduced them to Chinggis Khan, ordered them to prostrate themselves before him... And Chinggis Khan, kindly turning to Jochi, in an amiable voice deemed it worthy to say, ‘You are the eldest of my sons. You scarcely left the house when you had already returned successfully in good health, having conquered the Forest peoples without losing any men or horses. I now grant them to you as your subjects’ [9, p. 123].

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1 According to Yuanshi, the Kirghiz people ‘decided not to take a risk and sent ambassadors to Chinggis Khan’ [5, p. 125]. Rashid al-Din similarly reported that in the Hijri year 603 (August 8, 1206–June 27, 1207), ‘Chinggis Khan sent messengers to the two rulers of Altan and Bukra, encouraging [them] to surrender. They sent back their three emirs to accompany the ambassadors... and surrendered [to him]’ [6, p. 150]. This does not mean, however, that Jochi did not contribute to their surrender. Rashid al-Din reported that it was Jochi himself who subjugated them for the first time, since in 1218 Jochi ‘conquered the Kirghiz region again, as it rebelled [for a second time]’ [7, p. 256]. Sources also disagree on the conquest of the Oirats, though, in our view, we have more reason to trust The Secret History of the Mongols on this account than later accounts.
Jochi then received from Chinggis Khan the newly conquered lands. And so marked the beginning of the Ulus of Jochi. Additionally, he was also instructed to conquer new land for his ulus in the west: ‘All territories and ulus lands, located within the boundaries of the Irdysh River and the Altai Mountains, as well as summer and winter nomadic camping grounds of such vicinities, issued in an unconditional decree by Chinggis Khan, are hereby granted to Jochi Khan, so that [Jochi Khan] shall conquer and annex to his possessions the Desht-i Kipchak regions and states located in this area’ [8, p. 78].

The capital of the Ulus during Jochi’s reign was the main camp on the Irtysh River [8, p. 78], possibly in a former Kimek city, although it remains unclear whether any Kimek cities survived up until Jochi’s time. In any case, it is of little consequence exactly who they belonged to before the Mongol conquest—be it the Kara Khitans, the Naimans, or the Kipchaks. The Kimeks for their part founded several cities on the Irtysh which they used in accordance with the nomadic way of life of their state. These cities’ location and structure fit the nomadic Ulus of Jochi perfectly. It would thus be reasonable to assume that Jochi used a former Kimak capital on the Irtysh as his capital.

Following the unification of the Central Asian Turkic-Mongol nomads, Chinggis Khan conquered the Tangut state Xi Xia. Sources offer no information on Jochi’s participation in the military campaign against the Tangut. In 1211, Chinggis Khan crossed the Jin borders. Chinggis Khan himself was commanding the troops. Jochi, along with Chagatai and Ögedei, also participated in this campaign.

We also see Jochi join the 1213 campaign against the Khitans as well. Chinggis Khan at this time divided the army into three groups. He and his younger son Tolui headed the main group. Jochi along with his brothers Chagatai and Ögedei led the western group. And Chinggis Khan’s brother Hasar commanded the third group in the east. It is known that Jochi and his brothers moved south from the Tai Hang Mountain range and entered the northern bank of the Huang He River [Yellow River].

After the Chinese campaign, Jochi following the orders of Chinggis Khan marched his army to face Kudu, an enemy general who had taken shelter with the Kipchaks [2, pp. 226–227].

And then most likely before the Khwarezmian campaign, Jochi spent the majority of his time in his ulus, improving its infrastructure and expanding its territory to the west. However, the sources make no mention of this period. It is possible that Chinggis Khan specifically separated Jochi from Chagatai and Ögedei so that their squabbling did not interfere with the broader strategy, as was to happen during the later siege of Gurganj. Moreover, it seemed desirable, before waging war with the powerful state of the Khwarezm Shahs, to conquer its allies—such Turkic tribes as the Eastern Kipchaks, the Kanglis, the remaining Tatars, the Merkits, the Naimans, and so forth.

More information is provided by the sources regarding Jochi’s role in the campaign against Khwarezm. Jochi received from Chinggis Khan instructions to ensure security in the north. His actions in 1218–1219 largely enabled the Mongol troops to maneuver on a large scale during the Khwarezmian campaign. He also had to re-conquer the rebelling Kirghiz tribes, force out the Merkits, and confront Ala ad-Din Muhammad II at that time [1, p. 44; 12, p. 49].

Despite the nomadic way of life within the ulus, the Chinggisids nevertheless used cities as their capitals. As is well known, before his western campaign, Batu made Gurganj the capital of his ulus later on [11, pp. 386–387], although the precise date is unknown; he probably did it as soon as he had the opportunity, most likely after Chinggis Khan’s death, when the territory of the Ulus of Jochi was undergoing several changes. Even later on, Batu used the city Bulgar as his capital until the special establishment of Sarai on the Lower Volga.
During the war against the Khwarezm Shah, Jochi led the conquest of several Khwarezmian cities [7, pp. 198-201] and was to occupy Gurgandj with Chagatai and Ögedei's troops [7, p. 215]. The city was expected to become his, but Chinggis Khan ordered Ögedei to command the army [9, p. 139]. They divided the plunder from Gurgandj ‘without allotting anything to Chinggis Khan’ [9, p. 140], offended their father in process.

At this time the paths of Chinggis Khan's sons diverged. Jochi went ‘back to his carts’ [7, p. 219] to his ulus on the Irtysh [8, p. 78], where he undertook the expansion of his territories by conquering Kipchak lands [4, p. 44; 13, p. 258]. It is possible that this was carried out on Chinggis Khan's order. Or perhaps there was another motivation: Jochi was able to conquer the west independently, neither sharing his plunder nor carrying out his father's orders. ‘Chinggis Khan ordered Jochi to start a campaign and conquer the northern countries, such as Kalar, Bashgird, Urus, Cherkes, Desht-i Kipchak, and other regions lying in these lands. But when Jochi shunned this task and left to his dwellings, Chinggis Khan was enraged and said, ‘I will execute him, he will see no mercy’. [8, pp. 78–79].’

Did Chinggis Khan deliberately distance Jochi from his mother country, and was Jochi capable of conquering so many nations in the far west? Was it really important to divide the forces and conquer distant peoples in the thick of war against the Khwarezmians? Did Jochi have to hunt ‘wild asses’ in the steppes while other Chinggisids were conquering rich Central Asian cities [10, p. 20]? It would have been reasonable, from a military point of view, to finish the remaining Khwarezmian forces, as was Chinggis Khan's common practice: he conquered tribes and states one by one. And so it would seem that Jochi's situation lay beyond the scope of military strategy. The understating medieval sources conceal a psychological drama.

Jochi's name was never used again in connection with further military operations of the Mongol troops. While his brothers and father were fighting in modern day Afghanistan and Pakistan, Jochi stayed in his ulus. And undoubtedly, he did work hard on improving his territory and bringing the population of the eastern Desht-i Kipchak to complete submission. All of this shows that Chinggis Khan excluded Jochi from further military operations due to several conflicts between himself and his brothers, and that apparently Chinggis Khan took his brothers' side.

Whether Jochi actually saw his father and brothers following this rift, it is difficult to say. On the one hand, Juvayni reported that in the winter of 1222/1223, Chinggis Khan 'sent a messenger to his eldest son Tushi [Jochi], inviting him to come from Desht-i Kipchak for hunting ... Near the Fenaket River (Syr Darya) all the sons gathered to see their father and held a quriltai, from which they then went to Kulan-basha. And Tushi arrived from the other side and came to greet his father (too) [10, p. 20–21].' However, as reported by Rashid al-Din, Chinggis Khan's eldest son was absent at the meeting [7, p. 226]. Rashid al-Din's account is supported by Juzjani: ‘When Tushi, the eldest son of Chinggis Khan, saw the air and water of the Kipchak land, he thought that there could be no land more pleasant than this one, or air better, or water sweeter, or meadows and pastures wider, in the whole world. And the desire to rebel against his father entered into his mind, and so he said to his companions: ‘Chinggis Khan must have lost his mind, for he kills so many people and destroys so many Tsardoms. I find it most reasonable to kill father during the hunt, establish rapport with Sultan Muhammed, bring this state to prosperity, and provide assistance to the Muslims’. Having learned of this scheme, his brother Chagatai informed his father of his brother's treacherous plan and intentions. And having learned (of it), Chinggis Khan sent his trusted men to poison and kill Tushi’ [10, pp. 14–15]. Undoubtedly, Juzjani's report contains specific inconsistencies. For example, Sultan Muhammed had already been dead for several years by this time. This report does indicate, however, that Jochi's criticism and dissatisfaction of Chinggis Khan's was known outside the family circle.

Therefore, we believe that Jochi began to avoid contact with both his father and his brothers following the conquest of Gurgandj.
The precise date and circumstances surrounding Jochi’s death remain to this day unknown. The Genealogy of the Turks reports the following: Jochi to have died 6 months before Chinggis Khan [10, p. 204], that is, in 1227. Jamal al-Qarshi provides another date: ‘Tushi died earlier than his father, in 622/1225’ [3, p. 119]. Sources also disagree on the cause of his death: either disease [8, p. 79] (Rashid al-Din most likely presents the official version) or poisoning on Chinggis Khan’s order [10, p. 15].

It is entirely possible that Jochi refused to attend the 1224 quriltai and was thus killed on the order of Chinggis Khan; this would make the year 1225 the more preferable estimate.

After Jochi died, his sons lived in their ulus and continued their conquests in the west in order to expand their territory. Batu then became the head of the family. Juzjani reports, ‘when he passed away as the result of scheming against his father, he had many sons’ Batu was the eldest one, and so Chinggis Khan made him the successor to (the throne of) his father’ [10, p. 15].

All of this helped maintain a uniform dynasty for some time. Jochi’s numerous sons were still young and stayed with the big Chinggisid family. Although part of their ulus was taken away at this time, the young Jochids were still instructed to expand their own ulus, and on their own no less. Overall, it seemed they were occupied with the very same tasks as their cousins. However, whereas the latter were able to join the conquest of rich territories, the Jochids had to fight against the scattered nomads of Western Siberia.

It is difficult to tell whether this was done on purpose, but the fact remains: Jochi’s family and the other Chinggisids were separated from each other while Chinggis Khan was still alive. And although they united later for a western campaign, Chagatai’s and Ögedei’s sons nevertheless looked down on the Jochids, a fact that motivated Batu’s later complaint to Khan Ögedei. And at a subsequent time, Jochi’s sons were to avenge themselves on their cousins.

§ 2. The Conquest of Khwarezm by Mongol Troops (1219–1221)³

Dmitry Timokhin

When the Mongol-Khwarezmian (1219–1221) war broke out, the state of Anushteginid Khwarezm Shahs in addition to the Khwarezm Region included the following territories: Transoxiana, Khorasan, and the territories of today's Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. To delineate its territory, the northern border ran along the right bank of the Syr Darya, where Otrar was considered the main frontier city, up to the Aral Sea. The northern shores of the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman formed its natural southern border, while the Indus presented the south-eastern frontier of the Khwarezmian domain. Ala ad-Din Muhammad's state reached the Pamir and the Sulaiman Mountains in the east and the Zagros Mountains in the east, in particular covering Persian Iraq. The ruler was so powerful that, according to a number of medieval historians, the states of Shirvan Shahs and Azerbaijani atabegs were regarded as dependents on it [14, p. 342].

It is only natural that medieval scholars regarded the collapse of such a strong and vast state, as well as the events following it, as something unprecedented and impossible; something which they remembered to emphasise in their writings. '[People] witnessed misfortunes unheard-of in the ancient times of bygone states. Whoever heard of such a thing? [A] horde appeared at the place of sunrise, traveled by land to Bab al-Abwab, and entered the Kipchak Land for a furious raid on its tribes, swinging their swords around randomly. They plundered any land they entered, and ruined every city they conquered. Following the circular campaign, the horde returned to their ruler, intact and with plunder, via Khwarezm, ruining the country's arable fields and cattle crop, putting its population to the sword. All this took them less than two years!' [3, p. 89].

Before we proceed to the Mongol-Khwarezmian war of 1219–1221 and its consequenc-

³ Sponsored by the Russian Humanitarian Science Foundation 15-01-00020.
determine its main causes. According to Arab-Persian sources, the diplomatic relations between Khwarezm and the state of Chinggis Khan were founded by a mission sent by Ala ad-Din Muhammad, which reached the Mongol court in 1215. It was received with honour and brought home rich gifts. This is what Chinggis Khan communicated to the Khwarezm Shah via his ambassador: ‘I am the ruler of the East; you are the ruler of the West! Let a firm agreement on friendship and peace be between us, and let merchants and caravans of both parties depart and return, and let costly articles and regular goods that are there in my land be brought to you and yours to me in the same way’ [37, vol. 2, p. 966]. The embassy, headed by Sayid Baha al-Din ar-Razi, witnessed the beginning of intense commercial and diplomatic interaction between the countries, which was interrupted by the event that triggered the Mongol-Khwarezmian war. It was the so-called Otrar incident of 1218.

What exactly happened in the Khwarezmian frontier city of Otrar remains a controversial issue in the history of the Khwarezmian-Mongol confrontation. The city was governed by Inal Khan, or Inalchik, entitled Gair Khan, one of the Khwarezm Shah's military commanders, related to his mother Terken Khatun. A caravan with 450 Muslim merchants and about a hundred Mongols, whom Chinggis Khan had sent to the Khwarezm Shah's domain for trade, arrived [18, vol. 1, book 2, p. 188; 43, p. 235]. The caravan was very nearly annihilated and the merchant's property all plundered—on Ala ad-Din Muhammad's order according to some sources [14, p. 348; 31, j. 1, p. 415; 11, p. 258] or on the initiative of Inal Khan according to others. The latter version states that the Khwarezm Shah merely ordered the caravan be detained, believing his vicegerent's report that the merchants were spies and spread propaganda among the locals [3, p. 79]. It should be noted that more recent Arab-Persian records seem to prefer the point of view represented by Ali ibn al-Athir and Juvayni [44, j. 2, p. 648].

One of the possible reason was not just the property carried by the caravan or the activities of the merchants' activities which could have been seen as espionage, but the human factor. In his work Juvayni states that the caravan was arrested not because of the merchants' property, but because of a personal insult made by one of the caravanners, who had known the ruler of Otrar before, caused to him by calling him Inal Khan and not Gair Khan [11, p. 52]. It is entirely possible that the caravanners' activities in Otrar were deliberately meant to provoke the Khwarezmian party and thus initiate a war, of which Ala ad-Din Muhammad and his vicegerent in Otrar could be accused. This accounts for the merchants' actions in Otrar as described by Al-Nasawi: ‘When they are face-to-face with a common man, they threaten him and say, “You are totally unaware of what is going on around; you will soon see what none of you has ever seen.” And the like’ [3, p. 79].

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My hypothesis is as follows. As I have already been stated, Inal Khan was related to Terken Khatun, the Khwarezm Shah's mother [36, vol. 1, p. 60]. A series of studies revealed that the ruler of Otrar could use his status to implement an independent foreign policy, of
which Arab-Persian sources offer little evidence [17, p. 151; 40, vol. I, pp. 102–103]. They mention that Terken Khatun's power was immense, and Ala ad-Din Muhammad dared not contradict his father ‘neither in minor affairs nor in major ones, whether of little or great importance, for two reasons: firstly, because of her maternal love, and secondly, because most of the state's emir came from her clan [3, p. 73; 45, p. 171, annm. 1; 4, p. 252].

Scholars have given much emphasis to the fact: ‘Khwarezm Shah and Sultan Ala ad-Din Muhammad was believed to be the absolute ruler but was in fact fully controlled by his mother Terken Khatun, who was in a manner of speaking a second ruler in both internal and foreign affairs, sometimes acting as her son's opponent’ [8, p. 128]. To quote V. Bartold, ‘in areas controlled by Terken Khatun, Muhammed's authority was actually denied’ [7, p. 444]. However, the possibility that the order to kill the caravanners came from Khwarezm's alternative center of power has not been considered so far. It is entirely possible that Inal Khan undertook it on his initiative to get away with the whole situation. However, knowing that Khwarezm had dual government, while the Turkic military elite had divided into two opposite camps (see below), it seems likely that Terken Khatun gave the order. For example, Al-Nasawī stresses how powerful Terken Khatun was by stating that in the event of two orders, issued by her and by the Khwarezm Shah regarding the same issue, the one signed more recently was implemented [48, p. 58–59]. Thus, a number of scholars have rightfully assumed that there was a ‘war party’ within the Khwarezmian military elite, who wanted to wage war against the new opponent [30, p. 113].

Khwarezm Shah Ala ad-Din Muhammad's actions following the Otrar incident is indirect proof of this. A new embassy from Chinggis Khan arrived, headed by Ibn Kafraj Bogra, demanding that the ruler or Otrar should be surrendered to the Mongol khan, warning that military operation would begin otherwise. ‘Chinggis Khan sent ambassadors to the sultan to inform him that the vicegerent of Otrar had committed a treacherous act towards the merchants because of his dangerous shortsightedness and that it was the sultan's obligation to surrender (Inal Khan) (to Chinggis Khan). Hearing the ambassadors words, the sultan ordered that they should be killed’ [46, p. 73]. Al-Nasawī provides the text of the message in detail [3, p. 79–80], also mentioning the reason why Ala ad-Din Muhammad could not meet Chinggis Khan's requirements and why he chose unavoidable war closer by killing the ambassador. Al-Nasawī attributes it to Inak Khan's relation to Terken Khatun and the fact that ‘most of the army and high-ranking emirs were his relatives’ [3, p. 80]. As we can see, the guilty person was not punished, and the Khwarezm Shah, finding himself in a deadlock, triggered the war himself. This had been the objective of some of the Turkic military elite of Khwarezm and Chinggis Khan, who allegedly appointed a Khwarezmian defector as the head of the embassy, thus provoking Ala ad-Din Muhammad into an irrational act [30, p. 113].

A battle between Khwarezm Shah Ala ad-Din Muhammad's troops and a Mongol corps commanded by Jochi is another controversial moment in the history of Khwarezm shortly before the Mongol invasion. It can be regarded as another pretext for war. To start with, Arab-Persian sources provide several possible dates. Al-Nasawī gives the Hijra year 612 4 [3, p. 52; 50, p. 14] but mentions the Hijra year 616 in the following chapter 5 [3, p. 52; 50, p. 13], as does Ali ibn al-Athir [14, p. 350], while Juzjani states that it was in the Hijra year 615 [12, p. 13–14]. More recent Arab-Persian sources also date the battle in the Hijra year 615 6 [11, p. 259; 18, p. 189–190]. A number of experts refer to Mongol and Chinese sources in dating it 1218 [27, p. 312–314; 32, p. 233–234].

The different localisation of the battle between Jochi's and Ala ad-Din Muhammad's troops, as well as its date in historical sources, have been analysed in depth by

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4 The 612 A.H. (1215–1216)
5 The Hijra year 616 – 1219–1220
6 The Hijra year 615 – 1217–1218
S. Akhinzhanov [5, pp. 226–227; 6, pp. 326–335] indicating the Turgay Plateau ‘north of the Irgiz, in the Kayla and Kimach interfluve, in the area known as Yugur’ [5, p. 227]. Both Russian and foreign historiography mostly refers to it simply as the Battle of the Turgay Plateau [7, p. 436; 8, p. 134; 20, p. 136]. However, its accurate location is still widely discussed due to the current situation of the mouth of the Irgiz River [45, p. 130; 37, vol. 1, p. 268], to which Al-Nasawi refers [48, p. 13]. According to S. Agadzhanyan, the river used to be much deeper, where it joins the basin of the Syr Darya and the Aral Sea [4, p. 53–57]. Nevertheless, additional information is necessary to give a final answer to the question where within the Turgay Plateau the battle took place.

Arab-Persian sources are nearly unanimous that the Mongol army was commanded by Jochi [3, p. 53; 11, p. 260; 46, p. 75; 44 p. 649; 37, pp. 269–270]. However, Chinese sources mention that it was not Jochi but Mongol commander Jebe who led the destruction of Kushlu Khan [Kuchlug] [32, pp. 233–234; 15, p. 46], after which the battle of the Turgay Plateau happened as can be inferred from Al-Nasawi’s writing. The confusion probably is due to the fact that most Arab-Persian sources, beginning with Al-Nasawi, merged two operations by the Mongol troops, the one against Kushlu Khan and the one against the Merkits, led by Toqta [Mongolian: Toqtoa]. The Mongol army was commanded by Jebe in the first case, and by Jochi in the second, of which Arab-Persian authors were aware as the Khwarezmians had to deal with the latter.

Now that all controversial issues have been mentioned, we shall provide a brief description of the battle and its effects. Ala ad-Din Muhammad’s campaign was motivated either by the ambition to annex part of Kushlu Khan's land after the Mongols had defeated him [3, p. 52] or by the need to protect the city of Jand and the adjacent Kipchak territories against the oncoming troops of Toqta fleeing from the Mongol army [44, p. 649]. The troops set off for the north to find the Merkits crushed. Ala ad-Din Muhammad heard of the Mongols’ victory but decided to pursue the troops commanded by Jochi even though the states were not formally at war [44, p. 649]. As soon as the Khwarezmian army caught up with Jochi, the latter started to negotiate, insisting that the Mongols were not going to fight against Ala ad-Din Muhammad as they had received no such order from Chinggis Khan [46, p. 76]. He even offered the Khwarezm Shah some gifts as a token of peace [11, p. 261] or part of their plunder from the Merkits [3, p. 52]. The Khwarezm Shah did not accept Jochi’s offer but started a battle, which nearly cost him a defeat. Ala ad-Din Muhammad survived due to the success of his right flank, commanded by Jalâl al-Dîn Mingburnu [3, p. 54; 46, p. 76; 11, p. 262; 37, pp. 269–270; 25, pp. 326–334]. Both parties left the battlefield without determining the winner.

The above battle was at least a factor that induced the military conflict, if not the reason of the war. With regard to the Khwarezmian side, Ala ad-Din Muhammad realized how powerful the Mongol army was and grew afraid of the new enemy. This was to have an effect on his actions during the Mongol-Khwarezmian war [3, p. 54; 46, p. 77; 44, pp. 649–650]. However, Chinggis Khan received valuable information regarding both the Khwarezmian army and its commanders. He apparently made sure that his potential enemy was relatively weak which was to define his resolute attitude to military preparations against Khwarezm [37, p. 269–270].

Finally, a number of additional factors could have influenced the beginning of the war between the Khwarezmian Empire and the Mongol State of Chinggis Khan. There was a third party interested in the enemies' mutual exhaustion or the total destruction of either. Arab-Persian sources mention a conflict between Khwarezm Shah Ala ad-Din Muhammad on the one hand, and Caliph Al-Nasir along with the Isma’ilis Muslims of Alamut on the other. The latter began to establish closer relations in order to confront the Khwarezmian ruler [10, pp. 154–155]. In 1211–1212, the Isma’il leader of Alamut Jalâl ad-Din Hasan began an intense period of rapprochement with Baghdad. This led to the negative reaction of Khwarezm
who had failed to conquer the northern Iranian land controlled by the Ismaili community [38, p. 509].

In turn, Ala ad-Din Muhammad demanded a number of concessions, both political and territorial, from Caliph Al-Nasir. This naturally concerned the ruler of Baghdad, as did the Khwarezm Shah's success in the Persian Iraq [3, p. 57]. As the Khwarezm state grew stronger and its ruler more ambitious, the caliph began to look for allies against it, encouraging the neighbouring states to wage war at Ala ad-Din Muhammad. After the Khwarezmian army conquered Ghazna in 1215, correspondence with Al-Nasir was found in the Ghurid archive in which he solicited the sultans to wage war against Khwarezm [34, p. 184]. This fact, as well as Caliph Al-Nasir's reliance on Ismaili Muslims to neutralise the Khwarezm Shah's officials and military commanders, as it had been with the viceroy of Iraq Oglymysh al-Atabek, led to Ala ad-Din Muhammad showing support for Shii Muslims within his domain on the one hand, while preparing for a military expedition against Baghdad on the other [50, p. 16]. The campaign took place in 1217. According to contemporary reports, Ala ad-Din Muhammad was able to gather an unprecedented army which apparently would have crushed the caliph's troops, but the campaign was canceled because to inclement weather [3, p. 64; 38, p. 397].

It is entirely possible that the 1217 campaign merely encouraged Al-Nasir to look for new powerful allies against Khwarezm Shah Ala ad-Din Muhammad. V. Bartold, supported by a number of Russian and foreign experts, doubted that the caliph had sent an embassy to the Mongols, since they believed sources provide no evidence of it [7, p. 467]. Indeed, a number of Arab-Persian sources contain no mention, whether direct or indirect, of the embassy [39, p. 366], while others indicate that a similar diplomatic mission might have existed without providing any details [14, p. 348; 8, pp. 125–126]. Nevertheless, Mir-Khwānd and Abu al-Ghazi in their work provide a meticulously detailed account of it, stating that Chinggis Khan received the necessary information from the caliph's messenger but chose not to start military operations immediately because he and the Khwarezm Shah were on peaceful terms at that time [46, p. 105; 41, p. 521]. Thus, the version that Caliph Al-Nasir contributed to the initiation of the Mongol-Khwarezmian war, and the vested interest of the Ismaili community of Alamut, is justified by Arab-Persian sources but cannot be regarded as a proven fact.

Before we proceed to the course of the Mongol-Khwarezmian war, we should make a few remarks on the balance of powers and what resources the State of Khwarezm and the Mongol state possessed. Chinggis Khan had an army of barely more than 150–160 thousand people when he invaded the State of Khwarezm [7, pp. 434–435; 16, p. 123; 27, p. 176]. It is essential to note, however, that the Mongols were making much use of hashar in addition to their own military forces, thus increasing their detachments and reducing the loss of Mongol warriors [23, p. 33–39; 24, pp. 393–395]. When referring to hashar, Arab-Persian historians actually mean detachments formed under compulsion composed of local men or captives. They were used for siege activities and as a living shield when conquering cities and fortresses. This enabled them, among other things, to exterminate the enemy's young population, who were most likely to rebel and show defiance to the conquerors. Arab-Persian sources mostly mention the use of hashar when describing the conquest of Transoxiana and Khorasan [18, vol. 1, book 2, p. 201], after which the Mongol conquerors preferred to form regular military detachments of locals, as they did during the siege of Herat [34, p. 316].

The armed forces of the Khwarezmians were apparently twice that of the Mongols when the war began: sources report Ala ad-Din Muhammad to have employed about 400,000 warriors in Transoxiana and Khorasan alone [46, p. 123; 44, p. 650]. According to Al-Nasawī, the Khwarezm Shah had much more, since he had declared additional conscription shortly before the war broke out but was unable to engage the troops [3, p. 81]. Regional and local chronicles also mention the additional armed forces of Khwarezm and their sad fate [21, p. 366; 51, p. 76].
Chapter II. The Formation of the Ulus of Jochi

The main reason why the numerical advantage of the Khwarezmian army was not used against the Mongols is due to the plan which Khwarezm Shah Ala ad-Din Muhammad chose before the war. Arab-Persian sources place emphasis on the fact that the battle of the Turgay Plateau had a shocking effect on the Khwarezmian ruler. However, this can hardly be regarded as the sole factor which may have determined his choice of tactics [11, p. 264]. Despite the confused dating [14, p. 349; 11, p. 265; 18, vol. 1, book 2, p. 192; 44, p. 650], Arab-Persian sources provide a very detailed description of both the military council and the preparations for the war undertaken by Ala ad-Din Muhammad [3, pp. 80–81]. Several plans of the anti-Mongol war were suggested at the military council: to bring the troops together and make a strike at the enemy near the Syr Darya when they were tired after the long march [14, p. 349]; to let the enemy enter Transoxiana and make use of their knowledge of the place to defeat it there [14, p. 349; 8, p. 138]; to retreat towards Ghazna and initiate a battle there or to retreat to North India [18, Vol. 1, Book 2, p. 192]; to retreat to the Persian Iraq, gather another army, and defeat the enemy when it was exhausted from fighting for Transoxiana and Khorasan [11, p. 265]; finally, to entrust the existing military forced to Jalāl al-Dīn Mingburnu, while Ala ad-Din Muhammad would retreat to Iraq and gather new troops [44, pp. 650–651].

Ala ad-Din Muhammad decided against a decisive battle within Transoxania, preferring to enhance the garrisons in local cities and fortresses which were expected to check the Mongol advance, while he would gather new forces in Khorasan and Iraq. Medieval Arab-Persian sources believed the decision to be cowardly and irresolute [11, p. 264], but the actual reasons were as follows. First of all, the ruler did not expect full loyalty from his military commanders and associates due to the conflict within the Turkic military elite [7, pp. 473; 16, pp. 115–116]. To make things worse, the Khwarezm Shah suffered an assassination attempt shortly before the war with the Mongols, which deepened his mistrust of his commanders [38, p. 414]. Furthermore, Ala ad-Din Muhammad and his associates had no idea what about their enemy, believing the Mongols to be bad at sieges and conquering fortresses and thus expected to be able to hold them in Transoxiana for a long time. The Khwarezm Shah was also under a delusion concerning the size of the Mongol army [3, pp. 78–79], while Khwarezmian intelligence was far from successful [14, p. 349; 31, p. 415]. Ala ad-Din Muhammad's war plan was quite logical but relied on mistaken assumptions that and thus led to a crushing defeat of the State of Khwarezm.

Chinggis Khan was able to make maximum use of all its limitations, as if he had known it in advance. This probably indicates excellent reconnaissance and espionage. Instead of employing all of his army to besiege one or two large frontier cities, the Mongol khan divided his army, blocked major cities in the Syr Darya region, and sent the main body to the centre of the country: ‘Chinggis Khan ordered Chagatai and Ögedei [Author] with several tumens of troops. He instructed Jochi to lead several detachments to Jand and Janikent, while a group of emirs were to march towards Hojend and Banākāt. Thus he assigned a part of the army to each direction and set off for Bukhara, accompanied by Tolui Khan’ [18, vol. 1, book 2, p. 198]. If Ala ad-Din Muhammad had given up the initial plan in time, he would have been able to exterminate Mongol detachments one by one. However, after the first defeats and lost cities, the Khwarezm Shah rushed towards the centre.

The Mongol troops invaded Khwarezm but met with no organised resistance until Khwarezm Shah Ala ad-Din Muhammad died in 1220. In fact, every city and its garrison had been abandoned to its fate without any assistance from the ruler. As has already been mentioned, Ala ad-Din Muhammad did not give up his passive defense plan. He persisted even when it was clear that the Mongols were either besieging and assaults Khwarezmian fortresses or blocking their garrisons, then proceeding towards the country's centre. Thus, the fate of this or that city depended entirely on its garrison and vicegerent, which is described in more detail below. Many localities gave in without a struggle, while others chose to go down fighting.
Chapter II. The Formation of the Ulus of Jochi

As a result, the Mongols conquered the following cities from September 1219 to December 1220: Otrar, Sygnak, Jand, Banākat, Khujand, Zarnuk, Nur, Bukhara, Samarkand, Nasu, and more, thus acquiring control over both Transoxiana and Khorasan.

The Mongols struck their first blow at Otrar but were unable to conquer it at once. It became evident that the siege would be a long one, since due to the Otrar incident, Inal Khan was unlikely to surrender to the mercy of the victor. After that, Chinggis Khan divided the army to strike at cities south and north of Otrar, as it has been mentioned above, and marched off for a siege of Bukhara—Khwarezmian major city. Otrar resisted for about five months. Its viceroy and garrison, expect for Hajib Karaja and his warriors, who defected, showed immense valour in the battlefield [11, pp. 56–57]. The Mongols eventually caught Inal Khan and put him to an awful death in front of Chinggis Khan: ‘He (Chinggis Khan—Author) ordered that Inal Khan should be brought to him. Then he ordered that silver should be melted and poured into his ears and eyes. So he killed him, torturing and punishing him for his disgraceful deeds, for his base acts and commonly deplored crimes’ [3, p. 81; 50, p. 30]. Al-Nasawī was probably mistaken, because in his work he writes that Chinggis Khan commanded the siege of Otrar directly and put Inal Khan to death, while according to other Arab-Persian sources Chagatai and Ögedei were the executors [11, pp. 56–57]. The siege of Khujend was another case of brave resistance to the Mongols. The Khwarezmian troops were commanded by Temūr Malik, who had better luck than Inal Khan. Following a series of dramatic battles, Temūr Malik realising that he could not hold the city, broke out from the Mongol encirclement, and fled to Gurgandj, where he joined Jalāl al-Dīn Mingburnu [11, pp. 60–63].

As soon as the Mongols invaded the State of Khwarezm, a number of military and state officials displeased with Ala ad-Din Muhammad's policies took their side. One of the defectors, Badr ad-Din al-Amid, did the following with Chinggis Khan's consent. He composed fake letters by military commanders, relatives and associates of Terken Khatun, expressing willingness to serve Chinggis Khan with the consent of the Khwarezm Shah's mother. The letters reached Ala ad-Din Muhammad, ruining any confidence of his subjects, after which, according to Al-Nasawī, he retired from commanding the army and governing the state. It should be noted that the same source reports that Terken Khatun received a letter from Chinggis Khan in which he recommended that she refrain from interfering and prevent her emirs from doing so. In exchange for doing so, a number of regions were granted to her. Just like her son, Terken Khatun panicked and abandoned her subjects in Gurgandj [3, p. 83; 50, p. 31].

Chinggis Khan's conquest of the following cities deserves more than a passing mention as they were critical to the State of Khwarezm: most importantly, Bukhara, Samarkand, and of course Gurgandj as the capital. The siege of Bukhara began in March of 1220. Part of the Khwarezmian garrison conducted a sortie outside the town but was defeated. Thus the scared citizens opened the city gate for the Mongols. However, another part of the garrison continued to resist in the inner fortress, so Chinggis Khan not only ordered that the people of Bukhara should be use as hashar but ruined the city completely as soon as the last defenders were crushed [11, pp. 70–71; 52, pp. 113–118]. Following the conquest of Bukhara, the Mongol troops commanded by Chinggis Khan set off for Samarkand. Khwarezm Shah Ala ad-Din Muhammad not only gave up any control over his state and army but fled to save his life. Samarkand was conquered after a series of unsuccessful attempts by its garrison (which some sources report to have been as large as 110 thousands [8, p. 145]) to defeat the Mongols in a field battle [14, p. 353–355; 11, p. 78–83]. The locals gave up the city, as was the case with Bukhara, in the hope of mercy. However, the Mongols slaughtered the entire Turkic garrison [11, p. 71] taking some of the population for their hashar and capturing craftsmen [8, p. 146]. Thus, only few citizens of Samarkand were able to survive its conquest by Chinggis Khan and stay in their city.
The ruler of Khwarezm Ala ad-Din Muhammad fled to Nishapur and Bistam when his subjects were dying in battles. Then, on discovering that Chinggis Khan had sent Jabe's and Sübüüi's detachments to find him [11, pp. 96–99], he moved to Gilan Province and hid there on the Island of Abaskun in the Caspian Sea [50, pp. 35–37]. In 617 (December 1220), there he died in Shawwal, the ruler of one of the largest states in the Islamic Orient. For his funeral, his subjects had to shroud him using their own clothes [3, pp. 91–92; 9, p. 186; 38, vol. 1, p. 418; 48, pp. 62–67; 50, p. 37]. Before he died, Khwarezm Shah Ala ad-Din Muhammad passed his power over to his eldest son Jalāl al-Dīn Mingburnu, who had been accompanying him across the country [3, p. 100; 48, pp. 77–78; 50, pp. 40–41].

Unlike his father, the new Khwarezm Shah advocated for active resistance against the Mongol conquerors from the first days on the throne and went to Gurgandj to make it the centre of organised resistance. However, the local emirs, who were loyal to Terken Khatun, not only denied his power but conspired to kill him. After discovering the plot, Jalāl al-Dīn Mingburnu left Gurgandj never to return. The Mongol army soon approached the city [48, p. 79–80]. Chinggis Khan employed an enormous number of troops commanded by his sons Ögedei, Chagatai, and Jochi, enhanced with hashar, to besiege the Khwarezmian capital. However, the resolute and brave resistance of the city's numerous population made its conquest a difficult task for the Mongols [11, p. 84; 18, vol. 1, book 2, p. 215; 47, pp. 134–135].

Arab-Persian sources emphasise two things about the siege, and in particular Jochi's attempt at negotiating the citizens and garrison of Gurgandj into surrender and thus keeping the city for himself as Chinggis Khan had promised it to him along with the Khwarezm Region, which attempt failed [3, p. 137; 48, pp. 129–130; 18, p. 215]. The siege of Gurgandj lasted for over seven months [8, p. 152], also as a result of the difficulties between Chinggis Khan's sons, Jochi and Chagatai. Thus, the ruler had to appoint Ögedei as commander of the sieging troops. Eventually, Ögedei reconciled them [18, vol. 1, book 2, p. 216; 47, p. 138]. At last, the Mongol troops were able to conquer the Khwarezmian capital, where they killed a great number of military and civilians [18, vol. 1, book 2, p. 205], and razed the city to the ground [3, p. 138; 48, pp. 130–131; 13, pp. 95–97; 36, vol. 1, pp. 60–61]. Many prosperous and flowering cities in Khwarezm and their populations shared the tragic fate of Gurgandj. In addition to the cities already mentioned, there are other notable cities whose fate should be mentioned: Merv, Nishapur, and Herat. Arab-Persian sources expressed dismay at scale of the disaster when describing the ruination and casualties [1, p. 99; 11, pp. 101–112; 29, pp. 529–530, 579; 34, p. 316].

Having left Gurgandj, Khwarezm Shah Jalāl al-Dīn Mingburnu began to accumulate troops to confront the Mongols first in Nishapur and then in Ghazna [3, p. 110], where he was able to gather considerable armed forces [3, p. 124–125; 14, pp. 365] and defeat a number of small Mongol detachments [7, p. 509; 3, p. 109]. The most important event at that stage of the Mongol-Khwarezmian war was the first serious defeat of the Mongol army near Pervana in 1221. The Khwarezmian army commanded by Jalāl al-Dīn Mingburnu was able to crush an army of 45,000 warriors led by Shikhikhutug-Noyon. This forced Chinggis Khan to employ all of his forces apart from Jochi's troops against the last Khwarezm Shah [7, p. 509; 26, p. 154; 14, pp. 365; 11, p. 287; 3, p. 125; 2, pp. 28–29]. The victory at Pervana per se had both positive and negative effects for Jalal ad-Din. The former included numerous anti-Mongol rebellion. The one in Herat was the biggest, though they were suppressed cruelly by the Mongols [34, p. 316]. The negative effects of the victory included a split in the Khwarezmian army which consisted of about 60,000 men before the battle. As a result, nearly a half of the remaining troops leaving Jalāl al-Dīn Mingburnu. Al-Nasawi emphasises that the conflict within the Khwarezmian army originated between the commanders of Khalaj and Karluk warriors and Amil Malik, who led the Kangli Turks and was related to Jalal ad-Din [3, pp. 125–126; 35, vol. 2, pp. 405, 407–408].
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Having lost the half of his army, Jalāl al-Dīn Mingburnu resolved to retreat towards Indus, heading for North India, where he expected to accumulate forces for a new war [3, pp. 126–127; 33, p. 31]. However, this never happened. The Khwarezm Shah had to engage in a battle on the Indus bank in 1221, facing the united Mongol army commanded by Chinggis Khan who had demanded his warriors take Jalal ad-Din alive [18, vol. 1, book 2, p. 223]. The Battle of the Indus began on November 23, 1221 and lasted for about three days [8, pp. 157–158]. According to Arab-Persian sources, the key battle of the Mongol-Khwarezmian war took the following course. The Mongol troops formed a crescent, pressing the Khwarezmians to the river while they had no opportunity to cross it or maneuver otherwise. The Mongols scattered the Khwarezmian flanks but the centre, commanded personally by the Khwarezm Shah, persevered for a long time [11, p. 291] until Jalāl al-Dīn Mingburnu realised they could stand no more and crossed the Indus on horseback in full arms [3, pp. 127–129; 33, pp. 133–134; 11, p. 291; 18, vol. 1, book 2, pp. 223–224; 38, vol. 1, p. 420; 42, p. 154]. His remaining warriors tried to do the same, but few succeeded, and the sultan's family either died in the Indus River or were captured by the Mongols [7, p. 513]. More recent Arab-Persian sources, starting with Juvayni's work, report that Chinggis Khan prohibited his warriors from shooting the Khwarezm Shah as he was crossing the river but said to his sons while pointing at him, ‘This is the kind of son that every father dreams of! Having escaped two whirlpools—water and fire—and reached the bank of safety, he will commit many a glorious deed and cause innumerable misfortunes. How can a man of reason but reckon with him?’ [11, p. 291].

The 1221 Battle of the Indus put an end to the Mongol-Khwarezmian war. The State of Khwarezm Shahs ceased to exist. Its last ruler took shelter in North India, and there was no military commander to lead the army against the Mongol conquerors. It should be noted that the Mongols did not control the whole of Khwarezmian territory. They only had their administrative system and vicegerent in Transoxiana, Khorasan, and the Gōra provinces, on which taxes were levied. At that time certain regions entered a period of temporary interregnum, while in others independent political structures began gradually to develop at a local level. The Mongol troops continued to annex the territories that they were unable to conquer during the Mongol-Khwarezmian war. For instance, the Mongols did not conquer Sistan until 1230 [21, p. 368; 51, p. 76], when the Kerman atabeg dynasty came into existence in Kerman, whose ruler Khajib Barak surrendered to the Mongols [49, pp. 23–24]. That is, despite the fact that the State of Khwarezm had been ruined by 1221 and the last centers of resistance on Transoxiana, Khorasan, and Gōra provinces were eradicated in 1222–1223. Many territories formerly included in the state of Khwarezm Shahs were not controlled by the Mongols and did not belong to Chinggis Khan's Empire. This brought about a second wave of Mongol conquests in Iran, Iraq, and the South Caucasus in the 1220s and 1230s, during which they had to confront Jalāl al-Dīn Mingburnu again after he left North India in 1225. However, when the ruler died in 1231, the last remnants of the formerly vast State of Khwarezm were conquered and finally annexed by the Mongol Empire of Chinggis Khan's descendants.


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§ 3. The Conquest of Russian Lands in 1237–1240

Alexander Majorov

Although numerous studies exist about the invasion of Batu in Rus’, some important aspects of the Mongol conquest remain as if aside from the thoroughfare of historical investigation. Nevertheless, they are not only important for the reconstruction of the general picture of the events but are of great interest per se. This essay mainly considers these—to a large extent controversial and obscure—circumstances of the Mongol invasion of Europe.

The Mongols and the Princes of Northeast Rus'

Peace Negotiations Between Tatars and Grand Prince Yury Vsevolodovich

The Laurentian Chronicle contains a eulogy to the Grand Prince of Vladimir and Suzdal Yury Vsevolodovich that mentions peace offerings on the part of the Tatars: ‘As they did before, the messengers came, those evil bloodsuckers, saying: “Make peace with us”. He did not want that, as the prophet said: “Glorious war is better than disgraceful peace”. These godless men with their deceitful peace will cause great dismay to our lands, as they have already done much evil here’ [41, column 468].

The last editor of the Tale of Batu’s Invasion in the Laurentian Chronicle tried to soften the unfortunate impression the Prince of Vladimir and Suzdal had of the Tatars after speaking to them. He apparently made significant changes to the original text [31, p. 91; 35, p. 41]. As a result of these changes, the news about the Tatar messengers took on a completely different meaning: the Prince declined the Tatar peace offering because he discovered their deceitful nature. However, the Chronicle contains one more phrase before the above-mentioned words, and it is precisely about how Yury Vsevolodovich contacted the Tatars: ‘His every malicious person released the godless Tatars with gifts’ [41, column 468].

The phrase about malicious intentions is not about the godless Tatars. It is the beginning of an interrupted phrase ‘His every malicious intention...’. V. Komarovich noticed this peculiarity in Yury's commendation: as Laurens reached the words malicious intention, he inserted a fragment of commendation of another Russian Prince, Vladimir Monomakh, that was entered in the Laurentian Chronicle in 1125 (‘as all his malicious intentions were in the hands of God’). Laurens based his commendation of Yury on the one written for Monomakh: the former was ‘as if woven from extracts of the previous text’ [35, p. 42].

The unfinished phrase about malicious intentions is followed by the end of another phrase about Tatars ‘...released the godless Tatars with gifts’, the beginning of which is omitted. As D. Bulanin described, the result of this clumsy combination of different borrowed texts was a meaningless message: ‘His every malicious person released the godless Tatars with gifts’ [7, p. 471].
The noun malicious person (zlomysl) does not have an analogue in modern Russian and is best translated descriptively: ‘he who intends to do something bad, destructive’ [88, p. 418]. As a result the word for word translation of the phrase about malicious intentions and gifts to Tatars, which was combined from multiple texts, reads as follows: ‘Every person who planned something bad against him released the above-mentioned godless Tatars with gifts’.

G. Prokhorov believes that the latter half of the phrase is about how Yury Vsevolodovich received the Tatar messengers: ‘The “commendation” to prince Yury reveals that the author knew about one of the delegations—the Tatar delegation: Yury Vsevolodovich “released the godless Tatars with gifts”’ [76, p. 87]. Modern researchers have reached the same conclusion [84, p. 73; 102, pp. 209–210; 30, pp. 56–57].

The author of the commendation to Yury then says that the Tatars had sent their messengers to the prince of Vladimir and Suzdal before (‘as they did before, the messengers came’). This means there were several Tatar delegations. According to Prokhorov, the mention of the Tatar delegation is ‘one of the two original phrases of the commendation that were not borrowed. It is possible that the tale mentioned delegations to Yury at the beginning, but were deleted by its editor’ [76, p. 87].

As is well known, the Mongols paid close attention to diplomatic preparations prior to their conquests, and almost always tried to negotiate with their potential enemies before attacking. The aim of these negotiations was to impose fear or, conversely, to lull and disorient their future opponents, while at the same time scouting out their strengths, future plans, and other valuable information.

It is obvious that the peace conditions that the Tatar messengers brought to Prince Yury Vsevolodovich were the same that they offered to Ryazan and, for that matter, to anyone whom they wished to subdue: obedience and the paying of tributes [76, p. 87; see also: 38, p. 148; 103, p. 133; 30, pp. 56–57]. The ‘gifts’ that Prince Yury gave to the Tatars (‘Tatars were released with gifts’) were, in Prokhorov’s opinion, the above-mentioned tribute. ‘However, the editor/compiler managed to use this not as evidence of the Grand Prince's cowardice and short sightedness, but as him following the commandment to love not only your friends, but also your enemies’ [76, p. 87; see also 84, p. 73].

The chronicler hinted that prince Yury did not believe the Tatars, as he had already known the value of their promises (‘these godless men with their deceitful peace’), but in his Christian humility he decided to resign himself to his fate. However, this astuteness as regards the ‘deceitful peace’ with the Tatars was most probably belonged not to the Prince himself, but to his eulogist, writing after the lands of Vladimir and Suzdal had already suffered from the treachery of ‘godless’ invaders.

It is hard to avoid gaining the impression that Yury's Christian humility, the image of a ‘new Job’ painted in his posthumous eulogy [see: 74, pp. 142–143], and the passivity and inaction of the Prince in face of mortal danger that even the chronicler who praised him could not deny, were a result of more mundane reasons: Yury believed the Tatar messengers' promises and until the very last minute hoped to avoid an invasion, safely sitting out the conflict in the forests near the Oka River without becoming involved in the Tatar war in the south with either the Cumans or Ryazan troops [see: 103, p. 77; 102, pp. 209–210; 30, pp. 56–57].

One way or another, the Prince of Vladimir and Suzdal seemed to have done everything he could to avoid direct warfare with the Tatars. The prince's departure from the capital, Vladimir, before it was stormed by the Tatars was seen as fleeing by his contemporaries. This is how the author of the First Novgorod Chronicle described Yury's behaviour: the prince ‘left Vladimir and fled to Yaroslavl’ [65, p. 75]. Yury had no plans to enter into a full-on battle with the enemy. In any case, the skirmish with Tatar troops near the Siti River where Yury met an inglorious death could not be considered to be one [see: 85, pp. 53–55].
Chapter II. The Formation of the Ulus of Jochi

The Aims of the Mongolian Conquest of the West

Immediately before Batu invaded Northeast Rus', the Hungarian missionary monk Julia-nus appeared on the border of Rus' and Volga Bulgaria for the second time, having embarked on another journey to the country of the Ural Hungarians. On reaching the eastern border of Rus' he learned that the Volga Bulgaria and the ‘Great Hungary’ had already been routed by the Mongols, whose troops were concentrated near the Russian border and were preparing for an invasion. They were waiting for the onset of winter so they could cross the frozen rivers and swamps. On his way back home Julianus visited the yet una harmed Suzdal, where he was greeted by Prince Yury Vsevolodovich [see: 2, pp. 71–76].

The report Julius wrote to the archbishop of Perugi and the Pope's legate in Hungary, Salvio de’Salvi, known as ‘the letter by friar Julianus on the Mongol war’ (Epistola fr. Juliani de bello Mongolorum), along with a report written by monk Ricardi based on Julianus’ story (Relatio fratri Ricardi) show that the missionary met numerous Mongol messengers on his way to Rus’, Volga Bulgaria, and the Ural Hungarians [2, pp. 81, 88]. The monk describes one such delegation in detail: he saw the messengers, sent by the Mongol khan to the King of Hungary via Suzdal. The Prince of Suzdal detained the messengers for unknown reasons and gave their letter from the khan to the King of Hungary to Julianus [2, p. 88].

According to the Prince of Suzdal and other sources, Julianus learned that the main target of the Mongolian conquests in the West was the Kingdom of Hungary, as it led to Rome: ‘Many believe, and the Suzdal Prince used me to pass his words to the Hungarian King, that the Tatars are holding counsel day and night so as to come and conquer the Kingdom of the Hungarian-Christians. For they say that they intend to conquer Rome and beyond’ [2, p. 88].

This show that the Grand Prince of Vladimir and Suzdal knew about the Mongols' plans to go to war with Hungary. These plans were openly declared in the autumn of 1237. The source of this information—the letter from the Mongol khan—could not have been more reliable. It is possible that the Mongols intended this letter to fall into Yury Vsevolodovich's hands.

The Mongols' true intentions regarding Hungary, and the role of Rus' as a mere intermediate stage on the road to fulfilling those intentions, are made evident by the following: the Mongols used the Croat-Hungarian title of ban (ruler) in reference to the Grand Prince of Vladimir, Yury Vsevolodovich. Thus, the Chinese biography of Sübütäi, which forms part of official history of the Mongolian Yuan (Yuanshi) dynasty that ruled in China, states that this great Mongolian commander fought against the ‘ruler of the Russian people Yury-ban (Ye-le-ban)’ [32, pp. 230–231, 242].

Annalist of the Mongolian invasion Rashid al-Din called Yury Vsevolodovich ‘emir Yanke Yurku (var. Vike Yurku, Jike Yurku, Rike Yurk)’ [81, p. 39, add. 25]. In Rashid al-Din's narrative the title of ban was, it seems, part of Prince Yury's name, while his position in the hierarchy of Russian princes was conveyed by adding the traditional Muslim title emir (ruler, prince, leader). It is worth noting that the title of ban does not denote a sovereign ruler, but merely the namestnik appointed by him. It is possible that Mongols used this to demonstrate their perception of the Prince of Vladimir and Suzdal as a less important ruler than the king of Hungary.

Having received seemingly reliable information about the main aims of the Mongolian conquest in the south, the most powerful of the princes of the Northeast Rus' had a reason to hope that the situation would unfold in a different way, one less tragic for him.

Of course, with no solid facts as evidence, this is nothing more than speculation. However in our view is also true that this theory ‘explains better than any other the evident inaction of Prince Yury Vsevolodovich, his clear reluctance to provoke the Mongols into military actions’ [81, p. 53].
There is also no doubt that the Mongols were conducting peace negotiations with the Russian princes while simultaneously preparing for war. Their military preparations before the invasion of Northeast Rus' did not escape the attention of the Hungarian missionary spy Julianus: ‘Being on the borders of Rus,—he wrote about the Mongols' positions and plans,—we now know what is close to the real truth: the forces moving towards the western countries have been divided into four parts. One section approached Suzdal from the East, from nearby the Etil River on the borders of Rus’. Another section to the South had already attacked the borderlands around Ryazan...’ [2, p. 86].

Having made their preparations for a campaign of looting in Rus', the Tatars only had to bide their time for the moment to strike. Julianus continued, ‘According to the Russians, Hungarians, and Bulgars who had already fled from them, the Tatars waited for the land, rivers and swamps to freeze over in winter, so that it would be easy for large numbers of Tatars to plunder the whole of Rus' and all Russian land’ [2, p. 86].

The plans to invade Rus' at the beginning of the 14th century are also mentioned by the Mongol Empire's official annalist, Rashid al-Din. After conquering the Volga Bulgars, the Burtas, and the Mokshas, the fate of Russian lands was decided at the Mongolian quriltai: ‘In the autumn of the mentioned year (the year of chicken, which is year 634 Hijrah, that is—September 4, 1236–August 23, 1237) all the tsareviches present organised a quriltai and unanimously decided to declare war on the Russians. Batu, Orda, Güyük-khan, Mengü Qa'an, Kulkan, Kadan, and Buri stormed the city of Arpan (Ryazan) together and conquered it in three days’ [81, p. 38, add. 18].

We do not make a judgment on whether the Mongol Tatars' initial plans included invading all of Northeast Rus' or just the Ryazan land next to the steppes. One thing remains clear—to proceed with his conquest Batu needed not only to achieve peace, but also to subdue the Russian princes and use the financial and human resources present in the Russian lands.

The Battle of Kolomna and Its Consequences

But if the prince of Vladimir and Suzdal Yury Vsevolodovich had really negotiated with the Tatars and reached some agreement by accepting their conditions, what was the reason for the attacks on Northeast Rus' and the cruel execution of the Grand Duke and his sons?

We believe the available sources do provide an answer to that.

It is very likely that an unexpected clash with troops from Vladimir at Kolomna provoked Batu's anger. It was to here, on the border between the Ryazan and Vladimir-Suzdal lands that Roman Igorevich (Ingvarevich), brother of the Prince of Ryazan, Yury, retreated with his druzhina, chased by Tatars. According to a chronicler form Novgorod, he did not defend Ryazan, but participated in battles against Tatars: ‘the Prince of Ryazan Yury barricaded himself in the city along with its people; Prince Roman Igorevich fought against them with his people’ [65, p. 75].

In Kolomna, Roman met with a detachment sent by Yury Vsevolodovich, the Prince of Vladimir and Suzdal not to help Ryazan, but to secure the borders of the Vladimir principality. Here, at the border this patrol was waiting for the outcome of the battle between the Tatars and Ryazan. Thus, we interpret the words of the chronicler from Novgorod ‘Yermey to the outpost voivode’ to mean that Prince of Vladimir sent him to Kolomna [65, p. 75]. Somewhere near the city itself a battle took place, in which both Roman Igorevich and Yeremey Glebovich, the voivode of Vladimir, were killed. Vsevolod Yuryevich, the son of the Grand Prince, led the Vladimir army. He was unharmed in the battle and safely returned to his father [41, col. 460, 515–516; 28, col. 779].

The battle of Kolomna had other consequences that defined the fate of Northeast Rus'. If what the majority of researches believe is true, and in the Compendium of Chronicles by Rashid al-Din the word Ike (that is—the city on the Oka) means Kolomna, then Kolomna is the place where one of the main Mongolian commanders, died. His name was Kulkan, the young-
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The eldest son of Chinggis Khan himself. Immediately after conquering Ryazan, the Mongols ‘took the city of Ike as well. Kulkan was wounded there and died. One of the Russian emirs, Urman (Roman Igorevich—Author), led his army against the Mongols, but his army was crushed and he was killed [81, pp. 38–39, add. 19].

There are insufficient grounds to suggest that the Vladimir army led by Prince Vsevolod Yuryevich also took part in the battle of Kolomna in addition to Yeremey Glebovich's advanced detachment. Information from later chronicles that suggest voivode Yeremey was sent ahead of Vsevolod [11, p. 139; 87, p. 55], or, on the contrary, that he came to Kolomna after him [92, col. 290] were mistaken reinterpretations based on other ambiguous information in ancient chronicles. The First Tale of Novgorod, which contains the nearest thing to a description of the event itself, does not even mention Prince Vsevolod as having participated in the Battle of Kolomna [65, p. 75].

However, the Novgorod chronicle mentions the Muscovite army taking part. According to the chronicler, the Muscovites, having been attacked by the Tatars, fled the battlefield: ‘the Muscovites fled without seeing anything’ [65, p. 287]. These words are present in newer copies; in the most ancient Sinod copy the word ‘fled’ was scratched off, leaving ‘Muscovites did not see anything’ [65, p. 75]. The Vladimir-Suzdal, and the later Moscow chronicles omit this episode.

We believe that the clash between Russian troops and Tatars near Kolomna was local in nature. As the Mongols were chasing the druzhina led by Ryazan prince Roman Igorevich, who had retreated from Ryazan to the border of Vladimir's territory, they suddenly ran into another powerful Russian army near Kolomna—the Vladimir outpost army. A sudden attack from the Vladimir army caught the Mongols unawares, and Tsarevich Kulkan died as a result.

The Mongols could not leave the death of Chinggis Khan's son near Kolomna without consequences. These consequences proved catastrophic for the whole of Northeast Rus'. Sources say that the Mongols punished the killing of a Chinggis Khan family member with utmost brutality. Such revenge was purely ceremonial in nature. Not only the rulers of states at war with the Mongols were made to suffer, but also all the inhabitants of those lands and cities where the Chinggisid died. Such cities were demolished and their entire populations killed.

For example, in 1222 Togachar, husband of Chinggis Khan's fourth daughter, Tumelun, was killed during the siege of an Iranian city, Nishapur. According to Juvayni (who died in 1283), ‘to avenge Togachar's death, the order was given to raze the city to the ground so completely that the land could be ploughed, and that nothing would be left alive, not even cats and dogs’ [114, pp. 137–140].

It is likely that Chinggis Khan himself began this tradition after his grandson Mutukan (Mao-Tukan) was killed in battle near the Afghan city of Bamiyan. According to Rashid al-Din, when the Mongols took the city, Chinggis Khan ordered (issued a yasa) ‘the killing of every living creature including humans, cattle, wild animals and birds, and prohibited the taking of prisoners or loot’ [80, p. 219].

It would appear to be no coincidence that after the battle of Kolomna chroniclers recording the destruction of Russian towns start to mention cases where the entire population was exterminated. The first such incident took place during the conquest of Moscow—the closest city to Kolomna in the Vladimir-Suzdal land, and whose citizens took part in the battle of Kolomna. Having taken Moscow, Tatars killed the voivode- and took the Prince hostage, while ‘all the people, from elders to smallest babies, were killed’ [41, col. 461].

We can not ignore another example which speaks volumes. Rashid al-Din's tale of the Mogolian Tatars' conquest of Northeast Rus' only mentions the names of three Russian princes. They were: ‘Emir Urman’ and ‘his druzhina’, that is—the Prince of Ryazan Roman Igorevich who was killed near Kolomna; ‘the prince of Makar city’ ‘named Ulaytimur’, that is—
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the Prince of Moscow, Vladimir Yuryevich who was also killed by the Tatars; and ‘Emir Vanke Yurku’, that is—the Grand Prince of Vladimir and Suzdal Yury Vsevolodovich who ‘fled to the woods’, but ‘was caught and killed nonetheless’ [81, p. 39]. All these princes are mentioned in connection to the death of Tsarevich Kulkan: two of them—Urman and Ulaytيمur—were killed by the Tatars immediately after the battle of ‘the city of Ike’ (Kolomna) that took the life of the Chinggisid tsarevich; the third—Vanke Yurku—fled from his capital (‘the city of Yurg the Great’) and was caught and killed by the Mongols in the forest.

It would seem that, from the point of view of the official Mongol annalist, the destruction of the Vladimir-Suzdal Land was a consequence of the death of Chinggis Khan’s son, which required vengeance in accordance with Mongol laws. It is worth noting that in Sübütti’s Chinese biographical writings, which form part of the Yuaansi, the Mongols’ destruction of Northeast Rus’ is described as a ‘punitive campaign’ against Prince (ban) Yury [32, pp. 230—231, 242].

The Mongols and the Princes of South Rus’

The Mongols’ stone artillery

The Novgorod St. Sophia Cathedral’s chronicles of the first half of 15th century contain a comprehensive account of the defeat of the Russian hosts near Chernigov, the capture of the city by a savage assault, and the subsequent reconciliation of the Russian princes with the Mongols (Tatars) [92, pp. 300–301; see also: 67, p. 115; 66, pp. 222–223]. This account undoubtedly originates from the South Rus’ version of The Tale about the Invasion of Batu that is found also in the Hypatian (Ipatiev) Chronicle. However, in the Hypatian Chronicle the description of the storm and the capture of Chernigov, most probably due to the confusion of sheets in the ancient original (a common protograph of the Hypatian and Khlebnikov codes) and through inadvertence of a copyist, was divided into two parts and attributed to different events [see 50, pp. 311–326]. A number of episodes are dated to the Chernigov campaign of the Galician prince Daniil Romanovich and the Kievan prince Vladimir Rurikovich. The Hypatian Chronicle dates this campaign to 6742 (1235) [28, p. 772].

Describing the storm of Chernigov by Tatars, the chronicler mentions stone-throwing weapons that destroyed the city walls and predetermined the outcome of the battle. They must have stunned the contemporaries. The scribe characterizes the event as something unheard of and almost improbable. The stones hurled by terrible machines were too heavy to be lifted even by four strong men, and those stones flew the distance that was half as long again as a bowshot.

The extraordinary character of the event is underscored by the use of an unusual in such cases term **taran** (battering ram) instead of a more usual and appropriate in this context **poroky** (praky) that was customarily used in chronicles and other records to report stone-throwing weapons [92, p. 134].

The use of powerful stone-throwing machines in the siege of Chernigov is a most important argument in answering the question of which army—Russian or Tatar—used them. This tactic was little known in Rus’, while the Mongols used it widely and successfully to capture the Russian cities. Stone-throwing machines were their main weapon, and there were no means to resist it. At least, this is an impression made by numerous descriptions of the Tatar ‘poroks’ in action contained both in Russian and foreign sources [see 73, p. 144; 41, p. 462; 28, pp. 780–781, 785, 786; 65, pp. 76, 288; 96, pp. 21, 23].

Brought from China and operated by Chinese engineers, the advanced military machinery, especially the siege artillery that had been successfully developed over centuries, had mechanical characteristics and combat qualities that far exceeded any counterparts existing at that time. For example, the maximum shooting range of stone-throwing machines, used in the Middle East and known in Western Europe since the time of Crusades, was 80–120 m, while that of the Chinese catapults was 75–150 m [110, p. 122]. According to the Chinese military
treatise Shou Cheng Lu by Chen Gui, the longest-range weapons (yuan pao) could hit the enemy at a distance of over 350 bu (over 535 m) [111, p. 133].

Historians believe that the adoption and systematic use of this machinery by the Mongols made a great impact on the Mongol state [113, p. 801; 71, p. 122]. According to N. Voronin, ‘the Tatar poroki were the key technology that helped the Tatars to overcome the heroic defense of almost all Russian cities’ [10, p. 468].

According to A. Kirpichnikov, heavy lever machines, similar to those used in the storm of Chernigov, were up to 8 metres high, weighed 5 tons, and threw stones as heavy as 60 kilos or sometimes more. To actuate them, 50 to 250 soldiers were needed [31, p. 75].

Hence, it is understandable why the super-power Tatar catapults made a stunning impression on the Chernigov defenders. It is also absolutely clear that the Russian princes who besieged Chernigov in 1235 cannot have had such weapons at their disposal.

Reconciliation of the Russian Princes with the Mongols

Some researchers refuse to accept the conclusion of a peace treaty between the Russian princes and the Mongols in 1239. They believe that the report about it was entered into the Novgorod chronicles by misunderstanding. Indeed, it must be attributed to the internecine war of 1235 accounted for in the Hypatian Chronicle, which also ended in peace [108, p. 281]. That was the line of argument of John Fennell: This coda (the report about the peace treaty—A. M.), which is also found at the end of Ipat’s description of the siege of Chernigov in 1235, seems to me to be misplaced here: it would be hard to see what the princes of Chernigov, Smolensk, and Galich were doing in Kiev at the end of 1239 [99, p. 135, note 101; see also 103, p. 171; 30, p. 305, note 14].

In fact, the report about reconciliation sounds unclear and unlikely in the context of the story about the ‘war of Daniil and Vladimir against Mstislav of Chernigov’, because there was no war with such correlation of forces. According to the Hypatian Chronicle, Mstislav, Vladimir, and Daniil were allies from the beginning to the end and did not have to become reconciled. According to the Novgorodian First Chronicle, Mstislav Glebovich did not participate in the campaign of 1235 at all. Vladimir and Daniil fought against Michael Vsevolodovich, who successfully held the line in Chernigov.

Perhaps the most unnatural is the report in the Hypatian Chronicle under the year 6742 about the participation in the campaign against Chernigov of one of the Chernigov princes, Mstislav Glebovich. No other source that retains information about the internecine war of 1234–1235 mentions this prince, who allegedly participated in the devastation of his native land. Only Vladimir and Daniil set out on the Chernigov campaign, while Michael Vsevolodovich, who occupied at that time the Chernigov throne, confronted them [65, pp. 73–74, 284; 83, p. 363; 22, pp. 117–118].

But even if we suppose that Mstislav Glebovich did participate in the campaign as an ally of the Kievian and Galician princes, why would the latter need to conclude peace with him at the end of the campaign if they fought on the same side from the very beginning? Besides, it is beyond understanding how the mentioned peace treaty with Vladimir and Daniil was drawn up by ‘Mstislav and the Chernigovichi’ if Michael at that time was the prince of Chernigov who headed the defense of the city, while Mstislav was among the assaulted.

Unconvincing is Hrushevsky’s attempt to interpret the report in the Hypatian Chronicle in the sense that Mstislav Glebovich may have been set on the Chernigov throne by his allies after the city fell and Michael Vsevolodovich fled [20, p. 247]. Anton Gorsky has recently attempted again a similar ‘combination’ of the reports in various sources that essentially contain alternative versions of the event [15, p. 86, note 33]. But what about the evidence of the Novgorod First Chronicle saying that the defenders of Chernigov did not even think about capitulation and that the city was never captured [65, pp. 74, 284]? The statement about enthroning Mstislav in Chernigov totally contradicts further evidence of the source reporting
that hardly had Vladimir Rurikovich returned from Chernigov to Kiev, when ‘Michael with Chernigov’s townspeople’ came with Izyaslav and the Cumans ‘near Kiev and seized Kiev’ [65, pp. 74, 284]. Therefore, all this time Michael was the prince of Chernigov, and his replacement with somebody else is out of the question [see 49, pp. 564–566].

Martin Dimnik, the author of a special study analysing chronicle reports about the siege of Chernigov in 1235, has convincingly shown that the Hypatian Chronicle account is not consistent with the logic of the events, which, on the contrary, is clearly seen in the alternative variant of the Novgorod chronicles [119, pp. 395–396]. Indeed, according to the Hypatian Chronicle, making peace between the parties in war preceded the ‘fierce battle’ with battering rams near the walls of Chernigov. It remains unclear why they continued the war and what the outcome of the ‘fierce battle’ near Chernigov was.

In our opinion, the report about the peace in the Hypatian Chronicle account under the year 6742 is a poor insertion that breaks up the correct order of events [see 50, pp. 323–324]. Contrary to J. Fennell’s statement, this report does not conclude the description of the Chernigov campaign but rather breaks it ridiculously. The result is that the decisive storm of Chernigov took place after the feuding parties became reconciled.

M. Dimnik had every ground to state that no peace was concluded in 1235 [119, p. 401]. The war continued, and after the Chernigov campaign had failed, military operations moved to the Kiev land. The retreating troops of the Galician and the Kievian princes were followed hard by the army of the Chernigov prince Michael Vsevolodovich, while from the south, ‘with a heavy force’, his ally Izyaslav Mstislavich came in time with the Cumans [65, p. 74; 28, p. 773]. As a result, Vladimir Rurikovich and Daniil Romanovich suffered an overwhelming defeat that cost them both their princely thrones—the Kievian and the Galician respectively [see 49, pp. 566–570].

The report about the conclusion of peace, on the contrary, fits well into the context of the Mongol invasion of 1239. It does not break the narration but rather concludes it logically. In spite of many details and separate episodes, the account of the ‘capture’ by the Tatars of the Chernigov land does not contain any internal contradictions and is proved by evidence from other sources (unlike the confusing and inconsistent account of the Hypatian Chronicle about the campaign of 1235). It is a detailed and integral narration, most likely told by a direct witness, with all the components being in line with each other and united by one plotline.

**Möngke Khan’s arrival in Kiev and the flight of Michael of Chernigov**

Like the Novgorod St. Sophia Cathedral’s chronicles, the Hypatian Chronicle retains the data about the attempt of the Tatars to make peace with the Russian princes after the fall of Chernigov. In this account, the peace negotiations also took place near Kiev, but the Tatar ambassadors held negotiations with Michael Vsevolodovich and the Kievans, rather than with the three aforementioned princes. ‘Möngke-Khan […] sent his ambassadors to Michael and the townspeople, wishing to deceive them, but they did not listen to him’ [28, p. 782].

Michael’s flight was preceded by the appearance near Kiev of Möngke-Khan’s troops and the negotiation with the Khan’s ambassadors. Möngke-Khan came to see the city of Kiev. He stayed on the other side of the Dniester (Dnipro, according to the Khlebnikov Codex.—A. M.) in Pesochny town; seeing the city, he wondered at its beauty and grandeur. He ‘sent his ambassadors to Michael and the townspeople, wishing to deceive them, but they did not listen to him’ [28, p. 782]. From the Hypatian Chronicle’s account of the negotiation between the Tatar ambassadors and Michael and the Kievans, it is unclear how the Tatars wanted to deceive them. It is only clear that the negotiation did not lead to peace, and Michael had to flee from Kiev.

Insufficiency of the ancient source report might have caused the later chroniclers to attempt to supplement its report. Thus, the chronicles of the late 15–16th centuries contain the report about the killing of Möngke-Khan’s ambassadors by Michael (‘they have slaughtered
Gradually, it unfolded into a novella in the Nikon Chronicle: Möngke offered his friendship to Michael and advised that the latter should ‘be penitent’ and ‘bow to our tsar Batu’, but the pious prince refused because he could not accept the power of a tsar of a different faith. Möngke got angry with Michael and tried to lure him out of the city as if for new negotiation, but the prince, having recognised the deception, ordered the killing of all the Khan’s ambassadors. Then, afraid of what he had done, he fled from Kiev. The Tatars followed him but could not catch him [64, pp. 115–116].

Although historians sometimes doubt the trustworthiness of this account in the Nikon Chronicle, on the whole, they trust the report about the killing of the Tatar ambassadors by Michael [among the recent studies see: 97, p. 11; 26, p. 578; 120, p. 353; 103, p. 181; 75, p. 132; 30, pp. 87–88]. It is suggested that this killing was one of the reasons why Batu ordered the killing of Michael in 1246 [12, p. 45; 112, pp. 123–125].

As we see it, the report about the killing of the Tatar ambassadors by Michael requires a more careful source analysis. First mentions of the killing of ambassadors appear in Moscow chronicles only in the late 1470–early 1480s. In the Ermolin Chronicle, Chronicle of the 72 Tribes, and the Moscow Svod of 1479, it looks like an addition to the original text: ‘He slaughtered them … ’ [25, p. 77; 42, pp. 54, 212]; “… and did not listen to him, and slaughtered those sent to them” [61, p. 131].

The episode of slaughtering the ambassadors got into Moscow chronicles evidently from The Life of Michael of Chernigov. One of its versions (the so-called Father Andrew’s extended version, included in the brief version of the Russian Prologue under 23 August) reads: ‘Michael held Kiev at that time; ambassadors came from Batu; on hearing their flattering words, he ordered to slaughter them’ [44, p. 299; see also 86, p. 64]. This version was compiled in the early 14th century at the latest (its oldest copy is dated 1313) [44, pp. 244, 298]. Most researchers acknowledge that the original version of the Life was the Rostov version compiled in the third quarter of the 13th century, at the time of Michael Vsevolodovich’s daughter and his grandchildren, the princes of Rostov, Boris (d. 1277) and Gleb (d. 1278) [86, pp. 110–111; 33, pp. 208–210; 60, pp. 183–185]. The Rostov version does not contain any report about the slaughter of the Tatar ambassadors [86, p. 55]. This report is also absent in the brief version of Father Andrey [86, p. 55].

A. Gorsky carried out a comparative and textual analysis of Father Andrey’s extended and brief versions and showed that the account of the Mongol invasion in the extended version is secondary to the brief version, and the ‘mentioning of the murder of the Mongol ambassadors by Michael appeared in the non-original version of The Life and had no connection to the archetype text’ [19, pp. 146–147]. The same conclusion has also been made by N. Milyutenko [60, pp. 184–185].

The appearance of the episode of the murder of the Mongol ambassadors in The Life of Michael of Chernigov at one stage of its evolution is likely to have been connected with the beginning of glorifying the prince as a martyr for the faith. When the Grand Princely Chronicle Svod of 1477 was compiled (the likely protograph of the Ermolin Chronicle and the Moscow Svod of 1479, the main source of which was the Sophia First Chronicle), Pachomius Logothetes, based on the text of the Sophia First Chronicle, wrote a new version of The Life of Michael of Chernigov, with the episode about the slaughter of the ambassadors included [see 16, pp. 200–212]. Pachomius, apparently, participated in the work on the chronicle of 1477 in general and consistently supplemented it with anti–Horde-oriented elements [see 17, pp. 87–93].

But if Michael Vsevolodovich did not commit the murder of the Tatar ambassadors, what caused him to flee from Kiev ‘in the face of the Tatars’? Clearly, the flight was directly
related to the arrival of the Tatars or, more exactly, to the essence of the demands made by Möngke-Khan’s ambassadors from Michael.

It is unlikely that in the fall of 1239, Möngke-Khan planned to take Kiev by storm. Most researchers agree that Möngke’s campaign was of a reconnaissance nature and that he was not strong enough to besiege the capital of Rus’ [29, p. 116; 103, p. 174; 75, p. 132]. The peaceful character of Möngke’s mission is supported by the chronicle evidence that the Khan had left his army on the opposite bank of the Dnieper, near Pesochny town (‘he stayed … in Pesochny town’).

So, it appears that no immediate threat existed that the Mongols would seize Kiev in the fall of 1239. Therefore, political, rather than military, reasons caused Michael to flee. That reason might have been the alliance of the Mongols with Vladimir Rurikovich and Daniil Romanovich—the main rivals of Michael Vsevolodovich in the struggle for Kiev. Michael learned about that alliance during negotiations with Möngke. After Chernigov had been taken, the Tatars apparently made a decision to grant Kiev to one of their new allies—Vladimir Rurikovich—and after his sudden death, to Daniil Romanovich.

The conquer of Kiev and South Rus’

The siege and the capture of Kiev

The description of the siege and the capture of Kiev by Batu’s army was drawn up by the witness of the events or from eyewitnesses’ account. This is evident, in particular, from the list of names of Tatar chiefs given in the Hypatian Chronicle and compiled after the evidence of a captive Tatar Tovrul. The account focuses on the activities of tysiatsky (thousandman) Dmitr, who was wounded in the assault, captured, and pardoned by the Tatars ‘out of regard for his courage’. Later he advised Batu to set a campaign against Hungary. This part of the account must have been written by a person who was close to tysiatsky Dmitr [70, p. 85; see also 30, pp. 98–104].

In the Hypatian Chronicle, the words ‘Dmitrey was brought, wounded, and [Batu] did not kill him out of regard for his courage’ are followed by a small insertion: ‘At the same time Daniil went to Hungary, to the king, and so he did not hear about the coming of the wicked Tatars to Kiev’ [28, pp. 785–786]. Aleksei Shakhmatov noticed the insertion-like nature of this report [109, p. 161], which in the Hypatian Chronicle is separated from the preceding text by a characteristic punctuation mark—four bold dots arranged crosswise. The next entry begins with a cinnabar initial. In this way a chronicler used to separate significant parts of a text which differed in content and origin.

The original text of The Tale about the Invasion of Batu Khan did not say that Daniil knew nothing about the arrival of the Tatars to Kiev. This can be concluded by comparing the accounts of the Hypatian Chronicle and those of the Novgorod St. Sophia Cathedral’s chronicles. The aforementioned insertion was made by the compiler of the Chronicle of Daniil of Halych in the prince’s best interests in order to explain his strange evasion of the protection of the main city of Rus’ and later of the cities of Volhynia and Galicia.

In the account of the siege of Kiev, the author gives the list of the Tatar chiefs who gathered at the walls of the Rus’ capital. The list was compiled from the words of a captive Tovrul: Those were his brothers (Batu’s—A. M.), strong commanders: Urdu and Baidar, Biruyi, Kaidan, Bechak and Möngke, Güyük, who returned, having learned about the khan’s death, and became the khan himself; not from his clan, but his first commander Subutai Baghatur and Burundai Baghatur, who seized the Bulgarian land and the Suzdal land, other commanders out of number—they cannot be listed here [28, pp. 784–785].

At the same time, according to the Mongol, Persian, and Chinese sources, Güyük and Möngke, who were mentioned in the list, in fact were in Mongolia in spring 1240, where they were recalled by the Great Khan Ögedei [see 6, pp. 282–284; 91, pp. 195, 199; 96, pp. 37, 48]. For this reason, as some contemporary researchers believe, they could not participate in the
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siege of Kiev that began in the fall of the same year [29, p. 117; 24, pp. 26–27; 26, p. 580; 63, pp. 33–34]. This conclusion seems to be confirmed by the report of a Hungarian monk Rogerius. Circa 1244, he compiled the list of Mongol khans who participated in the campaign against Hungary that does not contain the names of Güyük and Möngke [129, p. 563]. The list compiled in 1247 by the papal legate Giovanni da Pian del Carpine mentioned only Orda, Batu, Sheiban, Kadan, Buri, and Budzhek. Möngke was named among those who ‘stayed in their land’, while Güyük is not mentioned at all [23, p. 44].

Based on the given data, Vadim Staviski concluded that the information in the Hypatian Chronicle is unreliable. Güyük and Möngke ‘could not participate in the siege and the assault of Kiev’, and therefore the list of Batu’s ‘brothers’ and ‘commanders’ who besieged the capital of Rus’ was not drawn up according to a captive Tatar but rather on the basis of a written source available to the compiler of the Kievan Chronicle, who inserted it here according to his understanding’ [94, p. 193].

This conclusion, in our view, seems too hasty. The Secret History of the Mongols retains the text of Güyük’s report about his glorious victories in the West, from which it follows that together with other tsareviches, he participated in the capture of Kiev and other Russian cities. ‘… tsareviches Batu, Buri, Güyük, Möngke and all other tsareviches … completely defeated and captured the Orusuts (the Russians—A. M.) … as well as the people of the cities of Bolar, Man-kerman, Kiwa (Kiev—A. M.) and other cities … and returned to their homeland’ [91, pp. 189, 194].

The possible participation of Güyük and Möngke in the taking of Kiev is supported by another source—the Chinese official History of the Yuan Dynasty (Yuánshi)—where we find the exact date of the ‘imperial order for Güyük to recall the troops for rest and reinforcement’: December–January 1240/41 [32, p. 176].

Thus, Güyük and Möngke were recalled from Batu’s army after the taking of Kiev and, therefore, both tsareviches must have participated in its siege and storm. The Yuánshi confirms the trustworthiness of The Tale about the Invasion of Batu data as regards the participants of the assault of Kiev and refute the doubts about the trustworthiness of their source—the evidence of a captive Tatar Tovrul.

Two dates of the fall of Kiev

No currently known copy of the Hypatian Chronicle that contains the most detailed and the earliest story about the capture of Kiev by the troops of Batu Khan has any indication that may help to determine the full date of this event. Nor does the Novgorodian First Chronicle (either older or younger version) contain the date of the fall of Kiev.

Among the surviving records of the Mongol invasion of Rus’, only the Laurentian Chronicle reports the date of the fall of Kiev: ‘This malice happened before Christmas, on St. Nicholas day’ [41, p. 470]. St Nicholas day—6 December, the memory day of the highly revered Russian saint St Nikolaos of Myra—is referred to as the date of the fall of Kiev in the chronicles that were based on the Laurentian Chronicle or, more precisely, on the Rostov chronicle writing of the third quarter of the 13th century: the Suzdal Chronicle according to the Moscow Academic Chronicle [41, p. 523], the Vladimir Chronicle [8, p. 90], the Novgorod St. Sophia Cathedral’s chronicles [92, p. 302; 67, pp. 116–117; 66, p. 227]. Most Russian chronicles of the late 15–16th centuries provide the same dates [11, p. 145; 64, p. 117; 83, p. 375; 87, p. 93; 61, p. 131; 9, p. 76].

Chronicles that go back to the Pskov Chronicle of the turn of the 1460–1470s contain a different dating of the fall of Kiev. They include Avraamka’s Chronicle from Western Rus’, the Pskov Chronicles, and the Bolshakov Chronicle from Novgorod, which is close to Avraamka’s Chronicle. These sources specify the date when the siege began, the siege length, and the date when the Kiev fell. The best readable text is in Avraamka’s Chronicle and the Pskov 3 Chronicle: ‘The Tatars came to Kiev on 5 September, stayed for 10 weeks and 4
days, and took it on 19 November, on Monday’ [43, p. 51; 78, p. 81; see also 77, p. 12; 36, p. 354]. Many historians accept the full date given in the Pskov chronicles as the most probable date of the siege and the capture of Kiev. Vladimir Pashuto preferred this date [71, p. 157; 72, p. 285]. Nikolai Berezhkov also adhered to this view [5, p. 111]. Oleg Rapov argued that as 19 November 1240 does fall on Monday, the entry that fixed this date must have been ‘made immediately after the event and can be trusted’ [79, p. 87].

V. Staviski conducted a special source investigation in order to determine the exact date of the fall of Kiev. The author concluded that the dating that goes back to the Pskov chronicles ‘is true and the oldest one’ [93, p. 290]. A number of contemporary studies recognise 19 November 1240 as the most probable date of the fall of Kiev [see 1, p. 30; 103, p. 190; 27, p. 160]. Often both chronicle dates of the siege and the fall of Kiev are recognised as equally trustworthy, and a conclusion is made that the months-long siege of the South Rus’ capital lasted from 5 September to 6 December [see 79, p. 87; 101, p. 386; 102, pp. 234–235; 75, p. 133; 30, pp. 99–100].

More or less distinct evidence of the time of the capture of Kiev by the Mongols can be found in a Hungarian source. Compiled at the time of the events, this source has been under-investigated by the historians of Rus’.

Matthew Paris in his Chronica Majora (mid-13th century) cites a letter of a certain Hungarian bishop to an unnamed bishop of Paris (possibly Guillaume III d’Auvergne). Before telling a legendary history of the origin of the Tatars, which the Hungarians had heard from the captive Tatar scouts, the author reported a few interesting details regarding the time and the circumstances of the Tatars’ stay in Rus’ before they attacked Hungary: I reply to you about the Tatars that they came as far as the border of Hungary in five day’s marches and approached the river that is called Deinphir, which they had been unable to cross in summer. Wishing to wait until winter, they sent forward a few scouts into Russia … [126, p. 75].

Another variant of this document, dated 1239, is found in the Annals of Waverley. It is fuller and, in the opinion of contemporary researchers, ‘more reliable’ compared to Matthew of Paris’s version [116, p. 53, Anm. 196; 125, p. 162, Anm. 61]. The Waverley manuscript reads: I am writing to you about the Tatars, that they came as far as the border of Hungary in 5 days’ march. When they reached the Damaii river, which they had been unable to cross in summer, they wished to wait until winter in order to be able to cross the aforesaid river over the ice. They retreated by a good 20 days’ march and are waiting for winter there … [115, p. 325].

Most researchers identify the river Deinphir (as spelled by Matthew of Paris) as the Dnieper [see 128, p. 379; 121, p. 723; 123, p. 22; 116, p. 54; 125, p. 163; 130, pp. 112–113]. Both versions of the letter support this identification. Unable to force a crossing over the deep river, the Tatars delayed it until winter frost, when a strong sheet of ice would cover it, and withdrew to the East at the distance of 20 days’ march. Similarly, the following year, when the Tatars had already come to Hungary, they had to wait for winter frost in order to cross the Danube over the ice.

If the Hungarian bishop’s letter was about the crossing of the Dnieper that the Mongols were to undertake, this document must have been written before the siege and the storm of Kiev. Contemporary researchers date the document to 1239 or, preferably, 1240 [see 116, p. 54; 125, p. 163; 122, p. 153; 130, p. 112]. In any event, the situation described in the letter and, therefore, the letter itself, came into being when the West was not yet filled with horror at the Mongolian invasion but was watching the approaching aggressors with increased attention.

The Hungarian bishop’s letter informed that the Tatars had once come up to the river Deinphir/Damaii, which they could not then cross by swimming. Now they were expected to
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...come back and cross the river when winter frost would lock it with ice. This detail seems to comply with the Hypatian Chronicle report about the arrival of Möngke Khan’s troops to Kiev before the capture of the city by Batu Khan.

The Hypatian Chronicle narration about the siege of Kiev by the Mongols contains a notable detail. When Batu’s troops surrounded the city, there was a terrible noise, and the besieged citizens ‘could not hear each other due to permanent grating of cartwheels, many camels’ roar and horses’ neigh’ [28, p. 784].

Consequently, in the late 1240, the Mongols arrived near Kiev with a lot of cattle and their mobile dwellings on cartwheels, household possessions, and families. Moreover, Batu Khan’s army had heavy battering rams and trebuchets that destroyed Kiev’s walls in a few days.

One can hardly doubt that such an army could cross the Dnieper only after winter frost had set in and solid ice had covered the river. Taking into account the climatic features of the Middle Dnieper, it can be assumed that the Mongols could not arrange an ice crossing on the Dnieper near Kiev earlier than in mid-November. Until then, according to the Hungarian bishop’s letter, the Mongols were waiting on the opposite bank of the Dnieper.

Thus, these data proves the date of the fall of Kiev that goes back to the Rostov chronicles of the third quarter of the 13th century, that is, 6 December, St. Nicholas day. Considering that—according to the Mongolian version given by Rashid-al-Din Hamadani—Kiev was captured in nine days, the storm of the city began on 28 November. This must have been preceded by the Mongolian troops crossing the icebound Dnieper, the siege of the city, and the preparation for the assault. The entire military operation near Kiev appears to have taken the Mongols less than a month.

*Rashid al-Din’s reports about Uladmur cities*

The official historiograph of the Ilkhanate, Rashid al-Din Hamadani (ca.1247–1318), compiled his work in 1301–1311. He used widely the Mongol original works and the historical documents that have not survived. According to him, after Kiev had been taken, the Mongol army split into tumens and, using sweep tactics, conquered all Uladmur’s cities. Only Uchogul Uladmur resisted and withstood a three-day siege [see 59, pp. 169–181].

Phonetically Ulādmur corresponds to the Russian princely name Vladimir. However, when the translators of Rashid al-Din could not find a suitable candidate among the Russian princes of the times of the Mongol invasion, they decided that the proper name Uladmur must be related to the name of the city Volodymyr Volynskyi and apply to other cities of Volhynia [81, p. 45].

But if we accept this interpretation, we need to look for the city named Uchogul among the Volhynian cities. However, this name has no even remote phonetic correspondence with any of the now known Old Russian placenames. Besides, as it has long been noticed, in Turkic languages, uch ogul literally means ‘three sons’. This meaning has no historical correspondence in the Russian place-name study.

It is possible that Rashid al-Din’s Uchogol Uladmur has nothing to do with the name of the city but rather results from the wrong interpretation of another authentic Turkic evidence. In this connection, we believe, Vladimir F. Minorsky’s translation is noteworthy. It reveals the meaning of the expression Üchogul Ülādmur, that Rashid al-Din had left untranslated into Persian ‘Jointly they (the Mongols—A. M.) besieged the town “of the Vladimir’s three sons” (Üch-oghul Ülādmur) and took it in three days’ [127, p. 885].

Rashid al-Din, as well as the Turkic source that he had used, paid attention not only to the names of the lands and the cities captured by the Mongols but also to the names of the defeated rulers. This interest shows itself in particular in the description of the invasion into Vladimir-Suzdal Rus’. In five days, the Mongols seized ‘Makar city (probably, Moscow—A. M.) and killed the prince [of this] city named Ulaitimur (probably Vladimir—A. M.’); or
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‘they took Pereyaslavl city, the native region of Vezislav (probably, Vsevolod—A. M.), jointly in five days’ [81, p. 39].

On the whole, the Mongol version of the invasion of the Russian land is very precise and in many details coincides with the facts known from the Russian chronicles. These include the report about the taking of Ryazan, Kolomna (‘town on the Oka’), and Moscow, the flight and the death of Grand Prince Yury Vsevolodovich ‘in a forest’ at the edge of his land, where he was caught and killed, as well as the report about the two-month siege of Kozelsk town by Batu [81, pp. 38–39].

Noteworthy, in the report about the taking of the capital of the Northeast Rus’, Vladimir-on-Klyazma, by the Mongols, Rashid al-Din does not mention the name of the city but only the name of the prince: ‘Having besieged the city of Yurgi the Great, they took [it] in eight days’ [81, p. 39].

Not surprisingly, in describing the invasion of Southern Rus’, Rashid al-Din and his Mongol source provide the name of the Russian prince with whom they associate Ulādmur’s cities and the city of Ulādmur’s three sons captured by the Mongols.

This solution seems more preferable. The transfer of the rulers’ personal names on the cities and regions under their control is usual for Rashid al-Din’s geographic onomastics. At the same time, naming the entire country (region) by the name of one of its cities is an unheard-of phenomenon. Nothing of the kind is encountered in describing the invasion of other parts of Rus’.

As we see it, the sources allow a reliable enough identification of prince Vladimir, whose sons resisted Batu in Southern Rus’.

By the beginning of the Mongol invasion of Southern Rus’, Vladimir Rurikovich was the lawful prince of Kiev. He reigned in Kiev for over 10 years with intervals (after Mstislav Romanovich died in the battle of the Kalka River). When he voluntarily ceded Kiev to Yaroslav Vsevolodovich in 1236, his most likely aim was to establish a joint rule in the South of Rus’ to ensure that the Monomakhovichi have superiority over the Olgovichi (Yaroslav was the prince in Kiev, while Vladimir reigned over the Kievan Land). When Yaroslav left Kiev in spring 1238, he, apparently, returned the Kievan throne to Vladimir. However, Michael Vsevolodovich soon forced Vladimir out of Kiev [see 14, pp. 29–30; 18, pp. 185–186].

The capture of Kiev by Michael in 1238 was perceived in Rus’ as unlawful. The name list at the beginning of the Hypatian Chronicle of all Kievan princes ‘who reigned in Kiev before Batu’s slaughter’ does not mention Michael Vsevolodovich, while it contains all the other princes who occupied the Kievian throne before Batu came: Yaroslav Vsevolodovich, Vladimir Rurikovich, and Daniil Romanovich [28, p. 2]. When the Pskov chronicle reports the death of Vladimir Rurikovich (under the year 1239), it calls him the prince of Kiev (‘prince Vladimir Rurikovich of Kiev died’) [77, p. 12; see also 78, p. 79].

The Mongols also perceived Vladimir Rurikovich as the lawful Kievan prince, when in the fall of 1239, they concluded a peace treaty with him and Daniil Romanovich and Mstislav Glebovich directed against Michael Vsevolodovich, who fled from Kiev immediately afterwards [see 51, pp. 46–86]. It seems no accident that the chronicle reports about the reconciliation between the princes and the Tatars place Vladimir Rurikovich before Daniil Romanovich. ‘They made peace with Vladimir and Daniil … ’ [28, p. 772]; ‘… they reconciled with Mstislav and Vladimir and with Daniil’ [92, p. 301].

What happened to Vladimir Rurikovich afterwards is not entirely clear. For some reason, he had to leave Kiev in the late 1239 and soon died under unclear circumstances. He might have been killed in Smolensk, defending his native city from the Lithuanians’ attack [see 51, pp. 87–94].

So, when the Mongol source reports about the taking of all Ulādmur’s cities after Kiev, it means, as we see it, the cities under the control of Vladimir Rurikovich or, more precisely,
of his sons. This is all the more likely, because tsareviches Möngke participated in the taking of Kiev in 1240. The previous year, he, according to the Russian chronicles, arrived near Kiev to hold negotiation with Michael Vsevolodovich and forced him to flee from the city [28, p. 782; 92, p. 301]. Due to this, the Kievian throne was returned to Vladimir, which, of course, could not have happened without Möngke’s knowledge. A year later, Möngke and all Mongol leaders continued to consider Kiev to be Vladimir’s city, as there was no other prince there at that time.

One of Vladimir Rurikovich’s sons can be encountered on the pages of the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle. Following the report about Daniil Romanovich’s return to Volhynia after the Tatgars had left, we read: ‘Rostislav Vladimirovich came to Daniil in Chelm, as God saved him from the wicked Tatgars’ [28, pp. 788–789].

Dariusz Dąbrowski justifiably believes that the mentioned Rostislav Vladimirovich can only be the son of the former Kievian prince Vladimir Rurikovich, while the chronicle’s phrase ‘as God saved him from the wicked Tatgars’ may refer not only to the city of Chelm, as it is usually believed, but to Rostislav, who survived in the Tatar invasion [117, pp. 225–226; see also 118, pp. 548–551].

‘Three Vladimir’s sons’ mentioned by Rashid al-Din and his Mongol source were the only princes in Southern Rus’ who resisted the invaders. For three days, they defended their city, the name of which seems to have been of no interest to the Mongols. This town may have been the Kolodyazhin that is mentioned in the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle. To seize it, Batu had to use battering rams (like in the storm of Kiev) [28, p. 786]. It is also not improbable that the city of ‘Vladimir’s three sons’ can be found among the nameless fortified settlements existing until the mid-13th century at the border between the Kievian and Volhynian Lands.

The Conquest of Volhynia and Galicia.

The Galician-Volhynian prince Daniil Romanovich did not wait for the beginning of the enemy’s invasion and left his native land. He returned to Volhynia only after he got the word that the Mongols had left Rus’ [see 54, pp. 53–77]. This explains a peculiar character of the reports about the conquest of Galician-Volhynian Rus’ by the Tatgars, as given by Daniil’s court chronicler [see 56, pp. 87–99; 53, pp. 56–72; 55, pp. 6–12].

Daniil of Halych’s Chronicle reports about the unheard-of invasion of the steppe-dwellers very briefly and lightly, focusing all attention on how luckily the prince and his family escaped dangers [see 58, pp. 11–24]. The chronicler mentions the evidence of the disaster that befell the country only to the extent that it caught the sight of Daniil. Only a couple of lines described the invasion: ‘And [they] came to Vladimir, and took it by the spear, and killed without mercy; and the same [they did with] the city of Halicz and many other cities that are innumerable’ [28, p. 786].

Perhaps this is the only so cursory and obscure description of the catastrophe that befell the country among other surviving written sources originating from the Russian lands where local chronicles were compiled and literary works devoted to Batu’s invasion were created.

The massacre of Berestie inhabitants

When Daniil and Vasilko Romanovich returned to the ravaged by the Tatgars Volhynia after they had failed to win over from the Templars Drohiczyn town near the border with Mazovia [see 57, pp. 36–51], the first town in their way was Berestie. According to the chronicler, who apparently accompanied the princes personally and eye-witnessed the events, when Daniil and Vasilko arrived at Berestie, they could not go out of the town in the field because of the stench from many remaining bodies of the perished. ‘Daniil with his brother came to Berestie and could not go to the field because of the stench of the many killed’ [28, p. 788].
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It is noteworthy that the bodies of ‘the many killed’ were not in Berestie, as it could be expected, but somewhere on its outskirts, ‘in the field’. The town was not destroyed, and moreover, as far as one can judge, it did not suffer any significant damage. That is the conclusion that contemporary researchers have arrived at as a result of a study of archaeological artefacts of the medieval Berestie. ‘The excavations’, Piotr Lysenko writes, ‘did not reveal any traces of a massive fire or the destruction of the town in the layers of the mid-13th century’. Therefore, the historian concludes that ‘the most probable is the hypothesis that the town had not been seized and ruined, while the battle took place in its vicinity’ [45, p. 21; 46, p. 28].

Of course, one cannot exclude that a bloody battle took place at the walls of Berestie, about which the chronicler keeps silent for some reason. But who could participate in this battle? If it were the defenders of the town, why would they leave their native town and go for the battle with the Tatars in an open field, condemning themselves to death? Even if we suppose that the mass death of Berestie inhabitants ‘in the field’ resulted from an unsuccessful sally, in which most townspeople participated, it is unlikely that their armed resistance did not entail any consequences from the Mongols.

As far as we know, the mass death of Berestie residents outside the city walls described in the Chronicle of Daniil of Galicia is the only case of its kind that was reflected in chronicle reports about the Mongol invasion of Rus’. Perhaps, that is why the reasons of the event remain unclear.

In our opinion, to see more clearly the picture of tragic events that took place near the walls of Berestie, we should look more closely at some well-known facts from the history of Mongol conquests in Central Asia and the Middle East that illustrate the regularly used methods of subjecting cities and treating the conquered people.

In February 1221, the inhabitants of Balkh submitted to Chinggis Khan. ‘Then’, Rashid al-Din reports, ‘under the pretext that they need to count [people], the Mongols took all the people of Balkh in the steppe, divided them between the soldiers, and killed everybody’ [80, p. 218]. The same destiny befell the citizens of Fanakat (Beneket, Shahrukhiya), one of Khorezm cities: ‘on the fourth day the residents of the city begged for mercy and went out [of the city] … The Mongols separated warriors, craftsmen, and [common] people. Some warriors were killed with swords, others were shot, and the rest were divided into thousands, hundreds, and dozens’ [80, p. 201]. After the two-week siege in Khorasan, the Mongols took Nasa city. They drove the citizens out and ordered them to tie each other firmly. Then the slaughter began: The Mongols massacred 70,000 Nasa inhabitants, ‘feeding them to wild animals and the fowls of the air’ [62, pp. 96–97].

During the storm of Baghdad in February 1258, Hulagu Khan demanded from Caliph Al-Musta’sim: ‘Tell the townsmen to lay down arms and go out, so that we could count them’. When they fulfilled the requirement, the Mongols carried out a mass slaughter near the walls of the city: ‘townspeople laid down arms and went out in numbers, and the Mongols killed them’ [82, p. 44].

In late 1259, Hulagu’s army approached the Syrian fortress Harim. After a short siege ‘the local people begged for mercy’, intending to leave the city. ‘They went down as it was agreed upon on oath. Hulagu Khan was very angry with them and ordered that they should be killed at once, together with their wives and children … ’ [82, p. 50].

Even if the city gave up to the Mongols without resistance, its inhabitants had to come out beyond the city walls unarmed and humbly accept their fate. However, in this case, as a rule, there was no mass killing. In April 1219, the Khorezm city of Jend (Che-ta) gave in to the Mongols without struggle. The townspeople were driven out and kept in the field while the city was being plundered [114, pp. 88–90; 80, p. 200]. When the residents of Zarnuq city surrendered to Chinggis Khan, they were all taken out beyond the city walls. The young men were taken into the khashar (auxiliary troops used to assault cities). After the Mongols had destroyed the citadel,
they allowed others to return to their homes [114, pp. 98–100, p. 204]. The inhabitants of Nur, who gave up without struggle, were taken out into the field. Six hundred young men were selected for the khashar; others had to pay ransom [114, pp. 98–100; 80, pp. 204–205].

As we can see, before an assault, the Mongols offered to the citizens surrender and leave the city unarmed as a sign of humility. No oaths or safety guarantees were observed in such cases. Death or captivity often awaited those who surrendered. Only if the city gave in without resistance, could its residents preserve their life and freedom. Those cities were plundered mercilessly, but as a rule, they avoided a more massive devastation.

In light of these facts, the killing of Berestie citizens by the Mongols outside the city walls suggests that at first, the besieged townspeople resisted the invaders, but then they had to give up. They came out of the city unarmed and were killed. The fact that the bodies remained unburied for several months—supposedly, until April of 1241, when the Romanovichi could return from Poland after the Tatars had left—implies that there was nobody to commit them to the earth. The inhabitants of Berestie were either killed or taken to the khashar.

The taking of Volodymyr Volynskyi and the ‘Volhynian skulls’

One might think that other Volhynian cities, including Volodymyr, were seized under similar circumstances. Like Berestie, the capital city of Volhynia became almost desolate. When prince Daniil arrived there after the Tatars left, ‘there was nobody in Volodymyr who kept alive’. Though on that occasion, the prince found the unburied bodies of the dead townspeople not in the field near the city but in the city churches: ‘the church of the Holy Virgin Mary was full of dead bodies; other churches were full of corpses and dead bodies’ [28, p. 788].

This tragic scene, as well as the chronicler’s indication that Volodymyr was ‘taken by the spear’, apparently suggests that the city was assaulted by the Mongols. Archaeological data seems to support this conclusion.

As far as one can judge, in Volodymyr Volynskyi, more or less clear signs of resistance to the invaders were discovered. In 1930s, in the market square near the Kievan Gate, a common grave was accidentally found during earthwork. Many skeletons with broken skulls, cut-off limbs, and arrow points in backbones lay there at random. Weapons damaged in a battle were also there [106, p. 165; 95, pp. 46, 96]. It is very probable that these findings are the material evidence of the assault of Volodymyr by the Mongols in December 1240. However, the circumstances under which they were made do not allow precise dating.

The same should be said about the traces of many fires found within the territory of the medieval Volodymyr Volynskyi. There are no reliable grounds to interpret them as the consequence of the assault of the city by the Tatars.

The total destruction of the city in the mid-13th century is out of question. Most now known ancient churches of Volodymyr survived the Tatar invasion. Plano Carpine, who passed through Volodymyr Volynskyi, mentioned no traces of destruction that he later observed in Kiev [23, p. 47].

Finally, in our opinion, it is false that the Mongols imposed mass executions upon the intractable defenders of Volodymyr in revenge for their stubborn resistance, although the idea is shared by many contemporary researchers.

At various times, human skulls were found in the city’s territory with large iron nails hammered into the crowns of their heads and temporal bones. These skulls come from single graves and burial places located near ancient Volodymyr churches (Apostol’shchina, Mikhailovets, Spashchina areas) or under their vaults (Fedorovshchina, Staraia Kafedra areas). Several skulls were found in the city vicinity and in various settlements of the Volodymyr district [107, pp. 99, 368; see also 104, p. 33; 105, p. 223].

Vadim Kargalov, who studied this cranio logical material on the basis of one of Cyn kalowski’s publications, arrived at the idea that the skulls pierced with nails came from the
mass executions of the defenders of Volodymyr Volynskyi by the Tatars. ‘… The struggle for the city was long and fierce, and the Tatars had a hard time seizing it; for that reason, they imposed terrible executions upon its inhabitants’ [29, p. 127].

This interpretation became widely accepted in literature. Following Kargalov, most contemporary authors see in the nail-pierced human skulls from Volodymyr the evidence of mass executions carried out by the Mongols [40, p. 405; 103, p. 189; 30, p. 105; 37, p. 256].

On the other hand, a more grounded, in our opinion, explanation of the origin of ‘Volhynian skulls’ was suggested long ago. Among the supporters of that view were Alexandar Cynkałowski and Iaroskav Pasternak [69, p. 629]. Making a hole in a dead man’s skull with a nail or an iron tooth of a harrow is a well-known custom of dealing with ghosts and vampires that was especially popular among Ukrainian population, in particular in Volhynia and the Carpathian region, and still existed in the 19th century [21, p. 108; see also 39, pp. 109–124].

Contemporary researchers of the Old Russian obsequies attribute the findings of human skeletons with nail-pierced skulls in Kiev and Volodymyr Volynskyi to the now known community burial places, where the measures were taken to render the dead people safe in accordance with popular beliefs about vampires [68, p. 152].

Recently, new proofs were produced of the origin of the ‘Volhynian skulls’ as a result of an ancient local custom of fighting vampires [48, pp. 302–317]. In particular, a special cranio-metric investigation was carried out on one of the skulls with the nail driven into it that was found by Cynkałowski and is now kept in the Lviv historical museum (KR 23497). According to its basic characteristics, the skull pertains to the Volhynian anthropological type, that is, it belonged to an indigenous inhabitant of medieval Volhynia. The skull injuries clearly testify that they were inflicted after the death of its owner [48, p. 311].

In view of the given facts, the ‘Volhynian skulls’ can hardly be considered an evidence of long and stout resistance of the Volodymyr inhabitants to Batu’s troops. Moreover, as far as we know, no other data confirms that the Mongols used such a peculiar method of killing captured enemies.

The fate of Halych

That the Mongols seized Halicz—the capital of Roman Mstislavich’s domain, for which his sons struggled long and hard—the Chronicle of Daniil of Halych mentions casually. It reports nothing but the name of the city: The enemy won Halicz among ‘many other cities’.

This strange indifference to the fate of the capital city of Halicz seem to have puzzled the later chroniclers, who tried to complete the narration with some details in order to depict at least a general picture of the city’s fall: ‘And then they came to Halicz’, the Hustynia Chronicle reads, ‘took it, and burnt with fire, and cut some people, and captured others’ [22, p. 119].

With the current state of written sources, it is hardly possible to reconstruct a more complete picture. The suspicious silence of the Old Russian chronicles about the fall of Halicz and no mention thereof in the Mongol sources suggest that the capture of the city was an ordinary event that did not give cause to point out the heroism of its defenders or the valour of the Mongol commanders.

At the time of the Tatars’ attack, not only the prince was absent from Halicz but also a part of local boyars who had accompanied Daniil and his son Lev to Hungary and had stayed there until the Tatars left. This, of course, was not conducive for the success of the city’s defense.

Like in Volodymyr Volynskyi, archaeological investigation of the sites of medieval Halicz did not reveal any traces of total destruction in the mid-13th century. The main church of the city — the Assumption Cathedral — and many other structures had survived Batu’s invasion and were destroyed later due to other reasons.
Bogdan Tomenchuk, a contemporary researcher of ancient Halicz, has localised its stronghold to the ancient settlement of Krylos (now Krylos village, Halicz district, Ivanovo-Frankivsk Region) [for the discussion about the localisation and territorial structure of the ancient Halicz, see 47, pp. 467–476]. The settlement centred on a well-fortified princely castle of the area of 7 hectares. ‘Our excavations around the castle’, the historian writes, ‘have studied the strong wooden and earthen fortifications (III phase) that burned in the mid-13th century’ [98, p. 501]. The outer wall of the citadel, which had a more complicated cribwork structure, burned down too: ‘This defensive wall with housing and household extensions burned about the mid-13th century. Now it is fixed by a rather thick ash layer (0.3–0.7 m)’ [98, p. 515].

The burning of the citadel and the princely castle seem to evidence an assault. However, it is known that the Mongols did so even if the city surrendered voluntarily.

No traces of the mass death of the townspeople as a result of Batu’s invasion were found. Nevertheless, it is clear that the mid-13th century was a tragic milestone in the city’s history. Its golden age was over, and Halicz entered a period of decay. One can state a considerable decline in the total number of archaeological findings made in Halicz that date back to the period after the mid-13th century [see 13, pp. 61–67; 3, pp. 146–151; 4, pp. 70–74].

Apparently, Halicz, like other cities of South-Eastern Rus’, lost a significant part of its population that was killed or taken into khashar when the city had been captured by the Mongols. We see those Russian captives from Volhynia and Galicia later in the vanguard of the Mongol army that started warfare in Poland and Hungary.

Thus, according to Jan Długosz, Russian units went ahead of the Mongol army in Polish land and showed the way to the invaders. ‘Some Rusyns, who were very unfriendly to the Poles, directed their movement and led their way’ [124, p. 267]. Thomas of Split reports about a Russian deserter who warned the Hungarians before the decisive battle with the Tatars at the Sajó River (11 April 1241) about the turning movement that the enemy was preparing [100, p. 107].


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§ 4. The Campaign of Conquest of Central Europe: Military Force and Secret Diplomacy

*Alexander Majorov*

The study of the Mongols' campaign in Central Europe is usually concentrated on its military aspects—investigation of strategic plans and military tactics, movement routes and number of troops, and the results and progress of the main battles. And yet, in any war, there
is always an opposite side, so to speak. A side which, although seemingly staying in the shadows of brighter events unfolding directly in the theater of operations, nevertheless largely predetermines the overall outcome. I am speaking about the diplomatic preparation for war, to which the Mongols, as is well known, paid special attention. The political alliances and agreements crafted by the Mongols determined the balance of forces and, to a large extent, influenced the outcome of military campaigns. These kinds of activities typically were kept secret from the majority of the Mongols' contemporaries, and therefore their results are primarily evident from indirect signs requiring special analysis.

The Mongol Invasion and the Emperor's Rivalry with the Pope

The Aggressive Plans of the Mongols

The first indisputable evidence of the Mongols’ conquest plans for Western Europe, it would seem, was the Mongol Khan's message to the King of Hungary, Julianus, a Hungarian missionary of the Dominican Order, delivered this message in early 1238, after already having been to the Volga twice while looking for the ancestral homeland of the Hungarians. During his second trip, undertaken sometime between the summer and autumn of 1237, Julianus met in Suzdal some ambassadors who had been directed by the Mongol Khan to go straight to the Hungarian King, Béla IV. The Grand Prince of Vladimir and Suzdal, Yury Vsevolodovich, interned these ambassadors for some unknown reasons, and instead gave the Khan's letter to Julianus to give to the Hungarian King [see: 20; 81, pp. 589–602; 52]. Threatening an inevitable attack, the Mongol Khan rudely demanded that the Hungarian King voluntarily recognize his supreme power [1, pp. 88–89].

Moreover, Julianus learned from the Grand Prince of Vladimir and Suzdal as well as other informants that the ultimate objective of the Mongol conquests in the West was Rome, the path to which lay through Hungary. ‘Many believe, and the Suzdal Prince used me to pass his words to the Hungarian King, that the Tatars are holding counsel day and night so as to come and conquer the Kingdom of the Hungarian-Christians. For they say, they have the intention to march on Rome and further’ [1, p. 88].

Béla IV himself then immediately informed the Roman Curia about the imminent threat. Julianus's report of his journey including the text of the Mongol ultimatum, was then sent to the uncle of the Hungarian King, the Patriarch of Aquileia Berthold of Andechs, to be sent further to the Pope [81, pp. 600–601].

It is clear that the initial plans of the Mongols also included the conquest of German lands which lay on their path to Rome. The German Emperor Frederick II also received a message from the Mongol Khan at the same time as the Pope. The text of the document did not survive. The only evidence of the message we have is from the Cistercian monk Albrik’s (died appr. 1252) Chronicle, from the Three Fountains Abbey in Champagne.

From the Chronicle in 1238, we read: ‘The Tatar King wrote to the Emperor Frederick, dictating to him that if Frederick submits to the Tatar King he will be given land and the opportunity to select for himself a position in the King's court. To this the Emperor replied that he was good with birds and could become a distinguished falconer for him (the Khan–Author)’ [10, p. 943]. At times, the reliability of this message is questioned [49, p. 61]. However, it is neither the Khan's ultimatum or its content that is questioned, but the extremely bizarre answer of the Emperor.

In any case, the French chronicler treated the Khan's ultimatum of threats against the Emperor as seriously as he treated news of the Tatars' impending attack on Hungary. One year earlier, Albrik had written down a message in his Chronicle regarding rumours alleging the Tatars' intended to conquer the Kingdom of Hungary in the near future [10, p. 942].

Following the defeat of the Hungarian King's army by the Mongols at the Battle of the Sajo River (April 11, 1241), anxious talks about the invaders' further plans to conquer Germany and the entire Christian world reverberated throughout Europe.
It follows from the 19 June 1241 letter of Pope Gregory IX to the Abbot of the Heiligenkreuz Monastery in Vienna that the Pontiff received many related signals: ‘From the letters of the noble dukes [...] of Austria and [...] Carinthia, we know that following the subjugation of the Kingdom of Hungary to onslaught and large-scale conquest, without distinction of sex or age, intoxicating their swords by the blood of those whom they can seize, the Tatars wish to attack the Czech and German kingdoms, turn the entire Christian land into a desert, and destroy our faith’ [33, pp. 722–723].

The Emperor Frederick II confirmed these same intentions of the invaders in his encyclical on June 20, 1241 against the Tatars (which has survived in many copies), writing: ‘We firmly believe that the Tatars want to profane the mother of our religion and faith, the holy Roman Church, and conquer the capital and the main city of our Empire on the basis of domination or, better [to say], violence’ [67, pp. 322–325].

In July 1241, when the Hungarian lands to the north of the Danube were already under the sway of the invaders, the Hungarian King Béla IV informed the German King Conrad IV about the further plans of the invaders: ‘...we are sure that they (the Tatars—Author) are planning to catch Germany by surprise when winter comes and, after quelling all resistance there, to conquer other kingdoms and provinces’ [30, p. 348]. This document has survived in several copies [30, p. 347] suggesting the importance given to its content.

The Emperor's Inaction

Despite numerous stories about the horrors of the Mongols' conquests in the east, their victories over the Kipchaks, and their seizure of Kiev and other Russian cities, people in Europe seemed to have underestimated the true power of the Mongols and the determination of these invaders to go further west. Up until the defeat of the army of Béla IV by the Mongols at the Battle of the Sajó River and the subsequent arrival of these enemies to the banks of the Danube, the Emperor and Pope, presumably, supposed that the Hungarians would be able to deal with the aggressors on their own, or at the very least that the Mongols would have to spend too much time and force to conquer the Kingdom of Hungary, the largest and strongest state of Central Europe.

An echo of this sentiment rings out in the words of Emperor Frederick II. Rationalizing his long inaction towards the aggressors, Frederick claims that he was relying on the ‘large number of brave Princes and their people, those who resisted the weapon and violence of the coming Tatars at that time’. In the same document—the encyclical against the Tatars—the Emperor admits that due to ‘the large distance, we were sure that the Tatars would not be able to catch us by surprise’ [67, p. 323].

By all appearances, only a month after the defeat at the Battle of the Sajó River, the Hungarian King asked the Emperor directly for military assistance. On 18 May 1241, Béla IV sent his ambassador, the Watzke Bishop Stephan, from Zagreb to Italy with letters to the Emperor and Pope. And it is probable that Béla asked for help from the French King Louis IX at the same time, as can be gleaned from later diplomatic correspondences [26, p. 220 sq.]. In the letter to the Pope, the Hungarian King wrote: ‘We kindly request and beseech you, let the wisdom of Your Holiness give the Kingdom of Hungary and us proper council and provide support for the sake of the Christian people’ [90, p. 182, nr. 335].

The original letter of Béla IV to Frederick II did not survive, but its content, briefly explained in the Chronicle of Richard of San Germano (died appr. 1243), the court notary of Frederick II, is as follows: ‘In this very month (June 1241—Author), a rumor has come to the Emperor that the Tatars have defeated the Hungarian King and are already at the gates of Germany. The Emperor received this information from the Hungarian King himself, through the King's messenger, a Watzke Bishop; and in these letters the King promised to submit himself and the Kingdom of Hungary to the power of the Emperor, if only the Emperor were to save him from those Tatars by the shield of his patronage’ [76, p. 380]. The contents of this
letter are confirmed by a message from the Annals of Saint Pantaleon's Church in Cologne (also known as The Greater Annals of Cologne or The Royal Chronicle of Cologne): the Hungarian King "through the Watzke Bishop asked for the Emperor's help, promising eternal allegiance if he gives him back his Kingdom" [13, p. 535].

The exhortation of the Hungarian King coincided with the preparation for a crusade against the Tatars in German lands, headed by the son of Frederick II, the German King Conrad IV. In May 1241, Frederick II urged his subjects to 'take up the cross' against the Tatars and come to Nuremberg by 1 July [67, pp. 445–446]. At the same time, the so-called 'Military Instructions' (Praecepta bellica) against the Tatars, known from a 13th century manuscript, were prepared in the Royal Curia [67, p. 445]. And furthermore, on 16 June a set of papal bulls was published with calls of support for the Hungarian King, including an appeal to all ecclesiastical Prelates and clerics [90, p. 184, nr. 339].

Frederick II, for his part, issued his encyclical against the Tatars only on 20 June 1241 [67, pp. 322–325]. Frederick's reply to King Béla IV, dated approximately in the latter half of June, has only survived in a later, undated copy. In this response, the Emperor states that he is busy with some urgent matters in Italy and urges the Hungarian King to wait until he comes with his son Conrad and large imperial army to help the Hungarians [42, pp. 1143–1146].

And so there is no doubt that the Emperor initially intended for Hungary to stop the Tatars on its own and unaided, without any military assistance from the West. In his letter addressed to the English King Henry III and other Christian sovereigns, dated 3 July 1241 and quoted in Chronica Majora of the Benedictine monk Matthew of Paris (died after 1259), Frederick lays the blame for the defeat of the Hungarians entirely on King Béla: 'Their King, lazy and extremely careless, [...] did not properly set an example, neither to his people nor to outsiders, on how to prudently prepare for the defense and protection of his subjects against the raids of the [Tatars]' [65, p. 113].

It appears from this letter that the Emperor was aware in advance of the numerous threats posed by the Mongols to Béla: '...through messengers and ambassadors, the Tatars demanded that he (the Hungarian King–Author), if he values his own life as well as those of his [subjects], shall hurry to curry their favor by transferring [into their hands] himself and his kingdom' [65, p. 113]. Consequently, the Hungarian King repeatedly appealed to the supreme Suzerain of Europe with news of the military plans of the Mongols and, undoubtedly, requests for help.

Records from the aforementioned Albrik of Three Fountains allow us to determine Frederick's reaction towards such appeals. The Emperor did not take the Mongol threat seriously for a long time and, even while the enemy's march into Europe raged on, admitted that, despite repeated and frequent warnings, he did not believe in the real possibility of a Mongol invasion until the very last moment [10, p. 943; see also: 42, pp. 1139–1140]. In his encyclical against the Tatars, Frederick wrote directly, 'Although we had been hearing about them (the Tatars–Author) for a long time already, we were nevertheless afraid to believe in what we heard; and we preferred not to believe it' [67, pp. 322–325].

Confrontation Between Emperor and Pope

Apart from the general underestimation of the scale of the Mongol danger, there was another reason why the Hungarian King could not count on getting real military assistance against the Tatars from either the Emperor or the Pope.

At the turn of 1230/1240s, Gregory IX and Frederick II were competing with one another for political hegemony in Northern Italy. Both sought to take advantage of the Mongol factor in this struggle. As a condition for calling a crusade against the Tatars in Hungary's defense, the Pope stipulated that the King come over to the camp of the Pope's supporters and break off relations with the Emperor [57, p. 127; see also: 39, p. 304].
On 20 March 1239, Gregory IX excommunicated Frederick II once again, with this excommunication lasting up until the death of the latter. Furthermore, on 1 July 1239, a papal encyclical was published, probably written by the Cardinal Rainer of Viterbo, a sworn enemy of Frederick, in which the Emperor was denounced as a heretic and ‘the final forerunner to the Antichrist’. In turn, the Emperor and his supporters launched a counter-propaganda campaign in Northern Italy, glorifying Frederick as the new Messiah [see: 70, pp. 49–57].

On 9 August 1240, Gregory IX declared that a new ecumenical Council with the purpose of condemning the Emperor would be convened for Easter of 1241. Leaving unanswered the unsettling news about the coming of the Tatars, the Pope strongly urged the Hungarian King to come to the Council and ensure the arrival of the Hungarian Prelates [90, nrs. 329, 330]. In one message, dated 15 October 1240, the Pontiff demanded Béla ignore threats from the Emperor and personally be present at the Council [90, nrs. 331, 332]. The Chaplain of His Holiness John Civiello then went to Hungary in order to instruct Béla and the Hungarian Bishops on how to circumvent the obstacles arranged by the Emperor on the way to Rome [90, nr. 327]. And just one month before the invasion of the Tatars, the Apostolic See was still urging Béla to oppose the Emperor. In letters to the Hungarian King and Archbishop of Esztergom, sent on 26 February 1241, Gregory IX repeatedly demanded they come to Rome for the council, not accepting any objections or delays [90, nr. 333; 33, p. 709].

Other participants were now arriving from all over Europe, convening at the northern borders of Italy but unable to go further because of the Emperor’s opposition. Genoa then agreed to take the participants from Nice to Rome by sea, bypassing the territories controlled by Frederick. However, the Emperor managed to organise a naval blockade with the help of Pisa, the rival of Genoa. On Friday of 3 May 1241, between the Montecristo and Giglio islands of the Tuscan Archipelago, the Genoese fleet suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of the Emperor’s allies’ fleet, headed by the Emperor’s son Enzio, King of Sardinia, and the Admiral Ansaldo de Mari. Out of twenty seven ships of the Genoese fleet, only two managed to escape. Over a hundred Roman Prelates were captured by Frederick (these events are described in numerous documents from the Imperial Chancery [see: 42, pp. 1108, 1120, 1124 sq., 1127, 1146]. European chroniclers of the 13th century also discussed these matters [see: 64, p. 325; 76, p. 380; 11, pp. 194–196; 15, p. 229 sq.]). And consequently, the convening of the council was discontinued.

And then, in the latter half of June 1241, having received news on the Hungarian King’s defeat by the Tatars, Emperor Frederick headed to Rome with his army under the pretense of negotiating with the Pope about organising a crusade against the invading barbarians. However, Rome was virtually under siege. It was in these circumstances that the Pope passed away, on 22 August 1241. And there exists to this day extensive literature on the confrontation between Emperor Frederick II and Pope Gregory IX (for the latest works see: [88, pp. 36–43; 47, pp. 73–75, 178, 186–190]).

The Secret Diplomacy of Emperor Frederick II

The Anti-Staufe Coalition

It seems, the military assistance for Hungary promised by Emperor Frederick and his son, the German King Conrad, never arrived. From diplomatic correspondences and other imperial documents it can be concluded that Frederick II was planning to take active measures against the Tatars, but only after settling his conflict with the Pope. However, even with the death of Gregory IX, the matter never advanced past the issuing of declarations [see: 42, pp. 1141–1142, 1144–1146, 1152, 1166; 43, pp. 5, 65; pp. 116–117; see also: 21, pp. 78–81].

It is true that Matthew of Paris, sympathetic to the Emperor, wrote in a 1241 report that the sons of Frederick, Conrad and Enzio, defeated the Tatars and Cumans “with an innumerable army collected from all corners of the Empire” in a fierce battle somewhere near the Danube [65, p. 131]. And in his 1244 report, Matthew maintains, again, that the Kingdom of
Hungary was liberated from the Tatars by the army of Frederick: ‘Having sent an innumerable army, the Emperor, not without great expense and danger, liberated this kingdom from the inhuman Tatars and decisively and wisely expelled them away from the borders of Hungary’ [65, p. 298].

Researchers, however, regard these reports as either false or too exaggerated. The same tone is also heard in the accounts of several sources related to the victories over the Mongols of the Dukes of Bavaria and Austria [see: 75, pp. 100–105; 40, pp. 153–164]. From the letter of the new Pope, Innocent IV, dated 21 August 1245, we see that Béla did not receive any military assistance from the Emperor against the Tatars. The Pope on this basis released the King from his earlier oath of loyalty to Frederick [90, pp. 199–200, nr. 369].

The facts that we know about the personal relationship between Béla IV and Frederick II bear witness against the version of events where the Empire's military assistance liberated Hungary from the Tatars. Immediately following his ascension to the throne (autumn 1235), Béla refused to pay the Emperor the annual tax (tribute) of five thousand marks of silver; a tax the former Hungarian King, Andrey II, had agreed to pay. And the ambassadors to the Emperor, arriving to collect the money, also happened to become witnesses to a huge scandal in the royal family: the stepmother of Béla, the Dowager Queen Beatrice, dressed as a boy groom, fled the palace with her lover. However, she was recognized by the Emperor's ambassadors who were on their way to collect the tribute, and soon the incident became known all throughout Europe [10, p. 939; see also: 57, p. 122].

According to Roger of Apulia, at the very same time, followers of Béla had intercepted letters from some Hungarian Barons to the Duke of Austria, Frederick the Quarrelsome, and Emperor Frederick II containing an offer to place the Kingdom of Hungary under the Emperor's patronage [74, p. 547].

In his confrontation with the Emperor, Béla IV relied on the support of Rome. In the late 1230s, through the efforts and active support of the Holy See's Special Envoy to Pope Gregory IX, Archdeacon Albert von Behaim (died appr. 1260), the Anti-Staufer coalition of European rulers was formed.

A native of Bohemia (according to one version), Behaim was a canon in Passau and archdeacon in Lorsch. He then spent several decades at the Papal court, and from 1246 to 1260 was a dean of the diocesan chapter in Passau (Bavaria). Many historical, theological, and journalistic works are attributed to Behaim. According to Johann Engelberger, these numerous extant scattered fragments had previously formed a single finished work—A Description of Peoples and Various Countries of Europe (Descriptio gentium et diversarum nationum Europe) [see: 31, pp. 26–49; 32].

Thanks to the decisive actions of Behaim, the Czech King Wenceslaus and Duke of Bavaria, Otto II, joined the side of the Pope. They were then soon followed by Béla IV and the Prince of Poland, Henry II the Pious [see: 71, nrs. 11322–11323; see also: 51, pp. 57–58].

As a means of weakening the positions of the Staufens in Germany, Rome refused to recognize the German King Conrad IV (the 13-year-old son of Frederick II) as the legitimate ruler and demanded a new election. Those who disagreed suffered severe persecution: upon the initiative of Behaim in 1240, Archbishop of Salzburg Eberhard II, Passau Bishop Rüdiger von Bergheim, and a number of other supporters of the Emperor from the German clergy were all excommunicated. One zealous Papal emissary demanded that Frederick II von Parsberg, the Prince-Bishop of Eichstätt, impose an interdict (prohibition of all church services) on the inhabitants of Nuremberg, Weissenberg, and Greding for providing auxiliary troops to the Emperor for his military operations in Northern Italy [see: 19, p. 108 sq.].

By the end of 1240, the most powerful Princes of the Church in Germany, reserving the rights of Kurfürsts [Prince-Electors]—including the Archbishop of Cologne Konrad von Hochstaden (whom Frederick II, relying on his loyalty, appointed as an Imperial Prince with
secular rights in 1238) and the Archbishop of Mainz, Siegfried III von Eppstein (appointed by the Emperor as Regent to the infant King Conrad)—began to view the Pope favourably. Only the imminent danger of the Tatar invasion restrained these Prelates [see: 35, p. 1867].

As a means of currying favor with Béla IV, Behaim proposed to include his vote in the new election for King of Germany, despite the fact that the Hungarian King did not hold Kurfürst rights [see: 9, p. 28]. And so, once preliminary preparations were completed, Behaim in March 1241 requested that the Pope send a new legate by sea to Hungary, where he was to be met by Otto II, Duke of Bavaria, and Henry the Pious. Together, they would then travel to Germany for the election [9, p. 27; see also: 68, p. 713].

Contacts of Frederick II with the Mongols

In this difficult situation of conflict with the Pope, Emperor Frederick II apparently established some contacts with the Mongols and tried to obtain their help in the fight against the Pope and his supporters.

In any case, many contemporaries of the Mongol invasion of Europe expressed such suspicions about the Emperor. The main denouncer was Albert von Behaim, who directly accused Frederick of conspiring with the Mongols and inciting them to attack Europe based on the fact that ambassadors of the Emperor were seen in the enemy camp on the eve of the invasion.

Part of the documents of Behaim are known from extracts made by Bavarian court historian Johan Georg Turkayer, also known as Giovanni Aventino (Aventinus) (1477–1534), which are stored at the Bavarian State Library. Among them is a copy of a message to the bishop of Ferrara and other prelates, the original of which is dated 27 March 1241. In particular, this document contains the following information: ‘It was reported from some parts of Germany that ambassadors of Frederick had been seen in the army of those barbarians (the Tatars—Author), who are already prepared to invade’ [9, p. 28].

However, the given source of information is questionable in view of its extreme political bias. Still, persistent rumours about Frederick's collusion with the Mongols were repeatedly noted by witnesses more loyal to the emperor as well.

This primarily concerns the news of Matthew of Paris, a monk of St Albans Abbey in Hertfordshire (England), whose political sympathies were entirely on the Emperor's side. As noted by almost all researchers who have studied the works of this chronicler, in his desire to glorify Frederick and belittle his enemies, the greatest of whom were the Popes, he didn't mind distorting facts and often used unreliable information, even when he described events related to the Mongol invasion [see: 77, pp. 116–132; 75, pp. 92–96; 40].

Nevertheless, the chronicler could not get around information that he learned about the collusion of the Emperor with the Mongols, and the evidence that he provided still remains the main source on this matter.

Under the year 1241 in his Chronica Majora, Matthew added a special chapter about ‘ill suspicions’ concerning Frederick, which becomes a kind of response of the chronicler to the his aforementioned Message of the Emperor Concerning the Tatar invasion to the English King and other Christian rulers of Europe, dated 3 July 1241 [see: 65, pp. 112–119].

According to the chronicler, the rumours about the collusion of the Emperor with the Tatars which flooded all of Europe were fueled by obvious nonsense contained in the aforementioned message: ‘Strange rumours have spread all over Europe and even in the Saracen lands, with regard to which there is no consensus. There were people who insisted that the Emperor was deliberately using the Tatars, that scourge of the nations, and that his wordy, cunning letter served as nothing more than a cover for his sinister and daring plans, in which Frederick dreamed of power over the entire world and the destruction of the Christian faith, like Lucifer or the Antichrist’ [65, p. 119].
Matthew felt the greatest indignation with regard to the false information contained in Frederick's letter about the origins of the Tatars: 'He was reproached', continues Matthew, 'with one part of the letter that contained a lie. It said that the Tatars, whom nobody had known before, came from the southern countries located in the hot zone; however, this is obviously a fiction, because we have never heard that the Tatars went through the southern or eastern countries' [65, pp. 119–120].

This 'lie' of Frederick and the impossibility of getting reliable information led to new suspicions: 'Some suspected even more terrible things, as if the secret operations of the Tatars were accomplished with agreement from the Emperor. Nobody could understand their intentions, because they are able to keep their language secret and have learned to change their weapons. If one of them (the Tatars–Author) is captured, even the most cruel tortures will not get information from him about their plans and intentions' [65, p. 120].

Analyzing the consequences of the Tatar invasion of Hungary and other countries of Europe, Matthew found new evidence of collusion between Frederick and the steppe-dwellers: ‘...it was these Tatars, together with the Cumans, who being invited by the Emperor attacked the King of the Hungarians and other rulers of the Empire in order to drain their strength and force them to seek salvation with the Emperor and swear fealty to him so that he would help them in return. Indeed, the Tatars left as soon as this happened’ [65, p. 120].

Yet the chronicler, who was well-disposed toward Frederick, finished his investigation of the suspicions about the latter's collusion with the Tatars with doubt: ‘However, I am far from the idea that this evil could arise in the heart of only one person’ [65, p. 120].

Under the year 1247, Matthew of Paris again addresses the issue of relations between Frederick II and the Tatars and reports new reasons to suspect the Emperor of collusion with the barbarians. According to the chronicler, when Frederick was deposed by the Council of Lyons (summer 1245), ‘many sensible men’ were seriously afraid that ‘the distressed and extremely furious Emperor will renounce the true faith or will call the Tatars from Rus’ to help him, or the Sultan of Babylon, with whom he lived in friendship’ [65, p. 635].

The rumours repeatedly described by Matthew about collusion between the Tatars and the Emperor, who was trying to bring the recalcitrant Hungarian king under his power, are confirmed by other sources of the mid-13th century.

In particular, this is attested to by Richer from Senones (died ca. 1266), a monk from the Benedictine abbey of St Peter in Senones (French, German Sen [Vogesen, Lotharingia]). He traveled extensively across France and Southern Germany, and he had been to the court of Emperor Frederick II and was well aware of the political developments of that time.

In his The Deeds of the Senonian Church (Gesta Senoniensis Ecclesiae), in the chapter devoted to the Tatar invasion of Hungary, Richer notes the following: ‘Some said that Emperor Frederick caused them (the Tatars–Author) to attack Hungary, because the King of received from the Emperor Kingdom of Hungary did not want to submit to him; later this was confirmed. The King of Hungary was to submit to the power of his lord the Emperor and received the Kingdom of Hungary [from him]’ [73, p. 310].

Obviously, news about collusion between Emperor Frederick and the Tatars demands careful attention in view of their possible association with the massive Anti-Staufer propaganda of Rome. However, as P. Jackson aptly noted, these accusations, and especially information that the Emperor had sent his ambassadors to the Mongols, are not so absurd as they might seem on the face of it. Suffice it to recall that in the past the Christian rulers of Europe had repeatedly resorted to the services of nomads to achieve their political goals [49, p. 68].

The defeat of the Emperor's opponents

The lack of direct evidence of secret relations between Emperor Frederick II and the Mongols to some extent can be compensated by indirect data, which, in our opinion, is quite eloquent.
When analyzing the course of events during the Mongol invasion of the countries of Central Europe, T. Yasinky noted an important pattern: ‘It cannot be a mere coincidence that in spring of 1241, the brunt of the Mongols fell upon the supporters of the Pope, except for Bavaria, which only due to its geographical location avoided the fate of Hungary, the Czech lands (Moravia) and Poland’ [51, p. 58].

Even if we exclude the idea of collusion between the Mongols and Frederick, there can be no doubt that the invaders were well aware of the alignment of political forces in Europe, and, in one way or another, took sides in the conflict by attacking only the supporters of Pope Gregory IX. In view of the immense scale of military operations in Central Europe, it is difficult to accept that the Mongols relied only on luck and hadn't established any contacts with their potential ally Frederick. The latter is all the more likely because the military campaign was led by Subutai, who constantly relied on diplomacy [51, pp. 58–59].

Indeed, if we remember the Anti-Staufer alliance which was created by the efforts of Albert von Behaim at the turn of the 1230/1240s and consisted of the rulers of Bavaria, the Czech lands, Hungary and Poland, and compare this fact with the results of the Mongol invasion of Europe in 1241, we can attest that the invaders attacked only the lands of the opponents of Emperor Frederick.

In Poland, the Mongol attack fell upon the lands of the Duke of Silesia, Greater Poland and Krakow, Henry II the Pious, and the Duke of Sandomierz Boleslaw V the Chaste, who was under his guardianship. In January 1241, the Mongols conquered Lublin and Zawichost; Sandomierz fell on 13 February; the armies of the voivodes of Krakow and Sandomierz were defeated on 18 March in the battle at Khmelnik (near Krakow); Krakow fell on 28 March. Duke Boleslaw the Chaste fled to Hungary, and later to Moravia [for a reconstruction and chronology of events see: 59, pp. 189–224; 56; 50; 25].

On 9 April 1241, near the city of Legnica (Lower Silesia), the army of Henry the Pious, consisting of the troops of Silesia and Lesser and Greater Poland, joined by German and Moravian knights, was utterly defeated and almost entirely destroyed by a Mongol detachment of roughly the same size and headed by a Tsarevich Orda; Prince Henry was captured and executed ignominiously [see: 91; 22; 62].

The Army of the Czech king Wenceslaus I, which was coming to help Henry the Pious, arrived just one day late for the beginning of the battle of Legnica. In the second half of April 1241, the Mongol army invaded the lands of Moravia and within several days had brutally devastated them. Only cities and castles fortified beforehand upon the order of the Emperor had survived. Haste in the actions of the Mongols in Moravia is most likely explained by an order from Batu to urgently move a detachment of Orda to join the main Mongolian forces in Hungary [see: 58; 8].

In spring 1241, the brunt of the attack of the Mongolian armies fell upon the Kingdom of Hungary. Most likely the main attack began on the eve of Easter (31 March), although the first clashes had already occurred on the eastern borders of the Kingdom at the end of 1240. In the decisive battle on the Sajó river (11 April) the Mongols defeated and destroyed the army of Béla IV and his brother Coloman, and then occupied the entire territory of the country to the north of the Danube [see: 86; 85].

The subsequent actions of the Mongols on the territory of the Kingdom of Hungary resemble a special operation to capture Béla: having crossed the Danube in winter 1241/42, in early March they had already reached the Adriatic, where systematically looked for the fugitive King along the entire coast, visiting one city after another. After receiving information that Béla was hiding in the fortress of Klis (close to Split), the Mongols made several attempts to storm the fortress, but when they had made sure that the king wasn't there, they raised the siege and moved to the island fortress of Trogir. Only the barrier of the water, insuperable for the Mongol cavalry, saved Béla from capture [see: 87, pp. 142–143].
According to some very unreliable data, Duke Otto II of Bavaria was also unable to avoid a clash with the Mongols. The annals of the Tewkesbury monastery (Gloucestershire, England) contain the following message under the year 1240: ‘A nation appeared called the Tartars, the sons of Ishmael, who came from caves, 30 million or more [in number]. They devastated all provinces through which they passed. But Duke of Bavaria killed many of them and threw them into the river’ [12, p. 118].

Researchers consider this report to be false [83, pp. 135, 147; 82, p. 45; 40, p. 67]. However, some information from the chronicle of Philipp Muske (mid 13th century) seems to imply some kind of victory of the Duke of Bavaria over the Mongols: ‘On the other hand, the Duke of Bavaria, // He, his way and his banner // Easily intimidated them [the Tatars]’ [24, p. 681, vv. 30963–30965].

After learning about Frederick’s relations with the Mongols, the former supporters of the Pope hurried to normalize relations with the Emperor at any cost. Already in May 1241, Béla IV, as we have seen, agreed to recognize the sovereignty of the Emperor, while the Czech King Wenceslaus I established contacts with Frederick’s son, Conrad IV, by declaring his determination to fight against the Tatars [27, pp. 134–135, nr. 79]. Next, Bolesław the Bald (the Horned), the eldest son of Duke Henry the Pious of Poland, who had died in the battle of Legnica, sent an embassy to the Emperor [51, p. 60].

**Crusade against the Mongols**

**Mobilisation in the German Lands**

In the German Lands, the crusade against the Mongols started even before the official call of Pope Gregory IX and the authorisation of Emperor Frederick II.

In April 1241, the German prelates at the local church councils adopted several decrees on preparation for the crusade, declared extra church fasts and organized public confessions. Monks of the mendicant orders who had fled from Hungary and Poland because of the Mongols became actively involved in the propaganda of the crusade and launched a massive fund-raising campaign for its needs [see: 48, pp. 6–10; 61, pp. 59–60; 36, p. 262].

The Annals of the St. Panteleimon monastery in Cologne contain the following lines: ‘Following this battle (the battle of the Sajó river–Author), as well as following the defeats in Poland and Hungary, many preaching brothers and minorites fled, and by the sign of the cross raised almost all the German clergy and laity against these barbarians [...] The King, the son of the Emperor, the archbishop of Cologne and a great many nobles of Germany also put on the Life-Giving Cross. Great fear of this barbarian people took hold of distant lands as well, not only Gaul, but also Burgundy and Spain, where nobody had heard the name of the Tatars before’ [13, p. 535].

Apart from Konrad I von Hochstaden, the Archbishop of Cologne, an important role in the preparation of the crusade was played by the Archbishop of Mainz Siegfried III von Eppstein, archchancellor of the Holy Roman Empire and regent of the German king Conrad IV.

The Chronicle of the bishops of Worms (the Annals of Worms) from the 13th century reports the mass mobilization of volunteers and fund-raising that was started throughout Germany, and especially in the Archbishops of Mainz: ‘Having heard that (news about the invasion of the Tatars–Author), Lord Siegfried, Archbishop of Mainz, commanded Christians everywhere to observe the church fasts and to organise in the province of Mainz public confessions and processions carrying relics and prayers against the Tartars [...]. He also ordered and determined to preach about the above-mentioned Crusade throughout the province. And with the greatest zeal it was announced everywhere that those who fight against the Tartars would be granted absolution for all their sins; and that those who cannot or do not want to go should give of their property that which God inspires him to, and it will be divided between
the poor participants of the campaign. Almost everybody agreed to go and fight against the Tatars, and an incalculable amount of money was raised from everywhere’ [16, pp. 46–47].

On 26 April 1241, Bishop Henry of Constance, submitting to the authority of the Archbishop of Mainz, announced the preparation for the crusade against the Tatars and the raising of funds for the needs of the crusade [see: 42, pp. 1209–1213].

At the same time, King Conrad IV proclaimed the ‘peace of the land’ (Landfrieden) in Germany, a legal prohibition on using military force to resolve private conflicts [see: 42, pp. 1207–1208]. An important role in the mobilisation of forces for the crusade against the Tatars was played by the landgrave of Thuringia, Heinrich IV Raspe [see: 65, p. 110; 67, p. 78] and the Czech King Wenceslaus I [see: 23, pp. 105–117].

The so called Edict of King Conrad IV (known now only from the first publication in 1723) addressed to the subjects of the Empire ‘for living in the lower lands’ (probably in the lower reaches of the Rhine), reports that at the council in Esslingen, which was held ‘on the past feast of Pentecost’ (19 May 1241), ‘we have taken up the all-conquering sign of the cross’ against the Tatars, regardless of the Pope’s will, and ‘we will bear this cross up until the feast of St Martin’ (11 November), and if needed, even longer. The Council members expressed their determination ‘on the octave of the coming feast of St. John the Baptist (1 July) to safely gather our troops around Nuremberg and together with them and all those faithful to Christ to go and fight against the Tatar dogs’ [67, pp. 445–446].

Emperor Frederick II expressed his full support for this initiative when he learned about the preparations for the campaign. According to the annals of St. Panteleimon monastery in Cologne: ‘The Emperor wrote to the magnates of Germany that they should provide support (to the crusade—Author), because he also was going to help the Christian world against the bloodthirsty barbarians’ [13, p. 535].

In response to a request for help from King Béla IV of Hungary, the Emperor ordered him to join the army of King Conrad, promising to personally lead the combined forces and win a quick victory over the enemy: ‘...from heaven we will be granted the victory which we are accustomed to win over all our enemies, and we will defeat the Tatar hordes’ [42, pp. 1143–1146].

By the time these lines were written (the latter half of June 1241), the Hungarian king had probably already conducted some negotiations with German rulers and shared with them the bitter experience of his failures. Addressing Béla IV, Frederick II wrote the following: ‘We encourage the desire of you and your people, for the sake of resisting the attack and invasion of our common enemies, to appeal to our beloved son Conrad, elected King of the Romans, in order to prevent him from fighting against them in the open field until we come with a big army for a complete victory over them’ [42, pp. 1145–1146].

The warning addressed to the Hungarian king about the danger of fighting against the Tatars in the open field was recorded in the so called Military Orders (Praecepta bellica) prepared in the Curia of the German King, probably soon after the military Council in Esslingen (known from the 13th century manuscript). The first item of the orders contains the following: ‘Rulers should not themselves seek the Tatars in the field, but should protect their borders; for if they happen to be defeated by the will of God, they will no longer be able to assemble their troops’ [67, p. 445].

It is possible that the warnings addressed to Béla IV were the reason for postponing the start of the crusade and moving the day for marching out planned in Esslingen to a later time—from 1 to 25 July. This can be concluded from the letter of a Dominican monk and a Franciscan monk (whose names are denoted with the initials R. and J.) quoted by Matthew of Paris in his Chronica Majora. The letter says that Emperor Frederick and his son King Conrad had planned a general attack against the Tatars ‘on the coming feast of St. James’ (25 July 1241) having gathered their troops in Merseburg (Marburg?). At that time, Béla IV was ready
to head out to meet them with a large army, of which he informed his recent ally in the Anti-Staufer coalition, the Czech King Wenceslaus I: ‘...the Hungarian King wrote to the king of Bohemia that he wishes to head out to meet them, having gathered men and equipped a large army’ [66, pp. 81–83].

The defense of the borders of the Empire on the Danube.

At the same time, preparations were being made to repel a possible attack of the Mongols in other parts of the Holy Empire, especially on the Hungarian-Austrian border.

Duke Frederick II Babenberg of Austria, who remained loyal to Emperor Frederick II and his son King Conrad, held a quite contradictory position in regard to King Béla IV of Hungary and his fight against the Mongols.

Based on a letter to King Conrad dated 13 June 1241, initially the Duke of Austria decided to help the Hungarians in their fight against the Tatars: the strength of the Tatars ‘we have experienced personally, when we met them in Hungary and started to fight, and when we, defeated, left that place, the king and the entire Kingdom of Hungary experienced the same’ [42, pp. 1216–1218].

Obviously, the defeat of the army of the Duke of Austria at the hands of the Tatars which is mentioned in the document had happened at the very beginning of their conquest of Hungary. In any case, it must have happened before the battle on the Sajó River, which determined the fate of the kingdom, because the extant sources do not contain any evidence of the involvement of Austrian troops in the battle.

Military clashes between the Duke of Austria and the Tatars in Hungary are described by Roger of Apulia. However, from his description it follows that Frederick Babenberg didn’t even plan to fight against the Tatars: ‘It isn’t clear, but it is said that upon the request of the King, the Duke of Austria came to Hungary but with a small number of people, and unarmed, as if he didn’t know what was going on’ [74, p. 566]. According to Roger, somewhere in the vicinity of Pest, Frederick even routed a small detachment of Tatar warriors and defeated two Tatars in a personal duel. After that the Austrian troops apparently did not take part in hostilities [74, p. 566].

It is difficult to say what objectives was pursuing the Duke of Austria by agreeing to help King Béla, and how great the defeat of the Austrians at the hands of the Tatars that Duke Frederick later reported to the German King was. Nevertheless, it is clear that as a result of the campaign to Hungary and contacts that took place there with the Tatars, the Duke of Austria changed his attitude towards the Hungarian king: the recent allies had become enemies. And when Béla IV, after his defeat in the battle of the Sajó River, agreed to take advantage of Frederick Babenberg's offer of asylum in Austria, the latter treacherously took him captive and released him only after receiving a substantial ransom, a part of which was the concession of three Hungarian counties on the border [74, pp. 574–575].

The involvement of the Duke of Austria in military operations against the Tatars and the death of some Tatar ruler, or caienzi (probably derived from knyaz, prince) at his hands, recounted by Roger, had no serious consequences. Retaliatory measures, if they were taken by the Tatars, were unusually palliative. In any case, nothing speaks to the intention of the Tatars to devastate the Austrian lands in a way comparable to the devastation of Hungary, or to pursue Duke Frederick like they pursued King Béla.

Such a conclusion can be drawn, first of all, based on the reports of the Austrian and Styrian annals, which say almost nothing about attacks of the Tatars on the Austrian lands, confining themselves to information on the cruel devastation of Hungary. Only occasionally do sources mention the appearance of the Tatars on the Austrian bank of the Danube.

The most detailed information is found in the annals of the Garsten Monastery (Upper Austria, Bishopric of Passau): ‘The unknown Tatar people perpetrated a massacre in the Kingdom of Hungary and in other Christian countries, in Poland and in Lower Slavonia; an-
other part of it suddenly attacked Austria and put many Christians to the sword on the bank of the Danube near Neuburg, and then returned to their own without losses or injuries’ [28, p. 597]. The author of the so-called Second Continuation of the annals of the Heiligenkreuz monastery gave even shorter description: ‘a part of their (the Tatars–Author) army invaded the Czech lands and Austria, killed many people there, and returned’ [29, p. 640].

Duke Frederick II of Austria also mentions a clash with the Tatars that happened on the Austrian-Hungarian border. In the letter to King Conrad cited above, he tells of his brilliant success in repelling the invaders: ‘We write about everything that the ferocity of the above-mentioned Tatars suddenly and insidiously perpetrated on the borders of our land, where they hesitated for some time out of fear of our nearness; for several hundred men died, out of which three hundred or more were killed by our men’ [42, p. 1217].

The message of a certain Yvon of Narbonne to Gerald, the Archbishop of Bordeaux, cited by Matthew of Paris, contains a description of one episode of resistance against the Mongols which was witnessed by the author of the letter. However, it didn't come to a fight, because the invaders didn't dare to start a battle against the combined forces of the European rulers that had assembled on the Austrian bank of the Danube River near Vienna: ‘And when spies (of the Tatars–Author), from the top of a mountain spur, saw the Duke of Austria and the King of Bohemia, the Patriarch of Aquileia, the Duke of Carinthia and, as it is said, the Margrave of Baden and enormous forces of the neighboring states already in battle formation, all of that unholy army immediately disappeared, and all those horsemen returned to unfortunate Hungary’ [65, pp. 272–273].

Some researchers accept the information about the joint actions of Duke Frederick II of Austria, the Czech King Wenceslaus I, Patriarch Bertold of Aquileia, Duke Bernhard II of Carinthia and Margrave Herman of Baden against the Mongols as true [83, pp. 146, 190–191], while others question it [49, p. 67]. One way or another, we can say that there were no significant fights in Austria against the Mongols: for whatever reason, the invaders didn't let their main forces cross the Danube in summer 1241.

The failure of the anti-Tatar campaign.

Despite large-scale military preparations and the general religious fervor of the participants in the crusade against the Tatars, the crusader army didn't engage in battle against the invaders. It was unexpectedly disbanded, apparently, without even stepping outside of the borders of the Holy Empire.

Contemporaries, expressing their bewilderment, speculated about the possible causes behind such a strange turn of events.

The failure of the crusade was a great disappointment for the author of the annals of the Garsten monastery. The majority of the participants must have experienced similar sentiments. According to the chronicler, there were no worthy leaders for the crusade: ‘Many Christian princes and others, professing the name of Jesus Christ, were called by the preachers of the Cross to fight against the Tatars; children and women weren't an exception. Everyone unanimously designated themselves with the cross, but the army didn't have leaders, so it stayed home; while the Tatars, driven by their own will or the calling of the Lord, turned back’ [28, p. 597].

German chroniclers proffer another explanation. Monastery chronicles from the Bishopric of Constance, one of the main centers for the preparation of the crusade, suggest that the Tatars fled when they learned about the coming campaign of the crusaders, thus, the necessity of the crusade disappeared by itself. For instance, the following information is found in the Annals of the Benedictine monastery of St. Trudpert in Schwarzwald (the latter half of the 13th century): ‘Different peoples, called Tatars, devastated the lands of Pannonia, Semigra’dye (Transylvania), and Moravia. For this reason, people across all of Germany took up the cross. After learning
about this, the Tatars fled’ [14, p. 294]. This information is repeated almost verbatim in the Greater Annals of the Zwiesel monastery (the early 16th century) [17, p. 59].

According to some other rumours, the army of Frederick II engaged the Tatars and even caused them to suffer a heavy defeat, thus pushing them back behind the borders of the Empire.

The most detailed description of this version is given by Matthew of Paris. The English chronicler writes about the victory of the combined army of Kings Conrad and Enzio, the sons of Frederick, over the Tatars in a battle on the Delpheos river: ‘Fulfilling his will and the desire of the Lord, the honourable Emperor sent his son Henry (Enzio, the King of Sardinia—Author), who, as it was already mentioned, had won over the prelates and their princes, to his brother Conrad with a vast army collected from all over the Empire which was ready to repel the invasion of the Tatars and Cumans, so that the brothers would strengthen and give solace to each other, fostering themselves with abundant chivalry. Upon the order of his father, he (Enzio—Author) had taken with him four thousand horsemen and a detachment of infantrymen, no lower in number, which combined with those whom they came to help and together made up a vast army. The haughty enemies then fell silent and tamed their arrogance. For after the ferocious battle at the Delpheos River, located near the Danube, in which many people died on both sides, the enemy army, which was hardly amenable to any calculation, was finally repelled by God Himself’ [65, p. 131].

Another English source, the Annals of the Tewkesbergy monastery, from 1241 contains information about a battle against the Tatars with more tragic consequences: ‘Henry, the son of the Emperor Frederick, was killed by the Tatars, and a great massacre of people took place on the eve of the feast of Sts. Cosmas and Damian (25 September)’ [12, pp. 118–119]. Apparently, this report about the King of Sardinia Henry (Enzio) confuses him with the King of Poland Henry the Pious, who died in a battle against the Tatars on 9 April 1241.

It is noteworthy that rumors about the victory of the Emperor's army over the Tatars circulated only on the fringes of the Christian world, far away from the places where real contacts with Frederick or his sons could have taken place. This is the source for the abundance of improbable details and distortions of reality.

Vague rumours about the military failures of the Tatars in the German lands reached the Near East and Armenia. Such testimonies are found in one of the extensions of the Coptic History of the Patriarchs of Alexandria, the History of the Patriarchs of the Egyptian Church (13th century), known from the manuscript of the National Library of France in Paris [see: 44]. The History of Armenia by Mkhitar Ayrivanetsy (the latter half of the 13th century) contains the following information: ‘The north detachment (of the Tatars—Author) moves along the upper parts of the Caspian Sea, tramples many countries and crosses the Danube River. The Alemannic Emperor stands against it and forces it to retreat’ [7, p. 414]. The same information is also found among other Armenian authors [see: 2, p. 90].

In the course of time, this information led to the appearance of the story about the death of the supreme leader of the Mongols, Batu Khan, while crossing the Danube on the Hungarian-Austrian border, which became widely known not only in Western Europe but also in Russia [see: 5, pp. 107–149].

It is very likely that Frederick II himself spread rumors about the supposed victory of the army of the Emperor, his sons, or allies, over the Mongols in order to cover up the true reasons behind his failure to resist the aggressors and the withdrawal of the latter from attacking the Holy Empire. Improbable stories about military victories over the Tatars with reference to non-existent geographical locations (like the Delpheos River), could gain currency only in lands far from the events, where the information was difficult to ascertain. Apparently, this explains the lack of such news in German, Austrian, and Hungarian sources.

One of the Austrian chronicles of the middle of the 13th century, the Annals of the Heiligenkreuz monastery (Lower Austria, the bishopric of Passau), contains one more version
explaining the disbandment of the crusade against the Tatars. The crusade was terminated by the decree of the Emperor Frederick II due to the non-participation of the Hungarian King Béla IV: ‘But the honourable Emperor forbade it (to start the crusade—Author), because the Hungarian King didn't support him and didn't send ambassadors for negotiations’ [29, pp. 640–641].

In our view, news about the termination of the crusade by order of the Emperor can be recognized as quite feasible. However, doubts can be raised about the explanation provided by the chronicler regarding the reasons behind the decision taken by Frederick. It is inconsistent with information from other sources about the negotiations of the Hungarian King with the Emperor and other participants of the crusade against the Mongols. True to his commitments, Béla IV brought together the surviving Hungarian troops and remained on alert for several months after preparation for the crusade was terminated in Germany. Assuring himself of the unreliability of the Emperor's promises, the Hungarian king again asked the Pope for help.

According to Roger of Apulia, Béla IV ‘had no one to help him, hesitated, and stayed in Slavonia (Croatia)’, and only when the Tatars crossed the frozen Danube, ‘the King fled and later, unwilling to stay in the coastal castles, moved to the islands’ [74, pp. 583–584]. Thomas of Split says that the Hungarian King was gathering forces against the Tatars while he was in Zagreb: ‘At that time, King Béla arrived with his family; he was returning from Austria and stayed in Zagreb. He gathered all those who managed to escape from the Tatar sword, and they stayed there for the entire summer waiting for the outcome of the events’ [87, p. 168].

Thomas of Split dates the Mongol crossing of the Danube to ‘after January’—that is, the beginning of February in 1242 [87, p. 172]. This date is confirmed by the records of another historian, according to whom Béla IV was still in Croatia up until the end of January 1242, ready to resist the invaders and anticipating the promised aid of Christian rulers. In a letter to the Pope sent from Chasm (60 km south-east of Zagreb) on 19 January 1242, the Hungarian King again asked the unnamed pontiff (not yet elected by that time) to assist in making the ‘sovereigns of the Catholic kingdoms who took up the cross’ to protect the crossing points over the Danube in view of the impending enemy attack [42, p. 902–904].

Like the medieval chroniclers, contemporary historians also puzzle over the cancellation of the crusade against the Tatars in Germany. ‘It is not clear why the crusade didn't have any further development’, says P. Jackson, 'but the most likely explanation is the arrival of news that the Mongols moved back from Bohemia and from the German borders and were then concentrated in Hungary’ [49, p. 66]. The Mongols didn't cross the Danube, and therefore the crusade of the German King Conrad didn't take place, says K. Mayer [61, pp. 59–60]. B. Homan held the same opinion in his day, considering that the German King Conrad IV dismissed his troops in July 1241 when he learned that the Mongols had stopped their advance on the Danube [45, p. 149].

But can the suspension of the offensive on the Danube and the withdrawal of Mongol troops from the German borders in summer 1241 be taken as evidence of the refusal of the conquerors to continue their campaign on the West? The Mongol troops did not withdraw from the Danube region, and their conquests in Europe soon continued. In all likelihood, the pause in hostilities is explained by the fact that the Mongol army needed a summer respite to replenish forces and to prepare a crossing of the deep Danube; the easiest way to do so was to cross the river when it was frozen.

Meanwhile, the participants of the aborted crusade against the Tatars in Germany behaved as if they were provided firm guarantees of the complete cessation of the Mongol offensive. Such a conclusion can be drawn based on information from German sources stating that the leaders of the crusade not only dismissed their troops but also divided the money
collected for the crusade among themselves. We read in the annals of Worms the following: ‘Meanwhile, news came that the Tatars had moved to other regions. The bishops and lords then divided the collected money among themselves’ [16, p. 47].

It seems that this act is disapproved by the chronicler, not because of the carelessness of the crusade leaders and their underestimation of the possibility of a renewed Mongol threat, but because of their greed; only one of the bishops acted fairly and ordered to return the money to the donors: ‘But the bishop of Worms, sir Landolf, ordered to return the money collected in Worms and in the diocese’ [16, p. 47].

The Demarche of Frederick II.

In our opinion, the main reason behind the failed crusade against the Tatars, prepared in Germany, lies in the attitude of the Emperor Frederick II to the crusade [see: 6, pp. 16–45].

It appears that by the middle of June 1241, the Emperor prepared his own action plan against the Tatar threat, which didn't involve military actions against the aggressor.

Such a conclusion can be drawn, first of all, from the content of the most famous document of Frederick, the encyclical against the Tatars, dated 20 June 1241, which survived in a variety of differing editions and copies. The authenticity of the document is confirmed by its presence in the collection of the letters of Petro de Vineis (Petrus de Vineis) (around 1190–1249), chancellor and secretary (logothete) of Emperor Frederick, who was jailed under false pretenses and died in prison. Beginning in the 1270s, the collection of his letters in Latin, mainly written on behalf of the Emperor and published for the first time by Y. Iselin in 1740, was spread in many copies [see: 69, pp. 193–197].

Concerns over the ‘peace of the Empire’—mentions Frederick in an encyclical against the Tatars—instigate us ‘to treat with greater caution not only evident but also possible threats’. That's why, despite the obvious danger of the Tatar invasion, ‘for the sake of the common good’, Roman Augustus is forced to choose ‘already existing and known threats’ to ‘future and possible losses’ from unknown barbarians. Frederick considers his conflict with Pope Gregory IX and the pontiff-supported ‘rebellion of the Milanese’ as such a kind of threat [67, pp. 322–323].

In a letter to the English King Henry III and other Christian sovereigns dated 3 July 1241, quoted by Matthew of Paris, Emperor Frederick lays the blame for his forced inaction against the Tatars on the Pope in a dramatic tone: ‘...since his own will was a law to him, and he didn't restrain the unbridled flow of [his] speech and didn't consider it necessary to refrain from countless attempts at strife, to the delight of the rebels, who had malicious intentions against our honor and glory, he ordered to proclaim a crusade against me, the right hand and defender of the church, through his legates and nuncios, which should have been started against the tyranny of the Tatars [...] As far as our most immediate concern is to get rid of internal enemies, then how shall we repel the barbarians?’ [65, pp. 117–118].

Frederick informed his addressees about the call of the Hungarian King to come to the defense of Hungary and in turn took the decision to turn his army in the opposite direction and move on Rome. ‘Making frequent transitions and constantly thinking of ways of achieving victory, we headed directly to the City, where, if [via] the supreme pontiff the son will find his father, and for the sake of his faith he will get advice from the Apostolic See, then as a Roman Augustus, Catholic Emperor, and illustrious victor over the rebels, he will not doubt and hesitate, for the sake of the protection of the Christian faith, to come himself and bring the entire might of his troops’ [67, pp. 323–324].

The Emperor bases the subordination of the ‘rebels’ and even the Pope to himself on his crusade against the Tatars in defense of the Christians in Europe. ‘For this reason, says Riccardo di San Germano, the Emperor, worried about the destruction of Christianity, urgently goes to the City to negotiate with Pope Gregory and at the same time sends letters to all of the sovereigns of western countries with explanations of the issue [...]’, in which he inspires and
motivates these sovereigns to defend the Christian faith and help the Holy Church’ [76, p. 380–381].

As we see, the normalization of relations with the pontiff on the Emperor's terms, according to the latter, should have been a prerequisite for his crusade in defense of the faith and the church as head of the army that consisted not only of the subjects of the Empire but also of all of the Christian sovereigns of Europe that recognized the Emperor as their main protector.

The essence of Frederick's intentions was already clear to his contemporaries. Even Matthew of Paris, who felt sympathy for the Emperor, as we have seen, had to admit that his letter served as nothing more than a cover for his genuine intentions, in which Frederick dreamed about not only control over the entire world but also ‘about the destruction of the Christian faith, like Lucifer or Antichrist’ [65, p. 119].

Frederick motivates his call to all of the sovereign Christian rulers to act against the Tatars under the leadership of the emperor on the fact that he had already ordered a crusade against the invaders: ‘We decisively ordered our beloved son Conrad and other notable people of our empire to prevent the powerful invasion of enemy barbarians by all means. For the public good, by the creator of our Christian faith and our Lord Jesus Christ, we wholeheartedly implore Your Grace to prepare effective assistance as soon as possible’ [65, p. 118].

At the same time, in an address to his subjects in Germany, ‘to loyal comites, free people, ministerials and other people in Swabia’, Frederick orders to postpone the crusade against the Tatars until he overcomes the Pope's resistance and makes all other sovereigns take his side: ‘When the Roman Pontiff ceases his resistance of the general well-being and his indifference to the Christian faith, together with us and other sovereigns, to whom we appeal to by letters and ambassadors, and zealously joins God's cause, then you, thinking over all of the means and ways, together with us, if God permits, both quickly and successfully will be able to resist these dangers and come to the aid of all the Christians and us’ [67, p. 325].

The authenticity of this document is indubitable. The text of the imperial encyclical, addressed to the people of Swabia, was found as a postscript in the parchment code of the imperial abbey of Ottobeuren (Bavaria), containing the ‘Distinctiones dictorum theologicarum sive summa Quot modis’ of the French theologian and poet Alain de Lille (Alanus ab Insulis) (ca. 1116/17–ca. 1202/1203); the code is dated to 1241 [see: 67, pp. 322–323].

Thus, after sanctioning the preparation of the crusade against the Tatars and in every possible way calling the sovereign Christian rulers of Europe to join it under his banner, the Emperor eventually ordered his loyal subjects in Germany, who were ready to start the crusade, to postpone it until he would be able to lead a combined force after achieving the subordination of the Pope and other sovereigns. In fact, the demarche of the Emperor could mean only one thing—the failure of the entire anti-Tatar campaign and the discreditation of the German prelates as the main organisers.

The Mongols and The Roman Church

The Plot of The Archbishops

Historians have already noted that the failure of the crusade against the Tatars strangely coincides with the beginning of protests against the Emperor by the most influential German princes of the church—the archbishops of Cologne and Mainz—who earlier supported Frederick II and led the preparation of the anti-Tatar campaign. According to P. Jackson, the revolt against the Emperor and his son, King Conrad IV, which started in September 1241 and plunged Germany into a lengthy civil war, made it impossible to combine forces against the Tatars, while the huge sums of money collected to fight against them were spent to finance opposition to the Staunfens [49, p. 66]. Accepting this point of view, another contemporary researcher states that the failure of the crusade in 1241 was caused by opposition from the archbishops of
Cologne and Mainz to the Emperor, which prevented Conrad IV from moving the gathered troops against the Tatars outside of Germany [36, p. 262].

Apparently, another wave of anti-Saufen opposition was initiated by the Archbishop of Mainz Siegfried III von Epstein (1230–1249). Being the successor of his uncle, the Archbishop Siegfried II, as well as the nephew (mother's line) of the Archbishop of Trier Theoderich II von Wied (1212–1242), Siegfried III was particularly favored by the Emperor for many years and was the most important pillar of his policy in Germany. He supported Frederick II in his conflict with his son, the German King Henry VII, and was involved in overthrowing the latter in the Reichstag in Mainz in 1235. Following the coronation of the infant Conrad IV in 1237, the archbishop of Mainz was assigned as his imperial regent (Reichsverweser) [79, pp. 260–262].

Thus, Siegfried III became the main representative of the Emperor to the north of the Alps and possessed his full confidence. Even when Frederick II was excommunicated by Pope Gregory IX (1239), Siegfried III stayed loyal to the Emperor and didn't support the anti-Saufen coalition created by Rome, despite the efforts of the Papal emissary Albert von Behaim. Instead, as we have seen, the archbishop of Mainz took an active role in the preparation of the crusade against the Tatars, announced by Conrad IV and supported by the Emperor.

Following the Mongol invasion, after the Staufens achieved a preponderance in forces and all of their recent opponents including the Czech King Wenceslaus I and the Duke of Bavaria Otto II took the Emperor's side, while the Pope besieged by him in Rome died, a new opposition force suddenly arose, headed by those who seemed to have been the most reliable allies of Frederick II in Germany.

A charter issued by the archbishop of Mainz has survived in the archive of the archbishops of Cologne, dated 10 September 1241. It follows from the document that the archbishops of Cologne and Mainz concluded an agreement, duly sworn, according to which both sides mutually committed to oppose the Emperor in defense of the Pope and the Apostolic See [71, p. 1681, nr. 11367]. Evidently, there was also a juror charter of the archbishop of Cologne with the same content, which hasn't survived.

The document states the following: ‘We, Siegfried, by God's mercy the archbishop of Mainz, arch-chancellor of the Holy German Empire, hereby declare, in writing, with the honorable sir Conrad, the minister of the Cologne Cathedral, our beloved cousin, that in the affair currently happening between the holy father and honourable supreme pontiff Gregory and the Apostolic See, on one hand, and the honourable Emperor Frederick on the other, we will firmly support each other by advice, word, and deed, will never leave each other in case of any danger, will start our affair together and will continue it in the same way, and this affair can be terminated only by the mutual decision of the general council’ [89, pp. 131–132, nr. 257].

Modern scholars consider the opposition of the archbishops of Mainz and Cologne to the Emperor as a turning point in the history of Germany in the middle of the 13th century, which significantly shifted the balance of political forces and weakened the positions of the Staufens [see: 46, p. 118; 60, p. 113].

The text of the juror charter, dated 10 September 1241, doesn't contain any information about the reasons that made the German prelates oppose the Emperor. Some additional information is provided in the Annals of the St. Panteleimon Monastery in Cologne: ‘In the same year (1241–Author), the archbishops of Cologne and Mainz, reinforced in their views, took the path of open resistance to the Emperor and his supporters and brought an army to one of the Rhine regions, called Wederav (around the Wetter river, to the north of Frankfurt on the Main–Author) on the river Mogus (Main–Author), devastating and burning many prosperous settlements. They also accused the Emperor of a serious, premeditated crime and stated that he should be anathematised for it. They even provided reasons for it. However, some people
made little account of them despite their real importance, because at that time, when the Roman throne was vacant, and the Emperor was creating difficulties for electing the Pope, they, as loyal and strong sons, were full of compassion for their mother, the unhappy Roman Church. For this reason, they had a legitimate reason to speak out, and, despite the dangers of fighting the Emperor, avenge the damage done to the church’ [13, p. 536].

Contemporary scholars suggest that the officially stated reason for their opposition to Frederick II—the defense of the church from his criminal offenses—can not be regarded as sufficient. Other reasons must have existed. These are, first of all, the desire of the archbishops of Mainz and Cologne to increase their territory at the expense of imperial possessions, as well as to make territorial claims against the Duke of Bavaria Otto II and the Landgrave of Thuringia Henry IV Raspe, who took the emperor's side and received his support. In 1242, Henry Raspe was appointed as the new imperial regent of the German King, instead of the rebelling archbishop of Mainz. For the latter, the death of the Pope became a convenient excuse to join the opposing political camp, because the Pope's death released him from all previous obligations [see: 84, pp. 513–514; 92, p. 194–195; see also: 34, pp. 9–10].

Of course, we cannot exclude the possibility that the actions of the German prelates were motivated by their own political considerations and the desire for material benefits. However, it is apparent from the text of the juror charter dated 10 September 1241 that the archbishops of Mainz and Cologne concluded their agreement against the Emperor during the life of the Pope Gregory IX, being aware of the possible dangers that they were exposing themselves to by defying the Emperor.

The death of the Pope, on the contrary, significantly weakened the position of the conspirators. In 1242, the supporters of Frederick II went on the offensive: the archbishop of Cologne Conrad I was captured by Graf Wilhelm von Jülich; fighting broke out on the territory of the Archbishopric of Mainz. Cities located near the Rhine, especially Worms, sided with the Emperor and the German King and provided the Emperor with significant military forces in exchange for new privileges [see: 54, pp. 97–104].

From our point of view, the causes of the anti-Sauen opposition of the archbishops of Cologne and Mainz should be found in the medieval sources. Perhaps the Pope, besieged in Rome by the Emperor's troops, managed to ask the German prelates for military aid shortly before his death, accusing Frederick II of 'serious, premeditated crimes'.

One should suppose that news about these accusations spread not only in Germany. One more contemporary of those events, the French historian and poet from the city of Turner Philippe Mousket writes about accusations of a serious crime against the Church and entire Christian world committed by the Emperor during the Tatar invasion. In his rhymed chronicle describing the Tatar invasion, written until 1242, he writes the following: ‘The entire world turned backward when Emperor Frederick, with their (the Tatars’—Author) help, undertook that which dishonored the Christian world’ [24, p. 681, vv. 30967–30970].

It is important to note that for the German prelates, the armed uprising against Frederick II became a more urgent matter than preventing the attacks of the Tatars and launching the crusade, which was prepared with their active involvement. This circumstance suggests that the emergence of a new anti-Sauen coalition must have been brought about by a change in the political situation, related to the threat of a Mongol invasion of Germany.

Indeed, in spite of their initial intentions, the Mongols stopped their attempts to attack the borders of the Holy Empire, and concentrated on conquering Croatia and other parts of the Kingdom of Hungary.

The following question remains unanswered in the contemporary literature: why didn't the invaders use such an opportune situation in the German lands in the autumn of 1241, when the anti-Sauen rebellion of the German prelates broke out and the troops gathered for the crusade were dismissed, while the emperor's army was sent to Italy?
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The Pope's Mongol Diplomacy

In our opinion, information about direct contacts between the Emperor and the Mongols on the eve of the Mongol invasion of Europe; persistent rumours about his collusion with the aggressors, whose brunt fell upon the enemies of Frederick and the participants of the anti-Saufen coalition created by Rome; the evasion of the Emperor from armed conflict with the Tatars; the refusal to participate in the crusade prepared by the German prelates against the Tatars, and instead—sending the imperial army to Italy to lay siege on Rome in order to force the Pope to recognize the supremacy of the Emperor; the unexpected retreat of the Tatars from German lands and the abandonment of their initial plans for conquering Germany; and finally, the unexpected opposition against Frederick by his loyal German prelates, who accused the Emperor of a serious crime against the church and Christianity, all of these, definitely, are interrelated events. In our opinion, their confluence can be explained only by accepting that Emperor Frederick and the leaders of the Mongol western campaign were bound by some mutual obligations.

The fact that the Mongols steered clear of the borders of the Holy Empire, moving their troops out of Dalmatia and Croatia even though their conquests continued in the period, can serve as one more proof of such a bound.

According to the Austrian chronicles of the 13–14th centuries, the Mongol troops that were returning from Hungary attacked the Latin Empire [see: 37, pp. 271, 507, 778]. Even though we didn't find any evidence of this news in the Byzantine sources, we have no reason not to trust it.

The following is said in the so-called Austrian chronicle (the latter half of the 13th century) in 1243: ‘The Tatars and Cumans, not encountering anyone, who could stand against them, left Hungary with a great booty consisting of gold and silver, clothes, animals, and many captives of both sexes, as a rebuke to the Christians. After arriving in Greece, they (the Tatars—Author) entirely devastated that land, except for heavily fortified castles and cities. The king of Constantinople, called Baldwin, fought them; in the first battle he defeated them, but in the second battle he was defeated by them’ [72, p. 245]. The same news is found in the Leoben chronicle [18, p. 8] and in the Second Continuation of the Heiligenkreuz Monastery Annals [29, p. 641].

The opponents of Frederick II were again the targets of the Mongols. As the only legitimate Emperor in the West, he didn't recognize the Latin Empire, which was founded by the crusaders following the conquest of Constantinople in 1204, and was strongly supported by the Popes. The German Emperor wanted to eliminate the state as an illegal instrument of the Pope's influence on the East [see: 53, pp. 169–193; 78, p. 109 ff.]

Following the invasion of Europe under the command of Batu, the Papal Curia applied considerable efforts to establish direct contacts with the Mongols, hence trying to seize the initiative from the Emperor. In March 1245, the new Pope Innocent IV, who continued to oppose Frederick II, sent four emissaries at once to the Mongol rulers from his new residence in Lyon; the Dominicans, Andre of Longjumeau and Anselmo (Astselin) of Cremona, and the Franciscans, Lorenzo of Portugal and Giovanni da Pian del Carpine. The envoys' trip took several years, and only two of them—Anselmo of Cremona and Giovanni da Pian del Carpine—reached their target [see: 55, pp. 195–198; 49, pp. 87–89].

In response to the mission of Anselmo, the Mongol embassy arrived in Lyon in the summer of 1248, bringing two charters to the Pope, one charter from the Great Khan Guyuk and one from Bayju Noyon (Bachu-khurchi), his vicegerent in Iran, Transcaucasia, and Asia Minor [80, pp. 113–117; see also: 38, p. 235].

Additional information about this embassy is given by Matthew of Paris, who mentions that the ambassadors of ‘the Tatar King’ brought a proposal to start joint military actions against
the Emperor of Nicea John III Doukas Vatatzes. However, such a prospect didn't meet the main goal of the Pope, which was to use the military force of the Mongols against Frederick II.

In response, Innocent IV asked to tell ‘the Tatar King’ to send his troops, after adopting Christianity, to campaign together with the Pope's troops against both the ‘schismatic’ Vatatzes and the German Emperor. With the Tatars' help, the initial plan was to 'subdue Vatatzes the Greek, son-in-law of Frederick, schismatic of the Christian faith, who rebelled against the Pope and Emperor Baldwin first, and then Frederick, who strayed from the Roman Curia’ [63, p. 39]. But the conditions of the Pope confused the Tatar ambassadors, who warned that the King would be angry when he learned the conditions [63, p. 39; cf: 66, pp. 37–38].

Nevertheless, the Apostolic See didn't give up its intention to establish a military alliance with the Mongol rulers; persistent attempts to enlist the sympathies of the Golden Horde rulers continued at least up to the end of the 1250s [see: 3, pp. 74–82; 4, pp. 34–50].


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60. Laszerth J. Geschichte des späteren Mittelalters von 1197 bis 1492. München, Berlin, 1903. xv + 744 s.


83. Strakosch-Grassmann G. Der Einfall der Mongolen in Mitteleuropa in den Jahren 1241–1242, Innsbruck, 1893. 227 s.
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§ 5. The Formation of the Ulus of Jochi

Vadim Trepavlov

In 1206, Chinggis Khan was proclaimed the ruler of all Mongolia, and soon after initiated a slew of radical administrative changes. What was before a scattered mass of nomadic tribes inhabiting the eastern part of Central Asia quickly began to form a coherent state organism. The external policy tasks of the new state was facing followed a common thread throughout history, and included the expansion of its borders, acquisition of new subjects, battling against powerful neighbours, and defeating the weaker ones. A year after Chinggis Khan ascended the throne, he began a series of Mongolian conquests that lasted almost until the end of the 13th century in various regions of the Eurasian continent. The conquered lands were distributed among Chinggis Khan's closest relatives and Jochi, his eldest son, was honoured with an appanage (ulus) twice. The first instance occurred shortly after Chinggis' coronation, at the very beginning of the conquests. While ruling over the Right wing of the newly-formed Mongolian army, in 1207 at his father's orders Jochi advanced against the tribes of Tuva, Khakassia and Altai, ultimately beating them into submission. Satisfied with the successful start to his expansionist campaign, Chinggis Khan proclaimed: ‘You, Jochi, the eldest of my sons, left your home just a short time ago, but in the lands to which you departed along a good road, you have already managed to conquer the forest peoples. Neither people nor horses were injured. Thus I grant you these peoples!’ [14, p. 184].

There is a complete dearth of information on the way Mongolian rule was organised in Southern Siberia during that period. However, the regime they established appeared to be too soft at the beginning, as stricter government requirements for Siberian nationals in 1218 immediately spurred a mass outrage among the Yenisei Kirghizes—the most common people in the region. As the 'appanage' ruler of the area, Jochi had full responsibility to stifle their rebellion.

Consequently, Tuva, Khakassia and Altai Mountains constituted a demesnial part of the Mongol Empire, and were attributed to the 'Root Yurt' [Barungar] governed by Chinggis Khan's youngest son Tolui and his family. Southern Siberia was therefore excluded from Jochi's jurisdiction, granting Chinggis the opportunity to prepare other possessions for his first-born.

The second instance came about when Jochi was granted an appanage in 1225 after the bulk of Mongolian troops returned to their native steppes from the multiyear Central Asian campaign. By that time, in addition to Mongolia and Southern Siberia, Chinggis Khan already ruled over Manchuria, the Turkic principalities of the Uighurs and Karluks in Eastern Turkestan, the former empire of Khwarezm Shahs (Central Asia and Khorasan), and eastern Desht-i Kipchak. The majority of these possessions were conquered either by Chinggis Khan personally, or by his sons at his order. In addition to other maneuvers, Jochi's troops chased away the hostile Mongolian tribe of Merkits, who were retreating westwards, and fought the army of Khwarezm Shah in the steppes of Desht-i Kipchak. Oriental chroniclers wrote that the eldest Chinggisid was excited and impressed by the steppe country in the West when compared with the Mongol Empire's boundaries at that time. According Juzjani, a Persian historian of the 13th century, ‘he discovered that in the whole world, there is no land more pleasant than the local one, there is no air better than this, no water sweeter than this, and there are no meadows or pastures broader than these’ [19, vol. I, p. 14]. And exactly these lands, which filled the
tsarevich with so much joy, were presented to him when his father distributed what had been conquered.

In this process, certain characteristics of the interpretation of ownership and possession rights inherent to the medieval nomad mindset became clear in a more concrete sense. As a rule, the top posts in nomadic empires were occupied by people belonging to one and the same ruling clan. In the Mongol Empire, this clan was formally considered to be the one of Chinggis Khan’s Borjigids from the Tayichiud tribe. However, the political reality of the time forced the empire's highest ranks to reconsider the unshakable canon of the tribal domain. There is no information that the founder of the Mongol Empire treated all Borjigids as tribesmen towards whom he bore any type of responsibility; using the phrase ‘you are my kin and my tribe’, he only ever addressed his own sons and younger brothers [14, p. 189]. Immediately after his accession to the throne in 1206, Chinggis Khan ordered one of his confidants to:

‘Distribute the multi-tribal state for me in the following way: allocate a share to our mater, younger brothers and sons...’ [10, p. 159]. Hence, the concept of a kin became even narrower, as it did not include uncles or nephews, and neither did it have in mind distant relatives. In this manner a circle of people who theoretically had access to power was outlined.

However, when it came to the process of distribution, the Mongolian ruler shrank this circle down even further. ‘A Khasar's legacy is to be continued by one of his heirs. Only the first deals with Alchiday's heritage, the second one—with Otchigin's heritage, and the third—with Belgutay's heritage (Chinggis Khan's brothers—Author). Following this system, I also trust my heritage with only one heir of my own’ [12, p. 186]. This ‘only one’ turned out to be his third son Ögedei, who was appointed as the successor to the All-Mongolian throne. Thus, Ögedei rose to a higher status than his brothers, or Chinggis' sons from his first wife Börte: Jochi, Chagatai and Tolui. This is to say that the empire formed in the course of wars was perceived as under the sphere of control of a single Borjigid branch—Chinggis Khan's family.

On what basis did the latter distinguish his offspring from among the other clan branches? In 1225, Chinggis Khan told Jochi and Chagatai before their departure to the newly-formed uluses: ‘My kinsmen have distinguished themselves among their relatives. They commit attacks even through mountains’ [14, p. 230]. Participation in Siberian, Jin (Northern-Chinese) and Khwarezmian campaigns, skillful command prowess, personal courage and leadership roles also seemed sufficient to him to establish the priority of his sons over his uncles and cousins.

In 1225, Jochi's father granted him the northern part of Khwarezm (lower reaches of the Amu Darya), along with Eastern Desht-i Kipchak as ulus possessions. According to Arabic chronicler Al-Nuwayri, the territory of his appanage covered the ‘summer and winter camps from Kayalyk and Khwarezmian lands to Saqsin's outskirts and Bulgaria's far edges, which the horses of his hordes reached during their raids’ [19, vol. I, p. 150] (by the time of Jochi's death, the horses of Mongolian troops ‘reached’ Volga Bulgaria and the tribes of nomadic Cumans in the Black Sea region). The main camp of Tsarevich was stationed ‘within the Irdysh’ [18, p. 78].

Persian author Rashid al-Din describes approximately the same area granted to him as an appanage: ‘Chinggis Khan granted control over all regions and the ulus located within the Irdysh River and the Altai Mountains, as well as summer and winter nomadic camps in their surroundings, to Jochi Khan, and issued an implicit degree for [Jochi Khan] to conquer Desht-i Kipchak regions and states located in this area, and annexed them to his possessions. His yurt was located within the Irdysh, and his state's capital was there as well’ [18, p. 78].

A later Mongolian source adds that Jochi was also awarded the title of ‘chief ruler of the Kipchaks’ and ‘chief darughachi over the Kipchaks’ [14, pp. 229, 230].

Moreover, at Chinggis Khan's order, several thousand warriors from the tribes of Kinghit, Sinjut and Khusin were directed to Jochi to fight under his command. During the reign of his closest heirs, the fact that Arguns, Oghuzes, Naimans, Buiraks, Oirats, Karluks, Kushchi, Ujsuns, Mingi, Kungrats, Keraites, Barlases, Tarkhans and Kiyats inhabited his ulus...
was also recorded [9, p. 222; 22, pp. 55–59]. This list includes not only Mongolian, but undoubtedly the Turkic tribes of the Oghuzes and Karluks as well. It is typically considered that the most populous nation within Jochi's possessions were the Kipchaks. However, this point of view is often questioned, especially if we take into account the scale of the conquest (which was accompanied by a ‘demographic catastrophe’ for the Cumans) and patch-work nature of the Golden Horde's ethnic composition (see: [12]).

The ruler of the new ulus thus moved to his possessions, according to Khiva historian Abu al-Ghazi, ultimately ‘settling in the Kipchak yurt. From the Mongolian [land] he brought here his family and all the Els (tribes—Author), which his father had granted to him’ [11, p. 44]. Although well-known sources do not contain data about any administrative measures the Tsarevich undertook in Desht, they nonetheless undoubtedly were carried out [21, pp. 58, 59]. However, the historical memory of the Golden Horde people retained the image of his son Batu (‘Sain Khan’) as the true founder of the state. The absolute majority of medieval texts touching on the history of the Ulus of Jochi rarely mention its first governor, and usually describe him as just a link in the genealogical chain.

In February 1227, Jochi died under unclear circumstances (as one theory has it, he might have been killed at his father's order, who suspected him of disobedience and separatism). Different medieval texts typically recount his posterity in different ways, but historians refer most frequently to the data provided by Rashid al-Din, who developed the theory of the fourteen sons of Jochi. The eldest were Orda, nicknamed ‘Ichen’ (‘master’) and Batu later referred to as ‘Sain Khan’ (‘kind ruler’). Judging from certain evidence, they both managed to secure investiture from their grandfather (died at the end of 1227), who ordered to grant them power over the Ulus of Jochi. This version can be considered credible because in the end, the offspring of these two Tsareviches, Orda and Batu, ruled over the Jochids during the 13–14th centuries. On the other hand, considering Jochi's other sons—Tuqay Timur and Shiban—among those whom Chinggis Khan ‘annointed’ or blessed to rule independently, can be perceived as a later adulteration used to justify the authority of khans who came to power from the lateral Jochid lines.

It is therefore understandable that Orda and Batu, who were indeed legitimate representatives of their father's ulus, took part in the nobility congresses of 1229 and 1235, where the ruling elite of the Mongol Empire discussed their intentions to conquer Eastern Europe. Batu was appointed to lead the army. Likely, that is because the lands conquered in the targeted campaigns were to be placed directly under his control. By that time, demesne lands controlled by Orda Ichen and his four subordinate younger brothers had already been formed in the Cis-Irtysh River Region. Some Chinggisids from other uluses in the Empire joined their troops to this army ‘to help and reinforce Batu’ [19, Vol. 2, p.22].

The conquest of Eastern Europe began shortly after Jochi's death. In 1228–1229, thirty thousand horsemen under the command of Subutai invaded the Western Cuman' nomadic lands. Many Cumans began to leave in the direction of Rus', Hungary, Danube Bulgaria and Transcaucasia, but the mass exodus started in 1236, when Batu's joint army moved in from the East.

The army under his command had an estimated 120–150 thousand horsemen. In a year, from autumn 1236 to autumn 1237, the Mongols completed their conquest of the Volga region and Desht-i Kipchak, and also subjugated Volga Bulgaria. Chinggisid Tsareviches, Güyük and Mangu [Möngke], formed a broad front with their troops and carried out a ‘raid’, moving through the ‘Wild Field’ which stretched from the Ural Mountains to the Azov Sea and the Don. At the beginning of winter 1237, the main invading forces met at the border of the Principality of Ryazan.

Ryazan fell on 21 December 1237 after a six-day siege featuring constant attacks. Throughout January, the Ryazan land was devastated. A fierce battle took place by the walls of Kolomna, which stood on the border with Vladimir-Suzdal Land, and Chinggis Khan's son, Tsarevich Kulkan, was even killed. Despite this, the Russians were defeated. On 7 February
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1238, Vladimir-on-Klyazma was taken, and in February alone fourteen major cities, including Suzdal, were destroyed. After defeating the joint army of the Russian princes in March on the Sit River, Batu ravaged several more cities. He had intended to advance on Novgorod afterwards, but due to the spring thaw elected to lead his troops back into the steppe instead.

A year later, Batu and Subutai gathered their forces and began a major new campaign. They easily swept aside the defenses of the ‘Chorni Klobuky’—nomads in the service of the Kievan princes. Vitichev, Vasilyev, Bilhorod and other fortresses protecting Kiev were razed to the ground. On 6 January 1241, the capital of Ancient Rus' fell after a multiple-day siege.

The conquering forces moved west, raiding in their usual fashion. The capitals of Southwest Rus’, Galich and Volodymyr-Volynskyi, were destroyed. In the spring of 1241, the battle moved to Poland and Hungary—the Mongolian army stormed into Europe. On 9 April, the Polish Prince Henry the Bearded, supported by French Knights Templar, was defeated outside the town of Legnica. Two days later, on the banks of the River Sajó, Béla IV, King of Hungary was also defeated. His capital, Esztergom, was unable to resist the siege laid by Batu's generals. Batu did not face any strong, organized resistance. He was laying waste to Croatia when messengers brought him an invitation to attend the congress of the nobility in Karakorum, the capital of the Mongol Empire. The congress was being held because Qa'an Ögedei had died and a successor had to be chosen. It was the best possible excuse to organise a retreat. Batu had understood that he could not hold Poland, Hungary and the Southern Slavic lands under his power. Undefeated, he announced his return to the East. By 1243, all of the Mongol armies had retreated beyond the Carpathians.

As a result of the 1236–1242 military campaigns, Volga Bulgaria, modern Bashkiria, Western Desht-i Kipchak, Crimea and part of the North Caucasus joined the Ulus of Jochi. The status of the Russian principalities is more difficult to determine. The Grand Princes of Vladimir initially (during the period when the empire was truly united) received investiture in the imperial capital, Karakorum, in the court of the supreme khan (qa’an). Other princes had to be content with a lesser investiture, awarded by Batu. The power to collect tributes from Rus' also appears to have been distributed among Jochi and Empire authorities: the latter held a population census in the principalities in 1250s. Thus, in the first period of the Golden Horde, Rus' was not solely controlled by the Horde's rulers, meaning the Slavic lands could not with justification be considered as part of the Ulus of Jochi. The participation of non-Jochi tsarevichs in wars in Rus' and Europe, as previously mentioned, is indirect evidence of this.

On returning from his European campaign, Batu settled not in his main camp near the Irtysh River, which was inherited from father to son (and was occupied by his older brother), but in the Volga region. The city of Bulgar became the fixed centre of Batu's part of the Ulus of Jochi but as a true Mongol, he naturally preferred a nomadic way of life. As a consequence, the area around this urban centre of old Bulgarian culture effectively became his domain. Subsequently, Batu founded a capital city, Sarai, in the Lower Volga. The Lower Volga Region also became a demesne. Seasonal migrations between the two areas (and later to the North Caucasus, also) were a singular feature of Batu's annual routine. Such migrations continued by the Golden Horde khans who succeeded him.

Orda Ichen's main camp was located somewhere in Eastern Kazakhstan, between the Tarbagatai Mountains and the upper Irtysh [15, p. 213; 22, pp. 56, 57]. Its exact location is difficult to determine because the information contained in sources is sparse and inconsistent.

The widely-held scholarly view that the Ulus of Jochi (the Golden Horde) was founded only once the Mongol army had returned from Central Europe in 1242 or 1243 is based on a misunderstanding. It is clear that the start of Batu's reign over the newly acquired western lands should not be thought of as the beginning of the Golden Horde state. The Ulus was in fact formed (or allocated by Chinggis Khan) in 1225. During the wars of 1230–1240, Batu and his brothers only extended its boundaries. Following these campaigns, the Ulus of Jochi did not change in any fundamental way. As far as it is possible to judge from sources, slight changes to its borders (or, to be more precise, spheres of influence) occurred only in the Cau-
casus, due to the patchy success of the Jochids in conflicts with the Mongol Hulaguid dynasty (in Iran). Only in the second half of the 14th century, when the state was seized by unrest and began to descend into chaos, did outlying possessions began to detach themselves from Sarai's sphere of influence.

According to sources (Abu al-Ghazi, Ötemish Hajji), Batu initiated the process of separating the governance of the different regions after returning from the Western campaign. He was assisted by the Orda Ichen in the east and west of the Ulus of Jochi. The boundary between the two virtually autonomous khanates was the Yaik River [21, p. 119].

In the first decades of its existence the Ulus of Jochi was included in the Mongol Empire's general system of organization of power and control. According to Mongol sources, in 1219 the first rulers of the Western uluses, Jochi and Chagatai, the sons of Chinggis Khan, promised their father that they would obey their younger brother Ögedei, who had inherited the supreme (qa'an) throne. They would therefore comply with all orders emanating from the qa'an residence.

Formally, the qa'an (khagan, or great khan) as the head of the Empire was its supreme ruler, the arbiter of its constituent peoples and uluses. A famous saying by 13th century Italian traveler, Giovanni da Pian del Carpine, seemingly confirms the Mongol Great Khan's monopoly on power: ‘Everything is in the hands of the emperor to such a degree that no one dares to say “This is mine and that is yours”, but everything belongs to the emperor, that is, all property, beasts of burden, and people’ [17, pp. 45–46]. This statement was something of an exaggeration. Between the empire and ulus authorities there was not only a separation of powers (primarily fiscal and financial), the rulers also had distinct areas of competence, in accordance with traditional, centuries-old rules of nomadic statehood.

These practices included a division of the territory and the population into two wings (right and left, i.e. Western and Eastern) with an independent ruler in each. The Right wing was considered inferior. A similar principle was common in most nomadic empires in the Middle Ages and the Mongol Empire is a prime example. The Ulus of Jochi and Chagatai belonged to its Right wing (mong. barungar); the eastern part of the Empire (known by the Chinese name, Yuan, by the end of the 13th century) comprised the Left wing (jungar) under the rule of qa'an. The Chinggisids had a sort of co-government, when the Khan of the Ulus of Jochi headed the Right wing and in effect (but not officially) had equal status with the Emperor in the Karakoram.

Chinggis Khan had outlined the separation of Jochids and Chagataids from the Left wing. After Chinggis Khan's death, Chagatai became the qa'an's de-facto co-ruler. After his death in 1242, leadership of the hierarchy in the West passed to representatives of Jochi's clan [16, pp. 115–122].

Güyük, son of Ögedei, came to the throne in Karakoram in 1246. He and Batu had a hostile relationship. Nevertheless, it is possible to conclude from some sources that they governed together. Giovanni da Pian del Carpine stated that 'Batu was more powerful than all the Tatar princes except the Emperor, whom he is obliged to obey’. European travelers were convinced that, despite the presence of a sovereign qa'an in the Mongol Empire, the head of the Golden Horde was ‘the main ruler of the Tatars'. His name was revered as far away as Khurasan, where out of the many Chinggisid leaders, Mongol informants, when speaking to ambassadors from the west, named Güyük and Batu as its supreme rulers [17, p. 69; 20, p. 223: 24, pp. 93, 95]. This is what Juzjani wrote about the reign of Güyük (1246–1248): ‘All the grandees and all the leaders of Mughal forces obeyed to Batu and, usually, treated him in the same way they used to treat his father Tushi (Jochi—Author)’ [25, p. 176]. Kirakos Gandzaketsi spoke more clearly on Batu's status. This Armenian chronicler wrote that Qeen Rusudan of Georgia sent messengers to offer 'the Tatar warlord named Batu, who was in charge of forces located in Rus', Ossetia and Derbent, to become her subject as he was the second to the Khan. And he told her to stay in Tiflis, and the Tatars did not oppose because the Khan (Güyük Qa'an—Author) died in those days [8, p. 181].
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Even this fragmentary information leads to the conclusion that the ruler of the Ulus of Jochi had a special status, submitted to the Great Khan only, held power and influence over certain western territories of the Mongol Empire. However, sources say nothing on whether Batu was recognised as a superior ruler of the Ulus of Chagatai. It is known that during the reign of Ögedei, Mahmud Yalavach with his son, and Kurkuz, all from Khwarezm, ruled China, Transoxiana (Mawarannahr) and the lands of Iran, subjugated by that time, ‘from Khorasan to the borders of Rus’ and Diyarbakir’ [18, p. 64]. Yet, their power did not cover the Jochids’ territories behind the Jayhoun (Amu Darya) River.

The relations between joint rulers became more defined during Möngke Qa'an's reign (1251–1259). After the death of Güzük, the Mongolian nobility offered Batu to take the throne of the Empire, as he was the senior Chinggisid at that time. He refused, citing the fact that he had already enough lands, and that ‘it would not be possible to rule them all, along with owning and ruling the states of Chin (China—Author), Turkestan and Ajam (Iranian lands then governed by viceregents [namestniks] sent from Karakorum—Author).’ Therefore, he proposed to enthrone Möngke (Mengu), his friend and younger cousin. ‘Möngke Khan... mounted the throne of Chin and upper Turkestan’ [25, pp. 179–180], that is, firstly, he began to rule the countries ‘rejected’ by Batu; and, secondly, the throne of Möngke was not considered to be the throne of Desht-i Kipchak and other Western regions.

Certainly, Batu was no absolute sovereign—the Great Khan appointed his fiscal clerks to Russian principalities, and managed the finances of the Sarai court [2, pp. 319, 320, 331]. According to the reports of French diplomat William of Rubruck, the Golden Horde was not authorised to establish diplomatic relations without the approval of the central government, because, as William of Rubruck put it, ‘Möngke Khan was the main one in the world of Moals’. But then, William of Rubruck cited Möngke Qa’an: ‘As the Sun spreads its rays all over, me and Batu spread our sovereignty everywhere’ [17, p. 141]. The explorer noted that the countries directly submitted to Möngke paid even more respect to Batu messengers, than they did to Qa'an's emissaries in the lands of the Jochids.

For the qa'an's edict to take effect in the West of the Empire, Batu had to confirm it. According to Kirakos, Möngke bestowed Hethum I, Tsar of Armenia, with ‘a sealed edict, so that no one would dare to oppress him and the country of his’, and Hethum sent a messenger to bring this edict to Batu, ‘for him, too, to write an edict in accordance with the charts (of the Khan)’ [8, pp. 224–225]. In the 1240–1250s, Seljuk sultans used the ruler of Sarai as a judge for their internecine conflicts, though, like Armenians, they had to travel to Karakorum to get their yarliqs there. Information on the active communication between Batu and foreign rulers contradicts what William of Rubruck wrote on the Horde ruler's dependent foreign policy.

The Amu Darya still bordered the spheres of influence. One typical case illustrates Batu's sovereignty. At the instigation of his Muslim brother Berke, he stopped Hulagu's army at the right bank of the Amu Darya: the Qa'an had sent the army to conquer the caliphate. For two years, the troops had been staying at the same place—they could not return because of Möngke's order, and they could not cross the river, as the messenger from Sarai did not allow them to do so. It was not earlier than the death of Batu in 1255, that Qa'an turned a favorable ear to the insistent requests of Hulagu and ordered the march to be continued [23, pp. 101, 102].

Moreover, the beginning of Möngke's rule saw the reprisal against the young tsareviches, descendants of Chagatai and Ögedei. Their lands were divided between the Supreme Khan and the Golden Horde, and the latter received the Transoxiana for ruling.

After Batu's death, his son Sartaq took the supremacy over the Golden Horde. Möngke ‘exalted him and rendered a great homage to him. He handed him the power of his father, that is, the command over all the armed forces and (the possession) of all the principalities he had conquered; then, he appointed him to be the second (person in the country) after him, and let him go back to where he had come from’ [8, p. 226]. Armenian chronicles tell that the Great Khan ‘honoured him (Sartaq—Author) and gave him the power of his father by recognising
him to be the second ruler after himself'; ‘at Möngke Khan's command he (Sartaq—Author) was given everything his father had possessed and even more’ [1, p. 27; 7, p. 11]. Thus, Batu's successor, like his father, became the second in rank in the Empire and acquired a right to autonomous law. Apparently, Khan Jochid was allowed to issue edicts regarding any aspect of inner life of his subject regions', provided that they agreed with Chinggis Khan's Yasa (code of laws) and orders of the capital administration.

Sartaq died when he was just beginning to use these prerogatives. In 1256, his uncle Berke became the head of the Horde. He still held a huge power and influence in the Western half (right hand) of the Mongol Empire and even attempted to extend it to the newly formed Ulus of Hulagu in Iran and Mesopotamia.

In general, as Rashid al-Din writes, until the end of Batu's days and ‘after his death, during the times of Sartaq... and during most of the times of Berke, between the houses of Tolui Khan (the Qa'an government—Author) and Batu a path of unity and friendship was finally paved’ [18, p. 81].

In 1260, the new Qa'an Kublai who had just won victory over Arik Buka, his brother and rival, supported by Berke, delivered a message to the ulus rulers: ‘The regions are having a time of troubles. From the banks of the Jayhoun through the gates of Misr (Egypt—Author), you, Hulagu, must be in charge of the Mongol troops and regions of taziks, and guard them well... From that side of the Altai to the Jayhoun let it be Algu (Chagatai's grandson—Author) to guard this ulus and be in its charge, and from this side of the Altai to the seashores I shall guard’ [18, p. 162]. Kublai omitted the Golden Horde ruler, who dominated firmly and indisputably over the north-west of the state. Yet, it was a clear attempt to exempt Hulagu's lands and the Chagatai Transoxiana from Berke's jurisdiction, so that Algu would be confirmed in his rights as the head of the Ulus of Chagatai.

Since then, the connections of the Golden Horde both with the imperial government and with neighbouring, usually hostile principalities were reduced to minimum. Naturally, political rivalry was the main obstacle. In addition, the discorded cultural-political orientations of elites in the huge country of the Mongols created yet another, objective difficulty. The rulers of its eastern parts became the Yuan emperors, chinned their courts, and followed Chinese and partially Jurchen patterns in their government.

The different religions of the rulers also prevented sustainable relations. Under Kublai's rule, China saw a wide spread of Buddhism, whereas the Jochids and the Hulaguids converted to Islam, and so were oriented to Islamic bureaucracy and merchantry. Yet, it would hardly be legitimate to ascribe special importance to these confessional differences. This fact should be mentioned, as literature often has it that the rulers of different uluses allegedly saw each other as people of different faiths and infidels as a result of such ideological transformations. But then, religious intolerance was never distinctive to the Mongol state. Formed as a polyethnic world power with a heathen ruling core ethnos, it accumulated followers of various religions and invited them for service. Such policy was dictated both by the advisability and by the precepts of the Empire founder. Chinggis Khan's tolerance to followers of various religions was clearly and, generally, complementarily witnessed by the 13th-century Persian historian, Juvayni, who was in public service for the ilkhan Hulaguids (see: [26, p. 18]).

The enormous clan of the Chinggisids was the key factor that, for a while, was preventing the final fall of the Empire. In spite of the violent conflicts between various branches, the descendants of Chinggis Khan had indisputable authority. The Yuan emperors kept their status of supreme rulers in the possessions of the clan. After Möngke Qa'an's death in 1259, the Jochids took no part in the empire-wide meetings of the nobility. Nevertheless, the Empire's nominal unity could be proved, firstly, by the Chagataids' and the Hulaguids' presence at these meetings; secondly, by the traditional trade and war relations. At the end of the 1260s, Kublai Qa'an requested the Ulus of Jochi to allocate forces to conquer the Song dynasty (Southern China) [3, p. 82]. Öz Beg Khan (1312–1342) of the Golden Horde was known to accept the hierarchic superiority of the Yuan emperor, Buyantu Khan [3, p. 92]. It was very possible that
the Qa'an's formal superiority was confirmed by giving equally nominal yarliqs for ruling in the western uluses. However, it was as early as the 1260s when the central government had lost real control over the policy of the Golden Horde.

In historiography it is generally believed that the Ulus of Jochi separated from the Mongol Empire under Khan Mengü Temür (1266–1282). At the very beginning of his reign he ordered that his name and family tamga be minted on coins instead of the tamga of the Qa'an. Thus he demonstrated the de facto separation of the Ulus from the Mongol Empire, and it is only from this time that one can start reckoning existence of the Golden Horde as an independent state. Since in the Middle Ages the issue of money served as one of the key indicators of a state's independence, such an interpretation of events seems reasonable. The first yarliq to the Russian Metropolitan was issued in the name of the same Mengü Temür. However, the real subordination of the Jochids' imperial vassal possessions (including Russia) took place much earlier. Since the reign of Sartaq, Russian rulers had not traveled to Mongolia for investiture (the last such visit, made by Gleb Vasilkovich Belozersky, took place in the mid-1250s [16, col. 474, 524,]), but instead received yarliqs from the hands of the Khan in Saray.

A multitude of peoples, who spoke mainly Turkic languages, lived in the vast territory of the Golden Horde. As for the Mongols, few of them migrated to the Ulus of Jochi. Those Mongols that moved to conquered countries (Iran, Central Asia, China, the steppes of Eastern Europe) turned out to be few compared to the local population. In the early decades the foreign conquerers remained aware that they belonged to the Mongol people. But when they found themselves surrounded by Turkic peoples, who were nomads just like them, they quickly (within a century) completely blended with them. In the Golden Horde, they gradually lost their original language and culture and mingled with the natives.

Formally, the Mongol people were considered the ruling class in the Empire. But in reality they were virtually unable to enjoy the fruits of their conquest. The bulk of the Mongols continued to live in the steppes of Central Asia and live the usual life of nomadic herdsmen. Treasures and tributes settled in the khans' and noyons' pockets, and merchants were not interested in trading with shepherds engaged in primitive subsistence farming. In 1264, Kublai, a grandson of Chinggis Khan, moved the empire's capital from Karakorum to Beijing (Khanbaliq), and Mongolia essentially turned into a peripheral province.

In the first half of the 13th century, the Kipchak clans ended up under the rule of the Mongol invaders, becoming the main human material for the construction of the Jochid and Chagatai ulus system (other Turkic nomads—the Oghuzes, Karluks, Uighurs and Altai peoples—were few compared to them). Desht-i Kipchak was divided into Mongol nutagi, or Turkic yurts—large areas of grazing land provided to the Mongolian tribes. It was believed that some (barely significant) part of the steppe not included in this requisitioning remained in the possession of the Kipchaks, ancestors of the future Kipchak lines of the modern Turkic peoples.

It is not known exactly how many Mongol families moved to Kazakhstan and the expanses along the Volga. In any case, medieval sources mention not even tens thousands, but mere thousands—quite a paltry number compared with the native Turks. Naturally, the newly-arrived nomads assimilated into the great mass of locals within the first century and a half of the existence of the Golden Horde and the Chagatai ulus. However, the Kipchaks practically lost their pre-Mongol tribal division and came to be designated by the ethnonyms of the Mongol tribes in whose yurts they happened to find themselves. Those who camped in the nutag of the Manguts became Manghits, those who ended up in the zone of the Khonkirats became Kungrats, those in the territory of the Naimans became Naimans, those in the territory of the Kereits became Kereits or Kerei, etc.

The Golden Horde period was marked by significant changes in the ethnic profile of the population of Desht-i Kipchak and the surrounding regions. The Mongol invasion caused massive population shifts over large areas. An example is the migration of the Kipchaks to the Southern Ural, to Bashkiria. A unique reference to this move was preserved by Abu al-Ghazi:
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‘Jochi Khan defeated and killed [all] the Kipchaks who fell into [his] hands; those who survived went to the Ishtyaks... the Kipchaks who lived between the Itil and the Tin (that is, the Volga and the Don—Author) scattered in [all] four directions’ [11, p. 44]. The influx of immigrants from the southern steppes in the middle–second half of the 13th century was a result of the Horde's administrative policy; when the Kipchak nobility was deprived of power, the Desht was divided into uluses for the Jochid tsareviches, and great numbers of subjects from various tribes moved from one region to another by order of the government. It is not impossible that part of the Kipchak settlers appeared in the Southern Urals on orders from above. In addition, after the Mongol conquest, some tribes chose places for a more peaceful and safer life on the edge of the steppe zone.

Material evidence of these processes in Bashkiria are burial sites of two kinds: under earthen mounds in the western plains and under stone mounds in the eastern foothills. The former are similar to the burial structures of the Volga Cumans and were probably left by people originating from the Lower Volga Region—the heirs of the pre-Mongol ethnic and cultural Pecheneg-Cuman population, as well as the northern Oghuzes ('Chorni Klobuky'). The latter have no parallels in the Volga and Ural regions and are linked to immigrants from the east and south-east, from the Kazakh steppes (Eastern Desht)—descendants of the tribes of a Kimak-Kipchak alliance [4, p. 70; 5, pp. 359, 360; 6, pp. 96–98]. The Kipchak ethnic and cultural base was characteristic of the tribes that formed in the southern Urals in the 13–14th centuries: the Katai, Min, Kipchaks, etc. These were so-called 'territorial tribes' [13, pp. 473, 474].


Chapter III.
The Politics of the Ulus of Jochi

§ 1. The Administrative Structure. Administrative Organisation

Vadim Trepavlov

The Golden Horde had a complex and extensive administrative system with multiple departments. It formed and changed shape throughout almost the entire three centuries of the state's existence. Starting with the introduction of the Mongol Empire's traditional institutions in conquered Desht-i Kipchak, the Jochids made efficient use of the administrative traditions of the conquered people and of neighbouring states. A complex system of administrative bodies and positions in central and local agencies, as well as hierarchised capital and country authorities, was formed.

There were several events in the history of the Ulus of Jochi that could be interpreted as milestones in the transformation of its administrative structure. The independence attained by the state from the Empire, in the latter half of the 1260s, motivated the Sarai khans to improve the state in line with its new, sovereign status. Yarlıqs granted on behalf of Mengü Temür Khan to the Russian Orthodox hierarchs served as a first indication of this. Nevertheless, the infighting that took place after his death distracted the Jochid nobility from administrative improvements, and thus the independent Golden Horde's bureaucracy was only formed after the end of the infighting, during the times of Toqta Khan (1290–1312). Soon the conversion of state to Islam as the official religion during the reign of Öz Beg Khan caused new transformations, and as a result the Golden Horde turned into another Islamic state with all their inherent laws and specific administrative ways, tried and true as they were throughout the centuries.

Later, as far as can be judged from the sources, there were no more significant transformations in this sphere. The internecine feuds of the 1360–1370s and the invasions of Timur in the 1390s never allowed the authorities of the Horde to improve its system further. Waging a cruel struggle for power, they simply maintained the administrative institutions that were preserved after political convulsions.

The characteristics of the Golden Horde's administrative system were as follows: a) the monarchical power of the Khan; b) the participation in the administration of the karachi begs, who were representatives of several (usually four) Tatar aristocratic dynasties; c) the division of the nomadic population and the territory into right and left hands (‘wings’); d) the ulus system, that is, the whole population of subjects and lands granted by the khan to commanders and ‘civil’ dignitaries; e) the institution of vicegerents (Mongolian: darugachi, darugha; Turkic: baskak)—in the administration of the sedentary population in the city and country; f) yasak-taxing; g) a combination of the state administration with traditional local governing bodies of the population.

The Khan ruled the state and the administrative system of the entire Ulus of Jochi. The foundation of monarchic governance and the organisation of the ruling elite had several sources in the Golden Horde. The first and main aspect was the authority of the founder of the Mongol Empire. In addition, upon inheriting power, the internal clan principles of transferring the rank of khan were dominant. From nomadic ancient times, there was the tradition of holding a plebiscite to elect the governor (in reality, to show their approval of the elected). As the
Ulus of Jochi was a secondary formation within the Empire, the investiture of the superior suzerain (the Karakorum qa'an) was of high importance during the 13th century. When the Golden Horde khans turned to Islam, there was an issue regarding the legitimacy of their power, which was to be developed in accordance with the tenets of this religion. Finally, during the course of the disputes and riots, it happened that the lead was taken by different Turkic-Mongol tsareviches and princes. After defeating their rivals, they took part in running the state or its split provinces, persuaded as they were that the supreme powers were on their side because they had ensured success in battle against their competitors.

The Jochid clan was constantly growing and branching out, and the system of eldership of its different lines was becoming increasingly complicated. It is likely that by the end of the 13th century, their hierarchic priority of order had been fully defined. According to currently available data, it can be supposed that the supreme places in this hierarchy belonged to the heirs of Batu, and (after him) of Buval in the west of the Ulus and to the heirs of Orda in the east. The next by age were the Tuqay-Timurids (in the following century, they were replaced by Shaybanids).

While Mongols remained mostly pagan, their interpretation of the sources and the limits of the khan's power was based on statements typical of the nomadic world. Evidently, the main points of the concept of supreme power were inherited by the Mongol Empire from its historical ancestors: the khaganates of the early Middle Ages. Their understanding put forth an idea of the enthronement of the founder of a state, and the successful governance of it by his descendants with the benevolence and support of divine powers. These powers were primarily personified by the Central Asian pagan pantheon’s leading pair: the Sky (Tengri) and the Earth (Etügen).

The governing rank of Chinggis Khan's family was strengthened by the legend of the family's first ancestor, Bodonchar, being sky-born. According to this legend, the foremother Alan Gua gave birth to him and two brothers from a ray of light that got into her womb through their yurt’s smoke hole [4, pp. 80–81; 12, book 1, pp. 10–14]. In addition, as regards the family's origins, there was a totemic ancestor called Borte Chino (Fulvous Wolf), also born 'by the will of the Supreme Sky' [4, p. 79]. Therefore, the legitimacy of the Chinggisids' governance, including the Jochids, was based on a set of pagan concepts about the participation of supernatural powers in singling out this clan over others.

Granted by the Sky and protected by the Earth, power was carried out in four main areas: protecting the integrity and strengthening the State; expanding its borders through conquest; caring for the welfare of residents; and supporting the readiness of troops. At the very beginning of Chinggis Khan's career, his first supporters saw him as 'a person who could take care of the army and run the ulus well'. Chinggis spoke on this subject in the following way: ‘I, having become a pillar (of the State), took upon myself the very difficult responsibility of protecting the people’. Similar issues are also mentioned in his speeches to his sons [5, pp. 95–96; 6, p. 189; 12, book 2, p. 90].

In general, it may be noted that the power of the ruling clan in the Empire and its uluses was based on the charisma of Chinggis Khan, as well as on the charisma of the Chinggisid family. Later, during the islamisation of the Mongol and Turkic nomads in western uluses, there was an issue regarding the legitimacy of the Chinggisid governance from the point of view of Islam. It was not even possible for them to obtain a formal investiture from the powerless Abbasid caliph, who was living aimlessly at the Egyptian court. Instead, a more fantastical version was developed: Chinggis Khan was turned to Islam by the Prophet's follower: ‘he accepted all the stipulations of God except hajj and circumcision when adopted the Islamic faith’ and pronounced the shahada (the symbol of faith). It was almost as if the adoption of Islam by the Mongol governor became known to the righteous Caliph Abu Bakr, who actually
lived in the 7th century [3, pp. 64–66]. Now, Chinggis Khan could generally be added to the grouping of Islamic dynasties that ceased to be ‘infidels’.

The machinery of government functioned on behalf of the khan and to implement his orders, whether the throne was occupied by a sovereign ruler or a puppet of the nobility. The khan was responsible for appointing the main administrative positions, the issue of currency, and negotiations with foreign rulers. He also headed the army during large military campaigns and so on.

However, he actually shared his powers with karachi begs, one of whom was senior (beklyaribek, ulug beg). Some sources reasonably consider that these four superior noblemen represented the most authoritative Turkic-Mongol clans and also constituted the ruler's council. As far as it can be judged, based on information about the Tatar Khanates of the late Middle Ages, karachi begs were the ones who had to perform the coronations. The structure of the four main dynasties (except for the regnant dynasty) was traditional for Turkic-Mongol statehood. One can suppose that, in beginning of the 14th century, at the times of Öz Beg Khan, in addition to their court duties, they also received four regions of the state to administer, turning them into ulusbeks.

There are no records of the traditional Turkic or Mongol kurultai, that is a council of the nobility, existing within the Golden Horde's governing structures. However, it might have been formal and only gathered in exceptional or festive occasions (like the proclamation of a new ruler). It is most likely that the four karachi begs themselves replaced this aristocratic council. If we consider multiple records mentioning assemblies of ‘the whole earth’ held in Kazan, Crimea, Siberia and Astrakhan, then it is clear that the kurultai was revived later, while the Horde's statehood still existed under the Tatar Khanates.

As with any empire formed by nomads, the military played the most important role in the life of the state. Nomads also understandably constituted the majority of its population and army, making administrative institutions in the Golden Horde first and foremost directed at controlling nomad nationals. However, the settled population made up of farmers, artisans and merchants was also one of the most important categories of nationals, most notably as taxpayers. Over time, with the adoption of Islam and the developing prosperity of cities in the first half of the 14th century, the role of these citizens in the economy, and therefore their social importance, increased at a significant rate. It therefore comes as no surprise that central governance was focused exactly on these two parts of the population.

Based on circumstance we can consider that the military business and the ulus-appanage system related to it were run by the Beklyaribek and three Karachi begs who were hierarchically subjected to him. All non-military affairs (first of all financial) were run by the Vizier and his chancellery, the Divan. In other words, the nomad population of the Golden Horde was mostly controlled by the Beklyaribek, and the settled population fell under the control of the Vizier.

The role of the Khan in this system of powers had been reduced to high control over his dignitaries, arbitrage over disputes between them, and final decision making on all principal matters. Not coincidentally, medieval observers noted that the monarch of Jochid 'paid attention only to the essence of cases, without going into details, and was satisfied with what he got from reports, and never sought particulars on levis and expenses' [15, p. 230]. However, this distance of the Khan from everyday matters was typical for the 14th century, and perhaps the 1270–90s as well. However, the first rulers of Ulus, Batu and Berke, examined every aspect of management down to the last detail, as they were only just beginning to fine-tune the mechanism of government.

Beklyaribek was the nominal head of the Beg social estate (noyons, emirs) and with this position, he acted as the supreme leader of war. When the Horde adopted Islam, their ideological base became intertwined with foreign politics which was, in a way, common for medieval
Islamic cities—battles (wars) were fought for the faith. In this capacity he was titled the ‘help of Islam and muslims’, and the ‘champion of warriors and fighters for the faith’. At the same time, the prerogatives of Beklyaribek were of course in constant submission to the Khan's, as the Khan ruled over the entire population, both during times of peace and times of war. As the number two in government, Beklyaribek also had a responsibility to build relationships with other countries, and perhaps even render justice as the highest court (in areas of life and segments of the population that had not yet adopted sharia). The western part of the state, from the Don River to the Danube River, was under the direct control of the chief Begs.

The institution of Beklyaribeks did not form until the 11th century among the Turkic-Oghuzes, but nonetheless had a long history in potestary societies during the proto-statehood stage, ultimately transforming into one of the matrix forms of functionality for Turkic nomad policies and reemerging in the Ulus of Jochi as a result of social consolidation among nomadic nobles. This was caused first and foremost by the favorable economic and demographic conditions of the 13th century, and secondly by the crises and repressions in the ruling Batu House during the reign of Toqta Khan, as well as in the beginning of the reign of Öz Beg Khan, when Jochids were losing support from their kin and dynasty members in their fight for power, yet finding it among the nomad Begs. The revival of the Turkic Beklyaribeks institution was also aided by the Turkisation of the court, bureaucracy and record-keeping in the Golden Horde, in addition to the infiltration of Iranian and Oghuz-Seljuk elements of governance. The factors stimulating the occurrence of this last phenomenon in particular were the temporary peace between the traditionally feuding Ulus of Jochi and Hulagu in the early 14th century, and the adoption of Islam as the state religion in the Golden Horde. Starting in the late 14th century, as the Jochid statehood weakened, the importance of Beklyaribeks in the life of post-Horde states increased dramatically. In some of them this position was monopolised by Begs from the Turkic tribe of Manghits.

The appearance of Beklyaribek as a position was a priority indicator of the Golden Horde's development, most strongly in terms of administrative and political development: a specialised military agency for the state was formed and represented precisely by the chief Beg and his court. However, the pressure from archaic attitudes and the crises in the various Ulus never allowed this process to come to full fruition. Secondly, there were social development concerns, as Beklyaribek did not appear until the Golden Horde had a fully formed social estate of Begs that required strict ranking and structuring. Although nowadays researchers have rejected the well-known concept of ‘nomad feudalism’, this concept is still relevant in that it demonstrates the never fully realised potential of the future seigneur-vassal relationships, mestnichestvo [system of seniority], feudal pyramid and other institutions of classic feudalism.

It is therefore not surprising that the most important dignitaries had such wide prerogatives and resources at their disposal that they could sometimes claim independence and assume rule over the throne. The most famous and powerful Beklyaribeks, Mamai and Edigü (often incorrectly referred to as usurpers and minions), appointed Khans as they saw fit and fully controlled all the business in the state.

The existence of two top dignitaries, the Beklyaribek and Vizier, reflected the division of the Golden Horde's ruling elite into two categories: military nobility (noyons, Begs, emirs) and administrative officials. Medieval Arabic authors refer to them as the rulers of emirs and rulers of cities accordingly [15, p. 347 ff, 412 ff]. Military and civil structures operated simultaneously, both exercising their own functions, but whereas the Institution of Beklyaribeks was an outgrowth of the Turkic-Mongol statehood tradition, then Vizier and Divan were the results of borrowed Islamic state institutions. The main responsibilities of these organs included the provision of a financial system, fiscal policy, control over an increasingly complicated and branching administration, regulation of
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...trade, urban planning and so on. While Khans and chief Begs tended to spend most of their time in regular (and prestigious) migrations, officials dwelt mostly in cities. The office of the Divan stored taxable copies (daftar, devter’), as well as various spreadsheets and cadastres.

Unfortunately, today this entire mass of documentation has been lost to history. However, even that small bit of knowledge we have about the actions of the central government structures of the Golden Horde allows us to assert that it combined elements of business culture from different countries and people of the Mongol Empire, including Uighurs, Khitan, Jurchen, Chinese and others. In the Ulus of Jochi, the influence of the Islamic Khwarezm, Transoxiana (Mawarannahr) and Hulagu Iran regions can clearly be seen, and it is likewise possible that the culture of Volga Bulgaria also had a certain influence here as well.

The hierarchy of Begs is known from original Khan yarliqs and their Russian translations, which mentioned temniks [generals], ty’yachniks [thousandmen], sotniks [hundred-men], desyatniks [tenmen], ulus princes and also military princes, regiment men and people’s princes (probably a synonym of ulus princes/ulus Begs). All of these military leaders and namestniks together formed a pyramid that had karachi begs and Beklyaribek at the very top. During the 13th century, they constituted a peculiar corporation that held the military administrative structure of the state in their hands and stayed almost entirely out of non-military affairs. In the 14th century, the military nomadic nobility, or in other words the keeper of the conquering traditions of the Mongol Empire, edged noticeably closer to bureaucratic officialdom.

Officials of the Golden Horde also had a multi-level ranking system: the highest position after the Vizier was the darugha, or man responsible for collecting taxes from a certain locality. Darughas were appointed both to distant localities and entire tumens, or appanages of an ulus. In the latter case they shared managerial duties with the local Begs and holders of uluses, and also arranged tax collecting with them. The darughas embodied the presence and supervision of the central government locally and served as its representatives, in this sense replacing the baskaks, who represented the qa’an during the cohesive period of the Empire, including the lands ruled by Jochids. In the 15th century there were known to be darughas responsible for the situation in the Russian Grand Principalities. In 1470 Ahmed Khan was roused against Ivan III during the negotiations with Polish people by ‘Prince Temir, the road to Ryazan and so on’ [10, Vol. 18, p. 224]. Apparently, that official was in charge of the affairs related to the Principality of Ryazan in the same way as the Moscow darugha was attached to the court of Ulugh Muhammad [10, vol. 12, p. 15].

In the 13th century, Imperial and Golden Horde authorities divided the controlled population into tumens (districts able to provide ten thousand combat-capable men for the militia), thousands, hundreds and tens using centuries-old institutions common among nomads. Tumens usually formed large uluses, and there was a strict military and administrative hierarchy between the heads of these detachments. Pastures were under the ulus holders, who regulated all movements and tax payments of the population under their control.

The tens system was also introduced in settled territories, but there it mostly served as a foundation for taxation, not for military mobilization. There is information about the establishment of tumens (‘tem’) in the conquered Russian lands thanks to the empire-wide census performed by the Mongols in the second half of the 1250s. Nevertheless, it is also known that lieges from the agrarian regions (including Russians) were involved in the military campaigns organised by Khans of Golden Horde.

The Golden Horde comprised two wings, separated by the Yaik River—the Right wing (western, the White Horde—Ak Horde) and the left (eastern, the Blue Horde—Kok Horde). Each of them was, in turn, subdivided into wings. Two halves of the Ak Horde were separated by the Don River, while the Kok Horde consisted of appanages of Jochi’s sons Orda Ichen and Shiban. The boundaries between them remain unidentified due to lack of data. Historians
obtained relatively detailed information only about the territorial and administrative organisation of the Ak Horde.

During the first century both the White Horde and the Blue Horde led mostly autonomous lives, being a part of the Ulus of Jochi only in name, without any explicit signs of cooperation. Ak Horde khans interfered in eastern affairs rarely and sporadically. Nothing is known about whether Ak Horde suzerains participated in the events to the west of the Yaik before the middle of the 14th century. There is also no information about the aristocracy of the two Hordes gathering for meetings to discuss common issues (there must have not been any); no evidence that the two wings used a uniform system of taxation or mustering troops. Perhaps, the only things denoting that the Ak Horde and the Kok Horde belonged to the same political entity were the lineal kinship of the rulers, a chain of caravan routes and postal stations, and—during the first decades—their obedience to the imperial Centre.

Merger of the two wings took place in the 1380s under Khan Toktamysh. It was short and ineffective, as it took place in the context of a dawning national crisis and the fall of the Golden Horde, right before Timur's fatal invasions. After the invasions the Right wing immersed in chaos, and independent khanates started to form on its territory. During the 15th century, the Öz Beg Khanate, Kazakh khanate and Nogai Horde formed in the Left wing. None of these new states deemed themselves to be Jochi wings.

A distinctive feature of the Golden Horde's government structure was the ulus system. The term ulus originally meant a people assigned for governing. Later, the term expanded to mean the territory that a given people takes up, and in this form it was used to denote an appanage or a state (a separated appanage, such as the Ulus of Jochi, the Ulus of Chagatai, the Ulus of Hulagu).

In the Golden Horde uluses were not inherited—at least, before the latter half of the 14th century. They were a form of conditional ownership. The main conditions for owning an appanage were collecting regular tributes from the people, maintaining order and stability for the territory under control and mustering required number of soldiers for the militia. It is believed that an ulus corresponded to a military tumen, meaning a group of ten thousand. In other words, each ulus provided ten thousand warriors. Thus, the ruler of the ulus held the rank of a temnik.

Khan could change ulus owners, selecting and assigning appanages as he saw fit. The borders of uluses remained unchanged. Each ulus had two guises, two forms of existence—territory and people. The space for regular nomadism was called nutag (Mong.) or yurt (Turk.); the people were called irgen (Mong.) or el, il (Turk.). Together a nutag/yurt and an irgen/el formed an ulus. Over time the territorial meaning of ‘ulus’ became the primary one, while among Mongols the primary meaning was that of a nomadic people formed an appanage.

V. Yegorov analysed the state of ulus structure of the Jochi Right wing in the middle of the 13th century—that is, during the period when the Golden Horde obtained political independence. According to Yegorov, uluses were located from the West to East in the following way (see [2, pp. 163, 164]).

1. Farthest Western regions beyond the Dniester that bordered with Danube Bulgaria were under the rule of Nogai, Jochi descendant of Buval, the last seventh son. At the end of the century, Nogai gained control over the whole region to the west of the Don, including Crimea. Nogai's residence was in the city of Ishakçı on the right bank of the Lower Danube.

2. The ulus of commander Kuremsa—presumably not a Jochid—was located between the Dnieper and the Dniester.

3. On the left bank of the Dnieper, temnik Mauchi (Mochi) led a nomadic lifestyle, who also did not belong to the imperial clan.
4. Further to the east and up to the Don were Kartan's lands given to him for marrying Batu's sister.
5. Crimea was initially separated into a special ulus, but its first rulers are unknown.
6. The Volga-Don interfluve was occupied by nomad camps of Sartaq, Batu's older son.
7. Berke, Batu's younger brother and the future Khan, first ruled over the territory to the south of the North Caucasian Steppe. However, in the late 1240s, Batu assigned another territory to him, west of Volga (probably in the Southern part of the Volga-Yaik interfluve).
8. Khan's appanage stretched along the left bank of Itil (Volga)—personal ulus of the Golden Horde ruler. Demonstrating devotion to their ancestors' traditional way of life, the rulers of the Horde tried to preserve nomadic way of life for their family and their court. The main camp (the Golden Horde itself) moved around during the year along the Volga, spending summers in the North and winters in the South. Due to climate conditions of this part of Eurasia, the Khan and his court were forced to spend most of the time on winter pastures. The largest cities—both capital Sarai and Haji Tarkan (Astrakhan)—were founded on winter camp territories. In the 14th century, Jochi governors spent their winters on the pastures of Steppe Ciscaucasia (the city of Majar was founded there). In the area of khan's summer camps the cities of Bulgar and Ukek were built (however, the latter stood on the right bank of the Volga).
9. The right bank of the Yaik. Here, along an ancient caravan route by the crossing through the Yaik River, Saray-Jük—one of the Golden Horde ‘megapolises’ was located. It is unknown who ruled over this ulus in the middle of the 13th century. During the fall of the Horde at the end of the 14–15th centuries, Jochi descendants Orda-Ichen, Shiban and Tuqay Timur were claimed by Saray-Jük.
10. The left bank of the Yaik. The ruler of this ulus is also unknown.
Khwarezm was an independent administrative district. This country's Northern part, with such cities as Urgench and Khiva, belonged to the Golden Horde. Perhaps, this area of ancient culture at the Lower Amy Darya region was an enclave of the Right wing surrounded by Chagatai and Kök Horde territory.

As for the inner subdivision of the Left wing, the only aspect we know is the location of Orda-Ichen and Shiban's territories. The older Jochid inherited his father's main camp in the Upper Irtysh. The sources describe the khan domains of the Kok-Horde with the use of various place names from Southeast Kazakhstan. Among the larger cities they mention Otrar, Sauran, Jand, Barchkent and Sygnak which became residence to local monarchs during the latter half of the 14th century. All these cities were mostly settlements at the Syr Darya, a territory that had already been urbanised during the pre-Mongol period.

Shiban's ulus took up vast steppes of Western and Central Kazakhstan. According to chronicler Abu al-Ghazi (17th century), Batu assigned it to his younger brother, saying: ‘The yurt in which you will live...will be between my yurt and the yurt of my elder brother Orda-Ichen: live on the eastern side of the Yaik in the summer, along the rivers Irgiz, Sanuk, Or up to the Ural mountain, and live in Arakum, Karakum, and by the banks of the Syr Darya in the winter, by the estuaries of the Chu and Sary Su rivers’ [14, p. 160].

There is no data on where the camps of other Jochi sons, subordinated to Orda-Ichen—Udur, Shingkur, Shingum and Tuqay Timur—were located.

In the 14th century, as the role of urban economy rose and the administrative body developed in forms typical of stable settled states, the Golden Horde transformed its administrative territorial division. Preserving the structure of nomadic uluses, the government established four additional ulus beqs that were mentioned in Arabic documents as Sarai, Khwarezm, Crimea and Desht-i Kipchak. It is obvious that the first three of these are local regions with developed urban life, and for them a single vicegerent was more than enough. As
for gigantic Desht-i Kipchak, additional internal subdivision was necessary for successful management. The old ulus system was preserved there for that very function.

According to limited and often questionable data from the sources, the total number of uluses in both wings of the Golden Horde was around seventy in the 14th century [2, p. 167]. Thirty of them belonged to the Left wing—the less populated one.

Based on medieval texts it is yet impossible to establish the principles of delimitating ulus borders. Geographic criteria (river boundaries) are not always applicable. If an ulus could be separated by Volga, Kama, Don, or Yaik, what would act as borders in the plain steppes—smaller rivers, or another landscape guiding lines, such as mountain ranges? Historiography suggests that the division into ulus wings might have been based on the resettlement of ethnic communities. For example, Kok Horde and Ak Horde approximately corresponded to the areas of resettlement of the Oghuz and Kipchak tribes (according to archaeological materials) [17, pp. 57, 58]. Possibly, the composition of the local Kipchak tribes and the outsider Mongol tribes was taken into account during the formation of the Jochids’ appanage system, when one ulus corresponded to a specific tribal community or group of communities. This is indirectly evidenced by the late medieval mentions of the population of Desht-i Kipchak, describing them primarily as aggregates of el’s—that is, populated communities of ulus domains; at that, each el was denoted in written sources by a tribal ethnonym: the el’ of the Naimans, the el’ of the Qongirats, the el’ of the Manghits, etc. If the hypothesis of four leading aristocratic clans governing the state is accurate, it is reasonable to presume that the clans had their own nomadism areas.

In the minds of those who lived in the Turkic khanates, the notion of the former centre of the Ulus of Jochi consecrated by the figure of Batu (Sain Khan), the second son of Jochi, was preserved. The capture of the main camp of the Horde Khan in the 15–beginning of 16th centuries was considered by his victorious antagonists as the appropriation of the holy throne of Sain Khan. This is how the Jochids, enemies of the Great Horde, treated their successes in their fight against it: ‘But Lord sent me another fortune: by killing Timer, the son of Kutluy, I took the throne of Sain’ (Ibrakhim, Khan of Tyumen, to Ivan III, 1494, regarding the defeat of Akhmed Khan thirty years before); ‘the golden capital of our father (ancestor—Author), Tsar Sain, is in our hands’ [11, pp. 46; 13, p. 539]. Mengli Giray himself in his letter to the Kiev voivode described the defeat of the Great Horde as a successful campaign where he ‘had driven away Tsar Akhmat and captured the capital of the Father Tsar’ [18, p. 181]. The ‘Father Tsar’ (ancestor khan) here is most likely to also mean Batu Khan.

The Eastern chroniclers believed that the main merit of the Manghit beg Waqqas (the second quarter of the 15th century) was the fact that he ‘twice won the throne of Sain Khan’ for his patron Abu'l-Khayr Khan, after which Abu'l-Khayr’s name was read at the beginning of khutbah—a devotional praise in honor of the ruler, minted on coins, and his persona ‘adorned the throne of Sain Khan’ [8, pp. 67, 155].

All the aforementioned thrones/headquarters/capitals (khan's residences) were in different locations, which indicates how relative this concept was in the ideological constructs of the late medieval Desht-i Kipchak. Moreover, ‘Kazan Chronicler’ of the 1560s, written in Russian, calls Kazan ‘Sain's yurt’ [10, vol. 19, pp. 13, 210].

In the eyes of the former Slavic tributaries, the Ulus of Jochi that had fallen into oblivion, was embodied by the khan's location. Visits to the khan to procure yarliqs, payments of the tribute—'vykhod', resolution of internal disputes between princes, etc., are described in the Russian sources as trips ‘to the Horde’, the word ‘Horde’ means the main camp and the state.

The symbolic nature of several of the above ‘thrones of Sain Khan’ seems obvious when compared to the actual location of one of Batu's residences in the capital city of Sarai. In the latter half of the 14th century, Mangutay became the khan ‘on Sain Khan's throne in the vila-
yet of Sarai’ (Sajy’-n-khan tehtinde Seray vilayetinde); Toktamys—‘in the city of Sarai on
Sain Khan’s throne’ (Seray shehrinde Saiyn-khan tehtinde) [16, pp. 109, 118, 136, 144; see
also: 9, p. 147].

So, locations of capitals and nomadic camps turned into places of general importance,
blessed by the presence of magical charisma (farn, kut) that gave the heaven’s chosen ones the
power over the people. At that, the inverse relationship of the phenomena needs to be taken
into account as well: capitals, main camps, burial sites could be arranged in areas that had
previously already had the reputation of holy places, and a nomadic camp, near which a khan
was buried, was turned into a memorial of its kind—a quruq [1, p. 149; 7, p. 158]. Apparent-
ly, such dynastic necropolises—quruqs—‘in the vicinity of the town of Saray-Jül on the Yaik
and in the Ulytau Mountains (Central Kazakhstan) maintained their general symbolic value
for the Jochids.

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§ 2. Territorial Organisation of the Ulus of Jochi
(Territory to the West of the Don)

Boris Cherkas

Reconstruction of the territorial organisation of the Golden Horde (Ulus of Jochi) is a major issue for the modern-day historical science, since understanding the regional division of this state can significantly expand our understanding of its existence. The scarcity of sources about the Jochids' state, mostly those of the internal origin, makes the study of this issue rather complicated. However, at the same time, the modern level of knowledge about the history of the Ulus of Jochi allows restoring the picture of the network of uluses in some of its areas. One of such portions of the Golden Horde are the lands located to the west of the Don, in the territory of the modern-day Ukraine and Moldova.

In 1224, Chinggis Khan performed an administrative reform, according to which the state was divided into uluses. The khagan's sons—Jochi, Chagatai, Ögedei and Tolui—were appointed as their rulers. The eldest, Jochi, gained the western region, which at the time included the newly conquered Khwarezm and the easterly Desht-i Kipchak. Still, even then, the lands spreading west were thought to belong to Jochi. This is obvious, for example, by the fact that after the 1223 battle on the Kalka River, the fate of the captured Kievan prince Mstyaslav was decided by Chinggis Khan's eldest son. The captive prince was taken east to Jochi's main camp by a dedicated courier, where he was executed [20, p. 223]. This episode confirms the opinion that it was Jochi who oversaw the actions of Subutai and Jebe. Juzjani's statement about Jochi's attitude towards Desht-i Kipchak should be seen in the same context: 'When Tushi (Jochi), the eldest son of Chinggis Khan, saw the air and water of the Kipchak land, he thought that there could be no land pleasanter than that one, or air better, or water sweeter, or meadows and pastures wider in the whole world' [52, p. 14]. The western campaign was also headed by a Jochid, and even when Batu encountered internal opposition represented by Guyük and others, the qa'an supported Batu [20, pp. 310–311].

As a result of the 1236–1242 western campaign and Kurumyshi's 1245–1246 march to the right bank of the Dnieper, the Ulus of Jochi became the largest region of the Mongol Empire. However, its geographic location—distance from the metropolis, and the fact that the Ulus of Chagatai also laid between the Ulus of Jochi and the capital—made the ulus ruler a rather independent figure. And while the contemporaries treated Batu as one of the most powerful representatives of the Empire, his successor Berke already acted as an independent ruler, as can be seen from Egyptian sources. The Civil War in the Mongol Empire that broke out in
1260 between Tolui’s sons, the brothers Kublai and Arik Buka, definitively fractured Chinggis Khan's Empire [61, p. 34 - 49].

As a result, as early as during Berke's reign (1257–1266), the Ulus of Jochi de facto became its own, separate state, with Khan Mengü Temür (1266–1280) starting to mint his own coins, send his officials to settled areas, conduct a new census, cease the sending of tribute to Karakorum and, following the example of the qa'an, distribute lands in settled areas. As for the uluses located in modern-day Ukraine, they were automatically transferred to the new state, while later in the 15th century the majority of lands in present-day Ukraine and Moldova had indeed become part of the Golden Horde.

It is far from a simple task (mainly to a lack of sources) to determine the borders of the Golden Horde where Ukraine is currently located. However, it is possible to make a general outline of the state's contours in this region. It should be noted that the Mongol Empire, followed by the Golden Horde, were not exclusively nomadic state formation. In fact, they were based on two entirely separate worlds: nomadic and settled. The steppe was the core of the country and contained its inner regions, while the outer contours of the state were home to the settled areas. The nomads were the force that gave rise to the state of Chinggis Khan, and later khans were able to keep their hold over the settled peoples owing in large part to nomads’ efforts. While the nomads made up the bulk of the military power, the settled population formed the country’s economic foundation. Therefore, we believe that in any effort to demarcate the borders of the state, the boundaries of the nomadic settlements should not be the only material taken into account. The territory should instead be reconstructed considering the network of the government bureaucracy, which was primarily represented by the Khan's vicegerents, the baskak-darughachi and other full-fledged ‘economic’ officials including customs officers, watchmen, heads of mail staging posts, atamans (chieftains) and so on. At the same time, most regions retained institutions from the old aristocracy, dynasties and administrative mechanisms; princes from among the steppe peoples governed their subjects just as the settled princes governed theirs. As for the countries neighbouring the Chinggisid states and paying tribute to them, but not officially part of the Golden Horde administrative structure, they are in our opinion best considered ‘dependent’ or ‘vassalic’.

Based on these criteria, the border of the Golden Horde during its most prosperous period can be described as such: in the west it covered Northern Dobruja and extended along the left bank of the Danube towards the Iron Gates, or the place where the Carpathians and Balkan Mountains reach the Danube; from there it continued on to the upper reaches of the Seret, Prut and Dniester, and along the left bank of the Dniester the boundary dropped down to Bakota and stretched further to the left bank of this river. In its description of the wars waged by Daniil of Halych against the Bolokhivians and the Horde, a Halych-Volhynia chronicle uses the following geographical names: during Kurumysh's and Burunday's campaigns against Rus¹, the first to come under attack are Shumsk and Kremenets [6, pp. 117, 124]; in response, the Rusyns' troops attack Bakota and capture a basquaq, Międzybuż and the Bug river region together with the ‘Tatar people’, Gorodok, Semoch ‘and all the cities under Tatars, Gorodesk, and from Teteriv to Zhidichev’ [6, pp. 117, 120; pp. 251–253]. As this text makes abundantly clear, the limits of the Mongol Empire in present-day Ukraine and Moldova included the upper reaches of the Seret, the Southern Bug, as well as the Horyn and Smotrych (this may be due to the presence of the steppe zone in these areas). The boundary then most likely ran along the Sluch River to the north, which is first and foremost evident from the fact that the Kievan Land was part of the Mongol Empire, and the Sluch River served as the principality’s

¹ After princes Daniil and Vasilyok (the senior branch of the Monomakhovichi) had united the territories of the Halych, Volhynia and partially Tutov-Pinsk, and Kiev principalities under their rule, this state received the name of the Kingdom of Rus. Accordingly, the terms ‘Rus’, ‘Rusyns’ and ‘Rusich’ should be considered general names for the power structure, army or population of this state.
boundary from Volhynia. It also happens to be proven by Daniil of Halych's march on Zvyahel in 1257, where at the time he and Mindaugas signed an agreement on a joint offensive against Kiev. The first city attacked by Daniil of Halych was none other than Zvyahel, which was located on the Sluch [6, p. 120]. The Mongols thus incorporated Kievshchina into their state, and even the term ‘basquaqs’ was first mentioned here during the fall of the capital city [20, p. 310].

To reconstruct the northern part of the boundary, we shall consider the work by Ye. Rusina, who analysed the functions performed by the elders and atamans (chieftains) in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (hereinafter ‘GDL’) in the 16th century mentioned in sources, and reached the conclusion that they contain the defining elements between the Golden Horde and Lithuania. Accordingly, the boundary should pass through the Chernobyl powiat, and also partially through the Ovruch powiat. The Mazyr and Lyubets powiats were not part of the Jochid State [43, p. 82] (see the maps of the powiats and their populated areas given in P. Klepatskij's work: [26]).

One chronicle mentioned that the reason for Daniil of Halych's journey to Batu was that Mochi (named 'Mighty' in the chronicle) demanded Halychia be given away [6, p. 109]. However, the neighboring lands belonging to the Horde were ruled by Kurumyshi, which logically means that Mochi summoned Daniil as an official who was below Batu in the power hierarchy (just as Batu was the last link in the command chain below the Khagan). It is significant that while naming ulus rulers, Giovanni da Pian del Carpine also says that Mochi ranks ‘higher than Korenca’ (Kurumyshi), but the Papal envoy fails to explain the essence of this superiority [42, p. 48]. However, after the papal envoy left Kurumyshi ulus for Batu's camp, the Papal envoy's people were sent to visit Mochi, where there were others as well including ‘prince Yaroslav and his companions, as well as... Sviatopolk from Rus' and his companions’ [42, p. 60]. It is likewise important to note that Giovanni da Pian del Carpine's return route was Batu - Mochi - Kurumyshi - Kiev [42, pp. 60–61].

But this ultimately begs the question: who exactly is hiding behind the name Mochi/Mighty? M. Safargaliev theorises that Mochi and Muval are actually the same person [46, p. 42]. To his benefit, this well-respected author used an alternative version of Mowal, most likely because Rukn al-Din Baybars and al-Nuwayri call him Muval [51, p. 150 footnote, pp. 152, 156] and al-Ayni call him Mughal [51, p. 503]. V. Trepavlov assumes that Mochi was not a Chinggisid [53, p. 31], while R. Pochekayev is of another opinion. In his study based on Rashid al-Din's findings, he asserts that Mochi was Chagatai's son [41, pp. 76, 156]. Only Mutukan and Moolji fit this role from among Chagatai's children, but the former died even while his grandfather was still alive, and Rashid al-Din fails to even mention the rule of the Chagataids in the Ulus of Jochi. Therefore, given the confrontation of this clan with the Jochids, in our opinion this situation is hardly probable. As for the area ruled by Muval (we have decided in favor of this name for ease of reading), here one must pay attention to the division of the Golden Horde into wings.

According to nomadic tradition, Jochi's descendants divided the Ulus of Jochi into two parts, or rather wings. The West (Right) 'wing' went to Batu, the ruler of the entire Ulus, and the East (Left) wing was ceded to Orda Ichen, the chief of the clan. By the early 14th century, the wings in the west of the Yaik River (modern Ural) lived an independent life. However, the rulers of the Left wing were officially considered to be dependent in relation to the owners of the Right wing. From a territorial perspective, the Right wing was also dominant. It not only owned huge tracts of steppe, but also all settled regions, and not only in the west, but also in the east (Khwarezm). According to research by K. Uskenbay, the Left wing was divided into two smaller wings ruled by Orda Ichen and Shiban [54, p. 373]. Accordingly, the same system must have applied in the western Right wing. Based on Muval's status described above,
we believe he was the head of one of the two wings in the Ak Horde, which allows us to employ the term ‘Muval's wing’.

We should also note that while in the Kok Horde the division of possessions between Orda Ichen and Shiban is relatively clear, in the Ak Horde the part that belonged to Muval is not so easily defined, due mainly to several reasons. First and foremost, Batu received the lands conquered not long ago, and secondly, with each passing year the threat coming from neighbouring lands was growing, primarily from the Hungarians, Rus and Lithuanians, which required him to gather enough forces that ultimately were not sufficient enough to both stifle uprisings and combat external threats. And while the large Right wing (Ak Horde) managed to maintain control over this situation just barely, Muval's descendants, whose possessions actually cut into Central-Eastern Europe (Bulgarian, Hungarian, Ruthenian and Lithuanian possessions formed an arch running along the land boundary of the Ulus of Jochi and Muval's wing, respectively, extending from the Danube River to the Dnieper) had few forces and opportunities to do the same. One particularly telling example of this is Kurumyshi's futile attempts to conquer the Kingdom of Rus', even though he was probably also supported by neighbouring uluses [31, pp. 251–252; 41, pp. 264–266].

Weakness of the Muval's wing led to other problems. In particular, some of its region were allotted not only to Muval's offsprings, but also to children of his elder brothers. Thus, a part of the Right-bank Ukraine was given to Orda Ichen's son Kurumyshi (at least, in the genealogy compiled by Rashid al-Din, this name was attributed only to Orda Ichen's descendant [52, p. 46]). During the first years after its conquest, Crimea belonged to Shayban, while the Cis-Don River lands were governed by prince Kartan, not a Chinggisid at all, who though later became Batu's brother-in-law (his sister's husband) [42, p. 48]. Thus, the elder brothers, Batu, Orda Ichen and Shayban, not only formally headed their respective wings, but also took possession of a larger part of the Muval wing lands. With all this, it was Kurumyshi who lead the army, which the Jochids, according to Giovanni da Pian del Carpine, were keeping at the western border [42, p. 47]. Even during the passage of representatives of western countries, as it is evidenced by the example of Danylo Romanovich and Giovanni da Pian del Carpine, visiting Mochi was not obligatory. It is worth remembering that such meetings assumed presentation of gifts [42, pp. 47, 60], the value of which depended primarily on the status of the ruler in the particular area.

In our opinion, Batu further undertook on an attempt to centralise the power in the Ak Horde. Already William of Rubruck paid attention to how Batu had forced Berke to move his ulus from the lucrative ‘Caucasian’ road to ensure that revenues therefrom went only to the Batu's treasury [42, p. 95]. Even the fact that Khagan Möngke had granted Georgia as appanage to Berke, could not prevent this [20, pp. 187—188]. Apparently, Batu gave the Muval wing to his son Sartaq; for William of Rubruck, who was passing here in 1253, it was indeed Sartaq, who personified the Mongolian rule over the western domains [42, p. 67]. As for Muval's heirs, they most probably received lands within Batu's territories, closer to the capital city. It was no accident that later Nogai had land possessions to the east of the Volga River, near the Yaik [51, p. 117]. Mentioned in the sources messages and instructions, which Nogai (at least by his account) received from Batu [46, p. 45], indicate that the latter had a practice of granting his relatives plots of land in the vicinity of his own property prior to having them sent to distant campaigns and expeditions. For example, in 1256 Batu sent Muval descendants to Hulagu to help him conquer Persia.

After Berke's rise to power, however, the ‘Ukrainian-Moldavian’ wing again comes under the rule of Muval descendants, namely his grandson Nogai. We assume that support from

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2 The term ‘Central-Eastern Europe’ as a designation for modern Ukraine and Moldova is currently used expansively in Ukrainian historiography.
other Jochids, dissatisfied with Batu's policy, was one of the reasons why Berke so relatively easily did away with Batuids, Sartaq and Ulaghchi.

It was during the reign of Nogai that the Muval wing acquired its significance. It was not accidental that chroniclers, who were quite careful about the titulary in the Horde, called Nogai the Tsar [40, p. 79]. In this case it was not an exaggeration, but a statement of the fact. In the Jochids' vertical of power, Nogai took a position equal to that of Shayban in the greater left hand (wing). Hence, a new power centre emerged, both for subjects of the Jochids and the neighbouring countries, which paid tribute to the Golden Horde. George Pachymeres explained Nogai's independence in the following way: 'And, observing flourishing lands and peoples, capable of establishing their own independent state, he turned against those, who had sent him, and assumed the authority over those peoples' [1, p. 287]. Thus, as this quotation shows, the Greeks, on the one side, did not understand the reasons of Nogai's independence, though on the other side, clearly grasped the sovereign potential of the peoples inhabiting the lands where Nogai ruled.

Nogai's defeat resulted in the Muval wing loosing its significance. At first, Khan Toqta gave it to his brother Burluk, who apparently received the position of a beylerbey: it was not by coincidence that he led the army sent against Nogai's son Chaka, and later against Karakisek [51, p. 119]. Burluk's main camp, however, was located not by the Danube, but in the Don area. This can be seen from the report on the Sarai-Buga and Turay mutiny. Soon after Toqta's victory, Turay approached Sarai-Buga with a suggestion to plot a rebellion against the Khan. Sarai-Buga agreed and now together with the Nogai's son went to his brother Burluk. Turay's initiative, however, was dictated not only by his family ties, but also by considerations of the power, which Sarai-Buga had as the ruler of the Muval wing. According to sources, in order to get to the brother's main camp, Sarai-Buga crossed the frozen Volga River and then, having left the army, came to Burluk [51, pp. 118–119]. That is, in order to reach his main camp, the rebels did not even need to cross the Don. It is not known, who was the head of the Muval wing after Burluk.

In the times of Öz Beg, the power in the Muval wing was to be transferred not to the Chinggisids, but to someone of the emirs, what corresponded to the internal changes that the state power structure had undergone under this Khan. Öz Beg, seeking to prevent emergence of competitors, was giving the key positions in the state to emirs. The tradition to pass the wing to non-Chinggisids, established by Öz Beg (we can assume that it had been introduced even earlier by Toqta after Burluk), was also continued by his successors. Thus, under Berdi Beg, Mamai was appointed to head the Muval wing. Interestingly, the region's power centre was also concentrated nearby the Dnieper [7, pp. 117–121]. It was under Mamai that the Muval wing again restored its importance. For the period of the Great Troubles, it acted as one of the power centres, with the locally resident khans (under the actual rule of Mamai) presenting themselves as the sovereigns of the whole Ulus of Jochi. Having come to power, Toktamysh had to revert back to the traditions of the 13th century. The Muval wing under him was again headed by the Chinggisids. Thus, in the 80s/early 90s of the 14th century, here ruled Bekbulat, and the centre moved to Solkhat tumen. In 1391, Bekbulat came out against Toktamysh; hence, as in the time of Nogai and Mamai, the Muval wing again acted as a subject of political relations. After Bekbulat's defeat, it was apparently Tash Timur, who took on leadership of the wing. In battles against Tamerlane in 1395, in the Caucasus he was among the rulers of the Muval wing, and sources of the 15–16th centuries already mentioned him as one of the longtime khans (for details see: [60]).

During the rout of the Golden Horde in 1395–1396, Tamerlane led a separate campaign to destroy the Muval wing regions [52, pp. 121, 179]. Further internecine wars, which spread over decades, resulted in it practically ceasing to exist as an administrative-territorial unit. Every khan with his Horde roamed around the lands of the formerly one country, looking for
an opportunity to settle on the captured territories. The lands, previously belonging to the wing, were the subject of the strife between the Transvolga khans and appointees of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

Besides that, the Muval wing had one more specific feature. Quite often its rulers or ulus begs from its territories simultaneously functioned as beylerbey—military commanders of the entire Golden Horde army. Kurumyshi led an army of six tumens. We suppose, this comprised the whole field army of Batu at that time. Nogai, Burluk and Mamai held this position in different years. It can be that Bekbulat, and Tash Timur after him, were also beylerbey. Unfortunately, the absence of a full complex of source data does not permit to make a conclusion whether that was a regular practice. The very geopolitical position of the wing compelled khans to keep there substantial forces, as opposed to the left hand (wing), which in fact was an internal one and, consequently, faced no immediate threat to its existence. As for wars in the Caucasus, they were mostly of an offensive nature for the Golden Horde. Troops, therefore, were sent to the Caucasus periodically, not being kept there on a constant basis. A different situation was in the Jochid territories, west of the Don. First of all, sedentary regions ‘squeezed’ steppe uluses from the north and south. Secondly, behind them lay the lands of independent or semi-dependent countries—Bulgaria, Byzantium, Hungary, Poland, Lithuania, and Rus’. All of them were potentially dangerous for the Horde. Periodically, the Golden Horde collided with one or another of these countries, and eventually the advance of these neighbours, coupled with attempts of the oppressed peoples to gain independence, became fatal for the Muval wing.

The borders of this wing partially coincided with the state border, as sedentary regions belonged at first to Karakorum and then to Sarai. Thus, similar to the Danube region, where frontiers were identical to the state ones, the state border in the Right-bank Ukraine ran south of the Bolokhivians land, along the border of the Ulus of Kurumyshi. The same relates to the Left-bank Ukraine. The southern border of the Solkhat tumen represented the wing's boundary on the Crimean Peninsula (for more details about borders of uluses see hereafter).

Let us try to reconstruct the Muval wing’s eastern border. Giovanni da Pian del Carpine was the first to provide a description of where the lands of Ulus of Jochi were situated. Based on his report, V. Yegorov assumed that the border between the lands of Mochi and Katran had probably passed along the right bank of the Don River and, in the upper part of it, along the Siverskyi Donets [15, p. 164]. The same region served as the borderline during Nogai's campaigns. The 1283–1285 conflict between the princes of Rylsk (Oleg) and Lipetsk (Svyatoslav), and the Kursk baskak, Ahmat (Ahmed), actually turned into a confrontation between Nogai and Töde Möngek. A. Zaïtsev places the disputed region in the upper reaches of the Siverskyi Donets, the Seym and the Psel [17, p. 215, map No. 5]. Consequently, the upper reaches of the Siverskyi Donets is referred to. It is known from the description of the events of 1292 that Nogai, when travelling to meet Tula-Buga, first crossed the Dnieper, and then approached the Khan's main camp joining other emirs on his way (this means that he advanced further to the east). During negotiations, Tula-Buga was suddenly attacked by Toqta. After he had defeated his rival, Toqta retreated quickly beyond the Volga. Notably, the Don was not mentioned in the sources [52, pp. 69–70]. Therefore, Tula-Buga was waiting for Nogai on the left bank of the Don River. At the end of the 1290s Nogai responded to yet another message from Toqta as follows: ‘Our (Nogai's warriors—Author) horses are thirsty, and we want to water them from the Don’ [51, pp. 110; 4, p. 45]. Thus, the Don was defined as the border out of the several major rivers that separated the lands of Nogai and Toqta.

In the winter of 1298, Toqta approached the Dnieper with his troop, however, when in spring it came to a long-term deployment he retreated back to the Don again [52, p. 71]. In the same year, the enemies fought a battle at the Yasa River (stated by Rukn al-Din Baybars) [51, p. 111] or at the place named Bakhtiyar (as reported by Rashid al-Din) [52, p. 71]. Both re-
ports note that it happened near the Don. Rashid al-Din reports that it happened on the bank of a river (‘Bakhtiyar on the bank of the Tan River’) [52, p. 71]. The Egyptian chronicler notes that the Don was in Toqta's rear area [51, p. 111]. V. Tiesenhausen presumes that the Yasa is the Akai, a tributary of the Siverskyi Donets. What is important is the description of the locality given by Baybars. It indicates that the Yasa was located between the lands (that is the wings) of Nogai and Toqta [51, p. 111].

As we can see, the Don and the Siverskyi Donets appear to be the eastern border of the Muval wing. In our opinion, the description of the journey made by Metropolitan Pimen (1389) to Constantinople (a story on the movement along the Don) [28, p. 289] and its analysis described by K. Kudryashov [32, p. 26] can help to define more precisely where the border lay. In May, Pimen's Embassy visited ‘Velikaya Luka’ and passed the ‘Tsar's Ulus of Sarikhozya’. On the following day the Metropolitan was sailing by the ‘Ulus of Bekbulat’, a day later he visited the Ulus of Ak-Buga, and three days later he was already in Azov [28, p. 289]. K. Kudryashov defined ‘Velikaya Luka’ as the place where the Don ‘abruptly changes its direction from latitude-wise to longitude-wise’ [32, p. 24]. Thus, Pimen could see Bekbulat's lands in the Chir River region. So, as of 1389, the eastern border of the Muval's wing passed along the interfluvial area of the Siverskyi Donets and the Don.

It is hard to say now whether it was an ordinary eastern border of the wing or whether Bekbulat, who raised his first revolt against Toktamys in the same year [35, pp. 110, 111], expanded his possessions eastwards. It is noteworthy that Pimen saw ‘there are a lot of Tatars from both sides of the Don River. On Thursday we were sailing by the Ulus of Bekbulat and saw such a great quantity of Tatar livestock which one can hardly imagine: sheep, goats, oxen, camels, horses’ [28, p. 289]. Pimen's journey occurred in spring. At this time of the year, nomads from the steppes on the Left Bank of Ukraine usually migrated to the Azov Sea and to the Don (see, for example, the story on nomadism of Cumans up to the Azov Sea and the Molochna River in spring of 1103 [39, p. 55]). However, it is known that nomads would go up to the northern pasture-lands for summer. In the interfluvial area of the Siverskyi Donets and the Don, summer nomads were most likely to be somewhere around Oskol, probably, reaching the Tikhaya Sosna. No wonder it was there that the aforementioned conflict between the Russian princes and baskak Ahmed took place.

Thus, the existing sources give reasons to assume that the eastern border of the Muval's wing passed along the lower course of the Don and the left bank of the Siverskyi Donets.

The Mongol conquest created conditions for the new authorities to create an administrative and territorial structure which would meet their interests and traditions. In the first place, this was necessitated by military mobilisation purposes. Accordingly, the main unit became tumen—a region capable of providing ten thousand warriors. However, during the conquest the Chinggisids did not attempt to make any drastic changes in the administrative structure of their subjects. This is not that surprising, as initially they needed rations, supplies and recruits. Given the conditions of military campaigns, they needed to receive all these promptly. However, once the Western Campaign was over, ‘a regional reform’ was implemented. First of all, it affected the territories where nomads lived: Cuman hordes and Black Klobuks (Karakalpaks). It was an inevitable occurrence because the settlement of nomads strongly depended on the economic capabilities of the lands and the density of their settlement. Consequently, the authorities allocated plots of land for their oghlans, noyons, emirs and khans based on the existing situation. At the same time the principalities with a more settled population, although they were likely to lose lands suitable for nomadism, however, nothing on the part of Mongols threatened their existence in the form of separate regions.

At the end of 1245, the Ulus of Kurumyshi was formed in the territory of Ukraine, to the west of the Dnieper, in the lands which belonged to Köten's horde and Black Klobuks. It emerged as a result of a Mongol troop's arrival to protect the land from its European neigh-
bours [42, p. 47]. In the sources, this ulus is known under different names: ‘Mesta Kuremsovy (Kurumyshi Places)’ [6, pp. 122–123], ‘Severnye Oblasti’ (Northern Regions) [51, p. 112], ‘Proslavia’ [12, pp. 32–65] and, finally, ‘Podolia’ [45, p. 396].

The personality of Kurumyshi is rather mysterious. In the biographies presented by Rashid al-Din there is only one character with this name—the third son of the eldest Jochid, Orda-Ichen [52, p. 42]. The following is stated about him: ‘This Kurumyshi does not have any sons, his wives are not known either’ [52, p. 46]. In 1259–1260, when internal strife occurred in the Mongol Empire, namely between Kublai and Arik Buka, the latter was supported by Kurumyshi on behalf of Jochi dynasty [52, p. 73]. V. Trepavlov states that Kurumyshi ‘was not probably a Jochid’ [53, p. 31]. Giovanni da Pian del Carpine places Kurumyshi among the superior regional rulers of the Ulus of Jochi. Notably, it is obvious from the description of the Pope's Ambassador that Kurumyshi was a Chinggisid, otherwise Giovanni da Pian del Carpine would have described him as a Kartan: ‘some prince’ [42, p. 48]. It is possible that Rashid al-Din's report may contain inaccuracies. For example, after the description of the heirs of Hulagu, Kurumyshi's blood brother, he adds: ‘But God knows better’ [52, p. 47]. And at the end of the family tree of the Jochi dynasty he writes that this information was provided by ‘trustworthy people’ [52, p. 60]. It should be noted that Rashid al-Din was not a witness of the events he described. Moreover, the Ulus of Kurumyshi was situated far away from the interest area of the Iranian court which, certainly, was the reason for poor awareness of the Persian historian of the situation in the western part of the Ulus of Jochi. Particularly, this is traced in the description of Nogai's war: while stating the reasons why the emirs were unhappy after the Crimean campaign, Rashid al-Din mentions neither these emirs' lands nor their names [52, p. 71]. Accordingly, he does not mention Kurumyshi's sons, whom researchers learned about from the Egyptian chronicler, Rukn al-Din Baybars. Baybars noted that the Northern Regions were ruled by three of Kurumyshi's sons (Kurmyshi in the text): Abaji, Karaja and Yanchi, who were senior military commanders and ruled tumens [51, p. 112].

The ulus suffered great losses during the internecine war of 1299–1301. Kurumyshi's two elder sons were killed, therefore once the conflict was over, Khan Toqta gave the region to his younger offspring [51, pp. 113, 117]. During the first decades of the 14th century, the kingdom of Rus' spread its influence over the territory of the ulus. In 1352, a local ruler made a stand against Jani Beg Khan, for which he was punished. There are reasons to assume that, as a consequence, the ulus lost its ruling dynasty, and as early as the 60s of the 14th century the region was ruled by emirs of the neighbouring ‘Ulus of Nogai’. In 1362, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania struck a successful blow against the local Horde. The Lithuanians extended their power south, conquering the whole ulus. This situation lasted until the early 1390s. The decline of the authority of the Koryatowicz princes (who were members of the Giedyminowicz dynasty and rulers of the Principality of Podolia from 1362 to 1394) helped emirs from the ‘Ulus of Nogai’ restore their power south of Blue Waters. In 1395 there was already an ulus belonging to a certain Khurmaday. However, during the reign of Vytautas, the border of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania again stretched down to the Black Sea. With a yarliq, Toktamysh gave the Grand Duchy of Lithuania permanent possession of the lands of the former Ulus of Kurumyshi. De facto, the southern part of the region was regularly subjected to attacks from both nomads and the sedentary population, and as a result the local inhabitants began to disappear and cities declined. The main form of economic activity here was ukhodnichestvo—hunting, fishing, and gathering honey3.

3 The type of economic activity which was common among the Ukrainian population. Ukhodniki (Cossacks) represented groups (‘gangs’) who set off for the steppes seasonally to hunt, fish (in the lower reaches, first of all, of the Danube, the Dniester, the Southern Bug, the Ingul, the Dnieper, the Siverskyi Donets and the Don with their tributaries), keep wild bees, produce salt, etc.
Chapter III. The Politics of the Ulus of Jochi

After the ulus was formed, the Dniester formed its western boundary. However, it is unlikely that Ponizovye and Bolokhovo (a forest-steppe territory in the basins of the Dniester and Southern Bug) were a part of it. This would not be consistent with the structure of the Mongol Empire, in which the sedentary regions were directly subordinate to Karakorum. Reports from the Halych–Volhynian Chronicle about wars between Kurumyshi and Daniil Romanovich create the impression that the Horde came from remote lands. On the other hand, there were no nomads during Daniil's campaign against the Bolokhovo people. The army of the Rus' was confronted by their tribesmen, Rusyns, who were, however, under Mongol leadership. According to Giovanni da Pian del Carpine and William of Rubruck, a similar state of affairs also took place both in the Kievan region and southern Crimea (where the Rusyns were mentioned among peoples serving in the army of Temnik [General] Skatay [42, p. 83]). However, in 1352 the ‘king of Proslavia’ is mentioned as the ruler of the sedentary and nomadic region that was later known as Podolia [12, pp. 32–65; 59, pp. 13–25]. Khans of the Golden Horde who withdrew from the mother country adopted complete authority, which meant that the sedentary regions were subordinated to them. One of the defining characteristics of the new order was that these territories were distributed for ‘kormlenie’ [system of supporting officials at the expense of the local population in lieu of salary] to emirs or even honoured captives. A vivid examples of kormlenie are when Khan Mengü Temür granted Kiev and Kaffa to Tuqay-Timur [62, p. 212] or when Khan Berke awarded sultan Izz ad-Dīn the city of Sudak [19, pp. 55, 75, 92, 98]. It is also possible that some of the Bolokhovo people, along with the lands of the Cherkasy area, were annexed to the Ulus of Kurumyshi, which was extended northwards. This in turn broadened the base for creating the Ulus of Nogai. It is not by accident that Rukn al-Din Baybars indicates this area is northern [51, p. 112].

The eastern border of the ulus went along the Dnieper. It is less clear where the border with Nogai was. Initially, it would be logical to draw the border along the Dniester. Sources say that the battle between Toqta and Nogai took place at the site of the latter's old yurt (area of nomadism) [52, p. 71]. Some researchers believe the exact spot was on the Kuyalnik River [64, p. 179; 45, p. 386; 46, p. 61]. It is indicative that the local emir Hajji Bey was also subordinate to the Ulus of Nogai [45, p. 388]. Therefore, it turns out that the demarcation line between the two regions must have been the Southern Bug. However, A. Galenko considers that this river could not have been the border, especially if we consider how much smaller it is than the Dniester [5, p. 141]. We believe that this fact alone cannot determine where the border was. The Volga is a perfect example. This large waterway passed through the middle of the Golden Horde region, but did not play a crucial role in setting a border.

In 1502, the White and Blue Waters on the Dnieper are mentioned as a possible place of nomadism of the Trans-Volga (which, however, did not reach this area) and Perekop Hordes [47, pp. 418, 432]. The Blue Waters River is the present-day Synjucha. It is more difficult to identify what White Waters [Belaya Voda] was. There is no river with this name in Podolia. From the context we see that it separated nomadic fields from the West. It cannot be the Dnieper, because that river is found in the same documents under its own name [47, p. 469]. Moreover, if the Dniester was meant, the Kodyma River at least should have also been mentioned. White Waters [Belaya Voda] cannot be the Inhul, Inhulets or Chichakleya rivers either. Firstly, it is not logical from a geographical point of view, secondly, these names have Turkic origins [24]. The Inhul and Inhulets are called ‘Engel ve Ongul’ in a source from Crimea [34, p. 193], while ‘The Book of the Great Draft’ mentions them as the Angulets [27, p. 112]. In our opinion, the Southern Bug could have been called the White Waters. It is known that ‘white’ meant ‘western’ in the colour definition the Turks used to define cardinal points. This tradition obviously existed back in the time when the Ulus of Kurumyshi was located here, when the river was the border with Nogai lands. Another fact suggesting the
Southern Bug was the border is that both Kurumyshi and Burunday invaded Daniil Romano-


vich's possessions from the territories located on the left bank of this river [6, pp. 117, 121– 124; 31, pp. 251–252; 41, pp. 264–266]. Because the sedentary population belonged to the Ulus of Kurumyshi, the border mostly likely went from the Southern Bug along the Kodyma River or not far from it, to the Dniester.

Rukn al-Din Baybars wrote that Kurumyshi's children 'ruled over tumens in northern areas. They were equal to Nogai in their power, significance and number of troops' [51, p. 112]. In our opinion, the nature of the message in which three brothers are described indicates that the ulus consisted of three tumens. Considering the directions of the rivers, the tumens stretched from south to north, which was related to the seasonal nomadism. Giovanni da Pian del Carpine found Kurumyshi's main camp near the Dnieper, but hardly lower than present-day Zaporizhia (otherwise he would have ridden to Batu through Mo-


chi's camp). In fact, a week-long trip from Kaniv along a frozen river on carts would hardly have brought him to the river rapids, which he even does not mention. Besides, taking into account the season, it was the southern camp of the ulus' ruler. In the summer, he should have gone northwards and apparently he reached Porosye with its abundant pastures [25, p. 23]. Therefore, we should localise at least one tumen on the territory of present-day Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia along the Dnieper to the Ros. To some extent, this is support-
ed by reports of Benedict of Poland, according to which the Papal embassy met the com-
mander of eight thousand warriors in front of Kurumyshi's main camp. This leader demand-
ed gifts and then provided a slave who escorted the ambassadors to Kurumyshi [69, p. 224] (Benedict of Poland must have meant the temnik).

The story by Abdulgaffar Qirimi about the escape of Mamai's son with the horde to the Dnieper's right bank can be used to determine the location of the second tumen. The story states that their shelter was at the ‘Engel' ve Ongul’ (that is, the Inhul and Inhulets) [34, p. 193]. That is, in the 14th century the Horde considered this to be a separate region suitable for nomadism. The second tumen apparently stretched along these rivers and the Southern Bug northwards to the Blue Waters.

Contiguous lands of the sedentary population and nomads to the north of the Kodyma and Blue Waters could have belonged to the third tumen, since the population of sedentary territories also served in the army of the Golden Horde. Eventually, Nogai was killed by a warrior from among the Rus' [51, p. 114].

As we see, three tumens of the Ulus of Kurumyshi occupied a smaller territory in size in comparison with tumens in the Left Bank region (information about these tumens is provided below). This can be explained by the abundant pastures that made it possible to maintain the corresponding number of nomads, and by the neighbouring powerful sedentary region inhab-
it by the Bolokhovo people who, according to the chronicle, provided nomads with ‘wheat and millet’ [6, p. 104]. Therefore, the large sedentary population was the reason that, by the mid 14th century, the Ulus was already mentioned in European sources under a Slavic name—Proslav. Moreover, this number increased so much that after the Koryatowiczczes ascended the throne in Podolia in 1362, they were already opposed not by local Tatars, but by Chambuls from neighbouring regions.

On the eve of 1300, Rashid al-Din reported, ‘Toqtay with 60 tumens of troops crossed the Ozü River and established a camp on the Tarku River where Nogai's old ulus used to be located' [52, p. 71]. If we take into account that the Dniester River area finally became part of the Ulus of Jochi after Kurumyshi came in the winter of 1245–1246, the formation of this ulus should be dated to this time too. This is also supported by the fact that burial places of Chorni Klobuky were found on the lower Dniester [45, p. 384; 13, pp. 69–72]. Being a strong mili-
tary power of Rus', the Chorni Klobuky were apparently divided between Batu and Muval within the Right wing, thus they managed to retain their ‘capital’ status.
For some time, this Dniester ulus was a province at the remote western border. Muval's offspring, including Nogai, mainly lived at the courts of Batu and Berke—they took part in the Iranian campaign against Hulagu as commanders of Jochid troops. Consequently, already in the course of the first Caucasian war (mid 1260s), Nogai transferred a range of peoples to the Dniester area—Alans, Ruses, Goths, Zygii [4, p. 28], Circassians and 'others' [1, p. 287]. For example, it was said about the Alans that Nogai achieved great success with their help [1, p. 288]. With them, he invaded Budjak and Northern Dobruja. It was here that he created his new ulus with the capital in the city of İshakçı. According to N. Russev, ‘We can confirm that the centre of Nogai's Ulus was the area of the Danube River with contiguous territories on both banks of the river’ [45, p. 385].

The mass construction of settlements and cities in the Danube-Dniester Region begins right from the moment Nogai settled on the Danube River [45, p. 400]. In turn, this area became the second power centre after the Volga Region. In the days of his power, Nogai conducted independent foreign politics, entered into kinship with the Bulgarian and Byzantine monarchies, and minted his own coins. The double tamga of Nogai and his son Chaka found on these coins allows us to presume that these possessions were also divided into wings. If it was indeed so, Nogai must have ruled over the right, and Chaka over the Left wing. It is evident from the fact that Chaka participated in internecine feuds against the Kurumysheviches on the territory between the Dniester and the Dnieper. Consequently, after Nogai was defeated by Toqta, the ulus passed under Chaka's authority. However, the latter did not manage to retain power and had to retreat to Bulgaria where he died. Toqta decided not to break up the ulus, and kept it whole. This whole area was granted to the Khan's son, Tukel-Buga [51, p. 117; 4, p. 23].

During the reign of Öz Beg and Jani Beg, the Ulus of Nogai was already governed by several emirs, but still retained its territorial integrity [52, p. 211]. Moreover, by the mid 14th century, he extended his fiscal power over the neighbouring ulus of Kurumyshi. When the ‘Great Troubles’ began, Nogai's emirs basically detached from the Golden Horde. But defeats in the 1360–1370s gradually led to the decline of the ulus. By the 15th century, the population of the ulus was called Bilhorod or Budjak Horde by contemporaries. However, local lands and people were still connected to Nogai in certain placenames and names of several sources [45, p. 386].

The territory of Nogai's first ulus encompassed the Black Sea, the Dniester, Southern Bug and possibly the Kodyma rivers. At the peak of Nogai's power, the maximum extent of his ulus in the western direction stretched across the plain between the left bank of the Danube and the Carpathians, abutting against the mountains near the Iron Gates [51, p. 117]. In the south, possessions of the Horde included the right bank of the Danube River, while in Dobruja, nomads occupied its northern part. The northern border, stretching between the Carpathians and Dniester, reached present-day Chernivtsi Oblast, which is indicated by several factors. In the upper reaches of the Prut, archaeologists have discovered the ancient Horde town of Costești [15, p. 80; 14, p. 155; 22, p. 312]. In the upper Dniester, excavations uncovered a frontier castle of the kingdom of the Rus’ [56, p. 85]. During Tula-Buga's campaign against Poland, when he reached the lands of the Rus', he found out that Nogai had arrived in Przemyśl with his army via a parallel path. However, their troops had not met. That is, Nogai probably entered the interfluve of the Seret, Prut and Dniester rivers. Moreover, placenames related to the Darughachi are still found in the upper reaches of the Seret and Prut, as well as the foothills of the Eastern Carpathians [45, pp. 380–381].

Reports of Rukn al-Din Baybars about sons of Nogai and Kurumyshi say that their forces were equal. This means that the Nogai's sons had three tumens. However, Nogai himself was not there; it seems that he had at least one more tumen under him. Therefore, we come to the conclusion that the ulus consisted of four tumens. This is also confirmed by the fact that in
the mid-14th century, after the Alans' emigration, the ulus contained three tumens. However by the beginning of the century, Chaka had taken refuge, according to Baybars, 'in the land of the Ases where the commander and 10,000 of his warriors resided' [51, p. 116]. O. Bubenok provided evidence that here he meant the Danube River area [3, p. 231]. Since the Alans' territory was identified as a separate country and the number of its inhabitants was given, this means that they were a separate tumen [51, p. 116]. The presence of their own leader among them, recognition of Chaka and their arrival in the Balkans after the Nogai's sons death all indicate that they belonged to Nogai's domain.

In our opinion, the tumens were arranged in the following way: the 'old yurt' represented one tumen with the capital in Khadjibey; the 'Land of Ases' was located on the opposite side of the ulus, near the Iron Gates. N. Russev points to the Tatar principality of Demitria (the 1360s) located on the territory extending from the Dniester along the Răut to the Seret and to the north of them. If we take into account the territorial borders and the status the principality had in the politics of neighbouring countries, we can conclude it was indeed a tumen. Its capital city was apparently the ancient town of Old Orhei. Budjak constituted a separate tumen. Its economic resources are indicated by the fact that in later times, the Belgorod-Budjak Horde could mobilise up to 4 to 5 thousand warriors [2, p. 49]. In the 18th century, Budjak had a nomadic population of forty thousand people. Genoa documents of Antonio Ponzi from Kilia, which N. Russev cites, mention Tatars with whom Italians did business—'thousands' of Konakobey, Mengli Buga, and Koyu; 'hundreds' of Rabek, Keloga, and Kogikarios; and 'tens' of Boru, Kogimay, and Tokoyar [45, p. 388]. In our opinion, it could not have been emirs who controlled the whole Ulus of Nogai (three thousand of them are not commensurable with the territory of the ulus). It was definitely princes who were commanders of thousands in the tumen where Kilia was located. We make this conclusion because there is no tumen in the Kilia list. If the Horde people were from different tumens, it would have been indicated in this list.

Nogai's war caused significant demographic losses in the area. The Alans, who numbered from ten [3, p. 231] to sixteen thousand, headed to Byzantium; and more than half of them were warriors [11, p. 34; 1, p. 288] (it is interesting that Toqta later demanded they return [1, p. 291]). Some time later, three thousand warriors retreated to Poland with Nogai's grandson Karakisek [51, p. 119]. The army and population suffered great losses because of the hostilities. As a consequence, the power of the Horde in the coastal regions was somewhat curtailed. Kilia and neighbouring Likostoma were ultimately allotted to the Genoese. Bilhorod (present-day Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi, which in different sources has been mentioned as Mavrocastro, Akkerman, etc.) fell under the sway of Bulgaria before the 1320s [45, p. 386], while the local Orthodox Church became subordinate to the kingdom of the Rus' [49, pp. 120–137]. During the reign of Öz Beg, in 1322–1323, Bilhorod was returned to the Golden Horde [11, p. 31]. After the defeat at the Blue Waters and the rebellion in Bilhorod in 1362, a series of misfortunes and territorial losses began. First the Lithuanians annexed the Ulus of Kurumyshi, then in three years the Moldovans began to advance southwards and supplant the Tatars from Codri—the central part of Moldova. In the 1370s, the Principality of Podolia conquered Bilhorod [10, pp. 133–134].

Taking into account the fact that at the beginning, the boundary of the Mongol Empire went along the Dnieper, the first ulus on Ukrainian territory was the 'Left Bank' one. It is noteworthy that Mochi's position as the wing's ruler doesn't exclude the possibility that he also ruled over an independent ulus. The report of Giovanni da Pian del Carpine proves that this territorial-administrative unit did exist. Carpine, recalling Mochi, noted not only that he had a higher status than other Chinggisids, but indicated the exact borders of his possession: 'on the opposite side (of the Dnieper—Author) Mochi lived as a nomad in those steppes' [42, p. 48]. The existence of such a large region fits well with the Mongols' politics of that time. It
was necessary to take control of new lands as soon as possible in which the population was not yet completely subdued, but the neighbours posed a danger. The example of the uluses of Kurumyshi and Nogai demonstrated that only a large administrative unit could counter such threats.

With the consolidation of Kurumyshi's position, incorporation of Kievshchina and Chernihiv-Severian principalities into the Empire's structure (which was aided by the destruction of the local power elite) and gradual restoration of their military potential to a level sufficient to repel attacks of the Lithuanians, the ulus of Mochi turned from a frontier region into an internal one. Already by the 1250s, during the war with Daniil of Halych, only Kurumyshi is mentioned [31, pp. 251–252]. This, moreover, does not mean the chronicler was uninformed. Thus, William of Rubruck, who in 1253 traveled from Crimea to Karakorum, also didn't mention any big ulus between the Dnieper and Don. For him, the embodiment of Mongol power was the Crimean temnik Skatay [42, p. 81]. Therefore, we can assert that by the 1250s the Ulus of Mochi [Mochi-Yaba] ceased to exist as an independent administrative territorial unit.

At the turn of the 13–14th centuries, there were several regions that had emerged on its former territory. At least, this conclusion can be drawn from the description of the war between Nogai and Toqta provided by Rukn al-Din Baybars [51, p. 113]. According to this source, Maji, Sudun, Utraj, Akbuga, and Tayta, ‘commanders who were subordinate to’ Nogai, went to Toqta's side, which allowed him to approach the Dnieper. At the same time, when they supported Nogai, the latter attacked Toqta on the Siverskyi Donets River [51, pp. 111, 113]. As we see, we are dealing with emirs whose possessions were situated between the two rivers, which means that they used to belong to Mochi. It is hard to say whether all of them were emir temniks [generals] based on the number of tumens they represented. The oriental author could have given names only considering their status and influence. For example, the army they mobilised had thirty thousand warriors. It is clear that, in fact, tumens did not usually have a permanent statutory composition. However, we should note that Arab authors could hardly have determined the size of the army based on the register. It is most likely that they relied on the amount of tumens. For example, the number of troops serving under offspring of Nogai and Kurumyshi was estimated based on this.

In 1334, Ibn Battuta escorted Öz Beg's wife (khatun), Bayalun, to her father in Constantinople. Their route was from Sarai to Crimea and the way back was along the Black Sea coast, to Tsargrad [51, pp. 302–305]. Although Ibn Battuta did not provide any description of the lands he crossed, he noted however that ‘every emir in this region escorted the khatun with his troops to the very edge of the area under his control’ [51, p. 303]. We can therefore conclude that the khatun crossed a rather large number of regions. More accurate information can be found during the reign of Mamai. He arrived at the Battle of Kulikovo in 1380 ‘with all his Horde princes’. Here we should note that the lands Mamai controlled were between the Dnieper and the Don rivers. At the same time, the Volga Region had already been under Toktamysh's control since 1379 [35, p. 59]. ‘Three temnik princes’ were seen with Mamai during the battle itself. Therefore, this information suggests the existence of at least three uluses between the Dnieper and the Don rivers. Already during Toktamysh's reign we see oghlans Bekbulat, Bek-Yariq, and Tash Timur; princes Aktau and Mamai's son in the same areas. Sources describe them as independent commanders and their names are linked to certain territories. However, the description of how Timur destroyed Muval's wing shows that there were already three tumens: that of Bek-Yariq, Tash Timur and Prince Aktau [52, pp. 121, 179]. Moreover, the Ottoman source notes that Aktau was the head of the tumen [37, pp. 202–209]. The uluses that inherited Mochi's region did not emerge after it was dissolved. These could have been the tumens into which the ‘left-bank’ region was divided from the very beginning. The tumen of Solkhat is a good example. After we have a general picture of the left-bank uluses, we should describe each of them with as much detail as the source base allows.
Chapter III. The Politics of the Ulus of Jochi

The formation of the Crimean ulus occurred during the Western campaign. A source from the 16th century informs us that Batu, following the advice of the Begs, provided Shiban with an army of forty thousand warriors, which included several clans, and ‘appointed to vilayets of Crimea and Kaffa’ [55, p. 96]. However, this seems to be an exaggeration caused by the lengthy period of time and political bias of the source—Batu (Sain Khan in the source) was not the Khan, and Kaffa did not exist at that time [41]. But this report is based on real facts. However, according to Rashid al-Din, the army was headed not only by Shiban, but also Buchek and Buri [52, p. 37]. D. Iskhakov refers to information from an 18th century source suggesting that Shiban was escorted to the peninsula by local atalyk Boraltai Tarakli Kiyat. In addition, the researcher contends that one of the clans that Batu provided to Shiba, ‘yuruldai’, is nothing less than a distorted ‘buruldai’ [23, p. 25]. In this case, the information about the atalyk is trustworthy. It means that when conquering Crimea, the Mongols had migrants from the peninsula among their warriors. They were possibly the people who joined Jebe and Subutai in 1222–1223. No wonder that the latter, when he returned from the campaign of 1224, sent a petition to Chinggis Khan asking to form a separate regiment from the new subjects who came with him [20, p. 228]. Therefore, we can assume that the idea of creating a new ulus in Crimea emerged back in the 1220s.

Giovanni da Pian del Carpine does not mention the Crimean ulus in 1245–1246 or, accordingly, its ruler. However, the Papal envoy didn't describe everything he saw, but what was important to him. At the same time, Carpine called temniks whose status was lower than that of Mochi ‘leaders who were very many, but we do not know their names’ [42, p. 22]. Another European envoy, William of Rubruck, who in 1253 rode to Karakorum through Crimea, left evidence that an ulus did exist. According to him, the area was governed by a certain Skatay who was Batu's relative [42, p. 81]. Shiban was not mentioned there, but possibly because at that time, Batu represented the supreme authority. At the end of the day, we do not know how closely related Batu and Skatay were.

In ten years, an Egyptian source, describing Mamluk envoys to Berke, characterised the Crimean ulus as a tumen [51, p. 63]. Therefore we see that this area was created along a military-territorial scheme. It existed in this condition in the future as well. Thus, Ibn Battuta in his report of 1334 also calls its governor the commander of ten thousand [51, pp. 280–281]. According to Italian documents, the official name of this region in the 14th century was the ‘Tumen of Solkhat’ [9, p. 173]. This tumen managed to survive the troubles the Golden Horde faced and by the 15th century it was mentioned in Haci Giray's yarliqs to ‘court officials and begs, subordinate to Yeminek, who is the ruler of the Crimean tumen’ [65].

During the ‘Great Troubles’, the Crimean ulus (together with the Dnieper River area) gained the status of one of the central parts of the empire. It did not lose its significance during Toktamys's reign either. Bekbulat, who spoke out against the Khan, made Crimea his headquarters. Starting in the beginning of the 15th century, the Crimean ulus was the foothold from which ‘pro-Lithuanian’ khans tried to seize the Sarai throne. Gradually, the Solkhat tumen turned into a state—the Crimean Khanate (for more details see [50]).

Although the Crimean ulus is first of all associated with the peninsula, this was only a part of its territory. The description of William of Rubruck's journey shows that the coastal sedentary territories were directly subordinate to Batu (formally, these territories should have been controlled by the Khagan, but apparently the traveler only noted the de facto situation). He met the Tatars only on the third day of his journey from Sudak. As we have already noted, this was usual for sedentary regions. Ibn Battuta, who rode along the peninsula coast from Kerch to Kaffa, noted upon his arrival in Solkhat that he was now in Öz Beg's possessions [51, p. 280]. Rukn al-Din Baybars placed Kaffa between Istanbul and Crimea [51, p. 111]. In the charter of Ulugh Muhammad it is noted: ‘in Crimea, in Kaffa, or in Kipchak’ [8, p. 123]. We see that in the south, the ulus was contiguous with Italian colonies, while in the north it
shared borders with other Tatar possessions. The generalisation ‘Kipchak’ shows that the border went across several uluses here.

We can judge the extent to which the northern border extended past the peninsula by reports of William of Rubruck and Ibn Battuta. They both reached the Don through the territory of only one temnik. Otherwise, they would have recorded a meeting with another oghlan or emir in their notes. This is especially true of William of Rubruck, because the reception at the temnik's court involved a long procedure, including costs that would have been reported when he returned. Both travelers reached the Don much higher than the river estuary. William of Rubruck, who crossed the river near a Russian settlement, reported that there was another settlement to the south where nomads crossed the river in winter when they came down to the sea [42, p. 87]. After Ibn Battuta crossed the river, it took him three days to reach Azov [51, p. 284]. The French envoy wrote that the ulus aristocracy 'possessed manors in the south' [42, p. 75]. Thus, tumen lands stretched from the Black Sea and Azov Sea coasts quite far to the north. The ulus extended to the Don, which is also evident by the fact that Toktamysh granted emir Bek Hajji the Syutkel el [8, p. 90]—a feudal possession near Molochnyi Liman of the Azov Sea.

Later reports also indirectly indicated that the ulus extended across a broad territory. Thus, keeping in mind the presence of powerful rivals, in the 15th century the Crimean Khanate could hardly have attacked from the peninsula or ‘Steppes on the island of Kaffa’ as Giosafat Barbaro called these possessions [21]. Moreover, the amount of Tatar troops in the 1430–1450s fluctuated by several thousand people. In 1434, the Khan deployed five thousand warriors in the Battle of Solkhat, Hacı Giray I recruited six thousand soldiers to face the Turkish army near Kaffa in 1454, [18, p. 82], while according to reports of Giosafat Barbaro, the Khan had approximately three to four thousand horsemen [21]. Therefore, we can see that the lands of the peninsula itself were sufficient for the permanent nomadic population to live a normal life, especially if we keep in mind that nomadic households were at the mercy of natural disasters. However, the steppes beyond Perekop were not as fertile as those located north of Samara or on the Right Bank. In the 18th century, Thunmann noted that these territories had little water and that it was of poor quality. William of Rubruck complained (without naming the place) that horses quickly polluted the water and it was impossible to drink [1, p. 216].

This meant that the bodies of water near which the Franciscan stopped were small and shallow. Under these conditions, the ulus, of course, was a rather large territorial enclave. Since there are no sources, we can only guess where the region's northern boundary was. F. Shabuldo, who studied the history of yarliqs of the Crimean Khans on the territories granted to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, came to the conclusion that the northern boundary of the Perekop Horde was along the Ovechya Voda River. Therefore, the boundary could have stretched from this river to the Siverskyi Donets estuary.

Nizam ad-Din Shami and Sharaf ad-DīnʿAlī Yazdī mention an area called Mankerman (this is how Kiev was called in the East) within the Golden Horde territory in their descriptions of Tamerlane's campaign. The name of this region and its location point right to Kievshchina. Here we see that an ulus near the city is meant, because Uvek is mentioned in the same context (after it was destroyed, Tamerlane advanced towards Mankerman). Therefore, the most northern ulus in Left-Bank Ukraine was on the territory of the Kievian lands. This was natural, given the nature of the location of uluses—they were provided areas with sufficient pasture lands [39, pp. 73–75]. Accordingly, new masters settled in these lands.

Unfortunately, we have little information about the history of this tumen. The first mention of Horde people as permanent inhabitants can be found in the chronicle about Daniil's trip to Batu: ‘He arrived in Pereiaslav and met Tatars’ [6, p. 109]. It's not clear from the context whether the Mongols were within the city itself or resided nearby. This may be explained by the fact that new permanent inhabitants had been brought to lands of the former Torks.
During the war between Nogai and Toqta, at first this tumen supported Nogai, but then, together with other Left-Bank territories, it switched to Toqta's side. During the ‘Great Troubles’, this ulus fell under the influence of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania on the rights of joint ownership (condominium). Tamerlane's massacre also caused significant destruction in the region called ‘Mankerman’. During the reign of Vytautas, lands of the ulus were ultimately annexed to the Principality of Kiev and gradually turned into ordinary feudal possessions of the Russian and Tatar nobilities. The latest mention about an administrative unit, according to Ye. Rusina's observations, are found in the 1430/40s. Egoltaj's tumen may serve as a vivid example of it [44, pp. 100–113].

The Torks' pastures, as we have already mentioned, should have formed the ulus' basis. In S. Pletnyova's opinion, they were located on the right bank of the Sula and in its mid-stream. Such pastures were also found around the cities of Vsevolozh, Unenezh (Unezhi), Bakhmachi, and Belovezh [39, pp. 73–74]. They were so fertile that in 1500, the whole horde of Sheikh Ahmad, Khan of the Great Horde, was supported there in the summer and autumn. Numismatic discoveries indicated that we should search for the ulus' basis here. After studying the Kievian coins 'inherited' by the Golden Horde, the dirham, K. Khromov outlined the territory where they had been found: the Dnieper, Psel, Upper Vorskla, Oster, the Left Bank of the Seym River not far from Putyvl [58, pp. 122–130]. Archaeological excavations of Nizhyn, settlements near Baturino [48, pp. 34–38], and Ozheretsky settlement show that some sedentary settlements remained along the Osyotr, Desna and Seym rivers. At the same time, sedentary activities decreased to the south. In this context, E. Kulpin's idea about disappearance of forests on the Left Bank is interesting. The researcher proposed that this could have happened as a result of active transhumance cattle- and sheep-raising [33, p. 81]. Therefore, there was a nomadic enclave bordered to the north by the Oster-Desna-Seym rivers here.

It seems that the tumen gained the name Mankerman because of its close proximity to Kiev. The status of the tumen itself would indicate a large number of inhabitants. Thus, considering the fact that the nomadic lifestyle required vast territories, the ulus must have been rather large. Keeping in mind the region's limits that we have already mentioned, it must have been located in the east. Since this ulus belonged to Muval's wing, its eastern boundaries must have coincided with the wing's borders. Accordingly, we should look for the border of Mankerman region in the upper stream of the Siverskyi Donets.

In our opinion, the point that formed this part of the region was the tumen of Egoltaj (or 'Yagoltaj' in some sources). The yarliqs mention 'Egoltaj's tumen', and remains of an ancient town with this name existed back in the 17th century in the area 'from Lieven to Oskol, to Egoltaj's ancient town via the Murava road and through the Oponka River, 2 days' ride. It is about 40 versts from Egoltaj's ancient town to the Murava road up to Oskol, and Oskol's upper reaches are near the Murava road'. F. Petrun designated this part of the yarliq as the protograph—the initial version [38, pp. 170–185]. Therefore, it should have existed at least since the 1590s. If we take into consideration F. Shabuldo's theory about Mamai's yarliq, we can shift this date to the early 60s of the same century. Ye. Rusina proved that apart from 'Yagoltaj's (Egoltaj's) ancient town', this 'feod' included Oskol, Mirojlub and Muzhech. The researcher concluded that it existed back in the pre-Lithuanian era [44, pp. 100–113].

Therefore, this ulus completely matched the boundaries of the Pereiaslav Principality [29, pp. 100–105; 30, pp. 72–82]. In our opinion, the idea that the Chinggisids in fact turned a Russian principality into an ulus directly governed by the Golden Horde seems promising. Here we should turn to the events of 1239. At that time, the city was conquered by Jochid troops, while in the same year Chernihiv was attacked by Tsarevich Mengu. Thus, the Jochids conquered the lands where their nomadic camps must have been located. It's not a coincidence that the Pereyaslavl episcopate was transferred to the capital of the Ulus of Jochi. Ultimately, there was nothing extraordinary about transforming the principality into an ulus.
Similar cases took place in other parts of Chinggis Khan's state. Mongols did not conquer desolate territories, but settled lands that already had borders. Moreover, neighbouring Kiev, as we have already mentioned, was granted directly to Jochi's son, Tuqay Timur.

The description of Tamerlane's campaign against Muval's wing allows us to define the boundaries of the Dnieper uluses. After Ukek's destruction, Tamerlane went south. In the 'Yulukluk-Wazukluk' region, he joined up with regiments that were going from the North Caucasus [52, p. 121]. It is quite likely that the Buzuluk River (a Khopyor tributary) is meant here, as it is located southwest of Ukek. If our suggestion is right, the route would then have gone south of the Tikhaya Sosna, through Oskol. The ruler of Transoxiana could have crossed the Siverskii Donets near the Horde city at present-day Izium. From here, he arrived in the Mankerman ulus governed by Bek-Yariq (who fled east). The events took place in the summer, when nomads were going to northern pastures. This means that Bek-Yariq must have been located near the estuary of the Vorskla, Psel or Seym. Tamerlane's next victims were Tash Timur's and Aktau's lands. Their people also fled. Besides, was headed west, to the right bank of the Dnieper, towards Khurmaday's possessions [52, pp. 121, 179]. In both cases, the Golden Horde aristocracy did not find shelter behind Kiev's walls. Apparently, Tamerlane managed to cut them off from the city. The fact that Tash Timur and Aktau retreated to the Right Bank, where their enemy Khurmaday ruled, can be explained by the regional geography. The Dnieper forms an arc below the Vorskla. Apparently they were south of this river arc, which is why Tamerlane pressed them to the Dnieper bank. No wonder the Dnieper is constantly mentioned in the description of the events. Tash Timur and Aktau could not have been higher than Samara, because then they would have crossed the river in the area of Koryatowicz possessions. Therefore, the border of the Mankerman ulus must have been from the Dnieper along the Vorskla; and further on, between its upper stream and the Seym and possibly to the Bystraya Sosna River.

Given the regions already mentioned in the steppe and forest-steppe parts of Left-Bank Ukraine, i.e. the Solkhat region and Mankerman, the third ulus should be located right between the Vorskla and Ovechya Voda rivers. In 1478, Crimean Khan Mengli Giray wrote to Kiev voivode Khodkevich that in winter ‘capital uluses should reach the Orel and Samara’ [66, p. 427]. Pastures in this region were fertile enough to feed the nomadic domain of the Golden Horde. After studying the ‘Semyon people’, F. Shabuldo concluded that the Orel-Samara region was an independent region (since we do not know what this region was called, we will use the term ‘Samara-Orel’ for convenience). In the 15th century this region was under the control of Sayyid-Ahmed, Haci Giray I, and Semyon Olelkovych of Kiev at different periods, and Mengli Giray I demanded it be returned [63, pp. 57–73]. If we compare reports in sources about the journeys of Daniil Romanovich and Giovanni da Pian del Carpine, we can draw the conclusion that Mochi lived as a nomad to the south of their routes. At the same time, Giovanni da Pian del Carpine writes nothing about Crimea during his visit of the main camp on his way back. The logical conclusion is that Mochi lived on the territory of the ‘Samara-Orel’ ulus.

A Spanish source from the first half of the 14th century states that the city of Pidea was located on the Black Sea coast, between the Dnieper and Crimea. Moreover, it was ‘the capital of the kingdom’ which in turn was a vassal of Khan Öz Beg [67, p. 96]. Portolet maps indeed contain a placename called ‘Pidea’. When analysing the mentions of Pidea in portolans, I. Fomenko concluded that it meant a ‘good harbour’, he also contended there was building timber there [57, p. 114]. Archaeologists localise many burial sites and mounds in neighbouring territories. However, we do not have any facts that would support the existence of the remains of a city here. It seems that the author mistook the main camp of a Tatar emir or og-hlan for a city. Let us remember how William of Rubruck described Skatay's main camp: ‘it seemed as if a large city was moving towards me’ [42, p. 82]. Keeping in mind that the Span-
ish source calls Pidea a kingdom and places it slightly below Öz Beg, we think that Pidea was a tumen. We should also keep in mind the fact that in order for a European to perceive Pidea as a city, it needed to have the court of the local ruler and a significant number of people. At the same time, it was not the tumen of Solkhat, because later on, the source describes Crimea without any reference to Pidea. We therefore see that the main camp of the ‘Samara-Orel’ tumen’s ruler was located on the sea coast, or possibly the sea coast was one of its places of nomadism.

By the mid 14th century, this ulus was under control of the Kiyats’ kin, to which Mamai belonged. Apparently, this prince governed the ulus. It was here in the floodplain, his capital was located. In the 17th century it was known as ‘Mamai’s townlet of Sarai’ [27, p. 111], while modern archaeologists call it the ancient town of Bolshie Kuchugury or Konskie Vody [16, p. 163] which, in A. Grigoryev’s opinion, was named ‘Horde’ [8, pp. 117–121]. Beginning at that time, the status of the ulus began to change from provincial to capital. Thus, during the twenty years ‘Mamai Horde’ existed, its political centre was located here. It is characteristic that Toktamysy, having taken control of the whole country, sometimes migrated back into this region. On the eve of the Battle of Vorskla in 1399, Temür Qutlugh’s Horde was in the ‘Samara-Orel’ Ulus. During the confrontation between the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Golden Horde (Edigii), no one could gain a foothold in these territories. In the 1420s, the ulus was under Ulugh Muhammad’s control and he set up camp here every year [18, p. 58]. Later, this region was appropriated by Sayyid-Ahmed for twenty years. After his defeat in 1455, it was annexed by the Principality of Kiev, but it could hardly avoid invasions of one horde or another. Therefore, the mention about transfer of uluses in Mengli Giray the First’s warning is not unusual.

The location of the Samara-Orel Ulus and its inner arrangement contributed greatly to increasing the population and enriching its elite. Archaeological discoveries provide us with substantial material [16, pp. 162–166]. The abundant pastures increased the standard of living of the residents, especially in the winter. This can be seen from letters of Ulugh Muhammad [18, p. 58] and Mengli Giray [66, p. 427]. Documents from the late 17th century note that pastures along the Orel River, as well as those located between this river and the Vorskla, were nutritious and suitable for grazing all year round. Pastures near the Samara, especially on its right bank, could feed a large number of horses and sheep most of the year. These territories had a sufficient supply of drinking water during the year. The amount of influence that Nogai’s war of 1299–1301 and the plague of 1352 had is still open for debate. It seems doubtful that Lithuanian troops invaded the ulus, especially if we remember that Mamai had generally allied or neutral relations both with Algirdas and Jagielło. The first demographic turmoils recorded in the sources date to 1380–1381. Then, according to Abdulgaffar Qirim’s chronicle, a part of local population, including Mamai’s son, migrated to the right bank of the Dnieper [34, p. 193]. In 1395, the ulus was destroyed by Tamerlane’s army. Some of the population moved back to the Right Bank, this time for good [52, p. 121, 179; 37, pp. 202–209; 18, p. 52].

However, the region was not left completely desolated. For example, at the beginning of the 15th century, the Genoese Senarga family bought the town of Leriki-Locum Illicis (ancient Oleshye) from the Tatars [68, p. 111]. This indicates that people continued to live here, economic life functioned and proprietary relationships developed without which the sale could not have taken place. In the course of the confrontation between Vytautas and Edigii, the region could have lost the bulk of its population, but during the reign of Sayyid-Ahmed, the population apparently began to increase. It is not surprising that Mengli Giray so persistently demanded the return of the ‘Semyon people’.

The Dnieper formed the western border of the ulus. Reports about the migration of the local nomadic population to the right bank make it sound like an extraordinary event. The
Vorskla served as the northern boundary. It is not surprising that the armies of Vytautas and Temür Qutlugh-Edigü met on this river. Keeping in mind the above-mentioned Pidea, the southern border might have gone along the Black Sea coast. Then it could have risen to the Ovechya Voda River or even to the Konskie Vody. The eastern border must have coincided with the border of Muval's wing, which was along the Siverskyi Donets.

The Golden Horde administration was strictly set up along territorial lines. Its original basis was formed back when the Jochid Ulus was established, and extending it across European territories was so effective that this basis existed without any major changes almost until the 15th century. The boundaries of regions on the territory of modern Ukraine and Moldova are so consistent with the natural geographical features of the land that this state 'absorbed' whole uluses and kept their original boundaries for a long time during the persistent attacks of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the 14–15th centuries. One of the reasons the areas were divided up in such a functional way was because the Chinggisids relied on the existing situation when creating them. In fact, the Horde turned the state entities of conquered peoples into tumens. When setting up the territorial structure of the territory of modern Ukraine, the Golden Horde divided it into two parts: the steppe regions were part of Muval's wing, while sedentary areas were included into the Khan's region.

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Chapter III. The Politics of the Ulus of Jochi


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Court Etiquette and the Protocol

Roman Pochekaev

The Law of the Golden Horde was distinguished by the simultaneous coexistence of several legal systems whose elements were not mutually exclusive, but rather complemented each other. Of course, depending on the political situation one of the systems could dominate the others, which was reflected in the predominance of particular sources of law for the regulation of especially important social relations.

The legal system of the Golden Horde was based on Mongol imperial law, which was established by Chinggis Khan; the lawmaking process was then continued by his successors. Consequently, the first sources of Imperial Law were edicts, or yarliqs, of the founder of the Mongol Empire, which were later elevated to the status of legal principles necessary for developing subsequent regulations and making decisions concerning the law. The totality of these principles was traditionally defined as the Great Yasa. It is commonly suggested by historians that the Yasa was a code of laws or written customs composed by Chinggis Khan; however, a more thorough analysis makes it possible to define it rather as a certain public order based on compliance with the legal mandates of Chinggis Khan himself and his successors [see, for example 52]. The Great Yasa was commonly cited by Golden Horde rulers and the elite as a certain inviolable legal heritage which passed to the Ulus of Jochi from the Mongol Empire and symbolized the legal succession of the Horde's khans from Chinggis Khan.

Nevertheless, their inviolability did not mean that these principles could not be augmented: in the first quarter of the 13th century Chinggis Khan could not have foreseen in his legislation all the legal institutions and areas of legal relations which started to take shape half a century later, to say nothing of later periods. In this regard the main source of imperial law in the Golden Horde became the khans' yarliqs as acts of supreme legal force which were issued on a wide range of matters: yarliqs could be laws, letters, tarkhan yarliqs (letters patent on tax immunity), appointment yarliqs (including yarliqs to vassal rulers of the Golden Horde
on the confirmation of their status by the khan), and orders on individual matters. The provisions of a yarliq remained in force throughout the lifetime (or reign) of the khan who issued it, or, if they were letters patent or appointment yarliqs, they remained in force throughout the lifetime (or tenure of office) of the yarliq holder. Consequently, every new khan ascending the throne confirmed or rejected the will of his predecessors through his own yarliqs (the former happened much more often), or, in case of the holder's death, issued a yarliq of the same purview to his successor. Thus the yarliqs were, firstly, the most numerous, and secondly, the most frequently updated sources of law, objectively reflecting changes in the legal situation of the Golden Horde.

In executing yarliqs, Golden Horde officials and regional governors often issued their own bylaws where the provisions of the khan's edicts could be clarified or interpreted 'broadly'. Naturally, unlike the yarliqs, which were often addressed to 'everyone', that is, the whole population of the Golden Horde, government officials and even foreigners living in the Jochid lands, these bylaws were in force only on the territory under the jurisdiction of the ruler who issued them [for more details see: 29, pp. 61–90].

One more source of law based on the Great Yasa and the khans' yarliqs were legal precedents, in other words, the results of the operation of the jargu courts. The judges themselves were appointed by khans' yarliqs that established their powers and defined the regulations on which they were to base their decisions. However, this did not mean that the khans dictated how to decide one dispute or another or determine the penalty for a crime: the judges followed the core principles of imperial law, but were largely free to consider a case at their one's discretion, depending on certain circumstances [6, pp. 135–136].

One cannot but mention one more specific type of law—tore. Historically it originated long before the foundation of the Mongol Empire and was in force in the era of the Turkic Khaganates, initially being the result of the lawmaking of these monarchs. However, the Mongols (in the pre-imperial era) transformed the specific legal norms of tore into principles of sacred law established by Heaven, the observation of which guaranteed the preservation of universal order. Chinggis Khan and the Chinggisids incorporated the ancient Turkic law into the imperial law system, turning the tore into a set of essentially abstract principles which symbolized the reign of the khan's dynasty as the fulfillment of the will of Heaven, that is, they confirmed the ancestral charisma of Chinggis Khan's successors. In the Golden Horde, tore was often mentioned both in legal acts and in making important decisions, when it was necessary to preserve imperial values and the inviolability of the khan's dynastic traditions. The issues regulated by tore included, in particular, the status of the khans and their relations with the elite, the conduct of military campaigns and the sharing of spoils, and the basics of administrative and territorial division (the khan's main camp, the wings, etc.) [for further details see: 31; 45].

However, imperial law could regulate by no means all spheres of legal relations. The khans of the Horde (like the rulers of the Mongol Empire) tried to encompass primarily public relations, that is, the interaction between the various Chinggisid rulers and governmental bodies and relations between subjects and the authorities. They prudently tried not to interfere in matters of private law relations. Such matters were dealt with through other law systems operating in the Golden Horde.

The customary law of the nomadic tribes was the most widespread in the nomadic districts of the Jochid Empire. In the Mongolian tradition it was termed yosun and regulated many private matters including family and inheritance relations, settlement of property disputes, etc.

In settled areas Islamic law was more widespread; this included the precepts of sharia and those norms of adat, the customary law which had operated long before the foundation of the Golden Horde, which do not contradict them. Jochid rulers acknowledged the right of
Islamic communities to resolve private issues on the basis of their own religious law, which was one of the examples of Chinggis Khan's descendants showing religious tolerance. Consequently, it served as a basis for private law relations and the resolution of property disputes, as well as the regulation of taxes payable to the Islamic community in accordance with sharia.

After Öz Beg Khan established Islam as the official religion of the Golden Horde in 1320, the sphere of application of sharia law significantly expanded: the members of the Islamic administration, who acted in accordance with the principles of Islamic law, were integrated into the system of public authorities, and Islamic qadi courts, which also passed judgment on the basis of sharia, appeared alongside the jargu courts as part of regional governments. Nevertheless, one cannot say that the entire population of the Golden Horde was forced to abide by Islamic law: for example, in the early 15th century the nomadic population of Desht-i Kipchak lived on the basis of customary law, and Edigü had to work actively to introduce Islamic values (including legal ones) to them [for more details see: 50].

Imperial law (Yasa and the khans’ yarliqs) was the most relevant in the Golden Horde in the 13–mid-14th centuries, because it was during that period that the khan's power was the most stable and any expressions of the monarch's will were perceived as norms of supreme legal force. As a result of the internecine feuds of the 1360/1370s, Tamerlane's invasions and the subsequent disintegration of the Golden Horde, the prestige of the khans' power declined significantly and the coherent system of Chinggisid law lost its relevance. As a result, settled regions (and later, the post-Horde states founded on their territory: the Kazan, Astrakhan, and Crimean Khanates) started to rely on Islamic law and the qadi court, while the nomadic districts (where the Siberian and Kazakh Khanates and the Nogai Horde later appeared) mostly returned to the ancient customary law of the Turkic-Mongol steppes, which became the basis for a system of elected judges or beys, who made decisions on the basis of these legal customs.

Thus, it can be argued that the status of the Golden Horde as an imperial state was emphasized by the widespread acceptance of the norms of imperial law, which reflected that the Jochid Empire belonged to an empire-wide political and legal framework. After the disintegration of the Mongol Empire and the crisis on the Golden Horde itself, imperial law practically ceased to be applied there, which indicates the loss of imperial status by this state.

Let us briefly examine the most significant institutions of law in the Golden Horde—the tax system, relations in the sphere of crime and punishment, the court and justice.

One of the main features of the Golden Horde as a state is a developed system of taxes and fees, originally inherited from the Mongol Empire. The introduction of taxes and the creation of a fiscal system was one of the first actions the Mongols performed in conquered lands. Information about taxes, fees and duties collected in the Golden Horde can be reconstructed from preserved yarliqs of the khans, most of which are privilege yarliqs, that is, they grant tax immunity to their holders. However, a more thorough acquaintance with the khans' yarliqs and other sources convinces one otherwise: the Horde's tax system was strictly and clearly regulated.

Until quite recently, the tax system of the Golden Horde was perceived as a rather disorderly complex of taxes and duties collected by the Horde authorities and the elite from the common people and vassal states without any control. However, a more thorough acquaintance with the khans’ yarliqs and other sources convinces one otherwise: the Horde's tax system was strictly and clearly regulated.

The taxes could be monetary or in kind, and were introduced by special yarliqs. Under this system the authorities of the Horde took into full consideration the specifics of each region and the different categories of populations subject to taxes or levies. Thus, for example, the yarliq addressed to city dwellers did not include taxes assigned for the peasant population, and, conversely, a yarliq addressed to country dwellers did not mention taxes and levies imposed on merchants and craftsmen [46, p. 240]. Moreover, taxes, levies, and duties, as a rule, were usually listed together in specific groups, making it easier to organize and systematize them. For
example, a yarliq issued by Timur-Kutluk to Muhammad and Mahmud states: ‘[from] their vineyards a tamga, from Inkinchi and Uskübola quruts, a grain tax, and a threshing-floor levy, [and from] their dependents—[the taxes] qismet and kubchir, yasak and kalan; and let them not take called ‘saliq’, baj and kharaj; and on their way to, or at the place of, their arrival, or upon [their] departure, in the Crimea, or in Caffa, while they are selling or buying things of various sorts, let [no one] take from them either tamga or tartnak; and of the Tarkhans and [their] dependents let no one demand travelling fees or protection fees; let no one seize their cattle or their carts; let no one force [them] to provide lodging for the night or in the day; let no one demand of them victuals or fodder; and let [them] be immune and protected from any disturbances, levies, and exceptional taxes’ [7, pp. 98–99]. Based on analysis and research of the yarliqs, we can single out several groups of taxes, levies, and duties.

The basic taxes were imposed on all subjects of the Khan of the Golden Horde, although some of their variants were more specifically collected from either nomadic or settled populations. These taxes and collections were denoted by such terms as yasak and kalan [46, p. 236]. The main taxes were a poll-tax (collected from the nomads) or a land tax (collected from the settled population), known as borch kharaj and tutun kharadji respectively [46, p. 235]. Its rate in the Golden Horde is unknown, but one may surmise it equaled the rate which existed in Iran, being 7 dinars for the rich and 1 dinar for the poor [2, p. 80]. The qupchur was a tax levied on cattle herders. It was a general tax on cattle which initially charged 10 percent of the stock of horses, cows and sheep, but later was lowered to 1 percent. Naturally, it was levied on the entire nomadic population, except for the aforementioned Tarkhans, and thus it makes sense to consider it as a basic tax. It was first instituted by the Great Khan Ögedei in Mongolia in the 1230s, and was later continuously collected in the Chinggisid states, including the Golden Horde [34, p. 36; cf.: 8].

The settled population on the other hand paid several taxes not levied on the nomadic subjects of the Khan. Concurrent with the nomadic tax of qupchur, a tax on the harvest, or tagar, was established for the settled population, collecting 1/10 of the harvest. It was thought that this tax was implemented with the purpose of being redistributed among the poorer elements of the general population [34, p. 36]. Another kind of ‘agricultural’ tax was the so-called plough tax. The plough tax was collected from each plough, that is, from each household working on its patch of land. The rate of this tax was 3 akçe [see: 2, pp. 80–81; 47, pp. 34–35].

Trade taxes, road taxes, and border taxes were mostly collected from foreign and Golden Horde merchants, but some were also collected from other groups (non-merchants) who had to cross and transport property across the border. At the crossing of the border the individual would immediately pay a tax either on the imported products or other property. If cargo was imported by ship, the rate of the tax depended on the number of masts on the ship. The tax was levied twice, during the ship's arrival into the port and its subsequent departure, serving as a substitute for the import and export taxes [10, p. 24]. Additionally, a road tax was also paid at the border, intended for road maintenance and providing the merchants with an armed escort (karaulluk) [see, for instance: 7, pp. 99, 107; 9, p. 97; 33, pp. 21, 36]. While moving across the Golden Horde, merchants and travelers also had to pay a number of transport levies when they made a crossing by boat or raft, or crossed a bridge [10, pp. 135–136; 12, p. 5]. The sources, however, don't allow us to conclude whether the tax was levied on all bridges of the Golden Horde.

Sale taxes consisted of a proper sale tax and a tax by weight. In line with the commercial traditions of the Black Sea region, which for the most part had adopted Byzantine terminology and methods of tax collection, the system for these two taxes and entrance duties went under the general name of kommerkion. The sale tax, following Horde tradition and terminology, was called tamga, and the official who levied it (‘tamozhennik’, [the tamga man]), as evidence that
the tax had been payed, marked the goods with a specific sign. This sign was also called tamga. The rate of the sales tax in the Golden Horde was 3 percent of the goods' value (and which, in exceptional cases, rose to 5 percent) [10, pp. 15, 98, 149–150]. However, exceptions were made with respect to certain kinds of goods. For example, in a yarliq granted to the Venetian merchants of Azov by Uzbek in 1332, there is one such provision: ‘And in olden times a sales taxes on the trading of precious stones, pearls, gold, silver, and spun gold was not levied, and let them not levy it now’ [10, p. 27]. The tax by weight, tartanak or kantar, was closely related to tamga. Its rate was half the rate of the sales tax (and in the case that the sale tax rose, the absolute value of the tax by weight rate rose, too). It is interesting to note that the taxable units of tartanak were not the weight of the goods themselves, but the carts in which they were imported. Moreover, this tax was levied even if both parties of the deal were foreigners [10, pp. 15, 98, 103–105]. Additionally, a special fee was paid to a middleman following a commercial transaction; in the Empire of Trebizond, this fee was 1 percent of the deal's value. It can be reasoned that the rate was roughly the same in the Golden Horde. A special fee was also collected for the creation of a contract [see: 10, p. 151].

It is a curious fact that many taxes and fees of this category, that is, this system of taxes and customs duties, were widely spread throughout Western Europe, even as early as the times of the Roman Empire. [see, for instance, 35, p. 222]. Thus, it is highly possible that such taxes and duties entered into the tax system of the Golden Horde not from Mongolia or China, but from its Western neighbours, with whom the Horde since its inception had maintained close contact. This idea is corroborated by the fact that taxes are not mentioned in the Great Yasa or in yarliqs of the Great Khans of the Mongol Empire. It is only in the yarliqs of the Golden Horde where they appear, and this could be due to influence from the West and not the East.

Special collections and taxes were also applied to people of certain professions. The yarliqs mention taxes on the use of water and mines [33, pp. 21, 34–35], qurt collection (levied on the producers of qurt—cottage cheese and other dairy products) [46, p. 237], a mill tax and threshing-floor tax [24, p. 477], garden and vineyard taxes, a wine producer tax [9, p. 102], an arrow production tax [7, p. 130], and a tax on small livestock [2, pp. 80–81; 7, p. 130]. The last tax, according to Simon de Saint-Quentin, equalled 3 akçe for every 6 sheep [see: 4, p. 34].

Additionally, special or exceptional taxes and duties were levied on the population of the Golden Horde in certain cases: on the arrival into the region of high officials, ambassadors, or the Khan's relatives, all of whom were to be treated with gifts and benefactions as per tradition; on arrival to the Khan's headquarters of Golden Horde subjects or foreigners, who were obliged to present to the Khan, his family, and the highest officials with gifts. The most representative of such taxes are to be found in the Khan's yarliqs to Russian metropolitan bishops, where duties such as dary' [gifts] (pominki), zaprosy' [requests], pochest'ya [honours], and dokhody' [income], among others, are mentioned [2, pp. 92–95; 9, pp. 34–35; 24, pp. 474–475]. To this kind of collections should probably be referred the collection paid to the court after the settlement of a dispute [see: 6, p. 104].

Yarliqs rather often mention such duties as carts (ulag), riding horses (mal), provisions (ulafa), and feed for cattle (susun). Within this category the duty to lodge travelling officials and diplomats (ilchi–konak) was also included. Rather often these duties were imposed on the population collectively or in pairs, which is testified by the use of 'double terms' in the yarliqs—ulafa–susun, ulag–ilmak and others [46, p. 236]. Another group of duties was related to the organization of military campaigns or hunting raids. This category included lodging soldiers, providing them with food, providing men for military campaigns (or voyna [war] in Russian translations of these yarliqs) [see, for instance: 2, p. 93; 9, p. 34]) and hunting raids (mentioned as chiriq avy in the yarliqs [46, p. 237]).

Cheriq, or conscription, in each region depended on the population size; thus, for example, the naming of an administrative-territorial unit as tumen meant that, in the case of war,
this area must provide up to 10,000 soldiers—with 1,000 corresponding to a thousand, and so forth. According to the Book of the Great Khan, the Golden Horde Khan Öz Beg had 700,000 soldiers under his command [51, p. 59]—that is, 70 tumens. However, this did not mean that the Khan maintained this number of soldiers in a constant state of combat readiness. It simply meant that, when necessary, he could mobilise this number of soldiers. However, neither Öz Beg nor other Khans of the Golden Horde had ever done so in its history!

To the list of duties it is also worth adding the provision of security in the region—this included the constant struggle of warding off robbers and thieves. In yarliqs, this duty is listed as ‘karauluk’ or ‘night call-up’ [7, pp. 99, 107; 46, p. 237]. Locals also had an interest in carrying out this duty: in cases of robbery of passing merchants or government officials, local residents were compelled to either find the robbers, or to pay damage to the victims at their own expense. This duty could be fulfilled through supplying dispatched units as well as assigning the locals to form their own units.

The collection of the majority of taxes fell within the jurisdiction of the civilian administration, headed by a Vizier. The Vizier also controlled other ‘branch ministries’, or divans. One such divan was the national treasury divan [see 6, p. 99].

In the Khans' yarliqs, there is not only a detailed list of taxes, but also a detailed list of the officials responsible for their collection. For example, Timur-Kutluk's yarliq contains a standard list of people responsible for either the collection or proper disposal of taxes: ‘the right (and) Left wings of the uhlans, the ty'syatskis, the captains, and the foremen led by Temnik [general] Edigü, the darughachis of the interior villages, ... chamber scribes, customs officials (and) tax collectors, passing-by envoys (and) messengers, patrols (and) outposts, coachmen and horse-fodder collectors, falconers (and) panther hunters, boatmen and bridge managers, and market traders’ [40, p. 158–159]. Tulyak's yarliq to Metropolitan Michael has a similar list: ‘Tatar ulus and military princes, volost officials, and princes, and scribes, and customs officials and passing-by envoys and falconers, and pardusniks and buralozhniks and outpost commanders and boatmen, and many other types of people’. [24, p. 465] The Russian version of the names of most of these officials already indicate which taxes, duties, and obligations these officials collected.

Subordinated to the the civil administration heads of the area were customs officers (tamgachi) and ‘weighers’ (tartnakchi), responsible for the collection of sales taxes and taxes for use of state scales respectively [see: 10, pp. 15, 50, 94, 135]. Also acting as subordinates were the bazaar guards (bazarga turkanlar—tradesmen), whose function was to keep order in the markets [33, pp. 21, 25] as well as, probably, to collect special fees following the purchase or sale of animal skins, to take a percent for mediation, and to collect fees for drawing up contracts.

Part of the taxes and duties collection fell under the jurisdiction of the military administration. For example, commanders of hundreds and tens were directly responsible for the preparation of food for soldiers joining a campaign as well as the collection of recruiting fees in the areas under their supervision. Additionally, so-called tysyatskys and Temniks supervised their subordinate commanders. Moreover, Temniks, who were responsible for the protection of the state borders of the Golden Horde also supervised outposts and troops, ensuring security and order in border regions. The commanders of these outposts (in yarliqs referred to as zastavshhiks, tutkauls, and buralozhniks) were tasked with collecting tolls and fees for the import and export of goods. The commanders, or bukauls, of the mobile units, in turn, collected fees for the protection of merchants and others on the road. According to Oriental chroniclers, the Bukaul was a high army official responsible for the supply of military units under his command, probably drawing funds from the fees acquired through protecting the roads [see: 9, p. 97].
Tax collection was the prerogative of the central authority: The Khan's relatives and tribal leaders had very limited rights in this sphere. For example, they had the right to collect fees and duties from only nomadic populations under their control, while the settled areas, although formally in their possession, were administered fully and subject to tax collection by the Khan's darughachi. Under this system, funds went to the Khan's treasury and only then, at the discretion of the Khan, were the funds distributed among his family and nobility. This met the doctrine of the Golden Horde, under which the khan was practically considered the main and sole owner of all land holdings. In reality however, some of the Khan's relatives and high officials had the right to rely on the Khan's generosity, something he could allow at the expense of the citizens and foreigners residing in the territory of the Golden Horde. For example, the Khansha [Khan's wife] Taidullah had her own staff of tax officials who collected a number of taxes not found in the Khan's treasury, but rather which went directly to her. However, khans often revised these privileges of their relatives: for example, Berdi Beg, Taidullah's grandson, in 1358 gave his close friend Togla-bey the right to charge every ship coming into the Azov 3 soms of silver ‘for arms’—and not at the expense of the Khan's treasury, but at the expense of fees that Taidullah himself had previously collected! The latter had to agree to this condition and support the Khan's additional order [10, pp. 152–153]. Simon de Saint-Quentin wrote and supported the fact that these taxes and fee grants in favor of the Khan's relatives and dignitaries were common practice: ‘Firstly, the Khan receives his share ...; secondly, a special holder; thirdly, the regional owner ...’ [quoted from: 47, p. 34].

In most cases, the tax exemption was given or confirmed by the Khan in person and at his own discretion rather than on the basis of privileging a single class. Accordingly, Tarkhans could belong to different groups of the tax-paying population, and tax immunity was not a sign of their social class. As a rule, the status of Tarkhan included the exemption from taxes and incurring obligations, the right to retain all prey killed during battue hunting, and the privilege to see the Khan at any time and ride near him during trips and campaigns. An additional privilege was an exemption from penalty for nine offenses; these privileges were maintained for nine generations [see: 2, pp. 53–54; 49, pp. 308–311]. The status of Tarkhan could be granted to individuals, entire categories of people, or even whole villages. Toktamysh, Timur-Kutluk, and Ulugh Muhammad's yarliqs are individual grants to specific individuals, the yarliqs to the Russian clergy are privileges to a whole category of people. In Toktamysh Beck-Hajji's yarliq, there is a reference to Khan Pulad's yarliq, giving the status of Tarkhan to a whole village (or clan)—Shhurakul' [12, p. 3]. An analysis of their content allows us to trace the evolution of the tax immunity institution of the Golden Horde.

At the early stage of the history of the Golden Horde the tarkhan custom was not a widespread practice. It was developed further and became widespread under Toktamysh and his immediate successors. In order to strengthen their power, the Khans sought to attract members of different tribes and groups of the population by giving them exemption from taxes. Yarliqs, which exempt the holders from the greatest number of taxes and duties, belong to this period [47, pp. 124–125]. In late periods, one can observe a gradual curtailment of the rights of the Tarkhans. Already in the yarlyk of Ulugh Muhammad, who came to the throne a quarter century after Toktamysh, there exists the following clause: ‘And also, [all] that you paid to your darughachi every year, now also pay according to [our] yarliq’ [7, p. 122].

Researchers point out that, in addition to a Tarkhan's yarliqs and charters, there also were Suyurgal yarliqs and charters [see, for instance: 46, p. 281]. The researchers determine that a Suyurgal, being a Khan's land ownership grant, originally gave a specific tax and legal immunity. Therefore, Suyurgal charters typically do not contain any provisions on the release of their owners from payment of taxes. However, the very fact of giving the Suyurgal grant meant a release from payment of taxes, as well as a ban on interference from the Khan's officials in the affairs of the Suyurgal individual. The Suyurgal appeared in the Golden Horde
before the end of the 15th century, most likely after the invasion of Timur, as a result of the impact of the legal traditions from the East [46, p. 214; 47, pp. 114–115]. The only surviving document of this kind is Ulug Muhammad's yarliq of 1420, which, in addition to the removal of a number of taxes, affirms Tuglu-Bey and Khizr's right to inherit the title and ownership of their father, a former darugha in Kerch [7, pp. 112–135].

Notions of crime and punishment were sufficiently clear in the criminal-legal system of the Golden Horde. Crimes against the state and the ruling family were considered the most serious.

Usurping the throne was considered one of the gravest crimes of all: ‘There is one decree: anyone who sets himself above all others and desires to become sole emperor without the electing princes, must be killed without mercy’ [15, p. 48]. That is why throughout the entire history of the Golden Horde there were practically no cases of the throne being successfully usurped. Even during the Great Troubles (‘Velikaya Zamyatnya’ in 1358–1381, and the further collapse of the Horde in the first half of the 15th century) this rule was obeyed, when between three to five candidates would lay claim to the throne at once, each of them with their own kuriltai (great assembly), and declare himself khan in accordance with current legislation. However, in 1291 khan Tula-Buga was killed as a throne usurper when the all-powerful beklyaribek Nogai accused him of occupying the throne that was to be inherited by another tsarevich. Yet in reality Nogai wished only to cover up the military upheaval effected at his own command, which ended with the khan's assassination, as Tula-Buga acceded to the throne in accordance with the law meaning ‘...the wives, brothers, uncles, relatives and confidants agreed’ with his accession [44, p.106, 108]. Khan Jani Beg, who took over the throne after the assassination of his two brothers, was not considered a usurper because he was accepted by emirs [44, pp. 263–264], leading to the assumption that he was enthroned by decision of the quriltai in accordance with tradition and law.

Offending a khan or the khan's clan in any way was also considered a serious crime. Even foreign rulers who were vassals of the Golden Horde khan lost their lives repeatedly for similar crimes. For example, the Russian chronicles include passages about the grueling execution of prince Roman Olgovich (1270), who ‘abused...the great tsar’: for this crime ‘it was required to cut out the tongue and shut the mouth with a wimple, start cutting his joints and fingers and toes, mouth, ears and other joints all over the body, and once only a corpse remains, the skin must be peeled off the head and a spear stuck into it’ [27, p. 149]. In 1326 in the Golden Horde, Dmitry the Fearsome Eyes, the Great Prince of Tver, was also killed because he had murdered Prince Yury Danilovich ‘without the Tsar's Permission’ [27, pp. 189–190]. Any similar acts of self-will in the khan's camp were considered an offense to his majesty.

The murder of a representative of the khan's clan was considered one of the most heinous crimes and punishable only by death. Thus, for example, the Arabic historian from the end of the 13–the beginning of the 14th centuries, Rukn al-Din Baybars reports that during the war led by khan Toqta with his rebellious beklyaribek Nogai, the latter was killed by a Russian warrior from the khan's own troops. Despite the fact that the murder was committed during the battle itself, the warrior was executed in accordance with the khan's order, ‘because he killed such a highly-titled man and did not present him to the sultan’ [44, p. 114]. The same historian reports that a year earlier Nogai himself committed a devastating raid into Crimea and burnt the Genoese colony Kaffa, the rulers of which traitorously murdered his grandson Ak-taiji [44, pp.111–112].

Violations of administrative orders were considered as a separate group of crimes. It is not written in the majority of khan yarliqs exactly what punishment was to be imposed for the violation of official orders. Typically, the authors would note nothing more than a vague sanction, such as ‘those who do not obey shall be dealt with immediately’ [see, e.g.: 10, p. 121].
Presumably, wording sanctions like this gave the authorities tasked with punishing the guilty persons free to reign over how to administer justice. Depending on the gravity of the crime, the violator could be dismissed with a small fine, or also perhaps beheaded.

No matter the time period, bribery was always strictly considered an official crime. Even though in the East, as we mentioned in the previous chapter, there was no notion of what a ‘bribe’ entailed, certain activities of officials could nonetheless be considered as such. For instance, khan yarliqs contained an exhaustive list of taxes and fees to be collected from certain regions and categories of persons, and any attempt to collect additional duties or augment its amount could be construed as a bribe. For example, the yarliq of Mengü Temür to the Church contains the following statement: ‘Those basqaqs, scribes, customs officers, and land tax collectors who see and hear this charter shall not collect any tribute or anything from priests and monks. Should they collect anything, they must ask for forgiveness and die according to the Great Yasa’ [24, p. 468]. This is one of few yarliqs where execution is given as an explicit condition for the violation of its orders.

Another administrative violation among nomads was the unauthorised abandonment of their duties. Thus, Juvayni reports: ‘Another yasa is as follows: none of the thousands, hundreds or dozens where he is assigned shall dare to leave for another place or escape to any other places, and nobody shall let that person arrive, and if anybody will act counter to this order, the one who will defect and who will hide him shall be enfettered and punished. This is why nobody can let any alien come in. For instance, no Tsarevich shall let any person of lower rank come in, and shall not violate the prescriptions of Yasa [quoted from: 4, p. 145]. Thus, when several emirs/military commanders of Khan Toqta decided to defect to beklyaribek Nogai, the khan demanded from the latter that he return the defected back and execute them [44, p.158].

The specified crime can justifiably be considered as a subgroup of war crimes. The Mongols often faced crimes of this kind because in the Golden Horde (like in any other state of the Chinggisids) practically every subject at the age of 14 to 70 years old was considered a warrior and could be conscripted into the army at any moment. It is therefore not surprising that the state lived under permanent martial law, and the Golden Horde Khan citizens had to conform their actions with military discipline and the safety of the state.

The most serious crime in the civil sphere was undoubtedly crimes against a person, thus making murder in the Golden Horde punishable by death. But it must be said that such a severe punishment was only applicable for the murder of a Mongol, whereas for the murder of a different nationality one could simply buy their way out. For example, the 15th-century Middle Asian historian, Mir-Khwānd reports that ‘one can pay duty for murder (escaping execution for a crime) by paying forty golden coins (balysh) for a muslim, and a donkey for a Chinese’ [quoted from: 48, p.143]. Such a legislatively fixed separation by nationality was a characteristic feature of Mongol rule in Eurasian countries.

Another group included property crimes, among which robbery and theft were considered the most common and were punished quite severely in the Golden Horde. ‘If anyone is caught at another's place and there is a robbery or an evident theft in his estate, then he will be murdered without any regret’, reports Giovanni da Pian del Carpine reports [15, p. 42]. William of Rubruck agrees with him: ‘They are punished by death for a large theft. For a light theft, for example of a ram, if the person has been rarely judged for that crime, they shall be cruelly beaten, and if they are given one hundred punches as punishment then it means one hundred lashes with a stick’ [37, pp. 100–101].

The Mongol nomads showed particularly extreme severity in regard to horse thieves. For example, according to Giovanni de Pian del Carpine, even Andrey Mstislavich, Prince of Chernigov, was executed in the Golden Horde after having been punished for ‘stealing horses from the Tatar estates and selling them in another region’ [15, p. 36]. According to the report
of 14th century Arabian author, Ibn Battuta, after the acceptance of Islam certain extremely severe punishments for similar crimes were replaced with less severe ones: ‘Their statement regarding this was that one who has stolen a horse must return it back to the owner and also give him nine similar horses, and if he cannot then his children will be taken away, and if he has no children then he will be murdered like a sheep’ [44, pp. 282–283]. However, it is reasonable to conclude that replacing execution with ransom was quite conditional in terms of the Islam faith: it was hardly possible that a person who stole a horse could afford to pay nine horses as a penalty! Thus, while formally following Sharia law de-facto, Golden Horde authorities continued to apply their previous cruel punishments.

As for punishments, they were strictly regulated in Golden Horde law. Capital punishment was established for the most dangerous crimes (treason, lèse-majesté, etc.) was exercised by decision of the khan himself or high officials. The only exceptions could be instances when a criminal was caught during the commission of a crime and was murdered immediately, or lex talionis (eye for an eye) would come into play—murdering the killer by relatives of the killed person according to the decision of tribal elders.

Mengu Timur's yarliq given to the Russian church (1267) contains the following statement: ‘Those who see and hear this charter, namely, any basqaqs, princely scribes, popluzhniks, tamozhniks, shall not collect any tribute from priests and monks. In case they do collect anything they must bring their apologies and die according to the Great Yasa' [24, p. 468]. Based on this statement, one can conclude that the death penalty could be prescribed for religious crimes as well, however, we think that the risk of death penalty is meant here not for the infringement of the rights of the Church but for the failure to comply with the law—the Great Yasa and the khan's yarliq. As is well known, the khans of the Golden Horde pursued a policy of religious tolerance, and we know some occurrences of the capital punishment for religious crimes [compare: 39]. By the decision of a khan the death penalty could be substituted with sales into slavery or deprivation of all property [see: 44, p. 234].

As follows from the aforementioned facts provided by the sources, corporal punishments could vary, from whipping (the number of strokes depended on the severity of the crime) to cutting off an arm. Both the death penalty and corporal punishment could be prescribed by the official authorities as well as by a judicial decision delivered by common law. For example, William of Rubruck writes: ‘If they prescribe one hundred blows it means one hundred canes. I am speaking about those who are subjected to whipping by a court sentence’ [37, pp. 100–101].

It can be understood from the legislation of the late medieval Mongols and Kazakhs that eventually fines replaced most other more severe punishments. There is no doubt that it was caused by the adoption of Islam in the Golden Horde: Islamic law, though does not prohibit capital punishment, but yet prescribes to replace it with a fine where possible. In the case of murder such a fine is called in Sharia diyah—payment for blood [21, pp. 190–191]. This form of punishment became widespread in post-Horde states (particularly, in the Kazakh Khanate), however there is every reason to believe that it is the Golden Horde where this practice originates from.

To end the discussion on the principles of punishment in the Golden Horde, one cannot but talk about the responsibility of the rulers themselves in whose power the destiny of all their subjects was. Thus, for example, when Khan Uzbek adopted Islam and demanded that all people from his circle did the same, they interpreted his actions as violations of the Mongol law tore and yasa of Chinggis Khan and refused to submit. They even tried to put him out of the way. Only decisive actions of the Khan who during a short period of time executed a great number of Islam opponents helped him to stay in power. Khan Aziz, who ‘established bad customs’ was killed by his own people [42, pp. 130–131, 141]. Thus, the Khans of the
Golden Horde, while requiring from their subjects rigorous compliance with the law and who punished those strictly for any crime, also had to comply with rules of law and were responsible for any violation of the law. In our opinion, this is indicative of a consistent policy that the monarchs of the Golden Horde pursued in the law area, their commitment to legitimacy, and refutes one more time the stereotype of them being despot who possessed absolute power and were above the law. I. Izmailov rightfully considers the control of the Horde aristocracy over the Khans to be some system of restraints and counterbalances the existence of which eliminates completely the stereotype of autocratic power in the Golden Horde [see: 23, pp. 170–171].

As we can see, the system of punishments in the Golden Horde was rather severe but efficient at the same time. Therefore many foreigners who visited the Golden Horde were surprised to note that there was practically no theft among the local population, no sex crimes, and robberies were only committed by residents of submitted states [see, for example: 15, p. 40; 19, p. 123].

The supreme judicial authority of the Golden Horde was its rulers. The system of justice as a function of the Khan's power had already been acknowledged in the ancient Turkic society. It is not surprising that Khans of the Golden Horde exercised actively judicial functions. Thus, a chronicler describes one of them as follows: ‘Khan Mengü Temür... was a fair, clever and generous tsar; during his sultanate he strengthened with fairness and justice the basis of the Khanate and principles of ruling, so that during his reign the offended thanked his nature and the offenders complained’ [42, pp. 205–206]. It was during the reign of Mengü Temür that the Golden Horde officially became an independent state and its rulers became sovereigns, an integral feature of their power being exercise of the supreme judge function.

Coins appear to serve as some kind of a proof of importance of the judicial constituent of the Khan's power. Many of them have among epithets of the monarch a title Al-Adil which is usually translated as 'fair' or 'just'. We can see this epithet on the Khans' coins whose reign coincided with the zenith of the Golden Horde (end of 13–first half of the 14th centuries): ‘Supreme Sultan Tokhtogu the Fair’ [13, pp. 65–67, 69, 70], ‘Fair Sultan Jani Beg [22, p. 110] and later rulers (end of the 14th century—‘Fair Sultan Toktamys Khan, ‘Fair Sultan Temür Qutlugh Khan’ [18, pp. 455, 464]. Most likely designation of the judicial function on coins was a kind of advertisement, that is in this way Jochids tried to communicate this function not only to the population of the Golden Horde but also to foreign rulers, merchants—to all those who used money and could resort to the khan's justice.

Not infrequently Khans acted as international arbitrators resolving disputes of vassal rulers of the Caucasus, Middle East, Rus'. One of the most well-known examples was the dispute about the great Moscow throne submitted for consideration to Khan Ulugh Muhammad in 1432. Despite the decision made by the Moscow princely house not to involve the Horde authorities in internal conflicts, the boyar of the Grand Prince Vasily II Ivan Vsevolzhsky, the actual ruler of the Grand Principality of Moscow resorted to the Khan's court and managed to get the decision in favour of his patron. Notably that Vasily II appealed in the dispute not to 'the dead charter of his father' (that is to the will as his uncle and rival Yury of Zvenigorod did) but to 'favour and yarliq' of the khan himself [28, pp. 249–250; see also: 16, pp. 45–46]. Notably, Khans not only held court but also could grant to certain individuals and categories of people immunity which exempted them from court of justice of region vicegerents and other representatives of the authorities except that they could not be exempted from the court of the monarch himself. For example, in the yarliqs granted to the Russian clergy, Khans Berdi Beg, Tyulyak (and Khansha Taidullah in their charters) delegate their judicial authorities to the Russian Metropolitans prescribing to Russian Princes and Horde officials not to interfere with the Church matters [see, for exam-
Tarkhans who were exempted from the payment of taxes usually obtained the judicial immunity as well: they were subject to judgment ‘for nine offences’ [49, pp. 309–312].

Apart from the Khan's court of justice other courts were available to which the khan transferred his judicial authorities as necessary. There is information that qurultais executed justice both in the Golden Horde and in Mongolia. For example, in the early 14th century, ‘in order to settle the matter’, a quriltai was convened by Bayan—the ruler of the eastern regions of the Golden Horde (The Left Wing or the Ulus of Orda Ichen) who fought for power with his relative Kuylyuk [41, p. 44; 42, p. 44]. However, the quriltai court with regard to the Golden Horde is rarely mentioned in sources. One can assume that its judicial function was just a tribute to the ancient Mongol tradition and soon was brought to naught. This was due to the fact that those functions were transferred in the 14th century to karachi-beys—tribal princes who became a kind of ‘state council’ for the khan of the Golden Horde.

The role of tribal princes in the Golden Horde was even more significant than that in the Mongol Empire the rulers of which relied on the officialdom which advanced to the forefront during the reign of Chinggis Khan and his nearest successors. The Jochids to a greater extent had to reckon with the leaders of tribes whose ancestors had come to the Volga region from Mongolia together with the founder of the state, as well as with representatives of local noblemen [53, p. 283]. It goes without saying that the status and the role of major feudal in the Golden Horde depended in many aspects on the personality of the khan, however, the tendency to strengthening of their role in ruling which appeared during the reign of Öz Beg Khan was rising during the period of further existence of the Golden Horde which manifested in their exercise of judicial functions. Thus, in 1319, when the Princes Michael of Tver and Yury of Moscow faced the trial of Öz Beg, the khan delegated consideration of the case to tribal princes. He only reserved the right to punish the person who would be found guilty: ‘...and the Tsar said to his princes: ‘as verbal attacks were levied against Prince Michael, please try Grand Prince Yury Danilovich of Moscow. And I will grant a pardon to the one who is right, and I will execute the wrongdoer’ [28, p. 168].

Apart from the princes, judicial functions were also performed by darughas—vicegerents of the Golden Horde regions. Their authorities are also reflected on the coins: for example, there are coins of the vicegerent of Hajji Tarkhan (Astrakhan) with the inscription ‘Fair Emir Cherkes Bey’ (the second half of the 14th century) [5, p. 178]. Let us note, however, that the court of justice of the region rulers was not something special in the Golden Horde—in the Ilkhanate in Iran, in the Yuan Empire in China and other states of the Chinggisids, which emerged later during the same period, vicegerents of regions were supreme judges in their lands at the same time. The Hungarian missionary brother Johanca who visited the Golden Horde in 1320 mentions in his letter the Tatar judges in ‘Baskardia’ (that is, those of Bashkirs of the Volga region) and in ‘the country of Siberia’. [1, pp. 93–94] There is no doubt that the court of the vicegerents of these regions is meant.

Some information on the court of the Horde darughas can be obtained from the preserved Horde documents. They provide valuable information on some measures to which they resorted in order to obtain justice for the Horde subjects who happened to be victims of foreigners' actions. Thus, when a ship with several Horde merchants on board was attacked by Venetian pirates, the Crimean darugha Ramadan notified the Doge of Venice that he had arrested two Venetian salesmen and confiscated their property. He promised to release the captives only after the Venetian authorities set free the Horde merchants and gave back them their property [10, p. 172].

The next judicial instance was the court—dzargu (yargu). This is how they are described by Ibn Battuta, an Arabian merchant and traveller of the first half of the 14th century: ‘...every day the qadi comes to his [Emir Temür QutlUGH's, a vicegerent of Khwarezm,—
Author reception room and sits down in the seat reserved for him; and legal scholars and scribes [come] together with him. One of the senior emirs takes a seat on the opposite side, he is accompanied by eight other senior Turkic emirs and sheikhs called argudji [yarguchi]; people come to them for legal proceedings. As far as religious issues are concerned, they are resolved by the qadi, all other [cases] are subject to these emirs' consideration’ [17, p. 76].

Finally, one more judicial institute should be considered. Its emergence can only be explained by the international relations of the Golden Horde: a joint court of representatives of the authorities of the Golden Horde and other states which functioned in the regions where active relations between merchants of the Golden Horde and other states, diplomats, etc. existed. For example, in the Crimea and other Black Sea regions diplomatic representatives of the Genoese and Venetian republics were present at all times. The Khan recognized the Consul in Azov as the head of the Venetian community, and the Consul in Kaffa—as the head of the Genoese community. According to the ‘table of ranks’ (reflected, for example, in the dictionary as Codex Cumanicus) which was in place in the Black Sea region, a Consul was equal in his status to an Islamic qadi [10, p. 22], that is apart from administrative functions he performed judicial functions as well. Thus, the yarliq of Khan Jani Beg granted to Venetian merchants of Azov in 1342 reads as follows: ‘Also, if any of our subjects happens to come into quarrel with a Venetian, offend him or, on the contrary our people end up complaining on Venetians, may the ruler of Azov and the Consul of Venice at a joint meeting establish, carefully weigh and resolve all above mentioned complaints, offenses and humiliations, so that no harm would be done to a father by a son and to a son by a father’ [10, p. 73]. The procedure for ‘initiating a case’ is stipulated in another document—a notification of the Crimean ruler Ramadjan to Venetian merchants as well: ‘Also, if a Venetian enters into a dispute with anyone from a tumen, or litigates with him, then the one who lodges a lawsuit against a Venetian has to go to the Consul; in case a Venetian lodges a suit against somebody from a tumen, he has to go to the territory ruler’ [10, pp. 181–182]. In this case we face the principle of jurisdiction according to the citizenship (allegiance) of the defender which is typical of the modern international law.

Despite the fact that Sharia courts of the Golden Horde were arranged in a similar way as the courts of the countries of the Islamic East, they nevertheless had some peculiarities. Islam had become the state religion in the Golden Horde by 1320, but unlike other Islamic states, this did not result in total Islamisation of its society, state and law institutes. One of the peculiarities of the Golden Horde judicial system was, first of all, the aforementioned coexistence of the traditional Mongol justice institutes—dzargu courts and the Islamic qadi court. Notably, no conflicts between the seemingly incompatible law systems were observed: representatives of each system considered cases which were referred to their exclusive jurisdiction [6, pp. 103–104]. The Hungarian missionary Johanca who visited the Golden Horde in 1320—that is, during the period of Islamisation of this state, speaks about ‘the infection with Saracen delusion’ (Islam), while at the same time noting the existence of Tartar judges who adhered to Nestorian Christianity and had significant influence [1, p. 92]. We do not encounter in the sources any information on inequality of Muslims and ‘infidels’ before the Horde court. However, during the same period of time, in the Islamic districts of Christian Spain evidences of a Christian witness were not taken into consideration unless they were confirmed by a Muslim witness, however, they were ignored if only confirmed by a Christian [3, p. 146]. The Golden Horde did not have special courts for non-Muslims, which, for example, appeared in the Ottoman Empire after the Turkish Sultans had conquered Christian lands of Southeast Europe [43, p. 220]. The principle of equality before the court can be regarded as a rather cutting-edge one for that period of time when in Europe even a resident of a neighbouring village was considered to be an alien, let alone representatives of other states and, certainly, of other confessions!
So, the creation, development and functioning of the judicial system of the Golden Horde was influenced a great deal by centuries-long state and law traditions of the regions which were a part of this state. The legal awareness at the period of the Golden Horde should also be taken into consideration. It is these conditions that outline the unique features of the Golden Horde court of justice and its similarity with courts and legal proceedings of other countries at the same period of time.

We deem it necessary to say a few words about the court protocol and ceremonial used in the Golden Horde because its rules were to a great extent relevant to legal norms and especially to legal awareness of the ruling elite of the state of Jochi, and violation of these rules often resulted in severe legal consequences for the wrongdoer.

As soon as any foreigner crossed the border of any Turkic-Mongol state and came into contact with representatives of the local authorities they faced peculiarities of protocol nature. Immediately cross-cultural disagreements occurred: representatives of the authorities demanded some tribute from the travellers which ‘civilised’ Europeans regarded as a bribe at best, and as attempted robbery at worst. Thus, for example, Giovanni da Pian del Carpine, a messenger of the Pope, who visited the Mongol Empire in 1245–1246, wrote: ‘The chief of the settlement gave us horses and people to accompany us to another settlement, its chief was an Alan named Mikhey... It was him who sent to Kiev his body guards against us in order to give us a fake notification on behalf of Korenca so that we were considered to be Ambassadors and came to his place. And though it is not true, he did it in order to obtain gifts from us...’ [15, pp. 70–71]. The Russian chronicles also tell us about ‘gifts’ describing a journey of Russian Princes to the Golden Horde in the second half of the 14th century: ‘Ambassador Sari Khoja... received many gifts in Moscow which he brought to the Horde... And when the Grand Prince Dmitry of Moscow arrived in the Horde, he gave a lot of gifts and promises to Mamai and tsarinas, and princes, so they did not deprive him of the principality...’ [36, p. 87]. Meanwhile in the Turkic-Mongol states (and generally in the East), there was almost no notion of bribe, and such tributes were considered to be an element of the ceremonial during interaction with representatives of the authorities of all levels. According to eastern beliefs, any actions of officials were supposed to be rewarded [30, pp. 259–260].

It is noteworthy that European diplomats and the latest European historians emphasised to a lesser degree that it was in the practice of the Mongol Empire that for the first time the principle of respect to ambassadors and other diplomatic representatives was actively used, and that the level of reception of foreign diplomats was to reflect the power of the receiving sovereign. These aspects are only noted by contemporary researchers [see, for example: 54, p. 205].

Before meeting representatives of supreme authority, foreigners would undergo a kind of protocol enlightenment: special officials explained to them what could be done in presence of august persons and what was prohibited because it might be regarded as lèse-majesté and entail inevitable death. Certain ceremonial rules of the court also seemed to be bizarre and insulting to Europeans. William of Rubruck, a messenger of the French king Louis IX to the ruler of the Golden Horde Batu, described how his Horde guide taught him not to touch the tent threshold, not to speak until asked, and to kneel down before the Horde ruler. However, when William of Rubruck faced Batu and received permission to speak he ‘bent one knee as before a person. Then Batu gave a sign to bend both knees, which I did to avoid disputes. Then he made me speak, and since I was on my knees I imagined that I was praying to God and began my speech with a prayer’ [27, p. 117].

However, if all the necessary ceremonies and rituals were followed, even foreign ambassadors, rulers or other persons went through the ceremony of joining the Mongol society. Thus, for example, when Prince Daniil of Halych came to Batu, the latter offered him kou-
miss, and when the prince drank it, the Golden Horde ruler said a ritual phrase: ‘You are our person now, a Tatar’. After that Daniil was dressed in Mongol clothes and assigned a certain place in the system of the Golden Horde hierarchy. It is noteworthy that the Russian chronicler who described the trip of Daniil to the Golden Horde presented all these ceremonies as an endless chain of humiliations for the Russian Prince. ‘Oh, so evil is the Tatar honour!.. Daniil Romanovich... now is sitting on his knees and being called a lackey...’ [25, p. 185]. But in the meantime, after Daniil had come back from Batu, the Hungarian king agreed immediately to marry Daniil’s son to his daughter which he had refused to do earlier: no doubt that in his opinion this ritual that the Prince performed did not make Daniil a ‘lackey’ [see: 14, pp. 355–356]. The inclusion of foreign rulers and diplomats into the Turkic-Mongol hierarchy ensured honouring the head of this hierarchy—the monarch.

However, if Turkic-Mongol rulers wanted to do away with unwanted foreign rulers, violation of rituals by the latter was often the ground for reprisal. Thus, according to the Russian chronicles, Prince Michael of Chernigov was executed in the Golden Horde in 1246 for refusal to perform the ritual of passing between fires: during this ceremony the person who came to face the monarch allegedly became purified from evil intentions in relation to the monarch. By the way, this ritual was not mandatory, and that same Daniil of Halych was exempted from performing it. But Michael was an old enemy of the Golden Horde, and shortly before he came to Batu he had tried to form a coalition of European sovereigns to fight against Mongols. Therefore he had to be done away with him, but for this reprisal not to look as an arbitrary action, Michael of Chernigov was accused in refusal to perform protocol actions, and therefore in the intention to insult Batu, bring the anger of the Heaven on him [38].

However, the Golden Horde khans tried to create an image of themselves as not only powerful and mighty but also generous rulers who abode by the law. Thus, for example, in 1319, Prince Michael of Tver faced the court of the Golden Horde Khan Öz Beg. He was accused of, among other things, poisoning the Khan's sister. Since Öz Beg did not want to act as an impartial judge in this case he instructed his people to consider the case saying: ‘as verbal attacks were levied against Prince Michael, please try Grand Prince Yury Danilovich of Moscow. And I will grant a pardon to the one who is right, and I will execute the wrongdoer’ [28, p. 163].

Another khan of the Golden Horde, namely, Ulugh Muhammad demonstrated his generosity in a similar way: his military commander Haidar treacherously captured Grigory Protasev, a Lithuanian voivode, but the Khan ‘instead of praising him scolded Haidar, and, let Grigory go with honour’ [26, p. 95]. The Khan's behaviour in this case made rather positive impression both on contemporary and later historians: particularly, N. Karamzin who used to give negative characteristics to the rulers of the Golden Horde, described him as ‘an example of honour, rather rare among barbarians’ [20, p. 140].

Thus, the ceremony and protocol of the court remained an efficient tool which helped to create and maintain the image of the rulers of the Golden Horde throughout the period of its existence.

2. I. Berezin Ocherk vnutrennego ustrojstva ulusa Juchieva (The essay about internal arrangement of the ulus of Jochi) // Saint Petersburg, 1864, 112 p.


Chapter III. The Politics of the Ulus of Jochi


38. Rykin P. Gibel’ knyazya Mixaila Chernigovskogo v svete tradiczionny’x mongol’skix verovanij (The death of Prince Michael of Chernigov in the light of the traditional Mongol beliefs)
Chapter III. The Politics of the Ulus of Jochi


§ 4. Interrelations of Rus’ with the Jochid Ulus

Charles J. Halperin

Because neither Rus’ nor the Jochid Ulus remained unchanged from the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries, Rus’-Tatar relations also changed. Tatar influence on Rus’ was never uniform; it varied chronologically, geographically, and socially [36; 6, pp. 432–436; 31, p. 377–387]. Although Rus’-Tatar interaction varied, it was never marginal or unimportant.

Unfortunately specialists in medieval and early modern East Slavic history have often overlooked the role of the Tatars [47, pp. 306–322 (37, pp. 62–76); 46, pp. 298–310 (37, pp. 156–167); 25, pp. 385–408 (37, pp. 239–263)]. Traditional historiography treated the Tatars as barbarians, plunderers (zakhvatchiki) greedy for loot, whose influence upon Rus’ history was either entirely negative or insignificant. To do so such historians either disregarded or used only very selectively, the research of specialists in the Jochid Ulus who demonstrated that the Jochid Ulus was much more than a band of nomadic bandits. The Jochid Ulus was a state with a functioning administrative and fiscal apparatus and a Muslim urban civilization [32, pp. 131–144 (37, pp. 306–317)]. Although some historians in Russia and the West have attempted to treat the Tatar factor in Rus’ history more evenhandedly, the topic remains extremely controversial [7; 9; 10; 22, pp. 74–94]. Modern Russian historiography continues to manifest a complete aversion to admitting that the Tatar role in Rus’ history was sometimes positive or at least mixed.

Outside legitimate academic scholarship the situation is even worse. Amateurs or non-specialists have advanced alternative, often fantastic, concepts of Rus’-Tatar relations. The original Eurasianists of the inter-war period transformed Russia into a reincarnation of the Mongol Empire [19, pp. 477–493 (37, pp. 25–42); 38, pp. 55–194]. Lev Gumilyov reduced the Tatar conquest of Rus’ to a friendly alliance [17, pp. 109, n. 59 (37, p. 211, n. 59)]. The New Chronology goes even further and turns the Mongol Empire itself into a Russian Empire [18, pp. 1–50]. Such theories are driven by Russian nationalism—the desire to deny that European, civilized, Christian Rus’ was conquered by shamanist, later Muslim pastoral nomads. It is possible to create such metaphysical interpretations only because of the nature of the medieval and early modern sources about Rus’ and the Tatars.

Rus’ sources about the Tatars present major difficulties to analyzing Rus’-Tatar relations [43, pp. 27–34]. The least evidence is available for the earliest period of Tatar rule, the 13th century, but the Rus’ sources for later periods of Rus’-Tatar relations are still puny compared to those for the Mongols in China or Iran. Narrative sources presented the Tatars as enemies of Rus’ Orthodox Christians in stereotypical terms and images derived from Scripture [8], even though the Tatars were tolerant of the religious beliefs of all their multi-confessional subjects. Rus’ sources avoided depicting or minimized instances of cooperation between Rus’ and Tatars because such activities impugned their paradigm of Rus’-Tatar conflict. The Rus’ sources give the one-sided impression that Rus’-Tatar relations consisted of nothing but hostile military encounters. Tracing Tatar institutional influence is hampered by a chronological anomaly. Only scattered evidence from the Grand Principality of Muscovy survives even from the second half of the 14th century. The most detailed data on Tatar institutional influence date to the end of the fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries, after the overthrow of Tatar rule. Sources from the other Russian principalities annexed by Muscovy such as Tver’ or Riazan’ suffered disproportionally from the process of Muscovite conquest. By the early 14th century, the Dnieper River valley and Galicia-Volhynia fell increasingly under non-Rus’

All terms and transcriptions provided by the author of the article.
rule. The indigenous chronicle tradition in the future Ukrainian lands disappeared. Gaps and biases in the Rus’ sources inhibit scholarly understanding of Rus’-Tatar relations.

The situation of Jochid Ulus sources is worse. When Timur sacked Sarai he burned the Jochid Ulus archives. The Tatars of the Jochid Ulus had no chronicle tradition [27, pp. 1–15 (37, pp. 264–276)]. Only scattered government charters survive. Archeological evidence demonstrates the presence of Rus’ princes, nobles, clergy, merchants, artisans, and slaves in the Horde. Rus’-Tatar trade resulted in Rus’ importation from the Horde of silks, glass, beads, cowrie shells and boxwood combs. Unfortunately Arabic, Persian and later Turkic chronicles shed very little light on Rus’-Tatar relations, and literary and material evidence of Muslim high culture is altogether irrelevant to Rus’-Tatar contacts.

Absent adequate evidence on both sides of the Rus’-Tatar divide, scholars and amateurs can formulate highly fanciful theories.

Precisely because Rus’ and the Tatars evolved, the theme of Rus’-Tatar relations is best approached chronologically. The era from the thirteenth to sixteenth centuries can be divided for heuristic purposes into four periods: pre-Jochid Ulus, the Jochid Ulus at its height, the Jochid Ulus in decline, and post-Jochid Ulus. This periodisation is only approximate. Rus’-Tatar relations must be understood within the context of the history of the Grand Mongol Empire, of each its successor states (Yuan China, the Chagataid ulus, the Jochid Ulus, and the Ilkhanate), and, where relevant, of the successor states of the successor states (the successor states of the Jochid Ulus will be discussed below) [40, p. 239-261 (37, p. 114-131); 42, p. 321-339 (37, p.182-200); 3, s. 385-400 corrected errors in 24, pp. 229–245].

During the first period, the pre-Jochid Ulus, Rus’ dealt with the World Mongol Empire. Their first encounter was at the battle of the River Kalka in 1223 which aroused among some Rus’ apocalyptic expectations that the peoples of Gog and Magog had finally broken through Alexander the Great’s wall. This reaction was never dominant and soon disappeared because the world did not come to an end. This was also the only occasion in which Rus’ relations with the Tatars reflected Rus’ ignorance of the Tatars, and even then the Rus’ knew that the Tatars were steppe nomads [51, pp. 23–30; 5, pp. 32–40]. The Tatars conquered Rus’ during the campaigns of 1237–1238 and 1240, but the Rus’ sources tried to avoid acknowledging a change in Rus’ sovereignty despite repeating irrefutable evidence of the imposition of Tatar rule. The Tatar ‘conquest’ was depicted as just another nomad raid in the manner of the Cuman one [36, pp. 61–74; 51; 17, pp. 98–117 (37, pp. 201–218); 5]3. Such intellectual ambivalence toward the Tatar conquest later complicated ideological articulation of attempts to overthrow Tatar rule in 1380 after the battle of Kulikovo Field [41, pp. 7–103; 51, pp. 103–156; 5, pp. 169–181; 52, pp. 248–263; 49] or 1480 after the Stand on the Ugra River [51, pp. 171–90; 5, pp. 182–200].

The Rus’ Ideology of Silence [20, pp. 442–466; 2, pp. 65–98] could not impede Rus’ integration into the World Mongol Empire. Without confronting the intellectual consequences of Mongol conquest, the Rus’ exalted the status of the Mongol rulers who had conquered them. Even provincial Rus’ sources recognised the legitimacy of the heirs of Chinggis Khan to be titled ‘tsar’—the Slavic translation of the title of the Byzantine basileus [15, pp. 323–335 (37, pp. 11–23)]. Sons of khans (‘sultans’ in Turkic) were called ‘tsarevichi’, wives (khanshas) of khans became ‘tsaritsy’. When it was politically expedient the Rus’ used Chinggisid legitimacy to criticise non-Chinggisid rulers (such as Mamai and Edigü and even the great Central Asian conqueror Timur) who nominated puppet khans. These leaders were accused of usurping the title ‘khan’, of committing lèse-majesté, perhaps the one political crime of which they were innocent. Politically the Mongols left the Rus’ princely infrastructure intact. Why the Mongols sometimes liquidated indigenous dynasties and at other times

3 For a later reflection of this identification of Tatars and Polovtsy see [21].
permitted them to continue has never been fully explained [11, pp. 117–140]. The Mongols respected the legitimacy of the Rurikid dynasty and never raised a non-Rurikid to a Rus’ princely throne, but exercised final approval over all occupants of all Rus’ princely thrones [36, pp. 44–60]. Rus’ princes traveled to Karakorum in Mongolia to swear fealty, an experience which afforded them an unequaled opportunity to appreciate the power and wealth of the Mongol Empire. Rus’, both east and west of the Dnieper River, was subjected to a World Mongol Empire census, the creation of an on-site administrative apparatus of tax-collectors or tax farmers, and governors called baskaks. Probably, the firm application of Tatar power in the southwest occurred slightly later than in the northeast, but the rulers of Galicia-Volhynia could not resist when the Tatars decided to impose their complete authority. In addition to paying tribute, the Rus’ had to perform military service for their new rulers. Rus’ from Galicia-Volhynia joined raids and campaigns against Poland, Hungary and Lithuania. Rus’ from the northeast helped the Jochid Ulus battle the Mongol Ilkhanate in Iran over ownership of the rich pastures of Azerbaijan. Although relevant documentation dates only to the fourteenth century, there must have been a conscription to supply the Rus’ recruits who wound up constituting Rus’ regiments in Yuan China. No one conquered by the Mongols could on their own avoid fiscal and military service obligations; the Mongols exempted only clergy.

The immediate economic impact of the Tatar conquest was devastating. Some regions, such as Kiev, never recovered. The Rus’ carried a heavy burden of taxation. In addition to tribute and other taxes, they had to support Tatar officials in the Rus’ forest zone and cover the expenses of princely trips to make obeisance to the khans. Punitive expeditions for disobedience of Mongol authorities also cost the Rus’ economy dearly. The Rus’ economy required a century to recover.

Many Rus’ princes and nobles lost their lives fighting the Tatars, but those who served the Tatars loyally were favored. The price paid by the lower classes was much higher, first of all in lives, both in the cities and the countryside, and in taxes, conscription, and slavery.

The World Mongol Empire, from the Pacific Ocean to the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and the Mediterranean, was too big to remain united. As a result of Mongol civil wars, the Jochid Ulus, called ‘the Horde’ or more precisely the ‘Volga Horde’ in Rus’ sources, achieved greater autonomy, even sovereignty, during the second half of the thirteenth century. Formally, however, even in the early fourteenth century it still acknowledged the titular supremacy of the Yuan Khan ruling China and Mongolia. The Jochid Chinggisids maintained ties, and even possessed appanages, in China until the overthrow of the Yuan. From the second half of the thirteenth century until the 1360s the Jochid Ulus was at its height, the second period of Rus’-Tatar relations.

At the same time as the Tatars lost control over Ukrainian Rus’ they maintained a cordon sanitaire to the southwest to ensure the safety of the Tatar homeland in the Black Sea and Caspian steppes. The Volga Horde maintained its territorial aspirations in Ukraine long after its ability to impose direct rule had disappeared. The Dnieper region, while not depopulated, was a no-man’s-land of little value or interest to the Tatars. Even as the Horde developed into an East European regional power, Sarai was far more interested in Azerbaijan and Khwarezm than the Rus’ forest zone; the former generated far greater revenues than the latter. Rus’ was not only on the geographic periphery of Horde territory, it was also peripheral to the Horde’s major economic interests. Nevertheless, the Horde continued the World Mongol Empire’s involvement in Northeast Rus’. Unfortunately the place of Rus’ within the Jochid Ulus remains elusive. Rus’ authors were willing, when convenient, to describe Rus’ as the Tsarev Ulus (the Ulus of the Khan). However such self-serving assertions did not necessarily reflect the Horde’s administrative structure [53, pp. 257–263 (37, pp. 77–83); 34, pp. 21–30 (37, pp. 318–328)].
If during most of the thirteen century Tatar interference in Northeast Rus’ dynastic succession was limited, the development of competing Rus’ principalities thereafter necessitated a different role. When the Horde was divided between Nogai and Toqta, Rus’ princes naturally aligned themselves with one or the other, but a united Jochid Ulus was the sole decision-maker of who received the yarliq to be Grand Prince of Vladimir, titular ruler of the Northeast. At this time the Horde removed the baskaks and shifted to indirect administration of its Rus’ princely vassals via ‘envoys’ (posoly) and ‘absentee governors’ (darugi). The Horde permitted Rus’ princes to collect the Tatar tribute for Sarai. Russian resistance to direct Tatar rule, such as the 1327 Tver’ uprising, was probably not responsible for this change in Tatar administrative practices. The Rus’ princes profited from collecting the tribute not so much by embezzlement as by tax apportionment. Neither the Rus’ princes nor the Jochid Ulus observed traditional Rus’ princely succession practices nearly as scrupulously as in the past.

At some times Tatar policy favored Moscow over Tver, at other times Tver or Nizhny Novgorod over Moscow, but all the Rus’ princes had the same Tatar policy: to take advantage of Tatar power to overcome Rus’ rivals. The princes of Moscow were not successful in this endeavor because they were more servile, more unscrupulous, or more immoral, but because they were adept at it [44, pp. 23–29]. Moscow timed its support of the Horde to coincide with Horde strength and its opposition to the Horde to coincide with Horde weakness. The Horde was unable to reverse the rise of Moscow.

Social familiarity between Rus’ and Tatars may have reached its height when the Horde was at the apex of its power. The Rus’ were well informed of Horde personnel, customs, society, geography, administration, nomadic routes, and life [26, pp. 161–175 (37, pp. 43–61); 36, pp. 104–119]. There were some intermarriages in the thirteenth and early fourteenth century between Chinggisid princes and Rus’ princes. In this context princes Gleb Vasil’kovich of Rostov, Fyodor the Black of Smolensk and Yaroslavl or Yury Danilovich of Moscow should be mentioned. However, such intermarriages were rare. Rus’ knowledge of the Horde was acquired under duress. Rus’ princely survival could depend upon accurate intelligence information about the Horde. The Tatar presence in Rus’ of administrators, envoys, and tax-collectors, with their retinues was unavoidable. Probably the Tatars did not install major Tatar garrisons in the forest zone. Punitive expeditions were far more destructive than the regular Tatar administration. Although the Rus’ possessed ‘insider’ expertise about the Tatars, nevertheless to the Rus’ the Tatars remained ‘outsiders’, ‘others’. For security reasons and because knowing too much about ‘infidels’ was not considered a virtue, most Rus’ information about the Tatars was never recorded for posterity. No Russian wrote a travelogue of Sarai’s palaces, mosques, caravansaries, medressas, or aqueducts. Rus’ princes and boyars shared the martial ethos of the Tatar warrior class, as evidenced by the chivalric actions attributed to Batu toward the Russian bogaty’ Evpatyi during the 1237 siege of Ryazan and the depiction of the fleeing defeated Tatars in the epic Zadonshchina about the 1380 battle of Kulikovo Field. Rus’ elite also shared the Tatar elite’s attachment to hunting as a form of recreation. Such social compatibility was absent among the Russian peasants and artisans captured in raids to serve as servants in Sarai or to be sold as slaves to Central Asia or the Middle East.

The economic recovery was uneven. Some artisan skills of Kievan Rus’ such as niello enameling had disappeared forever, but the urban sector prospered, particularly those cities such as Moscow and Nizhny Novgorod connected via the Volga River to the Silk Route. The northwest cities such as Novgorod, Pskov, Smolensk, and Polotsk also did well. A Khan issued a decree exempting Baltic merchants in Novgorod from paying customs dues. The Rus’ economy must have resumed generating an economic surplus, because stone church construction resumed, and the northeastern principalities resumed minting silver coinage. The khans of the Volga Horde exempted the Russian Orthodox Church from taxation in return for prayers for the health of the Khan and the Golden Kin. The Church spent this windfall on church-
Chapter III. The Politics of the Ulus of Jochi

es, icons, frescoes, vestments and other church materials, and on literary activities such as chronicles and saints’ lives. The inhabitants of cities not tied to the most lucrative international trade routes probably did not share equally in this prosperity [36, pp. 75–86; 62, pp. 360–390; 61, pp. 321–355; 63, pp. 108–132].

Political and other factors brought this ‘golden age’ of the Jochid Ulus to a close in vicious succession disputes in the Horde during the ‘great troubles’ of the 1560/70s, initiating the third period of Rus’-Tatar relations. Timur smashed the temporary recovery of Horde unity under Toktamysh. Even Edigü’s ascendancy could not stem the tide of increasing political disintegration within the Horde. Eventually the Jochid Ulus fragmented into a nomadic core, the Great Horde, which claimed to exercise previous Jochid Ulus sovereignty, the khanates of Kazan’, Astrakhan’, Crimea, Sibir’, and Kasimov, and the nomadic Nogai Hordes. This decentralisation of power culminated in the liquidation of the Jochid Ulus per se by the destruction of the Great Horde in 1502 by the Crimean Tatars.

By the late fourteenth century the Horde dealt more and more exclusively with Moscow, which probably began borrowing Tatar institutions. Certainly, Muscovy—and potentially other northeast Rus’ principalities, about which we have much less information—had already acquired from the Tatars such fiscal and administrative institutions and terminology as the kazna (the treasury), tamga (customs tax), and iam (postal service). Muscovite coinage imitated Tatar coinage, even to the extent of carrying fake Arabic inscriptions. The Muscovites could not have been victorious at the 1380 battle of Kulikovo Field if they had not become experts in Tatar warfare. Unfortunately, it is impossible to determine whether they had already acquired the skills and accouterments of Tatar mounted archers or structured their field armies in imitation of the five divisions of a Tatar field army. Unquestionably, they eventually did do so, but the evidence comes from the post-Jochid Ulus period. The Rus’ may even have borrowed a land measurement custom from the Tatars, although as a rule, the Tatars—unlike the Mongols in other areas such as China—did not try to impose their social customs upon the Rus’, and in general the Rus’ did not borrow social institutions from the Horde [14, pp. 647–673]. The Rus’ elite seclusion of women in the terem (women’s quarters) is not of Mongol origin [36, pp. 116; 63, pp. 64–84]. Administrative borrowing has been exaggerated. The number of Muscovite boyars was not fixed at four, so the Muscovite Council (duma) did not imitate the diwan of the four Horde karachi begs. Muscovite namestniki (governors) and voloydeli (county administrators) were not divided between military and civilian offices in imitation of the Horde administrators were not divided between civilian and military functions [29, pp. 237–257 (37, pp. 219–238)]. That the Russians borrowed some Tatar institutions does not entail that they borrowed all Tatar institutions.

The area of Rus’ high culture remained almost totally immune to Tatar influence. While some decorative arts at the Horde may have made their way to the Rus’ forest zone, Rus’ high culture was Christian. The high culture of the Horde was Muslim, and therefore considered as tabu [36, pp. 120–125]. Translated Oriental tales from the Horde reached Rus’ in the form of vitae, totally purged of any Islamic taint. Russians did not want to learn how to build better mosques.

Even in the mid fifteenth century, the Volga Horde khan and its feuding elite still exercised considerable influence on the Muscovite dynastic wars. Moscow remained highly attuned to Horde politics. Times had changed, but the attitude of court and church writers toward the Tatars did not. There was no radical alteration in the depiction of Tatar actions from neutrality to hostility after 1448 or 1453. Rus’ sources had not been neutral toward Tatar oppression before 1448 and Russian sources after 1453 continued to respect Chinggisid legitimacy [33, pp. 53–62]. However, by the second half of the fifteenth century Tatar control was

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6 For a different interpretation, see [56, pp. 187–201; 55, pp. 85–101].
sufficiently weak to permit Russian writers to take previously unthinkable literary liberties with Batu’s biography, inventing defeats he never suffered and treating his legacy with disdain [16, pp. 50–65 (37, pp. 99–113)]. However, the blunt rejection of Chinggisid legitimacy vouched by Bishop Vassian Rylo of Rostov in 1480 remained atypical. Even after the liquidation of the Great Horde the Muscovites had to continue to defer to Chinggisids, most importantly the Crimean and Kazan’ khans. Muscovite respect for Chinggisid blood continued throughout the sixteenth century. In addition, the absence of a clearly articulated concept of Rus’ conquest by the Tatars precluded formulation of a clear-cut ideology of ‘liberation’ from the Tatars in 1480. Russian writers employed analogies to the exodus of the Hebrew slaves from Egypt as a substitute, even if this metaphoric model hardly depicted Rus’-Tatar relations accurately.

The fourth and last period of Rus’ relations with the Jochid Ulus encompassed from 1502 through the end of the sixteenth century. Muscovite-Tatar relations remained highly significant. Instead of a united Horde dealing with competing Rus’ principalities when Rus’ was part of the Grand Mongol Empire or during the period of Jochid Ulus ascendancy, now a united northeast Rus’, Muscovy, dealt with rival Tatar states and hordes. Muscovy had been allied with the urban peripheries of the Jochid Ulus, Kazan’ and the Crimea, against its nomadic core, the Great Horde. The successful destruction of the Great Horde led to the dissolution of this alliance as the former allies squabbled over the division of the spoils. Now hostility grew between Moscow, on the one hand, and Kazan’ and the Crimea on the other. Moscow still had to stay abreast of politics throughout former Jochid Ulus territories. Envoy and couriers visited not only Kazan’ and the Crimea but every Nogai Tatar notable from the ‘prince’ to the lowest mirza. Dealing with the vast disunited Nogai Hordes was a tiresome burden for Muscovite diplomats. Tribute was still paid to the Crimea which claimed the Jochid inheritance, but the Muscovites called it ‘gifts’. Moscow and Poland-Lithuania tried to outbid each other to direct Crimean slave-raids against the other, which was expensive even to whoever succeeded and destructive to whoever failed. Crimea was virtually out of reach of Muscovite arms, but Kazan was not. In 1552 Moscow conquered Kazan. Astrakhan, at the mouth of the Volga River, fell soon after. Muscovy now controlled the river route to the Caspian Sea.

Moscow continued to trade with the steppe. The Muscovite cavalry rode steppe ponies imported by the thousands from the Nogais. Defending the southern and southeastern frontiers against raids continued to drain state revenues. Slave raids from Crimea continued to drain population. By the end of the sixteenth century, however, Muscovy was clearly advancing into the steppe, creating ever more advanced defensive lines.

It is from the post-Jochid Ulus era that our most convincing evidence of Muscovite institutional borrowing comes [36, pp. 33–60, 87–103]. Muscovite mounted archers could have passed for steppe warriors in armaments, armour, and horse equipage, perhaps even in tactics. Muscovite field army marched in the Mongol five divisions including the Right and Left Hands. The Muscovite postal system duplicated the speed and reliability of the Mongol iam. Muscovy conducted its diplomacy with steppe and oriental polities (but not European countries) according to the basic principles of Tatar diplomatic practice [13]. However, the Muscovites lacked either the ability or the inclination to copy all Tatar institutions. The Grand Mongol Empire had conducted an imperial census, including of Rus’ households, but Muscovite cadastres of the late 14th and 16th centuries did not derive their format from the Tatar devter’. Various forms of conditional land-holding obtained in the Middle East, but our evidence from the Jochid Ulus is sparse, and the Muscovites did not need to borrow the pomest’e from anyone, either Tatars, Iranians, Ottomans, or Byzantines. The complicated Muscovite system of mestnichesto allocating ranking and office based upon both genealogy and clan service record had no Tatar input. The Muscovite ‘Assembly of the Land’ (zemskij sobor) had nothing specific in common with the Tatar quriltai, even if the Muscovites could become acquainted with that institution in the Kazan Khanate. The
first *Zemskij sobor* was convened by Ivan IV, who would never have created an institution with the authority to elect or remove a ruler like the *qurultai*. In the 16th century there were limits to Muscovite borrowing from the Tatars as in the 14th.

As the Volga Horde declined some Tatar notables entered Muscovite service, probably bringing small suites with them. However, it is only in the post-Jochid Ulus period that significant numbers of Tatars moved to the Russian forest zone, often retaining, even after conversion, some elements of their former steppe lifestyle [58, pp. 13–38; 5; 57, 1–23; 60, 365–387; 59, 114–120]. How many of the supposed Tatar founders of Muscovite boyar and gentry clans were historical, rather than legendary, remains disputed, but, without question, many Tatar nobles did convert and intermarry and assimilate into the Russian aristocracy. Some serving Chinggisids, even Muslims, were even given appanages populated by Russian Orthodox Christians. How the Russian subject populations interacted with their new overlords cannot be determined.

Muscovite familiarity with the steppe did not lessen when anti-Tatar and anti-Muslim religious rhetoric increased in the middle of the 16th century. Even the monks employed by the Metropolitan of Moscow and All Rus’, the chief advocate of anti-Muslim propaganda, had mastered precise information of the structure and personnel of the court and Muslim religious establishment in Kazan’ [28, p. 188–201]. Nevertheless Rus’ clerics had never manifested much interest in the intellectual content of Islam [12, p. 117–143]. The metropolitan was not above citing a forged patent (yarliq) of Khan Öz Beg to defend Church land from the aspirations of the Muscovite Court, supposedly striving for their secularisation.

It was not until the middle of the 16th century that hindsight gave the Stand on the Ugra River in 1480 its modern significance as Russian ‘liberation’ from the ‘Tatar Yoke of the Golden Horde’. The key terms of this formula were created in the middle of the 16th century. The term ‘Tatar Yoke’ originated in Latin in the 16th century and did not appear in Slavonic until the second half of the 17th century [50, pp. 20–39 (37, pp. 168–181); 63, pp. 244–245; 54, p. 241 (erroneous reference in 31, p. 378 n. 9); 48, p. 59]. The term ‘Golden Horde’ originated in Russian in Muscovy in the mid-16th century. No one in Rus’ during the 13th to 15th centuries had heard of the ‘Golden Horde’ or the ‘Tatar Yoke’. The projection of such anachronistic vocabulary onto medieval Rus’ can only distort the history of Rus’-Tatar relations.

Chronicles of the mid-16 century continued to deny that the ‘Tatars had ‘conquered’ Rus’ and therefore that Rus’ needed to be ‘liberated’ from Tatar rule at all. Chronicles emphasized uninterrupted continuity from Kiev to Vladimir and Moscow. There was no ‘Tatar period’ of Rus’ history [51, pp. 191–200; 5, pp. 201–209; 35, pp. 11–26; 4, pp. 149–170] (in modern Russian historiography the ‘appanage period’ often replaced the ‘Tatar period’). Respect for Chinggisid blood continued. Captured Chinggisids from Kazan’ were treated with honor. Whatever Ivan IV was doing when he assigned converted Chinggisid Simeon Bekbulatovich the throne of Moscow and All Rus’ in 1575, only to demote him to Grand Prince of Tver’ in 1576, Simeon’s Chinggisid status was a prime consideration in Ivan’s choice of puppets (note that Simeon could never have played that role if he were still a Muslim [45, p. 306-330]).

Even after Muscovy’s conquest of former territories of the Jochid Ulus such as Kazan, Astrakhan, and at the end of reign of Ivan IV, Siberia, Muscovy did not become or perceive itself to be a successor state of the Jochid Ulus [23, pp. 481–497 (37, pp. 277–297); 30, pp. 5–20 [the Russian-language version of this article, 1, pp. 68–71 (37, pp. 298–305) contains unintended distortions]]. Muscovy did not try to reproduce the changing boundaries of the Jochid Ulus. Muscovy had no aspirations to Azerbaijan, Khwarezm, or Bulgaria (which had been controlled by Nogai at the turn of the 14th century). The Muscovite court permitted the Nogai

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7 For a long time it was thought that only 17th-century manuscripts of the *Kazanskaya istoriya* (The History of Kazan) contained the term: [51, pp. 184–187; 5, pp. 194–198], but a 16th-century manuscript of the *paterik* of the Joseph of Volokolamsk monastery contains it: [48, pp. 58–59].
Tatars to laud Ivan IV as ‘White Tsar’ and even as a descendant of Chinggis, but Muscovite political and diplomatic ideology gave Ivan an imperial Roman lineage. Ivan IV did not become a khan in order to conquer Kazan; he was not raised on a blanket at his coronation. Diplomatic reports of Muscovite embassies to Stockholm, London, and Vilnius employed Muscovite political and social lexicon to explicate ‘European’ governments and societies far more than the embassy to Istanbul did to describe Ottoman government and society, a manifestation of a subtle, perhaps unconscious, belief of the Muscovite foreign policy establishment that Muscovy was ‘European’, not ‘steppe’ [39, pp. 81–103]. To be a successor state of the Jochid Ulus or any segment of the Great Mongol Empire requires more than some territorial continuity, use of Mongol servitors, and borrowing of Mongol institutions; it entailed adoption of a political and cultural identity. Muscovy lacked just such an identity. Unlike Timur who tried to emulate Chinggis Khan in his conquests, Ivan IV did not try to emulate Batu.

In conclusion, Rus’-Tatar relations were fluid, complex, and multi-faceted. Each period of Rus’-Tatar relations has elements in common with the others, but also unique characteristics. The underlying commonality in all four periods is that such relations were intense, complicated, significant, malleable, and informed. Only the first encounter of the Rus’ and the Tatars on 1223 occurred in an environment of Rus’ ignorance of the Tatars. This familiarity with the Tatars made the Tatars an integral element of Rus’ history for over three centuries. It was only after the Great Troubles that Russian knowledge about Tatars began to erode. That process completed by Peter the Great. But the importance of Rus’-Tatar relations before Peter should never be denied.


§ 5. Left Wing of the Ulus of Jochi in the 13–the Beginning of the 15th Centuries

Kanat Uskenbay

Possessions of the First Ordai'ds

After Jochi's death, his place was taken by his second son Batu. Modern scholars believe that it was the decision of Chinggis Khan, the great Qa'an of the Mongol Empire [2, p. 15]. The firstborn son of Jochi and the older brother, Batu—Orda, according to Rashid al-Din 'agreed to the accession of Batu, and it was him who put him on the throne of his father' [16, p. 66]. Did Orda claim the sovereignty in the Ulus of Jochi, or was he forced to agree with the decision of his grandfather? According to the legends of the 16th century, the brothers gave way to reign to each other: 'You're my older brother, who replaced my father, and that is why you are like a father to me. We will go to someone else's yurt. You'll be the Khan', Batu said. 'You're right, I'm older than you. But our father raised you with care and affection, and he loved you greatly. Let you be the Khan! I can bear your reign, but you can not bear mine', Orda objected. The brothers' dispute was solved by the 'great grandfather' (ulus baba) Chinggis Khan giving preference to his second grandson [23, pp. 92, 121, s. 37b–38a].

However, in fact there was a division of uluses (people) in the Ulus of Jochi between the older brothers. According to Rashid ad-Din, 'in the troops of the Jochi Khan, he (Orda) was in charge of one half of them, and the other half was under Batu' [16, p. 66]. According to Was-saf, Jochi's personal four thousand, which at the time of his death were more than a tumen of the troops, were under the control of the elder brother Hordu (Orda—Author) [18, pp. 84–85]. Orda, together with his younger brothers Udur, Tuqay Timur (Togha Timur), Shingkuro and Shingum 'was the left hand (wing) of the [Mongol] army; and they are still called tsare-viches of the left hand (wing)—shakh-zadagan-i dast-i chap' [16, p. 66].

The authors of medieval essays have always noted the important role played by Orda in the political life of not only the Ulus of Jochi, but the entire Mongol Empire. It is their opinion, we should think, that was a reflection of the real position taken by this Chinggisid. Essentially, Orda, together with his younger brother Batu, led the third generation of rulers of Eke Mongol Ulus—the era of the grandchildren of Chinggis Khan. In the centre of the Empire the grandchildren were alternately introduced as Güyük, Mōngke, Ariq Böke and Kublai. Away from them, in the south-west of Mongolia, in Iran there was another grandson—Hulagu. At the time of their reign, the Empire that their grandfather had founded reached the peak of its power, and duding them began its inevitable decay. The most important events of the military-political history of the Mongol Empire during the second third of the 13th century took place with the indispensable participation of Orda. According to Thomas Allsen, starting in 1241, when Ögedei and Chagatai, the last surviving sons of Chinggis Khan, had died, Orda
acquired the status of elder of all Chinggisids: he was not almighty, but everybody had to consult with him [2, p. 15].

Rashid al-Din says that Orda was held in great esteem and respect, both in life of his father and after his death. The supreme ruler of the Empire Möngke Qa'an in the public documents, which were sent to the Ulus of Jochi 'on the part of Edicts and Yasa, the name of Orda (Möngke Qa'an—Author) put in front' of the name of Batu [18, p. 41]. Hearing about this 'honour and respect' to Orda reached the Arab authors. For example, Al-Nuwayri reported that some have called Orda, one of the sons of Jochi, the son of Chinggis Khan [19, p. 150]. Giovanni da Pian del Carpine, passing through the lands of Orda in 1246, wrote the following: 'The sons of Tossuk Khan (Jochi—Author) are: Batu, he is the richest and the most powerful after the Emperor; Orda, he is the eldest of all the Leaders; Syban, Boru, Berke...' [14, p. 39]. Further describing Orda's lands, which Giovanni da Pian del Carpine and his companions passed through, he said: 'In these lands lives Orda, who is senior over Batu; moreover, he is older than all of the Tatar princes' [14, p. 64]. According to the author of the History of Tatars, the brother of C. de Bridia, Orda was 'senior and most respected among the Leaders' [24, p. 110].

After Orda's death, the aksakal of the third generation of elder Chinggisids, his name became taboo, and he received the honorary posthumous title Ichen Khan (Ichen Khan, Ezhen Khan)—Lord Khan, which completely replaced his real name. Modern researchers, combining the name and the posthumous title, turned him into the Orda-Ichen. His younger brother Batu is also known as Sain Khan [13, pp. 23–27]: this name or honorary nickname, as determined by J. Boyle, was his posthumous title [7, pp. 28–31]. Such titles Mongols used to refer to the deceased members of the Khan's family. Contemporaries of the first Jochids did not call Orda Ezhen (Ichen, Edzhen). For Giovanni da Pian del Carpine, Rashid al-Din, Wassaf and others he was just Orda. For the first time, as far as we know, this term as the name of Orda was used by a Persian-speaking author of the first third of the 15th century in the book 'Mu'izz al-ansab' [11, p. 39].

The successor of Orda, his eldest son Konkyran, despite his name did not become a strong (kon) and clever (kyran) ruler. He ruled until about the end of the 1270s. His name only once, as far as it is known, is mentioned in connection with the events of the first half of 1250-s. We are talking about the military actions of Möngke Khan, who had just been proclaimed the Khan of the Empire, against the representatives of Chagatai and Ögedei families. Möngke Khan sent one of his noyons with ten tumans of brave Turks to the west, to the borders of the Ulug Tag, to the lands (the names can not be read), between Bishbalyk and Karakorum, so that they leave that area and came closer to the camp of Kunkyran-ogul, which was situated in Kajalyk's borders, and pulled the camp up to the bank of Otrar [16, pp. 137–138].

According to V. Bartold, 'in order to finally destroy his enemies, Möngke Khan sent a large army to the west, which was to occupy the space between Karakorum and Bishbalyk and connect with Jochids' troops, located in the countryside between Kayalyk and Otrar, under the command of Khunkyran (or Khunkuran), the son and successor of Orda. All commanders in the Ulus of Chagatai, suspected of sympathising with the conspirators, were executed' [5, p. 65; 6, p. 560]. Thomas Allsen, probably on the basis of the same fragment believed that Kunkyran 'assisted Möngke Khan in tracking down the escaped conspirators, inspecting the area from Kayalyk to Otrar intending to arrange a brutal massacre' [2, p. 16].

Orda's Ulus in the Era of disintegration of Eke Mongol Ulus

Since the second half of 1270s, on the throne of the Orda's Ulus was his grandson and son of Sartakty, Konchi (Koishi, Kuindzhi, Turuk Qa'an), which 'has long been the ruler of the Orda's Ulus' [16, p. 67]. During his reign came the inexorable disintegration of the mighty Mongol Empire, accompanied by permanent war between the numerous descendants of Chinggis Khan. Konchi pursued an active foreign policy. First, he 'began a friendship' with
Kaidu and successfully fought with him against Kublai [16, p. 13]. After 1280, Konchi, as well as the Golden Horde Khan Töde Môngke and temnik [general] Nogai made peace with Kublai and returned Numugan, the son and heir of the Khan of Yuan from captivity. Kublai replied with gifts and financial assistance: according to Yuanshi, in February 1288, the Emperor gave the Imperial Tsarevich Huo-ni-chi (Konchi) 500 ounces of silver, a pearl necklace and embroidered fabrics. The following year, the salary (what form was not specified) was sent to Konchi's troops [2, p. 21].

Konchi was a 'friend and supporter' of the Ilkhans of Iran and constantly sent messengers to Argun Khan, Gaykhatu Khan and Ghazan Khan 'with the expression of love and sincere friendship', 'consensus and request for a union' [16, p. 67; 17, p. 134]. Specific information about Konchi's contacts in this period with Saray Khans has not survived.

After the conclusion of peace with the descendants of Tolui in Iran and China Konchi spoiled relations with the neighbours in the south, where the descendants of Ögedei and Chagatai ruled. The rivalry was partly over the cities in the south and south-east of modern Kazakhstan (Kary Sairam is mentioned in the source). The descendants of Orda at that time were already expanding their possessions from the east to the south in the direction of the Chu-Talas nomad territories. This, of course, caused a war with Kaidu, the master of Zhetysu. According to Rashid al-Din, Kary Sairam 'was dependent on Kaidu, [classed to] Konchi's uluses' [16, p. 81].

Nevertheless, in general, Konchi's reign was peaceful and calm. This did not escape the attention of the quite knowledgeable traveller Marco Polo who mentioned, 'The Tsar (of the North, Konchi—Author) has a lot of people, but he fights no one and peacefully rules his people' [8, p. 206].

During these years, Orda's Ulus became independent from Batu's Ulus: The representatives of Orda's family declined the previous formal vassal relations with the Karakorum and Sarai, expressed, according to Rashid al-Din, in the 'ordinary to consider their sovereign and ruler the person who is the deputy of Batu, and their names are written at the top of their labels', however, 'from the very beginning there was no case that some member of Orda's family, who took his place, went to Khans of Batu's family, as they are distant from each other and are independent sovereigns of their uluses' [16, p. 66].

However, after the death of Konchi around 1299 the political stability was upset: his successors began a fierce struggle for power.

The Dark Age

The history of the Left Hand (Wing) Tsareviches from the beginning of the 14th century to 1360s—that is, since the death of Konchi (ca. 698–701 AH), and until the time of the reign of Urus Khan (ca. 770 AH), has received scant coverage in the sources. Compendium of Chronicles by Rashid ad-Din ends with a description of events in the beginning of 14th century; Arab authors give scattered and fragmentary facts; original information reported by the 'successors' of Rashid al-Din, particularly Natanzi, 'whose data, other than the question of the kinship, had reason to be taken into account' [2, p. 26]; numismatics has little information. In all of these sources the sequence of the reigns of the Khans and their family ties are dimly reflected. This period was marked by an internecine struggle of Ordaids; the interference with other lines of Jochids and Chinggisids; the submission to Batu's Ulus—the Tsareviches of the Right Hand (Wing); the elevation of Tuqay-Timurids and the emergence of a number of 'new' khans of this branch; finally, the uprising of Mubarak Khoja Khan, who only then received clear chronological outline of numismatic sources (768–769 AH), but at the same time, when written sources remained silent. This period (700–770 AH) can rightly be called the Dark Age in the history of Ordaids, which, as suggested by the author of these lines, did not 'disappear' or 'extinguish', but newly rose with the advent of Urus-Khan.
The civil war that broke out after the death of Konchi not only weakened the Orda's Ulus, but actually split it into parts, which were not subordinate to each other. Among the main rivals in the fight for supremacy over the princes of the Left Hand (Wing) the sources name Bayan (sometimes, Nayan)—Konchi's heir and his eldest son; Makuday (options: Mangitay, Mungkia)—the forth and the youngest Konchi's son; Kubluk (Kuylk, Kupalak)—the son of Timur-Buka from another branch of Ordaids; and also Kushtay (Kushay, Kush-Temir, Kushnay)—the son of Kubluk. Each of them, according to the sources, occupied the Khan's throne of Orda's Ulus for some time.

In the view of Rashid al-Din, the legitimate ruler of the Orda's ulus appears to be Bayan: ‘Bayan, son of Kuindzhi, now is the sovereign of the Orda's ulus’; ‘Bayan is currently sitting on father Kuindzhi's place and still rules in the ulus of his father’; ‘Bayan is still in charge of the larger part of the Orda's Ulus’; ‘Now he (Bayan—Author) is the sovereign of the Ulus’ [16, pp. 14, 66, 68, 212]. Yangichar, son of Kaidu, is ‘at odds’ with him, as the head of Orda's Ulus’; the sovereign of Islam, Ghazan Khan, is ‘friendly’ with him; Toqta ‘who owns the throne of Jochi’ ‘helps’ him; and the powerful Kaidu is ‘afraid’ of his possible actions [16, pp. 14, 68]. While Kubluk, ‘warring’ with the ‘sovereign of Orda's ulus’ is satisfied with the army, ‘which broke away from Bayan, and with that came to his aid from Kaidu and Duwa’ [16, pp. 14, 68]. We can judge that Kubluk only claimed to supreme power in Orda's ulus by the fact that Kaidu and Duwa conspired to help him become the sovereign of the Ulus [16, p. 68]. Rashid al-Din believes this plan failed, and he did not become a sovereign.

A different picture appears on the pages of Arabic works. The historians of Mamluk Egypt, ‘equalised’ in the rights for the throne all contenders for Khanate of Orda's ulus of that time, declaring them sons of the Konchi and of his uncle (?). The fact that Konchi's successor was his nephew Kubluk, but not his son Bayan, is also indicated by Ibn Khaldun: ‘After Kuindzi his son, Kuyluk, came to the throne... his brother Bayan rebelled against him’ [19, p. 394]. Baybars and Ibn Khaldun talk about the division of Orda's ulus between the rival clans. It is highly likely that there was a temporary collapse of ulus and parallel board of at least two Khans—Kubluk and Bayan. It is worth remembering the words of Rashid al-Din that Bayan ‘is responsible for the bigger part of Orda's ulus’ [16, p. 68]; it is obvious that Kubluk ruled the smaller part. The same can be said of military resources: Kubluk based himself upon the army, ‘which broke away from Bayan’, besides, he was helped by Kaidu and Duwa (Tuva). ‘The intentions of them (Kaidu and Tuva—Author) was as follows: we will help Kubluk become the sovereign of the ulus, and he will be our ally in the dispute with Ghazan Khan’ [16, p. 68]. ‘Bayan fought with Kubluk and the army of Kaidu and Duwa eighteen times, six times he personally participated in battles’ [16, p. 68]. In the end, he was defeated and fled ‘to the boundaries of the area where Toktay, the successor of Batu, ruled’ [16, p. 68].

In search of allies, Bayan tried to get the support of governors of Saray, Tabriz and Yuan Khanbaliq, and decided to create a Grand Alliance [2, p. 23]. ‘Because of these incessant battles his army (Bayan's—Author) impoverished, the warriors were partly horsemen, partly infantry, but he, [Bayan], was still bravely fighting the enemy, and asked that party [meaning Ghazan Khan] to help him with cash resources [be mal]’ [16, p. 68].

Toqta's army helped Bayan to win in the civil strife. This is indicated by information from Abu'l Qasim al-Kashani, the author of Tarikh-i Uldzhaytu: ‘at the end of the reign of Toqta, Tubidzhi (Konchi—Author), son of Khardu (that is, Orda, but not really the son, but his grandson—Author), died. He left two famous sons—the elder Bayan, and the younger—Mumkiya. Bayan inherited from his father the Ulus and army, and Mumkiya was against him and forced him to flee the country and ulus and wander. Toqta came to his aide with a myriad bloodthirsty army, and prevailed. Mumkiya fled, and his father's place was confirmed for Bayan’ [1, p. 144].
Chapter III. The Politics of the Ulus of Jochi

In the second decade of the 13th century, Bayan managed, with the help of the forces of the Golden Horde, to regain power in Orda's ulus. From that moment the Ulus of Orda recognised its dependence on the Ulus of Batu. Thomas Allsen rightly writes, ‘The most likely explanation for the loss of their (the princes of the Left Hand [Wing]—Author) autonomy is that the descendants of Bayan, faced with continuing internal and external threats to their power, were forced to turn to the Öz Beg for help and protection, and the payment, which was demanded by their patron for support, was the unprecedented subordination of the Left Hand (Wing) princes to the Right Hand (Wing) princes’ [2, p. 26].

Bayan's successor, his son Sasi-Buka, apparently ruled for an insignificant period of time (1318–1321). According to information by Natanzi, Sasi-Buka 'followed the path of obedience and submission... and in all that time he never took a step off the path of service to Tugrul Khan and Öz Beg Khan and never contradicted or refused quriltai. Maintaining fidelity to the [Khan], he died a natural death in 720 AH (2 December 1320—1 January 1321). His tomb is located in the fortress of Sauran' [12, p. 73]. Khans of the Left Hand (Wing) had a city protected by God—mahruse Sauran' [12, p. 73].

After the death of Sasi-Buka Khan, due to the edict of Öz Beg Khan, Yerzen (Irzan) became Khan. He possessed a great intelligence, insight, and knowledge; had a lot of power in the country, 'and in a short time achieved a position close to the greatness of Öz Beg Khan himself. A wise, just, pious and God-fearing Padishah built a large part of the madrasah, khanqah, mosques and other charitable institutions in Otrar, Sauran, Jenda and Barchkend. By the omen of justice and mercy, he has transformed the whole of Turkestan into an example of the highest heaven, and for almost seven hundred of his relatives, he made it possible to use the common grace, and gave each of them an area or region to manage, so that everyone could find their yurts, high position, service and people. None of the nobles oppressed the commoners, and none of the common people behaved rudely towards the nobles. That security and prosperity that was known in the Ulus in the days of his rule, later people could not see it in a dream' [12, p. 73]. Yerzen was buried in the city of Sygnak (madine-i Sygnak) [12, p. 73].

Despite the fact that Natanzi notes the same 'submission and obedience' of Yerzen Khan to Öz Beg Khan, we can assume that all these measures of the new Ulus ruler to strengthen his own power in the country, the desire to find support from the Islamic clergy and nomadic aristocracy, and, more importantly, aristocracy of urban centers of Turkestan, could not bother the Khan of Saray. There is no specific information about the rivalry with the Golden Horde Khan, but we know about the campaign of Tini Beg, son of Öz Beg, evidently in the region of Turkestan, where Yerzen became stronger.

In about 740–741 AH, Tini Beg came with his army to Sygnak. If Yerzen had still been alive at the time, then it is likely that he would have peacefully handed over his power to the son of his suzerain, while retaining Ordaids' position in East Desht-i Kipchak, because there is no information about any reprisals following the confirmation of Tini Beg's power. Tini Beg stayed in Sygnak for a short time. At the beginning of 742 AH, having received the news of the death of his father, he went back. The Emirs of his younger brother Jani Beg met returning Tini Beg in Saray-Jük, and treacherously murdered him. Jani Beg, having occupied his father's throne, had not forgone about the rebel Eastern Horde. Perhaps seeking to enlist the support of the local nobility, he made his son Yerzen the Khan of Chintaya (Jimbay) and did not appoint his protégés here. The new Khan of Sygnak ulus directed his activities at restoring political stability and, according to Natanzi ‘fixed the broken in the way that time require’ [12, p. 74]. After ascending the throne at the same time with Jani Beg about 742–743 AH (1341/2–1342/3), Chintay lived four years longer than him, and died presumably in 762 AH (1360/1 g).
The end of Chimtay's reign was overshadowed by a political crisis: ‘Time of Troubles of Berdi Beg, Jani Beg and Kildi Beg was during this time’ [12, p. 74]. It is about a protracted civil war in the Golden Horde, provoked by the rise to power of Berdi Beg b. Jani Beg in 1357. The weakening of Saray Khan's power led to increased de-centralist trends around the Ulus of Jochi. In the 1360s, in the Syr area, where even earlier the Kiyat nobility became stronger, the descendants of Tuqay Timur were on the ascent. According to Utemish-Haji, here alternately ruled Kara-Nogai (ca. 761–ca. 763 AH) and Tugly-Timur (ca. 763 - ca. 767 AH) [23, p. 113]. After their reigns, Mubarak Khoja came to power (768–769), according to some sources–a Tuqay-Timurid, according to some others–an Ordaid [3, pp. 371–385].

According to Natanzi, ‘Mubarak Khoja, because of his excessive vanity and greed, organised a rebellion (jetne), and the memory of this turmoil (bulgak) is still preserved in the Dasht-i Kipchak. Because people are used to security, prosperity and peace, this time of troubles led to nothing. Six months later, he preferred [his] disappearance over that of the disappearance of the heavenly habitat of Turkestan, and for two and a half years, not knowing a refuge, he wandered in the habitat of the Kyrgyz and Altai, until he died there’ [12, p. 74]. According to extant coins, he ruled for only two years: 768–769 AH (1366/1367–1367/1368). From 770 AH (1368/1369) the next Khan, Urus, began minting his coins in Sygnak. The circumstances of Mubarak Khoja Khan's reign are unknown. It is possible that he was toppled from the throne by Urus Khan, and he was forced for some time to wander near the eastern nomadic areas of Sygnak Horde, among Kyrgyz people and in the Altai.

The Rise of Urus

The rule of Urus-khan can be divided in two stages: the end of the 1350/60s, which was a period of conflict with the Eastern Kiyat Begs (Cir-Qutlugh and Tengis-Buka) and Tuqay-Timurids; and the 1370s, during which a conflict with the Western Kiyats (Mamai) and Shabanids took place. It is assumed that the rise of Kiyat Begs in the Eastern Desht-i Kipchak struck a negative cord among the population, as it overshadowed the other Beg clans and tribes. That is why ‘the pillars of the nation and nobility’ (Natanzi [12, p.74]), as well as the ‘amirs of troops and rulers of the state’ (Ibn Wali [21, p. 187]) relied on Urus. Sources from that period describe political activity of Manghits, Jalairs, Kangyrats, Kipchaks, Bakhrints, Naimans, and others in the Sygnak Horde as follows: ‘Approved by all amirs of troops (umara-jii lakshar) and civilian officials (umana-jii daulat), Urus-Khan rose to power, and state affairs were settled owing to his insight. He scared the Uzbek tribes so much that all rebels quieted down’ [21, p. 187]. According to Ötemish Hajji, ‘this Urus-khan became a great ruler, and held power over all Turkestan vilayets’ [23, p. 113].

It was quite obvious that the Turkestan vilayets were never enough for Urus. Instead, his intentions were focused on the West ‘as Urus-Khan ascended to the throne he revealed his innermost goals to the pillars of the state and the nobility at kurultai. Everybody encouraged him in his pursuit of unison. After several days of ample feasts and generous gifts, he embarked on a crusade to that country’ [12, p. 76–77]. From 1374–1375 he conquered Saray-Jük, Hajji Tarkhan, Sarai, and then began to mint his own money. At the same time Toktamys, the son of Tuy-Khoja-oglan executed by Ulus, received the support of Barlass emir Timur, the ruler of Transoxiana. Urus-khan left his vicegerents in the Volga region and returned to Ulytau, and the Syr-Darya region, but before

his return the sons of Urus-khan, Qutlugh-Buka and Toktakiy twice defeated the troops of Toktamys given to him by Timur. In one of the battles Qutlugh-Buka was wounded and killed, but this only intensified the pressure from the Özbegs (who the sources of the Timurian circle referred to as the subjects of Sygnak khans, for example in ‘Matla as-sadain va majma-i bakhrain’ by Samarkandi [18, p. 198; 21, p. 245]), who eventually defeated the troops of Toktamys once again. Urus-khan sent his messengers to Timur, demanding the wounded Tokta-
mysh be given over to them and threatening war if they did otherwise. Timur in response offered a vague, evasive answer and prepared his troops for attack.

In the autumn of 1376, the troops of Urus-khan gathered outside the city of Sauran as Timur and his troops approached Otrar, but severe weather conditions delayed the general battle between the sides. In smaller battles Urus-Khan's troops managed to inflict several defeats on the commanders of Timur, and after having lost many of his troops, horses and provisions, in the winter of 1376–1377, Timur retreated to Samarkand and Kesh. In 1377, Urus-khan finally met his end.

According to Natanzí’s descriptions, the Padishah was ‘incredibly stubborn, irascible, and powerful’ [12, p. 76].

**Territory**

The borders of lands under the influence of the Golden Horde and its descendants are difficult to establish with any certainty. During different periods of time these lines varied due to the varying political situations inside and outside the Ulus of Orda. At the beginning of the Horde’s history its rulers held firm control over the steppes of West and Northwest Kazakhstan, and as they gradually moved southwards they also took South Kazakhstan under control, as well as the cities of Sauran, Sygnak, Jand, Barchkend and others. The territory of the Orda Ulus expanded mainly from the East to West, encompassing the area between the Baraba steppe and Kulundinsk steppe in the North, and between Tarbagatay and Balkhash in the South; the Ulus also added the steppes of Saryarka (Kazakh hillock area), the Ulutau mountains in the West, and the Karatau mountain region in the South to their territory by the 13th century. At the start of the 14th century, the khans of the Ulus of Orda began spreading their influence into a section of modern West Kazakhstan, reaching as far as the eastern Yaik river bank. Under Urus-khan these lands became a profound part of the Horde nobility’s property as he conquered the steppes of the Lower Syr Darya and Mangystau.

**Households**

The main population of the Ulus of Orda was comprised of nomads engaged in nomadic and semi-nomadic cattle breeding. The principles and nature of nomadism, along with the composition of herds, did not undergo any considerable changes for many centuries, as nomads continued to practice meridional semi-nomadic cattle breeding. They preserved traditional nomadic routes and stationary winter camps. According to the sources, the nomads of West Desht-i Kipchak often travelled from Saryarka to Zhetsysu along the banks of Karatal, Aksu and Lepsi to spend the winter, crossing the frozen Balkhash to reach their destination. Toktamыш fell upon khan Temür Malik, Urus-khan’s son, at a winter camp in Karatal, and after Toktamыш’s victory, the other son of Urus Khan, Koirijak, moved here as well.

Modern archaeological research indicates that agricultural traditions were significantly widespread in the nomadic steppes. Along the banks of large rivers such as the Irtys, Chu, Syr Darya, Nura, Esil, Torgaj, Tobol, Irgiz, Emba and Yaik, people established permanent settlements that were inhabited the whole year round.

Hunting birds and wild animals remained an important pillar in the lives of nomads in the Left Wing in the 13–15th centuries, and the skins and furs collected were traded for other goods. Marco Polo, in his description of Konchi’s territories, stated the following about its inhabitants: ‘those who live here in the mountains and on the steppes are avid hunters; they catch many expensive animals with high prices, and receive great benefits from these activities; they catch ermines, sables, squirrels, and black foxes, and many other expensive animals from which they make expensive fur coats at high prices. They are armed with weapons that never miss’ [8, p. 206].

Stable political development typical for the main period of this state’s history contributed greatly to the development of the economy and trade. The homogeneous nature of this country was also beneficial, unlike in the Golden Horde, which had a more heterogeneous state that
constantly demanded a strong centralised authority to rule. The expansion of state territories in the 15th century with the inclusion of the Syr Darya basin gave way to an extended period of the state's military and political dominance.

As for the negative influences on the related economic and political development, internecine feuds and external wars were at the top of the list. During the last quarter of the 14th century, the economy of the country was in decline because of both the unsuccessful campaigns of the ruler of Transoxiana, Emir Timur, and its involvement in battles for the Golden Horde cities in the Volga region.

**Religion**

Despite long years of Islam's supremacy in West Desht-i Kipchak before the Mongols arrived, the majority of nomads still adhered to the 'native nomadic religion' (according to Devin De Weese's terminology). With the arrival of the Mongols, the position of Islam weakened for a short period of time, ultimately giving way to the more traditional religious views of the nomads.

According to Marco Polo, the subjects of Khan Konchi (Kanchi) strictly 'obey Tatar (Mongol—Author) law... they obey it as precisely as Chinggis Khan and other authentic Tatars did; they craft their god from felt and call it Nachigai (evidently, one of the lowest Mongol deities—Author); then they make him a wife, and name the two of them gods; they say they are earthly gods that protect their cattle, bread, and all their earthly possessions. They pray to them, and when they eat something good, they also spread it on their gods' mouths’ [8, p. 206].

In the meantime, Jochi's sons were already beginning to convert to Islam. Berke was in fact an open supporter of Islam. Some Horde descendants received Muslim names as early as at birth. For example, along the bloodline of Kuli, the Horde's second son, there was Musulman, Kuli's son, and Mubarak, Kuli's grandson [16, pp. 69–70]. However, official conversion to Islam nonetheless occurred at almost the same time as in the Golden Horde and in the Chagataid territories, meaning only in the 1320/30s. From that time on, Islam became the official religion of the nobility, spurring two significant processes to take place: the construction of various religious institutions – mosques and madrasahs that khans erected in their cities—and the tendency for khans to add new Muslim names to their own. For example, Urus-Khan became Muhammad Urus, and Toktamysh, another descendant of Jochi, became Mahmud Toktamysh. Other Chinggisids were also given Muslim names at birth, such as Mubarak Khoja, Jalal ad-Din, Muhammed, and others.

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Conflict between the descendants of Urus-khan and Toktamysh, the destructive campaigns of Aksak Timur, and the war for the Volga region cities resulted in the decline of the economy, trade and urban culture. Toktamysh's rise to power was marked by the transition of the political centre from the Syr Darya region to the Volga region, which is linked by many researchers to the temporary restoration of the former unity of Ulus Jochi.

The Saryarka and Western Kazakhstan steppes were formally recognised as territories under Toktamysh and were governed by local nobility, some of whom, such as Manghits and Kungrats, held high military positions in his government. But still others began to offer their support to Urus-khan, who aspired to restore his power. While Koirchak did not manage to accomplish this task, his son Barak nevertheless successfully united the former Horde territories under his rule [9, pp. 59–64].

Abdulgaffar Qirimi described Barak as a ‘man of reckless bravery, and quite an energetic individual’ [4, p. 108]. According to Kadir Ali, Barak was an influential, large and strong Bahadur [20, p. 229; 10, p. 114; 23, p. 75].

However, the consolidation of tribal nobility preceding this, as well as the decentralisation of authority, led to new conflicts that ended in Barak's death and the subsequent
disintegration of the country. The steppe nobility put their support behind the young Abulkhair, a representative of another Jochi clan, the Shaybanids. However, Urus-khan's descendants continued to rule over part of the territory, and only the growth of Abulkhair's power forced Girey and Jani Beg, the oldest of Urs Khan's children, to move to the East into Mogulistan territories. This single event led to the creation of the Kazakh State.

§ 6. Languages Used in the Records Keeping and Paperwork Culture of the Golden Horde

Lenar Abzalov

The fact that the Mongol state was a large, polyethnic structure, within which the Ulus of Jochi was formed, naturally determined that its record keeping would be multilingual. The Mongolian language, as the one spoken by the ruling dynasty, was the primary official language of the Empire. Along with the Mongolian language, the Uighur or Turkic language became widely spread and originally gained the status of an official language. The Uighur language was used widely due to: the ethno-cultural proximity of the Turkic-Mongol tribes living together for many centuries in the Central Asian steppes; the ethnic composition of Chinggis Khan's ulus, where the Turkic-speaking tribes formed a significant part of population; and the influence of the Turkic-speaking Uighurs, who were more culturally developed than other nations that had been originally included in Chinggis Khan's possessions and who occupied key civil positions. It is not surprising that the observant William of Rubruck wrote about them: ‘the Yugurs were the main scribes among them’.

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8 Within this article, the term ‘Turkic language’ means all the linguistic diversity of the Turkic languages existing during the period of the Mongol Empire and the Ulus of Jochi. As we know, Arab and Persian authors used this term for all the Turkic languages and peoples, along with local glottomyms and ethnonyms (the Uighurs, Kipchaks, Bulgars, and others) [21, p. 36]. It is no less important that medieval Turkic authors were aware of their ethno-linguistic unity, which certainly had more in common than in the modern period. Moreover, from the beginning of the 8th century the Uighurs themselves defined their language as Turkic [28, p. 5].
In the Mongol Empire, the functions of a particular language depended on the ethno-linguistic development of the Chinggisids’ chanceries. Chinggis Khan's Ulus initially included numerous Turkic-speaking tribes, and the number increased as the Mongols expanded west. Along with the prevailing Turkic-Mongol nomads, there were many settled Turkic-speaking peoples that practiced agriculture.

In the Ulus of Jochi, the area of use and status of the Turkic language was naturally determined by the prevailing Turkic-speaking community. The positions of the Mongolian language in the Ulus of Jochi were originally limited by the small number of Mongolian speakers in the western peripheries of the Empire. The prevalence of bilingualism among the Central Asian tribes could be just as important. The Mongols themselves usually spoke both languages. In turn, the traditional status of the Turkic-Uighur language in Chinggisid chanceries as a language that all Turkic-speaking peoples of the Ulus of Jochi understood, including inhabitants of settled agricultural centers of the Turkic-Islamic culture, predetermined the area in which the Turkic language was used. Furthermore, the Turkic language was better known in the Islamic East and other states that had close ties with the Turkic nomadic world (the Transcaucasian countries, Rus', Byzantium, Hungary), which made it the language of diplomatic correspondence [35, p. 307].

Some researchers tend to exaggerate the extent to which the Mongolian language was used in record keeping and distribution in the Ulus of Jochi [9; 13; 14; 15]. Yet most of the facts known to the academic world prove the opposite.

It is difficult to believe that the Mongolian language would be used in the internal record keeping when the Turkic language prevailed across the whole territory of the Ulus of Jochi. This is partially supported by the lack of extant Mongolian-language documents in Golden Horde chanceries. M. Usmanov notes that ‘even with about ten Turkic narrative written sources and acts, the academic world doesn’t know of even one Golden Horde official act in Mongolian addressed to anyone except a Mongol. However, four Mongolian scripts were found within the territory of the Ulus of Jochi: three paizas issued by the khans in the 13–14th centuries and fragments of a birch bark book with Uighur-written Mongolian, as well as Turkic-Uighur manuscripts. On the other hand, unlike a traditional paiza with mainly symbolic, non-linguistic inscriptions, the second bilingual written source is of particular interest because it concerns daily activities and indicates its owner was bilingual’ [29, p. 96].

The Mongolian written language was used mainly to develop relations with the Chinggisids’ uluses and the central yurt of the Empire. Apparently, they continued to use it in the Ulus of Jochi primarily in political and prestigious spheres. It is likely, that even during the times of Öz Beg Khan (1313–1341), the Mongolian language was used by some representatives of the ruling dynasty [28, p. 89] and Mongol aristocracy, by their servants (including scribes and translators). However, due to the increasing functional limitations of the Mongolian language, the Turkic language began to take precedence.

There were authors back in the 13th century that used the Turkic language in the Jochids' chancery, for example, the secretary of the Egyptian Sultan Rukn al-Din Baybars al-Bunduqdarī (1260–1277), Muhî ad-Dîn Abu-l-Fazl Abdallah ibn Abd az-Zahir (died in 1293) wrote The Life Story of al-Malik az-Zakhîr [26, p. 64]. One can frequently come across ambiguities in the Arabic narrative sources and inaccuracies in their translation regarding the language of diplomatic correspondence between the Ulus of Jochi and Mamluk Egypt, in which there was confusion between the Mongolian and Uighur languages and the Uighur script. Based on the information from these sources, some researchers are convinced that Mongolian was the language of correspondence between these countries [9; 13; 14; 15]. Meanwhile, careful study of Arabic texts brings us to the conclusion that not one of these medieval authors spoke specifically about the language. Only al-Aynî, who knew Turkic well, provided specific information: ‘And two letters, one of them written in Arabic, and the other
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in Uighur’ [29, p. 95]. At the same time, it should be noted that both the term ‘Mongols’ and the term ‘Tatars’ were used by medieval authors mainly as politonyms [25, p. 103].

In Mamluk Egypt it was considered important to learn Turkic, as Egypt maintained close diplomatic contacts with the Golden Horde. Egypt became one of the centers of research and development of Turkic literature during this period [20; 2, pp. 30–31]. From this perspective, a reference to lexicographical materials is very demonstrative and shows that the Turkic language was more widely diffused [for more details see: 19; 24; 12; 22; 15; 34] than Mongolian, including in diplomatic correspondence. If the Mongolian language was used in official correspondence for several decades, then it should have been reflected in lexical materials.

It is quite appropriate to refer to the well-known Codex Cumanicus here. This dictionary is illustrative, defining the role of the Turkic language in the Ulus of Jochi [for Turkic loanwords in the Persian part of the dictionary, see: 31, pp. 101–104]. It should be kept in mind that even before the Mongol invasions, the Kipchak language had become somewhat of a lingua franca in Crimea, and soon after the Jochids’ rule had been established over the great expanses of the East European steppes, the role of Kipchak (wider, Turkic) language further increased. It is no coincidence that the Turkic language in its Kipchak dialect became widely spread among other peoples, too [for more details, see: 7; 8]. According to L. Ligeti, the Turkic column of the Codex Cumanicus was used for high-level contacts with the Mongol-Tatar elite [33, p. 11]. Ya. Dashkevich, discussing the linguistic situation in Crimea during the Golden Horde period, notes that ‘in notarial acts of Caffa dated back to 1289/1290, long before the city’s rise in the 1320/30s, a translator from the Genoese community called Pietro de Milano was mentioned, who probably spoke Greek, Syriac (Arabic?) and Tatar, or was at least a member of the notaryship while the acts with the participation of these nations’ representatives were recorded. Besides him, 24 other people are mentioned as translators who spoke Greek, Syriac, Arabic, Armenian, Alanic and German’ [11, p. 80]. It should be noted that there is no mention of Mongolian translators in these acts, and by the Tatar language the Turkic language spoken by the local population was meant here, because in the Codex Cumanicus the Kipchak language is referred to as Tatar: ‘tatar tilgä koneldi’ [33, p. 229], which means ‘translated to the Tatar language’. As can be seen, those materials support our conclusions of the limited use of the Mongolian language. The ethno-linguistic predominance of the Turkic-speaking people in the Ulus of Jochi caused only one of the state's official languages to functionally develop.

All the available narrative sources characterise the Ulus of Jochi as a Turkic-speaking state. According to the extant data provided by the Ulus of Jochi’s contemporaries, the Turkic language was most widely spoken. This was most vividly expressed in the descriptions of Ibn Battuta’s travels (1304–1377). An Arabic traveler who stayed with Öz Beg Khan for a long time, when describing the customs of the khan's main camp, provided numerous Turkic words, and Ibn Arabshah (1388–1450) emphasized the fact that: ‘This region (Dasht-i Kipchak) is exclusively Tatar, overcrowded (…) by the Turkic tribes... Judging by their language, they are the most eloquent Turks’ [26, p. 459].

A Florentine financier of the 14th century, Francesco Pegolotti (died around 1350), in his guide for merchants, known as The Practice of Commerce (La practica della mercatura, compiled between 1310 and 1340), recommended hiring servants with a good command of Cuman language [35, p. 320]. A Franciscan monk, Paschalis of Vittoria (died in 1339), wrote in his letter dated 10 August 1338: ‘By the grace of God, I studied the Chaman [Cuman] language and Uighur script, as they both are most commonly used in all the Tatar tsardoms and empires’ [30, p. 212]. Long before him, Giovanni da Montecorvino (1247–between 1328–1331) wrote in his letter: ‘I was supposed to make six pictures in order to help the unversed to understand the Old and New Testaments, and wrote explanations for them in Latin, Tarsit (Tatar – Author) and Persian, so that anyone could read them in one of the languages’ [30,
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p. 142]. Turkic became the language of inter-ethnic communication; using it, the linguistically diverse tribes of the Empire could understand each other. This was reported, for example, by Johannes de Galonifontibus, the Archbishop of Soltaniyeh [10, p. 15].

It was during the Golden Horde period that the Turkic-Tatar language and literature were formed and reached their golden age. The fact that the local poets wrote in Turkic when dedicating their works to the Jochid rulers indicates that these powerful leaders spoke Turkic. A poem written by Golden Horde poet Qutb (late 13—mid 14th centuries) called Khosrow and Shirin (1342) that is dedicated to Öz Beg Khan's eldest son, Tini Beg, and his wife [18] has come down to us.

Apparently, the khan's yarliqs preserved in Russian translations were issued to the Russian clergy and originally written in Turkic [6, p. 198]. As a result of the long-standing relations with the Turkic peoples, their language was well-known throughout Russian lands, unlike the Mongolian language [17, p. 16]. It should be noted that even after the Tatar khanates had been integrated into Russia, one of the major official languages in the chancery was Tatar. Charters were issued and letters were written in Tatar.

The history of Jochid-Moscow correspondence points only to the Turkic language. There are a significant number of Turkic loanwords in Russian that dated back to the period of Golden Horde domination, while the number of Mongolian words is insignificant. According to V. Arakin, most Turkic words in Russian were borrowed from the Kipchak dialect spoken in the Golden Horde starting from the latter half of the 13th century [3, p. 146]. It should also be noted that words used both in Mongolian and Turkic entered Russian vocabulary through the Turkic language, because Russian phonetic form of the words was the same as in Turkic, but differed from Mongolian pronunciation. M. Usmanov notes that, ‘If the Mongolian ethnic component and language had an absolute dominant role in the Ulus of Jochi established in the Kipchak steppes, then the proportion of borrowed Mongolian words in the Russian language would be larger than of Turkic’ [29, p. 99]. Tatar and Cuman dictionaries are evidence that Russia and the Horde used the Turkic language to communicate [16; 1]. O. Pritsak concluded that these dictionaries were compiled in the 13th century [17, p. 17]. In view of this, we can conclude that the traditional language for Russian-Horde contacts was the Turkic-Tatar language. And it is quite possible that it was so at the early stages of relations between the Horde and Russian princedoms.

Thus, at the early stages of the formation and development of the Ulus of Jochi, the Mongolian language was the prevailing official language used by the ruling dynasty, although the objective factors of the state development determined the diffusion of the Uighur (more widely, Turkic) language, dominant in functional sense at all stages of the state development. In spite of the limited sphere in which the Mongolian language was used, it was still preserved in the Horde for some time and was mainly used for establishing contacts with the other Chinggisid uluses. Later in these parts of the former Mongol Empire the Mongolian language was also superseded. We can observe the same process in the Ulus of Jochi where the Mongolian language was eventually superseded in the first half of the 14th century. Apparently, by the beginning of the same century, or even earlier, the functional sphere of its use was extremely limited and, due to this, was merely a convention or ceremonial formality, a kind of attribute of belonging to the ‘golden family’.

At the same time, the extension of the sphere in which the Turkic language was used is in line with the Chinggisids' bureaucratic traditions, and also reflect ethno-linguistic processes taking place in the Golden Horde. For these reasons, the Mongolian language was seamlessly and smoothly replaced in Jochid record keeping. The Mongolian language persisted based on the same traditions.

Describing the path of their development, a regular line of replacement of the Mongolian language can be tracked in Jochid record keeping. Later, the Mongolian language was eventu-
ally superseded by the Turkic language in the official record keeping system. This process, which had started back during the early stages of the state's formation, concluded during its golden age. This conclusion does not generally contradict either data from historical sources or Mongolian record keeping traditions.

Taking into consideration the limited use of the Mongolian language and its quick replacement in Jochid record keeping, we should not diminish the role and importance of the Mongols in the Ulus of Jochi: one way or another the Mongolian dynasty of Chinggisids stayed in power. It can be assumed that the Mongols themselves were aware of their ethno-cultural affinity with a large part of the population of the Ulus of Jochi, which became one of the reasons that Mongolian was so rapidly replaced in a process that was, at the same time, undetectable for most. The sensible attitude of the Mongols themselves to this process is additional proof of the original bilingualism of the Mongolian aristocracy and representatives of the khan's family, as well as the original bilingualism of the official record keeping in the Ulus of Jochi.

The official written language of the Ulus of Jochi was formed on the basis of old Uighur and to a lesser extent on local Kipchak-Oghuz language elements. In this language, the number of Arab-Persian loanwords was minimal. It was a language that was understandable for the majority of the population of the Empire. The Turkic-Tatar formal language was strictly standardised. However, there are incidents in the sources when it was varied, which depended on the cultural and historical conditions and the level of education of the author. Local language elements strengthened during the period of decline and dissolution of the state.

After the Golden Horde collapsed, although the common framework of the official language was preserved, foreign elements and colloquials found their way more and more into the Golden Horde official language in the new states. This is also a logical consequence of its development. But still the old Golden Horde language tradition proved to be very stable and was maintained even after the fall of several Turkic-Tatar states.

Establishment and growth of the Jochid state encouraged the active development of the state apparatus, requiring record keeping in organisational and management activities. Standards and rules were established for record keeping and various forms of documentation appeared as documentation support became necessary.

Uighur record-keeping traditions, which stood at the origins of the Chinggisid paperwork culture, served as the basis for paperwork culture of the Ulus of Jochi.

Paperwork initially began to develop in civil administration, one of the main duties of which was document handling. Record keeping traditions were created in central governmental authorities, which were concentrated in the khan's main camp, the Horde. The ruler of the Ulus of Jochi, as well as the other Chinggisid rulers, had a number of officials who were in charge of civil matters and handled issues of serving the khan's main camp. Among the numerous attendants involved in the management of the Horde's operation were those responsible for documentation support, including the financial and fiscal registers, correspondence, recording of resolutions and some orders of the ulus ruler, and others.

The main finance and fiscal body of the Ulus of Jochi was the Divan, which provided technical execution of decisions made at the state level, mostly in the sphere of financial and fiscal policies. The Vizier performed the duties of the head of the Divan and was in charge of the civilian agency, finance, taxes, and the khan's property. He organized and supervised the work of the bureaucracy, including clerical services.

In the Ulus of Jochi there was initially a certain nomenclature of clerical workers, they all had certain functions and corresponding titles. The bitikchi initially handled record keeping in the khan's chancery [33, p. 91]. Concurrently with this title, another designation for scribes was bakshi [33, p. 91; 5, p. 72; 4, p. 501]. Apparently, this category of employees was responsible for writing documents in Uighur script that were intended for the Turkic and
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Mongol population. It is clear that in the early stages of the Ulus of Jochi, there were scribes in the chancery who were proficient in preparing papers in Arabic script (also in Turkic, Persian or Arabic) called katibs.

In the materials we come across reports about scribe clerks in the khan's chancery, divan bitkäčeläre. This shows the role that clerks had in the administration system. The third part of the addressee (inscriptions) of Jochid letters patent included terms listing upper and local executors of orders, and the term ‘divan bitkäčeläre’ was the most obligatory element of the addressee [29, pp. 213, 220]. In general, this term is typical of all varieties of Chinggisid-granted yarliqs. However, it should be emphasized that in this part of the Jochid letters patent, the chief inspectors-clerks of the government chancery were mentioned, so they should be distinguished from scribes, called bakshi or katib in the yarliqs [29, p. 221].

The bitikchi performed a quite wide range of duties, which was typical for this period. The primary duty of the scribes was drawing up a ruler's edicts and some of the resolutions adopted by the administrative apparatus, as well as storing documentation. Along with this main record-keeping duty, the khan's chancery dealt with financial and fiscal issues, including population registration. In addition, the employees of the chancery could simultaneously act as translators.

The bitikchi and bakshi of the khan's chancery had to have special qualifications, because drawing up official papers required special knowledge and experience, especially in the field of diplomatic correspondence. Bitikchi of the khan's chancery had to be proficient in the official languages of the Empire, and employees involved in diplomatic correspondence were obliged to know foreign languages.

Bitikchi and bakshi of the khan's chancery used traditional methods for drawing up official documents. Along with the common standards for preparing documents adopted in most countries, the Golden Horde had features that differentiated it from the Islamic East and the Christian West: rigidity, brevity, lack of decorative frills, and the use of the Uighur and Arabic scripts, which in general was typical for Chinggisid official documents. Rulers of the Ulus of Jochi stuck with the old record-keeping traditions and despite the increasing role of Islam in the daily life of Golden Horde society, the paperwork canons didn't change significantly and continued after the Ulus of Jochi collapsed. Thus, the paperwork culture of the Ulus of Jochi was highly developed and was able to ensure the administrative apparatus worked effectively in such a large and powerful state.


33. Codex Cumanicus. Edited by G. Kuun with the prolegomena to the Codex Cumanicus by L. Ligetti. Budapest, 1981


Chapter IV.
The Golden Age of the Ulus of Jochi

§ 1. First Rulers of the Ulus of Jochi

Roman Pochekaev

In formal terms, the founder of Ulus Jochi was the eldest son of Chinggis Khan, thus giving its official name to the state. However, the actual founder of the Golden Horde, of course, was Batu—the son and heir of Jochi. During his reign, the Jochi state more or less established its formal borders, expanded its autonomy. Relations between the Jochids and rulers of the Mongol Empire and other Chinggisid uluses were also established.

Batu was not Jochi's eldest son. After his father's death the right to the throne was passed to his older brother Orda. According to the accepted historiographic tradition, Orda, who was fond of his younger brother, voluntarily waived his right to the throne of the Ulus of Jochi to Batu. However, there is reason to believe that he could have been forced to do it by his relatives from Karakorum, in particular—Börte, the elder wife of Chinggis Khan. Although both Orda and Batu were her grandchildren from Jochi's line (her eldest son), Batu was also the son of her niece Uki Khatun—tahta is, by blood he was closer to her than Orda and could be more pliant to her influence [read more: 31, pp. 51–52].

After becoming leader of Ulus of Jochi, Batu became drawn involuntarily into court intrigues, as a result of which there was a redistribution of Chinggisid possessions, in contrast to the boundaries established by Chinggis Khan in the first half of the 1220s. The young ruler of the Ulus of Jochi (he acceded to the throne at the age of 18) had the sense not to oppose his uncle's intentions to tear away part of the original Jochi possessions for himself. As a result, he was able to establish relations with Ögedei who became the new Mongol khan. Together with him, Batu took part in hostilities against the Jin Empire in the early 1230s. Certain researchers consider that in the early 1230s Batu fought in Volga Bulgaria and Western Desht-i Kipchak. However there is no confirmation in the sources [1, p. 98]. By participating in the fight against the Jurchens, Batu, apparently, endeared himself even more to his crowned uncle, with whom he subsequently maintained good, and even informal relations: for example, in one of his letters, sent to Ögedei during the Great Western campaign, he allowed himself a very direct reference to Ögedei—Uncle Khan [17, p. 194]. The Khan's patronage had important implications for Batu.

First, immediately after the conquest of the Jin, he received several areas in the newly conquered Chinese territories. Monetary revenue from these areas were in favor of Batu and his descendants until the middle of the 14th century. [13, p. 172]. Secondly, as a result of the good relationship with Ögedei, all the conquered possessions in the west were granted to the Ulus of Jochi ruled by Batu who led the campaign to seize those lands. However, some sources suggest that Batu shared the high command in the Great Western campaign with an outstanding general Subutai-Baghatur. In certain cases the decisions of the latter were final, even if they were at odds with the views of Batu and other Chinggisids [see: 13, p. 233]. However, among the tsarevichs-war chiefs, the seniority belonged to Jochi's heir. This sometimes led to conflicts with other Chinggisids, particularly Güyük, the eldest son of Ögedei, who genuinely could not understand why he, a son of the Mongol Khan, should obey the ruler.
of a distant ulus, of a younger age at that (Batu was younger than Güyük for 3–4 years). In fact, Batu ranked quite low in the imperial (and family) hierarchy in the 1230s and early 1240s. Above him, there were two uncles, Chagatai and Ögedei, as well as his elder brother Orda. We have already described his contradictory status in relation to Batu.

However, thanks to Ögedei's support, Batu was able to assert his supremacy at the final stage of the Great Western campaign. This was to justify the inclusion of almost all the territories conquered in the west into Ulus of Jochi. As a commander, Batu was unable to prove his worth in comparison to Subutai and even other Chinggisids—Möngke, Baydar, Shibian, who was his own brother, etc. However, he made a very successful politician and administrator.

In 1242–1256, while he ruled Ulus of Jochi without any major wars, he managed to create a system to govern conquered lands, establish relationships with vassal rulers of Rus', the Caucasus region, Asia Minor. Batu was also actively engaged in the development of trade relations within Ulus of Jochi and with other states, also rebuilding destroyed cities and new ones [11, pp. 95–96, 129–130]. Thus, he laid the foundations of the Golden Horde's future power and to a large extent—ensured the possibility of fighting for independence for its subsequent rulers.

However, no matter how much Batu was interested in developing his own ulus and improving its prosperity, he could not withdraw from the empire-wide policies—even if he wanted to. As mentioned above, after the death of Chagatai and Ögedei, he became aka—the elder of the Chinggis family. He became a highly influential political figure, whose opinion on the most important political issues of further development of the Mongol Empire was crucial.

Due to the uncertain rules of succession in the Mongol Empire (and in some uluses of the Mongolian Empire, including in the Golden Horde, as we shall see below) Ögedei's death resulted in a four-year interregnum (1242–1246), during which various political clans struggled to put their proteges on the throne. There is a widespread opinion in historiography that the transitional period was delayed due to the fault of Turakina—Ögedei's widow, who tried to put her eldest son Güyük on the throne. However, this opinion is erroneous for two reasons. Firstly, she was in no hurry to pass the throne to Güyük. The position of regent was sufficient for her. Secondly, with no gift for governing in the absence of serious political support, Turakina would not have been able to maintain power over the Empire if it had not been for Batu's silent support. We do not know whether the regent of the Mongol Empire and the ruler of the Ulus of Jochi held any formal negotiations, nevertheless they managed to ‘divide spheres of influence’. Batu tried not to interfere in affairs of Karakorum. On a number of occasions he cancelled visits under various pretexts, thus preventing the holding of the Kurultai to elect a new Mongol Khan. Turakina, on the other hand, was not interested in affairs of the Western ulus, giving free rein to Batu both in the Golden Horde and in vassal states [read more: 31, p. 221].

The idyll was broken in 1246, when Güyük was elected as the new Mongol Khan at the Kurultai. This time Batu also tried to put off the moment of its convening, however, seeing the inevitability, he sent his brothers to assure the support to the person, for whom the majority would vote [33, p. 118]. His support for Güyük, apparently, made the latter to forget about their feud, which began during the Great Western campaign. It is significant that when Güyük ordered the trial of Temuge Otchigin, the younger brother of Chinggis Khan, who had tried to seize the throne during the interregnum, he appointed Orda, Batu's elder brother, and Möngke, a son of Tolui, who was a close friend to the Golden Horde ruler [47, p. 255]. However, at the same time, the new khan immediately tried to regain control of Ulus of Jochi, so lightly lost by his mother-regent. He began by ensuring that each of the states, vassal to the Golden Horde, had two governors, one of whom was a supporter of Batu, the other did not enjoy his
support. This solution seriously undermined Batu's positions in the Caucasus region and in Asia Minor, and weakened his control over Russian lands. Soon Batu's governors were ousted from his possessions in Iran that had been allocated to him by Ögedei [read more: 31, pp. 226–227].

However, Güyük failed to undertake any other actions against Batu. Firstly, Batu, being a prudent politician, gave the Khan no formal reasons for grievances and moreover—punitive sanctions. Secondly, Güyük had a lot of problems within the Empire, he could not afford to spend time and effort on conflicts with Batu. However, in 1248 the Khan, irate over Batu's constant excuses to come to him personally, rode at the head of large armed forces to meet him. His formal excuse was to meet with the ruler of Jochid Ulus on neutral grounds. No-one had any doubt that Güyük intended to start fighting against his cousin. Not far from Samar-kand, the Khan suddenly died under mysterious circumstances [33, p. 121]. Although even contemporaries accused Batu of poisoning him, we can reasonably argue that with his actions Güyük antagonized virtually all political forces of the Empire. Thus his death was beneficial not only to the ruler of the Golden Horde.

However, it was Batu who benefited most from the death of the Mongol khan. Similarly to the previous interregnum, he tried to prevent holding the quriltay to elect the Khan's successor at any cost. He even approved Güyük's widow, the completely incapable Oghul-Qaimish, to be a regent. Her abilities were even worse than Turakine, who also had not been blessed with many talents [33, p. 122; 47, p. 263]. We believe that such a strange choice had to emphasize Batu's lack of interest in imperial affairs, especially given that soon he refused the offer to become the Mongol Khan, saying that he was satisfied with his own vast dominions.

However, this position was certainly insincere. He knew perfectly well that the status of the Golden Horde depended on the next Khan of the Mongol Empire. So, he was not inclined to let the process of selecting the new monarch without his involvement. After three years of negotiations and secret discussions (1248–1251), Batu decided on the candidacy and proposed Möngke, Tolul's eldest son. Möngke was considered a friend of Batu. Moreover his mother, Sorkhaktani Beki, was Batu's main ally both during the regency of Turakina and Güyük's ruling. So, the quriltai took place in 1251. The leading role was played by Batu's two brothers—Berke and Tuqay Timur (according to other sources—Berke and Sartaq, Batu's son), who came to the event at the head of 20,000 warriors and literally forced the Golden Horde ruler's will upon participants.

After the election of Möngke, Batu's influence in the Mongol Empire reached its apogee. He preserved his status of head of the Chinggisid clan and the khan's co-ruler as the governor of the West Wing of the Mongol Empire, but also, according to some reports, obtained the title of khan. The History of the World Conqueror by Juvayni presents him under the mysterious title of Qa'an-aka—that is, literally, 'a senior khan'. He also mentioned in historical writings of his Caucasian contemporaries under the title ‘Khan's father' (used as a Byzantine equivalent of 'vasileopator') [16, p. 181; 47, p. 561; 52, p. 274, n. 1]. Thus we can say that Möngke actually recognized Batu's seniority not only in the family but also in the imperial hierarchy. According to sources, after the election of Möngke vassal rulers began to come to Batu for approval instead of visiting Karakorum. He gave vassals and merchants his yarliqs—it also suggests that he had the khan's title, since the right to issue yarliqs was provided to supreme rulers only [16, p. 218; 47, p. 267]. Shortly after his election, Möngke faced a conspiracy of Ögedei's supporters. He began repressions against his political opponents, allowing Batu to deal with a number of members of Chagatai's and Eljigitai's families (the latter being Chinggis Khan's nephew). Perhaps these measures should include the so-called Nevryui's Men. This was a campaign, undertaken by one of the Golden Horde commanders—Nevryui—against Rus'. It results in the overthrow of the Grand Prince of Andrey Yaroslavich, a protege
of Güyük and Oghul-Qaimish, and enthroning of his brother, Alexander Nevsky, an ally of the Golden Horde [read more: 31, pp. 245–249].

However, it is important to bear in mind that Batu's title of khan did not mean that he was an independent ruler. His status was relevant in the scale of the Mongol Empire, so, it would be a mistake to consider Jochi's heir the first Golden Horde khan. However, the tradition in which the main source of law in the Golden Horde was not the right of Chinggis Khan (Yasa) but yarliqs-edicts of Golden Horde monarchs, began to emerge in the era of Batu's ruling.

Perfect relations seemed to established between Karakorum and Sarai, the capital of the Golden Horde, founded by Batu, but soon they began to deteriorate. Apparently, with the consolidation of his power, Möngke Khan decided that the status of Batu was too high and undermined his own authority. Therefore, without showing open hostility to his co-ruler (as Güyük did in his time), Möngke gradually equalized Batu's rights with other rulers of Chinggisid uluses. At first, he cancelled the Golden Horde khan's right to receive more revenue from their holdings in Mongolia and China than it was officially defined. This was under the pretext that such additional payments would drain the imperial treasury. Then he sent his officials to Jochid Ulus and its vassal states to carry out a population census. Finally, in 1253, Batu received the Khan's order to allocate 20% of his warriors to march to Iran under the command of Hulagu—Möngke's younger brother. It is interesting to note that all Möngke's actions were carried out in full compliance with legal standards. Batu could not resist them because it would mean that he was disobeying the Khan, the election of whom had been greatly facilitated by his own hands.

Therefore, similarly to Möngke Khan, he decided to avoid engaging in open hostilities. He also tried to delay the census process. As a result, it was carried out in Ulus of Jochi and other vassal states just at the end of 1250's—that is, after Batu's death. Similarly, by formally submitting to the order to provide his army to Hulagu, Batu made it clear to the Khan's brother that he did not approve of its further progress. The future Ilkhan had to halt close to Amu Darya until Batu's death, as he dared not incur the wrath of his brother's co-ruler to further progress in Iran [47, p. 268].

Despite the cooling of their relations, formally Batu and Möngke were allies and co-rulers. Möngke even agreed to approve Sartaq, Batu's eldest son, as Batu's heir in Ulus of Jochi (and, consequently, his future co-ruler). Sartaq came to the Khan, was treated kindly and received the necessary confirmation of his powers [47, p. 268]. This, in our view, also indicates that Batu did not aspire to independence from the Golden Horde, and saw that the might of his ulus was connected to the Mongol Empire, with full respect for the principles of power and the legal regulation within the imperial model.

Batu died in early 1256, leaving his successors with a vast and rich ulus, a high status in the Mongol Empire, as well as a number of unresolved problems inside the Golden Horde, in its relations with the Mongol Empire, Chinggis ulus, and other neighboring states.

Berke's Accession to The Throne as a Turning Point in the Golden Horde's History

Based on medieval sources, it can be argued that Berke, Jochi's seventh son by his status, became actively involved in the political life of the Golden Horde at the turn of the 1240/50s. Juzjani makes it clear that he was de facto the co-ruler with his brother Batu [37, pp. 15–16, note 4]. However, there is every reason to doubt the truth of this statement by an author, eager to idealize the image of Berke as the first Muslim ruler of the Golden Horde and, accordingly, present him as a more significant political figure than he was in reality. However, in 1251, Berke was sent to Mongolia to organise the quriltai to approve Möngke for the throne, thus becoming an empire-wide scale politician.

However, all his activities after Batu's death were far from independent, since after the death of his elder brother he became head of the family of Jochids and as such had the right
to claim the Golden Horde's throne. However, he was unable to implement his power ambitions in an ulus which was part of the Mongol Empire. The Mongol khan Möngke reserved the right to select a ruler of the Ulus of Jochi and he had approved Sartaq as Batu's heir during the latter's lifetime. The historiographic tradition suggests that Sartaq professed Christianity in its Nestorian form, while Berke adhered to Islam. This allegedly was the cause of their mutual hostility. However, given the high degree of Chinggisids' tolerance (especially early in the history of the Mongol Empire and Chinggisid states), there is reason to doubt it. Undoubtedly, Berke saw Sartaq as a rival in the struggle for power, who illegally acceded to the throne, bypassing the oldest Jochids in the family. So, when Sartaq died unexpectedly after a feast at Berkechar (Berke's brother from his father and mother), no one doubted that it was Berke, who had arranged his murder. However, the elimination of Sartaq did not bring the coveted throne to Berke. Möngke Khan, who for some reason did not like Berke, preferred Sartaq's small son Ulaghchi with his grandmother Borakchin Khatun, widow of Batu, as a regent [47, p. 268]. The same Juzjani explains the hostility by the fact that after Möngke was elected at the Kurultai and had to give the Khan's ritual oath, Berke allegedly made him swear on the Quran [23, p. 53; 37, p. 16]. This statement, as well as the reference to the joint ruling of Berke and Batu, looks doubtful. Apparently, Möngke Khan saw Berke as the same ambitious and determined figure as Batu and did not want him to head Ulus of Jochi and become his co-ruler across the Empire.

For some time, Berke did not attempt to renew the fight for power. However, in 1257 Möngke Khan decided to personally lead Mongol forces against the Chinese empire of Southern Song, and Batu decided to make use of the Khan's seemingly distracted attention. In the same year, 1257 (or 1258), Berke eliminated Ulaghchi. When the regent Borakchin, in an attempt to save her power, decided to appeal to Ilhan Hulagu, Möngke Khan's brother, he accused her of treason and ordered that she be executed [38, pp. 150–151]. After that, with the full consent of the Golden Horde nobility and Jochi's descendants, he proclaimed himself the ruler.

It is possible, however, that Berke's formal accession to the Golden Horde throne took place in 1259. He may have received news of Möngke's death during the siege of one of the Sung cities and make use of the subsequent interregnum. He was far from miscalculating. It is known that factional fighting between the Khan's brothers Kublai and Arik Buka ensued after the ruler died. The nominal winner of the four-year struggle was Kublai Khan. He managed to capture Arik Buka and gain recognition as the successor to Möngke. However, the real winners were the rulers of the other three Chinggisid uluses—the Golden Horde, Ulus of Chagatay, and Ilkhanate. Careful not to interfere in the fighting between the brothers, they nevertheless did not allow Arik Buka to be killed. They also prevented imperial officials from regaining control over the affairs in their uluses.

Thus, Berke became the first ruler of the Golden Horde to come to power without the approval of Karakorum. In addition, Kublai, who had a lot of issues in Mongolia and China, de-facto had to recognize him, since he did not possess the capacity or the energy to overthrow Berke and enthrone a more loyal ruler of the Golden Horde. He had to be content with Berke's possessions that he had deprived him of. Earlier they were allocated to the Golden Horde rulers in China and Central Asia. Sources say, in particular, that a Golden Horde garrison was eliminated in Bukhara. It had been stationed there to exercise control over that part of the city, which was in the Jochids' possession [37, p. 82]. However, Berke hardly needed to keep those lands, which, as already mentioned, merely generated revenue to the Golden Horde's coffers in cash. However, that income did not compensate for the contributions paid by Ulus of Jochi to the imperial budget. After the Mongol Khan's baskaks were killed in his possessions (including in Russia) in 1262, Berke himself could avoid paying.
Making sure that there was no threat to his power in Ulus of Jochi from the Mongol Empire, Berke attempted to return to the Golden Horde those possessions, which it had lost as a result of Güyük's and Möngke's policies—especially Azerbaijan, at that time it was under the control of Ilhan Hulagu. As a result, Berke started the first war between uluses in the Mongol Empire. This was not a civil war to get the throne but a war for the redivision of lands, which, as it turned out, lasted about a hundred years with varying success.

Undoubtedly, the cause of that war was territories disputed by the Golden Horde and Ilkhanate. These included not only Azerbaijan, but also other Caucasus regions, as well as a number of areas in Iran and the Anatolian Seljuq Sultanate. During Batu's reign, all those territories were controlled by the Golden Horde. However, at first Güyük drove his viceregents from Iran. Then Möngke supported his brother Hulagu in the fight for Iran, Azerbaijan and establishing suzerainty over Georgia and the Seljuqs. After making sure that Kublai Khan could not help Hulagu, as his older brother once did, Berke decided to return his rightful possession by military means.

He accumulated enough reasons for the outbreak of hostilities against Hulagu. Significantly they were well within Mongol imperial legislation. First of all, Hulagu delayed delivery of trophies to Berke acquired in the campaign on the Baghdad Caliphate. Berke was legally entitled to his share as the ruler, who had sent troops to the aid of Hulagu (although in fact it had been done by Sartaq) [37, p. 19, note 3]. In addition, Hulagu, apparently, did not trust the Golden Horde commanders from among the Jochids (that is, Berke's direct and great-nephews). He accused them of plotting against him and demanded that Berke should punish them. The Golden Horde ruler responded by saying that Hulagu was free to decide their fate, probably hoping that he would also forgive them and send to Ulus of Jochi. However, Hulagu caught him at his word and ordered to execute the accused [16, p. 236; 34, p. 59]. Thus, the reason for the war against Hulagu was to take revenge for unlawfully executed relatives. The fate of the Chinggisids was supposed to be decided at the family council by representatives of all uluses of Chinggis Khan's descendants.

In 1262–1263, Berke and Hulagu undertook several raids on each other's possessions. Despite the fact that the troops of both opponents had advanced into the enemy lands far enough and caused a number of serious injuries to each other, it was obvious that the conflict had reached a deadlock, and the solution looked impossible without the involvement of the additional forces. As a result, Hulagu (and after his death in 1256—his son and heir Abaqa) enlisted the support of the Byzantine Empire and tried to win over the Crusaders, while Berke allied with a mighty power of the Middle East—the Mamluk Sultanate. It is interesting to note that both rulers, who justified their actions to other Chinggisids by references to imperial laws and Chinggisid traditions, attracted their allies by stressing the unity of religion. It served as the origin of stereotypes in medieval historiography that the Muslim Berke, supported by Mamluks of the same faith, led a holy war against the Ilkhans, who tended towards Christianity and wished to unite the Christians of the Mediterranean and the Near East against the Muslims.

A few remarks on Berke as a Muslim would be both appropriate and beneficial to mention at this point. A number of scholars place full confidence in medieval Oriental sources of relevant information, yet other experts reasonably advocate for a more critical approach, as their authors were Muslims themselves, so it is likely they indulged in a certain amount of wishful thinking when describing the situation in the Golden Horde. According to the Turkic medieval historiographic tradition, Berke not only accepted Islam himself, but also converted the Golden Horde's nobility and army, a total of several tens of thousands people, to the ‘true faith’. What followed was the construction of mosques, development of theology, and other similar processes [see, for example: 37, p. 17].
However, we cannot agree with this interpretation, as in this case Öz Beg Khan would have needed to have staged a religious revolution in the Golden Horde in the first quarter of the 14th century, and then fight for years until Islam was recognised as the official religion. It is beyond any doubt that Islam was not widespread in the Ulus of Jochi during Berke's reign. Yet it would still be wrong to deny the fact that he was a Muslim himself, for this was also mentioned by William of Rubruck, who was by no means interested in idealising Berke's image as a Muslim ruler [35, p. 115]. His phrase ‘Berke pretends to be a Sarace’ is believed to be of critical importance for understanding the ruler's religious position. That is, he demonstrated Islamic devotion on a superficial level to the public, while at the same time remaining a true Chinggisid that acted according to the principles and rules of Mongol imperial law, to the extent, naturally, that it was politically beneficial. Living demonstratively as a Muslim was meant to facilitate Berke's recognition as the ruler by a large part of his subjects (Bulgars, Khwarezmians, and others), as well as bring him international recognition as an independent ruler on behalf of his powerful neighbours, the latter also being a pre-requisite for entering the Pax Islamica. This reason was a major factor in why Berke played such an intricate game of religion and diplomacy during the restoration of the caliphate Hulagu destroyed in 1258. In 1262, Al-Hakim, the candidate whom he supported, arrived in Egypt, where he was also recognised as the caliph [see: 12, pp. 11–12; 51, pp. 170–171]. The dethroned Seljuk Sultan İzzeddin Keykavus II, who was also a follower of Islam, logically took shelter with Al-Hakim as a fellow believer [38, p. 191]. The strategic alliance with the Mamluk Sultanate in 1263 [12, p. 52; 38, p. 61–62], which survived even the non-Muslim descendants of Berke, was of particularly crucial importance.

In any event, Berke's reign over the Golden Horde became a turning point not only because he was essentially the first independent ruler of the Ulus of Jochi, but because he was the first Jochid to rely on religion for the entrenchment of his power and international recognition. While outwardly demonstrating adherence to Islam, Berke also maintained the common Chinggisid policy of religious tolerance. In particular, it was during his rule that the Russian Orthodox Eparchy was established in Sarai; he also stimulated the rebellion of Georgian Orthodox Christians against the Ilkhanate and the like.

An Islamic orientation and alliance with Islamic states was undoubtedly one of the major consequences of Berke's rule over the Golden Horde. Yet during his lifetime he was unable to make use of these policy advantages. He died ‘of renal colic’ in 1266, with his death causing another shift in the Golden Horde's politics and motivating Berke's successors to become even more engaged in the policy of the Empire.

**Mengü Temür as The First Khan of the Golden Horde**

Berke managed to ascend to power by manipulating the vague succession that existed in the Mongol Empire in general and the Golden Horde in particular. Although he was able to make use of it successfully, in most cases this gap in imperial law was known to bring about long periods of interregnum and violent disturbances.

According to Arab sources, Batu's grandson Mengü Temür—a son of Batu's second son Tutukan—was Berke's official successor even before he died [38, p. 193]. We can assume, however, that Batu's brother declared him as such just to make members and associates of Batu's clan compliant with his assumption of power. In addition, being appointed by one's predecessor was hardly the only foundation on which people made claim to the throne. It therefore comes as no surprise that the Russian chronicles report an internecine feud in the Golden Horde following Berke's death. It might be argued that Mengü Temür's associates and adherents of Berke were part of strife, as he wanted his son (also a Muslim) to inherit the throne, but it is also entirely possible that Töde Möngke, Mengü Temür younger step-brother, was viewed as yet another claimant. In the opinion of G. Vernadsky, as a grandnephew of Batu and Berke and descending from their oldest brother Buval, who had nearly become the
Golden Horde's supreme commander-in-chief during Berke's rule, Nogai might have had a claim to the throne after Berke's death as well [3, p. 170]. Yet it seems unlikely that Nogai, being a descendant of Jochi's son by a concubine, dared rival the numerous descendants of his sons by legal wives (Batu, Berke, Shiban, and others), so he most likely offered his support to one of the other claimants.

As a result, Mengü Temür ultimately rose to power, in one fell swoop bringing the direct dynasty of Batu's descendants back to the throne. But even though he continued the family line of Batu, the new ruler tended more towards the policies of his grand-uncle Berke.

First and foremost, he maintained his focus on ensuring a policy of independence between the Ulus of Jochi and the Mongol Empire, and constantly ignored Kublai's attempts at persuading him to recognise the supremacy of the Yuan Empire. The Mongol Khan had to content himself instead with the fact that his yarliq to Mengü Temür, sent in confirmation of his appointment as the ruler of the Ulus of Jochi, was left unanswered [33, p. 168]. Unlike Berke, the new ruler would not put up with the Golden Horde's self-isolation from the Empire's affairs. On the contrary, he was never anything but actively involved in Chinggisid politics.

For example, in 1268, soon after his rise to power, he interfered with the battles being waged between Kaidu, the ruler of the Ulus of Ögedei, and Borak, who reigned over the Ulus of Chagatai. As Borak was Kublai's appointee, Mengü Temür naturally took the side of Kaidu and sent him a reinforcement of 30,000 warriors commanded by Berkechar, Berke's brother. A year later the defeated Borak, having received no support whatsoever from the Yuan emperor, had to negotiate with the winner [for more details see: 48, pp. 25, 63]. A quriltai attended by rulers and tsareviches from the Uluses of Jochi, Chagatai and Ögedei, was held in the Talas valley in 1269, where two crucial decisions were made. Firstly, as mentioned above, the rulers of the three uluses were declared to be khans equal to both each other and Kublai in status. Secondly, Kaidu and Mengü Temür appropriated about one third of the Ulus of Chagatai, which in fact enabled Borak to compensate for his losses during a campaign against Ilkhan Abaqa, the last Chinggisid ulus ruler who still recognised the Mongol khan's suzerainty [34, p. 71].

As an insightful politician, however, Mengü Temür could not allow himself to undertake any long-lasting alliance obligations with a Chinggisid khan. Seeing that Kaidu would not content himself with his status as an independent ruler after his victory over Borak, and instead declared himself Mongol khan in opposition to Kublai in 1271, the khan of the Golden Horde did not hesitate to support Nomogan, the son of Kublai, whom his father had sent to war against Kaidu. Moreover, sources report that Mengü Temür and Kublai agreed on providing mutual assistance to suppress domestic rebellions in each other's domains. However, when Nomogan obtained a degree of success in his struggle against Kaidu, Mengü Temür instead grew inclined towards allying with the latter. When Kublai's son was then betrayed by his noyons and captured by Kaidu's associates in 1278, Kaidu sent the prisoner to Mengü Temür, and he was kept there until the very death of Mengü Temür as a guarantee of Kublai's peaceful policy towards the Golden Horde [10, pp. 48–49].

Having secured, as Berke had done, the Mongol khan's non-interference in the affairs of the Golden Horde and, more importantly, his recognition as khan by other Chinggisids, Mengü Temür enhanced his foreign-policy activities.

Mengü Temür consolidated his power over Rus', which is most remarkable for the fact that it was not by military force as his grandfather Batu had done, but by being the first ruler of the Golden Horde to issue a yarliq to the Russian Orthodox Christian Church exempting it from any taxes and charges [27, pp. 467–468]. As a result, the Orthodox Christian clergy became an influential ally for him, which from that moment on did its best to keep Russian
principalities loyal to the khans of the Golden Horde, whom the Russians came to call ‘tsars’, just as they used to refer to Byzantine emperors.

Despite being a Muslim and professing the traditional Chinggisid religion Tengrism, Mengü Temür continued his predecessor's policy of consolidating his alliance with the Mamluk Sultanate. This alliance seems to us now all the stranger because Mengü Temür led no wars against the Ilkhanate after Ilkhan Abaqa defeated him in 1268, meaning that he did not need any military assistance from the Mamluks. However, the amicable and periodic exchange of embassies between the Golden Horde and the Mamluk Sultanate were maintained throughout Mengü Temür's entire rule [12, pp. 59–63].

Mengü Temür's reign was less impressive when compared to Batu or Berke: he neither fought constant wars, nor tried to enthrone his appointees in Mongolia, nor had any ambitious plans regarding his key role in the politics of the Mongol Empire. Nevertheless, he was still the first khan of the Golden Horde, was able to successfully annex certain Central Asian and Caucasian territories as a result of the war against the Alan-Jasz people, while also maintaining peace with the Ilkhanate and an alliance with the Mamluk sultans, develop commercial and diplomatic relations with Italian merchant republics which he officially permitted to establish colonies in the Crimea and Northern Black Sea Region, as well as Hanseatic cities, and granted merchants from said cities to enter the Golden Horde via Russia lands on a duty-free basis [8, pp. 57; 21, p. 141]. It was also during Mengü Temür's rule that the procedure was finalised according to which khans of the Golden Horde confirmed the powers of Russian grand princes (taking into account the Russian traditions of succession to the throne), and the tradition of khans patronising the Russian Church was developed as well. Thus, the Ulus of Jochi first became the truly independent state known as the Golden Horde during Mengü Temür's reign.

**Nogai and Toqta— The First Civil War in The Golden Horde and The ‘Second Empire’ of the Chinggisids**

Mengü Temür died in 1280, leaving behind a system of administration that was efficient enough to prevent the usual infighting that occurred after a ruler's death, and allowing his next eldest brother Töde Möngke to take the throne peacefully. As a ruler he was less authoritative and vigorous than his predecessor, and was thus in need of more efficient and effective assistants. Nogai, Batu's great-grandson who had obtained a key position in the Horde's army during Berke's rule but had fallen into disrepute with Mengü Temür for supporting another claimant to the throne, soon filled the vacancy.

Nogai stayed put in his family domain, the Cis-Dniester River Region, throughout the ruling period of the first khan of the Golden Horde. Mengü Temür excluded him from the Golden Horde's affairs, but did not interfere with Nogai's ulus or his activities in the neighbouring states.

Nogai therefore took the opportunity to engage in large-scale diplomatic activities, not hesitating to arrogate to himself the right to develop independent international relations, which was in fact exclusive only to sovereign rulers. He exchanged embassies and made alliances with rulers of both the East and the West without ever seeking agreement with the Khan's court.

For instance, he sent his embassy to Sultan Rukn al-Din Baybars of Egypt, offering him an alliance in the Hijrah year 669 (1270). In order to earn the sultan's sympathy, Nogai informed him in his letter that he had converted to Islam, which the temnik might have in fact actually done, for Arab sources refer to him by the Islamic name Isa. The Baybars issued a positive reply without hesitation, which was in fact the beginning of their friendly correspondence. The successors of the Baybars inherited amicable relations with Nogai, to whom they continued to send letters and rich gifts. But Nogai ultimately did not fulfill his promise to the Baybars, as he waged war on Hulaguid Iran until Tula-Buga, Mengü Temür's second suc-
cessor, was enthroned in the Golden Horde and until Egypt was ruled by Sultan Qalāwūn, the third successor of the Baybars. Remarkably, Nogai was still able to make use even of the unwanted peace with Iran by sending his son Turi as a messenger to Ilkhan Abaqa, which ended with Turi marrying the Ilkhan's daughter [33, p. 86].

Nogai's friendly relations with the Sultan of Egypt could not help but influence other rulers' perception of the temnik either, for they had to adjust their international policies to come in line with Egypt's position. Michael VIII Palaeologus, the Emperor of Byzantium, who had nearly been captured by Nogai and his ally, Constantine of Bulgaria, was among such rulers. The Emperor thus undertook an unprecedented measure to prevent new attacks by the powerful temnik—he married off his illegitimate daughter Yefrosinya to Nogai. This wild, illiterate nomad therefore became a son-in-law of the Byzantine basileus and was even awarded the Byzantine title of archon, or province ruler [6, pp. 164, 210].

As the Emperor's relative, Nogai implemented a much friendlier policy towards Byzantium, whose ruler he rather ironically referred to as his 'father'. Of course, the basileus could only be regarded as Nogai's father in familial terms and not politically, as the temnik was not able to recognise his supremacy while being, even though only in name, a subject of the khan of the Golden Horde.

Nogai did not hesitate to demonstrate his lack of piety for his 'father' when receiving his embassies either, which Michael VIII would send to his newly acquired son-in-law along with rich gifts such as barrels of famous Roman wine, gold and silver plates, luxurious expensive clothes and headgear becoming of a Byzantine nobleman. While accepting the wine and offering it his due praises, Nogai nonetheless treated the Byzantine garments with contempt. He was recorded as once holding some headgear decorated with pearls and asking: 'Does this calyptra heal headaches, or do these pearls and other gemstones on it protect the head from lightning and thunderbolts to make the one who wears it invulnerable?' The temnik would ask similar questions when trying on other costly gold-brocaded clothes, ‘Can these precious garments protect parts of my body from exhaustion?’ When Byzantine diplomats offered up their embarrassed negative answers, Nogai would shake off the exotic clothes with disgust and sometimes even tear them in the presence of the Emperor's messengers, after which he would demonstratively don his regular armyak [6, pp. 318–319; 42, p. 508]. Although despite such insults directed at his ‘father’, the temnik often proved his alliance with Byzantium in practice, mostly through Byzantine-Bulgarian relations. After becoming the Emperor's son-in-law, Nogai not only gave up his raids of Byzantine territories, but prohibited his former ally and vassal Tsar Constantine Tikh of Bulgaria from invading them. In 1277 and 1278, Nogai's troops and the Emperor's army carried out joint anti-Bulgar operations, and in 1282 they fought against John of Thessaly, all while the Mongols stayed behind in Byzantium as allies [6, pp. 314–315; see also: 44, p. 176; 50, pp. 369–370; 55, p. 7].

In 1277 Tsar Constantine Asen was subverted and killed during a popular uprising, and the ‘peasant tsar’ Ivaylo took over the Bulgarian throne and married Constantine's widow. The new tsar began military operations against the Mongols immediately and even defeated them in one of the battles, yet after just a year the Byzantine Emperor's appointee, Ivan Assen III (also a son-in-law of Michael VIII), confronted him, and Ivaylo turned to Nogai for help. He arrived at the temnik's camp and at the outset was received with honour, for Nogai viewed the subverted tsar as an instrument he could use to shape his Bulgarian and Byzantine policies. In another year's time, Ivan Assen III was also overthrown from the throne and came to Nogai. The temnik indeed found it flattering that the lives of two Bulgarian tsars depended entirely on his own will, yet he also realised that this uncertain situation could not last long, and instead made a decision based entirely on his father-in-law's interests. At a feast in 1280 attended by the two overthrown Bulgarian monarchs, he said while pointing at Ivaylo, ‘This
man is an enemy of my father, the Emperor, and it is not life but death that he deserves’. The dethroned tsar was thus killed immediately. Ivan Assen III, who was expecting the same to happen to him, was eventually sent away to his former domain in Mačva, Serbia, at the insistence of Yefrosinya [6, pp. 429–430; see also: 2, pp. 351–352]. The new tsar George Terter, who at first paid tribute to the Golden Horde in 1285 like his Russian vassals, had to admit his allegiance not to the khan himself, but to Nogai, and started minting special coins specially marking this fact [for more details, see: 5, pp. 71–72].

After giving up on raids of Byzantium, Nogai directed his attention towards other countries in Central Europe. He undertook a series of raids on Polish and Lithuanian territories from 1275 to 1279. These campaigns proved useful to Nogai beyond just the riches he plundered, although he did accumulate numerous trophies and forced many locals into slavery. Much more importantly, the temnik was able to establish a rapport with the South Russian princes, Leo of Galicia and Roman of Bryansk, who became subordinated to him rather than the khan of Sarai. According to Hungarian and German chronicles, the 1285 Hungarian campaign was initiated by Cumans, who had been taking shelter in Hungary but then rebelled against King Ladislaus IV and were defeated [7, p. 135]. Nogai's cohort in these campaigns was tsarevich Tula-Buga, a baskak in South Rus' and one of the most probable claimants to the khan's throne, as his father was Tarbu, Mengü Temür's elder brother. Somewhat later in 1283 and 1285, Nogai and Tula-Buga, along with the princes of Galicia and Volhynia, successfully raided Hungary and Poland, which ultimately served to bring the two Jochids even closer together [29, pp. 211, 345–347]. His alliance with a relative of this amount of influence opened up alluring prospects for Nogai.

In other words, Nogai had become a major political figure in Eastern Europe and the Balkans by the time Mengü Temür died, so the confines of his appanage grew too restrictive for him. The death of Mengü Temür enabled him to return to the bigger-picture politics of the Golden Horde and serve as beklyaribek during the rule of Töde Möngke.

The new khan, whom a number of sources report to have had Sufi Islam leanings, was even more peaceful a ruler than Mengü Temür. Immediately after his brother died, he freed the valuable hostage Nomogan, Kublai's son, and sent him back to his father to express his peaceful intentions [33, p. 171]. Any military activities the Golden Horde engaged in during the khan's rule were carried out on the initiative and under the command of Nogai, along with another Jochid, Tula-Buga, the nephew of Mengü Temür and Töde Möngke. Without confronting the khan openly, the beklyaribek implemented policies of his own that were often in conflict with the khan's own policy. Töde Möngke's and Nogai's attitude to Vladimir Rus' is a good example of this tendency. In 1281 the khan overthrew Grand Prince Dmitry Alexandrovich (Alexander Nevsky's eldest son) from his throne, replacing him instead with his younger brother Andrey. However, Nogai supported the subverted Dmitry, who re-claimed the title of Grand Prince in 1282 and was thus able to win back supreme power over Rus'” [30, pp. 153–154].

Also in the early 1280s Nogai appointed Muslim merchant Ahmat baskak to the Principality of Kursk, where he proceeded to establish two ‘slobodas’ for peasants and city dwellers fleeing their princes around 1283. Lower taxes and duties compared to other Russian principalities were the main factors attracting the runaways. Quite naturally, the princes affected by this were dissatisfied with the decision, and two of them, Oleg of Rylsk and Svyatoslav of Lipetsk, submitted a formal complaint to the khan. Töde Möngke order in response was as follows: ‘Take as many people of yours as there are in the slobodas to your volost and do away with the slobodas’. Encouraged by the khan's support, the princes of Kursk together with his representatives robbed the slobodas and captured their dwellers. Ahmad then filed a complaint to Nogai immediately, claiming Oleg and Svyatoslav were preparing for war against the beklyaribek. Nogai summoned the ‘guilty’ princes, but of course they did not risk
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coming, so the ruler instead sent his troops to Kursk volost. Oleg and Svyatoslav fled to Töde Möngke Khan, but Ahmat was still able to capture and put to death some of their boyars. The baskak soon restored his slobodas so that when Oleg of Rylsk went to the Horde again, Svyatoslav of Lipetsk did not wait for the khan's resolution to destroy them for a second time. After returning from Sarai with the khan's officials, Oleg discovered what Svyatoslav had done and killed him to prevent another invasion by Nogai. Indeed, the prince never saw him again, for he and his two sons were soon killed by Alexander of Lipetsk, Svyatoslav's brother. When Nogai learned about the two princes' deaths, he concluded that the guilty ones had been punished and chose to spare Kursk volost, which was in a state of ruin anyway [see: 24, p. 0; 30, pp. 154–156; 46, p. 204].

Nogai, who was outraged even by Khan Töde Möngke's tentative attempts at limiting his power and influence, soon established friendly relations with the pugnacious tsarevich and soon persuaded him and several of his brothers and cousins to carry out a coup d'état. In 1287, the tsareviches declared Töde Möngke insane and removed him from the throne (with his own permission, according to the official historiography). The next in line to be declared khan was Tula-Buga, Nogai's associate in the above-mentioned raids on Poland and Lithuania. However, Nogai believed him to be too hot-tempered and pugnacious, so he forced him to share supreme power with his brother Kunche and cousins Algui and Tughril, sons of Mengü Temür, at the instance of the beklyaribek, who was in fact the temporary ruler of the Golden Horde [33, p. 83].

Tula-Buga and his co-rulers were in power from 1287 to 1291, which was the same period Nogai undertook his major military campaigns against the Ilkhanate and Hungary. However, his Iranian campaigns of 1288 and 1290 were unsuccessful; Ilkhan Argun defeated the Golden Horde's army in both cases [15, pp. 64–65]. On the other hand, the 1288 Hungarian campaign was successful for Nogai but a failure for Tula-Buga, who took another route and advanced his troops simultaneously. As a result, the khan blamed Nogai for his defeat, which caused a deterioration in their relations [38, p. 106].

Nogai then entered into correspondence with him to assure him of his support and stage a coup in 1291. He enticed Tula-Buga along with his co-rulers to his main camp, where they were subsequently captured and put to death immediately by Toqta's associates [33, p. 84].

For several year the new khan demonstrated complete obedience to Nogai's orders, which mostly consisted of eliminating public officials and tribal leaders in the Golden Horde whom the beklyaribek regarded as his enemies [38, pp. 108–109]. However in the mid-1290s, a strong opposition to Nogai consolidated consisting of the khan's brothers, high officials, and military commanders. The beklyaribek was facing certain difficulties within his ulus, and was thus unable to prevent his opponents from uniting against him. Seen in this light, the events around 1297 seem entirely logical and understandable. Worried lest the khan fall out of his control, Nogai demanded him to get rid of a number of counsellors including Saljitai Gurhan, the father of Nogai's son-in-law, and Toqta's maternal grandfather. The khan understandably refused to kill his own grandfather, which led to an open confrontation with the beklyaribek [33, pp. 84–85].

By that time Nogai had won control over the Cis-Dniester River Region and those areas of the Golden Horde that lay on the Danube, as well as the South Russian steppes and Crimea. For this reason he decided against looking for another candidate for the throne after challeng-
ing his former protégé and declared himself a khan, instead appointing his eldest son Juki as co-ruler and, consequently, official successor; coins bearing the two names together have been thoroughly documented [45]. Military commanders and the tribal aristocracy thus divided into supporters of the khan and associates of the beklyaribek, and the risk arose that the Golden Horde could possibly split into two independent states.

The first battle between Toqta and Nogai took place in 1298, resulting in the khan's troops suffering a crushing defeat and scattering in all directions. The khan just barely managed to escape total destruction and likely death because Nogai decided to punish the population of Genoese colonies in the Crimea who had been imprudent enough to support Toqta and kill Nogai's grandson when he came to collect tribute, meaning he did not march immediately to Sarai [38, pp. 111–112, 382]. Toqta used this opportunity to gather troops loyal to him, and his adherents were soon so numerous that even some of Nogai's commanders defected to his side. The battle that took place on the Southern Bug River in 1299 was the last for Nogai, as he was defeated and killed while retreating by a Russian warrior in Toqta's service [33, p. 86; 38, p. 114]. Thus was the end of the Kingmaker of the Golden Horde, who believed that his influence and sweeping geographical power enabled him to claim the throne in breach of all principles and rules of the Mongol Empire's law.

It is therefore curious that Nogai nonetheless seemed to recall every once in a while that the Golden Horde was indeed part of the Mongol Empire, and tried to use the previous unity of the Chinggisids to his own benefit. For instance, at the beginning of Töde Möngke's rule along with the Khan of the Golden Horde and Konchi, the ruler of the Blue Horde, he negotiated with Kublai until Nomogan was set free [33, p. 81]. In 1299, shortly before his death, he also understood that the game was over and turned to the Persian ilkhan Ghazan, asking him to grant him and his people citizenship (but Hulagu's descendant proved to be a no-nonsense politician and refused to get caught up in the internecine feud in the Golden Horde) [33, pp. 86–87]. Thus, even in his own separatist activities that disregarded Chinggisid principles of succession to power, Nogai viewed himself as the bearer of Mongol imperial traditions, albeit to the extent that it coincided with his political interests and ambitions.

His descendants did not appeal to the Chinggisid unity, relying instead on Nogai's appanage ulus in the Balkans, most likely intending to establish an independent state of their own. Juki, the eldest son of Nogai who also became his co-ruler while he was still alive, presented the greatest danger to Toqta. Having successfully escaped the battlefield where his father's decapitated body lay, Juki proceeded to wrangle his domain on the Danube under control. As his first order of business he dealt with the rebelling thousand commanders who had split from Nogai and captured his second son Teke, Juki's brother. Nogai's eldest son went into combat with the rebels, defeated them, decapitated one of the captive thousand heads and sent his head straight to the remaining rebels. Teke took advantage of their confusion and fled, taking along with him several hundred of their warriors [33, p. 85–86].

Yet Teke did not benefit from the liberation, as along with Yaylak Khatun (the mother of Turi, Nogai's third son) tried to convince Juki that he should conclude peace with Toqta and recognise his power. Juki killed them both in a fit of rage [33, p. 86; compare: 38, pp. 115–116]. Yet by killing his brother he turned a number of military commanders against him. Two of them, Nogai's son-in-law Taz and Tunguz, incited the troops to rebellion and soon confronted him openly. Juki then fled to the North Caucasus region where he still had loyal troops, along with 150 of his warriors, where he substituted his ranks with contract Jassic (Ossetian) fighters to defeat the rebels. The insurgent noyons and surviving warriors thus fled to Toqta.

Juki marched his increased army into Bulgaria, where an internecine feud among claimants to the throne was still raging on. Unlike his father, Juki chose not to enthrone a Bulgar tsarevich or boyar, instead deciding to conquer Tarnovo and declare himself the tsar. In order
to prove his right to the Bulgar throne, he referenced his marriage with Elena, the daughter of former tsar George Terter I; her brother Fyodor-Svyatoslav was currently with Juki as something in between a co-ruler and a hostage. Thus Juki, the son of Nogai, became the only Chinggisid to occupy the throne in Central Europe in 1300 (or 1298–1300 according to some reports [5, p. 73]) [for more details, see: 3, p. 195; 26, pp. 37–39; 44, p. 179]. Alternatively, certain medieval Arab sources report that Juki merely took shelter with the Bulgar ruler, who eventually killed him lest his relations with Khan Toqta sour beyond the possibility of a reconciliation [38, pp. 117, 160–161].

In any event, local boyars soon understood the balance of power and became apprehensive that Khan Toqta might avenge Bulgaria for being a shelter for his arch-enemy. At the beginning of 1301, Fyodor-Svyatoslav and the boyar conspired against Juki, captured him and threw him into prison, where Jewish executioners strangled him after just several days. Fyodor-Svyatoslav, who was declared the new Tsar of Bulgaria, sent his head to Toqta, along with a statement of his own submission. As a token of gratitude, Toqta disclaimed his suzerainty over the Balkan state, which sank back into a mire of internecine feud after 20 years of peace at the hands of Fyodor-Svyatoslav [see: 44, p. 179; compare: 20, p. 31]. However, Toqta's actions soon resulted in the Golden Horde losing much of its influence over the Balkans [see: 39, pp. 188–191].

As soon as Juki was out of the picture, his brother Turi began presenting problems for Toqta. When Nogai died, his third son hid out in the Ilkhan's domain, for he was married to the daughter of Abaqa b. Hulagu, but the reception was not as warm as he had expected, so he eventually returned to his father's former demesne on the Danube in late 1300/ early 1301. By that time, Toqta had already appointed his viceroyens for Nogai's uluses: his son Ilbasar in Ural, and another son Tukel-Buga and his brother Sarai-Buga in the Danube Region [see: 18, pp. 187; 36, p. 387; 54, pp. 148–149]. Sarai-Buga turned out to be reckless enough to receive Nogai's son at his court.

Day by day Turi, who had inherited his father's cunning personality and propensity to scheme, convinced Sarai-Buga that he deserved the throne no less than Toqta himself. Together with Sarai-Buga, Turi eventually marched his troops towards Sarai, yet the land of Burlyuk, another brother of Toqta, lay in their way and prevented their advancement. The rebels did not hesitate to suggest that Burlyuk should join them, who in turn pretended he agreed while sending a messenger to Sarai to warn the khan about the rebellion. Then he invited Sarai-Buga and Turi for negotiations, captured them at the khan's order, and killed them both. Several viceroyens of the khans thereafter ruled the Cis-Danube part of the Golden Horde, and the autonomous ulus as such ceased to exist [38, pp. 118–119, 384; see also: 40, p. 91].

Tsarevich Karakisek, Juki's son, was the only surviving descendant of Nogai out of many, and after Turi's death, he fled to the territory of Bulgaria along with two relatives and three thousand warriors, where his father met his demise. Refraining from risky schemes unlike his father and uncle, Karakisek chose instead to serve the Šišman, Despot of Vidin, thus becoming the first Chinggisid to ever be 'in foreign service' [38, pp. 119, 182; see also: 4, p. 58; 9, p. 111].

By 1302, Toqta had suppressed the rebellion organised by Nogai and his descendants, and finally overcome the rift that had existed in the Golden Horde for two decades. Now the khan could afford to pay more attention to other more pressing issues in his domestic and foreign policies.

As concerns Toqta, he was already attempting to normalise his relations with other Chinggisid uluses back when he was still subordinate to Nogai. For instance, he concluded peace with Ilkhan Gaykhatu in 1294. At the turn of the 14th century, the rulers of Chinggisid uluses entered into negotiations in which Toqta played a crucial role, resulting in the restora-
tion of the Mongol Empire, albeit as a confederation of independent states among which the Yuan Empire was nominally supreme, for its ruler was regarded as the ultimate arbitrator in the event of disputes between ulus rulers [53, p. 340].

It can be assumed that it was far from simply nostalgia for former greatness that motivated Toqta to advocate for a ‘Second Empire’ of the Chinggisids with the support of Yuan Emperor Temur, Khan Duwa of the Chagatai Ulus, Ögedeid Chapar, and Ilkhan Ghazan (later also his successor Öljaitü). There were political reasons behind his interest in the Empire's unity as well. First and foremost, restored relations with the Yuan Empire enabled Toqta to regain control over the Chinese prefecture of Pingyangfu, which had been ruled by Batu before Kublai confiscated it following his conflict with Berke. Toqta was able to retrieve the prefecture (or rather, the right to earn income from it) peacefully, at the same time receiving two additional prefectures, Jizhou and Yunzhou, that provided an annual income of 2,400 liang silver, most likely in appreciation of his assistance to Emperor Temur in restoring the empire [19, p. 32]. Secondly, since all Chinggisids had equal rights to the throne, Toqta had the opportunity to claim the title of all-Mongol khan, which Arab sources report that he tried to do towards the end of his rule but never managed to accomplish before he died [38, p. 162, Note 1].

At the same time, around 1310–1311, Toqta decided to implement monetary reforms in the Ulus of Jochi, finally bringing to conclusion the previously unsuccessful attempts of his predecessors Berke and Mengü Temür. A national coin, although manufactured at a number of different mints, was introduced across the entire Golden Horde [43, pp. 120–123]. It can be assumed that in doing so Toqta made use of the Yuan Empire's vast experience in monetary policies, enabled first and foremost by the newly enhanced relations to Chinese Mongols and Yuan experts. It is conceivable that Toqta intended to eventually narrow the minting of the coin in all cities except for Sarai, but died before he could make this a reality.

Even though the unity of Chinggisid uluses never managed to materialise (Duwa soon waged war on Chapar, eventually annexing the Ulus of Ögedei), allowing Toqta for some time to prevent invasions of the Golden Horde by relatives from other uluses. This came just in time, as problems arose in the Blue Horde which, as already mentioned, was in fact an independent state with a ruling house of its own, yet still in need of an outside intervention to address its dynastic issues. Konchi, the ruler of the Blue Horde, died c. 1300, and the throne was thus claimed simultaneously by two candidates representing different branches of Orda Ichen's descendants—Bayan, the son of Konchi, and his second cousin Kuylyuk. Kaidu and Duwa, who in fact benefited from any sort of infighting in the Ulus of Jochi, supported the latter immediately, pushing Toqta to align himself with Bayan and send him aid in the amount of 20,000 warriors. The struggle for power in the Blue Horde lasted for nearly the next ten years. Bayan proved to be an ineffective ruler, and even the death of Kaidu in 1301 (his successor Chapar preferred to stay out of the Jochid internecine feud) and Kuylyuk in approximately 1305 did not put an end to the feuding. Kuylyuk's son Kushay inherited his father's claim to the throne, and meanwhile some opponents of Bayan declared his brother Mangutai the new ruler of the Blue Horde. Thus, there were as many as three claimants to the Blue Horde's throne between 1308 and 1310. The war finally ended in 1310, when while performing his alliance obligations to the Yuan Empire, Toqta confronted Chagataid Esen-Buga and sent his troops into the Blue Horde, thus putting an end to the internecine feud and confirming Bayan on the throne [38, p. 118; see also: 41, pp. 135–146].

Meanwhile, unification in the ‘Second Empire’ did not prevent the ruler of Iran Öljaitü from starting a new war against the Golden Horde in 1308. The ilkhán most likely believed the Golden Horde's khan was too caught up in the infighting in the Blue Horde, and found this to be the most opportune moment to attack. However, Toqta was able to redeploy some of his
troops in Azerbaijan and thus prevent Iranian Mongols from advancing deep into his domain. The relations with Iran remained tense until Toqta died in 1312, but there were never any displays of open hostilities: just like his predecessors, Toqta maintained an alliance with the Egyptian Mamluks, who initiated military operations in Syria in the early 1310s that prevented Öljaitü from continuing his war against the Ulus of Jochi [15, pp. 70–71].

Toqta also came into conflict with Genoese colonies in the south of the Crimea, as had his opponent Nogai, yet their motivation was quite different. While the rebellious beklyaribek ravaged them to avenge the killing of his grandson, the khan instead wanted to punish the Italians because they had been buying children from citizens of the Horde during the famine in the Ulus of Jochi and selling them to the West (although some authors assert that the true reason was espionage for the Ilkhanate). In 1308, Toqta marched his army against Kaffa, forcing most of its Italian population to leave the Horde's domain in a hurry on ships. The colony was not restored until 1313, when the succeeding khan, Öz Beg, had just come to power [49, pp. 412–413].

Just like his predecessors, Toqta also tried to maintain order in vassal states (especially in Russian principalities) through peaceful methods, but he was not always successful in his efforts. In 1293, he supported the claim of Prince Andrey, the son of Alexander Nevsky, to be the Grand Prince in Vladimir against his brother Dmitry (as mentioned previously, he enjoyed the support of Nogai, who was at the height of his power) and sent his brother Tudan, leading considerable forces, to help him. The invasion, which the Russian chronicles refer to as Campaign of Dyuden, proved devastating for Northeast Rus', but overall effective in accomplishing its goal, for Dmitry Alexandarovich disclaimed any rights to his title, which put an end to the time of troubles in Alexander Nevsky's family [28, Column 527]. In 1297, Toqta attempted to secure peace among his Russian vassals by calling together a convention of princes in Pereyaslavl where the khan's ambassador Aleksc Nevryuy read Toqta's yarlıq instructing Russian princes to settle their disputes by negotiations [32, pp. 347–348, 351].

Relatively peaceful relations of Toqta with Rus' are largely attributable to the khan's non-interference with the politics of Russian principalities (unless their actions posed a threat to his suzerainty over Rus') and his observance of agnatic seniority, or the established principle of succession to the throne in Rus'. For example, when his appointee Grand Prince Andrey Alexandarovich died in 1304, his nephew Yuri, the son of Daniil Alexandarovich of Moscow, claimed the throne. It was then at Toqta's instance that Michael Yaroslavich of Tver became the new grand prince as the senior prince in Northeast Rus' in accordance with Russian legal tradition [25, p. 92].

The sources suggest indirectly that Toqta was the first khan of the Golden Horde to ever plan a visit to Rus'. However, he died under unclear circumstances in 1312. According to the Muizz al-Ansab, he met with his end in the wreck of a ship navigating on the Volga [14, p. 41]. This type of death, which is rather unusual for a Mongol nomad, was the official version, but rumour had it that he might have been poisoned on the order of his nephew Öz Beg.

20. [Лонгинов А.В.] Istoriiya slaveno-bolgarskaya o narodah i o caryakh i svyatix bolgarskix i o vseh deyaniix i bytix bolgarskix // Zapiski Odesskogo obshchestva istorii i drevnostey. Т. XVI. 1893. Отд. II. С. 1–54.
Chapter IV. The Golden Age of the Ulus of Jochi


§ 2. The Golden Age of the Ulus of Jochi: The Rule of Öz Beg and Jani Beg

Roman Pochekaev

The Golden Age of The Golden Horde: The Rule of Öz Beg

The name Khan Öz Beg (1313–1341) is traditionally associated with the most prosperous period of the Golden Horde and the time of its greatest power. Indeed, his reign was one of the most outstanding in any historical period, and he was able to introduce truly radical reforms into the administrative system of the Ulus of Jochi. However, a detailed analysis of his reign reveals that he was not the perfect ruler that medieval Muslim authors made him out to be, while the Golden Age moniker was no more than an example of clever marketing to disguise more deeply-rooted political problems.

The reason why medieval Arab, Persian, and Central Asian authors so intensely glorified Öz Beg undoubtedly stemmed from his religious reforms. The Khan officially declared Islam the official religion of the Golden Horde in the late 1310s–early 1320s, and the eastern chroniclers described in picturesque detail Öz Beg's piety and ardent struggle for the triumph of the 'true faith'. But in reality, the religious reform is hardly attributable to Öz Beg's dogmatic dedication to Islam. Instead, it was rather motivated by politics.

When Toqta died, both his son Tukel-Buga and his nephew Öz Beg, who also enjoyed a high position both at the court and in the army, claimed power. Öz Beg's associates killed Ilbasar treacherously, but other descendants of Toqta were still supported by numerous tribal leaders, public officials, and military commanders of the horde. Öz Beg needed funding to consolidate his adherents that only the Muslim clergy and merchants could ultimately provide, which pushed him towards declaring his intention to make Islam the official religion of the Ulus of Jochi, gaining immediate support among clergymen and merchants and also ensuring support from the Islamic regions of the Golden Horde. However, the struggle lasted for many years until Öz Beg declared in a letter to Sultan Al-Nasir of Egypt in 1320 that Islam had triumphed all across the Jochid Empire and all its enemies had been destroyed. The last of Toqta's three sons, as well as other claimants to the throne, undoubtedly had already died by that time, as the sources report that the number of Chinggis Khan's descendants alone exterminated by Öz Beg during the struggle approached 120 (!) [52, p. 141; compare: 61, pp. 102–104].

In addition, Öz Beg destroyed the 'bakshys and lamas'—that is, Buddhists and the ministers of other confessions, whom Toqta and his associates had patronised. It stands to reason that the triumph of Islam was no more than a pretext (perhaps even exaggerated by Muslim historians from Egypt and Syria whose works we rely on as primary source data). After his major political opponents were neutralised, Öz Beg had no reason to pursue non-Muslims, and in fact permitted them to profess their religions and even once again occupy important positions. Bakshy scribes, meaning Buddhist Uighurs, were still nonetheless part of the court of Öz Beg and his successors [for example, see: 18, pp. 71, 74]. Buddhist holidays and rituals still took place in the Golden Horde as late as the first half of the 15th century as reported, among others, by Johann Schiltberger, a Bavarian contractor in the Golden Horde army [for more details, see: 29, pp. 190, 202–203].

After declaring Islam the official religion, Öz Beg assumed the triple name Sultan Giyas al-Din Mohammed Öz Beg and continued passing reforms that brought the Golden Horde's administrative and judicial system into conformity with its canons.

In addition to the Mongol imperial dzargu courts, Islamic courts known as qadi were also established in the Ulus of Jochi, where it was the duty of the litigants themselves to decide which court to appeal to. According to Ibn Battuta, both dzarguchis and qadis met in adjoining halls on the premises of the regional ruler's palace [22, p. 76].
Öz Beg's administrative reforms centralised the khan's power to a considerable degree—all the numerous appanages of Jochi's descendants and clan leaders were thus reorganised into 70 tumens and united to form ten large ulus regions ruled by vicegerents appointed by the khan and referred to as ulus begs [19; 66, pp. 89–103]. After finishing with his reforms of the White Horde, meaning in the lands where he exercised full control, Öz Beg attempted to integrate the Blue Horde into the new system, in this way reducing its autonomy to a significant degree. The ruler of the Blue Horde, Mubarak Khoja, became disaffected and incited a rebellion against Öz Beg in 1328, declaring himself khan and minting his own coin, but was defeated and forced to flee, after which a number of vicegerents were established in the Blue Horde who were apparently subordinate to Timur, Öz Beg's eldest son, and after his death the khan's next eldest son Tinibek [52, pp. 130, 211, 214].

There is every indication that Öz Beg's administrative and territorial reform was in fact not his own idea, but rather a borrowing from the Yuan Empire's administrative tradition. Similar to Toqta, Öz Beg maintained contact with the Mongol khans, bore the title of Third Grade Prince in the Empire's hierarchy and was considered to own the three regions previously granted to Toqta by Khan Temur, or Emperor Chengzong. The suggestion that a separate governorate general should be established in the territory of these regions was first submitted in the final years of Toqta's rule, but was not officially implemented until 1337 towards the end of Öz Beg's reign [6, p. 202]. Nevertheless, negotiations on this issue most likely provided detailed insight into the administrative and territorial structure of the Yuan Empire for Öz Beg's benefit, granting him the base material to refer to regarding his reforms while still taking into account the characteristic features of the Golden Horde. It is thus no coincidence that the system of administrative units established in the Ulus of Jochi (uluses ruled by ulus begs and tumens subordinate to them and administered by darughas or temniks) is similar to the two-tier system of the Yuan Empire: districts (taos) administered by governors general and ‘darughas’ (lu) administered by governors [78, pp. 594–595; see also: 47, p. 38].

The centralisation of the khan's power was also manifested in the curtailment of Chinggisid rights, for they could not rule their own appanages directly, collect taxes from them for their own benefit, or form troops of their own during Öz Beg's rule because these issues fell under the purview of the khan's officials. Depending on the place that a Jochid occupied in the family hierarchy, he received payments from the khan's treasury where taxes from the corresponding appanages were funneled. Quite naturally, neither the tsareviches of the khan's clan nor influential tribal leaders liked this new system of administration, so the opposition to Öz Beg and his successors' centralisation policy, which started gaining major ground in the 1320s, was one of the causes of the dissolution of the Golden Horde in the 1360/70s.

Unlike the relatively peaceful Toqta, Öz Beg was known more as a straightforward warmongering khan. At the very beginning of his rule in 1313 or 1314, he most likely preferred not to interfere with the internecine feud of the Ulus of Chagatai and the Yuan Empire owing to his own feelings of insecurity on the throne. In order to obtain Öz Beg's support in the war, the Chagataid ruler Esen-Buga informed him that the Yuan Emperor did not recognise Öz Beg as a legitimate ruler, and was intending to replace him with another tsarevich. However, Temür Qutlugh, Öz Beg's cousin and beklyaribek, was able to check the validity of this fact and refute it [52, pp. 141–142; 80, p. 346–350]. In any event, Öz Beg then started a series of wars after several years that never stopped until the end of his rule, waging war against other Chinggisids, vassals, and neighbouring states.

Öz Beg's initial intentions towards Iran were to maintain peace, yet it is recorded that he also sent ambassadors to Ilkhan Öljiutü immediately after his enthronement, demanding him to 'return what belongs to us under Möngke Qa'an's yarliq', apparently referring to the Iranian territories that Möngke Khan had granted to the Golden Horde in appreciation of its troops' contribution to Hulagu's campaign. The demand was never fulfilled, but in 1314 Öz Beg's
new embassy still concluded official peace with the Ilkhan [see: 24, p. 73; 30, p. 86]. This peace was nearly broken when Baba ogul, a Jochid tsarevich (presumably a descendant of Shiban, Batu's brother [23, p. 42]), ran away from the Golden Horde to enter the ilkhan's service. There the ilkhan granted him 1,500 horsemen, with the help of whom he undertook a raid to plunder Khwarezm. When vicegerent Temür Qutlugh spoke out against him for this transgression, even some of the Khwarezmian warriors joined the tsarevich to attack the cities and settlements of Khwarezm. The defection of the troops of Temür Qutlugh, the vicegerent of Khwarezm, can most logically be attributed to Baba ogul's origin: they apparently found his actions as a descendant of Chinggis Khan to be more legitimate than those of the vicegerent, who, though related to the khan's house, did not come from the Golden Clan. After rounding up a number of warriors as prisoners, Baba ogul promptly returned to Iran. Öz Beg wasted no time after this sending an angry letter to the ilkhan, demanding he give up Baba ogul. Öljaitü's vicegerent in Khujand, Chagatai Tsarevich Yasawur, attacked Baba ogul at the order of Öljaitü, defeated him, and forced him to set the captives free. Baba ogul eventually gave himself up to the ilkhan, who ordered that he be executed in the presence of Öz Beg's messengers, and peace was thus restored [52, p. 139–140]. While keeping peace with Ilkhan Öljaitü, Öz Beg even refused, on the advise of his beklyaribek Temür Qutlugh, to occupy the Hulaguid throne after the ilkhan's death in 1316, as per the suggestion of Iranian emir Choban. According to Arab chroniclers, the above-mentioned Temür Qutlugh, who was both Öz Beg's relative and associate, reacted to Choban's suggestion by telling Öz Beg that 'when he went to Khorasan, the Northern State would slip through his fingers, and another would come to rule it. It would often be difficult to manage the other state, and in the end both would be gone' [57, pp. 324–325]. In other words, the refusal was not based on Öz Beg's generosity and intention to observe the treaty of peace with the ilkhan, but instead due to the instability of his own power at that moment.

But soon after realising that nothing remained of the desired unity, and that the 'ultimate arbitrator' for all disputes, the Yuan emperor, was perpetually engaged in internecine feuds with his relatives, Öz Beg found himself to be free of any obligations under the Union Treaty. He began by securing support from the ilkhan's other opponents and entering into direct correspondents with the previously mentioned Yasawur, who had rebelled against Öljaitü's successor Abu Said and won control over Khorasan. Öz Beg and Yasawur decided to take joint measures against the Ilkhans, but torrential rainfall prevented the allied forces from uniting [52, p. 140; 57, pp. 517–518]. Yasawur died soon afterwards in the struggle against Kebek, the khan of the Ulus of Chagatai, whose throne he had been trying to occupy, while Öz Beg was unable to help him because he was allied with Kebek as well [57, p. 524; 71, p. 59].

In 1320, Öz Beg Khan resumed military operations against Hulaguid Iran in another attempt to annex Azerbaijan. However, as a military commander Öz Beg failed miserably and suffered heavy losses exacerbated all the more because he, a mature and experienced monarch, had to face the 16-year-old Ilkhan Abu Said with much fewer warriors. Öz Beg's domain suffered from an attack by Iranian troops in response in 1325. Emir Choban (the one who had offered the Iranian throne to Öz Beg) invaded the North Caucasian regions of the Golden Horde through Georgia and forced them into a hurried retreat to Arran, all without ever having to actually battle the Horde's army [1, p. 104; 52, p. 92]. This conflict apparently had an intensely dramatic effect on the entire region, as even the Book of the Great Khan, written in approximately 1330 for Pope John XXII, mentions it: ‘when Emperor Öz Beg (lempereur usborch) was leading a war against the Emperor of Bussay and planning to go to battle against him, he brought seven hundred seven thousand warriors to the battlefield without any drastic consequences for his empire [79, p. 60; see also: 47, pp. 15–16].

After suffering defeat at the hands of a foreign military, Öz Beg then decided to try his hand at diplomacy. His informants in Iran reported a tension between the young ilkhan and
Choban, his amir al-umara (equivalent to the beklyaribeck of the Golden Horde). As his relations with Ilkhan Abu Said deteriorated, Choban had to turn to other rulers for support. In this way he intended to enter the Yuan Emperor's service while entrusting his sons to Khan Öz Beg and the Sultan Al-Nasir of Egypt. It was then that the khan of the Golden Horde entered into correspondence with Choban, and the latter soon suggested that he should invade Iran again, promising that his troops would provide support. However, both the sultan and the khan of the Golden Horde instead quickly chose to execute the rebellious official's sons; Choban was also killed only a little later by Malik Giyath ad-Din Kurt, the ilkhan's vicegerent in Khorasan whom he had asked for shelter [1, pp. 105–107; 51, pp. 11–12; 71, pp. 62–63]. In other words, Öz Beg once again failed against the Ilkhanate.

The khan of the Golden Horde then had another opportunity in 1335 when Abu Said was poisoned by his own wife Baghdad Khatun, the daughter of Emir Choban. As he had no heirs, a struggle for power broke out in Iran immediately, leading Öz Beg to take advantage of the situation and once again send the Golden Horde's troops to invade Azerbaijan. According to some medieval Persian historians, Öz Beg began his invasion of Iran back in the final days of Abu Said's rule, and the ilkhan even began preparations to repel it [52, p. 93; 71, p. 66]. However, Abu Bakr al-Ahari, who was a contemporary and eyewitness of the events, indicates directly that 'when the news of Sultan Abu Said's death reached Desht-i Kipchak, Öz Beg Khan's desire was kindled and he marched to Iran again' [1, p. 111]. The only assumption that could reconcile these two versions is that Öz Beg Khan's spies at the ilkhan's court informed him that Abu Said would soon die, and he chose not to wait until that moment came. The following report by al-Ahari might be an indirect indication of this: 'In Rabi' I of said year (19.10–17.11.1335), Baghdad Khatun was put to death for having been in correspondence with Öz Beg and encouraging him to invade Iran' [1, p. 110]. It is entirely possible that she confided in the khan of the Golden Horde that she was planning to poison her husband beforehand.

But in any event, this time around the khan was defeated by the newly enthroned Arpa Khan [1, p. 110]. Ironically, the new ilkhan did not enjoy the spoils of the throne for a long time, as he was overthrown and killed by another Hulaguid, Musa Khan, that same year. Some Persian sources even seem to 'justify' Öz Beg's defeat by reporting that during his invasion of Iran he received news about emir Temür Qutlug's death (he died in Khwarezm on 9 Rabi II of the Hijrah year 736, or 26 November 1335), which devastated the morale of both the khan and his troops [52, p. 93; 62, p. 59]. Although this was Öz Beg's last attempt at conquering Azerbaijan, his successors continued his struggle for that territory.

Öz Beg even tried to re-establish the Golden Horde's control over the Balkan countries, a pursuit his predecessor Toqta had given up on long before. In 1323 the khan's troops were sent to aid Tsar George Tarter II in Bulgaria, but were not able to prevent his defeat by the Byzantines in the battle near Adrianople. Öz Beg did not wage war on Emperor Andronikos II, and neither did he later against his grandson and at the same time successor—Andronikos III, for he was related to them as the husband of Andronikos the Second's daughter (the latter's aunt), who was referred to as Bayalun Khatun in the sources [see: 11, p. 202]. Öz Beg's troops participated in the battle to redivide power in the Balkans again in 1330, where three thousand warriors from the Golden Horde fought within the joint troops of the Walachian voivode Basarab I and the Byzantines against King Stephen III of Serbia. But the Serbian ruler also employed Spanish and German condottieres, who enabled him to defeat the allies near Velbujd, thus forever quenching Öz Beg's hope to ever restore the Horde's former power over the Balkans [see: 11, pp. 202–203; 40, pp. 45–46].

It was during Öz Beg's rule that the Grand Duchy of Lithuania started gaining upward momentum; its ruler Grand Duke Gedimin was able to conquer Volhynia and Kiev in 1320 by defeating the local princes and those vicegerents from the Golden Horde who had come to...
help them. Öz Beg marched his troops against Lithuania in 1324 and then again in 1337, but never restored control over Southwest Rus'. Öz Beg's army was able to capture Narimantas, Gedimin's son, in a frontier clash in the early 1330s, which the Golden Horde could have used to extort concessions from the Lithuanian ruler. However, Narimantas was bought out by Prince Ivan Kalita of Moscow and sent home as early as 1333, so the Horde and Lithuania fell back into their previous confrontation. In 1339, Öz Beg sent his army to Smolensk, which Gedimin had claimed, and was able to keep the city under control for some time, but at the end of that same year Smolensk was conquered by the Lithuanians, and its prince recognised his vassalage to Gedimin. A year later the Lithuanians occupied the last principality of Southwest Rus'—that of Galicia, thus putting an end to the Horde's suzerainty over the region [5, p. 30; 39, p. 112].

In his struggle against Iran, Öz Beg tried to maintain an alliance with Mamluk Egypt, as did the previous rulers of the Golden Horde, but once again did not seem to succeed diplomatically. Sultan al-Nasir expressed his intention to marry a Jochid princess in 1320, and Öz Beg's first cousin once removed Tulunbay was offered to him as a bride. When the sultan's ambassadors arrived at the khan's court, he summoned a council of 70 temnik emirs, who proceeded to demand a bride price of 1 million dinars, after which the sultan eventually withdrew his proposal. However, after a while the marital negotiations resumed. This time the Egyptian ambassadors did not have enough money and had to borrow 27,000 dinars from the merchants of the Golden Horde, after which all the formalities were finally completed. Yet the khan set such a high bride price that the Egyptian wedding embassy were forced to borrow a large sum from local merchants [21, pp. 78–80; 57, pp. 167–168, 438–439, 518–519]. It is entirely possible that Öz Beg deliberately enabled his friends, or Muslim merchants who had helped him ascend to the throne, 'to make money from the wedding contract'. In any event, a princess from Chinggis Khan's clan became the wife of the Egyptian sultan in 1320.

Arab sources identify her as 'the daughter of Tukaji, the son of Hindu, the son of Teku, the son of Dushikhan, the son of Chinggis Khan' [57, p. 518]. The remainder of her life was rather tragic: she had been married to the sultan for roughly eight years before she was married off to his emir Saif ad-Din Kawsun (Mengli Buga according to another version) in 1327, then after his death to his brother Susun, and finally to Emir Umar. She died in Egypt on 8 September 1340 according to some sources, 18 August 1342 according to others, but others nonetheless claim her final day as late as 20 January 1364 [57, pp. 198–199, 264, 440, note 2]. The following report by Al-Ayni is quite curious: when the rumour of the sultan's divorce reached Öz Beg, he sent him an irritated letter mentioning how An-Nasir had insisted on the marriage, and asked for more details on the reasons for the divorce. The sultan in response resorted to lies to prevent his relations with the khan from deteriorating. He told Öz Beg's ambassadors that the princess was dead and even issued a document in confirmation of that fact, which was verified by his emirs and handed in to the Horde's ambassadors for the khan to read [57, pp. 527–529].

Öz Beg took an even harder line in his later negotiations with Egypt: outraged as he was at the Mamluk sultan's refusal to provide military aid, he ordered the execution of the Egyptian ambassador, Venetian Shaqran, who was in high favour with Sultan An-Nasir [3, p. 18].

To name one of the positive outcomes of Öz Beg's foreign policy, he came to patronise Italian colonies in the North Black Sea Region. In 1313, he permitted the Genoese people, whom Toqta had exiled from the Crimea, to settle in Kaffa. In 1320, Venetian merchants of the Black Sea region submitted a petition to the khan asking for a land lot in that area to build a permanent factory, as well as trade concessions. However, it indeed took the khan a long time to eventually make a favourable decision. Öz Beg's officials and lawyers spent 12 years studying the situation and analysing the existing precedents of such concessions for the Black Sea region granted by the Iranian ilkhans, emperors of Trebizond, and other rulers. It was not
until 1332 that a khan's yarliq to the desired effect was officially issued to the Venetian merchants, enabling them to build their factory in Azaq (Azov) [18, p. 10; 53, p. 32; 77, p. 411]. The khan thus fostered the development of trade in the Black Sea Region, which served to increase income to the treasury from commercial taxes and charges [18, pp. 5–33, 67, pp. 117–118; 77, p. 411]. Yet it is still entirely possible that it was for fear of losing economic competitiveness with his enemy, the ilkan of Iran, that Öz Beg finally decided to grant land for the factory and other concessions to the Venetians. The Iranian Hulaguids made trade concessions to the Venetians in 1306, and permission to build a factory in one of the ilkan's largest cities, Tabriz, followed in 1320 [see: 26, p. 96].

However, Öz Beg did not equally favour all residents of the Black Sea region. For instance, the Arab traveller Ibn Battuta reported a conflict between the Muslim and Christian population of Sudak in 1322, where troops of the Golden Horde commanded by Tulak-Timur and Kara-Pulad were sent to restore order. There they occupied the city and introduced a number of anti-Christian sanctions, such as the removal of church bells and the confiscation of icons [4, pp. 600, 621; 57, p. 303; see also: 10, p. 143; 11, p. 203]. Citizens of the Golden Horde were also sold abroad during Öz Beg's rule, as had been the case when his uncle Toqta held the throne, although this time it was not the Crimean Genoese people—they had learned a bitter lesson in this regard—but the tribes of the North Caucasus who formally recognised the suzerainty of the khan of the Golden Horde. Öz Beg Khan had to embark on a series of punitive campaigns against the Circassians and the Jasz people to discourage them from capturing and selling his subjects [57, p. 231].

But unlike his predecessors, Öz Beg chose to interfere as often as he could in the affairs of his vassals, or Russian princes. Indeed, it is his rule with which it is reasonable to associate the term ‘the Horde yoke in Rus’. Öz Beg overthrew the ancient Russian agnatic seniority principles of succession to the throne, according to which it was inherited by the oldest member of the prince's clan, and instead granted the throne to whomever he thought fit. For example, in 1317 he removed Grand Prince Michael of Tver (appointed by Toqta) and transferred the throne of Vladimir to Yury of Moscow, who was both younger and inferior according to the princely family's hierarchy, by marrying off his sister to him. Realising that the legitimate Grand Prince would not cede the title to him without a struggle, Yury obtained from Öz Beg two cavalry tumens of the Horde's army, in the face of which Michael did not oppose the khan's pressure and gave up his title in favour of Yury. Yet the triumphant Prince of Moscow was still not quite satisfied, so he invaded the Principality of Tver, his opponent's personal domain, with support from the Horde's ambassadors Kavgady and Alcheda, as well as their loyal troops. Michael of Tver ultimately defeated this advance, Yury fled the scene, and ambassador Kavgady chose to surrender. Most unfortunately, the young Grand Princess Konchaka (baptised Agathias) was also captured by the prince of Tver and soon died under mysterious circumstances in Tver. The causes of her death remain unclear (though even certain Russian chronicles report that ‘he captured his [Yury's—Author's note] princess and brought her to Tver, where he put her to death’ [40, p. 338]), but with a helping hand from Kavgady, Yury of Moscow alleged Michael of poisoning him, the accusation of which Öz Beg, distressed by the death of his sister, believed [see: 15, p. 50; 55, p. 214; see also: 8, p. 95]. In 1318, Michael of Tver was summoned to court to the Golden Horde. Remarkably, even as a stakeholder in the affair himself, Öz Beg demonstrated his impartiality by refusing to try the prince on his own, instead referring the case to emirs, telling him, according to the Russian chronicles, ‘as verbal attacks were levied against Prince Michael, please try Grand Prince Yury Danilovich of Moscow. And I will grant pardon to the one who is right, and I will execute the wrongdoer’ [45, p. 163]. Of course, it goes without saying that the emirs understood what judgment the khan expected them to pass. In fact, the issue of the Prince of Tver's guilt of the death of the khan's sister was hardly even addressed, as the other accusations were
enough to suffice. Yury of Moscow accused his opponent of grave wrongdoings including concealing the Horde's tribute, resisting the khan's ambassador, and negotiating an anti-Golden Horde alliance with 'the Germans' (probably the Teutonic Order). It is no great surprise that the trial did not end until 1319. Michael Yaroslavich was ultimately found guilty, executed, and subsequently canonised in Rus' [44, column 410–413; see also: 15, pp. 50–51; 28; 55, pp. 215–217; 81, pp. 73–74].

However, in 1322 Öz Beg then removed Yury and transferred the throne to Dmitry, Michael of Tver's son, and then over to his brother Alexander. A year later in 1327, Öz Beg, who had grown suspicious of his appointee, sent an ambassador to Tver with an extraordinary mission to grant him even greater powers than the prince had for the period of his visit. To create the impression the khan's order carried more weight, a special ambassador was also chosen; the nominee was Öz Beg's cousin, Tsarevich Shawkal, the son of Tudan (the very same who led the awful Duden's campaign in 1293). By appointing his relative as ambassador, Öz Beg wished to send a warning message to the Russians about the consequences of defiance. Basking in satisfaction over his substantial new authority, Shawkal indeed began to act much too provocative in Tver. He even forced Prince Alexander out of the palace he occupied with his retinue. Around this time an unrealistic rumour also began to spread that the khan's relative was planning to murder the princely family of Tver and seize the city's throne [43, p. 194; see also: 66, p. 137]. It is curious that the rumour was later referred to in the folk song Shhelkan Dudentievich, which depicts the 1327 events in Tver quite closely to the chronicle. According to the song, Shhelkan became the absolute ruler and judge in Tver, violating both the prince's rights and those of the citizens, so they took it upon themselves to kill him [20, pp. 24–27]. Some scholars believe that Shawkal came to Tver not to make any kind of inspection, but as the commander of a Mongol detachment within the joint forces of Rus' and the Golden Horde, as Öz Beg Khan was planning to establish an outpost in Tver to check the Lithuanian military advances against Rus' [8, pp. 140–141]. However, sources fail to confirm the accuracy of this version. In fact, the family and political relations that princes of Tver shared with Lithuanian rulers suggest quite the opposite—Tver might have indeed allied with Lithuania against the Horde.

But either way, the aggressive attitude of Shawkal's retinue eventually caused a rebellion. The chronicles report that the Tver rebellion broke out when members of Shawkal's retinue attacked a local deacon named Dyudko and stole one of his mares. The locals intervened on behalf of the deacon, started to ring the veche bell and then took to beating representatives of the Golden Horde in the city [for example, see: 44, column 416]. Some Tatar authors believed that Prince Alexander of Tver incited the rebellion [for example, see: 63, p. 93]. As a result, the Tver people attacked the Horde's representatives, who locked themselves in the prince's palace and attempted to defend themselves with bows; the citizens (not without prince Alexander's approval) then burned down the building along with the men in it including Shawkal. Having cruelly suppressed the rebellion through Prince Ivan Daniilovich, Öz Beg appointed two grand princes at the same time—the same Ivan of Moscow as mentioned above, and Alexander of Suzdal. In 1337, he permitted Alexander of Tver (whom he had removed in 1337) to declare himself grand prince in his Tver domain. At least ten Russian princes were executed in Öz Beg's main camp during his rule—more than all his predecessors had put to death combines [45, pp. 161–172].

However, just like other international actions of Öz Beg, his policy for Rus' had a rather adverse effect on the Golden Horde, for by interfering in Russian affairs he caused one of the other princely houses, namely that of Moscow, to grow stronger. The princes of Moscow (Ivan Kalita and his descendants) proved to be vigorous and ambitious rulers, and were able to get almost all of Northeast Rus' (except for Tver, Ryazan, Nizhny Novgorod, and Veliky Novgorod) under their control in just a short period). They led the opposition to the khan's
authorities during the Time of Troubles in the Golden Horde in the 1360/70s. But this was to come later. When Öz Beg was the ruler, Russian princes, scared by his interference with their affairs and numerous reprisals against members of the princely family, tried their best not to trigger another devastating campaign.

Öz Beg’s volatility and inconsistency affected even his family life. At first seemed to favour his wife Bayalun, the illegitimate daughter of Emperor Andronikos II Palaeologus of Byzantium [57, pp. 294–295; 82, pp. 84–85; compare: 61, p. 102] (according to G. Vernadsky, the daughter of Emperor Andronikos III, the grandson of Andronikos II [11, p. 202]). However, when she refused to give up Christianity for Islam, Öz Beg quickly lost interest in her and even removed her brother Baydemir from the position of vicegerent of Khwarezm. Indignant at her husband’s attitude, she decided to leave him. In 1334, Bayalun asked the khan for permission to travel to Constantinople to see her father. It was her trip that the Arab traveller Ibn Battuta described, for he was staying at the court of Öz Beg Khan at the time and, having found out what the khan’s wife was going to undertake, obtained permission to accompany her. Ibn Battuta reported that, having reached Byzantium, Bayalun resolved to stay there and never returned to the Horde. However, scholars have questioned the veracity of the information reported by the Arab traveller regarding these events. Furthermore, as Ibn Battuta himself states, the khan’s wife was pregnant when she set off for Byzantium. It is unlikely that Öz Beg Khan would allow his child to remain in a foreign country, especially a Christian one.

Taidullah (Tai-Toglu-begim) became Öz Beg’s new favourite; she gave him two male heirs, Tini Beg and Jani Beg. According to Arab travellers, she was able to remain in favour with the volatile Öz Beg for a long time due to certain physiological features of her body. The Arab traveller Ibn Battuta provided spicy details: ‘The sultan loves her due to one special feature of hers, which consists in the fact that each night he finds her to be seemingly a virgin’ [57, p. 293]. We can only wonder who ‘one of the trustworthy people’ in the Golden Horde was that took the liberty of sharing with the traveller such intimate details concerning the khan’s wife, whom ‘the people venerate as well due to his (the sultan’s) great respect for her, and despite her being the stingiest of khatuns’! Looking ahead, however, it should be noted that Taidullah was very influential not only during her spouse’s rule, but during the reigns of her son Jani Beg and grandson Berdi Beg. This means that her influence is not wholly attributable to her physical merits!

Öz Beg’s favourite son was his firstborn, Timur, but he died before his father in 1330. The rest were continually coming in and out of favour with their fickle father. At first Öz Beg wanted the next eldest son, Tini Beg, to become his heir, and began to prepare him. Tini Beg commanded troops, and in 1337–1341 reportedly was his father’s vicegerent in Khwarezm and even sent ambassadors of his own to European rulers. For instance, Pope Benedict XII, in his letter to Khan Öz Beg dated 1338, mentioned his reception of the khan’s ambassadors, ‘including Khelim of Hungary, a Franciscan, the ambassador of Grand Prince Tini Beg, your son’ [quoted from: 25, p. 307]. Ibn Battuta, who visited Öz Beg’s court in the 1330s, also refers to Tini Beg (Tinabek) as ‘the successor to the tsardom’ of Öz Beg [57, p. 296]. Öz Beg apparently favoured his eldest son at that moment. His military campaign in the eastern part of the Ulus of Jochi is described in the Biography of Sultan al-Malik al-Nasir: ‘Shortly before his death, he [Öz Beg—Author] sent his eldest son Tini Beg with troops to the land of Chagatai, the first (nearest) of Khatai regions, to conquer those countries’ [57, p. 263]. Sources indicate that Öz Beg was allied with the Chagatais and the Chinese Emperor throughout his rule, which means that conquering the areas was out of question. It is thus only reasonable to assume that Tini Beg was sent to Khwarezm or the Blue Horde, whose tsareviches and emirs constantly manifested separatist intentions [see: 36, p. 139]. A number of authors believe that Tini Beg led the Horde’s troops against the insurgent Mubarak Khoja in the late 1330s–1340s and replaced him as the ruler of the Blue Horde, which he ruled until the death of his father...
Öz Beg [36, p. 139; 60, p. 283] (however, this opinion is rather dubious, as there is numismatic evidence that Mubarak Khoja was expelled in 1328–1329 and it was Öz Beg's eldest son, Timur, who campaigned against him).

While in the east, Tini Beg somehow managed to anger his father, who started to favour Tini Beg's younger brother, Jani Beg. Already in 1339/1340 the Golden Horde minted coins bearing the names of Öz Beg and Jani Beg [12, p. 123; 58, p. 59; 65, p. 186; 76, p. 437], while foreign rulers addressed their letters not only to the khan of the Golden Horde and his wife Taidullah, but to Jani Beg as well; for example, in 1340 the above-mentioned Pope Benedict XII sent letters not only to Khan Öz Beg, but also to his wife Taidullah and 'Prince Jani Beg' firstborn son of His Majesty the Sovereign Öz Beg, Emperor of the Tatars' [74, p. 1002]. Some scholars surmise that Tini Beg was essentially exiled to the east, away from the khan's court, around 1339 for certain 'disgraceful deeds' mentioned by Persian authors [18, pp. 41–42].

Öz Beg was no less capricious when it came to choosing officials. At first he was completely under the influence of emir Temür Qutlugh, who had helped enthrone him. Öz Beg married his sister to Temür Qutlugh, appointed him beklyaribek, and lavished benefits on him, never failing to heed his advice. But several years later Temür Qutlugh was removed and sent to Khwarezm as a vicegerent (ulus beg). For the formerly omnipotent prime minister, this high-ranking position meant nothing but an honourable exile! Öz Beg's next favourite and beklyaribek was another son-in-law, Isa Gürgen of the Uishin clan, who was married to the khan's daughter. He also fell out of grace with the khan after some time, and Temür Qutlugh became the berklyaribek again, only to be replaced once more by Isa Gürgen [18, pp. 13–14; 57, p. 388].

Even in matters of faith, Öz Beg was less consistent than he probably would have liked to be, in hope of going down in history as a champion of Islam who converted the Golden Horde to the 'true faith'. Having established Islam as the official religion, he continued to extend patronage to the Orthodox Christian church and even Catholic missionaries.

The so-called 'extensive collection' of khans' yarliqs to the Russian Church contains one issued by Öz Beg to Metropolitan Peter. Its content is very different from other documents in the 'collection', which has attracted great attention from scholars. The yarliq was found to be forged in 1918 [54]. Yet the very fact that it was included in the 'collection' suggests that such a yarliq was issued, even though its actual content might have been less beneficial for the Church [for more details, see: 47, pp. 173–176, 191–192]. As we know, each khan of any Chinggisid state confirmed his predecessors' edicts on Church privileges upon enthronement. A yarliq of Toghon Temür, the last great khan and the Emperor of the Yuan dynasty, is a prime example. In a yarliq granting certain privileges to Taoists, he refers even to a yarliq of his predecessor Rinchinbal, who only ruled, according to different sources, from several days to two months, but still issued a yarliq on the matter! [83, pp. 3–4]. It is highly improbable that Öz Beg issued no yarliq to the head of the Russian Orthodox Church during his 30-year rule, all the more so because he is known to have issued a tarkhan yarliq to Bishop Barsanuphius of Sarai [34, p. 24].

On 20 March 1314, that is, soon after his enthronement, Öz Beg issued a yarliq to the Franciscans, granting them numerous benefits and permitting them to found a mission in Sarai in the following year. There were as many as ten Franciscan missions in the Horde by 1336. Catholics enjoyed the khan's protection because they facilitated Öz Beg's negotiations with western merchants—for trade was his priority, not religion [see: 82, p. 58]. Furthermore, Öz Beg corresponded with Popes John XXII and Benedict XII [18, pp. 40–41; 38, pp. 113–114; 46, pp. 118–119, 198–199].

According to some sources, Öz Beg himself participated in non-Islamic festivities [for more details see: 75].
It is commonly believed that Öz Beg's rule was the apogee of the Golden Horde's power and prosperity. There is no doubt that the Jochid state had a powerful international standing in the 1320s–1330s; its vassals' dependence on the khan was greater than ever, and enemies dared not trouble its frontiers. However, everything was not as smooth as it seemed on the surface.

In particular, most foreign rulers were unaware of the plot against Khan Öz Beg in 1339. The rebels besieged the khan in his own palace and tried to break in by setting a fire to distract the guards. The plot failed, and most of the conspirators were captured and put to death [18, pp. 40–41]. However, the very fact that the khan was assaulted in his own residence indicates that the 'great and mighty' Öz Beg could not trust even his immediate circle! Remarkably, not only citizens of the Golden Horde participated in the plot, but foreign Christians as well, as attested to by a letter of Pope Benedict XIII: he thanked the khan for being merciful to Christian conspirators, executing only three of them [74, p. 1003].

 Öz Beg's nearly thirty-year-long rule was an epoch of great efforts and an incredible expenditure of resources—monetary, material, and human. The population of the Golden Horde was being constantly distracted from activities at home for campaigns against Iran and Rus' or suppression of rebellions in various regions of the Golden Horde itself. Apart from the constant engagement of the Golden Horde's population in the khan's military undertakings, enormous sums of money were spent as well. This brought about a massive outflow of silver from the Golden Horde during Öz Beg's rule, as it was cheaper there than in Central Asia and Iran. The Khan tried to prevent it by stating the value of silver as established by law on copper coins, but this measure proved ineffective. The problem was only solved by his successor Jani Beg [37, pp. 56–58]. As wide-reaching and money-consuming as these actions were, they yielded a very poor result. Öz Beg's foreign military undertakings always ended in defeats. Having devastated his vassals in Northeastern Rus' with a series of punitive raids, he ceded Southwestern Rus' to Poland and Lithuania with hardly any resistance. Neither did he attain success in Iran.

 Öz Beg died in 1341, glorified as a powerful and pious ruler, but having in fact weakened the Golden Horde with constant wars and incessant replacement of high officials, as well as creating dynastic problems. Nevertheless, his successor Jani Beg automatically continued the active policy of Öz Beg, whose time is also associated with the peak of the might of the Ulus of Jochi.

Khans Jani Beg and Berdi Beg.

Like Öz Beg, Jani Beg maintained relations with the Yuan Empire, having inherited the title of ‘third-degree prince’ in the imperial hierarchy and the right to receive income from three Chinese regions [33, pp. 32, 34]. However, the anti-Mongol Red Turban Rebellion of the early 1350s ultimately resulted in the overthrow of the Yuan dynasty, which essentially ended Jani Beg's relations with the Mongol khans. It would seem that the severance of these contacts played a role in the fate of the Golden Horde itself. It should be noted immediately that Jani Beg's policies seem peaceful compared to his father's energetic activity in international politics, although in fact it was not.

 Russian chroniclers often characterise Khan Jani Beg as ‘kind’. To quote a description of Jani Beg from the Nikon Chronicle, This Tsar Chanibek Azbyakovich was very kind to Christianity and granted many a benefit to the Russian land, but he was judged, for he smote his brothers and drank the same cup’ [43, p. 229]. However, it is entirely possible that the Russian chroniclers literally translated the phrase sain Khan Jani Beg, which his supporters could have used after his death. The word sain (an equivalent of the Arabic aziz) has the meaning ‘kind’, but can also mean ‘deceased’ [see: 7]. And later chroniclers tried to think of the reason behind the khan's ‘kindness’ mentioned in earlier chronicles.
In fact, he was hardly likely to have been kinder than the other monarchs of the Golden Horde; it is remarkable, however, that the Horde did not invade Rus' during his rule [see: 55, p. 244]. The report in the Nikon Chronicle dated 6856 (1348) is illustrative in this respect, as it states that a ‘Prince Temir of the Horde’ approached Aleksin, burned down its suburbs and captured numerous prisoners, but ‘the Tatars’ killed him and his children as soon as he returned to the Horde [43, p. 220]. This undoubtedly refers to a man who disobeyed the khan and was punished.

In his relations with Rus’, Jani Beg consistently supported representatives of the Moscow House—Simeon and Ivan II, sons of Ivan Kalita—as Grand Princes. However, he was prudent enough to prevent them from gaining strength through the subjugation of other princes. For example, the khan settled conflicts between the rulers of Tver and Nizhny Novgorod on his own to emphasise their independence from Moscow. Nevertheless, when Grand Duke Algirdas of Lithuania sent an embassy to Jani Beg headed by his brother Koriat to conclude a military alliance against Rus’ in 1350, the khan gave up the ambassadors to his vassal and ally Grand Prince Simeon Ivanovich [15, p. 73; 43, p. 219; 55, p. 244].

According to some sources, though, it was Poland and not Rus’ against whom Algirdas wanted support. This is confirmed by the events of 1352, when the Horde's troops helped Algirdas in his struggle against Poland [see: 15, pp. 75–76; 70, pp. 47–48, 50]. Nonetheless, chroniclers did have some reason to praise Öz Beg's son, especially after the rule of his father, who was very harsh towards Rus'.

However, Jani Beg proved to be even harsher than his father when it came to the Russian Church. Despite his uneven temper, volatility, and authoritativeness, Öz Beg continued to observe the custom established by Chinggis Khan of not levying taxes on ministers of the Church. But Jani Beg had to fund his numerous military campaigns and buy support from emirs. For this reason the khan resolved to impose a number of taxes and levies on the Church, which was reflected in the 1342 yarliq to Metropolitan Theognostus. Its text has not survived; we know the document from a chronicle record dated 6850 (1342) that reports Metropolitan Theognostus to have undertaken a trip to the Horde ‘to the heathen (sic!) Tsar Chanibek’, who ‘tormented him and said, “pay me an annual tribute”’ [45, p. 174]. This gives scholars reason to assume that Jani Beg ‘forgot’ about Chinggis Khan's order and deprived the Church of a number of benefits it had previously enjoyed, in particular, exemption from duties and quartering in Church houses, as well as independence from the khan's court [49, pp. 72–78; see also: 9, p. 68; 63, pp. 96–97]. The possible reason why Jani Beg levied taxes on the Church was his reliance on secular princes rather than the Church to maintain his power in Rus' [see: 68, pp. 290, 292].

For fear of losing the Church's support of the khan's power over Rus', however, Jani Beg's mother Taidullah prohibited secular princes from interfering with the Church's judicial proceedings in her charter to Bishop John of Sarai in 1347. Thus, while the khan manifested his power, his mother demonstrated kindness and went down in Russian chronicles as ‘the patroness of the Russian Church’ [see: 17, pp. 50–51; 42, p. 467; 49, p. 79]. Thus, the khan's relations with the Church were generally favourable, bringing him the name ‘the kind tsar’ in Russian chronicles. Accordingly, Jani Beg's policy for Rus' was peaceful, but his actions towards other vassals and neighbouring states showed more aggression.

Soon after his enthronement, in the same year 1342, Jani Beg issued a yarliq to Venetian merchants confirming Öz Beg's yarliq of 1332 (on the ownership of the Azov colony and exemption from certain taxes and charges), but a conflict broke out between the Golden Horde and the Italian colonies only a year later which was to prove long-lasting. It was largely caused by the Italians, who had been living in the Black Sea and Azov Sea region for so long and had so many privileges that they sometimes felt like they were the lords of the land, forgetting it to be the demesne of the khan of the Golden Horde. Formally, the centre of the
Genoese domain, Kaffa, had a dual allegiance to the Genoese signoria and the khan of the Horde. Numismatic data confirms this status of the Italian colonies: as early as in the 15th century, coins minted in Kaffa bore Genoa's coat of arms on one side and the tamga of the Golden Horde's rulers on the other [for example, see: 69, p. 8]. In effect, the consul of Kaffa and the representatives of major noble and merchant families did not answer to anybody and took the attitude of feudal seigneurs towards the population of nearby cities and settlements. The Venetians acted similarly in their colony in Azov (Tana), which was also a subject of the khan of the Golden Horde.

The Italians had no respect for subjects of the Golden Horde, which often caused conflicts. For instance, in 1343 Venetian nobleman Andreolo Civrano killed merchant Khodja Omar from the Golden Horde, who had slapped him in the face, in a street fight in Azov. As the result, many residents and visitors of Azov of European origin were robbed and even killed; the rest had to flee, whether to Kaffa or to their home in Italy. This inflicted enormous financial losses on Venetian, Genoese, Florentine, and Pisan merchants (over half a million gold florins), while causing European prices for Oriental goods, crops, and fish to surge. Jani Beg, angry with the Europeans for behaving in such a provocative manner in his domain, implemented real economic sanctions against them by expelling all Italian merchants from Tana for a period of five years [18, p. 79; 53, p. 34]. The khan took other punitive measures as well, as a result of which, in particular, the settlement Porto Pisano at the mouth of the Don, which belonged, as its name indicates, to Pisan merchants, was destroyed, thereby denying them the opportunity to trade with the Golden Horde [67, pp. 118–119].

The Senate of Venice investigated the events in Azov, found Civrano guilty and arrested him, of which it informed the khan of the Golden Horde immediately, soliciting for the Venetians' right to trade in Azov to be restored. Jani Beg relented and expressed his readiness to compromise. The Venetians allied with their old enemies, the Genoese people of Kaffa, to ensure maximum success by jointly claiming compensation for the losses that they had suffered in Azov because of the conflict with the local population (the Genoese also had business in Azov). Having learned about these negotiations, Khan Jani Beg thought that the Italians were going to join against him and sent his troops to Kaffa in 1344. He embarked on the campaign on the pretext that the Genoese community of Kaffa had formally refused to give up the murderer of Khodja Omar for trial according to the Horde's law [see: 72, pp. 81–82].

However, Jani Beg had bad luck: Kaffa turned out to be a well-fortified city with a population experienced in defence, as its Genoese population had survived a number of sieges apart from the above-mentioned attacks by Nogai's, Toqta's, and Öz Beg's troops from the Golden Horde, namely, a raid by Giovanni Sorando's Venetian squadron in 1296 and an invasion by the troops of the emperor of Trebizond and the ruler of Sinop in 1313 and 1314 [see: 35, pp. 221–222]. It is no wonder that they repelled every attack and even undertook daring sallies against the besieging army. The Horde's troops suffered casualties of up to 15,000 men and lost all siege weapons during the siege and were forced to retreat [13, pp. 156, 158; 18, pp. 82–83; 72, p. 82]. While retreating, the khan unleashed his fury on another Genoese settlement, Cembalo (Balaklava), which had no fortifications but an earth mound and proved helpless in the face of the Golden Horde's army; the city was captured and burned, and its dwellers fled [see: 73, p. 320]. Nevertheless, the khan had to start peace negotiations with Genoa.

However, Jani Beg wanted revenge and resumed the siege after a year. Since his troops failed again, the khan's beklyaribek Mogul-Buga, who was commanding them, resorted to extreme measures. He was one of the first in medieval history to use a 'biological weapons': they used a catapult to throw the body of a man who had died of plague across the wall. An epidemic broke out in the cramped and not very clean city, which is only natural given the hot weather. Many of the defenders who had bravely withstood the siege and assaults fled to the
mother cities of Venice and Genoa for fear of the disease. However, some of those who fled were already infected and brought the horrible illness to Europe. That was the beginning of the plague epidemic of 1348–1349, which according to some sources wiped out up to 60% of Europe's population. It returned somewhat later, in the early 1350s, this time shattering Rus'; it was then that Grand Prince Simeon Ivanovich Gordiy died, as did many other princes and a great number of their subjects. It is remarkable that the Golden Horde itself suffered much less from the plague, as its cities were cleaner and not as densely populated, while the steppes had an even thinner population. Scholars have suggested that the people of Kaffa were able to buy off the Horde's troops, and they raised the siege [18, p. 84]. Of course, in this case, it unclear how the plague entered the city. The Trinity Chronicle contains a report on the plague in the Golden Horde itself, dated 6854 (1346): 'In the same year, God's punishment befell the people of the eastern land of the Horde, and in Ornachi, and in Sarai, and in Bezdezh, and in other cities and countries, and there was a great plague on the people, on Besermyans, and Tatars, and Ormens, and Abazas, and Jews, and Fryazes (Italians), and Circassians, and other people that lived there' [48, p. 368]. The plague had reached as far as Syria and Egypt by 1349; al-Ayni reports that up to 20,000 people were dying in Cairo daily, and a total of 2/3 of its population died [57, p. 529].

Despite the tragic effect that the siege of Kaffa had on all of Europe, Jani Beg failed to capture the city and had to retreat again. To make the defeat even worse, it was inflicted on the khan of the powerful steppe empire by a single peripheral city! Nevertheless, the khan was able to take revenge by prohibiting the Italians from trading in the Golden Horde. However, the Italian merchant republics had a powerful lobby among the khan's officials, so the prohibition was raised after a year, and they were once again able to carry out commercial operations in Jani Beg's realm. In 1347, the Venetian community of Azov received a new yarliq from the khan, under which the turnover tax alone was increased from 3% to 5% [18, pp. 104–105].

The Italians apparently did not learn anything from the khan's severity; in 1349, Jani Beg marched his troops again, this time against Azov, once again plundering the property of the Venetians, Genoese, and Pisans. But fortune did not favour Öz Beg's son this time, either; the Genoese fleet from Kaffa entered the Sea of Azov and started to bombard the khan's army, forcing him to raise the siege and conclude a peace treaty with the Italians [13, p. 161].

Another conflict between the Venetians and the Golden Horde broke out in 1353, this time outside of Jani Beg's domain. In the Mediterranean, where another Venetian-Genoese war was in progress, the Venetians boarded a Genoese galley, capturing its passengers and their belongings. Unfortunately, several merchants who were subjects of the khan of the Golden Horde were on board. One of them was killed and the rest stripped nearly naked and flung into prison. Fortunately for the Venetians, Jani Beg was busy addressing domestic issues: Russian chroniclers report that he was suppressing the rebellion of a ‘Tsar Ourdak’, which will be described below. Thus a drawn-out judicial dispute began, which was eventually ‘inherited’ by the khan's successor Berdi Beg, who faced a number of more pressing problems and chose to stay out of the proceeding by entrusting it to his grandmother Taidulla and the Crimean daruqha Temür Qutlugh. Taidullah and the official contented themselves with monetary compensation to the victims and their families—and remembered to obtain remuneration for themselves ‘for their pains’—so the offenders got a lenient punishment [18, pp. 172, 176, 185–191, 199–206, 215–217; 27, pp. 177–178].

The Venetians finally came to an understanding with Jani Beg towards the end of his rule, in 1356: the Crimean daruqha Ramadan allotted them the Crimean town Yangi-Shehr (the Venetians called it Provato) as an additional trading post, in which the former 3% tax applied [18, pp. 169–175, 181]. It is beyond doubt that the khan's ‘generosity’ to his enemies is wholly attributable to the fact that he was going to embark on the conquest of Azerbaijan and thus needed money and did not want any conflicts in his own realm.
The eastern uluses of the Golden Horde (formerly the Blue Horde), integrated into its administrative system by force, were never truly subjugated. And after the death of Tini Beg, who had been able to restore order there in the 1330s, Jani Beg was probably unable to fully control them. For example, Russian chroniclers reported in an entry dated 1352 the following: ‘Tsar Chanibek came with warriors that autumn and drove Tsar Ourdak out to the desert’ [50, pp. 63–64]. The identity of this ‘Tsar Ourdak’ remains a mystery. A number of authors identify him as Urugdaq, a descendant of Tuqay Timur (Jochi’s thirteenth son) and the grand-uncle of the future khan Toktamysh, who ruled a territory near Mangyshlak [17, pp. 57, 211–212; see also: 52, p. 61]. However, ‘Muizz’ mentions another Urgudaq, a descendant of Jochi Qasar (Chinggis Khan’s brother) and an immediate relative of the last ilkhan Tuq-Timur [23, p. 28]; the family’s land was situated in Mazandaran, so it is entirely possible that he could have fought against Jani Beg for some territory near Khwarezm. Jani Beg was powerful enough to deal with the problem, but the very fact of an armed rebellion proves that the administrative system created by Öz Beg was not very effective.

It was Jani Beg who put an end to the confrontation between the Golden Horde and Iran, which had lasted for nearly a hundred years by that time. The Ilkhanate had dissolved into several territories by the mid-1350s. The Muzaffarids, a dynasty of Persian emirs of Arab origins, also related to the Halaguids by that time, ruled Khorasan. Central Iran was controlled by members of the Turkicised Mongol Jalair clan, also related to the House of Huлагu and therefore even claiming the khan's title. The Sulduzes Shaikh Hasan Kuchak and his brother Maliq Ashraf, grandsons of emir Choban, were in power in Azerbaijan and, despite their being matrilineal descendants of the ilkhans, set up straw monarchs from the House of Chinggis Khan throughout their rule. Needless to say, the three dynasties were always at enmity. Furthermore, other Iranian dynasties ruled certain regions—the Kurts in Herat, the Injuids in Fars, the Saffarids in Sistan, and others—but their territories lay beyond the scope of the Horde's interests.

One puppet khan enthroned by Maliq Ashraf, the atabek of Azerbaijan, who had come to power in 1344, died in 1356. Before Ashraf had the chance to crown a new monarch, Jani Beg decided to take advantage of the fact that the emir did not have ‘his own’ khan, and personally marched the Golden Horde's enormous army to conquer the disputed territory. According to various reports, his troops numbered from 100,000 to 300,000 warriors, while the ruler of Azerbaijan was only able to gather 17,000–18,000. There are indications that the noblemen of Azerbaijan called for Jani Beg, as they were disaffected with their ruler Maliq Ashraf. According to Zayn ad-Din, Azerbaijani emirs complained to the khan of the Golden Horde that Ashraf was oppressive [52, p. 94]. Chinggis-name states that Ashraf was even planning to marry his own daughter [61, pp. 107–108; see also: 24, pp. 82–83]. Jani Beg's report on his victorious campaign, which he sent to Egypt following the conquest of Azerbaijan, estimated the size of his troops at 700,000 [57, p. 448].

Unlike his deceased brother Hasan Kuchak, Maliq Ashraf was a failure as a commander. He gave up mountain passes in which a handful of warriors could have impeded the advance of an entire army without a struggle. When Jani Beg's troops entered Azerbaijan, Ashraf's army scattered without even engaging in battle with the Horde's soldiers [52, p. 95; see also: 24, p. 83]. The emir tried to save his treasures, but had to give them up and save himself as warriors from the Golden Horde went in pursuit of him. Ashraf hid in the house of his adherent, Shaikh Muhammed Baligji. His ‘faithful’ supporter gave him shelter, and then sent a messenger to inform the khan of the Golden Horde that he was there. Jani Beg's emirs captured Ashraf and brought him to their ruler. A conversation took place between Jani Beg and Ashraf, during which the khan asked, ‘What was it that made you do violence, devastate the country, plunder people's property, and hurt the slaves of Allah?’ Ashraf replied, ‘That is what all rulers, leaders, and sultans did’. Jani Beg Khan ordered that Ashraf should be decapi-
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... and his head put on display on the city gate of Tabriz. According to another version, Ashraf blamed his nökers for the atrocities, saying that they would not obey him. A number of authors report that Jani Beg was reluctant to execute Ashraf, but the emirs from Azerbaijan insisted, claiming that Azerbaijan would not see peace as long as Ashraf was alive [see: 24, p. 84; 57, pp. 95–96]. Thus, after the nearly hundred-year-long war for Azerbaijan, the khans of the Golden Horde were finally able to defeat their Iranian relatives. Quite remarkably, it happened during the reign of the ‘kind’ Jani Beg, and not those of the pugnacious Berke or Öz Beg! Tabriz, Khoy, Nakhchivan, and Maragheh continued to mint coins bearing his name throughout 1356 [16, p. 201; 24, pp. 84–85]. The khans eldest son, Tsarevich Berdi Beg, was appointed vicegerent of Azerbaijan, assisted by military commander emir Akhidzhuk [1, p. 129]. Some Persian authors report that Akhidzhuk was a warrior in Maliq Ashraf's service, and then seized power in Azerbaijan when the Horde's troops left [52, pp. 95, 97]. Others refer to him as Jani Beg's vicegerent [71, p. 78].

However, the khan's triumph was not to last, for he became gravely ill during the campaign. Concealing the khan's illness from the troops, the emirs sent the monarch to Sarai in complete secrecy. The Horde's doctors failed to cure Jani Beg, and his concerned mother Taidullah sent for Metropolitan Alexius of Rus', who was known even in the Horde to be a healer. Of course the khan's mother could not say that the khan was at death's door, so she wrote in her letter that it was she who was ill, pretending that something was wrong with her eyes. This version subsequently went down in Russian chronicles [see: 17, pp. 86–87; 18, pp. 126–127; 31, p. 184].

Having learned that Jani Beg was dying, one of his influential emirs, Togla-bey, immediately informed Berdi Beg of his father's state in a letter advising him to arrive in Sarai as soon as possible if he wanted to be the new khan and not cede the throne to one of his numerous relatives. Berdi Beg followed this advice and, leaving Akhidzhuk in charge of Azerbaijan, hurried to the capital. Different sources offer different versions of what happened next. Some report that Jani Beg died before his son reached Sarai [2, p. 101; 52, pp. 96, 98]. Authors who felt a clear antipathy toward the Golden Horde and its rulers present an alternative account of events. According to their reports, 'a grave disease befell Jani Beg, and his emirs called for Berdi Beg. When Berdi Beg came to see his father, Jani Beg rebuked him for coming back. Outraged, he issued the order under which his father was killed on the 4th of Sha'ban 758 AH / 22 July 1357' [52, p. 214]. A number of medieval historians claimed that Taidullah took part in the conspiracy against Jani Beg as well [52, p. 128]. Russian chroniclers also reported that ‘The impious Tsarevich Berdi Beg came to his father deceitfully with his councilors, the tsareviches of the Horde, and strangled his father Chyanibek, son of Azbyak’ [43, p. 229]. Khan Jani Beg died on the 3rd of Sha'ban 758 AH (22 July 1357) and was buried in Saray-Jük [52, p. 214; 59, p. 81].

The death of Jani Beg in 1357 put an abrupt end to the golden age of the Golden Horde, followed by the most dramatic period in its history—a twenty-year-long Time of Troubles that nearly put the country on the verge of collapse.

Berdi Beg began neutralising his rivals for the throne as soon as his father died. Jani Beg's sons and other relatives who were descendants of Öz Beg (including even Berdi Beg's newborn brother), a total of 12 people, were killed within several days. Russian chronicles refer to them all as the killer's brothers. For instance, according to the Nikon Chronicle, ‘Berdi Beg... took the throne and killed his 12 brothers’ [43, p. 229]. The Trinity Chronicle reports: ‘In the same summer Tsar Berdi Beg was enthroned in the Horde; he killed his father and his brothers’ [48, p. 376]. It is entirely possible that the word ‘brothers’ (Russian: ‘bratiya’) here refers to not only brothers, but to other relatives and even attendants [see: 56, column 169]. Eastern authors also report that Berdi Beg killed not only his brothers, but other relatives as well [2, p. 101; 52, p. 129; 61, p. 108]. Some members of the khan's family were able to es-
cape, but they were too scared by what had happened to their relatives to confront Berdi Beg, who took the throne with no resistance.

The murderous khan took a favourable attitude to Metropolitan Alexius. He issued a yarliq to him in the first days of his rule to the effect that all benefits and privileges of the Russian clergy were restored completely. It can be assumed that Berdi Beg, whether deliberately or subconsciously, was expressing his gratitude to the metropolitan for failing to heal his father [see: 17, p. 88].

Emir Akhidzhuk, who had been left as a vicegerent in Tabriz, soon declared himself an independent ruler, attracting surviving adherents of Maliq Ashraf. However, he could not hold onto power without support from the Horde's army and was soon defeated and killed by Mubarak ad-Din Muhammad, the Muzaffarid ruler of Fars [71, pp. 78–79]. Azerbaijan had been part of the Golden Horde for less than a year when Iranian rulers won it back!

Berdi Beg died (or was killed, according to alternative reports) in 1359. He had ruled for less than two years by that time. Eastern historiography views his death as the end of Batu's line, which had been in power in the Golden Horde for about a century. Khan Abu al-Ghazi of Khiva, a historian, provided the following symbolic description of the dynastic crisis in his Genealogical Tree of the Turks: 'Birdi Beg was the end of the line of Sain Khan's children. Now the Uzbeks have the saying, “The trunk of the pomegranate tree is cut in Birdi Beg”. Those who ruled Desht-Kipchak after him were descended from other sons of Jochi Khan' [2, pp. 101–102]. As a result, on the one hand, the continuous line of rulers in which power had been passed from brother to brother or from father to son was severed. On the other hand, there remained younger representatives of Öz Beg's line who in principle had no less of a right to the throne. However, the actions of the last khangs from Batu's house, who violated numerous ordinances of Chinggis Khan, had disaffected the other Jochids and emirs, leading them to the conclusion that this branch of Batu's descendants had degenerated and needed to be replaced.

This brought about a struggle for power in the Golden Horde involving several branches of Jochi's descendants.


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[Yurgevich V.] Rasskaz Rimsko-katolicheskogo missionera Dominikanca Juliana o puteshestvii v stranu privolzhskix Vengercev, sovershennom pered 1235 godom i pis’mo papy' Venedikta XII k xanu Uzbeku, ego zhene Tajdolyu i sy’nu Dzhanibeku, v 1340 godu (Tale of the Roman Catholic missionary Dominican Julian about the trip to the country of Volga region Hungarians made before the year of 1235 and the letters of Pope Benedict XII to Khan Öz Beg, his wife Taidolu and son Jani Beg in 1340) // Zapiski Odesskogo obshhestva istorii i drevnostej. Vol. 5. 1863. Pp. 998–1006.


Chapter IV. The Golden Age of the Ulus of Jochi
§ 3. Military Science in the Golden Horde

Emil Seydaliyev

Lately, the subject of military success, arms, and the organisation of troops in the Ulus of Jochi has become increasingly attractive for scholars. Confirmation of this are the numerous conferences, round table discussions and forums dedicated to military science of the Golden Horde that have been held, as well as the large number of relevant collected studies and monographs that have appeared. Yet, a number of issues pertaining to the subject remain under-explored. These include, in particular, the military organisation of the Ulus of Jochi, the number of its troops, weapons production, and several others. To a certain extent, some of these questions can be solved through the use and comprehensive analysis of various sources: written, archaeological, ethnographical data, etc.

The military organisation of the Golden Horde was characterised by a complex structure. The beklyaribek headed the army. The following names of outstanding beklyaribeks have come down to us in sources: Nogai, Temür Qutlugh, Mamai, Edigü. Even though the khan was the head of state, it was the beklyaribeks in whose hands military power was concentrated, who also represented supreme administrative power, and who were subordinate only to the khan. In fact, beklyaribeks could often even remove and enthrone khans for their own benefit. They were also commonly known as temniks (tumenbashis)—that is, commanders of ten thousand warriors, a tumen. This is not particularlly accurate, however, as will be demonstrated below, since the number of troops controlled by a beklyaribek was much larger. The commanders-in-chief of the Golden Horde's army often remained on the sidelines during a battle. Sometimes, however, they participated directly in combat. Rashid al-Din reports that an arrow struck Nogai's eye in the battle of Aksu in 1265, and that his troops retreated to Shirvan [69, p. 99].

Characteristic of the Jochid Ulus army was the designation of a military service class chosen primarily from among the Horde's social elite. The Jochids formed its upper crust, followed by ulus begs and darugh begs, then emirs in command of thousands, hundreds, and dozens, to whom the title beg also applied [67, p. 210]. Commanders from the Jochi clan were known as oghlans on the army's right and Left wings [29, p. 410]. Therefore, most scholars agree that the organizational structure of the military consisted of a rigid hierarchy based on the decimal system, in which tens were the smallest units and a tumen of ten thousand warriors—the largest unit. Marco Polo described the military structure, providing both the names of sub-units and their numerical strength: ‘When the Tatar Tsar goes to war, he takes along a hundred thousand horsemen and arranges them as follows: he appoints a commander over ten men, another over a hundred, another over a thousand, and another over ten thousand...’, then he explains how the khan, (commander over a hundred thousand warriors), interacted with the tumenbashi (temnik), and so on down the hierarchy. Marco Polo names the numerical strength of the sub-units below: ‘A detachment of one
hundred thousand, you know, is called tut; ten thousand, toman; one thousand, min; one hundred, yuz; and ten, on’ [35, p. 256]. Ibn Battuta confirmed his report: ‘The leader of the toman is the one with 10,000 horsemen under his command’ [63, p. 299]. Sources indicate that the actual number of warriors in a unit did not always correspond to data provided by Marco Polo; it could be either larger or smaller.

The decimal principle of army organization was apparently typical of nomads at this stage in the formation of a state, when they had to mobilize the khan's subjects. Scholars believe that tumen commanders were also ulus begs and controlled a territory capable of supplying approximately ten thousand warriors, including mixed contingents. Plots of arable land awarded to vicegerents as a source of livelihood in exchange for their service—iqta—gradually evolved into appanages. These appanages provided an income for their begs, which enabled them, among other things, to maintain troops. I. Izmaylov rightfully points out that ‘the clan aristocracy not only received enormous income, but also usurped the part of the military system subordinate to it, having turned petty noblemen into their vassals, whose duty was to serve not the khan or the empire but a specific ulus beg or clan head’ [29, p. 411]. We do not observe as rigid a hierarchical structure with, for example, the Kipchaks of Eastern Europe in the pre-Mongol period: clan heads, while subordinate to the khan, also supplied troops, but their number was not so clearly regulated. When the Cumans became part of the Horde, they had to adjust to its rigid system.

Like other representatives of the Golden Horde's military aristocracy, some of them distinguished themselves by wearing distinctive military belts and other paraphernalia. According to M. Kramarovsky, such prestigious armaments and equipment were characteristic of veterans of Batu's European campaign and, apparently, some of the Cuman khans who recognized Mongol authority [38, p. 508; 39, pp. 42–43]. As concerns the Cumans, it is commonly believed that their tradition of military belts became extinct in the 12th century and then reappeared during the Mongol period: but only those who were able to make a military career among the Mongol khans might enjoy the honour. The rich Cuman burials of Rotmistrovka, Lipovtsy, Taganchi and others, serve as proof of this: they contain a full range of military equipment, but no belt adornments. Yet, such a belt was found in a noble Cuman's burial near Novopidkryazh village in the Middle Oril Region [41, pp. 93–94]. Archaeological records also provide a clear insight into the social stratification of the Horde's army. Burials where the deceased warrior is surrounded not only by belt sets, but also by ornate weapons and protective equipment probably belong to commanders. These collections were often complete and included long-range weapons, as well as sabers, human and horse armour, and others.

Common soldiers were buried with a minimum of armaments (bows, several arrows, and close combat weapons). Each military contingent had maintenance personnel who not only acted as servants, but were also employed in trade and repair work. According to I. Izmaylov, there were at least two servants per mounted warrior [29, p. 411]. Thus, we can conclude that conscription was practiced by the Golden Horde's army, as earlier nomadic communities had done. Certain principles pertaining to the formation of military contingents were observed. It was typical for warriors to provide themselves with whatever they needed for campaigns. However, the army of the Ulus of Jochi was permanently on alert, and was regulated by regular military inspections and training sessions. Such inspections could take place upon the khan's enthronement, on important holidays or gatherings of aristocrats (quriltai), as reported by the aforementioned Ibn Battuta [63, p. 299].

Military exercises and warrior training deserve more than a passing mention. Since each male nomad was a warrior, it is appropriate to focus special attention on military science. First and foremost, nomads learned archery. From childhood each of them would participate in the hunt using a bow and arrow, as well as a lasso. Giovanni da Pian del Carpine reported
that male nomads were ‘from time to time in charge of the herds, also engaging in hunting and shooting exercises. This is why they are excellent archers, and their children begin to ride on horseback at the young age of two or three. They receive a bow when they have grown up a little’. [57, p. 37]. He also mentioned the women, who could ‘ride horses as artfully as men. We also noticed that they carry quivers and bows’ [57, p. 37]. Guillaume Le Vasseur de Beauplan reported that the Tatars begin to teach their children archery from the age of seven and send them to war at 12. Beauplan also pays particular attention to their physical conditioning and endurance, which Tatar warriors were likewise taught beginning in childhood [13, p. 215].

Modern ethnographic data provides an insight into military training as practiced by Turkic nomads. L. Yermolenko, while describing the ancient Turks' notion of war, provides information on riding competitions among Central Asian peoples, such as the Kazakhs, the Kirghiz, the Uzbeks, the Turkmen, and others. The so-called ‘goat grabbing game’ or kukburi, was common on holidays, at weddings and funerals. A ram's or goat's carcass would be thrown into a crowd of horsemen. The one who got hold of the carcass and brought it to the appointed place, while leaving behind his rivals, won. Competitors were often maimed or killed during such competitions. Both boys and adolescents played a similar game. It was called ‘ok sunak’ (white bone) or ‘sunak otdi’ (bone throwing). A bone would be thrown into a crowd of players on a moonlit night. The first player to find it would then cry out. The rest would then jump on him, grab the bone and bring it to their ‘elder’ at a specific place. These games represent unarmed struggle over an animal. Scholars believe that players at such competitions equated themselves with wolves and the animal carcass or the bone with their prey [23, pp. 26–27].

In both the children's competition and the adult game they imitated the wolf's behavior as a hunter and fighter, an image much desired by all warriors in the tribe. One feature of Turkic ‘men's unions of wolves’, which aimed to provide warrior training, was the ritual known as ‘barymta’, or cattle-lifting. It was neither theft nor robbery. Three days before the attack a warning would be given. Such raids could take place either in daylight or at night [23, pp. 28–29]. These traditions and peculiar practices are characteristic of modern Turkic peoples whose ancestors were the medieval nomads of Eurasia; they provide us with insight into the traditional military education or Pecheneg and Cuman youth. It is possible to draw a parallel between the institution of ‘men's unions of wolves’ and certain practices in Cuman society when, for instance, Khan Bonyak would howl like a wolf to attract victory before a battle [30, p. 170]. Such competitions were also meant to instill fighting qualities in the younger generation, in warriors and hunters.

Moreover, the hunt could be interpreted not only as a means of obtaining food or other provisions, but also as a raid. S. Pletnyova rightfully pointed out that ‘the second important function of hunting was military training for everyone from the khan to the common soldier...’ A hunting was an opportunity for the most courageous warriors, excellent archers, horsemen and commanders to stand out [55, p. 137]. Combat and hunting revealed the strongest and most gifted members of society, thereby determining hierarchic relations in nomadic communities.

Competitions among warriors often took place during inspections. For instance, Ibn Battuta reported that during an inspection ‘targets were put up for each toman commander... Something like an ambon was arranged for each emir so that he could sit while his people were having fun in front of him’ [63, pp. 298–299]. Giosafat Barbaro also provides a detailed description of such competitions [5, pp. 155–156]. The Venetian traveler's notes shed light not only on the skills of Tatar warriors, but also on their bravery: ‘The warriors are very valiant and brave, so much so that some of them, for their excellence, are called "tulubagator", which means "a valiant fool"'. The same author reported how five warriors from the Horde drove off
a hundred Circassians [5, pp. 146–147]. Marco Polo shared similar impressions of the Tatars' valor [35, p. 81]. The Kipchaks, who were without a doubt part of the Golden Horde's army, were also characterised by the Egyptian sultan's secretary, al-Omari, in the 14th century as: ‘...one of the best Turkic clans in terms of their reliability, valor, honesty, their perfect and beautiful figures, and their nobility of character. They comprise the majority of the Egyptian army, as Egypt's sultans and emirs are their descendants [63, p. 232].

No exact and accurate data on the number of troops in the Golden Horde is available. Information on this differs depending on the source. Al-Qalqashandi and other Arab authors described the size of Tatar troops in general terms: ‘the troops are so numerous that they cannot be counted’. The author mentioned below that ‘... (the khan) sent one of each dozen (warriors) against him. And the number of warriors counted reached 250,000’ [19, p. 299]. Moroccan Ibn Battuta reported Khan Öz Beg to have gathered 17 emirs: ‘17 such temniks were present, having under their command 170 thousand; but his (the khan's) army is larger than that’ [63, p. 299]. As we can see, the traveler here confirms that each emir commanded 10,000 horsemen, that is, a tumen. Rashid al-Din reports that in 1262 Berke Khan sent Nogai at the head of a thirteen thousand detachment against Hulagu Khan. In 1264–1265, Nogai embarked on another campaign, leading a Vanguard detachment with 50 thousand reinforcements under Suntay's command against the Hulaguids [63, p. 152]. Rashid al-Din calls Nogai's detachment a 'complete army', but immediately adds that Berke brought 300 thousand warriors to aid Nogai [69, p. 99].

At the present time, it is impossible to state how large the army actually was. I. Izmaylov rightfully points out that names for units such as tumen, thousands, hundreds, and dozens in fact referred not to the actual number of forces, but to those available, in principle, for possible ‘mobilisation’. In any case, the largest unit was the tumen, which consisted of approximately 10 thousand mounted warriors, although corps of 3–4 tumens could be formed depending on the mission [29, p. 416]. Populations of dependent states might also have contributed to the composition of the Golden Horde's army. For instance, sources report that Nogai was killed by ‘a Russian from Toqta's troops’ [63, p. 114], while M. Kramarovsky, in his discussion of burial complexes, demonstrates the Mordvin princes' close connection with the house of Batu: this may indicate that the Horde's army contained a Mordvin contingent [41, pp. 106–119].

There was a direct connection between the structure of the army and its division into branches. Central to the Mongol troops, as well as to other nomadic armies, was the infantry. Composed of military and service class nobility, it was the most privileged group within the army. I. Izmaylov emphasizes that noblemen owned taller horses with better pedigrees as compared to the ordinary steppe horses of common warriors [29, p. 418]. It was typical for a horseman to have several replacement horses, a number of attendants, and a special set of armaments. Noblemen formed the armour-clad cavalry, armed with special close combat, armour-piercing weapons such as pikes, six-flanged maces, and war hammers, as well as powerful protective equipment—Scale Armour, Baidana, Kuyak armour (Brigandine), etc. M. Gorelik provided an example of such armour-clad warriors based upon reference to archaeological materials published by V. Chkhaidze and I. Druzhinina [17, pp. 110–125; 71, pp. 137–145]. Such heavily-armed cavalry enabled the Mongols to employ battering rams attacks with spears in battle.

Light-armed horsemen were numerically prevalent. Their set of weapons and equipment is harder to determine. Their main weapons were, without a doubt, projectiles such as bow and arrows, axes and fighting knives. Edged and long-poled weapons (spears) were less common. This type of warrior used a lightweight shield, as well as leather armour and a helmet for protection. Such warriors formed the basis of light archer detachments. They were widely employed on the battlefield: they would initiate combat, chase the enemy when neces-
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Sary, protect the army's flanks, and could encircle their opponents. Light archer detachments also served as patrols and advance guards, thus providing security.

Almost unknown are reports of infantry being employed in the Golden Horde's army; even if it was, it would have played only an auxiliary role. The infantry might have been responsible for engineering, field camp security, etc. Wherever a city had to be assaulted or besieged, dismounted horsemen were used. Marco Polo described a situation when unmoun-
ed horsemen shot elephants with bows: ‘Upon seeing this, the Tatars became furious and did not know what to do; they realised that they would all die unless they were able to lead their horses forward. However, they found a clever solution: seeing that the horses were scared, they dismounted, hid their horses in the woods, and tied them to trees. Then they grabbed their bows, nocked their arrows, and began to shoot at the elephants. They were excellent archers and wounded the elephants gravely. The Tsar's warriors did not stop shooting and kept attacking them fiercely, but the Tatars were better at combat than the enemy and defended themselves bravely... Seeing the elephants run away, the Tatars mounted their horses at once and galloped at the Tsar's army; there began a ferocious skirmish...’ [36, pp. 142–143]. Nevertheless, it should be noted that infantry was not typical of the Golden Horde's army, and that they were, in all probability, mercenaries.

It was uncharacteristic for the army of the Ulus of Jochi to have a fleet. It was not until the second half of the 14th century in the Bulgarian Ulus that the formation of a river fleet began to be continued in the time of the Khanate of Kazan [29, p. 420]. In the rest of the territory no fleet ever developed, even at a later period in the Crimean Khanate, which had access to the sea.

The nomads used various assault equipment during the siege of a city, which they generally wanted to be short. The ram and throwing weapons enabled them to break city gates and walls. Setting fire to them was another common tactic. Not only flaming arrows but specialised equipment was used for this. To quote a chronicle, 'The impious, and godless, and thrice-cursed Konchak came with innumerable Cumans; he attacked Rus' because he wanted to occupy Russian cities and set them on fire; they found a Besurman (i.e. Moslem) man who could shoot live fire; they had tight crossbows that 50 men could hardly pulling’ [30, p. 435]. The chronicle dates the event from 1184. This means that the nomads had projectile devices that shot shells filled with an oil-based liquid, which a Muslim operated.

The Lay of Igor's Campaign also reports such equipment to have been used. P. Melioransky pointed out places in the The Tale where devices and substances for the application of ‘live’ fire are enumerated [8, p. 402, 404]. He identified širišär to be the Persian tir-i-čarh, meaning an arrow of a shell—čarh, while associating the Persian term specifically with crossbows. The scholar interpreted smaga as oil. A large number of Persian and Arab sources mention such equipment. We can see them in Ancient Russian miniatures that depict the cities occupied by Mongols [73, pp. 70–71]. It is entirely possible that the Cumans borrowed this type of siege weaponry from their eastern neighbours inhabiting Central Asian or Caucasian cities. It is also possible that the Muslim maintaining this equipment came from there. S. Shkolyar provides some information regarding China's employment of 'Muslim' experts in throwing weapons [72, pp. 222–228]. Scholars are far from agreeing on the design and origin of this weapon at present [49, p. 250]. Beginning in the 1230s, Ancient Russian chronicles mentioned weapons know as ‘poroks’ and used to assault cities. P. Tolochko believes that they came into use when the Mongols came to Eastern Europe [65, p. 445], which agrees with the date of the first chronicle mentions of ‘poroks’. Providing evidence that throwing weapons were used in Rus' from 1206, M. Ivanuts remarked that it could have been used before [31, p. 44].

Fire artillery gradually replaced throwing weapons, though the two categories co-existed in a number of cases [29, p. 421]. The Tatars adopted fire artillery into their military
in the 14th century. The 15th century was its golden age. Lightweight *tufeng* cannons were used to siege and defend fortresses. It was a small-calibre lightweight weapon. Manual *tufeng* also existed. Cannons began to change in the 15th century; bombards, mortars, and other weapons for throwing large and heavy cannonball came into use. Early cannonballs were made of stone, while later versions were cast of bronze or cast iron. Such projectiles could break stone walls. During the early stage, cannons were made of iron strips riveted together; cast iron was used for the production of later cannons, which increased their efficiency. Firearms became more diverse in the 15th century due to manual bombards for shooting lead balls [29, p. 421].

A number of written sources present information, though incomplete, on the military campaign strategy and tactics of the Golden Horde's army. Those include Ancient Russian chronicles, Eastern authors, and West-European travellers. A comprehensive analysis of the sources reveals certain features of the Tatars' strategy as well as the tactics that their commanders used. As noted by scholars and indicated in sources, military strategy and tactics depended on where the Khans directed their eyes and policies. The Golden Horde as a state ceased to expand with new land at some point, confining itself to levying tribute on subordinated territories.

As A. Kushkumbaev rightly pointed out, Mongols planned all of their large-scale military operations in great detail and beforehand. It was typical to start planning a war in spring [43, pp. 41–42]. Most military operations took place in summer or autumn, when harvesting was finished, so that there was enough to plunder. Besides, the nomads' horses were especially fit and endurable in campaigns after the summer season. Of great relevance is the following mention in Robert de Clari's *Conquest of Constantinople*: ‘...In winter, when they are planning to embark on a campaign, they go out of their tents and leave their country’ [61, p. 47]. Even though this refers to Cumans, we can assume that it applied to the Golden Horde to some extent. When all strategically critical operations had been meticulously planned and discussed among the high command, the khans approved them at a quriltai: ‘After a big quriltai, he sent Kublai Qa'an to the realm of Khitai and the above countries and assigned troops to him, and sent Hulagu Khan, with consent of all the relatives, to the land of Iran...’ [69, p. 26].

Great importance was attached to military and political reconnaissance. The Western campaign can be interpreted as a case of military reconnaissance. The army of the Ulus of Jochi consequently carried out active operations in Western Rus' and Central European countries. For example, in 1243 it embarked on a campaign to the Tsardom of Rus'; Poland and Lithuania were the next to suffer blows from Batu's troops. A series of strategic actions was taken against the Hulaguids. For instance, Nogai's campaigns against Byzantium were aimed at sidelining the allies of the Hulaguid Iran. As the result, the Eastern Roman Empire hardly interfered with the Jochids' conflict with Iran. Despite a number of differences in means of war depending on the direction, the military organisation of the Golden Horde generally determined a uniform strategy. The strategy consisted in direct blows and blitzkrieg. The troops consisting of noble horsemen required considerable funds, so plunder in successful campaigns was integral to military operations as it helped maintain the army. It was not common to declare war before undertaking a raid; the Mongols preferred to attack the enemy's camp where no men were there, either in the dark or at dawn [51, p. 94].

The nomads generally tried to ruin cities and settlements, set them on fire, and plunder as much as possible. Where the nomads had the military initiative, they wanted to advance deep into the enemy's territory and undermine its defensive capacity. This was usually implemented with great efficiency, especially if the attacks were sudden and the enemy was less mobile than the nomads and had no advantages in terms of cavalry. Where the nomads did not feel superior to the enemy, they tried to find a peaceful solution, limiting themselves to levy-
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ing a tribute on the enemy [59, p. 205]. In case the nomads hesitated to take a direct approach to the enemy, they could decide for a sudden attack, which tactic was known as ‘izgon’. In this case they advanced deep into the neighbouring peoples’ territory and to undertake a series of short and devastating raids. Such attacks were often carried out by large detachments [59, p. 206; 51, pp. 92–93]. During each raid, the nomads sent reconnaissance men ahead to find out how large and prepared to repel the attack the enemy’s forces were and how likely they were to attack from an unexpected direction [60, p. 87; 77, pp. 69–85]. Marcin Broniowski mentioned it several times that the Crimean Khan would send his best warriors ahead during military campaigns so that they could find out the size of the enemy’s forces and their location before he attacked [46].

Taking into account the fact that the Golden Horde had the strongest, very well-trained and excellently armed army throughout its existence, it hardly needed to carry out defensive operations [29, p. 424]. In case of possible or actual intervention, however, they could use the following strategy: the nomads either vanished into the steppe or accepted a battle after drawing the enemy deep into the steppe through a series of feigned retreats [51, p. 98; 53, pp. 291–292]. Yet, as noted by A. Kushkumbaev, Toktamysh did not attempt to use the strategy of long retreats and wearing down of the enemy during the invasion of Timur’s army in 1391 since he could not rely on the fortifications of Golden Horde cities [43, p. 62].

Combat tactics as well as strategy were determined primarily by the specific structure of the Golden Horde’s army. Scholars have been able to largely reconstruct them from written sources. An increased interest in the military art of the Ulus of Jochi has brought about more works on it lately. Among them, articles by M. Gorelik, I. Izmaylov, Yu. Khudyakov, L. Bobrov, and A. Kushkumbaev are of special importance [15; 29; 42; 43; 77]. Tactics refers to battle orders, field combat techniques, siege and defensive warfare, reconnaissance, offensive warfare and stratagems, transferring troops to the place of the battle and preparations for it, overcoming obstacles (e.g. assault river crossing), and military camping.

The Golden Horde’s army was arranged as follows in the battles: vanguards, two wings, centre, and reserve. I. Izmaylov provided detailed information on the battle order of Tatar troops; he also classified all parts thereof within a system of five or seven detachments. The corps—kuls—were called vanguard (ertoul) or wings (baraunkar and jaounqar) depending on their position within the order; no specific terms for the centre and the reserve have come down to us. The heptamerous structure also included a vanguard, known as karaul, flange guard (kangul), sometimes also a rear guard (surgavy’l) [29, p. 424].

A number of sources prove it. For instance, Sharaf ad-DīnʿAlī Yazdī described the confrontation between Timur and Toktamysh in his Books of Victories: ‘He (Timur—Author) arranged 7 corps (kuls) in such a way that nobody had ever seen or heard of. Such thoughts can (only) result from divine prompting and support of Heaven, for there is many a mystery behind the special nature of the number 7, which only those familiar with the 7 verses (of the Quran) can fathom. He embellished one of the corps with the name of Sultan-Mahmud Khan; it consisted entirely of men of war, who were brave and knew how to use a sword. He appointed Emir Suleyman Shah its commander. Having established the main corps, he entrusted it to Tsarevich Muhammad Sultan and reinforced its sides and edges with brave men who smote lions and experienced soldiers who broke the (enemy’s) ranks. He left for himself 20 koshuns of valiant men by choosing brave men and soldiers who broke ranks from among the army and took his place behind the main corps in order to be prepared to help and alert in case any part of his victorious army needed reinforcement when the brave men of both parties came to blows. He built another corps on the Right wing, which he embellished with the victorious banner of Murza Miranshah; Tsarevich Muhammad Sultan Shah was at the front and ready to combat using trench shields and gabions. Emir Hajji-Seif-al-din with well-ordered troops and reinforcement, who were ready to sacrifice themselves at a moment of (demonstra-
tion of) courage, stood at the extreme flange (kanbul) of the Right wing. Timur formed another corps in the Left wing, which he entrusted to Murza Omar Sheikh, and at the extreme flange of the Left wing Berdi Beg-i-Sarbuka and Khudadad Hussaini with a detachment of courageous men came to blows with the enemy bravely. Having taken their places, the emirs of the right and Left wings—temniks, thousand heads, and (emirs) of koshuns, ranked according to the battle order, and both dismounted and mounted warriors prepared for the battle, holding their shields in front of them. Security posts were approaching from the other side. Khan Toktamysh embellished the centre and flanks with the tsareviches of Jochid clan, such as Tash Timur Oghlan, Bek-Yariq Oghlan, Ilygmysh Oghlan, Beg Pulad Oghlan, Ali Oghlan, Chente Oghlan, and others, as well as emirs noyons such as Ali, Suleyman Sufi Khungirat, Nawruz Khungirat, Aktau, Ak Buga, Uruschuk Kiyat, Hasan Beg Sarai, Kuke Buga, Yagli bei Bakhrin, Kungur Bey, and other emirs and commanders of the Ulus of Jochi; he brought them there in a column (yasal) [64, pp. 167–168].

Detachment flags and ‘nakar’ drums were used to manage troops during battles. Marco Polo described the beginning of a battle. He wrote, ‘The Tatars dare not start a battle until the nakar of their leader begins to beats; as soon as it does, they start a battle. The Tatars have the following tradition: When preparing for a battle, they sing softly and play dichords; they sing, play, and have fun, waiting for the battle until the nakar begins to beat. Both parties are prepared and waiting, as is the custom, for the nakar to beat and the battle to begin... The nakar started to beat, and the people immediately rushed to...’ [35, p. 92]. It is a common opinion in literature that Tatar military commanders could control battles with the help of special whistling arrows. A hollow bone whistler with special holes was attached to the shaft of the arrow under the arrowheads, producing a shrill whistle when the arrow was shot. Messengers were also used to pass on orders and instructions [42, p. 27].

Each kul or koshun (a smaller detachment within a kul) had specific combat functions. The centre was expected to hold the entire army; as we can see from Yazdi's report above, the main corps was fortified with ‘trench shields and gabions’ [64, p. 168]. Among its other purposes, the centre immobilised the enemy while the flank detachments attacked the enemy's flanks and could circumvent it.

Marco Polo provided a detailed description of a battle. He wrote, ‘The nakar started to beat, and the people rushed immediately... They grabbed their bows and bega shooting arrows... They threw as many arrows as they had; there were many dead and mortally wounded ones... They ran out of arrows, hid their bows in bow cases, grabbed their swords and clubs, and set off’ [36, p. 102]. It can be inferred that Tatar military clashes occurred in two stages: namely remote combat with the help of the bow and arrows and a close combat using pole and edged weapons.

Sources describing the beginning of a battle involving the armies of the Golden Horde and its successors, the Tatar Khanates, mention another characteristic feature. Marco Polo described the tactics as follows: ‘When fighting against the enemy, the Tatars do not get off their horses but ride around and shoot’ [36, p. 276]. The description in Sigismund von Herberstein's Notes on Muscovite Affairs provides more details: ‘Their weapons are bows and arrows; a sword is rarely found amongst them. They begin the battle with the enemy from a distance and very bravely, though do not stand it for long, and make a feigned flight. When the enemy begins pursuing them, [at the first opportunity] the Tatars start firing back at them with arrows; then, having suddenly turned the horses, attack the disordered lines of the enemy. When a battle is to be fought upon their native plains, and they have the enemy within arrows' flight, they do not enter into the engagement in regular battle-array, but draw out their forces into a winding circle, so as to afford themselves a freer and more certain opportunity of discharging their weapons at the enemy. They observe a wonderful degree of order, both in
advancing and retreating... This battle technique is known as ‘dancing’ because it resembles it...” [9, p. 168].

Herberstein’s contemporary Michalo Lituanus reported that the Tatars ‘are always the first to enter a battle, trying to occupy the enemy’s left flank to make shooting easier’ [48]. Their successor Guillaume Le Vasseur de Beauplan also stated that the Tatars used the bow and arrows at the beginning of the battle. He claimed that the Crimean troops used this technique against the Poles until the latter were exhausted and then, feeling strong enough to ‘fight with a sword’, forced the Poles to retreat [13, pp. 243–245, 251]. M. Gorelik suggested the term ‘carousel’ for the technique. Besides, he determined the most efficient shooting position to be the forward side and to the side backward, reporting today’s Kirghiz people to use these techniques for mounted shooting [15, p. 157]. A. Kushkumbaev and L. Bobrov rightfully point out that, efficient as it was, the carousel technique was also vulnerable to rapid and unexpected attacks by the enemy or in case of the leader’s mistake or death, which is confirmed by S. Herberstein’s [42, p. 9]. Apart from this technique, attacks in small groups of mounted archers were used; they were able to reform for an attack quickly and make larger units depending on the combat situation.

As has been shown above, the Tatars resorted to attacks by dismounted archers as described by Marco Polo. Chinese authors confirm his report: ‘In general, [the Black Tatars] use dismounted order in regular [formation] and use cavalry in extended [formation]’ [27, p. 68]. Zakhir ad-Din Muhammad Babur reported another tactic: ‘When the ranks had got to close quarters, the enemies began to advance the edge of their right flank into our rear area; I turned around so that my front was facing them, and our vanguard, to which all the Yigits who had seen battles and fought with swords had been assigned, was at the right hand; there was not a single man in front of them. We eventually repelled the attack of the enemies that had advanced forced them towards the centre [of their army]; some old noblemen of Shaybani Khan even told Shaybani Khan, ‘We have to retreat; the time to stand is over,’ but he stood there firmly. Having driven back out left flank, the enemy’s right flank subverted our troops. Since our vanguard was left on the right hand, our front was uncovered. The enemy’s people attacked us at the front and in the rear and began to shoot arrows... Those men who had circumvented us were close too and started to shoot arrows right at our banner; they were attacking us at the front and in the rear, and our people reeled back. This ‘tulgama’ is the great martial art of the Uzbek people. There is no battle without tulgama’ [4, p. 107].

Feigned retreat combined with ambushing was a very widespread tactic. While the main body was lying in ambush, the vanguard retreated rapidly after showering arrows on the enemy; seeing them fly in the heat of combat, the enemy chased them to be attacked by the main body. Marco Polo: ‘This is how they defeat their enemies in battles: they are not ashamed to fly. When in flight, they turn back and shoot. They have taught their horses to turn round like dogs. When driven away, they fight wonderfully on the run, as if they stood face to face with the enemy; they fly and turn back for a well-aimed shoot, killing both the enemy’s horses and men; the enemy believes them to be upset and defeated and loses because its horses are all killed and many of its men are dead. Seeing that they have killed many horses and men of the enemy, the Tatars turn back and fight well, crushing the enemy bravely and defeating it. This is how they won many battles and conquered many nations’ [36, p. 91]. The retreat could last for several days in a row; when the enemy overextended its troops and dropped its guard, the Tatars would strike a sudden blow.

A number of authors mention the tactics described by the German historian of the late 15th century A Cranz, which was used by Russian warriors, who ‘come in large lines, throw spears, and fight with swords and sabres’. This technique most likely was borrowed from the Tatars [32, p. 14; 15, p. 158; 29, p. 427]. At the second stage, the Horde's heavily armed warriors could undertake a ram attack with spears. According to Yu. Khudyakov, the heavily-
armed armour-clad cavalry entered the battle when the outcome was clear and they had to suppress the enemy's centres of resistance [42, p. 18]. Those were the key steppe combat tactics practices by troops of the Ulus of Jochi. Other tactics could be used depending on the situation [42, pp. 7–20].

*The Siege and Defence of Cities*

Troops of the Golden Horde generally preferred open terrain combat. Yet, they sometimes had to besiege and assault fortified cities. Various siege equipment, projectile weapons, and fire artillery were used in such cases. Where assault could be avoided, the Tatars tried to occupy the city by merely threatening the enemy with a storm and thus forcing it to surrender without a struggle. It should be noted that I. Izmaylov rightfully pointed out, that the city siege and defence tactics did not play any major role in the development of military art in the Ulus of Jochi [29, p. 431].

*The Nomadic Army on The Move - Military Camp - River Crossings*

Despite their high mobility and being constantly on alert for another campaign, the Horde's troops always placed special importance on preparation. Tactica Leontis describes the nomads as follows: 'They are accustomed to heat, cold, and all the other deprivations of comfort the nomads have to endure', mentioning below that 'they are accompanied by much cattle—stallions and mares, which they use both to feed on their meat and milk and to demonstrate how numerous they are' [44, pp. 275, 276]. When describing the army of the Ulus of Jochi, which included Kipchaks, I. Izmaylov quoted Arab sources on how the warriors prepared for campaigns: ‘Each of their horsemen was always accompanied by two servants, thirty head of sheep, five head of horses, two copper pots, and a cart’. In the same place he provided quotes on the high endurance of nomadic warriors during long passages, their swiftness and quickness [28, p. 8]. Speaking of the organisation of Cuman campaigns, Robert de Clari reported, ‘Each of them has ten or twelve horses; they have tamed them so well that the horses follow them wherever they lead them, and they ride their horses alternately... so they never stop advancing, whether during the day or at night. They move so fast that they cover a six, or seven, or eight days' passage within one night and one day. While advancing this way, they never chase anybody, nor do they plunder until they turn back; it is on their way back that they plunder, capture prisoners, and take whatever they can get’ [61, p. 47]. Michalo Lituanus and Guillaume Le Vasseur de Beauplan provided similar information on the Tatars; they also reported the 16–17th centuries' nomads to have about five replacement horses and travel quickly [48; 13, pp. 229–231].

The treatise by Leo VI the Wise contains a description of how the nomads arranged their military camps. He wrote, ‘They do not camp like the Romans do but stay divided into clans and tribes until the day of the battle; they leave their horses at pasture, unattended, both in summer and in winter. When the day of the battle comes, they catch the horses they need and keep them corralled near the Turks' tents until they are to form the battle order, which they begin at night. They place their vigiliae at a large distance from each other so that it is not easy to attack them suddenly’ [44, p. 276]. It can be inferred from this report that the nomads posted a guard around their camp. The Cumans also made camps of vezhas or kibitkas—that is, small structures mounted on a cart or wagon. Giovanni da Pian del Carpine described them as follows: ‘Their camps are rounds, made to resemble a tent of rods and thin sticks. Up in the middle of the camp there is a round window to let in light and let out smoke, because they always have a fire in the middle. Walls and roofs are covered with felt; doors are made of felt, too. Giovanni da Pian del Carpine also mentioned the carts: ‘Some (of dwellings) are easy to disassemble, repair, and transport on pack animals, while others cannot be disassembled but can be carried on carts’. William of Rubruck described the dwellings in similar terms: ‘The logs of his house are rods converging at the top to form a small wheel, from which a neck resembling a chimney protrudes upward; they cover it with white felt’ [57, pp. 27–28, 90].
It is possible that the Kipchaks, already being part of the Ulus of Jochi and supplying warriors for its army, maintained their camping traditions. Marco Polo made several mentions of the Tatar military camp: ‘When Berca had finished his preparation and gathered his people, he found out that Alau along with his troops had set out on a campaign; he decided to keep up with him and started immediately. He travelled until on a large plain, where his enemy was awaiting him; he made a camp about ten miles away from Alau. His camp was as good as that of Alau and no less rich; there were rich tents of golden cloth; indeed, nobody had seen a more beautiful camp and a richer one before... Nogai and his people arrived before two days had passed since Toqtai’s arrival on the plain and arranged his camp in perfect order ten miles away from his enemy. When the camp had been set up, there were many beautiful installations of golden cloth and wonderful tents to be seen; it was clear that it was the camp of a rich Tsar; Toqtai’s camp was no worse and no poorer but better and richer; there were miraculously rich installations and rich tents’ [36, pp. 228, 234]. The Khan’s tent was apparently separated from the rest of the camp and guarded by special detachments [77, pp. 32–33].

The nomads could easily overcome water obstacles during long passages. The Byzantine historian Niketas Choniates reported, ‘In order to cross a river, the Scythians use leather bags stuffed with straw and so well-made that not a single drop of water can leak into them. The Scythian mounts his horse and sits on a bag like this, which he ties to the horse's tail; he puts the saddle and all the munitions over it so that he can use the horse like a ship uses its sail to easily cross the Danube in its full breadth ’ [52]. The Jewish traveller, Rabi Petachiah of Regensburg confirms this report: ‘The dwellers of this land have no ships, but they sew together up to ten stretched horse skins, attach a single strap around their edges, and sit on the skins with all their carts and possessions; then they tie the ends of the skins to horses' tails using straps and make the horses swim, thereby crossing the river’. He also described the nomads' diet during military campaigns: ‘They eat not bread here but only rice and millet cooked in milk as well as milk and cheese. As for meat, the Kedars put it under the saddle of a horse and make it gallop until it sweats; when the meat is warm, they eat it as it is’ [66, pp. 264].

I. Izmaylov noted that all steppe battle breeders were very undemanding during campaigns, referring to reports of Marco Polo and Giosafat Barbaro regarding the Tatars [28, p. 8]. V. Ushnitsky provides evidence that horse meat and koumiss were the key staples of the Kipchak diet, also drawing up on ethnographic parallels [68, p. 60]. Authors of the 16th and 17th centuries described the ways in which the Crimean Tatars and Nogais overcame water obstacles. Michalo Lituanus writes: ‘Rapid deep rivers, which produce awful cracking sounds in the North during the severe winter time as ice breaks on them and are hard to cross, they overcome without ships but on horses only; they hold their manes while doing so; they tie bags to their horses, [which they put] on wooden boards or bunches of reeds to cross the river without delay, easily and quickly’ [48]; Guillaume Le Vasseur de Beauplan gave a very similar account of the Tatars' crossing of the Borysthenes [13, pp. 251–255].

Military architecture in cities of the Golden Horde is an issue that deserves to be studied in detail. Scholars associate different patterns of city planning with different regions within the Ulus of Jochi. A number of Golden Horde cities were founded in the pre-Mongol period and continued to develop. Those were mostly situated in the Crimea, Bulgaria, and Khwarezm. In the central regions of the state the new cities appeared: Sarai, Ukek, Majar, Sarai-al-Jadid, etc. Some inner cities were unfortified, while others had constantly developing fortifications from the pre-Mongol period. It is clear that nothing posed a danger to the new cities arising in the Empire's inland, so they were generally left unfortified. In contrast to them, urban centres in border areas could be threatened by neighbouring countries and nations and were consequently surrounded with defensive barrows and moats, defensive walls and towers. Ancient towns in the Volga Region pertaining to different periods are characterised by barrows and moats, some of which date back to the pre-Mongol period. Scholars report that dur-
ing the period of Great Troubles defensive belts were made even for cities which had existed without such fortifications. For example, barrows began to appear at the Tsarevskoye archaeological site and Old Orhei in the second half of the 14th century. At the same time barrows, a moat, wooden walls, and towers were built at the Bulgar archaeological site [20, p. 408].

The situation was different in another region of the Ulus of Jochi, namely in the Crimea. Since large commercial ports and pre-Mongol cities already existed in the Crimea and a local tradition had been established in military architecture, the only fortified city to emerge in the Golden Horde period was the capital of the Crimean yurt, the city of Qırım (Solkhat, Eski Qırım, presently Stary Krym). Speaking of pre-Mongol fortified centres on the Crimean Peninsula, it should be noted that following Nogai's campaign in the late 13th century, life in Tepe-Kermen, Eski-Kermen, and Suiren was diminished and they likely lost their fortifications; Sudak and Aluston were robbed; Qırq Yer was robbed (occupied?) [40, p. 439, 11, pp. 55–56]. In the opinion of A. Herzen, the Principality of Theodoro arose in the southwestern Crimea in the latter half of the 14th century, whose centre on Mount Mangup was surrounded by three rows of defensive walls [10, pp. 138]. The emirs of Solkhat, Mangup, and Qırq Yer participated in the Battle of Blue Waters against the Duke Vytautas of Lithuania in 1362/1363, which M. Kramarovsky interpreted to indicate segmented power in the ‘Crimean Ulus’ and the Golden's Horde undoubted control over the aforementioned cities and fortresses [40, p. 439, 442].

An Armenian source reports the construction of Solkhat-Qırım's first fortifications in the form of moats and barrows to have begun. The entry is dated 1363. It was recorded by an eyewitness who lived in the Armenian quarter of Solkhat, known as Chxbnis (Upper). He has been identified as a son of the Crimea's miniaturist and calligraph Nater of Bayburt1, scribe Stepanos from the scriptorium of the Church of Saint Sargis. Below is a translated excerpt from the 1363 text according to the Catalogue of the Armenian manuscripts in the British museum: ‘...Earthly rulers cause great tumult because there is no tsar at the head of them to create peace as the Lord said, “any kingdom divided against itself will be ruined”, and now the head of the city is making a moat around the city. He is razing to the ground many houses, and the devastation is innumerable, and everyone is in fear’ [74, p. 248]. These lines by Stepanos omit to name the head of the city who ordered the construction of the moat; neither the opponent nor the cause of the event that horrified the people of Solkhat is mentioned. Remnants of the medieval moat and barrows were discovered during conservation archaeological studies near the city Eski Qırım in 2011. The barrows had been heavily damaged by ploughing for vineyards; the surviving part reached 0.7 m above the natural ground surface. Seven metres east of its maximum surviving height point, remnants of a moat about 9 m wide and up to 3.1 m deep from the current surface level with traces of an obstacle made of stones at its base. Scholars date the material discovered at the site within the latter half of the 14th century, thus attributing the earthworks to Solkhat's original fortification line [45, pp. 85–87]2.

The first mention of Solkhat-Qırım's walls in written reports was made by the Venetian Giosafat Barbaro as late as the mid-15th century, rightfully describing Solkhat not as a fortress but as a settlement with a wall surrounding it [5, p. 15]. Pero Tafur, who visited Kaffa in 1438, mentioned the walls indirectly ten years before Barbaro [78, p. 163]. In the mid-17th century the Turkish traveller Evliye Çelebi associated the legend of the fortress Qarım-Kermen, allegedly built under the aegis of the ‘King of Sudak’ from what had been stolen from the merchants3, with the remnants of Solkhat walls. He even measured the steps along

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1 Historical Armenia, Khakhhtik Region (Khakhteats Gavar)

2 I express my sincere gratitude to V. Mayko for the opportunity to use to the study data.

3 The Genoese King Sudak reportedly said in reply to the merchants' petition, ‘...Build a fortress and a city in the place that you have chosen and settle there!’ As soon as the permission was issued,
its perimeter. This yielded 17,000 steps; the traveller reported the walls to be made of smoothly cut stone blocks [75, p. 659]. Likely this refers to the way in which stones of the frontal shell were processed, which is illustrated by the masonry facade of the Solkhat madrasah (the beginning of the second third of the 14th century), even though it was made of pliable limestone. Findings made in the 2009–2012 seasons proved that the Turkish traveller was right. Though the original masonry of the walls has not survived, some traces of it remain. An 18th century topographical survey and an air photographic survey conducted in the 1970s have brought down to us some objective data on the city's stone defensive belt.

According to the city plan by quartermaster I. Lyutov, dated around 1783 (Russian State Military History Archive, fund: Military Records, file 22608), the walls had a perimeter of 6,734 m. This matches the report of Evliya Çelebi assuming the informer's step to be about 0.4 m long. The plan depicts 28 towers reinforcing the walls (the cartographer apparently counted the well-preserved remnants of tower ruins, the estimated total number of towers being 65). Curtain size depends upon the relief, but the distance between towers on the crest of the south-eastern branch of the Maly Agarmysh, which separates the valley from the steppe, is up to 90 m. The line of the wall along the crest of the Maly Agarmysh branch as well as the bases of five rectangular towers with a side of approximately 10 m are clearly visible in the 1973 aerial photographs (Archive of the Institute of Archaeology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, archive no. 2201–51033). The distance between towers is 75 to 100 m, which is essentially consistent with the data contained in the plan by the military topographer of the last quarter of the 18th century.

V. Smirnov (1886) mentioned the defensive walls of Solkhat in his reports on trips to the Crimea [62, p. 504], and the commission lead by B. Zasypkin was able to discover part of a wall during a survey in 1926. It should be noted that the most large-scale and systematic studies on the defensive belt of Eski Qırım have been undertaken very recently [1; 2; 3]. The surveys were carried out on the south-eastern branch of Mount Maly Agarmysh. Remnants of a defensive wall approximately 2–2.5 m wide were discovered at five sites. A 1–1.5 m wide trench from the wall in the natural ground had survived at certain sites. The shells of the wall were made of local large stones with mortar rubblework between them. Besides, the walls were lined with finely polished slabs, which trend can be traced to the architectural traditions of Stary Krym. Traces of three defensive towers adjoining the defensive wall on the north were localised at three excavation sites. An opening, presumably a wicket, was found under the defense of one of the towers in a section of the wall [1; 2; 3]. The defensive complex of Solkhat was built within a short period from 1362 to 1380. It consisted of two stages of different scales, the first of which—the moat and the earth barrow—was conceived by Qutluğ Buga and implemented in 1362–1365. The second stage—the stone walls—dates back to 1375–1380. It was planned and carried out by Mamai. Planimetric data suggests that there is no engineering connection between the complexes. Each had its reasons, purposes, and technical parameters. The former was designed to defend the city from the Lithuanian threat and the latter from that posed by Genoa.

Generally speaking, defense construction was unsystematic in cities of the Golden Horde; the development of military architecture was largely poor and could only be seen in a number of borderline regions or cities where defensive structures had been previously built. Just like other aspects of military art in the Ulus of Jochi, its weaponry was largely inspired by Turko-Mongol traditions, mostly borrowed from Central Asia, while drawing upon

they started to erect a fortress at the place where they had been robbed, which they named Qarım-Kermen. This name, Malignant Fortress, was given to avenge on their evil enemies who had stolen their goods there. The word qarım was gradually transformed into qırım, as it was commonly mispronounced, and '<...>' its [the city's] construction was completed after forty years' [75, p. 658].

I express my sincere gratitude to M. Kramarovsky for the opportunity to use the study data.
influence from Eastern European traditions. Contact with local military traditions influenced the development of the Golden Horde's new weaponry [18, p. 396]. It is beyond doubt and has been confirmed by written sources that military contingents representing subjugated local Turko-Tatar, primarily Kipchak, peoples prevailed in the army of the Ulus of Jochi. Archaeological records are of the utmost importance for reconstructing the weaponry of Ulug Ulus—numerous excavation materials, whether they have been introduced into scientific discourse or are unpublished, and enable scholars to estimate the development of weapons in the Golden Horde and its dependent peoples. Graphic sources can be used for additional reference while exploring the subject.

We will attempt to discuss the key types of munitions and military equipment used in the Ulus of Jochi taking into account the way in which the Golden's Horde army was structured.

The bow and arrow were an essential weapon for the Horde. To quote Marco Polo, ‘most often they use the bow because they are excellent archers...’ [36, c. 90]. The so-called ‘Mongol bow’ was used. Scholars estimate that this type of bow first appeared in Europe in the early 13th century and was brought there from Central Asian steppes. Various species of wood and flexible horn were used to make it. In the centre a rigid knot of front and side bone lathes was formed. The lathes had notches on one side to improve adherence between the bone and the wood. Having analysed the material pertaining to nomadic burials of the Golden Horde period from the Eastern Azov Sea Region, I. Druzhinina, V. Chkhaidze, and E. Narozhny singled out two bow types within the burial accessories. The first type of bow is characterised by long middle front laths: they are wide, massive, and flared towards the ends. Such lathes have grooves on their inner side for attachment to the wooden frame. Part of the lathes are ornamented on the outside. The sets contain no preserved end lathes [21, p. 101]. The second type of bow is characterised by end shoulder lathes [21, p. 102]. V. Korenyako and A. Atavin attributed such finds to the pre-Mongol period [37, pp. 98–100]. However, it is commonly believed that both bow types in the Eastern Azov Sea region belong to the so-called ‘Mongol composite bows’ [21, p. 102]. M. Gorelik and I. Izmaylov singled out another bow type, also compound, the so-called Middle-Near Eastern type, which gradually replaces the Mongol type. It was easier to manufacture and was made combining with several wood species and soft horn [18, p. 397].

Warriors from the Ulus of Jochi used iron and bone arrowheads. Nearly all iron arrowheads that have been found are tanged; only in one case G. Fedorov-Davydov presented a socketed arrowhead in his work [70, pp. 25–26].

Arrowheads can be divided into hunting and combat depending on the function of the arrow. Arrowheads with a feather flat in cross-section were prevalent. They were known as general-purpose arrowheads. Armour-piercing arrowheads with a feather that was quadrilateral in cross-sections were used in combat only. Some arrowheads had a feather that was triangular in cross-section or round, but they are scarcely represented in nomadic artefacts of the studied period. Several three-blade arrowheads are known [70, p. 27], which are rather combat than hunting type, though it is not entirely impossible that they served both purposes.

In some quivers depicted on Cuman stone sculptures, quite large arrowheads of two types—diamond-shaped and two-horned—can be discerned [54, p. 31]. The artefacts have also been recorded in an archaeological context. A. Medvedev dated them from the 12–14th centuries [47, Table 21]. It should be noted that the so-called ‘srezni’—arrowheads of various types, flat or two-horned with a wide fighting part. They were mostly used to inflict large wounds on the enemy or damage his bow-string. They were mostly used to inflict large wounds on the enemy or damage his bow-string. Marco Polo described such arrowheads in the following way: ‘It is their custom that each warrior is to have sixty arrows for a battle, thirty small for throwing and thirty large with broad iron heads, which they throw at
a close distance at the enemy’s face and hands or to cut bow-strings, always doing each other much harm with them’ [36, p. 212]. Giovanni da Pian del Carpine also mentioned Mongol arrows to be extremely sharp, pointing out that ‘they always carry files attached to their quiver to refine arrows’ [57, p. 51]. The same author described various arrowheads depending on their purpose: ‘They also have different arrows for shooting birds, animals, and unarmed men, three fingers thick. Furthermore, they have various arrows for shooting birds and animals’ [57, pp. 52–53]. It is known that the Mongols came to use flat and three-blade arrowheads with bone whistlers, perforated barrel-shaped or biconical objects made of bone. Their size varied depending on how large the arrowhead was. Their main purpose was to produce deterrent noise; it is possible, however, that they could be used to fix the arrowhead on the shaft, to control the flight of the arrow, to attach burning hemp, and to carry a combustible. In the latter case, hemp or similar materials were used to stuff the holes in them [50, p. 219]. There is the alternative assumption that those bone objects acted to expand the wound, which increased bleeding with such arrows [34, p. 138]. We find the opinion of A. Kushkumbaev and L. Bobrov that the pieces were used for signalling in combat to be more likely [42, p. 27].

Unfortunately, it is not always possible for archaeologists to identify the materials with which arrow shafts were made, as they were usually poorly preserved. According to written sources, Mongol arrows had shafts of willow, juniper, or birch wood [50, p. 219]. The butt end of the tree, the one closer to the root system, was used because it is thicker and more elastic [34, p. 133]. Arrow shafts could be painted with different colours for quick identification in case they were carried in the quiver with their heads, which varied in shape and purpose, down [34, p. 133]. Alternatively, colouring could have a totemic, decorative, or social meaning. It is seldom possible to identify the length of an arrow, which is again attributable to the poor preservation of wood; but Giovanni da Pian del Carpine defined it as ‘two feet, one hand, and two fingers’ [57, p. 51], which makes approximately 80 cm.

Feathers of various birds were generally used for arrow fletching. Straight and springy feathers which were not too rigid, mostly obtained from local birds, were used. Eagle, falcon, and seabird feathers were especially valuable [50, p. 51]. Eagle, vulture, and goose feathers are known to have been the most common with Mongols [50, p. 219]. The shaft had another important structural element, the nock. It was the flared end of the shaft opposite to the arrowhead, which had a notch to secure the arrow on the bow-string. Reed, cane, or bamboo arrows could have nocks with a tanged or socketed plug that was inserted into the shaft. It could be made of wood, horn, or bone [34, p. 139]. There is evidence that the Mongols used poisoned arrowheads [50, p. 219]. Known bone arrowheads are few as compared to iron ones. They were apparently rather uncommon and used primarily for hunting, though their use in combat cannot be denied. G. Fedorov-Davydov classified them into the following four types: bullet-shaped (conical), quadrangular with a socket inside, triangular with a flat tang, and leaf-shaped with a flat tang [70, p. 29].

Arrows were carried in quivers made of leather or birchbark on a wire or wooden frame. Quivers shaped as a narrow case for carrying arrows with their heads up were characteristic of the 13–14th centuries. Sometimes the mouth of the quiver could be closed. The quiver was worn on a system of buckles and straps. It was typical to decorate the surface of the quiver with bone or gilded silver plates, sometimes combined, with various decorations. Such plates could also be attached to bow cases for storing bows. Warriors in the Horde are also known to have used saidak sets (a bow case and a quiver) attached to the belt with the help of special loops and a system of T-joints. Speaking of the archers’ weaponry, such finds as rings with a triangular protruding part for the so-called ‘Mongol shooting style’ are of interest. The style consisted of using the protruding part of the ring, which was worn on the thumb, to pull the bow-string instead of holding it with one’s fingers. A large portion of these rings are made of
bone and horn, though it is known that more materials were used, including metal, wood, and stone. The artefacts range broadly in dates [22, p. 30] and areas [70, p. 25].

As has already been mentioned, the Tatars used close combat weapons during the second stage of a battle. Quite naturally, those were predominantly pole weapons. Warriors in the Horde used swords (a straight, two-edged blade and a handle that is coaxial to the it), broadswords (a straight, usually one-edged blade with a hilt angled towards the edge), and sabres (a curved one-edged blade with a hilt curved towards the edge). The sabre was the most widespread type of this weapon; it gradually replaced the sword and the broadsword [18, p. 398]. The Golden Horde sabres sometimes had a sharpened piece at the back of the blade up to 30 cm long. As noted by M. Gorelik and I. Izmaylov, sabres with bayonet points had spread from the Kuban Region to the Ulus of Jochi by the 14th century [18, p. 398; 56, p. 284]. Scholars emphasise that sabres from the Golden Horde feature grooves, sometimes double, on both sides of the blade, often arranged so that the grooves on the one side are staggered relative to those on the other side. The sabre grew more curved with time and developed a jalman at the end near its point. Sabres from the Golden Horde had cross-shaped, narrow rhombic cross-guards. Early swords had asymmetrical cross-guards, in which the lower portion is longer than the higher one. Over time, nodes appeared on the end of the cross guards. A thong was often attached to the end of the hilt. Archaeological finds provide an insight into how sabre scabbards were attached. The scabbard had sheet braces or clamps holding together the halves of the scabbard with the one part attached slightly lower than the throat and the other in the centre. Rings were attached to the clamps for wearing the scabbard on a belt. A sword pertaining to the Golden Horde period, found in a burial at Kairka 3/1 burial site, was identified by M. Gorelik as a ‘falchion’ [16, pp. 240–242]. Speaking of short edged weapons, combat knives and daggers were used.

Long pole weapons were represented by spears with spearhead of various shapes. Common spears included those with narrow blades, quadrangular in cross-section, having broad laurel- or willow-leaf spearheads, flat or rhombic in cross-section. The shapes coexisted for a long time because they had different purposes. Spears or pikes with faceted narrow blades were used by armour-clad warriors for ram attacks and to pierce armour, while broad-bladed spears made wide wounds but could only be used for enemies wearing light armour. Striking and crushing weapons included maces and flails with knobs or weights of iron, bronze, and bone that varied in shapes, including spherical, bi-conical, covered with pyramidal spikes, etc. Maces with a beak-shaped protrusion part on their edges resembling the beak-shaped corbin [18, p. 401]. These weapons were used to break and crush armour, which was achieved due to the weight and shape of the impact portion. Axes were less common than other weapon at that time but are still present in the warriors' weapon sets of the Golden Horde. M. Kramarovsky pointed out that veterans of the Western campaign had small ceremonial axes with brass or silver [39, pp. 42–43], while M. Gorelik and I. Izmaylov clearly defined axes as part of Tatar warriors' munitions [18, p. 402].

Helmets used by Tatar warriors are primarily represented by archaeological finds. Those are combat headgears with peaks and spikes with rings on them for attaching ribbons. They had one-, two- and three-piece crowns welded to the band. Helmet shapes included spherico-conical, hemispherical, and semi-ovate. Such headgear also had face protection in the form of half masks or combat face masks. This applies to the finds located near the villages of Kovali and Lyppovets, in Rotmistrovka and Chersonesus. The masks clearly portray the deceased person. Slits for the eyes, nostrils, and mouth indicate that the mast was used as a visor (face mask) when the warrior was alive. To prove it, the mask is very massive and attached securely to the helmet. Slits in places which are expected to be covered in ritual masks also make it unlikely that the mask had purely ritual functions. A. Kirpichnikov identified such masks on ancient Russian helmets as combat one, also suggesting a reason for portrayal, which was to
identify the prince during a battle [33, p. 28]. A mask found near the village Kovali had an ‘ear’ attached by welding. L. Bobrov assumed that side fasteners could be used to attach redundant straps that secured the mask on the head [7, p. 13]. We can also assume that the rivets were used to attach a camail protecting the warrior’s neck. A. Kirpichnikov attributed a similar function to rings in the bronze ears of the masks [33, p. 28].

A metal armour of rectangular plates having apertures along the edge used to protect the torso of the heavily-armed warrior in the Golden Horde. Armour was either lamellar, that is made of small plates, or laminar if made of large plates. The classification of fastener type is as follows: plate armour was made of plates connected with straps. In scale armour, the plates were riveted into or strapped to a textile or leather garment, while in brigandines (kuyak, khuyag) large plates were attached to a canvas or leather garment [18, p. 402]. The armour also had rectangular or leaf-shaped Pauldrons reaching the elbow or lower, and cuisse [50, pp. 212–213]. Unlike western armour, in the East, torso protection became increasingly mobile with time.

The Tatars also used leather armour, which Marco Polo confirms: ‘on their backs they wear armour of buffalo or other leather, boiled and very strong... Their mail armour is made of buffalo leather’ [36, pp. 90, 139]. Mail armour became common in the latter half of the 13th century, and in the beginning of the 14th century both types of torso protections were combined—a mail armour was worn under the upper armour made of metal plates. The so-called plate and mail armour—behter (bahterets, behterets)—gradually replaced lamellar and laminar armour. In such armour the plates were connected with metal rings and not straps. Only wealthy warriors could afford it because its production was highly labour-intensive [18, p. 403; 25, pp. 126–127].

Apart from torso protection, protective equipment for the arms and legs existed. On one of the Cuman stone statues Pauldrons can clearly be discerned. They are represented as two strips running down the shoulders to the shoulder-blades [70, Figure 28, 1]. G. Fedorov-Davydov wrote about this matter: ‘These strips on the shoulders probably represent metal plates protecting the warrior's shoulders’ [70, p. 175].

There are vambraces among archaeological materials pertaining to the Golden Horde period. They were found in one of the Cuman burial grounds in Krasnodar Krai. In literature the burial is referred to as Burial 2 of Mound 4 near Dmitriyevskaya stanitsa [14, pp. 140–141]. Among its burial accessories, folding vambraces dating back to the first half of the 13–14th centuries. M. Gorelik believed them to have been brought there by Mongols [14, p. 143]. G. Fedorov-Davydov also wrote that the nomads ‘used hemispherical plates to protect their knees...’ [70, p. 35]. Unfortunately, very few graves have been found in burial sites; we know only one case in a Cuman burial ground of the Golden Horde period near Dmitriyevskaya stanitsa. Those were made of iron and were found on the deceased man's legs. A stripe of mail was used to attach the shin pieces to the knee pieces, forming full graves 68 cm long and 18 cm wide in their central part. Yu. Zelensky dates the find at the 13–14th centuries by reference to the accompanying accessories, inferring that the burial belonged to a wealthy Cuman serving in the army of the Golden Horde [26, pp. 116–117]. The wicker shield became common in Eastern Europe in the Golden Horde period; later versions of it were iron-clad [18, p. 404]. Wooden shields reinforced with umbos, like the one found in Burial 2, Mound 4 near Dmitriyevskaya stanitsa, were also used. The umbo had the form of an iron disc having a diameter 9.7 m with metal plates crossed over it and riveted into the disk in the centre. According to M. Gorelik, such umbos are peculiar to the Kuban Region of the Golden Horde period. The scholar thinks it possible that they were borrowed from Italian colonists by citizens of the Horde living in the North-Eastern Black Sea area in the latter half of the 13th century and later spread to western Mongol states [14, p. 142].
Materials from archaeological studies of nomadic records provide most of the available data on horse armour. First, we should dwell on chest pieces. A known item is a falciform plate with its edges turned up, which was attached to the vertical harness strap on the horse's chest [70, p. 61]. Forehead and nose plates can also be classified as protection. They combine different metals: iron, silver, and bronze. A light-weight horse protection was made of leather plates and straps as well as stitched soft materials lined with iron plates. Written sources confirm it [50, pp. 221–222]. Besides, conventional horse harness with metal pendants, tassels, and similar details was used.

Military accoutrements were also part of the warrior's outfit in the Golden Horde. This category includes banners, or flags. No items available in the archaeological materials could be classified as a flag or a banner, while the Ancient Russian chronicles mention nomadic banners, and miniatures in the Radziwiłł Chronicle depict nomads under banners, which undoubtedly represents a real historical event. Its was traditional for miniatures to symbolise victory with a vertically installed flag and defeat with lowered banners or banners lying on the ground [58]. A flag is depicted on one of the Cuman statues. The reverse side of the statue presents a motionless horseman on horseback with a flying large angled flag on a long flagpole. Only one find among the archaeological materials could be viewed as pertaining to a banner, namely the iron topper with a ring in its upper part presented by G. Fedorov-Davydov [70, p. 35]. These attributes were mainly used to indicate the place where troops were concentrated and bolster the morale of either the whole army or a specific detachment [6, p. 365].

Specialised combat signal devices were another military attribute used by the nomads.

Describing the beginning of a battle involving Mongol troops, Marco Polo reported: ‘The nakar started to beat, and the people immediately rushed forth...’ [36, pp. 101, 102, 212, 213, 216, 220, 231, 236]. In this case the word nakar refers to a kind of timpani or drums, the sound of which most probably meant the beginning of the battle and deter the enemy. Speaking of musical instruments among finds attributes to the nomadic military class, the kobyz found in the burial site near Kirovskoye village, Beryslav district, Kherson region, should be mentioned. The discovered find is a bow instrument made of ash wood [12, p. 43; 24, p. 281; 76, p. 81]. The item consisted of a resonating cavity and a neck with an ornately shaped headstock. The instrument had a slightly convex wooden bow with a round cross-section. The kobyz has a total length of 87 cm and the bow of 48 cm [324, p. 85]. In the opinion of G. Yevdokimov, the instruments had three strings. It was held vertically in the player's right hand [24, p. 282]. The burial area probably belonged to a person with a special social status, though not a rich one. Given that the burial site contains munitions, he undoubtedly was a warrior. Even though scholars associate the burial complex with the Cumans, Marco Polo's report reading, ‘The Tatars have the following tradition: when preparing for a battle, they sing softly and play dichords; they sing, play, and have fun, waiting for the battle’, suggests that a musical instrument could already be a warrior's attribute in the Golden Horde period [36, p. 213].

As we can see, the military art and weaponry of the Golden Horde evolved greatly from Chinggis Khan's first conquering campaigns to the state's dissolution. When mounted warriors consolidated to form a social class, it brought about not only social differentiation but a division of troops into branches: heavily armed armour-clad warriors and light mounted archers appeared. Fortifications are only present in peripheral centres (the Crimea) or cities of the Volga Region, where the pre-Mongol traditions have been preserved. Taking into account that artillery developed at a rather slow pace and was mainly used to defend cities in the Bulgar Ulus, blockade and stratagems devised to occupy cities replaced the tactics of siege and assault. The troops of the Ulus of Jochi largely maintained the tactical traditions of nomadic field combat, which I. Izmaylov believes to have led to its defeats against Poland, Lithuania,
Rus', and Timur [29, p. 431]. It should be noted, however, that frequent defeats of the declining state are attributable to powerful centrifugal tendencies and the time of Great Troubles. These factors eventually brought about the post-Horde Khanates and other political entities that succeeded the Ulug Ulus not only in terms of statehood, politics, and culture, but in military art.


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Chapter V.
The Population of the Ulus of Jochi
and the Development of the Medieval Tatar Ethnos

§ 1. The Ethnonym ‘Tatar’ at Different Stages of Eurasian History

Rafael Khakimov

The ethnonym ‘Tatar’ has caused considerable confusion and speculation that have complicated research on the history of Eurasia. The key problem is that the names ‘Tatar’ and ‘Mongol’ are often confused and their ethnic and linguistic attributes are unclear. The established historiographic traditions preclude unbiased interpretation of sources and evaluation of the Tatars’ actual contribution to the world history. Political history is the only guide in the kaleidoscope of early medieval ethnonyms and politonyms. The military and political dominance of particular tribes made it possible for their names to go down in history as well as for their culture to continue and for the nation to survive to the present day.

The first mention of the Tatars appears in the inscription in honour of Kul Tegin (732), referring to the ‘Oghuz-Tatar’ and ‘Toquz Tatar’ tribal unions as Kul Tegin’s enemies. At that time the Tatars and the Kirghiz people were supporting the Toquz-Oghuz people against the Turks (Turkuts). In 723–724, the Tatars (Toquz Tatars) in league with the Toquz-Oghuz people rose up against Eletmish Bilge Khagan, but apparently failed since the latter reportedly ‘conquered the Tatars of eight tribes again’ (about 742). It is mentioned below that ‘in the year of the Pig (747), the Karluks of three tribes and the Tatars of nine tribes… asked him respectfully to become the khan’ [22, pp. 43–44]. The Terkhin inscription reports that ‘when this inscription was being made, oh my Khan, in attendance were the noblemen of my Heavenly Khan, the Tatars of eight tribes, seventeen Az buyuraks, sanggongs and a detachment of a thousand Tongra (people), and the Uighur people with my tegins’ (753) [22, p. 42]. During the time the Turkic Khaganate was established, the Tatars were playing a major role in the Turks’ relations with the Chinese Empire and apparently were more or less independent. In the late 1240s, they joined the Oghuz rebellion against the Uighur Khaganate and suffered a defeat. The runic inscriptions also mention a war against the Kirghiz. What is relevant here is not the historical sequence of events, but the ethnic independence of the Tatars. They were mentioned along with the Turkuts, the Uighurs, and the Kirghiz people in the 12–13th centuries, but neither the Kipchaks nor the Mongols were regarded as political actors at that time.

The Chinese called the Tatars Ta-ta (da-da) since there is no R sound (character) in the Chinese language. ‘Even now, wrote Munir Yerzin, the Chinese use these two characters—Tata[er]jen (Tatar) and Tata[er] gongheg, meaning Tatar Republic—to differentiate Tatars from Tatarstan in writing’ [13, p. 15]. According to him, ‘Ta-ta, the word for Tatar, essentially consists of two characters. The left character conveys the meaning of the word and the right one, its sound (the tonality with which it should be pronounced). That is, the left character stands for crafted leather (bulgar), while the right indicates the phonetic feature. This word of two characters does not have any other meaning; it was created specifically to denote the Tatar nation’ [13, p. 46–47]. The association between the ethnonym ‘Tatar’ and bulgar crafted leather is just one of the many opinions in existence. It is important to note that the Chinese did not name the nation ‘Tatar’ but merely rendered the ethnonym by introducing a special word for it.
A number of scholars (N. Baskakov, P. Pelliot, G.-J. Ramstedt, N. Kychanov, and others) have studied the etymology of the word ‘Tatar’, drawing on various concepts. However, the ethnonym is most likely connected with an ancient ancestor named ‘Tatar’. Curious as it is, the origin of this self-designation is not of such importance, as it is the political, and not ethnic, history that determined the ethnonym’s destiny. Here we have to face the problems caused by the existence of six Tatar and two Mongol state entities before the Empire of Chinggis Khan was established. A comprehensive review of annals of Mongol ‘states’ is given in ‘The Empire of Chinggis Khan’ by N. Kradin and T. Skrynnikova; therefore it is not necessary to discuss the issue in this chapter [see: 25]. S. Klyashtorny carried out a detailed analysis of the locations of the six Tatar states (yurts) mentioned by Rashid al-Din [see: 24]. We will discuss this below.

The name ‘Tatar’ initially referred to tribes living north of the Great Wall of China as well as in the steppe zone of Central Asia. In the ‘Complete Description of the Mongol-Tatars’ (Meng-Da Bei-Lu, 1221) the following is written: ‘The land in which the Tatars originally rose lies north-west of the [land of the] Khitans. The [Tatar] tribes descend from a special kind of Shato people’ [36, p. 45]. The name ‘Shato’ refers to a union of Western Turkic tribes who lived near Fergana in the 7th century. In the 8–10th centuries, Shato splinter groups inhabited the territories of today’s Shaanxi, Gansu, and Shanxi provinces. The Chinese historian Wang Guowei explains that this refers to the so-called White Tatars. His report is as follows: ‘All Tatar people are valiant and pugnacious. Those who are closer to the Chinese land are known as cultured Tatars. [They] can sow millet; they cook it in flat-bottomed clay pots and eat it’ [36, p. 45]. Rashid al-Din identified the White Tatars as a Turkic group, claiming them to be one of the peoples ‘that have recently been named Mongols’ [37, p. 77]. Apart from Tatar farmers, there were also the nomadic Black Tatars and the so-called wild/immature Tatars.

To quote the Short Notes on the Black Tatars chronicle, ‘The state of the Black Tatars (that is, of the northern chanyu) is called Great Mongolia’ [26, p. 137]. Northern chanyu was the Chinese term for tribal leaders of the northern Xiongnu people after they had split into northern and southern. The Northern Xiongnu people occupied the territory that is presently inhabited by the Mongols. The chronicle continues, ‘The Black Tatars live in dome-shaped huts—that is, felt tents. They build neither walled cities nor [stone] buildings. [They] move from one place to another depending on [access to] water and [pasturing] grass without any permanent [routes]... The location of the Tatar ruler's hunting tent is generally always called ‘wolito’” [26, p. 139]. ‘Wolito’ here renders the Ancient Turkic word ordu, or ordo, meaning ‘camp’ or ‘palace’. ‘As for his golden tent (the poles [inside it] are made of gold. This is why [the tent] is called golden), it is only when the tents of all the illegitimate empresses and a camp for [the rest of subjects] are erected [along with it] that [this] is called “the Great Horde” (yeke ordu)” [26, p. 139]. In the early 13th century the Chinese often referred to Chinggis Khan's Mongols as Hei-da, meaning Black Tatars. To cite Meng-Da Bei-Lu, ‘The current Emperor Chinggis, as well as all (of his) military commanders, ministers, and officials are Black Tatars’ [36, p. 49].

Chinese sources also singled out the Wild Tatars of Southern Siberia, whose sources of sustenance were hunting and fishing. They were ruled by tribal leaders and had no khans, which is why they were called ‘immature’. ‘The so-called Wild Tatars are quite poor and primitive, and they do not have any skills. They can do nothing but ride on horseback after

1 William of Rubruck mistranslated the word orda as ‘middle’. ‘In their language [the word for] a homestead is orda, which means middle’. He apparently confused the word orda with the Tatar word urta, which indicates that the ruler of the Mongol Empire had a Turkic linguistic environment.

2 Chinese chroniclers considered all Tatar khans and their wives to be self-proclaimed emperors and empresses because they were not appointed by the Emperor of China.
everyone [else]’ reads Meng-Da Bei-Lu [36, p. 49]. As we can see, the Tatars were classified as White, Black, and Wild according to their economies.

It should be noted that different Tatar tribes had different self-designations. If the ethnonym ‘Tatar’ doesn’t appear in sources, this does not mean that the Tatars are not mentioned, because they can be called a different name. The Secret History of the Mongols mentions the Airiud-Bujruud, Oboe, and Derben groups, which are all regarded as Tatar tribes. For example, it says, ‘Once Ambaghai Khagan wanted to personally see off his daughter, whom he was going to marry off to the Tatars of the Airiud-Bujruud tribe, which is on the Urshun River between the Buyur naur and Kölen naur lakes. This is when the Tatars of the Zhuying tribe captured Ambaghai Khagan and took him to Altan Khagan of Khitan’ [42, §53]. The Derben-Tatars were not homogeneous as a tribe but were divided into Chaaan-Tatars, Alchi-Tatars, Dudaut-Tatars, and Alukhai-Tatars [42, §141, 153]. Rashid al-Din named six main Tatar tribes: the Tutukuljut Tatars, the Alchi Tatars, the Chagan Tatars, the Kuin Tatars, the Terat Tatars, and the Barkui Tatars. There were other Tatar tribes as well, like the Hoyins, the Ne-raits, etc. ‘The Tutukuliut tribe is the most respected of [all] Tatar tribes’, he added [37, pp. 101–103]. The prefix ‘Tatar’ was sometimes omitted in tribal self-designations because their Tatar origin was well known at the time. Rashid al-Din provided the following example: ‘There is a custom according to which every man of this tribe is called Tutukulitai and every woman is called Tutukulichin. Those coming from the tribe of the Kuin Tatars are called Kuitai and Kuichin, and those of the Terat tribe, Terati and Terauchin’.

A large number of self-designations resulted naturally as the population grew. Each tribe that had broken away was differentiated from its parental one by its name, and indication of its Tatar origin was lost. The ‘parent’ ethnonym was only preserved in the name of the eldest son as the legitimate successor to his father’s authority. Exploring Chinggis Khan’s genealogy, N. Kradi described the traditional path to legitimisation: ‘A tribal leader who has some success in uniting tribes under his authority gives the name to the community, sometimes referring to an authority of the past. For instance, Khabul Khan named his union Kiyat. However we can assume, as legend says, that this ethnonym could be found on the original territory of Mongol tribes. This ethnic name was given to Khabul Khan’s senior descendants. The story of the life of Yesugay-bahatur, Chinggis Khan’s father, is preceded by an account of his place in the genealogy: “§ 50. Bartan Baghatur had four sons: Mengetu-Kiyan, Nekun-taiji, Yesugay-bahatur, and Daritai-otchigin”. As we can see, the ethnonym appears in the name of the eldest son, the legitimate successor to his father’s authority’. [25, pp. 172–173]. By referring to different self-designations of the tribes, we can perceive them as different nations, while they actually could have been close relatives who remember about their origins, and when they came together in alliances they returned to their ‘parent’ name, as was the case with the Alty Tatars, Toquz Tatars, Oghuz Tatars, and others.

The process described by Rashid al-Din is also possible: ‘Because of their extraordinary greatness and honourable position, other Turkic clans were known by their name despite all the differences in their ranks and names. They were all referred to as Tatars’ [37, p. 101]. Back in ancient times, the Tatars had conquered other Turkic tribes up to the ‘borders of Khitai’, which were renamed after the dominant tribe. In this case the ethnonym ‘Tatar’ became a politonym. According to Rashid al-Din, something similar had happened with the name ‘Mongol’, which turned into a politonym as Chinggis Khan gained power, causing many tribes to assume the name ‘Mongol’ as they had earlier assumed the name ‘Tatar’. The author makes an important point, however, that all Turkic tribes from China to Desht-i Kip-

3 Abu Sa’id Gardezi reported that a tribe needed 700 people in order to separate out as an individual tribe. The Chinese chronicler Yeh Lung-li, in the History of the Khitan State, wrote of the Tatars, ‘Every large tribe consists of two to three hundred families, and every small one consists of fifty to seventy families’ [12, p. 306].
chak and Maghreb were still known as Tatars in his time [37, p. 103]. Subsequently, when Chinggis Khan had become a world-famous conqueror, chroniclers continued to refer to the Mongol Empire as Tataria, and not Mongolia. The whole Eurasia came to be associated with ‘Tataria’ with time, evidence of which can be found on medieval maps.

A number of interpretations claim the name ‘Tatar’ as an exoethnonym—the Chinese term for everyone who wasn't Chinese (something like ‘barbarian’). N. Munkuev believes that the Chinese, having encountered some Tatar tribes ‘extended the name to include all Mongol and even non-Mongol tribes living within today’s Outer and Inner Mongolia as well as Southern Manchuria’. He refers to the ‘commonly-known fact that the Tatar tribes, whose name the Chinese extended to include all Mongol tribes, were enemies of Chinggis Khan's clan and had been exterminated by him long before 1221’ [34, p. 135]. There is no reason why the Chinese would have referred to the Mongols as Tatars, especially if the Tatars had been exterminated by that time.

There are also those who believe that the Chinese chancellery was instructed to replace the self-designation ‘Mongol’ with ‘Tatar’ or at least ‘Mongol-Tatar’ (Meng-da) in reports. This would mean that the Chinese, who had been living side by side with the Tatars for centuries, waged war against them and traded with them without knowing who they were. Here we should cite N. Bichurin: ‘It is essential to note that China maintained political connections with the Mongols, the Tunguses, and the Turks since the very time it discovered these peoples, and it has always known the difference between them’ [5, p. 10]. In fact, Chinese officials and historiographers did not confuse different peoples; they wrote not only about tribes, but about dynasties too, including their titles. They used the term ‘Mongol-Tatars’ in the political, rather than ethnic, sense, with ‘Mongol’ meaning the dynasty and ‘Tatar’, its people (budun). European chroniclers were not naive bystanders either scared of a Tatar invasion of Europe, many of them undertook reconnaissance trips to find out who they were to deal with. King Béla IV of Hungary wrote very clearly in his letter to Conrad IV of Germany: ‘The fierce peoples who call themselves Tatars have come from the East like locusts from the desert and devastated Great Hungary, Bulgaria, Cumania, and Russia, as well as Poland and Moravia’ [16, p. 805]. The letter clearly states that the ‘fierce peoples’ called themselves ‘Tatars’.

We are skeptical of the idea that the ethnonym ‘Tatar’ was imposed on the conquered peoples of the Mongol Empire. What would be the political motivation for doing this? It is quite clear that neither the Mongols nor the Chinese needed it; and nobody else could have imposed the name. A number of authors have proposed that the ethnonym ‘Tatars’ was invented in the 19th century by nation-building ideologues like Shigabutdin Marjani, who is said to have replaced the original name ‘Bulgar’ with the artificial ‘Tatar’. For instance, Michael Kemper wrote, ‘By introducing the term “Tatar people”, Sh. Marjani devises an ethnos to replace the religiously-defined and multi-ethnic “Bulgar” cultural community’ [18, p. 613]. Indeed, the memory of the Bulgar state has remained in the memory of the Tatar people, as have those of the Golden Horde and the Khanate of Kazan, which, however, neither indicates that the people had dual self-identification nor that the ethnonym ‘Tatar’ was imposed on them by enlighteners of the 19th century. The idea that the Tatars gave up their authentic self-designation for the ethnonym ‘Muslim’ is also untenable. The Tatars did indeed call themselves ‘Muslims’ in accordance with the Russian Empire's system of classes and confessions, which was completely in line with their ethnic identity. In some really exotic versions of Eurasian history, the ethnonym ‘Tatar’ is not mentioned at all [see: 40]; this is hard to comment on since it reveals an absurd desire to shrug off the ‘Tatar issue’.

Placenames and hydronyms connected with the Tatars refute the claim that ‘Tatar’ was an exoethnonym. The name ‘Tatar’ appears in local names, names of mountains, lakes, rivers, streams, mountain peaks, and localities in many countries, including China, Iran, Pakistan,
Afghanistan, Turkey, Central Asia, Azerbaijan, and Eastern European countries including Bosnia, Serbia, and Macedonia. It can even be found in the names of administrative units, mountain ranges, and valleys. They are neither few nor coincidental. Japan, for example, is very far from the key arenas of Tatar invasions, so it would be only natural if Tatar presence was minimal there, unlike in Asia or Eastern Europe. According to an oral report by Vladimir Kurbatov, there are mountains on Honshu Island between the cities Aomori and Hachinohe which are called Tatara yama (mountain) and Tatara san. North of Tokyo lies a small marshy island called Tatara numa (swamp), a tiny lake north of Mount Ube has the name Tatara saki, and in the western part of Ryukyu Island are Tatara shima (island) and Tatara gawa (river).

In addition, there is a town on Noto Peninsula called Kazan shi, a hill mass near Cape Sata called Kazan, and the Nanpō Islands in the East China Sea contains a group of isles known as Kazan retto. It is clearly no coincidence that so many similar names exist there. That is, the Tatars left an imprint on Japan long before Kublai attempted to force the Japanese islands into submission. In particular, Japanese scholars date the Tatara iron smelting process used to make Samurai swords to the 7th century [see: 49]. The placenames not only indicate that the Tatars were present in Japan for a long time, but also that it would have been impossible to impose them by force. They represent the people's self-designation.

Some experts (I. Marquard, S. Akhindzhanov, and others) believe that the early Tatars were Mongol-speaking, which is very doubtful because the reasoning relies entirely on either indirect evidence or liberal interpretation of sources. To quote N. Bichurin, ‘Khyagas must have been a Mongol-Turkic state in terms of its original composition, consisting of two peoples, Mongols and Turks. The Turks, or Tatars, were the aboriginals and the Mongols—their masters, previously known as the Xiongnu, but in that epoch they were called Hoihu4. The Hoihu language was presumably used for negotiations with the Chinese embassy at the Khyagas court, as it was [the language of] the ruling people, which the Chinese knew. So the messenger reported the Khyagas people spoke Hoihu; but the thing [in fact] the Khyagas people spoke the Tatar language, which the following words prove: Ai—moon, Wei—the title of minister’ [5, p. 351]. In this case the replacement of the name ‘Xiongnu’ with ‘Mongol’ and then ‘Hoihu’ (Uighur) is only natural because it indicates that not the ethnicity was changed, but the names of the ruling ‘Houses’. What is important for us is that not only Tatars but Khyagas (Kirghiz) people spoke Tatar. It is commonly known that Turkic tribes are closely related, and so are their languages. Abu al-Istakhri wrote, ‘As for Turkestan, the Toquz Oghuz, Khyrkhyz, Kimek, Ghuz, and Khazlaj people speak the same language, and they all are descendants of each other...’ [32, p. 25]. Rashid al-Din, the best informed of medieval historians, classified the language of the Tatars as Turkic.

Mahmud al-Kashgari, the outstanding expert in Turkic languages, entitled the chapter listing the peoples as ‘On the Composition of the Turks’ and included the Tatars in the list. He devised a classification of Turkic languages, remarking that, like the Chomuls, ‘Each union of Kai, Yabaku, Tatar, and Basmysly has a special dialect (luya) but at the same time speaks the Turkic language fluently’ [33, p. 76]. This report was considered sufficient to confirm that the Tatars were Mongol-speaking. Yet, al-Kashgari did not mean the Mongolian language. It was just that Tatar speech sounded different to him than Turkic (meaning Turkut) and his mother tongue Karakhanid. At that time ‘Turks’ was not an umbrella term, but was used to specifically denote the Turkuts as opposed to the Tatars, Uighurs, Kirghizes, and some other peoples5. Similarly, when speaking of the Oghuz replacement of the letter ghayn with aleph, he con-

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4 Chinese chronicles used the term Khyagas for Kirghiz people and Hoihu for Uighurs. As we can see, Bichurin identifies both the Mongols and the Tatars as Turkic-speaking.

5 Chinese sources enumerating the titles of states to the north mention the wan of the ‘state of the Turks’ and ‘the state of the Western Turks’ among many Turkic tribes (Kirghiz, Tatar, Shato, and others) [50, p. 146].
trasts the Oghuz dialect with Turkic, although they are only pronounced slightly differently but are not of different languages [33, p. 79]. Describing the differences in the languages spoken by various Turkic peoples, Mahmud al-Kashgari added that some letters were in a different order or missing, which cannot be interpreted to mean that the Tatars were Mongol-speaking. According to his reports, they could not have spoken a mixed Tatar-Mongol language as described by S. Kaziev: ‘In our opinion, the language of the Kai and Tatar peoples might have been that of ethnic groups of mixed Turkic-Mongol origin, a kind of lingua franca, which both Mongol-speaking and Turkic-speaking groups understood’ [17, p. 373]. It is possible that some Tatars spoke two languages, but there is no evidence that a Tatar-Mongol language existed. The term ‘Mongol-Tatars’ (Meng-da) as such began to appear in Chinese sources after Chinggis Khan ascended to the throne and declared a Mongol dynasty, which resulted in the traditional Ta-ta/Da-da acquiring the Meng character, which referred to the ruling dynasty. This does not mean that a Turkic-Mongol pidgin ever existed as suggested by S. Kaziev: ‘The Tatars were one of Shiwei tribes who had the most extensive contacts with Turkic-speaking tribes and therefore either knew the Ancient Turkic language or spoke a Turkic-Mongol pigeon as al-Kashgari remarked’ [17, p. 377]. In fact, Mahmud al-Kashgari did not mention any pidgin language; his compilation of Turkic words deals with the subtle differences between Turkic dialects.

The assumption that the Tatars were Mongol-speaking draws on the opinion that Mongolian was the Mongols’ only language, leading to the conclusion that the Tatars must have been multilingual. Why not assume the opposite? It is possible that the medieval Mongols knew Tatar. For instance, it can be inferred from The Secret History of the Mongols that Chinggis Khan had no problem talking to representatives of the clearly Turkic-speaking Onguts (White Tatars), Karluks, and Uighurs. This does not mean that everybody spoke Mongolian, but rather suggests that Chinggis Khan knew the Tatar language. Subetei Bagatur said while offering peace to Kipchak tribal leaders, ‘We and you come from the same tribe and the same clan, but the Alan strangers to us. We will make an agreement with you that we will not harm each other; we will give you whatever gold and garments you like if you leave to us [the Alans]’ [37, p. 230]. This does not prove that the Kipchaks were Mongol-speaking or bilingual. It is equally possible that Subetei spoke Tatar. Moreover, it is stated clearly that the Mongols and the Kipchaks belong to the same clan, that is, they are both Turks.

There is no evidence that the Mongol language was predominant among Turks, whereas it is safe to say that the Kipchak dialect was a lingua franca and Turkic dialects had a major impact on the Mongol language. A. Shcherbak expressed the idea very clearly: ‘Borrowing was unilateral until the 13th century. Mongol languages borrowed from Turkic ones’ [52, p. 48]. The Codex Cumanicus was compiled to aid European merchants who wanted to use the most widely understood language in the Mongol Empire. It should be noted that it refers to the Cuman (Kipchak) ‘tatar tili’ language. The Tatar or Turkic-Tatar language was the actual lingua franca. This accounts for the shared terminology between the Tatar and Mongol language. It represents borrowings from the Tatar language into Mongolian, but not vice versa.

It appears that scholars have difficulties distinguishing between the ethnonyms ‘Tatar’ and ‘Mongol’, which brings about the common assumption that the Tatars are in fact ethnic

6 Turkic languages and the language of the Turkic/Turkut ethnic could have been confused because the separate ethnonyms ‘Turk’ appeared in the late 5th century. I. Kyzlasov writes, ‘Turks was the name for only one of the numerous Turkic-speaking peoples that existed at that time—the one that founded the First and Second Turkic Khaganates. Other peoples speaking related languages had different names (Uighurs, Basmyls, Az, Zygii, Karluks, etc.). The Turkic people united many (but by no means all) Turkic-speaking and other peoples within a vast Eurasian empire, thereby extending the political meaning of its name’ [19, p. 36].
Mongols, the arbitrary division of the Tatars into ethnic Mongols and Tatars, or the use of the compromise term ‘Tatar-Mongols’. In order to shed some light on this issue, we should quote Rashid al-Din, who believed that ‘the Mongols used to be [merely] one tribe within a whole group of Turkic steppe tribes in ancient times’ [37, p. 103]. This is really quite clear. We could challenge this assertion by the outstanding chronicler. Yet, this truly is the best account of that period that has come down to us. By the way, other chroniclers shared Rashid al-Din’s opinion. For instance, Meng-Da Bei-Lu reports that the former Mongol state had been destroyed by that time and that the Mongols of that period were actually Tatars [36, p. 52]. The Mongols did not appear in Tatar-populated territories until the 10th century. E. Kychanov, the famous expert in Mongol studies refers to the ‘arrival of Mongols in Mongolia around the latter half of the 10th–first half of the 12th centuries’ [20, p. 141] (the territory included today’s Mongolia, Inner Mongolia, and the Gansu and Shaanxi provinces in China). Since there were many Tatars, which all chroniclers note, they lived in a large territory both along the Silk Road and across today's Mongolia. The issue of how the Mongols of the 12th century are connected to the Mongols of today is beyond the scope of this article.

The report in The Secret History of the Mongols that all Tatars were slaughtered, so only a small number of them that were able to hide and remain unnoticed or that were saved by somebody survived, is very confusing in terms of how the ethnonyms ‘Mongol’ and ‘Tatar’ relate to each other and it also contributes to the linguistic confusion. For example, E. Kychanov wrote on the Tatar and Mongol wars: ‘For the Tatars these wars ended in 1202 with them almost completely annihilated’ [21, p. 210]. Firstly, ‘annihilated’ here has a political rather than physical meaning. That is, the Tatar dominance in the steppe was ended, not even of all Tatars, but specifically the Derben-Tatar tribal union: ‘We annihilated the Tatar leaders of the generations Chagat-Tatar, Alchi-Tatar, Dutaut-Tatar, and Alukhai-Tatar here’ [42, §153]. That is, former leaders merely became common vassals (kol). Secondly, it is unclear why the Derben-Tatars and the Taichiud Tatars are described as Chinggis Khan's allies in § 196 of The Secret History of the Mongols despite the graphic description of the extermination of Tatars: ‘The Jadarans, Katagins, Salji'uts, Derbens, Taichi'uds, Ongirats, and others that were with Jamukha all submitted’ [42, §196]. Thirdly, two of Chinggis Khan's five main wives were Tatar women, namely Esulun and Esukat. Besides, sources often refer to the Tatars as the people from whom the Mongols took their wives. So it appears they first slaughtered all the Tatars and then married Tatar women. Assuming that, to cite Chinggis Khan from The Secret History of the Mongols, they had ‘annihilated the Tatar people, measuring their children against the axle of a cart’, how did they return to the historical arena? According to Rashid al-Din, ‘they [the Naimans, the Uriankhats, and the Tatars] became numerous due to a population increase’ [38, p. 55]. He also reported the Tatars occupied high positions, which he enumerated: ‘From the Hoyin Tatar tribe came: Samkar Noyon, the groom of Hulagu Khan, who at the time of Abaq Khan became an honourable and great emir; Tugan, Mulai and Kui-tai, the father of Buka Kurchi... In the ulus of Jochi Khan, the senior wife of

7 The Turkic tradition was to kill the elite, while the people either became vassals of the conqueror or some clans were scattered among other tribes. For example, in 710–711, the Turks crossed the Sayan Mountains to overwhelm the Kirghiz El and kill its Khagan Bar Beg. Yollig-Tegin reported, ‘The Khagan was killed, and his people became slaves... We organised the tribal unions of the Az and Kirghiz people’. That is, the state and its khagan were exterminated, but the indigenous Kirghiz tribal union (bodun) was preserved. The Turkic term for ‘slave’ was equivalent to ‘vassal’ in the Chinese or European tradition. Accordind to ‘Suishu’, when Ishbara Khagan (Shabolue) asked what the word vassal meant, the answer was as follows: ‘Vassal in the Sui Tsardom is the same as our (Turkic) “rab” (slave)’ [5, p. 237]. The new suzerain imposed taxes and military duty on his dependent peoples. Following the execution of ringleaders in a mutiny, Eletmish Bilge Khagan reported, ‘Kara igil’ buduny jok kil`madim ebin barky'n jelky'sy'n yulmadm’ (I did not exterminate their common people; I did not take away their yurts and buildings, nor their cattle).
Jochi’s son Batu, named Burakchin, was from the Alchi-Tatar tribe; also from this tribe was the wife of Tüde Möngke, the ruler of the same ulus, named Türe Qutlugh; among the emirs of Batu, a senior emir by the name of It-Kara was from this tribe; among the emirs of Mengü Temür, also the ruler of that ulus, a senior emir by the name of Timur-Beg was from the same tribe...’ Chinese sources confirm that Tatar associates of Chinggis Khan enjoyed a high status. The Yuanshi chronicle reports, ‘Tahai-Temur, a Tatar. In the time of Taizu, his ancestors had served Go wang Muhali, commanded the Left wing of the Great Tumen in the Mongol army, and controlled eight western districts in Taiyuan [province]’ [50, p. 93]. This refers to keshiktens, the guard that Chinggis Khan established in 1206 as his ‘personal thousand’ and which eventually grew to become a tumen. According to Rashid al-Din, the personal thousand included a detachment of Tatar keshiktens commanded by Esungtee [38, p. 267]. Is it possible that Chinggis Khan employed representatives of the ‘annihilated’ Tatar people as his personal guard? This sounds ridiculous. This list of famous Tatars among Chinggis Khan’s associates is far from full, which by no means supports the idea that the nation was ‘annihilated’. Yet, the contradictions can be eliminated easily if we interpret ‘annihilation’ as interrupting the political dominance of enemy Tatar tribes, depriving them of their name and scattering them by dispersing families among other tribes.

No direct evidence is available that the Mongol language was spoken in the Golden Horde. Though the empire is commonly believed to have had two official languages, none of the known official documents is written in Mongol. A birchbark manuscript dating back to the beginning of the 14th century was found near Ternovka village on the left bank of the Volga in 1930. It is written using the Uighur alphabet; most of it is in Mongol and the rest in Uighur. The birchbark manuscript contains lyric verses. This single case cannot be regarded as proof that the Mongol language was common among Tatars. All other evidence that exists is also indirect. For example, a silver paiza was found in the territory of Yekaterinoslav guberniya in 1845 (currently kept in the State Hermitage Museum). It bears an inscription in Mongol written in Uighur script that reads, ‘Monke’ te’gri-in kuchun-dur, eke’ su dzhalini ige’ge’n-dur: Abdulla-in dzharlik ke’n ulu bushire’ku kumun aldaxu, ukuky’ (By the power of the eternal sky, (its) great volition and power, any person that disobeys the order of Abdullah will thereby commit a crime and die) [2, p. 146]. This inscription pertains to the period of 1362–1369, when Abdullah sat on the throne of the Golden Horde. Paizas of Öz Beg Khan and others have also come down to us.

Being a symbol of power, the paiza is to some extent a document. However, it continued the traditions of the Chinese and Mongol Empires, meaning that the design was more important than the text, so we cannot infer from it which language was common in the Golden Horde. Nevertheless, scholars rely on indirect arguments to insist that Mongol was the official language. A. Grigoryev quoted Giovanni da Pian del Carpine in favour of this theory: ‘...we presented the charter and asked for translators who could translate it. They were provided to us... and we worked together to translate the charter carefully into the Russian and Saracen scripts and to that of the Tatars; this translation was presented to Batu, and he perused it’. The quotation is followed by the statement below. ‘Thus, during the rule of Golden Horde’s first khan Batu (1227–1255), its chancellery kept records in the Mongol language’ [9, p. 83]. This conclusion was made by arbitrarily identifying a Tatar as a Mongol, though it is entirely possible that Batu could read Tatar. A. Grigoryev used a similar approach to analyse the rest of documents to arrive at the following point: ‘Our general conclusion it as follows. The official language of the Golden Horde in the 13–14th centuries (until 1380) was Mongol written with the Uighur script’ [9, p. 89]. As was proven by M. Usmanov, there is no evidence that early grant charters issued by Jochids were written in Mongol [46, pp. 94–97]. Moreover, it is wrong to judge what language they were written in from Russian translations as A. Grigoryev does. Nigmat Kurat was able to present a better-grounded study on yarliqs and bitigs issued
by khans of the Golden Horde by referring to the originals: ‘The letter is written in the literary language that was used in the Golden Horde; it is commonly and somewhat inaccurately referred to as Chagatai’ [27, p. 30]. It is only natural to call the language of the Golden Horde ‘Tatar’ and not the artificial term ‘Chagatai’ or something else. Kurat notes the Arabisms in some of the texts, but not those of other languages, not to mention Mongol. Moreover, he noted that Crimean khans used the same language as was employed in the Golden Horde: ‘All the yarliqs are very similar in this respect. Their style reveals the Golden Horde's tradition of record keeping’ [27, p. 101].

The issue of the Golden Horde's language has given rise to a great deal of literature attempting to trace down not only Mongol but Uighur, Kipchak, Karakhanid, Karluk, and Chagatai linguistic influence on the Tatars. Terms devised to denote the state's official language include Volga-Golden Horde, Khwarezmian-Volga, and finally Turki or Turkic (Oghuz-Kipchaks). For example, the following commentary is offered regarding letters by khans of the Golden Horde: ‘These texts are undoubtedly of linguistic interest. Without dwelling on the subject, we should note that the simple Turkic language with numerous archaisms in the former two letters can be compared with the sophisticated Arabic-Persian of the latter ones, also in Turkic’ [35, p. 235]. When the term ‘Turkic language’, or ‘Turki’ is used to speak of the Golden Horde, it creates a substantial amount of confusion. Is it to be interpreted as the language of the Turks (Turkuts) of the period of the Turkic Khaganate or a separate one spoken by some unknown Turki nation that once lived in the Tatar state? The conventional use of ‘Turkic’ as an umbrella term for a group of closely related languages is quite understandable. However, there is no reason to devise a special term like ‘Turki’ just in order to avoid calling the language Tatar. The use of the pre-revolutionary term ‘Turkic-Tatar dialects’ is entirely reasonable as it refers to the common Tatar origin of this group of related languages. Some experts suggest that the official language of the Golden Horde should be termed Old Tatar or, as a compromise, Turko-Tatar. This is absolutely unnecessary because it can accurately be called simply the Tatar language of record keeping!

The colloquial medieval Tatar language differed from formal and literary Tatar and its nuances also varied depending on the area. It was typical for medieval states to use different languages for official (formal), literary, religious, and colloquial purposes. They did not merge until capitalism began to develop in modern times. It can be asserted from the available evidence that Tatar—at first using the Uighur runic script and then with the Arabic script—was used for colloquial, literary, and clerical purposes in the Golden Horde. The slight differences in its use depending on whether it was formal, literary, or colloquial language as well as regional variances are not reason enough to view it as ‘Turkic’, Chagatai, Volga-Khwarezmian, etc. and not Tatar. It was the medieval Tatar language, which is largely understandable even now. Since the Uighur and Tatar languages are closely related, khans of the Golden Horde were able to employ the Uighur script for official use.

Let us get back to the issue of early Tatar states. Not only were the Tatars a numerous people before Chinggis Khan came to power, but also they had built a number of state entities (yurts) by that time. Rashid al-Din reported, ‘There are six Tatar tribes which are famous and glorious and each one has an army and [a] sovereign’ [37, p. 103]. Yet, Rashid al-Din failed to describe their location.

One of the Tatar yurts has been localised around Buir Lake in the eastern part of today's Mongolia. Another was in Gansu at the border of Eastern Turkestan with Suzhou as its capital. Al-Kashgari referred to this territory as Desht-i-Tatar. ‘Hudud al-Alam’ (10th century) mentions the Tatars as neighbours and allies of the Toquz-Ghuzz—that is, Uighurs—and refers to Eastern Turkestan as the ‘land of the Toquz-Ghuzz and the Tatars’ [51, p. 47]. The third Tatar yurt appears to be associated with the Kimek Khana. Abu Sa’id Gardezi described the Kimeks' origin as follows: ‘A leader of the Tatars died and left two sons; the eld-
est son reigned over the Tsardom, and his younger brother envied him; the younger brother's name was Shad. He made an unsuccessful attempt on the life of his elder brother; fearing for himself, he took with him a slave mistress, fled from his brother, and came to a place where there was a large river, lots of trees and an abundance of wild game; there he pitched his tent and stayed... Then seven people came to them who were their Tatar relatives: Imi, Imek, Tatar, Bayander, Kipchak, Lanikaz (?) and Adzhlad (?)... Other people, upon hearing the news, also began to arrive [here]; 700 people gathered. For a long time they remained in Shad's service; then, when their number increased, they scattered throughout the mountains and formed seven tribes called by the names of these seven men [3, p. 43–44]. This report by Gardezi might leave the impression that both the Tatars and the Kipchaks belong to Kimek tribes. Yet, we should not forget about the principle that the senior branch of the clan preserved the 'parent' ethnonym while the other branches assumed names of their own. We can merely infer from Gardezi's evidence that the Kimek tribe was politically dominant over Tatar tribes, which were closely related to it, in this specific period and within the confines of this area. The Kimek Khanate was essentially a separate Tatar yurt.

R. Khrapachevsky attempted to localise the six Tatar states mentioned by Rashid al-Din. He wrote, ‘According to Tangut sources, Xi Xia bordered on three Tatar unions in the 11–12th centuries. Two of them should be associated with the Western Tatars... The third one, occupying the territory from the Alashan Mountains to the Inshan Mountains, was the Tatar unit that had connections both to the White Tatars (Onguts) and tribes of Turkic, Mongol, and mixed origins that were allied to them (Naiman, Zhubugu, black-cart Shiwei, Xi, and others). The Diu troops at the northern and north-eastern borders of China (or, to be more precise, the Liao and Jin Empires) can be regarded as another eastern Tatar confederation. It also contained tribes of various origins (Teraites Tatars, Uighurs, Merkits, “Tangut” and many more)... Outside observers (like the Song authors) could mistake it for two separate unions at certain times... Finally, the last major “Tatar confederation” to be named is represented by the groups of Mongol tribes proper that occasionally established tribal unions of varying types’ [50, pp. 37–38]. The Western Tatars bordered the Uighurs and occupied the territory of today's Gansu and Shaanxi provinces. Being located along the Silk Road, they most probably formed a state that served the sole purpose of connecting the Chinese and the Uighurs along the trade route. The White Tatars inhabited today's Inner Mongolia and can be viewed as a separate state. There were two more Tatar states, which R. Khrapachevsky associated with the so-called Diu troops, led by the Tutukuljut Tatar tribe ('the most respected' one according to Rashid al-Din). He localised them north of the Khitan (the Liao Empire) and west of the Jurchens (the Jin Empire). The Black Tatars apparently formed an independent yurt in the north-eastern part of today's Mongolia. The Chinese chronicler Li Xinchuan presented the following account of Jin affairs: ‘Jin was still on the throne when he issued the order to Yunji to go to Jingzhou and obtain gifts from the Black Tatars’ [50, pp. 70–71]. This indicates that in 1211 the Black Tatars lived along the Jin borders and were vassals to the Jurchens. Different chronicles referred to the same Tatar groups by different names because they used different classification criteria. They sometimes referenced key economic activities (the Black Tatars were cattle breeders) or the territory that the group occupied. What was essential about the entity formed by the Diu troops is their function within the state (they appear in ‘Jinshi’ as ‘the northern frontier troops’).

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8 Turkic ‘parent’ ethnoses is a subject that deserves to be studied in detail, which is difficult due to the scarce historical and historiographic data. For instance, S. Klyashtorny and I. Sultanov singled out the early Kirghiz people, the Kipchaks, and the Tele as independent ethnoses. The Tatars, who have always been an independent political actor, cannot be identified with any of the ‘parent’ ethnoses, not to mention with the Kipchaks and the Mongols, as they were the last of the above to enter the historical arena. The Uighurs also qualify as an early independent ethnos.
We believe that the above-mentioned Kimek Khanate belongs among these states. Thus, all the six Tatar yurts listed by Rashid al-Din have been localised, though it is unclear how long they had existed before Chinggis Khan's conquest. Rashid al-Din apparently did not consider the Wild Tatars to form an independent state because they did not have either khans or government institutions, being primarily engaged in hunting in Southern Siberia. Apart from the above, Chinese sources mention the states of the Western, Northern, and North-Western Tatars [50, p. 145]. They can be largely identified with the states listed above. The Western Tatars lived in Gansu Shaanxi; the Northern Tatars inhabited the area along Xi Xia's border in the Gobi Desert and can be viewed as the Black Tatars. The North-Western Tatar state had the same territory as the White Tatars occupied.

Every ethnonym undergoes transformations that are sometimes so complex that it can be difficult to trace their origins. The Kimeks and the Kipchaks once dominated the Great Steppe but then, according to the majority of scholars, they assimilated with closely related peoples. Al-Omari wrote on Desht-i Kipchak, ‘This state used to be the land of the Kipchaks in ancient times; but when the Tatars occupied it, the Kipchaks became their subjects. Then they became mixed with and related to them, and the land prevailed over their [Tatar] natural and racial qualities, and they all became just like Kipchaks, as if they came from the same clan’ [44, p. 105]. Indeed, the Kipchaks had a period of prosperity but then disappeared from the historical arena. Yet, many Tatar, Kazakh, Uzbek, Nogai, Bashkir, and even Russian (primarily Cossacks) people are related to the Kipchaks [11, p. 112]. Does this mean that it is possible for a nation to dissolve into other peoples or change its language easily? A well-developed nation is very unlikely to do so. The Kimeks and the Kipchaks founded the Kimek Khanate. The Great Steppe was known as Desht-i Kipchak until the very last Tatar Khanate, the Crimean one°, dissolved. Could they have just vanished? There are no arguments to support this. For instance, the Maris have not disappeared in millennia. They keep living where they have always lived, near the Tatars and the Russians. Why should the Kipchaks have disappeared? In fact, the Kimeks and the Kipchaks merely returned to their ‘parent’ ethnonym of ‘Tatar’ after losing political influence.

To understand ethnic processes in Eurasia it is essential to note that the Huns, Turks, and Tatars that moved from the east to the west did not arrive in uninhabited areas. Peoples closely related to them occupied the land. N. Bichurin wrote in the foreword to ‘Collected Data on Peoples Who Lived in Central Asia in Ancient Times’, ‘Brief as they are, these reports reveal that in ancient times the whole part of Central Asia that stretches from the Eastern Ocean westward to the Caspian Sea was populated by the same peoples that inhabit it now; they led the same life as their descendants lead after two thousand years, and they do it within the same confines with only minor territorial changes’ [5, p. 10]. We note the important fact that the peoples that used to live in the area of Central Asia from the Pacific Ocean to the Caspian Sea before the Common Era still live there.

It is hard to discuss the formation of the Tatars' ancestors in Siberia, the Urals, the Volga Region, and the Black Sea Region before the Common Era because relevant data and archaeological material is scarce. Some authors believe that there were Turkic-speaking tribes among the Scythians [see: 8], but this assertion requires further research. As for the Hunnu/Huns, it is beyond doubt that this group included Turkic tribes. V. Radlov believed that ‘the On-Uighurs apparently formed the core of the Xiongnu state, and it is not surprising that the Chinese name Xiongnu is nothing but a corrupted On-Uighur...’ [39, pp. 126–127]. N. Bichurin similarly wrote, ‘According to the history of China, the Oikhor [Hoihu] House was maternally descended from the Hunns. Therefore, there is no doubt that the founding father of the Oikhor [Hoihu] House was the son of the Xiongnu khan's daughter or niece who

° Crimean Khans began to lay claim the Golden Horde's legacy following the collapse of the Kazan and Astrakhan Khanates, calling their state ‘Ulug Urda wa Desht-i Kipchak’.
was married off to a ruling prince who belonged to the union of Dili generations, which can be dated to the beginning of the Second century before Christ, when the Xiongnu completely conquered Mongolia. In the period of Chinese history known as *Zhan Guo* [480–221 BCE], the northern parts of today's Chinese Shanxi and Gansu did not belong to China but were occupied by various nomadic peoples’ [5, p. 213]. The Hoihu (Uighurs) and the Dili (Teles tribes) were undoubtedly Turkic.

In order to properly understand the historical processes, it is important to view the Great Steppe as a common environment populated by nomadic tribes. It can be described as a steppe civilisation by analogy with the Mediterranean. Fernand Braudel's approach to the Mediterranean applies here. He studied the Mediterranean, including the coast, as a whole civilisation regardless of ethnic and state borders. To cite Braudel, ‘The Mediterranean can be defined as a strip of landlocked water. However, one should not confuse the different stretches of land that envelope and press round the sea. Would it be right to say that the Mediterranean is a body of water surrounded by mountains? It should be emphasised that this fact and its numerous consequences are especially important in historical terms, particularly since it is traditionally neglected’ [7, p. 34]. The Mediterranean is united by its climate, such staples as olive trees and grapes, and sea trade routes.

The steppe is clearly associated with specific geographical conditions and a certain historical lifestyle. The Great Steppe is surrounded by mountains and forests, which are both of vital importance since the former yield metal and the latter wood. The Turks and, later, the Tatars could not have made their great conquests without their own metallurgic resources, in particular in the Altai Mountains. Trade routes were also crucial. While the Mediterranean would be inconceivable without its coastal fleet, Eurasian states could not exist without good, safe roads and means of transport.

The Silk Road was definitely more important than any other commercial connections. René Grousset wrote, ‘The territory of the Tarim Basin, presently occupied by the Chinese Turkestan, used to be a centre of commerce and caravan routes, and chains of oases formed a line there that ensured communication between the great Western civilisations, situated in the Mediterranean, Iran and India, and those of the Far East, namely China. A double path ran in the double bend north and south of the Tarim River: the northern route connected Tonghua, Hami, Turpan, Kara Shahar, Kuqa, Kashgar, the Fergana Basin, and Transoxiana; the southern one included Tongwan, Hotan, Yarkant, the Pamir valleys, and Bactria. This thin double line winding across deserts and mountains was strong enough to connect nations’ [10, p. 13]. The Silk Road crossed the entire Central Asia—the cradle of many Turkic peoples—and some of its branches stretched towards Volga-Kama Bulgaria and Crimea. This ensured continuous connection between the Turks of Gansu, the Turpan oasis, Bukhara, Khwarezm, Crimea, the Black Sea region, and the Middle Volga Region in the Middle Ages. Muslim missionaries entered the Volga Region from Khwarezm along with merchants. The fact that even nowadays Tatars do not need interpreters to talk to Uighurs from Xinjiang and Uzbeks from Khwarezm illustrates how tight the cultural connection has been among the nations living on the Silk Road. Our linguists are too preoccupied with differences between Turkic languages to notice how extremely similar they are. This degree of similarity is not attributable to common Turkic roots alone. If we compare the languages spoken by the Yakuts and the Tatars, or even by the Chuvahe and the Tatars—given that their areas alternate to form a mixed population—we will find the difference too big to communicate without an interpreter, even though these ethnic groups are all Turkic. It is not the case with the Uighur, Kazakh, Kirghiz, Uzbek, and Tatar people. Distant from each other as they are, they have similar cultures and languages. Olzhas Suleimenov described it as ‘remarkable conservatism of the Turkic word and language’ [43, p. 109]. Yet, it is determined not only by the nature of Turkic languages, but by the civilisational principles of the Great Steppe.
The territory of Eastern Turkestan has never been homogeneous in economic and cultural terms’, wrote S. Klyashtorny. ‘It combined sedentary farming oases with extensive nomadic economies based on cattle breeding’. The two economies were not only not isolated from each other, but even developed a certain symbiosis, which also influenced the population’s culture and political life. This merging of the two types of culture and economy was especially pronounced in the northern part of the country, where rich cities of the Tarim Basin always maintained strong connections to the nomads of Semirechye, the Eastern Tien Shan, Dzungaria, and Mongolia [23, pp. 383–384]. As early as in the 1st millennium BCE, the tribes of Central Asia, Eastern Turkestan, and what is now Gansu province ‘mastered bronze and iron metallurgy, metal working, wheeled carts, and horseback riding. They lived in hemispherical felt kibitkas with a conical top, which were attached to large bull-driven carts when it was time to change locations’ [23, p. 384]. The Steppe was not self-sufficient in the Early Middle Ages, so it often waged war on China for free trade rather than tribute. A historiographer described China’s policy as follows: ‘No tribute [subordination] means no trade; tribute means rewards’. Later nomadic empires wanted to combine different types of economies. The tendency was especially strong in the Golden Horde, which can hardly be described as nomadic. It relied equally on arable farming, metallurgy, and sea-borne trade, with wheat being its chief export.

Tomas Barfield views the whole nomadic world as a culture living entirely on plunder from sedentary farmers, such as the Chinese [see: 4]. Peoples for whom plunder was the main source of subsistence did exist, for instance, the Rouran, but they were the exception rather than the rule. It would be wrong to regard plunder as the point and purpose of nomadic culture. There was no raiding into submission Ancient China, with its powerful economy, efficient state structure, and well-armed troops. To confront the Celestial Empire, one needed a powerful army—that is, an organised population capable of maintaining hundreds of thousands of warriors, and a metallurgical industry of one’s own to supply the troops with the world’s best weapons.

Nomadic empires could not be built merely by exploiting sedentary peoples. Cattle breeding was the cornerstone of their economy. An efficient system of power relations was necessary to ensure the land was protected. The reallocation of pastures and search for new grazing lands was what brought about all the wars and mass migrations, but not the pursuit of tribute. How people were distributed across the steppe was important for nomads, as it enabled them to preserve the terrain and maintain cattle breeding. War was inherent to nomadic life. The nomads had to either defend themselves against foreign enemies in the struggle for pasture lands or confront other peoples in times of expansion.

In the nomadic world it was possible for entire nations to cover long distances at high speeds, even by today’s standards. By giving rise to a unique nomadic civilisation, the Steppe made it possible to establish a connection between the East and the West, thereby forming a united Eurasia in which great empires could develop. Many states, including Russian principalities, were centred along waterways. But this lifestyle was not conducive to building empires. Only the steppe, which was home to the Turks, could bring together the widely dispersed small principalities. N. Trubetskoy wrote, ‘Any people in control of a river system dominated only a certain part of Eurasia; but a people in control of the steppe system dominated the entire Eurasia, because by dominating stretches of all the river systems flowing across the steppe, they thereby controlled each of the river systems as a whole. Therefore, only a state in control of the entire steppe system could unite Eurasia’ [45, p. 7]. Besides, the one who controlled the steppe at that time controlled the cities as well. This determined the very nature of Eurasia and enabled great empires to develop. The Huns, the Turks, and then the Tatars eventually came to control a vast territory, in which medieval ethnoses formed.
Chapter V. The Population of the Ulus of Jochi and the Development of the Medieval Tatar Ethnos

The steppe terrain developed many millennia ago, long before the Common Era, which means that the peoples inhabiting its territory from the Strait of Tartary to the Black Sea region and the Danube had shared certain features long before any written mentions of the nomads. Whenever Turkic tribes migrated from Eastern to Western Eurasia, they encountered their relatives. Legends of the Kazan Tatars present a somewhat blurred memory from that period. The legend of Alyp-Batyr is especially well-known [6, p. 23–25]. It is set in relatively recent times, most probably is about the dissolution of the Second Turkic Khaganate. It begins as follows:

‘Legend has it that Prophet Nûh had three sons, and Yafes (Japheth) was among them. Yafes had three sons, too: Ghazi, Turk, and Alp. They were handsome and strong, but in time started to quarrel, and a war began between Ghazi and Turk. Turk was the winner. His brother Alp was so strong that he could move mountains. Once he went to faraway lands but got lost and could not find his way home. So he came to a river and encountered a tribe that spoke a language similar to his. He found himself a wife and stayed with the people. Alp had two sons, and he did not know what names to give them. All of a sudden the sky turned cloudy, it grew colder, and the babies began to cry. Alp tried to soothe them, but the babies continued to cry. Then Alp realised that they had a reason to cry. It occurred to him that they needed names. Alp consulted his wife, and they called one baby Bulgar and the other Burtas. Alp's children grew to be as strong as he was and founded two cities. His two sons gave rise to two peoples, who at first spoke the same language but then their speech became less similar. This is the legend. It is hard to identify the legendary Alp with any historical figure because Alp could have meant simply an epic hero or a title in written sources. According to Movses Kaghankatvatsi, the name of the North Caucasian Huns' prince who ruled in the 660s was Alp Iletver (that is, ‘hero-elite’). Alp Iletver, the ruler of the Hun state, occupied the third position in the hierarchy of the khaganate after the khagan and his heir [15, p. 265]. High status of Alp in the Turkic hierarchy is confirmed by a surviving inscription in Northwest Mongolia which reads: ‘[I], Alp Sol [of the clan with these tamgas]. I, Tyupesh Alp Sol, wrote [this]. I was in good health [then] (variant: I sat as an esen then)’ [23, p. 122]. S. Klyashtorny dated this inscription to the latter half of the 8–9th centuries. He wrote, ‘However, one of the tamgas used in the inscription is typologically similar to one of the three tamgas of the Khagan of the Uighur dynasty found on the monument to Bayan-chor (Eletmish Khagan, 747–759) in Moghon Shine Usu’ [23, p. 123]. Turkic tribes were apparently in the midst of forming new states, in particular Volga Bulgaria, at the time in which the legend of Alp is set.

There is much speculation about the Bulgar issue. During the Soviet period, the Tatar's historical thinking was refocused on their Bulgar origin. This ideological attitude has carried over from the Soviet past as the so-called Bulgarist movement. Its adherents regularly file petitions to public authorities asking that the Tatars be renamed Bulgars. There is a political reason for their perseverance. If Tatar history is viewed as beginning from the Bulgars, it is confined to a rather recent period. For example, there is a city named Tetyushi in Tatarstan. It lies just opposite to Bulgar. It was founded as an outpost in the years of the First Turkic Khaganate, probably when Istämi Khagan conquered the Volga Region (558/559). That is, the ancestors of the Tatars had existed for several centuries by the time the Bulgar State was founded. Before the Turkic Khaganate emerged, the Huns had occupied the territory of today's Tatarstan. Of course they had predecessors, but no reliable data on them has come down to us. Anyway, it is beyond doubt that the ancestors of the Tatars lived along the Volga River before the Common Era. The famous Russian linguist S. Malov wrote, ‘What I can say is that even five centuries before the Common Era, the Turks lived in essentially the same territory as they do now, with some minor exceptions’ [30, p. 136]. Having analysed 30–40 Turkic

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10 Claude Lévi-Strauss cites a myth of North American tribes, which contains the following passage, ‘Since the baby cried incessantly, his new “father” decided to give a name to his “son” so that he would calm down’ [28, p. 28].
languages and dialects, Malov arrived at the following conclusion: ‘Migrations did not have the importance for and influence on Turkic languages that is traditionally attributed to them’ [30, p. 136]. This is essential for understanding the history of the Tatars, whose ancestors already inhabited the Volga Region, the Black Sea region, and the banks of the Danube at the beginning of the Common Era. The subsequent Migration Period caused some changes, but just in which Turkic tribes were subordinated to others. The appearance of the Huns, followed by the Tatars under Batu's command, did not mean a new homeland for the Turks. It was just a shuffling of the cards, without any dramatic differences in culture.

We have little information on the period of the Huns, not to mention the Scythians, which seems to be the time when the Turks first settled in the territories that they still occupy today. Of particular importance is the following statement by S. Malov concerning the long history of the modern Tatar language: ‘I believe that long ago, that is, long before the 5th century BCE, two language groups formed from many tribal languages in the western part of the Turkic territory, one being Khazar-Bulgar-Chuvash, and the other Bashkir-Tatar-Kipchak-Mishar. In order to avoid chronological confusion (13th century Tatars!), the latter should be referred to as just ‘Mishar’, since the term ‘Mishar’ is unlikely to cause any historical or chronological confusion. I believe it is irrefutable, from the linguistic perspective, that this Mishar (Tatar) language group has existed in the west since ancient times. Western Turkic languages reveal too long a history, too many different influences. This could not have happened within a very short period of time. All known Turk migrations from Central Asia (e.g. the Huns, the Mongol-Tatars, the Kirghiz) did not have the expected linguistic effect, nor did they trigger the shift towards Eastern Turkic linguistic elements that would have been only natural if there had not been long-established West Turkic languages in this western area [30, p. 137]. This raises serious questions. It is clear that the Mishar (Tatar) dialect was the original language of the Tatars' ancestors in the Volga Region. This dialect incorporated the Bulgar dialect in the 7–10th centuries, then the Volga-Khwarezmian dialect in the 13th century, after which the modern Tatar language was formed.

Given the circumstances, there is no reason to view the Tatars and the Bulgars as different peoples, the former being non-indigenous and the latter autochthonous, considering they had a common ethnic origin, closely related languages, and similar cultures. The conquest of the Bulgars by the Tatars under Batu's command was nothing out of the ordinary. There are many fratricidal wars in the annals of history. To quote Ahmed al-Yakubi, ‘Each Turkic tribe has a separate state of its own, and some of them fight with the others’. [1, p. 149]. It is beyond doubt that both the Eastern ancestors (Tatars proper) and the Western Huns (Bulgars) contributed to the development of the Tatar nation between the Volga and the Urals. Both groups descended from the ancient Xiongnu.

The name ‘Tatars’ was most widely used in the time of Chinggis Khan and, later, Batu. Despite the Mongol Empire's considerable influence, the politonym ‘Mongol’ failed to replace the ethnonym 'Tatar', which was eventually extended to apply to the whole Turkic-speaking population of the Golden Horde. Chinese, Asian, and European chroniclers all referred to the Mongol Empire as the state of all Tatars, which contributed to the historiographic confusion of the terms 'Tatar' and 'Mongol'. For instance, Marco Polo gave the following account of Chinggis Khan's coming to power: ‘In 1187, the Tatars elected their tsar, and his name in their language was Chinggis Khan. He was a brave, intelligent, and valiant man. I tell you, when he was elected tsar, Tatars from all over the world who had been scattered across foreign countries came to him and recognised him as their ruler’ [31, p. 85]. European travelers did sometimes misidentify Eastern peoples, but Chinese and Asian chroniclers were definitely able to distinguish between them. Rashid al-Din titled the second chapter of his chronicles ‘On Turkic tribes who are known as Mongols at present’. Meng-Da Bei-Lu reported, ‘[The Tatars] also admire the Mongols as a pugnacious people and therefore refer to the name
of the dynasty as “the great Mongol state”. They learned it from escaped Jurchen officials, too. [I], Hun, have personally noticed their Go Wang Mo-Hou, who is temporarily acting as the Emperor, call himself “we Tatars” each time... They even do not know whether they are Mongols and what kind of name it is, what is the dynasty name and what is the name of regnal years. As for the documents that are sent these days, the literate officials who escaped here explain the affairs [to Tatars] carefully at all times to teach them’ [36, p. 55]. It should be noted that Mo-Hou (Muhali) was Chinggis Khan's most intimate associate. Commenting on this extract, N. Munkuev mentioned that Muhali, who originated from the Jalair tribe, could never have called himself a Tatar [36, p. 135]. Here the author of Meng-Da Bei-Lu, who had met Muhali in person, should be given more credit than the person who translated the chronicle into Russian. What is curious about this quotation is the fact that Jurchen escapees taught the Tatars to call themselves ‘The Great Mongol State’, that is, they turned to the Chinese tradition for determining the titles of ruling dynasties.

Governmental affairs were determined not by ethnonyms, but by various political forces that aspired to rule the country. V. Bartold noted, ‘It was during the reign of Chinggis Khan that the name Mongol... was first used to refer to the state and the dynasty; its meaning was later extended to include the people's name’ [3, p. 616]. The Souther Song ambassador Xū Ting, who visited Mongolia in 1235–1236, reported: ‘[The Tatar ruler] calls the Tatars “his own bone” each time’ [26, p. 142]. The Turks had used the word ‘bone’ to denote patrilinear kinship in ancient times. Important decisions, such as those regarding wars and military campaigns, were made by the kaghan personally, but ‘he also discusses them with his relatives. Chinese and other people do not participate [in such discussions]’ [26, p. 142]. The name ‘Mongol’ at that time was neither an ethnonym nor a politonym but referred to the dynasty, the ‘bone’, that is, the clan. V. Radlov was right to assume that family and tribal entities (clans), which occasionally formed military and political alliances and conquered neighbouring peoples under the command of outstanding tribal leaders, played the key role in the development of nomadic communities. When the Empire collapsed, they scattered again to gather together in new entities [39, pp. 72–73]. The relationship between the ethnonyms ‘Tatar’ and ‘Mongol’ can be confusing because the tribe and ethnos were identified with the ruling House of Mongol.

Already N. Bichurin observed, ‘The origin of the Mongol people and that of the House of Mongol, after which the people was named, are two completely different things’ [5, p. XXXIX]. The name House of Mongol was extended to refer to the state but did not become a politonym until Chinggis Khan and his ‘golden clan’ came to power.

The ruling houses established according to the appanage system of administration were first mentioned in ancient Chinese chronicles. To quote N. Bichurin, ‘The state was divided into small dominions, which tended to merge and split, giving rise to new states. On top of this, the Mongol people was named after the ruling House. Therefore, the same people was known as the Xiongnu when ruled by the Xiongnu House, as the Dulga people when ruled by the Dulga [Tukue] House, and as Mongols when ruled by the Mongol House, and it would bear this name until another House grew stronger and conquered it, thus giving it its own name’ [5, p. 8]. The name of the House did not always reveal the ethnic identity of people that this dynasty ruled. Quoting N. Bichurin, ‘The Xiongnu, referred to as the House of Mogul Khan in Asian sources, reigned in the western half of Mongolia; its horde camped near the Khangai Mountains (not far from the Orkhan River); its realm spread from Kālāgān to Baikal in the north and to the Tarbagatai Mountains in the west. ‘The Dunghu, referred to as the House of Tatar Khan in Asian sources, reigned in Eastern Mongolia; its horde was in the heart of the country (in Kartsin); its realm spread up to Kālāgān in the north, to the Khingan Mountain Range in the north... The descendants of the two houses rose and fell, exchanging roles and ruling Mongolia alternately in two lines for a total of thirteen centuries. The House of Xiongnu gave rise to the Rouran, Dulga [Tukue], and Oikhor [Hoihu] within this long pe-
iod; the House of Dunghu gave rise to the Wuhuan, Xianbei, and Khitan; the Muyung and Toba were regarded as branches of the House of Dunghu. The first Mongol dynasty Xiongnu was interrupted by the fall of the House of Khitan. Its line had continued in generations from the year 1864 before Christ to the year 1115 after Christ. The House of Mongol, the line of which is still being continued in Mongol princes, replaced it following a short period (31 years) [5, p. 32]. The quotation indicates that the Houses were not named or divided into more Houses according to ethnic features. Even though the Dulga and Oikhor, descending from the House of Xiongnu/Mogul Khan can be identified to some extent with the Turkic Tukue (Turkut) and Hoihu (Uighur) tribes, the Rouran hardly belong to Turkic tribes, which means that the House of Xiongnu ruled a multi-ethnic community. Historians identify the Wuhuan, Xianbei, and Khitan, who descended from the House of Dunghu/Tatar Khan, as Mongol tribes. Yet, it is not clear whether the Xianbei state and the Khitan Liao state, which existed from 907 to 1125, were mono-ethnic, because the Khitan language has not been deciphered. ‘The identity of Tatar Khan remains unclear. Was he the khan of the Eastern Mongols or the Khan of the Yuezhi?, continued N. Bichurin, ‘Both nomads camped not far from China; the former owned the land beyond the border of Zhili governorate; the latter lived in the territory which now makes up the north-western corner of the Chinese Empire. This lack of clarity, however, is eliminated given that Mongolia was divided into eastern and western halves, the former belonging to Tatars and the latter to Mongols, after which the peoples were named’ [5, p. 220]. The ‘Tatar’ and ‘Mongol’ Houses here cannot be associated with ethnicity, nor even with the state. They refer solely to the ruling dynasty, the ‘bone’, clan, though the meaning of the House of ‘Tatar’ was extended with time to become the eponym of the people, who were made up of closely related tribes of the ruling House.

It is hard to identify the ‘Houses’ ethnically because Tatars lived all across Mongol, Siberia, and along the Great Wall of China, while the Yuezhi were Proto-Iranians. As for the ancestors of the contemporary Mongols, they did not come to Mongolia until the 10th century at the earliest. N. Bichurin described their ascension to power as follows: ‘The Mongol tribe gained strength rapidly around the time of the birth of Jesus Christ and bothered the Middle Colour [a literal translation of Zhonghua, or China] for a long time. Finally, in the middle of the ninth century the Khyagas people were able to defeat the ruling House of Oikhor [Hoihu]; the vengeful China exterminated the remaining ones who sought shelter under the Great Wall; the remaining generations moved away from the Khangai Mountains, to the Ili or Tarbagatai Mountains in the west. Then the House of Khitan, the last branch of the House of Dunghu, succeeded to the Oikhors [Hoihu]. As the Khitan rose, the Mohe of the Black River, commonly known as Tatan, came from the Amur River. They took advantage of the Mongols’ exhaustion to easily cross their border westwards and go down the south-western slope of the mountains towards Chahar until they settled on the desolate northern slopes of the Yinshan Mountains. Those Mohe of the Black River gave the people its current name of Mongol, and European sources began to use it instead of the ancient names that had been given to Mongols by their ruling Houses. Therefore, the Mongolian Empire was founded not by native Mongols, but by Tungus people, who came to Southern Mongolia from the Amur River’ [5, p. 375]. Detailed as it is, the explanation leaves some doubts because of more recent reports identifying Chinggis Khan as a Black Tatar. This problem is eliminated if we take into account the following report by Sima Guang (1019–1086): ‘The Tatars are a separate tribe descending from the Mo[he] and Jie. They live in the Yingshan Mountains’ [50, p. 173]. Most scholars do not question Chinggis Khan’s Mongol origin and therefore change the name from ‘Tatar’ to ‘Mongol’ in the chronicles. However, it is essential to distinguish between the Mongols descending from the Black Tatars and the modern Khalkha Mongols. We will not be able to understand the dramatic history of the Tatars if we confuse them.
It is critical to realise that Chinggis Khan used the name ‘Mongol’ to refer to his dynasty, not his ethnos. N. Munkuev wrote, ‘Some authors conclude that the union of Mongol tribes or clans in the 12th century was a state with a name of its own, “Khamag Mongol Ulus” (Khalkha Mongolian for “Khamag-Mongol State”) and that the phrase “Khamag-Mongol” (Khalkha Mongolian) was an ethnonym referring to these tribes. However, neither the name “Qamuy mongqol ulus” nor the ethnonym “qamuy mongyol” appears in “The Secret History of the Mongols” or in any other sources. Sources only mention the names “Mongol ulus” (Mongol State), as does The Secret History of the Mongols, and “Yeke mongyol ulus” (Great Mongol State), which appears in the legend of Güyük Khan’s (1246–1248) seal dated 1246’ [34, p. 379]. Chinese sources indicate that in 1211, Chinggis Khan's state was first given the official name Da Menggu guo, that is, Great Mongol State/Domain of the Great Mongols, which is a calque of the Mongol ‘Yeke mongyol ulus’.

In the latter half of the 12th century, the name ‘Mongol’ referred to all tribes whose progenitors descended from the legendary Alan Gua’, continued N. Munkuev, ‘Therefore, the Barulas, Adarkin, Urut, and Mangut people were known to be Mongols at that time as well as tribes that branched off later—Taichiid, Besut, Khonkhotan, Geniges, and others. ... As a general name, the word “Mongol” apparently applied to all clans and tribes descending from the legendary ancestors of Chinggis Khan’ [34, p. 380]. Having analysed the use if the terms ‘mongol’ and ‘mongoljin’ in The Secret History of the Mongols, P. Rykin concluded that ‘in no context do these terms act as a self-designation of any group or denote (even “by outsiders”) any ethnic identity’ [41, p. 57], ‘it does not refer to “ethnic” Mongols or Mongols “proper”. In all relevant contexts, the term mongol acts not as an “ethnonym” but as a category of classification comprising those groups who declared Chinggis Khan ruler or supported him voluntarily’ [41, p. 61]. This means that the name of Chinggis Khan's state ‘Yeke mongyol ulus’ does not convey any ethnic meaning, but refers to the dynasty that had come to rule. However, speaking of the Tatars in this state, the ethnonym or, rather, politonym is used. The chronicle Da Jin guo zhi (1234) offers the following explanation: ‘The great dynasty is the Tatars (Dada) of the Mongol state’ [50, p. 249]. Xū Ting's notes of the Mongols begin as follows: ‘The state of the Black Tatars <...> is called Great Mongolia’ [26, p. 137]. As has been mentioned above, it was Jurchen officials who taught the Tatar to call themselves Great Mongolia, which does not mean that it was possible to make the Empire's subjects believe that they all had become Mongols, as is argued by P. Rykin. He wrote, ‘The strategy used by the Empire's ruling elite to construct the Mongol identity consisted of making a point of the “common descent” of that ruling elite and the population subordinated to it’ [41, p. 64]. The author obviously exaggerates the constructivism of the chancellery. Chancellors did not determine the great ruler's influence; it was based on the belief that the khan's power originated with Kuk Tengri (the Eternal Sky)—that is, was divine. The inscription on Güyük Khan's seal begins as follows: ‘Müngke tengri-yin küčün-dür yeke Monggol ulus un dalai-yin qan jarliq’ (By the power of the Eternal Sky. Yarliq of Dalai Khan of the Great Mongol Empire). Rashid al-Din wrote, ‘Common people saw for themselves that he enjoyed various kinds of support from Heaven’ [38, p. 64]. The Chinggisid power drew on the idea of divine will as the source of the ruler's power as well as succession to the throne within the ‘golden clan’.

In the opinion of N. Kradin, Mongolisation took ‘the form of development of a ruling elite, nirun (descendants of Alan Gua's sons), and other elements of the politia, known as Darlekin (all patrilineal descendants of Borte Chino)’ [25, p. 162]. The Chinggisid clan relied heavily on kinship, which included a large number of branches. Rashid al-Din wrote, ‘In the time of Kabul Khan, who was the Mongol khan from whose line came the majority of Kiyat tribes, and to whom the Mongol tribes of Nirun were cousins, and other branches of the Mongols, each of which was known by its own special name and nickname — all were his uncles and grandfathers, and all were considered his friends and allies, and in adversity and misfor-
tunes they became his helpers and defenders’ [37, pp. 103–104]. Here a clan is described in which descendants of the ‘immaculate’ Alan Gua had access to power. In fact, the legend of Alan Gua has much in common with the story of Virgin Mary’s immaculate conception. Given that some of Chinggis Khan’s associates were Nestorian Christians, it seems likely that they extended the Biblical story to Alan Gua.

The House of Chinggis Khan, as well as the later House of Batu, implemented the principle of clan inheritance; however, the meaning of the term could be extended in a political context. A House is a clan consisting of close relatives and influential political figures, usually distantly related through marriage. Whether it has the same ethnicity as the people or not, the House stands in contrast to the demos (budun). This is why, when we say, ‘The Mongols ruled the Tatar Empire’ we do not refer to the ‘Mongol’ and ‘Tatar’ ethnoses, but mean the ruling clan known as ‘Great Mongol’ (Tatar is ‘ak suek’, meaning ‘white bone’) and the people known as ‘Tatars’ (budun, ‘qara xalıq’, meaning ‘common people’). Therefore, the name of the Mongol state reflects citizenship rather than ethnic affiliation.

Giovanni da Pian del Carpine was not mistaken when he titled his report ‘Liber Tartarorum’ (The Book of the Tartars). He was using the politonym. Neither was it wrong when the learned scribe of the 14th century corrected it as The History of the Mongols Whom We Call the Tartars (Historia Mongalorum quos nos Tartaros appellamus), for this title referred to both the ruling dynasty and the subordinated people.

Many people began to call themselves Mongols after Chinggis Khan came to power, but the self-designation ‘Tatars’ preserved its meaning. There are two possible reasons for this. Firstly, the Mongol dynasty distinguished itself from among the rest of the people, including non-noble Mongols. Describing the 1211 anti-Jin campaign, Rashid al-Din wrote that the khan left his commander Tokuchar, who led two thousand horsemen, in the rear ‘for protection against the tribes of Mongols, Keraites, Naimans, and others’ [37, p. 163]. Secondly, the Mongols were not the numerically dominant group as compared with the Tatars, the Naimans, etc. To quote N. Munkuev, ‘In the state of Chinggis Khan, those Mongols alone to whom the “thousand” administrative system applied—that is, those subordinated to the khan, counted as many as 695 thousands, which does not include various, in particular Mongol, tribes in northern wooded areas as well as Turkic peoples’ [34, p. 393]. The Mongols proper were a drop in the ocean as compared to the tens of millions of conquered people. Besides, some of the Mongols were simply assimilated by the numerous Turks, Persians, and Chinese. The latter warned them, ‘Our state is like a sea, and your state is like a handful of sand’. It was true.

This was a critical period for the ethnonym, due primarily to the political situation. The Golden Horde became the turning point for the ‘Tatar’ ethnonym. With its efficient machinery of government and well-developed culture and language, it was able to draw various tribes into its orbit [see: 48]. No policies for ethnic assimilation were implemented in the Golden Horde because religious equality was promoted; local customs, traditions, and even law were preserved. However, the new culture as well as the country’s powerful economy were the centrifugal force that laid the basis for the medieval Tatar people, which had much in common with the Tatars of today.

Regional differences became more profound as the Golden Horde dissolved and numerous Turkic-Tatar states arose. In 1428, Tyumen split from the Horde. There Abu’l Khayr Khan and his ulus became known as the ‘Uzbek people and ulus’. In Central Asia, the term ‘Uzbek’ referred to the nomadic population of eastern ‘Desht-i Kipchak’. Isfakhani wrote in the early 16th century: ‘There are three tribes of Uzbeks who are the most glorious in the realm of Chinggis Khan. Now one (of them) is the Shibanits... The second tribe is the Kazaks, who are famous throughout the world for their strength and fearlessness, and the third tribe is the Manghits... [47, p. 47]. The core of what was to become the Kazakh people began to form in the Uzbek union during the rule of Abu’l Khayr Khan. Abd-al-Razzāq Samarqandī
wrote in 844, ‘At times some of the Uzbek troops, having become Kazakhs, came to Mazanderan and, having plundered everywhere, returned [to where they came from]’ [14, p. 381]. Historical chronicles sometimes refer to them as ‘Uzbek–Kazakhs’. Here ‘Uzbek’ referred to the nomadic tribes of Shayban’s ulus and ‘Kazakh’ referred to the nomads of Orda Ichen’s ulus; the two groups were very similar ethnically. As late as the 16th century, Abu’l Khayr’s grandson Shayban Khan conquered the Timurid state by occupying Samarkand and Bukhara. It was then that he extended the meaning of ‘Uzbek’ to include Central Asian Turks.

At that point the Tatars, the Uzbeks, and the Kazakhs began to develop distinct differences. The nomads of Mongolistan and the Left Wing of the Ulus of Jochi formed the core of the Kazakh people, while in Central Asia the Turkic language was influenced by Farsi, resulting in the Chagatai-based modern Uzbek language. The Crimean Tatars remained under the aegis of the Ottoman Empire for a long period of time and therefore adopted numerous elements of the Turkish (Oghuz) culture. The other ethnic groups developed in relative isolation, which accentuated their local features. Those are now known as the Azerbaijani, Kumyk, Balkar, Karachay, Nogai, etc.

A pure ethnos does not exist. Every nation contains constituents of many tribes and ethnoses. To quote Sadri Maksudi, ‘any effort made to ensure direct ethnic, clan, or tribal succession, ethnic adequacy both between ancient and medieval Turkic tribes and between medieval and contemporary ethnic communities of Turks (ethnic groups) is fruitless and will never be rewarded’ [29, p. 291]. Each of today’s Turkic peoples is a unique mix of ancient tribes.

To sum up, the scope of the ethnonym ‘Tatar’ changed from the time of the Turkic Khaganate to the Golden Horde period. In the Early Middle Ages, Tatar tribes often split into new tribes due to rapid population growth and the establishment of new yurts. Therefore, they assumed new self-designations, sometimes forming unions with other ethnic groups, whether related or not. The Tatars were originally Turkic speaking. There are no solid arguments for the opposing opinion. In the Golden Horde, various Turkic-Tatar tribes consolidated to form a medieval nation that had a literary language and well-developed culture and whose heritage is still valuable today.

It should be noted that there is no cultural, linguistic, or anthropological evidence of any Mongol influence on the Tatar people. In addition, a Y chromosome DNA test has revealed that haplogroup C is hardly found in Tatars, but is very common in today’s Mongols. This is all the more surprising because chronicles report that Batu was entrusted with four thousand Mongol horsemen, which was about twenty thousand people with families, whereas N. Munkuev estimated the size of his army at 139 thousand warriors [34, p. 396]. These warriors settled in the Golden Horde. The Jochids were buried in the Kazan Kremlin as well as Bakhchysarai in Crimea. Their numerous descendants have lived in the Volga and Black Sea regions for centuries. However, no genetic trace of the Khalkha Mongols has been found, which supports the assertion that not only the Tatars, but also the Mongols of Chinggis Khan’s time differed greatly from today’s Mongols.

It is essential to keep in mind in the context of medieval history of the Tatars that the name ‘Mongol’ had multiple meanings. Different chroniclers used the term as: (1) the ethnonym of an ancient people; (2) the name of the House of Mongol, which existed before the Mongol Empire was established; (3) a politonym which appeared following Chinggis Khan’s rise to power; (4) the dynasty that ruled the Yeke mongyol ulus; (5) the contemporary Mongols. This can cause confusion in studies unless the intended meaning is specified for each case and period. It should be noted that the Chinese chancellery used the term ‘Mongol-Tatars’ in the form of Meng-Da to refer to both the ruling dynasty and the subordinated Tatar people. In this case the term ‘Tatar’ was used as a politonym, referring to all common people (budun) as opposed to the ‘white bone’, or the Mongol dynasty. This term does not convey
any meanings in addition to the above. Therefore, it appears reasonable to differentiate between the terms ‘Tatar’ and ‘Mongol’ in both ethnic and political terms.


26. Radlov V. K voprosu ob ujgurax (On the issue of the Uighurs) // From the foreword to edition of the Kutadgu Bilig / Appendix to Vol. 72 of the Notes of the Imperial Academy of Sciences. Saint Petersburg, 1893. No. 2. 130 p.
§ 2. Interconfessional Population of the Ulus of Jochi

**Russians**

Yuri Seleznyov

After Batu's 1237–1241 aggressive campaign on the Russian Principalities, Russian princes faced the question to recognise the power of the invaders or to defend their independence by force of arms. Princes, who survived the disastrous invasion, one after another went to the main camp of the fearsome commander, and Russian lands were absorbed by the Mongol Empire as part of the Ulus of Jochi. This led to the fact that an enclave of the Russian orthodox population, with a significant territory and considerable number of inhabitants, appeared within the Mongol Empire.

The political culture created by Chinggis Khan and his descendants implied that head of the relevant administrative unit (principality) or the supreme ruler have to visit to the Khan's
main camp upon the change of a ruler. We cannot completely exclude the need for a prince's or his representative's visit to the Khan's main camp during the annual meetings of the Horde's elite—the quriltai [30, pp. 78, 89] or the probability of a prince's relatives' serving in the Khan's guard forces [19, pp. 104; 22, pp. 70–75]. These political events required the participation of a significant number of prince's confidants and his servants, or other accompanying persons, including churchmen of the Russian Orthodox Church [16, pp. 22–28; 17, pp. 31–36; 19, pp. 267–272]. Moreover, the Russian princes and their court had to stay in the Khan's main camp for a long time, often for years.

The need for the frequent and long stays of Orthodox Christians in the main camp of the Horde ruler and in his capital city, Sarai, led to the establishment of the Russian Orthodox Eparchy of Sarai in 1261. The compiler of the Laurentian Chronicle briefly noted: ‘That very summer the Metropolitan appointed Mitrophan the Bishop of Sarai’ [11, column 476]. The new eparchy was supposed to care of the Orthodox population, who lived in the steppes between the Dnieper and the Volga, as well as in the state's capital [8, p. 56]. There is no doubt that the Golden Horde's tolerance significantly contributed to such a turn of events.

Another factor that contributed to the creation of a special eparchy in the steppes of the Golden Horde, was the presence of a significant number of Russian Orthodox population in the lands of the nomadic uluses, who were brought there as prisoners after the conquest. Their number and composition were replenished after various incursions into the territory of the Russian principalities, that during the period from 1223–1505 were more than 100 [20] (152 conflicts are known between Russia and the Horde [18]).

William of Rubruck speaks of the practice of removing the population from the conquered Russian lands: ‘When Russians have no more gold or silver to give, the Tatars take them and their little babies, like flocks of sheep, to the desert to guard their animals’. In his memoirs he noted that ‘Batu and Sartaq ordered to build a village (casale) on the eastern bank (on the left bank of the Don—Author) for Russians who transport ambassadors and merchants by boats’. In addition, William of Rubruck described of the appearance of Russian women, who, as he says, ‘do their hair like our women and decorate the front side of their dresses with vair or ermine from feet to knees’ [14, pp. 109, 110]. Thus, the driven out Russian population was located in the steppe uluses of the Golden Horde and performed different tasks for the public infrastructure of the Horde state.

The description of a functioning administrative unit, known in the sources under the name Chervleny Yar, might be a good example, based on which one can somewhat judge the life of the Russian Orthodox population on the territory of the Golden Horde.

Chervleny Yar is the name of the territory, defined in the historical science as the interfluve between the Don and the Khopyor [3, p. 88; 7, pp. 234–235]. In the middle of the 13th century, these lands came under the rule of the Mongol-Tatars as a part of the Ulus of Jochi. In the historiography an extensive literature is devoted to the problem of Chervleny Yar. The most controversial issue is the political and administrative status of the territory. Back in the early 20th century, S. Vvedensky published an essay about this historical territory [5, pp. 347–380]. The author, based on the fact that the interfluval area between the Don and the Khopyor belonged to the Eparchy of Ryazan, ascribed Chervleny Yar to the possessions of the princes of Ryazan. An extensive work on the history of the territory in the 14–16th centuries was written by A. Shennikov [29]. In relation to the middle of the 15th century, he identified Chervleny Yar as ‘quite significant’. ‘It must have been so significant that the Golden Horde khans in the height of their power (Öz Beg, Jani Beg), who seemed to have all the power and opportunities to just sweep Chervleny Yar from the face of the earth, did not do that...’ [29, p. 15]. In his resumptive work on the historical geography of the Golden Horde, V. Yegorov defines the middle and upper Don region as a ‘buffer zone’ between the Russian and the Horde lands [6, pp. 27–47]. A great material on the history of these territories was
collected due to the archaeological excavations conducted by the Department of Archaeology and Ancient History of the Voronezh State University under the guidance of M. Tsybin [27, pp. 121–124; 28, pp. 142–144]. As a result, they discovered ancient settlements and burials of Cumans (Tatars) on the territory between Don and Khopyor, which was apparently quite extensive in terms of population. M. Tsybin also considers it possible that on the territory of the Chervleny Yar there existed one of the peripheral uluses ‘that was there, probably, before the period of “the great turmoil”’ [26, p. 194].

Thus, in the historiography various aspects of the region's life and development in the discussed period can be found both in general works and in works dedicated particularly to the Chervleny Yar issue. That said, the question concerning the nationality of the territory and its administrative status in the 14th century remains open.

At the same time, the nature of the dispute between the eparchies (of Ryazan and Sarai), which is reflected in the charters of Theognostus and Alexius, allows to determine the status of these lands. A disputable situation occurred when the Bishop of Sarai, who was responsible for the Orthodox population of the entire Horde, attempted to exercise his rights on the territory of Chervleny Yar. However, he was opposed by the Bishop of Ryazan, who had been granted those lands at the end of the 13th century. The Eparchy of Ryazan then sent a letter of complaint to the Metropolitan, as a result of which he got back his rights to these territories. Thus, Chervleny Yar should be considered as an integral part of the Horde lands that obtained a special status in the Russian Orthodox Church. For whatever reasons, these lands were excluded from the jurisdiction of the Bishop of Sarai and handed over to the Eparchy of Ryazan.

As it is known, the ulus system was the principle of administrative and territorial division of the Golden Horde. According to it, all the state (the Great Ulus) was divided into smaller holdings, which were also called uluses. In their structure, they resembled the military organisation of the Mongols, and their sizes depended on the owner's rank (temnik, tysyatsky, sobnik, desyatnik). The major holdings were tumen uluses, with their number of inhabitants and size of the territory able to mobilise or keep a corps of 10,000 people).

As borders between the major uluses were set natural boundaries, quite often, large rivers. Their territory generally remained unchanged throughout the existence of the Golden Horde. This is because people were considered to be the main wealth of the nomads, while the land was Chinggis Khan's ancestral property. Therefore, after the division of the smaller uluses (tysyacha), the noyon with his people migrated to a new territory, while his land remained under the rule of the previous owner. However, the migration of ‘tysyacha’ from one ulus to another was forbidden by the Mongol law (Yasser).

The existence of an ulus in the interfluvial area between Don and Khopyor is proved by the information preserved in the charters of the 14th century Russian metropolitans. According to them, the territory between Don and Khopyor was the final point [1, p. 3] of the division [1, pp. 3; 2, p. 340]. So, we can see a definite territory with clear borders, which is an administrative and territorial unit. References of Metropolitans Theognostus and Alexius to their predecessors (Maxim (1283–1305) and Peter (1305–1326) allow for the possible existence of an ulus here at the end of the 13th century, which could have been established during 1240–1250, that is, at the time of the Golden Horde's formation and the creation of other uluses.

More complicated is the problem of determining the size of the given administrative-territorial unit known as an ulus-‘tumen’ or ulus-‘thousand’. According to the chronicles, in the late 14th century, Tsarevich Mamat-Saltan (Muhammad Sultan) roamed here. Princes were subordinate to him [12, p. 194]. According to the socio-political hierarchy of the Horde, ‘Tsarevich’ was a temnik or general and ‘Prince’ was a commander of a thousand or colonel [4, pp. 12–22; 21, pp. 124–128]. Thus, the territory of Chervleny Yar in the late 14th century was an ulus-‘tumen’. As mentioned above, the territory and size of uluses remained static
Chapter V. The Population of the Ulus of Jochi and the Development of the Medieval Tatar Ethnos 307

throughout the period of the Golden Horde's existence. Thus it follows that at the moment of its founding in the 1240–1250s, Chervleny Yar was already an ulus-‘tumen’.

M. Tsybin acknowledges the possibility that in the 14th century a provincial ulus could have existed on the territory of Chervleny Yar, which ‘lasted, in all probability, until the period of “Great Troubles”. Tsarevich Mamat-Saltan (Muhammad Sultan), however, led a nomadic life in the interfluve of Don and Khopyor rivers in the 14th century—that is, after the shocking events of 1360–1370s in the Horde. At the same time, chronicle sources note unusual activity on the part of Horde rulers of various ranks in the outlying territories during the period of Great Troubles. For example, in 1361, Prince (emir) Tagay occupied the Mordovian ulus (‘came to Naruchad [Narovchat—Author] and began to reign there’ [12, pp. 232–234; 13, pp. 70–71]); Prince (emir) Sekiz ‘robbed Zapianiye, surrounded himself with a ditch and there began to rule’ [13, pp. 71–72]; Prince (emir) Bulat-Temir occupied the Bulgar ulus [12, pp. 232–234; 13, p. 73]. Also in 1361, according to M. Safargaliev, the Mamai Horde established itself in the Crimea and the Black Sea region [15, p. 125]. This means that, in all likelihood, there was an influx of people into Chervleny Yar during that period.

Based upon archaeological research conducted by M. Tsybin, in the 13–14th centuries the territory of Chervleny Yar was settled by both Russians and Tatars (Cumans). ‘The ancient Russian and Cuman populations focused upon different economic activities, which allowed them to co-exist in the same region’ [27, pp. 123–124]. Thus, the ulus consisted of both settled Russian and nomadic Tatar (Cuman) populations. Also, according to charters from the Metropolitan, the Horde’s mid-level administrators, who were known as baskaks and sotniks, were represented by Orthodox Russians. At the same time, supreme military and administrative positions (generals and colonels) were held, in all probability, by Tatar (Cuman) Muslims, although they are not mentioned in the charters. This conclusion is based upon the presence of ceremonial, Muslim burial artifacts that have been discovered in the territory between Don and Khopyor Rivers [9].

Since Chervleny Yar was an administrative unit, other Horde officials were also supposed to be present there. Among them were: scribes, customs officers, poberezhniks (officials who collected duties for transporting goods by water), falconers, ‘pardusniks’ (leopard keepers in charge of elite hunting), ‘buralyzhniks’, zastavshchiks (duty collectors at outposts), or karaulshchiks (watchmen). (Patrols along the Khopyor River are mentioned in charters belonging to Metropolitan Alexius and others) [23 p. 528; 31, pp. 465–569]. The population of the ulus had to pay established taxes: a general tribute, poll taxes, sales tax, a transport tax (coachman and cart duties); on procurement of food and forage, and a gift tax, etc. [25, p. 240; 31, p. 465].

Establishing the ruler of Chervleny Yar as an ulus in the late 14th century is crucial to an understanding of the domestic political situation in the Golden Horde, and of events in outlying territories. According to the Russian Chronicles, in 1400 Tsarevich-Chingsisid Mamat-Saltan roamed this territory. His name is mentioned in regard to the united campaign involving troops belonging to Princes Oleg of Ryazan, Ivan Pronsky, Tit of Kozelsk and the Murom army to the nomadic lands ‘in the outskirts of Chervleny Yar, which involved patrols along Khopyor and Don Rivers’ in 1400. The Russian troops, evidently, passed along Nogai’s road and ‘killed many Tatars and captured Tsarevich Mamat-Saltan and other Horde princes’ [12, p. 194].

Three names are preserved in genealogical lists belonging to the Jochids that could be rendered in Russian as Mamat-Saltan. One of them is Mahmud (Mam'ud)—the second son of Ak-Sufi, who was the eldest son of Suncek-oglan, the second son of Tunki (Tuki), who was the second son of Badakul, who was the eldest son of Jochi-Buka, the second son of Bahadur, who was the second son of Shayban, the fifth son of Jochi Khan [10, p. 36]. Mahmudek Khan (Mahmud Sultan, Mahdum Sultan)—the sixth son of Timur-Beg, who was the second son of
Temür Qutlugh, a son of Numkan (Tomgan), who was the second son of Abai, who was the second son of Kin-Timur (Uz-Timur), the fourth son of Tuqay Timur, the thirteenth son of Jochi Khan, who was the eldest son of Chinggis Khan [10, p. 40; 24, p. 63]. Mahmudek Khan (Mahmud Sultan)—the fourth son of Muhammad Khan, who was the second son of Hasan, who was the second son of Jansa (Jine), a son of Dervish Khan, who was a son of Tulak-Timur, who was the second son of Kuichek (Kunchek), who was a son of Sarich, who was the fourth son of Urunka, who was the third son of Tuqay Timur, the thirteenth son of Jochi Khan, who was the eldest son of Chinggis Khan [10, p. 40; 24, p. 61].

The period of late 14th-beginning of 15th centuries is characterized by active political, military and economic activities on the part of the seventh (for example Khan Toktamysh) or the eighth (Toktamysh's children) generations of the Jochids. Among representatives of the Golden Horde's ruling clan Mahmudek Khan (Mahmud Sultan) belongs to the tenth generation. It is also known that his first cousin once removed, Khudaydad (Kuidat), who was the eldest son of his younger brother Hasan Aliy—that is, a representative of the ninth generation, participated actively in the political life of the Jochid ulus in the 1420s [12, p. 238; 15, p. 199]. And it was exactly during this period from 1420–1440s, and not in the 1400s, that the tenth generation of the Jochids were active.

Mahmudek Khan (Mahmud Sultan, Mahdum Sultan) belongs to the seventh generation. His elder brother, the Great Khan Timur-Qutlugh, died in June or July of 1400 [15, p. 214].

Mahmud (Mam'ud) belongs to the eighth generation. His cousin Yumaduk-oghlan (son of Sufi, his father's younger brother), according to Mu'izz: 'was appointed by a certain group of people as rule, despite the fact that his father is still alive'. The previous citation refers to 829 AH (Hijrah)—that is, to the period from 13 September 1425 to 1 September 1426. That means that Mahmud (Mamud) likely ruled sometime during the late 14th or beginning of the 15th century.

Consequently, those rulers roaming the territory of Chervleny Yar in 1400 could have been Mahmud (Mamud), the second son of Ak-Sufi, a descendant of Shayban (Shiban) and fifth son of Jochi, or Mahmudek Khan (Mahmud Sultan, Mahdum Sultan), the sixth son of Timur-Beg, a descendant of Tuqay Timur, who was the thirteenth son of Jochi. Also, in Nikon's Chronicle the record concerning the Ryazan troops' campaign against the Horde's camps in the territory of Don and Khopyor Rivers follows that describing Khan Timur-Qutlugh's death [12, p. 193, 194]. Obviously, the events described were happening in the same succession: the Khan's death, followed by the campaign to Chervleny Yar. It is possible that, wishing to take advantage of Timur-Qutlugh's death, Oleg Ivanovich of Ryazan decided to invade the lands belonging to the deceased khan's brother, and even captured him. At the same time, it seems unlikely that the brother of leader of Jochid ulus led a nomadic life not relatively far from the capital, but still in the outlying territory belonging to the state. This circumstance would appear to support the idea that Mahmud (Mamud) was the owner of Chervleny Yar in 1400.

Thus, the historical territory named Chervleny Yar was an administrative territorial unit of the Golden Horde in the 13–14th centuries. In the 14th century it was an ulus-‘tumen’, populated by both Russians and Tatars. In the 15th century these lands were deserted.

3. Amelkin A. Graniczy' gosudarstv v Podon'e v poslednej chetverti XIV v. (The borders of the states in the Don river region in the last quarter of the 14th century) // Vostochnaya Evropa v
drennosti i srednevekov’e (Eastern Europe during ancient times and Middle Ages). Kontakty’, zony' kontaktov i kontaktny'e zony' (Contacts, areas of contacts and contact areas). Moscow, 1999.


8. Hieromonach Leonid (Kavelin) Istoriya czerkvi v predelax ny'neshnej Kaluzhskoj gubernii i kaluzhskie ierarxi (The history of the church within the present Kaluga guberniya and Kaluga hierarchs). Kaluga, 1876.


Peoples of the Volga-Ural Region

Vladimir Ivanov

The Mongol conquest of Eastern Europe and the inclusion of the larger part of its territory into the Ulus of Jochi played a crucial role in definitively forming the map of ethnic peoples that found themselves in close proximity to the administrative borders and centres of the Golden Horde. According to the definition given by R. Kuzeyev, it was during this period of Golden Horde rule that ‘the formation of the modern outlines of the ethnic territories of all the Volga-Ural peoples (including the Turkic peoples) was largely completed’ [29, p. 88]. This conclusion is also supported by the archaeological material. Thus, according to N. Shutova, who studied the Udmurt burial sites of the 16–19th centuries, beginning from the 16th century, ‘A network of new burial monuments in uncultivated lands is recorded... As a rule, they are located in the upper reaches of shallow rivers or brooks, where no settlements of people were observed in the 10–14th centuries’ [36, p. 101]. In the geographical grid system, these sites are in the interfluve of the Cheptsy, Kil’mez’ and Izh rivers, where the author discovered Udmurt pre-Christian burial sites, the earliest origin of which was in the 16th century [36, fig. 1]. This means that in comparison with the prior period, the ancient Udmurt ethnic territory was diminishing. According to R. Kuzeyev, this happened due to the advancement of the Mari people to the north and the Russians to the east [29, p. 88]. Similar processes occurred in the Middle Volga region, where the invasion of the Mongol-Tatars made ‘The majority of the Mari people abandon their lands of habitation (Sura-Tsna basin) and save themselves in the Meadow Land, which was inaccessible to the cavalry of the Mongol-Tatars’ [32, p. 206].

Additionally, there is a well-established viewpoint in the historical literature about the domination of the Golden Horde over the peoples of the region. This was concisely expressed by I. Antonov: ‘undoubtedly, the Golden Horde, throughout... a relatively stable period in its history, that is from the mid-13th to the mid-14th centuries, held the Bashkirs, Bulgars, Mari, Chuvashers, and Mordva-Moksha people in its dominion. As regards to the Mordva-Erzi people, the southern Udmurts (the Arsk people, and bearers of Chumoitlin culture), and the Komi-Permyaks, there are not sufficient grounds to make such an unambiguous conclusion. Nevertheless, their lands were also in the sphere of the military and political influence of the Mongols’ (emphasis is mine—Author.) [1, p. 178]. This opinion is also emphatically and clearly pr-
sent in the map showcasing the heyday of the White Horde under the reign of Öz Beg Khan, which was compiled by A. Astaykin. This map shows the Middle Volga region (to the mouth of the Vetluga river), the Lower and Upper Kama rivers regions (to the mouth of the Chusovaya River), and the Southern Urals entirely as part of the administrative territories of the Ulus of Jochi [4, pp. 296–297].

However, the geography of archaeological artefacts pertaining to the period of the Golden Horde in the Volga and Urals region reveals somewhat of a different situation. The distance between the city of Bulgar and the farthest eastern Mordovian archaeological sites—Fedorovskoe, Ponetayevskoe, Ichalkovskoe ancient towns—in the upper reaches of the Alatyr and Issa rivers [11, p. 129], is over 300 km, which takes more than a week of travel by land. From the Kazan fortress to the closest Mari settlements between the mouths of the Ileti and Malaya Kokshaga rivers [32, p. 169], the distance is over 50 km, or one day and a half to two days of travel (and probably even more if traveling by river). The distance between the outermost northern Golden Horde town of Alabuga to the outermost southern Udmurt (Cheptsa) settlements [20, p. 213] is no less than 270 km (at least one week of travel). This means that a traveler in that period of time had to spend several days to reach the territories inhabited by the populations of the Golden Horde, the bearers of ‘the imperial culture’.

The Bashkir tribes of the forest-steppe Ural region are an exception; their ethnic territory spread out to the north of the Ural river in its middle reach [28, pp. 149–151; 1, fig. 2]. It is likely that the steppe between the upper reaches of the Ural and Irtysh rivers in the 13–14th centuries were inhabited by Turkic-Mongol tribes, namely, Naiman, Karluk, Kushchi, and Buyrak tribes which constituted the ethnic core of the ulus of the youngest Chinggisid—Shiban [26, pp. 131–132].

There is no doubt that the territory of the Ural region steppe, which is located to the north of the middle reaches of the Ural river in the period in question, belonged to the Bashkirs-Paskatirs. This is indicated in part by the narratives which appeared long before the Mongol invasion. This is in reference to the map of Muhammad al-Idrisi (mid-12th century), well-known by source study specialists. Despite its confusion (the Volga-Atil River flows from the east to the west, the Kama-Julyman [a nameless tributary on the map] falls into the Atil on the right, Pechenegs [‘bilad bag’nak min al atrak’] are placed in the upper reaches of this nameless tributary, etc.), the placement of ‘bajigaks’ to the north of the Ural river (‘ahr šaurān’), between the Volga-Atil river and the Ural Mountains (‘ġebel āskākā’) is consistent with the historical circumstances of the time and can be supported by artefacts of the Chiyalik archaeological culture of the 12–14th centuries.

The records of the Chiyalik culture are located (though rather sparsely) in the vast territory spreading from the Ik river in the west to the lower reaches of the Tobol river in the east [24, p. 81]. In the territory of modern Bashkortostan, records of the Chiyalik culture were discovered in the form of compact local groups located along the banks of the largest rivers around the Bugulma-Belebey Upland: the Ik, Syun’, Ust-Belsk, Chermasen, Dem, Tok, Ayd, Middle Belaya, Upper Belaya and Ural local groups [12, p. 9]. According to the archaeological artefacts investigated, the tribes of the Chiyalik culture led a semi-nomadic way of life, as their settlements were of seasonal nature—summer and winter camps. The former are camps with traces of collapsible portable dwellings—yurts, tents, huts. The latter camps are stationary settlements consisting of semi-dugouts heated by suval-furnaces and foundationless log houses.

None of the authors of the 9–12th centuries say anything about the way of life of the bajirt-paskatirs and their settlements. The exception is al-Idrisi, whose report about ‘bajirt towns’ is doubtful from the point of view of its credibility [2; 3]. However, in terms of chro-
nology and historical geography, the ‘bashjirt country’ (ard basgirt) on al-Idrīsī’s map\textsuperscript{11} coincides spatially with the areal of the records of Chiyalik culture. Here, the researchers make the natural conclusion that the Ugrians—‘Chiyaliks’ comprise the main ethnic core of the medieval Bashkirs [24, p. 82; 13, pp. 13, 24].

 Practically as soon as the Chiyalik culture was identified, the ethno-cultural affiliation of its bearers was defined as Ugrian [23, p. 99; 22, p. 85; 21, pp. 42–44; 9, p. 141]. No serious refutation of this identification has been made so far.

 And although the author of these lines does not set the task of reviving the concept, proposed at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries, about Bashkir and Madyar (read Bashkir and Ugrian) ethno-genetic affinity, however, the Ugric-Samody ethnocultural layer in the ethnographic culture of the Bashkirs is clearly present. Thus, until the beginning of the 20th century inclusively, the Bashkirs practiced stalking and drive hunting and hunting with birds, which was traditional for nomads, they also practiced forest hunting with the help of traps and large-size nets, bear hunting with spears, etc. The latter ‘...were known since ancient times by Russians, people of the Volga-Kama basin (Tatars, Chuvashes, Udmurts, Mari and Komi-Permyaks), as well as by the peoples of the middle Ob River region (Mansi and Khanty)’ [33, p. 86]. Forest bee-keeping is a traditional past-time of the Bashkirs. According to S. Rudenko, ‘It did not differ too much from ordinary bee-keeping, which was prevalent since ancient times among peoples of the Middle and Lower Kama River regions (Udmurts, Mari, Chuvashes, Tatars, etc.’). Similar to livestock farming, which was the prevailing industry of the Transuralian and South-Western Bashkirs in the beginning of the 20th century, in its nature (tebenevka), it did not differ at all from livestock farming among the neighbouring steppe Kazakh and Kalmik nomads [33, p. 111; 10, pp. 46–60]. Types of dwellings in the yâylâ and kışla: on the first ones there are typically nomadic yurts—tirmâ, framed constructions—alychak, huts-tents (kuysh), light log-house—burama; on the second ones—the same foundationless burama\textsuperscript{12}, constructively dating back to Udmurt kua, kuala, already known in the ancient Udmurt settlements of the 11–13th centuries [35, pp. 140–154]. Researchers have noted the strong influence of the Finnish-Ugric and later Russian cultures on the means of transportation which were traditional for Bashkirs: skis, sleds, sledges, and hollowed out boats.

 Thus, it is obvious that the material culture of the Bashkirs, at least in those categories which ensured the vital activity of the ethnus, was formed as a result of their adaptation to the natural conditions of the forest-steppe and forest areas of the Volga and Urals region, which differed from the conditions in the steppe. This implies close ethno-cultural interaction with the tribes and peoples of the region who already possessed the appropriate skills and traditions of economic life in the forest\textsuperscript{13}.

 Eastern authors of the pre-Mongol period ignore both the economic life of the Bashkirs and their religious affiliation. On the one hand, it is surprising, but on the other hand, there is an impression that they, as undoubtedly truthful adherents of the Prophet, consider Bashkirs to be no more than pagans. It should be assumed that despite the close proximity of Volga Bulgaria, which had become ‘a country of classical Islam’ already by the beginning of the 11th century, the Islamisation process did not reach Baskardia, and during the nearest (12–13th) centuries, it remained an wholly pagan country. The remoteness of the territory and its forested and mountainous make-up could have been one important factor behind the delay of the spreading of Islam (in comparison with Bulgaria). But the weak consolidation of the Chiyalik tribes, which lived separately in their appanages, obviously, was an important factor as well. One of the other important factors was the absence of a national leader who could

\textsuperscript{11} There are no other settlements for the period in question.

\textsuperscript{12} In the beginning of the 20th century, they became the dwellings of the poor.

\textsuperscript{13} This is indicative of the assimilation of the local Ural region Ugrians among the Bashkirs.
‘push’ his tribesmen into embracing a world religion or into the fold of the ‘developed’ early Middle Ages. Let us remember that neither the Russian Prince Vladimir nor the Norwegian Konung Olav, who at one point were dedicated pagans and then became saints, saw that forests, moors, seas and mountains were not obstacles for the establishment of Christianity in their states as an element and mechanism of reaching geopolitical goals.

At any rate, the fact that the trans-Volga Madyars adhered to pagan beliefs in the 1230s was clearly testified by the Hungarian monk Julianus in his report to Pope Gregory IX.\(^\text{14}\) However, it should be kept in mind that Julianus’ journey to the Volga and Kama regions as well as to the Southern Ural (this very event being something extraordinary) pursued a particular goal—the search and conversion of far away tribesmen ‘to the true religion’.

In general, it is typical of medieval narratives that the degree of credibility of the information that they provided ‘was lower the further you moved away from the centres of Islamic civilization and the places of residence of the authors of medieval treatises’ [31, p. 64]. The fact that in the medieval sources ‘Bashkirs’ are rendered as Turks does not mean at all that during the period in question ‘the Bashkir Horde’ only consisted of Turks.

It also follows that the authors of the 12–13th centuries actually meant the bearers of Chiyalik culture in the Urals region when speaking about the Bashkirs. The artefacts of this culture, as was mentioned above, spread along both sides of the Ural Mountain range. There are no other archaeological artefacts of that time in this region. Thus, the archaeological ‘Chiyalik people’ are the ‘Bashkirs’ referred to in the written sources of the 12–13th centuries. This means that ‘the Bashkir Horde’ included a part of the Ugric people of the Kama River region and the Cis-Ural region which assimilated later, first of all in terms of the language. With reference to the religious affiliation of the Bashkirs—‘Chiyaliks’, obviously, some of them remained pagans, while others already started to convert to the Islam of ‘the Bulgar Islamic canon’ [12, p. 21]. The first instance is supported by materials from the Taktalachuk, Azmetyevo I, Kushulevo, and Novo-Sasykul burial sites. The latter is supported by materials from burial sites such as Gornovskoe and Kazaklarovskoe, as well as Kushelevo, Azmetyevo I, Kara-Yar, etc. [12].

The attempt to discover the archaeological traces of the influence of ‘the imperial culture’ of the Golden Horde on bearers of the Chiyalik culture—Mordvins, Mari, Udmurts and the neighbouring tribes of the forest Kama river region—did not bring any positive results: the main components of this culture—weapons, horse harnesses, decorations and garments—are not found among the archaeological artefacts of these peoples [17]. Thus, the following conclusions can be made:

- the Mongol conquest of the region and the establishment of the Golden Horde in many respects provided grounds for and facilitated the process of forming the ethnic territories of the Volga, Kama, and Ural peoples—the Mari, Mordvins, Udmurts, and Bashkirs—who, actually, exist to the present day. The areal-forming role of the Golden Horde is doubtless here.
- The conquest which entailed this process and the following establishment of the military and political domination of the Mongol-Tatars over this region, in contrast to the preceding Bulgar period, hardly encouraged a tolerant perception of the conquerors’ culture by the population under submission. This was reflected in the range of material culture of the population of the Volga and Kama regions in the period in question.
- The absence of direct territorial contacts\(^\text{15}\) between the Finnish people of the Volga-Kama Region and the Finno-Permians of the Kama region, on the one hand, and the polyethnic and polyconfessional population of the Golden Horde, on the other, helped to preserve the

\(^{14}\) Julianus’ report was written down by brother Richard in the beginning of 1236.

\(^{15}\) This implies the existence of territories in which they co-existed.
Chapter V. The Population of the Ulus of Jochi and the Development of the Medieval Tatar Ethnos

traditional pagan outlook in the spiritual culture of the local population, which was reflected both in the reminiscences of the burial ceremony and in decorations. The only exceptions are the Bashkirs of the Urals region, for one of their ethnic components included the bearers of the Chiyalik culture, who accepted the Islam of the ‘Bulgar Islamic’ canon in the 13–14th centuries.

We cannot say anything definite in regards to the quality and quantity and circumstances in which the bearers of ‘the imperial culture of the Golden Horde’ could penetrate (and whether they did penetrate) into the forests of the Volga-Kama Region. A. Belavin, for example, thinks that ‘The Bulgars of the Golden Horde, and then the Kazan people, maintained steady economic and political relations with the Cis-Ural and Trans-Ural regions up to the 15th century’, continuing to use the Kama Trading Route for this purpose [7, p. 12]. It is quite probable that this is how it was in reality. However, the fact that the disseminating components of ‘the imperial culture of the Golden Horde’ among the population of the Volga and Urals region did not occur on a large scale suggests that, in contrast to Volga Bulgaria in the Pre-Mongol period, the relations of the Golden Horde with the population in the territories adjacent to it in the north were mostly of a political nature, which was never recorded archaeologically.


6. Belavin A. Vneshnie i vnitrennie e’tokul’turnye i e’konomicheskie kontakty’ srednevekovogo naseleniya Predural’y (po keramicheskomu kompleksu) (External and Internal Ethnicultural Contacts of the Medieval Population of the Cis-Ural region (according to the ceramic complex)). Izhevsk-Glazov, 1999.


Chapter V. The Population of the Ulus of Jochi and the Development of the Medieval Tatar Ethnos


Armenians

Alexandar Osipyan

The formation of Armenian colonies in the Golden Horde towns was prompted by changes in trade routes, as a result of the 1220—1250s Mongol invasions in Western Asia and Eastern Europe. The establishment of the Mongol Empire (subdivided into four uluses) with a well organised postal system (the Yam), strict discipline and severe punishments that prevented robberies on the roads, absence of numerous internal dues and respectful attitude towards merchants and their property—all these fostered trade [19, p. 84]. Through the whole century between the 1250s and 1350s (the so-called Pax Mongolica), merchants could engage in trade without hindrance within vast territories of the Empire that spread from the Danube and Armenia to China [18].

Even before the Mongol conquest, Armenian merchants had been to the Cuman steppe (Desht-i Kipchak) [4; 12]. Their subsequent entry into the Volga region can be linked to nu-
merous trips by Armenian princes from Georgia, Greater Armenia and the Kingdom of Cilicia to Batu Khan's court during the 1240–1250s. In particular, a trip was undertaken in 1240 by the ruler (atabek) of Georgia, Prince of Princes Awag (†1250), son of Ivan Dolgorukiy; in 1246 by Princes Shahin Shah and Awag, Zakare (Shahin Shah's son), Aghbuga (Vahram Gageli's son), and Sargis Tmogveli; in 1250–1251 and 1256–1257 the court of Sartaq Khan was visited by Hasan Jalal, Prince of the Khachen territory; in late 1253 or in 1254 Sartaq's and Batu Khan's main Volga camps were visited by the Armenian King of Cilicia, Hethum I (1226–1270) [23; 24; 33].

While describing the events of 1249–1251, a period of struggle for power following the death of the Great Khan Guyuk (1248) and preceding the enthronement of Möngke Khan (1251–1259), Armenian chronicler Kirakos Gandzaketsi indicates that after the execution of the Mongol commander Elchigaday (a viceroy in Armenia and Persia) at the order of Batu, all Elchigaday's subjects began to seek Batu's attention: 'Tsars and Tsareviches, princes and merchants then started coming to see him, all embittered by the loss of their patrimony. He judged fairly and reinstated, for all those asking, their ownership of lands, property, and patrimony, and granted them special charters, and not one man dared oppose his orders' [2, p. 218]. In the Middle Ages, merchants would often travel under the aegis of an embassy or a ruler's escort. Besides, princes were the people who could ask Batu Khan and Sartaq Khan to grant safe-conduct charters for merchants, as their subjects [3; 35, p. 118].

It is a historical fact that Batu's main camp was visited by the richest Armenian merchant (metsatun), referred to in historical sources as Shadin/Shahabadin/Shnorhavor, Saravan's son. Mongols did not trust the Georgian Tsar David Ulu (1249–1270). For this reason, between 1259 and 1265, Tbilisi and Eastern Georgia were actually under Shnorhavor's rule. According to Armenian theologian and historian Vardan the Great (approx. 1198–1271), 'in 1264, the great Ilkhan Hulagu's invitation was passed to us by a man named Shnorhavor, who was held in great respect by everyone and especially by Batu, the ruler of the North, whom he had visited earlier and whose visit had been regarded a great honour, and by Hulagu as well' [8, p. 66]. One can assume that Shnorhavor and other Armenian merchants traded with Sarai as early as in the 1250s.

As time passed, Armenian merchants settled in the towns of the Golden Horde, which is implied by the evidence of Armenian church parishes found in the area. Sources dating back to the 1320s have mentions of Armenian bishops in Sarai, Solkhat (Eski Qırım), and Kaffa (Theodosia) (episcopus Armenorum in imperio Tartarorum Iusbect) [39, pp. 92, 159–160]. Franciscan Pascal of Vittoria lived in Sarai in 1336–1337 and, having learned the Kipchak language, moved further to the east in order to preach among non-Christians. In 1338 he set out from Sarai and sailed down the Volga to Saray-Jük in the Yaik/Ural estuary, then travelled to Urgench with a caravan. 'Having got aboard with some Armenians, I started on a journey down the river called Tigris, then traveled along the shore of the sea called Vatuk until I reached Saray-Jük 12 days later. From that place I continued my journey in a carriage pulled by camels and reached Urgench on the fiftieth day' [29, pp. 83–85]. Thus, Armenian merchants had not only been to Sarai, but reached Urgench as well. Unfortunately, written sources containing information about Armenians in the Volga region are scarce, so one should hope that archaeological excavations will provide a more detailed picture of their presence in this vital region of the Golden Horde.

The largest number of Armenians settled in Southeast Crimea, namely in the Italian trading colonies of Kaffa and Sudak (Soldaia), in the city of Kirim/Solkhat/Surkhat (Eski Kirim), the administrative centre of the Crimean Ulus, and the many villages of the region. According to some tangential evidence, Armenian merchants had known of the Northern Black Sea region even before the Mongol conquests. This was the region used to trade with Kiev, a home to an Armenian community since the second half of the 11th century [26].
Over the period of the 12–15th centuries there were commemorative notes in the so-called Synaxarion (the Great Almanac) of Sourouzh, which contain references to Sudak’s inhabitants, including those who can be identified as Armenians based on their names. Records from 1242 mention the death of David, Sumbat’s son, those of 1283 make reference to the murder of Samat, Yefrem’s son, and in 1306 an entry on the death of Yernichu, Samat’s wife, was added. Finally, in 1292, a note was made about disagreement between Greeks and Armenians over the celebration of Easter (because the Greek Orthodox and Armenian Apostolic churches use different calendars) [5, pp. 593, 603, 609].

Vital records made by Genoese notaries of Kaffa in 1289–1290 are indicative of the active involvement of Armenian merchants and craftsmen in economic activities within the Black Sea area. In particular, the period from April 1289 to June 1290 witnessed 3 cases of Genoese ships being loaded in Kaffa by Armenian merchants (jointly, by 2, 3, and 10 companions) in order to deliver significant batches of wheat, millet, salt (from Ciprico on the Kerch Peninsula) and other goods from Crimea to Trabzon [20, pp. 68, 109, 233–234]. On 27 April 1290 several Armenian and Greek merchants in Kaffa received back their goods that had previously been robbed by the pirate Jurzuchi during a galley voyage [20, pp. 181–182, 25, pp. 271–272].

Crimean Armenians not only hired ships from Italians, but also made various deals with them. On 16 July 1290, Georgiy and Savva, butchers from Kaffa, in partnership with Flancus the Armenian, also a Kaffa resident, purchased a batch of wine from Oddin Bankat de Chev and promised to pay before Easter (1291) [20, p. 304]. On 14 August 1290 an Armenian named Hakob Fregulia purchased goods from Guillaume de Perco and promised to pay the price of 347 aspres a month later [20, p. 375]. At the same time Italian merchants Peter de Bobio and Jacob de Bobio bought large batches of bovine skins from Armenian tanners (5, 14, 18, and 21 kantars) by paying in advance and getting guarantees of the goods delivery in a year or by Easter 1291. A family of Armenian tanners offered their house as collateral, and the Armenian Tarkosha and his wife Mina offered their son (the house might have already been mortgaged) [20, pp. 160, 301, 309, 337]. The slave trade was a commonplace practice in Kaffa. The acts mention isolated cases when certain Armenians sold slaves (perhaps, servants or slaves received as forfeit from their trade partners). Thus, on 1 June 1290, a Kaffa Armenian, Sava the candle seller, sold a 10-year-old female slave, Arkona from Hungary, to Martin de Predono [20, p. 215]. The Armenians didn't systematically engage in the slave trade; it was concentrated in the hands of Italian merchants who delivered slaves to Egypt and Italy [27, p. 222; 31; 38]. At the same time, there was an Armenian interpreter (drogumano) at the marketplace of Kaffa, by the name of Stefan, who also functioned as a witness in deals between the Armenians and the Italians [20, p. 220, 233–234].

As a result of active business relations with the Italians, the Crimean Armenians were involved in the Eastern Mediterranean trade. Thus, on 23 June 1289, an Armenian by the name of Peter sold his goods to a Genoese, who promised to reimburse him 29 hyperpyra as soon as his ship arrived from Pyora [20, p. 105]. An Armenian named Chilacos (Kirakos?) from Kazaret (Chilacos erminio de Cazarese) lent money on 18 July 1289 to an Italian by the name of Raphael Ebriaco, who assured that he would return 2000 akçe in 15 days, when a ship would come from Syria, from Arsuf (in Siria loco ubi dicitur Sur) [20, p. 120].

It can be presumed that some Armenian merchants from Cilicia also visited the Crimea with the purpose of trade, and even settled there. A transaction carried out in Kaffa on 24 June 1290 may serve as evidence of that: a Syrian, Johannes (Johannes Sorianus), confirmed the reception of a loan from an Armenian, Christofanus, living in Kaffa or in Solkhat, from Lai-azzo (Christofano erminius, habitator de Caffa, sive de Sorcharti de Laizo), for the sum of 1800 akçe barikats, which he promised to return in a year and a half. As security, he gave Christofanus his house located in Kaffa [20, p. 220]. In all likelihood, the Armenian Chris-
tofanus was a native of the port Laiazzo/Ayas in Cilicia and lived in Kaffa or Sorkhat (Kaffa's neighbouring city Sorkhat/Solkhat was an important centre of trade with a numerous Armenian community) at the time of the deal; it is also likely that he retained his trading ties with the Eastern Mediterranean. The Syrian, Johannes, who also had a house in Kaffa, evidently had to sail to Syria and return the loan in a year and a half.

According to the Genoese Imposition of Kaffa (Impositio officii Ghazarie), there were already three Armenian churches in the city in 1316 [17, p. 827]. In time, the Crimean Armenians (from Kaffa and Solkhat/Kazarat) started to penetrate more actively into the Northern Black Sea and Azov regions. Thus, the preserved mid-14th-century sources record their activity at the estuaries of the Danube (Kilia and Likostomo), the Dniester (Akkerman/Moncastro), and the Don (Tana/Azak). It was along these great rivers that the merchants from the Black Sea region travelled into Eastern Europe to buy corn, wax and furs, or make contracts with Eastern European merchants who would bring those goods with them right to the Italian trading posts.

The records left in the sermon collections copied by the priest Terter Yerevantsi in Azak/Tana in 1339 and 1341, mention a local Armenian church of St. Gregory the Illuminator [13, p. 329–330]. Consequently, the Armenian community in Tana had existed long enough and was wealthy enough to erect a church. Terter also describes his trip from his native Yerevan through Georgia, then by sea to Kaffa, and from Kaffa to Azak. The notary acts of 19 September 1359 mention an Armenian Judicial Curia in Tana [6, p. 190]. According to the calculations of S. Karpov, there were 7 Armenians among the 443 free persons which figure in the acts of Tana in 1359–1360, [28, p. 79]. Tana was known as the centre of trade in fish, caviar, leather, and slaves. Therefore, the city attracted not only Crimean Armenians but also Armenian merchants from more distant regions, who often settled in Tana. Thus, in a transaction on 28 July 1360, which dealt with the selling and buying of slaves, there figures a certain Armenian by the name of Astlan, son of the late Sirim (Shirin/Suren?) from Arzeron (Erzurum), and a resident of Tana (Astlan condam Sirim de Arzeron armenus habitator in Tana) [6, p. 190].

The Crimean Armenians who visited Cilicia and Akkerman with trading pursuits are mentioned in the Genoese acts of the 1340s and 1360s. Thus, on 17 April 1344, in Kiliya, Andreolo de Venduri sold a Russian female slave and her two-year-old son for 4150 akçe to the Armenian merchant Hodja Amir from Tiflis, a citizen of Kaffa (Coia Amir de Tefelix, burgensi de Caffa) [22, pp. 102–103]. Thus, Amir from Tiflis had moved to Kaffa and had obtained citizenship (he is called a 'burgensi' and not a 'habitator', if he had been just a ‘resident’). In the old Armenian Church of the Dormition in Akkerman (Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi) there are marble plates embedded in the walls in memory of the dead (perhaps, some walls of earlier provenance were later embedded in the church walls). One of the inscriptions, dated 1351, mentions a certain Kutchsen, who mourns the death of his mother [7, p. 66]. On 14 September 1360, an Armenian, Grego(ry), son of a late Arabec, resident and citizen of Kiliya (Grigo Erminius, quondam Arabec, habitator et burgensis Chili), sold a twenty-year-old female Mongol slave named Toydani for 5 sommas to Johann de Monterosso, resident and citizen of Pera [21, pp. 107–108]. As we see, if Kaffa resident Amir from Tiflis only visited Kiliya for business purposes, Gregory settled down there and received citizenship. The Danube and its tributaries bound Kilia with Hungary, Moldavia, and Red Ruthenia (Western Ukraine), from where grain and wax were delivered to the Black Sea market. On 30 October 1360, a Kaffa Armenian named Sarkis, son of Constantine (Sarchis Erminio de Caffa, filio Constantini), signed a contract in Kilia with Yagop from Hungary, son of the late Bartholomew, resident of Kilia (Yagop de Ungaria, quondam Bartholomei, habitator Chili), according to which Yagop was obliged to deliver a large shipment of wax (5 cantaros) to Sarkis in Kilia on Easter of 1361. As security, Yagop left Sarkis his thirteen-year-old slave-girl Alekesa. One
of the witnesses in the contract was a local Armenian by the name of Sabadin/ shabadin (?) (Sabadin Erminio, habitatore Chili) [21, pp. 193, 194]. The aforementioned Sarkis of Kaffa had figured earlier as a witness in transactions on 25 August and 14 September 1360 ‘Sachis de Caffa, habitatore Chili’ and ‘Sarchis Erminio de Caffa’) [21, pp. 58, 111]. In the first case, he was called ‘a resident of Kilia’, so he either stayed there for long periods of time or had moved from Kaffa altogether. The contracts made in Likostomo (Vilkovo in the Danube delta) on 13 September 1373 mention a seventeen-year-old Armenian by the name of Mkhitar and his two advisors/guarantors(?) Abram and George, Armenians from Kaffa (Machitar maiorem esse annis XVII, cum consilio Abram Erminii de Caffa et Georgii Erminii de Caffa) [22, p. 197], as well as an Armenian named Spinula, who had become a citizen of Genoa by that time (Erminium Spinulam civem Ianue) [22, pp. 200–201].

Probably, in the second half of the thirteenth century, the Armenians started to settle in Lviv, which was a point of transit trade between the countries of Central and Western Europe. When the Polish King Casimir III conquered Lviv in 1349, it had an Armenian community which he allowed to retain their own judiciary court [15, pp. 27–28]. Armenian merchants from the Crimea continued to settle down in Lviv and erected the Church of the Dormition there in 1363 [30, pp. 41–42]. From this time on, Lviv became the centre of an Armenian bishopric which included parishes not only in Galicia, Podolia, and Volhynia, but also in the Principality of Moldova [10; 11; 32; 34].

The Armenian merchants of Lviv and Kamianets-Podilskyi maintained commercial relations with the Crimea, while the internecine feud that erupted in 1359 in the Golden Horde led to an influx of new migrants from the Crimea. The memorial records (colophons) of the Armenian manuscripts copied in the Crimea in 1363–1371 describe the troubles of the local Armenians and their anxiety over forthcoming disasters, which forced many to emigrate [40, pp. 93–98].

The fate of the Armenian merchant Nekomat Surozhlanin was closely intertwined with the policy of the mighty Emir Mamai, the actual ruler of the Western part of the Golden Horde [9]. Russian chronicles reveal that in 1375–1383, Nekomat repeatedly visited Moscow and Tver, where he not only engaged in commercial activity but also carried out diplomatic tasks for Mamai, mostly of a secret nature. Nekomat was Mamai's agent in his liaisons with prince Michail Alexandrovich of Tver and Ivan Vasilyevich, the disgraced son of Moscow tysiatskii Vasily Vasilyevich Velyaminov. The defeat at Kulikovo Field and the murder of Mamai in Solkhat or Kaffa led to the death of his agent Nekomat. In 1383, ‘some fraud called Nekomat was killed in Moscow for some transgression’ [14, p. 85]. In the earliest act book of Lviv's magistrate for 1382–1389, in a record of a deal on 14 November 1386, a certain ‘Avakhav, son of the late Nekomat’ (Awachaw filius quondam Necomath) is mentioned [36, p. 69]. We think it possible to identify this Nekomat with the Nekomat of Sourozh from the Russian chronicles. Nekomat of Sourozh was executed in 1383, which agrees well with the record in the Lviv acts that the transaction was made by Avakhav, the son of the late Nekomat. ‘Avakbarun, son of Nekamaty’ (Awackbarun filius Nekamaty) is mentioned in the tax register for Armenian house owners in Lviv from 5 September 1407 [37, pp. 40–41]. The case of Nekomat and his son Avakbarun is, to our mind, a good example of commercial networks based on family ties. It appears that Nekomat carried out commercial activity between the Crimea and Tver and Moscow, while his son Avak traded between the Crimea and Lviv. It is likely that Avak (Avakhav, Avakbarun) finally settled in Lviv after the defeat and death of Mamai, his father's patron, and the execution in Moscow of Nekomat himself. The Crimean merchants of Sourozh made regular trading trips to Moscow under the reign of Prince Dmitry Ivanovich. He took brought some of them with him from Moscow in 1380 on his march towards Mamai's army. L. Khakichyan identifies most of these Sourozh merchants as Armeni-
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ans and Greeks [16]. It is likely that Armenian merchants frequented Novgorod during the same time [1].

Thus, thanks to the religious tolerance and the promotion of trade of the Mongol rulers, a considerable number of Armenian merchants and artisans settled in the cities of the Golden Horde, mainly in Sarai and the port cities of the North Black Sea region and the Azov Sea region. The period of instability in the Golden Horde in the 1360s and the 1390s contributed to the outflow of a number of Armenians from the Northern Black Sea region into the Principality of Moldova, Galician Rus' and Podolia, as the Armenian merchants had often previously visited these regions with commercial purposes.

5. Zametki XII–XV veka, otnosyasheysa k kry’skomu gorodu Sudgee (Sudak), pripisanny’e na greschkom’ sinaksare (12–15th centuries notes related to Crimean city of Soudaia (Sudak), written in a Greek synaxarium) // Zapiski Odesskogo obshhestva istoriy i drevnostey. Vol. 5. Odessa, 1863.
13. Памятні записи армійських рукописів XIV в. / Сост. Л. Хакічян Ереван, 1950. XXXIII+759 с. (на арм. язь'ке)
16. Хакічян Л. 'Гости-сурохан' в русских летописях и Сказания о Мамаевом побоище (‘Sudak merchants’ in Russian chronicles and Tale of the slaughter of Mamai. [To the question of their ethnic affiliation]) // Русская и армянская средневековья литературы. Л., 1982. P. 333–357.
33. Осіпян A. Practices of Integration and Segregation: Armenian Trading Diasporas and Their Interaction with the Genoese and Venetian Colonies in the Eastern Mediterranean and the
As J. Muldoon remarked on several occasions, the fundamental objective of Catholic missionaries during the Middle Ages was the keeping the commandment of Jesus Christ—to preach the Word to all people so as to save all humankind. Therefore, missionaries were to devote their activities to strengthening those Christians whose faith was being threatened, confronting the false doctrines and heretics, and, what is most important for this article, to make every effort to return the ‘infidels’ to the fold [18, pp. 37-38]. The importance of the latter of the above objectives was invariably supported by quotes from the Scriptures, whose interpretation in the 13th century had become distinctly eschatological: both Jesus himself and Paul the Apostle indicated the necessity of total conversion of the ‘infidels’ prior to the imminent coming of the Anti-Christ, as a compulsory condition for the future atonement of the whole of humankind [see Matthew: 24: 14, 28: 19–20; Mark: 13: 10; Romans: 11: 25–26; and also: 24, pp. 1–2; 21, p. 271; 20, p. 2; 10, pp. 12–13]. Therefore, from the point of view of theorecticians of the Catholic missionary operations, the future salvation of Christians was dependent not only on the moral transformation of their lifestyle, but also on the effectiveness of proselytising activities of the new apostles of the Roman Church outside Europe.

In its turn, the Holy See demonstrated a clear comprehension of the new tasks faced by the Roman Church, and entrusted their fulfillment to the new orders of Franciscans and Dominicans, founded in the early 13th century to resolve the issues at hand. In his special bull ‘Cum hora undecima’ of 1235, later reproduced without modifications by subsequent pontificates during the 13–15 centuries, Pope Gregory IX instructed the new apostles of the Roman Church to travel to ‘peoples and tribes, and many tongues and kings’, because, to alter the words of Paul the Apostle, ‘the entire Israel will not be saved until the full number of pagans enters it’ [see Revelations 10: 11; Romans 11: 25–26; and also: 3, no. 210, pp. 286–287; 22, p. 222; 18, pp. 36–37]. The list of peoples, to whom the missionaries were to be sent to preach the Gospel, first included the 'Tartars' in the homonymous bull of Pope Innocent IV of 23 July 1253 [8, no. 211, p. 237], and they remain present in the later bulls of the Roman pontificates until the 15th century.

From the moment of appearance of the Tatars in the Eastern Europe, they had presented a perfect object for Christian proselytism, whose conversion was pivotal for the future redemption of Christianity. The apostolate of the Franciscans and Dominicans among the Tatars completely met the Catholic missionary ideals. Moreover, such activities could be extremely
useful for the achievement of geopolitical goals: ‘the Tartar pagans’ who converted to Christianity could provide significant military support to the Latin world in its centuries-long struggle with Islam. In particular, Raymondus Lullius, in his missionary project submitted to the French King Philip IV, pointed out the foreign political advantages that could follow the total baptism of the Tatars [11, p. 64]; while the Franciscans of Kaffa, who preached the Gospel among the nomads of the Golden Horde and in 1323 addressed a report on their activities to the administration of the Order, assured their Western brothers that ‘after the complete conversion of this Empire, the Saracen power would no longer have any strength, locked and surrounded as it would be by this empire from one side, and the Greeks and Italians, that is, the Latins, and other Christian kingdoms from the other’.

At the same time, the Latin authors expressed their extreme concern regarding the possible success of Islamic proselytism among the Tatars. The same Lullius in a number of his treatises of the late 13th century insisted on the necessity of intensification of Christian proselytism in the East, and described the threats to Christianity that were lurking in the potential conversion of the Tatars to Islam [19, p. 119; 11, p. 66; 13, p. 151; 12, I, p. 374]. In the early 14th century, Lullius was already lamenting that Khan Toqta surrounded himself with Islamic secretaries, and expressed his concerns that, due to their superior position, senior Islamic bureaucrats were able to disseminate the Islamic faith in the Ulus of Jochi [12, I, pp. 381–384, III, p. 374]. In his turn, a Dominican friar, Guillaume Adam, in his treatise 'How to Defeat the Saracens' of 1317 wrote that Khan Uzbek ‘receives in his domain, encourages and protects the Saracen fakirs, that is friars, and all others, with whose assistance, in the end, he, along with other Tatars, has become the worst Saracen, enemy and persecutor of the Christians’.

And a Venetian, Marino Sanudo Torsello, indicated that the conversion of the nomads of the Ulus of Jochi to Islam ‘could become an extreme threat and grave danger for the Christian faith, since reliable persons insist that the mentioned Uzbek has innumerable horsemen’.

Due to the aforementioned reasons, Catholic missionaries applied their best efforts to arrange the preaching of the Gospel in the Golden Horde. However, to deploy the proselytic activities in the East, they needed to overcome a number of hurdles, in which undertaking they were given invaluable support by Western merchants. The Italian commercial expansion concurred with the development of the Eastern apostolate and establishment of marine communication between Europe and Asia allowed Christians to relatively easily reach the regions, where they deployed their proselytic activities. For example, the aforementioned letter of the Kaffa Franciscans contained the following instruction for those missionaries who wished to devote themselves to the Eastern apostolate: ‘Know that it is safer and easier to arrive there by sea in the company of Venetian traders than by land, through the territories that are considered very difficult to transverse and dangerous’.

In its turn, the missive of the Iberian Minorite, Paschalis of Vittoria, contains the description of his journey from Spain to Sarai in 1335, along with the enumeration of all intermediate stages of travel of the Catholic missionary through Venice, Galata and Tana [23, pp. 501–506].

16 ‘cum, illo inperio perfecte conuerso, nullius momenti foret potentia saracenica, que inter illud ex vna parte et gregum ac ytalicum siue latinum ex alia et regna alia xristiana interclusa est et vallata’ [17, p. 109].
17 ‘Saracenos etiam facarios, id est monachos, et alios quoscumque in suo dominio recipit, promouet et tuetur, per quos tandem ipsemet cum multis aliis Tartaris Sarracenus pessimus et Christianorum inimicus et persecutor est effectus’ [25, pp. 46–48].
18 ‘Hoc enim foret in praeiudicium nimium et periculum maximum fidei Christianae. Nam a nonnullis dignis fide assertur quod dictus Husbecho, habet equitum multitudinem’ [7, p. 33; 16, p. 66].
19 ‘vt sciatis ad partes quas per terram, quod difficilimum esset et periculosissimum, vel quod securius et leuius per mare et in societate mercatorum Venecorum extra veniendum’ [17, pp. 110–111].
The same contribution to the development of the Eastern apostolate was highlighted by an anonymous author from Munster, who at the same time pointed out the equally important material support of merchants from Northern Italy. ‘For the tradesmen of Lombardy and other rich lands, staying in those lands and frequently visiting them, carry with them these Orders there and found cloisters for them with the support of other tradesmen and the faithful, while generously giving them every necessary thing in accordance to what Order each of them prefers’. Western merchant obviously tended to fund the construction of Catholic churches in all large urban centers of the Golden Horde they visited, thereby promoting the creation of Franciscan and Dominican convents in Kaffa, Soldaia, Solkhat, Tana and Sarai [19, pp. 89, 94, 138].

Therefore, Catholic missionaries advanced eastwards side by side with Western merchants and, evidently, they arrived at the territory of the Golden Horde simultaneously with the establishment of a Genoese trading post in Kaffa. In any case, the Latin translation of the yarliq of Khan Uzbek, issued to the Franciscans in 1314, indicated that for the first time this yarliq was issued to Minorites by Khan Mengü Temür (1266/67–1280), supposedly, at the beginning of his reign [6, p. 65; 2, pp. 33–34].

The contents of this khan yarliq demonstrated another, more important circumstance that stipulated the trouble-free deployment of the apostolate within the borders of the Golden Horde, namely, the favor of the Jochid rulers towards Catholic missionaries. The yarliq granted the Minorites the right for unimpeded preaching of the Gospel throughout the territory of the Golden Horde, and guaranteed them the Khan's patronage in case of a conflict with representatives of alternative confessions. The Jochid protection was inestimably valuable to missionaries during their frequent clashes with Islamic residents of the Golden Horde urban centers, about which a missive of Friar Ladislaus, a Franciscan custodian of Gazaria (that is, North Black Sea region), provides priceless information. In his letter, Ladislaus described the circumstances of the conflict that took place in the summer of 1286 between the Franciscans of Solkhat and the local Islamic residents who resented the Catholic's tradition to ring the bell on their church. During the conflict, they tore off the bell and destroyed the Catholic Church, which resulted in a complaint being submitted by the Franciscans to Khan Tula-Buga and Nogai. In response to the petition of Minorites, the Jochid rulers sent their representatives to Solkhat, who, despite their personal affinity for Islam, strictly punished the offenders of the Franciscans, which allowed them to restore their church and hand three bells in the place of the one destroyed [12, II, pp. 444–445].

It is obvious that the rulers of the Golden Horde followed the orders of Yasa with regard to the tolerant treatment of all world religions, and continued doing so in the 14th century, despite the growing influence of Islam among the Jochid elite. Both the message written in 1320 by Brother Ioganka on the territory of present-day Bashkiria and the letter of the Crimean Franciscans, sent West three years later, could not hide the Minorites' admiration of the tendency of the Jochid administration to give all communities the complete freedom in the religious matters until their confessional autonomy interfered with the interest of the secular legislation of the Golden Horde [6, p. 66; 1, pp. 90–91, 108–109; 17, p. 111]. The most eloquent description of the religious tolerance of the Tatar was given by an Umbrian Franciscan Giovanni Elemosina, in his "Chronicon" of 1336: ‘And after Tartars had subdued many tsardoms… Under the influence of some natural mercy, they were transformed by the Divine Providence so greatly that they abandoned their former rage and ferocity and turned to good, starting to manage and care for the peoples conquered by them with love

20 *Nam mercatores de Lombardia et aliis terris ditissimi, qui in illis partibus degunt, et frequenter perveniunt, trahunt hos ordines ad illas partes, et eis cum auxilio aliorum mercatorum et fidelium claustra fundant et omnia necessaria largiter eis ministrant, secundum quod quivis aliquem Ordinem diligit* [12, II, p. 153].
and solicitude. And they allowed the peoples to follow their own laws and promote their culture without hindrance, in accordance with their ancient rituals, and peacefully own their land, with the only condition that they would obey the ruler of the Tartars and pay him a tax on the property.\footnote{Et postquam ipsi Tartari regna plura ... subiugaverunt, Deo providente, quadam naturali man-
suetudine eis infusa, adeo commutati fuerunt a furia sua et feritate, et in bonitatem conversi, gentes quas submi-
serant, caritate et curialitate regere et fovere ciperunt. Et libere concesserunt nationibus leges suas servare, et culturam sae-m agere secundum ritum antiquorum suorum, et terras suas possidere in pace, solum quod domino Tartarorum obedirent et censum ei persolverent} [12, II, pp. 444–445].

Using the Khans' patronage, the Franciscans launched extremely active missionary activities in the central regions of the Golden Horde. According to the above-mentioned letter of the custodian Ladislaus, by 1286, the Minorites founded their abodes in Kaffa, Solkhat, Qrrq Yer (Chufut-Kale), Sarai and Vicina (in the estuary of the Danube) [12, II, pp. 444–445]. A later list of Franciscan footholds in the Ulus of Jochi, made before 1319 and surviving as a copy of the manuscript in the collection of the British Museum (Nero A. IX), already indicates the existence of 17 convents, located apart from the cities mentioned by Ladislaus, also in Soldaia, Kherson (present-day Khersones), Cembalo (present-day Balaklava), Barasone (present-day Karasu-Bazar), Maurocastro (present-day Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi), Tana, Major, Ukek, and in the place of Saint John, at the distance of three miles from Sarai [12, III, p. 72].

A Franciscan author, Paolino Veneto, added to this list the mention of a convent in Bulgar, and Bartholomew of Pisa—the one in Aksarai (Sara al-Jadid), Agitarchan (Astrakhan) and Ilice (Eni Kale) [12, II, 268; 4, p. 557].

The Dominicans appeared the Golden Horde much later than the Franciscans and established themselves in Kaffa only in the late 13th century [9, p. 186, nota 174; 14, p. 257; 19, p. 94, nota 108, p. 132; 15, p. 92]. However, the Friars Preachers made their feasible contribution to the development of the apostolate by converting to Catholicism in 1333 a certain Millenus, the Alan ruler of Vosporo (Kerch). For his part, Pope John XXII was so happy to hear about the conversion of the Crimean Alans that he found it appropriate to found an archdiocese of Vosporo, headed by a Dominican, Francesco di Camerino [5, a. 1333, § 36–37, pp. 524–525].

However, the Catholic missionary operations were not limited to the urban centres of the Ulus of Jochi. A letter from the Franciscans of Kaffa of 1323 clearly indicates that the Crimean Minorites developed daily proselytic activities in the steppe: ‘but due to the hourly following of the travelling camps and wholly devoting ourselves to our tasks, we frequently have no time to partake of our meals before the stars rise. It is not surprising that during one such trip, a German brother tore 93 idols from the hands of the pagans, baptised all their families and instructed them on the matters of faith, as much as he was able’.\footnote{Set crebro castra sequentes ob diligentiam meram tante occupacionis gustare victum non vacat usque ad lucentes stellas. Nec mirum, cum exitu vno frater quidam almannus 93 paganorum ydola de eorum manibus surripuit et omnes familias baptizuit et in fide quo potuit plenius instruxit} This message to a great extent conforms to the contents of the report of the Minorite Iohanca about his six-year apostolate at the territory of the present-day Bashkiria [1, p. 90, 108; 6, p. 66]. It seems, Iohanca’s efforts were not in vain, since a later Franciscan document from the aforementioned manuscript from the collection of the British Museum (Nero A. IX) speaks of the baptism of ‘the son of some great thousandman called Tharmagar, as well as Estokis, the master of the entire Baschardia, along with his wife and children, and his numerous family’\footnote{Sed iam per proximo baptizatus est per fratem Henricum Alemanum filius cuiusdam magni millenarii vocatus Tharmagar. Item Estokis dominus totius Baschardiae, cum uxore et filiis et familia multa}. [12, II, p. 73].
However, a more detailed description of the apostolate in the steppe is contained in the "Chronicon" by Giovanni Elemosina, who, among other things, reported that ‘the shepherds, Friars Minor of Saint Francis, have five mobile residences among those Tartars, in tents covered with felt. Along with the Tartars, they move from place to place, transporting their residences, books and domestic effects in carts. They preach to the Tartars, baptise them and administer the Sacraments to the righteous. And since, from the very beginning, these brothers were blessing the groom, the bride and weddings and, following the example of our Lord, ate with them, for this reason the piety among the Tartars started growing so rapidly that the brothers had to bless weddings and eat with them frequently. And the Tartars love the brothers so well because they do not wish to fight and wear arms, and because they do not wish to own lands and vineyards, but only the paltriest of places where they could stay for a time’.24

Evidently, the Catholic missionaries felt safer in the steppe than in the Jochid towns, where they more than once clashed with local Muslims. It is obvious that this was the reason why the author of a Franciscan letter from Kaffa of 1323 offered the following characteristics of the nomads’ attitude towards missionaries that was in a harsh contrast with the description of a series of martyr’s deaths of Catholic preachers in Eastern towns: ‘So know that we meet with more displays of piety in pagans than in Christians. And they readily offer us food and good clothing that is available to them’.25


24 ‘Inter istos Tartaros pastores gregum, frates Minores Sancti Francisci habent quinque loca mobilia in papilionibus filtro cooperitis, et cum Tartaris moventur de loco ad locum, in curribus portantes loca et libros et utensilia, qui Tartaris predicant et baptizant et administrant credentibus sacramenta. Et quia ipsi frates a principio sponsorum et sponsam et nuptias benedicere ceperunt, et exemplo Salvatoris nostri cum eis manducare, ideo tantum inolevit ista devotion inter Tartaros, ut frates oporteat sepulchrum nuptias benedicere et cum eis manducare. Et diligunt tantum frates, quia bellare nolunt, nec arma portare, et quia terras et vineas nolunt possidere, sed solum loca humilia, ubi possint hospitari’ [12, II, p. 125].

25 ‘Sciatis quod maioris sepe deuocionis reperimus apparenciam in ipsis paganis quam nos in multis christiani cum et victualia nobis libenter conferunt et indumenta nobis apta qualia ipsis possident’ [17, p. 108; compare with: 17, pp. 104—106].
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Chapter VI.
The Golden Horde and Its Neighbours

§ 1. The Golden Horde and the Mamluks

Marie Favereau

From the mid-13th to the mid-15th century, the Jochids and the Mamluk sultans of Egypt and Syria regularly exchanged letters, presents and goods; and people used to travel from one territory to another. Slaves, civil administrators, warriors, traders, women, poets and scholars went from the Golden Horde to the sultanate [29, pp. 304–319]; Muslim literati, jurists, and traders left the sultanate for the khan’s court. Diplomatic missions were an important channel for the transmission of luxury goods—in particular through the circulation of gifts, expected and even demanded by rulers and elite members—but also of technical skills, knowledge and court fashion [21, p. 28, 32, 61–65]. Most likely, agreements concluded by the Jochids and Mamluks were confirmed in written form. The diplomatic letters themselves were sometimes considered as proof of agreement. These agreements were valid for a certain period, usually a ruler’s lifetime. A new sovereign would renegotiate the terms of the alliance according to his own background and to the new political situation. Diplomatic clashes between the Mamluks and Jochids and periods of hiatus, when the network was disrupted, occurred a few times. As we will see, the Mamluk-Jochid relationship cannot be considered as a single, long-lasting alliance, but as a succession of silent periods and active exchanges. Obviously, their complex ties went beyond simple cordial relations, and tensions between the two courts were palpable.

The reasons why these two societies enjoyed relations and exchanges over the long terms were complex and changed over time. The historical reconstruction of the entire period raises many questions, and the details of the Mamluk-Jochid diplomacy are either yet to be uncovered or remain disputed. Did the fact that Mamluks and Jochids shared common interests—the same enemies, for instance—remain the essential cornerstone of their diplomatic relations? Were they also seeking to achieve something else? What was the degree of mutual formal and organised contact? What was the level of formalisation of their exchanges? In other words, can we speak of a ‘foreign policy’ that went beyond the personal investment of a single ruler?

This study contains an overview of the long relationship of the Golden Horde and the Mamluk sultanate and offers some answers to these questions. The diplomatic interplay began precisely in 660 H. (between November 1261 and October 1262), year of the sending of the first letter from Cairo, and ended in the mid-15th century. By then, the Ottomans controlled the Black Sea, Constantinople and the strait of the Bosphorus. The khans lost their hands on the trade routes, and the means of communication between the Golden Horde and the Mamluks, via the Crimean peninsula, were cut. The Giray khans, based in the Crimea and surrounded by the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Ottomans, were not able to pursue a diplomatic and economic alliance on their own with the Mamluks.

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1 All terms and transcriptions provided by the author of the article.
2 Among the numerous studies that deal with the Mamluk-Jochid alliance, the most important contributions are Zakirov, Broadbridge and Ciocîltan works [1; 24; 26].
For a period of almost two centuries (c.1260–c.1440), setting aside the dubious or ambiguous mentions, we can identify some eighty missions. Times of intense diplomatic activity witnessed continuous reciprocal traffic: the Mamluk envoys sent to the khan came back to the sultan accompanied by Jochid messengers who carried the answer of their ruler and vice versa. By reconstructing the chronology of these exchanges and carefully investigating key moments, we should be able to clarify the motivations of the successive alliances set up by the Jochids and the Mamluks. This chapter reveals how crucial these alliances were for both parties by looking at the three most important periods of exchange:

1. The beginnings (1261–1267): the first alliance launched by Khan Berke and Sultan Baybars.

2. Pax Mongolica (c.1300 – c.1350): a period of time that witnessed the prohibition of the slave trade under Khan Toqta and, later, when Öz Beg and al-Malik al-Nasir Muhammad b. Qalawun were in power, the collapse of the Ilkhanate, arch-enemy of both the Golden Horde and the sultanate.

3. The last alliance (1382–1399): the last attempt, by Khan Toktamys and Sultan al-Zāhir Barqūq, to secure a diplomatic and economic relationship between their empires.

The Sources

Most historical studies on the Golden Horde and the Mamluk sultanate tend to focus on the Mamluks’ position. The khans’ politics appear almost as secondary. This imbalance is generated by the sources themselves: even if the original letters were not preserved, some of them were recorded by the secretaries of the Mamluk chancellery and included in chronicles, chancellery manuals and works of insā’ literature. The academic literature is based on these Arabic versions of the summarized letters. The fact that we do not have the original Jochid versions raises questions concerning the content of their copies as registered by the Mamluk secretaries. The Jochid missives could be written in Turkish, Persian, Arabic or Mongolian [30, pp. 76–80]; they were then summarised in Arabic and included in official works. How can we know that these copies truly reflected the Jochids’ messages? How should we deal with the strong bias of the Cairo-centric view? [24, p. 4] Can we still rely on these sources? I am inclined to think so.

Mamluk sources of the Golden Horde are precious. They are almost the only ‘pro-Jochid sources’ we know. Because the first task of a diplomatic mission was to gather and register such information, secretaries and Mamluk historians really meant to record concrete and reliable details about the khans’ environment: ruling figures, dynastic history, political achievements and plans, languages spoken at court, geographical descriptions, etc. The Mamluk sources thus, provide, concrete information about political and military issues. The careful reading of these texts, in which the names of the envoys, the list of gifts exchanged and the transcription of the oral report transmitted by the ambassadors are often mentioned, allows us to penetrate the formal conventions and to understand the practical side of the Mamluk-Jochid contacts.

This material is especially useful in reconstructing the chronology of the exchanges between Baybars and Berke: who opened the diplomatic friendship? What reasons were officially offered? When did it occur? To counterbalance the fact that there are no sources left from the Jochid side, we have to take the ‘events’ into account: exchanges occurred and missions were sent. The simple fact that the Jochids sent ambassadors to the Mamluks means they cared.

During the second half of the 13th century, the major source is Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir (620/1223–692/1292), who enjoyed a privileged position as Baybars’s personal secretary and biographer. The basics—in terms of facts and chronology—are given in his official biography of the sultan, al-Rawd al-zāhir fī sīrat al-malik al-Zāhir, which may be complemented by the narratives of Ibn al-Dawādārī, Šāfiʿ b.ʿAlī, Baybars al-Dawādār, al-Yunīnī, al-Nuwayrī, al-
Chapter VI. The Golden Horde and Its Neighbours

Ḏahābī, Mufaḍḍal Ibn Ābī-Faḍā‘īl, Ibn Kaṣfīr, Ibn al-Furāt, al-Maqrīzī and al-ʿAynī. Date disputes and confusion are common in the Mamluk sources, so it is necessary to compare all versions available to us.

During the period of the Pax Mongolica, on top of the major Mamluk historians, we can rely on important Persian sources (Rashid al-Din, Kashani); bearing in mind that they were patronized by the Ilkhanids and often biased when it comes to the Jochids. To complete the Islamic sources, Italian and Latin sources are very useful. Venetians and Genoese played a crucial role in the Mamluk-Jochid exchanges and were well informed by eye-witnesses [8; 26].

During the time of Toktamysh and sultan al-Ṣāhir Barqūq, we benefit a lot from cross Mamluk and Genoese information. The Temürid sources are also important but should be taken with a grain of salt, as their authors often held very negative views of the Jochids [25; 3]. Regarding the last years of the Mamluk-Jochid relation, which ended in the first half of the 15th century, we mainly rely on Arabic sources

I. The beginnings

Between November 1261 and October 1262 (660 H), Sultan Baybars entrusted his first letter for Khan Berke to Alan merchants. The sultan congratulated the khan on his recent conversion to Islam and exhorted him to fight Hülegü in the name of jihād. The war against a common enemy and the defense of Islam were the two reasons offered to justify the establishment of an alliance [37, pp. 88–89]. Yet, if we look at the crucial events of 1261–1262, what predominates is not the conversion of Berke but the military conflicts between the khan and Hülegū.

A Common Enemy

Indeed, Baybars’s decision had nothing to do with the recent conversion of Berke—who had been a well-known Muslim for more than ten years—but with the fact that the khan launched a first attack against Hülegū’s positions during the winter 1261–1262. In a few weeks Berke’s army reached the south of Derbent and took the city of Shirvan within Hülegū’s domain—their common border was situated at the Terek River, north of Shirvan. In August 1262, Hülegū left the city of Ala-tag, northeast of Lake Van, in order to travel to Shirvan to strike a return blow.

On 13 October 1262, a group of two hundred Jochid warriors arrived at Damascus. This group—called in the Arabic sources wāfīdūn or wāfidiyya, ‘the refugees’—was fleeing Hülegū’s troops. They showed a written order of the khan and asked the protection of the Mamluk sultan. Baybars welcomed them in Cairo on 10 November 1262 [37, pp. 137–139; 9, p. 220; 39, VIII, pp. 90–91; 56, pp. 442–443; 67, I, pp. 487, 496–497]. The first Jochid-Mamluk alliance was concluded.

At exactly the same time, Hülegū expelled the Jochids from Shirvan (14 November 1262). On 8 December 1262, he went to Derbent, which was occupied by the khan’s vanguard. He took the city back, crossed the Terek and chased the Jochid troops, plundering their encampments. Berke retaliated. On 13 January 1263, his army pushed Hülegū’s troops beyond Shabran. The khan stopped at that point and went back to the Volga valley. For almost a year, there was no fighting [61, pp. 392–399]. The conflict was still in its first stage, and both sides were making preparations to resume battle. It was precisely during this ‘truce’ that Berke sent his first diplomatic mission to Baybars. His messengers arrived in Cairo on 21 May 1263 along with Seljūq, Byzantine and Genoese envoys [56, pp. 452–453; 67, I, pp. 487, 496–497]. The first Jochid-Mamluk alliance was concluded.

3 Next to the range of Arabic sources edited by Tiesenhausen, we can find mentions of the Mamluk-Jochid exchanges in a few additional sources such as the Qahwat al-inšā‘ [44, letters 30–31].

4 Hülegū (d.1265) was the brother of the great-khans Möngke (1251–1259) and Kublai (1260–1294). In 1251, he was put in charge of the new Chinggisid conquests to the west.

5 The first part of this study draws mainly from [31].
Why did these five parties convene for?

Internal Legitimacy

If the Jochids decided to side with the Mamluks against other Mongols, it implied that the alliance involved more than military considerations. At that time, the Mamluk sultanate and the Golden Horde were young political formations. The rulers themselves were newcomers on the throne: Berke came to power in 1258, and Baybars in 1260. In this context of war against Hülegü, the khan and the sultan had to deal with internal legitimacy issues and they needed each other’s support. Both rulers’ situations have to be taken into consideration to understand what was at stake.

Baybars’s Situation

The Battle of ʿAyn Jalut (north of Jerusalem) took place on 3rd of September 1260. The Mamluks led by the Sultan Qutuz opposed the Mongols led by Hülegü’s commander Qitbugha. The Chinggisids were defeated, marking a crucial step in the regional balance of power that was until that point favourable to the Mongols. Their advance in the west was restrained for the first time since the fall of the major Islamic clusters in Central Asia, in Iran and in the Middle East. It was a badly-needed Islamic victory won under the banner of the Mamluks.

Most of these Mamluks came from Turkic nomadic families living in the western part of the Eurasian steppes, the region between the Volga and the Black Sea called Desht-i Kipchak. Such a military ‘slavery’ had distinctive features that allowed the successful candidates to have access to high-status functions. A Mamluk at the peak of his career was a representative of the elite, freed from slavery and held a higher social standing in comparison to a slave-warrior. The Mamluks who took power in Egypt and Syria were mainly part of the household of the last great Ayyubid sultan al-Ṣāliḥ Ayyūb (reigned 1240–1249). Baybars had been recently recruited as a Bahriyya member, and he was only one of the Mamluk emirs fighting at ʿAyn Jalut. After the battle, on his way to Cairo, the sultan Qutuz was murdered. Baybars, who claimed to be the head of the plot, took the place of the hero of ʿAyn Jalut by ascending the throne. He had to show that he was not only the victorious combatant of the crusaders, as he proved himself to be at the battle of al-Manṣūra, but also the challenger of the Chinggisids.

In his letters to the khan, the new sultan called for jihād against Hülegü and the non-Muslim Mongols. For that purpose, however, he needed more Mamluks. The regular routes used at the time of their predecessors, the last Ayyubids, crossed the sultanate of Rūm. Key markets such as Sivas were located there, and Türkmen and Seljuk merchants made deals with the Kipchak traders living on the other side of the Black Sea, in the Crimea. Yet when Baybars became sultan, in 1260, the Anatolian section of the trade circuit transporting military slaves from the Qipchaq steppes to Syria and Egypt was in the hands of Hülegü. Baybars had to find a way to bypass the Seljuk roads and the Turkmen intermediaries. He had to shape a new itinerary and to secure it by all military and diplomatic means.

Berke’s Situation

When Batu died at the end of 1255 or beginning of 1256, Great Khan Möngke wanted Sartaq, the eldest son of Batu, to succeed him in accordance with the rules of succession that tended to prevail among the Chinggisids. After Sartaq died, a few months after his election, Möngke ordered that Sartaq’s son, Ulaghchi, became khan. Ulaghchi died at the end of 1257 or beginning of 1258. Only then could Berke ascend the throne. He was the

6 Zakirov [1, p. 50] provides a wrong date based on Baybars al-Dawādār and Maqrīzī.
7 The Khwarezmshah, the Abbasids and the Nizārī-Ismāʿīlī were already dismantled at that time.
ağā—that is, the eldest of Jochids. But his mother—a daughter of the Khwarezm Shah—was only a secondary wife of Jochi, so his pedigree was not as prestigious as Batu, Sartaq and Ulaghchi. Möngke seemed, thus, reluctant to see Berke becoming khan of the Jochid ulus.

On the throne, Berke had nevertheless to obey the great khan’s orders and to follow the imperial agenda in the Middle East. Jochid troops participated, thus, in the Mongol conquests in Iraq and Syria-Palestine and helped to take Baghdad. As a result, they had rights on the conquered places and could claim a share of the tributes. Yet, Hülegū, who was leading the Chinggisid conquests to the west, started to threaten the Jochid positions in western and central Asia. He chased the Jochids from Herat, Tabriz, and Baghdad, and even executed some Jochid princes. Moreover, he discharged the Seljuq sultan ’Izz al-dīn, while he maintained his brother Qīlīč Arslān IV on the Seljuq throne. On the throne, Berke had nevertheless to obey the great khan’s orders and to follow the imperial agenda in the Middle East. Jochid troops participated, thus, in the Mongol conquests in Iraq and Syria-Palestine and helped to take Baghdad. As a result, they had rights on the conquered places and could claim a share of the tributes. Yet, Hülegū, who was leading the Chinggisid conquests to the west, started to threaten the Jochid positions in western and central Asia. He chased the Jochids from Herat, Tabriz, and Baghdad, and even executed some Jochid princes. Moreover, he discharged the Seljuq sultan ’Izz al-dīn, while he maintained his brother Qīlīč Arslān IV on the Seljuq throne.

What Berke Wanted in Exchange for Qipchaq Slaves

Why would Berke be ready to let Baybars buy young men whom he could potentially need in his own armies? The expected compensation must have been high. In the first letter he sent to Baybars in 1263, the khan claimed that Hülegū did not respect the Chinggisid laws: ‘[He] transgressed Chinggis Khan [yasa] and the šarīʿa of his people; he aimed only at killing men with hate’. For Berke, protection and propagation of Islam were also at stake: ‘[…] I, together with my four brothers, stood up and fought him from all sides for the sake of reviving the light of Islam and returning the abodes of the True Religion to their old state of prosperity and to the mention of the Name of God, the call to prayer, the reading of the Qur’an, prayer, and avenging the Imams and the Muslim community’.

Berke offered Baybars to send troops towards the Euphrates to stop Hülegū’s military operations and trap him between their two armies. At that time, the Abbasid and Seljūq legacies, the greatest of the dār al-islām, were at stake. Negotiations concerning the allotment of the Seljūq territory were in process. The khan asked the sultan to support ’Izz al-dīn, who was in exile at Constantinople. According to Ibn ʿAbd al-Ẓāhir, ’Izz al-dīn also promised Baybars half of his kingdom in case of victory. However, claims on the Seljuk domain, as

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8 On Berke’s origins, see Jean Richard [63; see also 30, p. 63]; on the precedence of the mother, see Juvayni [48, p. 40].
9 On Berke’s attempt to set up an alliance with the Negüderis (or Qara’unas), enemies of Hülegū, see [47, pp. 239–244].
10 I would like to express my thanks to Dr. Yihao Qiu who drew my attention to this information.
11 This is the most probable date despite a lot of debate on that point in the historiography. See [47, pp. 233–234; 11, p. 79; 30, pp. 64–67].
12 On the first mission sent by Berke, see [37, p. 171; 58, p. 87]. For a divergent version, possibly based on Ibn ʿAbd al-Zāhir, see [56, pp. 452–453; 67, I, p. 534, II, p. 195; 39, VIII, p. 97]. As for Baybars al-Dawâdār [20, p. 83], he mixed the texts of the two first letters sent by Berke.
13 It is highly improbable that the Jochids were ready to accept so easily the Mamluks’ claim on the Abbasid Caliphate, and perhaps some arrangements to share this crucial heritage were under negotiation as
on all the territories conquered by Baiju when he was in the service of Batu in 1242–1243 [47, pp. 216–219; 10, pp. 49, 177]14, were openly made by the Jochids. The common idea was that the region of Rūm was a Jochid conquest [15, p. 476]. Yet, direct tensions between Jochids and Mamluks over the Seljuk Sultanate never arose because Hülegü and, later, the Ilkhanids controlled the lands.

Since Baghdad was in the hands of Hülegü, Cairo became the new seat of the caliphate and the caliph was under the control of Baybars. Ibn ʿAbd al-Ẓāhir suggested that the khan was asking Baybars for the caliph’s recognition of his status as sultan. Indeed, Berke was keen to consolidate his position as a Muslim ruler. Having territorial claims did not imply that the khan had the means to fight his enemy and, compared to Hülegü, Berke was militarily and politically weak. Hülegü was the loyal deputy of the great khans Möngke and Kublai and could legitimately fight back; besides he had at his disposal more troops than did the khan15. Without external support, the Jochids could not hope to win against Hülegü. Berke’s alliance with Baybars aimed at strengthening the position of the Jochids in the newly conquered regions and in the wider Islamic world.

The khan was setting up an alliance with the Kipchak sultans (the main rebels to the Chinggisid cause) in Cairo and Delhi. His court was welcoming the nebula of administrators and officers who fled the court of the Khatuwaz Shah (Berke preferred to rely on faithful Turkic than on Uighur secretaries sent by Kublai). As the Golden Horde was becoming the main Islamic power of the area, it was crucial for the Jochids to have access to Mecca and Medina. Their friendship with the Mamluks would allow them to send their people to the Ḥedjaz to make ḥājj and to be recognized as part of the Muslim elite and significant members of the dār al-islām16.

The Agreement

In 1262–1263, Khan Berke concluded a formal agreement with Sultan Baybars and the Byzantine Emperor Michael VIII Palaiologos, who had recently retaken Constantinople from the Latins. At that time, the Mamluks were fighting the Mongols led by Hülegü in Syria and Eastern Anatolia. They had the same enemy as the Golden Horde had and the same problem: they need to bypass the Anatolian markets where slaves were sent from Crimea. Thus, they formalised an agreement with Michael VIII Palaiologos stipulating that merchants and ambassadors the sultan or the khan sent were allowed to cross Byzantium and to travel through the straits of the Bosphorus. The configuration of a direct route between Alexandaria and the Lower Volga region via Constantinople and the Crimea—a travel of two months or two months and a half—was the main result of the negotiations that took place in Cairo between Baybars, Berke, Michael VIII Palaiologos, Sultan ʿIzz ad-Dīn, and the Genoese17.

well. The Mamluk sources are obviously silent on a possible claim of Berke being associated with the caliphate. Yet a sign of such an association might be that the name of Berke was said during the Friday prayer in Medina, Mecca and Jerusalem [37, p. 174]; and previously in the regions of ʿAjam, Mā warā an-nahr and Khorasan [49, II, pp. 1285, 1292–1293].

14 Baiju, appointed chief commander of the Chinggisid troops in western Asia in 1242, was then under Batu’s authority. He passed later under the orders of Möngke.

15 According to Marco Polo [59, pp. 329–330], Hülegü had 300,000 men against 350,000 for the Jochid khan. T. Allsen rightly questioned the plausibility of these totals. It is hard to believe that Berke had more men than Hülegü, who was in charge of the conquests [10, pp. 203–207].

16 For instance, under khan Töde Möngke (reigned 1280–1287), two faqīh came to the Mamluk sultan with a letter in Mongol script asking his permission to make ḥājj. The khan wanted also two battle flags or standards, one with the sultan’s name and the other with the caliph’s name [42, p. 354].

17 According to the Treaty of Nymphem signed on 13th March 1261, the Genoese were to provide a fleet to the Byzantines and enjoyed commercial privileges in the Black Sea. For more details on the content of the agreement, see [28, pp. 36–38 (no. 1890); 17, pp. 42–45].
The setting up of a viable alternative to the Anatolian land route and the control of the slave-warriors market were a great accomplishment for all parties involved. Fifty days at least were needed to travel from Cairo to Saqsīn in 1262 [37, p. 215; 39, VIII, p. 99; 68, I, p. 540; 58, p. 105; 56, pp. 456–458]. The duration of the trip remained basically the same until the 1360s as did the itinerary from Cairo to the khan’s horde on the lower Volga region. According to Ibn Battuta’s account (c.1334) it took indeed twenty days to travel between Sudak and Sarai, and according to Pegolotti (c.1340), the distance between Tana, the gateway to the steppes, and Sarai could be covered by ox-drawn carriage in twenty-six days, including one day of navigation on the Volga, or ten to twelve days for the same trip on horseback. If we follow this itinerary, it is obvious that the hub of the exchanges was the Black Sea. Whoever controlled the strait of the Bosphorus and whoever controlled the south of Crimea commanded the two pivotal access points to the Mamluk-Jochid road. The fight for the control of these access points and the attempts to open competing routes would be one of the major issues at stake in this region until the end of the 14th century.

The short-term results of the first Mamluk-Jochid alliance were, therefore, substantial. True, the alliance was only partially successful. The plan outlined in the letters to recapture the Seljuk domain to the benefit of Baybars and Berke failed as did the resolution to kill Hülegü, who died a natural death. Nevertheless, Baybars and Berke succeeded in combining their military (human) resources through the recruitment of slaves. The alliance put a stop to Hülegü’s conquests into the western Islamic lands. It was a major factor of stability during Baybars’s reign and allowed him to recruit Mamluks for his armies, preventing the emerging sultanate from disintegrating. The consequences were equally positive for the Golden Horde. The cultural bonds between the two courts contributed to a first synthesis of Islamic and Chinggisid traditions. By allying with Baybars, Berke took independent and personal political decisions, which contributed to building up the foundations of the Golden Horde. Jochids and Mamluks were both looking for a legal basis to justify their expansionist agenda. Their agreement was framed by their convergence of interests. It was a good deal between two powers in equal need of each other.

II. Pax Mongolica

After the Mongol conquests, a commercial boom transformed the Eurasian continent, connecting the Mediterranean Sea to India and China. The economic exchanges intensified, integrating Asia, the Middle East and Europe. Historians call this global phenomenon Pax Mongolica (the Mongol Peace) because this was a world-shaping phenomenon on par with Pax Romana. The post-conquest stability of the Mongol dominions and relatively peaceful relationships between the descendants of Chinggis Khan laid the ground for such commercial boom. The ways Mongols stimulated the exchanges resulted in a new form of long-distance trade and the agreements established between the Golden Horde, the Mamluks, the Byzantines, the Italians, and others, led to the transformation of the trade networks. A new economic order emerged, which cannot be seen as the mere revival of the ancient continental Silk Road.

The Golden Horde was not a transit area that was merely crossed by merchants, but the melting point at which the great commercial circuits converged. Whenthe route was open from Venice to China, and the goods exchanged and traded along the entire way, only few merchants, like Marco Polo, make the whole trip. They usually stopped halfway: in the Golden Horde’s lands. At the level of the lower Volga region, the core area of the Golden Horde, two major routes were passable: the eastern one through Central Asia towards north India and China, and the second—western, through the Black Sea steppes and the Crimean peninsula towards the Mamluk sultanate and the Mediterranean world.

In this new economic context, the Mamluk-Jochid relation took a different shape. At the dawn of the 14th century, their exchanges were exposed to inter-regional competition and
tensions were palpable through their diplomatic correspondence. Clashes between the two courts occurred a few times. They never led to direct military conflicts because the Golden Horde and the sultanate had no common borders but, as we will see, the consequences were significant for their go-betweens and intermediaries.

Toqta and al-Malik al-Nasir Muhammad b. Qalawun: the slave trade prohibited (c.1300–1312)

The early 14th century was a period of unions at the level of the entire Mongol Empire. At the end of the year 1304, a peace agreement was concluded between the Yuan, the Chagataids, the Jochids and the Ilkhanids; the formal unity of the Chinggisid Empire was apparently restored. The Yuan kept the overarching title of ‘Great Khan’ and enjoyed a nominal primacy over the three other parts.

Yet, the same year, khan Toqta sent his first embassy to sultan al-Nasir Muhammad. In his letter, the khan said that he asked the Ilkhan to surrender the lands from Khorasan to Tabriz, and had threatened war otherwise. He sent also to the sultan 200 slave girls and 400 mamluks (most of whom died during the journey). In exchange, the khan asked al-Nasir Muhammad to support him against their Ilkhanid rivals.

At that time, khan Toqta was at the peak of his power. He had eliminated Nogai (d.1299), the powerful beglerbeg who was ruling over Crimea and Southeastern Europe. He had pacified the local tensions in the Dnieper and Dniester areas and in the Crimean peninsula. He wanted to control Transcaucasia. In May 1301, he sent his envoys to Ilkhan Gazan [62, p. 79]. We do not know the exact mission of this embassy nor the content of the letters brought by the Jochid messengers but, a few months later, some Jochid troops attacked the Ilkhanid Empire along the Terek River. The military operations failed to change the balance of power in favour of the Golden Horde. They ended on a status-quo agreement between the khan and the Ilkhan and the Transcaucasian road was re-opened [26, pp. 168–169].

The only way to really break the power of the Ilkhan was to open several military fronts at the same time and to attack the Ilkhanate not only from the north Caucasus but also from Syria. The Mamluks were, therefore, crucial allies for the Jochids. But when Toqta sent his envoys to al-Nasir Muhammad, the sultan refused to comply arguing that ‘Allāh had called Ghazan to him and that his brother Kharbende (Öljaytu) was already asking for peace’ [26, pp. 169–170]. In fact, an Ilkhanid embassy had already informed the sultan that Öljaytu allowed Mamluk merchants into Persia. For the sultan, the peace with the Ilkhan had huge economic advantages and allowed him to secure the transit of slave-warriors via Tabriz. In 1306/07, Toqta sent again the same letter to al-Nasir Muhammad who again refused to support any military operation against the Ilkhan. A few months after, the khan ordered to expel the Genoese from the Golden Horde and to confiscate their goods. Kaffa was besieged for eight months and the Genoese had to abandon their fortified settlement in May 1308.

Since the formation of the Golden Horde, the Jochids had interrupted merchant activities only once. The khans’ policies combined state control (treaties, currency issue, taxes, roads supervision) and liberal exchange (fluidity in partnership, alliances based on common interest and not on ethnic or religious affiliation, low taxation regime). They did not interrupt the

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19 We have to bear in mind that at this time, al-Nasir Muhammad was only a puppet. The emirs were ruling in his name (Salar, Baybars al-Jashnakir, and others). I am grateful to Professor Amitai for this significant information.

20 At the end of the 13th century, when Nogai fought with the Genoese, it had nothing to do with the Mamluks, tax issues and political struggles within the Horde were at stake [26, pp. 161–162; 55, p. 184].
exchanges except in case of warlike situation. Only very serious reasons could have led to Toqta’s decision. Historians often presented the khan’s actions as brutal and unexpected and they struggled to provide convincing interpretations of what happened. We should consider the explanations given in the sources at the time when the first Mamluk-Jochid crisis took place.

According to both Mamluk and Christian sources, Toqta took his revenge because the Genoese ‘stole’ Tatar and Kipchak children to sell them on the slave markets. The Franciscans argued further that the Genoese were acting too independently and were not respectful of the imperial laws. Indeed, kidnapping was illegal and merchants had to pay taxes on selling and purchasing. Yet, these taxes were very low and we know cases of pure robbery involving Genoese, or others, that were not punished by the sword. At last, if Toqta was against the slave trade or against selling local children—why was this happening in 1307 and not before? We should remember that in 1304 he had sent 200 slave-girls and 400 mamluks to the sultan. Therefore, selling local children cannot be considered the reason for the tension between the Genoese and the Golden Horde.

Some historians argued that Toqta was a ‘shamanist’ and not a Muslim. It would explain the misunderstandings and disagreements he had with the Mamluk sultan. We can counter-argue that the Mamluks had fine diplomatic relations with khan Möngke-Temür who was not Muslim. Besides, depending on the sources, Toqta was a sky-worshipper, a Christian (baptised by the Franciscans under the name of Giovanni and buried in a Franciscan monastery near Sarai) and a Muslim, bearing the name of Ghiyath ad-Din, as can be seen on series of coins that were minted under his name in Sarai and Ukek. Thus, it is hard to believe that religion had anything to do with the crisis between the khan and the merchants.

Obviously, the Genoese paid for al-Nasir Muhammad’s refusal to organise a joint attack against the Ilkhanids. The timing of the khan’s decision is a revealing indication: right after the sultan’s third refusal, Toqta expelled the Genoese (November 1307). Genoese were not only key intermediaries between the sultanate and the Golden Horde, they were also responsible of the most strategic slave-market places, at Kaffa especially. In the wake of his expulsion of the Genoese, the khan stopped all diplomatic exchanges with the Mamluks, despite the conciliation attempt of the sultan, who wrote to Toqta, in September–October 1308, that ‘having heard of military clashes in the Caucasus between Ilkhanids and Jochids, he had prepared a military unit to help the khan but since he heard that the fights had stopped, he dismissed the unit’ [18, p. 96]. Toqta was not fooled by the sultan’s story and he remained closed to further diplomatic discussions.

The Mamluks and Jochids had no common border, they could not fight on the battlefield but they could fight on the market sphere. A blow to the slave merchants was a blow to the sultanate. For the first time, the Jochids tried to stop the slave trade; but the trade could not be stopped because there were other slave traders than the Genoese (such as Venetians, Greeks, local merchants, Alans, and Turks) and alternative networks. As the Byzantine historian Nicephorus Gregoras (c. 1292–c. 1360) noticed: every year one or two ships would cross the Black Sea to bring slave-warriors to serve in the Mamluk army and nothing could be done to end this trade which had become so significant [13, pp. 364–366; 33, pp. 101–102].

Even the most powerful empires cannot control their surrounding world. In this specific case, the use of an embargo had two effects. On the one hand, the Genoese and Venetians merchants living in the Golden Horde sought a new legal and institutional framework that

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21 V. Ciocîltan offers an overview of the historiography and its limits: [26, pp. 163–173, and esp. p. 166, note 93].
22 As far as I know, there is no indication in the sources that the slave trade from the Qipchaq steppes decreased at that time.
would provide better protection to their business [8]. On the other hand, the Mamluks looked for alternative solutions to secure the supply of military-slaves, which meant further cooperation with the Ilkhanids, masters of the Tabriz road. But, even if there was a short detente, the war had not ended. The Ilkhanids were still the enemies of the Mamluks and the Jochids. In 1310/11, Toqta sent his envoys back to Cairo with the Mamluk messengers who had come to announce al-Nasir Muhammad’s third enthronement to the khan [18, p. 98]. The Mamluks and the Jochids still needed to exchange and communicate.

Öz Beg and al-Malik an-Nasir Muhammad b. Qalawun: the End of a Common Enemy (1312–1341)

Öz Beg and al-Nasir Muhammad entered into relations soon after the khan was elected. Öz Beg’s first embassy arrived in Cairo in March–April 1314. His letter informed the sultan of his throne accession and conversion to Islam. Al-Nasir Muhammad sent his congratulations of his accession to the throne and a great number of gifts. In December 1315, he made a special request to the khan’s envoys: he asked for a Jochid bride. After three years of negotiations, Tulunbay-Khatun (the khan’s niece) was ready to be married to the sultan. In exchange, the khan forced the Mamluk ambassadors to borrow 27,000 dinars from his merchants to pay the dowry and to finance the wedding festivities. Tulunbay and her huge retinue (up to 3,000 people, depending on the sources) departed from the lower Volga in 1319 and arrived in Egypt in early May 1320 [24, pp. 132–133].

Sheikh Nuʿman Khwarazmī, Segurano Salvaygo—a Genoese merchant nicknamed Sakrān—and Qūṣūn, a future Mamluk emir, were among the most important persons of the princess escort23. The sultan received sumptuously Tulunbay-Khatun and, in May, a marriage contract was arranged for a dowry of 30,000 dinars. This was not an extravagant bride-price if we consider that a year after, the sultan sent a gift package that was worth 40,000 dinars to thank the Ilkhan Abu Said for his series of gifts equivalent to 25,000 dinars [21, p. 67].

For Öz Beg khan, this wedding alliance was a reassessment of the Mamluk-Jochid alliance and it implied military support against the Ilkhanids. Thus, as soon as 1320–1321, the khan asked al-Nasir Muhammad to join him on the battlefield against their common enemy. Yet, the sultan refused to comply and even warned the Ilkhan of Öz Beg’s plan. At that time, peace negotiations between the Mamluks and the Ilkhanids were in full swing and, for al-Nasir Muhammad, it was worth a diplomatic clash with the khan [24, p. 134].

In 1322, when the Mamluk messenger carrying this negative answer went back from the Golden Horde, he complained of Öz Beg’s treatment. The khan received him only once. During the meeting, he did not inquire of al-Nasir Muhammad’s health. Besides, the sultan’s envoy was prevented from purchasing slaves and slave-girls [24, pp. 134–135].

The khan had two major reasons to complain as it was expressed in his letters to the sultan: first, al-Nasir Muhammad sent no army to Iraq while he, Öz Beg, had faced the enemy for a month and, so far, has received no news of any advance from the Mamluk side. Second, the sheikh Nu man, who had very high status in the Golden Horde, was ill-treated by the sultan and his entourage. The sheikh wished to visit Jerusalem and Hebron (al-Khalīl) and to built in Jerusalem a pious waqf. The sultan had not let him to do so. The khan was particularly displeased with this issue, as he had provided the sheikh with the necessary funds [24, p. 135]. It meant no respect for someone close to him and considered as a holy figure in the Golden Horde. Moreover, the khans had always allowed the sultans, and people from their entourage, to patronize the construction of religious buildings in the Volga Valley and in the Crimea. For instance, the gifts sent by Qalawun to the Horde in 1287 contained goods worth 2,000 dinars for the mosque being built in Solkhat and masons were sent with their material and paint to

23 On Segurano Salvaygo, see: [50]; on Qūṣūn, see: [66].
carve the name and titles of Sultan Qalāwūn on this mosque [42, p. 356]. Between sultans of
the same standing, reciprocity in the exchanges was expected. Al-Nasir Muhammad acted as
if he was despising the khan or as if they did not have the same status.

To retaliate, the khan killed Segurano Salvaigo, a rich Genoese merchant who was close
to the sultan and used to purchase slaves in the Golden Horde. When al-Nasir Muhammad
complained, the khan said that this merchant was killed by one of the tsars of al-Jazāʾīr (the
islands); openly lying to the sultan’s envoys [50, p. 86]. A few years after, al-Nasir Muham-
mad took his revenge by making a fool of the khan’s messengers. In 1327–1328, al-Nasir
Muhammad had divorced Tulunbay and married her to one his Mongol commanders (Sayf
ad-dīn Mankalī Bughā) [64, p. 482]. When the khan complained that she should be sent back
to the Golden Horde, the sultan answered the messengers she had died and asked a judge to
produce the legal proof for it [24, p. 136].

The divorce, the sheikh’s bad-treatment and no military support were the major reasons
explaining the diplomatic tensions between the Golden Horde and the sultanate. The inter-
regional context has evolved since the time of Baybars and Berke. Al-Nasir Muhammad was
in a strong position to negotiate with the khan: the Bosphorus route was not the sole access
to the sultanate for the slave traders; the Anatolian and the Syrian land routes were then passa-
ble. In 1321, the Mamluk troops occupied Ayas (Laiazzo) in Cilician Armenia—one of the
Greatest commercial hubs of the area. The sultan had also a peace treaty with the Ilkhan who
offered very advantageous conditions for trading in the Ilkhanate [12]. Yet, as the main source
of Mamluks was still the core territory of the Golden Horde, Öz Beg khan and al-Nasir Mu-
hammad continued to exchange embassies and gifts, even during this ‘cold war’.

Between the reigns of Toqta and Öz Beg, there was a clear evolution in the status of
the Genoese. Under Toqta, the clash with the Mamluks led to a massive expulsion of the
Genoese merchants. The entire community living in the Golden Horde was held responsible
for it. Under Öz Beg, the Genoese, as an intermediary group between the Jochids and the
Mamluks, could not be held responsible anymore for any diplomatic struggles with the
Mamluks. In fact, when Öz Beg arrived on the throne, the khan agreed on the reconstruction
of Kaffa, which started in 1316 on the basis of a new agreement: ‘Anno domini MCCCXVI
redificata fuit civitas Caffa per dominum Antoniun gallum et dominum Nicolaum de pagana
sindicos comunis Janue per gratiam sibi concessam per Usbech imperatorem tartarorum’
[60, pp. 500–501].

The detailed content of this agreement was not preserved24, but for the same period we
can rely on the contract concluded between Öz Beg khan and the Venetians. Dated in 1333, it
covered the crucial questions of the liability (collective and individual) and protected status of
the trading community [8]. It is highly probable that the same rights were granted to the Gen-
noese and their most important settlement in Kaffa.

If Segurano Salvaigo paid for the diplomatic clash between the khan and the sultan, it
was not because he was Genoese. Indeed, the Italian community was left in peace and the
khan did not confiscate their goods. Neither was it for the divorce with Tulunbay, that Öz Beg
learnt later, nor because of the military defection of the Mamluks against the Ilkhanids. Se-
gurano Salvaigo, a close friend of the sultan, paid with his life for the sheikh Nu’man’s ill-
treatment. The sultan had scorned the image of the khan as a powerful Islamic ruler, influen-
tial beyond the Golden Horde. The khan had to reply, for his internal and external legitimacy
was at stake. Like the messages the diplomatic gifts suggested, actions towards rulers’ repre-
sentatives (ambassadors, close relations) required appropriate reactions. It was a matter of
reputation for the rulers of the time.

24 In the case of the Genoese, if we except the chronicles, the oldest agreements with the Golden
Horde that were preserved are from the 1380s, fortunately they included older contracts.
The reigns of Toqtamish khan (c.1377–c.1397) and az-Zahir Barquq (1382–1390)25 offer coincidently interesting similarities. They both ruled during approximately two decades; Barquq died in 1399, which is also the date of Toqtamish’s political death after his defeat on the Vorskla. Both reigns marked the end of an era and the beginning of new times. In Egypt, the connections with the Qipchaq world became looser, as well as the importance of the nomadic culture in court and political life. Az-Zahir Barquq started to integrate into the Mamluk elite an increasing number of Circassian people. It is worth noting that he was the last sultan to perform court rituals associated with koumiss [51, p. 173]. He was also the last sultan to exchange extensively with the Jochids. In the last quarter of the 14th century, Mamluk-Jochid relations still were important for both parties.

Previous scholarship has focused on the relations between the Mamluks and the Têmûrids [24, pp. 168–197]; yet, they rarely highlight the role that the khan and his entourage, especially his deputies in the Crimea, played in the local geopolitics. In this last part, we will see what was concretely at stake at the end of the 14th century between the Mamluk sultanate and the Golden Horde and why this period was a turning point in the exchanges between both powers.

Temûr, the New Common Enemy

The chronology of the missions exchanged between al-Zahir Barquq and Toqtamish (Toktamish) is quite easy to reconstruct (especially if we compare with previous sets of diplomatic exchange between the khans and the sultans). We know about two missions: the first one in 1384–1386, the second one in 1394–1395. Both seemed to have been initiated by Toqtamish.

According to Ibn Duqmaq, in 786/Feb. 1384–Feb. 1385, the khan’s envoys arrived in Cairo. Maqrîzî gave the more precise date of 11 Dhû al-hijja 786/24 January 1385. Ibn Hajar al-‘Asqalânî added that the chief ambassador was Hasan, son of the former governor of Crimea, Ramadân. The embassy itself was sent by al-hâqîm bî-l-Qrim or Şâhîb al-Qrim on behalf of the khan. The envoys brought gifts: seven hawks and seven types of textile made of cotton from diverse origins, and slaves [40, p. 322; 52, pp. 427–428; 43, p. 450].

A following embassy, this time sent directly by Toqtamish, arrived in Muḥarram 787/12 February–14 March 1385. The content of the letter is not preserved in the Mamluk sources, we only know that Toqtamish was asking az-Zahir Barquq to reestablish relations as in olden days [24, p. 172]26. The reason for this diplomatic meeting was probably the war with Temûr. Indeed, the first campaign launched by Toqtamish in Transcaucasia started soon after. In 1384–1386, Temûr had made a military incursion as far as Azerbaijan where he had left a governor over Sultanîyyah and Taβriz. In 1386, the khan’s troops attacked Derbent and Taβriz. Temûr replied by sending troops led by one of his sons. The fighting stopped on a status quo. At this point, the military strategy of Toqtamish was apparently to multiply the military fronts to weaken Temûr’s positions [2, p. 99]. The sultan would attack Temûr’s troops stationed between Derbent and Taβriz, and they would be caught between the Jochid and the Mamluk armies.

In 1388, Toqtamish launched his first campaign towards the East. His armies reached the banks of the Amu Daria River but failed to conquer the city of Bukhara. Again, both sides stopped on a status quo. This time, Temûr decided to retaliate. In January 1391, after three months of preparation, he launched a campaign deep inside the heartlands of the Golden Horde. When the Temûrid and Jochidarmies met on the battlefield, Temûr’s troops were exhausted after six months of travelling in the steppes. Yet Toqtamish was defeated. Having lost

25 The sultan’s rule was interrupted for almost a year due to a revolt in 1389–1390.
26 According to al-Asqalani, in Safar 787 (March 14 – April 11, 1385), Toqtamish’s envoys came again. They probably came for the same purpose: to convince the sultan to attack Timur [43, p. 450].
Chapter VI. The Golden Horde and Its Neighbours

the battle, he had to escape to the Middle Volga region [2, pp. 124–125, 138], where he activated his alliance with the Grand Duchy of Poland-Lithuania by sending his envoys to his ally Władysław II Jagiełło (1377–1434), who was the head of the Grand Duchy together with his cousin Vitovt (1392–1430). Toqtamish was defeated but the raids conducted by the Temürid troops in the aftermath of this campaign were limited. And indeed only three years after, in spring 1394, Toqtamish was ready to resume the fight.

Before launching his new military expedition, the khan actively communicated with Poland-Lithuania and the Mamluks. On the 26 March 1394/ 23 Jumada I 796, his envoys arrived in Damascus to discuss the terms of a viable alliance against Temür [42, p. 356; 52, p. 428]. Soon after, in 797/1394–1395, the khan’s troops entered the Caucasus. The region was then again under the control of one of Temür’s son. In April 1395, Temür stroke back and the khan lost a crucial battle on the shores of the Terek River. According to Țūlūman ʿAlī Shāh, the Mamluk ambassador who went back to Egypt in September 1395, the khan lost the battle because one of the most influential emirs of the Golden Horde betrayed him and joined Temür’s camp [42, pp. 356–357]. Modern historians have established that this emir was Aktau [4, p. 180].

After the khan was defeated, he flew away to a wooded area in Bular [6, p. 178; 2, p. 138]. The Lower Volga region and the area between the Don and the Volga were plundered by Temür’s troops. The Mamluk ambassador Țūlūman ʿAlī Shāh left the region just before Temür’s men arrived. With his companions, he went to the Crimea, first to Solkhat, then to Kaffa, where they looked for a boat to cross the Black sea and go back to Egypt. But the Genoese kept him as a hostage and he had to pay 50,000 dirham to leave and safely reach Samsun. According to Maqrīzī, the Genoese were on Temür’s side [52, p. 428].

In fact, the Genoese—as the Byzantines—played all sides and switched from an alliance to another. We know, for instance, that at the same period they played the Ottomans against Temür and the other way around. Temür’s military intervention had shaken the political organization of the peninsula and the Genoese were becoming increasingly autonomous.

Were the Genoese for or against the khan?

The first agreement between Toqtamish and the Genoese dated 1381. It recognizes the Genoese authority over eighteen places and villages in the southern Crimea. In exchange, the Genoese would support the khan, and not welcome his enemies in their towns. At that time, the khan needed to set up a strong alliance with the Genoese in order to have free hands to impose himself in the Rus’ lands. If we compare the content of this agreement with the yarliqs granted by Öz Beg, Janibek and Berdi Beg to the Venetians, we see that the khan made striking concessions to the Genoese: not only the eighteen settlements, but also the right to travel wherever they wanted in the Golden Horde [26, pp. 225–229].

Right after they reached this agreement, the Genoese started a large-scale renovation of the fortifications of the citadel in Kaffa. They also increased their food supplies, acquired weapons and military equipment from Genoa and Pera. This led to the Solkhat war which opposed the Genoese, the local Crimean populations, and the Jochids based in Solkhat, from 1385 to 1387 [22].

Twice in less than ten years, Toqtamish launched military expeditions in the Caucasus. He targeted Derbent and beyond—Shirvan and Tabriz; yet, even more important strategically, this was the only way to open a protected land route to Syria. The khan needed to keep the exchanges with the Mamluk world fluid for military and economic reasons. This direct land access to the sultanate would also put him in a stronger position to renegotiate his agreement with the Genoese, who tended to dominate the connection between the Jochids and the Mediterranean world as the misfortune of the Mamluk ambassador Țūlūman ʿAlī Shāh has shown.

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27 My deepest thanks to Ilnur Mirgaleev for providing me with this information and, more generally, for his relevant comments on the conflict between Toqtamish and Timur.
But the khan was never able to secure a Transcaucasan land road between the Golden Horde and the Syria-Palestinian coast.

The Crimea: the Last Bridge Between Egypt and the Golden Horde

The succession of events that led to the Jochid embassies in Cairo in 1384–1386 and 1394–1395 is rather well documented. Yet, the political agendas of Toqtamish and az-Ẓahir Barquq remained complex. We have to look under the stones to understand what was at stake. Temūr’s role and importance should not be exaggerated. The exchanges between the Mamluk sultanate and the Golden Horde did not have for sole purpose the war against him. As we saw, Toqtamish did not only answer Temūr’s attacks, he had his own agenda.

The notion of an age-old friendship between the Mamluks and the Jochids, expressed in the Mamluk sources and in the recorded letters, is part of the language of diplomacy. The vocabulary used in the diplomatic missives, as their format, were very conservative partly because the secretaries used to take old letters as writing models [30, pp. 89–91]. Yet, the geo-political situation was not the same as in the times of Berke and Baybars. Tradition was not the real motivation of the Jochids and the Mamluks, nor the driving force of their exchanges; they did not send missions every year, but only when they needed it.

When Toqtamish sent his first embassy to the Mamluk sultan, it has been ten years that the diplomatic contact had stopped28, which does not mean that the commercial exchanges between the Golden Horde and the sultanate were cut. Even if the itineraries were the same, we have to deal with two different dynamics, trade and diplomacy, which sometimes converged but not always. As we already mentioned, the embassy of January 1385 was led by Hasan b. Ramaḍān, the son of the former beg of Solkhat. At the diplomatic reception, he offered falcons, cloth and military slaves, and the letter he was carrying for the sultan was read in front of the audience. The heads of the chancellery, then, discovered that the embassy was not coming directly from Toqtamish but from the governor of the Crimea. This generated embarrassment and confusion because the protocol had to be adapted to the status of the sender [23, pp. 114–115]. This scene was recorded by al-Qalqashandī as an example of the kind of mistakes the secretaries in charge of the diplomatic protocol could make. Yet, the fact that al-ḥāqim bī-l-Qrim sent a letter and envoys to the Mamluk sultan was not an innovation at all. We know that the divan al-inshā’ received and kept letters from the highest Jochid officials and civil administrators. Ibn Faḍl Allāh al-ʿUmarī and Ibn Nāẓir al-Jaish recorded their correspondence with al-ḥāqim bī-l-Qrim, with al-ḥāqim bī-Azāq, with the umarā’ al-ulus, with the nāʿib al-qān (or beglerbeg) and with the wazīr (chief of the divan) [41, pp. 44–48; 46, pp. 339–340].

The interesting point is not so much that the diplomatic reception was disrupted when the heads of the chancellery discovered the misunderstanding, but the fact that diplomatic exchanges between the khans’ deputes in the Crimea and the Mamluks existed since, at least, the first half of the 14th century—not because the beys of Solkhat were acting independently of the khans but because the peninsula was a highly strategic place, a bridge between Egypt and the Golden Horde.

In the last quarter of the 14th century, the Mamluks were keen to maintain their commercial network and connections with the Black Sea area. The Crimea was the hub of the slave trade network; here stood the slave markets and the shipping facilities to the Bosphorus and the Mediterranean Sea. The Jochids needed the money from the sails; alternatively, the Mamluk sultans needed the young slave warriors. The diplomatic gifts carried by the first embassy during Toqtamish’ rule were a metaphor for exchange economy and fair trade:

28 The last embassy had been sent in 776/1374–1375, when the Egyptian secretary Ibn Nāẓir al-Jaysh wrote a letter for the sultan to the khan ‘Muḥammad’ (probably Urus); this embassy also carried gifts for the khan [1, p. 94].
hawks and slaves were emblematic luxury commodities from the Golden Horde. The Jochid elite acquired textiles made of cotton, silk, linen, from the Anatolian market and the Middle East. In the Crimean peninsula, clothes had been exchanged for slaves since Seljuk times.

For the sultanate, the importation of future Mamluks remained a crucial issue. Az-Zahir Barquq personally acquired some 5,000 Mamluks during his rule of sixteen years. He once was a slave himself. When the emir Yalbugha al-ʿUmarī bought him in 1363, he had approximately twenty-two years and had been living in Qrim, as a slave, for several years [51, pp. 64, 69]. The Crimea and especially Kaffa remained the biggest slave market, comparable to Tabriz. And it was more advantageous to control the market places where the slaves were brought from everywhere, than their region of birth—the Desht-i Kipchak and the Caucasus where the Circassians came from.

In the first half of the 15th century, the Ottomans progressively controlled the Black Sea until they, finally, took control of the straits of the Bosphorus and Constantinople. Then, the connection between the Golden Horde and the Mamluks was cut for good.

**Concluding Remarks**

The long-term relationships between the Mamluk Sultanate and the Golden Horde had a strong impact not only on both empires but also on the whole inter-regional balance. The Horde and the sultanate were part of a bigger world – So, to understand what was at stake between them, we need to look at the broader context: the Mongol Empire; the Genoese; the Venetians; the papacy and the sultanates of the dār a-islām.

Regarding the diplomatic conventions, we can say that basic topoi were elaborated during the founding period of Berke and Baybars. The expressions and images used in further letters show how important this first alliance was. The secretaries from both chancellories based their rhetoric on the text of the letters recorded in the īnsāʾ literature, manuals and chronicles, and made frequent reference to the previous alliances. This first sequence set the terms for the birth of a diplomatic tradition and its language. Yet we should not forget that Mamluks and Jochids had concrete and contextual reasons to engage in exchange and that only when the economic and political motivations failed did the alliance lose its raison d’être.

Baybars and Berke, and their close entourages, were the instigators of a foreign policy that was continued and adapted by their successors. Jochids and Mamluks shared political and economic aims, they formalised and protected the exchanges on the basis of treaties and foregone itineraries, and they tried to coordinate their strategies to confront a changing political environment. They developed forms of communication between societies with different languages and traditions. They did believe that diplomacy could change things and used it as such.

There is no true alliance without tension. In this study, I tried to identify the reasons why the Mamluks and the Jochids, though officially allied, struggled at times. The Pax Mongolica was a period of tense economic competition. The evolution in the statuses of the merchants and of the ambassadors from Venice and Genoa is a significant consequence of such competition. Besides, notwithstanding their friendship, both the sultanate and the Golden Horde were empires in the stage of expansion with their own internal issues.

The Golden Horde and Its Neighbours


22. **Charmoy F.B.** Expédition de Timoûr-i-lênk contre Toqtamiche, Khân de l’Ouloûde de Djoûîchîy en 793 H., 1391 de J.C: textes arabes, persans et turcs / publiés et traduits avec des notes


§ 2. The Golden Horde and Anatolia

Inur Mirgaleyev

Anatolia and Desht-i Kipchak had maintained close cultural, religious and political ties since ancient times. The same was true of the Golden Horde period. The Jochids considered that Chinggis Khan had left all of the land west of Central Asia to the Ulus of Jochi in his will. Naturally, they considered Anatolia to be a part of this. While Batu and Möngke Khagan were joint rulers, it was in Batu's control. He established close ties with the Seljuqs. His brother Berke, one of the first Muslims in Chinggis Khan's family, married a Seljuq princess [13, p. 33].

It is worth noting that Crimea's ruler, Togluk-Timur, was an Ottoman-Seljuq, meaning he came from Anatolia. He was one of Öz Beg Khan's supporters and was active in the Islamisation of the Golden Horde. This is described in Qalandar-name: ‘The ruling amir had Seljuq roots’ [1, p. 361]. This shows that even the early Jochids attracted immigrants from Anatolia who had links with the Seljuq elite to assist with administrative work. They would later provide significant support to the khanate rulers Öz Beg and Jani Beg. This phenomenon was undoubtedly linked to the Jochids and Seljuqs creating family ties, as well as the policy of power centralisation in the Golden Horde and the spread of Islam. Information contained in the Qalandar-name clearly shows that immigrants from Anatolia were among the proselytizers of Islam. Representatives of Anatolia's Sufi Qalandar brotherhood were close to Öz Beg and Jani Beg. It is possible that their predecessors even served under Berke. Anatolian sheikhs were among the last Seljuq princes. Berke Khan rescued them from being held in captivity by the Byzantines [6, p. 52]. Scientists and religious figures moved to the Golden Horde from Anatolia. Part of the populations of newly-constructed Golden Horde cities was made up of immigrants from Anatolia. It has been established that, under Berke, Islamic missionaries from Anatolia became active in the Crimea and Black Sea areas including Dobruja, which covered modern-day Moldova and Romania [10, pp. 33–34].

Academic study of the extensive theological work Qalandar-name by Abu Bakr Qalandar Rumi Aksarayi has provided a new perspective on many aspects of religious life in the Golden Horde. A surprise revelation was the closeness of its ties with Anatolia [1; 12].

The Golden Horde established close relations with Seljuq beyliks, including the Ottoman beylik which was gradually gaining power. Ottoman historical works considered this ruling clan to be Tatars. These relations continued even after Hulagu included Anatolia in the creation of a new state, a move that the Jochids opposed. As we know, the Golden Horde was often in conflict with the Hulaguids. They remained in contact, therefore, despite the difficult military-political circumstances.

Ties which were established during the reign of Batu and Berke no doubt continued, but with the formation of an independent Ulus of Hulagu, they turned from being political to cultural-religious in nature.

‘The trace of Anatolia’ in the Golden Horde is vividly in evidence in its architecture, where the influence of the Seljuq school may be observed among the extant monuments of the Golden Horde period not only in Crimea, but also in the Middle Volga region and the Golden Horde town of Bolgar. Judging from them, construction in Golden Horde cities, especially those in the Right wing (the western part of the Ulus of Jochi), was strongly influenced by the Seljuq style. These influences could not have extended so far north without Anatolian craftsmen living there. Apart from architecture, the Anatolian influence is strongly seen in artistic metalworking and other art forms. M. Kramarovsky, a renowned archaeologist from the State
Hermitage Museum, has written dozens of works on this topic [7, 8, 9] which describe these influences in detail.

In the 13th century, the Jochids fostered close contacts at a high political level with the late Seljuqs. This provided an opportunity to attract skills from Anatolia, a region with rich traditions in architecture, governance and art, to improve Golden Horde cities. Later, in the 14th century, contacts in the field of religion came to the fore. This was especially the case during the Islamisation of the Golden Horde, when great numbers of scholars, preachers and theologians were required. Islamisation should also have increased Anatolian influence on religious architecture and the organisation of academia, as well as the regulation of Islamic tariqas and their relationship with the Golden Horde's ruling elite.

From the mid-14th century, there was political unrest in the Golden Horde and its sphere of influence decreased. Gradually, it began to grow weak. At the same time, the Ottomans, one of the beyliks of West Anatolia, increased their territory in Anatolia and the Balkans. They created a powerful state which soon began to resist the power of Ilkhan militarily and escaped their control. The Ottomans had their own ideology based on gazavat—a holy war against European states. In their turn, Europeans were guided by an ideology of ‘freeing’ Middle Eastern lands from Muslims. According to letters from Golden Horde Khans to Ottoman Empire sultans, the Tatar Khans treated the Ottomans with respect and maintained a good relationship with them [22, pp. 609–610]. The gazavat ideology, created by closely-linked Sufi circles, was undoubtedly the reason behind this. For instance, children of the Khan's confidants became students of Anatolian sheikhs. The Anatolian Qalandar sheikh, Abu Bakr, taught in Crimea [12]. This would explain the respect for the Ottoman gazavat ideology shown by the Golden Horde. From Khan Jani Beg onward, the Khan's offspring were brought up by atalyks-pirs who had links with Sufis.

There is no doubt that the Islamic elites in both regions had links: there were many migrants from Desht-i Kipchak among the Ottoman Gazi. At the end of the 14th century, when the Ottomans became a leading force in Anatolia, these states gained a common enemy in Emir Timur. The Golden Horde and the Ottomans decided to confront the common threat together [11, pp. 139; 20, pp. 51–57]. An anti-Timur coalition was created which included Tatar Khan Toktamysh, the Ottoman ruler Bayezid, Mamluk sultan Barquq, the Emir of Sivas Burkhan ad-Din Ahmed, the ruler of Kara-Koyunlu Kara Yusuf, the Jalâyirids, the rulers of Mardin and the Turkmen Emirate [11, pp. 128–129]. Negotiations regarding the alliance began in 1394. In order to prevent this union from being formed, Timur attacked the Golden Horde and defeated the Tatar army as Toktamysh had initiated the confrontation with him. Thanks to the destructive campaign of 1395–1396, the Tatars were sidelined from active foreign policy-making.

The defeats that Timur inflicted on Toktamysh in 1395 and Bayezid in 1402 were turning points for both states. Therefore in the period following these defeats, when both states faced internal problems, there were no ties between the Golden Horde and Anatolia. At the same time, according to Timur's court historian, Nizam ad-Din Shami, the Golden Horde troops led by Emir Aktau that retreated to the lower reaches of the Dnieper after being defeated by Timur [23, p. 196]. Thereafter, they first settled in Ottoman Empire territory in the lower reaches of the Danube, before being accommodated south of the Danube and in the Balkans. However, some time later, Sultan Bayezid changed his mind and made a deal with the Tatar emirs, agreeing to resettle people around Edirne [18]. Arabic authors also report that at the end of the 14th century Tatars moved to Anatolia, ‘to the Rûm people’ in huge numbers, which ‘can neither be counted, nor estimated’ [17, p. 470]. Townspeople would undoubtedly have been the first to abandon the troubled country.

Ulugh Muhammad, the last Khan of the unified Golden Horde, sent an ambassador with a message to Sultan Murad II in 1428 [4, pp. 6–7; 19, pp. 109–112]. The letter emphasised the
previous relationship between the Golden Horde and the Ottoman Empire. ‘Our former Khanbrothers and your fathers, the sultans of the vilayet Rûm and our elder brothers, exchanged ambassadors, gifts and greetings, traded using merchants-urtaqs and maintained good relations. Then our brother-Khan, Khan Toktamysh, and your grandfather, Gazi Bayezid Beg, according to the fine old custom, exchanged ambassadors, gifts, greetings and, living in friendship and accord, were honoured with God's mercy’.

The Golden Horde maintained trading relationships with the Middle East, Egypt and Mediterranean countries via the Genoese and Venetians. This trade was carried out through straits which passed into Ottoman possession in the 15th century, blocking the route for Italians. The khans tried to find a solution to this problem, but political instability made it hard to develop a suitable strategy. Meanwhile, the Ottomans made further advances and conquered the Balkans. This destroyed the trading relations between the Golden Horde and Italians once and for all, which exacerbated the economic crisis. This was the reason why the Hungarian king's suggestion that Khan Jalal ad-Din form an anti-Ottoman alliance with the Byzantines was accepted [13, p. 91]. Had the Golden Horde's Time of Troubles been at an end, the Tatar Khans would undoubtedly have had a clearer position in Eastern European policy-making and their interests would always have been taken into consideration.

Golden Horde khans continued to communicate with Ottoman sultans even after the reign of Ulugh Muhammad. We know that two such letters were written to the famous sultan, Mehemed Fatih. One is Khan Mahmud's letter dated 1466 [19, pp. 37–45]; the other, Khan Ahmed's letter of 1477 [19, pp. 46–53].

We know from Mahmud Khan's letter that the Golden Horde wanted diplomatic and trade relations with the Ottoman Empire to continue: ‘ambassador-envoys of previous khans—our ancestors—and ambassadors-envoys from Your best people of the past would come to each other, exchange gifts and greetings, inquire after one another's well-being and health; they succeeded in attaining the mercy of almighty God through their friendship and brotherly relationships. Thanks to the grace of Allah, when the great place of the former khans—our ancestors—was graciously given to us and at a time when we, according to the custom of our best people of the past, decided to exchange ambassadors, messengers and merchant caravans, and would inquire after each other's well-being and health, many important events have happened; thus, our people could not come [to You] for this reason. Now, by the grace of the one and only almighty God, if from this day on, increasing the friendship of our fine, old people, good relations between us increase, strengthening the friendship between us in the future, our kind people will visit each other, the distant [Emperor] will hear [it], while the close will see [it]’ [19, p. 42; 26, p. 140].

Khan Ahmed's letter noted that the Golden Horde was an unconditional ally of the Ottoman Empire: ‘Karaj Bahatur, the ambassador that you sent, has arrived. He told us that you are in good health and prospering. He brought us information about the cities [you] conquered. On hearing the news, we were extremely, eternally happy. Praise be to almighty God for the peaceful resolution of affairs. Brotherly relationships between you and us were revealed on the way of love. From this day on, forever more, let there be no lack [of friendship and love], so let our ambassador-envoys visit each other exchanging precious greetings and small gifts. To foster our friendship and brotherhood day after day, I have sent my son, whose name is Aziz Khodja, as an ambassador to you. I am one son (descendant) of Chinggis Khan, Aziz Khodja is another son (descendant). Henceforth, with God's mercy, may the friendship [established] between you and us multiply, so that, if almighty God is willing, let the name of this [friendship] remain on the lips of friends [and] enemies in further times. Then, in whatever direction You go or advance militarily, we shall take the same side in order to strengthen you’ [19, pp. 52–53; 21, pp. 247–250; 26, pp. 141–142].
The situation is more clearly understandable if we consider that this letter was written during the last days of the Golden Horde, while the Ottomans had conquered the Crimean Peninsula and lands around the Azov Sea. In the summer of 1454, the Ottoman fleet under the command of Demir-Kahya made a raid along the shore of the Black Sea and met Hacı Giray, who supported the Ottomans. Hacı Giray entered into an agreement with them, according to which the Sultan received the Tatars' help during the conquest of Kaffa and other Genoese fortresses, while the Tatars took ownership of Kaffa and the entire coast of Taurida.

Tatar-Ottoman embassy activity in the second half of the 1470s shows that cultural relations between Anatolia and Desht-i Kipchak were at a high level. Now, at a time of great political change, the Golden Horde khans, still influential in Eastern Europe, were trying to create a strategic relationship with the Ottomans. It is impossible not to notice that the attitude of the Tatar Khans to the Ottoman Sultans was more than favourable. However, there was a need to protect the Golden Horde's interests. This was especially the case with regard to the changing situation in the Balkans where the Tatar-inhabited area of Dobruja would be at the forefront of the Ottoman Empire's attentions. The stabilisation of trade in the Black Sea region also required some care. However, political stability was not possible in the last days of the Golden Horde: Khan Ahmed was killed [14, p. 202; 15, p. 346; 16, p. 95]. With the support of Lithuanian princes and Poland, Crimea became an independent yurt with a claim to Takht Eli [throne place], but it soon fell under the strong political influence of the Ottoman Empire. This also shows that the population of the late Golden Horde was strongly influenced by the Ottoman gazavat ideology, which could have led to a closer alliance between these powers.

The Golden Horde broke up into several Tatar Khanates [for more details see: 5], with which the Ottomans communicated from time to time. The Crimean Khanate recognised the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire and followed in the wake of Ottoman policies. As a result, Tatar Khanates could only communicate with the Ottomans through the rulers of Crimea, the Girays.

Часть VI. Золотая Орда и ее соседи


11. Миргалиев И. Политическая история Золотой Орды периода правления Тохтамыша (Политическая история Золотой Орды периода правления Тохтамыша) // Золотоординская цивилизация. Вып. 3. Казань, 2010. С. 31–35.

12. Миргалиев И. Сочинение 'Каландар-я' Абу Бакр Каландара как источник по истории Золотой Орды (Сочинение 'Каландар-я' Абу Бакр Каландара как источник по истории Золотой Орды) // Золотоординская цивилизация. Вып. 9. Казань, 2016.

13. Миргалиев И., Камалов И. К вопросу об источниках по истории Золотой Орды (К вопросу об источниках по истории Золотой Орды) // Золотоординская цивилизация. Вып. 9. Казань, 2016.


17. Тишенхаузен В. Сборник материалов, относящихся к истории Золотой Орды (Сборник материалов, относящихся к истории Золотой Орды) // Сборник материалов, относящихся к истории Золотой Орды. Вып. 1. Казань: Институт истории им. Ш. Марджани АН РТ, 2008. С. 87–94.

18. Девей А. 'Естablishment de Aktav de la Horde d'Or dans l'Empire Ottoman, au temps de Yıldırım Bayezid', 60. Doğum Yılı Münasebetiyle Z.V. Toğan'a Armağan, İstanbul 1950, s. 77–92.

19. Курат А.Н. Topkapı Sarayı Müzeyi Arşivindeki Altın Ordu, Kırım ve Türkistan Hanlarına Ait Yarlık ve Bitikler (Курат А.Н. Topkapı Sarayı Музей Архиве Золотой Орды, Крыма и Туркестана Ханами Активов и Витиков) // Карсийские исследования. Вып. 1. Стамбул: Буранеддин Матбааси, 1940.


§ 3. The Golden Horde and the Yuan Dynasty

Zhào Zhū Chén

There is not much information available about the international communications between the Golden Horde and the Yuan dynasty, although they undoubtedly play a significant role in the history of the Golden Horde. This is due to the following factors.

Firstly, khans of the Ulus of Jochi were located far northwest of Khanbaliq, the capital of the Yuan Empire that was founded by great Khan Kublai. Sarai and Khanbaliq were 5,000 km apart, which hindered traffic between them despite the fact that the Mongol Empire had the well-known yam transportation system.

Secondly, as we know, during the reign of Chinggis Khan, internecine feuds started between his offspring (the houses of Jochids and Chagataids) who wanted to inherit the Great Khan's throne. 1260 was marked by constant military conflicts between Arik Buka and Kublai, which led to a civil war between Mongol Khanates. As a result of this war, the Ulus of Jochi de facto became a state independent from the Empire.

Thirdly, in 1269 representatives of the Ulus of Jochi, Ulus of Chagatai and the Ulus of Ögedei gathered at a quriltai on the banks of the Tallas River and concluded an agreement about delimiting the territories of the three states up to the Amu Darya. Long-lasting military conflicts and political unrest interrupted communication between Sarai and Khanbaliq.

Fourthly, both the Ulus of Jochi and Yuan dynasty pursued their own foreign policies. The Yuan dynasty maintained relations with South China, Southeast Asia, Korea and Japan, while the Ulus of Jochi had ties with Europe and the Middle East.

The relations between the Yuan dynasty and Golden Horde rulers have not yet been sufficiently studied. Neither Western European nor Islamic sources provide enough information on these interrelations. They mostly speak of the connections between the Golden Horde and Byzantium, Lithuania, the Mamluk state and other countries. Therefore we turn to the original Chinese sources to demonstrate relations between the Golden Horde and Yuan.

One of the important and fundamental sources for Mongolian history is ‘Yuanshi’ (The History of the Yuan Dynasty). This written record contains some materials (though fragmentary) on this topic. Yuanshi contains 210 chapters and consists of four large parts:

- The first part is Benji (Imperial biographies);
- The second is Zhi (Descriptions);
- The third is Biao (Chronological tables);
- The fourth is Liezhuan (Biographies).

Based on an analysis of these parts, we have compiled a table of relations between the Yuan and Golden Horde rulers.

Here, our task is to reconstruct the main aspects of diplomatic relations between the Golden Horde and rulers of the Yuan Empire according to information from this Chinese source. The basic data are presented in Table 1 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The imperial biographies–Ögedei (Taizong Benzi)</td>
<td>1235</td>
<td>Ordered to start a campaign against the West under the command of Batu</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The imperial biographies–Ögedei (Taizong Benzi)</td>
<td>1236</td>
<td>Honoured Batu with a feudal manor in Pinyanfu</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter VI. The Golden Horde and Its Neighbours</td>
<td>353</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### The imperial biographies—Möngke (Xiǎnzǔn Benzi)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1251</td>
<td>Batu, Berke, Tuqay Timur supported Möngke's candidacy for the Great Khan's throne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1252</td>
<td>At Möngke's order, Berke was resettled to the territory of Qiú erzi. Qiú erzi is Georgia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1253</td>
<td>1. Berke was appointed as a secretary (<em>bichichi</em>, <em>bitikchi</em>) and sent to Rus' to carry out a population census. 2. Batu sent an ambassador to Möngke asking for jewels. 1. Here Berke is not the ruler of the Ulus of Jochi, but his namesake, a Karakorum official. 2. Möngke Khan granted Batu 1,000 ingots of silver as an annual award of the Emperor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### The imperial biographies—Khayishan/Külüg Khan (Uzong)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1308</td>
<td>The Emperor sent a delegation, led by Yuelu, to Toqta</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### The imperial biographies—Ayurbarwada/Buyantu Khagan (Renzong)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1314</td>
<td>After Toqta's death, the Emperor appointed Öz Beg as the Khan of the Ulus of Jochi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### The imperial biographies—Yesün Temür (Taidingdi)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1324</td>
<td>Oz Beg sent Ambassador Kerei to the Emperor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1326</td>
<td>1. Ambassador Huan-Chi was sent to Öz Beg 2. Öz Beg presented a colourful panther to the Emperor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1353</td>
<td>Jani Beg presented the Emperor with sabres, bows and chain armours from Tashkent (Chach) and Egypt (Maṣr), as well as two dark-brown and two white horses. For this, the Emperor honoured Jani Beg with bank notes amounting to 20 thousand</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Chapters on administrative geography (Dilizhi)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administrative division of Öz Beg's territory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Economic description (Shihuozhi)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jochi's offspring were granted a yearly award from feudal manors in Pingyangfù, Jingzhōu and Yeongjo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Genealogical tables of imperial families (Dezong shi shi xi Biao)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jochi's descendants</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


| Genealogical tables of princes (Zongwang Biao) | 1. In 1308 Toqta was honoured with the title of Prince of Ninsu. 2. In 1329 Kuan-Chieh was honoured with the title of Prince of Su |
| Jochi's biography (Jochi liezhuan) | The Jochids' genealogy: Jochi – Batu (Jochi's son), – Sartaq (Batu's younger brother) – Mengü Temür (Sartaq's younger brother) – Toqta (Mengü Temür's younger brother) – Berke (Toqta's younger brother) – Öz Beg (Berke's younger brother) – Jani Beg (Öz Beg's son) |
| Subitai's biography (Subutai liezhuan) | In 1251 after Ögedei's death, Subutai persuaded Batu to take part in the meeting to elect the Great Khan |
| Telen's biography (Telen liezhuan) | A Turkic-speaking people. Over 14 years, this naiman visited the Ulus of Jochi four times as an ambassador of Emperor Kublai |

Let us analyse the materials presented in the Chinese source and comment on the political-economic and military relations between the two states. Regarding political-economic relations, firstly, the Ulus of Jochi included Kirghizia, Khwarezm, Alania, Jand, Kipchak land, Bulgaria and Rus'. The information about Golden Horde territory generally coincides with non-Chinese sources.

Secondly, the development of diplomatic relations between the Golden Horde and the Yuan dynasty was completely dependent upon the political situation and position of Chinggisid houses. Military conflicts between Arik Buka and Kublai led to a civil war between the houses of Jochi, Chagatai, Ögedei and Tolui that started in the beginning of Kublai's reign

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29 It is noteworthy that Jochi's biography (Jochi liezhuan) contains significant mistakes in the dynasty's genealogy. In our opinion, these mistakes are a result of both unstable political contacts and the fact that Yuanshi was written relatively late. According to our observations, some West European sources contain similar genealogical mistakes.

30 In Chinese: 吉利吉思. Chinese sources state that since the 8th century before the Mongolian epoch, Kirghizia had been located in the area of present-day Khakassia and the Altai Republic. Here, ‘Kirghizia’ means the utmost eastern territories of the Golden Horde.
(1260) and lasted till the end of Temur's rule (Öljaitü Khagan, Kublai's grandson) (1307). As a result, relations were broken off between Tolui's and Jochi's offspring. Relations between the Golden Horde and Yuan dynasty were restored only during Temur's reign.

As we know, after Jani Beg and Toghon Temur (Ukhaghatu Khan), diplomatic relations were suspended because of the unfavourable political environment. The Golden Horde gradually entered into a political crisis after Jani Beg, while in 1368, the Ming dynasty overthrew the Yuan.

Thirdly, let us note the political status of the Yuan Empire and the Golden Horde. It is known that both states developed historically along separate paths. Therefore, they did not have common political interests, because the Golden Horde was politically independent from the Great Khan in Khanbaliq. The exchange of ambassadors between the Golden Horde and Yuan is reflected in the source, which shows the attitude of the Yuan Emperor towards rulers of the Golden Horde. For example: ‘after Toqta’s death, the Emperor appointed (Chinese ming) Öz Beg as the Khan of the Ulus of Jochi’; ‘ Öz Beg presented (Chinese xiàn or gun) a colourful panther to the Emperor’; ‘the Emperor honoured (Chinese qì) Jani Beg with bank notes amounting to 20,000’, etc.

The truth is that great khans of Yuan always viewed rulers of the Golden Horde as their governors (vassals). The Genealogical Tables of Princes (Zongwang Biao) calls rulers of the Golden Horde xibei gongjue (northwest princes). Therefore, they had their hubi—that is, appanages or feudal manors, on Chinese territory. Indeed, each member of Chinggis Khan’s clan had a right to demand a hubi for himself in newly-conquered lands. According to the Chinese source, appanages of Chinggisids from other uluses existed in China until the fall of the Yuan dynasty in 1368.

Moreover, the awards and gifts of various kinds that existed when the two states maintained contacts were of economic significance in the history of the Golden Horde and the Yuan Empire. The exchange of imperial jewelry and products of the country of ‘vassals’ was of political and economic importance for both parties. This exchange of gifts confirmed the political status both in the centre and in provinces. Trade, as an economic activity, also helped to maintain bilateral economic relations and strengthen political relations.

It is known that the Yuan Empire had special forces among which the Ases and Kipchaks particularly distinguished themselves. They made up a significant part of the forces—both among commanders and ordinary fighters.

It is interesting that there were also Russian warriors in China, who constituted a whole tumen—that is, a corps of 10,000 people. It is hard to say on what conditions and along which routes these immigrants from Russian lands arrived in China. But they doubtlessly were sent to the Far East from the Ulus of Jochi during the most powerful period of this state, the reign of Öz Beg Khan.


3. 新校本元史并附編二種三 / (明)宋濂等撰；楊家駱主編.台北:鼎文書局 San. Ming ['Yu-an’ shi’ novogo ispravlennogo izdaniya s dopolneniyami. 2 varianta. Tom III (‘Yuanshi’ of
§ 4. Between Steppe Khanates: Relations Between the Chagataids and the Golden Horde (1260–1370)³¹

Michal Biran

Relations between the Mongol steppe khanates are less documented than the relations between Ilkhanate and Yuan China, and their cultural interchanges are far less impressive. Nevertheless, the relations between the Chagataids and the Golden Horde included a whole range of political, economic and cultural contacts. These contacts will be briefly examined in this article, which is mostly limited to the period of unity of the Chagataid Khanate, before Tamerlane's ascension and the Golden Horde's zenith, and before the Time of Troubles of the 1360s.

Political relations

The tension between Jochi, Chinggis Khan's eldest son, and Chagatai, the next in seniority and the first of his sons whose paternal origins were not questioned, was evident during the life of Chinggis Khan and, quite possibly, cost Chagatai the Great Khan throne. During the period of the empire's unity (1206–1260), the Jochids enlarged their territory and strengthened their power, while the Chagataids partially lost both. This was partly because the possessions of the Chagataids in Central Asia, stretching from the land of the Uighurs (present-day Xinjiang) to the Amu Darya (present-day western border of Uzbekistan) were among the first regions conquered by the Chinggisids, and their resources—both human and material—were used by the constantly growing empire, often to the detriment of local needs. In contrast, the Jochid territory, which stretched from the Irtysh River 'as far to the west as the hoof of the Tatar horse trod' [10, I, p. 31, (trans.) 42], was significantly expanded during Ögedei's rule, and its extreme remoteness in the west gave it broader autonomy.

The Chagataid-Jochid opposition was inherited by the next generation, because Batu, Jochi's son, had a conflict with Buri, Chagatai's son, and Güyük, Ögedei's son, during the Great Western campaign (1236–1242). Later on, Batu was the key figure in the enthronement

³¹ The present study was carried out with the support of the Israel Science Foundation (grant 602/12) with the use of a database compiled with funding from the European Research Council under the seventh Framework programme (FP/2007-2013) / Agreement of the European Research Council on the provision of grant No. 312397. -
Chapter VI. The Golden Horde and Its Neighbours

of Toluid Möngke as the Great Khan and at the expense of the Ögedeids. After Möngke came to power (approximately 1251–1259), there was a purge among the Ögedeids and allied Chagataids. Many princes and officials were prosecuted, exiled and even killed; some of them (Buri, for example) were even executed right at Batu's court. The Jochids took advantage of the Chagataids' weakness and expanded their presence in Transoxiana. At the same time, Möngke transferred some Far Eastern territories, for instance, Kayalyk and the Irtysk basin (in Kazakhstan), to the younger Ögedeids who had supported him [1, pp. 18–63; 5, pp. 46–49].

The struggle of the Toluids for the succession of power after Möngke's death and the subsequent fall of the empire gave rise to a new political order. During the first decades after the empire's fall (in the 1260–1280s), the Golden Horde played a significant role in Central Asian politics, providing support to Kaidu (app. 1271–1301), an Ögedeid prince who was at first a rival of the Chagataids and later their ally and suzerain.

Chagataid Khan Alghu (app. 1260–1266) skillfully took advantage of the struggle for succession of power in Mongolia and the Golden Horde's preoccupation with the conflict with Hulagu in Azerbaijan in order to regain territories of his ulus that had been annexed by the Jochids, as well as expand his possessions in former Ögedeid lands. Under these conditions, the Golden Horde agreed to support Kaidu, who was trying to restore Ögedeid possessions, and issued a challenge to both Alghu and Great Khan Kublai (app. 1260–1294). Khans of the Golden Horde Berke (app. 1257–1267) and Mengü Temür (app. 1267–1280) provided Kaidu with military aid in the decisive moments of his struggle for power and helped him defeat Alghu and his heir Barak (app. 1266–1271). The Golden Horde played an important role during the quriltai in Talas in 1269 at which the relationships between the Central Asian Chinggisids were regulated.

Despite the fact that the rights of Mengü Temür in Transoxiana set out in Talas were not observed, Kaidu and Mengü Temür maintained generally good relations. The latter even suggested Mamluk Sultan Baybars (app. 1260–1277) establish diplomatic relations with Kaidu because of their common enemy—the Ilkhanate. These contacts had been established at the latest by the 1280s. Moreover, the supremacy of the Golden Horde over Kaidu during this period was acknowledged by other Chinggisid branches. When Toluid princes sent by Kublai to fight Kaidu rebelled in 1266/67, they sent the head of the army—the son of Kublai Nomugan—to Mengü Temür and the leading general of Nomugan, Antong, to Kaidu. They weren't sent back to China until 1284 [2, pp. 19–37; 7].

The Golden Horde decreased its participation in Central Asian events in the 1280s both due to internal conflicts within the Golden Horde provoked by the challenge Prince Nogai (died in 1299) posed to the ruling khans and because Kaidu successfully established domination over the Chagataids after the enthronement of Duva (app. 1282–1307), Barak's son, as the Chagataid khan, who remained a loyal ally of Kaidu up till the latter's death.

The Golden Horde began to once again actively engage in Central Asia at the very end of the 13th century, after the Golden Horde Khan Toqta (app. 1291–1312), who had improved relations with the Yuan China, managed to defeat Nogai in 1299. At that time, Toqta and the Central Asian Chinggisids supported rival candidates for the Blue Horde throne. These candidates were descendants of the firstborn son of Jochi, Orda Ichen, who had previously been subordinate to the Golden Horde and ruled in its south-eastern possessions that bordered the Chagataid state. Bayan, Toqta's protege, suggested forming a coalition against the Central Asian Mongols that would unite the Yuan, Ilkhanate, Golden Horde and some local rulers. Although this coalition was not created, this threat forced Kaidu and Duva to deploy their garrisons along all their borders, which limited their military capabilities.

The renewal of this threat in 1302/03, after Kaidu's death, was one of the factors that pushed Duva to subdue Yuan and contributed to the conclusion of the pan-Mongol peace in 1304. Although this peace did not stop internal Central Asian conflicts (they ended only in the beginning of the 1320s), after the peace agreement was reached, the Jochid state turned
its attention to Eastern Europe and Azerbaijan, limiting its participation in Central Asian politics. The Golden Horde became a refuge for several Ögedeid runaways when the Chagataids turned against their former Ögedeid allies after the peace agreement was reached. Chagataid Khan Yesen Buka (app. 1310–1319) was still involved in political events in the Blue Horde. Later, fearing the Yuan-Ilkhanate coalition, he attempted to make a pact with the new Golden Horde Khan, Öz Beg (app. 1313–1341), but the latter preferred to side with the Great Khan.

In 1322, Öz Beg joined Yesen Buka's successor, Kebek (app. 1319–1327), in order to invade Ilkhanate's Khorasan and later he approved of the Islamisation of Chagataid Khan Tarma Shirin (app. 1331–1334). Nevertheless, when the Chagataid Khanate fell into chaos after Tarma Shirin's rule, the Golden Horde, which at that time was at its zenith during the reigns of Öz Beg and his heir Janu Beg (app. 1342–1357), was tempted to invade Central Asia in hopes of returning several territories. This, however, did not result in stable acquisitions [5, pp. 54–59].

Immediately after this, the Golden Horde experienced a period of anarchy known as the 'Great Troubles' (1359–1380). That time, the Chagataid Khanate was divided into two parts: the Chagataid Khan continued to rule over the eastern territories of his ulus, while Transoxiana was conquered by Tamerlane (app. 1370–1405), the former Chagataid general. Escaping from upheavals in the Jochid Ulus, Toktamysh (active 1375–1405)—the prince from the Blue Horde and Tuqay Timur's heir—found refuge at Tamerlane's court. With his help, Toktamysh restored Jochid rule in the former Golden Horde state, which, as a result, turned into a threat for his former patron. As a consequence of this, Tamerlane invaded the Golden Horde in 1391 and 1395. His last invasion, during which he burnt cities of the Golden Horde, including its capital of Sarai, struck a decisive blow against the Jochid state. At the end of the day, nomadic groups who split off from the Golden Horde and were later known as the Uzbeks and Kazakhs moved southwards and gradually won Central Asia both from the Timurids (app. 1370–1501), and the eastern Chagataids (app. 1347–1678) [8, pp. 76–85, 182–237].

**Economic ties**

The two khanates were economically tied via diplomatic presents and through the presence of their appanages on each other's territories. The Chagataids had received income from Kyat and Khiva since Chinggis Khan's times up to the time of Tamerlane, while the Jochids enjoyed certain privileges in Transoxiana [2. p. 178]. For the most part, however, these relations were manifested through trade.

Thanks to their central location, the Chagataids connected the Golden Horde with Yuan China, with which the Golden Horde also had a common border, as well as with the Delhi Sultanate. At the same time, the constant wars in Central Asia in the second half of the 13th century led to a decrease in East-West continental trade, increasing the significance of the North-South trade with India. The political orientation of Central Asian Mongols also meant that the Chagataid traded with the Mamluks or Europe through the Golden Horde. Central Asian goods, primarily slaves, were transported overland to the Golden Horde and from there by sea through Byzantium into Egypt or westward [6; 7].

When peace was established in Central Asia at the beginning of the 1320s, the volume of East-West continental trade significantly increased, thus intensifying the connections between the two khanates (and also between Europe and China). By this time, however, the Chagataids could rival the Golden Horde in the trade of eastern and northern goods and trade with Iran and Egypt along overland routes without Jochid intermediaries. The fall of Ilkhanate in 1335 increased the significance of the northern route in the eastern direction—from Sarai to Urgench and Otrar—which went around Transoxiana and went only through eastern possessions of the Chagataids, in particular Olmaliq. Internal political upheavals among the Chagataids, especially beginning from the 1340s, again took a toll on continental Asian trade. In-
deed, one of the reasons Tamerlane attacked the Volga region cities was his aspiration to change the direction of trade routes, again directing them towards Transoxiana to the detriment of the Golden Horde's economy [6].

**Scientific relations**

The close scientific connections in the pre-Mongol period between Transoxiana and Khwarezm were maintained in the epoch of Chinggisid rule, despite the devastation caused by the Mongols in these lands. Already by the 1240s, if not earlier, Bukhara had once again become an Islamic scientific centre that attracted scientists and sufis from the Golden Horde state (for example, Hasan Bulgari). Indeed, it was Bukhara sheikh Saif ad-Din al-Baharzi (died in 1261) who converted Golden Horde Khan Berke to Islam, making Khan Berke the first Islamic Mongolian prince. At the same time, upheavals in Bukhara by Ilkhan Abaqa in 1273, caused many to emigrate from the Chagataid state. Although few people chose to settle in the Golden Horde at that time, later waves of immigration helped to move a significant number of Transoxianian scientists to the Golden Horde, mostly after Öz Beg Khan adopted Islam. Khwarezm became a large scientific centre, many schools of which had Transoxianian teachers. Wandering Sufis also linked the two states, as did European travellers and missionaries, although we do not have any detailed information about cultural contacts outside the field of Islam. During the reigns of Tamerlane and his heirs, whose achievements were later inherited by the Uzbek, the scientific centre moved back again to Transoxiana [7; 9, pp. 58–94].

**In conclusion:** the Golden Horde and Chagataid Khanate were not close friends, but their conflicts with Toluid neighbours were often worse than their relations with each other, thus making them allies of sorts. During this period, the Golden Horde had a noticeable impact on the Ulus of Chagatai via support provided to Kaidu, thanks to which he became the suzerain of the Chagataids. Nevertheless, the fates of both uluses continued to be tightly intertwined over the following centuries, long after their Toluid enemies had ceased to exist. The Golden Horde and the Chagataids cooperated and competed in the spheres of trade and Islamic scholarship, maintaining a certain level of cosmopolitanism. However, they never managed to achieve the brilliance of their Toluid neighbours.

§ 5. Relations with the Ilkhan

**Il'nr Mirgaleyev**

The state of the Hulaguids, arising from the conquests in the Middle East by Chinggis Khan's descendants, was formed as a result of the feud between the Chinggisids. These territories were not originally conquered by Chinggis Khan himself, and so it is still not fully determined whether they belonged to the Chinggisid families or not. Following the events connected with the feud between Jochi's descendants and the houses of Chagatai and Ögedei—ending in the total defeat of the latter—the descendants of Chinggis Khan's younger son, Tolu, took over the Mongol Empire with the help of the Jochids. Batu had declined the all-Mongol throne [that of the Great Khan] [9, p. 16] and instead became the co-ruler of the Mongol Empire [10, p. 77]. The territories west of Mongolia were deemed to be his according to Chinggis Khan's will [8, p. 244]. It was also known that Chinggis Khan's youngest son Tolu (and his descendants) were to control only the original lands of the Mongols [9, p. 80].

Eventually, as the Mongol Empire began to collapse following the death of Möngke Khan, his [Möngke Khan's] brothers, Kublai and Hulagu—both active army leaders—decided to strengthen their respective positions on the newly conquered territories and create their own states. The interests of the other Chinggisid houses and central authority were not considered during this state of affairs. This entire situation and feud led to future conflicts between the different Chinggisid houses.

A perfect example of this is the relationship between the Golden Horde and the Hulaguid state [the Ilkhanate]. The whole web of reasons for these complicated relations stems primarily from both unregulated territorial claims and violations of Jochid interests during the organisation of the new Chinggisid state, the Ilkhanate.

Hulagu had to act carefully, taking into consideration the interests of Karakorum authorities, Kublai, and the Jochids. As a result, he remained a military leader for practically the rest of his life. Later on, when the Empire had already collapsed, Hulagu remained on the conquered lands and started to rule on behalf of Kublai. This is why the Hulaguids named themselves the Ilkhang—that is, merely the 'Khans of el'. And thus their claim to the throne was lower than that of the Jochids and all the other Chinggisids. The descendants of Kublai, the Khagans [Great Khans] of the Yuan Empire, were considered to be the supreme rulers of the Hulaguids. But although the Hulaguids' suzerainty became more and more apparent with their conversion to Islam and adoption of the title sultan, and China was so far away, they nevertheless remained 'the Khans of el' in the Chinggisid world up until the very end of the state's existence.

As is well known, the all-Mongol quriltai of 1251 called for completing the conquest of the Baghdad Caliphate. For the campaign it was decided to collect soldiers from all uluses, two soldiers out of every ten men [9, p. 67]. The younger brother of Möngke Khan, Hulagu, was designated to lead the troops. However, it was only in 1256, after Batu's death, that the army could begin as Batu, being a co-ruler of the Mongol Empire, forbade the launching of the campaign due to harsh objections from the Jochids against conquering the Caliphate [8, p. 246]. But by all appearances the co-rulers did end up discussing the future of the soon-to-be
conquered territories, and so the campaign was only delayed until this issue had been resolved.

P. Jackson concludes, based on an October 1312 dated letter from Öz Beg Khan to Ilkhan Öljeitü, that the subject of negotiations between Möngke and Batu was the future of these territories. In this letter the Golden Horde ruler, referring to a yarliq by Möngke Khan, demands he be granted the Transcaucasian territories [12, p. 208]. Undoubtedly, Batu based his claims for those lands on Chinggis Khan's will. So it is quite possible that the two sides had already come to an agreement.

The political influence of the Jochids in Iran, Transcaucasia, and Anatolia was already well acknowledged in Karakorum, as it was believed that the whole west belonged to the Jochids. Yet vassalage of the states of Transcaucasia to the Mongol Empire certainly had not yet been fully determined. The region, although already having been divided into uluses, was still more or less a united entity. And in fact, there were only two variants for its control: either by the centralised government in Karakorum or the Ulus of Jochi. Moreover, Batu, as a co-ruler of the Empire, had ruled over the western lands and had already granted Letters patent and yarliqs to Sultans of Rûm, Syria, and other countries of Asia Minor [9, p. 22]. And Georgian rulers became dependents as well in the 1240s. But now these territories entered the composition of the Hulaguid state, something the Jochids saw as a clear violation of their rights. Moreover, the Jochids had their own plans for their ally, the Baghdad Caliphate. However, the issue of finding a new ruler for the Ulus of Jochi after Batu's death was not resolved quickly. The Khagan [Möngke Khan] and his circle at this time delayed the ascension of Berke to the throne of the Golden Horde for more than two years since Berke was against the liquidation of the Caliphate [12, p. 224]. Möngke Khan instead tried to confirm to the Jochid throne Batu's son, Sartaq, who in the autumn of 1256 as per his agreement with Möngke Khan had sent Golden Horde troops to help Hulagu [4, pp. 53–54].

And while Berke had still not yet been confirmed as the ruler in the Ulus of Jochi, Hulagu began his conquest of the Baghdad Caliphate. It would seem the Jochids could not dictate their own conditions at this time. In 1258 Mongol troops took Baghdad and executed the Caliph [8, p. 205; 9, p. 74], an ally of the Jochids.

The territory of Persia was then approved to become the third imperial province and a subject of Karakorum's centralised authority [2, p. 172]. After Möngke Khan's death in 1259, Kublai and Hulagu remained in their conquered territories as the head of their respective troops. The descendants of Hulagu ruled over Iran up until 1335. After the death of Ilkhan Abu Saïd, the dynastic line of Hulagu ended. Following Saïd the title of Khan was merely nominal and often these Khans were representatives of other Chinggisid lines. And in the early 1350s the history of this state ended in complete disintegration. By this time the state had split and the Jalâyirids, Muzaffarids, Sarbedars, among others, managed to form their own separate states.

In this rather short period of time—a little less than 70 years for its entire existence—the Hulaguid state's relationship with the Golden Horde was almost always tense. If we are to analyse their conflict, then one aspect stands out: the Jochids were almost always the initiators of conflicts. Later on, when Jani Beg Khan took control of the Transcaucasian territories, the Hulaguid state had already ceased to exist.

Undoubtedly, following a series of unsuccessful wars both sides exchanged ambassadors and restored the status quo. However, their relationship never amounted to anything substantial. It was precisely due to this conflict that the Golden Horde was drawn to the Islamic world more and more, eventually turning into an Islamic state. The main ally of the Golden Horde in their fight against the Hulaguids became Mamluk Egypt. This then fundamentally influenced the geopolitical leanings of the post-imperial Golden Horde.
The qurultai of 1251 had merely designated the complete conquest of the Caliphate territories and did not set out a plan for the creation of a state. Prior to the formation of the Hulaguid state, the Jochids fully controlled the trading routes of the Transcaucasia as well as the eastern part of Asia Minor. Moreover, the goods imported by merchants from the Ulus of Jochi were not subject to taxes [7, p. 73]. When Berke finally became the ruler of the Golden Horde there were many issues that demanded review. The Jochids were supposed to present a rather large list of demands to new rulers in the lands of the former Caliphate based on Batu's agreement with Möngke Khan.

‘From every Persian country that was under Mugal jurisdiction, he [Batu] received the established appropriations and his agents were designated to those positions that were presented to Batu’ [13, p. 519]. However, following Batu's death the payments stopped. But Berke began to demand this income again as soon as he ascended the throne [2, p. 176]. The level of tension was so serious that the sides could not come to an agreement and eventually they proceeded to engage in open conflict. The creation of the new ulus [Golden Horde] was legitimised to some extent only at the qurultai of 1269.

As is well known, following the death of Möngke Khan in 1259 Arik Buka was chosen by a qurultai as the new Khagan. However, his brother Kublai expressed his defiance and proclaimed himself to be the new Khagan. This conflict then influenced the course of the relationship between Berke and Hulagu since Hulagu supported Kublai while Berke supported Arik Buka's claim [8, p. 188]; and at the beginning of 1261 Berke withdrew his auxiliary troops from Hulagu's army. Thus, the Jochids lost their hope for a peaceful resolution to their claims.

Grateful for Hulagu's support, Kublai in 1263 granted him a yarliq on the lands from the Amu Darya River up to Syria and Egypt [9, p. 75], thereby acknowledging the new state in a one-sided manner. This situation was clearly aimed against the Ulus of Jochi. The Mongol Empire was collapsing. References to the ‘will of Chinggis Khan’ or the agreement between Batu and Möngke no longer worked. The political and economic interests of the Golden Horde in these areas were no longer being considered. And thus, when Hulagu proclaimed himself the ruler in 1263, the Jochids did not recognize his claim and began a war against him. The first battle between Berke and Hulagu then took place at the Kura River. The Golden Horde army was defeated initially and forced to quickly retreat back to their territory. They then gathered a larger army and managed to stop the counterattack of the Hulaguids in a bloody battle at the Terek River.

Following the defeat Hulagu ordered the destruction of all Golden Horde merchants in Iran. This order was completed with the approval of Kublai. Kublai, for his part, also executed the Golden Horde merchants in Central Asia [6, p. 207] so as to prevent the Golden Horde from trading with, among others, the South Caucasus and Iran, and thereby destroy the relations established during Batu's reign between the Jochids and their allies—the South Caucasus and the Baghdad Caliphate. The conflict between Kublai and Arik Buka ended in 1264 [11, p. 37] with the defeat of the latter.

After Berke's death, when both uluses were already fully formed and disputes between the Chinggisids on the creation of the Yuan Empire and Ilkhan state had been somewhat regulated at the qurultai of 1269, the Jochids were no longer interested in Karakorum's fate and openly did not support Karakorum. Their priorities in their relationship with the Hulaguids also were changing, with their main demands now essentially boiling down to territorial claims.

In their conflict with the Hulaguids the Jochids started to use Islamic ideology. Berke was a Muslim and in his ulus he leaned on Muslim clergy and merchants. It became senseless to make claims based on Chinggis Khan's will and Jochid-Tuluid agreements as the Mongol Empire had practically disintegrated. That is why, ideologically speaking, religion became the
main factor. And thus the annihilation of the Baghdad Caliphate and the execution of the Caliph were held against Hulagu. The alignment with Muslim Egypt and the revival of the Abbasid Caliphate in Egypt were both consequences of the larger conflict between the Jochids and the Hulaguids.

In 1260 the Mamluks managed to restore their caliphate and get it approved by Berke, who also took it under his patronage [5, p. 29]. And thereby the Jochids became the leading force in the Islamic world. Naturally, this elevated status had to be the result of diplomatic agreements and dictated by international realities. Such serious political acts could not have been achieved by mere will, and instead had to result from a political consolidation that emerged after the formation of the Ulus of Hulagu.

When the relationship between Berke and Hulagu deteriorated a part of Hulagu's troops, those who had come to him from the Ulus of Jochi, shifted to the Mamluks. The Mamluk Sultans from this time on became the main allies of the Golden Horde in their respective foreign policies up until the end of the 14th century. The Jochids had already began to follow their own policy without consideration of the imperial authority as it had become senseless to them. The subsequent maintenance of the illusion of a united Mongol Empire should only be considered as part of the foreign policy of the Ulus of Jochi.

The Sultans ruling in Egypt were from the Mamluk military class, who themselves were natives of the Kipchak lands. This itself provided another reason for the two states to unite together as one kindred. Later on, Turkic youths were sent to the Mamluks from the Golden Horde and ended up becoming Mamluks themselves. Additionally, the Golden Horde regiments located in the Middle East, as mentioned before, went over to the Mamluks.

The relationship between the two uluses during the reigns of the Golden Horde Khans Mengü Temür and Töde Möngke existed within the framework of a quadrangle—that is, within the context of the Golden Horde's relationship with Egypt and the Ilkhan's relationship with Byzantium [1, p. 62]. Byzantium, not daring to start a war against the Golden Horde, carried out a policy of maneuvering between the Jochids and the Hulaguids. The Golden Horde, for their part, had to use their military force several times to solve interstate problems. At this time the Golden Horde was in fact forming its own foreign policy.

The Horde Khan Tula-Buga recommenced in 1288 the conflict with the Ilkhan and sent troops to conquer Azerbaijan. However, his troops retreated, never reaching their destination. During internal complications within the Golden Horde, caused by Nogai's opposition to the centralised authority, the Jochids withdrew from the south. This then resulted in finalizing the legitimisation of the Hulaguid state and its consolidation in the Transcaucasia.

After Khan Toqta resolved these internal issues, he resumed his claims on the Transcaucasian territories. In 1303 Toqta's messengers demanded that Ilkhan Gazan leave the whole Caucasus region to Toqta. And although Toqta never got exactly what he wanted, he did reach some agreements in trading [1, p. 71].

In 1294 Toqta and Ilkhan Gaykhatu concluded a peace treaty. And then in 1304 Toqta and Ilkhan Öljeitü concluded a trade agreement once again. After Toqta, Öz Beg Khan also made a claim for the Caucasus even though both sides had already taken steps towards reviving mutual trade to boost their trading-economic relations.

Undoubtedly, following the legitimisation of the Hulaguid state, its continuing confrontations with the Golden Horde were connected with the Transcaucasia territories, very profitable in an economic and strategic sense. Transit trade between the East and the West was one of the main sources of profit for Chinggisid states since two of the world's main trading routes crossed Iran and Desht-i Kipchak. But after the formation of the Ilkhan state, trade connections between Desht-i Kipchak and Iran were disturbed and the southern route fell out of Jochid control. That is why war between the two states was inevitable.
§ 6. The Confrontation Between the Ulus of Jochi and the Catholic Europe from the Mid-13th to the Mid-14th Centuries

Roman Hautala

In his 1247 History of Tartars, Polish Minorite C. de Bridia contrasted the precisely defined borders of Europe, which was characterised as dominated by the Catholic Church, along with the Mongol Empire, that had conquered the main part of the Eurasian continent and from
then on had been bordering the Latin world [24, p. 4]. The Nomadic Empire was described as an unshakable state, while the Catholic Europe had to establish new political relations, where the main role was given to the head of the Roman Church.

The achievement of urgent foreign policy objectives was the core mission of Giovanni da Pian del Carpine, who headed to the East in April 1245 upon the order of Pope Innocent IV. The main aim of Giovanni da Pian del Carpine's diplomatic mission was to deliver the messages of Innocent IV to the Mongol ruler, in which the pontiff expressed his geopolitical ambitions similar to the claims of Chinggisids seeking world domination, and demanded to give an account of the recent invasion in the catholic areas in order to determine the immediate plans of the head of the Mongol Empire. In particular, the Pope's letter 'Cum non solum' (dated 13 March 1245) condemned the Mongol ruler for the recent invasion of Hungary and Poland and urged him to repent [44, pp. 147–148].

In turn, in his reply the Great Khan Güyük expressed his anger over the Pope's ideological ambitions, which he believed were based solely on his supremacy in the Catholic World. According to the Great Khan, the recent military successes of the Mongol army were a more powerful argument for proving the special sympathy of the Almighty. Consequently, Güyük demanded the Pope to visit his main camp for the expression of his humility and for the respective establishment of peaceful relations [21, pp. 142–143]. According to Giovanni da Pian del Carpine, the refusal to subordinate to the Great Khan inevitably resulted in the war with the Tatars [36, p. 264]. Moreover, Friar Giovanni asserted that Güyük had already made the decision to start a war against Europe following his enthronement on the imperial quriltai, and added that troops and commanders were already assigned at that quriltai to invade Hungary and Poland [36, pp. 294–295, 323]. Thus, Giovanni da Pian del Carpine brought in Europe the news about Güyük's intention to resume the expansion to the West (not confirmed by any Oriental source [42, p. 200]). However, a separate statement by Friar C. de Bridia about the inflamed conflict between the Great Khan Güyük and the Jochid ruler Batu explained the reason that prevented the realisation of these plans [24, p. 21].

Defense of Europe against the Potential Tatar Invasion

Not waiting until the completion of Giovanni da Pian del Carpine's mission, Pope Innocent IV took some precautionary measures to repel the possible Mongol aggression against Europe. The First Council of Lyon of the Catholic Church, which commenced two months after Friar Giovanni's departure to the East, dealt with the Tatar threat to some extent. After the council, the pontiff sent a papal bull to a number of European rulers, in which he explained the essence of the sixteenth canon of the council, which contained a list of measures that had to be taken to protect the eastern borders of the Latin world: the rulers of lands that were under the immediate threat of the Tatar invasion were called to build fortifications on all roads and passages leading to their lands, to repel the vanguard of the Tatars and to get the follow-up aid from the west [16, p. 55]. Thus, this decree of the council entirely consigned protection from the first attack of the aggressor to countries that bordered the Mongol Empire, and postponed the review of the military aid issue to the future.

According to the participants of the council and the Pope himself, defensive fortifications on the eastern borders of Europe were to hold the enemy attack temporarily; however, neither the King of Hungary, nor the Polish rulers got clear guarantees of a timely military assistance from the West. Indeed, in his message dated 30 January 1247, Innocent IV promised Béla IV of Hungary to provide assistance of crusaders involved in hostilities in Palestine or against the Nicean Empire [55, I, pp. 203–204]. However, Innocent IV did not consider the possibility that the main part of the kingdom could be devastated by the Tatars before deploying crusaders from the Middle East or even from Constantinople. In turn, influenced by the rumors about the probable offensive of the Tatars headed by Güyük, which he received from both Giovanni da Pian del Carpine, who visited the King of Hungary in August or September
1247, and from his own ambassadors, who returned from the Tatars [53, p. 203], in his reply to Innocent IV, Béla IV pointed to the fact that the defense of Hungary was supposed to be an all-European affair and blamed the pontiff for paying much more attention to conducting crusades in the countries of Levant than strengthening the defense capability of Hungary, on the integrity of which the security of the entire Europe depended [55, I, pp. 231–232].

It should be noted to the credit of Innocent IV that the pontiff tried to compensate his negligence of the security of the Kingdom of Hungary by forming a coalition of Ruthenian principalities and the Teutonic Order, in order to create ‘a kind of signaling system on the eastern borders of Christianity’, borrowing the expression of V. Matuzova [9, p. 360]. However, it would be appropriate to highlight the fact that this activity was aimed at achieving specific goals of the Apostolic See, namely, its desire to conclude a union with the Orthodox Church. In particular, on his way from Poland to Batu's main camp, Giovanni da Pian del Carpine tried to get in touch with Daniil of Halych. However, Friar Giovanni was not able to meet with Daniil Romanovich during his first visit to the Galician princely court, because the latter was gone to Batu's main camp to accept formal dependence on the head of the Ulus of Jochi on condition of maintaining significant autonomy of the Principality of Galicia–Volhynia. Nevertheless, Giovanni da Pian del Carpine had an opportunity to meet the local Orthodox bishops in Galych, in order to present them and Daniil's brother, Vasilko, the Pope's message ‘Cum simus super’ calling for the reunification of the eastern and western Churches. According to Friar Giovanni, the pontiff's call was received very favourably, but ratification of the union was prevented by the absence of Daniil [36, p. 304]. However, in his next visit to the Galician princely court, following his return from Mongolia (9 June 1247), Friar Giovanni managed to meet with the Prince, Vasilko of Volhynia, and local bishops, who, according to Friar Giovanni, expressed a clear desire to accept the papal supremacy and enter into the church union [36, p. 330].

The warm welcome Giovanni da Pian del Carpine received in Halych was an obvious consequence of the anxiety of the Galicia and Volhynia princes related to the threat of the Tatar invasion: in 1246, Friar Giovanni visited the princely court of Galicia at a time when nobody in Galich could predict the outcome of Daniil of Halych's travel to Batu's main camp. At the same time, anxiety about the potential aggression of the Tatars was also fueled by increased activity of oghlan Curemsa (Kurumyshi), who founded his ulus on the right-bank Ukraine [11, pp. 94, 97]. In turn, the visit of the papal legate to the princely court in the summer of 1247 coincided with the circulation of rumors in Eastern Europe about Great Khan Güyük's impending offensive on the West.

Innocent IV granted a number of privileges to the princes of Galicia and Volhynia to encourage their convergence with the papal curia. By the bull of 3 May 1246, the Pope already took Daniil Romanovich's domain under patronage [16, pp. 69–70], which was very important with regard to the recent aggression of the Kingdom of Hungary in Galicia. With his message of 27 August 1247, the pontiff entitled Daniil and Vasilko to return some hereditary domains illegally taken by unspecified rulers [16, p. 85]. Apparently, these domains were the territories in Styria and Austria, claimed by the princes of Galicia and Volhynia during their participation in the War of the Austrian Succession [8, p. 688]. In the synchronous bulls, the pontiff granted the princes an absolute right to prevent the members of military orders from acquiring lands in their domains without their knowledge and allowed the local priests to maintain the features of the Orthodox liturgy, not conflicting with the canon law of the Roman Church [16, pp. 86–87].

It should be noted once again that for Innocent IV the main goal and condition of convergence of the princes of Galicia and Volhynia with the papal curia was concluding of a church union. In negotiations the Pope was mainly represented by his prelate Albert von Suerbeer, who had received an order on September 1247 to visit the Principality of Galicia-
Volhynia and make sure that religious reforms were carried out there [16, pp. 89–90]. The Pope had clearly explained to his legate that he was not satisfied with the personal union of the princes with the Roman Church, but wanted to get an evidence from Daniil Romanovich of the start of the gradual Latinisation of the local Orthodox Church. In turn, on 22 January 1248 Innocent IV sent to Daniil a bull calling the prince to inform the Teutonic knights about the impending Tatar offensive in advance, so that they, respectively, could communicate these news to the papal curia in a timely manner. Thus, in exchange for the consent to enter into a church union and inform the papal curia about any aggressive intentions of the Tatars, the Prince of Galicia got quite an unreliable promise of military assistance from the West [16, p. 108].

Apparently, the Pope's mediation contributed to the convergence of Daniil of Halych with the Teutonic knights from Livonia, with whom the Prince concluded a treaty on military cooperation [7, p. 27]. However, Daniil, who had to take into account also the opinion of the local Orthodox clergy, could afford to continue negotiations about the church union only in exchange for the promise of military assistance for the period when the threat of the Tatar invasion was quite realistic. Apparently, when Daniil received the news of Güyük's death in April 1248, he lost faith in the validity of rumours about the planned expansion of the Mongol Empire to the west and terminated the negotiations with the Apostolic See.

However, four years later, the relationship of Daniil of Halych with the neighbouring oglahan Kuremsa sharply aggravated. Apparently, inspired by Great Möngke Khan's empire-wide fiscal reform, in 1252 Kuremsa sent his baskak to Bakota with an obvious intention of conducting a census in the Bolokhovo lands for the subsequent collection of due tributes from the population. Daniil, in turn, considered the Bolokhovo lands to be within his sphere of influence and expelled Kuremsa's baskak from Bakota, which led to an open conflict between the Principality of Galicia and the neighbouring Tatar ruler. Kuremsa's several subsequent unsuccessful invasions into the Principality of Galicia and Volhynia showed that at the beginning of the war Kuremsa had minor forces in place. Daniil successfully resisted Kuremsa's attacks and, in the meantime, managed to attack the lands of the Yatvagians bordering with Volhynia [5, pp. 828–831, 838, 840–843; 11, pp. 96–110].

Nevertheless, at the very beginning of the conflict, Daniil was not sure that Batu would not provide military assistance to Kuremsa and, therefore, he hastily turned to the Pope for help. In response to the Prince of Galicia's call for assistance, on 14 May 1253 Innocent IV wrote a letter to all Christians of Bohemia, Moravia, Serbia and Pomerania and expressed the necessity to organise resistance against the imminent Tatar invasion. The Pope clearly indicated to the recipients of his message that the push-back to the aggressors had to be organised as part of the anti-Tatar crusade [16, pp. 152–153].

Apparently, the Pope considered the preaching of the crusade as the most effective tool for the mobilisation of massive military and financial resources. On the other hand, the use of sacralised military actions had a number of disadvantages. First of all, the organisation of the crusade took too much time, not allowing to respond to external threats in a timely manner. Apart from that, starting from the Fourth Crusade, every military campaign, authorised by the Apostolic See, could suddenly deviate from the original purpose. The aforementioned papal bull suggested that the planned military campaign could have been aimed not only ‘against the Tatars’, but also against ‘other pagans’.

As a result of propagating the crusade, an army of 60 thousand men, led by the Bohemian King Přemysl Otakar, was mobilised in December 1254—that is, one and a half years after proclaiming the crusade against the Tatars. Apparently, the crusaders army consisting of volunteers from Bohemia, Moravia, Austria, Brandenburg, Saxony, Thuringia, Meissen and other German lands, was one of the largest armies to cross Poland in the Middle Ages [37, pp. 304–305]. However, having received information about the insignificance of the Tatar
threat, the Crusaders army proceeded to Prussia to carry out a lightning campaign against the local pagans in the winter of 1254–1255, resulting in the complete defeat of the Sambians [7, pp. 31–32]. It is possible that this crusade brought some benefits to Daniil, who got an opportunity to attack the Yatvagian lands [7, pp. 35–38]. On the other hand, the Prince of Galicia was able to see for himself that in case of the Tatar invasion he would not be able to get timely support from the Pope, because mobilisation of the Crusaders required too much time, and these forces could be used to achieve alternative political purposes. As a result of understanding the irrelevance of the pontiff's aid, the relations between the Prince of Galicia and the Apostolic See gradually deteriorated, which was exacerbated by the temporary convergence of the Papal Curia and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. In his letter of 5 March 1255 to the Duke of Lithuania, Mindaugas, Pope Alexander IV called him to facilitate the battle against schism and entitled him for new territorial acquisitions in Volhynia [56, I, p. 61]. The Pope's decision affected the relationship between the Papal Curia and the Prince of Galicia, who, in the end, rejected the union with the Roman Church. In particular, in his letter of 13 February 1257 to Daniil, Alexander IV already threatened the Prince by the crusade, because the Prince of Galicia was explicitly preventing the realisation of the union conditions [14, p. 66]. Thus, by the time of the resumed Tatar invasion in the West, the Principality of Galicia-Volhynia was outside of the Latin World's sphere of influence, which immediately affected the security of its eastern borders.

**The Second Tatar Invasion in Poland**

Following Berke's enthronement in 1257, the priorities of the external policy of the Ulus of Jochi changed dramatically. In the same year, Berke decided to hand over the administration of the Ulus of Kuremsa on the right-bank Ukraine to tumen commander Burunday [5, column 846; 12, p. 30]. The decision of the new Jochid ruler reflected Berke's clear intention to start expansion to the north-west. Burunday was one of the most outstanding Tatar military commanders and distinguished himself in the previous military campaigns in the Volga Bulgaria, the Northeast Rus' and, more importantly, during Batu's invasion of Hungary in 1241–1242. Thus, he had the experience of leading military actions against the Europeans, and was expected to use these skills during the next territorial expansion [6, pp. 48–49, 73]. In addition, far larger military forces were placed at Burunday's disposal compared to the previous potential of Kuremsa [5, column 846].

In 1259, Burunday with his army entered Galicia and ordered Vasilko of Volhynia and sons of Daniil of Halych (Daniil himself fled to the Poles and then to Hungary [5, column 850]), who came to bow him in token of obedience, to demolish the fortress walls in Danilov, Stojka, Lviv, Kremenets, Lutsk and Vladimir [12, p. 32]. In spite of the fact that Kholm, the new capital of Galicia, refused to do it and even successfully resisted Burunday's troops, in general we can say that since that moment the rulers of the Principality of Galicia-Volhynia had to accept the direct subordination to the Ulus of Jochi [41, p. 109, no. 88]. First of all, the recognition of their subordination was expressed in performing military duties during the following invasion of Poland, in which, according to the "Great Poland Chronicle", their military units were actively involved [47, VIII, pp. 113–114].

Thus, Burunday's army including the military units of the Principality of Galicia–Volhynia, secured a reliable rear, and in November 1259 invaded Lesser Poland [47, VIII, p. 113]. The Tatars had hastily passed Lublin and Zawichost, crossed the Wisła and entered the Sandomir region [5, column 852]. Then, according to the description of the synchronous "Rocznik kapitulny Krakowski", the Tatars conquered Sandomir and killed or captured the main part of its population, and invaded Ziemia Krakowska [47, V, pp. 87–88, II, p. 585–586; 5, column 852–855]. According to the same source, Burunday's army had inflicted much heavier losses on Poland than Orda Ichen's army that fought on its territory in 1241. The Tatars did not encounter significant resistance (yet they did not dare storm Krakow) and, accord-
ing to several Polish sources, returned to the east (in April 1260) with a large number of captives [49, p. 626; 46, II, p. 839, III, pp. 73, 170; 47, V, p. 242; 20, p. 528].

In turn, the Kingdom of Hungary stayed away from the conflict and avoided the Tatar invasion. In 1259, Berke demanded the Hungarian King Béla IV to enter into a military alliance on the eve of the Tatar invasion into Lesser Poland, which is evident from Pope Alexander IV's reply to the Hungarian sovereign, dated 14 October of the same year [55, I, p. 240]. Béla IV resorted to a kind of blackmail by threatening the Pope with accepting Berke's request if he did not get real support from the Apostolic See. In turn, the pontiff emphasised that accepting the Tatar ultimatum would have called into question the good name of any Christian ruler and underlined the unreliable nature of any political treaty concluded with the Tatars. In addition, Alexander IV made it clear to the Hungarian sovereign that his attempt of political blackmail was unsuccessful, and refused to provide him any specific support [55, I, pp. 240–241].

In his letter of 28 January 1264, addressed to the Hungarian ruler, Pope Urban IV pointed to the fact that Berke's claims remained valid even after four years [55, I, p. 264]. On his part, the Hungarian monarch was able to refuse Berke's claims, but apparently, did it in the most tactful way. Probably, Béla IV admitted the formal dependence on the Tatar ruler and paid him tribute irregularly, whenever the Tatar ambassadors visited the royal court with an official threat of military invasion [10, p. 35]. The arrival of the first Tatar embassy to Hungary was documented in 1263 [in the copy of 1271; see reference in: 41, p. 222, no. 31]. But the most detailed information about diplomatic exchanges between the Tatars and Hungarians is given in King István V's charter, dated 10 December 1270, which describes two previous Hungarian embassies to Khan Mengü Temür contributing to the appeasement of the Golden Horde ruler [32, pp. 347–348]. Probably, both embassies provided abundant gifts to the Tatar 'Emperor'. The tribute to the Tatars was to be paid even further, and in 1288 the Archbishop of Esztergom openly accused King Ladislaus IV in admitting his subordination to Khan Tula-Buga [see reference in: 41, p. 222; no. 32]. However, the dudgeon of the prelate of Esztergom was likely related to the deterioration of relationships between the Hungarian monarch and the local clergy. Ladislaus IV consistently continued the diplomatic policy of his grandfather and father [41, p. 201].

**Invasion of Hungary and Poland led by Nogai and Tula-Buga.**

The aforementioned evidences of embassies, sent by Béla IV to appease the Jochid rulers, show that the Kingdom of Hungary was under the constant threat of the Tatar invasion. For instance, in 1265, the Hungarian monarch informed the Papal Curia about the resumed threat of the invasion and asked Pope Clement IV for help again. In the reply, addressed to the archbishops of Esztergom and Kalocsa in June 1265, the pontiff authorised the preaching of the anti-Tatar crusade in Hungary, Bohemia, Poland, Styria, Austria, Carinthia and mark of Brandenburg [55, I, p. 280]. Thus, Clement IV had seriously considered the threat of the Tatar attack on the Central-Eastern Europe and, for the first time, responded to the numerous calls of the Hungarian monarch for assistance. According to the continuator of the chronicle of a Minorite from Erfurt, in 1270, the Tatars attacked the Kingdom of Hungary, taking advantage of the interregnum after Béla IV's death [27, p. 213]. According to one 1291 charter of King András III, the Tatars had attacked Hungary even after István V's death (1272), taking advantage of the minority of his son, King Ladislaus IV [33, VII/2, p. 141].

In turn, by the moment Ladislaus IV reached majority, the Kingdom of Hungary was exposed to the internal unrest of Cumans, unhappy with the implementation of the program of forced Christianisation of the Hungarian nomads and the simultaneous assaults of the Hungarian monarch to their political autonomy. The Cuman rebellion started in 1280, but two years later, Ladislaus IV heavily defeated the rebels on Lake Hood [22, pp. 146–147]. After the defeat, a significant part of the Cumans fled to the Tatars, and according to the compilation of
the Hungarian chronicles of the 14th century, as a result of instigations of these fugitives, Nogai and Tula-Buga decided to attack Hungary, with the scale of attack being inferior only to Batu's invasion in 1241 [54, I, p. 472].

According to the minor annals of Augsburg, the Tatars invaded Hungary on 2 February 1285 and stayed there during the next Lent [18, p. 10]. Hungary was simultaneously invaded by Nogai's army from the south and troops of Tula-Buga from the east. With regard to Nogai's actions, the synchronous message of the Esztergom presbyter Benedict shows that military operations were solely of punitive nature and were aimed at rural population, because the Tatars did not try to storm any fortified urban centres [45, II, p. 419]. Queen Elizabeth, wife of Ladislaus IV, had an opportunity to observe from the walls of Buda the vanguard of both Tatar armies that merged under Pest, which is evidenced by her charter [33; VII/2, pp. 110–111].

After plundering the neighbourhood of Pest, the Tatars headed back, and both armies headed back separately, following the same way that they invaded the Kingdom. On the way back, Nogai's army suffered some losses from Ladislaus IV's army, following hard after it [10, p. 153]. However, Nogai suffered heavier losses from the Transylvanian Székelys, Vlachs and German colonists [41, p. 205], which showed how unsafe it was to leave enemy fortresses untouched in the rear. In particular, in his message the aforementioned presbyter Benedict said that Székelys, Vlachs and Saxons had significantly impeded the return of the Tatars by building barricades and other obstacles on the Transylvanian roads [45, II, p. 419]; while ‘Rocznik Traski’ described significant losses, suffered by Nogai's army in an attempt to attack the Christian fortifications on the way back [46, II, p. 850; III, p. 183]. However, despite all these references, Nogai's losses, apparently, were insignificant; and presbyter Benedict's statement about the estimated 26,000 losses of the Tatars seems to be exaggerated [45, II, p. 419]. However, information about the retreat of Tula-Buga's army, which suffered heavy losses because of extremely unfavorable climatic conditions, might be reliable. For instance, according to the ‘Niederaltaich Annals’, on the way back the Tatars were badly hit both by hail, snow, rainfalls and by the Hungarian army chasing them [31, p. 414; 39, I, pp. 257, 297–298; 18, p. 10]. In turn, the ‘Hypatian Chronicle’ complements this information adding about the famine rampant in army of Tula-Buga. Although the chronicle's statement that from the entire army only Tula-Buga ‘with his wife and horse’ managed to cross the Verecke Pass should be considered improbable exaggeration [5, column 891].

As for the reasons behind the Tatar invasion of Lesser Poland following the attack on Hungary, it contained an assumption that it resulted from the unsuccessful outcome of the previous campaign in 1280 [10, p. 154]. The campaign, in turn, was launched upon the initiative of prince Lev Danilovich of Galicia, who tried to seize the principality of Lesser Poland following Boleslaw V the Chaste's death in 1279. On the eve of the Lesser Poland invasion, Lev Danilovich asked Nogai for military assistance, and the latter fully supported the proposal of the Galician Prince. Nogai sent him rather limited military reinforcements led by Tatar military commanders Konchak, Kozey and Kubatan [5, column 881]. However, what was more important is that Nogai ordered the Dukes of Lithuania and Volhynia to take part in the planned campaign. In February 1280 [46, II, p. 847, nota 1], the combined forces of Galicia and Volhynia attacked Lesser Poland with the support of the Tatar and Lithuanian reinforcements, passed Zawichost and approached Sandomierz, where they split. The Volhynian troops stayed around Sandomierz, not undertaking any serious attempts to conquer it during the entire period of stay on the territory of Lesser Poland. Lev Danilovich, together with his Tatar and Lithuanian allies, invaded Ziemia Krakowska and stayed there until September of the same year, not achieving any significant success. The newly elected prince of Lesser Poland, Leszek II the Black, decided to make a counter-attack instigated by the unexpected victory of
the Lesser Poland troops near Goslicz over the detachments of Tatars, Lithuanians and Ruthenians [46, II, p. 847, III, p. 364; 19, p. 429; 5, column 881–882].

Of course, Nogai was irritated both by casualties of the Tatar detachments and the general failure of the military campaign. However, the Tatar reaction kept waiting for over seven years. That's why a more probable reason for the Tatar invasion was Leszek II the Black's attack on the Galich lands during the next Tatar campaign to Hungary in 1285, which prevented Lev Danilovich from participating in the invasion of the Kingdom of Hungary as a part of army of Tula-Buga [5, column 888].

According to the "Life of St. Kunigunda", the Tatar troops invaded Lesser Poland on 6 December 1287 and stayed there until 11 February the next year [46, IV, p. 715]. Just like in the Hungarian campaign, the armies of Nogai and Tula-Buga moved separately and did not encounter any open resistance on their way. Tula-Buga crossed the frozen Wisła with some difficulties and approached Sandomierz. His attempt to storm Sandomierz failed, the khan abandoned the siege and decided to move towards Krakow. However, on the halfway he learned that Krakow was already besieged by Nogai's army, who arrived there by another road through Przemyśl around Christmas, according to the dating of the "Poznań Rocznik" [47, VI, p. 130]. After receiving these news, Tula-Buga quickly returned to Sandomierz and moved further to Galicia, thoroughly ruining both the occupied Polish lands and the allied lands of Lev Danilovich [5, columns 893–895]. Nogai also had to confine himself to the devastation of the Krakow neighbourhood, because attempts to storm the capital of Lesser Poland encountered vigorous resistance from its population. Later, in gratitude for the resistance to the Tatars, Leszek II the Black granted the people of Krakow with a charter exempting from taxes [43, p.4].

In general, the study of this campaign gives the impression that it was mainly aimed at punitive expedition into the Polish lands. On the other hand, a special mention should be made to the inconsistency of the military operations conducted by both Tatar armies, which resulted in the failure of the siege of Sandomierz and, especially, Krakow. The capital of Lesser Poland, obviously, was to be the key point of the military operations, where both armies, moving separately to this goal, were to converge. However, 'a great dislike', that according to the Hypatian Chronicle [5, column 892] determined the relationship between Nogai and Tula-Buga at that time, prevented the two armies from conducting joint operations. The Hungarian King Ladislaus IV, on the contrary, hastened to provide timely assistance to the Poles and sent troops led by György, son of Simon, against the Tatars, and they defeated one of Nogai's units, according to the 1288 charter of the Hungarian monarch [33, V/3, p. 395].

From Khan Toqta to the War of Galician Succession

The internal conflict between Tula-Buga and Nogai, which followed the campaign of 1287–1288, led to a sharp decrease in the Tatars' activity on the borders of the Catholic world [41, p. 205]. In the future, due to the consolidation of the internal situation in the Ulus of Jo-chi during Toqta's reign, the Tatars made a relatively large raid to the Sandomierz land in 1293, taking advantage of the conflict between Władysław I the Elbow-high and the Bohemian King Wenceslaus II [40, VII, pp. 277; 46, II, p. 852, III, p. 184]. It is interesting to note that on the eve of this attack, the Tatars had sent an embassy to the Bohemian monarch [38, p. 718], apparently trying to secure his neutrality in the future conflict or even trying to establish military cooperation [41, 200].

The Tatars, obviously, were already regarded as potential allies in the internecine conflicts of the Christian rulers. In particular, according to "Rocznik Małopolska", in 1302 Władysław I the Elbow-high with the help of the Ruthenians and the Tatars attacked Lesser Poland [46, III, 186]. However, this attack was unsuccessful for the allies; in the following counter-attack of Lesser Poland's troops Prince Yuri I of Galicia lost Lublin [46, II, p. 853; 4, p. 128].
In both raids the Tata rs had much smaller military force than during the previous invasion of Tula-Buga and Nogai, and this observation suggests a significant reduction of interest of the Golden Horde rulers in the deployment of military operations in Poland and Hungary. In particular, during Toqta's reign, the Tatars made the only significant raid to the domains of the Kingdom of Hungary, attacking the south-western region Mačva in 1293, according to András III's charter dated 10 November of the same year [51, p. 125]. The other attack of the Tatars on the Slovak region Leles in 1305, apparently, did not have any significant impact [41, p. 206, 226, nota 75].

The Tatars did not expose Hungary to serious attacks even during the reign of Uzbek, and that allowed the Hungarian monarch Charles Robert to invigorate his foreign policy in the south-eastern direction. For instance, during his stay in Transylvania in 1323, Charles Robert sent military forces led by his attendant Phynta de Mende to some Tatar lands, which is evidenced by the royal charter dated 12 August 1324 [57, I, pp. 388–389]. Raids to the Tatar domains took place even later, which is evidenced by the gratitude expressed in 1325 by Pope John XXII to the Hungarian King for sending two captured Tatar lads to Avignon [55, I, pp. 501–502]. The Tatar invasion of 1326, described by the Prussian annalist Peter of Duisburg in an extremely exaggerated way, obviously, was a response to these attacks [52, I, p. 213]. Nevertheless, the Hungarian forces continued to attack the Tatars, and in 1331 they were led by Charles Robert himself as it appears from the congratulations expressed by the pontiff to the Hungarian King in August 1331 [32, p. 617].

In turn, the relationship between Poland and the Golden Horde deteriorated temporarily following the sudden death of Prince Andrey Yurievich of Galicia and his brother, Prince Lev II of Volhynia, in 1323. According to the message of Władysław I the Elbow-high to Pope John XXII, dated 21 May 1323, the King of Poland considered both princes of Ruthenia to be a reliable protection of the eastern borders of his kingdom. However, after their sudden death putting an end to the rule of the Romanovich dynasty in Galicia and Volhynia, Władysław I the Elbow-high expressed to the Pope his concerns about the selection of their successors and asked John XXII to authorise the preaching of the crusade due to the potential collision between Poland and the Golden Horde [1, p. 152].

The pontiff, occupied by the struggle with Emperor Ludwig IV, authorised the anti-Tatar crusade only in 1325 [17, p. 162]. However, by that time the crisis in the foreign policy had already been overcome by appointing the prince of Masovia, Bolesław-Jerzy II, as the ruler of Galicia [41, p. 209]. Bolesław-Jerzy's enthronement resulted from the compromise between Władysław I the Elbow-high and the Duke of Lithuania Gedimin [13, p. 34]. However, it is more important that the selection of the new prince of Galicia was approved by Uzbek Khan, who was trying to consider Lithuanian and Polish interests in Ruthenia on the essential condition of continuing to be paid tribute by the Principality of Galicia-Volhynia [50, 307–308; 2, p. 94].

Thus, Uzbek took a rather passive position in relation to the Kingdom of Poland, not infringing Boleslaw-Jerzy's autonomous reign in Galicia and satisfied with being paid annual tribute by the Ruthenian lands. However, at the end of his reign, he began to show some concerns about the expansionist claims of the Polish and Hungarian rulers and decided to resort to the Pope's mediation in resolution of the border conflicts. In the spring of 1340, Uzbek sent a Franciscan Helia of Hungary, an attendant of his elder son Tini Beg, to Avignon with a letter calling the pontiff to put some pressure on the Catholic rulers in order to stabilise their relationships with the Ulus of Jochi. In his reply dated 17 August 1340, Benedict XII assured the khan that he would make every effort to meet his request [23, p. 78]. However, this answer was not particularly sincere because half a month before Benedict XII had declared the preaching of the anti-Tatar crusade in Poland, Hungary and Bohemia [15, pp. 102–104].
Uzbek's concerns were caused by the sudden death of Bolesław-Jerzy, who was poisoned around 7 April 1340 [46, II, p. 860] by the local boyars for his attempt to latinise the Galician church, if we take the statement of John of Winterthur for granted [26, p. 184]. According to Rocznik Trusky, King of Poland Casimir III immediately took advantage of the Galician Prince's death and conquered Lviv with a small army in order to repeat the attack in June of the same year with significantly larger forces, resulting, apparently, in the conquest of Przemyśl [46, II, pp. 860–861, III, pp. 199–200]. Anticipating Uzbek's reaction, Casimir rushed to ask Pope Benedict XII for help, which is evidenced in the reply of the pontiff dated 1 August 1340, approving the preaching of the anti-Tatar crusade [15, pp. 103–104].

According to Jan of Czarnków, the main reason for the subsequent Tatar invasion was the Ruthenian embassy to Uzbek, led by the boyar appointee in Galich, Dmytro Dedko, and the Volhynian serving Prince Daniil of Ostrog, who assured the khan that Casimir intended not only to occupy Ruthenia, but also to stop paying annual tribute to the Jochid ruler. As a result, the Tatar army invaded Lesser Poland in early 1341 [26, p. 184], but was pushed back by the Polish army on the Wisła River [46, III, pp. 620–622, 860–861, III, p. 200; 47, VI, p. 130; 15, pp. 112; 26, pp. 184; 39, II, p. 218]. According to the "Rocznik świętokrzyski" (with a wrong date), on the way back the Tatars made vain attempts to conquer Lublin, but its siege was suddenly stopped because of their military commander's death [46, III, p. 78]. However, the statement of František von Prague that the Tatars were forced to retreat because of famine and cold, seems to be more trustworthy [34, p. 429]. In this context, special attention should be given to hypothesis of John of Winterthur that the Tatar invasion was caused not by political reasons, but was a result of severe famine raging in the Golden Horde and, thus, the desire of nomads to find food in neighboring lands [26, p. 181].

At the end of this raid, Uzbek Khan focused on military campaigns against Byzantium and Chagataid Ulus, and due to the subsequent death of the khan, the Tatars could not prevent the strengthening of the Polish king's influence in Galicia [41, p. 210]. The appointee Dmytro Dedko remained the actual ruler of Galicia, but soon was forced to accept a formal subordination to Casimir on the condition of preserving the Orthodox rite [13, pp. 38–39].

The reign of Janibek.

However, the war for Galicia did not abate, and Casimir was forced to ask the Avignon Curia for help again. In 1343, Pope Clement VI provided the King of Poland with the tithe from the income of Archbishop of Gniezno and his suffragans for four years, explaining his decision by the continuous raids of the Tatars, Ruthenians and Lithuanians to the new territorial acquisitions of Casimir [56, I, pp. 468–469]. However, later Casimir, apparently, agreed to start direct diplomatic relations with the Golden Horde khan. Thus, according to the "Rocznik miechowski", in 1349 Casimir held negotiations with the Tatar ambassadors, resulting in the Polish conquest of 'Russia'—that is, the entire Galicia and the main part of Volhynia [46, II, p. 885]. The terms of this diplomatic pact between Casimir and Janibek remain unclear. Apparently, the King of Poland ensured neutrality of the Tatars in his military campaign against the Lithuanians carried out in the same year. In turn, Janibek was apparently ensured to be paid traditional tribute from the Ruthenian lands, in spite of the fact that they had come under the control of the Polish monarch. Anyway, in his later letter to Casimir, dated 24 January 1357, Pope Innocent VI rebuked the Polish ruler for paying Janibek the annual property tax from his new territorial acquisitions and becoming a tributary of the Golden Horde khan [56, I, p. 581].

According to the message of Pope Clement VI addressed 14 March 1351 to the Polish prelates with demand to provide the Polish King with the tithe for four more years, Casimir most likely did not strictly follow the terms of the concluded pact, because two years later the Tatars entered into a military alliance with the Lithuanians. It is noteworthy that the pontiff's bull contained reference to a case of conversion to Catholicism of some ‘influential prince’ in the Ruthenian lands, by which Clement VI, apparently, meant one of the sons of the Duke of
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Lithuania, Karijotas [3, p. 145]; thereby indicating the disagreements among the Lithuanians [56, I, pp. 531–532].

According to Henry Taube from Seelbach, in March of the next year, the Tatars invaded Lesser Poland and conquered some Polish town [25, pp. 102–103; 28, p. 4]. In turn, information from the "Rocznik miechowski" allows to assume that the conquered town was Lublin [46, II, p. 885]; while the continuator of the chronicle of Matthias of Neuenburg mentions that the main part of the troops invading Poland consisted of Lithuanians [35, IV, p. 284]. As a result of this attack, Pope Clement VI sanctioned the crusade preaching in support of Poland by a bull dated 4 November 1354 addressed to the prelates of Gniezno, Krakow and Bratislava [55, II, pp. 10–11], which almost literally mirrored previous bull of Pope Benedict XII dated 1 August 1340 [15, pp. 102–104], but contained reference to Lithuanians along with the Tatar as objects of an organised military campaign.

However, by the time this bull was published, Casimir had already signed a truce with Lithuanians, ensuring their neutrality in case of a repeated attack of the Tatars on Poland [3, p. 145]. The King of Poland, apparently, did his best to break the military alliance between the Lithuanians and the Tatars. For instance, according to the royal charter dated 19 January 1354, in 1353 he sent his attendant, Ian Pakoslav, as an ambassador to ‘the Tartar people’ [29, pp. 209–210]. Furthermore, a later message of Casimir, dated 2 January 1363 and addressed to Pope Urban V, contained numerous references to Pakoslav’s visit of ‘the Caesar of the infidel Tartars’ to sign truces [48, p. 400; 3, p. 145]. By 1356, Casimir could already boast about a military alliance with ‘seven Tartar princes’ in his call to take part in the planned military campaign against Lithuania, addressed to the Hochmeister of the Teutonic knights [30, p. 107]. In turn, the Teutonic knights, bonded by that time with the Lithuanians, sent to Avignon charges of Casimir with making an alliance with the Tatars and paying them the annual tribute in exchange for owning the Ruthenian lands [41, p. 211]. Respectively, Innocent VI expressed his rebuke to the King of Poland by sending a message on 24 January 1357, in which the pontiff did not hide his indignation by the fact that Casimir acted only from pragmatic interests centred around keeping his recent territorial acquisitions [56, I, p. 581].

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§ 7. The Golden Horde and the Balkans (13–14th Centuries)

Aleksandar Uzelac

The Mongol Invasion

The news about the upcoming Mongol invasion reached the Balkan region as early as in 1239. At that time a large group of Cumans that was fleeing from the Mongols, crossed the Danube, wreaking havoc along their way. The refugees eventually settled in the various parts of the Balkan Peninsula, but most of them stayed in Bulgaria, where they fully integrated into local medieval and Christian society. Despite the fact that the coming of the Cumans had positive consequences in the years to come, their pacification presented a difficult task for the states in the Southeast Europe, who were also engaged into the quarrels among themselves. The only move, taken in order to counter the Mongols occurred when it was too late. In the summer of 1241, great Bulgarian ruler and the most dominant figure in the Balkan politics, Ivan Assen II, died and the two year armistice was concluded between the three empires and mutual adversaries—Bulgaria, Nicean Empire and Latin Empire of Constantinople [54, p. 950]. However, nothing else was done in order to organise a joint front against the nomadic war machine led by Batu and Subedei.

Even before the armistice was concluded, Bulgaria experienced the Mongol strength. In the early spring of 1241 army led by Prince Buchek passed through South Moldova and Wallachia, which was under the Bulgarian political domination at the time, before it entered South Transylvania [44, p. 45; 69, pp. 103, 118; 112, p. 431]. Not accidentally, several western contemporary sources record that Bulgaria was attacked by the Mongols even before they entered Hungary [56, p. 299; 101, p. 310; 110, p. 283]. It was the ominous announcement of the events that took place next year, when another army of Prince Kadan, son of the great Khan Ögedei, took a chase in order to capture Hungarian king Béla IV and thoroughly devastated the Balkans, from the shores of Dalmatia to the vicinity of Constantinople.

In the very beginning of 1242, Kadan’s Mongols devastated Slavonia and Croatia, which was described by two contemporaries—Roger of Varad and Thomas of Split [59, pp. 288–291; 102, pp. 584–585]. Recent archaeological researches provide a more complete, but not less terrifying picture. In Eastern Slavonia the traces of the fortifications built in order to check the Mongol advance were discovered, while discontinuity in the use of local cemeteries suggest the heavy depopulation of the region. A buried vessel containing a dog’s head was found in a cemetery near the city of Koprivnica, which points out to the Mongol presence in
the region [105; 109]. Afterwards, the Mongols descended on the Adriatic coast and Kadan at first unsuccessfully attacked the fortress of Klissa (modern Klis) near Spalato (Split). Only then, he besieged Traù (Trogir), where Béla IV indeed found refuge, but he was unable to attack this city, which had strong natural defense. Kadan and his men devastated the Dalmatia, but were faced with the problem—the lack of pasture for their horses. Eventually, in March of 1242, they abandoned their camp in the vicinity of Traù and went further southeast [59, pp. 294–300; 108]. During the next month, the Mongols devastated southern parts of Bosnia and descended into the region of Zeta (modern Montenegro), which was a part of the Serbian medieval state, where they destroyed a number of cities. Among them Thomas of Split explicitly mentions Cattaro (Kotor), as well as episcopal seats of Swakium (Svač) and Drivastum (Drivast) in the vicinity of Üsküdar (Skadar) [59, pp. 300–303]. From there, Kadan entered the hinterland of Serbia, probably following so-called via de Zenta, the road along the river Drim that led from Scutari to the region of Kosovo and further to Niš, which was at that time Bulgarian border city [50, pp. 19, 56].

For Serbia, the Mongol passing was a striking, yet brief episode, but Mongol actions left more serious consequences in the Danubian plains of Northern Bulgaria. Judging from sparse written sources and more from the archaeological findings, many larger urban centers became their victim—s, including Lovech, Preslav and Silistra [3, pp. 680–683; 4, pp. 17–18; 5, pp. 3–10; 35; 38; 104]. It seems probable that the Bulgarian capital of Tarnovo has fallen into their hands as well. Persian writer Rashid al-Din, conspicuously mentions the city of Kirkin/Tirnin in the country of Vlachs, among those conquered by the Mongol commander [44, p. 45; 69, pp. 104, 120; 112, p. 445]. Devastation of Bulgaria was not Kadan’s final achievement, as the Latin Empire also became his target. According to the information preserved in the several Austrian chronicles, the Frankish ‘King of Constantinople’ and his knights managed to defeat the Mongol invaders in the first encounter, but in the second one they suffered defeat [67, p. 85; 74, pp. 131–132; 117, p. 70]. In the West, rumours spread that the Latin Emperor Baldwin II died [74, pp. 132–133], while Syriac chronicler Grigory Abūl-Faraj recorded different gossips, according to which the Franks managed to defeat the Mongols, who wanted to conquer Constantinople and forced them to retreat [64, p. 398]. Neither of these were true. In fact, Kadan’s actions against Serbia, Bulgaria and the Latin Empire were not aimed at the outright conquest and they were probably prompted by the fact that fugitive Cumans found the refuge in all these Balkan states [4, p. 17; 50, p. 42; 82, p. 65].

Establishment of the Tatar Sphere of Influence

It is usually assumed that in 1242 Bulgaria was forced to acknowledge Mongol overlordship, as a consequence of the devastation brought by Kadan’s forces. The earliest mention of its dependent status was preserved in a letter of Hungarian King from 1247 [106; 118, p. 231], while two years earlier Giovanni da Pian del Carpine and friars minorities who passed through the Black Sea region steppes conspicuously omit Bulgarians in the list of the peoples subjugated by the Mongols [75, pp. 289–291, 305; 79, pp. 22–23; 107, p. 135]. Therefore, it is more probable that Bulgaria became a part of the Jochid sphere of influence between 1245 and 1247, simultaneously with the extension of their power over the principalities of the western Rus’ [36, p. 89; 50, pp. 73–74]. In 1255, another famous Franciscan traveler, William of Rubruck described in detail the extent of the Mongol domains in the Black Sea region. According to his report, Bulgaria was not only subjected to the usual tribute, but also to a temporary extraordinary levy in metal artefacts. Bulgarian envoys visited Batu and Sartaq to carry the annual tribute and gifts and its Emperor Michael Asen (1246–1255) was according to Rubruck heavily pressed by the service to the Tatars [107, pp. 167–168, 209, 331].

The position of Batu’s ulus as a major player in the politics of Southeast Europe was recognized even before the Rubruck’s travel to the East. In 1249 or 1250, encouraged by the successful trade enterprises of the Italian merchants in the Northern Black Sea region, a deci-
sion was made in Constantinople to send the embassy to the Tatars, led by nobleman of the Empire, Baldwin of Hainaut [100; 115]. Rubruck recorded that Baldwin conducted talks with Batu’s son Sartaq and that he visited Mongolia [107, pp. 201, 268]. As a consequence of his mission, diplomatic relations were established between the Latin Empire and the Ulus of Jochi. It is noteworthy that Rubrucc carried with himself the recommendations signed by the Latin Emperor that eventually provided him a safe-conduct charter across Jochid lands, from Crimea to the basin of Volga [107, pp. 188, 190–191].

Despite the Frankish attempt to conclude an alliance with the Mongols, the Balkans remained largely out of Jochid interest during the reigns of Batu and Sartaq. These conditions drastically changed in the time of Berke, due to the events of ecumenical importance: Nicean capture of Constantinople in 1261 and the eruption of the Jochid-Ilkhid war. Consequently, they led to the establishment of the Jochid-Mamluk alliance.

First contacts between Nicea and the Mongols were made by Emperor John III Doukas Vatatzes (1222–1254). He sent an embassy to Karakorum, where his envoys met with William of Rubruck in 1254 [89, p. 180–185; 107, pp. 247, 255–256]. His successor and restorer of the Byzantium, Michael VIII Palaeologus (1258–1282) realised the benefits of the alliance with the Chinggisid branch in Persia and around 1260, he turned to Hulagu with the alliance proposal. Surprisingly enough, Hulagu accepted and his forces pacified Turkmen bands and brought desperately needed order on the Nicean eastern frontiers [72, pp. 184–187; 89, p. 24–25]. After the reconquest of Constantinople, Michael VIII also established contacts with Mamluk sultan Baybars and Berke [15, pp. 44–46; 47, p. 57; 72, pp. 236–237]. Probably as a consequence of these negotiations in the same year the orthodox bishopric of Sarai was founded [52]. There was a specific reason why Byzantine proposals were gladly accepted in Sarai and Cairo. Free passage of emissaries, goods, and the slaves that filled the ranks of the Mamluk corps, through the Constantinople and the straits of Bosphorus and Hellespont was of the utmost importance for the interested parties. That fact was duly noted by Byzantine writers George Pachymeres and Nicephorus Gregoras [10, p. 75–77; 95, pp. 101–102].

Michael’s vigorous diplomacy that included simultaneous reliance on the three powers was not destined to last long. When in 1262, war broke out between Hulaguids on one, and Jochids with Mamluks on the other side, he was forced to make the choice. It fell upon Hulagu’s Mongols, who were closest to the Byzantine borders. Michael imprisoned the Seljuq pretender Izzeddin Keykavus, who was considered an adversary of the Mongol interests in Anatolia [47, p. 203; 72, pp. 180–187; 95, pp. 81–83; 117, pp. 73–74], and probably under the pressure of Hulagu’s emissaries present in Constantinople, he decided to hold Baybars’ representatives who traveled to the north in 1263 [15, pp. 49–52; 47, pp. 59–61, 99–100, 189–190; 89, pp. 192–193]. The sultan lodged official protest [47, pp. 62, 126, 432–433; 89, p. 193], but did not dissuade Michael, who went so far to offer his daughter Maria, born out of wedlock, as a bride to Hulagu.

However, there was a more sinister threat to the Emperor’s plans, embodied in the imprisoned Seljuq Prince Izzeddin. Despite being confined, he managed to get in touch with one of his cousins who lived on the Northern Black Sea region, as Pachymeres writes, or with Bulgarian Emperor Constantine Tikh (1257–1277), as less reliable report of Gregoras provides, in order to ask for the Tatar help for his release [72, pp. 300–301; 95, p. 100; 117, p. 74]. Berke was interested to liberate Izzeddin, but even more to reopen the communications with Egypt. His dependent, Bulgarian ruler was also dissatisfied with Michael VIII, who in 1263 gave him his niece as a bride, but abstained to release a promised dowry—the Black sea ports of Anchialos (modern Pomorie) and Mesemvria (Nesebar) that were a cause of discord between the two states for quite a long time [7, pp. 510–511; 72, pp. 276–279; 95, p. 99].
Fig. 1. Image of Jani Beg Khan from the Catalan Atlas (circa 1375)

Text on the right: ‘... l’imperi comenca en la provínçia de Burgària et finex en la ciutat de Organcio. Lo senyor es appelat lambeh senyor del Sarra’ (...This Empire begins in the province of Bulgaria and finishes in the city of Urgench. Its sovereign is named Yambeh. [He] is the Emperor of Sarai’.

Fig. 2. Bone adornments for quivers found in the hill Trapezitsa, Veliko-Tarnovo [42, p. 54]. Photo by Deyan Rabovyanov
The joint Bulgarian and Tatar military actions against Byzantium took place in the winter of 1264/65. Constantine Tikh was officially the leader of the enterprise, but auxiliary Tatar detachment, led by Berke’s commander Qutlug-Malıq [24, pp. 33–34], played very important role in the campaign. Exactly at the time of the attack, Michael VIII was returning from Thessaly, together with his Seljuq prisoner. He managed to find refuge inside the walls of Constantinople, while his retinue shut themselves inside the fortress of Ainos (modern Enez) on the Aegean coast. Besieged by the Bulgarians and the Tatars, the defenders eventually agreed to release İzzeddin and the truce was concluded. The attackers withdrew, but the Tatars thoroughly plundered countryside on their return [28, pp. 6–10; 72, pp. 302–311; 95, pp. 100–101; 117, pp. 75–77]. As a consequence, Michael VIII not only lost his precious hostage, but was forced to open the straits for the passage of Jochid and Mamluk representatives. According to Mamluk sources he even agreed to send the yearly tribute in silk to Berke [15, pp. 53–54; 47, p. 191; 89, p. 196]. However, he did not completely abandon his pro-ilkhanid orientation and in 1265, his daughter Maria, finding out about Hulagu’s death, married his son and successor Abaqa [45, p. 65; 72, pp. 234–235].

The wavering attitude of Byzantine government provoked another Tatar military intervention, which took place in 1271 or 1272. Pachymeres gives yet another cause of that campaign: according to him, the Tatars were called by Andronikos Tarchaneiotes, Byzantine renegade who rebelled against the Michael VIII and joined forces with another adversary of Palaeologus—sebastocrator John of Thessaly. The Tatars, probably led by Nogai, cousin of Khan Mengü Temür, again thoroughly devastated Thrace. Their second attack was so brutal that, according to Pachymeres’ words ‘it could be discussed only in a separate book, written not by words, but by tears’ [40, pp. 162–163; 50, pp. 136–138; 72, pp. 418–419]. According to the very words of Emperor Michael VIII, written in his short autobiography, ungrateful Bulgars this time again gave free passage to the Tatars and helped them in the attack [36, p. 98; 77, p. 457; 92, p. 296]. Judging from the circumstances of their two campaigns against Byzantium, it may be concluded that the Bulgar-Tatar relations drastically improved with respect to the previous decades.

**Byzantine-Tatar Alliance**

Tatar pressure from the north, accompanied by enmity of the Bulgars increasingly became a major concern for Emperor Michael VIII. Not long after the second attack, in 1273 or 1274, he decided to counterbalance the menace by proposing an alliance to Nogai, as well as the hand of another of his illegitimate daughter—Yefrosinya. Pachymeres vividly described details of the negotiations between the Byzantine representatives and the Tatar leader. Nogai originated from different cultural environment and when Byzantine representatives offered him among other gifts a precious calyptra (cap), he ironically asked ‘is it good because it protects from headache, or is it because pearls on it can protect its bearer from the lightning and storm!’ Despite his allegedly contemptuous attitude, Nogai concluded the negotiations by accepting the hand of the princess and the alliance proposal [33, p. 124; 72, pp. 442–447; 92, p. 300].

As a consequence of the agreement between Michael VIII and Nogai, it seems that the relations between Byzantium and Mengü Temür Khan also improved. The contacts between the Middle Volga state and Constantinople during the seventies were in the hands of the bishop Theognostus of Sarai. He visited the Byzantine capital on several occasions in order to resolve church as well as political matters. Not many details is preserved about them, but to what extent they were intertwined is visible in the fact that he carried the letters of the khan and metropolitan of Kiev to the Constantinopolitan Patriarch and the Emperor [40, pp. 164–165; 41, pp. 336–337; 89, pp. 206–207].

The biggest loser in the political great game was Bulgarian Empire. It became effectively cut off from the central authority of the Golden Horde and its protection. Immediate conse-
quence of the agreement was disappearance of the Bulgarian political presence in the Danube delta, where joint Byzantine-Tatar condominium was introduced in the mid-1270s. The center of the Byzantine power in the region became the city of Vicina where metropolitan seat was established around 1280, while Nogai took control of the city of Sakchi, situated not far from the modern Tulcea, at the place where lied the most convenient crossing over the Danube estuary [2, pp. 29–31; 86, pp. 188–189, 193; 99, pp. 36–37]. In the following years Sakchi became unofficial Nogai’s capital and there, numerous series of coins were struck in his, as well as in the name of his son Chaka. These numismatic finds bear inscriptions in Greek and Arabic and were discovered at various localities in the Danube delta, Dniester basin, as well as in Bulgaria [88; 96; 97].

In the mid-seventies of the thirteenth century, Nogai’s Tatars began raids on Northeastern Bulgaria. The vivid example of their ferocity is preserved in an inscription found at the fortress of Shumen: ‘I, George, looked up and down and said: “Oh God, by thy name, save us from the Tatars”‘ [97, p. 131]. Constantine Tikh was unable to check the invaders, his authority greatly diminished and he lost respect of his fellow countrymen. Eventually, in 1277, a rebellion broke out in Bulgaria, led by certain Kordokoubas, probably Cuman by origin, also named Lahanas in Byzantine sources [72, pp. 548–549; 90, p. 251; 95, p. 131]. He is frequently equated with enigmatic ‘Emperor Ivaylo’, mentioned in a contemporary fragmentary notice from the so-called Svrljig Evangeliary in 1279 (still, there is a strong possibility that Ivaylo is none other than the Byzantine pretender to the throne in Tarnovo—Ivan Assen III of whom more will be said later) [11; 14, pp. 65–66; 46, p. 12]. The rebel leader first took up arms against the Tatars and managed to defeat some of their marauding bands, which encouraged many people to flock under his banner. When he became strong enough, he turned against the Emperor of Tarnovo. The rebels defeated Constantine Tikh near the Bulgarian capital and slew him, ‘like a ritual animal’ [72, pp. 550–553]. Bulgaria was now drowned into the three years of anarchy and the civil war in which the Tatars played one of the crucial roles.

Upon the news of the death of the Bulgarian ruler, Michael VIII, decided to exploit the opportunity and announced his candidate for the vacant Bulgarian throne—Byzantine protégée Ivan Assen III, grandson of the namesake Bulgarian ruler [6, p. 249]. Constantine’s widow Maria decided to counter his aspirations by unexpected move: she opened the gates of Tarnovo and offered her hand to Kordokoubas. Michael VIII then asked Nogai for help and the Tatars swept into Bulgaria. The rebel army and their leader went to the north in order to stop the invasion, but were besieged in the Danubian fortress of Silistra by combined Greek and Tatar army, led by young and promising general Michael Tarchaneiotes Glabas. In the meantime, smaller detachment that consisted of Byzantine regiments and the Tatar cavalry suddenly descended upon Tarnovo and captured the Bulgarian capital in 1278. Maria was handed over to the Byzantines, and Ivan Assen III was enthroned as a new Emperor. Tatar commander Chavush-Bakshi was endowed by Michael VIII with honorary title of protospatharios, as a sign of gratitude for his contribution in the war [72, pp. 588–591; 93, p. 261; 119, pp. 264–266]. It was unique example of formal inclusion of a member of the Tatar elite into the high Byzantine court hierarchy.

The capture of Tarnovo did not signal the end of the war, as Kordokoubas managed to escape from Silistra and to gather his followers. Aware that the military balance was in the hands of the Tatars, he tried and eventually succeeded in winning them and their commander for his cause. In 1279, combined forces of Bulgarians and the Tatars clashed with hastily gathered Byzantine forces and carried two significant victories—near the fortress of Diavena (modern Diavena) in the region of Sliven, and on the slopes of Sredna Gora. Disheartened, Ivan Assen III decided to abandon Tarnovo and in the beginning of 1280, new emperor took up the crown; it was a distinguished member of a local aristocracy—George I Terter, ‘who
was highly respected and esteemed by Bulgarians’, despite being Cuman by origin [72, pp. 566–567].

Terter’s election was expected turn of the events, considering that for the majority of Bulgarian political elite neither the rebel candidate, nor the Byzantine puppet were adequate choices, but for the rebel leader it was a heavy blow. Encouraged by his previous successful cooperation with the local Tatar army, he decided to ask for the help directly from Nogai and it turned out that at the same time, Michael VIII sent his protégé to his Tatar ally. As Pachymeres informs us, Nogai provided hospitality to both claimants for Bulgarian throne, but quickly he got tired of their mutual intrigues. Finally, at a banquet, he suddenly ordered the execution of Kordokoubas and his disloyal commander Chavus Bakshi. According to the report of the Byzantine historian, he intended to kill Ivan Assen III as well, but eventually he spared his life, due to the pleas of his Greek wife Yefrosinya [33, p. 124; 36, pp. 104–105; 72, pp. 588–591]. More probable is that the scenario of the tragedy was fully prepared in advance and that Nogai acted in accordance to the wishes of his father-in-law, Michael VIII.

One thing is certain—despite the failure of the Bulgarian adventure, the confidence in Nogai was unshattered and in Constantinople he continued to be considered the most trustworthy ally. Not much time has passed before he was called to help once more. In 1282, Michael VIII decided to solve the question of the renegade Greek state of Thessaly, and to subdue its independent ruler, energetic John Angelos. For this purpose he asked Nogai to send him his men. In autumn of the same year, 4,000 Tatar horsemen came, probably via the Bulgarian territory. Michael VIII greeted them in the Gallipoli Peninsula, where he gathered the army for the upcoming campaign, and expressed the wish to lead them to the glorious victory. However, the Emperor was ill and on December 11, he died, before the campaign ever started. His death was a tragic loss for both Greeks and the Tatars, who equally mourned him [72, pp. 658–667; 95, p. 149–154].

Michael’s son and successor Andronikos II (1282–1328) postponed the grandiose father’s plans, but he could not disband the Tatar corps. Instead, he decided to use it in an ad hoc campaign against Thessalian ally—Serbian king Stephen Uroš II Milutin (1282–1321), who in the autumn of 1282 conquered northern Macedonia. The Tatars were put under the command of Michael Glabas. In the beginning of 1283, the Tatars, strengthened with Byzantine border units swiftly ravaged the territories of the enemy and without encountering any resistance they penetrated to the north as far as Kosovo region. However, the Serbian side organised defense on the banks of the river Drim. Part of the Tatar force suffered a crushing defeat in an attempt to cross the river, then swollen from spring floods. Its leader, mentioned in the Serbian sources as ‘Črnoglav’ (which is probably nothing else than Slavic rendition of Turkic name ‘Karabash’), was captured and beheaded [1, pp. 110–112; 51, pp. 102–103; 117, p. 102]. The battle of Drim signaled the unsuccessful end of the campaign and soon the Byzantine alliance with Nogai that Michael VIII tried so painstakingly to maintain during the previous decade, crumbled to pieces.

Under the Shadow of Nogai

Simultaneously with the rise of his influence in the Golden Horde and reinvigorated Tatar expansion towards Hungary, Nogai was not content with the role of the defender of Byzantine interests anymore. The abrupt change in Byzantine-Tatar relations became obvious in the fall of 1285, when a Tatar army, which allegedly numbered 10,000 warriors, penetrated through Bulgaria and stormed into the northern Thrace. Byzantine Strategus of Mesembria, Ubertopulos bravely clashed with the attackers and defeated them [73, pp. 92–93], but consequences of the attack were hard to ignore. Byzantine possessions were devastated and many captives fell into the Tatar hands [110, pp. 298–301; 114, p. 625]. At the same time, the influence of Byzantium in the Danube delta was wiped out. A church source records that metropolitan of Vicina arrived to Constantinople in 1285 with the help of divine providence, which
is probably the reflection of the existing Tatar threat [5, pp. 13–14; 94, pp. 37–38]. Two years later, this port was undoubtedly in Nogai’s hands, and in a contemporary Franciscan report, certain Tatar official Argun is mentioned as the governor of Vicina [63, pp. 58–59, 119; 76, pp. 444–445].

Bulgaria emerged from the civil war with a new ruler and a dynasty, but politically and economically weakened. George I Terter (1280–1292) was forced to rebuild the central power from the scratches. He encountered serious opposition in the face of the regional lords—Smiletis, master of the southern region of Sredna Gora and Sisman, ruler of Northwestern Bulgaria with the seat in Vidin. Sisman, who like Terter was also a Bulgarian aristocrat of Cuman origin, accepted the suzerainty of Nogai from the very beginnings of his rule in the early 1280s [27, pp. 47–48; 50, p. 117; 58, pp. 39–40]. George I Terter was forced to follow his footsteps. In 1284, he concluded alliance with Serbian King Milutin [6, pp. 257–258; 26, pp. 334–335], but after the Tatar incursion in Thrace, which took place next year, he also recognized Nogai’s overlordship and married his daughter to Nogai’s son Chaka [73, pp. 290–291].

Thus, during the reign of George I Terter, Bulgarian lands, effectively split into three separate political entities, came again under the Tatar sphere of influence, but historians were too often inclined to harshly judge the nature of the mutual Bulgarian-Tatar relations. The marriage between Chaka and Terter’s daughter, undoubtedly an indication of the dependent position of the Empire of Tarnovo, also suggests that the Bulgarian ruler enjoyed Nogai’s favors at the time. Furthermore, although it survives until today, the belief according to which George I was forced to send his son Theodore Svetoslav as a hostage to Nogai is completely unfounded [50, pp. 199–202]. Quite the contrary, Theodore Svetoslav was present in the Tatar lands at the end of the 13th century as a political refugee, when he married a lady named Yefrosinya, whose godmother was the namesake Nogai’s wife [34; 70; 73, pp. 290–291]. According to Baybars al-Mansuri, the wife of the Bulgarian prince was a relative of Nogai and Chaka [47, p. 117]. Considering that younger Yefrosinya descended from the wider circle of Nogai’s kindred, it is certain that the Bulgarian prince enjoyed the support of the mighty Tatar leader, despite the fact that his father lost it in the meantime.

Foreign political orientation of George I Terter and reliance on the Serbs and the Tatars was possible and opportune only as long as all of these interested parties were joined in their enmity towards Byzantium. However, at the beginning of the last decade of the 13th century, important changes took place, as two Bulgarian allies—the Tatars and the Serbs—entered into the mutual conflict. In the late 80s of the 13th century, Milutin’s older brother Stefan Dragutin, who ruled the territories that lied south of the Sava River as a Hungarian vassal, began a war against independent lords of the region of Braničevo (now in eastern Serbia), half-brothers Dorman and Kudelin, another prominent Bulgarian aristocrats of Cuman stock. The lords of Braničevo turned to Nogai. He allowed them to recruit Tatar groups from Wallachia for their cause, thus hoping to extend his influence in the Balkan interior. Strenthened with Tatar detachments, Dorman and Kudelin conquered Dragutin’s possessions in 1290. Dragutin fled under the protection of his younger brother and asked his help in order to recover the lost territories [1, pp. 114–115; 25, p. 335; 116, pp. 10–13]. At that point Dorman and Kudelin overextended their strength; Hungary also openly entered into the war against them. In the winter of 1291/92 Hungarian forces managed to inflict two crushing defeats to Tatar detachments in their army on the banks of Sava River [60, pp. 617–618; 61, p. 125; 82, pp. 202–203], And in the course of a year, Milutin and Dragutin joined forces and conquered Braničevo. Dorman and Kudelin were forced to flee to Nogai [1, pp. 115–116; 116, pp. 13–14].

Tatar interests in the Balkans were shattered, but Nogai was quick to react. Bulgaria, whose ruler George I Terter was his dependant, but also a staunch ally of Serbian king, was a
priority. In 1292 Nogai forced Bulgarian ruler to abandon the throne and according to his wishes, new emperor became Sviats [28, pp. 22–23; 50, pp. 213–214; 73, pp. 121–122, 292–293]. Terter fled to Byzantium, but the Tatar troops followed him and for one more time, the northern Thrace was devastated [13, pp. 97–100; 73, pp. 290–293]. In order to prevent new Tatar attacks, Andronikos II was forced to strengthen the defenses in the border area with Bulgaria, and to undertake the resettlement of local Vlach populations to Asia Minor. It was a harsh, but necessary precaution, for it was feared that they might join their forces with the Tatars [73, pp. 120–123; 117, pp. 87–88].

Next task for Nogai was to deal with the Serbs. This time, he opted for more indirect approach. He encouraged Prince of Vidin, Šišman, his dependent and ally of the lords of Braničevo, to organise a campaign against Milutin, putting, according to Serbian archbishop Danilo II, the ‘thrice-cursed Tatars’ at his disposal. In 1293, Šišman’s combined Bulgarian and Tatar army penetrated deep into the Serbian territory, as far as the area of Hvosno in the region of Kosovo. However, it suffered defeat near the village of Ždrelo in the Rugova gorge. Serbian sources attributed their failure to divine intervention, but it is beyond doubt that it ensued as a consequence of a careful preparation, strong defence or maybe even an organized ambush by the Serbs [1, pp. 117; 16, pp. 57–58; 50, pp. 215–217]. Milutin was quick to exploit the victory and in the same year he attacked the Principality of Vidin. The outcome was total Bulgarian defeat. Serbian forces occupied the land of their adversary, including his capital and, similar to the Lords of Braničevo, Šišman was forced to flee on a barge across the Danube. Victorious Serbian king was now in position to dictate the terms, but, as his biographer Danilo II states, he showed generosity: the armistice was concluded and pre-war borders reestablished. As a guarantee of peace, the marriage was arranged between Šišman and a Serbian noblewoman [1, pp. 118–119].

In fact, behind Milutin’s lenient policies lied quite a different cause—the Tatar threat [18, pp. 219–220; 116, p. 14]. According to archbishop Danilo II, after Šišman’s defeat ‘Nogei, the lawless and impious Tatar tsar… rose up with his forces and took up arms against the righteous Tsar’. Hearing about this, Milutin decided to send his messengers to Nogai, with ‘nice words’ and gifts, in order to placate his anger [1, pp. 120–121; 25, p. 347]. His delegation succeeded to convince the Tatar leader to suspend the attack, but Nogai’s mercy came with a price. The terms of Serbian-Tatar agreement, achieved in late 1293 or 1294, included Milutin official recognition of Nogai’s overlordship and another obligation: the king’s oldest son Stefan was sent to Nogai ‘to serve him’; he was allowed to return after the three years [1, pp. 121–122; 25, p. 336; 50, pp. 219–221]. Milutin’s submission signaled the end of the long conflict in the Danubian region and it was the culmination of the Tatar influence in Southeast Europe. The entire area between the slopes of the Carpathian Mountains and Thracian Plain now lied under Nogai’s authority.

It seems that the former adversaries cooperated to some extent in the future events. Namely, after the agreement with Nogai, the Serbs renewed the conflict against Byzantium and at the same time, new Tatar raids on Thrace ensued. Byzantine sources record simultaneous Serbian and Tatar attacks against the Byzantine possessions that are usually dated in 1297 [28, pp. 30–31; 73, pp. 282–283; 90, pp. 413–414]. However, soon Nogai’s influence in the Balkans crumbled, as a consequence of the war that broke out between him and his cousin – Khan Toqta. In the late 1299, or the very beginning of 1300, Nogai was slain and, as a bizarre twist of the events, many of his followers were forced to flee to Bulgaria and the neighbouring countries. They were the same ones that were in the two previous decades frequently harassed by the Tatar attacks.

Tatars in the Service of the Balkan States

In late 1300 or early 1301, Nogai’s son Chaka, accompanied by the loyal fraction of once mighty army of his father, decided to leave the Black Sea region steppes and to retreat
south of the Danube. Together with Chaka were his Bulgarian wife and her brother Theodore Svetoslav with his Tatar consort. A partnership was concluded between Chaka and the Bulgarian prince. As Pachymeres confers, Theodore Svetoslav ‘wanted to subdue the Bulgarians’ and he needed the Tatar support for it [73, pp. 290–291; 117, p. 94]. After the death of Nogai’s puppet, Emperor Smilets in 1298 [28, pp. 41–44], Bulgaria was without any effective central government and small Chaka’s army was enough to restore an order in the country. And so, Nogai’s son and Theodore Svetoslav took control over Tarnovo and eastern Bulgaria without encountering resistance.

It was a long-held view that Chaka then proclaimed himself as Bulgarian Emperor, but it has to be rejected [30]. Namely, he was never crowned with the imperial crown, nor did he aspire or needed to. From the formal point of view, Bulgaria was a land under his domination. For Chaka, Bulgaria was primarily important as a base for the reorganization of his forces and for the continuation of war against Toqta. If these were indeed his plans, they were not destined to be fulfilled. According to Pachymeres, Theodore Svetoslav suddenly captured his brother-in-law, imprisoned him and eventually ordered the Jewish executioners, positioned at the court, to murder him [73, pp. 292–293]. Baybars al-Mansuri adds that Bulgarian prince imprisoned Chaka, because he was urged by his followers, who were afraid of Toqta [29; 47, p. 117]. He then sent a word about his captive to the Khan, who ordered his execution. Chaka’s head was then sent to the Khan in Crimea as a proof [21, pp. 111–112; 53, pp. 176–177].

In this way, Theodore Svetoslav secured Toqta’s support and he was free to deal with his internal opponents. Among them the most prominent place belonged to the Bulgarian patriarch Joachim III, who was also executed, on the pretext that he was supporter of Nogai’s Tatars [32; 73, pp. 292–293].

Another member of Nogai’s lineage who found refuge in Bulgarian lands was his grandson and Chaka’s son Karakisek. According to Baybars al-Mansuri, in 1302, together with his two cousins—Jerik-Temur and Yol-Kutlu—and accompanied by 3,000 horsemen, Karakisek came to the country of Šišman. He and his men were settled there and served as mercenaries [31, pp. 114–116; 47, p. 121; 65, pp. 1101–1102]. Nogai’s grandson did not show intentions to continue the family ambitions, nor was he considered a threat to Toqta’s power, but Šišman also decided to come to the terms with Toqta and to acknowledge his overlordship. The dependent position of the Principality of Vidin towards the Tatars, including the sending of the regular tribute, is recorded around 1310 in the anonymous contemporary western source—so-called Description of Eastern Europe [50, p. 218; 58, p. 40].

Many of Nogai’s and Chaka’s subjects—Tatars, as well as Alans from the territory of the present day Moldavia—also fled to the lands south of the Danube. At the time of Chaka’s demise, a large group of Alans, numbering between 10,000 and 16,000 thousand people, of which large part were women and children, asked the government in Constantinople to provide them refuge in Thrace [55, c. 214-215; 73, c. 336-353; 95, c. 204]. The Alans were welcomed and sent to Asia Minor where they participated in the unsuccessful war against Ottoman Turks. Later, they came into the conflict with another mercenary group in Byzantine service—notorious Catalan company. When in 1305 tired and disappointed Alans finally renounced their allegiance to the Byzantine government, they were ambushed by the Catalans near the Thracian fortress of Apros, who inflicted a crushing defeat upon them. The majority of Alans were slain, but some managed to flee to Bulgaria, where they were accepted by Theodore Svetoslav [55, pp. 215–218; 62, pp. 61–62, 81–82]. These Alan immigrants are mentioned again in 1323, during the Bulgarian-Byzantine war. Alan leaders who bore Tatar names – Itil and Temur – with their men participated in the clashes around the city of Plovdiv on Bulgarian side [80, c. 172-175; 117, c. 123-125]. Once more, we hear about Alans in the Bulgarian service some four decades later. In 1365 they are mentioned as defenders of Vidin,
against forces of Hungarian king. For them, it is explicitly mentioned they were ‘Ismaelites’—that is, Muslims [31, p. 119; 113, pp. 359–360].

Besides Alans, there were other refugees from the Black Sea region steppes who fled to Byzantium after Nogai’s demise. Certain Kuchi-bakshi or Khoja-bashi, Nogai’s ‘chief magician’ (probably Buddhist), also entered into the Byzantine service. He was baptized and given a prominent position in the local administration in Asia Minor, but at one point he has fallen out of favors and found himself in prison. However, he managed to escape and to join Alan renegades. His final destiny is unknown [73, pp. 378–379, 602–603, 626–629; 91, pp. 114–117; 119, p. 262]. In Bulgaria, a seal of sword-bearer Tagchi (Μεσωνωσα Ταγχι) was found, roughly dated in the late 13–14th centuries. It is probable that this man was a Tatar, who had prominent position in Bulgarian service [17, p. 142; 49]. Anonymous continuator of archbishop Danilo II speaks about the group of Tatars and Alans, who in 1310 came to Serbia and entered into the service of king Milutin. They participated in the war that broke out at that time, between Milutin and his brother Dragutin and, according to the Serbian writer they played a key role in the king’s victory over his adversaries [1, pp. 358–359; 117, pp. 108–109]. For a short time they formed the Milutin’s elite bodyguard unit, but in 1312, at the behest of Andronicus II, they were given to Byzantium [50, pp. 253–255; 62, p. 83; 83, pp. 232–233; 95, pp. 262–263, 266–267]. Byzantine Emperor and historian John IV Kantakouzenos (1347–1354), who calls them ‘Cumans’, records that in 1320 Milutin asked for their return, but in vain as Constantinopolitan government was unwilling to deprive itself of this military asset. At that time, the residence of these men was in Thrace, but seven years later they were relocated to the Aegean islands of Lemnos, Thasos and Mytilene. In Constantinople, it was feared that they might join the Tatars of khan Öz Beg, who became a serious threat to Byzantium [80, pp. 35, 259].

The Tatar immigrants in the Balkans brought with them some aspects of nomadic military technology. During archeological excavations on Trapezitsa hill in Tarnovo and on other sites in Bulgaria, nine peculiar bone appliqués for quivers were found that exhibit obvious nomadic influence. Furthermore, composite bows that bear resemblance to the characteristic Tatar types of this weapon are depicted in the frescoes of the 14th century, preserved in several monasteries in Macedonia [8, pp. 72–77; 42]. Many place-names indirectly attest to the Tatar settlement in the Serbian and Bulgarian lands; some of them, like village Nogaevtsi in the valley of the Vardar River, are still preserved today [50, p. 363].

**Restoration of the Tatar ‘Hegemony’**

Byzantium was first among the Balkan states to recognize the potential winner of the conflict between Toqta and Nogai. As early as in 1297, Andronicus II offered his illegitimate daughter Maria to the Khan in a similar fashion as Yefrosinya was offered to Nogai quarter a century earlier. Toqta gladly accepted the offer, but the bride remained in Constantinople during the course of war and went to Sarai only after the Khan’s final victory [73, pp. 294–295; 89, pp. 208–209; 117, pp. 87–88]. Maria is probably identical with Bayalun, Greek wife of Khan Öz Beg, whom he married after the death of her first Jochid husband, as Arabic writer Ibn Duqmāq records [47, pp. 323–324; 66, p. 265]. Famous traveller Ibn Battuta met her personally and travelled with her to Constantinople in 1332, when she went back to her father [47, pp. 294–295, 302].

In order to maintain cordial relations with the Golden Horde, Andronicus II did not hesitate to send occasional presents to Toqta. These presents were considered tribute by contemporary western observers [58, p. 7], and probably by the Khan himself. In Bulgaria, Theodore Svetoslav, who became the Emperor in 1301, also recognised Toqta’s overlordship. Thus, Toqta managed to restore the political influence of the Golden Horde south of the Danube almost to its extent during the Nogai’s lifetime (with exception of the distant Serbian kingdom). As Arabic authors noted, in the beginning of the 14th century all lands from Caucasian
Derbent and Khwarezm to Constantinople had been under the sway of Toqta [47, pp. 197, 206, 447]. Not much is known about Bulgarian-Tatar relations during the reign of Toqta. There is a long-held opinion that the Khan, as a sign of gratitude for the murder of Chaka, gave his Bulgarian vassal the port of Mavrocastro (Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi), but it is unfounded [19; 111, pp. 123–124]. It is, however, certain that the Empire of Tarnovo stayed firmly in the political orbit of the Golden Horde at the beginning of the reign of Öz Beg. Anonymous Tuscan geographer who wrote between 1313 and 1315, records that Bulgaria obeys the Tatars [71, p. 176]. Other western sources confirm that impression and add more details about the western extension of the domains of the Golden Horde. In a bull of Pope John XXII from 1318, it is stated that the domains of the bishop of Kaffa in Tatar lands stretched from Sarai to Varna in Bulgaria [57, p. 549; 111, pp. 124–125]. Five years later, a Franciscan document that listed monasteries in the “lands of the Northern Tartars”, included those in Maurocastro and Vicina [22]. On many contemporary European maps and portolans, both Mavrocastro and Vicina are drawn with the Tatar tamgas on their flags and Arabic geographer al-ʿUmarī conspicuously included Danube among those rivers that flow through the Khanate of Kipchak [47, pp. 236–237].

During reign of Öz Beg, the Tatar presence south of the Danube intensified and Byzantium again became their main target. In 1321 and 1322, two Tatar raids took place. The attackers did not do much damage and their activities were limited to the vicinity of Adrianople and Bulgarian-Byzantine border [80, pp. 188–189; 84, p. 281; 117, p. 123]. It was, however, the ominous announcement of the calamities that would befall Byzantium in the years to come. New Tatar incursion in Thrace, on much larger scale than previous attacks, took place in the fall of 1323. According to Kantakouzenos, their army was led by two commanders, Taytak and Toglu Torgan, and numbered as much as 120,000 men. The Tatars plundered the countryside for forty days. Young Emperor Andronikos III, grandson of Andronikos II, harassed isolated smaller Tatar detachments, but he did not have army large enough to openly confront the invaders, who retreated only after they gathered enough booty [80, pp. 189–193; 117, pp. 126–128]. Florentine chronicler Giovanni Vilani states that the Tatars wrought unremembered havoc and that they killed or took into captivity more than 150,000 people [68, p. 275; 84, p. 291]. The figures of the attackers provided by Cantacuzenos, as well as the number of captives recorded by the Florentine chronicler are greatly exaggerated, but the inhabitants of Thrace were undoubtedly struck by the great fear of future raids, as Nicephorus Gregoras observed during his travel from Constantinople to the Serbian court couple of years later [83, p. 164; 95, pp. 374–375].

The above-mentioned Tatar invasions were caused by Bulgarian-Byzantine enmity and it seems certain that the forces of Öz Beg Khan acted in the interests of newly elected Bulgarian Emperor, successor of Theodore Svetoslav of Bulgaria. It was Michael, son of Šišman, who in 1323 managed to unite lands of Tarnovo and Vidin under a single crown, after decades of coexistence. Michael counted on strong support of the Tatar contingents from the north of the Danube when he meddled in Byzantine civil war between Andronicus II and Andronicus III in 1328 [80, pp. 294–297, 323–324; 95, pp. 430–431; 117, pp. 128–129], as well as in the war that broke out between Bulgaria and Serbia in 1330. In the decisive battle of this conflict, which took place near the city of Velbužd (modern Kyustendil in western Bulgaria), Bulgarian forces numbered some 15,000 men, of which 3,000 belonged to ‘Scythian’—that is, Tatar corps [36, pp. 121–122; 95, p. 455]. Serbian sources confirm the presence of ‘neighboring Black Tatars’ in the Michael’s army [43, p. 84; 51, pp. 108–109].

In the battle of Velbužd, Bulgarian army was utterly crushed by the enemy, being unable to resist a sudden charge of the Serbian cavalry, strengthened with the contingents of Catalan mercenaries. Michael Šišman died on the battlefield and Bulgaria was now at the mercy of the
Serbs. A political faction led by Michael’s half-brother Belaur, born from the Šišman’s marriage with his Serbian wife, was ready to offer the imperial crown to Stefan, but the king firmly rejected the offer. He was content to post on the throne Michael’s son from his first marriage, Ivan Stefan, who was also half-Serb by his maternal side [1, pp. 191–195]. Serbian lenient policies towards the defeated enemy were undoubtedly instigated by the fact that Bulgaria was in the sphere of influence of the Golden Horde. Describing a Bulgarian embassy that visited Cairo in 1331, al-ʿUmarī made a reminiscence of these events by noting that the Serbs and Bulgarians quarrelled among each other, but they nonetheless respected ‘the Sultan of Kipchak because of his great power over them’ [20, pp. 621, 627–630; 47, pp. 235–236; 51, p. 109].

Serbian protégée on the Bulgarian throne did not stay in power for long. He was overthrown in less than a year and Bulgarian nobility elected Ivan Alexander (1331–1370), son of Michael’s sister, as his successor. Ivan Alexander easily arranged relations with the Serbs, but opposition inside the country, gathered around Belaur of Vidin, was a hard nut to crack. Still, Ivan Alexander had an obvious advantage; he could count on the Tatar support. Belaur suffered a defeat [14, pp. 69–72], which was largely due to the Tatar activities around Vidin in the fall of 1331. They are concisely described in a letter of a Ragusan merchant who was the eyewitness of their raids in Northwestern Bulgaria [39, pp. 51–52]. Next year, Ivan Alexander was free to turn against Byzantium, who used the crisis in Bulgaria to gain some territorial advantages in the border region. In this Bulgarian-Byzantine war which was decided in the battle of Rusokastro «(Burgas)», 2,000 Tatars participated on victorious Bulgarian side [7, pp. 583–584; 80, pp. 458–470; 95, pp. 483–488].

During the reign of Andronikos III, relations between the Golden Horde and Byzantium reached their lowest ebb. Al-ʿUmarī recorded that the Byzantine Emperor greatly feared ‘the pressure and the malice’ of the Khan [47, p. 236]. The fear has been justified because in 1337 a ferocious Tatar attack on Thrace took place. According to Nicephorus Gregoras, it was because Byzantium had stopped to send the regular gifts to the Tatar ruler and their nobility. The Tatars seemed unstoppable. They devastated the whole region up to the vicinity of Constantinople and took great number of captives. They also inflicted a crushing defeat and completely annihilated the band of Ottoman marauders, who at that time began to regularly cross to Europe in search for booty [95, pp. 535–536; 117, p. 132].

In 1341, another serious crisis in Byzantine-Tatar relations emerged. Byzantine authorities foolishly allowed the passage through the straits to their Turkish allies—corsairs from Aydın, who plundered Bulgarian cities on the Black sea coast, but also the port of Kilia in the Danube delta, which was under the Tatar control. Öz Beg promised vengeance and allegedly declared the conquest of Constantinople as his war goal. A diplomatic mission, laden with precious gifts, was sent in a desperate attempt to placate the khan’s anger [87; 89, p. 217]. In the same year, Öz Beg died and these news must have been received in Constantinople with the great rejoice. A smaller Tatar army once again attacked Byzantium in 1342, but their success was limited because, as Kantakouzenos admits, they had nothing to plunder anymore [36, pp. 124–125; 81, p. 303; 83, p. 170].

From the Golden Horde to Ottomans

Last known Tatar leader in the Danube delta who was invested in power by the central government in Sarai was Atlamys, brother-in-law of Khan Jani Beg. He was defeated by Hungarians in 1345 [9, pp. 23–26; 66, pp. 278–279], and it is unlikely that he exercised any influence in the Balkans. In the ensuing era of The Great Troubles, the political domination of the Golden Horde altogether disappeared in the Southeast Europe. Despite that fact, during the second half of the fourteenth century, autonomous Tatar groups on northern Bulgarian frontier remained a formidable force to be reckoned with. Three Tatar princes that were defeated by Lithuanians in the Battle of Sinie Vody (1362)—Demetrius, Hajji Bey and Kutlu-
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Chapter VI

buga—maintained their independence in the region north of the Danube delta. According to Turkish historian Nesri, who wrote in the beginning of the 16th century, two of them—Yanchi (Hajji?) Bey and Kutlubuga—were asked by the Ottomans, to join them in the campaign against the Empire of Tarnovo in the penultimate decade of the 14th century [12, p. 80; 23, p. 93]. On the basis of numismatic evidence, it has been suggested that prince Kutlubuga exercised suzerainty over short-lived Bulgarian despotate of Dobruja, or at least its northern part with the capital in Silistra. If that was the case, it is also a likely explanation for the Tatar reluctance to assist the Turks [2, p. 199; 5, pp. 23–27]. Another early Ottoman writer, poet Enveri, mentions that Tatars helped the Serbs in the famous battle of Kosovo in 1389 [13, p. 147; 78, p. 38]. His notices have to be accepted with reservation, but the possibility that some Tatar detachments indeed came to aid the Serbian army via allied countries of Bulgaria or Wallachia cannot be completely excluded [36, pp. 128–129].

Tatars of the Golden Horde appeared for the last time on the Balkan stage at the very end of the 14th century, at the time when the region was already firmly under the Ottoman grip. Fleeing from the wave of destruction brought by the hordes of Tamerlane and the disaster at the battle of Terek (1395), Aktau Tatars (the name is rather tribal designation than personal name) fled to the west and settled in the lands of commander Hurmadai, who was independent Tatar leader, probably in the Prut-Dniester interfluve [48, p. 179]. Aktau Tatars were not content in their new homeland and after short time they decided to move south of the Danube delta. In 1399 they passed through Bulgaria like a storm and conquered Varna on the Black Sea coast, thus erasing the last trace of the independent Bulgarian despotate of Dobruja [2, p. 199; 12, pp. 80–83; 37, pp. 111–112; 103, p. 60]. Then, they descended in the Thrace, where they were invited to enter into the Ottoman service. Soon, the tensions arose between the newcomers and the local authorities. In order to prevent their rebellion, Ottoman sultan Bayezid (1389–1402) treacherously ordered the execution of the Tatar leaders. Without leadership, Aktau Tatars succumbed and were permanently settled in the small communities across Thrace and Southern Bulgaria [37, p. 113; 85, pp. 93–94]. Eventually, they lost their identity and melted into the Muslim population of the Ottoman Eyalet of Rumelia.

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§ 8. The Domination of the Golden Horde in the Romanian Regions

Victor Spinei

The impact of the Great Mongol Invasion of 1241–1242 on the Romanian regions was particularly deep, causing massive economic and political disruptions that inter alia resulted in the inclusion of wide territories from outside of the Carpathian arch into the Golden Horde state for more than a century. Naturally, this historical sequence raised a major interest in historiography, being the subject of numerous studies and monographs [93, pp. 33–66; 48, pp. 101–121; 54, pp. 42–67, 79–132; 82, pp. 64, 94–97; 100, II, pp. 628–656; 91, pp. 236–272; 34, pp. 243–253]. Moreover, monographic volumes and various other studies that treat the events related to the Mongols’ conquests in Eastern and Central Europe synthetically also illustrate aspects regarding the Danube-Carpathian lands [103, pp. 20–21; 107, pp. 66–67, 74–76; 63, pp. 63–64, 68–70; 47, pp. 410–414; 30, pp. 95–104, 112, pp. 343–346]. The conclusions reached by the historians interested in the above topics mainly concerned, until several decades ago, the information resulting from the Western and Eastern narrative and diplomatic

32 All terms and transcriptions provided by the author of the article.
sources. Their number is low, and their content rather poor in terms of data, so that they project only partial aspects of the demographic and political realities of the regions on the Lower Danube, thus raising many questions. At a certain point, there was the illusion that the informative substance of these sources was fully exhausted. Still, beyond this pessimistic perspective, certain persuasive researches identified sources that had either not been analysed until then or had been only partly explored. In the years following World War II, during which the field of medieval archaeology progressed, numerous vestiges dated to the period of the Mongol expansion were brought to light, substantially enriching the topics related to the contacts between the autochthones and the invaders. Among the finds recovered then are also a great number of coins, the prospecting of which led to very interesting conclusions. In the current phase of research, comprehensive investigations regarding the history of the Romans and Mongols of the thirteenth-fourteenth centuries cannot be undertaken without a thorough parallel examination of the written and archaeological sources.

When the Mongols started their great campaign in Europe, the Romanian regions had just crossed a long critical phase, the consequence of the successive settling in the plain areas north of the Lower Danube—in Budjak and Bărăgan—of the Pecheneg, Uzes and Cuman tribes, and of the inclusion of Transylvania within the Kingdom of Hungary. The nomads’ predatory raids and skirmishes with the neighbouring states brought instability to the area, stifling demographic growth, preventing economic prosperity, and delaying the coagulation of vigorous polities [101, pp. 47–305; 52, pp. 32–55]. In these circumstances, on the one hand, the Danube-Carpathian lands were not attractive targets for the Asian riders’ predatory attacks, and, on the other hand, were not great hindrances for the military actions of the Mongol hosts. It is for these reasons that they were only a pale flicker in the landscape of the political potentates of the era, and of the historiographical circles as well.

Already before the Mongols’ penetration into the Danube-Carpathian regions, certain repercussions of their campaigns in Eastern Europe were registered at a great distance from the epicentre of the military confrontations. Thus, many historians consider that the 1227 request of the Cuman contingents to the ecclesiastic authorities of Hungary to patronize their evangelization—soon resulting in the creation of the Cumans’ Bishopric in Southeast Transylvania, northeastern Wallachia (Muntenia) and southwestern Moldova—would have been due to the shock felt by the Turkish tribes following the defeats inflicted by the detachment led by Jābā (Gebe) and Sūbūtāi north of Caucasus in 1222 and at Kalka in 1223. It has been assumed that through this confessional initiative, the new converts wanted to obtain the benevolence and protection of the Kingdom of Hungary in the eventuality of renewed Mongol aggression [82, pp. 66–67; 61, p. 131; 47, p. 406; 67, p. 260; 80, pp. 97–98]. Surely enough, the attacks recommenced in 1236, at much higher amplitude. The serious defeats suffered by the Cumans’ tribal confederations in the Volga basin and in the Ponto-Caspian steppes forced them to find refuge westwards, in the Pannonian Plain and the Balkan Peninsula. The group coordinated by Köten Khan reached Hungary after crossing the Northern Carpathians through the Verecke Pass—the traditional migratory route from the North Black Sea region into Pannonia—thus avoiding the territory of Moldova. On the other hand, the group that penetrated south of the Danube, where it met the hostile Bulgarian tsar, could not have reached that region unless they crossed the southern part of Moldova and the eastern part of Wallachia.

The Mongol army advanced down to the territories neighbouring those already inhabited by the Romanians in 1239 or 1240. In the Hijrah year 635 (= A.D. 1237–1238), the Mongols penetrated into the Desht-i Kipchak (the Qipchaq Steppe / the Cumans’ Steppe) and, after arduous fights, defeated the armies coordinated by Köten. In 1239, the Cuman khan requested king Béla IV to grant him refuge in the Kingdom of Hungary. It is also possible that the deserted area might have been taken over quasi-instantaneously by the victors, allowing the possibility that the Mongol detachments advanced all the way to the mouths of the Danube.
According to the timeless laws of war, all territories of those defeated in military confrontations were seized by the conquerors, even when decisive confrontations had taken place only within a limited space.

If for the Mongols’ penetration along the lower course of the Danube we do not have information, their advancement towards the northeastern limits of the territories inhabited by the Romanians is, however, recorded by contemporary sources. After the conquest of Kiev of 6 December 1240 (some other pieces of information, less credible, indicate the date of 19 November), Mongol detachments penetrated into the western regions of the Principality of Kiev, as well as into the Principality of Galicia-Volhynia, where the local leaders, dispirited and considering that any opposition would be useless, bowed to the aggressors. Most operatively, without allowing themselves any rest after the lengthy military operations in Russia and Desht-i Kipchak, the Mongols prepared to attack the countries in Central and Eastern Europe, the invasion of which they had planned long before.

At this phase of the campaign, the Mongols’ supreme commander, Batu, did not have the same manpower available which he had counted on when the great invasion in Eastern Europe started. Naturally, some of his soldiers died during the confrontations with third parties, but most probably the manpower could have been completed by integrating detachments recruited from within the subjected populations into the invaders’ hosts, according to the steppe riders’ usual practice. On the contrary, some of the Mongols’ army bodies that had participated in the fights with the Russians, Cumans and other peoples in Eastern Europe were withdrawn to Asia after the capitulation of Kiev. Thus, among the active chieftains on the theatres in Poland and Hungary, we do not find anymore the names of some of the notable members of the Chinggisids’ clan, such as Güyük, son of Ögedei, and Möngke, son of Tolui, both future Great Khans of the Mongol Empire. Obviously, they did not retreat alone, but accompanied by their subordinating troops. The Empire’s supreme authority probably considered that the most important objectives of the campaign—the conquest of the plain area north of the Caspian Sea, the Caucasus Mountains and the Black Sea, including the imposition of hegemony over the Russians and other Eastern European peoples—had been accomplished. Although the continuation of the expansion towards Central and Eastern Europe held a somewhat lower priority within the Mongols’ expansion plans, this military enterprise was not at all underestimated.

The command of the expeditionary corps, led by Batu Khan, was well advised about the high combative potential of the Central and Eastern European states, with the Arpadian Kingdom appearing a formidable adversary. Already before the settling of the confrontations with the Russian principalities, the conquest of the Kingdom of Hungary was among the Mongols’ strategic priority plans. The testimony of Dominican friar Julian, sent on mission to Eastern Europe while the invasion of the armies of Batu Khan in Russia, is suggestive in this regard: ‘Fertur a pluribus re certa et dux de Su[z]dal mandavit per me regi Hungariorum viva voce quod nocte dieque consilium habent Tartari, qualiter vincant et obtineant regnum Hungariorum christianorum’ [51, pp. 38, 42; 38, pp. 177–178] (It has been a long known fact that the prince of Suzdal verbally transmitted through me to the king of the Hungarians that the Mongols were deliberating night and day how to defeat and conquer the Kingdom of Christian Hungarians). Moreover, Mongols also envisaged the invasion of Germany (Alemania) [49, pp. 25, 29, 33; 39, p. 158]. In order to start the military operations, in the winter of 1240–1241 the Mongols’ hosts were concentrated in the western territories of the Principality of Galicia-Volhynia and probably in the northern half of Moldova. To avoid raising suspicions on an imminent penetration into Hungary, between their locations and the frontiers of the Kingdom, they preserved an area that was not subjected to plunders and which could be crossed in four to five days [89, p. 32, 71; 90, pp. 164–165], which would probably equate to about 150–200 km. The protection of this buffer area also served the purpose of ensuring the victuals for the
fighters and also fodder for the animals when the attack would begin. In order to support the intendancy services, the subjected communities were forced to provide food products to the campaigning armies. Such tasks had been attested for the Bolokhovo inhabitants, whose domains were located in the middle course of the Southern Bug. In 1241, they received the order to hand over wheat and millet to the Mongols [12, column 792]. It is very possible that other Russian and Romanian collectivities might have been obliged to provide similar items, without having been recorded by contemporary chronicles. During the Christmas feast of 1240, in the Kingdom of Hungary there were reports regarding Mongols who started plundering the lands near the frontier towards Russia: ‘circa nativitatem Domini fama fuit, quod confinia Hungarie Ruscie contigua [continua], Tartari deuastabant’ [89, pp. 29, 68; 90, pp. 156–157].

The Mongol armies gathered in the winter of 1240–1241 near the northeastern slopes of the Eastern Carpathians, and started the general offensive towards the western regions in March 1241. Poland and Hungary were attacked simultaneously by several corps, such a tactics did not allow time for helping those on the defensive and, on the other side, offered facilities for provisioning to the invaders. The main wing of the armies directed towards the Kingdom of Hungary, under the coordination of Batu, forced the crossing of the Northern Carpathians through the so-called Gate of Russia (ad dictam portam Ruscie) [89, pp. 32, 71; 90, pp. 164–165], a term used to designate the Verecke Pass (nowadays Nizhni Verecki). The fortified settlements to the north of Bukovina, which, according to archaeological research undertaken after World War II, ended their existence in mid-thirteenth century, were most probably destroyed by the troops subordinated to Batu while they were marching towards the frontiers of Hungary [22, p. 89 ff.; 5, pp. 266–270, 275].

One of the most robust wings, undoubtedly, the second most important among the invading forces, led by Kadan, son of Great Khan Ögedei, advanced westwards on a road situated ‘between Rus’ and Cumania’—that is through the northern part of Moldova. In three days, he crossed the entire forested areas of the Eastern Carpathians, reaching the eastern side of Transylvania, the Someșul Mare Valley, at the end of March 1241. The first to oppose the Mongol advance was the Saxon community of Rodna, colonised there by the Hungarian kings for the mining purposes. The Saxon’s determination in defending themselves and wishing to avoid possible losses, prompted Kadan to simulate a retreat. The inhabitants of Rodna—which were not familiar with the nomads’ tactical tricks—had the naiveté to believe that their warrior initiative frightened the Mongols. Their sudden return found the Saxons completely unprepared, and thus they were easily defeated. Six hundred of those whose lives were spared, led by ‘count Aristald’, were forced to follow Kadan when crossing Transylvania on his way towards Hungary [89, p. 33, 72; 90, p. 164–167]. The episode that took place in Rodna is illustrative of the manner in which the Mongols filled their ranks during military campaigns. Explicit references to such events are very rare, especially for the operational theatres in Europe, but this does not mean that such practices were not generalised. Without such supplements to the numbers of fighters, their expansive vigour throughout the long campaigns would have been drastically diminished, especially considering that the demographic potential of the Mongols’ homeland was never high. Accompanied by the 600 Saxons, Kadan reached Oradea and entered the city rather easily but found tougher resistance when they besieged the fortification, which they conquered only after they cracked its walls using seven stone-throwing devices. The punishment for those who resisted was extremely cruel: not only the civilians were killed, but also the clergy and the women, while the cathedral and the other churches were looted, desecrated and torched [89, pp. 45–46, 85–86; 90, pp. 198–201].

From among the most important cities of central Transylvania conquered by the Mongols, mention should be made of Cluj [46, p. 65], which probably also became the victim of the expeditionary group led by Kadan, while traveling on the route between Rodna and Oradea.
Fig. 1. The putative route taken by the Mongol units crossing the Carpathians on their way into Transylvania and Hungary in the spring of 1241.
A Mongol host, unnamed by the written sources, advanced from Central Moldova towards Transylvania along the Bistrița Valley, as suggested by the archaeological research undertaken in the fortified settlement of Piatra Neamț—Bătca Doamnei, dated to the end of the 12th century and the first half of the 13th. The archaeological excavations unearthed a large number of weapons, implements, clothing pieces, and iron harness items [95, pp. 441–454], indicating a sudden abandonment due to an immediate great danger, certainly represented by the Mongol movement. Advancing north-westwards, along the Bistrița River, the bulk of this army made junction with the hosts coordinated by Kadan.

Another wing of the Mongols acted in the south of Moldova, where, after having crossed the Siret River, penetrated into 'the country of the Cumans' bishop', crushing the armies sent to confront it. We do not know whether this wing advanced from Galicia (Halych) and northern Moldova, or from Desht-i Kipchak. It was led by a certain Bochetor [89, pp. 33, 72; 90, pp. 166–167], whose name was rendered in a deformed manner by Roger (Ruggiero) of Torre Maggiore, the one who wrote about the events. It is also possible that this anthroponym might have referred to Böchek, son of Tolui, or Bârkâchar, son of Jöchi (Joči) and brother of Batu. After having destroyed the Cumans’ Bishopric, the Mongols moved into Transylvania via the Oituz Pass, the easiest accessible way from Moldova towards the inner Carpathian Arc (Fig. 1). According to Tholomeus of Lucca (1236?–1326/1327) and other Italian chronicles, the task of defending the mountain pass befell on the Romanians and Szeklers (Ollaci et Siculi), but they did not manage to stop the advancement of the invaders [104, p. 539; 99, pp. 7–15; 102, pp. 23–38, 119–134]. Nor did the forces led by the voivode of Transylvania, who tried to oppose them in Burzen (Byrsa) land (Țara Bârsei) but were not of any considerable effectiveness. The Mongols continued their advancement westwards along the valley of the Olt River, plundering the Cistercian monastery of Cârța. The campaign in southern Transylvania resulted inter alia in the conquest of the cities Sibiu and Alba Iulia [46, p. 65].

As specified in a letter addressed by King Béla IV to Pope Innocent IV from 11 November 1250, during the campaign against Hungary, an army of Mongols passed through a region situated in ‘the neighbourhood of the Cumans beyond the Danube, and of the Bulgars’ (in confinio Cumanorum ultra Danubium et Bulgarorum) [57, p. 261, where the letter is erroneously dated to 1254], a statement from where it would result that the territory of Wallachia would also have been affected by the invasion. It is possible that, within the strategic coordinates of this encroachment of the eastern half of the Kingdom of Hungary, the Mongols might have initiated attacks both towards Transylvania in the Olt Valley, through the Turnu Roșu Pass, and towards Banat through the Danube Gorges (Clisura Dunării/Banatska Klisure). The military confrontations between the Mongols and the Romanians are tangentially referred to by the famous Persian chronicler Rashid al-Din (1247–1318), who had access to the rich documentary resources available at the court of the Ilkhans. The Romanians are designated through two different ethnonyms: Ulagh and Qara-Ulagh (the Black Romanians), reflecting the fact that they occupied distinct territories and did not have similar political statuses. Against them acted the detachment led by Böchek, who, ‘passing on the road of the Black Romanians, through the mountains down there, conquered those peoples of Romania’, and later on won another victory against a certain Mishlove [86, p. 70; see also 87, II, p. 332], probably a local chieftain. The Qara-Ulagh (the Black Romanians) might have lived outside the Carpathian arch, while it is also possible that the Ulagh (the Romanians) in the text of Rashid al-Din might have originated from Wallachia or Transylvania. The invasion of the territories of the Romanians (Blacci) is also mentioned in a writ by the Florentine Dominican Riccoldo da Monte di Croce (ca. 1243–1320) [88, pp. 106–107]. Moreover, another erudite originating from Tuscany, Giovanni Villani (ca. 1275–1348), speaks in his chronicle of the conquest of Wallachia (Bracchia) by the Mongols [109, p. 71; 110, pp. 255–256].
Hurrying to reach the Pannonian Plain as soon as possible, so as to make the junction with the main body of the armies led by Batu, who was expecting an energetic response from King Bela IV, the detachments ruled by Kadan, Buri, Böchek and the other Chinggisid chieftains did not have enough time to destroy and plunder on a wider scale. Still, when the signal was given for the retreat from Hungary, after they received the news of the Great Khan Ögedei’s death, the groups of Mongols indulged in slave capturing and terrifying robberies. We do not have information on the road followed by the main corps of the armies led by Batu, but one can assume that he preferred to retreat also through the Verecke Pass. Numerous detachments of Mongols returned to their lands of origin, crossing Transylvania, where they caused important damage. Since the Mongols did not allow themselves to leave troops for the surveillance of the regions crossed in 1241, the local Transylvanians took advantage of this situation to strengthen the fortresses in the area. Unfortunately for them, these were not sufficiently equipped to withstand the invaders’ attacks [89, pp. 55–56; 90, pp. 220–225]. Other groups of Mongols, commanded by Kadan, who stationed in the winter of 1241–1242 near the coasts of Dalmatia, moved towards the Eurasian territories crossing the northern regions of the Bulgarian Tsardom. The route followed by the Mongol hosts is marked by the traces of destruction identified within certain fortresses as well as by several monetary hoards from Dobruja hidden by the local inhabitants [78, pp. 97–98; 1, pp. 4–9]. In the year in which the Mongols decided to withdraw from East-Central Europe—1242, news came to the West, received with joy by all, that they were defeated by ‘the king of the land of the Vlachs’: ‘Des Tartares revint noviele, / Ki par tot le monde fu biele, / Que li rois de la tiere as Blas / Les ot descomfis a un pas’ [117, p. 819]. The bishop of Tournai, recorded in the rhymed chronicle of Phillepe Mousket (pp. 1220–1282), this information raises inherent suspicions with respect to its veridity. The French poet used the ethnonym Blas to designate the Balkan Vlachs and the representatives of the Second Bulgarian Tsardom (Johannitsa, called Kaloyan—Jehanins—is named in the chronicle as Sires des Blas et des Comins <Comans>) [117, p. 765], the ruler of which, Tsar John Asan II, died in 1241 and was replaced on the throne by his underage son Koloman, who, obviously, was not yet able to distinguish himself on the battlefield. A victory of the Asanides is hard to conceive—excluding any eventual small successes—given that only a few years after the invasion, explicit information is available concerning the tributary status of the Slavic polities in the Balkans under the Mongols.

The great Mongol invasion of 1236–1242, probably the most fulminant military undertaking throughout the entire Middle Ages, resulted in an array of lasting ethnic-demographic, economic, political, cultural, and confessional repercussions for the destiny of the peoples in the western part of Eurasia. The consequences of the military confrontations were not always uniform. In my opinion, within the regions affected by the invasion, three main distinct categories can be identified. In certain countries—Poland, Moravia, Hungary—homicide, destruction and plundering took place throughout the campaign, but the Mongols did not impose thereafter any coercive obligations. Some other countries—Rus’, Danube Bulgaria and Serbia—suffered the same calamities and were subjected to impoverishing tributary provisions for a long time. A third category of regions—Volga Bulgaria, Cumania, the North-Caucasian area and Crimea—lost their political autonomy, being occupied directly by the Mongols and falling under their direct administration. The proposed distinction has not remained immovable, certain categories undergoing evolutions throughout time.

In general lines, the three categories are also found in the area inhabited by the Romanians, their configuration being to a great extent influenced by the previous political entities. Thus, Transylvania, where the percentage of the Romanians within the demographic compound was considerable, left within the frontiers of the Kingdom of Hungary, being protected by the attacks of the neighbours east of the Carpathian chain, and also by the fortifications erected by the authorities in the more accessible passes. In the regions outside the Carpathian
arch, there were no such imposing landform barriers, but in spite of that the Mongols did not want to fully annex them but only partly. In a predictable manner, they took over their territories held by the Cumans, former owners of the Ponto-Caspian plains. Like the other nomad Turkic steppe tribes—the Pechenegs and the Uzes—the Cumans had their wintered in the strip of plain north of the Lower Danube and in the area of the maritime lakes between the mouth of the Danube and the estuary of the Dniester; that is, in Budjak and Bărăgan, from where they would go northwards together with their families and their flocks during the warm seasons. In their search of plains favourable for flocks and herds, they followed the courses of the main rivers, advancing into northern Moldova and Wallachia. Usually, they avoided the hilly lands covered by thick forests, so they did not entered the Subcarpathian area, and did not exceed, in the west, the courses of the Siret River in Moldova and, respectively, of the Olt in Wallachia. The entrenchment of the Turkic nomads in Budjak and Bărăgan forced the local agricultural population to migrate northwards and westwards, in lands more protected from their plundering raids [97, pp. 84–104; 101, pp. 307–360; 85, pp. 89–93, 139–145, 230–232]. These territories remained outside the possessions of the Golden Horde, but could not avoid the position of tributaries to the powerful state created in Western Siberia and the southern part of Eastern Europe.

The boundaries of the territory occupied directly by the Mongols and their Turkic subjects are hard to establish with precision. Slightly more precise data are provided by the archaeological researches undertaken during the last decades, with priority given to the ceramic and monetary finds. In this regard, we refer to the reddish-yellowish ceramic species (Fig. 8/2) produced by the craftsmen in the eastern urban centres of the Golden Horde that brought over technologies of older traditions. Its unique quality determined its special appreciation, so that in many of the European regions of the Mongol Empire it had a large proliferation, often replacing other types of ceramic products. Its finding in the rural settlements of Moldova and Dobruja indicate the fact that the respective villages were within the economic orbit of the reddish-yellowish pottery production centres, which enjoyed the protection of the authorities. It was from such centres that the commercialisation of the produced goods was assured, with priority in the area controlled by the Mongol administrative factors and, to a much more limited extent, beyond the limits hereof, where the reddish-yellowish ceramicware is identified in conjunction with the pottery items created by the local craftsmen. The charting of the settlements where the reddish-yellowish pottery was prevalent indicates that the dissemination area did not extend westwards which was the course of Siret River. Between the Siret and the Prut this ceramic artefacts has been discovered so far only in the southern half of this interfluve, while between the Prut and the Dniester, the limits of the dissemination hereof go northwards, occupying approximately two thirds of the surface of Bessarabia [21, passim]. Isolated reddish-yellowish ceramic potsherds were identified in the levels dating back to the mid-14th century at Baia, Mihoveni, Suceava (Suceava County), etc., but their percentage was limited among the pottery recovered when archaeological excavations were carried out [37, pp. 243–253]. That is why the finds of northwestern Moldova have another meaning than those evoked above. According to the available information, the reddish-yellowish ceramic species has not been recovered, so far at least, in the eastern part of Wallachia. On the contrary, it was identified in Dobruja [96, pp. 231–238]. Several monetary issues, coined by the khans of the Golden Horde, were found in southern Moldova [18, pp. 135, 138–140, 143–144, 146–150; 19, pp. 96–113] and in Dobruja [78, pp. 115–124]. These finds support the idea that the dissemination area of the reddish-yellowish pottery west of the Dniester indicates the territories that were under Mongol administration. It should be mentioned that in the current phase of research, the production and usage of this ceramic species in Moldova and Dobruja is attested only starting from the 14th century. As for the previous period, we do not have evidence regarding the limits of the extension of the direct occupation by the Golden Horde in the regions
to the right of the Dniester. One can assume though that the area of Mongols’ hegemony in the second half of the 13th century was in general lines similar to the one in the first half of the following century.

The involvement of the Mongol ethnic element in capturing and administering the regions on the Lower Danube and the lower basin of the Dniester is not reflected in a relevant manner in the available sources. It is a well-known fact that the Mongols’ limited demographic availabilities allowed them to undertake only a superficial colonisation of the huge territories they conquered in Eurasia. The khans only firmly assumed the hegemonic prerogatives, meaning that they rigorously supervised the stability of the domains conquered through military coercion and conveniently benefitted from the tributary provisions imposed on the local communities. In order to raise government efficiency, they widely used the cooperation with various representatives of the enslaved peoples, with experience in the management of the administrative problems, and also with skills in crafts and commercial activities. Once subjected to the conquerors and the loss of military power, in order to avoid riots and claiming autonomy, the peoples included into the Mongol Empire benefitted from a certain protection of their own daily life norms, in the spirit of the precept designated as pax Mongolica, which supposed the unconditioned acceptance of the political supremacy of the Chinggisids.

Among the tribes that had to assume the statute of vassal, there were also the Cumans. They stood up firmly and steadily against the aggressors and consequently paid for their headstrongness with tens thousands victims. In spite of this hecatomb as well as the massive migration towards other meridians, the number of those who survived the invasion cataclysm was considerable, so that throughout the decades that followed, the Mongols’ long cohabitation with the Cumans and other Turkic groups in Western Asia and Eastern Europe resulted in the linguistic assimilation of the former [10, pp. 65–67; 13, pp. 242–244]. Within this process the group holding political supremacy lost its ethnic individuality and left itself absorbed by the subordinate Turkic entities but numerically prevalent. The situation might have seemed unlikely if it had not been reiterated in the case of the Bulgars and the southern Slavs, the Rus’/Scandinavians and the Eastern Slavs, the francophone Normans and the Anglo-Saxons, the Lombards and the Italians, etc. The perpetuation of the Cumans and possibly of other Turkic groups within the territory of the Golden Horde was registered not only in the Pontic-Caspian steppes but also in Southeast Moldova. The archaeological research undertaken in the barrow compounds led to the identification of several tombs specific to the nomad Turks, dating back to the second half of the 13th century and the first half of the 14th [8, pp. 28–39; 9, pp. 65–79]. It is hard to specify whether they belonged to the Turkic communities that already lived in the area before the Mongols’ arrival or if they should be assigned to groups of nomads moved by khans, from Desht-i Kipchak to the places emptied by those who left for Pannonia and the Balkans. The assumption, according to which some of the nomads’ barrows discovered on both banks of the lower course of the Dniester belonged to the enclaves of the Chornye klobuki, dislocated from the course of the Ros River [8, p. 32, 39], does not seem to be fully convincing.

The effective takeover of the flatlands of Moldova and Wallachia took place either simultaneously with the execution of the invasion of 1241–1242 or immediately after its completion. There are several pieces of contemporary written evidence that indicate the application of the Mongol hegemony on the Lower Danube River region during the first decades after the great invasion. The statute of the region is reflected, inter alia, in the letter of Béla IV of 11 November 1250, specified above, where one can read that regions, such as Ruscia, Cumania, Brodnic and Bulgaria—previously “for the most part … obeying” (in magna parte … subiacebant) to the Kingdom of Hungary—had recently become the possession of the Mongols [57, p. 260]. As understood by the Arpadian chancellery service, the notions of Cumania and Brodnic referred to the counties east of the Kingdom, corresponding to the territory of Mol-
Illustrative for the extension of the sovereignty of the Golden Horde is the notification contained in the report by William of Rubruck for his trip in the Mongol Empire in 1253–1255. According to the Flemish Franciscan, ‘Ab orificio Tanais versus occidentem usque ad Danubium totum est eorum, etiam ultra Danubium versus Constantinopolin, Blakia que est terra Assani et minor Bulgaria usque in Sclavoniam omnes salvunt eis tributum’ (From the mouth of Tanais [the Don] westwards, as far as the Danube, everything is theirs [the Tartars’] even beyond the Danube, towards Constantinople, Blakia which is the country of Asan and Lesser Bulgaria as far as Sclavonia, all pay them tribute) [92, pp. 167–168]. Since the Balkan states had accepted the payment of the tribute to the Mongols, it goes without saying that the Romanians north the Danube could not have avoided this obligation. In fact, the messenger of King of France at the court of the great khan mentions that envoys of the Romanians (Blaci) would give gifts to the khan of the Golden Horde, together with the representatives of other European peoples [92, p. 209].

The inclusion of the Romanian regions within the Empire of the Horde is also attested by several Islamic sources. Among these, mention should be made of the encyclopaedic work elaborated by al-Nuwayri (1279–1333), a prestigious erudite from Mamluk Egypt. He assigns a large offensive to the elder son of Chinggis Khan, Jöchi (Joëi) Khan, who would have ‘crushed the Turkic tribes of the Qipchaq people and other ethnicities, such as the Alans, Ases, Vlachs, Circassians, Russians and other inhabitants of the Northern Lands’. Later on, all these peoples, previously mastered by Jöchi, came to be ruled by Batu Khan, Sartaq and the sons and brothers of Batu [27, p. 149, note 1]. Al-Nuwayri was wrong when he assigned the offensive of the ‘Northern Lands’ to Jöchi. He was probably confused by the fact that the territories dominated by Batu Khan were designated in the eastern world under the name of ‘Ulus of Jochi’. On the other hand, the enumeration of the peoples that had entered under the khans’ hegemony is perfectly correct, a fact that is not at all surprising, considering the constant and amicable contacts between the Mamluk state and the Golden Horde that allowed the transmission to Egypt of precise information on political and demographic realities of the Ponto-Caspian space. Tributary to the writings of his predecessors, another chronicler of the Mamluk Sultanate, al-‘Ayni (1361–1451), enumerated among the Mongols’ conquests the same peoples as those specified by al-Nuwayri, but indicated Batu Khan and his relatives as leaders of the military actions—this time correctly [25, p. 503]. Having other sources of information than his co-nationals of the Mamluk Sultanate, Ahmad al-Qalqashandi (1355/1356–1418) enumerated among the Mongols’ possessions ‘the Khwarezm, Desht-i Kipchak, the countries of the Khazars, Crimean Tartars, Azakians, Circassians, Bulgars, Vlachs, Ases and Russians’ [26, p. 404, note 3]. The obedient status of the Romanians—in fact, of only a part of them—in relation to the Mongols can be inferred from a formula contained in Johann von Würzburg’s poem entitled Wilhelm von Österreich, composed in the early 14th century. The verses of interest refer to a—essentially imaginary—prolonged journey undertaken by the hero of the work, who, after passing through the Hungarians (Ungern), reached ‘the Cumans from Tartaria / where the Vlachs live’ (zu den Valwen in Thartary / den die Walachen wonent) [115, p. 13].

The territory of Moldova served on many occasions as a crossing point for numerous Mongol military troops launched in campaigns undertaken in the neighbouring regions. Among these, of larger notoriety were those initiated by Nogai, one of the most ambitious and energetic strategists of the Horde. Apart from the undertaking of military actions in the Russian principalities and against the Persian Ilkhanate, he interfered with considerable self-confidence in the dynastic and inter-state disputes in the Balkans, restarted after the winning back of Constantinople by the Byzantines. Upon the request of the Bulgarian tsar and of the Seljûq Sultan Izzeddin Keykavus, who were in conflict with Emperor Michael VIII Palaeologus, in 1265 Nogai started a reprisal expedition in Thrace [27, p. 154; 81, I, pp. 229–240;
The hostility of the Golden Horde towards Byzantium was also due to the fact that the Empire had amicable relations with the Persian Ilkhanate, the Sarai khans’ arch enemy. In order to throw down the Mongols’ alliance with the Bulgarian tsars and avoid new attacks, the Constantinopolitan diplomacy made efforts to get Nogai’s benevolence. In this regard, he was offered a wife from one of the natural daughters of Michael VIII [81, I, pp. 231, 265; 56, I, p. 149]. To increase the efficiency of the military actions in the northern part of the Balkan Peninsula, Nogai set one of his residences in the northern Dobruja, at Isaccea, where the easiest Danube crossing point near the Delta was located; that facilitated the link between Bessarabia and Dobruja. The good relations between the Byzantium and the Mongols got damaged, together with the death of Michael VIII, so that during the first years of reign of Andronikos II (1281–1328), an army of ‘Paristrian Scythians’—an archaic name that designated, certainly, the Mongols—penetrated the east of Thrace, though it was defeated near Mesembria [81, II, pp. 80–81].

Several years later, more precisely in 1285, the ruler of the Horde initiated a new ample invasion of the countries in Central-Eastern Europe. Hungary and Poland were the main targets of this campaign. The coordination of the operations in the Kingdom of Hungary was assigned to Tölä Buqa (Tula-Buga), nephew of Töde Möngke Khan, and to Nogai [58, pp. 221–223; 94, pp. 271–282]. The former probably directed his armies towards the Verecke Pass, while Nogai intended to cross the Oituz Pass to attack Brașov (Nogai poide na Brashev) [12, column 890]. This itinerary would have clearly crossed the southern half of Moldova. Like in 1241–1242, the defence of the mountain passes towards Transylvania was entrusted to the Szeklers and the Romanians, who, because of the circumstances, were joined by the Saxons. Near the Carpathian passes massive palisades were built (indagines in Latin, prisăci in Romanian, gyepü in Hungarian) in order to prevent the incursions of the enemies from the east: ‘Tartari […] venientes fere a VII Castris [Siebenbürgen = Transylvania]. A VII Castris incipiendio fere [?] usque ad Danubium totam terram devastarunt. […] Nunc autem ipsi Tartari presidio fuge manus evadere cupientes Vngarorum, usque ad VII Castra pervenerunt, sed Siculi, Olachi et Saxones omnes vias ipsorum [Tartarorum] cum indaginibus stipaverunt sive giraverunt et sic de vita ipsorum omnino sunt de necessitate cogente ibidem castra eorum sunt metati’ [70, II, pp. 419–420; 45, pp. 263–264]. The row of fortification with stone walls and the tough response of the local forces, in conjunction with the organisational dysfunctions on the Mongols’ side, resulted in great losses for the aggressors [94, pp. 277–280].

During the last decades of the 13th century, Nogai consolidated his positions in the northwestern area of the Black Sea and on the Lower Danube. It was not a coincidence that Rashid al-Din wrote in his Chronicle about the fact that he extended his domination over the territories of the ‘Orus (Russians), Ulagh / Ulakh (Romanians) and khart / khrb (unidentified people), which he conquered and established there his yurt-’. These events took place in the context of the reign of Tölä Buqa (Tula-Buga) Khan (1287–1290) [86, p. 125; 87, II, p. 363]. The Persian chronicler was certainly wrong when he assigned to Nogai the subjection of the Russians and Romanians, a fact that actually took place about half a century before, during the reign of Batu Khan, but he was correct in appreciating that Nogai had extended his authority over them. Nogai’s ambitions were even higher, so that he did not hesitate to deny the political prerogatives of the legitimate khans of Sarai and assume the hegemony in the western area of the Golden Horde, recognised as such also externally. Significant for his claims was the issuance at Isaccea (Sakchi) of certain monetary types with his own heraldic symbols [77, pp. 291–304; 78, pp. 93–128; 69, pp. 3–9; 24, pp. 129–145]. This attitude naturally led him to a direct conflict with Toqta Khan, who had occupied the throne of Sarai since 1291. The first conflicts between them led to Nogai’s victory, but the decisive confrontation took place in the Hijrah year 699 (=28.09.1299–15.09.1300) [2, p. 114; 27, p. 159; 87, II, pp. 364–
365], probably near the Dnieper, where Nogai was defeated, losing his life on the battlefield. As Rashid al-Din claims, Nogai’s sons, disheartened by the outcome of the conflict, took refuge at the Hungarians (Keler / Kilar and Bashghird / Bashghurd) accompanied by one thousand soldiers [86, p. 129; 87, p. 365]. Unfortunately, the chronicler in the service of the Persian Ilkhan does not specify whether this solution was taken by all or only a part of Nogai’s descendants, and also does not develop on the position taken by the Hungarian officials towards the rump group. Naturally, any support given to Nogai’s descendants, at a moment in which the outcome of the Mongol infighting was not fully settled, would have constituted a manifest act of hostility towards the legitimate dynasty of the Golden Horde. Briefly mentioning the main moments of Toqta’s reign—in the work dedicated to the history of the Mongols, written in the first years of the 14th century—the Armenian scholar Hethum (Hayton) mentioned, among others, the occasional wars carried out by the khan against the Kingdom of Hungary (Aucune foiz [Tocthaï...] movent guerre au roiaume de Ungarie / Quandoque movent isti guerram [...] cum regno Hungarice), without any additional details [114, pp. 215 and 335]). By corroborating the information provided by Rashid al-Din with that of Hethum, we can deduce that Toqta’s military actions were of a retaliatory nature, caused by the Hungarian support of his adversaries. In spite of his success, the khan of Sarai was not able to operatively regain his authority over the counties on the Lower Danube, where Nogai’s former adherents still held strong positions. Proving a lack of political realism, his sons engaged in fierce fights for power in ‘the countries of the Russians and the Vlachs’ and in ‘the country of the Alans’ [2, pp. 115–117; 27, pp. 160–161; 11, pp. 383–384], instead of uniting and mobilising their forces against those of the same blood who were threatening them from the East. The ‘countries’ specified in the Islamic sources were probably situated east of the Eastern Carpathians. If ‘the country of the Vlachs’ had been mentioned alone, then it would have been plausible to identify it as the Balkan Vlachia, that is, the Second Bulgarian Tsardom, but the association to ‘the country of the Russians’ pleads for its localisation in Moldova. After thorough confrontations with his brothers, Nogai’s elder son, Jöge (Čākā), managed to impose his suzerainty in the countries near the mouths of the Danube, on both banks of the large river. Just like Nogai, in his residence of Isaccea, Jöge minted his own coins in the Hijrah year 700 (=16.09.1300–7.08.1301) [77, pp. 296–298; 78, pp. 133–135; 73, pp. 139–143] as confirmation of his hegemonic claims. To consolidate his authority in the area, he married a princess from the Bulgarian tsar’s family, a strategic move that proved to be ineffective. Asked to intervene in the disputes for power between Nogai’s descendants, Toqta Khan sent an army led by his brother Bürlük against Jöge [2, pp. 116–117; 27, pp. 160–161; 11, pp. 383–384]. Incapable of making any resistance, he found refuge—as indicated in the eastern chronicles—in ‘the country of the Vlachs’, syntagm designating in this case the Second Bulgarian Tsardom. Lucidly evaluating the changes of victory of the two Mongol sides, Tsar Theodore Svetoslav did not take into account the family relations and arrested and killed Jöge [81, II, pp. 264–265; 2, p. 117; 27, p. 161; 11, p. 384]. Re-establishing his prerogatives on the western territories of the state, Toqta entrusted the mission of the ruling hereof to his son Tükāl Buga, who set up his headquarters at Isaccea [2, p. 117; 27, p. 161].

The supposition that he might have given up the attributes of power on the Lower Danube to the Bulgarian Tsar has neither documentary, nor logical support. The large military efforts of the central authority of the Horde for reacquiring major strategic and economic points would have been fully nonsensical if the ultimate goal was to pass them to the Bulgarians, who were tributaries of the Mongols. In support of the above assumption, several pieces of evidence were invoked [40, pp. 104–119; 108, pp. 122, 161–162; 1, pp. 18–23], most of them completely non-revelatory [Cf. the arguments presented in 62, pp. 699–716]. Among these though, one cannot ignore a document issued in Genoa on 22 March 1316, which stipulated the interdiction of engaging contacts with the Bulgarians, as a result
of their refusal to grant satisfaction for the drawbacks caused to the Genoese merchants in the ‘countries’ subjected to Fedixclaus (= Theodor Svetoslav), ‘both at Mavrocastro (= Cetatea Albă), and in other places’ (in terris subditis dicto domino imperatori tam in Mavocastro quam alibi) [60, column 382]. As notified in a letter written in Kaffa, two years earlier, in 1314, the Minorite monk Angelo da Spoleto had been martyred in the same town (Mauro Castro) by the Bulgarians [72, p. 106]. From this text it would result that in the specified harbour settlement was a Bulgarian community, which is certainly plausible. On the other hand, the supposition regarding the application of the political authority by the Bulgarian Tsar in the area of the Dniester estuary is contradicted by numerous sources showing that the Mongols maintained their hegemony in the area of the Lower Danube for several decades. Thus, chronicler emir Rukh al Din Baybars al-Mansuri (died in 1325) from the court of the Mamluk sultans specified that after the suppression of Jöge, ‘the Northern Lands— as the Golden Horde was known in the eastern environments— were fully annexed by Emperor Toqta’ [2, p. 117], a fact also confirmed by Syrian erudite Abu’l Fida (1273–1331), who noted that ‘Nogai’s Tsardom was left to Toqta’ [29, p. 39]. In his turn, Qutb al-Din Musa al-Yūnīnī (1242–1326), descending from a family of Damask, opines that once Nogai was defeated and killed, Toqta won the ‘entire realm of the Kipchaks’ [113, p. 191]. An astute observer of the Balkan political landscape, Georgios Pachymeres (1242–mid-1310), the most rigorous Byzantine chronicler of his age, likewise reported that when Nogai disappeared, his ‘state’ was taken over by Toqta [81, II, p. 268]. Khan Toqta’s regain of the hegemonic prerogatives, both in his eastern and western domains (dominus in toto oriente et quasi aquilone), after the victory over his tenacious opponent, was also recorded by Tholomeus of Lucca [118, p. 646], which practically indicates that a simple replacement had taken place at the level of the top ruling class of the Khanate. Moreover, the mint of Isaccea remained operational even after the suppression of Jöge, on the obverse of the Mongolian coins Nogai’s tamga being replaced to the one of the house of Batu Khan [77, pp. 298–299; 20, pp. 41–44; 16, pp. 371–372]. Referring to the events that had taken place in the Hijrah year 706 (= A.D. 1306–1307), at the mid-14th century the Copt chronicler Mufaddal ibn Abil-Fada’il noted the following: ‘from the Iron Gates to the country of Kipchaks [Cumans], to Sudak, to Kwarazm and to the frontiers of the Empire of Constantinople, sovereignty belongs to Tsar Toqta’ [71, III, pp. 127–128]. Given the tight connections established between the Golden Horde and the Mamluk Sultanate, rather precise pieces of news could reach Egypt and Syria regarding the entire military and administrative realities from the Ponto-Caspian and Danubian regions. In two further subchapters of his writing, corresponding to the Hijrah years 720 (= A.D. 1320–1321) and 724 (= A.D. 1323–1324), Mufaddal ibn Abi l-Fada’il made estimates when it came to the limits of the territories held by Toqta’s successor: ‘From the Iron Gates (Bab al-Hadid) [identified as a pass in the Baysuntau Mountains in Transoxania] to Kwarazm and Sudak and from Bulgar [on Volga] to the frontiers of the Constantinople [Empire] reigns Sultan Yuzbak [Öz Beg]’ [66, pp. 65, 91]. With several substitutions, this statement is also inserted among the events regarding the Hijrah years 737 (= A.D. 1336–1337) and 741 (= A.D. 1340–1341): ‘From the Iron Gates, from the (country of) the Russians and one from Kipchak, and from Kwarazm and Sudak to the frontiers of [the Empire of] Constantinople there was a spread from the Empire of Tsar Baraka [Berke], where Sultan Yuzbak [Öz Beg] reigned’ [66, pp. 178, 233–234]. As one can notice, the author ignored the existence of the Second Bulgarian Tsardom, probably from the available sources one cannot understand that this state enjoyed an autonomous statute. In fact, in an anonymous description of Eastern Europe prepared in 1308 probably by a French catholic prelate, it was specified that Bulgaria was at that moment paying tribute to the Mongols: nunc [Bulgaria] seruit tartaris sub tributo [35, p. 40].
The maintenance of the Mongols’ political attributes in southern Moldova and northern Dobruja is also attested by several cartographic sources. Thus, on the map of Black Sea, made in 1320 by Pietro Vesconte of Genoa—signed Petrus Vesconte de Jenua—by the site Mavrocastro a flag is drawn with a tamga [7, pl. LIV], the Mongols’ most known heraldic sign. An identical flag is also present on a nautical map attached to the chronicle of Venetian Marino Sanudo the Old (il Vecchio), supposed to have been created by his townsman Petrus Vesconte in about 1320/1321 [76, p. 33, pl. 13; 32, pp. 17–19; 7, pl. LV]. Similar elements are found on Perrinus Vesconte’s map of 1327 [76, pl. VII, 1]. Several years later, in Angelino Dulcert’s portolan chart of 1339, above the site Mau(ro) Castro is a flag with the image of the crescent and the tamga. It is very probable that the crescent—the symbol of Islam—was added following the official adoption of the Muslim religion within the Golden Horde during the reign of Öz Beg Khan (1313–1342). The representation of the flag with the crescent and the tamga is also present in the harbour’s centre Vicina in Dobruja [76, p. 58, pl. IX]. The two important cities—Vicina and Mavrocastro—are mentioned in a list of Franciscan settlements written around 1320, which are included in the Vicariate in Tartaria Aquilonaris [53, II, pp. 72, 266–267; 111, pp. 256], organised, as the name indicates, in the territories held by the Mongols of the Golden Horde. During the same period, more precisely in 1318, a bulla of Pope John XXII specified that the domains under the canonical jurisdiction of the bishop of Kaffa in ‘the Tartars’ lands’ (ad partes Tartarorum) would spread from the city of Varia [= Varna] in Bulgaria to Sarai and from the shores of the Pontus Sea [= the Black Sea] to the country of the Ruthenians [= Russia] [31, pp. 12–14]. Since the area of confessional entities in the Middle Ages was circumscribed to the state frontiers, it was obvious that the jurisdiction of the eparchy with the residence in Crimea was applied only within the territories controlled by the Mongols. ‘Paristrian Scythians’, that is the Mongols of Paristrion, who in about 1320–1321 endangered the stability of the European frontiers of the Byzantine Empire [56, I, p. 302], had their seats in Dobruja. Certainly, they were de jure subordinated to the khans of the Golden Horde. From there, they would become involved in the warrior conflicts of the regions, acting alone, or in alliance with various dynasts from the Balkans. They are found, inter alia, under the name of ‘Tatars’ (Татарѣ), fighting together with the Bulgarian Tsar and Basarab against the Serbs in the famous battle of Velbuzhd of 1330 [79, pp. 53; 64, p. 83; 6, p. 114], that was to determine considerable modifications in the foreground of the Balkan political scene, determining the change between the Bulgarians and the Serbs, in favour of the latter ones. When, in 1326, an army of the Turks from Anatolia undertook a predatory raid in the Balkan Peninsula, reaching the Danube, the Mongols on the left of the large river responded energetically and caused a devastating defeat [68, p. 31–32]. A request from the Constantinopolitan diplomacy for the Mongol intervention on the left bank of the great river seems little probable, given that Andronikos III Palaeologus — at that moment co-emperor alongside his grandfather Andronikos II — bemoaned, during the same period, the ‘barbarian’ invasions from around the Danube into Thrace [56, p. 399]. Such invasions were also recorded by Marino Sanudo the Elder (il Vecchio), called Torsello (1270–1343), who, in an extensive epistle — essentially a micro-treaty of Eastern-Mediterranean geopolitics — addressed to cardinal Bertrand du Pouget, from the 10th of April 1330, reported that, taking advantage of the dispute between the two Byzantine sovereigns, the Mongols advanced up to the walls of Constantinople and took 100,000 Greeks into slavery when they retreated [116, p. 781]. Even if the number of captives is clearly hyperbolized, the scale of the damage caused by the invaders, who surely had very large effectives, cannot be disputed. The same author, this time in a letter from the 4th of April 1332, the receiver of which was Philip VI of Valois, the King of France, claimed that ‘likewise the Tatars from the northern region descended into that part of the Empire of Romania towards the west, pillaging, capturing and taking with them many Greek people’ (Tartari etiam in parte septentrionali degentes veniunt ad partes illius imperii Roma-
niae versus occidens, capientes, depraedantes ac secum conducentes multas gentes Graeco-
rum). The scale of the operations suggests that the learned Venetian aristocrat was referring to
military effectives originating from the Black Sea area, and not to those from the Balkans. At
the same time, he made known his fear that the Mongols ‘will spread to the furthest parts in
the west, since, as it is well known, they are very numerous’ (Et finaliter timeo, ne ipsi se ad
ulteriora loca occidentis diffundant, cum ipsi, ut publice scitur, sint in maxima quantitate)
[116, pp. 797–798].

The Mongols’ military vigour was maintained south of the Danube also in the follow-
ing years. To prevent their attacks during the first years of the reign of Andronikos III
(1328–1341), Byzantium entered into a peace treaty with them and paid them a tribute. The
amicable relations were also sealed through a matrimonial alliance, a daughter of the em-
peror marrying Öz Beg [59, II, p. 393]. According to a notification contained in the map of
the Pizzigani brothers in Venice, drawn in 1367, it was during the reign of this khan that the
Empire ‘started from the province Burgaria [Bulgaria] and the city of Vecina’ [Vicina] [55,
p. 447]. The famous erudite and traveller Ibn Battuta, who served the khan of Sarai for
many years, claimed that the southern limits of the realm of the ‘Turks’, an ethnonym
through which he designated the Mongols, reached Baba-Saltyk [59, II, p. 417], identified
with the site of Babadag in northern Dobruja. His testimony is credible, given that in 1331
he crossed twice the distance between Sarai and Constantinople, and had personally known
the lands to the northwest of the Black Sea.

From this entire copious set of data it undoubtedly results that after the residence of
the son of the Khan of Sarai was established at Isaccea, the authority of the Golden Horde
was uninterruptedly applied in the northeastern corner of the Balkan Peninsula until mid-
14th century. Of course, an extension of the domination of the Bulgarian Tsardom north of
the mouth of the Danube could not have taken place during the reign of Theodor Svetoslav.
The Bulgarians had the possibility to act there only in their capacity as subjects of the
Golden Horde, which in certain cases would concede various military attributes to the
populations on whom they had imposed their hegemony. It is equally true that, like in the
case of the Russian principalities, the Bulgarian Tsardom would try to take advantage of the
moments in which the rulers of the Horde were involved in disputes on other meridians, in
order to solve their own political priorities.

Obviously, to maintain the domination over Dobruja, Mongols also had to have under
their control the southern part of Moldova, an area for which we do not have equally numer-
ous pieces of information. As mentioned already, in the flatlands between the Prut and the
Dniester, designated in the Middle Ages with the Turkic name of Budjak, there were identi-
fied several barrows dated to the second half of the 13th century and the first half of the 14th,
assigned to the Cumans and possibly other Turkic peoples.

It was also in the southeastern side of Budjak, where the Dniester emptied into the es-
tuary of the same name, where during the last decades of the 13th century an important
harbour settlement was founded on the ruins of the ancient fortress Tiras, erected by the
Greeks and later taken over by the Romans. Its genesis is connected to the commercial of-
ensive of Genoese, who, according to the treaty of Nymphaion of 13 March 1261, obtained
important facilities from the Byzantines for the exchange transactions in the Black Sea ba-
sin [65, I, p. 488–495], confirmed and extended by the khans of the Golden Horde. Using a
favourable political context and their own economic potential, starting from the last decades
of the 13th century, Genoese founded a row of commercial points, of which some evolved
in time into fortified urban centres along the Black Sea shoreline, inhabited by an ethnically
and religiously mixed population. Among these, mention should be made of Maurocastron
(Moncastro, Akkerman, Cetatea Albă, Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi) (Figs. 2–3), attested in a
written source for the first time in a document issued on 8 May 1290 under the ‘Malvocas-
тро’ graphical form [36, p. 203].
Fig. 2. The fortifications of Moncastro / Cetatea Albă / Belgorod Dnestrovski. 
A – exterior ; B – interior curtain walls (Photo I. Cândea, 2011).
Fig. 4. The urban settlement of Orheiul Vechi (14th century) (Photo V. Spinei, 2014).
During the 14–15th centuries, the number of times this settlement is mentioned increased exponentially, in various forms, parallel to the increase of its commercial and military importance. It is significant that in the nautical maps representing the Black Sea basin, created by the Italian and Catalan cartographers, the name of the harbour at the mouths of the Dniester was rendered in red, just like those of the main cities along the coast, unlike most other settlements, written in black. Among the centres on the western end of the Golden Horde, the scholar al-ʿUmarī (1301–1349), originating from Damask, mentioned in his great synthesis on the Mongol state only the name of Akkerman, also adding that among the great rivers that would drain their waters through the Mongol Empire was the Turlu (= the Dniester) and the Danube [33, p. 142]. The prosperity of the city was mostly due to the commerce with grains, slaves, salt, but probably with other goods as well. In a detailed treatise of commerce, prepared around the mid-14th century by the Florentine Francesco Balducci Pegolotti, the wheat of Maurocastron / Cetatea Albă (grano da Maocastro) was mentioned together with the one that was cropped at Kaffa, Anchialos, Varna, in Bulgaria as well as at Vicina and at Sozopolis [83, p. 42]. The transport of grains was especially meant for Constantinople and Pyora. The slave markets in the North Black Sea harbours were supplied particularly by the Mongols through the raids undertaken in the neighbouring countries. In exchange for the goods sent from Maurocastron / Cetatea Albă, as indicated by the archaeological excavations, metal, glass and ceramic items were brought back in return from Byzantium and from various Asian countries. Numerous coins and two monetary treasures, composed mainly of issues by the Golden Horde, discovered within the precinct of the city, prove the important role of the coin in the process of the exchange. Like in most harbour sites located on the North Black Sea shores, the population of Maurocastron / Cetatea Albă was ethnically heterogeneous, a fact reflected by several medieval texts and by the archaeological vestiges uncovered there, indicating the presence of collectivities of east-European, Byzantine, Mediterranean and Eastern origin [40; 15, passim; 3, p. 757–790].

While protecting the commercial activities of the Italian colonists, the Mongols were naturally the beneficiaries of substantial revenues. During the cohabitation with various sedentary populations, the mentalities of the nomad aristocracy evolved in the direction of an awareness that encouraging certain economic branches would bring them much larger material gains than the predatory raids. In the spirit of these precepts, they were founding patrons of the urban settlements from Orheiul Vechi (Orhei district) on the Râut River (Figs. 4–5) and Costești (Ialoveni district) on the Botna River (Republic of Moldova).

After the destruction of the free Dacians’ proto-urban settlements, and when the Roman ones were destroyed during Late Antiquity, urban life in Moldova witnessed an interruption of about one millenary due to the cadenced succession of the great invasions from the East. In such circumstances, the urban traditions of the local population faded away entirely, so that the contribution of the Mongol authorities to their re-emergence proved to be propitious. Being a nomad steppe population, the Mongols did not have any experience either in designing buildings and street networks, or in certain branches of the urban economy and administration, but they efficiently used in this regard the potential of the urban communities subjected during the military campaigns. For stimulating the creation of cities, the power of the Empire frequently used deportations and colonisation through coercive measures; this was traumatising for personal destiny, but beneficial for the evolution of certain territorial entities. These practices were also common in the case of Orheiul Vechi and Costești. None of these two cities is mentioned in written sources; they were identified through archaeological research undertaken during the post-World
War II decades. The archaeological vestiges recovered with the occasion of the excavations reflect characteristics not specific to the local environment, closer though to those identified in the urban centres of the Golden Horde in the basin of the Volga, in the western part of Central Asia, and in the Ponto-Caspian regions. Inside the central perimeter of the two sites there were massive stone edifices of public and private use, while towards the peripheries simple constructions made of wood and wattle were prevalent, some of them used as craftsmen’s workshops. At Orheiul Vechi there was discovered a mosque, two caravanserais and three baths in eastern style (Fig. 5/B), heated with the help of pipes placed under the floor. Both at Orheiul Vechi and at Costești, the drinking water supply of certain dwellings was achieved with the help of ceramic pipes. Both cities were active craft centres, where metalwork took place and where various ceramic assortments were likewise produced. It is at Orheiul Vechi where one of the oldest storages of agricultural implements in 14th century Europe was found, containing 68 furrowers, 42 plough knives and other items, certainly produced not only for the usage of the city inhabitants but also for trade with the neighbouring rural communities [98, pp. 242–258; 14, pp. 70–107].

Of special significance is the fact that, in all probabilities, the respective site minted its own coins. Their Arabic legend specifies being coined in Shehr al-Jadid or Yangi-Shehr, that is—the New City. This was for sure the name of the urban settlement where the coinage existed [28, pp. 193–213; 23, pp. 39–66; 74, pp. 167–179; 75, pp. 1367–1373]. Like in the case of Maurocastron / Cetatea Albă, the urban centres on the rivers Răut and Botna had intensive commercial contacts with the cities in the eastern regions of the Golden Horde, where from high quality metal and ceramic items were brought. A rather large quantity of enamelled ceramicware originated from Kashan in Ilkhanide Persia, one of the most famous pottery centres of the Middle Ages, is a fact that proves the existence of social layers with high tastes and with considerable material resources available, as they could afford to purchase expensive goods. The necropolis corresponding to the two cities contained inhumed bodies laid in different positions, reflecting various rituals, specific both to the Christian communities and to the Muslim ones. In fact, not only the funeral rite but also their constructions and inventory indicate the inhabitants’ ethnical-cultural heterogeneity. While most of the urban population probably originated from eastern regions of the Golden Horde with Turkic preponderance, the rural communities neighbouring the cities, that provided city inhabitants with agricultural products, were mainly composed of Romanians [98, pp. 242–258; 14, pp. 70–107].

As specified above, apart from the territories directly administered by the Mongol authorities, some of the Moldavian and Wallachian regions were left outside of the possessions of the Horde. We do not have precise information from documents as for their political statute, but certain suggestions result indirectly from several categories of sources. From the content of the so-called Diploma of the Joannites of 1247, in the central and western side of Wallachia there were several Romanian polities, some of them in a certain condition of dependence in relation to the Hungarian crown [106, pp. 73–76; 50, pp. 21–28. See also 82, pp. 138–141; 105, pp. 233–242; 30, pp. 131–135; 84, pp. 225–242]. It is hard to state whether at a certain moment these formations or those that succeeded had or did not have to accept the khans’ suzerainty. In any case, when Basarab came to the throne of Wallachia during the third decade of the 14th century, his state was not under the Mongols’ hegemony. If he was in an obedient position, during the convulsive moments of the expedition of Charles Robert of Anjou of 1330, he would have undoubtedly used the support from his neighbours in the Black Sea region steppes, but this did not happen.
Fig. 5. The urban settlement of Orheiul Vechi (14th century). A – The settled area close to the banks of the Răut River; B – The ruins of the Oriental baths (Photo V. Spinei, 2014).
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Fig. 6. Iron stirrups from the 14th century uncovered in the settlement of Orheiul Vechi (Photo V. Spinei, 2014).
Fig. 7. Iron stirrups from the 14th century uncovered in the settlement of Orheiul Vechi (Photo V. Spinei, 2014).
Fig. 8. 1 – Glazed dish discovered in the settlement of Orheiul Vechi;
2 – Reddish-yellow paste vessel with handle discovered in the settlement Bârlad-„Prodana”
(14th century) (Photo V. Spinei, 2014).
Fig. 9. Glazed dishes discovered in the settlement of Orheiul Vechi (14th century) (Photo V. Spinei, 2014).
Fig. 10. Glazed dishes discovered in the settlement of Orheiul Vechi (14th century) (Photo V. Spinei, 2014).
Fig. 11. Jug with impressed decoration discovered in the settlement of Orheiul Vechi (14th century) (Photo V. Spinei, 2014).
On the other hand, during the same period and even several decades later, about half of the territory of Moldova—from its southeastern side—was under the Mongols’ direct administration. The northern and the western sides had another statute, but it is hard to establish whether within these territories the political regime was a uniform one. The medieval and early-modern toponymy offers certain clues regarding the political relations in the northern part of the considered region. In this regard, we refer to several medieval documents issued in the voivode’s chancellery in the 15–17th centuries, which mention villages named Basco-couți, Băscăcianii and Băscăceni in the northern part of Moldova. These names are derived from the detachments of Baskaks, charged by the khans with the collection of the tribute and the imposition of other duties on the populations subjected by the Mongols in the territories where they applied their hegemony but which were left under the administration of the local dynasts [97, pp. 165–166].

Towards the middle of the first half of the 14th century, after the Anjou dynasty consolidated its authority within the entire Kingdom of Hungary, its expansive tendencies were reactivated, especially beyond the southern and eastern frontiers of the state. Several sources indicate tensioned conditions or even clashes between the Hungarians and the Mongols, the military theatres of operations being situated in the lands inhabited by the Romanians. In 1324, there took place an expedition under the command of Fanta Mendiisky in ‘the Tartars’ country’, with the purpose of preventing an attack hereof [106, I, pp. 387–388]. During the same period, the Holy See sent Charles Robert financial help in order to organise the crusade’s actions against the Mongols, the schismatics and the pagans and granted the spiritual blessing for the warriors involved in the fights [57, pp. 574–575, 630, 631]. The launch of an aggressive policy towards the East would have been at that moment inauspicious, given that the Golden Horde reached its military and economic apex during the rule of Khan Öz Beg (1313–1342). Marino Sanudo the Elder, a keen theoretician of Western political concepts, delivered in 1330—in the aforementioned letter sent to a high representative of the Roman Catholic Church, Bertrand de Pouget—a warning about the potential dangers posed to his co-religionists by the Mongols: “the Tatars who neighbour the Kingdom of Hungary can pass into Germany and France, as well as into Italy, and subdue them to their rule. And this does not seem impossible, because the Tartars of the northern parts have dominion over a large number of warriors, but also because their lord called Özbäg is a competent Saracen” (Possent transire Tartari, qui cum regno confinant Ungariae, et in Alemanni et Franciani ire, ac etiam in Italiam, et totam dominio suo submittere. Et non videtur hoc imposibile, quia Tarta-rus ille de septentrionalibus partibus subitus dominium suum habet multitudinem maximam pugnatorum, tum etiam quia dominus ille nomine Husbecco est Saracenus effectus) [116, p. 779–780]. The Venetian scholar was informed on the military potential of the Golden Horde, but also on the capacity to retaliate of Angevin Hungary, possessing certain general knowledge and on the ethnic and confessional makeup of Mediterranean and Eastern Europe. Among others, in a letter, issued on the 13th of October 1334 in the city he resided in and addressed to King Philip VI, the following note is found: “Also, under the rule of the king of Hungary there is a numerous people, who follows the rite of the Greeks” (Item sub dominio regis Hungariae est magnus populus, qui sequuntur Graecorum vestigia) [116, p. 801]. Even if he does not explicitly name them, Marino Sanudo most probably referred to Romanians, who at that moment were the largest Eastern Orthodox people of the Kingdom. Together with the ascension to the throne of Louis I of Anjou (1342–1382) the Kingdom of Hungary increased the amplitude of military undertakings beyond its northeastern and eastern frontiers. To respond to an attack against Transylvania, Andrew Láckfi, the count of the Szeklers, was charged with an expedition in the ‘country of the Tartars’ [42, pp. 276–277; 43, p. 167]. In spite of his success, the Mongols were not pushed to the left of the Dniester, as some historians consider. Nor was the defeat suffered by the Lithuanian Grand Duke Olgerd (Algirdas) in
1362/1363 at Sinie Vody [17, p. 66] meant to oblige them to abandon the territories north of the mouths of the Danube. As a proof of this statement one can invoke the longevity of the urban settlements of Orheiul Vechi and Costești until the end of the seventh decade of the 14th century. It was then that they stopped to exist, as demonstrated by the Mongol coin which stopped circulating within the urban precinct, like at Maurocastron / Cetatea Albă [97, pp. 252–254].

The circumstances and moment of the termination of the domination of the Golden Horde on the extra-Carpathian Romanian regions are not, unfortunately, reflected in a clarifying manner in the written sources. It is possible that the Mongols’ being chased away beyond the Dniester might have been helped by a coalition of the Christian forces that took advantage of the internal disturbances occurring within the Golden Horde; this was seriously affected by the civil wars started in 1359 and continued for about two decades [10, pp. 261–298; 103, pp. 109–121; 4, pp. 58–108; 44, pp. 219–225]. The data provided by the narrative sources also remain inconclusive with respect to the moment the regions in southeastern Moldova came under the sway of the Romanian polities east of the Carpathians. After the conquest of Cetatea Albă and Chiilia in 1485, the Ottoman Turks called back the Tartars to Budjak, in order to establish a bulwark against the Moldavians, in case they might attempt to retake the two important harbour cities. The Tatars also remained in Budjak after the dissolution of the Golden Horde in 1502, being evacuated by the tsarist armies from Eastern Europe only at the beginning of the Russian-Turkish war of 1806–1812 [41, pp. 162–171].

As everywhere in the invaded countries, the Mongols’ intrusion into the regions inhabited by the Romanians caused large damage demographically, economically and politically. Entire communities were slaughtered and enslaved or had to leave their abodes. Important goods were destroyed or plundered, causing disturbances in the economic life, particularly in the field of commercial exchanges. The capture of extensive territories hindered the coagulation and consolidation of political formations by the local inhabitants. On the other hand, the Mongols’ presence in the lands on the Lower Danube represented an impediment to the extension of the domination of the Kingdom of Hungary beyond the Carpathian ridges and of the Bulgarian Tsardom north of the Danube. The Pax Mongolica, in effect for several decades on the Lower Danube, created conditions for the activation of commercial roads of continental importance, for the development of certain craftsmanship branches, and for the emergence of several urban nuclei. In spite of the precepts imposed in the older historiography, the idea that the Mongol domination in the Romanian regions also had positive consequences shall therefore be accepted.

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Chapter VII.
The Civilisation of the Golden Horde

§ 1. The Golden Horde as a Civilisation (Based on Archaeological Materials)

Mark Kramarovsky

However paradoxical it may seem, there has never been a state called the 'Golden Horde.' In the same way that there has never been a state bearing the name 'Byzantium.' The Greeks called their state the 'Empire of the Romans (Romaioi)'. Hence, 'Romania' in the Latin world, and 'Rûm' in the Turkic. The use of the name 'Byzantium' to designate the state of the Romaioi occurs after the fall of the Empire, being introduced by humanist scholars. A similar story occurred with the name of the Golden Horde, which called itself 'Ulugh Ulus' in Turkic, that is, the 'Great State'. The new name came into being after the dissolution of the Jochid empire, not as a result of the will of scholars but due to monastery scribes in the latter half of the 16th century, who took the name of the main camp of the Khan, the Golden Horde, as a basis.

After the disintegration of the single Chinggis Khan empire, the Jochids, despite occasionally hostile relations with their kindred Mongol dynasties, including the Ulus of Chagatai, which included Transoxiana, Semirechye, and Kashgaria, the il-Khans of Iran, and the Mongols in China (up to 1368, when the Yuan dynasty was replaced by the Ming), did not lose these ties until their total disappearance from the political scene. This gives reason to raise the question of the interaction of cultures within the greater boundaries of Pax Mongolica and its natural frontier areas, including the Asian steppe zone and the forest-steppe of Eurasia. Since the western part of Pax Mongolica was mostly represented by the Golden Horde, with the latter acquiring the form of a steppe empire—by the end of the 13th century—with a whole range of peculiarities, including ethnic, economic, cultural, political, and ideological ones, it is reasonable to describe it from the vantage point of a unique civilisation model.

This essay consists of two unequal parts. The first one will contain a review of three theses that relate to the justifications behind descriptions of the Golden Horde as a civilisation. As for the second part, it is reasonable to focus it on the main stages of the Jochids' self-identification in the period between 1207 and 1502.

One of the most important pre-conditions in defining any civilisation, including that of the Golden Horde, is the commonness of origins, the fate, and the legacy of the ulus of Jochi. Indeed, it is these phenomena that distinguish the Golden Horde as a cultural and historical entity with a specific world-view, making it recognisable at the scale of Eurasia. While trying to define the notion of the Golden Horde civilisation, it is pertinent to refer to the experience—be it not so simple and unmistakable—of Russian 'Eurasianists,' from Trubetskoy to Vernadsky [73, p. 58 and other; 24, pp. 158–186]. Additional value will be found in the observations of P. Bitsilli (1922) [5, pp. 67–73], who regarded the Eurasian continent as a complex structure comprising a number of unique local civilisations [74, p. 198].

According to Fernand Braudel, civilisations '<…> of great reality, inexhaustible continuance <…> endlessly adapt to their fate' [for an analysis of Braudel's conception, see: 13, pp. 178–186; 17, pp. 169–187]. The thesis about a long historical period [83, p. 46] in which a civilisation lives should not be perceived simply as linear (that would contradict his theory of a multi-level structure of reality, each with its own rhythm) and infinite. 'Linear' time is attributable to the fate and experience of every individual person. In a historic sense, however, it is the
generation that is the main measuring unit, as it is only within the genealogical lineage that the notions of the 'closeness', 'remoteness,' and 'ultra-distance' of time can be manifested. Approximately fifteen generations of the Horde formed a live chain of fates from the moment when the Ulus of Jochi detached in 1207 until 1502. Several more generations of veterans, including the founders of the Mongol state, starting with Temujin—Chinggis Khan—and the generation of his elder sons, should also be added to that. Was this a substantial number or not in terms of the period of the formation and development of the civilisation of the Jochid dynasty? Meanwhile, the people and representatives of the dynasty did not disappear after 1502 and proceeded to live their historical life-lines in political formations of separate Khanates, which grew from the ruins of the Golden Horde and continued its cultural traditions up to the period of modern history. It is worth noting that written sources from the 15th to the 18th centuries retained the memory of the 189 descendants of the 'golden lineage' (*Altan urug* in Turkic) [4], which, undoubtedly, is indicative of the long-existing perception of the legitimate succession rights to the title of Khan of Desht-i Kipchak.

In general terms, we can view any civilisation (including that of the Golden Horde) as the totality of traditional links among the historical factors of material and spiritual culture, authority, socio-legal norms (in our case, the Yasa and Islamic town-courts), and economy, forming sustainable and long-term vectors in the development of society. In our situation, the society itself, which was heterogeneous in terms of ethnicities, traditions and religions, turned out to be able to function only in a certain cultural and physiographic area: an accommodating landscape that met the combined requirements of nomadic cattle breeding and the life of steppe towns. The geographic centre of the 'accommodating landscape' happened to be located in the expanse of the Desht-i Kipchak. The Jochid (Golden Horde) civilisation, therefore, had its own nucleus, periphery, and borders at different stages of its development.

We shall look into this phenomenon through the prism of the main phases of the Jochids' self-identification.

Ulus of Jochi was formed as a part of the mighty centralised state of Chinggis Khan and for several decades existed within the latter's military and administrative system. From 1220, the centre of the empire was located on the eastern bank of the Orkhon river, where the main camp of the Great Khan was set up near the small river of Karakorum. In 1235, already under Ögedei, the construction of a town commenced there. For a quarter of a century (until 1260), Karakorum was the unified Mongolian capital city. By the time that Kublai Khan (1260–1294) transferred the capital to Beijing, the first capital city of the Golden Horde—Sarai (Palace)—had been founded in the estuary of the Volga, on the left bank of the Akhtuba River. Construction of the Jochid capital city dates to the early 1250s; William of Rubruck, a Minorite monk, visited the place in 1254 on his way from Karakorum to the main camp of Batu [54, pp. 184–186].

The ulus of Jochi separated from the Great Mongol state with the disintegration of Chinggis Khan's empire, though the initial 'Siberian assignment' of Jochi was arranged by the personal decision of the empire's founder. This was the first hereditary ulus in the Chinggisid family. For the Jochids (heirs to the house of Chinggis Khan's elder son), the process of becoming politically autonomous took a definite shape only in the 1240s after the army of Batu (1227–1257) completed its seven-year European campaign in 1242, the result of which was the return of the Mongol cavalry to Desht-i Kipchak after reaching the shores of the Adriatic Sea. The new state formation consisted of two main military-political units: the right and left 'wings', called the Kok Horde and the Ak Horde in Oriental sources [58, pp. 94–96; 69, pp. 55–63; 50, pp. 79–95; 66, pp. 360–378]. Although the geographical location of various uluses changed with time, the Eastern Desht-i Kipchak—most of the territory of present-day Kazakhstan—remained an integral part of the Ulus of Jochi. At the same time, the steppe lands, which formed the nucleus of the state after the Western campaign, found themselves on the outskirts of the cultural world for a number reasons. As was
noted by E. Kulpin, the establishment of the urban way of life in the steppe zone helped to overcome the Golden Horde’s (Ulus of Jochi) civilizational marginality [44, pp. 127–157]. Despite the continuing predominance of nomads, dozens of towns grew up at the locations of old steppe winter quarters as early as in the first half of the 14th century. New cultural forces were gradually taking shape therein; inhabitants of handicraft districts occupied a significant place among them. Evidence testifies that in the Golden Horde, a new development occurred in the first half of the 14th century, in which there was a formation of a new cultural milieu with diverse interests and cultural vectors that differed from the early Jochid period, and expand far beyond the subject of our review [for references to libraries in Sarai, see: 27, p. 203; about the language and script and literature, see: 67, pp. 658–667; 51, pp. 668–675; 49, pp. 676–681].

The interaction of nomadic and sedentary (largely, urban) life-styles within the framework of the single state allows for the designation of three major periods in the cultural development of the Golden Horde. The early Jochid period (the first half, roughly, 1207–1250s) is characterised by the nominal separation of the Ulus of Jochi from the range of territories belonging to Chinggis Khan, with the de facto preservation of the integrity of the emerging empire. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of the early Jochid stage in the formation of the culture of the future Golden Horde as the construction of the new began within the system of ties of the Chinggis Khan state, which acquired the official name Yeke Mongvol ulus—‘the Great Mongol state’ (1211–1264). That period was characterised by the intensive redistribution of traditional tribal ancestral formations in favour of the Chinggisid Mongol elite, accompanied by the rearrangement of pasture-lands, watering sites, and routes of seasonal migrations. Vigorous innovative processes in the material culture were mostly drawn from the traditions of Central Asia and North China. As never before, a gap between the steppe and urban cultures is felt in these decades (the latter developed predominantly outside of the steppe nucleus of the emerging state). It is natural that the basic content of the cultural paradigm was determined by the struggle of the Mongols for the Eastern and, later, the Western Desht-i Kipchak. It should be noted that the polemical remarks of scholars, which emphasise the dramatic consequences of the Mongol–Kipchak confrontation in the sphere of ethnic processes encompassing the entirety of Desht-i Kipchak, are interesting but not entirely convincing [42, pp. 199–234].

The middle Horde period (mid–second half of the 13th to the first two thirds of the 14th centuries). The main achievement of this period was the stabilisation of the economy and the cultural formation of the new steppe towns of the Jochids, where a considerable part of the noyon elite settled down already at the time of Berke. At the end of the 1250s—early 1260s, the Jochids introduced their own coin system, ushering in one of the most important phases of state and cultural construction, which was accompanied by the revival of the northern branch of the Great Silk Road. The first period of coin minting occurs in the time period between the second half of the 13th century and the Toqta reform of 1310–1311 [71, pp. 45, 46]. A characteristic feature of this stage is the prevalence of the regional turnover of coins inside separate numismatic provinces within the boundaries of the former Volga Bulgaria, Middle and Lower Volga regions, Crimea, and the north-western Black Sea area, Danube and Dniester regions [71, p. 46]1. The most vivid

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1 It is notable that in the given period in Crimea, anonymous jarmak coins with the inscription ‘Emir of Crimea’ are replaced by coins bearing the name of the issuer—Temir Buqa (Tuka). Thus, early Crimean emissions indicate a viceroyal minting coins [75, pp. 15–17]. Recently in Crimea, pula with the name of Giyath ad-Din Mas’ud II from the early 1280s [76, pp. 328–331; 9, pp. 83–85] have been discovered, which, contrary to the opinion of numismatists, could hardly be of local coinage. Mas’ud was the son of Sultan Izz ad-Din Kaykaus, who lost the throne in the Sultanate of Iconium in 1261 and was sent into confinement in the fortress of Enos at the shore of the Aegean Sea by Michael VIII Palaiologos. The imprisoned Sultan of Iconium was freed by the order of Berke in 1265 and was granted iqta over Solkhath and Sudak in Crimea [25, pp. 66, 67]. The eighteen-year rule of the ex-Sultan, Izz ad-Din Kaykaus (his...
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Events of the period are related to the reconstruction of old towns which were destroyed in the invasions, and the commencement of the building of new towns. G. Fedorov-Davydov and V. Yegorov describe the Golden Horde as a state with two capital cities—at the Selitrennoe (Sarai, Sarai al-Mahrusa) and Tsarevskoe (Sarai al-Jadid) archaeological sites [70; 17, p. 112–117]. According to written and cartographic sources, the capital city of the Golden Horde is localised to the Selitrennoe archaeological site, located on the high terrace of the left bank of the Akhtuba River, 115 km north of present-day Astrakhan. Selitrennoe ancient town is identified as the city of Sarai, first mentioned by William of Rubruck with reference to the year 1253. Modern archaeological and numismatic data puts into question the existence of a 13th-century town at the location of the Selitrennoe archaeological site [52; 8, pp. 345–349]. Later on, in the 1330s, under Öz Beg Khan (1312–1342), the town of Gulistan Saray was founded at the location of the Tsarevskoe archaeological site (left bank of the old course of the Akhtuba river, near the village of Tsarev in Volgograd oblast) [the discussion about Gulistan Saray was revived by I. Evstratov, see: 16, pp. 88–118]. During the middle Horde period, the steppe and urban branches of culture actively interacted. The former experienced pressure from the Islamised municipal communities of the Khan's domain and the regional centres of the Azov Sea region, the North Caucasus, and Crimea [in total, the register of Golden Horde towns was compiled by V. Yegorov to include 140 sites, see: 17, p. 139]. Actually, it is in this period that the urban vector—be it indirectly—begins to influence the material culture of the steppes; as for the handicrafts culture, it acquires a distinctive Golden Horde appearance.

The late Horde period (from the 1340s–60s to the beginning of the 15th century) was characterised by the flourishing of urban life at the early stage (until 1395), with the noticeable leadership of Islamic communities. The latter did not lead to any pronounced tensions in interfaith relations. Central Asian elements of culture gradually died away in the steppe, being ousted by Islamic innovations pouring into the society of the Golden Horde from the direction of Khwarezm, the Caspian Sea region, Egypt, and Asia Minor (via Crimea). The Jochid elite rapidly lost its links with the Three Rivers region and, together with its 'old' homeland, the Mongolian language. Already in the time of Toktamysh (1376–1395), Turkic becomes the official language of the Golden Horde. The dominant cultural idea in that period is completely determined by urban crafts, which form their own industrial centres.

The mints of Sarai, Sarai al-Jadid, and Gulistan operate at full scale during the reigns of Toqta, Öz Beg, Jani Beg, and the Khans of the 1360s; dirhams from those emissions fill up the markets of the Volga region, the Mordvin lands, the North Caucasus, the Dniester region, and Crimea [71, pp. 46, 47]. During the time of troubles and internecine feuds in the 1360s, large numbers of coins disappear in hoards, and already in the 1370s, the monetary sphere experiences the rapid growth of centrifugal tendencies. From the second half of the 1360s, the majority of hoards begin to contain coins with countermarks; an important place among them is occupied by the silver of Öz Beg, coined by the mint of Krym al-Mahrusa in 720 AH. Starting from 1380–1381, all dirhams bearing the name of Toktamysh issued by the mints of the European part of the Golden Horde are being coined by uniform weight measures [71, p. 48].

The shocks of 1395, caused by the military victories of Timur (1370–1405), lead to the slow death of extensive international trade and urban life in the central regions of the country (the second stage of the late Horde period). The monetary reform of 802 AH, related to the reduction of the dirham weight, did not result in the unification of the monetary sphere [71, p. 54], and coin circulation started to experience a downfall trend nearly everywhere. Almost a century-long period of the disintegration of the Golden Horde statehood and a general cultural stagnation begin after 1395. Nonetheless, local crafts centres, mostly in Eastern Crimea, still

coins are unknown), in the Eastern Crimea left a noticeable imprint on the material culture of Solkhat [39, pp. 5–17].
continued to work during this period. In 1502, the Crimean Khan Mengli Giray delivers a decisive blow against the Great Horde. This ends the military and political history of the Golden Horde but not the history of the dynasty. And it certainly does not end the cultural tradition of the Golden Horde. Vectors in the spheres of political life, economy, crafts, and ideology, formed by the 14th century, continue to exist in the post-Horde period; mostly they are evident in the centres of power of the new Chinggisid dynasts in successor states, be it in the steppes of Kazakhstan, the forest-steppes of Western Siberia, the Middle Volga region, Ryazan, and the more so in Crimea. In the 15–16th centuries, this tendency also manifests itself in the culture of Moscow. Horde elements are most vividly reflected in the miniatures of the Chronicle, compiled in the 3rd quarter of the 16th century. At the time of the conquest of Kazan, the Golden Horde was still the historically legitimate power holder in the period of the 13–15th centuries, and in diplomatic correspondence with their eastern neighbours, the Moscow Tsars called themselves 'White Tsars' ('Ak Padishah') [65].

Studies of the early developmental stages of Chinggisid crafts and culture are hampered by a lack of reliable sources. This situation largely relates to the fact that the 'dark ages' of Mongol history occurred at the time of the consolidation of the Mongol tribes within the framework of one state in the 11–12th centuries, headed by the ancestors of Chinggis Khan (around the middle of the 12th century). The records of written sources about contacts between part of the Tatar-Mongols and the Liao Kithans (916–1125) and Jin Jurchens (1115–1234) still remain poorly supported archaeologically, and we know practically nothing about the material culture of the Mongols in the time of Khabul Khan and his political successors. This contributes to an incomplete understanding of the genesis and initial formation of the material culture in the period of Mongol unity. Because the Ulus of Jochi developed as part of a multi-ethnic empire throughout the first half of the 13th century, the sparse historiographic sources related to the early Jochids—while reflecting the general status of the issue—imply nothing specific in themselves. Only toreutic items—the artworks of silver and gold which more precisely met the requirements of their owners, the Mongol elites, in respect to their authenticity—can somehow fill this gap. In real life, the aspiration for imperial self-identification found its reflection in the choice of regalia befitting the Khagan, his keshigs, the ulus Khans, their tarkhans and noyons of all ranks, and representatives of the local nobility who were equal to them. Besides a limited number of symbols of the Khan's power [34, pp. 73–79; 79, pp. 131–190], dress [11, pp. 16–79; 12], uniform hairstyles, headgear [40, pp. 413–419] and some types of male and female decorations, this list included the details of horse trappings [38, pp. 122–129], warriors' belts, and ceremonial items. It is the last three categories of items that can most expressively help in forming a perception of the character of the horsemen culture of the early Jochid elite.

In this context, the most important discoveries to consider are items made from gold and silver that are related to the first generation of the Chinggisids, be they from regions of Central Asia, Southern Siberia, or the European steppe zone behind the Urals. Quite recently, during the field season of 2005, the expedition of the Mongolian National University (led by Prof. 2

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2 The Illustrated Chronicle of Ivan the Terrible includes over 17,000 miniatures, about 10,000 of which relate to the history of Rus' [48, pp. 61–70; see also: 90, pp. 157–179].

3 According to the observations of J. Gärälbadrax, the state, headed by Khans Khabul, Ambbagai, and Hotula, was called 'Mongyol ulus'—the 'Mongol state' [15, pp. 25–32], and not 'Qamuy Mongyol ulus'—'Khamag Mongol ulus.' The first state of the Mongols, in which some historians saw a big tribal confederation of part of the Mongols and Tayichiuds living in the area of the estuary of the rivers of Onon and Kherlen, did not exist long and disintegrated in around 1160. For us, it is important that in the years of peaceful relations, the Mongols of Khabul Khan and his successors maintained cooperation with their neighbours. For example, in exchange for the deliveries of livestock herds to the Jurchens, they received cereals and silk (300,000 pieces of fine silk and the same amount of rough silk) [46, p. 285]. The very existence of normalised trade relations with the Jurchens, as in older times with the Khitans, gives grounds to assume the acquaintance of the Mongols with the cultural achievements of their neighbours in various day-to-day tasks.
D. Navaan) discovered an unspoiled female grave with a horse, and golden saddle facings with images of four-toed (?) dragons at Tavan Tolgoi (Sükhbaatar aimag) in south-eastern Mongolia [96, # 44, pp. 18–27; 99, vol. 4/1, pp. 55–60, fig. 6, 7]. The grave belonged to an unmarried young woman (not more than 20 years old), whose high status is evident by the rich golden decorations—earrings, filigree decoration of the hairstyle⁴, pectoral and vajra, but, most of all, golden saddle facings with images of dragons. Undoubtedly, grave no. 5 from Tavan Tolgoi belongs to the early Mongol epoch, and likely, to the first decades of the 13th century. It is notable that the young woman without a bokka (that is, unmarried) was buried with a ceremonial golden saddle with images of dragons. This is the third female saddle discovered from the early Mongol epoch after the discoveries at Khailin Gele and nearby Melitopol [34, pp. 21, 22].

Now we know the series of golden and silver saddles of that epoch to which the golden saddle facings from the collection of Nasser Khalili should also be added (end of the 12th–beginning of the 13th centuries) [81, pp. 42–46; 34, p. 21]. Three of them belong to female burial sites. It is difficult to imagine more expressive evidence of gender equality in the early Mongol environment. The dragon theme on the saddle facings from Tavan Tolgoi is typical for the first level of noyon regalia, including military belts and belt challices.

It can be recalled that the system of emblems of the Great Khan and his ‘guard’ containing images of dragons was developed within a narrow stretch of time between 1204–1206 and 1217. It was noted in 1221 by Zhao Hong, who arrived in Yanjing, the recent former capital city of the Jurchens. This stretch of time can probably be shortened by a little. At present, discoveries of military (‘guards’) belts with dragon images were only found in archaeological findings from the European steppe zone, where they were brought by the first generation of Jochid horsemen as early as in the period of the 1220s–1240s. The area of the discoveries includes the Dnieper, Middle Don, Steppe Ciscaucasia, and Middle Volga regions [34, pp. 35–45, fig. 14, 1–16, 17–19]. From the findings of the Lower Volga Region, we can take note of the belt set from the destroyed grave site at Krasny Yar ancient town [34, pp. 35–45, fig. 18]. A fragment of the belt is extant. The fittings—of silver and gold—include a buckle⁵, cap, sliding scabbard clamp, two sabre holders with loops for attaching the scabbard, and 25 lunulas [60, p. 69, Cat. no. 19]. With a full length of 125–150 cm for an intact belt, an estimated number of 65–70 units of belt fittings seems to be optimal⁶.

This group of military belts is closely related to a group of belt sets with a ‘hunting’ designation: a silver belt set from the Tash-Bashat burial site in the Talas Valley, Kyrgyzstan, a golden belt set from Gashun Usta in the North Caucasus, three golden plates from the private collection of Nasser Khalili in London, and three bronze plates with images of fallow deer from the museum of P. Alabin in Samara [34, pp. 45–49, fig. 20, 21; 1, pp. 24–29]. It should be noted that, along with the belt, a scoop with a handle in the shape of a dragon protoma was also found at Gashun Usta in the Stavropol Region. Vessels of such type have been found in Siberia, in the Volga region, near Voronezh, and in the Dnieper area [60, pp. 56–58, 163, fig. 13; Cat. nos. 12, 13, 14, 21]. Related to this group of vessels, a two-handled bowl for wine was found during the

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⁴ The filigree decoration is similar to that which is found in the female grave of the three-chamber mausoleum referred to the middle of the 12th century, discovered in 1990 by Chinese archaeologists in Hebei Province [104, n. 12, pp. 37–51; 95, p. 36; 34, pp. 171, 172, fig. 88].

⁵ The buckle was restored in antiquity by a Russian master [34; p. 44].

⁶ The composition on the face plate decoration consists of two face-to-face dragons with fish tails. The back plate of the cap is covered with a scaly pattern on the reverse side. The sabre holders are hollow and of a rectangular form with large frog loops. The holders' face plates were made in the open-cast technique. The image of a three-toed dragon occupies a larger part of the object. The lower field is occupied by the figure of a flying bird; the big beak and heavy feathers probably indicate a falcon. This sabre holder with an extended frog loop and a chiseled image of a three-toed dragon on the face side of the plate is identified by the jade from the Song dynasty.
excavation works at the Tsarevskoe archaeological site [60, p. 59; Cat. no. 15]. The whole set of these vessels is dated from the 13th to the turn of the 14th centuries [34, pp. 61–72], and it differs from the Yuan vessels of this type [60, p. 159, fig. 11].

Saddles and belts with dragon-shaped heraldry seem to have appeared in the *Mongol milieu* almost instantaneously. Apparently, they were called into existence by the drastically increased level of state-building after the reform of 1206, when in the course of the establishment and rapid growth of new family branches, the nobility found itself in need of new unifying symbols. Thus, the two groups of belts belong to the older generation of the Jochids command corps, who came to the European steppe zone around the middle of the 13th century. The types and styles of these belts were developed in Central Asia already before the formation of the Ulus of Jochi. They may be viewed as part of the ‘Chinggisid legacy’ which was brought to Desht-i Kipchak with the first generation of conquerors and afterwards, on new ground, gave impetus to the development of the horsemen cultural phenomenon of those generations of Jochids who, upon returning from the Western campaign in the 1240s, laid the foundations of the Golden Horde. For the first time, this set of articles of Central Asian artistic handicrafts allows the opportunity to examine historical artefacts dated before the middle of the 13th century, which have not been discovered until the present day, except for a few discoveries in the parent country. It is significant that this group of items—which was very important for the early Jochids—does not yet possess innovative features related to Western adaptations from the time of the resounding defeat of the Khwarezm Shah state. Along with the advance of the Mongols to the west of Irtys, Islamic traits become noticeable in the forms and decorations of ceremonial items used by the early Jochids. There is a group of artefacts, totalling about ten vessels, five of which (four of them are intact) are remarkably similar to each other in their shape. By the same attribute, the group of high-stem vessels is closely related to the bowl of Asia Minor origin from the private collection in London, dated to the middle of the 13th century. Except for the London bowl bearing the name of Ulugh Humayun (the place of discovery is unknown), the whole group of discovered items originates from the Ural and Cis–Irtys River regions [34, pp. 93–108] and the Surgut area of the Cis–Ob River region [80, pp. 144–147]. The vessels belong to one specific or several related workshops, which operated during a short period of time from the 13th to the turn of the 14th centuries. The geography of discoveries indicates that a certain local centre, serving the north-eastern regions of the Golden Horde, existed east of Ishim [34, pp. 106, 107]. Questions about the production location of these vessels, their originality, the genesis of their style, and chronology problems of some of the items remain unanswered.
Below is the data about the main artefacts of the group, presented in the form of a table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Place of discovery or storage</th>
<th>Material and dimensions</th>
<th>Physical condition</th>
<th>Publication</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. 1</td>
<td>Probably, the Cis-Urals A private collection in Perm before 1909</td>
<td>Silver, dimensions unknown</td>
<td>Whole</td>
<td>57, no. 221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 2</td>
<td>Part of the treasure trove to the north of Sverdlovsk Oblast, village of Ponil, and Ivdelsky urban okrug</td>
<td>Silver, diameter: 27.0 cm; height: 12.5 cm</td>
<td>Missing ? spoons</td>
<td>7; 34, fig. 45. Cat. no. 54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 3</td>
<td>From the Surgut area of the Cis–Ob River region, burial site 'Saygatinsky 3', burial place 31</td>
<td>Silver, diameter: 12 cm; height: 6 cm</td>
<td>Damaged body of the bowl</td>
<td>34, fig. 47, Cat. no. 55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 4</td>
<td>From the Surgut area of the Cis–Ob River region, Shrine Saygatinsky 1</td>
<td>Silver, diameter: 14 cm</td>
<td>Missing stem</td>
<td>34, fig. 48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 5</td>
<td>From the Surgut area of the Cis-Ob River region. Accidental discovery at the Karavevskoe archaeological site</td>
<td>Silver, diameter: 19.5; height: 12.1 cm</td>
<td>Whole</td>
<td>80, pp. 144–1147</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Morphology, production techniques, and decor properties are the attributes that are common to all of the objects. As regards the form (morphology attributes), it is worth noting the combination of deep hollow-patterned bowls (nos. 1, 2, 4, 5) with distinct corollas and a pan in the form of a high cone-shaped stem, thickening at the fluently bent-out base plate. Some items (bowls no. 2 and no. 4) share the uncommon lotus-shaped flower with two bent down petals. The same attribute is present in the decor of the silver cup from the Tobol area of the Cis–Irtysh River region [34, fig. 52, Cat. no. 56]. It is notable that the flexible stem of the flower with typical narrow trifoliums at the edging of the cup is remarkably similar to the stem that decorates the crown of the vessel from the Surgut area of the Cis–Ob River region (cup no. 5). Meanwhile, the design of the flexible stem with wide sappy palmettes at the corolla edging from the Ivdel exhibit from the Urals (bowl no. 2) is identical to the flexible stem in the decor of the crown of the silver tankard, found at the 'Saygatinsky 1' shrine in the Surgut area of the Cis–Ob River region [34, fig. 51]. One more detail should be noted, which localizes the cup from the Tobol area of the Cis–Irtysh River region closer to the findings from the Surgut area of the Cis–Ob River region (cup no. 5 and the tankard from the shrine 'Saygatinsky 1'); this is the distinctly detailed portrayal of a straight-faced animal (a bear?) with its head turned back. In some cases, similarities in images allow the identification of the 'hand' of a particular craftsman. It remains to be added that the theme of triangular-shaped figures with double contour lines and fan-shaped clusters of retouching hatches in the decor of the stem of the bowl from the Karavevsk archaeological site (cup no. 5) has a rather close analogy with a similar geometrical pattern on the fragment of the silver cup (a part of the base plate?) from the Saratov area of the Volga region [34, fig. 54]. At the same time, the pattern of fan-shaped clusters of retouching hatches [bowls nos. 1, 3, 4, 5] is repeated as an independent theme not only in the decor of the fragment of the cup from the Saratov area of the Volga region but also on the inlay mark of the silver vessel from the ‘Saygatinsky 1’ shrine [34, fig. 44]. Thus, the range of items originating from one or several related workshops, determined on the basis of a system of similar signs, includes nine silver vessels from Western Siberia and the Urals. Five of them are distinguished by the similarity of their shape. The tenth bowl—in the form of a belt scoop, but with an image of a lotus-
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shaped flower— is similar to bowls nos. 2 and 4, as well as the cup from the Tobol area of the Cis–Irtysh River region, which was found in the North Caucasus [34, no. 136]. Thus, the Irtysh group of silver artefacts belongs to one or several closely related workshops, which operated during a relatively short interval of time from the first third of the 13th to the beginning of the 14th centuries. There is no doubt that the new crafts centre was being formed at the same time as the yurt (appanage) of Jochi, in the area of the migration routes of the camp of the ulus khan and his wives by the Irtysh River, but not in the upper reaches of the river, where the central camp of the Ögedeids was located. The geography of the crafts centre is indirectly confirmed by the zone of archaeological findings, limited to the east by the basin of the Surgut area of the Cis–Ob River region [32], and by the Middle Urals and Perm krai in the west. The level of originality and ultimately the recognisability of the reviewed group of vessels is determined by the confluence of artistic traditions of the peoples of North China and the West, where distinct signs of the craftsmanship of the Islamic Central Asia and the Middle East emerge and go on to influence Byzantium and Asia Minor.

Thus, on the basis of authentic archaeological findings at the burial complexes of the early Jochids and excavations at different ancient settlements and sites, for the first time, we receive the possibility of acquainting ourselves with certain rare objects from the Great Mongol state. Many of these artefacts were brought from the Irtysh and Western Siberia regions to the basins of the Sura, Volga-Kama Region and the steppe zone of the Don by the cavalry of Batu's Siberian troops, the core force of the European campaign of 1237–1242. Nonetheless, one of the groups of the items, identified as ‘Irtysh’, provides an understanding of the new vector in the development of the culture, which began at the time of the early campaigns in the western part of Desht-i Kipchak. These two groups of materials—specifically the details of the belt sets and horse trappings with dragon images—reflect an integral part of the horsemen culture in the first stage of the self-identification of the Turkic-Mongol population of the Golden Horde.

The loss of the cultural norms of the Turkic-Mongol horsemen in the early Chinggisid period is reflected in toreutic materials as early as in the beginning of the 14th century, at the time of the intensive Islamisation of the Golden Horde. In the Simferopol treasure trove, one of the most characteristic complexes from the first half of the 14th century, which belonged to a Crimean ruler [34, pp. 114–120], only one of the three belt sets is from the Golden Horde. Details of this ceremonial military belt do not contain any features at all of the early Jochid tradition, which developed during the period of unity in the Chinggisid empire [60, p. 83; Cat. nos. 527–564]. This belt set belongs to one of the many groups of discovered items produced—apparently—in Crimea during the middle Horde period. The style of its making differs little from the techniques used by the craftsman of the golden belt set from the Kazakh Cis–Irtysh River region [60, p. 85, Cat. nos. 143–155]. Apart from Crimea, such articles could be manufactured at urban workshops of the Volga region, including Bulgar [34, pp. 130–140], from where they were then spread throughout the territory of the whole European steppe zone. Nonetheless, the traditions of the Great Khan period do not disappear without a trace. They can be seen in other items from the Simferopol treasure trove such as in the typical finials of headwear. It is of interest for our theme that one of the most noteworthy artefacts of the treasure trove is the decorations of a female hat [60, p. 82; Cat. 307–330], where the relics (the rendering of the miniature multi-petal flowers with a central pearl on a high stem of golden wire) still reveal the handicraft tradition more typical for Central Asia, going back to the Chinese Sui dynasty (581–617)—compare with the decoration of the gold and silver female headwear from the grave of Li Qinsun (Li Jingxun) in Shanxi Province, People's Republic of China [103, p. 112, no. 274].

7 Sources are vague in their reports about the existence of towns in the Irtysh area in the pre–Mongol period. According to Al-Idrīsī (in the 12th century), there were 16 towns in the country of the Kimeks, eight of which were situated in the valley of the Garmash river, identified as the Irtysh. At present, there is no established connection between the Kimek towns and traces of sedentary life in the Mongol epoch.
Apart from pearls, the decoration of the finial plate and twenty onlays of the headwear from the Golden Horde treasure trove include amethysts, spinels, emeralds, chrysoprase, jasper, sapphire and turquoise, and, in one case, rock crystal [60, nos. 307–332; p. 82], which indicates the saturation of the markets of the western branch of the Silk Road as early as in the middle of the 14th century. Apparently, the phenomenon of female dress conservatism played its role in preserving the decorative tradition in respect to girl’s (?) hats. It should be noted that all parts of the headwear decoration and some parts of the belt from the Simferopol treasure trove were made in eastern Crimea, most probably in one of the jewellery workshops of Solkhat, serving the rulers of the town and the region of Qirim. Thus, it may be concluded that the items closely related to the demands of the horsemen elite most completely reflect the two stages of the self-identification of the Jochids, starting from the post-imperial and lasting to the middle Jochid period, coinciding with the flourishing of urban life. Meanwhile, the upper social strata of the Horde begin to actively adapt Islamic behaviours in the 14th century, which—with difficulty—replace the traditions of the Chinggis Khan empire.

Because of the vastness of the territory, the Golden Horde did not and could not have a uniform town planning system. Several local variants of urban development are distinguished here: the Steppe Volga region with its capital city of Sarai, Gulistan Saray, Ukek, and Beljamam represent one variant. The Dniester region, Crimea, the Cis–Azov region and the North Caucasus are represented by settlements and towns which are in many aspects different from the towns and settlements of the khan’s domain.

Unlike other towns of the Volga region and other territories of the Golden Horde, Sarai was not completely destroyed by the army of Timur in 1395. The date of its final desolation is not known, but in 1438 it was still notable as a centre of international trade [22, pp. 166, 167]. The capital city of the Golden Horde was a major crafts centre; the quarters of craftsmen-metallurgists and potters have been discovered there, as well as the workshops of jewellers and bone carvers.

As for the steppe towns of the Golden Horde, where, like at the Tsarevskoe archaeological site, only major topographic contours can be discerned [105, pp. 21–23], it is, apparently, too early to speak about the specific features of the layout scheme. Nonetheless, some important details have been identified. The area of the town within the limits of the ditches and the ramparts—built in the 1360s for the defence of the central quarters during the years of feudal strife—amounts to about 2 sq. km, but the total area of Gulistan Saray is much larger [17, p. 113]. The town plan drawn by A. Tereshchenko (1840s) shows up to 1,550 separate buildings just within the ramparts of the 1360s. Outside the ramparts, individual manors can be seen, which, according to the observations of G. Fedorov-Davydov, became larger in size in proportion to their distance from the town centre, to the east and to the south. Big manors, with areas of up to 26,000 sq. m, can be found on the far outskirts of the town to the east; to the west of the suburbs, there was an urban-type settlement, representing a complex of seven manors connected by common walls. It seems that similarly to the construction in the larger radius of Selitrennoe ancient town, Tsarevskoe ancient town can be regarded as an agglomeration, where town buildings, big manors, and their clusters alternated one after the other with rural zones and pasture lands. A big lake lay west of the town, on the shores of which were located housing quarters in the middle of the 14th century, while at the end of the century, a burial site appeared. In the centre of Gulistan, there was a big square, surrounded from the south and east by buildings of a prominently large size. From the centre to the outskirts lay streets with irrigation channels, along which pedestrian sidewalks could be seen in some cases. One more square can be seen in the microrelief in the eastern part of the town; four artificial water reservoirs apparently also existed in this sector of the ancient town. Tsarevskoe ancient town was located on the flood plane of the Akhtuba, most probably on the very bank of the river. Archaeological studies established the existence of municipal water conduits as well as complex hydrotechnical constructions that regulated the water level in the reservoirs. Initially, the nucleus of the town
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was formed by a few big aristocratic manors [69, pp. 85–87; 17, p. 114]. Unlike Sarai and Saray-Jük on the Ural River, Gulistan Saray was destroyed by Timur.

Besides Selitrennoe and Tsarevskoe ancient towns in the Volga region, over thirty more ancient towns and settlements were discovered outside of the Bulgar area, representing medium and small townships, though among them there are also well-known ones such as Mokhshi, Ukek, Beljamen, and Hajji Tarkhan [17, pp. 106–120]. G. Fedorov-Davydov rightly warned against the automatic expansion of the list of Golden Horde towns [70, p. 41], but in fact, if we look only at the number of noticeable towns, their amount is incredible. In reality, such centres were brought into being by the needs of the state structure and trade exchanges (see above). A cursory enumeration of the ancient towns provides a panorama of the urbanisation boom in the 14th century. Below are some of the towns and major settlements within the boundaries of the right ‘wing’. In the Pru–Dniester region: Akkerman, Kilia, the Costești ancient town, Old Orhei (Shehr al-Jadid/Yangi-Shehr); in Ciscaucasia: Majar, Lesser Majar, Upper Majar; in Dagestan: Derbent; in North Ossetia: Upper Dzhulat; in Karachay-Circassia: Lower Arkhyz ancient town, the settlements of the Terek–Sulak interfluve; in Kabardino-Balkaria: Tersk ancient town and Lower Julat. In the Azov Sea region: the Azov ancient town (town of Azak), and several settlements. In Taman: Matracha. From the new Golden Horde towns in Crimea, the only one that has been identified is Solkhat (Qirim).

Within this essay, it is not easy to outline the general and specific features of life in the towns of the Golden Horde. I can mention just two examples manifesting the peculiarities of communication in the life of urban settlements in different points of the enormous state in the 14th century. At four different archaeological sites—Tsarevskoe (town of Gulistan Saray), Sarepta (apparently, from medieval Ukek), Vodyanskoj ancient town, and the archaeological site of the medieval Saray-Jük—tare vessels—khums (sums)—were found, with a height of up to 1.07 m and a diameter of 0.6 m, bearing the stamp of the craftsman or the workshop owner. The three-line lettering of the stamp indicates the name ‘Anand (?), son of Sarkis’ [37, p. 119, nos. 164, 575, 576]. There is no doubt that the production of the Armenian craftsman, who worked in the Volga region, was widely known and reached as far as the Ural River (Yaik in Turkic) at the time of the urban boom [64, p. 240]. Another example and one of the finest specimens of the pottery art is the wine cup made from semi-faience (kashi) with polychromic painting, found in the Golden Horde town of Azak. The cup was most likely produced in one of the workshops of the capital Sarai [36, pp. 182–189]. The cup contains an image of Islamic paradise and was apparently designed for a palace or the banquet table of a rich manor. It is decorated with a cobalt underglaze painting and a three-colour overglaze painting in red, green, and black colours against a white background of opaque glaze, with the addition of rolled gold in some areas. The closest parallels to the Azak artefact can be found in the fragments of polychrome pottery discovered at the archaeological sites of Saray-Jük [64, pp. 39, 112, 137, 247] and Bulgar (the vessel has not been presented in publications). An inscription on one of the fragments from Saray-Jük mentions the year of the workshop work as 764 AH, that is, 1362—1363. An alternative opinion about the source of this group of ceramics links them to Iran [30, p. 144], though this is unconfirmed due to the absence of similar types of discoveries in the Middle East.

The majority of madrasahs, mosques, and other public buildings in the towns of the Golden Horde are dated to the first half of the 1360s [102, pp. 41–56; 23, pp. 9–58; 35, pp. 112–116]. The Islamic branch of urban culture, it seems, may be viewed as an archaeological indicator of the second stage of the self-identification of the Jochids8. This line of the development of the spiritual

8 Within the Bulgar ulus of the Golden Horde, the Islamic tradition based itself in the lands conquered in the pre-Mongol period. The work on establishing the succession of these attributes, however, is complicated by the unfinished state of the discussion on the typology and dating of some categories of large-scale discoveries in Bilyar, introduced by A. Khalikov [see, for example: 68].
and material culture was inherited by the successor states after the demise of the Golden Horde. It is pertinent to note that the civilisational legacy was being passed at the time of the fading of world trade along the Great Silk Road in connection with the downfall of the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368) and the general decline of urban life in the Kipchak steppe itself. The crisis of monetary circulation—the signs of which appeared in the 1370s—resulted in the reduction or total cessation of coining by the mints of Sarai, Sarai al-Jadid, and Gulistan. This was related to the overall degradation of urban life in the central regions of the country after the time of troubles in the 1360s. In 1399–1400, monetary circulation in the Volga region was on the decline [71, pp. 49, 55].

Among the political factors determining the life in the Golden Horde at that period, it is worth noting the increased activity of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania at the Golden Horde’s south-western borders and of Moscow in the north-west.

The second half of the 14th century is characterised by the marked return of Desht-i Kipchak to the nearly forgotten values of the first generation. By this, I mean the revival of the traditions of belt sets with dragon images. There is a certain series of belt plates in the form of tropeic medallions with scalloped edges made from bronze alloy cast into rigid moulds. On the face side, there is an image of a polymorphous creature (leftward), depicted in two planes in the flat relief technique, with a body, wings, three-toed bird legs, a snake-like tail, and the head of a chimera with a wide-open mouth, from which a forked tongue is outstretched. On top of the chimera’s head, there are two projections—horns (?). The details of the feathering of the spread wings are not cut out but are still rather distinct. The outstretched right paw (to the left of the viewer), together with the springy rings of the tail and the open mouth with a forked ‘snakes’ tongue, creates the illusion of threatening movement. Two such plates from the Hermitage collection were found near the village of Zubovka in the former Tsarev uyezd⁹; one in Bilyar [72, no. 17] and one in Bulgar—the onlay from the collection of the National Museum of the Republic of Tatarstan; one more was also discovered during the examination of the Kokpomyagsky burial site (burial place 131) in the Vychegda area of Perm by the Vym river [55, p. 138, tables 36–23]. The Vym artefact is dated to the 13–14th centuries, but it is also possible that the bronze belt plates, preceding the Kazan Zilant, became a part of the series in the second half of the 14th century. The proliferation of this dragon figure—unusual for Golden Horde iconography—is also indicated by the discovery of a sewed-on plate from carved bone containing a similar image. The plate was undoubtedly made by a Russian craftsman based on a Golden Horde sample¹⁰; it was found in the excavated layer of a rural settlement from the middle of the 13th to the last third of the 14th centuries, not far from Nizhny Novgorod. Apparently, the image of such a serpent-dragon was brought to the Golden Horde from Italy, where it is known by the needlework insertion on a linen towel from Perugia (13–14th centuries; not published, the Hermitage Museum, Inv. no. T–650)¹¹. The serpent-dragons of the Perugia towel differ from those of the Golden Horde mainly by membranous wings. The same feature is present in the image of biped dragons with bird legs on the base plate of a silver Balkan bowl of the 15th century (?) from Constantinople (collection of Fr. Martin) [57, table CXVIII, 274]. "Bat' wings are a typical but optional element of dragons in European iconography, see, for example, the image of a winged dragon in 'The Book of the Treasure' by Brunetto Latini (13th century) [78, p. 80]. On the seals of the Russian Grand Princes, Ioann III (1497), Vasily Ivanovich (1514),

⁹ Village of Zubovka, Solodovka volost, Tsarev uyezd, Astrakhan guberniya; accidental discovery, 1882. The Hermitage Museum, Inv. nos. 758, 759.
¹⁰ Not presented in publications. Discovered in 2006 by the expedition of N. Gribov at the excavation site of the ancient settlement of Beshentsevo 3 near Nizhny Novgorod (excavation site 1, pit 2). For the closest examples of Russian bone carvings based on Horde models, see: [31, nos. 155, 158]. I am grateful to N. Gribov for the information.
¹¹ The date is shown on the exhibit label. For a general description of the 'Perugia towels' see: [41, p. 55].
and Ivan IV Vasilyevich (1539), Saint George slays a two-legged serpent-dragon portrayed in the Western style. It is possible to agree that the iconography of the serpent-dragon on the Golden Horde belt sets served as the basis for the adoption of the design as the Kazan Khanate's heraldic symbol [72, pp. 132–135]. One should not, however, exclude the possible substitution of this image, accommodated by the Turkic tradition, with a version of a crowned basilisk from the Latin bestiary [93, p. 85], similar in iconography to the dragons of our bronze belt plates. One of the latest manufactured heraldic emblems of the Kazan Khanate (first half of the 19th century) can be seen in the decor of the throne in St. George’s Hall in the Winter Palace in St. Petersburg.

At the turn of the 14–15th centuries, belt sets with dragons were typical not only for the Middle Volga Region but also for the south-western regions of the Golden Horde. One of the most remarkable findings is related to the coin–artefact treasure trove near the village of Litva on the territory of present-day Belarus. The coins in the treasure trove include no less than 6,191 silver coins specimens of Prague groschen, 6,186 of which went to the museum of the National Bank of Belarus. According to Prof. V. Ryabtsevich, that was only a part of the treasure trove. Five more coins of this type and three small jewellery made from gilded silver were assigned to the National Museum of History and Culture of Belarus (the latter had been earlier discovered by Ryabtsevich at the site, by means of ground digging and the use of a magnetometer). All of the discovered coins from the treasure trove were minted in 1378–1419 at the Kutná Hora mint in the Czech Republic (location determined by V. Ryabtsevich). The artefacts part of the treasure trove comprises two belt sets (silver with gold-plating and niello). I examined one of them at the National Museum in 1997, and I saw the parts of the second one (which were in a private collection in Paris in the early 2000s) in a photograph several years later. The belt sets from the treasure trove near the village of Litva are unique and belong to the workshop which operated in the epoch of Hacı Giray in eastern Crimea. By its non-military nature and the peculiarities of the decoration (one of the belts is, probably, for hunting), the belts can be listed under the category of ceremonial attributes, belonging apparently to the treasury of a rich merchant or prince. All of the parts are made of silver, while the majority of them are decorated with niello and gold-plating. The belt fittings set of the first belt consists of 15 items: a buckle, tip cap, two (of the four found) rectangular plates, two large (up to 8.3 cm in diameter) plates with scalloped edges, and nine round plates with a diameter of up to 6.5 cm. The dual buckle (6.6 cm long in total) with a rectangular receiver (3.2 x 3.0 cm) repeats the form of the buckle of the late-Gothic silver belt set of the late 15th century from the collection of the Hungarian National Museum in Budapest [106, pp. 208, 209, 322, 323; Cat. No. 46]. Dragon images are included in the decorative structure of plates 7 and 8. Each of the two (diameters of 6.4–6.5 cm) has two images, along the borders of the face side, of annularly winding large-toothed serpent-dragons biting each other at the tail ends. The dragons have ‘fish’ heads with an upper lip that is bent upwards, an almond-shaped eye, and short ‘manes.’ Their bodies are covered with notches. The subject of two serpents in a circle or, in some cases, a sphere, relates in the Islamic tradition of astral themes, as, for example, in the miniature with

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12 From the letter of V. Ryabtsevich to the writer of this essay.
13 The number of items is tentative. During an examination of the findings at the National Museum of Belarus (Minsk) at the end of 1994, I was shown 15 items, which, prior to the information revealed by the articles from the Paris collection, were regarded as one single belt set. In the pit of the hoard's burial place by the village of Litva, V. Ryabtsevich also discovered two rectangular plates, similar to the ones I saw in Minsk but with different dimensions. It seems, therefore, reasonable not to include them in the list of fittings of the first belt. As it was impossible to establish the number and composition of the findings of the Paris part of the treasure trove, similarly, there is no certainty in regards to the distribution of the individual items of particular belt sets.
an image of a lunar deity in Kitab al-Diryaq, dated 1199 and localised to Seljuk Iran by Melikyan Shirwani [91, pp. 4–16]. Apparently, a protective property is the main theme in these cases [84, p. 50, fig. 41]. The Islamic bestiary inherited this theme from ancient times [3, pp. 16–27]. In the Turkic world of the Middle East, however, contrary to the traditions of the peoples of China, a dragon is always a monster of the lower world, whose place is underneath the ground or in the sea, the latter apparently being the result of the pressure of their ancient heritage [85, pp. 275–284]. In such a case, their undeveloped wings, as noted by V. Propp, are a relict of the heavenly image of the serpent [53, p. 303].

Comparing the attributes of the craftsmanship traditions allows us to localise the belt set to a workshop in eastern Crimea14.

Little is known about the composition of the fittings of the second belt. Based on the reproductions that we have, it can be said that they mainly consisted of the same set of plates of two types as the first one. It is evidenced by the large plate with a scalloped edge and parts of the openwork pendant on a joint. The decoration of the face side of this plate is similar to the decoration of plate no. 2 of the first belt set. The two small ones are comparable to plates nos. 7 and 8 of the first set. It is not only the ornamental-decorative structure of the face plates that match but also the images of serpent-like reptiles along the plate borders. But the main difference relates to the buckle. The buckle consists of two parts connected by a clamp. We have the picture of the second half, which can be described as a receiver. The face side of the buckle plate is richly decorated. The conceptually dominant idea is represented by four heraldic serpent-dragons directed toward the centre in the form of a six-pointed rosette with a medallion. The medallion is completely covered by a stylised floral pattern with a characteristic half-palmette; the same theme, but already in the shape of a flexible stem, is in the decoration of the rosette.

The renderings of paired serpent-dragons on the belt buckles are dominated by Seljuk stylistics, similar to the presentation of paired dragons on the Diyarbakr Aleppo gates, where winged monsters, leaning on one paw, are positioned inside the elongated triangular-shaped cartouches.

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14 Narrow (up to 0.5 cm) rims of both plates are decorated with the pattern of nielloed vines and groups (up to seven) of small serrate leaves, emphasised by niello; the leaves on plate no. 7 are gold-plated. The theme of small leaves is repeated on the rims of other plates (nos. 9, 10, 12). As the image of separate small leaves does not involve much in terms of semantics, this theme deserves special attention from the point of view of the craftsmanship tradition. It is this particular element of decoration that is often repeated on golden nielloed items from the Simferopol treasure trove [see: 34, fig. 61, Cat. no. 307; fig. 62, Cat. nos. 334–356, 308–332] or in combination with the half-palmetto with a characteristic ringlet, such as in the decoration of the silver comb case from the burial place in mound no. 1 of the Belorechensky burial site, as well as in the decoration of the plates on the golden bracelet from Juketau [34, p. 110, fig. 55, p. 131, fig. 71, Cat. nos. 81, 111]. The emergence of Golden Horde artefacts on the territory of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, where Tatars (the descendants of the Horde) also lived in the 14th century, was conditioned by the history of the relations between these medieval states [for more details see: 14, p. 203 and others]. In the archaeology of Lithuania, this phenomenon found its reflection in a whole range of particular findings, which also included such decorations as earrings in the form of a question mark, open-ended ring-shaped earrings with a small dragon head, plated bracelets with lion images, and others [see, for example: 100, p. 167, fig. 7, 97, pp. 205–224]. There is a high probability that the dissemination of Golden Horde decorations towards the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the European north-east was precipitated by Novgorod, where no less than fifteen earrings of the same question mark shape were found in ground layers from the 14th to the early 15th centuries [56, p. 16]. Earrings in the form of a question mark and open-ended earrings with dragon's head are found in the funeral inventory of the Loemsky burial site, which is on the right bank of the Luza River [see: 55, fig. 4–1, 2, 4]; in the excavations at Belozero [see: 21, fig. 51–4; fig. 264–12]; there is also a fragment of a Golden Horde plated bracelet here [fig. 264–8]. From among the Golden Horde discoveries, let us note the earrings with a dragon head found in the Dnieper River region, in the complex of the Vasilitsa treasure trove near Cherkasy, found along with 52 Golden Horde coins, the latest of which are from the 1370s [62, fig. 5–1], and the earrings of the same type found among the discoveries in the Poltava area [64, p. 92, fig. 87] and in the inventory of the Mamai-Surka burial site near Zaporizhia [18, fig. 32–5].
The dragons face each other and are separated by an inscription containing the name of Sultan Mahmud, son of Kara Arslan; the inscription shows the date—579 AH, that is, 1183–1184 [82, p. 82]. A pair of serpent-dragons is carved on the gates of Baghdad; underneath the friso there is an inscription with the name of caliph Al-Nasir and the date—618 AH, that is, 1221–1222 [84, fig. 39]. The Artuqids of Diyarbakr had ceded Hisn Kaif and Amida to the Ayyubids already by 1232. In the first third of the 13th century, they already experienced vassalage under the Seljukid Rûm, and after the conquest of Transoxiana by the Mongols in 617 AH (1220), under Jalal al-Din Mingburnu (1220–1231); the Mardin branch of the Artuqids continued to exist until the beginning of the 15th century. Another line of similarities can be seen in the images of heraldic winged serpent-dragons on the silver buckles of belts from the 13–14th centuries from the fortress of Dolishte in north-eastern Bulgaria, obviously designed for a Turkic user [36, note 1, pp. 131, 132, table III–1; pp. 136, 138]. The heraldic buckle of belt I was, most probably, made by a Byzantine craftsman or brought from Byzantium, where the Turkic nobility, represented by nearly three dozen clans, established itself in the upper social strata of the state from the middle of the 11th through the middle of the 14th centuries [26; 20, pp. 163–175]. Since the second half of the 12th century, the Turkish military aristocracy already held a prominent position in the lands between the Danube and Stara planina [the Balkan Mountains].

The type of Seljuk winged reptiles, as is evidenced by the discovery of a saddle at a nomadic burial site of the 14th century near the village of Philia in the area of Ekaterinoslav, Ukraine [34, pp. 126, 127, fig. 37], was well known in the European part of the Golden Horde as well. V. Shalobudov believes that the decoration of the saddle facings was made at a Golden Horde workshop by a craftsman who evolved and matured under the influence of the Russian bone carving school [77, pp. 110–119]. Triangle-shaped plates with dragons from Philia show—as we see—that the carver was acquainted with Seljuk prototypes. There is hardly a doubt that the design of the winged reptiles on the buckle from the treasure trove at the village of Litva could be developed somehow other than under the influence of the Seljuk tradition.

The theme of the chthonic world with figures of serpent dragon-like creatures inevitably brings us to the terrain of Turkic mythology. This line is typical for both the east and the west of the Turkic-Mongol world. For example, the Kimeks, residing west of the Khitans and connected with the Khitans by a common destiny back in the period of the Uighur el (744–840), depicted their serpents as totem creatures [2, p. 115]. There is an account of the Chinese Ambassador Wang Yan-de, who visited The Uighur Turfan Principality in the latter quarter of the 10th century, and describing his journey in the western part of Manchuria and eastern Mongolia, he mentioned the lands of the Duchong Taiizu tribe by the borders of the Khitan state [47, p. 2, p. 115; 10, p. 465]. The word ‘dachong’ is translated as ‘great serpents’ [94, p. 175]. In the first half of the 11th century, the Turkic-speaking Kai and Yabaku were the eastern neighbours of the ‘Sary (Yellow)’ Turgesh in the Balkhash area; the coalition was led by a Yabaku, Budrach ‘the great serpent’ [28, pp. 11, 12]. Despite the fact that the link with the serpent totem is traced also to the western Kipchaks in the genealogy of the Sharukhanid clan (12th century), whose name originates from the Turkic word for dragon, we have no information about any developed Kipchak iconography in the pre-Mongol period. As P. Golden noted, the Russian tradition holds the memory of the Cumans’ leader—Tugarin Zmeievich (‘zmeievich’, ‘serpent’s son’) —and identifies the Cumans with their totem—the serpent [10, p. 465]. In the Golden Horde, this iconography is fixed in the decoration of quivers and warriors’ belts but dates back mostly to the Khitan and Jurchen prototypes. In our case, the characteristic iconography of dragon-like reptiles is an indicator of the artistic tradition of Seljuk Asia Minor and Upper Mesopotamia. In the Islamic West, this image became wide-spread in the 12–13th

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15 This is evidenced both by historical placenames on the territory of Bulgaria and by the dynastic history of the Cumans; for a description of the main stages of the Cumans’ penetration into the Dniester–Carpathian and Carpathian–Danube lands, see: [29, pp. 90–142].
centuries [see: 87, pp. 10–17]. Judging by the similarity of the reptile themes in the materials of Seljuk Anatolia and on the belt plates from Crimea, the acquaintance of the craftsman or craftsmen with product specimens of the Sultanate of Rum, with its capital in Iconium Konya (since 1134), seems obvious.

Details of belt sets with heraldic dragons from the Middle Volga region and Crimea of the time of the Giray dynasty's ascent to power represent and document that the late Jochids—from the second half of the 14th to beginning of the 15th centuries—safely preserved non-Islamic beliefs, not as hidden vestiges but as a civil norm adopted by the institutions of power.

The progressive advance of the Golden Horde as a world power was halted by the fatal superimposition of several crises simultaneously. Among them is the systemic crisis of power that began in the 1360s and the global ecological crisis, which, together with the plague pandemic, caused irreparable damage to cattle breeding and the towns of Desht-i Kipchak. The military–political catastrophe of the late 14th century destroyed the single network of markets of the Jochid steppe towns. After 1395, the Golden Horde ceased to exist as an empire. Nonetheless, the civilisational legacy, formed from the 13th to the beginning of the 14th centuries, was taken over by the Turkic states of Eastern Europe in the 15–16th centuries.

In short, it may be stated that within the territorial boundaries of the Ulus of Jochi (the Golden Horde)—in a relatively short amount of time—there developed recognisable nomadic (horsemen's) and sedentary/urban cultures, each of which had its own unique features, dynamics of development, and local peculiarities. They existed as mutually complementary systems in the socio–cultural context of the single empire. The weakening of the horsemen's branch of the single system entailed stagnation and the eventual downfall of the urban culture.

The recognisability of the Golden Horde's culture (sometimes disputed by colleagues) and the growth of sedentarisation in the 14th century and of the relative share of urban life in the steppe expanses west of the Volga, including Crimea and up to the Danube, allow to suggest for the description of the heritage of this state an approach based on the analysis of the Horde civilisation in the context of the history of the whole continent of Eurasia. The latter seems relevant in connection with the special position of the Golden Horde between the West and the East, taking into account the poly-ethnicity and the preservation of the multiconfessional character of the population of this state.

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58. Sultanov T. K voprosu o terminax `Ak-Orda`, `Kok-Orda`, `Jyuz-Orda` (On the question of the terms 'Ak Horde', 'Kök Horde' and 'Jüz Horde') // Pis'menny'e pamyatniki i problemy' istorii kyl`tur' narodov Vostoka. Moscow, 1970.
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§ 2. Environmental and Economic Criteria of Civilisation in the Golden Horde

Eduard Kulpin-Gubaydullin

Environmental criteria.

According to archaeological data, we know that in a number of districts during the period of the sixth generation from the start of the Mongol invasion (1325–1343), strips of continuously settled areas started to appear on the map. The central urban agglomeration on the Lower Volga, which stretched from Old Sarai to Saray al-Jadid, is of particular interest, as its emergence was only possible based on the condition that the environmental and economic problems of the settlement were resolved simultaneously. For a settlement's evolution into an urban agglomeration, the capacity of the country's agriculture to produce a surplus of foodstuffs and industrial crops was also a crucial requirement. However, the nature of the steppe was not favourable for the development of arable farming. Its negative factors could only be overcome due to the efforts of the elite and residents of the central portion of the Golden Horde, who managed to successfully put into practice a civilised and environmentally-oriented set of measures. None of the urban agglomerations known to us in the past or present has ever faced a similar need to overcome such a complex challenge.

There exists the belief that civilisation in general is a synonym of culture, as it demonstrates the level of material and spiritual public development, which in fact establish society's ability to maintain a reasonable quality of life (from the perspective of members of this civilisation) of people, even in disadvantageous natural conditions.

It is thus natural that all ancient civilisations originated in the tropics: in the cities there, all material and spiritual blessings were accumulated already in one place. It was more difficult, though still possible, to create similarly advantageous circumstances in the countryside, for example, the Roman villas, and even in the natural conditions of Southern and South-Western Europe. Notably, the northern border of the Roman Republic, and later of the Empire, for a long time corresponded to freezing temperatures in January and only later just barely crossed over this invisible limit.

However, the benefits of these areas for civilisation could not be recreated in the dugouts, yurts, and yarangas of north and east Eurasia. It was therefore believed that only barbarians (from the perspective of civilised people) were capable of living with winter temperatures below zero, and the harsher the environment was, the more they were considered barbaric. The lands between the zero January isotherm and −5°C were first settled by the Germans, followed by the Slavs, then the Ugrians, Finns, and finally, at the same latitude but only in the steppe zone, by nomadic peoples. It only become truly possible to create a decent mode of living in the steppe zone of European civilisation starting from the late 18th century. It was only then that urban infrastructure was being built up in the prairies of North America (which well earned the moniker of the 'Wild West'), in the Argentinean pampas, and in the steppes of Southern Rus, but these were limited to individual towns.

Only once in its history, in particular during the Golden Horde period, has humankind ever managed to create an urban system of towns. Archaeological excavations indicate that cities included in the agglomeration featured both the common benefits of Western European civilisations of the period and more unusual ones. Barbarians, or nomads of the Eurasian steppes, outpaced the general course of historic development and created, from the perspective of the Old World's greatest civilisations, an unprecedented phenomenon.

16 'Certain areas of the state are turning into multi-kilometer, populated areas of an entirely sedentary lifestyle, comprised of small towns, settlements, and aristocratic castles surrounded by cultivated fields' [5, p. 13].
Today, thanks to the efforts of archaeologists, we can form an idea about the riches of the steppe cities. In the past, archaeologists have traditionally only considered the social and political processes, which has assisted greatly in understanding the Golden Horde as a phenomenon but did not allow to completely conceive of its value or its grandness, when compared to other civilisations. By combining traditional historical studies with the works of biologists, geographers, and climatologists, we are now able to understand the process of its formation as a complex social entity, along with its developmental stages and causes of its downfall.

At present, the man-made landscape has changed the face of nature and, also to a great extent, the micro-climate of the European steppe that was centred on the strip between 52 and 48° North. The steppe of the former days is gone, but even though the cities of the Golden Horde have disappeared from the face of the Earth and are beyond the recall of people's memories, the steppe cenosis was thoroughly studied by biologists before its disappearance.

Before the Golden Horde, the Great Steppe had not been a country of cities, which was indeed not a coincidence: the Eurasian steppe climate is unforgiving, and it is ill-suited for both agriculture and human habitation in general. The steppe is characterised by seasonal and daily contrasts of temperatures, coupled with overheating of the land in the summer and harsh cooling in winter, and large differences in daily and nightly temperatures. The overwhelming majority of atmospheric precipitation (80%) in the steppe is attributed to the summer months, and even then it is quite uneven, as in June and July, the area from Moldova to the Don suffers from droughts. Starting from the latter third of September, the entire expanse of the Eurasian steppe descends into a state of hibernation, either due to a lack of heat or water, or both. Sometimes, a year's worth of precipitation may fall in a single heavy summer shower and quickly evaporate due to the heat, and then a drought reigns for months on end, preventing the growth of trees and healthy grasses, and plaguing the human population with constant thirst. Plants are unable to use more than one fifth of the moisture that falls in the steppe. Severe droughts are cyclical every 3–4 years in the steppe. It is no coincidence that agriculture among nomads went no further than merely sowing seeds in spring and then leaving the field, only to return to it in autumn to gather whatever meager crops reached maturity, if any at all.

The steppe climate of our mainland features a high-pressure area that extends as a narrow ridge to the west from the Siberian anticyclone, and along the nominal line connecting the cities of Kyzyl—Uralsk—Saratov—Kharkiv—Chişinău—Székesfehérvár. This nominal line is also known as the Great Eurasian Climactic Axis and serves as a wind divide on the mainland. In winter, to the north, where the wooded steppe and forest zones are located and where agricultural workers used to live in the Middle Ages, warm winds blow in from the West and South-west, bringing moisture along with them. To the south, where the steppes, semi-deserts and deserts are, the dry and cold north-eastern and eastern winds prevail, and here only nomads used to live in the Middle Ages.

The wind direction is conditional upon the clockwise movement of air flows in anticyclones: out from the centre, where the atmospheric pressure is high, to the edges, where it is lower. In January, the pressure contrast between Atlantica and Siberia created a powerful air flow from the centre of Asia to the Atlantic Ocean. This frosty draft chooses its path along the smooth, low spaces between the uplands and the mountains.

Territories to the north of the Great Eurasian Climactic Axis receive more precipitation in winter than those to the south, and a deep layer of snow also protects the soil from excessive freezing. In spring there is not just much water, it is in abundance: flooding occurs, and that water does not flow into rivers immediately, but gradually seeps into the soil, moistening it. To the south of the Great Eurasian Climactic Axis, water evaporates quickly in spring, as it is unable to penetrate the frozen soil. The steppes get their biggest intake of water in spring, when the snow melts, while in summer there is less water from rain showers than forest ecosystems usually receive. The period of abundant precipitation, however, is quickly replaced by droughts
in the steppes. It is no coincidence then that steppe cities of the Golden Horde originated on the
river banks, as life in the steppe is entirely dependent on water.

To preserve moisture and phytomass to the maximum during dry periods, the biocenosis
developed a special trick—continuous movement as a necessary condition for the survival of a
large animal in the steppe. If hoofed animals, with their immense herd density, were evenly
distributed throughout the entire area of the steppe or prairie, they would eat up the entire
aboveground mass of plants in only a few days, never giving them any opportunity to grow [12,
pp. 43, 75–76, 87–88, 90]. However, in natural conditions, the even distribution of hoofed ani-
mals across the steppe is, in fact, impeded by predators, which also act as agents of natural
selection, regulating the population sizes of mammals. However, such a stable homeostasis was
typical for the steppe before the arrival of humans. To quote the concise words of Sergey Bal-
andin, 'The steppe, much like a good Turkmen carpet, needs to be stomped on' [12, p. 76]. The
more hooves tramp down the steppe, the more grass it has later. But the steppe cannot be
tramped on without limits, even though the recreative abilities of the steppe biome are amaz-
ingly well developed: 'the surface of the steppe, compacted by cattle to a state resembling tar-
mac, in just three years after the pasturing animals move on, restores its initial condition...' [12,
p. 134]. Yet, recreative abilities of the steppe biome are nonetheless far from limitless. The
ecological vulnerability of the steppe was indeed the latent Achilles' heel of the Golden Horde
civilisation.

The reclamation of steppes both in the Middle Ages and modern history made homeostasis
there less stable, yet the natural instability of this region was also felt by people who had created
the Golden Horde steppe cities from scratch. The people who populated them did not know
how to behave in the steppe and were not aware that the skills developed by their ancestors in
other natural conditions would fail to serve them in a new place, yet they quickly adapted their
economic activity to the unfamiliar conditions. Nomads also considered the steppe to be incom-
parably richer than their former stomping grounds, and they knew not the limits of its capacities,
or what would occur if they pushed it beyond its bounds into an environmental crisis or local
environmental catastrophe. So before the 1360s, no elements of an upcoming crisis were ever
felt.

The natural capacities of steppes determined universal regularities, as in the man-made
landscape they depend on the physical mass of household cattle; in the nominally man-made
landscape, the total mass of domestic and wild animals could not exceed the mass of the wild
hoofed animals that had been present there before the arrival of humans. Moreover, to maintain
the ecological balance of the steppe biocenosis, not only the total number of animals was im-
portant but also the numerical ratio of different species. From time to time, as things used to be
done in the Ryn Desert in the 19th century or in present-day Mongolia, herdsmen get caught in
an environmental trap, when the ratio of numbers of sheep and goats in the herd is disturbed.
The problem, however, is also related to the number of nomads: the more of them live in the
same space, the more sheep they need to feed themselves. But sheep put a massive strain on the
earth, both in the literal and figurative sense. Unlike cattle, sheep move slowly and stomp down
the ground thoroughly. The pressure applied by a small sheep's hooves on a unit of surface area
is four times greater than the pressure of tracks of even a medium-sized tank [12, p. 164].
Whereas cattle only graze on the grass, sheep, to use the popular Buryat expression, shear it.

Circumstances in the geographical centre of the state of the Golden Horde, apart from
climactic features and the underdevelopment of medieval infrastructure, were aggravated by
the foundation of centralised administrative and economic management and, correspondingly,
the accumulation of a large number of cattle and industrial facilities. All of this created addi-
tional pressure on the steppe biocenosis. However, up until the beginning of the civil war in the
steppe—also known as the Great Troubles—there were no signs of steppe degradation either
on the vast stretches of land or in the vicinity of cities. This can be attributed first and foremost
to the cultural skills of land owners and nomads, and also to the developed coordination between the groups or the link between the polis and the khôra.

Only later was it fully demonstrated that the nomadic Turks, spearheaded not by the Mongols but by the Turkicised elite of the society, were able to establish cities so quickly. The necessity for such cities was born from the needs of the state, as well as global goals of strengthening and consolidating great trading routes. This, in turn, set the task before society to unite cities within a single system, ideally in the efforts to create an urban agglomeration. But to do so, problems involving production needed to be solved, mainly 'where to produce?' and its derivative, 'how to produce?'

As a result, an agglomeration of settlements eventually took form. D. Iskhakov and I. Izmaylov describe this event as follows: 'The Lower Volga region was the heart of the Ulus of Jochi. This was the area that, according to an Arab historian of the latter half of the 14th century, Ibn Khaldun, was "rich in cultivated areas" (that is, populated settlements) [13, p. 378]. It was also where the two most shining examples of medieval mega-cities of the Ulus of Jochi were located—Sarai and Sarai al-Jadid [New Sarai], not to mention the other large cities, including Hajji Tarkhan (near modern-day Astrakhan), Beljamen (Vodyanskoе ancient town), Ukek (near modern-day Saratov), Gulistan and Saray-Jüük (modern-day settlement of Sarayshyq to the north of the town of Guryev) that, along with dozens of other towns and settlements surrounding them, comprised a densely populated agricultural oasis stretching along both banks of the lower reaches of the Volga and the Ural. The political, economic, and cultural centre of the empire was focused exclusively here, where there was a concentration of immense material and human resources…' [6, p. 67]. The reasons behind the emergence of this major urban agglomeration in the Middle Ages were multifaceted and spanned various historical, ecological, administrative, manufacturing, trading, and communicational elements.

The Lower Volga steppes were chosen by the Jochids as the primary territory for their new state, or the domain of the Jochid khans, possibly because in the 12–early 13th century there was a sort of vacuum there encompassing a multitude of free pastures and a very sparse population, even for the nomadic steppe. These areas were then quickly populated in the 13–14th centuries by nomads who moved there out of necessity and others—purely of free will'.

Also, 'the Lower Volga, where new cities were being built, featured a favourable combination of low flood plains, well suited for agriculture, wooded river banks, and wide steppes, where abundant herds could graze and people could roam freely. After taking up residence in this area, the Golden Horde khans held an important trading thoroughfare for all of Eastern Europe—the Volga—under their control. This was where the routes passing along the Volga from the north towards the Caspian Sea and further to Transcaucasia, Iran, and Central Asia crossed caravan routes from the cities of the Black Sea area and from Azaq to the east, through the Kazakhstan steppes to the deserts near the Aral Sea' [15, p. 11].

**Economic criteria.**

The Lower Volga urban agglomeration, immense even when considered from a modern-day perspective, functioned in accordance with objective laws similar to those of contemporary urban agglomerations [see 10, pp. 256–275]; it is indeed one manifestation of civilisation's economic criteria that has held true for the entire civilised period of world history.

At the same time, the Lower Volga agglomeration also had its downsides, which were unavoidable for such a large swath of geographical space. In fact, spatial tightness is a primary condition for the economic foundations of urban growth, where the direct proximity of suppliers and consumers reduces transportation and communication costs, driving down the costs of manufacturing and sales processes. It is no coincidence that from a historical perspective, everywhere in the world the largest cities originated around inexpensive, natural or man-made transport nodes, including along sea shores and on large rivers when this mode of transportation was still the cheapest, eventually being replaced in the 20th century by railway hubs.
Large urban agglomerations promote the establishment of companies and branches of industry that produce goods for other companies and branches of industry. Thanks to the growing specialisation of production, significant savings are made on both transportation and communication costs. As a group, merging companies can acquire lower prices for resources, in turn lowering overall costs, which is impossible if they are geographically dispersed. The inflow of new production capacities is stipulated by these savings, as is the population of cities. As a result, the attraction of manufacturing and, consequently, populations to cities is, in fact, a self-replicating, cumulative process. The rapid development of New Sarai (or Gulistan, as some scholars refer to it) during the reign of Öz Beg Khan may be considered an indicator of this process.

This means that urban agglomerations stimulate a rich and varied infrastructure that in itself acts as a powerful integrating force, as well as an explanation for the growth of major modern-day urban territories. From a modern perspective, infrastructure comprises the water and power supply, sewage treatment facilities, transportation, research and technological services, financial institutions and banks, consulting services for management and advertising, specialised legal services, and many other services. Almost all of the above (naturally, at the medieval level and in that sense incomparable to our own) were present as part of the infrastructure of Golden Horde cities.

Practice has demonstrated that the proximity of manufacturers of finished and intermediate goods to each other provides them direct access to the services and markets needed for the sale of their finished goods, giving rise to the pre-conditions for market growth, which ensures the development of the internal economy into large-scale production. As a result, groups of manufacturers always aim to concentrate in cities.

Consumers of inexpensive, mass-produced goods and services, as well as consumers of sophisticated luxuries, also gravitate towards cities. Urban agglomerations turn into places where representatives of almost all layers of society are able to satisfy their needs in accordance with their tastes and resources. These circumstances acted as another powerful force drawing the population towards urban agglomerations, both in the past and at present day.

The urban agglomeration of the Lower Volga region satisfied almost all of the above conditions, except for one: the country's agriculture was unable to produce surplus foodstuffs and industrial crops. The steppe environment was far from favourable for the development of arable farming, making the achievements of the elite and residents of the central portion of the Golden Horde, who had been able to resolve such complex problem, even more valuable.

One cannot but acknowledge that contemporaries were unlikely to have contemplated the problems in any kind of comprehensive manner as we are prone to in modern times. Their scope of vision was limited only to the individual, contextual tasks they solved. The general range of problems described above was not represented in the consciousness of individuals but rather in the collective unconscious (as per the definition of Carl Gustav Jung). In their actual lives, they strove only to make their own existence comfortable, and all together as a single mass they solved major, complex problems, without ever recognizing the fact or even comprehending the grand scale of their own achievements. Yet they still unconsciously felt their degree to a certain extent, visualising an amazing manorial city/suburb along the entire length of the Lower Volga Region, with its artisan quarters, bazaars, and squares. Old Sarai was at one end of this settlement belt, and New Sarai at the other, while the still undiscovered, mysterious, fabulous Gulistan was somewhere in the middle.

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17 A more detailed analysis into the economic life of the city from the standpoint of modern-day economies is indeed a subject of special consideration but reaches beyond the framework of this current study.
Social fabric of society.

Historians are quick to point out that the Golden Horde underwent the process of amalgamation, or the merging of the Mongol aristocracy with the urban patrician class/officials; this strengthened the Islamisation of the Mongol aristocracy and its transition to an urban, settled way of life [15, p. 16]. The turkicised Mongol elite was known for its ambition to partake of the conveniences of settled, urban life, while also partially preserving their traditional, nomadic lifestyle. This gravitation of theirs towards the qualitatively new, urban lifestyle corresponded to the desires of the Turkic masses and other peoples of the empire. The administrative resources of the state were aimed at the mass construction of cities, which were commissioned pursuant to a khan's order but completed by the efforts and energy of common people. The turkicised elite also participated in this process. According to G. Fedorov-Davydov, ‘during the reigns of khans Toqta and Öz Beg, the Mongol nomadic feudal elite, whose ancestors had arrived from Central Asia, was drawn into the trade and state administration and established closer ties with the Muslim bureaucratic/merchant city elite. Certain representatives of the old Mongol nomadic nobility became noblemen at the khan's city court and participated in the management of trade, crafts, and general state politics' [15, pp. 15–16].

Yet state promotion alone was unable to ensure the settlement and development of life in difficult natural conditions by large masses of the population. The state programme could only be implemented by the voluntary efforts of society. The Mongols built their capital in the steppe on the basis of a sparse nomadic population. After the capital was founded, the issue of fortifying it through a system of agricultural and craft settlements came to the forefront, which, put simply, means the steppe was in need of colonisation. Applying non–economic methods, that is, administrative coercion, to resettle agricultural workers from outlying areas there, or forcing nomads to turn to agricultural ways of life and urban craftsmen, would be difficult even in the modern world [see the description of a similar phenomenon in Mongolia in 8] and was simply beyond the realms of possibility in the Middle Ages. Indeed, after the first and only forced act of construction of Old Sarai, the government of the Golden Horde never attempted to repeat its follies.

The state could not force the colonisation of the steppe, but creating conditions for natural processes that operated along these lines was certainly within its power. F. Engels, who in our day and age has nearly been forgotten, wrote: 'The reverse influence of state power on economic development may be threefold. It may act in the same direction as economic development, making its success even quicker, but it might also counteract economic development, meaning that at present in the case of any large population, it will ultimately fail after a certain period of time: either that or it puts obstacles on the road to economic development in certain directions and pushes it forward in others. However, it is clear that in the second and third cases political power might cause immense harm to economic development and cause the waste of powers and materials on a massive scale' [16, p. 417].

We do not know if there ever existed even the most generalised plan of what was eventually built in the almost uninhabited, central part of the state. The existence of a programme of economic reclamation of the steppe that included the creation of nodes of agriculture, well-developed animal husbandry, and the construction of settlements as centres of trade and craft is doubtful. Yes there remains no doubt that the government of the Golden Horde acted in the direction revealed to them by demographic and social development, and not only abstained from impeding natural processes but also promoted the acceleration of such processes.

As settlements gradually grew into towns, their bazars—centres of information exchange and connection among the Turks, both city dwellers and nomads—were becoming more populated. Both had the same language and culture tied to this place; some had permanent dwellings, while others kept to strictly delineated travel routes passing through specific settlements. But
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despite these differences, connections between city dwellers and nomads were centered on both
an exchange of information and kinship ties.

The turkicised nobility built its manors in the growing settlements on a massive scale, transi-
tioning in the process to a semi-nomadic or completely sedentary lifestyle. Their Turkic servants
also started settling down in the same communities and naturally began to assimilate to the long-
term residents. Crafts based on the Turkic workforce saw a marked development as well, always
with the mandatory involvement of highly-qualified experts from the periphery of the empire and
abroad. The state continued during this period to offer preferential treatment to city dwellers: there
was no confession-based discrimination, and international trade was actively sup-
ported. This has
been noted by leading researchers of the Golden Horde G. Gabaydullin, M. Safargaliev, and G.
Fedorov-Davydov [2; 11, pp. 280–526; 14]. 'In the early and mid-14th century, the urban patricians
and the merchant class closely connected to it supported the khan's all-encompassing power, as it
ensured the order of trade, prosperity of crafts, and supply of cities with materials and human re-
sources' [15, p. 16].

To support trade, the state maintained a low customs duty level that did not exceed 5% of
the cost of goods. In the Northern Black Sea region, it amounted to 3% on all imported and
exported goods, and only during the reign of Berdi Beg (1357–1359), on the eve of the Great
Troubles of the 1360–1380s, were trade duties raised all the way to 5%. These measures for the
promotion of urban life were an undoubted necessity, yet ultimately insufficient.

More notably, five principal economic functions of government are highlighted today:

1) to provide a legal foundation and social climate promoting the effective functioning of
the market economy;
2) to support competition;
3) to redistribute income and material benefits;
4) to regulate the distribution of resources to provide public goods and to make adjust-
ments for side effects;
5) to stabilise the economy [10, p. 200].

Considering said modern government functions, the powers that be of the Golden Horde
performed the first and the last; the second one, only partially; and the fourth, to a relatively wide
extent. As far as its own urtaq merchants were concerned, the government not only offered them
benefits but also provided them with direct financial support. The performance of state functions
even at this scale was a tremendous achievement in terms of contemporary European practices.

Yet in the end, everything depended on the people's attitudes towards the established pro-
ductures and their ability to carry them out through specific actions. And they acted as if they knew
the fundamental principles of modern marketing, namely: 1) achievement of the maximum level
of consumption; 2) achievement of the highest consumer satisfaction; 3) provision of the largest
selection of goods to the consumer; 4) maximum increase in the quality of life. People aspired to
and achieved the maximum demand for their services by connecting their income not with an
increase of consumption (for example, the building of new inns) but with the quality of services
along old trade routes. They attracted merchants through various road options, gave them the
freedom to choose their routes, and improved the service culture, as can be seen from the functions
of caravanserais.

The absence of confession-based discrimination and the provision of personal safety, or
the main issues encountered when travelling in the Middle Ages, are crucial for the life of so-
ciety even in modern society. In the Middle Ages, ideological tolerance and preservation of life
were rarely guaranteed. The advantages of globalisation has been a particularly popular topic
as of late. In the Middle Ages, the Golden Horde was the most globalised state, oriented in large
part towards foreign trade and to a certain extent, owing its own existence to these activities as
well. This fact was crucial in determining the internal life of the society. First and foremost,
neither confessional affiliation nor ethnic origin had any influence over an individual's social
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status or service career. The world-view and ideological sphere of the Golden Horde was characterised not only by religious tolerance but also (typical for modern-day criteria of a civilisation) non-conformism with direct support from state structures. For example, before the end of Tatar rule in Rus', up to 1480, not a single case of a khans' infringement of the established privileges of the Russian church had ever been documented.

Merchants and entrepreneurs are members of the most progressive social layer as we know it today. In the Golden Horde, this social layer was particularly respected in accordance with the traditions established by Chinggis Khan himself. The customs of the great empire protecting the life, honour, and property of merchants were radically different from those in Europe, where 'travellers had no shortage of trials or obstacles … the forest with its dangers and fears … bandits, innumerable taxes collected from merchants and sometimes simply from travellers near bridges, at mountain passes, or rivers, plus the poor condition of roads…' [9; pp. 128–129].

Were people free in the Golden Horde? From the modern point of view\(^\text{18}\), the subjects of a khan were deprived of rights, as their rights were not protected by legally codified laws applicable to all ('the law is above the king'). Yet this modern formal criterion can only be partially related to Medieval customs. When compared to Europeans of the same period, the subjects of a khan in fact enjoyed a significant amount of freedom, as according to Medieval conceptions, 'a free person is one who has a powerful patron' [9, p. 262]. In the Golden Horde, this patron was the most powerful it could possibly be—the state itself. According to certain indirect witness statements, we can assume that the order maintained in the Golden Horde by the state in its prime was adhered to not in word, as was the case of most states of the period, but in deed: it was strict but sufficiently civilised. It particular, it is known that representatives of the authorities were prohibited to take hostages, or arrest relatives or tribesmen of a criminal in their stead [4, p. 96]. It is only fairly recently that humankind as a whole has begun to place such importance not on the group but on the personal responsibility of each individual. It is now believed that the appeal to group responsibility indicates the powerlessness of authorities to control the social life of society. Before the Great Troubles of 1360, the khan's power was so strong that it could indeed employ civilised (from the perspective of a modern person) methods. It might be the fact that based on modern-day democratic criteria this is more bad than good, but the state successfully maintained order and opposed oppression, burglaries, offenses, and the high-handedness of major and minor feudal rulers or bandits up to 1360.

As a result of the consolidated actions of the authorities and society, within just 60 years over, one hundred large settlements were founded in the steppe, or cities, according to the definition of historians and archaeologists. Even though large settlements in the steppes of Eastern Europe were founded pursuant to the khan's orders, their construction was naturally not based on any unified, standard design. Unified principles and standards had existed, but they did not so much originate from the state, as came about as a result of interactions between the state and society.

Golden Horde cities denoted the directions of two trading transportation routes in Eurasia: from West to East, the Great Silk Road; and from North to South, Northern Europe–Persia–Middle East. A total of 38 trading posts of Italian republics—Venice and Genoa—also operated in the steppe. Some of the trading posts were represented by smaller settlements, whereas the walled quarters in the two Golden Horde capitals could also act as trading posts. Some of them were cities, of which Sudak and Theodosia—the medieval Soldaia and Kaffa—in Crimea are

\(^\text{18}\) It must be noted that the matter of human rights is usually limited to political rights, while the Universal Declaration of Human Rights also takes into account other rights, including economic and social. The entire spectrum of human rights (or lack thereof) in the Golden Horde requires a special analysis that faces one insurmountable difficulty: a lack of information. We are only sure of one fact: intellectual non-conformism, which during the Middle Ages boiled down to the free choice of religious beliefs, was protected by the state.
known best. Trading posts were not independent formations nor states within a state. ‘During the entire history of the Golden Horde, Solkhat-Qirim dominated over the peninsula in constant competition with Kaffa. And even though this was a competition of administrative capitals of approximately the same age—the Jochid one and "the colonial possession of Gazaria"—the real power in Crimea, despite the defeat of the Golden Horde forces in the local war with the Genoese in 1385–1386, belonged to Solkhat’ [7, p. 102].

The geography of the cities demonstrates that the maximum density of the urban population was attributed to the crossing of the North–South and West–East trading routes. This area was not a point in geographical space per say, but rather the connection of two routes along the left bank of the Volga, from modern-day Volgograd to Astrakhan. The goods on the West–East route were also transported by land, while those on the North–South route were shipped by water through the Baltic, Volga, and Caspian Sea. The mass and weight of goods transported by land were significantly smaller, mostly expensive goods that generated income for the treasury, thanks to customs duties, and monetary compensation to the population of towns and settlements for various services along the trading routes. For example, the goods of Sogdian merchants included silk, hemp, silver, gold, sal ammoniac, medicinal herbs, brass, emerald-colored and red glass, certain kinds of fabrics, and other products. [1, p. 7]. No more than several tons of goods could be transported by land in the same caravan ('Goods can be carried in carts that can handle up to 30–40 poods. Three camels are usually tied to these carts…' [2, p. 63]), while when travelling by water, a single ship could take dozens, even hundreds of tons.

Both light and voluminous goods such as furs and heavy items including timber and grain were transported along the Volga. Written sources indicate that timber and grain along the Volga originated not in Rus' but in Bulgaria, where Turks were settled for six centuries and built the great city of Bulgar and other cities, and entered the epoch of urban civilisation earlier than in other areas. This is one possible reason why Bulgarians did not migrate downstream along the Volga; there are no indications of mass migrations of the Bulgarians to the lower reaches of the river, where intensive urban development and craft expansion was taking place. On the contrary, there is in fact archaeological evidence of their movement in the opposite direction, giving rise to the need for additional studies in this respect. Yet it might still be assumed that the high cultural and economic quality of life of the Bulgarians was achieved in amidst their relatively low numbers.

The Golden Horde required an immense amount of fuel for the mass construction of urban settlements, to protect residents from the cold, burn bricks, and produce ceramic, metal household items, and weapons, which needed to be brought to the water-scarce and therefore woodless steppe from the distant, forested North. In other words, the existence of the capital, settlements and towns growing in its vicinity required economic connections with provinces. These connections were arranged and regulated by the state. The principal construction materials for fundamental structures were stone and brick. Bricks and the other connecting material, lime, were produced on-site, while the wood for burning bricks and lime needed to be shipped into the forestless steppe from afar, and stone was rarely found anywhere nearby. For the first capital of the Golden Horde—Sarai Batu—the state collected construction materials and the builders themselves through the use of force. However, later it was no longer necessary to use force, and the further development of settlements came about naturally, based on the self-organisation of the society and economic interests but still under the supervision of the khan's authority.

The fifth and sixth generations of descendants of conquerors of the Eastern European steppes (1308–1343) witnessed the mass transition of a portion of Turks from the nomadic to a settled lifestyle. Since the natural conditions did not allow the nomads to become agricultural workers, the nomadic Turks instead had only a single opportunity: to skip one historical development stage and move on directly to the next—to the epoch of urban production—which they achieved by creating their own city system. This transition, unlike all other precedents of nomads
finally settling down, implied not the deterioration but the improvement of both the level and quality of life, while moving from the militarised to the demilitarised zone meant a change in the meaning of life for nomads (the warrior class).

The optimal ethnic ratio of Turks and representatives of other ethnicities had become a condition for the process of intensive assimilation of achievements of other countries and peoples, the improvement of those achievements, and the formation of a unique civilisation. The high level of globalisation, typical for the 21st but not for the 14th century, was a typical feature of this civilisation. The indicators of the civilisation level of the Golden Horde, both environmental and economic, offer themselves up to be considered as a phenomenon of both Middle Age and modern-day parameters.

1. Askarov A., Buryakov Yu., Gulyaev V., Sayko E. Differenciruyushchee i integriruyushchee dejstvie Shelkovogo puti v kulturno-istoricheskix i e`tnicheskix processax (The differentiating and integrating influence of the Silk Road in cultural, historical and ethnic processes) // Goroda i kara-

12. Sud'ba stepej (Destiny of the steppes) / Mordkovich V., Gilyarov A., Tishkov A., Bal-
An important characteristic feature of how the Golden Horde state became a medieval empire was the way that, after uniting various peoples who possessed their own individual cultural and historical traditions, it was able to create a distinctive Golden Horde civilisation, which many peoples in modern-day Eurasia feel is related to their own heritage.

The reason for the successful development of the Golden Horde was largely that, despite the co-existence, interaction, inter-penetration, and development of various folk customs and traditions over its vast territory, the processes that lead to the formation of the state were given a civilisational tone by Islam, which was able to integrate different sociocultural and ethnopolitical elements in the creation of a single community. It is hardly a coincidence that the Arabic word for civilisation, 'madaniya', has a similar root to the Arabic word for town ('madina'). According to U. Schamiloglu, 'Both of these meanings were closely connected to the Golden Horde, where, in the new towns of the steppe zone which had their own riverside oases, a new, high culture was created' [7, p. 589].

When the state was being formed, the Golden Horde khans' religious policy was characterised by a liberal, tolerant attitude towards religion. By the time the state formed, a complex and unstable confessional situation had come into being. Khwarezm and Central Asia had been dominated by Islam from the 8th century. It later took hold of the Volga Region and became the official religion of Volga Bulgaria in the 10th century. In Rus', Orthodox Christianity had been spreading since the late 10th century. Nomadic peoples were pagans, though their culture was continuously coming under the influence of one of the monotheistic religions.

As a result of Islam, which had been present in the region for more than 300 years, 'meeting' other religions and faiths, the Golden Horde was a unique environment well-suited to interconfessional interaction. This determined the unique spread of Islam [6, p. 43].

Numerous scholars of Golden Horde history have already traced the expansion of ideological boundaries within the Golden Horde state, as well as the spread of various religions and pagan cults among the local Turkic population [4; 19; 22]. However, it must be acknowledged that Golden Horde rulers were tolerant towards the diversity of organised religions. Numerous 13–14th century sources, and not only oriental ones, bear witness to this. Regarding the causes of Islamisation, those researching the history of the Golden Horde devote particular attention to foreign political stimuli: the Jochids' friendly relations with the Egyptian Mamluk sultanate was a motivating factor in their conversion. However, as regards the Jochids' religious leanings, researchers mainly stress the importance of the cultural and economic influence held by the Islamic trading elite and Islamic urban culture, reducing their arguments to stock phrases about the inevitable inclusion of nomads in Islamic civilisation [19, p. 18].

When Islam was elevated to the status of the Golden Horde's state religion, it began to be used as a means of gaining political power and as a source of cultural inspiration. It must be acknowledged that the history of the burgeoning of religious life in the Golden Horde during the reign of Öz Beg Khan is also the history of the Ulus of Jochi's integration into Islamic religious civilisation. This was true both in the sense of theological thought and at the level of popular Islam. This undoubtedly also influenced the establishment of its legal school, which was characterised by its liberal attitude to non-conformism and its ability to adapt to local customs. Therefore, the adoption of Islam as the state religion also led to the establishment of a certain legal school, on the basis of whose rules the public and spiritual life of the population took shape. Islamic scholars from Central Asia, especially Bukhara and Khwarezm, influenced the peoples populating the Golden Horde. The Golden Horde's rulers were effectively converted to Islam by
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After Islam was established in the Golden Horde in the 1270s, the incidence of pagan burial sites in the Volga and Cis-Ural regions diminishes from that time, while Muslim necropolises appear more frequently and become more widespread [18, p. 248]. Sufis played a prominent role in strengthening Islam's status as the state religion. Berke, one of the first Chinggisids to become a muslim, was converted by Saif b-Din Al-Baharsi, a student of Najmuddin-e Kubra. Öz Beg Khan converted to Islam under the influence of a Sufi sheikh, Sayyid-Ata: "after establishing himself on the throne (ÖZ Beg), spent eight years with his ile and ulus in the countries of northern (ark) Desht-i Kipchak... Eight years after the commencement of his rule, under the guidance of the holy sheikh of sheikhs and Muslims, having the highest titles, showing the path to serving the God of worlds to those who had lost their way, the leader of travellers and guide of seekers, Saint Sayyid-Ata, the successor to Zengi-Ata, he (ÖZ Beg) in the months of the year of hijrah 720 (12.11.1320–30.1.1321), corresponding to the year of the chicken, had the honour of converting to Islam" [17, p. 207].

All over the Golden Horde a well-developed system of Islamic institutions appeared: mosques, madrasahs, maktabb, khanqahs, tekkiye (cloisters), durbe (mausoleums). The writings of Ibn Battuta, a traveler who visited the Golden Horde during the reign of ÖZ Beg Khan, provide us with some important insights on this subject. His memoirs describe encountering mosques, religious judges, and Sufi traveller lodgings (zawiya).

Mosques in Golden Horde cities were centres of spiritual life and continued the centuries-old religious building tradition that previously existed in other cities of the Islamic East. Most of them have not survived. The most famous is the mosque in the city of Bulgar. Its construction is estimated to have started in the 1230–1240s. There are several Golden Horde-era mosques remaining in Crimea. The mosque commissioned by ÖZ Beg Khan (1314) and the ‘Baybars mosque’ (1288), so-called in honour of the Egyptian Mamluk sultan who donated funds for its construction, are the best-known buildings of the period. A portal of the first mosque has survived, on which information about its construction date is displayed. As far as the second mosque is concerned, there are discrepancies as to whether Baybars was still ruling Egypt when it was constructed—the last year of his rule was 1277. The medieval Arab chronicler Al-Maqrizi wrote: 'In the year 686 (=1287–1288), the sultan sent Berke an expensive gift and over 2,000 dinars for the construction of a mosque in Crimea, where the sultan's titles were to be inscribed. He (also) sent his stonemason to cut (the titles) and decorate them' [16, p. 435]. It is still a mystery how this substitution occurred as Sultan Al-Qalawun had sent his own craftsman to perform the work along with his ambassadors.
Madrasahs were the foundation of the faith—jurists, spiritual mentors and theologians all studied there. Madrasahs frequently aided the development of other disciplines: they housed libraries, where scholars completed their educations. The construction of a madrasah and providing funds for its upkeep was considered a godly act, a sure sign of the piety of its founder. This was the reason why such institutions were often established by rulers, senior bureaucrats, and members of the nobility [5, p. 57]. Ibn Battuta reports that during his travels he stayed in Urgench at a madrasah built by a Golden Horde viceroy, Temür Qutlugh. In Solkhat (Eski Qırım) there are still ruins of a madrasah founded by the wife of the ruler of Solkhat, Inci Bek Khatun. 'An inscription that has not survived once displayed the date of the spiritual school's foundation: 1332–1333' [5, p. 61].

Ribats, khanqah, zawiyah, and tekiye comprise a different category of Islamic religious building. These institutions were mostly intended for Sufi religious orders. They provided monastic accommodation for Sufis travelling in search of religious knowledge. Sufi orders and the ideology they followed played a major role in Islam becoming a Golden Horde institution. Written sources have been found full of Sufi motifs, where the prevailing ideas are of self-denial and decisive inner renewal. Ribats were 'fortified structures' where warrior ascetics lived. They were devoted to the protection and expansion of Islam. These structures featured religious military architecture [5, p. 59]. Ibn Battuta reports visiting a ribat built by sheikh Muhammad al-Bata'ihi in Majar. It housed '70 Arab, Persian, Turkic, and Ruric fakirs, both married and single' [16, p. 287]. Khanqahs were built inside cities and, unlike ribats, did not serve a defensive function. They were designed for the performance of Sufi rituals. They became widespread with the development of Sufism. 'Holy grave cults are a characteristic feature of Sufism, in contrast to Orthodox Islam. Therefore, khanqahs were usually built near the tombs of respected members of the Sufi order. A khanqah's residence was often turned into a tomb after his death' [5, p. 57]. Ibn Battuta's chronicles state that Öz Beg Khan visited the sheikh Noman al-Din al-Khwarezm's khanqah in Sarai every Friday [16, p. 307].

A zawiya was a guest house for travelling dervishes and pilgrims who had embarked on a hajj. They were places where travellers could rest and eat. Ibn Battuta mentions visiting two zawiyas in Khwarezm, the construction of one of which was financed by a donation from the wife of Temür Qutlugh, Tyurabek Khanum.

The Golden Horde reached the apex of its power during Öz Beg Khan's reign. Not only theologians and fakikhs but mathematicians and astronomers were invited to the khan's court. The first book on mathematics, 'et-Tuhfe fî ilmi'l-hisâb', has recently been discovered. Its author remains unknown but it contains lines devoted to the ruler of the Golden Horde's Crimean ulus, Abu'l Muzaffar Gıyaseddin Tuluktemir. This shows that the work was written during this period. Al-Birzali's chronicles contain information on a Golden Horde traveller, Ala ad-Din an-Nogman Al-Khwarezm: 'He was an amazing person. He left his homeland aged 21, travelled to (different) countries, met famous people, studied logic, dialectics, medicine, and returned to his homeland in the year 701 (=6 September 1301–25 August 1302) [16, p. 175].

Öz Beg Khan's son, Jani Beg (1342–1357), also made a great contribution to the development of Muslim culture in the Golden Horde. In addition to his Turkic name, he had an Islamic one—Jalal ad-Din Mahmud. During his reign, a number of significant Islamic philosophical academic works were written. Mubarek b. Yusuf al-Alani, on the 19th day of the month of Ramadan in 735/1334–1335, wrote a commentary entitled 'Turerul-mulyahhas' on the short work 'al-Mulyahhas fi ilmil-heyetiil-basita' by Sherafeddin Abu-Ali Mahmod b. Muḥammad b. Omar al-Chagmîni al-Khwârizmî. It spans the divide between Ibn Heysemji's scientific committee and Meraga's mathematical and astronomical school. He presented it to Jani Beg Khan. At approximately the same time, Kemaladdin Muhammad at-Turkmani al-Mardini, in the month of Ramadan of 755/September 1354, wrote his own commentary on the same work. This work is important in the history of Islamic and Osman astronomy in Sarai/Gulistan [8, p. 63].

Many Arab chroniclers describe Islamic science as being widespread in the Golden Horde and record that renowned scholars were present at khan's royal courts. For example, Ibn Arabshah
lists: 'our maula Kutbeddin, the most learned Errazi, sheikh Saaduddin Taftazani, seyid Jelaleddin, interpreter of 'Hajjibie', and other Hanafi and Shafi eminences, and then our maula Hafizeddin Elbazzazi and our maula Ahmed Elhojoshid'i [16, pp. 461–463]. In 1352–1353, in the Turkestan
city of Gulistan, Sa'ad al-Din al-Taftazani composed a work on the methodology of Islamic law
(usual al-fiqh) 'at-Talwih 'ala-t-tauhid'. His other work—'Sharh al-talhis'—was devoted to the ruler
of the Golden Horde, Jani Beg Khan [12, p. 90].

It should be noted that Hafiz ad-Din ibn al-Bazzazi (1329–1413) played an important role
in the establishment of the Crimea's medieval academic elite. Under his leadership a Crimean
scholar, Ahmed al-Qirimi (d. 1474), had the chance to develop. He went to Istanbul during the
reign of the Osman sultan Mehmed Fatih, where he earned the respect of the sultan and became
a tutor to his children.

While stressing the beneficial role of scholars and educated people from distant Islamic
and non-Islamic countries in the cultural life of Golden Horde cities, the local population's
great contribution to its flourishing must also be noted. The Golden Horde's many scientists and
authors are evidence of this. Nisbas such as Sarai, Khwarezmi and Bulgari have been recorded
in medieval sources and biographical works, in particular in Haji Khalifa's encyclopaedic work
'Kashf al-zunun 'an asami al-kutub wa-al-funun' ('The Removal of Doubt from the Names of
Books and the Arts'). This bibliographic encyclopaedia on the entirety of the literature in the
Islamic world comprises a compendium of information on scientists, theologians, spiritual
guides, writers, and poets. Muhammad Murad ar-Ramzi obtained a great deal of information
on the scientists of the Golden Horde from this encyclopaedia. In his famous historical work
'Talfiq al-ahbar va talqih al-asar fi vaka-i Kazan va Bulgar va muluk at-Tatar' ('News and re-
ports on events in Kazan, in Bulgar and on the Tatar tsars') (1908), he disclosed the names of
scientists recorded in Haji Khalifa's encyclopaedia [13, pp. 681–723].

The cultural exchange taking place at the time between the Volga and the Nile has also left
to us names of eminent scholars. For example, Mahmud ibn Fatshah as-Sarai (d. 1373/74) and
Shihab ud-Din as-Sarai (d. 1388/1389) taught in Cairo at the madrasah 'Al-madrasah as-Sara-
gatmyshiya'. Diya ibn Sadalah ibn Muhammad al-Qirimi (d. 1376/1377) in Cairo directed the
school 'Al-madrasah al-Beybarsiya'. Some time later he was recognised by the Mamluk sultan Al-
Malik al-Ashraf Sha'ban II (1363–1376), who called him 'sheikh of sheikhs' [3, p. 38].

This was the social and cultural backdrop against which a new stage in the development
of the Golden Horde's literary tradition began. Literature, along with the other art forms, has
a sophisticated way of reflecting mutual influence and infiltration of different cultures.

The creation of a number of artistic and religious works is an indication of high culture.
Most of them were compilations of previously known works by Persian and Arab authors. Their
distinguishing feature is that they were adapted to suit Turkic culture and translated into the
native language. As a result, they became more similar to the local folk and literary canon,
eventually turning into its continuation.

The manuscript of a work by Abu Bakr Qalandar Aksaray Rumi, 'Qalandar-name', has been
discovered recently. The text of this composition is gradually becoming known in academic circles
[1; 2; 19; 20; 21]. It was written during the reign of the khans Öz Beg and Jani Beg (circa 1320–
1340). The book is also entitled 'Qitab-e qalandariya', which makes it safe to assume that it was
dedicated to 'qalandars' or written on the subject of them. The author, Abu Bakr Qalandar, is mentioned in 'The description of the knowledgeable' by Eflyaki (14th century). It is likely that Abu Bakr
Qalandar is the very same spiritual guide whom Ibn Battuta (14th century) met during his travels
around Crimea. 'Qalandar-name' was written in Persian, and it contains a wealth of data on the his-
tory of Golden Horde and Sufi practices. The work resembles a 'sharkh' of sorts. It is written in the
form of a response to a widely known work by Jalal ad-Din Rumi (1207–1273) called 'Mesnevi-i
manavi'. 'Mesnevi-i manavi' is a collection of parables from Sufi commentaries. It is a classic of
Islamic literature.

Surviving Turkic literary works are of particular importance (those by M. Al-Bulgari,
Rabguzi, Qutb, Khwarezmi, S. Sarayi, Hisam Kyatib).
Some of these works clearly confirm the Golden Horde ruling elite's patronage of literature. One of the earliest is 'Kısasu'l Enbiya' ('The history of the prophets') by Rabguzi, (1310) composed for the local beg, Nasir ad-Din Tokbugi. Another surviving work is 'Khosrow and Shirin' by Qutb, which is dedicated to Khan Tini Beg (1341/1342) and his wife Melike Khatun. Qutb's poem is a reworking of the famous romantic poem 'Hosrou-o Shirin' (1180) by the Persian poet, Nizami (circa 1141–1209). Qutb himself noted that the translation of this work from Persian in the name of the khan was the aim of the work. His version raised the literary standards of the Turkic language by following orthographic traditions first established in the 11th century.

'Muhabbat-name' ('The Book of Love', 1353) by Muhammad Khwarezmi was dedicated to a specific person, Muhammad Khoja Beg. During the break up of the Golden Horde, the famous medieval poet Saif Sarayi emigrated to Mamluk Egypt, where he worked in the state chancellery as a scribe (kâtib). His famous works 'Gulistan bit-tyrki' (1391) and 'Sukhail i Guldrusun' (1394) were written in Egypt, where he received recognition and fame.

'Nahj al-Faradis' (1357–1358) by Mahmud Al-Bulgari can be thought of as a religious and didactic work written for the edification of the faithful. The book does not mention any of the Golden Horde rulers. This may have been the author's protest against the despotism of the Golden Horde rulers and their extravagant lifestyles that did not correspond to the ideals of early Islamic tradition, which were based on such concepts as modesty, moderation, and industriousness. There is no evidence to show that the author belonged to a specific Sufi order. It is more likely that the author of 'Nahj al-Faradis' was not associated with any particular religious movement but was a representative of moderate, ascetic piety.

Referring to the literary traditions of his time, Mahmud Al-Bulgari created a compilation. In the introduction (mukaddime), while stating the main idea of the work, he writes: 'If any faithful person, believing in the true god, brings these forty hadiths from my book to those who have not heard them, teaches the hadiths to the ignorant, the Almighty will include this person in the league of the all-knowing (learned) and resurrect them along with those who died for their faith. If anyone has evil intentions and lies, stating that certain hadiths are from my book when he knows that they are not, let him prepare to live in Hell for all eternity. We have selected forty Hadiths of the Prophet, may peace be upon him, from reliable sources and collected them together. And, in accordance with the hadiths, we have presented stories from the life of the Prophet and his four companions (Abu Bakr, 'Umar, 'Osman and 'Ali), and compiled a book comprised of four chapters. Each chapter has been divided into ten sections. Each chapter starts with a Hadith of the Prophet; there are forty in total. The first chapter is devoted to the life and virtues of the prophet; the second, to the four companions of the Prophet, family members, and the four founders of the Sunni madhhab. The third chapter is devoted to pious deeds that make a person nearer to God. The fourth chapter describes deeds that distance a person from God. This book was called "Nahj al-Faradis", which means "The open road to Paradise..." We hope that those who read this book will live in accordance with its advice, and it will be their guide to Paradise' [10, pp. 17–18]. It should be noted that 40 is the minimum number of hadiths that every faithful Muslim has a holy duty to learn by heart.

We may assume that the work is Orthodox Sunni in nature: it simply describes the principal knowledge and precepts necessary for a person to become a good Muslim. It includes balanced information on all Islamic legal schools and recognises Sunni scholars in the cities of the Ulus of Jochi, as described by Ibn Battuta. After all, Orthodox Islam was obviously the dominant religion in the Golden Horde cities along the Volga, while in Khwarezm and elsewhere in the south there was a strong Sufi tradition that played a part in Berke’s conversion to Islam [7, p. 598].

The break up of the Golden Horde state was described in 'Jumjuma sultan' by Hisam Kyatib (1358). The ideological line of the work, which develops out of its system of imagery and symbolism, foretells the imminent death of the society if Islamic values are forgotten' [4, p. 118]. What is interesting is that the ideals of religious didactic work of the period are all the same. H. Kyatib, like M. Bulgari, does not devote his composition to the glorification of any Sufi order nor to any
representative of the ruling elite. They are based on an appeal to refer to the traditions of early Sufism, when the Sufis aimed not at increasing their numbers of adherents but strove to bring the principal dogmas of Islam to simple believers [14, p. 244].

The spread of Islamic literature throughout the Golden Horde allows the realities of the workings of Islam in the Golden Horde to be revealed. At that time, Central Asia and Egypt were the recognised centres of theology, famous for their learned theologians. Many thinkers from Sarai travelled to these academic centres to study. However, famous works by Islamic authors were the most widely distributed in the Golden Horde. They were written by adherents of the Hanafi and Shafi‘i movements. Once again, this stresses the spread of the Hanafi madhhab in the Golden Horde.

Having become the official religion of the Golden Horde, Islam added its own flavour and stylistic features to Turkic-Tatar medieval culture. The Golden Horde period was the heyday of Turkic Islamic high culture. This is all prove that the Islamic and Turkic cultural synthesis, which took place in the territories governed by the Golden Horde in 13–14th centuries (before the Black Death), was very important for the development of both Islamic and Turkic civilisations [7, p. 598].


Fig. 2. Fragment of Fra Mauro's map dated 1459 where different 'Sarais' are indicated
Fig. 1. Vexillographic reconstruction map based on the materials of portolan maps of the 14–17th centuries. By I. Fomenko
Изображение на данной карте начало XIV в., настоятеля храма св. Марка и его на меме в Генуийском порту Джованни да Кариано (кarta появилась во время Второй мировой войны во Флоренции в 1943 г.)

Знаки с морских карт (Византийской Империи — Палеологов) времени создания карты

Местоположение знаков соответствует положению на морских картах — портовых

Дизайн и цвет знаков воспроизведены с оригинальных старинных карт

География Константинополя с V века до н.э.
Fig. 3. Fragment of Fra Mauro's map dated 1459 where 'Chagatai Horde', 'Urgench Horde', and a part of 'Asian Seythia' are depicted.
Fig. 4. Giacomo Maggiolo's nautical chart dated 1563

Fig. 7. Fragment of Nicolas de Fer's map dated 1737 (re-engraving from the map of 1711).

In the interfluve of the Volga and Yaik, south of the nomadic camps of 'Great Nogais, or Nogai Tatars, or Nomads', on the left bank of the Akhtuba River, the European reader is shown the heart of the Golden Horde marked on the map as 'Solitaia Ordes'.
Fig. 5. Map of Muscovy from the work of Roman bishop and historian Paolo Giovio di Como. Battista Agnese. Engraving, 1525. Map title: 'The map of Muscovy based on evidence received from Ambassador Dmitry (Gerasimov), which contains all provinces included into Muscovy, created in October 1525'. This 'Moscoviae tabula' was intended to be an addendum to the book about Muscovy and Tartaria by bishop Paolo Giovio, the best Latin scholar of his time ('Paolo Giovio. Libellus Basilii magni Prinsipis Moscoviae ad Clementem VII')
Map of A. Astaykin

Military campaigns
1 Tatars of the Kazan Khanate
Tatars of Sayyid Ahmad’s Horde
2 Byzantine Empire
3 Venetian territories
4 Duchy of Athens
5 Hospitaller Order
6 Trebizond empire
7 Principality of Sheki
8 Shirvanshah state
9 Gilan
10 Mazanderan

Genoese territories

Single boundary between the states of the Polish–Hungarian unity (1440–1444)
Borders of the states are mapped for 1450

Collapse of the Great Horde, 1438–1450
Tyumen (1468–1495) and Siberian (1495–1582) Khanates

Territories
- Tyumen Khanate
- Siberian Khanate during the reign of Kushtan
territories under the Siberian Khanate (late 16th century)

Settlements
- ☐ ☐ ☐ capitals of states
- ☐ ☐ ☐ cities and ancient towns
- ☐ ☐ ☐ ways of communication

Names of
- ☐ ☐ ☐ states
- ☐ ☐ ☐ Siberian and Ural voivodes
- ☐ ☐ ☐ ethnic names
- ☐ ☐ ☐ geographic names (modern)

Author of map: A. Astaykin, 2012
Tatars on the territory of the Grand Principality of Lithuania, the latter half of the 13–early 17th century

[Map showing territorial and migratory patterns of Tatars in 13–17th centuries, with color coding for different periods and territories controlled by the Grand Principality of Lithuania.]
Fig. 8. 1 – Glazed dish discovered in the settlement of Orheiul Vechi; 2 – Reddish-yellow paste vessel with handle discovered in the settlement Bărlad-„Prodana” (14th century) (Photo Spinei, 2014)

Fig. 9. Glazed dishes discovered in the settlement of Orheiul Vechi (14th century) (Photo V. Spinei, 2014)

Fig. 10. Glazed dishes discovered in the settlement of Orheiul Vechi (14th century) (Photo V. Spinei, 2014)

Fig. 11. Jug with impressed decoration discovered in the settlement of Orheiul Vechi (14th century) (Photo V. Spinei, 2014)
To E. Zilivinskaya's article 'Architecture and Art in the Golden Horde'

Fig. 35. Portal of the Janicke Khanum mausoleum in Chufut-Kale

Fig. 36. Stone carving in the church of St. Sergius (Sarkis) in Kaffa: 1—column; 2—baptismal niche
Fig. 37. Carved decoration of the Minor minaret in Bulgar: 1, 2—decoration of the doorway; 3—triangular chamfer of an octagon.

Fig. 38. Stamped terracotta slabs with glaze.
Fig. 39. Mosaic tondo
(Selitrennoe settlement)

Fig. 40. Parts of internal veneer of palace building walls
(Selitrennoe settlement)

Fig. 41. Mosaics with gilding, from the Juma mosque of Sarai
Fig. 42. Majolicas with under-glaze painting

Fig. 43. Mosaics with over-glaze painting and gilding
Fig. 44. Red-clay glazed ceramics 'sgraffito'

Fig. 45. Kashi pottery, with relief and polychrome painting
Fig. 46. Kashi pottery, with under-glaze painting, without relief

Fig. 47. Timurid ceramics
Fig. 48. Ceramics with over-glaze painting and gilding

Fig. 49. Belt set

Fig. 50. Belt set lining
Fig. 54. Bone quiver linings

To L. Nedashkovsky's article 'Agriculture, Cattle Breeding, Crafts, and Trade'

Fig. 4. Unglazed two-handled jar from the Uvek ancient town, collected and granted by Werckmeister (State Historical Museum (SHM), no. 26340, inv. 1507, no. 1)

Fig. 7. Unglazed khumcha (korchaga) with handles from the Uvek ancient town, collection of the 19th century (National Museum of the Republic of Tatarstan (NM RT), no. 5365–55, OAIIP)
Fig. 5. Unglazed red-clay flask from the Uvek ancient town (Saratov Regional Museum of Local History, no. AO 235)

Fig. 6. Unglazed red-clay flask from the Uvek ancient town, side view (Saratov Regional Museum of Local History, no. AO 235)

Fig. 10. Unglazed pot covers from the Uvek ancient town, collection of the 19th century (NM RT, no. 5365–38, item nos. 12770–12770a, 12770e, OAIII–78)
Fig. 9. Unglazed tuvak from the Uvek ancient town, collection of the 19th century (NM RT, no. 5365–50, item no. 12774)

Fig. 11. Grey-clay stamped flask from the Uvek ancient town (Saratov Regional Museum of Local History, no. CMK 57925/A–2974)

Fig. 13. Beads of glass, kashi, and carnelian from the Uvek ancient town, collected by F. Dukhovnikov in 1893 (SHM, no. 34162, inv. 952, no. 22)
Fig. 2. Fragment of Trabzon amphora from the Bagaevs ancient settlement, lifting material of L. Nedashkovsky, 2003.

Fig. 3. Fragment of Trabzon amphora from the ancient settlement of Shirokiy Buev (excavations of L. Nedashkovsky), excavation site I–2001, pit 1

Fig. 4. Fragments of glazed ceramics with under-glaze ornamentation in the sgraffito technique from the Uvek ancient town (NM RT, no. 5365–56)

Fig. 5. Fragments of glazed ceramics with under-glaze ornamentation in the sgraffito technique with figurative clay additions in the form of birds from the Uvek ancient town (NM RT, no. 5365–56)

Fig. 23. Bronze mirrors from the Uvek ancient town, collection of F. Dukhovnikov, 1893 (SHM, no. 34162, inv. 952, nos. 35–38, 40)
Chapter VII. The Civilisation of the Golden Horde

§ 4. Architecture and Art in the Golden Horde

Emma Zilivinskaya

The Golden Horde emerged as a state after nomadic Mongols conquered vast spaces of Europe and Asia that were mostly inhabited by nomadic and semi-nomadic peoples. Nevertheless, as early as the mid-13th century, its territory was already covered with settlements, while in the first half of the 14th century, the Golden Horde indeed grew into a full-fledged country of cities. Golden Horde cities, which were built and reached an unprecedented climax in record time, are at once a peculiar historical phenomenon and the most vivid reflection of various aspects of the Golden Horde civilisation. In the beginning stages, to build their cities, nomadic Mongols exploited the bonded labour of subdued peoples with multiple centuries of construction skills under their belts. During the state's zenith, builders, craftsmen, and traders moved to the Golden Horde voluntarily. This is in fact how the polyethnic population of its cities was first formed, in contrast to the more homogeneous population of the steppes, making the multiculturalism of Golden Horde society easier to observe in its urban culture.

Monumental constructions defining the appearance of cities are an expressive embodiment of their culture, and in the Golden Horde they differed depending on the region. In the steppes, cities were constructed from adobe and fired brick, similar to the Central Asian style. Glazed tile bricks, glazed majolica and mosaic, carved shaped bricks, and terracotta were widely used as decorations. In Dniester region, Crimea, and Volga Bulgaria, monumental buildings were made from stone with the addition of brick. Here architectural decorations are comprised mostly of stone carving, and in the North Caucasus, a mixed construction technique was common. In general, cities in the Golden Horde, despite their diversity, had a distinct Oriental exterior, which was in many ways defined by Islam and the leading role it played among urban citizens. The main and most impressive buildings here were, therefore, mosques, madrasahs, mausoleums, and eastern baths. These monumental constructions, first and foremost characteristic of Islamic countries, defined the basic appearance of cities.

The most significant cult constructions in all countries with ties to Islam are mosques, and minarets built into mosques or adjacent to them are also the most important city-forming element of Islamic cities, determining their unique silhouette. By the time they started to appear in Golden Horde cities, these types of buildings had a multiple-century history, with different kinds of mosques and minarets existing in different parts of the Islamic world [56].

In the Golden Horde, a state located at the very edge of the Islamic world, the first mosques were possibly constructed during Berke's reign, who was a Muslim himself and encouraged urban development. However, their mass construction undoubtedly took place during the rule of Öz Beg, whose name is linked to the adoption of Islam as a state religion, as well as the prosperity of its cities. During these years, Ibn Battuta, a traveller from Maghreb, mentioned 'thirteen mosques used for cathedral service and... an extremely large number of other mosques' only in Sarai [43, p. 306]. Although the number of mosques that have been researched throughout the entire Golden Horde territory is slightly larger than the number Ibn Battuta mentioned, the extant material gives us an idea about the plan of these buildings [23; 25, pp. 9–36; 26, pp. 13–42].

The most famous monument of Islamic cult architecture in the Golden Horde is the mosque in Bulgar city, the capital of Volga Bulgaria, known under the name 'Quadrangle'. Constructed in the 1260s, the mosque was rebuilt several times over the period of its existence (before the 1330s) [1, p. 54]. During the first period (fig. 1.1), the building had a rectangular form with a slight widening towards the south (32.6 m x 28.2–29.6 m). Walls 1.2–1.3 m thick were built from pieces of raw limestone glued together with lime mortar and were fortified with rectangular counterforts. The entrance doorway in the north wall was framed by a portal, with the rectangular plinth of the minaret located to the west. The mosque's inner space was divided
into five aisles by four rows of columns, with five in each row. The mosque's walls were covered with white lime both from the inside and outside; the floors were covered with wood.

At the beginning of the 14th century, the mosque was radically reconstructed (fig. 1.2). Its outer appearance was forever altered through the addition of multifaceted towers built at the mosque's corners. The diameter of the two northern towers constituted 8 metres, and in the south, 10 metres. Such a unique decoration of corners has not been documented in any other mosque. Fortified castles of a similar design were built in Central Asia in the early Middle Ages, while later, tower-like ledges at its corners were characteristic of fortresses, caravanserais, and khanqas. Massive round towers fortified the walls of feudal castles in Azerbaijan [13, pp. 74–78]. The small decorative towers of Kalyan Mosque in Khiva possibly have the same roots but are significantly reduced compared to the corner counterforts of the 'Quadrangle'.

During its final period, the mosque of Bulgar was reconstructed on the inside. Doorways were made in the eastern and western walls, and windows were inserted on either side of the doorways. Light portals were added to all three entrances from the inside. The mosque's colonnade was also changed: eight-faceted stone columns on square bases were now placed into six rows. Bases and column caps were adorned with carvings in the form of pastiched palmettes characteristic of Azerbaijan's architectural decoration [13, p. 378]. In the opinion of most researchers, the ceiling of the 'Quadrangle' was flat and rested on arcades, and the roof might have been sloped, which well corresponded to the climactic conditions.

The 'Quadrangle' also included the Big Minaret (fig. 2), known well from pictures and currently fully restored. The minaret's cubic base transitioned into an octagon, upon which rested a trunk in the form of a cylinder that narrowed towards the top. A platform for the muezzin was located upstairs. There were three windows on each of the two sides of the body, while its centre featured a wrap-around Arabic inscription. The height of the Big Minaret reached 24 m.

The Minor minaret was constructed in a similar manner, albeit 5 m shorter than its larger counterpart (fig. 3). This smaller minaret was also designed to feature a cubic base with inclined corners transitioning into an octagon and conical trunk. The body is finished with a platform, upon which stands a superstructure with a pitched roof, and the entrance is located on the northern side. The top of the doorway, the arc in the trunk of the minaret, and inclines of the cubic basement are decorated with stone carvings.

At present, two cathedral mosques have been examined and researched in the central part of the Golden Horde, the Lower Volga region, one of which was excavated in the Vodyanskoe ancient town in Volgograd Oblast [17]. The mosque was designed as a rectangle (26 x 35 metres) stretching from the north to the south (fig. 4). The walls of this construction were 1.2–1.3 m thick and made of ragged stone glued together with an adobe mortar, covered with a white lime solution inside and outside. The entrance to the mosque in the northern wall was shifted to the east relative to the central axis of the building and framed by the portal, and the southern wall in the centre had a rectangular ledge with a mihrab niche included. The semicircular mihrab is plastered with a white mortar and framed by profiled pylons; it was adorned with a rectangular plank with a stamped inscription in Arabic. The plank had a red border, blue background, and prominent white inscription.
Fig. 1. The mosque of Bulgar ('Quadrangle'):
1—in the 1st period; 2—in the 2nd and 3rd periods (according to [1])

Fig. 2. The mosque complex in Bulgar
Fig. 3. The Minor Minaret in Bulgar: 1—photo; 2—architectural measurements

Fig. 4. The Mosque of Vodyanskoe ancient town: 1—general plan; 2—plan sketch (according to V. Yegorov and G. Fedorov-Davydov [17]); 3—variant of reconstruction
Fig. 5. The mosque of Vodyanskoe ancient town, mihrab, and a stand for the Quran

Fig. 6 Juma, the mosque of Sarai: 1—general plan (according to G. Fedorov-Davydov); 2—plan sketch; 3—variant of reconstruction
A rectangular square (8.14 x 8.40 m) demarcated by walls made of pieces of bricks laid in three layers was located in front of the mihrab. In all three walls there were rough-cut square flat stones, which served as the foundation for wooden columns, which supported the roof above the platform. A section of a round marble column with flutes, which served as a pedestal for the Quran's stand, was dug into the centre of this platform (fig. 5). The column was placed with its wide end up, and to support it a marble early-Byzantine capital was situated at the bottom of the hole where its lower end rested. It is most likely that the cap and column were imported from Crimea.

The remainder of the mosque's space was divided into six aisles four-metres wide by five rows of columns. Column bases made of grey granite were 30 x 30 cm and 20 cm high with sloped corners that formed an octagon, and there was a notch for constructing wooden columns on the surface of many bases. The mosque's floor seems to have been covered by planks.

A minaret was located near the north-eastern corner of the mosque, and its stone, rectangular (5.0 x 4.2 m) basement was immediately adjacent to the mosque's eastern wall. The minaret's trunk, found in bits and pieces, was made of semicircular fired bricks and adorned with bricks covered by a turquoise glaze and ganch insertions with Kufic inscriptions.

Another cathedral mosque was examined in the aristocratic region of Sarai (Selitrennoe ancient town) that featured walls constructed of fired bricks glued together with clay mortar. The mosque consisted of two rooms: a large prayer hall and an addition constructed adjacent to its north-western part (fig. 6).

The prayer hall was square in the plan, with a size of 35.5 x 36.0–36.5 m. The main entrance to the mosque was built in the middle of the northern wall and decorated with a massive portal, the pylons of which were approximately 5 m long. The same type of portal, albeit significantly smaller, was likewise built in the middle of the eastern wall. It is most likely that an entrance with a portal was also located in the western wall.

The inner space of the prayer hall was divided into nine aisles by eight rows of columns, with eight columns in each row, apart from the two standing in the middle. In the middle rows the second and third columns, if we count from the north, were missing, and instead there was an internal courtyard 9.0 x 9.3 m in their place. Along its perimeter, there was a border made of fired bricks placed on their edges and glued together with lime mortar. The rest of the yard platform was paved with fired bricks placed flatwise. There was a pool in the centre of the yard in the form of a round cistern, the walls of which are lined with bricks. Only the brick foundations dug into the firm land have been left intact from the columns supporting the mosque's roof (fig. 7). Square-cut wooden columns were then placed atop them, as evident from the traces left behind in the lime daub. The columns placed in front of the mihrab differed from the rest, as they were put on foundations with wooden constructions and most likely stone. The space in front of the mihrab was fenced in with a ganch grating.

The mosque of Selitrennoe ancient town had a flat beam floor owing to how it rested on wooden poles. Its internal decoration was simple: the floor was earthen, and its walls and columns were covered with lime mortar. From the outside the walls were also plastered, and portals were adorned with glazed monochrome tiles and little carved bricks.

In the north, a small building (11.9 x 8.2 m) was added to the western section of the prayer hall, containing a rich interior design. The floor was paved with fired brick and walls adorned with mosaics featuring overglaze painting and gilt. A wide rectangular sofa was constructed along the western wall. The ceiling was supported by two poles, but only their bases of grey sandstone have survived to modern times. It is most likely that this room was designed not for the cult but for public needs, and in fact some sort of institution under the mosque was located here.
Three mosques have been examined in Golden Horde ancient towns of the North Caucasus, with two of them located in Upper Dzhulat, North Ossetia [38]. The minor mosque was a small (9.8 x 6.6 m) building with brick walls situated atop a stone basement (fig. 8.1). A mihrab in the form of a square protruding niche was made in the southern wall. The remains of six square abutments were inside of the mosque's inner space in the corners of the room and in the middle of the eastern and western walls. On the outside, a cubic minaret was built close against the wall near the north-eastern corner of the mosque.

A total of two thirds of the Big mosque's area in Upper Dzhulat has been subjected to examination (fig. 8.2). The building was trapezoidal and extended from the west to the east, with measurements 11.8 m wide and approximately 22.8 m long. The basement of the walls was constructed of river cobbles and lime mortar, while the walls themselves were built of figurate stones and fired bricks. The walls were approximately 6 metres high, and a protruding rectangular mihrab niche was found in the southern wall. The mihrab's floor and possibly its walls were adorned with tiles covered in turquoise glaze. The entrance to the mosque was located in front of the mihrab, and there was an additional portal in the western wall, opposite the minaret.

The mosque's floor was paved with large brick slabs, a portion of which was covered with turquoise glaze, ordinary bricks and small cobbles, and the walls were plastered and possibly painted. No traces of abutments or columns have been found in the mosque. It is likely that the flat covering and a double pitch roof were supported by wooden poles placed directly on the floor slabs. The roofing was tiled.
Fig. 8. Mosques of the North Caucasus: 1—the Minor mosque of Upper Dzhulat; 2—the Big mosque of Upper Dzhulat; 3—the mosque of Lower Julat (according to O. Miloradovich [38], I. Chechenov and E. Zilivinskaya [59])

Fig. 9. The mosque of Lower Julat, general view
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The Tatartup minaret (fig. 10), which is quite famous in the Caucasus and fell to ruin only in 1985, was also part of the Big mosque. The minaret was 20.8 m high, with a rectangular basement made of bricks and stone blocks. The minaret's stone trunk was conical and consisted of two parts divided by a double stalactic belt supporting a balcony for the muezzin. A door with a semicircular ending was located in the basement area, and the same door exited out onto the balcony. Brick stairs twisted around the five-corner trunk, which was also adorned with several ornamental belts, the main one of which was stalactic. Two stripes of turquoise glazed discs interspersed with brick lozenges were located directly under it. An ornamental belt imitating a Kufic inscription was positioned between them, and the top of the trunk was also decorated with ornately shaped brickwork.

The largest cathedral mosque in the Caucasus was excavated in the ancient town of Lower Julat in Kabardino-Balkaria. It was designed as a rectangular building with an area of 17.65 x 25.7 m (fig. 8.3) stretched out in the meridional direction. The entrance to the mosque with the portal was located in the northern wall, while the prayer hall was divided into five aisles by four rows of columns with stone bases (fig. 9). There were twelve columns in each row. The floor of the hall was paved with fired bricks laid directly into lime mortar.

A minaret was built to the eastern section of the northern wall; at present, only the basement has remained intact. The basement was overlaid with large rectangular blocks, between which was ornamental brickwork. A room, round in the plan, with traces of a wooden ladder was discovered inside the basement. It is most likely that the minaret of Lower Julat's mosque was similar to the Tatartup minaret.

The most famous monument in this style of architecture in the west of the Golden Horde is the mosque/madrasah of Solkhat. Multiple research works have already been dedicated to this subject [8; 12; 19; 54, pp. 104–118; 32, pp. 112–116; 27]. The building of the mosque that has survived in its entirety to the present day is a basilica with three pairs of octagonal pillars connected by pointed arcs (fig. 11.1). The size of the building is 17.9 x 13.5 m, and props support a rafter ceiling and a gable tiled roof (fig. 12). The cylindrical trunk of the minaret is built into the north-eastern corner of the building. A portal with a stalactic niche and carved stone frisos is located close to the southern wall; most scientists have noted the influence of Seljuq art here. The mihrab niche is decorated in a similar way.

An inscription dating back to 1314—the time of Öz Beg's rule—has been preserved on the carved portal of the mosque. A madrasah in the form of a large square building with an open yard in the middle abuts the mosque in the south. Excavations during the expedition of the State Hermitage led by M. Kramarovsky showed that the mosque and madrasah were built at different times: the madrasah was constructed in the first third of the 14th century, while the mosque was added to it at the turn of the 15–16th centuries [32, pp. 113–114]. Nevertheless, Solkhat's mosque can confidently be considered a representation of Golden Horde architecture, as in the opinion of M. Kramarovsky, at the end of the 15th century, it was not built from scratch but instead transferred to a new spot near the northern wall of the madrasah.

Ruins of one more mosque by the name 'Baybars' mosque' were located near Öz Beg's mosque (fig. 11.2). It is almost identical in its planning and takes the form of a three-aisle basilica with three pairs of columns set upon octagonal bases. Moreover, its arcade had identical column spacing when compared to Öz Beg's mosque [32, p. 116]. A semicircular niche of the mihrab can be traced in the southern wall, and a portal with an entrance is located on the northern side. According to the numismatic material, 'Baybars' mosque' is dated to Toktamysh's reign.
Fig. 10. The Tatartup minaret: 1—photo; 2—architectural measurements (according to [38])

Fig. 11. Basillica planned mosques of Crimea:
1—complex of Öz Beg's mosque-madrasah in Solkhat;
2—Baybars' mosque in Solkhat;
3—mosque in Chufut-Kale (according to M. Kramarovsky [32] and U. Bodanin sky [10])
A mosque referred to as 'Leaden' (Kurshun-Jami) used to be located in the former manor of painter Aivazovsky, represented by a rectangular building (12.5 x 17.7 m) built of crushed stone and lime mortar (fig. 13.1). The entrance to the mosque is framed by portal pylons; the western and eastern walls are fortified with twin counterforts. There is only one counterfort at the southern wall, which is located behind the rectangular mihrab niche running deeply into the thickness of the wall. Remains of the minaret's foundation have been located in the north-eastern corner. The entirety of the building is divided into two unequal parts. A square room (10.5 x 10.6) with a mihrab in the southern wall was topped by a dome on pendentives. The rectangular (10.5 x 4.5 m) northern room had a ceiling in the form of three semicircular vaults [8, p. 132].

The mosque in Sudak is very similar to Kurshun-Jami in both its plan and size [19, pp. 134–139]. However, it has survived to this day only after undergoing certain alterations. The main part of the building is rectangular (fig. 13.2, 14). Two square abutments divide the inner space into two parts. A square prayer hall with a mihrab niche in the southern wall was covered with a dome, and the rectangular vestibule of the mosque was roofed with three vaults. A minaret was added in the north-eastern corner, but currently only its foundation remains. The entrance to the mosque was located in the eastern wall, not in the northern wall. This departure from canon can be explained by the fact that the building stands on a hillside, and in the north the level of the floor is significantly higher than the level of the earth. A gallery consisting of three arcs was built along the eastern wall, but ultimately only two arcs were ever erected. The eastern wall has two windows with frames adorned by carvings taking the form of a complex plait.

Another Crimean mosque of the basilica type was examined in 1927–1929 in Chufut-Kale [3, pp. 166–168; 10, pp. 170–178]. The outer size of the building was 13.8 x 10.65 m (fig. 11.3), and its north-western corner was occupied by the basement of a minaret. Four foundations of columns, which divided the mosque's space into three aisles approximately 2.4 m wide, were uncovered during excavations. Two small niches of a pentagonal shape were made on both sides of the mihrab's rectangular niche. The entrance to the mosque was located in the northern part of the western wall, near the minaret. The abundance of architectural detail bares witness to the fact that the mosque had a portal with a stalactic niche, which was framed by a geometrically-ornamented belt and adorned with inscriptions and two rosettes. It is likely that a stone with the carved date of '746 AH' (1346) was part of the portal (directly indicating when the mosque was built).

Two mosques have been examined in the western part of the Golden Horde's steppe zone. The mosque of Kuchugurskoe ancient town (not far from Zaporizhia) was built of brick and had a rectangular form of 26.0 x 17.9 m (fig. 15.1). A broad vestibule (8.5 x 6.5 m) was located in the north and was also stretched out in the meridional direction. Inside, the mosque's space was paved with fired brick, and three rows of columns (from 9 to 11 columns in each row) divided the prayer hall into four aisles. A semicircular mihrab niche 80 cm wide and 35 cm
deep was located in the centre of the southern wall. The mosque of Kuchugurskoe ancient town had a minaret with its base built in the western wall.

Juma, the mosque of Old Orhei [14], is the most grandiose mosque in the Golden Horde with measurements of 57.7 x 51.5 m. Only the perimeter of this building with a portal in the northern wall and a mihrab in the southern one have survived to modern times (fig. 15.2). The north-eastern corner of this building was occupied by the base of a minaret, hexagonal in the plan.

Thus, a large number of Golden Horde mosques belong to this type: square or rectangular buildings, the inner space of which is divided by rows of columns supporting a flat covering in the form of beams or arcades. Rectangular mosques often stretch in the meridional direction but also sometimes in the latitudinal direction, as we can see in the Big mosque of Upper Dzhu-lat. The main entrance to the building is built in the northern wall opposite the mihrab and framed by a portal. As a result of its large size, the building could have also had additional side entrances, as for example in Bulgar, Sarai, and Kuchugurskoe ancient town. Sarai's mosque featured a small internal yard with a pond in its centre. The space in front of the mihrab in the mosque of Vodyansko ancient town was fenced, while the roof here was possibly raised higher.

This main type of mosque in the Golden Horde was developed under the influence of Asia Minor. Mosques from this region of the Seljuq period were designed as basilicas or rectangular halls divided into aisles by rows of poles or columns connected by beams or arcades. A typical feature of Seljuq mosques was a skylight in the roof, under which a drastically scaled-down inner court with a fountain was located, and a small dome might have been erected over this section in front of the mihrab. One of the simplest buildings of the Seljuk–Anatolian period was, therefore, the mosque of Mahmud Bey near Kastamonu, which took as its form a three-aisle hall with two rows of wooden columns, a beam ceiling, and a gable roof. Ulugh-Jami in Shiwaz and Afyon feature large multi-aisle halls with a transept leading to the mihrab, and a flat ceiling over the arcades [55, pp. 16–17; 57, pp. 100–102; 56, pp. 92–100].

Fig. 13. Dome mosques of Crimea: 1—Kurshun-Jami in Solkhat; 2—mosque in Sudak (according to A. Bashkirov [8], I. Baranov [60], and M. Fronzhulo [61])
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Fig. 14. The mosque in Sudak's fortress

The Big mosque of Upper Dzhulat, the building of which lies in the latitudinal direction, is unusual in its proportions (likely as a result of local traditions). For example, the Juma mosque of Derbent built in the 8th century—the most famous in the Caucasus—has a rectangular structure stretching far out in the latitudinal direction, with a ledge in the central part of the southern facade. In the Caucasus, other mosques of the same size are also known [5; pp. 141–143; 50; 35, pp. 110–112].

Fig. 15. The mosques of western regions: 1—in Kuchugurskoe ancient town; 2—in Old Orhei
There were also other types of mosques in the Golden Horde apart from large mosques of the basilica type. Dome mosques in Crimea were small buildings consisting of a square prayer hall covered with a dome and a rectangular vestibule with a vault ceiling. The same structure can be found among the mosques of Asia Minor of the Seljuq and early Ottoman periods, such as the mosque of 'Ala' al-Din in Bursa (1335), Orhan Gazi in Bilecik, and the Green mosque in Iznik (1378) [56, pp. 494–495; 58, pp. 84–92].

The Minor mosque of Upper Dzhulat is classified as a pole-dome construction. According to its plan, it is most similar to the pole constructions of Central Asia, such as the mosques in the mausoleums of Al-Hakim al-Tirmidhi (11th century) and Khoja Isa (11th century) [11]. The only difference is that these buildings are extended in the latitudinal direction, while the Lower Julat mosque is in the meridional, thus exposing the prevailing influence of Asia Minor in the planning and decoration of Golden Horde mosques. The Seljuq building tradition was able to spread widely through Transcaucasia, where such examples as the Minuchir mosque in Ani [6] have been preserved, as well as through Crimea. Mosques with a hall divided into aisles were known to have existed in the pre–Mongol period in Volga Bulgaria [49; 2], which could have also possibly served as a model for imitation. Having taken the basilica plan with a flat ceiling as their basis, Golden Horde builders creatively reworked...
this idea while keeping in mind the local conditions and tastes of their patrons. Moreover, in a number of cases, the idea of a closed hall with a flat ceiling supported by a colonnade was employed, but how it was built in different parts of the state was also quite diverse and original. At the same time, we cannot completely exclude the influence of Central Asia or local traditions, as was the case in Volga Bulgaria and the Caucasus.

Minarets are connected to mosques, forming with them a unified architectural ensemble. According to their position relative to the mosque, minarets of the Golden Horde may be divided into those that stand separately, those with a base abutting the mosque's wall, and those with a base built into the wall itself. Minarets that stood separately or were added to the mosque had a cubic or prismatic basement which, with the help of outer bevels, transitioned into an octagonal prism or straight into a cylindrical trunk slightly narrowing towards the top. A polygon could be found at the foundations of built-in minarets, and their basements were made from stone or fired brick. The trunk was usually made from brick but could also be from stone as well; stone constructions were decorated with carvings. The trunks of brick minarets were adorned with ornamental belts of carved terracotta, tooled brick, ganch insertions, and glazed tiles. A stalactic belt was located under the muezzin's balcony. Minarets featured hip roofing. Such architectural forms were only typical for Asia Minor and countries in the sphere of its cultural influence, such as Azerbaijan, Crimea, and a section of North Iran. They appeared there during the Seljuk period and continued to exist in the process of certain transformation. For example, these include the minaret of Alaeddin Jami in Niğde built in 1223, Ivli-minar in Antalya from 1220, the minarets of the Big mosque and the Gök madrasah in Sivas erected in 1271, and the Green mosque in Iznik from 1378 [56, p. 161; 58, pp. 26, 43]. The minarets of Azerbaijan had a triadic division similar to those found in Asia Minor [13, pp. 88–96, 156–160].

In Islamic countries, not only mosques but other institutions are also related to the religious cult: first and foremost, these include madrasahs, or the higher education institutions of Islam. Another category of buildings related to the Islamic religion includes ribats, khanqahs, zawiyahs, and tekiye. All these institutions served the needs of multiple dervish orders, which became quite widespread in the Middle Ages.

In the Golden Horde, just as in other states where the bulk of the population professed Islam, madrasahs and khanqahs were also built along with mosques. Information about these structures may be found in certain written sources, in particular the works by Juzjani, Ibn Khaldun, and 'Iskander's Anonymous', dedicated to the biographies of Muslim Khans Berke, Öz Beg, and Jani Beg [43; 44]. Arab traveller Ibn Battuta also described the madrasahs, ribats, and zawiyahs he visited personally during his time in the Golden Horde [43, pp. 278–314]. Unfortunately, his reports have yet to be confirmed as fact: spiritual schools and alms-houses have hardly ever been discovered in the Golden Horde. The only building which can be attributed to this group beyond doubt is the madrasah of Öz Beg in Solkhat.

This structure was designed as a square building (fig. 11.1) with a large, richly decorated carved portal known only from illustrations. A broad inner court lined all around by rooms with various designations and a colonnade was the basis of the interior; a large iwan was erected on each side of the courtyard, and a fountain was located directly in the centre. The madrasah of Solkhat has been preserved to a degree rarely achieved in others complexes, allowing us to make judgments not only about the building's planar geometry but about its cubic content, as the ceilings of certain rooms have survived intact in modern times (fig. 16). All four iwans were covered with monumental semicircular arcs, and jujras also featured a vault covering. Square rooms in the western part of the building were crowned with semispherical domes of brick [32, pp. 112–114].

A section of a building which likely had an internal court with standard living rooms (hujras) situated along its perimeter has been excavated in Selitrennoe ancient town, Lower Volga region (fig. 17.1). One room was occupied by a house mosque (fig. 17.2). Its plan and
location near the Juma mosque provide grounds to suggest that it was an institution related to the Islamic religion—either a madrasah or khanqah.

Based on its plan and building traditions, the madrasah of Öz Beg in Solkhat represents a typical example of Minor Asian craft. Open iwans with round vaults belted with a gallery and columned arcade, coupled with a fountain in the centre of the courtyard—these elements are reminiscent of the monuments of four-iwan plans in Asia Minor, such as Gök madrasah from the 13th century in Sivas, Çifte Minareli from the 13th century in Erzurum, Taş madrasah in Akşehir, the 13th-century madrasah of Burujie in Sivas, and the madrasah of Ibrahim Bey in Aksaray [55, pp. 33–35; 56, p. 515; 58, p. 46]. The building in Sarai, that may presumably be treated as a madrasah, does not provide sufficient material for definite conclusions. According to the masonry techniques, building materials, size and format of adobe bricks and ordinary bricks, this construction belongs to the Central Asian building tradition. A definite similarity can be observed between the construction in Sarai and the building of the madrasah examined in Sawran ancient town in South Kazakhstan [7, pp. 84–90].

Such type of building as a mausoleum became extremely widespread in Islamic countries; they are great in number and their role in the creation of the architectural image of cities and other localities is considerable. Mausoleums have always played a significant social and religious role in society. In the Golden Horde, just as in other countries from the same period where Islam was at the forefront, mausoleums were built throughout the entire territory, aided by the fact that preachers of Sufism, in which the cult of 'holy graves' was inherent, were extremely influential. Mausoleums make up the largest portion of monumental architecture objects excavated by archaeologists. Separate buildings have been preserved to modern day, and others are known only according to the illustrations and descriptions of researchers and travellers from previous centuries. An examination of memorial constructions of the Golden Horde shows us a wide range of architectural forms and planning solutions [26, pp. 93–165].
First and foremost, these buildings may be divided into two large groups: single-chamber and multiple-chamber mausoleums. The majority of Golden Horde mausoleums were designed as single-chamber constructions. According to the form of the main building, they are divided...
into three sections: tower-like, pyramidal, and cubic (prismatic). Tower-like mausoleums consist of two subsections differing in the form of their plan: round and polygonal (fig. 18). Pyramidal mausoleums could also be round and polygonal in their plan (fig. 19), while a square or a rectangle close to a square in its proportions lied in the foundation of cubic buildings. Each section can be divided into either the facade or portal type. Facade mausoleums are those without a strongly pronounced portal but with a distinguished section in which the entrance was located (fig. 20). Portal buildings are categorised by the distinguished size of their entrance portal (fig. 21). The only mausoleum of a centric plan where all the facades are of an equal size is the Black chamber in Bulgaria (fig. 22).

Fig. 20. The cubic facade mausoleum near Majar (illustration from the 18th century).

Fig. 21. Cubic portal mausoleums of Majar in drawings from the 18th century: 1–2—from P. Pallas' works; 3—drawing by M. Ivanov.
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Fig. 22. The Black chamber in Bulgar

Fig. 23. Transformation plan of the Asia Minor tower mausoleum into Bulgarian:
1—Asia Minor tower mausoleum; 2, 3—transformation of proportions;
4—Eastern mausoleum in Bulgar

Fig. 24. Mausoleums of the Cis–Urals: 1—Hussain Bek; 2—Tura Khan
Based on the form of the portal, these buildings can be divided into the following subtypes: with a protruding portal, with a portal seamlessly integrated into the building and resting on massive pylons (peshtak), and with a portal seamlessly integrated into the building but without massive pylons. In addition, every construction subtype is divided into two different kinds according to the form of ceiling, with either a dome or hip roof. Coverings are rarely preserved in archaeological monuments, which often complicates the process of determining their type, but it can still be defined by illustrations. Tower and cubic mausoleums might have had roofings of both types, yet all pyramidal mausoleums by definition had hip roofs.

The group of multiple-chamber mausoleums is divided into three sections: prismatic longitudinal, prismatic transverse, and multiple-chamber mausoleums of complex construction.

The classification of Golden Horde mausoleums vividly demonstrates that the architecture of memorial constructions was quite diverse in the Golden Horde. The diversity of types of mausoleums suggests that they were brought from different countries of the Islamic world, and certain borrowings prevailed in different sections of the huge Horde. Some buildings are quite original and are a result of the creative re-processing of already-known types of planning.

We can also distinguish two main focuses in the architecture of Golden Horde buildings: buildings made from either stone or brick (fired and adobe). There was also a mixed technique, where certain parts were built from different materials.

A thorough analysis of the design, construction techniques and architectural details of mausoleums, and construction tools lead us to the conclusion that several tendencies existed throughout the evolution of Golden Horde memorial architecture. This mainly includes the influence of Armenia and Asia Minor, which is most strikingly noticeable in the monuments erected from stone, yet the influence of the Central Asian construction style involving fired and adobe bricks was also extremely significant. And finally, remnants of nomadic (Kipchak) traditions can also be found in certain architectural forms. Currently, we can distinguish several areas where a certain school prevailed over the others. Volga Bulgaria and Crimea fell within the zone of Armenian-Minor Asian influence, while the Lower Volga region and steppe regions of the North Caucasus were more influenced by Central Asia. At the same time, the traditions of Azerbaijan architecture present in the Nakhchivan school, which used combinations of stone and brick, along with tiles for decoration, can be easily traced in certain parts of the Lower Volga region (Vodyanskoe ancient town) and North Caucasus (Pyatigorye, Upper Dzhulat, Lower Julat). The presence of Azerbaijanian elements, in particular the Shirvan–Absheron school, can also be observed in Volga Bulgaria. Rare forms of mausoleums found among Turkic commemorative constructions have been located in the Lower Volga region and North Caucasus, yet cities of the Golden Horde nonetheless did not borrow from any external traditions directly, instead opting to rework them in their own creative way. Thus, the surprisingly uniform type of tomb developed in Volga Bulgaria (fig. 23) subsequently spread throughout other regions, for example the Cis–Urals, where buildings similar to Bulgarian mausoleums were erected alongside mausoleums of the Central Asian type (fig. 24). New design types for memorial buildings also emerged, in particular two-chamber mausoleums, which also spread throughout various parts of the state.

In terms of civil public buildings in cities of the Golden Horde, banyas made up a significant percentage [20; 25, pp. 59–91]. The spread of these facilities in the Golden Horde is further proof that its cities were built on the basis of Eastern examples. With the advancement of Islam, the customs of which required obligatory ritual ablution, public banyas-hammams solidified themselves as an indispensable feature of any Oriental city. The immense popularity of public baths can also be explained by the fact that in the Middle Ages, they functioned more as a sort of social club visitors attended quite enthusiastically.
Eastern banyas, not unlike the more traditional thermae, featured a heating system where hot air exiting through the bath's furnace warmed the entire surface of the floor. Nevertheless, there were also important differences, such as the general layout of the building. The design of eastern banyas was a reflection of the Eastern 'ideology' of the bathing process, in which the most important element was a massage that led the body to a state of complete relaxation. An essential feature of every hammam is the presence of a central hall in the form of a cross, polygon, or star at the compositional centre of the building.

Banyas of the Golden Horde also featured heated floors, which evidences their direct relation to Eastern hammams and banyas more classic in form. The design of Golden Horde banyas was diverse, and examples of their various layouts have been discovered in most regions of the Golden Horde.

We can, in fact, confidently conclude how popular banyas were in the Golden Horde on the example of Bulgar alone, where six baths have so far been examined [51; 53; 25, pp. 64–
Banya No. 1 was designed as a rectangular (14.0 x 9.0 m) building with a simple layout (fig. 25.1). It consisted of a dressing room, washing room, and heating section. Other baths features still more developed designs (fig. 25.2–6), consisting of a rectangular or square dressing room, a cross-like central hall with four square washrooms at the corners, and a heating section in the form of a massive furnace with cisterns above it. The walls of Bulgarian baths were made from limestone with metal-sheathed masonwork, and their foundations were dug into ditches, at the bottom of which were massive abutments also built from limestone slabs. The floor was built upon these slabs, allowing the hot air from the furnace to travel through specially built channels into the underground space and warm the entire surface of the central hall floor and corner washrooms. Dressing rooms were either partially warmed or did not have a system of underground heating at all. In the latter case, warm sufas and kans might have been placed in the interior.

Cisterns for water were located above the heating section; there were always several cisterns, with the hottest water in the one located directly above the furnace. Water inside the banya was distributed through a pipeline located in special niches along the outer walls of the building, and flowed freely through the use of ceramic tee-joints, while short ceramic or copper tubes were used as taps. Water ultimately poured out into special tanks. A stone twelve-petal bowl of the fountain was located in the centre of the cross-like hall of the Red chamber, while 15 stone sinks of various forms and sizes were installed in the corner washing rooms and loggias of the hall. Waste water was removed via an open drain installed in the floor or through ceramic pipes laid under the floor.

The public banyas of Bulgar were fairly large buildings, the biggest of which was the Eastern chamber, measuring 39 metres long and anywhere from 14 to 19 metres wide in different parts. Judgements can be made about the exterior of Bulgarian banyas based on multiple illustrations of the White chamber, the walls and ceilings of which were preserved up until the first half of the 19th century. As we see from the Chernetsov brothers' illustrations [52], the dressing room and vestibule of the building were covered by a V-shaped roof. Leading out from the vestibule, the doorway led into a cross-like hall which was connected with hot and warm washing rooms by lancet arcs (fig. 26). The central hall and corner rooms were topped by domes with light holes in the zenith, and four windows were made near the basis of the large dome. The walls and internal surfaces of the domes were plastered, while the floor slabs were covered by a layer of a lime mortar. In the Red chamber, wall plaster was painted red, while walls in Banya No. 2 were instead painted blue, yellow, and red.

Baths with a cross-shaped hall have been discovered in Mokhsha, Ukek, and Kuchugurskoe ancient town. The bath of Sarai’s aristocratic elite region (Selitrennoe ancient town) also featured a cross-like hall, but with a much more complex design (fig. 27). The building had an elongated shape and dimensions of 26 x 13.3–15.8 m and walls constructed of fired brick. The bath consisted of nine rooms, six of which featured heated floors. The entrance to the building was framed by a
portal and led into a small vestibule, from which visitors could access a broad rectangular dressing room located in the building's southern part (these rooms were not heated). A sufa was constructed along three walls of the dressing room and warmed by chimney pipes, and a fountain was located in the middle of the floor. One of the walls of the dressing room featured a window closed off by a chiselled alabaster grating (panjara) made with colourful glass.

All of the remaining rooms featured heated floors that rested on small supports with a width of either one or one and a half bricks. Two narrow elongated rectangular rooms (most likely, cloakrooms) were located north-east of the dressing room. Their walls were covered with a mosaic panel of kashi tiles featuring white, yellow, turquoise and blue colours, while its floors were paved with hexagonal bricks interspersed with turquoise triangular tiles. A cross-shaped hall with four washrooms was located north of these rooms. Water flowed into the washing room via ceramic pipes and was removed through a rectangular drain, part of which was found in the corridor and entrance vestibule. The heating room of Selitrennoe's banya was located not along the long axis of the building but rather on the side, which can be explained by the fact that a house was located there. There is no information known about the roof of this banya; however, we may assume by analogy that the middle of the hall and square washing rooms were topped with domes. The rectangular washing room and cloakrooms might have had vault ceilings, while in the dressing rooms and vestibule they were possibly flat.

The largest and most complex bath in the Golden Horde is Banya No. 2 of Old Orhei, a trapezoidal building measuring 40.0–37.6 x 23.6 metres. The bath consisted of two almost symmetrical
sections. From the non-heated dressing room, visitors immediately entered square heated rooms, each of which was connected with two small warm rooms (one section featured an additional room). Further eastwards, both sections were connected with cross-shaped halls with corner wash rooms.

Baths of a simpler layout also existed in the Golden Horde, consisting instead of one or several rows of rectangular rooms. Buildings of the same design have been excavated in Vodyansko ancient town, in Majar, and Old Orhei [25, pp. 50–91]. Apart from public spaces, there also existed private banyas. Small homestead banyas designed to include just one heating room and possibly a wood-framed dressing room have been discovered in Mokhshi and Azaq. The homestead bath in Sarai (fig. 29) featured a dressing room with a swimming pool.

Four separate types of banya buildings can be distinguished throughout the territory of the Golden Horde. Banyas of the 1st and 2nd types, consisting of rectangular rooms with gradually increasing temperatures, belong to the ancient building tradition, while banyas of the 3rd and 4th types are classical hammams of the Oriental tradition, with a massage room in the shape of a cross-shaped central hall. Banyas representing the classic tradition existed throughout the Golden Horde even back in pre-Mongol times in Crimea, Volga Bulgaria, and Asian territories. The design of Banyas No. 3 and 4 was likely borrowed from Asia Minor or Azerbaijan, as baths of these types are hardly known to have existed in Armenia, while in Central Asia real hammams became widespread not earlier than during the Mongolian period and, in fact, featured a different layout. In other words, banyas of these types are, in fact, another example of Seljuk influence on the architecture of the Golden Horde.

Residential houses form the structural basis of every city, providing support for the idea that the architecture of dwellings in the Golden Horde should be taken as a major focus. All residential houses can be divided into three groups according to their construction technique. These buildings were built as: connected cells, each of which represented a single-room Mongolian house, multiple-room monumental buildings according to a single plan, and multiple-room monumental building conglomerates consisting of several parts built close to one another [21; 24; 25, pp. 91–132].

The simplest type of residential construction was the single-room 'Mongolian' house, which also formed the base unit of all other types of buildings belonging to the first group. This type of house emerged as a result of the transformation of yurts into stationary dwellings during the nomadic transition to a sedentary lifestyle. This process has been well documented and repeatedly described in ethnographic research. Stationary dwellings at first preserved their round shape, yet the use of hard building materials eventually led to the transformation of a circle into a polygon with defined angles and ultimately into a square. One version of the reconstruction of these 'Mongolian-type houses' in Golden Horde cities has been put forth by V. Yegorov [16] (fig. 30). The interior of a 'Mongolian' house, just as residential buildings of other types, consisted of an L-shaped or U-shaped sufa with a furnace (tandoor) and kan, built in one of the sufa's wings along the wall or in it in the shape of a semi-circle. The connection of the tandoor, kan, and U-shaped sufa into a single complex became the main and almost obligatory feature of the 'Mongolian' house and the majority of dwellings in general in the Golden Horde. In these houses, sufas occupied the most space. A drain valve—toshnau—was sometimes installed into the small floor, which could be either adobe or paved with fired brick.
Houses of the first group are distinguished by the mutual arrangement of cells, each of which represents a 'Mongolian' house. Houses consisting of a chain of rooms that each form a separate square house, and buildings consisting of 'Mongolian' houses linked up to one another without any real design are also characteristic of former nomads. Chinese influences may possibly be traced in the composition of two entirely symmetrical houses. Houses connected by an iwan and grouped around the inner yard are typical of most eastern countries, and Central Asia in particular.

Houses of the second group include fairly monumental buildings constructed from adobe or fired brick with a strict and regular layout. The most developed layout can be found in houses with a 'representative' nucleus consisting of a great hall with other rooms connected to it. We
can assume that their owners were members of the highest stratas of the Golden Horde population. Moreover, the great number and complicated differentiation of rooms, as well as their rich decoration, encourage us to perceive several examples of manorial houses as real castles. Houses of this type have been examined in the cities of the Lower Volga region.

Three manor houses in Selitrennoe ancient town also had similar designs (fig. 31), designed as square constructions divided into three rows of rooms by meridional walls. The central row consisted of a vestibule located on the southern side and a hall that served as the focal point of the building. The floors of these halls were paved with fired brick on lime mortar, and there was a podium in the northern part, upon which the couch of the house's owner was placed during festive occasions. In one of the buildings, archaeologists uncovered the poles of the podium that supported the canopy over the couch. A swimming pool was built into the centre of the floor, where water flowed via a channel coming from the yard through the southern vestibule under the paved floor. A similar channel stretching northwards diverted excess water from the pool. Residential and household rooms were located on both sides of the central row of living quarters and housekeeping rooms.

A palace building was excavated in Selitrennoe ancient town that has since become the largest manorial construction ever discovered in the Golden Horde (fig. 32). It is a multiple-room house with outer walls built from fired brick, and inner walls that were half-timbered. The building was partly destroyed, making its size known only in approximation at 32.5 m long, and presumably over 40 m wide. A succession of front doors, starting from a large porch with steps, occupied the central location, and the doorway ultimately led to a vestibule with L-shaped sufas. The distributional vestibule that followed was connected with the central hall via two passages.

The hall was rectangular, elongated along the North–South axis, and featured dimensions of 15.8 x 9.4 m. In its southern part, there was a raised platform topped with brick on lime mortar. Narrow sufas were placed along walls in the central part of the hall, and another pedestal was made in the north, which was wider than in the south. Passages leading to the northern quarters were located to the east and west, and sufas surrounded the figurately paved floor with a large toshna in the centre. The floor was paved with two different kinds of tiles: first, the border along the edge of the floor, the square framing the toshna in the centre, and paths leading from the corners of the square and forming a cross-shaped figure were paved with large square slabs. Second, the space between the paths was filled in with hexagonal brick tiles, while the space around the toshna was laid with ordinary bricks. The hall's walls were decorated with a mosaic panel consisting of intricate gilded polychromatic elements. Two more spaces were located north of the hall, while the vestibule and an iwan were located in the southern section.

The rooms located in rows along the north–south axis adjoined the front part of the palace in its western and eastern areas. In general, approximately 35 rooms with identified residential or household purposes have been examined. Apart from ordinary rooms with a sufa and kan, there was also a home bakery with several tandoors, a pantry with millstones for grinding grain, a bathroom, and a children's room with many children's drawings cut into its plastered walls. Rooms adjoined one another via corridors and vestibules.

Palace buildings of a similar design with front halls at the centre have been researched in Akhtubinskoe ancient town [42].
Chapter VII. The Civilisation of the Golden Horde

Fig. 30 A single-room house of the Golden Horde:
1—log; 2—brick; 3—clay; 4—planks (according to V. Yegorov [16])

Fig. 31. Manorial houses 'with a central hall' in Selitrennoe ancient town

It is difficult to imagine that the developed layout of these buildings emerged without any external influences in cities founded by nomads. Indeed, their roots should be looked for among nations possessing a fairly developed construction culture by the 14th century, and popular dwellings should not be considered as typical examples, as elegant manors are more useful for our purposes. A comparison with the palaces of Mongolia built on the basis of Chinese examples exposes the absence of any similarity either in construction engineering or design. Nevertheless, the descriptions of techniques used for building Mongolian castles recorded by William of Rubruck and Marco Polo might possibly shed light on the character of ceremonies that took place in the main hall of Golden Horde manorial houses. Their entrance was also located in the south, while the raised platform where the owner of the house sat was built in the northern section. Places for visitors and family members were located to the sides. That is to say, the organisation of the space in the grand hall of manor houses in the Golden Horde corresponds...
to that in the palaces of Mongolia. This type of layout is typical for any type of Mongolian dwelling. Mongolian yurts were built so that their doors were on the southern side, while the north is considered to be more honorary, but Turkic yurts have their entrances in the south-east \[18, \text{p. 16}\].

Fig. 32. A palace building in Selitrennoe ancient town

Fig. 33. The front hall of the palace building in Selitrennoe ancient town
As for the design itself, buildings with a central hall are widely represented in the architecture of the Middle East. Examples of buildings with a yard/iwan or hall/iwan layout can also be found in the architecture of Central Asia. The origins of manor houses with rectangular halls can be observed in Khwarezm.

The third group includes conglomerates of houses that did not follow any strict layout structure. These capital, richly-decorated multiple-room constructions obviously belonging to the city elite possess the same primitive architectural concepts that can be found in the design of houses for relatively poor craftsmen.

Therefore, a synthesis of various components can be traced through the design of manorial buildings in the Golden Horde. The so-called 'Mongolian-type house' lies at the basis of buildings of the first group, although its construction is characteristic of dwellings of former nomads in various regions. Buildings of this sort might have emerged in the Golden Horde independently and now represent the 'nomadic' tradition of housebuilding in the architecture of this state.

The design of houses with an iwan and inner yard, widespread throughout the East, were likely imported here from Central Asia. Manorial houses with a front hall belonging to the social elite of the Golden Horde society have a more complex and developed layout, which also emerged under the influence of Central Asia and Khwarezm. Nevertheless, despite such a strong Central Asian influence, no direct borrowings can be identified here. Houses with an inner yard and central hall have a strict North–South axis. In cases where there was a 'representative' nucleus, its entrance was located in the south, and the host's honorary place, in the north. This means that citizens of the Golden Horde took typical Central Asian designs as a basis and added their own organisational principles taken from Mongolia and possibly China. As a result, buildings began to appear that may be considered as an original variant of layout designs well-known in the Middle East.

Architectural decorations are directly related to architecture as a whole, but throughout the Golden Horde state they were entirely irregular. In regions where masonry prevailed, buildings were adorned with detailed carved stone.

The most vivid and artistic examples of stone carving have been preserved in Crimea. Paintings (watercolours by M. Ivanov) show that the madrasah of Solkhat featured a luxurious portal with a triangular niche filled with stalactites. Similar niches of a reminiscent form were carved into the side walls of the portal. Unfortunately, it is impossible to see all the details because of the angle, but certain elements of the portal found during excavations were covered with complex epigraphic and floral ornaments executed in flat, deep three-plane carvings [32, pp. 113–116]. The portal of Öz Beg's mosque has been preserved much better; it was originally built in 1314, according to the building inscription. Its rectangular portal was framed with a carved friso along the outer contour, and its inner corners were decorated with semi-columns with double capitals upon which an arc shoe of a sub-triangular niche rested. The niche was filled with ganch stalactites (mukarnas) (fig. 34.1). The arc's tympanum was also covered in detailed carvings. The strip above the entrance contained an Arabic inscription dedicated entirely to praising Öz Beg, who ordered the mosque be built, and also naming the year and name of its builder—Ibrahim al Irbili [32, pp. 114–115].

The mosque's mihrab featured an identical structure as the portal, albeit decorated more ornately (fig. 34.2). A stalactic niche supported in a way by semi-columns with double-layer capitals and bases in the form of lamps can be seen here in two different places. The space above the niche was covered with complex carvings, including different areas of epigraphic and floral ornamentation, as well as separate medallions. A Quranic inscription was located in the epigraphic friso. All this was framed by a wide strip of intricate carvings, with three voluminous medallions located on its upper shelf. Researchers believe that the mihrab might have been illuminated with gilt [32, p. 116]. Despite the fact that Öz Beg's mosque was built by an Iraqi
architect, its layout and ornamental carved decoration motifs evidence instead the influence of Asia Minor from the Seljuq period [32, pp. 115, 116].

Fig. 34. Stone carving in the mosque of Öz Beg in Solkhat: 1—portal; 2—mihrab (reconstructed by M. Kramarovsky)

Architectural details typical of the Seljuq style, such as sub-triangular niches of portals filled with stalactites, and stalactic capitals of columns and frisos have been found all over Crimea. The ornament referred to as a 'Seljuq chain', which often framed the portal, and the decoration of arc tympana with round rosettes featuring epigraphic and floral ornaments were extremely popular. These decorative elements were present in the mosque of Sudak's fortress and such mausoleums as Eski Durbe in Bakhchysarai, durbe No. 1 in Asiz, and Janicke Khanum mausoleum in Chufut-Kale (fig. 35*) [26, pp. 32–34, 133–135, fig. 34, 169, 172, 174–175]. It is notable that the exact same decorative elements are found not only in Islamic cult constructions but also Christian monuments in Crimea. The Seljuq chain as a portal framing or niche detail can be seen in the churches of John the Baptist, Michael and Gabriel in Kaffa, as well as in the Surb Khach monastery. The columns supporting the dome over the chancel in the Church of St. Sergius (Sarkis) in Kaffa are almost completely identical to the columns in Öz Beg's mosque, while the baptismal niches have a triangular ending filled with stalactites (fig. 36). In the Armenian monasteries of St. Elijah and Surb Khach, entrances are decorated with portals featuring triangular stalactic niches of a typical Seljuq appearance [26, pp. 79–88, fig. 86, 88, 96, 97]. The stalactic baptismal niche of a triangular shape in the Surb Khacha church represents a significantly simplified version of a Seljuq portal or mihrab, while the stalactic friso of the drum bottom is identical to the stalactic belt of Sultan Khan's caravanserai, dated 1232 and located in Kayseri [38, p. 75].

Stone carving became widely spread in Volga Bulgaria as well. The capital of the only extant column of the Bulgarian mosque is decorated with stalactites and stylistically identical

* See Fig. 35–54 for the article in the colour insert.
to the Öz Beg's mosque. Carvings in the Minor minaret have been fairly well preserved (fig. 37). The outer triangular chamfers of its octangle are decorated with six-petal palmettes, and the doorway is set far back into the niche with a rectangular ending and framed by a stone carving similar in appearance to a cable-stitch. The plane of the niche was also covered with carvings, including a wide band of stylised floral ornamentation and a border that looked like wavy, intertwining ribbons. A cavity with a lancet arc featuring a smaller semi-circular niche inside was located in the western facade at the same level. The space between arcs is filled by an ornamental edging with two round rosettes filled with a thin carved ornament.

Researchers categorise the decoration of the Minor minaret as belonging to the traditions of Transcaucasia, to be more precise, Azerbaijan and Armenia [1, p. 54]. The motifs of carved decorations in Bulgar also have multiple similarities with those found in Asia Minor. For example, decorative arcs of Tyurbe Khatunie dated 1255 in Erzurum are designed with the same 'cable-stitches' as on the doorway of the Minor minaret [58, p. 42]. The ornamentation of two wavy, intertwined ribbons has Byzantine roots and is quite typical [58, p. 62], while the decoration of arc tympanum with rosettes is one of the most widely spread techniques traced in the majority of Minor Asian buildings of the Seljuq and early-Ottoman periods. Unfortunately, research into the ornamental motifs and compositions of decorative elements in Bulgar buildings has not been conducted as a separate topic; therefore, at present we can only suggest that we might search for their origins in Asia Minor or Transcaucasia.

In steppe regions, where adobe or fired brick was most commonly used as construction material, buildings were adorned with various decorative elements covered with glaze. Glazed decorations were notably various in style [40; 41; 46, pp. 147–166].

The simplest elements were bricks of red-clay or kashi bricks, the surface of which was covered in a blue or turquoise glaze. A veneer of the minaret's base, decorated with rectangular (16 x 10 x 4.5 cm) blue and turquoise bricks forming rhombic figures on the surface of the wall, have been found in Selitrennoe ancient town [22; 26, p. 50], along with glazed bricks with a rounded front surface used for the masonry of minaret pillars and domes.

Glazed hexagonal red-clay slabs, as well as carved and stamped terracotta slabs in other shapes also covered with a white or turquoise glaze, were also used for external decoration (fig. 38).

The most widely spread type of ornamentation was undoubtedly mosaics consisting of white, turquoise, blue, yellow, and red elements. Elements of these mosaics were carved out of large kashi slabs [47, pp. 109–112] and then laid in different combinations; tiles were included into the brickwork of either walls or floors. For example, in one room of Sarai's public banya, the floor was paved with hexagonal brick slabs interspersed with turquoise triangles [20, p. 192; 25, p. 72]. Multiple elements of various colours formed decorative panels similar to the tondo found in Selitrennoe ancient town (fig. 39). Mosaics often covered the entire surface of walls, or their majority. During the excavations of a manorial building in Krasny Bugor of Selitrennoe ancient town, the floor of the front hall was covered with a thick layer of tiles that had fallen as a result of the walls being dismantled (fig. 40) [21, p. 76]. For decorative purposes, mosaic elements could be additionally ornamented with golden foil against a red background, as we can see in the Juma mosque of Sarai (fig. 41) [26, fig. 21].

Mosaics often depict floral compositions to include shoots, flower buds, and flowers in full bloom. G. Fedorov-Davydov notes that a typical feature of Golden Horde mosaics is the absence of repetitions, in comparison with Central Asian mosaics and their strictly rigid symmetry [46, p. 153]. Geometrical ornaments were usually painted on borders and benches, and epigraphic ornaments were found on borders as well.

Majolicas with a sub-glaze fresco were used to decorate rooms (fig. 42). Tiles were coated with various elements of floral ornamentation, but there were also geometric ornaments in the form of lozenges, hexagons, arcs, stars, plaits and knots, which in various combinations formed...
'Girih' ornaments typical of Middle Eastern art. Epigraphic and pseudo-epigraphic ornaments in the form of inscriptions written in Naskh script or 'Blossoming Kufi' were typically executed in white on a blue background.

Majolica with supra-glaze painting and gold plating can also be found in Golden Horde cities (fig. 43). A large number of such tiles of various colors and forms were uncovered during the excavations of a palace building in Selitrennoe ancient town [46, pp. 155–157; 25, p. 103]. Large panel pictures were created from these elements, including various shapes, colouring, and ornamentation [41; 46, p. 156]. Ten-pointed stars, between which were pentagonal insertions, were located in the centre, and the space between the latter was filled with irregularly-shaped lozenges. Insertions in the shape of two connected triangles and lozenges were included along the edge. Panel pictures compiled from these tiles were polychrome and overloaded with gilt. Although each unique element was exquisite in its own right, the general impression this decoration produced was somewhat blurry because of the small sizes of its fractionary ornaments.

Decorations of carved and stamped ganch were not so widely spread in the Golden Horde as they were in Iran or Central Asia. Nevertheless, chiselled ganch grating/panjaras were quite often used to cover window openings, and colourful glass was frequently inserted into them. For instance, the remains of such grating were found during the excavation of a public banya and wealthy manorial house in Selitrennoe ancient town [20, p. 190; 21, p. 49]. Ganch panels adorned with carved or stamped ornaments have also been sometimes found. Rectangular ganch insertions with Kufic inscriptions and meander ornaments adorned the trunk of the minaret in Vodyansko ancient town [17, p. 126]. One absolutely unique work of art from Sarai is a ganch panel depicting animals during estrus, drawn by local painters under the influence of the Transcaucasian or Central Asian schools [45, p. 125; 4, p. 448]. However, in general this type of decoration did not become as widely spread in the Golden Horde as it was in Iran and Central Asia.

When examining the origin of the architectural decorations of the Golden Horde, G. Fedorov-Davydov came to the conclusion that the impetus in the development of plate mosaics and majolica with supra-glaze painting made its way to the Golden Horde via Iran through Transcausasia [46, p. 164]. At the same time, architectural decorations took various forms in the Golden Horde, mainly in the use of red in mosaics and the abundant application of gilt in majolica. The influence of Central Asia can be vividly observed in the motifs of majolica with under-glaze painting, while many ornamental motifs of all decorative types were formed under the impact of Asia Minor [46, pp. 165–166].

Another reflection of aesthetic tastes in the Golden Horde is artistically glazed ceramics, which should in fact be viewed as pieces of art and not just examples of craftwork. 'Glazed ceramics reflected the general style of art from that time; they were an artistic phenomenon connected with the stormy epoch of the formation and development of Mongol states. This quite succinctly shows the syncretism and diversity of the Golden Horde city. The most widely spread artistic products were glazed ceramics, which reflected both social psychology and tastes, and greatly influenced them by inundating markets and homes. These were great examples of a developed craft industry that included all the latest technical know-how to make Middle Eastern pottery,' G. Fedorov-Davydov wrote [46, p. 78].

Artistic glazed pottery found in abundance throughout all Golden Horde monuments can be divided into two large groups: red-clay and kashi. Red-clay bowls were mostly crafted with open ends—cups, plates, and more rarely goblets—but closed bowls have also been found, such as albarelo, jars, and bottles.

Ornamentation was added either with engobe or via carving or reserve (sgraffito). Glaze could be transparent, turquoise, and ultramarine but was most often just shades of yellow, green, and brown [48, pp. 199–202]. Ornaments painted with engobe were usually not complex—floral
or geometric (fig. 44). Epigraphic ornamentation was always made to include the Arabic word 'success' [46, p. 125], but ornamentation executed in 'sgraffito' were more various. These included strips crossing in the centre that formed a rosette or cross located in the centre of a star, a rosette, trefoils or medallions with a picture of a flower. Different figures made from wide strips plaited together on backgrounds filled with spirals were widely spread on the bowls of this group. Floral motifs, in particular branches and pomegranates, have been found much more rarely. Bowls with zoomorphic pictures of birds with long legs, fish, deer, lions, and peacocks form a separate group. Ceramics of this kind are found in particular abundance in Crimea. Bowls with a picture of a female figure near a tree originate from Crimea [32, p. 144]. One particular masterpiece is a bowl found in Solkhat depicting a festive scene in a pomegranate garden. In M. Kramarovsky's opinion, the multiple-figure composition portrays the feast of an association of young men (futuwwa), known in the Middle East and Asia Minor. In both the plot and its execution, the researcher can see the clear influence of Seljuq Anatolia [32, pp. 142–147; 34, pp. 164–198].

Red-clay glazed ceramics were produced in almost all Golden Horde cities where pottery was found. Its fragments have been discovered not only in rich urban cities but in the dwellings of middle-class and even poor residents as well.

Kashi dishes made from white non-plastic material represent the highest achievements of pottery in the Golden Horde; they were produced only in Khwarezm, Saray-Jük, and the cities of the Lower and Middle Volga regions. Tableware (mostly bowls), bowls for rose water, pharmaceutical jars (albarello), ink pots, stands for reed pens, and small figurines were the most common items made from kashi. The tableware can be divided into two large groups, the first of which are bowls with lead-free alkali enamels and transparent glaze. The glaze on these bowls could either be clear, turquoise, or ultramarine, and was mixed through the addition of copper, chrome, and cobalt. The second group consists of ceramics with a non-transparent glaze and the addition of stannum oxide, which were painted either white, turquoise, or ultramarine. Light-green half-transparent glaze was applied to imitate Chinese faience of the 'celadon' type. Polychrome or monochrome under-glaze painting is typical for the first group, while the second group of ceramics includes products with over-glaze painting [48, pp. 195–199].

The kashi pottery with a relief and polychrome painting is the most artistically inclined. Their ornamentation was usually executed against white and more rarely light-turquoise backgrounds, and accompanied by a slight crock relief emphasising its main decorative element. The contour of the picture was painted with a dark-green, dark-blue, or dark-brown dye, while the light details of the ornament were coloured with blue dots or turquoise spots. On the outside, bowls were almost always decorated with arc ornaments, medallions and triangles, and a star, rosette, or a blooming lotus flower was placed at the bottom. The flower was surrounded by either petals or rings of drop-shaped figures (peacock eye). On some bowls, a complex floral ornamentation of thick shoots or medallions with lotus flowers was included around the central flower. Sometimes, a belt of oblique hatching or epigraphic ornamentation was made along the bowl's edge. Zoomorphic motifs are also considered a part of this group of ceramics. Birds (most often web-footed), animals (panthers, fallow deer), and fantastic creatures (fig. 45) could be depicted in the centre of the bowl.

The ornamentation of ceramics with under-glaze painting without a relief is so diverse that classification is indeed difficult [46, pp. 88–115]. It keeps the same colour palette, but the motifs include various floral and geometric compositions. Some bowls of this type have an epigraphic belt of Persian verses painted along the border. Ceramics with turquoise glaze were painted black and featured their own special elements of ornamentation (fig. 46).

Kashi pottery with monochrome cobalt painting on a white background is in its own sub-group stylistically (fig. 47). This particular type emerged at the end of the 14th century and is
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Various floral motifs are typical for this style of ornamentation, including leaves, shoots, floral rosettes, and bouquets with axial symmetry. Zoomorphic pictures feature animals such as birds with spread wings and wavering tails. Bowls have also been discovered with a phoenix added to the floral ornament, a pheasant, and a heron near a lotus flower. Undoubtedly, these images, just as the white-blue range itself, are an imitation of Chinese porcelain. At the same time, epigraphic borders with Persian verse inscriptions can be found on bowls painted with cobalt [46, p. 120].

Ceramics with over-glaze painting and gilt, similar to Iranian 'Minai' ware, were produced in the Golden Horde in small amounts. Kashi tiles executed in this technique can be found in many monuments, while ceramic discoveries are only occasional. This type of Golden Horde ceramics was first distinguished by G. Fedorov-Davydov, who based his theory on the discovery of substandard ceramics of this type found in excavations of the 2nd Selitrennoe ancient town near a pottery furnace [45, fig. 100; 48, p. 199; 46, p. 133]. Ceramic pieces of this type have been uncovered in Kunya-Urgench, Saray-Jük, Selitrennoe and Tsarevskoe ancient towns. A goblet from Azaq depicting phoenixes and blooming peonies is unique in its integrity (fig. 48), and a number of researchers insist on the Iranian origin of this item [9; 15; 28; 37, pp. 423–424]. However, after analysing the colour range and stylistics of the picture, M. Kramarovsky persuasively proved that this goblet, just as ceramics similar to it, was created by Golden Horde craftsmen in Khwarezm, or the capital cities of the Volga region [31; 33; 34, pp. 79–93]. Golden Horde ceramics is indeed related to the traditions of Iran 'minai' ware and 'lajwardina' ceramics but differs from it in a stylistic sense [34, p. 87].

Therefore, the entire range of cultural connections that weave the tapestry of the Golden Horde are reflected in glazed ceramics. Motifs of artistic ornamentation and the technique of production of red-clay ceramics express the influence of Central Asia (Otrar, Samarkand, Khwarezm), as well as Byzantium, Asia Minor, Crimea, and the Caucasus [46, pp. 135–137]. The decoration of kashi pottery points to close connections with Iran and Central Asia. Ceramics with cobaltic painting and a light-green glaze are an imitation of Chinese porcelain. However, according to G. Fedorov-Davydov, despite all the borrowings, an independent artistic style nonetheless emerged in the Golden Horde, which can be characterised by its special tendency in painting of violating line density, the feeling of omnipresent movement in its ornamentation, the colourisation of ornamentation with multi-coloured dots, which created overtones on the surface of dishes, as well as the presence of a 'top-down' orientation in a number of ornamental elements [46, p. 137]. Taken all together, these form the unique style of Golden Horde artistic ceramics, although it undoubtedly developed in the same vein as Eastern traditions, as they were in many ways both original and recognisable.

Artistic metal products can also be considered pieces of high art. Unlike architecture and ceramic production, they reflect the tastes and demands of not only the urban population but also the large portion of Golden Horde society who lived in the steppe. Theatre of the Golden Horde was thoroughly examined by M. Kramarovsky, who devoted a range of fundamental research works to this topic [most importantly 29; 30; 32]. The researcher distinguished three separate stages of the formation and development of artistic metal in the Ulus of Jochi [29, pp. 145–146]. The early-Jochid period (the 1250s) involves products related to horse riding culture. These items penetrated the western part of the Great steppe along with the generation of the Golden Horde's original founders. Some items representing this period are ceremonial belts, bowls, and cups. Military belts were decorated with the figures of curled up dragons (fig. 49), which were the heraldic symbols of the Chinggisids [29, pp. 146–147; 30, pp. 37, 52–53]. Front surfaces from the second group of belts depicted fallow deer or deer among blooming flowers, or simply floral motifs (fig. 50). The researcher defines these belts as produced for ceremonial hunting purposes [29, p. 157; 30, pp. 51–52].
Another typical characteristic of Mongolian horse riding culture can be seen in belt bowls (fig. 51). Two kinds of bowls can be distinguished in the collective group of early-Jochid artistic metal. The first and most numerous group features bowls with a handle in the form of a dragon protoma; bowls of the second group have handles in the form of a horizontal blade and are richly decorated with floral ornaments. All these items were pieces of Mongolian Jochid art and emerged on the foundation of Far Eastern (Chinese and Jurchen) traditions, but at the same time we can also see the influence of Middle and Near East culture in certain motifs and technical elements.

The Middle-Horde period (the late 13th–first two-thirds of the 14th century) is characterised by economic stabilisation and the appearance of a great number of steppe cities, where a part of the Golden Horde elite settled. During this period, steppe and urban cultures underwent a period of convergence. The artistic metal of this period is presented along with belt bowls, festive dishes in the form of capacious cups, and bowls on a high tray (fig. 52). One unique feature of items from this period lies in the fact that they were produced by Golden Horde craftsmen by order of the local elite. Products of the Golden Horde toreuters combined the traditions of Central Asian crafts with new representative elements and techniques from the Near and Middle East. Thus, the form and stylistic solution of spoon-like bowls were most likely borrowed from the Sultanate of Rûm [29, p. 170; 30, p. 97], while the Near Eastern influence with its strongly pronounced dominant Islamic elements can be traced in the decorations [29, p. 175; 30, p. 105].

The collection of the late-Horde period (the last third of the 14th century–first half of the 15th century) is the largest in quantity. This period is characterised by a blossoming of urban life and the notable influence of Islam on all of its feature. The steppe portion of the population lost connection with Central Asia and began to respond to the new cultural elements penetrating Golden Horde society from Khwarezm, Cis–Caspian area, Transcaucasia, and Asia Minor. Large treasure troves with goods or both goods and coins from the Volga region, Cis–Azov region, Crimea, and the Byareznëka burial mounds, as well as a complex of burial equipment from Belorechenskie burial mounds, are dated to this period. A wide range of jewels produced for both specific customers and sale were discovered in these complexes, along with belt sets and bowls (fig. 53). The influence of the craft traditions of Islamic and Christian Anatolia, Byzantium, Syria, Iran, and Mamluk Egypt on the one hand, and Latin Romania on the other, can be noted in the craft techniques and decoration stylistics of these products produced in Golden Horde cities.

When addressing the artistic products of the Golden Horde period, we cannot help but take particular interest in items carved from bone. Quiver covers, which were mostly found in burial mounds from the 13–14th centuries but also sometimes in cities, are of particular interest among them [36]. Covers represent plates divided into horizontal carved stripes. The simplest ornaments consisted of triangles and zigzags, and more complex elements were formed by S-shaped figures with additional curls and volutes (fig. 54). Plates with even more complex decorations contain zoomorphic pictures (deer, fantastic creatures) and sometimes even images of people carved in certain areas. The background around them is covered in small-scale hatching. On several covers, parts of the ornamentation are painted green, white, red, and orange. Modern researchers are also familiar with colourful chiselled covers in which the visual field is filled with pictures of animals and floral shoots between them. Sometimes quivers were covered with gold foil, on the background of which painted plates looked especially bright.
It has been agreed that such highly artistic products were produced in cities. At the same time, from a stylistic perspective, the decoration of bone linings is markedly different from the artistic style of other types of applied Golden Horde arts. However, the traditions of the Turks of Altai, Siberia, Central Asia, and Mongolia can indeed be traced back to this state [36, p. 169]. This is explained by the fact that their buyers were steppe dwellers, mostly the Kipchaks, which encouraged urban craftsmen to make products in response to their tastes. Moreover, bone items of everyday use are not noted for their beauty or intricate decorations. Therefore, artistic bone carving in the Golden Horde was mostly a reflection of the aesthetic views shared by the steppe population of Golden Horde society.

The art of the Golden Horde absorbed the traditions of multiple cultures and peoples with whom the Mongols had contact both during their conquests and in the course of peaceful coexistence. Researchers therefore often speak of the syncretical character of Golden Horde culture, yet items of Golden Horde art are nevertheless quite vivid, expressive, and well-recognizable. This all serves to demonstrate the synthesis of traditions and the elaboration of a definite and in many ways unified style. As G. Fedorov-Davydov noted, 'the inconsistency of eclectically bound elements was compensated by the powerful sound of a new style in applied arts (the main artistic direction of Golden Horde culture), a style that is 'pathetic' to a large extent and has a strong tendency towards 'painterliness' [46, p. 209].

4. Alpatkina T. Zolotoordy'nskie veshhi v fonde arxitekturnogo dekora Gosudarstvennogo muzeya Vostoka (Golden Horde products in the fund of architectural decoration of State Museum of Oriental Art) // Zolotoordy'nskoе nasledie. Materialy' Mezhdunarodnoj nauchnoj konferencii
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§ 5. The Language of Written Records from the Golden Horde Period

Fanuza Nurieva

The development of Turkic literary languages during the Golden Horde period was an outstanding moment in the development of the culture of Turkic peoples. By the beginning of the 14th century, the Golden Horde had established itself as a powerful state in the Volga and Cis–Ural regions, and in Northern Khwarezm. Here blossomed centres of urban culture; cultural and economic life thrived. The Jochid empire was most politically and economically powerful during the reign of Khans Öz Beg (1312–1342) and Jani Beg (1342–1357), when growth in the economy and trade coincided with a sharp increase in central power, and a unified system of rule was established in the empire. With the support of the khan's administration, dozens of
major cities quickly developed, in which a luxurious, expressive, in many aspects eclectic style evolved. The study of historical works, along with other sources (yarliqs, various reports), leads us to conclude that the urban class (trade-craft, official, clerical) played an important part in the cultural life of the population of the Golden Horde, which significantly affected the need for spiritual values for the entire society.

By the beginning of the 14th century, Islam had been fully adopted as the state religion. This helped to promote the further integration of peoples, the creation of a single ethnos and left a deep imprint on all Turkic peoples of Eurasia [2, pp. 61–62; 11, pp. 177–185]. Religion played, without a doubt, a significant role in politics, ideology, the management of social institutions, the economy, trade, in spiritual culture and in the arts.

During this period, famous classical works of a religious and didactic nature were created, such as 'Qisas al-anbiya' (=QR) by Rabguzi (1310), 'Nahj al-Faradis' (=NF) by Mahmud Bulgari (1358), 'Junjuma sultan' (=J) by Hisam Kyatib (1369), 'Kisekbash kitaby' (=Kb); and secular works, such as 'Muhabbat-name' (=Mn) by Khwarezm (1353), 'Khosrow and Shirin' (=KS) by Qutb (1383), 'Gulistan bit-turki' (=Gb) by Seyfi Sarayi (1391), etc. It should be noted that other active varieties of the literary language, namely, the language of yarliqs and bitiks belonging to the Golden Horde era, epigraphic inscriptions, etc., were current during this period.

In the opinion of the researchers who study the socio-cultural life of the cities and other cultural centres of the Golden Horde, these centres provided conditions for creation of oral-colloquial koiné, the linguistic basis of which was composed by Turks, speakers of dialects belonging to the Kipchak language group. The state language of the Golden Horde was Kipchak [4, p. 31; 11, pp. 94–101]. The cultural environment, the presence of administrative centres and local rulers, as well as an Islamic educational system replete with madrasahs, libraries, and literate mullahs—all of this created a basis for recording in a written manner a supra-dialectical form of the language; upon this basis, written literary texts of various genres and styles were created.

Many scholars have studied the problem of the establishment and development of literary languages in the Middle Ages: V. Radlov, A. Samoylovich, Ya. Ekman, E. Najib, E. Tenishev, G. Blagova, D. Nasilov, F. Khakimzhanov, F. Khisamova, F. Nurieva, among others.

A. Samoylovich's position on the uniformity of the Turkic people's literary language and its changeability under the influence of living dialects is at the basis of his proposed periodisation of the Turkic people's written culture within the framework of Islamic civilisation: the first period, centered in Kashgar, coincides with the initial establishment of the Kara-Khanid state; the second period, centered in the basin of the lower reaches of the Syr Darya and Khwarezm, coincided with the initial consolidation of Islam among the Oghuz and Kipchak peoples; the third period would then coincide with the beginnings of cultural life among the Timurids in a number of centres in the settled area of Chagataid Ulus. A. Samoylovich paid significant attention to the second period known as the Kipchak–Oghuz, as it was during this period—and not during the Chagatai period—that due to the formation of Chinggis Khan's Empire, conditions favourable to the development of a united literary language for all Muslim and Turkic tribes of the Mongol State occurred. Also, the origins of the main modern Islamic and Turkic literary languages can be traced to this period as well. The scholar points directly to the continuity of the modern Tatar language in reference to the literary language of the Golden Horde: '...the ancient Kipchak roots of the Kazan Tatar literary language, which survived several developmental periods, are not in the 15th century as generally assumed but in the earlier literary works of the Golden Horde, where Kipchak linguistic elements dominate. The same is true for the Crimean Tatar literary language' [7, p. 21]. A. Samoylovich's concept concerning the continuity of a uniform literary tradition was further developed in the works of E. Tenishev [9, pp. 67–85; 10, pp. 35–38].
One foremost authority on the history of medieval literary languages, E. Najib, contributed significantly to the illumination of the historical-cultural and linguistic situation during this period. As is known, the territory of the Jochid Ulus was vast, and the Golden Horde had several centres there. One of these cultural centres was Northern Khwarezm, in the lower reaches of the Syr Darya, where more ancient traditions characteristic of Central Asian Turkic (Kara-Khanid and Uighur) written culture could still be found. Sarai was another such centre in the lower reaches of the Volga River in the 12–13th centuries. And in the 14th century a new centre appears—Mamluk Egypt [4, p. 16]. E. Najib conducted a set of comparative studies of written sources created in the Golden Horde and Egypt. These studies focused, first and foremost, on the distinctive lexical characteristics of these works, and the distribution and statistical analysis of lexemes in them according to their dialectal attributes. He draw the following conclusions: 1) by the 14th century the Kipchak-Oghuz literary language labeled y-group, which was common in the Golden Horde and Egypt, had formed. 2) Along with this qualitatively new literary language, the more archaic written language known as z-group continued to be used. E. Najib called it the Oghuz-Kipchak literary language of the Lower Volga region—Khwarezm [5, pp. 81–82]. According to E. Najib, as early as the 14th century, this mixed, Kipchak-Oghuz written literary language was finally established 'as the literary language of the Golden Horde—Turs of the Volga and Ural regions' [4, p. 31]. The Middle Volga region, where the city of Bulgar is located, was also a cultural centre. In this cultural centre of the Golden Horde, in contrast to the Lower Volga region, or, let us say, to Mamluk Egypt—where complex ethnic processes such as the intermingling of different Turkic tribes, the formation of supra-dialectal koiné, or the creation of literary versions of the language occurred after the Mongol conquests—here there existed an ancient cultural, in particular, written literary tradition [15, p. 30].

In turkological literature, different terms are used to designate the literary language of the Golden Horde, such as 'mixed Kipchak-Oghuz literary language', 'Volga Turki', 'Turko-Tatar', 'Khwarezm-Turkic literary language', 'Khwarezm-Golden Horde written language', 'Eastern Turkic language', 'Golden Horde-Egyptian literary language'. According to the majority of researchers, the literary language of the Golden Horde differs notably in its structural properties from the preceding Kara-Khanid and Uighur languages, and functions in different ways: in the 'Oghuzed' variant of the Golden Horde language (which absorbed Oghuz elements) and the 'Kipchaked' variant (that is, which absorbed Kipchak features). Although the term 'mixed language' is used in research, this notion has not, however, been clearly articulated. Turkologists interpret the term 'mixed' to mean that a written source contains phonetic, grammatical, and lexical elements belonging, in their opinion, to a language of a different classification group. Notably, these language elements are usually attributed to a certain group of languages or dialects (Kipchak, Oghuz, Uighur, Karluk). Meanwhile, in modern linguistics the expression 'mixed language' has a specific meaning. It applies, in particular, to Creole languages that arose under specific socio-cultural conditions. As a rule, in these cases we are talking about substantial shifts in the lexical and grammatical systems of contact languages or dialects. In the existing turkological tradition, 'mixing' means not a change in a language system but the use in the language of one written source of dialecticisms, which are considered the norm in another written source. Notably, here one sees both synchronous matches and archaic phenomena typical of a language of another historical period. Such terminological ambiguity makes the comparative study of the language of written sources very difficult, because characteristics of 'mixing' are not universal for all researchers—this calls for the development of clear and uniform criteria for evaluating the language of a written source.

Given the existing problem in Turkology with the expression 'mixed language' of a written source, terms such as 'fundamental' and 'peripheral' systems [1] that were introduced by G. Blagova are widely used. Besides, they correlate with the notions of norm and variation. When classifying the language of a written source, we start by dissecting the text and singling out its
fundamental and peripheral elements. Based upon the phonetic-graphic and morphological features singled out by us and their statistical review, we see that every written source is a specific and living reflection of linguistic conditions. These selected phonetic-morphological features serve as markers when classifying Turkic languages.

Religious-Didactic Texts.

One written source, *Qisas al-anbiya* by Rabguzi (further QR), was composed in 1310 in the Northern part of Khwarezm. An ancient manuscript of it, kept in the British Museum of London, dates back to 1489. It should be emphasised that this manuscript was very popular in the Islamic world, which is why a great number of copies—approximately 35—have come down to us in manuscript archives. This number also does not reflect those held by private persons. Copies of the manuscript have been found in a wide range of geographical locations, including the Russian Federation, Tatarstan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and others. These copies were clearly updated by scribes, who introduced numerous language innovations into the text. Thus, our research is based on the most ancient copy. Ultimately, linguistic analysis allowed us to distinguish the following normative phonetic and graphic features. Compare: the language of KR includes a one-variation traditional spelling of words with ١ (alif), such as ١ ذکی 'righteous'; the graphic variation carries a certain semantic differentiation: 8 ār 'man', 9 ār 'warrior'. Labial harmony is consistently preserved; words with the 6-grapheme are the orthographic norm, but variation appears in later copies. The -q-grapheme in the intervocalic position ١ is also consistently preserved: saqyndy 'thought', the combinations -ayu-, -uyu-, -yyu- ١ ayu 'mouth', the auslaut -γ: ٠ sary 'yellow'.

Among morphological features, the fundamental declension system is related to the Uighur-Kipchak type. In the system of tenses, we observe multifunctional and wide use of past tense forms with -dy: aldymyz 'we took'. Among the group of absolute present and future tenses, we have the frequent form with -ar, -ur: jaturman 'I'm lying', the future tense with – ١ γaj: kiçürkämin 'I will forgive', having full conjugation paradigm in the future tense. The optative mood has the forms -ayun, -alyen: körküzäjin 'I will show you'. In the attributive function, two forms co-exist -yan and -mys. The action noun is represented only by the form -maq: oşbu kitmäkidin ölmäkimni tilär ırşäŋ 'if by leaving me you wish I were dead'. These features refer to the fundamental characteristics of the language of the written source and are, at the same time, characteristic of the Kara-Khanid Uighur literary language.

Another large-scale religious-didactic work, namely, *Nahj al-Faradis* (henceforth NF) by Mahmud al-Bulgari as-Sarai, is chronologically close to QR. Despite the small number of copies found—only ten—this written source played an important role in the cultural life of the Tatar people. It is especially interesting in terms of the study of the history of public opinion in the medieval Volga region, because its author relied on a great number of works (there are a total of 20 recorded sources) by famous Muslim theologians. This text represents a blending of religious and moral doctrines embodied in an artistic form. Fascinating novellas and wise parables were supposed to encourage loyalty to Islam and lasting immunity to temptations lying in wait for a Muslim on the way to celestial bliss. Thus, the text differs from QR specifically in its didactic nature. As a result, the language of NF is replete with descriptive devices, synonyms, antonyms, idioms, etc. As a whole, it could be characterised as close to a folk-colloquial form. This interaction of the literary norm and the folk-colloquial language is corroborated by the fact that in the language of NF, much more than in the language of the previous source, we find variation both in the phonetic-graphic development of the lexicon and in its grammatical features. But even here, however, one can trace the adherence to a basic system taking root in a stable written tradition. These fundamental features in graphophonetics include consistent preservation of labial harmony in word stems, and in genitive case and possessive affixes, -luq, -suz: ١ körklük 'beautiful', in the forms of adverbial participles. However, in NF there are certain examples of spelling of the affixes that violates labial harmony (most often, these
are possessive affixes or ones involving the past definite tense). In the stems with an alternating vocalic anlaut, the word written with \( l \) (alif) is most often replaced with \( \varepsilon \) (alif yay). However, this is not a consistent variation. Variation also becomes common with the use of \( d-\varepsilon-j \) and the predominance of the written \( d \)-grapheme: \( ﻣﻮرﻮغ \) \( \varepsilon \) \( quvûr 'well' \), \( ﺖﻱ ﺕﺍﻱ ﺔﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ \( ﺔﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ \( ﺔﻱ ﺔﻱ \) \( ﻢﺎ ﺔﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ \) \( ﻢﺎ ﺔﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ \). The expansion of the function of \( j: \) \( ﻢﺂ ﺔﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ \) \( ﻢﺂ ﺔﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ \) \( ﻢﺂ ﺔﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ \) \( ﻢﺂ ﺔﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦﻱ ﺔﻱ ﻦyt the peculiarities of its latest scribes. But, against the
Secular texts.

Secular texts include analyses of the following: 'Khosrow and Shirin' by Qutb (1383), 'Muhabbat-name' by Khwarezmich (1353), 'Gulistan bit-turki' by Seyf-i Sarayi (1391). As is evident from historiographic review, turkologists have often studied secular texts. Taking into account the achievements of our predecessors, we analysed the aforementioned texts using the language stratification method based upon fundamental and peripheral components. The most significant result of this approach was the classification of the primary linguistic system of 'Khosrow and Shirin' (hereafter KS) among the Kara-Khanid Uighur tradition; the two other texts, based upon their primary forms, we consider representatives of the Kipchak language system. The difference is explained, first and foremost, by the fact that Qutb, the author, who was from the Volga region, tied his literary activities to Sarai; he created this work at the end of his life by order of the ruler Tini Beg. As literary specialists have established, the work 'Nizami', written in classical, literary Farsi, served as its model. Thus, we must pay attention to the certain influence of the artistic form of the poem 'Nizami' on Qutb's work. Besides, when presenting his work to the ruler of the Golden Horde, Qutb, naturally, would have adhered to traditional etiquette and used a high poetic style clothed in the literary poetic form of the language common to the Turkeic literature of that period, which is rooted in the Kara-Khanid Uighur tradition. All of these factors, it seems, Qutb's high educational level, his old age, the fact that his work was ordered by the khan, and traditional court etiquette—influenced the specific characteristics of Qutb's poem 'Khosrow and Shirin'. Labial harmony in the language of 'Khosrow and Shirin' no longer forms a single strict system. A complex interrelation of the written tradition and living colloquial language is observed, which is evident from the variation in the spelling of a great number of words and word forms. Compare: بولوت (8 times) 'clouds'. Characteristic of the language of 'Khosrow and Shirin' is the use of elision of γ, -qγ, which, by the way, violates labial harmony: كوروم قوروع jazuqluy ~ لیژوز jazugly 'sinful'. In the anlaut, the spelling of the diagraph - ʃ 'alif + yay' is consistently preserved: لیل 'hand', زر ir 'man', ور iw 'house', although partial variation is noted: یارون irin ~ ایرن 'arın 'lips'. The alternations of د–ذ–ج can also be traced. In many words, the grapheme  ذ is traditionally preserved, though there are words appearing as duplicates: أذاق ađaq (77 words) ~ لیژوز ajaq (20 words) 'leg'. Although the relative stability of the auslaut –γ is noted, there is variation in the spelling with an omission of the final –γ with the auslaut –γ, like ورژور «quru». This is used in the text 14 times, and with the –γ دور 4 times. Declension is based upon Uighur-Kipchak forms, but structurally regular peripheral characteristics are associated with Oghuz forms. In the system of past tenses, the form in –dy dominates; چوپاید dyaq (12 times) is e.g. 'you came from afar, have some rest'. The perfect with -myş is used extensively: خسیس تکلریا ol gâwîr gâtylmş hasuf lég gadyu qudurşunça atyłmyş 'these pearls have been thrown on rough stones, just like Yusuf was thrown into the well of grief'; the perfect in –yp and –γan is quite rare; خساکنی تاژگیتی جولده چیریکن qarmers hykîni bîrlâ hâm igtîkân bu munça γîlm và hikmatlîr jaraîyan garaşqy tûnymăn kân bîrlâ jaraîyan While turning the sky around, he moved the stars, by his orders he helped everything to grow, created so much knowledge and wonder, lighted up the dark night with stars'. The present tense form with -a is noted in eight instances; چورد 58 times. For example: اج یستنی ol hyrqa یرت 'she covers the moon with her clothes'; نصیق تی بیلریا omba aldajursân 'you envelop me with your sweet words'.

As regards 'Gulistan bit-turki' (hereinafter Gb) by Seyf-i Sarayi, this work is a translation of the famous work 'Gulistan' by Saadi. Sarayi was famous among poets and scholars of the Golden Horde as an outstanding master of poetic, and therefore, his friends recommended him for the translation. We know that Sarai was born in 1321 in the Volga region, that he studied...
and was engaged in literary activities in Sarai, and that in the 1380s he emigrated to Mamluk Egypt [for more details, refer to 17]. Thus, Sarayi's native language belonged to the Kipchak family, but thanks to his education, he mastered the language of Turkic classical literature of that time. Therefore, in comparison to KS, the conditions in which Gb was created were different. In our opinion, this explains why, in the fundamental language system of this written source, one finds evidence of a Kipchak linguistic basis.

'Gulistan bit-turki', in terms of its genre, is close to KS but differs from it in its fundamental linguistic forms. The following distinctive features serve as proof of the significant introduction of Kipchak elements into the system of Gb: in the text, the anlaut - ʙ (alif yay) and ɢ (yay) dominate in the closed syllable; the language of Gb relates to the group with the j–feature, all the words of which are written in the same way with the j–grapheme; the assimilation of the auslaut -ɢ at the juncture of lexical elements is observed: ғазағ (21 words) ~ ғазы (11 words); the auslaut -γ is always omitted: ғажи 'angry, mean', ғары 'poor', ғары 'yellow', etc. Judging by its forms and main structural parameters, the fundamental declension system appearing in the language of Gb is related to Kipchak. Peripheral forms varying in the text: the dative case -a and the accusative case -ny in the 3rd person possessive paradigm are related to Oghuz declination forms. The system of preterite forms typically includes the features -ңan, -ңyş, -ңp, although the tense form with -ңyş is encountered rarely; the most universal is the past tense form with -ңp, which is represented by two models: -ңp тur+personal endings; -ңp+personal endings, which are observed in all 3 persons. This form focuses on the result of an action, and sometimes there is evidence of non-obligatory modality. There are rare occurrences of the form with -a, which in the respective text may render the semantics of the future tense. Compare: süzləmək təlbiz nizākim türk adəb ilə şəyr 'we want to read the poem according to the Turkic rules'. Verbal forms are represented by the affixes -мaq, -маqlyq, and in certain cases, the supine -ра is observed: üç alurа duşmanыndin waqf bar 'there is a time to take revenge on the enemy'.

The history of the creation of the third source, the poem 'Muhabbat-name' by Khwarezmī (hereinafter MN), is exactly the same. Khwarezmī was a famous poet who lived in the territory of the Golden Horde, specifically, in Sygnak. There he received a request from Muhammad Khoja Beg to create a poem, бизин тил бирлә, 'in our language', that is, in the Turkic-Kipchak language. Khwarezmī modeled his work on 'Muhabbat-name', a popular work in the East, which was a collection of love messages embodied in poetic form. While fulfilling his patron's specific artistic request, Khwarezmī (his real name remains unknown) created a work the language of which is based upon Kipchak roots. As with other authors, Khwarezmī's work is not a word for word translation of the original but its free rendering. Against the backdrop of the last two written sources, the language of KS, which was based on Kara-Khanid Uighur, contains a rather significant stratum of Kipchak elements in variations at the level of peripheral signs. As our analysis demonstrates, the Kipchak elements become the norm in the language of this written source.

The study of the language of 'Muhabbat-name' is important within the larger scale of research being conducted on the establishment and formation of the literary language of the Golden Horde, including its connections with other literary languages of Turkic peoples; and in determining the influence of its norms on literary languages in later periods. As already mentioned, in this written source, the Kipchak language elements begin to dominate. Thus, in the anlaut - ʙ (alif yay) are recorded, which is typical only of Kipchak languages: ғазағ 'lip', ғили 'gabby', etc. Whereas d-δ-j may alternate, in the written work we find only one variation spelled with -j. The intervocalic -q is generally preserved; in the auslaut, there is a voiceless -q: ғош 'door', voiced -γ in the affix -лы is always absent: ғор 'кёркля 'beautiful'. The fundamental declension system is closer to that of Kipchak, while peripheral forms are more similar to the Oghuz. The low frequency Karlik type declension is observed in the dative.
and locative cases. The perfective aspect is represented by two competing forms, - yan, - yp tur. Examples: çičäk japaq•årly qirjä tüşüptür 'flower petals were scattered on the ground'; iki jaktu gävhär ýälämja birgän 'he gave two light pearls to the world'. The attributive function is manifested more actively by the Kipchak form - yan, while the Oghuz forms - mëys, - an are recorded in only a few instances. Among forms of the adverbial modifier in the language of MN, the adverbial participle with - yp clearly dominates; there are extremely rare occurrences of the form with - a, - u, usually in repetition (although they may occur with different stems): külä ajnaju 'laughing and playing'. The action noun is represented by the form - maq; there are a few examples with - maya and - rya: seni şqägyda sajraçya Xarâzmi 'in order to sing to Khvarezmi; jyraq min baqma imkän joq aj żan 'I am far away, no chance to feast my eyes on you, oh, my soul'.

The language of the poem is colorful, rich, and metaphoric. The author skilfully employs various artistic devices, in particular, epithets, comparisons, and metaphors. Quite often, Khvarezmi creates a portrait of an amazingly beautiful girl by means of comparisons: irür jüzi quş tek ýäläm ara 'will beautify her face as the sun beautifies the universe', saçyn bir taryna min xor yitmas 'thousands of hours are unworthy of a single of your hairs', etc. The poem is adorned with numerous artistic metaphors: ysyryän danasi – zürhâ, jüziñ – aj 'Venus is only a gem in your earring, and the Moon is your face', etc.

The previous texts representative of the written literary language of the Golden Horde that we analysed above do not exhaust, however, the number of written examples of the Turkic-Tatar literary language of that period. Other important sources are Arab-Kipchak glossaries, grammars, and translated literary works from the 13–16th centuries, which were created in Mamluk Egypt over some 250 years. Among original sources a special place is held by the 'Codex Cumanicus' (hereafter CC), which is a major written source of the Kipchak colloquial language of the Golden Horde. It is also a very good source for studying the history of the establishment and development of nearly all modern languages belonging to the Kipchak group. The language of the 'Codex' is already referred to as Tatar in the work itself. For example, 'Iisus Hristos bitik tilinçe, tatarça 'kutkardaçı' tatar tilge konelde'. Translation: 'Jesus Christ, as it is written, was translated into the Tatar language as Saviour' [23, pp. 48, 83]. This written source is valuable because the Turkic language is represented in Latin graphics, which allows a more precise reflection of phonetic peculiarities. In the texts of this written source, the focus is basically not only on the spoken language but also, most importantly, on the availability of the language in the Turkic environment. It is exactly for this reason that the written source is a valuable fixed record of oral Kipchak dialects in the 13–14th centuries. This is demonstrated, in particular, by the regular j–feature: all words are written using the univariate j. Stable vocalisation of the intervocalic - q- is observed, although there are instances when it is preserved: çuşar 'let go', sayış 'sorrow', joqary baqyp 'looking upward', etc. The combination - ayu, - ayyu is regularly reflected in the diphthong - uw: awuz 'mouth', bazau 'calf'. The final - yf is regularly omitted: biti 'letter', jamau 'patch', tau 'mountain'. In the declension, the genitive case complies with labial harmony; accusative case formats include - ny, - ni, in the 3rd person - yn (17 times) and - nyu (18 times) co-exist equally; the dative case is represented by the affix - qa- and its respective harmonic variants, the original form of which is - dan, - tan. The infix - n- is commonly used in possessive-nominal declension. Thus, the illustrative material of the dictionary demonstrates clear Kipchak declension type. The tense form with - yp tur is used frequently, but the form with - yan and - mëys is comparatively rare. Thus, we can absolutely confirm that Kipchak is the fundamental language type appearing in the 'Codex Cumanicus'.

The development of Turkic literary languages during the period of the Golden Horde was an important stage in the cultural evolution of Turkic peoples. A formal business style—of yarliqs and bitigs—developed actively. Commenting upon the fundamental linguistic structure in Toktamys'h yarliq to Jagiello (1393) and Temür Qutlugh's (1398) yarliq, the researcher
F. Khisamova points out language peculiarities typical for the Volga area: the declension is absolutely Kipchak; the participle form -gan is used extensively, such as olturgan 'sitting solemnly', тушманlık киігант 'hostile Bekbulat'; and the infinitive form -ırga: тута тұрұға алтұң нұшалық әл тамғалық әрлұқ бәрілді 'a ярылғы with a golden seal and scarlet tamga was granted', etc. [15, pp. 54–57]. The specificity of these ярылғыs, according to F. Khisamova, is explained by the typological proximity of this business style to the specific regions where these ярылғыs appeared. This diversity in the literary language of the Golden Horde is, as is well known, directly related to the Volga River region: in it, to a greater extent than in other functionally stylistic varieties of the written language of that period, the linguistic peculiarities of local Turkic tribes are reflected [15, p. 59]. Having analysed over two hundred epitaphs devoted to Volga Bulgars and taken into consideration the graphic peculiarities involved in rendering Turkic words using the Arabic alphabet, F. Khakimzyanov was able to fully describe the graphic-phonetic structure, the phonetic-grammatical and lexical characteristics of the language of these inscriptions. As this scholar noted, the vocabulary in this group of written sources has much in common with modern Kipchak languages, mainly with the Tatar language. Lexical elements with Kipchak features are quite distinct at different language levels: this is reflected in the morphology in the formation of the past tense participle with the help of the affix -ын (asра́ын 'who brought up'); in the formation of the additive case with the help of -ы (баqы́ дүңяға 'to the eternal world'), etc. At the same time, there are indications of the Kara-Khanid Uighur literary tradition in the epigraphs; Arabic-Persian borrowings also play a certain role [13, pp. 64–65]. Taking into account F. Khakimzyanov's rather convincing facts regarding the formation of a supra-dialect of common Turkic (Kipchak) in the pre–Mongol period in Volga Bulgaria, one can assume that this tradition must have also played a role in the creation of a regional variant of the literary language during the Golden Horde period.

Our research demonstrates that the written literary form of the language of the Golden Horde, as it developed in literary centres, was initially oriented to the phonetic-graphical and grammatical norms of literary languages prevalent in the Kara-Khanid Uighur area. This can be explained by the fact that during this historical period, the aforementioned areas were centres from which Islamic education spread; this education also included, apart from religious fundamentals, instruction in the respective forms of the written literary language, which was, first and foremost, a religious-didactic literature. Beginning with the establishment of the Golden Horde as an independent state, cultural life in the Horde was heavily influenced by famous Muslim devotees-theologians, whose names are known to us from the works of historians Ш. Маржани, М. Усманов, and Г. Давлетшин, and from literary works such as 'Nahj al-Faradis' by Mahmud Bulgari themselves. Therefore, it is not surprising that in regional literary centres of the Golden Horde the literary language played such a significant role. Based upon the Kara-Khanid Uighur variant of the Turkic written language, this literary form secured its position in these centres. At the same time, the majority of the population of the Ulus of Jochi, both settled and nomadic, spoke tribal languages of the Kipchak type, although among the residents of the Golden Horde there were also speakers of Oghuz and Karluk type languages, such as Uighurs who worked in governmental offices. Thus, due to ethno-demographic conditions, those bearers of Islamic tradition we mentioned previously found themselves mainly among a Kipchak-speaking population. This ethnic situation aided in the establishment in cultural and trading centres of a supra-dialectal koiné based upon the Kipchak language environment. It is exactly this factor we find confirmed in our research materials: there is direct evidence of the influence of a folk-colloquial koiné, which was established under the aforementioned conditions, based upon the norms of the literary language of the examined period. The influence and interaction of the old tradition with new linguistic processes is reflected in different ways in the language of individual sources and was dependent on the genre of a written source (religious-didactic literature remained more consistent, while secular literature adopted innovations faster); on the
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author's educational level and affiliation with a particular literary-artistic school; on the customer who ordered the work as, for example, 'Khosrow and Shirin' by Qutb, or 'Muhabbat-name' by Khwarezem; on specific conditions in the location where the work was created; on the scribe, his tribal affiliation, and his level of proficiency in his native language. We can now state that in early written sources belonging to the Golden Horde, the Kara-Khanid Uighur tradition was firmly preserved, and that parallel to it in the Volga region, a new variant of the regional literary language was being formed.

Among phonetic-graphic features the following were stable: labial harmony, the intervocalic -q-, and combinations such as -ayun-. As for phonetic features, the most dynamic and least stable are [i], which gradually gives way to the narrow, non-labialised front vowel [il], which is reflected in writing; the replacement of -o- with -j-, as the language of written sources reflects the process when the j-grapheme enters into the language of the texts. The maximum number of phonetic features identified as representative of the Kara-Khanid Uighur tradition is used in 'Qisas al-anbiya' by Rabguzi; the minimum, in the 'Codex Cumanicus'.

Morphological description of the language of these written sources demonstrates that they also reflect general rules of language formation during the Golden Horde period. Significantly, their morphological parameters correspond to phonetic and graphic phenomena.

Analysis of morphological categories leads to the following conclusions: based upon the systematic study of the declension system in the written sources, the subsequent matching of all data from the analysis of every source, and upon consideration of all coincidences and deviations, we can now confirm that the transition from the Uighur-Kipchak declension type to the Kipchak type began in the 14th century. Forms outside of the basic declension system coincide in many respects. For example, in the noun paradigm such forms are the dative case with -a (in KS, Gb, MN, J), the accusative case with -i (in MN, Gb), the ablative case with -dan (in KS, MN). Considering their position in the declension system of each written source allows us to identify them as belonging to the Oghuz type. They are peripheral in relation to the fundamental declension system.

An analysis of synthetic aspect–tense verbal forms also demonstrated active interaction between the written literary tradition and a regional koiné; this interaction appeared to be non-uniform and varying in the language of specific written sources in the Golden Horde.

As for past tense forms, in the language of written sources from the 13th to the beginning of the 15th centuries, the most common and polysemantic was the -dy form. The use of all three forms of the perfect: -mys, -yan, -yp tur is quite limited, and reflects a living process of evolution in the perfect system: this includes the appearance in the literary language of the new Kipchak form -yan, -mys as a poetic expressive device used in the prestigious literary tradition, and the colloquial-dialectal form -yp tur.

The analysis of the tense system in the Golden Horde's written sources demonstrates that this system,—along with stable fundamental components stemming from earlier stages in the development of Turkic languages that reflect, primarily, the Kara-Khanid Uighur language tradition,—in the new Volga areal, as with the declension system, experiences marked shifts towards inclusion of new, local regional Kipchak forms: -a, -a turur, -yan, -yb, -ybtur. Significantly, the language of certain written sources reflects different stages in this development (compare the language of NF and MN).

In the field of impersonal substantive forms, the absolutely dominant form is -maq, the synonym of which is -maya. The form -maq, which is characteristic of a number of Turkic languages, generally is typical of Turkic languages of the Eastern areal. Its use in literary sources is related, most probably, to the post–Kara-Khanid period, and first became widespread in the language of the Golden Horde and Chagatai written sources. Out of the nine sources analysed by us, only in the language of KS, MN, Gb, CC is the new substantive form -rya present. It functions more often as the supine, that is, it designates the goal of an action. Despite
its low frequency, this form is regional, typical of the language of the Volga region. Thus, in the analysed written sources, we see recorded the initial stage in the dispersal of this form among languages of the Volga region.

On the one hand, the linguistic analysis we conducted, which has important socio-linguistic content, allowed us to reveal the origins of the Old Tatar literary language. These origins, nourished by a continuous Turkic literary tradition, date back to the era of the Turkic and Uighur Khaganates. On the other hand, we defined the role played by the regional Kipchak koiné which, widely spread within the territory of the Golden Horde, critically influenced the old literary language; this eventually led to the formation of an early, regional literary language. Subsequently, the Tatar (in historiography, the pre-national period is referred to as Old Tatar) literary language developed intensively and was used mainly in the Tatar khanates. The fundamental system of the regional Old Tatar language remained Kipchak. Cultural, historical, and linguistic conditions in the Kazan, Astrakhan, and Siberian Khanates helped to preserve its traditional archaic features. In the Crimea, as the Ottoman Turkish language began to influence the fundamental grammatical forms of the literary language, southern Turkish traditional elements began to dominate to a great extent.

When, as a result of Muscovy's active international policy in the East, Tartar Khanates became part of Russia, a functional variation of the Old Tatar literary language used in official business or diplomacy continued to actively develop. F. Khisamova's detailed study of the language of numerous official documents related to diplomatic correspondence with the East, as well as examples of administrative documents within Russia, demonstrated that the fundamental language of Old Tatar business correspondence was rather close to spoken Tatar. Its dialectal basis was absolutely Tatar. That is why it was referred to everywhere at that time in the language of official business as 'Tatar writing', the 'Tatar language' [15, pp. 376–377]. This style originated in well-known yarliqs and charters belonging to the Golden Horde, Kazan and Crimean Khanates. And this tradition remained stable during the centuries that followed, due to the functional importance of the official business style as one form of diplomatic language and administrative correspondence. F. Khisamova demonstrated in her work that business correspondence in the 16–18th centuries extended far beyond the borders of Tatar settlements. As the language of Russian diplomacy, charters and letters in the Tatar language were sent to countries such as India, China, Iran, and Turkey. This written language was widely used in administrative correspondence not only in regions settled by Tatars but also, as the eastern borders of the Russian Empire expanded, in administrative centres such as Orenburg and Kizlyar. As a result of this, administrative correspondence with representatives of Turkic and even non–Turkic peoples like the Kumyks, Chechens, and Kabardians was conducted in the very same Tatar language. In most cases, scribes and translators were also selected from among Kazan Tatars. Correspondence with Nogais, Kazakhs, Karakalpaks, and the Uzbek Khanates was conducted in a similar way [15, p. 377]. The Old Tatar literary language, spreading beyond the Volga River region, influenced the formation of regional writing traditions in Siberia, the North Caucasus, Kazakhstan, and in other regions with a Turkic-speaking population. Addressing the function of the Old Tatar language in Kazakh Khanate offices, F. Faseyev paid special attention to this problem. While remaining Old Tatar-Turkic in its basic parameters, as early as in the 18th century, it reflected and adopted a number of Kazakh elements, such as names of local objects or phenomena, titles, terms, personal names, and placenames. Later in the 19th century, while enriching itself with Kazakh phonetic-lexical-grammatical elements, the Old Tatar administrative language gradually evolved into the language of Kazakh business correspondence, after which it was used in other fields, such as in print media, the recording of Kazakh folklore, in written poetry and textbooks ... By the end of the 19th century it had become, in essence, the old written Kazakh language. Thus, with the help of an earlier language—in this case, the Tatar
administrative language—a new written Turkic language was established. This is a common practise in the derivation of new Turkic literary languages’ [8, p. 37].

Thus, study of the language used in written sources belonging to the Golden Horde confirms that the literary language of the Horde, which was spread over a huge territory, is basically Kipchak; its structure differs remarkably from the preceding Kara-Khanid Uighur literary language. In the 16–18th centuries, the basic system of the regional Tatar language, which was a spin-off from the Kipchak literary language of the Golden Horde, remained relatively stable during its lifetime.

Abbreviated notations of the sources referenced in the text:


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§ 6. Literature of the Ulus of Jochi and the Post–Golden Horde Tatar Khanates

Khatip Minnegulov

The Turkic-Tatar verbal art goes back to ancient Turkic literary texts, such as runic inscriptions of the 7–10th centuries, the poem 'Kutudgu Bilig' (1069) by Yusuf Balasaguni, the famous 'Dictionary of Turkic Dialects' (Dīwān Lughāt al-Turk, 1072–1074) by Mahmud Kashgari, and the poetry of Ahmed Yasawi (died in 1166), Süleyman Bakırgani (died in 1186), Qol Ghali (1183–1230s), 'Qíssai Yosıf' (1233).

During its two hundred years of existence, the Golden Horde achieved considerable success not only in political, economic, and social affairs but also in spiritual matters. The centuries-old rich Turkic traditions, among them the Bulgar Khazar traditions, the prosperous cities, religious tolerance, and close ties with many states, especially Mamluk Egypt, contributed to
the development of literature in the Golden Horde [4, pp. 185–193]. But, unfortunately, many written sources of this period have been lost for various reasons.

The written sources of the Golden Horde that have come down to us are of different purposes and natures. Among them, we find dictionaries, epitaphs, official documents, khans’ yarliqs, scholarly treatises, religious works, travel accounts, works of fiction, and others. The overwhelming majority of them are written in the Turkic-Tatar language. There are works written in other languages. In particular, the first part of the ‘Codex Cumanicus’ dictionary (a copy from 1303) was written in the Kipchak (that is, Turkic-Tatar), Persian, and Latin languages. The poet Khwarizmi composed his poems both in Turkic and in Farsi. Theological works were also written in Turkic-Tatar, Arabic, and Persian. For example, the expansive theological treatise ‘Qalandar-name’ by Abu Bakr Qalandar, dedicated to Öz Beg Khan and Jani Beg Khan, was written in Persian [6]. It should be noted that well-known thinkers, poets, and travellers of the Muslim East, such as Kutbuddin ar-Razi, Sa’ad ad-Din Taftazani, Kamal Khujandi, and others, lived and worked in the city of Sarai for a number of years. In the travel notes of Ibn Battuta and Ibn Arabshah, there is interesting evidence regarding the spirituality of the Golden Horde and the high intellectual level of the scholars of Sarai. In particular, they mention competitions in writing mulammag poems in different languages (Turkic, Persian, and Arabic).

The literature of the Ulus of Jochi was created and developed not only in Golden Horde lands but also in Mamluk Egypt, since it was ruled by the Mamluks, who came from Desht-i Kipchak, from the mid-13th century until the early 16th century. The Nile and the Volga maintained close political, scholarly and cultural connections. Many scholars, pedagogues, and writers of the Golden Horde (Mahmud Sarai Gulistani, Saif Sarayi, Berke Fakih and others) emigrated to Egypt for various reasons and continued their careers there. It was in Mamluk Egypt, somewhat later, in early 16th century, that the famous poem ‘Turkic Shahnameh’ was written by Tatar Ghali Efendi, also known as Sharif Ghamidi.

The literature of the Golden Horde, on the one hand, continued the best traditions of the ancient Turkic and Bulgar verbal arts. The works by Yusuf Balasaguni, Ahmed Yasawi, Süleymen Bakurgani, Kul Gali, and other authors of the old Turkic poetry were honoured and highly valued there. On the other hand, the Turkic-Tatar literature of the Golden Horde era developed in close connection with the written culture of the Muslim East. The works of Ferdowsi, Ghazali, Nizami, Attar, Rumi, and especially Saadi were read in the original and in various translations and with various commentaries. Some buildings in Sarai were even decorated with verses from Saadi.

When speaking about literature from the Middle Ages, it is necessary to bear in mind that there were no clear-cut boundaries between works of verbal art and other kinds of written records, and they often overlapped. Thus, for instance, the poem ‘Nahj al-Faradis’ by Mahmud Bulgari (1358) combined aesthetics, education, and religious ethics.

The fictional works of the Golden Horde cover a variety of genres; they are ideologically and aesthetically rich, and have an elegant style and language. There are both original and translated works in prose, poetry, nazira (poetical answers), and other genres.

Turkic-Tatar authors wrote in the genres of hikayat, qissa, dastan, long poem, ghazal, qasida, rubai (quatrain), ode-madhia, elegy-marsiya, fable, and others. There is a poetic novel by Qub entitled ‘Khosrow and Shirin’. The voluminous works of Rabguzi, Mahmud Bulgari, and Saif Sarayi are considered to exemplify the so-called ‘box-composition’ genre. To execute their artistic concepts, the authors freely use folklore, mythology, religious and historical books, the literature of bygone ages and the realities of everyday life. A poem by Berke Fakih, for instance, depicts the fate of the author himself, his move from Desht-i Kipchak to Mamluk Egypt and the hardships of his life. Rabguzi uses stories and characters from the Quran and the works of Arab authors.
The poets and prose writers of the Golden Horde dealt with various questions concerning life and human existence. They took interest in moral and ethical issues, the meaning of life, the structure of society, the attitude of man to God, the relationships between rulers and their subjects, love, and others. Secular motifs frequently and naturally were intertwined with religious Sufi ideas. Morality, intellect, and knowledge are considered to be the main components of their aesthetic ideal. The meaning of life was to live and work for the benefit of other people and to leave a 'good name' after death.

Following is a brief description of the works of some of the most famous authors of the literature of the Golden Horde period.

**Burhaneddin Rabguzi** lived in the second half of the 13th to the first quarter of the 14th century in the eastern part of the Ulus of Jochi, in Khwarezm. He is famous for his book 'Qisas al-anbiya' ('The Tale of the Prophets', 1310), which was very popular among Turkic-Tatar readers. This voluminous work was first published in Kazan in 1859 and was re-released more than ten times. 'Qisas al-anbiya' contains various legends and tales about the prophets and their deeds, and affirms the norms and criteria of religious ethics.

The life and works of **Qutb** (born in 1297) were connected with the Volga region and, first of all, with Sarai. The only surviving copy of the poetic novel 'Khosrow and Shirin' (1342) is stored at the Bibliothèque nationale de France. In the latter half of the 20th century, it was published in Kazan and Warsaw. 'Khosrow and Shirin' is based on the work of the same name by Nizami. Its author extols the greatness of love in his poem, confirming the ideals of beauty and humanity.

For both Qutb and **Khwarezmi** (14th century), love is the main component of the ideal of a perfect human being ('kamil insan') and the most important criterion for assessing his morality. The main idea of Khwarezmi's long lyrical poem 'Muhabbat-name' ('Love Message', 1353) is that love gives meaning and purpose to a person's life. In his qasida, the poet emphasises the importance of a robust life and the immortality of poetry.

**Mahmud Bulgari** (Mahmud ibn Gali al-Bulgari as-Sarai al-Kerdari, 1297–1360) was born in the suburbs of the city of Bulgar. He spent most of his life in the capital of the Golden Horde, Sarai. There he died. Mahmud Bulgari was a very respected man of his time: he was a theologian, a teacher, and a writer. His work 'Nahj al-faradis' ('Path to the Gardens of Paradise, 1358) was one of the most popular books among the Tatars. There are numerous copies of this poem. The oldest copy was made in 1360 in Sarai.

'Nahj al-faradis' consists of four chapters (babs), each containing ten parts (fasl). The first two chapters tell of the life and actions of Prophet Muhammad, of his retinue and the first caliphs. The third chapter depicts the human qualities and actions that lead to God, while the final chapter is concerned with the actions that lead away from the Almighty. In his book, Bulgari quotes hadiths, commentaries on them, and numerous hikayat (tales). 'Nahj al-faradis' can be considered a manual on morality. The author affirms the ideas of kindness, fairness, generosity, and modesty, at the same time harshly criticising their opposites with the use of antithesis.

The dastan 'Jumjuma Sultan' by **Hisam Kyatib** (1369) is intensely focused on the question of time. From the opening lines, it starts with reflections on the 'vanity of life' and the brevity of human existence. In order to prove his thesis of the vanity of earthly life, the author lists the names of many legendary and historical characters. According to Hisam Kyatib, they all ruled the 'world', but in the end, had to leave all their 'riches, power, and life' behind and enter the other world. To illustrate this idea, the author relates the tale of Jumjuma. Typologically, his story resembles Dante's 'Divine Comedy' and 'The Epistle on the Angels' by Ma'arri. Hisam Kyatib believes that every person is responsible for their deeds and actions, and that the principle 'you reap what you sow' is universal for all. Like Mahmud Bulgari, Hisam Kyatib sympathised with the ideas of Sufism. The most important things for the Sufis are not riches or power but being content with little, spiritual progress and godliness.
The works of **Saif Sarayi**[5] are considered to be the culmination of the Turkic-Tatar literature of the Golden Horde period. Already in his lifetime, he was an acknowledged and famous poet. Here is what a contemporary of his wrote about him (in a literal translation):

'Where in the world can you find a (man) as intelligent as Sarayi Saif?!
Not knowing how to describe him, my heart bleeds,
If one can find a man who dislikes his verse,
This man is either dumb or has no soul in his body.'

Saif Sarayi (1321–1396) was born in the Tatar town of Qamishli in the Lower Volga region. He studied and started his literary career in Sarai, the capital of the Golden Horde, and emigrated to Mamluk Egypt in the 1380s.

The literary legacy of Saif Sarayi is known to us by only two manuscript copies: 'Quitabe Gulistan bit-Turki' and 'Yadgyarname'. The former was written in Mamluk Egypt in the late 14th century. Then it reached Holland via Turkey and Crimea, and is stored at present in Leiden University library (no. 1553).

'Quitabe Gulistan bit-Turki' is 373 pages long. Pages 3–356 contain 'Quitabe Gulistan bit-Turki', and the rest of the codex is comprised of poems of eight Turkic-Tatar poets (Mawlya Kazy Muhsin, Maulana Ishaq, Maulana Huja Malyavi, Gabdelmajid, Ahmad Hoja Sarai, Tugli Khoja, Khwarizmi and Hasan oglü) and the poetic responses to them (nazires) by Saif Sarayi. In addition, at the beginning and end of the manuscript, there are original poems, among them ghazals by Sarayi and other authors.

Another copy of Saif Sarayi's poems is 'Yadgyarname', also written in Mamluk Egypt. The manuscript was brought to Central Asia by a pilgrim in the 18th century. It has been known to the scholarly community since 1965 and is currently stored in the Suleyman Institute of the Manuscripts of the Uzbekistan Academy of Sciences (no. 311). The collection also includes the poem 'Suhail and Guldursun', some poems by Saif Sarayi, and lyrical poems by Ahmed Urgench, Maulana Ishaq, and Tugli Khoja. All previously known works by Saif Sarayi, that is, all texts of the collections 'Quitabe Gulistan bit-Turki' and 'Yadgyarname', including the poems by other authors, were edited by K. Minnegulov and published in the collection printed in 1999 in Kazan [7].

The works by Saif Sarayi that have come down to us are only a part of his literary legacy. The fate of the rest of his works is unknown.

Saif Sarayi's key work, 'Quitabe Gulistan bit-Turki' (1391, 'Turkic Gulistan'), by its structure may be classified among the works of the so-called 'box composition'. It has no overall plot or single topic. It consists of 180 hikayat, 18 nasikhat, 57 hikmet, and other compositions written in verse and in rhymed prose. 'Gulistan bit-Turki' has a 'box composition' because of the didactic purpose of the poem. Its author's aim is to give educational instructions concerning the main issues of life, everyday conduct, and morals.

The main part of 'Gulistan bit-Turki' is divided into thematic chapters: Chapter 1: on the life of rulers; 2: on the morals of the dervishes; 3: on the advantages of being content with little; 4: on the advantages of silence; 5: on love and youth; 6: on old age and feebleness, 7: on the role of education; and 8: on the rules of communication. Several pages of the book include traditional introductory and concluding parts.

'Gulistan bit-Turki' was based on the famous 'Gulistan' by Saadi (1258). A comparative analysis of the works of Persian and Turkic-Tatar authors demonstrates that Saif Sarayi, like his predecessor Qub, took a creative approach to the original, immersing himself in its imagery. As a result, 'Gulistan bit-Turki' became a key work of independent aesthetic importance and enriched the Turkic-Tatar verbal art with humanistic ideas and new artistic forms and images.

The naziras by Saif Sarayi are remarkable examples of lyrical poetry of the Golden Horde period. They served as a source of inspiration for other authors. For example, the medieval Turkic-Ottoman poet Ahmed Dagy created a nazira based on one of the ghazals of Saif Sarayi.
In the poem 'Suhail and Guldursun' (1394), Sarayi heralds humanistic ideals and denounces the injustice and despotism of contemporary society. The dastan starts with a depiction of the horrors of war. Then it tells about the difficult fate of Suhail, who was a prisoner of war. Guldursun, daughter of the victorious shah, falls in love with the prisoner, frees him, and runs away with him, leaving her father's house. But on the way, the girl dies of long hardships and thirst. In despair, Suhail stabs himself with a dagger.

The heroes of the poem are appealing due to their beauty, faithful love, and courage. Guldursun's deed is represented as brave and noble. In one beit (couplet), it is said that the girl, upon seeing Suhail for the first time, turned his way like the Earth that revolves around the Sun (Gönäş gärdendä yörgän misle Yir tik). This comparison, besides being creative and original, is also valuable from the scientific perspective. It confirms the idea of the Earth revolving around the Sun, long before Copernicus and Bruno.

The literary heritage of the talented poet of medieval Turkic-Tatar literature Saif Sarayi attracts the attention of literary critics, linguists, philologists, and orientalists from around the world with its humanist content, aesthetic value, and rich language. His legacy is explored in numerous articles and books in different languages.

Just like the dastan 'Suhail and Guldursun', the works of the blind poet Ahmed Urgenchi condemn Timur's violent politics. The poet calls him a 'villain' and 'blood-sucker' and reminds him of divine vengeance.

The lyrical poems by Ahmad Hoja Sarai, Maulana Ishaq, Mawlya Kazy Muhsin and other Golden Horde authors are known for their rich thoughts and feelings, perfect form and elegant poetic diction. There are other literary works of the Jochid period.

So, judging even by the small part of the Golden Horde's literary legacy that has come down to us, the literature of the Golden Horde covered a wide variety of genres and ideological themes and achieved artistic perfection. The literary and official language of the Golden Horde and the subsequent Tatar states was Old Tatar, also called Turkic-Tatar. The continuity of the Golden Horde traditions is especially visible in written language and literature. It must be noted that the language of Qutb, Mahmud Bulgari, Hisam Kyatib, Saif Sarayi, and some other Golden Horde authors differs little from the language of Muhammedyar (16th century), Mawla Qoly (17th century), Utyz Imyani (1754–1834), Gabdeljabbar Kandaly (1797–1860), Gabdulla Tuqay (1886–1913), and Derdemend (1859–1921).

**Literature of the Tatar khanates of the 15–18th centuries**

The verbal art of the Tatar khanates of the 15–18 centuries, which embraces more than three centuries, developed during a complex, controversial, and tragic period. After the Tatar khanates in the Volga region (Kazan and Astrakhan) fell, the people of the Crimean Khanate started to Osmanise, setting themselves apart from the uniform linguistic, cultural, and ethnic Tatar world.

Tatar verbal art of this period, as well as the period of the Golden Horde, was relatively uniform and indivisible. This literature was written and distributed in the same language, Old Tatar. The authors of the Volga region, especially those of Kazan, were definitely most influential in the literary tradition that was being created across the enormous territory of Eurasia. Muhammedyar described Kazan as a 'city full of poets'.

Another issue is that only a few of the works written in the 15–16th centuries have survived to present times. Our knowledge of the literature of some other Tatar khanates is particularly scant. Therefore, discussions about the literature of the Kazan Khanate period are incomplete and sometimes even fragmentary.

Tatar literature of the second half of the 15—first half of the 16th century is a direct heir and successor to the Golden Horde literary traditions, both in terms of language and its ideological, thematic, and poetic features. It is permeated with Muslim ideology and Sufi motifs and images. Like the literature of previous centuries, it is greatly influenced by Arab-Persian
and Turkic literatures. For example, Muhammedyar creatively employs plots and images from '1001 Nights', 'Kalila and Dimna', and works by Attar and Saadi. Medieval Tatar readers knew Arabic, Persian, and Turkic to varying degrees. Therefore, works by Oriental authors were popular in the Volga and Ural regions. They were read in the original, as well as in various translations and with commentaries. In particular, there is a translation of the famous collection 'Kalila and Dimna' that dates from this period. The literary, as well as written Tatar language of the Middle Ages borrows heavily from oriental languages.

The Tatar literature from the period of the Kazan Khanate contains works of different genres: poetry, prose, poems, dastans, ghazals, qasidas, satire, and humour. Some literary works combine motifs and styles of written and oral literature. In particular, the dastan 'Edigü' makes use of some achievements and the experience of centuries-old written poetry. Sharifi in 'Zafarnamai Vilayati Kazan' (1550), that is, 'The story of the victory of the Kazan state', frequently uses characteristically folkloric and literary devices to describe the defenders of Kazan.

Literary works of this period explore various questions of human existence and society. The topic of moral character is particularly predominant. For many writers, the ideal human is an enlightened, morally pure, educated, and religious person. Tatar literature also deals with social and philosophical issues. For example, according to Muhammedyar, one's happiness depends both on the social structure of the society and on the rulers. The 'Edigü' dastan clearly shows that selfish, personal interests undermine the foundation of a state. Some works can serve as a reliable source for studying the actual life of that period. In particular, Sharifi in his 'Zafarnamai Vilayati Kazan' describes the attack of Ivan IV on Kazan, the city's siege, and the battle between the Kazan people and the forces of the grand prince. It is important that the author was a participant in the events he describes. Muhammedyar's poem contains images of real historical figures of the time, such as Sahib Giray and others.

Poems by Hasan Kaigi, Dusmambet, Kautzg, and Chalgiz Zhirau are folkloric, reflective of epic story-telling traditions. They celebrate the nature of the motherland, and unity and friendship between people. These poets lived in Kazan, Lower Volga region, and on the Yaik river.

The Kazan khan Muhammad-Emin (1469–1518) in his poem 'Gyikab' ('Revenge'), like his predecessor poets Saif Sarayi and Ahmed Urgenchi, criticises the inhumane, aggressive politics of the Central Asian ruler Timur, who destroyed many cities of the Golden Horde and brought countless woes upon the Turko-Tatars. Many readers in the Tatar khanates enjoyed the romantic poems by Majlisi of Central Asia (15–16th centuries) about the sublime love of Saiful Mulook for Badi-ul-Jamal, and poems by Sayyadi about Tahir and Zuhra. Though it is not clear when and where these poems were written, they were copied and spread among the Turko-Tatars, becoming part of their own literature. Therefore, it is no surprise that the poem 'Kyissai Seyfulmulük' by Majlisi was one of the first secular books in the Tatar language, printed in Kazan in 1807. There are numerous folkloric and written versions of stories about Saiful Mulook and Badi-ul-Jamal, and about Tahir and Zuhra.

In the poems by Ummi Kamal (Ismagil) (the latter half of the 14th century–1475) a Sufi ascetic contemplates human perfection, the meaning of human life, and the relationship between life and death. According to him, all people are equal in the face of death. Death has the same power over a mighty shah and a slave. The works of this gifted poet had a great influence on the poetry of Qolşärif (16th century), Mawlya Qoly (17th century), S. Zaki (1821–1865), Derdemend (1859–1921), and that of other Tatar authors. His life was connected not only with the Volga region and Crimea but also with Anatolia, but copies of his works were widely distributed among the Kazan Tatars.

Qolşärif was a renowned poet and religious activist. He died a heroic death on 2 October 1552 defending Kazan. His emotional religious and philosophical poems were used as educational material for several centuries. The work 'Zafar-nama-i vilayet-i Kazan' ('The Story of
The Victory of the Kazan State'), written in the autumn of 1550, has come down to the present times. This prose work, with poetic lines dispersed throughout, was composed by Sharifi (Sharifi Hajjitarhani). Some scholars identify Sharifi as Qolsarif.

The author condemns wars of conquest, calling Ivan the Terrible 'conceited', a 'troublemaker', and a 'malefactor', and portrays the heroism of the city's defenders with admiration. Sharifi's works contain a poem that extols the beauty and historical role of Kazan:

*A wonder! This city of Kazan is a place of joy in the world,
There is no other city in the world that provides such shelter,
There is no other city in the world that blooms like Kazan,
One can always find food and drink in Kazan—the city of the Universe!
We have inherited our power from our ancestor khan,
This place on earth has always been a city of the khan,
the place for a khan's son.
Having sold his land and house, he will not pay his father's tax.
Why is this villain here? This is not Ivan's city!
Sharifi, do not leave this city as long as you believe in gazavat,
From this day forth, they shall proclaim him the lord of Kazan.*

Muhammedyar (1497–1549) was one of the last poets of the Kazan Khanate period. Only the two long poems 'Tukhfa-i Mardan' ('The Gift of Men', 1540) and 'Nuri Sodur' ('The Light of the Soul', 1542), and one short poem entitled 'Nasikhat' ('Admonition') are known from Muhammedyar's considerable literary legacy. They are all both lyric and epic in style, with didactic content, vividly depicting the author's innermost thoughts and feelings.

Like his predecessors, Muhammedyar dreamt of a just, enlightened ruler, putting great hopes in him. He believed that the inhabitants of the state needed to be well-mannered in order for peace and tranquility to reign in the state. That was the reason the author deliberately portrayed moral qualities and actions, telling didactic stories and examples from real life. The poet valued justice, compassion, generosity and loyalty above all. He evaluated people not by wealth, rank or religion but by their noble, humane actions. His ideas about society and man's role and place in the world are concordant with those of the great Renaissance thinkers, and the Western European utopianists of the Middle Ages.

Despite his diplomatic immunity, Muhammedyar, who worked as an interpreter in the Kazan Khanate delegation to Moscow, was brutally murdered on the order of Ivan IV. Another member of the same delegation, Adnash Hafiz, was turned into a slave [8, pp. 141–147]. In these hard times, Adnash Hafiz wrote the book 'Siradzhel-Kulyub' ('The Luminary of Hearts', 1554), which spread widely among the Tatars. According to V. Bartold and A. Shcherbak, a book of this title was initially written in Arabic and then translated into Farsi. There were Turkic versions of the work as well. Adnash Hafiz created his work on the basis of its multilingual texts and variants [2, pp. 100–104]. 'Siradzhel-Kulyub' uses some materials from the Quran, the Hadiths of the Prophet, and other texts. The book examines various religious and moral questions. The author places particular emphasis on the tremendous role of faith and knowledge in preserving the national mentality. In presenting his ideas, Adnash Hafiz often used dialogues, contrasts, stories, and didactic examples.

The works by Turkic-Tatar writers, regardless of the place they were written, spread across all Tatar khanates. The traditions of the spiritual culture of the Golden Horde, its language and literature lived on in the Crimean Khanate. At the same time, beginning in the mid-16th century, it experienced the growing influence of the Ottoman Empire. This was evident not only in the public and political spheres but also in language, literature, the arts, and in particular, music and dance. It is important to stress that a considerable number of documents of the material and spiritual culture have come down to us from the time of the Crimean Khanate.
There were about two hundred poets, scholars, and authors in the Crimean Khanate [1, p. 37]. Unfortunately, most of their works did not come down to the present or have not yet been found. So-called 'historical prose' comprises a significant portion of the written literature of the Crimean Khanate. Such prose includes the following works: 'A History of Khan Sahib Giray' by Badr ad-Din Muhammad bin Muhammad Kaisuni Zadeh Nidai efendi, known as Remmal Khoja (died in 1569); 'Chronicles of Desht-i Qipchaq' by Abdullah b. Rizwan (Abdi), composed around 1630s; 'Tarikh-i Islam–Giray Khan' (finished 1651) by Khoja Muhammad ('Senai', 'Kyrml'); 'A History of the Tatar Khans of Dagestan, Moscow, and the Peoples of Desht-i Kipchak' (mid-18th century) by Ibrahim b. Ali Kefevi (1736–1737); 'The Rose Bush of the Crimean Khans' by Halim Giray, and others.

Although such works are considered historical, they are also, to varying degrees, literary art. Their language and manner of narration often come close to a literary, figurative style. They include examples of rhyme, rhythmic prose, and poetic rhymes. In addition to depicting real events and acts, they describe fictional circumstances and legends as well. Some stories of the khans can be read as panegyrics. Therefore, such works can be conditionally considered historical literary works. In their structure and contents, they resemble books written in the Kasmov Khanate that were well-known to Tatar readers: 'Jami' al-tawarikh' (1602) by Kadir Ali Bek, 'Daftar-i Chinggis-name' (around 1679) by an unknown author from the Volga-Ural Region, and also 'Tawarikh-i Bulgariya' by Hisameddin Muslimi [9]. Such works by the Crimean and Volga Tatar authors feature an intertextual and, to some extent, eclectic type of narration. They include texts borrowed from works of previous authors, especially Zakariya al-Qazwini (1203–1283) and Rashid al-Din (1247–1318). It is worth noting that composing and writing literary works were highly respected in the Crimean Khanate. Even khans and high-ranking officials engaged in it [1, p. 25]. Some authors of the above-mentioned 'historical' works were also poets. In particular, Remnal Khoja wrote a medical treatise in verse.

The surviving written literature of the Crimean state comprises poetic and prosaic works of various genres, such as dastan, ghazal, rubai, qasida, madhia, marcia, name, munajat, hikayat, seyahatname (sefernama), shajara, yarliq, etc. This literature reflects upon various aspects of human life and existence, including moral, philosophical, social, political, and domestic issues, and, of course, the subject of love. As in other regions of the Muslim East, spirituality in the Crimean Khanate was greatly influenced by Sufism, especially 'Mesnevi' (a 'poetic encyclopedia of Sufism' of sorts) by the great Jalal al-Din Rumi (1207–1273). Besides the classics of Arab-Persian literature, works by Ottoman authors were widely popular in Crimea as well. Such works include 'Muhammadia' (1449) by Yazicioğlu (Çelebi), 'Iskander-name' (1390) by Ahmedi Girmiyani, 'The Birth of the Prophet' ('Mavlyuden-nâbi') by Süleyman Çelebi (d. 1422), travel notes by Evliya Çelebi (1611–1670), and others.

Many readers and listeners in Crimea enjoyed various versions and variants of common Turkic-Tatar dastans, such as 'Edigü', 'Tahir-Zuhra', 'Chura Batyr', etc. Alongside the above-mentioned authors of the Crimean Khanate, there were other respected writers, such as Jan-Muhammad (15th century), Mengli Giray (15th century), Mudani (d. 1540), Bakayi (d. 1591), Leila Bikech, Aşık Arif, and others. The greatest and most renowned of the poets of the Crimean Khanate was Aşık Umar (1621–1707). He was born and died in the city of Kezlev (present day Yevpatoria), but he travelled a lot and visited many places in the Ottoman Empire.

Aşık Umar was a gifted and highly professional poet, who left a rich literary heritage. He created magnificent pieces of verbal art within the general framework of traditional classical Oriental poetry, as well as 'ashyk' lyrics. His poems, written in the genres of ghazal, murabbag, koshma, qasida and rubai, feature heroes with feelings and emotions that are deep and sincere, clear and harmonious poetic structure, and an elegant and musical style. Aşık Umar's poignant poems accompanied troops during raids and battles, and were read by Sufi ascetics in their cells and by lovers. His works had a great influence on the works of later poets of the whole Turkic world.
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Despite the fall of the Tatar khanates and the very harsh colonial oppression, the traditions of ancient and medieval literature were continued by subsequent authors to varying degrees.


§ 7. Formation of the Historiographic Tradition

Elmira Sayfetdinova

Golden Horde's high spiritual culture, noted in literary sources written in the local dialect, proves one more time the postulate of existence of the Golden Horde written historiographic tradition. Recent historical notions which denied the mere existence of the Golden Horde historiography were based on the fact that all the works dating back to the Golden Horde period were preserved in oral tradition and had folklore features passed by word of mouth; and other works on the Golden Horde history were written after its fall and in adjacent regions. It must be pointed out, in this respect, that the history of the nation includes not only various aspects of formation and development of political, social and economic relations but also the diversity of the spiritual culture. The study of the traditional components of spirituality allows us to reproduce historical events in their various aspects, gives us the opportunity to analyse a unified cultural-historical process.

In this regard, the research on the formation of the Golden Horde historiographic tradition has increased significantly. Even though only a small fraction of the sources dating back to the Golden Horde have survived to this day, and the archives (provided that they existed) have been ruined, the literary tradition in the form of fictional, narrative works created during the Golden Horde period indicates a high level of the state by medieval standards. Although fragments of information occurring in these works do not provide a complete description of development of the medieval state, they still reflect many aspects of social and political life, as well as spiritual culture. Native researchers (M. Usmanov, D. Iskhakov, I. Mirtaleyev, E. Sayfetdinova) frequently mentioned that it would be rational to include Turkic historiographic sources in historical studies of the Golden Horde. They emphasised that the Golden Horde literature should be used not only as an additional or illustrative material but also as a main source in research work. Especially due to the fact that nowadays information contained in many foreign sources has been proved to have a number of factual errors, and its bad Russian translations often confuse modern scholars. Therefore, modern historians mostly refer to Turkic sources, focusing on them in their studies.

The Turkic works dating back to the Golden Horde period are significant, first of all, because they have revealed the path of civilisational development of the Golden Horde state, since existence of the written culture itself negates the idea that the Golden Horde was a union of nomadic tribes. Nomadic civilisations had no written languages. The only sources bearing information about the ancient Scythians, Cimmerians, Huns, Sarmatians, and other nomadic peoples were the works of authors who belonged to the so-called 'classical' civilisations: the Greeks, Romans, Chinese, and so on. It should be also noted that the study of the historical tradition of the Golden Horde is complicated by a lack of complete authentic historical works, which could be interpreted as historiosophical conception of the history of the Golden Horde.

Today, it is hard to tell exactly when and who initiated the Golden Horde historiography, but it is quite clear that its main goal was 'to confirm the hereditary rights in confrontation with other Chinggisid branches and to create arguments in favour of the exceptional and noble nature' [2, p. 654].

Particular attention should be paid to the works originating from the Golden Horde. One of them is the work written by Abu Bakr Qalandar ar-Rumi 'Qalandar-name' in 1320–1340, during the reign of Öz Beg Khan and Jani Beg Khan. The book has been recently introduced into scientific use [1], but we can already say that along with religious features, it contains historical information.

The literary works written during the Golden Horde period confirm the existence of a well-developed written culture within the territory of the Golden Horde. Most of the currently
known fictional works created during that period have plots that contain no historical data on the Golden Horde; however, they present information revealing the internal political history of the Golden Horde state. For example, the poem 'Khosrow and Shirin' by Qutb, written in the year 1342 and dedicated to Tini Beg Khan of the Golden Horde and his wife, has a number of interesting changes that Qutb introduces into history of Nizami. 'One of them was the social structure of the society lead by khan. First came all the beys, then the warriors (bahadurs), others were the rich, in the fourth place were the poor, followed by the indigents and countless slaves, and others in the end'. According to U. Schamiloglu 'they were the ulug-begs, the wives of the ruling nobility (khatuns), and the landowners who distributed wealth. These members of the elite were not mentioned in Nizami's original version, and their appearance in this version is unexpected' [9, p. 597].

The work 'Nahj al-Faradis' by Mahmud al-Bulgari, written in 1357 in the Golden Horde, along with other literary works, is interesting in terms of identifying the main sources and ideological and theological background of the various aspects of spiritual life of the Golden Horde society. Their creation was naturally caused by events which took place in social and political life of the Golden Horde. For example, with respect to Tengrism in the Golden Horde, the Turkic-renewed form of Islam was spread, which combined the features of different cultures, along with Tengrism elements as a relic form of the original religion of the ancient Turks and Mongols. Consequently, the tradition of using the epithet 'Tengri' became deeply rooted in the language of literary sources. Thus, the 'Turkic-Mongol tradition in the Islamic paradigm' [2, p. 655] became used a priori both in linguistic and literary traditions of the Golden Horde.

As for the texts which describe the history of Golden Horde, they mainly date back to the 15–14th centuries and were recreated based on the Golden Horde historiographic tradition filled with Islamic religious and political elements, symbols. The main source for them was an anonymous work 'Shajarat al-Atrak' (The genealogical tree of the Turks), which, in its turn, combines information about the ancestors of Chinggis Khan with a storyline about the history of the Oghuz, 'Oghuz-name' [6, pp. 80–91]. In the version of the 'Oghuz-name', the ancestors of Oghuz Khan are associated with the prophet Yafet (Yafes) and his father, the prophet Nûh (Noah). The problems of formation and development of Islamic hierolatry were relevant to the archaic traditional cults of the Central Asian population. D. DeWeese considered the Islamisation process of the Golden Horde, performed a detailed analysis of the historical tradition, folklore, and literature sources [10, pp. 321–516]. The character of Baba Tuklas was especially emphasised here, as he actually became a key figure in the 'final' decision of the Öz Beg Khan to choose Islam. The adaptation of the cult of Chinggis Khan under the new concept system associated with Islamic values was to play an important role This storyline was vividly described in 'Chinggis-name' by Ötemish Hajji. The work 'Chinggis-name' by Ötemish Hajji is known to many modern researchers, both native and foreign. It was written in the mid-16th century in the Turkic language with Arabic script within the Khiva Khanate, one of the hereditary khanates of the Golden Horde. Nowadays, it has been proven that 'Chinggis-name' by Ötemish Hajji was created involving written sources most likely based on the official Mongol genealogy of Chinggis Khan, the 'Altan Debter' ('The golden book') and the 'Jami' al-tawarikh' ('Compendium of chronicles') by Rashid al-Din. It is important to note that the version proposed by V. Yudin of Ötemish Hajji using the nomads' oral historical knowledge seems to be wrong, as the author himself mentions the 'chronicles of Dost Sultan' and 'entry belonging to Hazrat Dost Sultan', and other sources. Moreover, Ötemish Hajji mentions in his work names of the people who provided information for him: Ilbars Khan of the Shibanids, Shaikh Ahmed Khan—a descendant of Tuq-Timur Khan, referred to as the last ruler of the Great Horde—Haji Niyaz from Hajji Tarkhan, and Khitai Baba Ali, who was the big beg of Abd al-Karim Khan, the ruler
of the Astrakhan Khanate. Thus, the 'Chinggis-name' by Ötemish Hajji is a solid historical written source and may become proof that there was a systematic historiography in the Golden Horde [3, pp. 49–50].

The Tashkent manuscript called 'Chinggis-name' by Ötemish Hajji figured in historical research even before our time. However, this manuscript is incomplete and lacks a large layer of information dedicated to Chinggis Khan and the history of his conquests—this allowed some researchers (V. Yudin, I. Izmaylov) to believe that the Golden Horde tradition did not preserve the history of the 'golden dynasty', and Chinggis Khan was only portrayed as the one who passed parts of his lands to his son Jochi. However, another list of 'Chinggis-name' by Ötemish Hajji has been recently discovered; it is more complete and gives us more information about the transformation of the 'Chinggis Khan's golden dynasty'. 'Sain Khan's clan ended with Berdi Beg, father of Berdi Beg Jani Beg Khan is said to be deceased and pardoned, Allah sent his revelation to him and made paradise a resting place for him; merciful, sacred, highly regarded and esteemed by Allah and among the people, Jani Beg Khan, may he have mercy and forgivenss (from Allah—Author), his lord (effendi) al-Aqtab Sheikh and a representative of our epoch Sagidet-din Effendi, may they be forgiven. Jani Beg Khan from his father Öz Beg Khan, his father Tugrul, his father Mengü Temür Kul Khan and his father Tugan, his father Sain Khan, his father Jochi, his father Chinggis Khan, his father Sabuke bahadur, his father Berbiyan bahadir, his father Kubyl Khan, his father Tumen Khan, his father Baysulkyar, his father Kaidu Khan, his father Durt Khan, his father Badanju, his father Kiçi Märkän, his father Tugan Chulhan, his father Kara Maral, his father Kük Khan, his father Oğuz Khan, his father Kara Khan, his father Ålbabd Bakir, his father Yafät (Yafä), his father Nûh, may peace be with him' [7]20. When listing the genealogical tree, the Golden Horde Khan Jani Beg is lauded with adoring epithets that allow to believe that the source of this information may have been a work written in the Golden Horde during the reign of Jani Beg Khan, since no other khan received such praise. As an example, we can mention the above literary work written by the Golden Horde poet Qub and devoted to Jani Beg's brother, Tini Beg.

Next follows a quite detailed description of the history of Chinggis Khan's conquests and his family This manuscript has been held by Z. Togan and his pupils and has not been presented to the wider research community21. Thus, one of the peculiarities of Golden Horde historical tradition should be considered the inclusion of 'Mongol' ancestors of Chinggis Khan in the Islamic world and historiography. In this list of 'Chinggis-name', the author keeps a clear chronology of the history of Chinggis Khan, emphasising his noble origin and drawing attention to his uniqueness: 'The Supreme God gave him freedom from self-seeking and salvation as his fate was granted from heaven' [7]. In this version of 'Chinggis-name', much attention was paid to the description of the Chinggis Khan's conquests, while the history of Jochi Khan was outlined very briefly. 'Jochi Khan was the eldest of his sons. He [Chinggis Khan] gave [him] a big army and sent him to rule in Desht-i Kipchak, saying: "Let it be a pasture for your horses". He [also gave him] the vilayet of Khwarezm. When Jochi Khan rode to the vilayet of Desht-i Kipchak, he reached Ulug Tag, which is well-known. One day, when he was hunting in the mountains, he saw a herd of maral-kiyiks. He was following the herd, shooting arrows, fell off his horse, broke his neck, and died' [7]. Primary focus was made more on the history of Berke Khan and his descendants, who maintained Islam in their ulus. Further development of the Turkic historical tradition of the Ulus of Jochi takes place within this narrative paradigm. It was based on the genealogy of one of Jochi's descendants with a brief characteristic of previous
generations and a more detailed description of the khan’s biography (Jani Beg, Orda Ichen, Urus, Abu'l-Khayr, and others) or a noble karachibek (Mamai, Edigü) [2, p. 657]. The version of Chinggis Khan's first meeting with the sheikh Najmuddin-e Kubrā is interesting: it is believed that before the ancient city of Urgench had been captured, Chinggis Khan ordered Najmuddin-e Kubrā to appear before him and thus save himself, but the sheikh refused and replied: 'I have lived with them for 70 years. If I abandoned them, that would be cruel and cowardly'. The Sheikh's body was not found among the casualties [7].

Speaking of the formation of the Golden Horde historiography, the fact to be pointed out is that the list made by R. Fakhretdinov contains not only references to the 'Chronicles of Dost Sultan' known to researchers but also the 'History of the Mongols (Magul tavarixî)' [7], as well as the work 'Zafar-nama' [7]. Unfortunately, it is not quite clear which exactly 'Zafar-nama' was mentioned, since the author did not specify the name of the interpreter.

Formation of historiographic tradition came to be a significant stage in the development of the concept of the mental world view and unification of various Turkic peoples, and the cultivation of a Tatar ethno-political identification. Having achieved independence from the Mongol Empire, the Golden Horde obtained the necessary patronage for the creation and establishment of an independent state historical tradition. After the official adoption of Islam as a state religion, it even found support in the countries of the Islamic world, having absorbed new motifs and symbols. ‘Unlike a whole range of other Turkic states with a vague social structure and undeveloped state tradition, the Golden Horde power ideology (a peculiar "political theology") became a powerful burst of Turkic-Tatar self-consciousness. Its paradigm of ethno-political ideology turned out to be so authoritative that it consumed less adapted and weaker mythologems from previous epochs or absorbed them, partly developing them, and defined the further development of Turkic historical-political thought of late medieval Eurasian states and their peoples for many centuries. The 'Tatar historical tradition turned out to be so strong that after the collapse of the Golden Horde, it became an integral part of the local historical traditions of various Tatar states in the 15–18th centuries.' [2, p. 656].


§ 8. Multilingualism and Cultural Interactions in the Golden Horde

István Vásáry

The Mongol conquests resulted in the formation of the largest known Eurasian Empire by the middle of the 13th century. After Chinggis Khan's election as ruler of all the Mongol lands and the consolidation of Mongol tribes in 1206, Mongolia became the starting point for the advance of an army comprised of nomadic warriors that was essentially a military force of unprecedented power. By the 1260s (that is, over the course of only two generations), they had forged a vast empire that spread across the Eurasian continent from China to the Carpathians. For a long time, historical research focused mostly on the military events that occurred during the Mongol conquests, while most works emphasised the disastrous devastation caused by the Mongol invasion in virtually all Eurasian countries and communities. However, at a later point, there came an awareness that after the initial destruction, any invasion could produce a positive effect on a community by consolidating various peoples, languages, and cultures within a single political system. It can facilitate a political, economic, and cultural exchange between civilisations. World history witnessed such processes to occur in large empires of the Hellenistic period and in the Roman Empire. In Modern history, they were characteristic of the British and Russian Empires.

Over the past few decades, globalism and multiculturalism have given rise to a new approach, which juxtaposes contemporary events with their analogues from the past, for example, the Middle Ages. Naturally, this has sparked increased interest in the Mongol conquests and the epoch that has often been deemed the medieval antecedent of the modern globalism. In the 2nd edition of his remarkable monograph 'The Mongols' published in 2007, David Morgan found it necessary to extend the original edition published in 1986 with an additional chapter entitled 'The Mongol Empire since 1985' [33, pp. 181–206]. In that chapter, he indicates that research on the Mongol Empire has been changing spasmodically and provides a detailed bibliography. This question is discussed in a myriad of monographs and articles that are based on excellent scientific research, let alone some other impeccable works meant for a wider audience. Books about Chinggis Khan are ensured of success on the Western publishing market, despite the fact that such books have been published by the dozens in the recent years.


We will take into consideration the comparative studies mentioned in the article's title using the examples of two western Mongol states: the Golden Horde and the Ilkhanate on the

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territory of Iran. It appears sensible to immediately determine the time frame and geographical boundaries of our study. From the very beginning, the unity of the enormous empire that spanned from China to the Carpathian Basin was fictional, because Chinggis Khan himself and his successors, the Great Khans, who ruled the empire from headquarters in Mongolia, only consolidated its separate parts religiously and legally. Since the very beginning, those separate lands were ruled by Chinggis Khan's heirs, formally and legally subordinate to the Great Khan. However, after the death of Chinggis Khan's grandson, Mengü Khan (still recognised as the Great Khan in each individual ulus) in 1259, the empire effectively broke down into four parts in the course of a struggle for the throne between Arik Buka and Kublai Khan. The ruler of Mongolia and China in the East was the Great Khan Kublai, who soon transferred his throne from Mongolia to China and became the first Yuan Emperor, founding a dynasty of Mongol origin. The territory of present-day Central Asia (the whole Eastern and Western Turkestan) fell under the rule of Chinggis Khan's other son, Chagatai. After earlier Mongol invasions and raids, the ancestral territory of Iran (present-day Afghanistan, South Caucasus, and the lands of the Baghdad Caliphate in Mesopotamia) eventually came to be under the Mongol reign only in 1258 as a result of a gory conquest and destruction of Baghdad, and fell under the rule of Chinggis Khan's grandson Hulagu. Finally, in 1241–1242, after a military campaign in the West (known in Hungary as 'the Tatar invasion'), an empire stretching from Lake Balkhash to the Carpathian Basin across vast steppes was established. It was later named the Golden Horde in Russian and European specialised literature.

The first period of existence of both fragments of the Mongol Empire lasted for over a century. In the Golden Horde, it lasted until the death of Berdi Beg, the last Khan of Batu Khan's lineage, in 1359. As a result, representatives of another Chinggisid dynasty seized power after twenty years of struggle for the throne and anarchy, although further disintegration of the Golden Horde into the Khanate of Kazan, the Crimean Khanate, and the Great Horde occurred only in the 15th century. In Mongol Iran, Hulagu's successors, the Ilkhan dynasty, ruled until 1335. Then followed a period of anarchy that lasted for decades, until, finally, another Mongol dynasty, the Jalāyirids, came to power. They, however, did not belong to the Chinggisids. From the perspective described above, this work focuses on both Mongol states until the mid-14th century.

Naturally, the Mongolian language received the status of the official language in the territories conquered by the Mongol Empire: China, Central Asia, Iran, and the Golden Horde. However, one should keep in mind that in the early 13th century, the Mongolian script was still quite new as a means of meeting the administrative needs of the empire in the making. It is known that only the Uighurs of Turkestan had peacefully succumbed to Chinggis Khan in 1206. At the time, the Uighurs were the most civilised people of Inner Asia and had had their own script based on the Turkic language for a few centuries. The Mongols had adopted the Uighur script, and Uighur scribes had helped them adapt to the Mongolian language. The so-called Uighur Mongolian script has been in use in the Mongolian culture for eight centuries and survives to this day, although in Soviet times, it was almost completely superseded by the Cyrillic script. As early as in the 1240s, almost immediately after the Mongolian script had been introduced, there appeared the remarkable work 'The Secret History of the Mongols'. It was really discovered and studied only in the 20th century and to this day is a unique source of information on the Mongol conquests.

Although the Mongolian language and script had become the official means of communication in the empire, they would never replace or supersede local languages, since the empire formed as a result of the Mongol conquests was a multicultural entity, with the conquerors being a linguistic minority. It is no coincidence that 100–150 years later, the Mongolian language was practically extinct in the conquered territories, and its use was limited to the ancestral Mongolian lands (the Mongolian Plateau, along with Inner Mongolia in the territory of present-day China). The Mongols adopted a practical approach to both language issues and ideological
and religious ones. Although they considered their belief system and language a top priority, the Mongols never tried to assimilate alien cultures, unlike the monotheistic world religions with their proselytism or modern national movements. For them, recognition of the Mongols' political supremacy by the conquered peoples was enough, which, in turn, entailed a practical task of organising administration of the conquered lands in order to maintain their power and collect tributes. This vast empire that embraced numerous languages and cultures required qualified officials with a good command of several languages. This need created exceptional opportunities for interpreters and translators. People from various professions and trades were involved in such activities: merchants and diplomats, travellers and adventurers, as well as missionaries from different religions, officials and scribes from various chancelleries. According to Thomas Allsen's accurate remark, 'learning and knowing languages became a political credit in the Mongol period' [12, p. 35].

Similarly to the process of script creation, Uighur scribe-officials actively participated in the establishment of Mongol chancelleries across the whole empire. Their title, 'bakshi', was borrowed from the Uighur language into Mongolian. While there is no known document in the Mongolian language in the territory of the Golden Horde (we will later address the causes of this obvious absence of Mongol documents there), a lot of these documents from the Mongol Ilkans of Persia have survived. The earliest document can be traced to Abaqa Khan (1267); the latest, to the Jalāyirids (Shaikh Awais, 1372), a Mongol dynasty (but not Chinggisids). Several Mongol letters in a luxurious style addressed to Philippe le Bel, King of France, are noteworthy written sources that reflect the Ilkans' foreign policy. One of the letters, dated 1289, is from Ilkhan Argun; another, dated 1305, is from Ilkhan Öljetü. Öljetü's letter is of special interest, as Buscarello de Ghizolfi, a well-known Genoese adventurer, who served as an ambassador to several Ilkhans, made a Latin translation on its reverse side that also bore the Ilkhan's red seal.

However, the Mongolian language, represented in writing with the Uighur alphabet, was used in not only diplomatic correspondence but interior letters patent as well. A good example is the letters patent granted by Ilkhan Abu Said to Shaikh Badr ad-Din Abu Muhammad Mahmud in 720 AH/1320 in Soltaniyeh [17; 41].

Here one should briefly describe the symbols that verified documents in Mongol chancelleries, namely seals and 'certificate tables'. Both symbols used in Mongol chancelleries were clearly of Chinese origin and are a good example of the cultural influences during the Mongol period. The usage of seals in China can be traced to the earliest times (first records of seals date back to 554 BCE), and the whole Far East and South Asia adopted the practice from China. After the conquest of Northern China and, subsequently, the whole Zhōngguó, the Mongols also started using seals in their chancelleries. The seals were large (5–15 cm), rectangular, and red in colour. Chinese seals were used around the whole Mongol Empire; they even had inscriptions in Chinese on them. For example, a Chinese inscription is discernible in the seal borne by the letter from Ghazan Khan to Pope Boniface VIII [34].

In the first hundred years of the Golden Horde's existence, not one single seal (as well as Mongol documents) remained on its territory, but they can be found in abundance on all Ilkhan documents. Each document bears 5–6 seals on the paper edges glued together. Before 1316, only seals with Chinese inscriptions were in use; later the inscriptions were in the Uighur script, and after the spread of Islam, there appeared Arabic formulae. However, the rectangular shape and red colour remained unchanged. In the Golden Horde, seals are only found on later documents in the Turkic language, and the inscriptions are always in Arabic and in Kufic script. In the Mongolian and Turkic languages, the red Chinese seal was called al tamğa (both words in Mongolian are ancient borrowings from Turkic) [42].

Another Chinese invention adopted in the Mongol state is the 'paiza' [tablet] (baysa in Mongolian and Turkish, pāyza in Persian). It is a flat elongated rectangular tablet with rounded
edges made of metal (gold, silver, copper, bronze, or iron) and fairly large in size (25–30 cm long and 8–10 cm wide) that state officials or their authorised representatives carried on their chest or waist. Both sides of the paiza had inscriptions that were originally in the Mongolian language, unlike those on the seals. These tablets were always signed on behalf of the Khan and ensured free travel for their bearers around the whole empire, as well as free lodging, food, horses and carriages required for travel. One can say that the paiza was simultaneously a travel document, a letter of attorney, and a privilege in the whole territory of the empire [35]. Most frequently, the granting of letters patent was also accompanied by granting a 'paiza' that meant additional privileges, and this fact is always mentioned in the certificate for the former, for example, 'there were granted letters patent with red seals and a paiza'. In Mongol texts, the original Chinese word was rendered as gerege/gerige [18], while in the Turkish language it was never translated, the Chinese word was only adapted as baysa. Only a few paiza tablets survived in the territory of the Golden Horde, and all of them have the following Mongolian message written in the Uighur alphabet:

‘By the will of the eternal heavens, may the Khan's name be sacred. Edict by Khan XY. He who holds no faith therein shall be killed’ [42, p. 63].

Since the function of the paiza remained unchanged, unlike the Khans who granted them, the text on it retained this fixed formula. This explains the fact that the Turkish translation did not appear in the Golden Horde even later. Moreover, the Mongolian tradition in paiza inscriptions (the Mongolian language and Uighur Mongolian alphabet) survived both in the Golden Horde and Iran under the rule of the Hulaguids. The situation was different during the Yuan era (Chinese dynasty of Mongol ancestry in 1271–1368), where the Great Khan Kublai (ruled in 1260–1295) ordered to create a new official Mongolian state script for the empire, which was later developed by Drogön Chögyal Phagpa (1235–1280), a Tibetan monk at court. However, this so-called square script, the Drogön Chögyal Phagpa's script, turned out to be short-lived: its usage lasted for only about a hundred years and was limited to the eastern parts of the empire—China and Central Asia. The paiza shown here is contemporary with the Yuan dynasty and is an excellent illustration of the multilingualism and multiculturalism characteristic of the era: the inscriptions on it were made in two languages using three alphabets. The Mongolian text is represented in both the Uighur and Drogön Chögyal Phagpa's new script, while the Persian phrase, rendered in Arabic letters, demonstrates that the Persian language was used as a lingua franca throughout Asia and even in China.

In the western part of the Mongol Empire, that is, in the Golden Horde and the Ilkhanate, Mongolian-speaking conquerors had been a linguistic minority from day one. Despite the prestige that the Mongolian language enjoyed among the ruling class, the conquerors had to take into consideration the linguistic majorities in both uluses. They spoke various Turkic languages in the Golden Horde and Persian (Farsi) in Iran. However, in Iran it was also impossible to ignore the Turkic languages spoken by a considerable share of the population, as the Seljuqs, speaking Oghuz Turkic, had conquered Iran in the 11th century and made it the centre of their empire. In the 11–12th centuries, new waves of Turkic tribes would constantly arrive and settle there (first of all, the Oghuz and Turkmen).

The Mongolian script was formed with the aid of Uighur Turks after the first conquests in the 1220s, whereas the Turkic script had already had a centuries-long tradition. The runic Turkic script appeared in the 6th century, and the Uighur alphabet in the 8th century. Both remained in active use: there exist runic Turkic texts dating back to the 6–10th centuries, while the Uighur script virtually outlived the Mongol period and was used in Eastern Turkestan until the 17th century. Simultaneously, for the purposes of our subject, it is more essential that for the two centuries preceding the Mongol conquest (1000–1200), as Islam kept spreading to the East, the
Islamic Turkic script that combined elements of the Arabic and old Uighur alphabet permeated the territory of Central Asia that was under the rule of the Turkic Karakhanid dynasty.

The Mongol conquests introduced drastic changes to the ethnic boundaries in Inner Asia and fostered the formation of new centres of the Islamic Turkic writing. One such centre was Khwarezm, which fell under the rule of the Golden Horde for a century. There appeared and thrived a new Islamic Turkic literary language called the Khwarezmian Turkic language in modern Turkology (to a great extent, owing to the studies of Janos Ekman, a Hungarian scholar). The Khwarezmian Turkic language is not a direct continuation of the literary language of the Karakhanids but a new 'blend' of Central Asian Turkic languages. The greatest difference separating it from the Karakhanid language is its vocabulary, as it uniquely combines lexical elements of the Oghuz and Kipchak languages. One should note that both the Karakhanid and Khwarezmian written records reflect the literary norm and give no idea of the contemporary colloquial language. Unlike them, grammars and lexicons of the Kipchak Mamluks was also composed in Arabic in Egypt in the 13–14th centuries, as well as the unique written source Codex Cumanicus, at present kept in Venice, give a credible account of the language spoken by the north-eastern Turks, that is, Kipchaks. By that time, the Kipchak or Cuman-Kipchak dialects had already been spoken throughout Eastern Europe for two centuries. On the other hand, from the 9th century, the mid-Volga region had been inhabited by Bulgar Turks, who were later subjected to Islamisation (in the 10th century). However, only a few written sources representing their relatively uncommon Turkic script have survived to this day.

So, in the Ulus of Jochi that we call the Golden Horde during the Mongol conquests of 1236–1241, the majority of the population spoke Kipchak Turkic (and, to a smaller extent, Bulgar Turkic) dialect, while the Tatars or Mongols, being a minority, came to be linguistically dissolved in the Turkic environment of the Polovtsian steppe (Dašt-i Qipčaq). Al-Omari, an Egyptian Mamluk (died 749 AH/1348–1349), clearly states that the Tatars (surely meaning the Mongol conquerors) completely merged into the Kipchak people [13]. We can assume that two generations after Batu Khan's conquests, that is, by the 1280s (the last years of Khan Mengü Temüür's rule), the Mongolian language was completely out of use in the territory of the Golden Horde. We will revisit this noteworthy question later: why did the Mongolian language become obsolete so rapidly in that region but survive much longer both in the official and everyday usage in the Ilkhanate? Thus, as mentioned before, there are practically no Mongol texts from the Golden Horde territory surviving to this day, except for brief formulaic texts on paiza tablets. This provokes the question whether the Mongolian language had ever been used in the chancelleries of the Golden Horde.

According to S. Zakirov, A. Grigoryev, and others, it is certain that in the administration, the Mongolian language had an official status and was obligatory, and Turkic translations appeared later [8, pp. 65, 98, 100, 102; 5]. M. Usmanov believes that from the very beginning, the official language of the Golden Horde was Turkic, which was also used for correspondence with the Egyptian Mamluk state [10, pp. 94–101]. This question cannot be answered on the basis of information available at present, since there is not a single original document from the first 130 years of the Golden Horde's existence surviving to this day. The first original is the

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24 Substantial information on all these Turkic scripts is presented in the two-volume work Philologiae Turcicae Fundamenta (I–II) [37]. R. Dankov [19] wrote about the Karakhanid literature. In his study, Dankov convincingly proves that the dictionary composed by Mahmud Kashgari (1072–1074), Divan Lughāt al-Turk, and Qutadḏu Bilig, a poetic work by Yusuf Khass Hajib of Balasaghun (1069), were of great importance for the creation of the Islamic Turkic (Arabic) script. However, after the Mongol era, the Turkic script followed a different path, so the literary language of the Timurids and Western Turks (the Ottomans and Azeri Turks) cannot be regarded as direct continuation of the Karakhanid literary language.

25 There is one exception; for details, see [9, pp. 81–87].
yarliq given by Toktamys Khan to Hajji Bey of Crimea, dated 782 AH/1381 [7, pp. 2, 13–15]. Instead of that, we have Russian, Latin, and Italian translations made in the 13–14th centuries that allow us to draw reliable and essential conclusions on the linguistic aspects of the documents that were later lost. The medieval Russian church preserved the Russian translations of khans' letters patent by which khans of the Golden Horde had granted it some tax privileges. Latin and Italian translations date back to the 14th century and describe the privileges enjoyed by two Italian colonies in Crimea, the Venetian Tana and Genoese Kaffa. These precious documents are kept in the archives of Venice and Genoa [20; 21; 6]. A thorough linguistic analysis of the documents clearly shows that the translations were made from Turkic originals [3], but it only means that the Turkic language was used in the chancelleries of the Golden Horde in the 14th century. There exists a single earlier Russian translation of the letters patent granted to Metropolitan Kirill by Khan Mengü Temür, which was made in 1267, but this brief translation is not enough to base on it any conclusions regarding its source language. Nevertheless, one cannot exclude the possibility that over the first decades of the Golden Horde's existence, its document flow was in the Mongolian language, but it soon came out of use and was replaced by the language spoken by the Turkic majority. In any case, by the late 13th century, local languages had also started being used for official purposes in various parts of the Mongol Empire (such as Iran). At the same time, the practice of using the Mongolian language in documents lasted until the 1360s, when the Mongol elite was likely to have stopped speaking Mongolian long ago (for example, there was a charter issued in Mongolian in Iran as late as in 1358).

All these facts take us back to the question asked above: why was the Mongolian language replaced by the Turkic language so quickly in the Golden Horde, while it stayed in use for so long in Iran? There is no definite answer to the question; however, it will not be far from the truth if we assume that the closeness of the Mongol and Turkic cultures was the most essential factor in it. The Turkic peoples conquered by the Mongols belonged to the nomadic tribal world that had determined the history of Inner Asia since the times of the Asian Huns (xiongnu). There are numerous instances of Turkic tribes switching to the Mongolian language and Mongol tribes, to the Turkic language. In these instances, a shift in language was not accompanied by a shift in culture, since the economic, social, religious, and cultural roots of the Turkic people and Mongols were extremely close. The Turkisation of the Mongol ethnic group in the Golden Horde occurred simply and quickly and only took one and a half or two generations. However, in Iran, where the Mongol elite clashed with a millennium-long Iranian culture and language, assimilation had a significantly slower pace. This also precipitated the weakening of the Mongol ethnic identity in Iran and eventually resulted in its complete loss after the adoption of Islam at the turn of the 14th century.

Further on, we will consider the phenomenon that has not been given due attention before. It is the fact that in the Mongol period, there was a significant share of Turkic population in Iran, who could play an intermediary role between the Mongol and Iranian cultures. As is known, since the 11th century, after the Seljuq conquests, Turkic tribes would constantly arrive

26 The original is kept in the Institute of Oriental Manuscripts of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IOM RAS), D–222.
27 For information on the traces of the Turkic original in khans' yarliqs given to the Russian clergy, see: [4].
29 The assumption that the Mongols were more 'alien' by their language in Iran than the Mongol rulers in the Golden Horde, whose subjects were generally Turks, was first made by M. Usmanov [10, pp. 100–101].
Chapter VII. The Civilisation of the Golden Horde

and settle in Iran. The Seljuqs, Oghuz, and Turkmen people spoke languages and dialects that belong to the south-eastern branch of the Turkic languages, which later served as the foundation for the Anatolian, Ottoman, and Azerbaijani scripts. The Central Asian Seljuqs conquered Iran while already being Muslims. Even though they seized political power, they had already been conquered by the Iranian civilisation culturally, as they adopted and supported all elements of its language and culture. This means that before the Mongol period, there were no Turkic texts in the territory of Iran, despite a great number of Turkic people who lived there and played a crucial role in the military forces. As shown above, the Mongolian script appears there during the Mongol period; it is noteworthy that soon there also appear a small number of Turkic texts. The Mongolian script and chancellery practices were forged by Uighurs and introduced by Uighur officials and scribes (bitikçi and bahşï). Uighurs used the eastern Turkic literary language, which later partially inspired the Islamic Turkic script of the Karakhanid dynasty Islamised in the 11th century. It is no coincidence that the first written Turkic documents in the Iranian territory, contemporary with the Ilkhan rule, are connected with the work of Mongol chancelleries.

It appears sensible to demonstrate such a document here in order to illustrate the general principles used for composition of brief Turkic texts. The charter was issued by Amir Hussein, one of the main emirs of Oljaitü Khan and vicegerent in the ruler's lands (Mongolian incü), in 1305. The contents of the charter concern property in the provinces of Tabriz and Ardabil [27, pp. 84–89 (Tables 25–35); 24]. The charter is a vivid example of multiculturalism that dominated the post-Mongol states in the 13–14th centuries. The charter is in Persian, and the main seal at the end of the document contains a Mongolian inscription in Uighur script (Üseyin-ü gerige belge, 'Verified and sealed by Hussein'). The ruler's rectangular seals used for glued elements contain Chinese inscriptions. Finally, on the reverse side of the charter there is a brief (five lines) inscription in an Eastern Turkic language made in Uighur script that gives a summary of the Persian document.

It is noteworthy that Turkic inscriptions appeared not only as a result of Mongol chancelleries operating but independently of them as well. A unique written source is, for example, a Turkic inscription in the Syrian Catholic Monastery of Mar Behnam, located 30 kilometers south-west of Mosul, in the proximity of the Ruins of Nineveh. Researchers have not given enough attention to it before. A short period of Ilkhan Baydu's reign in 1295 stirred hope among the Christian population, which was broken when Ghazan Khan came to power and established the ultimate supremacy of Islam. Baydu Khan had made an attempt to oppose the spread of Islam, which earned him praise from Bar Hebraeus, a Syrian historian, and gave grounds for Marco Polo and Hethum (Hayton), an Armenian historian, to consider him a Christian. When the khan visited the Monastery of Mar Behnam, he reinstated its proprietary rights previously taken away by the Mongols, which was celebrated by a long Syrianic and a brief Turkic inscriptions [40, p. 219; 26]. The text of the brief inscription in Turkic is as follows:

Qïdïr Aliyas-ñïng qut-ï alqïš-ï ilqan-qa bäg-lär qatun-lar-qa qon-zun ornaš-zun 'May the Ilkhan, noble men and women be blessed by Khidr Ilyas and live in bliss'.

What makes the inscription and comments on charters made in Turkic so remarkable? First of all, they prove that Uighur scribes worked in Iranian Ilkhans' chancelleries and that, probably, most Mongol charters were made there. Second, the Turkic language used by Uighur scribes was a version of the Eastern Turkic literary language rather than the one spoken by the Oghuz people residing in Iran. The latter developed into an individual literary language of the Iranian Turks only after the Mongol period. It is commonly referred to as the Azerbaijani or Iranian Turkic language (Türki-yi Acemi).

The picture of the inscription in Uighur script has not been published in either Harrak and Niu's article [26] or any other sources, for which reason we intend to publish soon our pictures that were taken on-site in spring 2002, before the Iraq War.
Two more noteworthy phenomena are indicative of the influence of the Mongol period on Iran and lasted for a long time following the 13–14th centuries. One of them concerns the formulas used in official documents. The formulas used in Mongol charters had an Uighur basis, an example of which can be well-known introductory phrases in khans' yarliqs meant to express the khan's orders. The phrase üge manu, 'by my word', in Turkic sounded like sözüm(üz). If the charter was granted not by the ruler but by a high-level official, a different formula was used: 'By X's (the khan's name) command, by Y's (high-level official) word'. For example, a charter issued on 13 April 1321 (721 rabī‘ I 14) reads as follows: Abū Sā‘īd Bahādur ḥān yarlığindïn, Čoban sözii, 'By Abu Said's command, by Choban's word' [27, p. 90]. This formula had become so widely used in official documents that the phrase sözüm(üz) was found in charters in Persian for a long time after the disappearance of Mongol chancelleries, in the times of the Kara Koyunlu (1375–1468), Ak Koyunlu (1378–1508) and Timurid (1370–1506) dynasties, up to the late 15th century [15, pp. 30–31, 148, 151, 154, 162, 171; 25, pp. 64, 72].

Another excellent illustration of the East Turkic influence is the application of the twelve-year animal calendar. The Uighurs were acquainted with the zodiac calendar of Chinese origin as early as the 8th century. The Mongols borrowed the Turkic version of the Chinese calendar from the Uighurs and implemented it in all the conquered territories [14, pp. 209–357, 385–412]. The introduction and application of the Chinese Uighur calendar in Iran was a sign of Mongolian sovereignty and a manifestation of the fact that Iran's new rulers had not come from beyond the boundaries of Islamic learnedness but had brought their share of knowledge from the Far East. The names for the twelve years of the animal cycle were translated into the Mongolian language and used alongside Turkic names. For example, a historical work by Rashid al-Din mentions the names of the years of the twelve-year animal calendar 54 times: 26 in the Turkic language; 34 times in Mongolian; in 13 cases it is impossible to determine if the name is of Turkic or Mongolian origin because it has the same form in both languages (for example, lu, 'dragon'). However, the names of months were only used in the Turkic form. After the Mongol period, Turkic and Mongolian names for the animal years of the calendar were preserved but were used less frequently. They were indicated alongside the Hijrah dates on a regular basis until the end of the Qājār dynasty (1781–1925) [31].

The presence of Turkic elements in Iran's Mongol chancelleries and introduction of the twelve-year animal calendar provide confirmation that Mongolian sovereignty in a number of cases enhanced the status of the Turkic culture in Iran (including Azerbaijan and Eastern Anatolia). It is no coincidence that in the 14th century, after the adoption of Islam, most Iranian Mongols merged with culturally similar Turks rather than Persians. The Mongol conquest did not bring to an end the Turkic period in Iran, which had begun with the Seljuqs' rule. On the contrary, after the Mongol period (1257–1335), Turkic influence kept gaining strength until the end of the Qājār dynasty in 1925.

Due to the Islamisation initiated by Ghazan Khan, the Mongolian language was superseded not only in chancelleries but in everyday usage as well, and by the 14th century, once revered language had completely disappeared, having left a large chunk of borrowings in Persian, which is described in detail in the first volume of G. Doerfer's monograph [23]. In a recent article focusing on changes in Middle Eastern languages within a broad context, P. Martinez pointed out an extremely interesting linguistic phenomenon. Martinez believes that numerous Mongolian (and Turkic) words appeared in the Persian jargon, which is an unambiguous indication of the downgrading social status of the Mongolian language caused by the weakening of the Mongolian sovereignty. Later on, these words came to be associated with a below-standard speaking style. The initial stage of the process is reflected in a famous Persian poem by Pur Bach (died circa 1284), where the author recreates an exotic atmosphere of the passing epoch of the conquerors by using Mongolian and Turkic words to excess [32].
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Coins from both states and the inscriptions on them also represent excellent material for the study of cultural and linguistic differences. Usage of the official Mongolian language was not limited to chancelleries: both the Horde khans and ilkhans, and later the Jalāyirids issued coins with inscriptions in Mongolian done in the Uighur script. Let us consider two examples from the Golden Horde. The first is Tole-Buk Khan's (686–689 AH/1287–1290) undated coins minted in Qirim (Qïrïm), an ancient Crimean capital, that have the khan's name in Uighur script on one side. The other is Toktu Khan's silver dirham minted in 710 AH/1310–1311 in Sarai, the capital of the Golden Horde (Sarai al-Mahrusa). On one of the coin's sides, Tokhtu Khan's name in its Mongolian form (Toqtaγa) is written in the Uighur script.

On the coins of Iranian Ilkhans (from Abaqa to Ghazan Khan), there is a long Mongolian text according to the following Mongolian formula: Qaγan-u nereber (XY) deleğegülïg-sen, 'coined by XY on behalf of the khagan'. Let us consider the example of a silver coin with the name of Baydu Khan, who ruled for only half a year in 1295. The coin was struck in Tabriz, the Ilkhanid capital, and has the khan's name on one side in the following manner: Qaγan-u nereber Baydu-yin deleğegülïg-sen, 'coined by Baydu on behalf of the khagan', with Baydu's name in Arabic letters below; the reverse side contains the Shahadah, the Islamic declaration of faith, in Arabic: lâ ilâha illâ'llâhu Muḥammad rasûlullâhi, 'There is no God but Allah, and Muhammad is his Prophet'.

After Ghazan's adoption of Islam and his extensive reforms (1301), the Mongolian manner disappeared from the coins. Both in the Golden Horde and Ilkhanid Iran, Arabic formulae characteristic of Islamic coins tends to occupy increasingly large areas of the coins' surface, while in the 14th century, only the khan's name was (or was not) given in Uighur script next to the Arabic version.

The background for the linguistic and cultural phenomena that we have been discussing above is formed by religious and legal aspects, which determine elements of belief systems and world perception. In conclusion, we cannot proceed further without at least a short summary of these phenomena. When the Mongols appeared on the historical scene, Islam tended to be the dominant religion in the Central Asian and Middle Eastern territories conquered by them. Moreover, in the centuries preceding the 13th century, Islamic civilisation had enjoyed its first thriving period. Islam is a triumphant world view, a religion that aims for victory in this world. Muslims can maintain their well-being and generally view their existence only as state-forming and dominating peoples. Although Christians and Hebrews enjoyed relative autonomy in the conquered Middle Eastern and Spanish territories, they were considered as second class subjects. For this reason, it was so difficult for Muslims to accept the fact that barbarians and Mongol pagans had seized and destroyed Baghdad, the caliphate capital, in 1258, bringing practically all the Muslim population under subjection. In the few territories that were not conquered by the Mongols, such as the Mamluk state or India, Islamic authors (Ibn Taymiyyah in Syria and Juzjani in India) condemned the Mongols' barbarian conquests, their religion, and legal system and considered the Yasa code incompatible with Sharia laws. Naturally, it was impossible to ignore the new power in the Islamic territories conquered by the Mongols, and in the 13–14th centuries, two high-profile Persian historians, Juvayni and Rashid al-Din, were already apologists for the Mongol rulers, trying to reconcile Islam and Mongolian sovereignty both in their hearts and their works. However, it did not take a long time: after only two or three generations, the beginning of the 13th century saw the completion of a well-known process given a classical definition by Horace, who described relations between Romans and Greeks:

33 For more information on these written sources, see Ömer Diler's book [22], and the following Internet database: www.zeno.ru.
34 http://www.zeno.ru/showphoto.php?photo=28685
'Greece, the captive, made her savage victor captive, and brought the arts into rustic Latium'.

Simply put, the Chinggisids and the Mongol nobility converted to Islam and from that moment displayed their military talents in the name and defence of Islam. Islam became the official religion of Iran in the late 13th century, following Ghazan Khan's conversion; in the Golden Horde, after Berke's (1257–1266) and other khans' failed attempts, it gained this status only under Öz Beg Khan's rule (1313–1341). This gap between the Golden Horde and Iran can be explained by the fact that the majority of the Turkic population conquered by the Horde (except the territories inhabited by the Volga Bulgars) had not been or had only been slightly exposed to Islamisation. On the other hand, in Iran Islam had been an integral part of the Islamic civilisation for centuries due to both the Persian and newly arrived Oghuz Turkic population. For this reason, the cultural and religious assimilation of the conquerors, who were a minority, occurred at a quicker pace. However, while the Mongols converted to Islam, they did not and would not abandon many traditions and customs of their ancestors for a long time. They preserved the essential elements of Yasa, a religious and legal system of the Mongols consecrated by its founder, Chinggis Khan. First of all, the so-called 'Golden Lineage' (altan uruγ) of Chinggis Khan's descendants preserved their ambitions of world domination for a long time even after the fall of the successor Mongol states in the 14th century. In Islamic Central Asia, from the Kazakh steppe to Bukhara, Khiva, and Kokand, primary political legitimisation, that is, the right to reign granted by a superior, was provided by Chinggis Khan's descendants, now Turks and Muslims, up to the partial and subsequent complete absorption of these lands by Russia in the 19th century.
37. Philologiae Turcicae Fundamenta (I–II).
Chapter VIII.
Economy, Crafts, and Trade

§ 1. The Nomadic Population of the Ulus of Jochi

Vladimir Ivanov

The ethnocultural processes in the steppes of Eastern Europe stabilised at the beginning of the 13th century. The steppes of the Southern Urals were part of the eastern periphery of the Desht-i Kipchak—the Cuman Field. It was a periphery since there is scarce archaeological evidence that the Kipchak-Cumans stayed in the area [13]. Volga Bulgaria lay to the north; in turn, it bordered the nomadic Ugrians in the east. The Bulgars continued to actively explore the Kama trade route, creating their fortress-trading posts in the forest-covered Kama region [2, pp. 395-407]. The nomadic Ugrians, displaced from the Ural steppes by the Sary-Kipchak-Cuman peoples, adapted to the forest-steppe landscapes of the Western Urals.

The western part of the Volga Desht-i Kipchak had its own 'internal disputes': The Konchakoviches asserted their authority in the Polovtsian steppe by fighting their rivals, the Sharrukanids, thus bringing relative calm to the Rus' [25, pp. 91–92]. This was so important for both parties (the system of 'chieftdom' in the Polovtsian steppe, traditional and clear to the Russian princes, was collapsing [26, pp. 78–89]) that the campaign, undertaken by Subutai Bahatur in 1223, as disastrous as it was for both ethnopolitical structures, failed to lead to any lasting conclusions after the tragedy on the Kalka River in regards to joining forces in the face of the impending danger. They did not even see it coming. On the contrary, the Cumans were to blame... [12, p. 164].

The realisation of the danger came later when it was too late. Let us review the words of the founder of domestic 'Golden Horde Studies', G. Fedorov-Davydov: 'The Mongol invasion finds the Polovtsian steppe torn by internal strife and rivalry between individual princes and tribal leaders...' [28, p. 230]. The conquered territories were regarded by Mongolian feudal lords as their yurts or nutugs [29, p. 44], in which the presence of 'unnecessary' people, even the subdued Cumans ('slaves'), was undesirable, while the population that dwelt in these areas—such as the Unagan-Bohol clans—became dependent on the conquerors. They had to live in these conditions—not where they would like but where they were prescribed to by the new rulers. As an example, G. Fedorov-Davydov names the burial mounds of nomads in the Lower Volga region in the 13–14th centuries: their morphological characteristics suggest the migrations of the Chorni Klobuky from Porosye to the Volga region [28, pp. 237–241].

The archaeological sites of the Golden Horde nomads (1,180 burials recorded by the author) are comprised of underground burials or, in rare cases, under-stone mounds that were made up of a stone-earth mound—a stone lining ('shell') around an earth mound and a stone fence around the grave. The mound contains one burial (very rarely, two), among which there are inlets in the earlier mound and—even more rarely—moundless (ground) burial sites; some ground mounds contain traces of fires, different animal bones, and fragments of pottery (funeral feast signs?).

Since, as mentioned above, the Golden Horde administrative system was based on uluses—people and nomads, given into ownership, who roamed in a specific area of a yurt or nutug—researchers take the words of Giovanni da Pian del Carpine (1245) as a basis regarding the Golden Horde's territorial-administrative divisions into the following uluses: on the right
bank of the Lower Dnieper (closer to Rus'), the ulus of Korents—evidently, Batu Khan's nephew; on the left bank ('the other side of the steppe'), the ulus of Mochi, one of Chagatai's sons [19, p. 128]. In the lower reaches of the Don, the ulus of Batu Khan's son-in-law, Kartan; and in the area of the Don–Volga interfluve, the ulus of Sartaq, Batu's son. The Volga region was the khan's ulus, while the stepspe in the Volga–Ural interfluve belonged to a Jochid whose name was not preserved.' However, Giovanni da Pian del Carpine wrote that it was two tysiachniks (commanders of thousands) who roamed both banks of the Ural (Jaec) River. Finally, the 'Southern Cis–Urals and Western Siberia steppe up to the Irtysh River belonged to Shayban, the son of Jochi, as well as his immediate descendants' [19, p. 129].

1,180 nomadic burial sites of the 13–14th centuries have been discovered and studied in these areas. They can be divided into 8 territorial and typological groups: Cis–Ural (234 burials), Lower Volga (207 burials), Middle Volga (162 burials), Volga–Don interfluve (110 burials), North Caucasian (77 burials), Don (91 burials), Left-bank Ukraine, including Crimea (95 burials), and Right-bank Ukraine (71 burials). If you compare them with the uluses designated by Giovanni da Pian del Carpine, the following matches are observed (see Table. 1), reflecting the division of the Golden Horde into the uluses fixed by the medieval traveller.

Table 1

<table>
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<th>No.</th>
<th>Ulus (according to Giovanni da Pian del Carpine)</th>
<th>Local group</th>
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<td>1</td>
<td>Korents</td>
<td>Right-bank Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Mochi</td>
<td>Left-bank Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Sartaq</td>
<td>Volga–Don interfluve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>North Caucasian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Kartan</td>
<td>Don</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Khan's Ulus</td>
<td>Middle and Lower Volga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Ulus of the 'Jochid' (or of 'two commanders of thousands')</td>
<td>Cis–Ural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Ulus of Shiban</td>
<td>Cis–Ural</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, no one doubts the polyethnic character of the Golden Horde and, in particular, the polyethnic character of its nomadic population. Among which, in addition to the traditionally perceived Sary-Kipchak/Cuman tribes, there were the Naiman, Karluk, Kushchi, and Buyrak groups. V. Kostyukov believes that they comprised the ethnic majority among the nomads of the Ulus of Shiban, 'among which the Kipchaks were not particularly numerous nor influential' [20, pp. 200–235].

Archaeologists studying nomadic objects of the Middle Ages in the steppes of Eurasia pay special attention to the problem of the identification and ethnocultural attribution of monuments left behind by the Mongols themselves during their grand march to the west in 1223–1242. In general, all of them are of the opinion that archaeological signs of the presence of nomads of Central Asian origin in the steppes of Eastern Europe include grave structures with stone constructions—stone mounds, stone and earth mounds, fences, rings, 'shells', compilations of stones over graves, and so on—the Northern orientation of the body, and the presence of a skeleton of a horse next to the buried. From the time of G. Fedorov-Davydov, those signs were considered to be wholly Mongolian. Mounds of this type make up a total of about 19% of all the recorded burials of the Golden Horde nomads and geographically occur in almost all local groups (uluses1), of course, in different proportions in relation to the total number of burials in these groups. The most common, burials located under stone structures are found in the Southern Cis–Urals (40.2%), the
Left-bank Ukraine (23.2%), and the North Caucasus (20.8%). Very rarely, they are found in the Middle Volga and the Volga–Don interfluve (2.4% and 2.7% respectively).

For example, a comparative statistical analysis of the funeral rites of burial mounds of the 13–14th centuries in the Volga–Ural steppes shows that burials under stone structures are characterised\(^2\) by such ritual signs as the northern orientation of the body, a grave with red lining, a ledge at the entrance to the lining area, the burial of the deceased on a 'frame' of boards, the wooden ceiling of the lining area, and the presence of horse bones to the left of the buried on the ledge, which, together with the values of other ritual attributes, demonstrate the low importance of the typological similarity coefficient between the funeral rite in 'stone' and 'earth' burial mounds in the region (0.47) \[17, pp. 362–365\].

The results clearly indicate that the 'earth' and 'stone' mounds of the Volga–Ural regions were left by nomads who were nonidentical in an ethnocultural sense and, therefore, favour the hypothesis proposed by V. Kostyukov. It is obvious that the latter were left by nomads who were not related to the Kipchak-Cuman ethnocultural habitat in Eastern Europe and came to the Southern Ural steppes as part of the Mongol invasion. This is confirmed by anthropological data. As R. Yusupov found out, those buried under 'stone mounds' in the South Ural region belonged to the \(^3\)South Siberian race—with a predominance of Mongoloid features—which, in turn, is one of the 'youngest' in the Southern Ural [32, p. 44]. Their ethnic affiliation is the theme of specialised studies. In the meantime, we should recognise that V. Kostyukov was right, in addition to other researchers, in questioning the ethnic and cultural dominance of the Kipchak-Cumans in the Ulus of Jochi—the Golden Horde \[21, p. 129; 33, pp. 26–27\]. It is possible that the 'stone mounds' could be the creation of the Mongols \(^5\).

However, as long as we do not have sufficient archaeological materials which would allow us to single out the monuments of the Naimans, Karluks, Buyraks, etc. in the east of the Great Belt of the Eurasian steppes, we should dwell on the assumption that the now-discovered Golden Horde stone burials in the steppes of Eastern Europe were left by these Turkic-Mongol tribes. Their first appearance to the west of the Volga River most likely was due to the Kipchak-Cuman expansion in the first half of the 11th century. But these were, apparently, a few scattered nomadic groups; as mentioned above, they made no significant impact on the Kipchak-Cuman (Sary-Kipchak) component of the ethnic map of the Eastern European steppes in the pre-Mongol period.

It should also be kept in mind that the Kipchak-Cuman expansion into Eastern Europe was a spontaneous movement of nomads (although caused by specific ethnopolitical collisions in the Kimek Khaganate) in search of 'a place under the sun.' It was carried out during the final stages of the aridisation of the Eurasian steppes, when the climate and natural conditions of the steppes of Eastern Europe, although close to modern conditions, were drier and thus more extreme for nomads [9; 10]. Therefore, it is not accidental that there are just 41 Kipchak-Cuman burials of the 13–14th centuries in the steppes east of the Trans–Volga and Southern Ural regions. This is 9.8% of the Kipchak-Cuman burials of the pre-Mongol period discovered in the steppes of Eastern Europe. That is, the Sary-Kipchaks/Cumans, joined by a group of Turkic-Mongol nomads, passed the Volga–Ural steppes almost without stopping (according to S. Pletnyova, the first stage of nomadism) [27].

The Mongol invasion of Eastern Europe was exclusively expansionist in goals. The steppes captured by the Mongols were not only exploited but also inhabited by nomadic tribes.

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\(^2\) That is, they reveal an increasingly frequent rate of occurrence.

\(^3\) At the burial sites of Khabarny, Ozernovsky, and Urta-Burtya.

\(^4\) First of all, in its Cis–Ural territories.

\(^5\) V. Kostyukov, in particular, did not deny the Mongol affiliation of such ritual signs—typical for stone 'mounds'—as a northern or north-eastern orientation, the absence of the remains of horses, or the presence of harness items [21, p. 229, footnote 38].
subservient to them. Among the latter, no doubt, there were tribes that retained their funeral rites, genetically dating back to the Turks from Central Asia and the Kimaks. They made up the ethnic core of the Ulus of Shiban (additionally, the steppes of the Volga–Ural region entered the humidisation stage in the era of the Golden Horde), and some of them could dwell in the Dnieper–Don interfluve, the terrain of which, by the way, is quite reminiscent of the terrain of the Southern Ural steppes (comp. the Donetsk and Azov highlands and the Turgay plateau).

Yu. Khudyakov’s conclusion that the nomads—who were affiliated with the Kipchaks and used to live in the steppes of North and Central Kazakhstan—abandoned the funeral ceremony of burying their deceased with a horse in the early 2nd millennium CE and switched to single inhumation under round earthen mounds, in ground pits or kerfs, in wooden bottomless sarcophagi (frames) or in tombs made of boards and covered with blocks with different horse bones in the graves [30] leads us to believe that the groups of mounds of the Golden Horde era in the steppes of Eastern Europe, in principle, comply with this provision, and therefore, the people that made them can be construed as the families that constituted this association and came to the region as part of the Mongol invasion. To a certain extent, such a conclusion goes against the now-traditional conception of the violent and administrative relocation of Torchesk, Chorni Klobuky and Cuman-Kipchak tribes from the west to the east from the 13th to the beginning of the 14th centuries, which launched the process of Kipchakisation of the Turkic population in the Volga–Ural region [29, p. 39; 22, pp. 455–457]. This is primarily confirmed by the low frequency of cases in which the deceased is buried in the eastern direction and of cases in which he is buried with a horse (characteristic for the Cumans) in the funeral rites of nomads of the Volga–Ural region in the 13–14th centuries. This also relates to the increased (compared to other areas) number of such graves in the Volga–Don interfluve (8.2%), on the Don (10.4%), and in the Right-bank Ukraine (9.9%)—areas of the concentration of 'Cuman vezha' camps in the 12–early 13th century.

On the other hand, the so-called 'equestrian' burials are traditionally regarded as one of the most expressive ethnocultural markers of the medieval nomads of the Eurasian steppes. In the 12–14th centuries, this is an ethnocultural attribute of the Sary-Kipchaks [31, pp. 482–491; 14, pp. 496–503]. Burials with horses make up a total of 16.2% of Golden Horde nomadic burials: 10.2% are burials with horse hides and 6% are with a skeleton of a horse. A separate group is made up of burials containing horse harness items—saddles, stirrups, and bits—but without the horse (23.2%). The geography of the 'equestrian burials' of the 13–14th centuries in the steppes of Eastern Europe also speaks in favour of the hypothesis that the Golden Horde nomadic population retained the tradition to bury horse hides (skulls and leg bones) along with the deceased: the prevalence of these burials out of the total number of graves in the local group increases from the east to the west: 5.2% among the nomads of the Southern Ural; 14.8% and 12.1% in the Middle and Lower Volga region respectively; 11.8% in the Volga–Don interfluve; 10.4% in the North Caucasus; 5.5% on the Don; 9.6% and 12.7% in the Left-bank and Right-bank Ukraine. Burials containing skeleton of a horse are distributed in a similar way: The Southern Cis–Ural, the Middle and Lower Volga region: 6.9%, 1.8%, and 6.3%; the Volga–Don interfluve, the Don, the North Caucasus: 3.6%, 12.1%, and 9.1%; the Left-bank and Right-bank Ukraine: 9.5% and 19.7%.

Similarly, from the east to the west, the prevalence of burial sites with the deceased aligned to the east or north-east increases—another sign of the Kipchak/Cuman burial ceremony.

On the whole, the picture is quite clear: in the 13–14th centuries, the steppes stretching to the west of the Volga River were still dominated by the Kipchak-Cuman population, \textsuperscript{6}part of which was forced to migrate to the east, to the Volga region, where there had been very few

\textsuperscript{6} This is in parallel to the sporadic inclusion of real newcomers to Eastern Europe—the nomadic population with Central Asian genetic roots (group burials under 'stone mounds').
representatives of this people before the Mongol invasion. This is confirmed, firstly, by the similar values of coefficients for the formal-typological similarities of burial monuments of local groups in the steppes of Eastern Europe [15]; secondly, by the high value of the coefficient of typological proximity between the 'earthen mounds' of the Golden Horde period in the Volga–Ural region and the mounds of the pre–Mongol period in the Polovtsian steppes of Eastern Europe (0.67) [16, p. 348]; thirdly, by the entirely opposite value of the coefficient of typological affinity for ritual signs, characteristic for each of the compared groups of 'stone and earthen mounds' of the Volga–Urals separately (0.27), in fact, they are in the same landscape–climatic zone [16, pp. 343–348, Tables 4 and 5].

The geography of Golden Horde nomadic mounds allows us to supplement our understanding of the boundaries of this state, especially in the north, which has been uncertain for a long time. Currently, we can draw a border from the mouth of the Danube in the west, through the lower reaches of the Dniester, the Bug, and lower reaches of the Dnieper River (mouth of the Samara River); then, in the Don–Siverskiy Donets interfluve in their lower reaches (confluence area of the Khopyor and Medveditsa) and along the Medveditsa River to the headwaters of the Sura River and the Volga towns of Kazan, Suvar, Juketau, and Mokhshi. Furthermore, we move along with the Samara River (a tributary of the Volga up to the headwaters of the Ural and Sakmara). That is, practically along with the border of the Eastern European steppe and forest steppe.

However, the geography of the nomadic burial mounds and sites of the Golden Horde period shows that their distribution in space was determined by certain factors, including the role played by Golden Horde towns and their outskirts.

By combining the monuments under review with the modern administrative map of Western Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine, we get the following picture (Table 2). The data in the table shows that there is no clear territorial connection between Golden Horde towns and synchronous nomadic monuments (at least, in the context of the current administrative division of the Eastern European steppes).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Region (Oblast)</th>
<th>Number of burial sites</th>
<th>% of total number</th>
<th>Number of towns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Aktyubinsk</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Astrakhan</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Bashkortostan</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Volgograd</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Voronezh</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Guryev</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Dnepropetrovsk</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Donetsk</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Zaporizhia</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Kalmykia</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Kiev</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Krasnodar Krai</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Crimea</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Luhansk</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Odessa</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2

7 The sole purpose of this was a more convenient geographic orientation.

8 Including those unidentified archaeological sites, which, according to V. Yegorov, have the remnants of brick buildings.
That is, most archaeologists in the field are 'doomed' to study the culture of the Golden Horde either in its urban or steppe nomadic versions. Accordingly, it is difficult to count on the presence of a topographic link between towns and nomadic burial sites of the period under review. Indeed, the area with the greatest concentration of Golden Horde nomadic burial sites—the lower reaches of the Uzeni (Mokrinsky I, Lake Raim, Zhanakala [Nov. Kazanka], Dzhanka-kala [Kara-Oba], and others), closest to the town of Saray-Jük—is 240 km away from this town along a straight line, which means at least 5–6 days of horse riding.

It should be noted that the town of Saray-Jük, founded in the second half of the 13th century [11, p. 124; 4, p. 245], is in the Caspian desert area, where no nomadic sites have been discovered. From the point of view of modern landscape and climatic characteristics, this is quite natural and understandable: the area is a barren zone of saltmarsh deserts and semi-deserts. However, according to soil analysts, the 13th century was the peak of the humidisation of the Volga-Ural steppes, which resulted in the growth of the moisture level and the shifting of geographical borders to the south. That is, the Caspian deserts and semi-deserts were the steppe, albeit dry [9, p. 62].

Burial sites at the Uzeni are even farther away from the Mavliberdinsky archaeological site near the Uil River (320–340 km along a straight line); they include the remains of brick walls of 30–40 buildings and irrigation canals [11, p. 127 ff.].

No burial sites could ever appear near the town of Hajji Tarkhan (town of Shareny Bugor), which was founded in the 14th century. First of all, the town is located in the Volga delta; so, the closest burial site is Seitovsky (30 km north-east)\(^9\), on the left bank of the Akhtuba River, in the semi-desert area.\(^10\) Secondly, this very area (at the relevant time, dry steppe) hardly inspired the nomads to develop it intensively. Therefore, the vast majority of well-known nomad burial sites in the territory of the modern Astrakhan oblast, dating back to the 13–14th centuries (Nikolskoe, Chyorny Yar, Krivaya Luka, Solyonoye Zaymishche, Staritsa, etc.), are found farther north, beyond the Caspian deserts and semi-deserts.

Naturally, we should mention the 528 moundless burial sites of the Golden Horde period, discovered and studied in the vicinity of the settlement of Shareny Bugor [24, pp. 137–154]. But what does 'in the vicinity' mean in this case? The largest cluster of moundless burial sites of the Golden Horde period (over 370 burials)—the burial sites of Baranovka (Kalmatsky Bugor), Vakurovsky Bugor I and II, Mayachny Bugor I–III, Mechetny Bugor I and II—is 30 km to the east from the settlement, on the left bank of the Buzan River [24, p. 124, fig. 4]. Such a territorial

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\(^9\) The burial site has not been studied; so, it is referenced to the Golden Horde period solely based on the findings of bricks [24, p. 154].

\(^10\) Then, apparently, the dry steppe.
remoteness make it difficult to perceive these burial sites as part of the sociocultural structure of the town of Hajji Tarkhan (despite the fact that these burial sites are mainly Muslim).

The town of Sarai al-Mahrusa (Selitrennoe ancient town) had no nomadic burial sites nearby at all. The closest (and only) nomadic burial site—Yenotaevskoe—is located 35 km north-west, on the right bank of the Volga River [24, p. 91, fig. 3] and has nothing to do with the settlement.

It is worth noting that the first capital of the Golden Horde was founded by Batu Khan in the early 1250s, when Islam was far from being the main religion of the state. Therefore, there were no objections to the stay of pagan nomads in the vicinity of the town from the perspective of confessional 'subtleties.'

No nomadic burial site of the Golden Horde period has been discovered in the immediate vicinity of Beljamen (Vodyanskoe ancient town) [11, p. 109 ff.] either. Six graves from the burial site near the settlement of Verkhnee Pogromnoe are situated on the left bank of the Volga River, opposite to the archaeological site. A burial in the mound near the settlement of Gusevka, 70 km north of Vodyanskoe ancient town [7, p. 83].

The same is true for territories near the town of Uvek (outskirts of the modern city of Saratov). The burial mounds closest to the town are Pokrovsk, Zaumorie, Skatovka; they are located on the left bank of the Volga River, while the Atkarsky burial site is 70 km to the north-west.

Just four nomadic graves—from the Balymersky burial site—have been discovered in the territory of modern Eastern Tatarstan, where most of the towns which existed in the Golden Horde period are located. These burials cannot be treated as anything but an accidental phenomenon in the area.

The same is true for the steppes west of the Volga River: in the immediate vicinity of the Golden Horde towns of Majary, Azak, Shehr al-Jadid (Old Orhei), Akkerman, and Kilia, nomadic burial sites have not been discovered.11

Against this background, the area near Sarai al-Jadid (Tsarevskoe ancient town)—appeared around the 1340s—looks unusual [3, p. 80]. Within a radius of 20 km up and down along the left bank of the Akhtuba River (just over an hour by trotting), there are 18 burial sites of the Golden Horde period: Zaplavnoe II, Bahtiyarovka I–III, Leninsk I and II, Malayaevka I, V, VI, Solodovka I–III, Tsarev, Kolobovka I–IV, and Zubovka. In total, there are 158 burials (85.2% of all the Golden Horde nomadic burials in the Lower Volga region).

This 'phenomenon' may be explained in several ways. The first is that 'some of the burials became operational in the Golden Horde period before the formation of a large town in the place of Tsarevskoe ancient town. Before the town appeared, the main occupation of local residents had apparently been nomadic herding. The transformation of the economy from nomadic to semi-nomadic coincided with the emergence and development of the town' [3, p. 97].

The second is that 'the area of Tsarevskoe ancient town mainly contains burials beneath mounds (by one and a half times more than ground ones), which is unique to Golden Horde towns of the Lower Volga region: it is likely that this area was dominated by representatives of the nomadic world...' [24, p. 237].

In principle, both of these assumptions do not contradict each other, and we cannot offer any other alternative.

L. Nedashkovsky creates a reasonable and convincing scheme of the dynamics of potential economic zones in the area of Tsarevskoe ancient town.12 The data provided by the researcher

11 The burial mounds of Russky Kolodets and Manuylovka, the closest to the town of Azak, are located 50 km away across the Gulf of Taganrog, and the Trapovsky burial site, the closest to the town of Kilia, is 60 km north-east, on the eastern shore of Sasyk Lake (Kunduk).

12 He draws it for all major towns in the Lower Volga region, but in this case, we are interested in Tsarevskaya.
shows that throughout the history of the town (from 1266 to 1395), the outlines of its economic zone changed slightly, and the nomads, which are represented by a large cluster of graves in the area, were consistently close to these zones. This led the author to the fair conclusion of 'close ties between Golden Horde towns in the Lower Volga region and their nomadic and rural districts' [24, fig. 10–14; p. 246]. There is hardly any sense to doubt this, or that those relations were markedly economic, not social. The latter refers to the difference in the dynamics between the social development of Golden Horde towns and the 'nomadic steppe'.

In this regard, one very illustrative example refers to Golden Horde burials with coins, which make up 10.1% of all burials in our sample. Mainly, these are the coins of such khans as Öz Beg (1312–1341), Jani Beg (1342–1357), and Berdi Beg (1357–1359), whose rules accounted for adopting Islam as the state religion of the Golden Horde. 8.8% of these graves are pagan, meaning that they contain horse burials and things that accompany the buried. They are found in burial sites located in the vicinity of towns (Bakhtiyarova II, III, Tsarevsky, a burial in Saratov) but are mostly found in the steppe.

The issue of Islam taking root in the Ulus of Jochi has been repeatedly addressed with the involvement of both written and archaeological sources [5; 6; 8; 18]. The main conclusion of the researchers is that, firstly, the process of the Islamisation of the Golden Horde was not momentary, and that it included several stages. The first stage was the adoption of Islam by the Jochids and the nobility close to them during the reign of Berke Khan. No mass Islamisation of the nomads or their nobles took place in that period. The second stage was the strengthening and expansion of Islam in the Ulus of Jochi at the end of the 13th century (Toqta Khan's ruling), when Islam (not without violence from the sovereign power) started to penetrate into the nomadic steppe. The third stage was the transformation of Islam into a state religion during the reign of Öz Beg Khan [18, pp. 100–108]. Additionally, the incentive to switch to the new religion came from towns and their outskirts, including nomadic ones. However, while pagan traditions were gradually giving in, the Golden Horde nobility continued to bury their members in Muslim mausoleums with the accompanying burial inventory [6, p. 126]. Also, the nomads of the Golden Horde steppe periphery preserved paganism (shamanism, ancestral worship) in the 14th century and even into the early 15th century. This is confirmed by pagan sanctuaries like the Akimbetovsky burial mound, the burial sites of Sistema I and Annenskoe–12 in the steppe Trans–Urals, and others [21, Chapter 2; 8, p. 94].

The most plausible explanation behind the 'confessional delay' in the Golden Horde nomadic steppe, as compared to Golden Horde towns, seems to be the conclusion of V. Kostyukov that 'a nomadic way of life does not create suitable soil for the entrenchment of proselyte religions. It is well known that in places where the nomads turned out to be more or less firmly tied to monotheistic public centres, such as Khwarezm or Byzantium, the process of the adoption of global religions was accomplished much faster and at a deeper level. In a different situation, new religious canons, not repeated regularly in the course of missionary instructions, refracted in the consciousness of the nomads in most peculiar ways, either failed to penetrate the critical areas of ritual practice or entered them in fragments, in a partial form' [21, p. 82].

As for the concentration of nomadic burial mounds near Tsarevskoe ancient town (town of Sarai al-Jadid), D. Vasilyev believes that 'it is a testament to the economic and political gravitation of the nomads towards major urban centres' [6, p. 131]. But we should not ignore the fact that in the preceding period, particularly in the 10–11th centuries, a similar pattern was observed in the area: the burial sites of Bakhtiyarovskiy, Kalinovskiy, Tsarevskiy, Solodovka, and Leninsk (in total, 20.1% of all recorded burials of the Oghuz-Pecheneg period). This gives us a reason to believe that this place was an ancient location for the traditional
winter camps of the nomads of the Volga–Ural region. We should not rule out the fact that the emergence of a town here (and all the towns in the Lower Volga steppe) was an additional (if not the main) dissonance in the relations between the 'nomadic steppe' and the Golden Horde central authorities. In our view, all of this has been exhaustively explained by Ye. Kulpin-Gubaydullin, 'The emergence of a man-made steppe homeostasis is less stable for a number of reasons. Towns in the steppe were created from scratch. The people who populated them did not know how to live in the steppe and were not aware that the skills developed by their ancestors in other natural conditions would fail to serve them in the new place (highlighted—Author). The nomads themselves did not know the new steppe. They considered the steppe to be incomparably richer than their former stomping grounds, and they knew not the limits of its capacities or what would occur if they pushed it beyond its bounds into an environmental crisis or local environmental catastrophe.' [23, p. 71].

An important (if not decisive) role in the development of this dissonance was played by the opposition, at the mental level, of the two components of the Golden Horde's cultural space: the steppe, based on the Great Yasa biligs ('When you want to eat an animal, tie its legs, rip the belly open, and squeeze the heart in the hand until the animal dies, and then you can eat the flesh; but if someone slaughters the animal as Muslims do (emphasis is mine—Author), kill this person himself'—§8; 'He forbade to wash their clothes in the course of wearing them, until they get worn out'—§15; 'Men are only allowed to engage in war and hunting'—§53), and the urban Islamic [16].

In general, it is clear that in the geographical and, consequently, the mental-psychological sense, towns and the 'nomadic steppe' of the Golden Horde period were two parallel phenomena in the socio-political, ethnic, and religious life of the Golden Horde. The connection between them was purely economic: the material culture of the nomads was regularly 'supplemented' by the products of urban crafts (which turned the Golden Horde into an imperial culture, that is, supra-ethnic), while the 'Golden Horde towns of the Lower Volga region could not do without the influx of livestock and dairy products from the nomadic steppe' [24, p. 221]. As for the spiritual connection between Golden Horde towns and the steppe, it hardly should be exaggerated. The Great Troubles of the 1360s–1380s is a very illustrative example.


13 In the same way as the whole territory on the left bank of the Volga-Akhtuba region.
Chapter VIII. Economy, Crafts, and Trade


10. Demkin V., Demkina T., Borisov A., Yakimov A., Sergatskov I. Izmenenie pochv i prirodny’x uslovij polupusty’nnogo Zavolzh’ya za poslednie 4000 let (Changes in soils and natural conditions of the semi-desert east of the Trans-Volga region in the last 4,000 years) // Pochvovedenie. 2004. No. 3.


Traditionally, historians have believed the Ulus of Jochi to be a nomadic state with underdeveloped agriculture. But in light of new archaeological evidence, this point of view is now incorrect.

In addition to nomadic steppes, the Golden Horde included old agricultural regions such as Bulgar, Khwarezm, Crimea, and the North Caucasus.

Bulgar ancient towns, in fact, during the Golden Horde period were familiar with common wheat, emmer wheat (farro), club wheat, millet, barley (hulless and chaffy), oats, rye, peas, vetch, lentils, cucumbers, apples, flax, and hemp [18, p. 218]. At Selitrennoe ancient town, grape and watermelon seeds were found during excavations [40, p. 231]. Exploration of the Uvek ancient town found the presence of rice, chickpeas, figs, grapes, barberry, coriander, walnuts, millet, and wheat [19], in addition to rye [National Museum of the Republic of Tatarstan (NM RT); Collections of F. Dukhovnikov, 1893, no. 5365–35, OAIII–66, file no. 12799, 202].

At the ancient settlements of Bagaevo, Kolotov Buerak, Khmelevevskoe I, and Shirokiy Buerak, Saratov Oblast, flotation was used for the first time to explore cultural layers and the fill of the examined constructions during the author's excavations in 2001–2003. 39 samples were taken from the intact lower horizon of the cultural layer and the construction fill at the Shirokiy Buerak ancient settlement; 66 samples at the Bagaevo ancient settlement; 17 samples at the Kolotov Buerak settlement; and six more samples were taken from pre-continental layers during excavation at the Khmelevskoe I ancient settlement. The samples were analysed at the Laboratory of Natural Methods at the Institute of Archaeology of the Russian Academy of Sciences by senior researcher in history, PhD E. Lebedeva. 209 definable grains of cultivated plants were found at the Shirokiy Buerak ancient settlement; 370 grains were found at the Bagaevo ancient settlement; 20 grains were found at the Kolotov Buerak ancient settlement; and 15 grains were found at the Khmelevskoe I ancient settlement.

*See fig. 4–7, 9–11, 13, 23 for the article in the colour insert.
At the Shirokiy Buerak, Bagaevo, and Khmelevskoe I settlements, fragments of wheat heads were found, thus providing evidence of grain threshing. And so, the theory that people cultivated plants at the explored settlements was found to be true, further allowing archaeologists to rule out the theory that grains were imported, since unthreshed grains were never transported for sale in the Golden Horde. It is impossible to not consider and examine the cultural, chronological, and territorial unity of the explored sites. These considerations allow us to correctly talk about a unified paleoethnobotanical system in the latter half of the 13–14th centuries. We believe that the absolute prevalence of millet in the samples (53.4% of all remains of cultivated plants)—surpassing that of rye (20.1%), wheat (19.6%), barley (5.9%), oats (0.7%), and dried peas (0.3%)—is not accidental. We found millet grains at the Khmelevskoe I ancient site in the fill of a den during the second excavation, 1–1999. The den was a household building in the complex shape of a figure eight. The eastern part of the den, in which the grains were found, was the deepest and served as a divided bell-shaped cellar with steps leading down into it.

Millet cultivation in the Golden Horde was described by medieval authors. In the middle of the 13th century, Giovanni da Pian del Carpine and William of Rubruck wrote that people of the Mongol Empire ate this type of crop [millet]; and of other types of crop, they only touched upon rice and barley, specifically discussing their use in making beverages [8, pp. 36, 95, 124, 138, 146, 148, 154; 55, pp. 10, 62, 68, 132, 166, 173, 183, 186]. Millet (‘tari’), oats (‘ous’), wheat (‘coptaluc’), farro (‘suulu’), barley (‘arpa’), rice (‘tuturgan’, ‘brinč’, ‘bri[ng]’), peas (‘brizac’, ‘noghuc’), and lentils (‘maruimac’) are mentioned in the Cuman part [47, pp. 107, 130–131; 48, pp. 96, 109] of the ‘Codex Cumanicus’ manual (originally written in 1303, this manual was based on materials from the late 13th century). This manual was compiled for Italians visiting the Ulus of Jochi. 'Vassaf's History' [The Allocation of Cities and the Propulsion of Epochs] mentions a sack of millet sent by Toqta Khan to the Hulaguid Ilkhan Gazan in 702 AH (1302/1303) as a symbol of the large size of the Golden Horde army [35, p. 83]. In his geographical work (700–749 AH / 1300/1301–1348/1349), al-ʿUmarī described farming in the Golden Horde: 'Their crops are scarce, hardly any wheat and barley; no beans are found at all. Most often they sow millet, and they eat this millet; millet, as it is the principal produce of the land, is their main food' [34, p. 230]. According to al-ʿUmarī, wheat, barley, and two sorts of millet—pearl millet (or dokhn) and 'javers (a typer of millet), similar to the seeds of trefoil'—in addition to lentils, were sold at the bazaars of Sarai [34, p. 242]. Giosafat Barbaro also mentioned that the people of the Horde used millet for eating and performing sacrifices. Apart from millet, he only named wheat and oats for their use in feeding horses [2, pp. 142, 146, 149–150]. Ambrogio Contarini, who crossed the Lower Volga region in 1476, only mentioned rice and crackers cooked of 'fairly good wheat flour', as well as onions and garlic [2, p. 221, see also p. 224].

Italian and Byzantine merchants bought various types of crops from the Golden Horde, including wheat, millet, and barley, all of which are ranked in order of export volumes [2, pp. 52–53, 57, 66; 5, pp. 442, 447; 6, pp. 39–43; 9, pp. 100–101, 103–104, 108–116, 118, 146, 149; 11, pp. 27–34; 12, p. 145; 13, p. 191; 14, pp. 156, 175–176, 183; 17, pp. 122–123, 131–133; 51, pp. 250–251, 259–260; 53, pp. 24, 42, 54–55]. Francesco Balducci Pegolotti wrote about the high quality of wheat exported from Kaffa and Moncastro [53, p. 42]. However, not all regions of the Ulus of Jochi were able to fully provide themselves with agricultural products: the famous Arab traveller Ibn Battuta provided information on the delivery of wheat and barley from Termez to Khwarezm by boat on the Amu Darya River [34, p. 309; 56, p. 542].

William of Rubruck talked about vineyards and wine in the Northeast Caucasus [8, p. 186; 55, p. 262]. The 'Codex Cumanicus' contains names for oranges (‘nainč’, ‘nouma’),
lemons (‘limon’), peaches (‘saftalu’), pomegranates (‘nardan’), apricots (‘mismis’), plums (‘er-ic’), figs (‘ingir’), grapes (‘xuxun’), megalocarpus muscat grapes (‘churu xuxun’), cherries (‘chiras’), dates (‘ghorma’), cucumbers (‘cheer’), melons (‘coun’), turnips (‘salgan’, ‘samuc’), cabbages (‘laghan’), beet roots (‘čagundur’), pumpkins (‘cabuc’), onions (‘sorgan’, ‘yousa’), garlic (‘sarmisac’), spinach (‘yspanac’), parsley (‘mangdan’), lettuce (‘marul’), dill (‘raxiana’), pears (‘armut’, ‘chertme’), and apples (‘alma’) in its Cuman section [47, pp. 125–127; 48, pp. 106–107]. Al-ʿUmarī provided interesting information about fruits, nuts, vegetables, and melons in his stories about the Golden Horde: ‘Various trees and different fruits (grow) there, such as grapes, pomegranates, quinces, apples, pears, apricots, peaches, and nuts. There is a vegetable that is called in the Kipchak language batenk (badendzhan?) [that is, aubergine—Author], similar to a wine berry... As for the melon, it is consumed (?) there in large amounts, especially the yellow sort. They store it and eat it throughout (the whole) year. It is extremely sweet and has a pleasant taste, while they also speak a lot about its abundance and cheapness. Some juice it and make halvah (a sweet) out of it. They grow various vegetables in their towns such as rutabagas, turnips, cabbages, and others’ [34, pp. 233–234]. Ibn Battuta, who personally visited Khwarezm, excitedly described Khwarezmian watermelons: ‘There is not a single melon in the world that would be similar to those cultivated in Khwarezm, neither in the East nor in the West... Its skin is green, while its core is red. It [the melon] is extremely sweet and at the same time, it is hard. Its amazing characteristics [lie] in the fact that it is cut, dried in the sun, placed in baskets... and brought from Khwarezm to the most remote lands of India and China. Among all the dried fruits, none is better than them (these melons)’ [34, p. 313]. Vineyards, gardens, mills, and farms in the surrounding areas of Sudak in Crimea, as well as barn duties and threshing floors taxes, are described in the 1398 Tarkhan yarliq of Temür Qutlug [31, p. 21, 33].

The 'Codex Cumanicus' manual also contains a word for a plough (‘saban’), as well as a number of words and phrases related to its use and structure: plougher (‘sabanci’), to plough (‘saban surarmen’, ‘saban surdum’, ‘saban sur’), ploughshare (‘saban temir’), and arable land (‘tarlov’, ‘saban ieri’) [47, pp. 8, 90, 180; 48, pp. 40, 87, 127]. Egyptian historian Rukn Al Din Baybars (died in 1325) also mentioned sokhas in his description of the conflict between Toqta and Nogai [34, p. 110]. According to archaeological data [18, pp. 213–214; 32, pp. 8–10], the plough had an iron coulter and a heavy share (either symmetrical or with right-sided asymmetry). Judging by the sources at hand [18, pp. 211–213; 32, pp. 10–11], the sokha in the Golden Horde period was two-forked and equipped with asymmetrical shares and a politsa (an instrument for casting off soil). For the tilling of soil, hoes were used, while sickles and small scythes were utilised for harvesting [32, pp. 11–12]. Agricultural tools of the Golden Horde are found at numerous sites in the Volga region. Evidently, the noria pots for watermills, the remains of which were found in the Lower Volga region, were also used for agricultural purposes.

Giosafat Barbaro, who from 1436 to 1452 lived in Tana—a Venetian colony at the mouth of the Don—gives some interesting information about agriculture in the steppe region of the Golden Horde in his work 'A journey to Tana':

'Around the new moon in February, they call together the whole horde, so as to summon and instruct every person willing to sow to prepare all necessities; for during the full moon in March, they will sow in a given place, and they shall know that on a given day of the given new moon, they will set out to sow. Afterwards, those who plan to sow, or those who want to charge somebody with this duty, load their carts with seeds, take the animals they need, and, together with their wives and children or with a part of the family, set out for the appointed place; usually, as a rule, this is a two-day journey from where the horde was camped at the moment people were called to sow. They plough, sow, and live in this place while they have not yet finished what they had come for. Then they return to the horde.'
The khan treats his horde just as a mother treats her children on a walk, never releasing them out of her sight. And thus he circles the fields—today he is here; tomorrow he is there, never separated [from his people] by more than a four-day journey. This goes on while the bread [crops] have not yet ripened. When the crops do ripen, the khan does not travel back to reap with his horde but rather sends out those who sowed and those who are willing to buy the wheat. They go in their carts with oxen, camels, and other things they need, just as they would if moving to their manors.

The earth there is fertile and bears a fifty-fold yield of wheat, as much as that of Paduan wheat; millet there bears a hundred-fold. Sometimes the harvest is so abundant that they leave some of it in the steppe' [2, p. 150].

Judging by the quotation above, a fallow farming system prevailed in the steppe region. It would seem the prominent systems in the Middle Volga region were either a 'random sowing of crops with an absence of rotation or a two-field rotation of crops, with both using fallow soil' [18, p. 223].

Apart from agriculture, cattle breeding was another economic pillar of the Golden Horde. The Jochid army contained a number of nomadic cattle breeders during the first half of the Golden Horde's existence, that is, up until the end of the 14th century.

Cattle breeding was not only developed in nomadic farming—although, naturally, it was a major foundation for it—but also present among the settled population.

According to osteological data, beef, mutton, and horse meat prevailed in the diets of the Lower Volga region population during the time of the Golden Horde. On average, rural regions consumed more beef, less mutton, and less horse meat than in the cities, where the main bulk of cattle was evidently imported by the nomads. Apart from the bone remains of cows, bulls, bullocks, goats, and horses, the Golden Horde settlements of the Lower Volga region also contained bones of camels, pigs, cats, domestic chickens, and ducks. Small cattle were slaughtered from 2 months to 8 years old; large cattle from 3 months to 6 years and older; horses from 1 to 12 years and older; and pigs from 1 to 2 years and older. Cattle were bred not only for meat but also for milk, wool, and skins. The role of dung was also significant: it served as the only fertiliser in medieval agriculture. Bulls and oxes were used for cargo transportation (along with camels and horses) and tillage [24, pp. 258–259; 42, pp. 117, 129].

Giovanni da Pian del Carpine wrote about the Mongols: 'They are very rich in cattle: camels, bulls, sheep, goats, and horses. They have such a large quantity of beasts of burden, the likes of which, in our view, do not exist anywhere else in the world; but they have no pigs nor other animals at all' [8, p. 28]. Giosafat Barbaro discussed the amount of cattle in the Ulus of Jochi in the 15th century: 'What shall I say about the enormous, even countless, multitude of animals in this horde? Will anyone believe me?' [2, p. 149].

Horse breeding in the steppes carried great significance for the military: every soldier had to have several horses when embarking on a crusade. Apart from that, horse milk was also used to brew koumiss, a traditional drink of the steppe nomads. They also paid their taxes in cattle and koumiss [37, pp. 39–40]. In the summertime, nomads primarily ate various dairy products (but storing butter, dried curd and cheese, and jerked beef for the winter), while during the winter, they primarily ate meat products [8, pp. 95–96]. Al-ʿUmarī (700–749 AH / 1300/1301–1348/1349) talked about meat and the tradition of giving meat as a gift among the nomads of the Ulus of Jochi: 'Their sustenance mostly depends on their cattle: horses, cows, and sheep. ... Those who live in the steppes do not sell nor buy meat. ... When someone's cattle grow sick, such as a horse, or a cow, or a sheep, he slaughters it and eats one part of it with his family. [The other part] he gives to his neighbours; and if one of the neighbour's sheep, or cow, or horse is ill, they slaughter it and give [part of it] to those who have offered them something before. That is why there is never any shortage of meat in their
hous. This (tradition) is so established among them that it makes giving meat an oblig-
atory deed' [34, pp. 230–231].

The Golden Horde exported cattle in enormous amounts. For example, they exported
horses to India for household purposes. Ibn Battuta, who described the export of horses from
the Ulus of Jochi to India, wrote about the steppe region of the Golden Horde: 'There is an
exceptionally large quantity of horses, and they all stand by, useless. ... They (Turks) only
eat them; in their lands, they are (as abundant), maybe even more, as sheep are in our lands.
Sometimes, one Turk has (several) thousands. One tradition of Turkic horse breeders living
in these lands (is when) they place pieces of felt with a length of a span [9 inches], tied to a
cubit-long thin stick, in the corner of the bullock-cart in which their wives ride. Every one
thousand horses correlate to one (such) piece. I saw how some of them had 10 pieces, and
some who had even more' [34, p. 286]. Giosafat Barbaro also described the cattle trade in
detail: 'There are horse traders among those people; they take horses from the horde and drive
them to various places... I used to meet merchants on the road who were driving so many
horses that they covered the entire steppe... The second type of animal that this people have
is the marvelous big bull. They have so many of them that there would be enough even for
Italian slaughterhouses. They are driven to Poland while some of them are driven through
Wallachia to Transylvania or Germany, and then from there to Italy...The third type of animal
this people keep is the tall shaggy two-humped camel. They are driven to Persia and sold
there for 25 ducats each' [2, p. 149]. Small and large cattle were imported in abundance by
nomads to other settled regions. For example, they were transferred to the Middle Volga [24,
pp. 258, 260, 271; 25, pp. 103–104, 106–107] and specifically to Russia, where cattle were
generally smaller in size. The average height of a large animal in the Golden Horde was
almost 10 cm more than animals bred in Russia [1; 42, p. 120].

The nomadism system in the Golden Horde times was strictly regulated by the khan's
power. All pastures and steppes were distributed within the state in accordance with its mili-
tary and administrative divisions. Every superior officer ordered his subordinates to nomadise
in certain territories and along certain routes. Giovanni da Pian del Carpini reported: 'No one
is allowed to stay in a country unless the emperor orders so. However, he himself decides
where tribal leaders must stay. Leaders order where a thousand-squad commander must stay,
while the latter orders the same to centurions and centurions to foremen' [8, p. 45]. The
system of nomadism in meridional direction parallel to the flow of large rivers prevailed
within the Golden Horde area. In summer, nomads moved along river basins northwards in
search for optimal living conditions; in winter, southwards. William of Rubruck wrote that
'each leader (capitaneus) knows the limits of his pastures judging by the amount of people he
has under his command. He also knows where he must graze his herd in the winter, summer,
spring, and autumn. It is in winter when they descend to the south, to warmer countries. In
summer, they ascend northwards, to colder ones. In winter, when there is snow, they graze
herds in places lacking water but convenient for pastures, because snow replaces water' [8,
p. 91].

Hunting made up an important part of the Horde's economy. Bones of wild animals were
found at the Golden Horde sites: hare, mottled polecat, fox, wolf, bear, badger, boar, beaver,
marten, ground squirrel, hamster, elk, red deer, reindeer, roe, kulan, saiga, auroch (?), ringed
seal, turtle, and birds (grey goose, grouse, partridge, mallard, grey heron, bustard, seagull,
rook, rock pigeon, magpie, jackdaw), which proves, along with written sources, the auxiliary
role of hunting in the population's economy. However, the ratio of wild mammals' bones
found at the settlements, if they were present at all, was insignificant. Judging by the amount
of meat that may be extracted from one unit of different animals, beef, mutton and horse meat
prevailed in the nutrition of the Lower Volga region population during the Golden Horde
period. Marco Polo provided information about hunting ermines, sables, squirrels, silver
foxes and marmots in the eastern part of the Jochid state [15, pp. 225–226; 54, p. 481]. 'They hunt very well mostly using bows', Giosafat Barbaro said about the Ulus of Jochi's population [2, p. 142]. Furs (of sables, ermines, martens, weasels, foxes, lynx, squirrels, hares, beavers, otters, marmots, polar bears), which were mostly brought from northern areas were one of the most essential exports of the Golden Horde [see 2, pp. 51, 57–58, 66, 217; 8, pp. 88; 9, pp. 23–28, 34, 64, 80, 84, 97, 147, 149; 12, pp. 152–154; 13, pp. 191; 14, p. 183; 34, pp. 297–298; 49, p. 386; 53, pp. 24, 150; 55, p. 44].

According to the tradition established by the Yasa, battue hunting [8, p. 99; 55, p. 71] was a peculiar school of military training and somewhat of military maneuvers. Hunting was one of the traditional entertainments of the Jochid aristocracy. The yarliqs of Mengü Temür of 1267, Berdi Beg of 1357, Tyulyak of 1379 and Temür Qutlug of 1398 mention falconers and leopard-keepers among the Golden Horde officials [7, pp. 64, 74, 82–84, 102; 31, pp. 21, 25; 45, pp. 465, 467, 469]. Hunting for falcons, gyrfalcons, and golden eagles (?) is mentioned by William of Rubruck [8, p. 98, note 59; 55, p. 69]. Russian chronicles of 1283 tell that Golden Horde falconers bred swans [26, p. 177; 27, pp. 154–155; 28, pp. 62, 222; 30, pp. 340–341]. Toota's ambassadors in 702 AH (1302/1303) presented Ilkhan Ghazan with hunting falcons, skins of 'Kirghiz squirrels, Karluk weasels (fennecs), Slavic ermines, and Bulgar sables' [35, p. 83]. Falcons are mentioned among the gifts presented by Öz Beg Khan's embassy to the Egyptian sultan in 717 AH (1317/1318) [34, pp. 325–326, 438]. Öz Beg sent gyrfalcons to Chinese great khan of the Yuan dynasty [46, p. 238]. Jani Beg's ambassadors who arrived in Egypt in Sha'ban 758 AH (20 July–18 August 1357) presented gifts, which included furs of sables and wild birds [34, p. 441]. On 30 January 1385, Toktamysh's embassy to the Egyptian sultan presented him 7 falcons [34, p. 441]. Hunting with falcons and gyrfalcons, as well as hunting deer, geese, and goldfinches, is described by Giosafat Barbaro [2, pp. 147–148].

The development of the fishing trade on large and small rivers is indicated by finds of fish hooks, boat braces, sinkers, as well as bone remains and fish scales, discovered at Golden Horde sites. Judging by the types of sinkers and hooks, they were familiar with the use of dragnets (both small and large) and stationary nets (both seine nets and multi-wall nets), trawl lines and fishing rods (including live-bait fishing). Dragnet fishing was much more popular than the use of stationary nets [20]. Bones of sturgeons, belugas, starry sturgeons, sterlets, pikes, pike-perches, catfish, and carps have been found in the Golden Horde settlements. At some sites, the amount of bones is very significant (0.1% to 54.7%), and the consumption of fish had a material impact on the nutrition of the local populace. It is interesting that the average consumption of fish in cities was a bit higher than in rural regions. Sun-dried and salted fish (including sturgeons and sturgeon balyks), as well as caviar, were exported from the Golden Horde by Italian merchants [2, pp. 50–52, 57–58; 9, pp. 79, 100–102, 104, 122–124, 146, 149; 12, p. 149; 13, pp. 191, 195, 210; 14, p. 183; 36, p. 803; 44, p. 218; 49, pp. 416, 676, 701; 53, pp. 24, 102, 380]. William of Rubruck spoke of the purchase of dried sturgeons, breams, and other fish in innumerable quantities' by Constantinople merchants (that is, obviously Italian ones, since at that time the city was the capital of the Latin Empire) [8, p. 88] near the embouchure of the Don, the inhabitants of whose banks are described by the traveller to have had great amounts of dried fish [8, p. 109; 55, p. 97]. Johann Schiltberger characterises Azak as a town 'on the bank of the Don that abounds with fish, taken away on large ships and galleys to Venice, Genoa and the Archipelago islands' [43, pp. 44–45]. Giosafat Barbaro, when speaking of the Volga and the Caspian Sea, stated that 'in the river and in the sea, there are fish beyond count' [2, p. 157]. Contarini's narration spoke of the fishing trade (involving sturgeons and starred sturgeons) and seal trade in the area of the Caspian Sea [2, pp. 216, 218].
Salt production was tightly connected to the procurement of fish. The existence of such trade in the Golden Horde and salt exports to Rus' are confirmed by the reports of Barbaro, Contarini [2, pp. 157, 219], and William of Rubruck speaking of significant proceeds to the khan's treasury from the control over salt making [8, pp. 90–91, 107; 55, pp. 52, 92]. On cosmographer Fra Mauro's 1459 map, a mountain near the Ural River is accompanied by an inscription 'the salt mountain' [50, p. 56, XXXIII].

The beekeeping trade was also of certain importance. Honey and wax were exported by the Ulus of Jochi, and honey, herbs, roots were collected and used as food by the general populace [2, pp. 51–52, 57, 66, 142, 153, 220; 8, p. 95; 9, pp. 32–33, 79, 84, 95–97, 104, 111, 128–129, 147, 149; 12, p. 131; 13, pp. 195, 210; 34, p. 234; 53, pp. 24, 43, 150; 55, p. 62]. The 'Codex Cumanicus' contains the names for a nut ('cox'), hazelnut ('catlau'), almond ('badam'), pistachio ('pistac'), chestnut ('castana'), rue ('sada'), mint ('gischic') and sage ('salg') in the Cuman part [47, pp. 125–126; 48, p. 106]; hence, they could also be collected. Herbs were also collected for medicinal purposes, for example, the florets of wormwood were exported from the Circum-Pontic and Azov Sea regions to Western Europe and the Middle East [2, p. 147, note 69; 9, pp. 84, 119; 53, pp. 69, 138, 429–430].

Certain historians have expressed their opinion concerning the insignificant degree of development of the Golden Horde crafts [33, pp. 76–78]. However, even as early as in the 15th century, when the principal urban centres of the Ulus of Jochi either had already declined or ceased to exist, we have the following report of Giosafat Barbaro on the Golden Horde army: 'In this army, there are many artisans, such as clothiers, blacksmiths, armourers, and others, and there are all the necessary crafts' [2, p. 147]. Archaeological data allows us to provide a detailed insight into the crafts of the Golden Horde.

In spite of the syncretism of the material culture (which has certain similarities throughout the adjacent areas) and the craft traditions in the Jochid state, the uniqueness of the Golden Horde products allows to distinguish them from products of the manufacturing centres of other medieval states. Craftsmen in the cities of the Ulus of Jochi lived in dedicated quarters, where estate-based crafts were also well-developed.

Let us try to briefly describe the main kinds of crafts and their products.
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Fig. 1. Iron fishhooks (1–13) and boat braces (14).
1—Podgornoe ancient settlement, 2–14—Uvek ancient town
[52, Fig. 65]

Fig. 2. Ceramic (1–13, 16) and stone (14–15) fishing sinkers.
1–14, 16—Uvek ancient town, 15—Khmelevskoe ancient town [52, Fig. 66]
Among all the types of crafts developed in the Golden Horde, pottery is worth a special mention. Unglazed, red-clay crockery is the key material for the settlements of the Golden Horde circle. 'Unglazed ceramics are characterised by greater standardisation, the clarity of shapes and simplicity of ornaments, mainly amounting to linear and wavy ornaments' [38, p. 235]. Ceramic goods of different shapes and sizes were widely used, including cauldrons, pots, jugs, bowls, cups, plates, basins, flasks, 'holes' ('tagora'), amphorae, large and small storage vessels, spheric cones, money boxes, tuvaks (sunaks), lids, lamps, candlesticks, devices for installing and relocating lamps, digirs, whistles, rattles and other toys, roof tiles, water pipes (kuburs), vessels in the shape of a blunted cone, fishing sinks, spindle whorls, balls, vessels with a net, stoppers, disks with holes, potter's wheels, and sippy jugs [see 40, pp. 7–199]. As a rule, they did not have any decorative design or complex ornaments but were characterised by high performance capability. Pressed to shape gray-clay pottery was also used. It was imprinted in parts in segmental ceramic molds (kalyps) known from the materials found in Tsarevskoe and Selitrennoe ancient towns.

Fig. 3. Unglazed ceramics found in the Uvek ancient town: jar-like (1–4) and a pot-like (5) vessels, khum (6) [57, p. 95, fig. 24]
I. Volkov made attempts to define the common features of ceramics produced in various Golden Horde regions: Azak, Volga region, Majar, Khwarezm, Eastern Crimea (Kaffa, Sudak, Solkhat) and South-Western Crimea [4, pp. 4–14, 20–21].

Different types of kilns for unglazed ceramics have been discovered in Vodyanskoe, Selitrennoe, Tsarevskoe [40, pp. 6–7], Bulgar, Narovchat, and Uvek ancient towns, as well as in other settlements of the Volga region (Bolshoy Shikhan, Zubovka, Krasny Yar, Lapas, Russky Urmat, Sukhorechenskoe, Tatarskaya Bashmakovka, Shareny Bugor, etc.) and in outlying regions of the Ulus of Jochi. In Selitrennoe ancient town, the complex of pottery kilns and ancillary facilities 'comprised a large craft workshop like a "karkhana" and occupied a whole block' [38, p. 232]. 'A rapid progress in mastering advanced pottery kilns is generally typical of the Golden Horde period' [10, p. 137]. Numerous items related to the manufacture of ceramics have also been found, such as kiln furniture (different shapes, including clay supports) and burnishers.

Fig. 8. Unglazed ceramics found in the Uvek ancient town: spheroconical vessels (1–8) and miniature vessels (9–10) [57, p. 97, fig. 26]

See fig. 4–7, 9–11, 13, 23 for the article in the colour insert.
A considerable amount of kashi (with a white or pink base) and red clay glazed ceramics were produced in the Golden Horde. The range of kashi products includes bowls, dishes, albarelli, rose water sprinklers (gulabdani), bottles, jars, reed pen stands, and inkwells. Red clay glazed bowls, albarelli, rose water sprinklers (gulabdani), tuvaks, lamps, jars, and toys were manufactured. The relatively poor shapes of glazed ceramics are supplemented with the incredible diversity of their colours and ornamentation. ... Glazed ceramics appear as a sea of bright, multiple colours, with rich designs and compositions [39, p. 137].

Pottery kilns for glazed ceramics (either for vessels or architectural decor) are known in the Lower Volga region, in Selitrennoe, Tsarevskoe, and Uvek ancient towns.

Among other things, ceramists produced bricks, as well as glazed mosaics and maiolica wares on a kashi and red clay base, carved terracotta tiles, window grating frames, carved and pressed ganch plates—elements for the decoration of buildings.

Glassblowing was also developed in the Golden Horde. Monochrome and polychrome beads, pendants, rings, bracelets, rings inserts, vessels (glasses, phials, jugs, bowls, lamps, and tuvaks), as well as window frames, were very popular. Glass jewellery, primarily beads, are among the most common finds. By their chemical composition, the greatest number of glass products are of the sodium alkaline class, and among these, 77% are items studied at Ukek and its surrounding area [3, pp. 263, 265]. In the Volga region, glass-making shops are known in the Bulgar and Selitrennoe ancient towns. Frit (a semi-finished product for glass manufacturing) was discovered in Tsarevskoe ancient town [10, p. 239]; semi-finished products were also found in the ancient town of Uvek. Chemical analysis of the products, along with discoveries of slag, fused glass, defective beads and sticks for drawing eyes on beads, are evidences that jewellery, such as necklaces, pendants, rings, bracelets, was produced in the workshop of Selitrennoe ancient town.

Smithcraft and iron-making were also well-developed. The Golden Horde crafts induced cast-iron production in Europe. Facilities related to iron processing were found not only in towns (Bulgar, Tsarevskoe, and Vodyanskoе ancient towns) but also in many rural settlements of the Golden Horde time. In fact, a set of blacksmith's tools is known among the findings in one of the burial mounds (Malyaevka VI, burial mound 4). In the Ulus of Jochi, blacksmiths used iron anvils, sledgehammers, hammers, blacksmith tongs, pliers, metal shears, pincels, files, nail headers, and chisels. Codex Cumanicus in the Cuman version mentions the terms forge (chura'), blacksmith (temirzi'), jeweller (altunči'), bellows (curuc'), coal (comur'), sledgehammer (čacuć), anvil (ors'), tongs (cheschač), file (egau'), knife (bičac) and coil spring (msa') in the Cuman variant [47, pp. 96–97; 48, p. 90]. A wide range of blacksmith technologies were known in the Golden Horde: goods were manufactured not only from bloomery iron but also from raw and whole steel, pack metal; forge welding techniques were also used, along with techniques of welding steel plates in the blade base, end, side and V-shaped welding of steel plates onto the blade, copper carburising, quenching, and soldering.

The range of blacksmiths' products was extremely wide: colters, ploughshares, openers, politsas, mattoks, ketmens, pickaxes, sickles, scythes, axes, adzes, chisels, knives, scissors, augers, tool bits, pincels, awls, needles, pincers, kchedyks, skilet handles, devices for cattle branding, fish hooks, snaffle bits, stirrups, horseshoes, horse tack rings, saddle ornaments, caulkins, fire strikers, mail armour, plate armour, helmets, arrowheads, spearheads and dart tips, sabers, maces, flails, daggers, quiver hooks, buckles, sulgams, onlays, hash marks, badges, cartridges, belt tips, bucket bails, candlesticks, rushlight holders, boxes, chains, wire, wedges, nails, brackets, cramp irons, latches, handles, door onlays, locks and keys. Cast iron was used to cast cauldrons, chalices, and hubs for cart axles.

Non-ferrous metallurgy was also highly developed—numerous casting moulds, melting pots, casting ladles, jeweller's anvils and hammers, chisels, locksmithing scissors, matrices, production waste, substandard products have been discovered. Waste from the bronze-making
industry have been found not only in towns (Tsarevskoe and Vodyanskoe ancient towns) but also in rural settlements of the Golden Horde. They used casting, fullering, embossing, engraving, and soldering techniques.

Products of non-ferrous metalworking are represented by a large number of various types of items, including buckles, onlays, stripes, belt rings, belt tips, badges, cartridgges, pendants, medallions, sleighbells, bells (a large bronze bell was also found in Tsarevskoe ancient town), buttons, clasps, hat tops, beads, chains, temple rings, earrings, kolts, ear picks, pincers, bow bracing rings, bracelets, hair pins, syulgams, mirrors, iltakhans, mace tips, cauldrons, basins, dippers, chalices, ewers, lids, phials, mortars, pestles, spoons, lanterns, lamps, pen cases, ink stands, kalams (writing sticks), fasteners for horse hobbles, wheels for pulleys, spindle whorls, thimbles, needles, cups for scales, weights, sealing weights, saber guards, sleeves and facings of knives, fire steel handles, facings for whetstones, door handles, bindings, wire, decorative nails, locks and keys.

The chemical composition of certain kinds of items varies and sometimes helps to identify various manufacturing locations of even morphologically similar products. The comparison of a number of Golden Horde products studied by types of alloys (distinguished by A. Konovalov) with the materials discovered in Novgorod and dated to the 12–14th centuries appears to be interesting: among the Lower Volga materials, there are fewer items made of lead-tin bronze (6.7%) than made of tin (46.9%; the predominance of this group can be explained by its numerous examined bronze mirrors, uncommon for ancient Rus'); the number of brass items (2.4%) is smaller in the Golden Horde selection; multi-alloy (copper, tin, zinc and lead 17.7%) and 'pure' lead products are more frequent (5.3%), and there are no products made of 'pure' tin at all. Among the materials from Pskov, dating to the 13–14th centuries, as compared to the Lower Volga region, there are fewer products made of 'pure' copper, and much more (even compared to the Novgorod materials) items made of brass and multicomponent alloys. This data allows us to suppose that brass was imported to the Golden Horde, as well as to Rus', from Western Europe through Baltics [see 21; 22; 52, pp. 49–54].

In Tsarevskoe ancient town, besides a bronze-casting shop, a goldsmith's shop was studied, which was later moved from one homestead to another and contained a furnace, crucibles, casting ladles, letter punches, jeweller's anvil, miniature spoons, numerous droplets of gold, cuts of gold leaves and a gold wire, samples of end products (a golden onlay and a belt tip). Jeweller's shops have also been explored in Old Orhei and Cheboksary. A goldsmith Shashidullah is mentioned in the text on a 1317 tombstone found in the Bulgar ancient town. The techniques of granulation and filigree were widely used in jewellery making.

The Golden Horde jewellers used silver and gold to produce chalices, goblets, buckets (including those attached to belts), plates, trays, ball-shaped vessels, spoons, parts of belt sets, hat-tops, charms, phylactery, paizas, buttons, beads, temple rings, earrings, rings, bracelets, hair pins, hair clasps, chains, combs and their cases, wafers, nails, foil, wire, medallions, pendants and badges. The famous Monomakh's Cap—the Moscow Grand Prince's and later tsar's ceremonial headwear—was manufactured by the toreutics experts of the European part of the Ulus of Jochi in the late 13–early 14th century (the cross and fur trim were added to the cap at a later time) [see 16].

Jewellery making was closely related to stonemasonry. Semi-precious and precious stone working was performed in the Golden Horde cities of the Volga region, including the Bulgar and Selitrennoe ancient towns (raw and primary materials, defective products were found there) [29]. The range of gemstone items includes bead necklaces, pendants, rings, ring inserts, buckles, inlays, plates, vases, and chess pieces. Lots of millstones, sharpening stones, whetstones, hone, fishing sinkers, spindle whorls, and cannon balls were manufactured. Furthermore, stonecutters manufactured gravestones and carved architectural details.
Bone-carving had reached a high level of development and used a number of technologies, including the working of products on a turning lathe, sawing, cutting, applying circular ornamentation, engraving, and polishing. Bone-cutting shops were discovered at the Tsarevskoe, Selitrennoe and Bulgar archaeological sites (colouring with bone carvers was noted there as well), and at the latter, bone ornamented facings of quivers were produced and sold to nomads by urban craftsmen. In two manors of Tsarevskoe ancient town, bone and horn blanks, bone and horn fragments, unfinished items have been discovered; knife handles, pommels, and onlays were also manufactured there. Production waste, blanks, defective products, bone carvers' goods and their tools (augers, cutting irons, special knives, and so on) were discovered in the Bulgar ancient town.

Bone was used to manufacture belt buckles, onlays, tabs, badges, buttons, beads, rings, charms, writing sticks, chess sets, checkers sets, game pieces for playing dibs, dice pieces, piercing pieces, bast shoe weaving tools, combs, ear picks, spoons, scales, needle cases, whip, bodkin handles, sleeves and butt plates for knives, saddles linings, horse hobble fastenings, rings for bracing a bow, whistling nozzles on the stems of iron arrowheads, bone arrowheads for hunting, bow elements and ornamented decorative facings of quivers that were frequently painted in different colours.

Tanning was well-developed. According to archaeological data, leather was used to manufacture bags, purses, pouches, casings, charms, bow coverings, quivers, belts, sirwals, boot and other footwear, headgear, mirror and needle cases. Saddles were also covered with leather. During the excavations in the Bulgar ancient town, there were found more than 1,500 fragments of items (including shoes with asymmetrical soles, manufactured separately for left and right feet), along with leather fragments. Furthermore, in a dwelling dated to the beginning of the 14th century, raw materials (leather fragments of 40 x 30 cm) and tools (cutting knives, a copper needle, an iron awl, and grindstone pieces) were found. Fragments of boots and booties, soft footwear like shoes and sandals were also discovered [41].

Giovanni da Pian del Carpine described in detail the leather armours and barding of the Mongols, as well as iron armours fixed by leather belts and thongs; he also mentioned fox furs wadded from inside [8, pp. 50–51, 80]. William of Rubruck also mentioned leather armours, boots, booties, sirwals, fur trousers, hats and winter fur outerwear of two types: bottoms with the fur inside, and tops with the fur outside. According to him, home fur clothing was also used [8, pp. 98–99, 122, 186, 242]. The Mongol women made clothes (including winter clothes, by sewing skins with sinew threads), shoes, boots, and all other items made of leather [8, pp. 37, 101]. Codex Cumanicus contains contextually related terms, such as furrier (‘ygina tonči’), needle (‘ygina’), scissors (‘bučchi’), thimble (‘oymac’), and thread (‘yp’) in its Cuman version [47, p. 97; 48, p. 90]. The source successively mentions the terms shoe-maker (‘eticči’), boot last (‘kalip’), awl (‘bix’), shoemaker's knife (‘biča eticči’), sole (‘taban’), outsole (top of a shoe) (‘suruc’), morocco (‘sastian’), sheepskin (‘choy suruchi’), boot (‘etic’), shoe (‘basmac’), and toe-cap (‘etic baxi’) [47, p. 99; 48, pp. 91–92].
Fig. 12. Kashi (1, 7–8, 10) and red clay (2–6, 9) glazed ceramics from the Uvek ancient town [57, p. 103, Fig. 28]
Fabric was used to sew clothing and headgear, to produce belts, purses, and mirror cases. Fragments of all these items (including brocade and silk headgear) were found during the excavations at the Golden Horde sites. Unfortunately, the archaeological material has not yet provided scholars with enough information to distinguish fabrics made in the Golden Horde from those imported, as well as locally produced threads from imported ones.

Codex Cumanicus mentions the following words in its Cuman version: wool ('yung'), flax ('usculi'), silk ('ypac'), raw silk ('last'), taffeta ('čux'), nak ('nac'), nasik ('nasič'), velvet ('catifa'), scarlet ('yscarlat') [47, pp. 106–108; 48, pp. 95–96]. Codex Cumanicus also contains such terms as tailor ('derxi'), tailoring scissors ('bizchi', 'chopit') [47, p. 98; 48, p. 91]. Ibn Battuta mentions tents made of linen and colourful silk, as well as a linen fence around them, which were prepared by the emir and the qadi of Azak to meet the emir of Khwarezm, Temür Qutlugh, who
arrived and stepped on pieces of silk cloth. The Arab traveller also reports on brocade cloaks for horses, which were used to draw arabas (carriages) of noble Mongol women with their attendants, all dressed in silk decorated with precious stones and embroidered with gold [34, pp. 285, 292]. The chronicles of the Battle of Kulikovo mention clothing ('porty'), and the extended edition of Zadonshchina ['the region beyond the Don River'] reports damask, nasik ('nosechi', 'nasycheve'), 'uzorochye' among the trophies captured by the Russian warriors [23, pp. 10, 40, 81, 103, 118, 131]. Giosafat Barbaro reports about the Golden Horde clothiers ('artesani de drapi'); he mentions silk, scarlet, and rag images of deities [2, pp. 140–141, 157, 173, 181–182, 260]. Noblemen wore brocade and silk clothing [8, p. 100; 15, p. 90], while the poor had to use linen, cotton, and woolen fabrics [8, p. 99]. Broadcloth was used to cover carriages (blue broadcloth is mentioned in particular) [2, p. 144; 34, p. 288] and to make ongons [15, p. 90].

Fig. 15. Plates (1–4), knives (5, 8), rings (6–7), anvils (9–10), filling of a gating canal (11), a chisel (12) and jeweller's hammers (13–14) from the Uvek ancient town. 1–4—gold, 5–6, 8, 12–14—iron, 7, 9–11—bronze [52, Fig. 60]
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Fig. 16. Stone casting moulds from the Uvek ancient town, collected by F. Dukhovnikov in 1893 (State Historical Museum (SHM), no. 34162, inv. 952, nos. 10–12)

Fig. 17. Stone casting moulds from the Uvek ancient town, collected by F. Dukhovnikov in 1893 (State Historical Museum (SHM), no. 34162, inv. 952, no. 12)
Written sources mention only the broadcloth produced in the Golden Horde and the Khwarezm silk; the other fabrics mentioned in the territory of the Ulus of Jochi were of foreign origin. It should be noted, however, that the Golden Horde imported fabrics and raw materials (raw silk, linen, cotton in the form of yarn and shreds) to start their production and not ready-made clothing, as evidenced by written sources and archaeological finds of clothes of their own design.

Felt was also used [2, pp. 144, 213, 222; 8, pp. 27–29, 32–33, 51, 91–92, 94, 99, 101, 122, 130, 166, 177; 15, p. 90; 34, pp. 281, 286] to cover and design araba carriages, trunks, to manufacture blankets, coats, shabraques, 'rain hats', shoes, and images of deities (ongons). According to Giovanni da Pian del Carpine, Mongol carriages had 'walls and top covered with felt, and felt doors' [8, p. 27]. Here is how William of Rubruck describes a Mongol carriage: 'A house they sleep in they put on wicker wheels; its logs are rods converging at the top to form a small wheel, from which a neck resembling a chimney protrudes upward; they cover it with white felt, often saturate the felt with calx, white soil, and bone powder to make it sparkle; and sometimes they use black felt. They decorate the felt around the top neck with beautiful and diverse ornaments.
The multi-coloured felt is also hung at the entrance. They sew together coloured or other felt composing grape-vines and trees, birds and animals' [8, p. 91]. According to the following report of William of Rubruck, felt was also used to manufacture trunks: 'rectangular boxes of the size of a large trunk are made of chopped small rods; then these rods are arranged in a canopy from one side to another, and a small inlet is made on the front; afterwards, the boxes are covered with black felt and soaked in fat or sheep milk to protect them from rain. Such boxes are evenly decorated with multi-coloured or plumy fabrics' [8, pp. 91–92]. Remains of felt linings are occasionally found under the buried bodies in the coffins of nomads. Mongolian women used to make felt and cover carriages with it [8, p. 101].

Fig. 19. Details of the silver belt set from burial site 4 excavated in 1913 in the Uvek ancient town [57, p. 29, fig. 4]
Woodworking is also worth mentioning. Due to the poor wood preservation at the Golden Horde sites, archaeologists managed to discover only a few types of products of wood carvers who used turning lathes in their work, which included saddles, quivers, bows, arrow shafts, scabbards, whip, knife and bodkin handles, bases for bokk hats, needle cases, charms, boxes, cups, bowls and plates, kobyzes (a string musical instrument), combs, and spoons. Wooden tableware was frequently ornamented with colourful paints.

Building reached a high level of development in the Golden Horde. Codex Cumanicus contains contextually related terms, such as carpenter ('cherchi'), axe ('balta'), splitting maul ('buran'), saw ('bičchi'), plummet ('uxun ip'), chisel ('uturgu'), hammer ('čachuč'), scribe-compass ('pargal'), hand plane ('uscu'), mallet ('tocmac'), and tool bit ('schinia') in its Cuman version [47, pp. 99–100; 48, p. 92]. Constructions in the the Lower Volga region include mosques, mausoleums, bathhouses, palaces, and houses as a rule equipped with horizontal kan chimneys, heated couches (sufas), and toshnau basins. There are also household and production facilities. In addition to wooden dwellings, such as half dugouts or dugouts, buildings made of stone,
Adobe or fired brick were also discovered. There were fences around manors in the urban area (sometimes rather massive walls). Cities possessed squares, ponds, wells, aryks, drainage facilities, earthenware ducts, not to mention fountains and public toilets.

Fig. 21. Onlays (1–23, 33) and patches (24–32) from the Uvek ancient town. 1–21, 24, 27–33—bronze, 22—bone and iron, 23—stone, 25—iron, 26—bone [57, p. 32, Fig. 6]
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Fig. 22. Temple rings (1–4), earrings (5–11), kolt (12), rings (13–23), and bracelets (24–33) from the Uvek ancient town. 1–3, 5–33—bronze, 4—silver [52, Fig. 35]

To sum up, agriculture of the sedentary regions of the Golden Horde was well-developed. In agriculture, millet was mainly cultivated, which was followed in order of importance by rye, wheat, barley, oats, and peas. Hunting was more important as a source of valuable fur rather than meat. Meat food of the Lower Volga region population during the Golden Horde period mainly consisted of products provided by well-developed cattle breeding (beef, lamb, and horse meat); products were exported to Europe and the Middle East, up to India. Fishing was also well-developed, and its products were exported all the way up to Italy. In the nutrition of the Lower Volga region population, the consumption of sturgeons and belugas was particularly
important. Among the trades, salt making, bee-keeping, harvesting of nuts, herbs, and roots should be noted. The Ulus of Jochi had well-developed crafts for that time: pottery, iron and non-ferrous metallurgy and metal working, jewellery making, glass making, weaving, stone-cutting, tanning, woodworking, and felt production.

Fig. 24. Bronze mirrors from the Uvek ancient town [57, p. 49, Fig. 9]
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Fig. 25. Bronze mirrors from the Uvek ancient town [57, p. 55, Fig. 10]

Fig. 26. Bronze mirrors from the Uvek ancient town [57, p. 58, Fig. 11]
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Fig. 27. Halves of bronze locks from the Uvek ancient town [57, p. 90, Fig. 22]

Fig. 28 Silver gilded belt ladle from the Uvek ancient town in the vault grave burial, excavated by engineer Ujejski in 1913 [58, p. 106, Fig. 40]

Fig. 29 Fragment of an ornamented bone knife handle from the ancient settlement of Shirokiy Buerak in Saratov oblast, excavations by L. Nedashkovsky in 2002, excavation I–2002, pit 1 (Saratov)
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Regional Museum of Local History


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25. Petrenko A. Stanovlenie i razvitie osnov zhivotnovodcheskoj deyatel'nosti v istorii narodov Srednego Povolzh'ja i Predural'ja (po arxeozoologicheskim materialam) (The formation and development of animal breeding bases in the history of nations of the Middle Volga and Cisural Regions [according to the archaeozoological materials]). Kazan: Institut istorii Akademii Nauk Respubliki Tatarstan 2007. 144 p.


§ 3. Tatars and Merchants on the Black Sea Border in the 13th and 14th Centuries: When Interests and Conflicts Align

Nicola Di Cosmo

Over the past few years, European and Asian historians have demonstrated that the dominant periods of nomadic invasions were not simply turning points that catapulted civilization back to its initial stage of development but rather times when scorched earth politics and plundering were at least partially in balance with positive achievements. This historiographic tendency underscores the necessity to, above all, recognize the concrete societal contribution of nomads, who indeed made it possible to establish contacts and connections throughout Europe, and contributed to their further development. This is particularly evident in the century following the Mongol conquests, when the Turkic-Mongol courts, armies, and administrative structures dictated the terms that regulated the flow of people and goods from China to the Mediterranean. The world became more open; distant countries became more accessible, and knowledge was enriched thanks to increased travel and cultural exchange.

To a significant extent, this openness was also a result of the inalienable need of nomadic empires for a means of living, where trade is an obvious source of income, making commercial communities obligated to pay taxes and tributes. The rulers needed commercial income (besides other types of income) to compensate expenses for large court complexes, individual security, permanent armies, and also to maintain the ‘lifestyle’ habits of themselves and their large families. Merchants were also relatively unpretentious partners and easy to find a common tongue with despite linguistic, religious, and political barriers. On the other hand, the attitude of the Mongols to the government was characterised by a clear tendency to use loyal foreigners and the flow of goods and merchants. In 1370 in his correspondence with the Grand Duke

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15 In regard to the statement that access and control over ‘economic zones’ is most important for the explanation of survival and success of the Mongol policy, see: [14, pp. 122–129].

16 However, we must note two opposite tendencies in the attitude of Mongol courts towards foreigners. One of them was exclusive, and for the most part disregarded foreigners, while the second was inclusive, cosmopolitan, and accessible for people of diverse cultural, ethnic, and religious origins. During the reign of Kublai (Khubilai) Khan (period of reign 1260–1294) and particularly after his death in the period from 1295 to 1368, the second tendency dominated, and many foreigners, especially of Turkic descent, served in the Yuan administration [see 51, pp. 281–310].
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Yaroslav Yaroslavich, the Golden Horde khan provided free passage for merchants and guaranteed their protection [44, p. 144]. Thus, according to the general consensus, at least on the whole, the Mongols played a central role in the golden age of trade, which, in turn, allowed the Europe and Asia of the late 13th and entire 14th centuries to move closer together and get to know each other much better than in previous periods.

But this network of exchanges and connections did not appear accidentally, or as a result of a general increase in global openness. Rather, in line with the convincing assertion put forth by Thomas Olsen in his recent research on Chinese–Iranian relations during Mongol rule, the increase in the volume of 'cross-cultural exchanges' (an expression borrowed from world history research) was closely associated with the Mongol factor [2, pp. 189–211]. In a nutshell, the point of view eloquently defended by Allsen was that the flow of people, ideas, and goods from Asia was determined, to a large extent, by the fact that the Mongols liked what they needed and had a vested interest in it. Chinese and West Asian scholars gathered at the Mongol courts not because of a spontaneous desire to compare their scientific notes but because the Mongols wanted to test the efficiency, benefits, power of persuasion, and relative value of diverse cultural traditions. This touched upon such diverse spheres as religion, cooking, astronomy, and engineering. Thus, 'cross-cultural relations' were subject to processes of filtration and adaptation, in which the Mongol rulers always occupied the most central and critical place. They controlled it insofar as they created the conditions for certain goods and people to travel around Eurasia faster and in larger numbers than others.

From this point of view, which is more favourable analytically, even a cursory review of the vast literature on the Black Sea as the most important link between Europe and Asia, described as a 'rotating food table' of international trade, shows that the role the Mongols and especially the Golden Horde played in it, requires a more precise definition. I fell under the impression that at times, the role of the Mongols is underestimated, and at others is overestimated. The degree of underestimation is obvious when considering that European expansion, for example, in terms of increasing maritime power and advancing the organisation of commercial activity, prompted the Italian sea powers of the 13th century to expand their influence in the Black Sea and beyond [50, pp. 96–114]. This particular point of view firmly focuses on the European theatre of action and is inclined to consider the emergence of Venice and Genoa as trade and military powers, as well as their interaction with the Byzantine Empire and many other European and Middle Eastern protagonists, including the pope, Muslims, northern European powers, and others. However, as prominent historians pointed out long ago, despite the fact that the Treaty of Nymphaeum (1261) provided Genoa with a commercial monopoly to the east of Bosphorus, it was the Tatars who allowed them 'to open up shop' in Crimea [see also 26, p. 92]. What the Mongols wanted, how they perceived these relations, and what manner they allowed them to develop in: all these are issues that must be considered in light of our knowledge about the Mongols' attitude toward the government, international relations, and commercial agreements.

What sometimes seems to be underestimated is the negative influence of the end of Pax Mongolica on international trade, combined with the alleged closure of the Ming China for foreign

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17 Literature on the Black Sea trade is too extensive to cite here in its entirety. However, after studying the main part of the important and minor works, I could not find any research that gave the Mongols (or 'Tatars', a more convenient term combining both the Turks and Mongols) a central role or paid attention to their activities in a way they deserve. This distortion is largely inevitable if we look at the nature of sources, highly rich in the 'latin' side and very meager in the Golden Horde side.

18 Phillips summarised this argument quite well. His book provides a balanced picture of European factors that contributed to the growth of eastern trade and, of course, played a very important role and cannot be attributed to the contrived 'eurocentric' imagination.
merchants[^19]. All in all, Italian trading depots continued to function up until the Ottoman conquest, and even that could not entirely eradicate Italian business circles [63, pp. 221–237; see also 19, pp. 134–141]. Secondly, serious difficulties in relations with Tatar rulers were experienced even before the fall of united and effective government in the Golden Horde. Thirdly, even though there was relative security provided by Tatar control over trade routes, after approximately 1360, there was increased instability and higher risks, although Black Sea trade never stopped entirely. In fact, it can be argued that the Genoese were more effective in imposing their terms of trade in the Black Sea starting approximately in 1360 simply because of the fact that now the power of Tatar rulers was reduced by internecine wars in the Golden Horde, and Tatars were therefore forced to cede them vast territories and trading rights. Conversely, in Europe in the latter half of the 14th century, many factors hindered investments in long-distance trade. Among these can be mentioned the credibility crisis of Genoese and Venetian merchants, which came into being in the latter half of the 14th century and perhaps was associated with the fall of Mongol-ruled Persia and the Black Death [31, p. 1]. Wars waged by Genoa and Venice in 1350–1355 and later, both against each other and against other enemies, burned through capital that could have instead been invested in commercial purposes[^20]. Another sign of the investment 'crisis' in international trade at the end of the 14th century was the increased difficulties in organising muda (maritime trade convoys) in the Black Sea [on muda, see 33, pp. 649–664; 9, pp. 172–194]. And perhaps the most important circumstance was the change of trade practices, where international business began to rely more on local (and stationary) foreign agents than on the initiative of traveling merchants and ship captains [37, pp. 343–348]. In general, despite the fact that Black Sea colonies were still considered pillars of the Italian trade network, the general tendency towards consolidation reduced the ability and readiness of Italian merchants to penetrate into more distant markets.

The purpose of this work is to consider certain aspects of the role of Tatars in encouraging or restraining the system of profits and the continuation of commercial and political relations between Italians and Tatars in the Black Sea. There are many levels of analysis that need to be considered in this regard, such as official relationships between 'states' and, so to speak, local relations that developed between the local authorities and merchants. Another aspect to consider is that the Venetian and Genoese factories in the Black Sea region and their respective positions in relation to the Tatars differed in terms of origin, geopolitical considerations, commercial influence, and legal status. However, based on the assumption that relations between merchants and Tatars included primarily the pursuit of mutual interests through a series of agreements and amendments, I compared these levels of analysis with two comprehensive categories of 'alignment of interests' and 'conflicts', focusing primarily on political and economic relations.

*Alignment of interests.*

Naturally, Tatar and 'Latin' wants coincided in their mutual readiness to be involved in business relations that involved earning income by the exchange of goods. Both the direct and indirect benefits shall be taken into consideration in the analysis of these relations from the Tatar side. Among various factors, we can mention the proceeds from trade charged by political authorities, the involvement of Tatar merchants in international trade, including partnership relations with European merchants, and the involvement of 'ordinary' subjects of the Golden Horde in minor trade. Among the less direct factors, we can mention proceeds from the 'transaction costs' of merchants trading abroad, including the rental of pack animals and labour, storage costs, and transit fees. They could total significant amounts and must have made their contribution to the local economies along trade routes during the period of increased intensity of long-distance trade in the

[^19]: In regard to the term 'pax mongolica', see [38, p. 480]; see also [49, pp. 549, 558]. In regards to the decline in international trade as a result of its end, see [43, p. 571].

[^20]: A description of the influence of long wars on the ability of merchants to invest in foreign trade can be found in [41, pp. 97–101].
first decades of the 14th century. The expansion of trade networks also contributed to the development of cities in territories controlled by the Tatars; such cities as Sarai, Urgench, and Tabriz became commercial centers of international import with markets often visited by merchants of diverse origins and ethnic affiliations [20, pp. 140–147].

Commercial charges (commercium, from the Greek κομμερκίον), levied by the Golden Horde on Italian trading colonies, had a low fixed rate of 3% of the value of the goods but were later increased for Venice to 5% [54, pp. 8, 13; 58, p. 261]. The land tax (terraticum) was imposed on the Venetian settlement in Tana under a treaty dated 1333, which granted Venice the privilege of establishing a commercial colony (or 'factory') there. These taxes were controlled by the Tatar ruler in Crimea, residing in Solkhat, who was in charge of maintaining orderly relations with sometimes disobedient Italians, and in some cases, represented the khan in diplomatic negotiations. Italian colonies, Kaffa in particular, had improved the complex local bureaucracy that facilitated the collection of duties and regulation of trade, although the specific details are ultimately unknown [there are several pieces of research on this issue; about Genoa, see 3, pp. 87–129; see also 52, pp. 177–266]. Kaffa also paid tribute (canlucum) to the khan in recognition of his supremacy [8, p. 273]. Agreements were entered into and signed directly with the Golden Horde khan, whose authority as the main political power in the region was never fully challenged, even after Genoa managed to gain full control over a significant part of the Crimean coastal regions in the 1380s. Other taxes were imposed randomly, as we can see from a complaint filed by the Venetian consul of Tana on 4 August 1333, according to which the officials of the Tatar aristocrat 'Tatamir'21 extorted additional taxes from certain merchants [15, p. 204, note 161].

Trade.

While the Italian factories in the Black Sea were end points for both local (Pontic, South Russian, Anatolian, and Caucasian) and international trade with Central Asia, Persia, China and even India, local trade was indeed more important in economic and strategic perspective, although the relative importance of both types of trade has been widely discussed for some time (see below). Local trade mainly consisted of grain, nomadic and hunting products, such as skins and furs, fish, caviar, and slaves. International trade mainly consisted of silk and spices, pearls and precious stones22. Famine in Europe sparked Venice and Genoa to start searching out alternative sources of basic food, and the coast of the Black Sea region, along with the coastal regions of Bulgaria and the territory to the north of Tana, offered foods that could satisfy European demand at the relatively low cost of sea transportation. Access to this food not only earned money for those who controlled access to it, but also provided a powerful strategic weapon that Genoa and Venice sought to use, despite the fact that they had already established a broad Mediterranean network for the importation of wheat. As we can see from the words of chronicler Martin da Canal, the famine of 1268 caused Venice to feel vulnerable and encouraged it to look for additional sources of grain on the vast and fertile lands around the Black Sea [11, pp. 324–325; see also 9, pp. 130, 135–136].

Leather was important in the medieval economy, and it is no coincidence that the leather-working workshops on the island of Giudecca in Venice became famous world-wide for its high leather processing quality just at the time when leather was being imported in large quantities from the Golden Horde [40, p. 56]. But another sphere in which the Tatars, it appears, were also very active was the slave trade. It is well known that this enterprise was one of the most prosperous commercial activities of the time. People, not necessarily merchants, were often involved in the slave trade and could sell slaves (sometimes members of their own family) to European merchants for the Mediterranean markets, as well as for use in the homes of Italian

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21 It is unclear who specifically was referred to, but Tash Timur later served as a general of Tokhtamysh, and it is possible that this could be the same person [see 55, p. 270].
22 For a comprehensive review of products in the Black Sea trade, see [4, II, pp. 717–868].
residents in Crimea. Mamluk Egypt imported men from the territory of the Golden Horde to use as slave soldiers, while in Europe, they were mainly used as home servants, concubines, and rarely, for other purposes as well. Most of the sales of slaves registered in the notarial documents relate to young women aged 12 to 18. In this regard, among the Italians there were professional slave resellers who penetrated into the inner regions to buy their 'goods' in order to sell them later in Kaffa, Tana, and other colonies, or to merchants who then transported them to Italy, or to agents of Italian customers. But we also have examples of Tatars who sold their slaves directly. Many slaves were not Tatars but rather Russians, Circassians, Hungarians, and members of other nations captured during raids. One such raid is colourfully described in the narration of Giosafat Barbaro, who joined the detachment of Tatars that decided to attack a passing caravan of Circassians. There is no doubt that the fearless type of Tatars with whom the Venetians made friends were tempted to sell the spoils of raids to slave resellers themselves. Al-ʿUmarī, an Arab author from Mamluk Sultanate, shows that famine in the territories under Tatar rule sometimes forced people to sell their own children into slavery. Other similar sources by Baybars al-Mansuri and Al-Nuwayri state that women and children were sold into slavery due to consequences resulting from civil war among the Tatars. Even Öz Beg Khan (1312–1341) had no objection selling people captured during wars or plundering raids. It is no surprise that the Tatars welcomed the presence in the Golden Horde's threshold of customers eager to supply the markets of Europe and North Africa.

Trade did not stop during periods of political and military tension, as we can see from the accusations made by Venice against Genoa that they failed to observe the terms of devetum (trade prohibition) which both cities agreed on during the war against the Golden Horde (1343–1347). These accusations contain a clear reference to a Tatar commander who was in charge of certain regions in the Crimea and still allowed to trade, despite military actions and a mutual embargo, while also charging an income tax on the vigorous Genoese merchants. This document implies the existence of a hidden economy of gifts and bribes, which obviously 'greased the wheels' in relations between the Tatar military, civilian officials, and Italian residents.

Transit fees.

The description of fees and duties to be paid by merchants travelling from Asia is presented by Pegolotti in his description of ordinary prices for shipping cargo by land from Ayas to Tabriz. A number of charges for entry, transit, overnight storage, and security from the point of entry into the land of Ilkhan Abu Said (1316–1335) to Tabriz amounted to the considerable sum of 209 aspri (Italian: aspri) for the cargo on one animal. In terms of comparison, we can note that a house in Kaffa sometimes cost around 400 aspri, though the majority of houses were much more expensive.

On the way from Tana to China, Pegolotti points to another procedure for spending money on hired people (translators, guards, guides, and others), food, and animals. With respect to his note that the route from Tana to Sarai was less safe than in other places and recommendation that it would be advisable to form a caravan of sixty people for mutual protection, we can see that the income earned by the Chinggisid states from payments for services and charges must have been significant.
Other conclusions.

Neither should we forget that Italian cities were centres of not only trade but also craft and manufacturing, and had craftsmen at their disposal (soldiers sent to Tana were also craftsmen) [16, p. 253].

Knowledge from experts on issues that might have held importance for Mongol rulers was also available. One example of this can be found in the edicts of Lamberto di Sambuceto. On 11 May 1290, a falconer named John de Rain was hired by Pietro de Braino until August the same year to accompany him to the court of emperor Argun [5, p. 192, no. 513]. The falconer would have been given 800 aspri and had his expenses covered had he ultimately reached the court (Orda) of the emperor. However, the document does not specify what the duties of the falconer were. It is reasonable to assume that Pietro planned to use the skills of the falconer to be accepted by Argun and, possibly, to obtain a commercial agreement. However, no additional information can be found, except that a few days earlier, the emissaries of Argun compensated a group of merchants for their damages incurred as a result of robbery by the Jurzuchi. At that time, the relations between Argun and the Genoese were good, and the compensation could have been a signal of the Ilkhan's intention to protect foreign merchants, in that way inviting more merchants to his lands [4, I, pp. 181–182, no. 459].

On some occasions, Romans served as mercenaries in Tatar armies. For example, Genoese troops fought on the side of Mamai, a prominent temnik [general] of the Golden Horde during the Time of Troubles, in his campaign against Grand Prince Dmitry of Moscow and were defeated alongside him in a landmark battle on Kulikovo field on 8 September 1380 [31, p. 69].

Global market?

Sharp criticism by M. Finley on the 'global market' idea in the ancient world remains an important warning against excessive generalisations. 'In order to make sense', he stated, the 'global market' or 'single economic bloc' should capture something much more extensive than merely the exchange of goods at great distances. Otherwise, China, Indonesia, the Malay Peninsula, and India would also have to be considered as part of one and the same bloc and global market. What needs to be shown is the existence of interconnected behaviour and responses over vast territories [...] in the dominant sectors of the economy, for example, in prices for food and metals. But no one can do this as of yet, or at least no one has been able to' [18, p. 34].

Researchers have already put forth ample evidence of the existence of 'interconnected behaviours and responses' in the economy of the Black Sea and Mediterranean in the period after the Treaty of Nymphaeum (1261). Venetian and Genoese merchants had by that time developed a network of agents and informants, which allowed them to predict short-term market behaviour over an area covering Europe, the Mediterranean, North Africa, and the Black Sea. But it still needs to be convincingly proven that merchants were capable of operating on the same level outside these regions.

This leads us to the question of just how important was long-distance trade with India and China (and even Iran)? The most outstanding, convincing, and zealous propagandist of the importance of communication with the Far East was undoubtedly Roberto Sabatino Lopez. In numerous studies, he demonstrated that since the middle of the 13th and up until the early latter half of the 14th centuries, perhaps even later, a rapid, regular, and well organised flow of goods was coming from China. He brought to light the names of many Italian and especially Genoese merchants who were active in this long-distance form of trade, names that earlier had just been buried in wills, notarised sales certificates, or court cases. Additional evidence of regular exchanges with the Far East has been found in the detailed information provided in the guide by Pegolotti: what they sold and purchased, exchange rates, routes, and many other practical issues.

26 For the tendency of Venetian merchants to base their business decisions on short-term forecasting, see [61, pp. 547–557].
beneficial for merchants were included in his treatise. Although not a unique work in its own right, it is a specific, sophisticated, and systematic example of that type of existing (perhaps in large numbers) merchant guides one of which, for example, was partially published by Robert-Henri Bautier [8, pp. 311–331].

On the other hand, Bautier argued in favour of a much more limited, irregular, inconsistent, and almost irrelevant economic exchange of goods with the Far East. Bautier's argument was based mainly on the meager amount of spices arriving by the continental route from distant regions to Tana and other parts of the Black Sea area [8, pp. 278–310]. On the western side, Europeans were able to make a minor contribution, as the main article of European export, ready-made and raw fabrics, could be easily sold either at the Black Sea ports or intermediate markets, such as Sarai and Urgench in Central Asia. In addition, it appears that a number of expeditions to India and China were 'one-off' activities, the participants of which were eager to get 'presents' from fantastically rich eastern rulers in exchange for 'donating' mechanical miracles, such as the fountains and clocks brought to the Sultan of Delhi by one group of Venetians [37, p. 346]27. There were also some other valuable and unique items, for example, horses and glassware most likely transported to the Chinese emperor by the Genoese Andaló da Savignone. The question is, can an argument in favour of the much more significant and regular Far East trade be based on the presumptive justification Lopez puts forth about the existence of regular, consistent, and abundant import traffic of cheap silk [36, pp. 13–33]? This is a serious argument based mainly on a 'default', that is, on the assumption that the silk used in Italy was mainly of Chinese origin, although origins as such were not specified.

Along with the accumulation of knowledge about the Genoese and (to a lesser extent) Venetian commercial interests in the Far East, cumulative proof has led to the assertion that international trade in the first decades of the 14th century became less regular, and that merchants, not just the adventurers themselves, earned their living by visiting the most distant markets in Beijing and Quanzhou (Zaitong). Such names as Vivaldi, Stancone, Bonaccia, Spezza, Ghisolfi, Bestagno, Savignone, Vegia, Malrasi, Gentile, Ultramarino, Adorno, Basso, and many others indicate the participation of individuals and families in the Far East trade. According to Michel Balard, the Asian route to China through Peru—Kaffa—Tana—Sarai—Urgench became a standard route following the fall of the ilkhans and the end of Italian trade with Persia after 1340 due to the harassment and looting that took place in Tabriz [6, pp. 681–689]. Tabriz was the most important centre of Italian commercial presence in continental Asia from 1290 to 1340. However, the Mongolian route through Central Asia only operated until the Ming dynasty overthrew the Mongol Empire in 1368 and almost closed its borders for international trade.

However, we have very little information about the type and volume of traffic, and the evidence that is available, regardless of the number of families who indeed earned their living (and sometimes their death) by trading in said distant regions, is not sufficient enough to assert that this implies an integrated market between the Mediterranean and China. In other words, even though it was significant, the penetration of commercial interests into far Asia did not give rise to any structural modifications of international trade in accordance with the type of 'colonisation' we observe in the Black Sea. This colonisation was facilitated by a mixture of personal and state interests, was supported by diplomatic agreements and political decisions at the governmental level, and protected by armed forces. Instead, Far East activities remained the prerogative of individuals and merchants, and an attempt to penetrate distant markets was never the primary goal of Italian maritime republics. Access to the products of India and China was in the hands of Muslim intermediaries, and the North African ports remained the main markets for purchasing spices and other products from the south, south-east, and east of Asia.

27 For more on the support provided by Tatars to Venetian merchants travelling from Urgench to Ghazna, see [27, pp. 252–253].
Indeed, the fact that the Ming did not want, as mentioned above, to support the activities of Italian merchants should not necessarily be interpreted as a complete closure to the foreign trade [49, p. 558]. Maritime trade flourished during the initial period of the Ming, as is well known from the navigational exploits of admiral Zhèng Hé, so it is more reasonable to assume that the Ming responded to the presence of western people, who enjoyed so many privileges under the Mongols to the detriment of the Chinese. Perhaps, the personal ties the Genoese and Venetian merchants were able to establish with the Mongol rulers in China eventually became the cause of their own collapse. But this model differed from reality in the Black Sea, where Venetians and Genoese persisted in sending missions and entering into diplomatic and commercial agreements even when the centralised government in the Kipchak Khanate fell and was followed by a chaotic and unstable political situation. In my opinion, this can be interpreted to mean that long-distance trade between the Mediterranean and China operated solely because it was actively supported by the Chinggisid states; this condition was also the primary factor that made the presence of Italian merchants possible in the Far East, aside from, of course, their own initiative. For this reason, the end of Pax Mongolica was particularly significant in the sense that support from the Mongolian state thus proved to be meaningless, and Italian merchants were unable to promote and protect their interests during successive powers.

The prosperity of international trade required active state protection not only to maintain the security of routes but, first and foremost, to ensure that market conditions were fair, the property of the deceased merchants was not lost, exchange rates were robust, and the circulation of money was enough for the needs of higher-value transactions. All of these factors could not exist without the existence of formal agreements and contracts with local authorities. Both Genoa and Venice made considerable efforts to promote the establishment of these terms in their agreements with the authorities they dealt with, including Byzantines, Mamluks, the Greek rulers of Trebizond and, of course, the Golden Horde and Ilkhanate. However, the Italian states never tried to initiate official relations with China, and ceased cooperation with Persia after the unsuccessful attempts of the successors of ilkhans to provide trade protection [39, p. 183].

The mission led by Andalò da Savignone to promote diplomatic contact between the dynasty of Yuan and the maritime republics was met with noted attentiveness from the Senate of Venice. What the Mongol Khan of China, Toghon Temür, wanted from the West, was clearly described in his diplomatic correspondence with European powers mediated by the Genoese merchant Andalò da Savignone: horses and other wonderful things (alia mirabilia). He intended to purchase in Venice between five to ten horses at the cost of two thousand florins, along with crystal 'jewels' (iocalia) at the same high cost from one to two thousand florins. In order to encourage the Senate of Venice with this particular diplomatic gesture, he promised to set forth on a Venetian ship. We do not know whether this request was satisfied or not, but we know that Andalò headed out on a Genoese ship, which first landed in Naples and then headed out to Kaffa, where the caravan with gifts continued its way onwards to China. At least one of the Italian horses eventually reached Beijing, presumably escorted by Italians [49, p. 555].

It seems to me that the Mongol request completely clarifies the nature of the contact the Yuan emperor was aiming for; obviously, the type of 'gifts' requested from the West corresponded to the tribute exchanges maintained by China with many independent states. The Italian delegation with its horses and other wonderful things, once they reached the Yuan court, would be considered as a tribute mission from a distant subordinate people, thus increasing the prestige of the imperial court of China.

Relations between Toghon Temür and the West were undoubtedly guided by a double aim of 'getting tribute' according to the Chinese tradition and opening doors for official rela-

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28 The 'florin' was a gold Florentine coin minted since 1252. It weighed 3.54 grams and was widely used in the Mediterranean.
tions with foreign countries. However, the Western side did not take advantage of this opportunity. The duty of presenting exotic gifts was reserved for individuals when the Venetian or Genoese states, it appears, were not inclined to initiate official relations with distant courts, even though they were well-acquainted with the tribute forms of diplomatic exchanges and had at their disposal people familiar with the customs of the Yuan court, who could easily act as intermediaries.

If we consider the key link between state support and commercial penetration into distant markets, we can see that the more we move away from the epicentre of commercial interests (in the Mediterranean and adjacent coasts), the weaker state interference becomes. In this area of interest, the Venetians and Genoese did not retreat from the Black Sea, even when they were under serious threat, and continued to search for 'points of contact' with local authorities while desperately defending their positions. Outside this sphere, the activities of the Italian merchants depended on the readiness and ability of the Mongol governments to facilitate the creation of favourable trade conditions.

The collapse of the Chinggisid courts, which actively supported trade, coincided with a sharp decline in long-distance trade, meaning this occurred mainly because the governments of the Italian republics were still not interested in establishing diplomatic relations with the Far East. On the other hand, they continued to negotiate and fight for their positions in the Black Sea even when the political crisis in the Golden Horde made this activity extremely difficult and risky. No matter how extensive and regular they were, private interests simply could not survive for a long time in an environment where they did not enjoy fair or at least predictable protection and legal status, which could only be guaranteed by official diplomatic agreements. Therefore, here we shall briefly consider what kind of treaties between the states regulated the presence of merchants and what guarantees they typically provided.

**Diplomatic activity.**

The mission of Venetian ambassador Jacopo Cornaro to Sarai (between 1360 and 1362) during the 'civil war' in the Golden Horde is a clear indication of the relentless attention payed by the Venetian Senate to establishing good relations with anyone and everyone in power. Before taking up this mission, Cornaro, as a Venetian consul in Tana, had the opportunity to study the political situation in the steppe. According to the detailed research by Skržinskaja, the khan who he met with was either Khizr or Murad; the same author also asserts that Cornaro's mission was aimed at confirming the rights of Venice in Tana and obtaining compensation for the losses incurred by the Venetians from the subjects of the khan on the khan's territory [53, pp. 67–96]. But it seems that the main issue was ultimately to reduce the commercial tax levied on the Venetians to 4%, which had been previously increased to 5% [57, I, p. 95, no. 355]. Cornaro must have succeeded, as according to the summary of another embassy sent to Mamai in 1369, it was involved in negotiations to further reduce the tax from 4 to 3% [57, I, p. 121, no. 476]. The intensive diplomatic activity of the Venetian government entailed additional costs, bearing in mind that the salary of the consul in Tana was increased from 70 to 110 golden liras, and the budget for administrative expenses was increased by five times to increase headcount and improve protection.

The mission by Cornaro to the Tatar khan emphasises the main issues that underlay diplomatic agreements among the Venetian and Genoese states and the Tatar rulers, including territorial concessions, a favourable tax regime, and the protection of the interests and property of subjects. To these main points we shall also add others associated with particular circumstances, such as negotiations to resume commercial activity after war, compensation for losses incurred

29 On this issue, see [47, pp. 41–116]. It should be noted that there is no reference to the Mongols in his review of the 'Asian empires'.

30 According to one document of the Venetian Senate, this mission was entrusted to the consul in Tana as nobody in Venice wanted to go as an ambassador to 'the Tatar emperor' [see 57, I, p. 96, no. 363].
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by subjects, or the return of captives held by the khan. Again, the grand chaos (the Great Troubles in Russian sources) in the Golden Horde did not present any real obstacles for the preservation of commercial agreements.

Similar agreements were already mentioned in the text of the treaty between Genoa and the Mamluk sultan Qalāwūn in 1290 [see 22, pp. 101-108]. Trade rights and immunities were granted to Genoese merchants on the entire territory of the sultan's domains, and no Genoese could be taken hostage for the crimes or debts of another person. If a merchant died on the sultan's territory and did not leave a will, his property was to be claimed by the Genoese consul or any other Genoese in the absence of the consul. If there were no Genoese, then 'the sovereign of the land' was to hold it until it was officially claimed by Genoa. Moreover, its sale and purchase was to be performed without any pressure or coercion, and only actually sold goods were to be taxed. Loading and unloading, along with other operations, were not to be subjected to restrictions or other charges. Other provisions charged import duties, which, for example, were 10% for silk and wool.

Legal procedures within the framework of the Genoese settlement were also clarified. If a 'Saracen' was suing the Genoese, this claim was to be reviewed by the consul, but if a Genoese filed a complaint against a Saracen, this claim was to be submitted to a financial officer. However, the consul had the right to appeal to the sultan if any Genoese ever sought compensation. The treaty also included concurrent conditions for Muslim merchants in Genoese territories, which essentially granted them the same rights and privileges Genoa enjoyed in Egypt. As Halt notes, despite the fact these conditions are very close to those granted to the Venetians by Mamluk sultan Al Mu'izz Aibak (1254), they have a different political character: the agreement of 1290 was a bilateral treaty between two equal powers and not a list of concessions.

Another issue stipulated in official agreements concerned the protection of the property of merchants who died in a foreign land, in particular on the way from Tana to China. Since death on the road was always possible and merchants carried either money or goods taken on credit from investors in the homeland, the option to reclaim and return the proceeds in case of the death of the merchant was apparently an important issue. According to Pegolotti, 'if a merchant going to or returning [between Tana and China] dies on the road, all his property shall become property of the ruler of the place where he died, and thus shall be given to the officials of the ruler; the same procedure shall be applied if he dies in China. However, if he has a brother or friend who was his brother under statement, they should be able to reclaim the goods, thus keeping the property' [48, p. 22]. It seems to contradict the order attributed to Yasa, or the collection of laws traditionally attributed to Chinggis Khan, according to which, if a person died without any heirs, their property should not be taken by the tsar but given to 'the person who served him' [65, p. 107]. However, the application of this rule to foreign merchants in places where wills could not be drawn up and people who out of necessity lived beyond the limits of established social or kinship ties might serve as an invitation to an unfair game. For this reason, only fellow travellers who were relatives of the deceased or could rightfully argue that they were his relatives could have the right to claim inheritance. Otherwise, property was to belong to the khan, whom the Venetian and Genoese authorities usually addressed at the end their claims for the return of goods lost or stolen by force. In other words, it seems to me that in a situation where, apparently, it was impossible to determine the legitimate heirs of the deceased, the provision to transfer official powers over the unclaimed property rights, thus guaranteeing that third parties could not benefit from the death of a foreigner, can be regarded as designed to protect the safety of merchants [for more discussion on this issue, see 39, p. 176].

This seems to be confirmed by a certain provision in the treaty of Qalāwūn, according to which the unclaimed property of deceased Genoese was returned to the local authorities to be claimed later by other Genoese, based on official request. The fact that the Venetians had the right to claim the property lost by a compatriot who died in 'Tatar regions' is confirmed by the
edict given to the bayyul of Constantinople to do everything possible to return the goods of Francesco da Canale. These goods were kept by the local population, but it appears there was still hope to return them by sending an envoy with an official letter [56, I, pp. 172, 304].

Territorial and commercial privileges were also provided by the Mongol khans on the basis of treaties or concessions. The first documentary example of privileges granted to Venice by the Mongol khan is a letter addressed by the khan of Persia to the Venetian doge in early November 1306 [21, II, pp. 122–124]. This letter, sent by the Tatar sultan (Soldani Tartarorum) Zuka and attributed by Heyd to Ilkhan Öljeytü (1304–1316), contains valuable information about three aspects of Venetian relations with the Mongol khan. Written in the Mongolian language, this document was submitted together with the Latin translation by the khan's envoy whose name is not provided, but most likely he was a 'Latin' serving the Ilkhan as we have seen a number of Italians in such position [58, pp. 47–48]. Expanding on what can be considered more an invitation than a formal concession, the Ilkhan informs the Venetians that their merchants can freely come and go without fear of being persecuted by the local population still waiting for the debts taken by their people to be returned. One more item was mentioned in the appendix to this diplomatic letter as confirmation that the khan's policy came into force; it explained that a certain Khoja Abdullah would not claim compensation for losses incurred by Venetian Pietro Rudolfo and would not hold other citizens of Venice accountable. At its end, two Italians signed as witnesses of this document: Balduccio Buffeto, whose origin is not mentioned, and Tommaso Uzi from Siena, who was hired to serve the Ilkhan as ilduchy or 'sword-bearer' of the ruler. It is important to note that the start of relations with Tabriz coincided with the establishment of peaceful relations with Golden Horde Khan Toqta and Öljeytü in 1304–1305, an event promoted by the political interference of Yuan Emperor Temür. This agreement led to the general resumption of trade across the territory controlled by the Mongols, even though relations between Toqta and the Genoese of Kaffa deteriorated soon after (see below) [65, pp. 82, 191].

The content and circumstances of this letter demonstrate that the Ilkhan was eager to attract Venetian merchants by applying rules strictly to individuals rather than promoting collective responsibility in commercial disputes. It also shows that local merchants were law-abiding in this policy, although we do not know if they were forced to comply with it, or if it was rather the policy they supported and the khan confirmed, perhaps under their influence. Thirdly, we see that western people serving the khan favour Islamic merchants and act, as mentioned earlier, as guarantors of said decision that merchants shall not be held responsible for losses incurred due to the fault of someone else. Here we see, first and foremost, the direct initiative of the Ilkhanate to apply generally accepted rules of international trade (as they should be accepted, bearing in mind they are mentioned in various different diplomatic agreements) in an effort to attract foreign merchants to Persia. As a consequence, the Genoese and Venetian communities in Tabriz prospered over the next three decades, turning the city into the most important centre of long-distance trade in continental Asia until the end of the existence of the Ilkhanate. In Trabzon, the Venetian and Genoese authorities developed closer links and dictated conditions to local rulers that facilitated the establishment of regular communication with the Ilkhanid. In fact, they insisted that the emperor of Trabzon grant tax privileges to merchants from the Ilkhanate in order to attract them to Trabzon [30, p. 416].

The agreement of 1333 entered into by Venetian ambassadors Giovanni Quirino and Pietro Giustinianio, and Öz Beg Khan about the foundation of their factory in Tana included territorial concessions, favourable taxation rates, protection for traders, and provisions in legal disputes. Import duties were fixed at the same rates as with the Genoese of Kaffa. It is interesting to note that

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31 Only Latin translation has been preserved in the archives, while the original Mongolian text has been lost.
disputes were to be resolved by the consul together with 'the sovereign of the land', or a representative of the khan. By this, it was probably understood as the Tatar ruler residing in Solkhat. This is confirmed by an instance when a Tatar official with the title of tudun (Latin, titanus) in 1374 was entrusted with judicial duties over the subjects of the khan until friendly relations between Kaffa and the ruler of Solkhat were resumed \[4, I, p. 286\]. It is perhaps interesting to note here that legal disputes between the people of different ethnic origins were reviewed according to the Yuan code by running joint meetings with the involvement of members of each ethnic group \[12, p. 83\].

Close and regular relations were maintained between the Tatar governor of Solkhat and the Genoese and Venetian governments of Tana and Kaffa. Another document, dated 14 November 1381, also mentions another embassy sent to 'the ruler of Sorgat and the emperor of Gazaria'\[32\]. This embassy had three goals: 1. To request all privileges enjoyed by the Venetians; 2. to explain the terms of the Peace of Turin upon the end of the Venetian–Genoese war, according to which Venice was barred from accessing the Black Sea for two years; 3. to organise the return of goods confiscated from Venetian merchants \[57, I, p. 151, no. 612\]. Again, here we see how diplomatic relations continued to play an important role in maintaining a political environment favourable for trade. Finally, we must note that these missions were expensive and that the gifts presented to the khan were at times quite significant. The state also undertook the economic burden of diplomatic exchanges and recorded this data in state documents\[33\].

As we saw, the Mongol 'alignment of interests' with Italian merchants covered many spheres, as well as a joint desire to create favourable conditions for trade, and was supported by a mutual readiness to find a common tongue, establish relations founded on trust, and reach mutual understanding. But this activity was far from risk-free, and the necessity to protect their own interests sometimes led to conflicts, just like how certain incidents could also escalate.

Conflicts.

Frankly speaking, although the Tatars seem to be supportive of trade, they were far from being 'simpletons'. Conflicts between rulers of the Golden Horde and the Italian colonies periodically broke out in their territory, and as a preliminary evaluation of the causes leading to the violent clashes, we shall note two main points. Firstly, conflicts were not caused by disagreements on commercial issues, and peace, as soon as it was restored, led to the resumption of the conditions of trade with no difference from those observed before the war. Secondly, it appears that military clashes were primarily caused by real or alleged infringements to the sovereign power of the khan. The motives of conflicts associated with the supremacy of power for the most part concerned two spheres: control over territory, and offenses against Tatar subjects.

In 1308, the Golden Horde Khan Toqta attacked the Genoese because of their alleged cooperation with Tabriz (despite the general improvement of relations between the Golden Horde and the Ilkhanate) and also because the Genoese were kidnapping Tatar children and selling them into slavery. In order to punish the Genoese, Toqta moved the merchants from Sarai to Solkhat and confiscated their goods, after which he sent his army against Kaffa. The Genoese resisted for several months but eventually set fire to the city and fled by ship. Toqta's army then entered and plundered the defenseless city on 8 May 1308 \[20, p. 89; 55, p. 84\]\[34\]. The Genoese supported Ilkhan Argun in his fight against the Golden Horde, and the victory of the latter dealt a heavy blow to the interests of the Genoese in the Black Sea. Therefore, it is quite possible that the aggressive behaviour of Toqta reflected an old grudge, but it is also possible that the Tatar child slave trade was so blatant and deprived the khan of so many people

\[32\] Gazaria (or Khazaria, that is, the land of the Khazars) was a term applied not only to Crimea but to the entire khanate of the Golden Horde. The evolution of this term in the Venetian application is explained by Skržinskaja in \[53, pp. 91–95\].

\[33\] The embassy sent in 1369 carried gifts worth 100 silver bars (sommi) \[see 57, I, p. 121, no. 476\].

\[34\] Vernadsky purports that Kaffa was attacked 'because of a misunderstanding between Toqta and the Genoese' but fails to explain the nature of said misunderstanding \[see 65, p. 191; see also 10, p. 283\].
that it provoked an armed attack. However, as mentioned by Brătianu, it is also possible that Toqta was primarily driven by the desire to make the audacious Genoese sensible to 'the weight of his power' [10, p. 283], that is, in order to punish their aggressive and arrogant behaviour, which was typical of the Genoese during the initial period of their commercial activities in the Black Sea and condemned by a number of parties.35

Perhaps the most significant episode of the conflict between the Golden Horde and the Italian colonies was the war led by Jani Beg Khan against Venice and Genoa from 1343 to 1347 [29, pp. 33–51]. As is well known, soon after emperor Jani Beg in 1342 [58, I, pp. 261–263] confirmed the privileges granted to the Venetians by Öz Beg, the incident in Tana caused him to react with force, that is, the expulsion of the Venetians and Genoese from Tana and the start of war between the Golden Horde and Italians, which led to an unsuccessful siege of Kaffa resolved only after several years of chaotic political destabilisation. In September 1343, Venetian merchant Andriolo Kivran killed a Tatar aristocrat who hit or beat him. This was of course illegal, as in addition to his disproportionate response, complaints against the Tatars were to be addressed through the appropriate channels and reviewed by a joint commission.37 The incident aroused the public and led to the armed interference of the government, which culminated in the expulsion of all Italians and the death of some, while others were injured or captured and their property plundered. Ultimately, most Italians managed to escape on their ships [28, pp. 270–272]. Apparently, the Venetians had received an official request to extradite the offender, but it was ignored [42, p. 285].

Tension increased for some time, and it is likely that the real goal of Jani Beg was Kaffa, not Tana, which was the most prosperous and independent Italian colony. Therefore, the legal dispute about legal responsibility reflected the broader problem of to what extent these cities would be allowed to preserve their almost sovereign powers. Even though Venice was granted the right to establish its base on the territory of the Golden Horde just ten years ago, and although its relations with local rulers were extremely attentive, the incident with Kivran showed that Venice was unable to dissociate itself from the hostilities between the Golden Horde and the Genoese. Instead, an unreliable alliance was forged between the Venetians and Genoese in order to protect their respective positions on the Black Sea, making the primary tasks to resume trade and keep their bases.

This could only have been achieved through the resumption of diplomatic negotiations with the khan and the simultaneous strengthening of embargo (devetum) inside the territory of the Golden Horde. This embargo was observed only partially, and in reality, the Venetians accused the Genoese of continuing their commercial operations in Kaffa and other places in violation of the agreement [42, pp. 289–295]. But finally it worked, as both sides were clearly suffering from the decline of trade and Jani Beg could not resolve the conflict through the force of arms. It has also been alleged that the negative consequences of the plague that wrecked the ranks of Tatar troops besieging Kaffa played their role in restoring the state of peace [60, pp. 139–152]. But it should be noted that the Venetians were eager to restore peace and in 1347 achieved conditions largely similar to the pre-war landscape, with the exception that the trade tax was increased from 3 to 5%. On the other hand, the Genoese lost access to Tana until Berdi Beg succeeded Jani Beg on the Golden Horde throne in 1358. But the situation was destined to remain tense throughout this period, and the Tatars threatened Kaffa several times. According to Venetian intelligence reports, in 1352, the Genoese were forced to request immediate assistance from Pyora as the Tatar khan was hostile to them and intended to attack Kaffa [13, p. 210].

35 Greek merchants often complained about the Genoese for their offensive and aggressive behaviour [see 32, II, pp. 675–686].
36 For a detailed study of the decree of Jani Beg, see [1, pp. 33–86].
37 The Yuan code of 1283 clearly states that if a Mongol beat a Chinese, the Chinese could not fight back but instead had to provide witnesses and file a lawsuit to the local authorities. It is quite possible that a similar procedure was followed in the Golden Horde [see 12, p. 85].
Another sign of the tug-of-war between Kaffa and the Tatars is the issue of currency. Asper barikatus (derived from the name of Tatar Khan Berke, 1257–1267) was the coin in use at the time in Kaffa, as well as in the entire Golden Horde, in most commercial transactions. In addition, the sommo (silver bar) was used for larger deals. Until the 1380s, the aspri used in Kaffa pointed to Tatar rule, based on the khan's name minted on coins. However, most likely after 1380, the same coins appear with the countermark of the authorities of Kaffa. According to certain sources, this was a necessary measure to devalue the currency as some of the coins had begun to be minted with inferior silver content. For this reason, good coins were minted with the image of the Genoese fortress to guarantee their proper value [23, pp. 25–52; 24, pp. 156–171].

But the stamp of Kaffa on the side reverse with the name and title of the khan was also a declaration of the new status of Kaffa following the agreements between Genoa and the Golden Horde in 1381 and 1387, which sanctioned the territorial expansion of Genoa along the Crimean coast and the expulsion of the Tatar subjects from the same region [46, p. 214. For more on the agreements between Genoa and the Tatars, see 62, pp. 177–187]. In the early 15th century, Kaffa issued a series of coins bearing only the name of Genoa (later Milan), which is evidence of its completely independent status. In any event, the reason for multiple clashes between Genoa and the Golden Horde had to be more than a mere rivalry between Genoa and Venice, but rather, more precisely, the attempts of Genoa to take away the territorial rights and sovereign powers of the Golden Horde rulers by force.

We can see from this that conflicts took place primarily when the Golden Horde khans believed their sovereign powers were under threat or subject to attack. But in this regard, it should also be noted that Venice and Genoa acted in completely different ways, and this difference underlies our understanding of what 'form' Black Sea colonisation took.

*Colonies or factories?*

The answer to the question of why Tatars on the whole had more conflicts with Genoa than with Venice should be sought not only in the size differences of their respective colonies but also in the very nature of their 'colonisation' of the Black Sea. The fundamental differences between Venice and Genoa in their corresponding attitudes to overseas possessions are well documented. Most researchers emphasise the broader autonomy of the Genoese colonial administration and certain other bodies established to regulate them (the most important were Officium Gazarie and Officium Romanie) from the metropolis, while the overseas Venetian administration is regarded as more closely controlled by the metropolitan centre. The power of the central government was stronger in Venetian domains, while Genoese colonies were more susceptible to the influence of individual initiatives in that location alone.

We, on the other hand, are more interested in the differences of the colonisation process. Venice was satisfied with the acquisition of commercial bases throughout the Black Sea, but the most significant were Tana, Trabzon, and Sudak, which granted free access to the local markets while also acting as safe harbours for its ships and merchants. As long as they were granted the rights to reside, together with permission to trade and be protected, the Venetians did not resort to the use of violence unless they were forced to protect themselves. The settlement in Tana, which was so important for the very existence of Venice in the Black Sea, was fortified in 1424–1429, only after it was plundered and destroyed several times over. However, as early as in 1442, we find reference to the possibly autonomous and independent status of Venetians in Tana [16, p. 260].

On the other hand, Genoa pursued a more aggressive territorial expansion policy initially aimed at excluding the Venetians and other competitors from the Black Sea through diplomatic agreements with local authorities and, when they failed, through armed force. During the war in 1350–1355, Genoa was in a situation where it had to fight simultaneously against the Byzantines, Venetians, and Tatars. Facing the threat of losing access to the Black Sea, it instead chose to
establish complete territorial control over strategic regions and commercial ports both on the Cri-
mean Peninsula and along the Romanian coast [45, pp. 939–947]. This control was preserved up
until the Ottoman conquest only through the increase of problems associated with the ability of
Genoa to provide its colonies (and itself) with a means of living. It is therefore not surprising that
especially after 1350, conflicts between Genoa and the Golden Horde were different from those
that broke out between Venice and the Tatars. These different manners of colonisation (if this
word is applicable here) reflected two different types of perception of the political landscape.
While Genoa had already strengthened its position in the Black Sea, controlled a larger volume
of trade and, therefore, felt that it should protect these achievements by often resorting to violence,
Venice was weaker from the very beginning and thus had to rely more on cooperation with the
local authorities and their protection.

In this inevitably cursory examination of the multilateral and widely discussed relation-
ships between the Italian colonies in the Black Sea and the Chinggisid states, I tried to concen-
trate most on Mongol goals, interests, and their active involvement. Several aspects deserve to
be mentioned in conclusion.

Firstly, Mongols benefited greatly from their commercial relations with the European states.
These states opened vast markets for local products, paid various fees, taxes, and trade expenses,
made contributions to the personal funds of the khan and earned his interest with both tributes and
gifts, and the provision of foreign knowledge. Any perception that the appearance of Italians on
the Black Sea coast was a phenomenon that is best understood in the context of Europe, the rivalry
between Genoa and Venice, the weakening of Byzantium, and the search for commercial oppor-
tunities on the distant markets by merchants and others must give due notice to the obvious un-
derstanding displayed by Tatar rulers in relation to the benefits of trade, as well as the numerous
positive steps they took to promote and protect it.

The second most noteworthy aspect is that international trade declined after the collapse
of the ilkans and Yuan dynasty not only because with the end of Pax Mongolica trade routes
became unsafe and risks became more unpredictable but also because the states of Venice and
Genoa never interacted diplomatically to obtain sufficient agreements. Despite the ripening of
conditions for the beginning of diplomatic exchanges with Beijing, they did not develop into a
policy of regular interstate correspondence. Although we shall resist the temptation to resort to
counterfactual arguments, it is still important to take due account of the fact that specific and
existing opportunities have been missed. Tabriz defined the limit of state interests, which was
partly determined by the influence that relations between the Ilkhanate and Golden Horde had
on regional stability. But as soon as the ilkhans fell and conditions became less favourable, the
state retreated, also forcing individuals to follow suit and abandon the Persian markets. Indeed,
the Mongols were exceptional in their ability to provide a basic trade infrastructure even in the
absence of formal support from Europeans states.

Finally, it should be noted that the overwhelming majority of conflicts between the Tatars
and Italian colonies were determined not by commercial issues but by problems of supremacy
and political power. Wars were waged between them not to deprive Italians of their trade priv-
ileges but to curb abuses that threatened the formal and actual application of the supreme power
of the Golden Horde rulers in the regions they assumed to be their domains. The disputes, of
course, were territorial in nature, but they also concerned legal and financial issues. In this
context, we also noted that Genoa and Venice had chosen 'colonisation' strategies that were
completely different from each other, yet both successful in holding their positions up until the
Ottoman conquest. The attitude of the Mongols towards administration and international agree-
ments contributed to the formation of political environment in which Venice and Genoa had to
make their choice and state the importance of the Mongol factor as a direct influence on the
scale of commercial, political, and cultural exchange between Europe and Asia in the period of
'European expansion'.

Chapter VIII. Economy, Crafts, and Trade
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§ 4. The Genoese and the Golden Horde

Michel Balard

Throughout the Middle Ages, the Black Sea was a border zone between nomadic cattle breeders who tried to reach its shores and settled empires located to the South which sought to establish their colonies on the Pontic coast. The opposition of these two worlds set the pace of the history of the Black Sea [37, pp. 50–51]. If the nomads moved south of the Danube or the Crimean mountains, the Byzantine Empire, being the mistress of the Black Sea before 1204, was immediately weakened and its food supply was under threat. And vice versa, if Byzantium established its colonies on the northern coast of the Black Sea, the steppe people retreated and the Byzantine predominance became strengthened all over the Black Sea, meanwhile maintaining the necessary trade relations with the nomads. The fate of the straits was the second factor that had a decisive influence on the development of the Pontic regions. The Black Sea would not have played a crucial role in the international economy if the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits had not remained open for unhampered traffic with the allowance of trade flows in both directions: agricultural products and goods coming through the steppe towards the Mediterranean region and Mediterranean manufactured goods going towards the Pontic regions. If the straits were closed by the will
of the political power which controlled them, the Black Sea lost its importance, its trade fell into decay, and the merchants disappeared. To make it fully integrated into the world economy, three necessary conditions had to be fulfilled: first, the existence of stable communities in the south of Rus’ that appreciated the trade benefits; then, the settlement of communities in Crimea that were engaged in trade and maintained regular communication with the Balkan and Mediterranean communities; and finally, the ability of the Mediterranean coastal population to consume the excess products coming across the steppe and to supply the nomadic population with manufactured goods through the control of the most important trade routes.

These conditions were realised in the latter half of the 13th century by means of communication between Western merchants and the Tatars of the Golden Horde, which was one of the fundamental events in the history of relations between East and West. For a little more than two centuries, the Black Sea became the ‘lazy Susan’ of international trade, as it was aptly characterised by the great Romanian historian Gheorghe Brătianu [12, pp. 204–224]. The Genoese merchants were its main protagonists due to their less than peaceful relations with the Golden Horde. In the period after the signing of the Treaty of Nymphaeum (March 1261) with Basileus Michael VIII Palaeologus, who granted them access to the Black Sea, they established a trading post on the Crimean coast in Kaffa and then, during the 14th century, expanded their presence from the entire Crimean coast and the Azov Sea, with their settlement in Tana, to the mouths of the Danube and Dniester rivers, with their colonies in Kiliya, Licostomo, and Moncastro. Of course, during the two centuries of their existence (circa 1275–1475), a number of these leading Genoese trading centres, which were located in the Mongolian world, were subject to significant changes related to the political and economic situation that influenced the Pontic regions, and, in particular, the Mongolian supply route of silk and spices, the intervention of Tatar armies, as well as Timur’s conquests, which threatened the Genoese trading posts.

The first contacts of the Genoese with the Golden Horde are shrouded in mystery, which was noted by the Genoese chronicler Giovanni Agostino Giustiniani Campi in the 16th century with the following words: ‘We have no clarity about whether the Genoese received the location for this city [Kaffa] as a gift, by purchasing it, or by using weapons...’ [20, p. 136]. Whether it was Nicephorus Gregoras, who ascribed the bestowal of the territory to the Genoese to ‘the great Scythian leader’ [35, II, pp. 683–684], Oderico, who wrote in the 18th century that the Tatars lost Kaffa to the Genoese before 1250 [38], or Canale, who referred the foundation of the city to the beginning of the 12th century, having confused it with the Syrian city of Kaiffa in the south of Acre [13, II, pp. 409–412; 14, II, pp. 142–144, 152–159]—historians largely made contradictory hypotheses due to a lack of precise documents relative to the concessions made by the Tatars of the Golden Horde to the commune of Genoa.

Reliable facts that can be affirmed are few in number. On the one hand, coins from Kaffa (asprì baricati) are first mentioned in Genoese documents in November 1276, but before 1280, they are mentioned there very rarely [4, Notai, cart. n° 118, f. 48v, Notai ignoti, busta 22, frammento 4, f. 5r (anno 1277)]. On the other hand, investments made by the Genoese in the Greek East between 1270 and 1280 by means of ordering agreements or marine company contracts (societas maris) were fulfilled in Greek coins or hyperpyrons and related to Romania and Constantinople, while Kaffa was not mentioned. In this regard, it is reasonable to assume that Genoese merchants, attracted by the opening of the Black Sea for their activities, were initially interested in the small old Byzantine town of Soldaia, which was visited by Italians in previous decades [36, pp. 30–34; 46, p. 392], and then, due to their competition with the Venetians, between 1270 and 1275, they gained the right from the khan of the Golden Horde to settle in the bay of Theodosia, the ancient and near-abandoned Greek
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colonies, where several of the Genoese, joined later by their countrymen, formed a small community with the consul as its head, beginning in 128138. The acts of the notary Lamberto di Sambuceto drawn up in Kaffa in 1289–1290 indicate the rapid growth of the Genoese trading post despite competition from the Venetians.

The Most Serene Republic obviously could not allow the expansion of its competitor. While the Genoese supported Argun, the Ilkhan of Persia, who had hospitably received them before 1280, Venice became closer with the Tatar Khan Tula-Buga and concluded a trade agreement with him in 1291, as well as with Emir Nogai, who took advantage of the weakness of the khans of the Golden Horde from 1280 and gave himself an appanage within the Horde, killing Tula-Buga before later becoming the victim of his successor Toqta in 1299 [42, pp. 412–413]. The rivalry between the two maritime republics and the complex of alliances between the Byzantines, Mamluks, and Tatars against the Ilkhanate led to the Genoese executing the Nogai's grandson, who arrived in Kaffa for tax collection, in 1298. Soon after the attack of the Nogai's army, which plundered the trading post, they suffered another devastation at the hands of the Venetian fleet led by Giovanni Soranzo in the following year [28, pp. 130–131; 46, p. 75]. This was one of the episodes in the War of Curzola, which had risen out of the Venetian–Genoese enmity in Crimea and then spilled over into Ayas and later into the Adriatic, before a peace without victors was concluded in Milan on 25 May 1299 under the aegis of Matteo Visconti.

By this time, the Genoese had occupied Kaffa again, though this turned out to be short-lived because in 1307, they were drawn into a conflict with Toqta, the Khan of the Golden Horde. The pretext for the conflict were abuses committed by the Genoese traders in their trade practices, though these were done with the consent of the Tatars, according to al-ʿUmarī, who mentions that 'in times of drought and famine (Tatars) sell their sons. In years of abundance, they give away their daughters, but not their sons. They get rid of their male children only in cases of extreme necessity' [fragment quoted in 42, p. 413]. The continuous selling of children devastated the khanate, and in order to put an end to it, after the arrest of Genoese merchants in Sarai, Khan Toqta sent his army to Kaffa at the end of 1307. Describing this event, Jacobus de Varagine, the continuing chronicler, emphasises the disparity between the opposing forces. This is done, of course, in order to explain the decision of the Genoese to leave the besieged city after eight months of siege and to burn it before leaving [16, pp. 500–501; 46, p. 84]. The consequences of this destruction were important: for several years, the Genoese ceased visiting the Black Sea coast, with the exception of the famous Segurano-Sakran Salvaigo, who was under the patronage of the sultan and probably returned to the markets of the Golden Horde after 1308 [27, p. 82]. But Kaffa and aspri baricati are not mentioned in notarial documents from 1308 until 1313.

However, both the Golden Horde and Genoa were considerably interested in the renewal of mutual relations: the former, to collect taxes from commercial activities; the latter, to gain access to the Silk Road and the agricultural resources of the Pontic lands. Thus, after the death of Toqta on 9 August 1312, Genoa hastened to send two ambassadors—Antonio Grillo and Nicco lo di Pagan—to his successor. They received permission to restore the houses and fortifications of Kaffa from the new khan [16, p. 502]. The metropolis also took measures contributing to the recovery of trade. In 1313, when the documents again recorded the appearance of the Genoese in the city, a commission of eight advisers 'for navigation and the Black Sea affairs' (constituti super factis navigandi et maris maioris) was established, which was often referred to as Officium Gazarie. On 18 March 1316, this commission adopted a series of measures aimed at the restoration, improvement, and strengthening of Genoese trading posts in accordance with a regulatory and highly detailed plan [23, II, pp. 170–171; 5, I, pp. 202–205]. The text of the

38 See all of this in my work: [5, I, pp. 114–118]. It is hardly possible to trust Jean-Paul Roux, who claimed, without references, first [42, p. 371] that the Mongols gave Kaffa to the Genoese in 1266 in exchange for duty payments; and then [42, p. 442] that this assignment took place in 1256, which is absolutely impossible due to the Venetian supremacy in Constantinople and the Latin Empire.
plan showed a desire to facilitate the colonisation and economic growth of the trading post and obliged all Genoese shipowners to stop at its port and pay taxes proportional to the value of their imported goods [31, pp. 234–235]. Fortified by a citadel and a wall surrounding the lower city, Kaffa experienced rapid growth for nearly thirty years, until new incidents with the Golden Horde put that to an end.

In the 1340s, there was a renewal of tensions that was caused by competition between the Genoese and Venetians in the Pontic regions. In 1341, the two communities encountered each other in Tana, where the presence of the Genoese was witnessed in 1289–1290, while the Venetians had to wait until November 1333 in order to obtain the charter that granted them a quarter beside the quarter of the Genoese. The incidents became more frequent, and the Venetian Senate sent an ambassador to Öz Beg Khan with a requirement to provide a quarter away from that occupied by the Genoese. The new Khan Jani Beg consented to this request and confirmed the privileges granted by his father [49, III, pp. 261–263]. At an unspecified date but prior to January 1343, the Venetian commune sent two ambassadors to the Khan again—Federico Piccamiglio and Enrico di Guasco [51, I, p. 46, n° 120]. Skirmishes continued with unabated force, and besides, the merchants of both nationalities began to cheat the tax service of the Tatars, seeking to avoid paying the statutory excise tax [51, I, p. 51, n° 151; 44, pp. 10–11; 11, pp. 110–201]. In 1343, due to the murder of a Tatar by a Venetian, a battle flared up between the local population and the Western residents: the houses and warehouses of the Latins were plundered, their property was confiscated, some merchants were killed, others were imprisoned, and the rest managed to flee on their ships. The episode of the ‘riot in Tana’ was described in detail by Giovanni Villani, who pointed out the economic consequences of these events: famine in Constantinople due to a shortage of grain, salt, and fish; a shortage of grain in Venice; and a sharp rise in prices for silk and spices in Italy [17, book XII, chapter XXVII; 48, p. 138; cf. 23, II, pp. 186–188; 31, pp. 256–258; 46, p. 394; 5, I, pp. 75–76; 39, pp. 182–184; 26, pp. 270–271].

The conflict in Tana spilled over into Kaffa, which was besieged by the army of Jani Beg. The city, which had been successfully strengthened during the 30 years of peace that followed its restoration, resisted, and in February 1344, its defenders destroyed the siege weapons of the Tatars, who lost courage and retreated after having lost more than five thousand people, according to Giovanni Stella [24, III, p. 192; 35, II, pp. 685–686; 48, p. 139].

In the summer of 1344, the Doge of Genoa, Simone Boccanegra, offered the Venetians a defensive alliance, along with a proposal for a trade and sea boycott of the Golden Horde [40, pp. 201–217]. However, wishing to avoid losing the benefits provided by the port of Kaffa, the Genoese refused to give their rivals and allies full exemption from customs duties in their trading post, as well as legal autonomy, which was perceived by the Venetians as a humiliating submission. Having received support from Pope Clement VI, in honour of which one of the defensive towers was later named, the Genoese survived another attack by Jani Beg's troops in early 1345. The plague epidemic spread among the Tatar troops, and the khan ordered catapulting the corpses infected with plague over the walls, hoping to force the city to surrender—the first example of bacteriological warfare in history. The besieged threw the bodies into the sea but were unable to prevent some of the Genoese from coming back infected on their ships to the West, thus bringing the pathogens of the epidemic, which under the name of the black plague caused the death of millions of its victims, perhaps up to one-third of the European population—so much that it can be called ‘the most serious environmental crisis in history’ [21, p. 161; 22].

As soon as the Tatar threat had passed, a split appeared again between the two maritime republics. The Venetians returned to Tana, where through an agreement with Jani Beg, they purchased one city quarter near the Don at the end of 1347, while the Genoese intended to strengthen their trade monopoly in the Pontic regions by forcing Venetian ships to stop in Kaffa. Various
incidents led to a serious conflict, during which the Genoese clashed with the Venetians, who united with Aragon and Basileus John Kantakouzenos [23, II, pp. 195–201]. After the battle of Bosphorus (February 1352), in which the Genoese fleet led by Paganino Doria retained its dominance in the Byzantine waters [8, p. 431–469], the two republics signed a peace treaty in June 1355 through the mediation of Visconti [30, pp. 118–119; 29, col. 617–627]. They pledged not to send their ships to Tana for three years, after which both republics began to act according to their own discretion in the Black Sea. After five years of cruel and costly war, according to the peace without victors, that is, the agreement for restoring pre-war conditions, both rivals kept their quarters in Tana, and Genoa kept its dominance over the Crimean coast.

In 1358, upon the expiration of the embargo period (devetum) established by the Milan agreement, the Venetians sent two ambassadors to Jani Beg (in fact, they were received by his successor Berdi Beg (1357–1359)) ‘seeking the former privileges’ [51, I, pp. 87–88, n° 324–325]. The Genoese hastened to do the same: in October 1358, Niccolo di Guano and Raffo Herminio returned from their mission to the khan with many gifts and jewels given to the two legates [4, Antico Comune, Magistrorum Rationalium, n° 52, f. 46]. An agreement was reached between the two republics and the volume of trade reached pre-1343 levels. After the death of Berdi Beg (1359), the Golden Horde was plunged into anarchy and for twenty years witnessed the reign of dozens of alternating khans, the short-term rulers of a small part of the Kipchak steppe population [46, pp. 107–112; 34, pp. 223–224; 42, p. 498]. Fratricidal wars followed each other with various contenders for power, which were supported in turn by the powerful Emir Mamai and later became deprived of his help. The Genoese also sought to ingratiate themselves with this new ‘majordomo’. He was officially received in October 1374 by the Consul, who presented rich garments to the ambassadors of Mamai several months later. According to the accounts of the massaria of Kaffa, the Genoese ambassadors who went to the Golden Horde were sent ‘to the Emperor of the Tatars’ and Mamai, which pointed to the fact that the Genoese fully realised who had the real power in the Kipchak steppe [4, San Giorgio, Caffa Massaria, 1374, f. 6v, 7r, 14v; cf. 25, pp. 32–33]. However, from that point, the power of the Emir waned. Defeated by troops of the Russian Prince Dmitry and then of Toktamysh, he fled to Kaffa, where he was executed by the local authorities, who sought to please the khan [46, p. 127; 42, pp. 498–500; 34, p. 237]. His death can easily be dated thanks to the massaria accounts: in March 1381, two ambassadors vested with the titles of messengers of the Emperor and Mamai were received in Kaffa. In November 1381, Corrado di Guasco and Cristoforo della Croce set forth with the embassy to the Emperor of the Tatars only. Mamai must have died between March and November of 1381, and it is quite probable that the Genoese ambassadors brought the khan that pleasant news. They were given luxury gifts and accompanied by sixteen other members of the embassy and two translators in order to demonstrate the magnificence of the commune in an effort to please the ruler of the Sarai [4, San Giorgio, Caffa Massaria, 1381, f. 3r et 242v; cf. 25, p. 35].

The Kaffa authorities took advantage of the period of anarchy in the Kipchak steppe to complete the construction of the city fortifications: the internal cordon of fortifications, begun about 1340, was completed by the Consul Gottifredo di Zoagli in 1352 [48, p. 156; 45, pp. 33–46; 5, I, pp. 208–209]. These fortifications soon became insufficient as the quarters built outside were left unprotected, especially by the time of the deterioration of relations between Kaffa and the rulers of Solkhat. Between 1383 and 1385, three successive consuls—Pietro Cazano, Jacopo Spinola, and Benedetto Grimaldi—built the external cordon of fortifications to protect the suburbs of Kaffa: a long wall stretched for 5.5 kilometers in length [5, I, pp. 211–212]. The Genoese also expanded their gains. In the 1340s, they founded a small community in Cembalo (Balaklava), where a notary by the name of Rolando Saliceto made an official act in favour of Paolo di Podio in 1344 in a church dedicated to the Virgin Mary. Consuls, who were appointed by Genoa to govern the city, built a citadel there between 1357 and 1386 [9, p. 112; 5, I, p. 157].
But the most important thing is that in 1365, the Genoese captured Soldaia, which the Tatars had taken away from the Venetians in 1343, as well as the neighbouring settlements of Alushta, Gurzuf, Yalta, and the settlements of Gothia (eighteen villages), which went on to form the Genoese Gazaria under the authority of the Consul of Kaffa. Inspectors from Gothia (vixitatores Gothie) made visits to these settlements, but the fiscal requirements of the Genoese likely made the inhabitants regret the loss of their former status under the Tatars. Emir Mamai, who practically ruled the Western part of the Golden Horde, restored the Tatar dominance over these villages in around 1375 [18, p. 163; 23, II, p. 205; 46, pp. 120–121].

The situation changed completely from 1378 when Toktamysh came to power. A distant descendant of Jochi, one of the sons of Chinggis Khan, Toktamysh tried to seize power in the Eastern wing of the Horde from one of his cousins—Urus Khan. Having found shelter in Transoxiana with Timur, he managed to overthrow Urus and then made for the West against the army of Mamai. In 1380, in an uncertain situation for Crimea, the Consul of Kaffa Giannone Bosco considered it useful to negotiate with Konak Beg, one of the Toktamysh's rivals, and Iharkas Ziq, the ruler of Solkhat (Eski Qırım), but then, when Toktamysh's power became firmly established, he renewed this agreement with Elias Bey, the successor of Iharkas and representative of the new khan [18, pp. 161–165; 10, pp. 98–99]. Toktamysh, realising the importance of the Genoese commercial activity for the Golden Horde, made an agreement dated 24 February 1381 that accepted the occupation of Soldaia and the villages of Gothia by the Genoese and guaranteed safety to Genoese merchants in his state in exchange for a very formal recognition of the khan's supremacy in Kaffa.

In the following years, relations between the Genoese of Kaffa and Solkhat deteriorated, as it seems, due to the fiscal claims of the Genoese authorities, who had intended to dispense with the mediation of Solkhat in their commercial relations with the internal regions of Crimea. The consequence of this was, at first, the rebellion of the Crimean rural population, and then, a conflict between 1385 and 1386 named by the Genoese sources as the Solkhat war (bellum de Sorcati) [4, San Giorgio, Caffa Massaria 1386, f. 99v]. Within two years, the newly established Military Officia (Officium Guerre) in Kaffa allocated significant funds for the purchase of weapons in Genoa or Pyora—bombs, crossbow arrows, spears, and helmets—in order to build brigantines for the protection of the Black Sea, to promote the arrival of military technicians and mercenaries, and to conduct costly diplomatic negotiations with the voivode of Moldova, the Prince of Circassia, and the ruler of Sinop [4, San Giorgio, Caffa Massaria 1386, f. 40r et 41r, 193r (the Genoese embassy of Carlo dell'Orto and Ilario Doria to Moncastro), f. 39r (reception of one embassy in Sinop)], seeking to preserve their neutrality. A decisive role in this relationship was played by Kotolboga (Qutlugh Buga), the confidant of Toktamysh. Generously showered with gifts by the Consul of Kaffa [4, San Giorgio, Caffa Massaria 1386, f. 97v; cf. 10, pp. 103–106], he contributed to concluding the peace treaty on 12 August 1387 after the exchange of ambassadors between Kaffa and Sarai [4, Archivio Segreto, busta 2729, doc. 27; 43, pp. 62–64; cf. 52, pp. 179–182 (a detailed analysis of the treaty of 1387); 5, I, p. 458]. Among the articles of the treaty, one should mention the mutual forgiveness of all crimes and robberies; compensation for damages caused to the merchants during the conflict; the return of fugitive slaves, the trade of whom was the main resource of the Genoese colony; and finally, the promise of the Tartars to provide money made of high-grade silver from the mint of Solkhat. Commercial deals were immediately resumed, and, particularly in Tana, ten merchants were declared debtors of the massaria (exchequer) in Kaffa in 1387 [4, San Giorgio, Caffa Massaria 1386, f. 453v].

39 The Officia for Saracen affairs (Officium super rebus Saracenorum) was established in Kaffa, which managed the property seized from the Tatars [4, San Giorgio, Caffa Massaria 1386, f. 190v, 213 r–v, 416v, 425v, 446r, 449v].
The intervention of Toktamys in Crimean affairs was not only dictated by the natural desire of the new khan to resume profitable trading relations with the Genoese but also by the desire to prevent the conclusion of an alliance between the latter and Timur, the conqueror of Ilkhan Persia, who represented a new threat to the Golden Horde, which stood up in arms for its rights to Azerbaijan. In 1391 and 1395, Timur inflicted two heavy defeats against the khan, who was forced to seek refuge in Lithuania, and then in West Siberia after a new defeat in 1399 [34, pp. 224–225]. The Golden Horde was in the hands of Edigü, the protege and later the enemy of Timur, who in the meantime continued his conquest and destruction: in 1395, after he had received a delegation of the Latin colony of Tana, which arrived to congratulate the winner, with feigned goodwill, Timur put the city to fire and sword, enslaved the merchants who could not flee, and destroyed the prosperous quarters of the Genoese and the Venetians [31, p. 304]. The city was completely destroyed; the Venetian Consul, Giorgio Capello, was killed, together with numerous merchants, and the damage caused to the subjects of the Serenissima exceeded 100 thousand ducats. The Genoese were subjected to the same disaster, so nobody was able to estimate their losses [19, p. 6]. Both of them demanded permission from To Khan (Toktamys) to restore their trading post and strengthen it. But despite this, the quarters of the Western residents of Tana were subjected to new attacks by the Tatars in 1410 and 1418, which caused more damage to the Venetians than the Genoese.

The Crimean coast escaped the ravages of Timur. Kaffa and other Genoese trading posts enjoyed a peaceful period during the first decades of the 15th century, which was interrupted in 1433 by the rebellion against the Genoese dominance of the Greek population of Cembalo, which submitted to the power of the Greek Prince Alexius, the ruler of Theodoro-Mangup. Genoa was forced to organize an expedition, headed by Carlo Lomellini, which suppressed the rebellion but was caught off guard when the main part of the troops headed to Solkhat, without keeping the necessary order. The survivors managed to reach Kaffa, which by that time did not have relations with the totally decayed Golden Horde Khanate, but had relations with the new state—the Crimean Khanate—which separated from the Horde and was founded by Hacı Giray, the leader of the Tatars and a distant descendant of Jochi [48, pp. 377–378; 23, II, pp. 381–382; 3, pp. 507–517; 2, pp. 23–36]. Despite the hostile relations with the new ruler of Crimea and payment of tribute to the Ottoman Sultan from 1454, Genoese Gazaria, which became the property of the Bank of Saint George in 1453, managed to survive until the arrival of the Ottoman fleet of Gedik Ahmed Pasha, who captured the Genoese colonies in five days [15, pp. 495–538].

The incidents in the relationship between Kaffa and the Golden Horde cannot hide the mutual interests of both partners. Of course, under the treaty of 1387, the inhabitants of Kaffa declared their 'fidelity and loyalty' in relation to the Khan. But this declaration was quite vague and meant nothing but a simple promise of reliability, as the policy of Genoa was to try to prevent the dependence of its representatives in Kaffa on the Tatar khans. Of course, the treaty did not define the autonomy of the trading post in relations with the Golden Horde. But since it confirmed the prior agreements, which subjected the settlements of Gothia 'to the will and the power of the Commune and its Consul, free of the Empire' (in la voluntay et bayria de lo Comune e de lo consoro, franchi da lo imperio) [43, p. 57; 18, p. 163; 52, p. 178], it is obvious that Kaffa was also de facto exempted from the actual rule of the Tatars, though the agreements with the Khan included two restrictions. On the one hand, citizens of the Horde living in the trading post were under the jurisdiction of the tudun [titanis in Latin, see 23, II, p. 371], a kind of vicegerent who represented the Khan. At the end of the 14th century, he had all the legal authority in relation to his compatriots, while in 1449, according to the Charter of Kaffa, all the Tatars who lived in the trading post or its suburbs for more than one year were subjected to the Consul, but not the Tudun.
In economic and financial terms, the symbolic and material power of the Khanate was manifested primarily in the use of cash money. Among the coins circulated in Kaffa, there were coins of the Golden Horde, aspri baricati (in the name of Berke Khan, 1256–1266) with minted tamga—a stamp impressed upon the heads of the cattle and later upon the Khan's coins before the Genoese authorities decided to coin counterfeits [46, pp. 232–234; 33, pp. 31–125]. Thus, from 1423, the Genoese started to coin the bilingual aspri with the image of the Genoese gate (ianua: 'the gate', according to the contested etymology) and the name of Kaffa on one side, and tamga on the other side, together with a description, written in Arabic letters, that listed the names and the titles of the ruling Khan [33, pp. 38–39]; it was a way to express the autonomy of the trading post at the time of strained relations with the Golden Horde and later with the Crimean Khanate. On the other hand, the Tatar customs agent levied kommerkium on behalf of the Khan, 'according to the ancient customs' (segundo le premere usansse), as specified in the revision of the agreement dated 1380 and written in the Ligurian dialect. This was probably the customs duty on goods exported from and imported in the Kipchak steppe, which was different from the kommerkium approved by the Commune of Kaffa.

This is the context in which the relations between the Genoese and the Tatars of the Golden Horde developed. The latter received some symbolic tribute for themselves, though this was by no means equal to the benefits received by the Genoese. The Genoese were the rulers of the urban lands and possessed them at their own disposal: none of the real estate purchase agreements respected the rights of the Khan. The Consul gradually expanded his jurisdiction to all of the residents within the city. At best, he could allow for special protection of the subjects of the Mongol Empire to be bestowed by an official representing the Khan, whose role did not seem to be superior to the role of the consuls of foreign powers in modern states. Trying to keep its gains, Kaffa began to enjoy much greater autonomy than it had been granted earlier, in the period of the near-total absence of power beginning in the latter half of the 14th century: unstable tribes and small ephemeral polities separated the Crimean coast and Sarai, the capital of the Khans. Suppressed by the ongoing palace revolutions, the Golden Horde only had an episodic impact on the coastal area of the Kipchak steppe by the end of the 14th century. The Horde's fading into insignificance resulted in the expansion of Kaffa's autonomy. This autonomy was only threatened by the neighbouring principalities of Theodoro-Mangup and Zyx, and later by the Crimean Khanate, which in the end managed to set back these changes.

In fact, the trade flow was the basis of the relationship between Genoa and the Golden Horde, which controlled the main trans-Asian routes that began in Tana, continued to Sarai, and then deepened into Central Asia, reaching Khanbaliq. Many Genoese and Venetian merchants travelled over this Northern branch of the Silk Road, which became safe in the latter half of the 13th century due to the establishment of Pax mongolica, which was described by Pegolotti [41, pp. 21–25]; this continued up to 1368, that is, to the date when the Ming dynasty came to power in China and interrupted direct exchanges between West and East Asia for centuries [6, pp. 149–164; 32, pp. 83–186]. Silk and spices in the East to West direction, and silver, fabrics, and small handicrafts in the reverse direction were the main (and most of ten recorded) goods for exchange [23, II; 47, pp. 121–146; I, pp. 174–178; 5, II, pp. 701–868; 50, pp. 366–396]. However, it is important to mention the significant transformations which took place in Pontic trade in the last two centuries of the Middle Ages: an almost complete disappearance of

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40 On the 'Genoese' kommerkium, see [5, I, p. 409]. It can also be assumed that the Commune allocated one part of the kommerkium revenue to the Tatar kommerkarijs (financial control officers). But no payment of this type is mentioned in the registers of the massaria of Kaffa. On the other hand, the care with which the government treated the Tatar kommerkarijs proves that the latter actually collected the taxes, despite the fact the Council tried hard to avoid the perverse impression produced by the honorary treatment of the agents entrusted with this task. The presence of the Tatar kommerkarijs was recorded in Kaffa in 1289–1290; cf. [7, doc. n°95, 190, 213, 231, 252, 459].
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silk and spices at the end of the 14th century, which had arrived from the Mongol direction approximately up to 1360; this was compensated by an increase in the transportation of regional products to Kaffa before their shipment to the West—grain, salt, wax, honey, leather, fish, fur, and non-ferrous metals, as well as slaves—which filled the holds of Genoese ships and replenished the Tatar treasury with customs duties from the goods.

In this sense, we can agree with Gheorghe Brătianu in his statement that the relationship between the Genoese and the Golden Horde made the Black Sea a 'lazy Susan' of international trade in the last centuries of the Middle Ages.

13. Canale M.G. Nuova istoria della repubblica di Genova, del suo commercio e della sua letteratura dalle origini all’anno 1797: narrata ed illustrata con note ed inediti documenti. 4 Vols. Firenze, 1858–1864

§ 5. International and Domestic Trade*

Leonard Nedashkovsky

In the Golden Horde period, there was an increase in Volga region trade relations. The Volga Trade Route was the most important in the Golden Horde and in the relations between ancient Rus’ and the East. Golden Horde khans and nobles patronized trade which brought them big profits. There were merchant associations which organised large-scale caravan trade. The Golden Horde state was characterised by the high level of monetary circulation, including small-scale retail trade.

At the beginning of the 14th century, there were trade relations with India. This is confirmed by information on the goods (words, flax, and linen) brought from Rus’ to India, found in the writings of the authors of the first half of the 14th century: Amir Khusrow and al-ʿUmarī [18, p. 17; 30, p. 59]. In trade relations with India, the export of horses from Kipchak steppes to Indian lands played a very important role [50, pp. 286–287]. The Golden Horde exported sable and ermine hides to India. They were mostly bought by Bulgar merchants from the peoples of the North, or brought from the territory of Rus’. In the Volga basin, a number of Delhi sultans’ golden coins have been found. [59, p. 62]. The majority of Indian coins known from the territory of the Golden Horde were found in the Volga region. In addition to coins, India was a source of unprocessed ivory. It has been found amongst the materials in Selitrennoe ancient town, as well as cowry shells and corals from the shores of the Indian Ocean. A filigree bone plate depicting an elephant and a monkey, which were possibly of Indian origin, was discovered in Tsarevskoe ancient town [58, p. 215].

To the Volga region from Khwarezm, talcum-chlorite vessels (primarily boilers) were imported, as well as grey-clay pottery, which reached even the Dniester and the Azak in the west; in Khwarezm and Ustyurt, in turn, dishes from the Volga region were found [6, pp. 13–14, Table 2, 17; 20, pp. 62–65; 44; 45, pp. 54–56, 80, 82, Fig. 4, 15, 4; 58, pp. 210–213, 221, Tables 105–106]. Khwarezm coins were present in the monetary circulation of the Volga cities of the Golden Horde; from Khwarezm, silk was also delivered to the Volga region and further to the West.

In the vicinity of Karakorum in Mongolia, finds of Golden Horde silver coins of the Lower Volga coinage have been made [5, pp. 140, 147, Fig. 6, 16].

From China to the Volga region, there came silk and brocade fabrics, porcelain (met in particular in the materials of the Bulgar and Tsarevskoe ancient towns), as well as Chinese bronze mirrors and products made of jade. In Selitrennoe ancient town, there have been finds of Chinese porcelain fragments and even Korean celadon from the 14th century [40, pp. 108–109; 42; 43; 45, pp. 49, 51, 75–79, Fig. 11–14, ill. 9; 58, pp. 218–219; 60, p. 204].

* See Fig. 2–5 for the article in the color insert.
From the Volga region to the Black Sea and further down to the Mediterranean area and Italy, sturgeon was taken [16, p. 122; 63, p. 380], as well as caviar, furs, and salt. To Azak, Crimea, Northern Black Sea region, to the Balkans, Volga kashin, red-clay glazed and unglazed, and stamped ceramics were brought [6, pp. 13–14, Table. 2, 18–19; 58, p. 210]. Venetian and Genoese merchants traded in the second half of the 13th and 14th century in the Lower Volga region and further to the east in India and China [16, pp. 95–96; 19, pp. 220, 222, 224; 58, pp. 205–206, 213].

At the monuments from the Lower and Middle Volga regions, fragments have been found of Trebizond, Triliyskiy, Crimean, Azak amphorae and pitchers testifying to the Golden Horde imports of wine and oil, as well as fragments of presumably Cretan pithoi, glazed Black Sea pottery [2, pp. 54, 57–59, Fig. 2, 1, 3, 2, 5, 9, pp. 20, 22; 26, pp. 62, 66, fig. 2, 4; 34, pp. 98–99, 102–106, 120–121, fig. 27, 6, 28, 2–6, 9; 45, pp. 59–67, 79, fig. 5, 2–4, 6, 6, 1, 7, ill. V, 4–5, VI; 58, pp. 208; 62, pp. 56, 59–60, 69–73, 233–234, 238–239, 244, 249–250, fig. 68–69, 74, 75, 6, 81, 2–6, 9, 86, 88]. Western cloth and linen were brought to the Volga region. The Uvek ancient town gave us a Western European bone statuette in the form of a recumbent lion; and Vodyanskoj ancient town, a bronze frame or jug handle of Mediterranean origin. From Western Europe through the territory of the Volga region, 13–15th centuries bronze Aquarians came to Siberia; and to Kazakhstan, a bronze statuette of a knight of French work [58, p. 207]. A Venetian ducat of the 14th century was found near Astrakhan [59, p. 62], and in Bulgaria in 1863, a gold florin of 1329 was found [48, pp. 87–89]. In Karatunsky hoard, a Trebizond coin and a Prague groschen were found [59, pp. 96–97, no. 152g]. In Vodyanskoj ancient town, a copper coin [29, pp. 59–60, Fig. 1, 13] of Trebizond Emperor Michael III (1341–1349) was found.

Links between the Golden Horde Volga region and Byzantium are confirmed by a discovery in the Bulgar ancient town of a copper coin of Emperors Andronikos II and Michael IX Palaiologos (1295–1320), and in Samosdelka settlement in Astrakhan oblast, of an iberperon of Andronikos II (1282–1332) [13, p. 240; 57, pp. 179, 202].

From the Middle East to the Middle and Lower Volga regions, transparent glass lamps with painted enamel of different colours and other glass vessels were brought, as well as some
types of kashi pottery; a marble candlestick with Arabic inscriptions found in Tsarevskoe ancient town is possibly from Egypt [3, p. 85, 90; 4, pp. 53–54, Fig. 2, Table VIII; 26, pp. 59–60, 67–68, Fig. 1, 4, 4; 39, pp. 207–211, Fig. 91–95; 45, pp. 45–47, Fig. 2, 3–4, ill. IV, 5–7; 58, pp. 209–210; 61, p. 168, Table VII, 1–4]. A copper coin of an Egyptian Sultan Al Mu’izz Izz ad Dīn Aibak (1250–1257), from Mamluk dynasty, was discovered in Juketau [28, pp. 43, 45, Fig. 4, 44]. In one of the graves near Komsomolsky village in the Krasnoyarsky district of Astrakhan oblast, a Cairo dinar was found [37, pp. 75–76; 58, p. 35; 59, p. 62], which belonged to an Egyptian Mamluk Sultan al-Malik az-Zāhir Rukn ad-Dīn Baibars I al-Bundukdari (1260–1277). In Selitrennoe ancient town, a Damascus dinar of Mamluk dynasty of 771 AH was found [29, pp. 57, 59–61, Fig. 1, 2]. From the Middle East to the Middle and Lower Volga regions, there came artistic brass vessels with gold and silver inlays, as well as expensive silk and brocade fabrics.

Fig. 7. A fragment of a minaya-type vessel (top left) and fragments of luster ceramics from the Uvek ancient town [National Museum of the Republic of Tatarstan, nos. 5365–56]

Fig. 8. Coins of the southern neighbours of the Golden Horde from the collection of the Saratov Regional Museum of Local History.

Hulaguids: 1—fals of Argun (1284–1291), 2—fulus of Suleyman (1340–1345), 4—fals of Anushiruwan (1344–1355). Jalāyirids: 5—fals of the second half of the 14th century (Muzaffarids’), 6—double dirham of Ahmed (1382–1410), coined in Halab. Timurids: 7—fals of Timur (1370–1405), 8—tanga of Shakhrukh (1405–1447), coined in Astrabad in 820s AH, 2–4, 6–8—the place of discovery is unknown, 5—Vodyanskoe ancient town [64, Fig. 20]
Trade with Iran is suggested by the finds of Iranian kashi dishes in the Bulgar ancient town and by some fragments of 'minaya'-type Iranian ceramics and luster-painted vessels found in the Lower Volga region; from Transcaucasia to the Volga region came red-clay glazed ceramics [8; 26, pp. 67–68, Fig. 4, 3; 45, pp. 58–60, 70–74, Fig. 5, 1, 5, 9–10, ill. V, I–2, VIII; 58, pp. 214–216, Table 107, 3–4]. Silk and brocade, as well as, probably, cotton fabrics, were brought from Iran.

Coins of Hulaguids, Jalayirids, Chagataids, and Timurids are known from the monuments of the Middle and Lower Volga regions, as well as from hoards of these regions. Primarily, coins of Hulaguids, Jalayirids, and Timurids were discovered in large hoards which can be attributed to merchant capital [35].

In Transcaucasia, in turn, finds of silver and copper coins of Jochid khans from Öz Beg to Kildi Beg of Volga coinage have been made [55, p. 212, nos. 590–593]. Silver coins of Golden Horde coinage have been found in Transcaucasian hoards [54, p. 166, nos. 181–183; 59, pp. 103, 111, nos. 180a, 257b].

Trade between Northeast Rus' and the East came through the Volga Trade Route. Ibn Abd al-Zahir wrote about the Volga in connection with the visit of the Mamluk sultan ambassadors to Khan Berke in the Lower Volga region in 1263: 'Russian ships (go) along it' [50, p. 63] To Rus' from the Golden Horde came Khwarezmian stone pots, glass rings, glass and kashi beads, unglazed, glazed, and stamped Golden Horde ceramics, which have been encountered during the excavation of many Russian cities, as far as Novgorod and Beloozero [12, pp. 168, 186–188, Fig. 61, I–3, 66, 3, 5–6, 13; 15, p. 127; 21, pp. 170–171, Fig. 1, I; 23, pp. 153–166, Fig. 1, 4–5, 12–13, 2, 1–8; 24, pp. 107–113, 115–120, Fig. 2, 5–10, 5, 4–5; 25, pp. 99, 104–107, Fig. 2, I; 26, pp. 61, 63; 27, p. 100–101, 103–105, Fig. 38–39, 40, I–2, 6; 31, pp. 271–274, 276–286; 32; 33, pp. 324–326, Fig. 146; 38, p. 48; 41, pp. 106–107; 46, pp. 50–51; 47, p. 88; 58, p. 220]. Carnelian, rock crystal, lapis lazuli [46, p. 52; 47, pp. 242–244; 58, p. 221], the Iranian, Syrian, Central Asian and Caucasus glazed ceramics [22, pp. 236–239, fig. 1, I–2, 4–5, 7, 10; 23, pp. 156–157, fig. 1, 6–7; 24, pp. 107–109, 111, fig. 2, I–2, 4, 26, pp. 59–60; 27, pp. 100–101, fig. 40, 3] Chinese celadon [23, pp. 158–159, fig. 2, 9; 25, pp. 101–102, fig. 3, 9; 27, pp. 101–102, fig. 41; 42, pp. 157, 163; 58, p. 220], the Middle East Glassware [3, p. 85; 27, pp. 98–99, fig. 37, 2–3; 49, pp. 104–105, Fig. 8, I] came to Rus' through the Middle and Lower Volga regions. In a Novgorod birch bark of the 14–15th centuries, an Asian cotton fabric called 'zenden' was mentioned [1, p. 281]. There are hoards of Golden Horde coins in Moscow and Nizhny Novgorod lands [11, p. 63; 17; 27, pp. 106, 156, 160–161, 179, 210–213, Fig. 52, 3, 53–54; 54, pp. 150, 185, nos. 108a, 312; 59, pp. 47, 88–89, 106–107, 113, nos. 95d, 97b, 208b, 214b, 217a, 312a–312b]. Some isolated finds of Juchid dirhams and puls have been discovered in the territory of the principalities of Moscow, Tver, and Suzdal–Nizhny Novgorod [10; 11, pp. 64–65; 27, pp. 160–161, 210–213; 55, p. 203–204, nos. 479–480, 488–493]. Glass bracelets and amber were brought from the Russian lands to the Middle and Lower Volga regions. Russian denga are often present in the Golden Horde treasure troves found in the Volga region (from 0.1% to 13.4%). Judging by the size of the hoards containing Russian coins, these discoveries are probably savings of merchants from commercial operations in Rus' [7; 27, pp. 157–159, 184–185, 189–192; 53, p. 76; 54, pp. 114–115, 122–123, 157, 169–170, nos. 141, 198, 200–201, 202a–202b; 55, p. 218, no. 201a; 56, p. 180, nos. 202B–202g; 59, pp. 56, 95–99, 105, nos. 151a, 152g, 152d, 202e]. In Selitrennoe ancient town, a hoard of more than 3 thousand pieces of silver was found, which included, in addition to ancient money, only 5 Golden Horde dirhams of the 15th century [51; 52, p. 118]. There are Russian coins in the settlements of the Middle and Lower Volga region [14, p. 95; 29, pp. 58–60, Fig. 1, 8; 34, p. 106; 53, pp. 76–77]; in Rozhdestvenskoe V ancient settlement in 2005, in addition to the published copies, an anonymous denga coined in Suzdal in 1427–1429 was found.
Great damage to the Volga trade was caused by the internecine feud of the 1360s–1370s. At the end of the 14th century, the most important cities of the Golden Horde were in decline or ceased to exist as a result of Timur's campaigns against the Golden Horde. The main trade routes between East and West were displaced to the south and no longer in the territory of the Ulus of Jochi.

However, trade in Sarai even in the 15th century brought considerable income to foreign merchants. A report of a Shiraz merchant Shams ad-Din Muhammad has survived. He sold his goods and bought Chinese raw silk, silk damask, satin, European cloth, and Russian canvas in Sarai in 1438. [18]

Thus, in the Golden Horde period, there was a surge in development of trade relations in the Volga region. The geography of contacts is unusually wide: Rus', Western and Central Europe, Black Sea, the Mediterranean, Middle East, Middle and Central Asia, India, China, Korea.

At the heart of the internal trade of the Volga regions of the Jochid state, the major cities were closely linked to small towns and rural areas of their counties. There were also trade relations with other regions of the Golden Horde, as well as contacts between the sedentary and nomadic populations, sharing production of crafts and agriculture, on the one hand, and animal husbandry, on the other. Domestic trade was based on a highly developed monetary circulation and met the needs of large-scale trade and small-scale retail trade.

In exchange for the supply of agricultural and fish goods to the city from rural communities, the urban centers supplied the villages with high-tech crafts (glazed ceramics, glass products, iron, many kinds of products made of non-ferrous metals), whose existence in small urban and rural communities has not been recorded. Primitive forms of non-ferrous metal processing, of course, existed in small towns and rural area. It is confirmed by the findings of spikes and metal scraps at Bagaevo, Kolotov Buerak, Sovetskoe, and Khmelevskoe I ancient settlements in the district of the Uvek ancient town, as well as in Vodyanskoe ancient town, where moulds have been discovered (the only case of such finds outside major settlements). From cities to the countryside came the usual Golden Horde unglazed pottery and ceramics. Most of the metal forged items find in rural monuments were also produced in the cities.

The village received imported goods through cities as major international trading centers (all the individual finds of foreign coins in the Lower Volga, the bulk of imports and products imported from other regions come from the monuments found in the cities): wine in amphorae, brocade and silk fabrics, sometimes even luster pottery and glass vessels with polychrome. Findings of fragments of Trebizond amphorae are known from ancient settlements of Bagaevo (where fragments of triliysky amphorae were also found), Kolotov Buerak, Khmelevskoe I, Shirokiy Buerak in Ukek district. Fragments of luster and painted glass vessels were encountered during our excavations in Bagaevo ancient settlement.

A variety of crafts (pottery, glass-making, iron production, advanced forms of non-ferrous metals processing) could not exist in the conditions of nomadic life. Therefore, all of their products in the funerary monuments of nomads should be regarded as imported from settlements of the Lower Volga region. The cities received cattle and dairy products from the nomads, while supplying them with crafts. Nomads received also some imported products, in particular wine amphorae, brocade and silk.

Economic ties were carried out not only through the direct exchange of food and raw materials for craft products but mostly in the form of commodity–money relations. This is confirmed by numerous finds of both silver and copper Golden Horde coins in many rural monuments and mounds of nomads.

These materials allow us to understand the specificity of economic interaction between the Golden Horde town and its districts, which was based on the exchange of products of craft, agriculture, livestock, crafts and goods received by means of long-distance international trade.
Chapter VIII. Economy, Crafts, and Trade

The rural districts of the Golden Horde cities of the Lower Volga region had a developed agriculture and crafts, capable of partially providing the city with food and handicraft raw materials. The village was supplied by the city with craft products (glazed and unglazed ceramics, glass and cast iron products, ferrous and non-ferrous metal objects) and expensive imported goods (wine, brocade, silk).

Nomads, in exchange for the products of cattle, received a wide range of craft products, many of which (vessels, bone plates, ornamented quivers, some types of mirrors) in the cities were made specially, taking into account the artistic tastes and traditions of nomads [36, pp. 59–60]. Nomads also obtained some imports which reached rural settlements.

It seems that the Golden Horde cities of the Lower Volga region were tightly connected by internal trade contacts (based on commodity–money relations) with the settled and nomadic districts.


§ 6. Jochid Money and Monetary Policy in the 13–15th Centuries

Pavel Petrov

In the Middle Ages, coin production took place where there was intensive trade development, and so demand for means of payment and money circulation increased accordingly. That is to say that coining processes were conditioned by economic factors. When authorities adopt an active monetary policy, it is always aimed at the development of the state's foreign and domestic trade with the purpose of maximising tax receipts. That is to say that the ultimate goal is fiscal in its nature. Monetary policy was not always successful, that is, did not always achieve its goals. It has been established that the amount of tax collected from the population was not determined by the level of output: ‘the increase of tributes and duties depended, in many cases, not on an increase in production but on foreign policy needs, military spending increases, etc.’ [11, p. 3]. However, treasury revenue sources were not limited to taxing the population. A significant proportion of revenues were taxes on trade, transit through the state, numerous water crossings, and so on. Therefore, it was in the interests of the authorities to promote the intensification and development of interregional and international trade. State authorities in the Middle Ages were at their least active in developing monetary policy during periods of economic crisis and heightened internal strife. It should be borne in mind that when authorities had no visible effect on monetary circulation in markets within a state, this was also a form of monetary policy, namely, passive monetary policy.

It has been well established that, in addition to coins, ingots made from precious metals were used as money in Europe, Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and even in China. While the use of ingots in China was extremely limited—they were mainly a means of sending provincial tax revenues to the treasury—in the territories west of China, ingots were used to fulfill all the functions of money. This is important for the assessment of commodity–money relations in the Jochid ulus, that is, both when the ulus formed part of the Great Mongol Empire and when it separated from the Empire and became an independent state.

There were many mints in the Eastern medieval states because there were no restrictions on who could create a coinage. With sufficient silver ingots or scrap, anyone who required new coins could order a run of coins of the required denomination as long as the mint had the right to produce it.

As the regions varied in the nature and degree of their economic development, the authorities took a different approach to monetary policy in each region. This tactic was particularly in evidence during the period of formation and development of the regions and the state itself, and also during its final period, when the state and its economy collapsed. Monetary policy is a multifaceted term. It defines not only the principles of coinage systems, the use of coins in circulation, denominations, coin metal quality (for coins made of precious metals), norms relating to weight
and size but also the degree to which a certain quantity of precious metal changes in value once it is made into a coin. It also concerns the price that must be paid for coin production and the amount of tax to be paid on coin production to the issuer. Monetary policy was based on the right of sikka, that is, the sovereign right of the khan to coin money and levy a tax on the process, as well as to mark coins with his name or a distinctive symbol which identified the issuer—a stamp of ownership known as tamga. Monetary policy was implemented through monetary reforms, legislative acts, and administrative orders addressed to mints, fiscal bodies, and the population. Since there are no extant written documents from the Jochid era, all theories about their monetary policy are based on research conducted on numismatic written sources from the time and studying the topography of numismatic findings in archaeological written sources. Coins—as a consequence, a result of monetary policy—form a very informative and comprehensive historical source that 'speaks' its own peculiar language [18; 19]. However, coins are, in a certain sense, secondary sources (to find answers to most issues, certain documents are required in addition to coins—orders made to mints, government edicts, etc.). This imposes certain restrictions on researchers regarding the certainty of their research findings. Nevertheless, a study of the dynamics of monetary circulation and coinage in different regions of the Jochid state in the 13–15th centuries creates quite an objective picture of the state's changes in monetary policy, as well as the reasons for these changes and their aims.

Legal changes in coinage and monetary circulation are called revisions. The term 'reforms' should be used to refer to more global changes in coinage and monetary circulation across the entire state. National reform refers to changes to standards used and the range of coined products (denominations) issued by all mints in the state. National reform can be of two types: 1. total withdrawal of all previously-issued coins in circulation in the state's markets; 2. no withdrawal of the previous issues. Through local revisions and national reforms the government could affect the quality and the nature of monetary circulation both in specific regions and throughout the state. However, once a fully-fledged system of coinage is in place, the government has only a few ways of influencing the money market, namely:

– permissive-prohibitive legislation;
– the change in value of precious metals once they are made into coins;
– fiscal policy, through determining which money the population may use to make tax payments.

Legislating for the type of money that can be used to pay tax provides support for the status of these means of payment in the market. Of course, coins made of precious metals are real money, their purchasing power being determined by the precious metal (subject to a moderate change in the value of the metal being in coin form). Copper coins were forced into circulation. It is well worth noting that copper coins were not used for tax payments and could not be exchanged for silver coins at mints or sarrafs (money changers). Copper coins had their own sphere of circulation, that is to say they were not a subsidiary of silver or gold coins. With their low purchasing power, copper coins were used in retail trade transactions for the cheapest product groups or served as a make-weight when trading silver. The main forms of money in the Jochid state markets were silver coins and ingots (Jochid soms, Russian grivnas). Scrap silver jewellery was also used as money [it appears to have been no more (and perhaps less) valuable than the simple cost of the metal]. Attempts by some researchers to claim that copper puls were subsidiary coins of silver Jochid dirhams are thoroughly mistaken as they do not take into account that the Copernicus–Gresham law of monetary circulation would have applied. According to this law, all the silver coins would have been hoarded, while only the 'bad' coins—the puls—would have stayed in circulation. As there is no evidence to support this, copper and silver coins circulated separately.
Of particular note is how the Jochids' coinage use perfectly illustrates the political process whereby the Jochid yurt and ulus changed from being an administrative-territorial unit of an empire to gaining the status of an independent state.

This brief introduction is intended to help the reader to avoid any ambiguity in understanding the following account. Below is an attempt to outline briefly a chronology of the stages of Jochid monetary policy and coinage.

**The 13th century.** The 13th century can be divided into two stages. The first stage concerns coinage and monetary policy in the Ulus of Jochi, which was part of the Great Mongol Empire. The second stage concerns coinage and monetary policy in the Golden Horde, which was an independent state.

**The first stage.** The first stage begins with the conquest of lands and the making of the conqueror's own coins in these lands. A feature of the Chinggisid conquests was that the Mongols conquered enormous territories that were at different stages of economic development, and their conquests were not instantaneous. Another feature is that the Mongols themselves did not have their own coinage and money in circulation before their era of conquests began. As was the case for all invaders in the Middle Ages, when the Chinggisids conquered new territories and wished to issue a coin, the coin would be similar visually and in size to those used by the local population—only it would bear different legends. For example: if only silver-plated copper dirhams and gold dinars were coined in the city of Merv during the rule of Khwarezmshah Muhammad ibn Tekish, then the Mongols issued the same coins (Fig.1.) [7]. If in the city of Ghazna silver jitals were coined prior to Chinggis Khan, then this coin would continue to be issued following his arrival (Fig.2.) [31, no. 1967].

![Fig. 1. Copper silver-plated dirham (stamp reconstruction). Merv, 618 AH, with Chinggis Khan title](image1)

![Fig. 2. Silver, jital [Ghazna], year not given, with Chinggis Khan title (St. Album auction, April 2011, lot no. 811)](image2)
The reasons behind this monetary policy were simple: the local population must accept the new coin; therefore, it must be similar to what they were accustomed to. Of course, not everybody could read monetary legends, so conquerors at least initially minted coins not just using the metals the local coins were already being produced with but also adhered to the size, weight, and very appearance of the coins. And only over the course of time, once the population structure had changed (or was forcibly changed), the government became stronger, and trading volume grew, were monetary reforms implemented that changed both the appearance of the minted coin and the nature of monetary circulation.

During the formation of the Jochid ulus, there were regions that were economically developed with a population accustomed to monetary circulation (the lands of Bulgar, the Caucasus, Khwarezm, the Syr Darya region, the Crimea, the European territories [Wallachia, Bulgaria]), and also the great expanses of Desht-i Kipchak, where they did not mint currency and did not use coins in trade. It should be noted that the nomadic population conquered by the Mongols had already been familiar with money as a concept. Certain dealings between the nomads were most likely carried out with the use of ingot silver and coins taken from various raids and robberies. However, using money was far from a universal or regular process among them. The Mongols were also familiar with Chinese coins, as they traded with Chinese states, but Chinese money did not perform all the functions typically associated with money. Therefore, it is not possible to find traces of regular monetary circulation among the nomads or to estimate the degree of readiness of this population for its development. It is thus obvious that in these conditions, the monetary policy in the Jochid ulus could never be manifested in any uniform rules for the development of coinage and monetary circulation throughout the entire subjected territory. In other words, the policy included differentiated approaches to the requirements, opportunities, and economic (first and foremost trade) potential in each region. Both distinctions in the level of economic development of different regions and the considerable remoteness of these regions from one another prevented any advancements in monetary policy pursued by the authorities. Only at the end of the 13th century were the prerequisites formed for the subsequent gradual movement away from such a rigid model of geographically differentiated monetary policy in the Jochid state. Now it is possible to unequivocally assert that in the 13th century, none of the regions of the Jochid ulus where coins were minted could reasonably have fulfilled the role of the supplier of coins to provide for the whole ulus! The fact of the matter is that the authorities never actually faced this task.

One of the most important questions when discussing the character and features of coinage and monetary circulation in the Jochid ulus at its first stage is the question of when they started to mint coins themselves. Various researchers have dealt with this question of the beginning of coinage in the Jochid ulus [28; 14; 12; 16, pp. 121–149]. In the work 'The hoard from Dev Keskenqala and issues of the beginning of silver coinage in the Jochid Ulus', the first attempt was made to analyse the available information on the beginning of silver coinage in the known emission centres of the 13th century, as dating for the beginning of coinage can only be carried out on the basis of the analysis and study of the commissioning of each separate mint. As a result of this analysis, the following conclusion was made: '... four out of five earliest emission centres of the Jochid ulus known today [Sarai, Jand, Khwarezm, the Crimea, and Bulgar—Author] record the beginning of their activity during the reign of Mengü Khan and Berke. But at the same time, there are also grounds to assume that the activity of these mints (except in the Crimea) could be initiated earlier, during the reign of Batu, although at the moment there is no reliable evidence corroborating this fact' [16, pp. 121–149]. In this article, it was argued that 'over the course of time, the results given here will be checked and corrected in the process of discovering new coins and emission centres'. Recently, the production facilities of another mint of Jochid on Syr Darya—Barchin, Barchanlyq, or Barchanlygkend—have been discovered. A gold dinar dated 64 (1, 2, or 4)/124(3–5 or 6–7) and silver dirhams, one of which is most likely dated 659/1261, have been
found [21, pp. 80–81, nos. 1 and 1A]. Thus, the earliest dated monetary issues in the Jochid ulus have so far only been recorded in the Syr Darya region (640s/1240s). It would not come as any great surprise if further on Jochid coins with earlier dates were eventually discovered. As the question of the beginning of coinage in each of the regions of the Jochid ulus has yet to be settled, it will continue to be brought up in the future.

During the period when the Jochid ulus was part of the Great Mongol empire, the monetary policy in the ulus was defined not by the owners of the ulus but by the khan's administration in Karakorum. This is easily supported by the coinage prohibition imposed on ulus owners: the Jochids were banned from putting their own tamga on coins. For this reason, silver dirhams of Jand, Barchkend, Khwarezm, and the Crimea did not have the tamga of the Chinggisids, the ulus owners. The only known coin with the tamga of Batu is the copper silver-plated dirham of Termez 6[1/2?] 8 AH (1221 or 1231) with the countermark containing both the tamga of Ögedei and the tamga of Batu at once [23, pp. 109–110]. If the tamgas on coins of the Great Mongol empire before 665 AH are analysed, it is easy to see that they were allowed to be put there mostly by the representatives of the family that included the Khan of the Empire. The tamga of Chagatai, for example, can rarely be found on coins (only one coin with his tamga and the tamga of Ögedei minted in his lifetime have been documented [21, pp. 88–89, no. 24]). In the reign of Mengü Khan, there were no other tamgas on the coins except his own, but at the same time, there are a large number of coins from different mints of the empire which have no tamgas at all. This means that the prohibition against the use of the ownership sign belonging to the owner of the ulus on coins minted in his possession applied beyond just the Jochids. A defined domestic monetary policy, as well as the economic policy of the supreme power of the empire, is clearly noticeable here. The tamga indicates the issuer exercising the right of sikkah (the one using monetary regalia). Currently, it is difficult to state precisely who was taxed to fund the mint that issued anonymous coins without tamgas or how they divided these funds. In fact, the question is still very much open to discussion.

It is necessary to pay special attention to the coins of Bulgar of the first half of the 13th century. The issue of coins (copper and silver) with the name of the late Baghdad caliph Al-Nasir li-Din Allah and without tamgas was at first replaced by coinage with the name of Mengü Khan and his tamga (copper and silver), and later with the name of Ariq Böke and his tamga (only silver). Namely, unlike the issues from all other mints of the Jochid ulus, the coins of Bulgar had tamgas of qa'ans. This phenomenon corresponds well to the practice of coinage by the khan of the empire when they ruled over a part of an ulus and yurt, or owned a mint. The production of monetary regalia in this case was carried out in relation to the issuer designated by the tamga [21, pp. 41–65].

It is known that during the reign of Mengü Khan, Otrar and certain other territories of Central Asia were given under the control of Batu. The study of coinage and monetary circulation in Otrar, as well as in present-day Kazakhstan and northern Uzbekistan, showed that from 650s/1250s to 663/1264–1265 gold dinars and their parts, and also copper silver-plated dirhams of Otrar, circulated in the territory controlled by the Jochids. From 656/1258, there were also fulus of Otrar. The area of their circulation (the areas of Otrar, Kendjde, Sayram, Taraz and Chach, and also modern western Kyrgyzstan) mark the territory of economic control and influence of Batu, and later Berke [21, pp. 84, 144]. In this case, the 'individual' approach to carrying out monetary policy can also be traced. It may also be the case that the Otrar mint paid taxes to Mas'ud Beg, and for this reason, copper silver-plated dirhams of the same type were minted here without any changes for 17 years.

The second stage. The change of monetary policy in the Jochid ulus took place rapidly and with concrete features in 665/1266–1267. But the beginning of this process can be accurately recorded as early as a year before—in 664/1265–1266, when the relations between the Jochids and Ögedeids, on the one side, and Kublai Khan, on the other, were aggravated worse
than ever before. The result of the opposition that arose immediately affected minting as a whole. Silver coins minted in Ordu Bazar in 664/1265–1266 with the tamga of Kaidu, House of Ögedei, have recently been discovered [22, pp. 71–72] (Fig. 3).

Fig. 3. Silver, dirham (stamp reconstruction).
Ordu Bazar, anonymous with the tamga of Kaidu, 664 AH.

At the same time on the undated coins from Jand [6, pp. 196–202] and the Crimea [29, pp. 8–9], we find a tamga which nevertheless should be dated to the period of Berke [21, p. 51, tamga 11] (Fig. 4).

Fig. 4. Silver dirham.
The Crimea, anonymous, undated, with the tamga of Berke

These coins are very rare, which means that their production rate was limited and they were not minted for an extended period of time (most likely only in that same year of 664, perhaps even right at the end of the year). The simultaneous minting of both Kaidu and Berke coins (each of them with its own tamga) can be considered evidence of the riot against Kublai Khan. While for the Jochids, this act of disobedience had resulted in the formation of a new state, the Golden Horde, in 665/1266–1267 with the accession to power of the first Khan Mengü Temür, Kaidu had lost this battle to Barak and achieved success only four years later [22, pp. 71–72]. The new status of the ruler of the Ulus of Jochi, namely, the status of Khan and Qa’an\(^{41}\), is confirmed in the coin legends of various mints of the Golden Horde. From this moment on, the state monetary policy changed indefinitely. Firstly, the number of functioning mints rapidly increased, and secondly, all the coins of Mengü Temür now only had one tamga—the personal tamga of Mengü Temür (for a long time, this tamga was called the tamga of the 'House of Batu', although none of the Chinggisid houses ever had such a tamga, including the

\(^{41}\) The difference between these titles among Chinggisid rulers is not entirely clear. The researchers often imply that the title of Qa’an is akin to the title of Khan of Khans; yet the coin legends completely rewrite the meaning of this word in the titulary of the Chinggisids.
Chapter VIII. Economy, Crafts, and Trade

Thus, Mengü Temür Khan's ascension to power began the second stage of monetary trade and monetary circulation in the Golden Horde. Naturally, the monetary policy based on differentiated territories remained as a principle, as the reasons for this approach were brought about by objective circumstances and conditioned upon the difficulties of organising effective administration in the vast territory of the state, as well as upon the lack of necessity for monetary unification throughout the entire state. During the first half of the reign of Mengü Temür, low-grade gold dinars were still in monetary circulation in the Syr Darya region and Khwarezm. The local mints coined this money themselves, but the coins also arrived in sufficient volumes from other southern and south-eastern territories. The gold dinar was never coined in the central regions of the Golden Horde, and to this day, traces of its circulation have yet to be found. The main and most common coin in the markets of the Jochid State was the silver dirham. Its large output, which was organised in several state mints at once, is evidence of the needs of local markets for some sort of monetary means. This was conditioned by the very organisation of the mints' operations, as the coin was minted from the customer's own silver, meaning that anyone, including the khan treasury, citizens, and non-residents, could have the coin minted from their own silver whenever required. The mints could belong to the khan, or be leased to private owners, which quickly led to minting in localities where coins were most in demand.

The silver coin, first and foremost, supported local and interregional retail trading, as it was appropriate for these purposes due to its low cost compared to its gold counterparts. In addition to silver coins, silver bars that were mass produced not only in Europe, Russian principalities, and the Bulgar land but in the mines of Central Asia as well, were also in use. They had various shapes and were not always made according to any weight standards (for instance, billets). In other words, they were a commodity. Correspondingly, ingot silver did not go through any sufficient revaluation in the form of a percentage of the metal's price. Even if there was a revaluation, it was minuscule compared to the revaluation of silver in coin, which in the east equaled to 3–7%.

Other than the output of silver coins, the monetary circulation of some regions also included a copper coin, which was used exclusively in local markets for low-price goods. In Crimea, the copper coin was regularly minted in the 13th century, but in Khwarezm, the mints did not produce copper coins at all. Bulgar started producing copper pul in the reign of Mengü Temür, but this process did not last long, and their coinage was then discontinued for more than 50 years (until the 1320s). In the 13th century, the territories near Sarai did not coin copper, which makes it impossible to trace a unified system of copper coins in the state, as every individual region in the country largely relied on an individual approach to the matter.

It is generally known that silver coins were not limited to circulation within the territory of a single state but were also accepted as money (even if only by the price of the metal) in other states. This was made possible in the East due to the low revaluation of silver into coins. This makes the fact of the circulation of silver coins from mints in the Bulgar wilayat of the Golden Horde being limited exclusively to the territory of this vilayet that much more remarkable! The localisation of Bulgar monetary circulation in the 13th century has been noted by all the scholars who study monetary production in the Bulgar region and the area of its distribution, and include several works dedicated to the study of this issue [17; 2]. It has been noted that the territory of Tatarstan has offered up almost no findings of silver coins from the 13th century minted in Sarai and Ukek; yet in the neighbouring regions (Samara and Penza oblasts), similar coins are the basis of the monetary bulk that used to be in circulation. However, these neighbouring regions did not have any coins produced at Bulgar mints.

The initial reason for the localisation of monetary circulation based on the remoteness of the centres of economic development of the Golden Horde is understandable, but as time went on...
on, the zones of handicraft industries and trade increased in size. This fact alone could not avoid impacting the expansion of the circulation area of minted coins in the state. Indeed, this process is clearly evident in the topography of the monetary findings when seen in the chronological aspect of the loss of coins during circulation. In other words, the localisation of the monetary trade and monetary circulation in the Bulgar wilayah in the 13th century and beginning of the 14th century, as recorded by the researchers, is the result of a reasonable monetary policy implemented in this very region of the Golden Horde. Based on these facts, we offer one possible mechanism for the implementation of this policy, as well as put forth the main objectives of this approach as they concern the formation of the monetary circulation in this region of the Golden Horde. Here they are in brief.

The main objective of the organisation of a localised system of monetary circulation lies in the desire to earn as much as possible for the treasury and the local governing administration. In order to achieve this, it was necessary to bring the economic potential of the region to life, which, in turn, required silver ingot material. After increasing revaluation during the production of local silver coins and organising tax collections exclusively with the coins of local minting or with foreign coins, albeit based purely on the price of silver, the administration could have suppressed the inflow of coins from foreign mints to the Bulgar region. Furthermore, the increased purchasing power of the local coin prevented it from flowing out of the Bulgar wilayah in considerable amounts, as it lost a portion of its purchasing power outside the Bulgar wilayah. The inflow and turnover of ingot silver could not be limited in any way, as it was circulated according to the price of the noble metal. Thus, the local market, which was inundated with goods from all over the world, was also loaded with silver to facilitate trading on the required scale, whereas sufficient amounts of chased silver promoted the development of handicrafts, the production of goods, and the development of animal farming and trading.

Apparently, interregional and international trading was of a seasonal nature, leading to the excess silver, concentrated in the wilayah in minted coins (as well as in bars), being transformed into treasure, yet it was not always used up by their owners due to various circumstances. Because of this fact, treasure troves with coins from this period are constantly being found in modern Tatarstan, the heir to the riches of Volga region of the 13th-century Golden Horde, more frequently than in any other region that was a part of this medieval state.

However, the nature of this type of monetary circulation was bound to have a negative effect on the development of trade in the region. The state of the economy was gradually changing both within the wilayah and in the neighbouring regions, as the cities of the Lower Volga region, firstly Sarai and its district, were actively growing. Naturally, at the beginning of the 14th century in the wake of its rise to prosperity, the capital centre, with its optimal location at the crossroads of trading routes from Crimea to the Caucasus, Khwarezm, India, and China, was starting to fulfill its trading potential to a much greater extent. This gradually weakened the economic positions of the Bulgar wilayah. At a certain point, the level and quantity of goods in local markets started to decrease, making isolated monetary circulation no longer needed. After a while, the existence of a localised zone did not even make sense anymore and could have even threatened the viability of the entire region. As a result, in 731/1331, monetary reform implemented in the region that put an end to the circulation of coins from former issues integrated this region into a unified zone of monetary circulation with other Volga regions of the Golden Horde [17, pp. 117–123].

The local monetary circulation project in the Bulgar wilayah was unique and temporary in nature, though it lasted for almost 50 years. Authorities did not intend to strike coins using the same measurement parameters at all mints in the Golden Horde but attempted to take maximum advantage of the economic potential in each region. In the 13th century, chased silver from Khwarezm was barely in circulation in the central regions of the Golden Horde, while Crimean dirhams were not used in the markets of the Volga region nor in Khwarezm. For ease
of trading, it was logical to adapt the measurement parameters of silver coins (metal purity standards and the weights of the chased coins) to the requirements of local merchants. Therefore, every local market 'chose' the measurement parameters of its coins (denominations) from those permitted by authorities at the specific time that they were required. Coins in the required denominations were struck at the local mints at the request of customers.

The growth of the sedentary population in the regions and its more even spread (mainly along the rivers and the banks of basins) led to an influx of money from different issuing centres. As a result, coins began to mix. For instance, 13th-century dirhams from Sarai and Ukek are often found in hoards discovered in the Samara Bend and the Penza oblast. In the early 14th century, this influx of money was enhanced by coins struck at the mints of Majar and Mokhshi. The aim of state monetary policy in the 13th century was certainly not to unify monetary circulation across the entire state, but it still contributed to the development of monetary flows that increased during the intensification of trade between regions. However, the central government did not ease its control and influence over monetary circulation. The easiest way to track this is to look at the tamgas on silver coins. For instance, only the tamga of Mengü Temür was stamped on silver coinage in the Golden Horde during the reign of Mengü Temür and Töde Mengü. Tamgas different from those of Mengü Temür were stamped during the reign of Tula-Buga Khan in Bulgar and Crimea. This signifies that the Khan ceded control over these regions to his two brothers, as well as the right to stamp marks of ownership on coins. That is, Tula-Buga provided his two brothers with uluses and yurts.

Toqta Khan's coming to power was marked by changes in the rules of stamping tamgas on Golden Horde coinage. First, Bulgar and Crimea began to stamp the hereditary tamga of Mengü Temür once again. Second, Nogai was given an ulus and yurt, and the right to mint coins bearing his tamga. The only known dated Nogai-era coins were struck in his ulus in the city of İshakçı in 690/1291. For now, we have no evidence that Nogai might have struck silver and copper coins in his ulus before Toqta Khan's reign.

Third, Toqta removed his tamga from coins struck in Ulug kul (The Great Centre). To be more specific, his tamga (the hereditary tamga of Mengü Temür) was not stamped on the coins from mints controlled by the khan's administration in Khwarezm, Sarai, Majar and Ukek. Mokshi is also included on this list of mints. At the same time, a tamga was stamped on silver coins in mints in Bulgar, Crimea, Azak, and İshakçı. In other words, the distribution of tamgas on coins shows which territories were encompassed by Ulug kul—the Great centre—and which territories were relatively independent economically but still under the khan's power. It has already been established that Toqta did not have full control over the Ulus of Nogai in the

42 A. Sinatullah has already noted that the stamping of tamgas on coins from Khwarezm and Sarai ceased [26, p. 70].
43 According to the available information, the Majar mint only started to operate during the reign of Toqta Khan [8, pp. 123–124].
44 [16, p. 131], this relates to Toqta's dirhams with a Tibetan inscription. There is no reference to the mint's name, but several factors mean it can be attributed to the coinage of Ukek mint (see, for example, [4, p. 128, no. 6a]).
45 [25, pp. 91–93; 5, pp. 56–65]. The reason we encounter no coins from Bulgar dating to the late 13–early 14th century in Nikolskoe ancient settlement would appear to be because the Mokhsan lands were private domains of the khans and not because coins of different weights had been minted and were in circulation, according to V. Vinnichek and V. Lebedev [5, p. 57]. On the other hand, coins from Crimea and Khwarezm did not reach Mokhshi. This was because monetary circulation was only regional in those areas due to considerable distance from the centre of the Volga region.
46 [10, p. 165]: 'In Wassaf's History, the khans' private domains are called "ulug kul", meaning "the great centre".
final decade of the 13th century. However, coins minted in İshakçı bear the tamgas of both Shaka and Toqta. This demonstrates that both issuers had the right of sikkah there. Silver coins from Bulgaria also bear Toqta's tamga. Coins from Akcha Kerman (near the modern city of Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi) bear Nogai's tamga only.

By the beginning of the 14th century, silver coins had been minted in Sarai for over 30 years, and coinage weight standards had changed in this time. In addition, the gradual loss of silver of coins in circulation meant that constant coinage weight standards could not be retained over long periods. Low quality dirhams that imitated Ukek coins featuring Tibetan writing began to appear on the markets. These coins were of such low quality that copper could be discerned in the alloy used. After Toqta's victory over Nogai, Majar, Ukek, and the other settlements in the Lower Volga region began to grow and consolidate their positions. A large trade centre at the intersection of the trade routes to the east—particularly to Khwarezm—from Europe, Crimea, and the Caucasus was required if the trade and transit potential of the Lower Volga region was to be developed. In addition, in several regions, the money in circulation needed reform. Khwarezm and Crimea's foreign trade relations demanded changes be made to the coinage and monetary circulation in these centres of development.

14th century. The third stage. The third stage of monetary policy in the Golden Horde began in the first decade of the 14th century with the reform of monetary circulation in Khwarezm in 706/1306–1307, in Crimea in 707/1307–1308, and in the Lower Volga region in 710/1310–1311 [15, pp. 145–146]. The coinage in the Bulgar wilayah underwent reform later, in 731/1330–1331. As yet, there is no information about whether there was any monetary reform in the Syr Darya region. Reforms to monetary circulation in the various regions were not aimed at unifying the measurement parameters for minted coins or minting the same type of coins at all (or the majority) of mints, as was the case in the Hulaguid state after Ghazan Khan's reforms. The reforms were primarily aimed at removing coins used locally in all three regions from circulation. They contained dirhams that were struck using different measurement standards not only as regards weight but also purity. There is no doubt that local reforms of this sort helped to improve trading conditions in these regions.

After 700/1300–1301, new mints emerged in Majar, Azak, and Mokhshi during Toqta's reign. However, by 700/1301, the mint in Sarai ceased to function, and production of silver coinage in two denominations only began at the mint in Sarai al-Mahrusa in 710/1310–1311. By 709/1310, the mint in Ukek had ceased to function, and its workers were transferred to the new money issuing centre in Mokhshi. The silver monetary system was a closed system, meaning that free circulation of coins from foreign states was not permitted in its territory. The few foreign coins that we have found were discovered in Golden Horde border settlements. However, it is impossible to determine whether these foreign coins would have been used as money or if visitors from neighbouring countries simply lost them by accident. It is possible that local sarafs used the influx of such coins for their own benefit.

It should be noted that Toqta Khan did not demand that all the mints in his state use the same stamp of religious creed. For instance, from 690/1291, the Turkic legend kutlugh bolsun, written in Tibetan script, was stamped only on coins made in Ukek. This legend disappears in 700/1300–1301. However, following Toqta's adoption of Islam, a kalima and Toqta's Muslim title of sultan, with a pseudonym, appear no later than 706/1306–1307. Again, this was only the case for Ukek coins [20, p. 317]. Toqta Khan is known to have had a seasonal main camp near Ukek. The legends on coins from other mints in the state did not undergo these changes at the time.

Coinage and monetary circulation reform in the first decade of the 14th century did not affect copper coins in circulation. Copper coins (pul) had their own specific area of circulation. Their purchasing power was very low, and it would appear that local authorities in each region

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47 Blessings kutlugh bolsun were marked on the coins in Tibetan script.
decided whether or not to use them depending on need. For instance, during Toqta's reign, copper coins were not minted in Khwarezm at all, whereas in Crimea, which was visited by merchants from countries of the Black Sea area and the Mediterranean, copper coins were minted regularly and in significant quantities relative to the size of the local market. In the early 14th century, copper puls were not minted in the Bulgar wilayah until approximately the 720s/1320s. Neither were they minted in Ukek, it would seem, for some time. For this reason, reforms to silver and copper coins almost never happened at the same time.

Further monetary reforms took place during the reign of Öz Beg Khan. During Öz Beg's reign, the number of different mints named on coins increased. In connection with the khan's reforms to the administrative division of the state and to increase centralisation of the state's government, changes were also observed in the tangas stamped on Golden Horde coins. For instance, tangas were not stamped on silver dirhams from the following mints: Sarai, Sarai al-Mahrusa, Khwarezm, Azak, Akcha Kerman, Crimea (in 713/1313), Ishakçı, Bulgar (from 740/1339–1340). A tamga stamp is present on coins from Mokhshi, Crimea (720/1320), and Bulgar (until 740/1340). A tamga was not stamped on copper puls from the following mints: Sarai (which started to mint coins in c. 713/1313), Sygnaq, Barchin, Jand, Yangi Kent, Khwarezm (which started to mint coins in 714/1314), Azak, Crimea (in 713/1313), Ishakçı, Bulgar (from 740/1339–1340). Tamga stamps are present on the puls of Mokhshi and Nurichat, Crimea (in 720/1320), and Bulgar (until 740/1339–1340). This means that, as during Toqta's reign, it is impossible to determine the borders of Ulugh kul by the presence or absence of tangas on coins. This territory, in fact, ceased to exist because almost all of the Golden Horde became directly subordinate to the khan. Even the Cis–Syr Darya River region in the east proved subordinate. The region of Mokhshi retained some economic independence. This did not immediately arise, but the Crimean region became independent from 720 AH. It is particularly noteworthy that there were huge time intervals between the periods when silver coins were produced in Crimea. After 720 AH, the next coins issued were stamped with the name of Toktamysh in 782 AH. The reasons for this have yet to be comprehensively researched.

The Bulgar wilayah also underwent significant changes during the reign of Öz Beg Khan. It ceased to be a special economic zone in the Golden Horde at the end of this khan's reign. The Golden Horde cities in the Lower Volga region (especially Sarai) started to grow, as they were better located for the transit of goods from Crimea to China and India than Bulgar. As a result of this, and also because of the increasingly important role these cities played in trade, the Bulgar wilayah became less important and by 730/1330, its economic potential had significantly reduced. It would not only have been disadvantageous to continue its status as a special economic zone, to have done so would also have put the existence of the region at risk. Local copper coins were introduced into circulation no earlier than the late 720s AH. This was the first stage of the full-scale monetary reforms in the wilayah [2, pp. 216–231]. However, this would appear not to have saved the local market. Under the previous system, the value of locally minted silver coins was greater than those from other regions. As a result, local silver coins and those from the central region could not be used at the same time on the markets in the wilayah (based on the Copernicus-Gresham law). For this reason, local monetary reform was required. These reforms were undertaken in 731/1331. Old coins were prohibited and withdrawn by the local mints. The new coin had a different non-archaic appearance but preserved the khan's tamga. That year marked the beginning of an influx of silver coins from different regions of the Volga region into the Bulgar wilayah, and local coins were able to flow freely into other regions of the Golden Horde [17, pp. 117–123]. In 740/1339–1340, the tamga disappeared from Bulgar coins, and the economic independence of the wilayah came to an end.

It should be noted that the reign of Öz Beg Khan was the first time that copper puls of the same type covered an area greater than the area (Sarai) specified on the legend denoting its issue. Indeed, they supplied the copper coins needed in many Golden Horde markets. Some
mints stamped their names on the same type of coins (instead of the name of Sarai on the 'lion and sun' type, for instance, there were coins bearing the name of the Azak mint). However, according to the preliminary results of the stamp analysis research, coins were produced in many different places in the state, with each location striking coins bearing the name of the Sarai mint. It is possible that the majority of these mints were given leases, while some may have been informal (illegal). The quality of the coins produced is suggestive of this. Of course, nobody calculated what quantity of a certain type of copper pul needed to be provided to the markets. As a result, puls saturated the markets relatively quickly. The ordered (declared) price of the coin would start to decrease, and after some time, the copper coin surplus would start to hinder the development of small-scale retail trade. Whenever this happened, a new type of pul would be officially issued, and the old types declared low denomination coins (several times lower in value). Note that people were trying to get rid of the old coins in the first place. Apart from the early undated type made between c. 713–720 AH, there were four coin issues in Sarai during the reign of Öz Beg Khan: in 721/1321, 726/1326, 731/1331, and 737/1337. This means that the copper pul was changed four times in 19 years, from 721 to 740 AH—an average of every 5 years. However, there were mints which did not produce the Sarai-type copper puls, for instance, Khwarezm, Crimea, Bulgar, Mokhshi, Sygnak, and others. In fact, even if the puls issued by Öz Beg Khan in Sarai reached these regions, they were thinly spread, small in volume, and the markets were mainly (and entirely in some places, for example, Khwarezm) served by locally struck copper coins. This situation would always lead to there being a temptation to use local copper coins instead of foreign ones, giving rise to a speculative currency 'rate' of foreign coins on local markets. This slowed both the influx of copper coins and the outflow of local puls to other regions. In other words, during the reign of Öz Beg, production of coins of the same type was not strictly regulated across all of the state's mints.

After Jani Bek Khan came to the throne, tamgas disappeared entirely from Golden Horde's silver and copper coins. Moreover, it should be noted that the Crimea and Mokhshi regions, which during the reign of Öz Beg continued to mint tamga-stamped silver coins, stopped producing any silver coins during the reign of Jani Bek. The centralisation of political power reached a peak during the reign of Jani Beg. Several large mints, including Sarai al-Jadid, began to operate around Sarai. The Gulistan mint was opened with the same silver coinage capacity as Sarai. Until now, it has been thought that silver coinage production in Bulgar ceased during the reign of Öz Beg Khan. However, recent topographical research and statistics relating to discoveries of coins bearing the name of the Sarai al-Jadid mint give reason to believe that the coins were struck in Bulgar. This is being researched at the moment.

Unfortunately, the question of whether the silver monetary circulation was unified during the reign of Jani Beg Khan cannot yet be considered. There are two reasons for this. First, the weight and purity of the Khan's coins struck at the Khwarezm mint—one of the most active centres of monetary production—has not yet been ascertained with sufficient accuracy. Single coins have only been discovered in what was once Khwarezm region, and most had their edges rounded off, making it impossible to determine their original weight. No Jani Beg-era hoards have yet been discovered in Khwarezm [27]. Neither has it been possible to determine with any confidence when the coins were rounded off. In other words, the region of Khwarezm simply cannot be taken into account regarding this issue. Second, coins issued almost 50 years earlier were still in circulation during Jani Beg's reign. They were Sarai al-Mahrusa dirhams dated 710 AH, which bore the name of Toqta Khan, and all subsequent issues from various mints. These coins lost a significant amount of weight while in circulation, meaning a large number of coins had a variety of different weights. In addition, following Jani Beg's Iran campaign at the end of the 1350s, a significant number of small denomination non-Jochid coins, similar in size and weight to Golden Horde dirhams but struck in the Caucasus and Transcaucasia, found their way into
Golden Horde circulation (particularly in the Caucasus and the Volga River border regions). It must be said that many of the secrets and intricacies of Jani Bek's monetary policy have not been uncovered yet.

During Jani Beg's rule, a new pul type provisionally named 'eagle' was introduced into the copper coins in circulation. Later, a larger 'rosette' coin from Sarai al-Jadid dated 750 AH was introduced. The 'rosette' type coins were the most widely circulated. They were minted in Sarai al-Jadid in Crimea and in the land that is now Moldova. These puls are often among numismatic finds, even in the Syr Darya regions.

The fourth stage. Once the khans Jani Beg and Berdi Beg had left the political stage, the so-called Great Troubles period began. Khans came and went, sometimes without an opportunity to occupy the throne even for a few months. The 760s/1360s were the most difficult years in the Golden Horde's history. Several severe droughts, repeated plagues, a sharp reduction in foreign and Black Sea trade: during this decade the east neither contributed to the strengthening of the state nor helped in the adoption of a single monetary policy. As a result, from 764/1362–1363, Khwarezm's local rulers stopped stamping the names of Golden Horde khans on their coins, but neither did they stamp their own names. Soon after, they started to mint a small gold coin for the first time [30]. In 768/1366–1367 in Sygnak, Mubarak Khoja started to mint a coin bearing his name and the title of sultan (sometimes the title of khan as well), meaning this khan became independent of Sarai [3]. In 764/1362–1363, Abdullah was declared khan. He was a puppet of the temnik [general] Mamai in the western and southern borders (Azak and Crimea) until 771/1369–1370. He was followed by Ghiyath al-Din Muhammad Tulak Khan. At the same time that Abdallah was Khan, other khans ruled in Sarai: Khair-Pulad in 764/1362–1363, Aziz Sheikh in 767/1365–1366, Uljay Timur in 768–769/1366–1368, etc. In fact, at that time, there was no universally-recognised khan in the Golden Horde. In various parts of the state, several contenders for supreme power declared themselves khans.

For this reason, tamgas again appeared on coins towards the end of 760s/1360s. The struggle not only over spheres of influence and territory but also for troops and the support of military leaders required a particular approach to internal policy in general and monetary policy in particular. This relates to tamgas on coins of non-Chinggisid origin. This matter is still being researched, but proof of the appearance of tamgas of this kind has been established.

If anyone should so wish, the regions where Sarai silver coins circulated could be traced, as well as those from Crimea, Ordu, and Yangi-Shehr al-Jadid. Coins from Azak and Khwarezm could be studied separately. In this case, the localised nature of circulation is explained by the political fragmentation of the state. As for copper pulses, almost every issuing centre minted its own versions. These versions changed much more rapidly than during the reigns of Öz Beg and Jani Beg.

The fifth stage. After completing his conquest, Toktamysh found himself in charge of a country that had been destroyed by internecine feuds and weakened by plague and famine. A new political and military force formed in the state—the emirs. They commanded troops in various regions of the country. Having just come to power, the Khan could not ignore this reality. This was the reason why A. Ponomaryov, in his research, found that Toktamysh's reign was marked by a change of approach to the structure of government spending: it is likely that large sums were paid to military leaders, on whom the khan relied for support in various regions [24, pp. 168–169].

Toktamysh's coming to power in the Golden Horde meant the country was unified under the Chinggisids. It is no wonder that the new Khan's first act relating to the state's coinage was to refashion it. In other words, a reform was carried out. Unlike Toqta's reforms, the reform of 782/1380–1381 did not end the circulation of silver coins issued earlier but replenished some of the state's markets with a new coin of reduced weight, and, probably, lower purity (at the current time of writing, the question of how purity was manipulated requires further study). It
is a curious fact that despite there being no discoveries\(^{48}\) of single Toktamysh coins in the Bulgar wilayah, and no functioning mint, there have been many discoveries of coins issued earlier whose edges have been rounded off. Just as in the 13th century, this feature separates the circulation of money in Bulgar lands from the general trend in the Golden Horde.

It should be noted that a significant number of coins were in circulation during Toktamysh's reign: Sygnak (from 781 AH), Khwarezm, Barchin (only puls), Saray-Jük, Hajji Tarkhan, Majar, Azak, Crimea, Crimea al-Jadid, Beled Qrim, al-Jadid, Sarai, Sarai al-Jadid, Sarai al-Mahrusa, Beled Saray, Idil (only puls), Ordu, Ordu al-Jadid, Ordu Muazzam, etc. However, in his study of the stamp connections of Toktamysh coins from different mints, L. Dobromyslov noticed an unusual connection: the stamp network of Ordu-minted dangs contains coin stamps from Sarai al-Jadid, Hajji Tarkhan, Majar, and even Khwarezm [9, pp. 27–28]. This might be a sign that, when taking a town, Toktamysh's army would confiscate stamps from the town's mint for use in their own camp's mint. If this is the case, it would be impossible to evaluate the relative operational activity of each issuing centre. In other words, the existence of a large number of mints and a huge mass of coins that they struck cannot be used to assess levels of trade and monetary transactions in the areas and regions where the mints in question were in operation.

The Golden Horde's unenviable economic situation determined the steps that Khan Toktamysh had to take. First, he returned the Principality of Muscovy and its allies to his rule; then he moved to conquer the Caucasus. For several years, a number of mints in the Caucasus (such as those in Baku, Gushtaspi, Shamakhi, and Mahmudabad) minted coins bearing Toktamysh's name. Toktamysh's Caucasus campaign certainly eased the economic pressure on the state to some degree. However, it clearly could not completely solve all of the complex issues it faced. Quite a large number of coins of the Ilkhans, Jalāyirids, and other southern dynasties entered into circulation in the Golden Horde. They included small coins, similar in size and weight to Jochid-issued coins in the central regions. Large coins that stood out were quickly remade.

In addition to the Caucasus campaign, Toktamysh invaded the domains of Emir Timur in Transoxiana in 789/1387–1388. As a result, Samarkand coins entered into circulation in the Golden Horde, but only the small miri could be said to have 'thrived'.

As a result of Timur's Caucasus campaign, Toktamysh lost an additional source of money and goods. From 793/1391 to 797/1394–1395, Emir Timur and Toktamysh repeatedly invaded each other's lands. This led to Emir Timur's coins constantly entering the Golden Horde's markets [1]. What is important to note is that monetary circulation in the Golden Horde was no longer protected from influxes of foreign coins. This is a clear indication that the state was in an economic crisis. Monetary policy did not change after Toktamysh left the political arena. Many mints ceased to operate either partially or completely. This situation continued for several years.

**The 15th century. The sixth stage.** The sixth stage of monetary circulation started with Shadi Beg Khan's monetary reform. It should be said that nobody has yet made a comprehensive study of coinage and monetary circulation in the Golden Horde during the 15th century. Apart from making a self-evident statement that Shadi Beg carried out some monetary reforms, for the time being it is impossible to trace the subsequent stages of the state's monetary policy. Shadi Beg's reforms were aimed at changing the quality levels of the coins used on the markets in the state's various regions. They affected Bulgar, Khwarezm, Hajji Tarkhan, and the Crimean Peninsula. The old silver coin was not compulsorily withdrawn from circulation, but its share as a percentage of coins in circulation steadily decreased over time. It could be said that in a number of regions the role of copper coins significantly decreased. After a small silver coin

\(^{48}\) Large hoards from the Toktamysh era have been found in Tatarstan, but they were all were buried either at the beginning of the 15th century or during Emir Timur's invasion. There is no record of Toktamysh-era coins being in circulation in the Bulgar wilayah.
which could justifiably be called an *akçe* was issued in significant numbers, the quantity of puls dropped dramatically. This is evident from the number of discoveries of both coin types in various issues.

The coinage and monetary circulation of the 15th-century Golden Horde and the Turkic-Tatar khanates that succeeded it still await meticulous, rigorous, comprehensive, and professional study. There can be no doubt that even in the previous two centuries many issues remain unresolved.


The emergence of cities.

It is surprising, but nonetheless true, that most of information we know about the Golden Horde—which we are used to considering a nomadic state—was obtained by archaeologists during excavations in the ruins of the Golden Horde cities. But how great was the influence of urban culture on the Ulus of Jochi and what was the reason behind emergence of cities in the steppes?

The Ulus of Jochi, or the Golden Horde, emerged as a result of the Mongol conquest of a vast territory of Europe and Asia including regions with different cultural and historical background. First of all, that were steppe and forest-steppe areas of the Western Siberia, Western Kazakhstan, Volga–Ural interfluve, Volga region, Don River region, Cis–Dniester river region, inhabited by nomads: the Kipchaks and Cumans. The outskirts of this vast steppe, called Desht-i Kipchak, were traditional settlement areas, but they significantly differed in terms of the level of development. South Kazakhstan, Left-bank Khwarezm, Crimea, and Volga Bulgaria were areas of long-lived settled way of life with a developed urban infrastructure. In the North Caucasus, there were many large settlements of Alans, but they had not become real cities yet. In the Mordvin lands and Prut–Dniester interfluve, the settled population lived in rural areas, and there were no cities in the pre–Mongol period. Archaeological research of the early 21st century allow us to attribute the delta and flood plain regions of the Lower Volga, where the city of Saqsin and related settlements, forming the region of the same name, were located, to the list of settled areas of the pre–Mongol era [13]. Thus, cities became a relatively new social and economic phenomenon just for the steppe regions centred in the Lower Volga region. It is the level of development of the Golden Horde cities in the Lower Volga region that can be regarded as an indicator of the level of development of the entire Ulus of Jochi at every stage of its existence; the life cycle of these cities remarkably clearly coincides with the life cycle of the Golden Horde state in general.

Traditionally, it was believed that the Mongol invasion, as a result of which many cities were burned and plundered, and their population was partially killed, partially enslaved, led to abandonment and decay of the city centres in the settled areas for almost centuries. This view is based on the data from historical sources, many of which depict truly apocalyptic pictures. However, archaeological researches largely disprove these established perceptions. For instance, the capital of Volga Bulgaria, the city of Bilyar, sinks into decay as Bulgar rises into importance and becomes the metropolitan centre. In the Golden Horde period, Bulgar reaches its peak impossible before. In the Lower Volga region, in the ancient town of Samosdelka (presumably the city of Saqsin), the 13th-century layers contain traces of a powerful fire, which can be linked to the Mongol invasion [11]. However, the city recovered in a very short period of time and continued to exist until it was flooded as a result of a rise in the Caspian Sea level. The Mongol invasion did not have a significant impact on the development of the Crimean cities.
Written source-based opinion about catastrophic consequences of the Mongol invasion of the Central Asia and that it resulted in the decay of many cities for a long period of time is rather stable [1, pp. 111–113]. However, in a large-scale archaeological research in a number of cities of South Kazakhstan, such as Otrar, Taraz, Sawran, etc., no traces of massive fires and destruction were found. In addition, they showed that cities quickly recovered and continued to develop in the Golden Horde period [74, pp. 72–79]. Before assaulting Urgench, the capital of Khwarezm, Jochi's troops held it under siege for seven months and tried to flood it by destroying the dam on the Amu Darya [63, pp. 214–217]. Although most of the population was slaughtered and enslaved, recorded buildings weren't significantly damaged [89, pp. 12–18]. During the Golden Horde period, Khwarezm would become one of the richest and most prosperous regions of the Golden Horde.

Besides this, by the 1240s, by edict of Batu, construction of new cities in the steppe area began. The reasons for this building have repeatedly been the subject of studies [24; 25, pp. 75–78; 27; 82, pp. 7–16]. The necessity to create administrative centres to control the conquered territories, inhabited by both the settled population and nomads, was the most significant among them. Initially, old cities like Bulgar and Urgench were used as administrative centres. There were officials and tax-farmers engaged in tax collection, most of which was sent to Karakorum. Local nomadic aristocracy was separated from the government over urban centres and rural settlements; systematic exploitation was taken over by the Chinggisids. The issue of arranging the governance over the conquered peoples led to a sharp struggle among the Chinggisids. Representatives of one point of view called for maintaining the nomadic life style and occasional plundering raids; another party argued in favour of limiting the arbitrariness of conquerors and organising a permanent taxation system.

According to G. Fedorov-Davydov, the Mongol cities were founded upon the edicts of the Mongol conquerors and quickly grew as craft and trade centres due to the labour of the enslaved population [81]. In the countries with advanced traditions of urban life, new cities emerged as administrative centres having no connection with the former strongholds of the government. In the regions with a predominance of nomadic culture, the fundamental reasons for the emergence of cities was, according to V. Yegorov, related to the changes occurring in the society of nomads [23, pp. 45–49]. It is possible that in the pre–Imperial period, there existed some sedentary elements among the Mongols because 'The Secret History of the Mongols' mentions some people using wooden doors, along with Mongols living behind felt walls [45, chapter VIII]. But there were no fortified cities performing commercial and handicraft functions yet; they emerged among the nomads only after the formation of the state with bureaucratic functions, civil service, and other attributes. Urgent decisions may be taken by the khan in his nomadic camp. However, the bulky and branched bureaucratic state apparatus was in need of a permanent location. This is the first stage of the development of urban life. To quote V. Yegorov, if a city arose solely as an administrative centre, without an economic lifeline it did not exist long. The second stage of development is the growth of a small administrative centre into a centre of craft and trade that turns into a populous city [23, pp. 45–49].

The early Karakorum can be studied as an example of emergence of a city as an administrative centre. The second stage was observed by William of Rubruck, who visited Karakorum at the turn of 1253 and 1254 [5, p. 20]. Based upon one more message of William of Rubruck, V. Yegorov makes the assumption that even the capital of Ulus of Jochi, Sarai, at the early stage of its existence was a small town, rather reminiscent of a nomad camp [23, pp. 44–45]. He also identifies two main types of the Mongol cities in the steppe area at the early stage of the development of the state. Type 1 is a city which arose as an administrative centre around the main winter camp when 'the army armed with bows and swords is aided by the army armed with quills and laws' [23, p. 46]. Further on, these cities acquire functions of trade and craft centres and accumulate orchards and crops around. Type 2 is a city-colony. These cities were inhabited...
by craftsmen and farmers from the conquered settled lands, who provided their products to nomads. As an example of such city in the Golden Horde, V. Yegorov points to Beljamen (Vodyanskoie ancient town) [23, p. 47].

G. Fedorov-Davydov highlighted features that were present in the cities of the Golden Horde. The first one is the construction of new urban centres in the shortest possible time using the labour of captives, the process being stimulated by the khan's power. The second feature is the development of a slave-owning economic system, which is particularly apparent in such form of craft organisation as a slave-type manufacture like the Iranian manufacture, karkhana. The third feature is the dualism of city and the nomadic camp-orda. Economic power of the state was concentrated in the city, while political power was concentrated in the nomadic camp [81, pp. 215–220] M. Kramarovsky writes that the emergence of cities and monetary circulation led to occurrence of new forms of division of labour, new economic ways of concentration, redistribution, and sale of the surplus product obtained from the steppe, farming concentrated regions of the empire, as well as from the international trade. Cities became centres of transcontinental trade, spiritual life, intellectual activity, and multi-ethnic culture. However, the resources of cities, their rhythm of life entirely depended on the steppe empire. The fall of the power of nomadic khans automatically leads to the fall of the steppe cities [47, pp. 567–568].

A. Yakubovsky mentioned the favourable combination of natural climatic conditions, allowing for agricultural and nomadic economy, as the main reason for construction of new cities in the steppes of the Lower Volga region, which became the centre of the independent state of the Jochids [20, p. 68]. In addition, the Lower Volga region was located at the intersection of the most important trade routes of the continent: the Volga–Caspian trade route and the northern branch of the Great Silk Road. Control over these routes enriched the khan's treasury. However, the independence of the Ulus of Jochi without the enthronement of Khan Mengü Temür was out of the question; thus, revenues from old urban centres were taken by appointees from Karakorum [79, p. 78]. Thus, development of the Lower Volga region, which was the private domain of the khans from the house of Batu and accumulated material and human resources [6, p. 24], meant the ability to 'seize' a part of revenues promised by the exploitation of settled regions.

So, the administrative and political factor was the main factor determining the emergence of the Golden Horde cities. Both capitals of the Golden Horde, the Old and New Sarai (Sarai al-Jadid), represent examples of such an emergence of cities [6, pp. 25–26]. M. Safargaliev noted that most of the cities which emerged in the Mongol period were built on the site of military camps. He tried to find the reason for their emergence in the translation of their names. As an example he mentioned Eski Qırım, Akkerman (Moncastro), Khan Kerman (Kasimov), Kermenchuk (on the Vyatka River), Kremenchuk (on the Dnieper River), and others. The word 'kerman' in the Cuman dictionary was translated into Latin as 'Castrum': 'fortification', 'fortress', 'camp'. In addition, the name of present-day Temnikov in Mordovia, Siberian Tyumen, Tyumen on the river Terek, he associates with the locations of the camps of khans' temniks, the commandants of ten thousand garrisons [72, p. 79]. V. Yegorov linked the emergence of such cities as Tula, Kaluga, Yelets in a so-called 'buffer' forest-steppe zone between Russia and the Horde domains to the existence of baskak districts and military outposts in their place [26, pp. 23–24]. M. Nasonov records lots of names of the villages the origin of which also goes back to the baskak localities and districts within the territory of Rus': Baskaki, Baskakovo, Baskachi, etc. [56, pp. 18–20].

Other cities of the Golden Horde, according to M. Safargaliev, owe their origin to the caravan trade. He attributed to those the cities of Solkhat, Azak (Tana), Majar, Sarai, Saray-Jük, Hajji Tarkhan, Ukek, Beljamen [72, pp. 79–80]. However, as it was aptly noted by M. Kramarovsky, the question of whether new cities of the Jochids appeared outside of the khans' will and support of tribal and military aristocracy is not worth discussing at all: in the Golden Horde, especially in
the 13th century, there was no other social force capable of changing the stereotype of nomadic farming in favour of sedentarisation [47, p. 572]. Furthermore, the thesis of M. Safargaliev about the emergence of cities out of fortified camps did not stand the test of time. Archaeological research in many archaeological sites of the Golden Horde provided a broad range of evidence that indigenous regions of the Ulus of Jochi were urbanised by the compulsory concentration of craftsmen in those regions. But not in the form of fortified settlements. In the steppes, there was nothing and no one for the Jochids to be afraid of' [47, p. 574].

Cities in the steppes emerged upon the will of khans, without reliance on the old traditions. Curiously, during excavations on the ruins of cities that were founded by the Mongols in the new location, the 'sub-city' stage has not yet been identified anywhere yet. Thus, so far it is impossible to track the evolution of the Golden Horde city from the foundation to transformation into a full-fledged settlement.

Currently, in the study of urban development in the Golden Horde, there is a concept which assumes that there are two main paths for the emergence of cities. These are the 'steppe' way (in areas which did not have the pre-Mongol settlement tradition) and 'autochthonous' (where cities had their own urban development traditions). In reality, none of these ways is implemented anywhere in its pure form, because the initial imperial culture of the Mongols was syncretic and based on the mixture of settled and steppe elements, on the mutual penetration of different cultural traditions [47, p. 574].

V. Yegorov identified six stages of development of the Golden Horde cities [25, p. 78], among which were the periods of recovery and use of old cities which existed even before the Mongols, in the 1240s; the beginning of urban development in the steppes during the reign of Batu, from the beginning of 1250s; the rise in urban development during the reign of Berke, from the middle of the 1250s to the 1260s; the period of slow growth of cities from the 1270s to the beginning of the second decade of the 14th century; the golden age of urban development during the reign of Öz Beg and Jani Beg from the second decade of the 14th century to the 1360s; the decrease and decay of urban development from the 1360s to 1395.

As further research has shown, this general scheme did not take into account the local features of urban culture in the Golden Horde [82, p. 16].

M. Kramarovsky, based upon numismatic research, identifies the following stages of 'leadership of the most significant permanent settlements and city-forming provinces' [47, pp. 576–578].

The first period (from 1240s–1250s to the 1290s). Coining was concentrated in the old urban centres of Bulgar, Crimea, Khwarezm and appeared in newly-founded Sarai.

The second period (1290–1341). It begins with termination of coining in Bulgar for 30 years, while it was maintained in all other minting centres. This period was marked by an attempt to mint coins with the name of Nogai in the Crimea and Ishakçı. In the reign of Toqta, the coining began in Majar. The reign of Öz Beg was marked by coinage in such centres of uluses as Crimea, Sarai, Khwarezm, Mokhshi, and Bolgar, as well as Azak and Sygnak.

The third period is from Jani Beg to Toktamys (1341/42–1380/81). The leaders of monetary emission in this period are the mints of Sarai al-Jalid and Khwarezm. The fall of the state led to the beginning of independent coining in Gulistan, Beljamen, Aksaray, Mokhshi, Hajji Tarkhan, Saray-Jük. The mints of Shehr al-Jalid in the Dniester region, Ordu al-Muazzam in the Dnieper River region, and Azak in the Don River region prospered. Even golden dinars were minted in Khwarezm during the entire period of independence.

The fourth period covers the reign of Toktamys until Jalal ad-Din (1380–1412). In this period, all regional centres became city-issuers. The mint of the nomadic Orda operated along with them [18].
Chapter VIII. Economy, Crafts, and Trade

This periodisation clearly shows that new centres of issue, which became active in the years of political fragmentation, are not a sign of decline in urbanisation: they mark the beginning of alignment of the levels of economic development of regions, which became possible in the years of obtaining political independence. These processes happen all the time and everywhere in the situation of feudal fragmentation of a once united country.

Based on the laws of monetary circulation in the region, L. Nedashkovsky identifies the main stages of development of the suburbs of the Golden Horde cities in the Lower Volga region. He highlights six stages in total: 1) 1266–1310 (from the reign of Mengü Temür until the reform of Toqta); 2) from 1310 to 1365 (from the reform of Toqta to the beginning of massive cutting of old dirhams and reducing the weight of new coins); 3) from 1365 to 1380 (during the height of internecine feud in the Ulus of Jochi); 4) from 1380 to 1395 (the reign of Toktamys); 5) from 1395 to 1420 (the era of Edigü); 6) from 1420 to 1459 (during the fall of the Golden Horde) [58, p. 225].

V. Blokhin came up with similar results in his research performed using generic numismatic data. Criticising V. Yegorov, he states that his identification of the second and third stages of urban development seems groundless and supported neither by archaeological nor written sources. There is only one building known to be built in the reign of Berke by now, and that is a mosque in Bulgar. No definite cultural layers dated from the 13th century have been found so far in artefacts of the Lower Volga region [6, p. 40]. According to the results of analysis of coins found in hoards in the Lower Volga region, it is difficult to grasp any drastic changes, alteration between ups and downs in urban development policy of the Golden Horde khans in the Lower Volga region from 1240s to 1310 [6, p. 41]. The monetary activity begins in 671 AH in Sarai, and the latter half of the 13th century is marked by slow progressive development of cities. Gradual concentration of resources contributes to the rise of urban development at the end of Toqta's reign, when the mint 'Sarai al-Mahrusa', which minted coins for the entire state, starts to function in 710 AH. The volume of monetary circulation sharply increased in the reign of Öz Beg Khan and Jani Beg Khan. Political destabilisation, associated with period of 'The Great Troubles' in 1359–1380, led to stagnation in the urban development and reduction of monetary circulation by several times. The next rise of monetary circulation resulted from the temporary unification of the country under the rule of Toktamys in 1380–1395. The final undermining of economic foundations of the state was caused by the campaign of Timur against the Golden Horde in 1395–1396. The majority of the Golden Horde cities were destroyed; however, the biggest centres, associated with international transit trade, recovered and existed for a long time. For example, Sarai, Hajji Tarkhan, and Saray-Jük became the political centres of the post–Horde states [6, p. 42–44].

Thus, according to V. Blokhin, the history of urban development shall be divided into the following periods:

1. The period of slow progressive development of urban structure from the 1240s to the early 14th century.
2. The rapid rise in urban development from the beginning of the 14th century to the early 1360s.
3. The period of decline in urban culture due to the Great Troubles from the early 1360s to the early 1380s.
4. A temporary insignificant rise due to recovery activities of Toktamys from the early 1380s to 1395.
5. Complete degradation of urban culture in the Golden Horde from 1395 to the first half of the 15th century.

Thus, obviously, the majority of researchers who studied this issue wanted to find an argument for identification of periods of development and existence of the Golden Horde cities in the monetary circulation within the territory of the Ulus of Jochi. Therefore, they recognise the vital importance of trade, craft, and the level of development of the market in general for
the existence of cities in the Golden Horde. We shall also note a common feature of these periods that the main historic milestone, which gave start to urbanisation, is in general associated with acquisition of independence by the Ulus of Jochi from the Mongol Empire.

The actual separation of the Ulus of Jochi took place at the end of the 13th century. Tax collection in Russian lands was transferred to the princes; supervision over them was transferred to the khans, and less funds were sent to Mongolia. From that time, the rapid growth of the cities began. New cities emerged and were controlled by khans and were free of the power of officials from Karakorum. The centre of the state shifts to the Lower Volga region, where already by the 40s was founded the capital, the city of Sarai (Sarai al-Mahrusa). This region was chosen primarily because of the favourable combination of natural conditions. Here were flood plain lowlands suitable for agriculture, forested banks of the river, endless steppes necessary for nomadic camps. In addition, Volga was the most important trade route for the entire Eastern Europe. It encompassed trade routes going to Transcaucasia, Aral Sea region, Kazakhstan, Central Asia, Iran in the east and Crimea, Circum-Pontic region, Dniester River region in the west.

In the 13th century, the cities of the Golden Horde were still few in number, but in the first half of the 14th century, cities and smaller settlements emerged everywhere across the Golden Horde, while the Lower Volga region, desert-like in the Mongol period, became an area of continuous sedentism. That was driven by the urban development policy of Öz Beg Khan and later his son Jani Beg, and also by the fact that in the reign of these Khans the Golden Horde reached the apex of its power. In this period, the economic and political situation of the state was marked by stability, almost no wars involved in, while crafts, trade, and cultural life flourished. Undoubtedly, the growth of cities is also associated with the adoption of Islam as the state religion. This step, largely initiated by the influential layers of the Khwarezm merchantry [9, pp. 20–23], contributed to continued influx of urban population from different Islamic countries of the east to the Golden Horde.

Initially, these 'khans-controlled' cities were built by the enslaved craftsmen, forcibly evicted from different countries. It was colourfully described by Giovanni da Pian del Carpine: 'They take all the best craftsmen and get them do their jobs. Other craftsmen pay tribute to them from their job. They harvest all crops to the barns of their masters; however, the masters give them seed, as well as bread enough for food; the rest are given bread daily of a specific weight, but just a little, and they do not give them anything except of a small portion of meat three times a week. They do it only for those craftsmen who live in the cities... In short, they eat very little, drink little, and are very badly dressed, unless they can earn something as a goldsmith and other good craftsmen. However, the masters of some craftsmen are so bad that they do not give them anything, and craftsmen are so busy doing jobs of the masters that they cannot earn anything for themselves, unless they allocate some time for themselves from the time when they are supposed to rest or sleep, and only those who are permitted to have a wife or own camp can do it. Others, who are kept at home as slaves, are more to be pitied' [65, p. 58]. In the first half of the 14th century during the reign of Öz Beg and Jani Beg, when the Golden Horde reached its golden age and prosperity, builders and craftsmen from neighbouring countries were moving to the Golden Horde cities, where work was always in abundance and their products were in demand.

More than 110 cities and settlements [25] are now known, but exploratory works of the last decades continue to discover more and more new settlement sites (Fig. 1). Thus, the state founded by nomads, who formed the core of its population, in a few decades became 'the country of cities'.
Fig. 1. The Golden Horde in the 14th century (by V. Yegorov [25] with amendments).
Geographical overview of the Golden Horde cities.

The most detailed region-based overview of the Golden Horde cities known to science can be found in the monograph by V. Yegorov [25]. We will quote it here very briefly and try to supplement it with data discovered by scholars since the publication of the 'Historical geography of the Golden Horde'.

The review starts with the Prut–Dniester interfluve, where V. Yegorov identified four ancient towns: Akkerman, Kilia, Costești, and Old Orhei. The first two cities were large centres of international trade and existed surrounded by nomadic steppe in isolation from settled regions. Ancient towns of Costești and Old Orhei were located in agricultural regions and were surrounded by numerous villages. Old Orhei stands out against these ancient towns: it was one the largest cities of the Golden Horde; administrative, crafts, and trade centre of the Prut–Dniester Region. Excavations here have revealed a number of monumental stone buildings of social and religious character: mosque, church, three baths, the remnants of a palace building [62]. From the residential buildings should be mentioned the Golden Horde houses with a heating system consisting of kans and tandoors, as well as the remnants of yurts that show the interweaving of nomadic and sedentary traditions [25, pp. 79–182].

In the Dniester–Dnieper interfluve, V. Yegorov recorded seven ancient towns of the Golden Horde, that is, Mayaki, Velyka Mechetnya, Bezymyanoe [anonymous] ancient town, Solonoe ancient town, Argamaki Saray, Ak-Mechet, Balykley. Perhaps, these ancient towns emerged and existed in the 14th century on the trade routes that connected Lviv with Crimea and western uluses with central regions of the state [25, pp. 82–84].

The left-bank Dnieper has not been studied enough from the archaeological perspective. Here were identified Kuchugurskoe ancient town to the south of Zaporizhia, the ancient town of Tavan to the south of Kherson, Konskoe ancient town on the Konka River bank. In addition, several ancient towns were located in Kharkivshchyna, Poltavshchina, and Donbass; no archaeological traces of them have been found yet, and they are known only from written sources [25, pp. 84–87].

Crimea is one of the most urbanised regions: traditions of settlement appeared here long before the arrival of the Mongols. However, its territory is divided into steppe regions, inhabited by nomads, and the mountain Crimea with the Black Sea coast, where the settled way of life was spread. The cities of Crimea (Eski Qırım) and Qırq Yer (Chufut-Kale) were known here in the Golden Horde time. The Genoese called the city of Crimea, Solkhat. Due to the rapid growth of the Genoese trade and closely located Kaffa, Solkhat became a major trade and craft centre. Ibn Battuta, who visited the city in the 1330s, reports that it is a great and beautiful city, from which deep into the state goes a road with stations for changing horses at regular intervals [75, pp. 280, 284]. From the time of its founding and until the end of the 15th century, Qırım was the administrative centre of the entire peninsula. Archaeological research confirmed that in the 13–14th centuries, the city was already developed and possessed high culture. A unique complex of mosque and madrasah of Öz Beg, as well as the ruins of two more mosques and a Christian temple, has been preserved to our days. Other cities of the peninsula legally had no connection with the Golden Horde; however, they were completely dependent on the Mongolian authorities. These are the cities of Vosporo (Kerch), Kaffa (Theodosia), Soldaia (Sudak), Cembalo (Balaklava), Theodoro (Mangup). These cities were surrounded by numerous rural settlements and acted as conduits in the international trade, playing an important role as intermediaries in trading on the Silk Road. Right there all overland caravan trade routes ended, and the sea route to the countries of the Middle East, Egypt, and Western Europe began. Goods from the northern regions, Rus' and Cis–Urals, also flocked here [25, pp. 87–90].

The Don River basin was one of the central regions of the Ulus of Jochi. The Southern Don River region is a steppe region, while the Northern Don River region is a forest-steppe. Until recently, only one large Golden Horde city, Azak (present-day city of Azov), was known...
in the Southern Don River region. However, medieval maps contain a few more small settlements in the lower Don. Azak was a large trade centre because there were Genoese and Venetian colonies called Tana. That was the place where all goods delivered by caravans from East and Rus' arrived. The counter-flow of goods was delivered to Azak from the Mediterranean countries. The following ancient towns are known in the upper and middle Don: Krasnokhotorskoie, Pavlovskoe, Tishanskoe, Durnovskoe, Glazunovskoe, Kumylzhenskoe, Sitnikovo, and there is information about the ancient towns near the city of Zadonsk in Lipetsk oblast and near the village of Elan'-Koleno in Voronezh oblast. Of course, this is hardly all the Golden Horde sites that existed in this region. V. Yegorov considers the interfluve of Volga and Don within the boundaries of present-day Volgograd oblast as a region of complete distribution of settled way of life throughout the 14th century [25, pp. 91–94].

In the Volga region, the Golden Horde captured the Volga Bulgaria, a region with a long tradition of sedentary culture. Along with numerous rural settlements and small towns in the Golden Horde period, there were the cities of Juketau, Bilyar (the pre-Mongol capital of the state [76, pp. 93–97], the size of which was significantly reduced in the Golden Horde period), Suvar (was also in decline in the Golden Horde period), Kashan, Kremenchuk, Kazan. In addition, the settlements of Iske Qazan (ancient town consisting of the Urmat ancient settlement and Kamaevskoe ancient town), Barskoenaruskoe ancient settlement and town, Kokryatske ancient town (perhaps, the remnants of the city of Tukhchin), Bolsheatrasskoe ancient settlement (proposed location of the city of Shungat), and the Cheboksary ancient town were archaeologically documented [25, pp. 94–106]. In the 13–14th centuries, the most important and the largest city in the region was Bulgar, the capital of the Volga Bulgaria during the Golden Horde period (the city of Ibrakhim, Bryakhimov, or Bryagov in the Russian chronicles [76, pp. 60–62]), the remnants of which are found near the present-day village of Bulgary in Tatarstan. During the course of excavations in the territory of the ancient town, entire districts of residential buildings were found in the central part of the city with remnants of a manor building. In addition, large buildings in the ancient town were either preserved on the ground or excavated and turned into a museum; these are the Cathedral mosque, the Big and Small minarets, a number of mausoleums (Northern, Eastern, the Black chamber, the Khan's tomb), six public baths (the most famous of them are the Black house and the Red house), and a number of other monumental buildings that show the significant level of development of the urban culture in the Golden Horde period.

Lands of the former Volga Bulgaria in the 13–14th centuries were a region of completely settled way of life, with numerous villages and small towns, many of which were discovered as a result of archaeological excavations. In addition, the region was an intersection point of traditional trade routes used to deliver furs from Cis-Urals, the Vyatka River basin, and Northern Volga. Again, numerous and various Russian goods were delivered to this region, where Eastern merchants were waiting for them.

The territory of present-day Bashkortostan was closely connected to the Volga Bulgaria. However, this territory was located away from large trade routes and represented a raw material base for supplies of fur, honey, wax, leather, and other products. Abisov ancient town is the only town in this region known to be related to the Golden Horde period [25, p. 106].

Interfluve of Sura and Moksha Rivers is one of the northernmost uluses of the Golden Horde. Here only one but very important and large city of Mokhshi, near the village of Narovchat in Penza oblast, is known. The city existed in the 14–15th centuries and was a significant settlement in terms of its area. Here the remnants of a mosque, baths, mausoleums, residential buildings were found. The city was an administrative and political centre of a big region inhabited by the Mordvinian tribes [25, pp. 106–107].

The Volga region played a special role in the life of the state, for it was the central from geographical and political perspective. That was the region with the largest number of localities
and the first cities founded by the Mongols in the steppes. According to the most general overview, there were 30–40 settlements in the Volga region from Tatarstan to the Caspian Sea, where the remnants of buildings made of fired brick were found (that is, those that can be considered as large cities). Starting a conversation about the Golden Horde cities in the Volga region, it makes sense to dwell only on the biggest and the most significant of them.

The ancient town of Uvek (the Golden Horde city of Ukek) is one of the earliest cities in the Golden Horde, which was founded by the Mongols in the 1250s. Its remnants are located on the right bank of the Volga River on the outskirts of present-day city of Saratov. The city of Ukek was fortified with a rampart and a ditch, stretched from Kalancha mountain to the Volga River bank. In the early 20th century, there were clear traces of stone buildings of the Golden Horde period; however, due to the almost complete development, its planning is not clear in general. Archaeological research has showed that the ancient city stretched along the Volga for over 2 km. Population of the city can be evaluated as 9–10 thousand people. Excavations have revealed various buildings made of fired and adobe brick, the remnants of water pipeline, furnaces for firing the architectural ceramics. The remnants of a Christian temple have recently been found and studied in Ukek [49; 50]. The 'Book' by Marco Polo, whose father and uncle visited this city in 1262, contains a reference to Ukek. The death of the city is associated with Timur's campaign in 1395 [57, pp. 72–81].

Vodyanskoе ancient town (possible location of the city of Beljamеn, Biezdziež in Russian chronicles) is located on the left bank of the Volga River, to the north of the city of Dubovka in Volgograd oblast. Its area is over 500 thousand square metres. Construction of the Golden Horde city in this place was associated with convenient geographical location. Here the distance between the Don and the Volga is at a minimum. This allowed merchants to transport goods and ships by land from one river to another with the least effort. That was a starting point of the route to both capitals of the Golden Horde, and further to Khwarezm, Mongolia, and China. Reliable historical sources confirm the existence of portage in this place. Archaeological research in Vodyanskoе ancient town allow us to describe Beljamеn as one of the developed and landscaped cities of the Golden Horde. In addition to various residential buildings, here were studied the remnants of stone and brick mosques, three mausoleums, bath with a water pipeline, and various craft complexes. Of special note is a Russian district, found here, inhabited by captives who were turned into slaves. According to the stratigraphy of archaeological stratas, the city was built by Russian captives, who were driven here and lived in dugouts [25, pp. 109–110].

The largest ancient towns in the territory of the Golden Horde are Tsarevskoe in the Lenin region of the Volgograd oblast and Selitrennnoye in the Kharabalinsky district of the Astrakhan oblast. By their location, area, and abundance of discoveries, these two archaeological sites can claim to be the capital of the Golden Horde.

The area of Tsarevskoe ancient town covers 160 hectares within the boundaries of the fortified part and together with the non-fortified part is over 400 hectares. The ancient town contains traces of streets, some farms, and aryps; a system of artificial pools was studied. Tsarevskoe ancient town is interesting by its planning. The site has a well preserved macro-relief: plans of the middle of the 19th century clearly show all streets and houses, the number of which reaches 1,550 (Fig. 2). In the city centre, there was a big square with large buildings, from which streets radiated to the outskirts; from them, in turn, side streets radiated and formed rectangular districts. Three estates of nobility were studied on the southern fringe of the fortified part of the ancient town; they were surrounded by rectangular fences, and apart from houses of owners, were equipped with pools, houses for servants, and guards. On the site, overground and buried into the ground dwellings were studied; traces of yurts, monumental buildings, and various craft workshops (bone carving, pottery, iron works, glass-making, bronze casting, and jewellery productions were iden-
tified) were also discovered. Human skeletons with iron-tipped arrows stuck in them were sometimes found in the ruins of houses, which tells about catastrophic destruction of the city [57, pp. 74–75]. In Russian historical research, Tsarevskoe ancient town is traditionally associated with the location of the city of Sarai al-Jadid, the second capital of the Golden Horde [82, pp. 22–23, 27].

Selitrennoe ancient town is located on the left bank of the Akhtuba (the main channel of the Volga River in the 14th century), near the village of Selitrennoye in Kharabalinsky region of Astrakhan oblast. It stretches along the river for over 7 km and goes deep into the steppe for 2 km. The ancient town is fortified with a weak rampart and a ditch built in the 1360s. During the archaeological excavations of the site, overground (including yurts) and buried into the ground dwellings, manors, mosque, the remnants of a minaret, baths, madrasah, mausoleums, workshops

Fig. 2. Tsarevskoe ancient town's plan made in 1842 by topographer Volokhov under the supervision of N. Teterevnikov (according to N. Savelyev)
(pottery, glass-making, bone carving, processing of semi-precious stones) were studied. The thickness of the cultural layer of the monument reaches 2 metres in some places.

Selitrennoe ancient town is marked by complete development, with streets and arks; rich estate development dominated in the western part of the city: behind rammed clay walls, there were houses of the owners of estates, dwellings of craftsmen and servants, household buildings, water reservoirs. A large manufactory, of a karkhan sort, and the largest Golden Horde homes (palace-like) were studied at the site. Also excavated on this site was the centre of an aristocratic district consisting of a Juna mosque, madrasah and public bath-hammam. From the 1370s until the 15th century, a significant part of the ancient town was occupied by burial sites. In general, according to numismatic materials, Selitrennoe ancient town is dated the last third of the 13–middle of the 15th centuries, while the period of the most active economic life of the site is dated 1330–1390s [57, pp. 75–76].

According to the view generally accepted in archaeological and historical literature, Selitrennoe ancient town is identified with the remnants of the Golden Horde capital, the city of Sarai [25, pp. 114–117; 82, pp. 22–23, 27]. In addition to these two large cities in the Lower Volga region, written sources and monetary material contain reference to the city of Gulistan, which have long remained unlocated [25, p. 114].

The traditional view that the first capital of the Golden Horde was at Selitrennoe ancient town and the second capital was at Tsarevskoe ancient town was criticised at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries. Results of numismatic material analysis from the data found in the ancient towns showed inconsistency between the amount and type of coins found there and the settlements that they were identified with. A reasonable hypothesis was put forward, according to which the city of Gulistan is now located by the researchers in Tsarevskoe ancient town, while the city of Sarai al-Jadid is located in Selitrennoe ancient town [7; 17; 22; 66; 67; 69]. The outbreak of scientific discussion helped to clarify the location of the first and the second capitals of the Golden Horde. The initial hypothesis of V. Rudakov and E. Goncharov about location of two capitals of the Golden Horde, the New and Old Sarai, in the territory of Selitrennoe ancient town was seriously criticised by I. Volkov, who highlighted numerous written and cartographic evidence on the existence of two capitals in the state [15; 16], and by A. Pachkalov [59].

A. Pachkalov put forward a hypothesis according to which currently the possible location of the city founded by Batu in the 13th century is considered the large Krasnoyarsky ancient town, situated about 40 km to the north-east of Astrakhan, on the north-eastern border of the Volga River delta [61]. This hypothesis is based, firstly, on the results of analysis of monetary material which was found on the surface and cultural strata of the ancient town, as well as extracted from graves in the burial site Mayachny bugor, which relates to the Krasnoyarsky ancient town as its urban necropolis. The burial site was left by representatives of the highest nobility of the Golden Horde. The largest number of hoards and the biggest number of rich burials in percentage (with gold and silver items) across the entire territory of the Golden Horde were found here. Some features of the burial rite allow us to link these burials to emigrants from the Far East: the Jurchens, Uighurs or Chinese, who practiced Buddhism [9, pp. 146–147; 10, pp. 436–435]. Information about the Krasnoyarsky ancient town and its neighbourhood allows us to consider that the Golden Horde city already existed here in the latter half of the 13th century. Here were found the Sarai coins of the 13th century, which almost did not circulate after the reign of Toqta Khan, as well as the coins of Ukek, which are rarely seen to the south of the Saratov Volga region. Some features of monetary circulation in the Krasnoyarsky ancient town allow us to characterise it as a large city. S. Skisov highlights the following features of monetary circulation in the ancient town of Krasnoyarsky: monetary circulation begins by the beginning of the 1270s and reaches peak activity by the end of the reign of Toqta Khan, that is,
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at the beginning of the reign of Öz Beg Khan. In the 1330s, monetary circulation sharply decreased and then almost stopped in the 1340s, resuming only 10 years later, but in a different capacity [73].

Archaeological research at the beginning of the 21st century and hypothesis about the location of the city of Sarai in the ancient town of Krasnoyarsky allowed us to clarify the location of some cities known from written sources and also to put forward a hypothesis about the time of the foundation of one more large city in the Lower Volga region, Hajji Tarkhan.

The ancient town of Shareny Bugor, located on the right bank of the Volga River, 12 km above the centre of present-day Astrakhan, is the remnants of Hajji Tarkhan. Archaeological excavations on this site showed that the surviving part of the ancient town represents one of the fringes of Hajji Tarkhan, built up mainly by dugouts. The time of the foundation of the city is unknown; we can only say for sure that it already existed by the 13th century. Visiting the city in the 1330s, Ibn Battuta says that 'this is one of the best cities, with big markets' [75, p. 301]. Timur's troops plundered and burned the city in the winter of 1396.

William of Rubruck states that Batu wanders on one side of the Volga River, while his son Sartaq wanders on the other side. From the context of William of Rubruck's story, it becomes clear that for winter, Batu had installed his camp in the city of Sarai, while Sartaq installed his camp on the opposite bank, and they did not go further down. Between these cities in the Volga River delta, there is the city of Summerkent, which had already emerged before the Mongol invasion, since the Mongols were forced to storm it. The path from Sarai to the main camp of Sartaq goes through Summerkent and numerous channels of the Volga River, which have to be crossed by boats. By the time of William of Rubruck's journey (1254), Sartaq had ordered to begin building a locality and Christian church in his main camp [65, pp. 180–182]. If we assume that 'Sarai and the palace of Batu', as it is recorded by William of Rubruck, were located in the Krasnoyarsky ancient town and start looking for the main camp of Sartaq on the western bank of the Volga River, it will be discovered in the place of the city of Hajji Tarkhan. Despite the fact that William of Rubruck did not state the name of the city, we still have an opportunity to link the foundation of this city to the beginning of construction of the locality and church by the Tsarevich Sartaq [12, p. 181].

In this case, we have the ability to localise the city of Summerkent in the Moshaik ancient town, which is located on the western border of Astrakhan, on the Bolda River bank, half-way from Sarai to Hajji Tarkhan. The message of William of Rubruck is the only information available now about Summerkent: 'There is the city of Summerkent in the middle arm [of the Volga]; it does not have walls; but when the river overflows, the city is surrounded by water. The Tatars stood under it for eight years before they conquered it. It was inhabited by the Alans and the Saracens' [65, p. 181].

The ability to localise the main camp of Sartaq to Hajji Tarkhan makes it clear why the ancient town of Yenotaevskoe, located by V. Yegorov to be on the right bank of the Volga River, opposite the ancient town Selitrennoe, has not been found [25, p. 117]. It just does not exist [12, pp. 64–72].

The presence of the city of Summerkent in the delta of the Volga River, which was founded in the pre–Mongol period, makes us turn to the question of existence of settled way of life in the Lower Volga region before the arrival of the Mongols. Archaeological excavations in the delta, in the Samosdelka ancient town showed the presence of powerful cultural deposits of the 9–14th centuries, which can be associated with the remnants of the city of Saqsin, the capital of the homonymous province [14, pp. 24–36]. In the 1230s, Saqsin was conquered and burned by the Mongols but was recovered and rebuilt in the early 14th century. If before the Mongol invasion, it was used as the main transit point on the Volga–Caspian trade route, then in the Golden Horde period, it already could not compete with new cities built by the Mongols. Nevertheless, in the Golden Horde period, the delta was populated, and there were many towns and villages, which constituted a part
of the Saqsin province before the Mongol conquest. One of them is the aforementioned ancient
town of Moshaik [13].

The unique site of the Golden Horde is the Lapas ancient town located on the left bank of
Akhtuba in the Astrakhan oblast between the Selitremnoe and Krasnoyarsky ancient towns. V.
Yegorov described the remnants of four large mausoleums of the Golden Horde located near
the ancient town; he allegedly associated them with burials of the Golden Horde Khans: Berke,
Öz Beg, Jani Beg, and Berdi Beg, not excluding the possibility that the founder of the state,
Batu, was also buried in this area [25, pp. 117–118]. Excavations and surveys in the ancient
town allowed to discover over 10 more mausoleums, to date the beginning of the construction
of complex as 1342, and allegedly link the emergence of the biggest mausoleum to the death of
Öz Beg Khan, who died in that year [8].

A large ancient town, located on the left bank of the Akhtuba, 70 km to the north of As-
trakhan, near the village of Komsomolsky, to the north of present-day Aksaraysk, is also of
great interest. Several large buildings: palaces and mausoleums, a number of dwellings, a big
number of burials were discovered here during excavations. A. Pachkalov suggests that the
Golden Horde city of Aksaray can be located here [60].

At that period of time, particular importance of the Volga River for the development of econ-
omy was not only that it connected some uluses of the Golden Horde. It was also used in major
permanent international transportation of goods. In the late 13–14th centuries the Lower Volga
region was an important point in the international transit trade, where it combined two streams of
the most diverse goods. One stream was coming from the north; the second one from the east.
Merchants from Rus', the Golden Horde, East and West Europe would continuously meet here,
developing a mutually beneficial relationships and largely contributing to the prosperity of cities
in the Lower Volga region [25, p. 120].

The North Caucasian region of the Golden Horde was very diverse from an ethnic and
economic perspective. In the Golden Horde period, small but numerous localities were replaced
by rapidly evolving large cities, which in a short period of time, became prominent centres of
craft and trade.

The most ancient town of the region is Derbent. It was founded long before the Mongol
invasion. In the 13–14th centuries, it was used as a border fortress separating domains of the
Jochids from the territories controlled by Hulaguids. During the reign of Batu, Derbent was
used in trade with countries of Transcaucasia. A long war for Azerbaijan, that started in the
reign of his descendants, decreased the regularity rate of these relations and reduced the role of
Derbent to an advanced border outpost of primary strategic importance. It is the only preserved
fortress in the Golden Horde with significant fortifications [25, p. 120].

The largest and the most important city in the North Caucasus was Majar; its remnants are
located on the territory and on the outskirts of the present-day city of Budyonnovsk in Stavropol
krai. Currently, a part of the ancient town has been built up and ploughed, that is why it is rather
difficult to determine its area. According to E. Rtveladze, the city occupied the area of 8 thou-
sand km [64, pp. 156–158], which indicates not only its vastness but also the significance of its
role in political and economic life of the region. The first confirmation of this is the right to
mint coins issued here in the 14th century. At the end of the 18th century, there were rather
many monumental brick buildings in the Majar ancient town, which is clearly described in the
story of Ibn Battuta (‘the big city, one of the best Turkic cities, located on a big river, with
orchards and abundant fruits’) [75, p. 278]. Majar is best known by mausoleums that survived
until the end of the 18th century and were repeatedly depicted and described by researchers and
travellers. As a result of archaeological surveys, here were discovered the remnants of dwell-
ings, traces of various craft productions, a complex urban water pipeline, the remnants of a
public bath [41]. The neighbourhood of Majar comprises the Lesser Majar and Upper Majar
ancient towns, located respectively down and up the stream of the Kuma River. Apparently, this archaeological complex represented an area of a completely settled way of life.

The remnants of large and important cities of the North Caucasus include the ancient towns of Lower Julat near the village of Maysky in Kabardino-Balkaria and Upper Dzhulat (Tatartup) near the village of Elchotowo in North Ossetia. The first ancient town is allegedly identified as the medieval city of Dzhulat, while the second one is identified as the chronic Iași city of Dedyakov. The remnants of monumental buildings, mosques, and minarets were discovered during archaeological excavations in the ancient towns. The minaret in the Upper Dzhulat ancient town had survived for a long period of time and fell to pieces only in 1981 [40, p. 121]. What is also unique in this ancient town is that the remnants of four Christian churches were studied [51, pp. 131–157].

In addition to these ancient towns, V. Yegorov also lists in the North Caucasus the city of Tarki near Makhachkala, the Urukh and Terek ancient settlements, as well as Khamidievskoe, Bulunguevskoe, and Verkhne-Chegmskoe ancient towns in Kabardino-Balkaria.

The cities of Matreg, located in present-day Taman, and Kopa, in the estuary of the Kuban River, were known on the Taman Peninsula during the Golden Horde period. In addition, there were 39 Italian colonies along the eastern coast of the Azov Sea and the Black Sea in the 14th century. The lack of archaeological surveys in this area makes it impossible to localise the majority of them; they are known only from medieval maps. The colonies represent small villages, but such a large number of them indicates brisk trade activities between Italians and the local population. In general, the North Caucasus and the Kuban region represented one of the important economic regions of the Golden Horde, which is evidenced by the extent of its involvement into international trade [25, p. 123].

The Volga–Ural interfluve features vast semi-desert and steppe areas. In the Golden Horde period, cities were located here only along the rivers. The most important political and economic centre of the region was the city of Saray-Jük, the remnants of which are located in Kazakhstan, on the right bank of the Ural River, near the village of Saray-Jük (60 km above the city of Atyrau). The name of the city is well known from written sources and coins minted here in the 14th century. It was founded in the latter half of the 13th century and completely destroyed in 1580 during the invasion of the Yaik Cossacks. According to V. Tatishchev, in the middle of the 16th century, merchants from Saray-Jük (Zaraychin) came to Astrakhan to trade 'with all sorts of goods'. Now the remnants of Saray-Jük have almost been completely destroyed due to the change of the Ural River-bed.

In addition to Saray-Jük, in the region there are an ancient town on the river Bolshoy Irgiz in Saratov Oblast, Sukhorechenskoe ancient town in Samara oblast, the Orenburg ancient town in the location of the present-day city of Orenburg, the Tendyk ancient town near the village of Tendyk in Kazakhstan. The Zhalkpaqtal ancient town has recently been discovered in the Western Kazakhstan region; there have been excavated several adobe mausoleums, the remnants of a mosque, and residential buildings. According to an instrumental survey of the ancient town, it occupies area of 68 hectares [52]. The Zhayik ancient town was discovered in 2001 not far from present-day Uralsk. There were excavated numerous buildings made of adobe and fired bricks, residential estates, a bath, mausoleums, production facilities [2; 3, pp. 97–112]. Without any doubt, all of these localities emerged along the trade routes from Khwarezm to the Volga Region. This caravan road, running through desert-like arid regions, was equipped with dug wells and caravanserais at the distances approximately corresponding to one daytime travel (about 30 km). Some of them have been studied by archaeologists. According to available information, there were 15 caravanserais on the way from Saray-Jük to Urgench [25, p. 125].

The Ulus of Khwarezm was a border south-eastern region of the state. Trade and irrigated agriculture played a prominent role in region's economy. The biggest city and the capital of the region was Urgench (Gorgan, Ornach). Its remnants are located near present-day locality
Kunya-Urgench in Turkmenistan. The ancient town occupies an area of around 400 hectares. During the Mongol invasion, Khwarezm suffered from economic and demographic destruction. It was caused by the fact that many craftsmen of Khwarezm were captured and taken to Mongolia and the Volga River region. Economic recovery of Khwarezm began just in the early 14th century. The period was also marked by revival of different size localities such as khutors, villages, and larger size settlements. Around 15 such settlements have been discovered during surveys carried so far on nowhere near the entire territory of ancient irrigation lands. The size of occupied area was different, for instance, the settlement of Kunya-Uaz II consisted of 12–15 houses, while the settlement of Akcha Gelin I stretched 5 km along the bed of irrigation canal, although it consisted of 40 buildings. This kind of localities always were located along the irrigation mains, stretching in the form of narrow strips, reaching the length of up to 10 km. In the Golden Horde period, there were many rural settlements in Khwarezm [25, p. 127].

Apart from the ruins of numerous mausoleums of the Golden Horde period in a vast territory of North Kazakhstan steppes, there have been found several ancient towns: the Mavliberdinskoe on the Oʻyil River, the Baytak on the Bolshaya Khobda River, and the Tagatay on the Nura River. The remnants of brick walls and traces of irrigation canals were found in this ancient towns. However, in general, settled way of life in this steppe region was underdeveloped [25, pp. 127–128].

There are many medieval ancient towns, most of which date back to the Siberian Khanate period, on the territory of Western Siberia in Tobol and Irtys Rivers basins. Definitively Golden Horde cities are Tyumen (political centre of ulus in the 14th century) on the Tura River, İsker (Sebourg, Siberia) on the Irtys River near the city of Tobolsk. There is also the ancient town of Tontur in Baraba steppe on the Om River. In these cities, which were located far away from contemporary to them centres of advanced urban development, there still were fundamental buildings, erected by qualified specialists [25, p. 128].

In the 13–14th centuries, South Kazakhstan was a part of Kok-Orda, the south-eastern part of the Ulus of Jochi. During the Mongol invasion, numerous cities in the basins of Syr Darya, Talas, and Chu Rivers were destroyed; population was partially killed, partially captured. Passing through this region in the middle of the 13th century, Giovanni da Pian del Carpine saw many devastated cities and villages without any signs of life. The late 13–early 14th centuries are marked by active revival of urban life in the Syr Darya River basin. The city of Sawran, located 30 km to the north-west of present-day Turkestan, became the centre of Kok-Orda. The remnants of the city of Sygnak are located near the city of Yani Kurgan in the Kyzylorda oblast of Kazakhstan. The remnants of another large city, Otrar, where the mint functioned in the 14th century, are located near the station of Timur. The remnants of the city of Jand, a prominent trade and craft centre in the lower reaches of the Syr Darya River, are located on the right bank of the Zhany-Darya River, 115 km to the west of present-day Kyzylorda. The Iași ancient town (Turkestan) with the iconic complex devoted to the Sufi preacher Hajji-Ahmed Yesevi is partially built up by modern city of Turkestan. Almost all of these cities are known from the written source of the 9–11th centuries; they existed much longer than the Golden Horde and desolated just by the 18th century, while Turkestan still exists [25, pp. 129–130].

V. Yegorov identified within the territory of the former Golden Horde the remnants of 110 settlements; most of them have been found so far during archaeological excavations representing ancient towns and ancient settlements. 30 cities known in the Middle Ages have not been located yet [25, p. 139]. Archaeological observations are close to information about 170 cities in the steppe, mentioned by Evliya Çelebi [85, p. 143]. However, are all ancient towns and ancient settlements in the steppes from the Dniester to Ural and Western Siberia the remnants of cities? Apparently, not.

V. Yegorov himself considered Sarai, Sarai al-Jadid, Khwarezm (Urgench), Gulistan, Bulgar, Bilyar, Azak, Crimea, Kaffa, Hajji Tarkhan, Ordu Bazar, Bek Bazar, Ukek, Saray-Jük,
Mokhshi, Shehr al-Jadid, Majar as the most important cities of the Golden Horde. These cities were highlighted because of the coinage right. In addition, Beljamen, Tyumen, Trestago, and Akkerman were flagged on the map of brothers Pizzigani as the most important cities. All of them were not only the centres of craft and trade but also important administrative centres [25, p. 139].

So, V. Blokhin questioned the exaggerated, in his opinion, level of urbanisation in the Golden Horde. He considers that the majority of sites, studied only by exploration, do not provide the possibility to attribute them to the group of cities. Even excavated areas within the remnants of large settlements are insignificant compared to the size of the settlements. Certainly, in such circumstances, information about structure, functional load, time, and conditions of foundation of one or another settlement will be rather relative. From the list of ancient towns by V. Yegorov, V. Blokhin classifies as the remnants of cities only Uvek, Hajji Tarkhan, as well as Vodyansko, Selitrennoe, and Tsarevskoe ancient towns. The author proposes to identify the status of several more settlements—Mechetnoe, Komsomolsky, Krasnoyarsky, Samosdelka—only after performing large-scale excavations [5].

Of course, such question is absurd. An archaeologist and historian, adopting these rules, lose the opportunity to not only discuss the Golden Horde cities in general but even to interpret one or another single object without 'performing large-scale studies'. Unfortunately, it is obvious that for most of the archaeological sites this time will never come. Thus, we encounter the problem of archaeological and historical identification of sites, and run the risk of turning any settlement site into an unknowable object. It is also obvious that the problem is about the degree of assumption that we are ready to accept in the course of historical interpretation.

A known fact is that the majority of the Golden Horde cities did not have fortifications, at least those located in the steppes. Based upon the generally accepted archaeological terminology, we should call the remnants of these cities 'ancient settlements' (even those, which V. Blokhin identifies as the remnants of cities). However, according to a long-established tradition, they are referred to as ancient towns because of being the remnants of large cities, that is, settlements called cities by the contemporaries. Theoretical framework for attributing one or another settlement to the cities of the Golden Horde has been neither determined nor developed yet. The following criteria can be put forward as the basis of framework:

1. The exceptionally large sizes of the site (sizes of the Golden Horde ancient towns vary from 15 hectares to 36 square kilometres). This criteria is subjective, but it is impossible to take into account all local conditions. L. Nedashkovsky, for example, suggests to consider as the remnants of large cities the sites occupying an area of 205–3,385 hectares (there are four sites of such kind in the Lower Volga region: the Uvek, Tsarevskoe, Selitrennoe ancient towns and Shareny Bugor, which is slightly different from the point of V. Blokhin). He attributes the sites occupying an area of 10–100 hectares to the group of small cities, the ancient settlements occupying an area of 1–7 hectares to the group of the remnants of rural settlements, and the ancient settlements occupying an area of less than 1 hectare to the group of villages [58, p. 15].

2. The presence of rich research material, including the remnants of dish-ware and packages, as well as irrigation vessels.
3. The presence of rich numismatic material: copper and silver coins.
4. The presence of the remnants of buildings made of fired brick, as well as glazed tiles, mosaics, and majolica at the site.
5. The presence of powerful cultural layer, dated not later than the 14th century.
6. The presence among the findings of a big number of fragments of handicraft products (not only ceramics), bone, iron, copper, glass items, and maybe the traces of productions.
7. The presence of evidences of transit trade: a considerable number of import items, lead weights-plumbs, copper weights, bronze and bone scales, etc.
8. The ability to correlate the site with the mentioned in written sources or highlighted on the medieval maps Golden Horde city, based on the features of topography or monetary materials.

9. The evidence of coinage, lasting even for a short period of time, may be regarded as a criterion for correlating an archaeological site with the category of cities. It will mean that a settlement was the administrative and economic centre of a big or small neighbourhood, thus, performed the functions of a city (of course, here should be taken into consideration the presence of abundant coining in the nomadic camp, Ordu, which wasn't a city, or at least, a stationary city).

In addition, we must bear in mind that the medieval criteria of cities did not necessary coincide with the modern criteria. If a locality was considered a city in the Middle Ages and that is recorded in written sources, we do not have any reason to consider it the remnants of a rural settlement.

Features of cities in the Golden Horde.

Large-scale studies of the Golden Horde cities, carried out by the Volga archaeological expedition in the 1960s–1970s, showed that they were different from contemporary to them cities of the East and West. The identity of the Golden Horde cities was analysed in a number of classical works of G. Fedorov-Davydov and V. Yegorov [23; 24; 27; 82; pp. 12–16]. Their main features are the green field emergence upon the khan's will, the manor planning, lack of fortress walls resulting in large sizes.

The manor-street type of development is one of the characteristic features of the Golden Horde cities in the steppe area. The first excavations in Tsarevskoe ancient town showed that its south-eastern part was occupied by large manors, making up entire neighbourhoods, while in the other parts of the city, the houses were located along the streets [77, p. 251; 78; 54; 55; 80; 27]. Further excavations in Selitrennoe and other ancient towns of the Golden Horde proved that they had the same development principles [82, pp. 12–16].

Unfortunately, written sources do not contain any specific information about the start of urban development in the Golden Horde, that is why G. Fedorov-Davydov assumed that this process progressed similar to the process in Mongolia. The construction of Karakorum was described by Rashid al-Din: 'Since he [Ögedei] brought with him from China different craftsmen and masters of every type of craft and art, he ordered to build in [his] yurt of Karakorum, where he mostly stayed in well-being, a palace with very high basement and columns, as befits high intentions of such ruler. The length of every side of the palace was equal to the distance of an arrow's flight. A grand and high kushk was erected in the middle, and the building was decorated in the best way and painted with art and pictures and was called 'Qarshi' [palace]. [Qa'an] made [it] his blessed throne. According to a decree, each of [his] brothers, sons and other tsareviches under him had to built a good house near the palace. Everybody obeyed the decree. When those buildings were erected, they stood next to each other, and there were so many of [them] [63, p. 40].

It should be noted that the 13th-century layers in the ancient towns almost have not been studied yet, that is why considerations about the initial structure of the Golden Horde city are largely hypothetical. However, the manor layout was maintained during the entire period of existence of the Golden Horde, and now we have enough information about the 14th-century manors. The manors of feudal nobility and wealthy citizens occupied a significant area of 5,000–10,000 square metres [27, p. 268], apparently, for this reason, all manors studied so far have been excavated only partially. Nevertheless, on the whole, their structure has been sufficiently studied. Large manors consisted of the owner's house, dwellings of servants, household buildings. Every manor had its own pond (haus) and was surrounded by a fence (duval). Often there were craftsmen workshops on the manor's territory; their products were used for the needs of the manor, and if there was an excess of products, they could have been sold at the market.
G. Fedorov-Davydov emphasized the similarity in structure of manors in Tsarevskoe ancient town and the manors in Karakorum [55, p. 89; 21, p. 128, Fig. 80].

One more important feature of new cities is the lack of fortifications and, thus, the three-part structure typical of the medieval cities of the East and West, which consisted of citadel (kremlin, arc), a part surrounded by the city wall (posad, shakhristan), and suburbs (ancient settlement, rabat). Some cities that replaced the earlier period settlements retained the initial layout. For example, the Lower Jula in the North Caucasus [86, p. 47; 44]. Notably, the most important public buildings (for example, Juma mosque) were inside the citadel. But the 'green field' 'khan's' cities did not have a clear structure: the densely built central part smoothly flew into more sparsely built outskirts and suburbs.

In the 'Time of Troubles' of the 1360s–1380s, some cities of the Golden Horde commenced construction of small earthen ramparts enclosing just a part of the city. These kind of ramparts were found in Selitrennoe, Vodyansko, and Tsarevskoe ancient towns. The layout of Tsarevskoe ancient town clearly shows that these fortifications were built when cities already existed; the ditch and rampart crossed the manor's territory, cutting its fence and destroying household buildings [55]. Recent research has showed that well-preserved rampart of the Bulgar ancient town also relates to this period 49.

If in the Lower Volga region cities, the ramparts could not serve the purpose of serious fortification buildings, a real fortress wall, made of local limestone, was built in the 1370s in Solkhat. The history of construction of these fortifications is extremely interesting [48, pp. 219–228]. The first fortifications in the form of a ditch emerged in Solkhat in 1362–1365, and they were built due to the threat of Lithuanian invasion. On the command of beklyaribek Mamai, a stone fortress was built in Solkhat in 1375–1380. The fortress wall over 6 km long was strengthened with towers, whose number, according to M. Kramarovsky, reached 65 [48, p. 225]. Mamai thought that the stone walls of Solkhat would balance the defensive capabilities of Kaffa and stop the Genoese expansion. However, realisation of such an ambitious project undermined the economy of Crimea, angered the majority of population, and ultimately triggered the fall of powerful Mamai, who lost all support [48, pp. 227–228].

Unfettered cities of the Golden Horde were growing bigger and bigger. Ibn Battuta, a traveller from Maghreb, wrote the following about Sarai: 'Once we rode on horseback with one of its elders, intending to go around the city to learn the area it occupies. We lived in one end of the city and headed out in the morning, and reached the other end of the city only in the afternoon. We made there the midday prayer, ate, and returned home only at the sunset. Once we had passed it across, headed out, and returned in a half a day, and that all was a complete row of houses without any spare place or orchard' [75, p. 306]. Research evaluated the sizes of Sarai (Selitrennoe ancient town) based on the archaeological data from 10 to 36 square km [25, p. 115]. Modern research has showed that the city only occupies an area of about 15 square km, and necropolises with mausoleums, made of adobe and fired bricks, stretch far into the steppe from the city [68, pp. 289–295].

The population of Sarai was numbered at 75,000 people. Ibn Arabshah notes an interesting episode confirming information about the size and density of population in Sarai: 'It was one of the greatest cities by its location and the most densely populated by the size of population. It is said that a slave of one of his lords ran away, settled in a place distant from the road, opened there a shop, and traded making a living. This scoundrel lived this way for about 10 years, and his lord has never seen him there, never met him there because of the size of his city and the large number of inhabitants' [75, p. 463].

49 Excavations by A. Gubaydullin in 2015.
The enormous sizes of new cities in the Golden Horde and the absence of clearly delineated parts in them led some researchers to believe that they weren't real cities. So, M. Kramarevsky calls them 'agglomerations', where residential districts were interspersed with orchards, pastures, and farmland [46, p. 110]. In his opinion, only Solkhat was a real city, occupying an area of just 2 square km. It is difficult to agree with this opinion. First of all, the author is inconsistent. Literally on the next page, he writes that the real city, Solkhat, wasn't densely built, and there were many orchards and gardens between houses [46, p. 112]. If we look at the layout of Tsarevskoe ancient town (Fig. 2), taken in the middle of the 19th century, when the relief was still well outlined, we will see that the entire central part of this 'agglomeration' (within the rampart) is built extremely densely [71, Fig. 4]. By the way, this central part also occupies an area of 2 square km. It is built less densely beyond the rampart, but there are many large adjacent manors. Of course, there could have been orchards and even gardens, but large fields and pastures would not fit into the city borders. Apparently, the same situation was observed in Selitrennoe ancient town, but there the relief is traced far worse, and the density of development can be evaluated only based on the excavation materials. Finally, Ibn Battuta, who saw Sarai first hand, tells about complete rows of houses 'without any spare place or orchard' [75, p. 306].

Formation of urban structure.

Despite a considerable degree of investigation of the Golden Horde cities of the 14th century, it is still impossible to make comprehensive conclusions about their structure. First of all, this is due to the large sizes of urban centres. For example, large-scale excavations in the Selitrennoe ancient town, that now comprise an area of about 30,000 square m, covered just a small part of the site, the total area of which is no less than 15 square km [68]. We can only state that the Golden Horde cities had a manor-street type development, and there weren't any districts of complete development typical of the majority of cities in the East.

Nevertheless, excavations of aristocratic district in Sarai (Selitrennoe ancient town) contain information allowing us to suggest what was the process of formation of urban structure in the reign of Öz Beg Khan. This district, located between Kuchugury and Krasny hillylocks, was formed in the 1330s. The public centre, consisting of a Juma mosque, the building of madrasah or khanqah, as well as a public bath-hammam, was studied in the district [43; 90]. Public buildings surrounded the houses of ordinary people. In addition, four big aristocratic manors were studied in this district.

The most significant building in this complex (Fig. 3) was a big mosque [32, pp. 354–357; 40, pp. 24–27]. It consisted of two rooms: the prayer hall (1) and an extension (2) in the north-western part of the building. The prayer hall was square in the plan, with a size of 36.5 x 36.5 m. The main entrance was decorated with a massive portal facing the square. There were two more entrances, decorated with smaller portals, in the western and eastern walls (see detailed information about the mosque in Sarai in the chapter 'Architecture and Art').
The space to the south of the mosque was occupied by houses (5). There were two houses adjacent to the southern part of its western wall. There was a 2-metre-wide passage in the northern part between the western wall of the mosque and the wall of a big multi-room house. One more house was built to the west of this one, and they formed a single residential complex. There was a 15-metre-wide street between the northern and southern tract houses; apparently, it led to the unpreserved western entrance to the mosque.

There was a necropolis on the southern side of the mosque; it consisted of several mausoleums, crypts, and graves with brick tombstones (mastaba) [83]. The mosque already existed when the necropolis aroused. Maybe, it happened when the mosque stopped functioning, and the entire district was abandoned.

There was a multi-room building (3) to the east of the mosque; by a number of features, it can be considered a public building, associated with the Islamic religion, a madrasah or khanqah [36, pp. 129–151; 39, pp. 82–98; 40, pp. 64–65]. Partially explored building, likely, had a rectangular shape and consisted of a series of buildings surrounding a courtyard. As a result of excavations, two perpendicular wings of the building were found. Its western wall stood parallel to the eastern wall of the mosque and was 6.0 m away from it. The walls of the building were made of adobe brick, and the outer, south-western corner was strengthened with a round tower-buttress made of fired brick. From south to north the building was 20 metres long, from west to east 15.1 metres long. All rooms, except for one built up later, were arranged in rows along two perpendicular axes. The north-western wing of the building occupied five rooms, four of which were living rooms of almost the same size and similar layout, and the fifth one was a small storage room. An insignificant number of traces of economic activities and household items and also complete lack of internal re-planning, so typical of the Golden Horde houses, allow us to suggest that these rooms did not have permanent owners.

In the centre of the south-eastern wing of the building, there was a square room of the in-house mosque with mihrab in the southern wall. There were two more living quarters to the east of the prayer room. Apparently, this building is an institution associated with Islam, such as a madrasah or a khanqah. In one of its wings, there were standard rooms for students or pilgrims, while in the other wing there were the in-house mosque and dwelling of spiritual mentor or landlord of the hospice.

To the south of the big mosque, there was a public bath-hammam (4) designed for wealthy people [29, pp. 174–226; 37, pp. 71–72]. Its facade was opposite to the main portal of the mosque and the eastern part of its northern wall. The bath and mosque were separated by an 11-metre-wide square or street. The bath's building stretched along the meridian axis and was 26 x 13.3–15.8 m in size. There were nine different rooms in the bath, among which we can mention an extensive dressing room with warm sufas along three walls, fountain bowl in the centre, floor paved with patterned bricks, and pandzhara bars with coloured glass in the windows. Walls of the dressing-rooms were decorated with glazed tiles, and floor was paved with patterned hexagonal bricks and turquoise tiles. The washing chamber consisted of a cross-shaped hall and four small rooms at its corners.

There were residential districts to the north of the bath [28]. Several house with wooden and adobe walls were excavated there. The foundations of three yurts were found near one of the houses. Their presence indicates the presence of nomads in the cities or preservation of nomadic traditions among the urban population.

Some public buildings, such as mosques [32], public baths [29; 84; 87], madrasah [36; 88, pp. 106–108; 46, pp. 113–116] have been studied in many cities of the Golden Horde, but in Selitrennoe ancient town, the entire complex of these buildings, forming the public centre of a big district of the city and a single architectural ensemble, has been excavated. All buildings are grouped around the big mosque. The building of a court or another public place is adjacent to it. Due to the mosque, there was a building of seminary or hotel for pilgrims on the site. And,
finally, there was a public bath near the mosque. It should be noted that in Islamic countries, as in ancient Rome, baths were not only for hygienic purposes. They were kind of clubs, places of recreation, entertainment, and communication, that is, performed functions of social institutions. In addition, a bath near the mosque might have been its waqf domain as it was often practiced in the countries of East. The complex of public buildings was surrounded by residential districts.

Stratigraphic research showed that the mosque was the first building on this site. Its walls were oriented to the cardinal points with deviation from the meridian to the east to 30 degrees. According to the canons of Islam, the mosque should be oriented towards qibla, that is, its mihrab should be directed towards Mecca. It is unknown what kind of calculations was used in the construction of the Selitrennoe mosque, but there was made a mistake. Simple calculations show that in reality the deviation from the north-south axis must be 16.7 degrees. Bath, madrasah, and houses were built later.

Four large aristocratic manors have been studied in the same district. The presence of large state-rooms, intended for receptions similar to those feasts in the palaces of the great Qa'an in Mongolia, described by William of Rubruck and Marco Polo, in the houses shows that these manors were owned by the elite of the Golden Horde society [33, pp. 340–377; 34, pp. 117–1264; 35, pp. 102–112]. The duval-surrounded large manors made up entire districts. They consisted of the central house, dwellings for servants, household buildings, various workshops, and other buildings, such as orchard pavilions and manor baths. Nevertheless, they were also included in urban planning. This is evidenced by the fact that their walls have the same direction as walls of the mosque and surrounding buildings. It proves that in the 14th century, the city was built according to a single plan. Apparently, the construction of any new building was started with a qibla-oriented mosque, and then other buildings were built accordingly.

Thus, in the 14th century, the Golden Horde cities, even though preserving the manor planning, weren't just a haphazard accumulation of manors. They were built according to a clear plan, had wide streets, and were well landscaped.

_Landscaping in the Golden Horde cities._

In her essay about the city of Majar, the well-known researcher of the North Caucasus T. Minaeva wrote the following: 'streets were close, narrow, dirty' [53, pp. 131–161]. Apparently, the stereotype of a medieval city fits here. Indeed, in cities of the Western Europe and Middle East, compressed with fortress walls, streets involuntarily were built narrow. But, as it was mentioned before, in the Golden Horde settlements free of any constraints, the streets could have been 10–15 m wide. In the same city of Majar, V. Gorodtsov excavated a section of a street that divided manors [19, pp. 197–198]. The street represented a 'valley' with the remnants of buildings on both sides. According to the cross section of the street, it was just over 3.5 m wide confined on two sides by adobe ramparts. In the steppe zone with relatively small amount of rainfall, streets weren't stoned; only in some places streets were stoned with fired bricks. The situation was different in Bulgar located on the black soil, which, because of a highly humid climate, most of the year represents a viscous thick mud. Here most of the streets have about 2-metre-wide wooden pavements [4, pp. 317–319].

In front of socially significant sites, such as Juna mosque, big mausoleums, public baths, there were squares paved with stone slabs [4, pp. 313–316]. Squares were often equipped with outdoor pools built of stone. At the centre of the square, there could have been a fountain. The foundations of such fountains were found in Bulgar in front of several public baths. M. Ivanov depicted the square in front of the ‘Öz Beg’ madrasah in Solkhat. The space in front of the portal is paved with stone slabs, and there is a spring with a pool on the left-hand side (Fig. 4).

The water supply system is very important for any city. For this reason, Golden Horde cities were built mainly along river banks. Water wheels were used to obtain water from rivers and other natural ponds. Water wheels have not been found, because they were made of wood, but water
Chapter VIII. Economy, Crafts, and Trade

vessels are one of the most popular categories of ceramics discovered during excavations in Golden Horde cities and settlements. Water was supplied to the system of aryks, the compact network of which covered the entire city. Water was stored in howz reservoirs. Howzs were located both outdoor on the streets and inside large manors. Water pipeline, built of kubur pipes, was used to supply water to public buildings, such as baths, and also to the outdoor pools and fountains (fig. 5). Considerably long water pipelines were found in Selitrennoe and Tsarevskoe ancient towns, and also in Bulgar [4, pp. 333–334]. The water pipeline in Majar, described by the land surveyor A. Arkhipov, had an interesting structure. It consisted of a high arched corridor built of brick. Arkhipov drew the layout of the water pipeline; its total length was about 650 m [19, pp. 166–167].

Fig. 4. The square in front of the 'Öz Beg' madrasah in Solkhat. Watercolor by M. Ivanov

Fig. 5. The water pipeline in Bulgar (by V. Baranov [4]).

The water in aryks and howzs was used for different purposes, but clean drinking water for the urban population was supplied from numerous wells. In Volga Bulgaria, the walls of wells were reinforced with a wooden frame [4, pp. 322–329]. In the Lower Volga region, the wells were laid with brick, arch brick, stone [70, pp. 288–289].
All parts of the complex urban water supply system have been studied in Tsarevskoe ancient town [70]. Three large pools were used as a water source there: the reservoir on the Kalguta River, the reservoir on the Tsarevka River, and a cascade of lakes in the northern part of the city at the foot of Syrt. Through the systems of dams, locks, and embankment, this water was supplied to the city. Dug canals, aryks, were used as water supply mains. Canals directed water from the Kalguta to the east of the city to the suburbs and irrigated fields, and also to the diversion canal in the city centre. Water was supplied to the city from the Tsarevka by canals from the east making up a single system with the Solodovsky eriks. From the reservoir, cascade water was supplied to the diversion canal in the city centre, and from there, it was distributed to the northern regions by a network of small aryks. Through the system of locks in the eastern part of the canal, water surplus could be discharged to the Solodovsky eriks, where with the help of dams artificial reservoirs were built. Probably, the reverse process was also possible. If necessary, water could be supplied from the Solodovsky reservoirs to the southern part of the diversion canal, water surplus was discharged to the Sakharneoe lake. Howz pools in the southern part of the city had a gravity feed through shallow groundwaters. The Kalguta River supplied water also to the western districts of the city: space between the Solonchatoe lake and the river was covered with a network of canals. The southern and south-eastern parts of the city did not have an advanced network of canals; the shallow groundwaters fed howz reservoirs, which were used as a water source. Wells of different composition were used to provide residents with drinking water. Clay pipes were found in some of them; these pipes could have been used as water pipelines to supply water from the well or could have been used as parts of the fountains [70, pp. 288–289].

In the cities with excessive moisture, groundwaters were removed through drainage systems. The drainage system (fig. 6) consisting of wood laid drainage ditches, water supply and water absorbing wells, reinforced with wooden frames, has been excavated in Bulgar [4, pp. 337–340].

A sewer system was built in the cities to dispose of sewage. A part of the sewer system has been excavated under the square between the mosque and public bath in Selitrennoe ancient town (fig. 7). Water from the bath's washing rooms was fed into the sewer system through the overflow launders. A trench was dug for the sewage; it was laid with wooden pipes made of logs hollowed out in the middle. Through these pipes, water was fed to the square settling well (fig. 8), the walls of which were laid with fired brick. Water surplus flowed further through another branch of the sewage canal [38, p. 165].

Unique for 14th-century cities hygienic facility, the public toilet in Selitrennoe ancient town, should be mentioned as well. It was located outdoors, at the back of the public bath. The toilet was a small building with half-timber walls. It was divided into two separate rooms, which shows that it was a public toilet [28, p. 165]. This kind of hygienic facility is an element of advanced urbanism.

Fig. 6 The drainage system in Bulgar (according to V. Baranov [4]).
Golden Horde cities arose not as a result of long historical development but in a short time at the command of the khans. In a matter of decades, they reached unprecedented peaks, striking with their beauty, size, and well-being. Having imbibed the traditions of urban development of many peoples, they had not become merely a copy of contemporary to them urban centres but acquired an original incomparable image. Having existed for a little over a century, they came off the stage of history leaving almost no trace; only cities built in the regions with traditionally settled way of life were preserved. The steppe cities of the Golden Horde can be compared with ephemeral plants. In the early spring, separate stars of tulips suddenly appear in the bare sad steppe, and soon the entire steppe flares crimson. After a short period of time, the flowers disappear as if they never existed. And only seeds, sown into the ground, remain until the next spring.


Chapter IX.
Natural, Social and Economic Crises

§ 1. Climate Change in Central Eurasia and the Golden Horde

Uli Schamiloglu

This essay considers the question of climate and climate change in Central Eurasia during the time of the Golden Horde (13–14th centuries). Focusing exclusively on two centuries, however, would not really give us meaningful insights into the climate history of Central Eurasia in this period. In order to contextualise this period of climate history, it would be more meaningful to consider a broader period of time. For this reason, in this essay I will try briefly to set the 13–14th centuries against the backdrop of the larger picture of climate change in the 9–19th centuries. The reason for choosing this longer period of time is because the Golden Horde existence coincides with a period of transition from the era known as the 'Medieval Warm Period' to the later cooling trend which is known as the 'Little Ice Age'.

The ecological zones of the territories of the Golden Horde

As is well known, the territory of the Golden Horde, which stretched from the Zaysan Pass in the east to various lands in Eastern Europe in the west, and from Khwarezm and the Pontic and Kazakh steppes in the south to Siberia in the north, can be divided into roughly three ecological zones. The southernmost vegetation zone, that of desert-oasis [37, pp. 95–96], is a well-known example of variation within a single zone resulting from the sharp segregation of habitable areas from uninhabitable areas. Today, the part of this zone which fell under the domination of the Golden Horde, namely Xwarezm, receives 30 cm mean annual precipitation or less (with much lost to dessication), and it is only along the southeastern piedmonts of Central Asia (in the 13–14th centuries forming part of the Chagatay Khanate) that this figure rises [37, pp. 77–78]. In those parts of this zone forming a part of the Golden Horde, sedentary human habitation would be possible only within the irrigated oases of Xwarezm.

The next zone to the north is the steppe zone [37, pp. 94–95], the grassland known to medieval travellers as the 'wilderness' [46, p.112] and home to the nomadic population of the Golden Horde and the so-called 'empires of the steppe' throughout history. The steppe begins in the east in Manchuria and extends west through Mongolia in a band roughly 300–1,100 km wide to as far west as Romania, beyond where the Danube River empties into the Black Sea, and the Alföld, or Great Hungarian Plain. This zone extends westward from Mongolia in only two spots: the elevated southern steppe passing through the Dzungar Gate [37, p. 50] and encircling Lake Issik-kul (this area formed a part of the Chagatay Khanate) and the northern steppe gate passing through the Altay Mountains along the Black Irtïsh River to Lake Zaysan and then continuing northwest along the Irtish River. One must also add to this the figures for the adjacent mixed forest-steppe north of the steppe zone, since this transition zone of grasslands and trees roughly 200–500 km in width [37, pp. 93–94] often offered easy access for nomads, though there were also sedentarists inhabiting this zone.

Beyond the forest-steppe is the mixed forest zone, a cone expanding northwest from east of the Ural Mountains to the Baltic Sea and stretching north. This mixed deciduous-coniferous forest eventually turns into coniferous forest in those regions where the climate is sufficiently wet and

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1 All terms and transcriptions provided by the author of the article.
cool. Together, the forest-steppe and the mixed forest constitute one of the most important zones of medieval agriculture, even though the forest-steppe was shared with the nomads. In the east, the forest-steppe changes rapidly from mixed forest or swamp into the tayga coniferous forest zone, while west of the Volga River, the forest-steppe and forest zones head southwest.

There are four distinctive sub-zones running through the zones travelled by pastoral nomads running latitudinally from the southern edge of the steppe zone to the forest-steppe in the north. At the southern edge of the steppe zone is the first sub-zone of semi-desert (sometimes considered a part of the desert-oasis zone), the vegetation of which alternates seasonally between desert (in the summer) and steppe vegetation (in the winter) [32, p. 175]. This sub-zone swings around the northern shore of the Caspian Sea and follows the course of the Volga River from two-thirds of the way up to Volgograd, where the line of 30 cm mean annual precipitation crosses the Volga, to as far as Volgograd itself. The second sub-zone of dry steppe (sometimes considered to be part of a separate semi-desert zone) [37, p. 95] extends from the great bend of the Volga near Volgograd, where the line of 40 cm mean annual precipitation crosses the Volga, to the south of Saratov. Cultivation in the sub-zones of semi-desert is generally not possible without irrigation.

The third sub-zone, that of true steppe, extends northward along the Volga River from south of Saratov to Samara (Kuybïshev), where there is another bend of the Volga River. The largest area of this steppe is a cone extending north-east from the Black Sea littoral and the western half of the North Caucasus foreland towards Samara. This zone receives more precipitation than the sub-zone of dry steppe (or semi-desert) to the south. Even though it is still too arid and subject to drought for trees to develop, the cultivation of cereals such as wheat is possible without irrigation. Precipitation continues to increase as one proceeds northward to the end of the sub-zone of true steppe at Samara, where the line of 50 cm mean annual precipitation crosses the Volga. This is the beginning of the sub-zone of forest-steppe (often considered a separate zone) extending along the Volga River from Samara to just south of the confluence of the Volga and Kama Rivers. This zone offers the best agricultural lands from the standpoint of heat, precipitation, and fertility. The forest-steppe zone ends, and the mixed forest zone begins where the line of 60 cm mean annual precipitation crosses the Volga. The forest sub-zones continuing to the north correspond not only to the areas of increasing mean annual precipitation but to ever-shorter growing seasons as well.

Additional factors to consider for the steppe and forest-steppe zones include the length and depth of winter snow cover, which are critical factors for the pastoral nomad and his herds [41, p. 22 ff.]. To the east of the Ural Mountains, the grass of the northern steppe can be covered with snow for up to 180 days per winter, and this far east even the southern steppe of the Golden Horde (not including the elevated southern steppes which would fall under the Chagatay Khanate) can be covered with snow over 120 days per winter. On the other hand, the grass of the lush northern part of the steppe zone west of the Urals is covered with snow over 140 days per winter, while along the Black Sea, the southern edge of the steppe, this figure drops to as little as 40 days. Around Azerbaycan and in the Crimea the duration of winter snow cover can be even less. A related consideration is the depth of winter snow cover. Although the horses native to this area have adapted to snow up to about 40 cm in depth, cattle, sheep, and goats can survive in snow-covered pasturage only if there is tall grass and it is not covered by snow deeper than about 20 cm. For this reason, it is also worth considering the data on the depth of winter snow cover: the line of 20 cm mean maximum depth of snow cover crosses the Volga River south of the great bend of the Volga, thus including within it most of the southernmost sub-zone of

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2 For a more detailed account see R.E.F. Smith [41, pp. 22–24], which includes an excellent description of the vegetation of the steppe zone.

3 ‘Kirghiz’ (Kazakh?) foals are unable to paw food buried deeper than 25 cm, while adult horses find 30 cm of snow hard to paw, and 40 cm is the maximum for adult animals [41, p. 22]
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steppe and all of the dry steppe. On the other hand, the situation further to the east is far worse: the line of 20 cm mean maximum depth of snow cover dips somewhat to the south-east, skirting the Aral Sea and running parallel to the Sir Darya [37, p. 83], which can only mean that all the sub-zones of steppe east of the Ural Mountains fall north of this crucial line.

The modern data presented so far on variation within the steppe zone is useful (insofar as they are applicable to the medieval period) for reconsidering a major question that has been debated inconclusively by historians of the Völkerwanderungen, or great Eurasian migrations, namely why there was a constant series of historical migrations of nomadic populations from the east to the west. I would argue that there is at least one significant consideration which seems to be absent from the traditional scholarship: early nomadic populations to the east of the Ural Mountains must have been well aware that the winters were less harsh in the southern winter pastures just north of the Black Sea and the Caucasus Mountains, and that the pasturage west of the Ural Mountains was far richer. They surely understood that the same area of pasturage could support a far greater animal population and therefore human population to the west of the Ural Mountains than to the east. A pastoral nomad concerned with feeding his flocks during the winter also understood that a southern winter pasture with as little as 20–40 days of snow cover in the west had great advantages over a southern winter pasture in the east with 140 days or more of snow cover, most of which would probably be 20 cm or deeper for an extended period of time. Medieval travellers also remarked that the steppe east of the Caspian was inhabited much less densely and confirmed the inability of the eastern steppe zone to support its population as well as the steppe zone in the west [31, p. 58]. Therefore, the more plentiful water and food resources and the milder winters of the west should be considered one of the significant factors attracting pastoral nomads to the west from various regions to the east throughout historical time. One additional factor which must be considered, however, is that climate was not constant and changed over time, Which means it could also affect these conditions just described above.

Climate change in the territories of the Golden Horde

The description of environmental zones offered above is based on the data for the modern period. Researchers in a variety of disciplines now recognise, however, that climate has not been constant throughout historical time and that present-day climatic conditions are not necessarily representative of earlier periods even in our own millennium. Therefore, any examination of the environment of these territories in the medieval period should at least attempt to confront the problem of climatic variation over longer and shorter periods of time as discussed in the scientific literature.

Climatic change can be studied in terms of long-term and short-term variation. Evidence for changes in global climate over longer periods of time (over millennia and the even longer glacial periods) is provided by changes in the advance and retreat of glaciers, changes in the vegetation patterns covering the earth, and many other categories of the so-called 'proxy' evidence. Scientists have associated climatic change on earth over the larger periods with variations in the earth's orbit, the effects of which differ above and below 43 degrees N and S latitude. More recently scientists have concluded that climatic change can now be considered the result of changes in global weather patterns, which result from the changes in solar luminosity and other phenomena. Occasionally, factors affecting global weather patterns, such as the dust spewed forth by major

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4 For the first attempt at a history of global climate change, see John L. Brooke [24].
5 See the essays in 'Climate and History: Studies in Past Climates and Their Impact on Man' [45]. See also the essays in 'The Earth's Climate and Variability of the Sun over Recent Millennia: Geophysical, Astronomical and Archaeological Aspects' [15] for an important collection of essays on the problem of climatic change and the sun; a summary of some of these points is found in this same volume, see T.M.L. Wigley and P.M. Kelly [44, pp. 547–549].
volcanic eruptions, must also be considered. Evidence for more recent short-term climatic variation (over centuries, decades, and individual years) is offered by the lower-scale advance and retreat of glaciers; variation in layers of tree ring growth; variation in isotope readings in a variety of sources such as datable layers of ice core samples or tree ring growth; written sources; and certain other categories of 'proxy' evidence.

It is instructive to recall that short-term variation in the climate of the territories of the Golden Horde can be viewed against the backdrop of long-term trends in the climate of the territory formerly known as the 'European part of the USSR'. The analysis of pollen from successive layers of peat bogs (which cannot be dated precisely) shows that the centre of this territory north of Moscow experienced a significant warming trend beginning roughly 6500 BCE which peaked roughly 4000–3000 BCE, and that we are currently in the continuing phase of cooler and wetter climate which followed [8, p. 87; 39, p. 122]. Data for the Middle Volga region also reveals a warming trend ending in the cooler phase of today\(^6\). This is further confirmed by the data for the basin of the Malïy Cheremshan (east of the Volga–Kama confluence), which also indicates that the earlier climate of this territory was warmer and drier than present, followed by a period of increased temperature and precipitation, culminating finally in the modern era’s cooler and wetter climate [19, pp. 255–258]\(^7\).

It would be important to know what conclusions can be drawn from these data regarding the climate of the second millennium CE, and especially the period of the 13–14th centuries. If we are to judge by a series of vegetation maps by Neyshtadt, vividly illustrating these long-term changes over the past 12,000 years, we can see only that the boundary between steppe and forest-steppe has advanced somewhat to the north over the past 2,500 years in the territory west of the Volga River [13]. This can be taken as an indication that while the exact composition of vegetation within the various environmental zones has changed over time, there could have been at best only minor changes in the boundaries of the various zones over the past millennium\(^8\). For the southern regions, it can be seen that during the past millennium there has been an increase in birch or pine at the expense of warmer weather plants such as broad-leaved trees in the northern parts of the Caucasus mountains [13]. In the Middle Volga region, the final phase down to our own day, which consists only of the uppermost 50–75 cm of the peat bogs in this area, is characterised by an increase in pine and birch, with a corresponding decrease in broad-leaved trees. Some of these changes could result from the intervention of the man, but they are also consistent with the notion of a period of cooling continuing through the past millennium [39, pp. 107–110]\(^9\). It is worth noting that the uppermost layers of pollen data for the basin of the Malïy Cheremshan corresponding to the most recent times show an increase in spruce, though by the 19–20th centuries, this tree no longer grew in the basin of the Malïy Cheremshan. These same uppermost layers also indicate a decrease in broad-leaved trees [19, p. 259]\(^10\). Thus, this data suggests that the climate may have been somewhat warmer earlier in the past millennium, with certain changes in evidence even for the past few centuries. Unfortunately, such data does not permit chronologically more precise conclusions regarding the 13–14th centuries.

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\(^6\) Peat bogs 4,000–7,000 years old in the Middle Volga region reveal a pine–birch phase, followed by a warmer alder–broad-leaved (or coniferous–broad-leaved) phase, ending in the cooler pine–broad-leaved phase of today. Areas further to the south-west reveal the former presence of trees such as hornbeam and beech preferring more warmth [39, pp. 107–110].

\(^7\) I am not considering the contemporary concern over global warming in this essay.

\(^8\) See, however, the discussion in I. Buchinskiy, O klimate proshlogo russkoy ravnï (discussing Grichuk 1946) [4, pp. 49–50]

\(^9\) The data for Estonia also indicates that this long-term cooling trend has continued through our own millennium [13, p. 42]

\(^10\) Shalandina attributes this change in tree patterns to human intervention.
For more precise information regarding the period of the Golden Horde, it is necessary to examine data which can be dated accurately to the 13–14th centuries. There is far less data available for short-term variation in climate in the territories of the Golden Horde than for Western Europe, nor would it be possible to derive the climate of the Golden Horde from the data for the climate of the rest of Europe in this same period\(^\text{11}\). Nevertheless, certain categories of 'proxy' data offer important evidence regarding the climatic history of the territories of the Golden Horde in the 13–14th centuries. This data includes explicit references to temperature, precipitation, and famine in sources such as the Russian chronicles; written and physical evidence on the changing level of the Caspian Sea; the physical record of annual sediment deposits in Lake Saki in the Crimea; analysis of pollen from datable archaeological sites; and certain other sources\(^\text{15}\). Even so, I must caution that there is no consensus regarding all the basic facts relating to the climatic history of this territory and that I am offering in this work an original synthesis which will no doubt require extensive revision as scientific research proceeds\(^\text{13}\).

**Temperature and climate change in the territories of the Golden Horde**

To begin with temperature, although the precise regional and local variations in temperature in the territories of the Golden Horde may never be known, the application of *global* trends is a very attractive working hypothesis for which certain other correlations can also be established. One study has assembled data to suggest that the uniform advance and retreat of glaciers around the world is indicative of shorter-term global trends of cooling and warming, including the following cold intervals over the past two millennia\(^\text{14}\) [44, pp. 550–551]:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cold Periods</th>
<th>(Suggested Minimum Date)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>570–660 CE</td>
<td>(640 CE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>850–1040 CE</td>
<td>(930 CE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1280–1400 CE</td>
<td>(1330 CE)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conversely, maximum temperatures during *global* periods of warmer climate would fall between these cooler periods (so 660–850 CE and 1040–1280 CE). Based on these data, it seems that more or less the first eight decades of the 13th century were the latest part of a *global* warming trend. The year 1280 marks the period of the beginning of a *global* cooling trend through the end of the 14th century, centred around 1330 CE. Many scientists and scholars believe that this is, in fact, the beginning of the cooling period known as the 'Little Ice Age' (with 1650, 1770, and 1850 CE marking the beginning of three particularly cold intervals) [36].

\(^{11}\) It is believed that fluctuations in rainfall and run-off in the Crimea and much of south-eastern Europe are generally inverse to those of northern, western, and central Europe [33, p. 84]. However, the detailed studies of climatic change in Western Europe during this period cannot be considered applicable to the territories of the Golden Horde. Moreover, the Golden Horde covered such a vast area of Eurasia that there was a significant variation within its territories.

\(^{15}\) Additional evidence for the climatic history of Russia is offered by dendrochronology (the study of annual tree ring growth patterns), but the sudden declines in ring growth for this region are not related to the long-term trends in precipitation discussed here. They are more likely to be indicators of periods of cold or drought [10].

\(^{13}\) I will not attempt a detailed discussion of this literature because it enters into areas where I am strictly an amateur. I would observe, however, that much of the data on which this research is based is culled from the Russian chronicles. Since the interpretation of this data is still open to debate (see the perceptive comments of M. Lyaxov, [12, p. 69]), historians should approach reconstructions of the climate of the European part of the USSR (and the equations applied to these data in some of this literature) with great caution.

\(^{14}\) It should be remembered that these data may not reflect other undetected cooling trends nor are the suggested minima intended to be regarded as highly accurate.
This periodisation should be contrasted, however, with studies suggesting a somewhat different series of pessima (periods of cooling) alternating with optima (periods of warming) in Western Europe over the past two millennia. These divergent views result not only from the introduction of new data but also from the fact that variation in climate was not uniform over the whole of the European continent, let alone over the entire planet. For example, Fagan argues that the medieval warming period from 800 CE to about 1200 CE offered unusually mild and stable weather conditions in Northern Europe and created favorable ice-free sailing conditions in the northern seas. This allowed the Vikings to sail across the Atlantic to Iceland, Greenland, and Labrador, as well as to venture over a far broader range of territories across Eurasia than they had ever done earlier. I would add that the warmer conditions in the Middle Volga region were probably a contributing factor in the migration of the Bulgars to the north, resulting in the establishment of the Volga Bulgarian state.

The suggested minimum date of 1330 CE for the cold period of 1280–1400 CE coincides with the beginning of the spread of the Black Death, highlighting the nexus between climate change and disease, which is only now beginning to be appreciated by scholars. As we know from Europe and North America, the Little Ice Age had a dramatic impact on the daily life and economy of the local populations and led to the abandonment of many settlements in marginally viable ecological zones. Yet the implications of the most severe periods of the Little Ice Age for sedentary regions, such as the Middle Volga region, or for the nomads of the Eurasian steppe are yet to receive serious scholarly attention. As I have noted elsewhere, the Middle Volga region is susceptible to poisoning of rye crops during times of poor growing conditions, and extremes of weather are associated with climate change. Precipitation and climate change in the territories of the Golden Horde

In contrast to the question of temperature, abundant precise data exists for the study of precipitation in the territory of the Golden Horde in the 13–14th centuries. For the southern territories, remarkable evidence on climatic history over the past four millennia is to be found in the sediment layers of Lake Saki in the Crimea. Although these data are famous among historians of climate, they have not been considered so far by historians of the Golden Horde. According to Schostakowitsch, who pioneered the study of these deposits, 250–790 was a dry period, and 1090–1280 was a period of rather thick deposits. Lamb considers that unusually thick layers in 805 CE and a series of very thin layers in 1280–1400 CE correspond to pessima, or periods of cooler weather, in Western Europe [33, pp. 36–37]. Great differences arose between wet and dry and between warm and cold weather over longer periods of time in different parts of the same latitude zone around the planet [33, p. 35]. One explanation of the phenomenon of inverse climatic fluctuation already mentioned above is the organisation of summer weather systems into a series of cold troughs. A system of four cold troughs (over the Bering Strait, the Atlantic coast of North America, Finland to the Adriatic, and Lake Baykal) is considered representative of an optimum or warm period in Western Europe, such as during the 11th or 20th centuries, while a system of five cold troughs (two over North America, one each over England, the Aral Sea, and Manchuria) is considered representative of a pessimum, such as during the 16–17th centuries or the period of the Golden Horde. For additional details, see Leroy Ladurie summarising the works of Lamb and a series of other scholars [34, pp. 297–304, especially, p. 299]. (The specialist will note that I have considerably oversimplified the description of these complex phenomena.)

For earlier periodisations, see: E. Le Roy Ladurie and Lamb [34, pp. 245–246; 33, pp. 117–271] Other scholars use the terms Medieval Warm Epoch (1000–1400) and the Little Ice Age (1400–1800), see [29, pp. 16–17] Climate change and shorter-term changes in weather patterns do not occur uniformly (or predictably, for that matter) over the entire world. See [29, pp. 16–17; 33, pp. 21–66, especially pp. 34–36]. For example, periods of warmer weather in Antarctica in 1250–1450 and 1670–1840 correspond to pessima, or periods of cooler weather, in Western Europe [33, pp. 36–37]. Great differences arose between wet and dry and between warm and cold weather over longer periods of time in different parts of the same latitude zone around the planet [33, p. 35]. One explanation of the phenomenon of inverse climatic fluctuation already mentioned above is the organisation of summer weather systems into a series of cold troughs. A system of four cold troughs (over the Bering Strait, the Atlantic coast of North America, Finland to the Adriatic, and Lake Baykal) is considered representative of an optimum or warm period in Western Europe, such as during the 11th or 20th centuries, while a system of five cold troughs (two over North America, one each over England, the Aral Sea, and Manchuria) is considered representative of a pessimum, such as during the 16–17th centuries or the period of the Golden Horde. For additional details, see Leroy Ladurie summarising the works of Lamb and a series of other scholars [34, pp. 297–304, especially, p. 299]. (The specialist will note that I have considerably oversimplified the description of these complex phenomena.)

For a comparable study of this period for the Ottoman Empire, see Sam White [43].
1280s mark the beginning and the end of the medieval period of moist climate in the Crimea [33, pp. 83–84, including Figure 34, Thickness of the yearly mud layers (varves) in the bed of Lake Saki in the Crimea, indicating rainfall variations in the area since 2300 BC]18. Lamb further observes that periods of warmer climate in western and north-western Europe (in this case, what he considers to have been the optimum of the 8–12th centuries) correspond to periods of wetter climate in the Mediterranean, the Crimea, the Caspian Sea region, and Central Asia [33, p. 173]19.

The significance of this amount of precipitation is better understood if it is considered that during this period the Pontic steppe (north of the Black Sea) was receiving rainfall equivalent to what the southern part of the forest zone receives [15, p. 15]. Additional supporting evidence for such a scenario in the south in this period is seen in the decline of the upper limit of the food line in the Caucasus mountains, which would correspond to a 0.7–0.8 degree C drop in temperature, or to a 250 mm rise in precipitation [7, p. 32]. Of course, it is not clear for how large a territory one can generalise based on the data for Lake Saki, but one may assume that such major increases in precipitation would have led to increased growth in grasses in the drier southern zones of semi-desert and dry steppe; conversely, the end of this wet period would lead to decreased growth in grasses in those zones.

The level of the Caspian Sea is another indirect source for the climatic history of the Golden Horde. Gumilyov, one of many scholars to have examined this question (though the only one with an interest in Eurasian history), follows the view that the level of the Caspian Sea has varied by as much as 8 m above and below its current level20. Conservative estimates by respected scholars such as Berg, on the other hand, consider that it has not varied more than 4 m above or below its present level [1, pp. 332–354; 2, pp. 281–326]. Whichever view is correct, it is clear that by the beginning of the 14th century, the level of the Caspian Sea had risen to a historic high (that is 4 or 8 m above its present level from a low of 4 or 8 m below its present level in the 3rd–4th centuries BCE). More recently, the Caspian reached a record low in 1977, after which it quickly rose again. A careful study of this abrupt change has made it possible to confirm that the level of the Caspian Sea is directly linked to precipitation and other climatic factors in the catchment basin (the upper and middle course) of the Volga River, since this river contributes 81% of the inflow to the Caspian Sea [16, pp. 73–81; 37, p. 114]. For this reason, the level of the Caspian Sea itself can be considered 'proxy' evidence regarding precipitation in the north (possibly including the Volga–Kama confluence) but not as evidence for precipitation in the area of the Caspian Sea. Thus, the level of the Caspian Sea can be taken as an indication of the fact that there was very little precipitation in the catchment basin of the Volga River leading up to the 3rd–4th centuries BCE, and that there was an unusually high amount of precipitation along there by the beginning of the 14th century. This increase in precipitation probably contributed to richer vegetation in the steppe zone.

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18 According to Lamb, after the unusually thick layer of 805 (or 800), there was another peak in 1130. Cf. Smith [41, p. 27] A. Zolotokrilin, A. Krenke, M. Lyaxov, V. Popova, M. Chernavskaia consider that the evidence from Lake Saki as measured against actual figures for the 19th century reveals that it is useful only for discussing 10–30 year trends rather than discussing actual precipitation levels for shorter periods of time [7, pp. 30–31].

19 Lamb also links drought in the Mediterranean, North Africa, and Asia characterised by two maxima of 300–400 CE and 800 CE with the Caspian Sea falling to low levels at the same time [33, p. 159]. The broad reference to Central Asia, however, should be more localised to retain any validity. Cf. G. Jenkins [30].

20 Gumilyov links the rise in the level of the Caspian Sea with dessication in the steppe in the general area of Lake Balkhash and the Aral Sea [28, pp. 331–336; 6, pp. 85–94; 5, pp. 53–66; 27, pp. 20–24]. See also the articles by other scholars in the volume 'Kolebaniya uvlazhennosti Aralo-Kaspiyskogo regiona v golotsene' [9].
It should not be forgotten that one of the possible sources of additional inflow into the Caspian Sea is the Uzboy River, which in the 13–16th centuries (but with the greatest volume during the 13th–14th centuries) led a significant portion of the waters of the Amu Darya into the Caspian Sea. Although this may not be a result of climatic conditions, the changes in the life of the Uzboy must have had devastating consequences for the environment of the surrounding areas. No doubt, its waters contributed to the rising level of the Caspian Sea in this period, but its contribution is not considered to have been the most important factor affecting the rise in the level of the Caspian Sea. In such a case, the contribution of the Amu Darya does not weaken the argument for increased precipitation in the catchment basin of the Volga River feeding into the Caspian [34, pp. 455–458].

Certain additional evidence regarding precipitation is offered by an examination of the pollen record from archaeological excavations. Although this involves the same methodology of pollen analysis as utilised to study long-term climatic phenomena, the studied pollen comes from specific layers excavated at a site which Soviet scholars identify with Bilär, which they further consider to have been the capital of Volga Bulgaria. The conclusion is that this site east of Bulgar was drier during the time of its existence (10–13th centuries) than it is today [23, p. 250]. This assessment appears to support the notion of drier conditions prior to the heavy precipitation in the early 14th century along the middle and northern course of the Volga River.

As for the remaining territories of the Golden Horde, it has been considered that Western Siberia and Central Asia also received extensive precipitation in the 14–15th centuries [4, pp. 100–101]. Beyond such a characterisation, it would be premature to make a detailed statement for Xwarezm or the other eastern territories of the Golden Horde (the patrimony of Orda) during this period. Although the level of the Aral Sea has also varied significantly over historical time, these changes owe more to changes in the course of its sources (for example, the aforementioned Uzboy) than to climatic factors.

On the basis of this important data, we can confidently offer the working hypothesis that there were long-term trends of high precipitation in the southern territories of the Golden Horde until 1280, followed by a decline. There was another small peak in 1310, followed by another, even worse drop in precipitation in 1320. It is only after 1360 that there was a recovery in elevated levels of precipitation peaking in 1370 and bottoming out in 1420. In the north, there may have been a dramatic rise in precipitation along the upper and middle course of the Volga River by the beginning of the 14th century. (One could speculate that this might have begun in the 1280s.) It is not clear, however, if we can relate extremes of precipitation in this period to extremes of temperature, even though it is known that the optima in Western Europe were accompanied by warmer weather, and pessima were accompanied by cooler, wetter temperatures. After all, it has been observed that there is a different relationship between temperature and precipitation north and south of 50 degrees N latitude in the territory formerly known as the 'European part of the USSR' [7, p. 34].

**Dendrochronology and climate change in the territories of the Golden Horde**

Earlier discussions of the relationship between climate and history in the former 'European part of the USSR' have relied exclusively upon climatic data in the written sources for medieval Russia. This data, including reports of droughts, floods, and cold winters, and other phenomena, have been assembled and studied by modern scholars [4, pp. 65–72; 14, pp. 87–94]. The written data for medieval Russia offers an incomplete picture, however, since there are gaps of many years between most reports. For example, it is very difficult to document, based on these sources, any general worsening of conditions that might have resulted from the pessimum beginning

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21 There is even significant variation in patterns of rainfall within the Ukraine itself [3, pp. 256–263].
around 1280. Certain additional categories of proxy data, such as tree ring data, are also available for medieval Russia, but this data is just as problematic as the written sources. It cannot be ascertained on the basis of the written sources whether the decline in tree ring widths in the Novgorod area in certain years was due to extremes of temperature or precipitation. Declines in certain years seem to correspond to the years in which locusts were reported (1008, 1094, 1103), which can be taken as an indication of high levels of precipitation. Other years of decline correspond to the years for which excessive precipitation is explicitly reported (1155, 1162, 1176, 1186, 1219, 1351). However, it is difficult to establish any firm correlation between the tree ring data and the written data on precipitation for Novgorod alone. It is not certain that the additional data on floods and famines would clarify this relationship, especially since it is often not possible to ascertain the exact causes of famine in a given year.

It is even less likely that we might be able to establish a correlation between the evidence for Novgorod and for Lake Saki in the Crimea. The closest possible correlation for the 13–14th centuries is between an extended period of unusually low precipitation in Lake Saki during the period of 1281–1285 and a decline in tree ring growth in Novgorod and other towns in the same region over a similar period (approximately 1282–1284 or 1283–1285) [10, pp. 43, 44, 57, 59, 60, 62, 72, and the discussion and comparative charts on pp. 85–87]. An earlier extended period of unusually low precipitation in Lake Saki (902–907) may also correspond to a decline in tree ring growth in 902–904 [10, p. 45]. The sources do not report extremes of precipitation or temperature in Novgorod during this time. A counterexample is provided by the decline in tree ring growth in 1279, since it corresponds to a year of excessive rain in Lake Saki. (Although the sources list famine in this year, it is not clear what the cause might have been.) One must conclude that the earlier dendrochronological data is insufficient for any precise formulation of the relationship between climatic information for the core Russian territories and the territories of the Golden Horde. Since this is a burgeoning field of research, it may be that we will have more data allowing more meaningful analysis in the future.

**Tentative conclusions on climate change in the territories of the Golden Horde**

A consideration of climatic change begs the question of how climatic change might have affected the environmental zones already described. The possible impact of climatic variability in various periods on human beings is the subject of debate in a growing body of literature. The results of the debate on the effects of climatic variation in Western Europe and elsewhere can serve as a guide for our own attempt at a description of climatic conditions in Central Eurasia during the time of the Golden Horde. Scholars disagree on the full range of effects of the period of warming in Western Europe, but these can be considered to include the expansion of cultivation in marginal areas which could not have been cultivated earlier due to excessive cold, major changes in the kinds of crops cultivated in other areas, and often lower precipitation. Some scholars have even equated advances in Western European civilisation during this period with favourable climatic conditions, which may also have been partially responsible for a rising population in Western Europe during this time. The onset of the cooling trends, however, had the opposite effects: increased storm activity, cooler and wetter growing seasons often resulting

22 See, however, Buchinskiy [4, pp. 101–102]
23 The sudden plagues of locusts can serve as an indication of unusually wet conditions coupled with a specific temperature range [33, p. 304; 42].
24 Tree ring layers have been studied for this area because of their significance for dating archaeological sites; but in order to be useful for the study of climatic variation, the trees should be in some marginal area in order to test variation in one specific variable condition.
25 While certain scholars, most notably Leroy Ladurie, have questioned the impact of a decline of as little as 1 degree Celsius in mean temperature, other scholars now point out that such small figures can mask a greater frequency of extreme conditions [29, pp. 32–33]
in failed harvests and famine, illnesses from moldy grain, the abandonment of marginal agricultural lands, epidemics, and increased glaciation\textsuperscript{26}. In Western Europe, it was not uncommon for communities to be forced to abandon their previous areas of habitation because of worsening conditions. On the other hand, worsening growing conditions in Italy after 1280 would contribute to an economic boom in the Golden Horde because of an increased demand for grain exports to the Italian maritime republics\textsuperscript{27}.

It is difficult to provide a complete description of how changing climatic conditions affected the Golden Horde, since so much of the past research is still entrenched in a notion of the unchanging nature of climate\textsuperscript{28}. In the broadest terms, it seems that the boundaries of the environmental zones themselves may not have shifted significantly or at all in the past millennium. The vegetation within these zones might have changed, however. Hudson suggested long ago in response to earlier theories regarding the eastern end of the steppe zone that dessication in the south could have led to the creation of new pasturage in the north in forest areas which had previously depended on higher precipitation \cite{30, note 12}. It is also not to be excluded that the increased moisture of the 9–13th centuries might have served to expand the lush pasturage west of the Ural Mountains (and, conversely, that drier conditions in 250–790 might have had the opposite effect). The same levels of precipitation could also have stimulated agricultural production in lands that otherwise would have been inhabited by the nomads.

Changing climatic conditions must have had significant consequences for the sedentary population within the traditionally agricultural territories of the Golden Horde as well, since changing precipitation levels could and did wreak havoc with grain production, as we know from the history of Western Europe. The expected effects of extreme conditions on sedentary communities in the territories of the Golden Horde would only be amplified because such large portions of the Golden Horde consisted of marginal lands. In the Volga–Kama confluence, more lentils, vetch, and peas were cultivated in Bulgar than in Bilär, to the east, where oats, rye, and flax were more common \cite[17, p. 243]{17}. Though differing soil conditions could also play a role, this can also serve as one indication that Bulgar was close to the northern limit of production of these crops. Such conditions, which also exist today, should be taken as another fact pointing to the marginal or near-marginal agricultural conditions this far north, including the danger of the poisoning of food supplies by rye mold\textsuperscript{30}. The Volga–Kama region was vulnerable to insufficient heat and especially to too much precipitation, just as the sedentary areas north of the Black Sea were sensitive to too little precipitation. In fact, the medieval Arabic geographer al-Bakrī states quite clearly that in all the lands of the north, hunger is a result not of a lack of rain but of excessive rain and dampness \cite[p. 39–54; 4, p. 48]{11}.

Finally, the apparent end to the wet period in the southern regions of the Golden Horde in the 1280s could have led to a decline in grain production in the south, with a likely shift of grain production to areas with the greater precipitation, required for grain production, than the semi-desert or dry steppe could afford. In that case, we can imagine that beginning in the 1280s, grain production could have shifted to (or expanded) further to the north, to the region around Saratov (site of the Golden Horde city Ükek), which today is an important centre of grain production. As noted above, there is a basis for believing that there was increased precipitation in the north

\textsuperscript{26} For these examples for the period of warming in Western Europe (according to Lamb, in 750–1150/1200), see \textsuperscript{Lamb} \cite[pp. 162–200, 272–309]{33}. It is instructive to compare the work of Lamb with the evaluation of his findings by Leroy Ladurie \cite[pp. 309–319]{34}.

\textsuperscript{27} On the grain exports of the Golden Horde, see my ‘Torgovlya Ulusa Dzhuchi so stranami Sredizemnomor’ya’ \cite{20}.

\textsuperscript{28} Such a view is based, for example, on the absence of any major redistribution in the plant cover of Western Eurasia over the past 5,000 years \cite[p. 15]{41}.

\textsuperscript{29} For a general description of this problem for Bolgar, see V. Tuganaev \cite{18}.

\textsuperscript{30} See my ‘Na-pravleniya v issledovanii Zolotoy Ordï’ \cite[p. 16]{22}.
after the 1280s, but it is not clear how much temperatures might have fallen over the course of the 14th century. Based upon global trends, however, it was still very far from experiencing the significant decline in temperatures associated with the Little Ice Age in the mid-17th century and later.

It has been the goal of this essay to introduce the topic of climate change to the historiography of the Golden Horde. It is possible to study this topic on the basis of sources and methods used for the study of other world regions. Even though the data may be far sparser than for Western Europe, there is still more than enough to make a start to integrate the science of climate change with the study of the history of the Golden Horde. There is a basis in the evidence to take seriously the idea that there was some kind of change in the climate of the territories of the Golden Horde beginning in the 1280s. It seems likely that this change had an effect on both nomadic and sedentary populations. It would also have had an important relationship to the economic history of the Golden Horde, especially a possible shift in the regions supplying grain for export to the Italian maritime states. It is likely that the climatic downturn beginning in the 1280s later had some role in the spread of bubonic plague in the mid-14th century as well. The emergence of the Khanate of Kazan, the Crimean Khanate, and the other khanates of the Later Golden Horde period in the mid-15th century would have taken place during a period in which the climate was becoming cooler, but it probably would not pose a crisis until later.

We cannot be sure when the nomads and sedentarists of Central Eurasia—even especially those living in the northern regions—began to experience a crisis, but it is likely that they were experiencing a severe crisis by the mid-17th century.


31 On the Black Death, see, for example, my ‘Chernaya smert’ i ee posledstviya’ [21].


§ 2. The Impact of the Black Death on the Golden Horde: Politics, Economy, Society, Civilisation

Uli Schamiloglu

This essay considers the question of the political, social, economic, and cultural transformations in Central Eurasia as a result of the Black Death during the time of the Golden Horde (13–14th centuries). The Black Death was the second of three major waves of deadly pandemic caused by the bacteria Yersinia pestis. The first wave was the Plague in the Time of Justinian from the mid-6th to the mid-8th centuries [see my 'The Plague in the Time of Justinian and Central Eurasian History: An Agenda for Research' 46]. The third wave was modern plague beginning in the late 19th century [for studies of modern plague, see 32]. The geographic point of origin of the plague is now believed to have been the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau. The plague, transmitted by rodents and fleas feeding on both rodents and humans, reached Lake Isıq-köl in 1338–1339. Arab writers in the Middle East inform us that the disease had begun in Central Asia and had been raging there for 15 years. The Russian sources indicate that it struck the cities of the Golden Horde, including Saray and Astrakhan. The disease then appeared in the Crimea in 1346 [for the sources, see my articles: 52, pp. 447–457; 3, pp. 686–690; 50, pp. 98–117]. From there the disease spread to Constantinople, and from there to Alexandria in Egypt and Sicily in Italy [on the Black Death in Constantinople, see 51]. The disease spread widely across the Middle East, Europe, and beyond. It ravaged these world regions in multiple waves for many years, with waves of the Black Death continuing in the territories of the Golden Horde apparently until the 15th century. In this essay, I will take as my starting point some of the topics considered by David Herlihy and other scholars for medieval Europe and the Middle East [see 27; 15; 22; 18] and explore additional topics based upon my own research on the Golden Horde in order to offer some thoughts in an attempt to provide a general overview of the political, economic, social, and cultural legacy of the Black Death in the territories of the Golden Horde and its successor states.

Earlier population growth vs. Black Death-era depopulation

It is believed that in Western Europe population was on the rise prior to the arrival of the Black Death in the mid-14th century. According to Herlihy, by 1300 many communities in medieval Europe had attained a large size: the population of the region of Tuscany, for example, reached about two million inhabitants. Scholars also believe that high prices for cereals and occurrences of famine in this period also offer indirect evidence of overpopulation. In Languedoc, there were 27 years of adequate food supply but 20 years of scarcity during the period of 1302–1348. In Northern Europe, the period of 1314–1317 was a period of famine known traditionally as the 'Great Hunger'. There was also famine in Florence in 1346–1347, on the eve of the arrival of the Black Death: only 20% of the population had access to bread, with the rest foraging in the countryside. Indeed, as Herlihy points out, some scholars have considered what was to transpire upon the arrival of the Black Death as a 'Malthusian crisis' of overpopulation [see 27, pp. 31–33. On the crisis of the early 14th century, see also the essays in 19].

Can we describe a parallel situation for the territory of the Golden Horde, namely that it, too, was experiencing overpopulation in this period before the arrival of the Black Death? It is difficult to make such a blanket statement. It does appear that there was some significant nomadic population, which arrived in the western part of Central Eurasia from areas further to the east with the Mongol conquests in the first half of the 13th century. Given the rich pasturage along the lower Volga River and other river systems, perhaps this enabled a better-nourished

32 All terms and transcriptions provided by the author of the article.
33 Clearly, there is a larger body of historical and interdisciplinary research on the Black Death which I cannot cite here in full.
population to grow in number. We also have a sense of the growth of urban centers, probably representing an expanding population as well.

With the arrival of the Black Death in the territories of the Golden Horde in the 1340s—the precise chronology and paths of which may never be fully elucidated—we must assume that there were very high levels of mortality in many regions. If we consider the effects upon Western Europe, it will help us to imagine what its impact might have been on Central Eurasia. As noted above, on the eve of the Black Death, the population of Tuscany had reached about two million inhabitants. After the Black Death and everything else transpiring after its arrival, Tuscany would not reach the level of population it had once had at the beginning of the 14th century until after 1850. The demographic impact of the Black Death is somewhat controversial, since in some areas, there could have been mortality up to 90%, while other areas nearby could have escaped its ravages altogether [See the discussion in 15, p. 245 ff.]. Many scholars believe that the population of Europe declined by one-third in the initial period of roughly 1346–1350 [35, pp. 149–150]. A higher estimate is offered by Benedictow, according to whom, mortality from plague reached 60% across Europe, with many communities wiped out completely [see 15, pp. 380–384].

It will prove next to impossible to find similar direct evidence for the territories of the Golden Horde, but we can look for additional indirect evidence to give a broader picture. A few Arabic sources I have already cited elsewhere give some of the only estimates to be found in the sources for population dying during the outbreak of the Black Death in the territory of the Golden Horde. The account of Maqrizi mentions depopulation in the steppe region prior to the arrival of the Black Death in the Middle East [33, ii/3, pp. 773–774; 22, pp. 40–41]. Ibn al-Wardi writes that when the outbreak of disease arrived in the 'land of Özbek' (bilād Uzbak) in Racab 747/October–November 1346, the villages and towns were emptied of their inhabitants. He also cites a report from a qādi in the Crimea estimating 85,000 dead [23, pp. 443–455, especially p. 448]34. Additional supporting evidence comes from the neighbouring Russian territories to the west, with the Russian chronicles reporting numerous occurrences of plague in cities throughout Russia accompanied by a high rate of mortality [on the Black Death in Russia, see 1, pp. 14–25; 11, pp. 15–58; 31, pp. 53–67, especially pp. 55–61; 12, pp. 12–15]. Indirect evidence is also provided by the spike in the number of gravestones bearing Nestorian Turkic inscriptions in the Syriac alphabet near Lake Isīq-köl and by a parallel spike in the number of gravestones bearing Muslim Turkic inscriptions in Volga Bulgarian in Arabic script in the Middle Volga region (see below).

Based upon everything we know about Europe and the Middle East in this period, the population loss must have been substantial—perhaps even extreme—and it would not be until the mid-to late-15th century that we can see the outlines of a rebound in population. Nevertheless, it is not clear whether the population crisis of the 14–15th centuries was strictly one of mortality (so death), or whether it also involved a question of factors affecting fertility [see 27, p. 2].

Depopulation and political instability

The most visible and dramatic result of the rapid depopulation associated with the Black Death was a disruption in the political system of the Golden Horde. The political system of the Golden Horde was based upon a system of political and marital alliances between a khan descending from Chinggis Khan and the leaders of four high-status tribes. The leaders of these four 'ruling tribes', the four ulus beks (known in the time of the khanates of the Later Golden Horde of the 15–18th centuries as the four qaraçı beys), formed a council of state involved in

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34 For a reference to the original text of the Risāla in Ibn al-Wardi’s Diwān, see [23, p. 446, note 16] and the discussion of Ibn al-Wardi’s works in my 'Preliminary Remarks on the Role of Disease in the History of the Golden Horde' [52, p. 455, note 17].
the selection and sometimes the removal of the Chinggisid khan, as well other matters of state [On this system, see my works 55, pp. 283–297; 54; 48, pp. 15–18]. The pattern of succession was originally based upon 'collateral succession', with an expectation that the sons of the first generation descended from Chinggis Khan might rule in descending order based upon age. It is clear that in the succeeding generations this principle (or cultural expectation) based upon genealogy endured to one degree or another, but in the Golden Horde, it is clear that over time the tribal élite selected the khan without adhering strictly to the original principle of succession. As a result, the line of succession appears to have shifted back and forth between lines of descent more than once. Within the tribes themselves, there was also a hereditary leadership which appears to have passed from father to son (though it is not certain whether it was also based upon the same principle of collateral succession).

What would have been the result of the waves of plague in the territory of the Golden Horde beginning in the early 1340s? I must say that the most remarkable aspect of the political system of the Golden Horde in the 1340s–1350s was the unlikely extent to which it was actually politically stable. I would have expected that the political system would have collapsed sometime earlier during the 1340s–1350s. It is surprising for me that it was only after the death of Berdi Bek that the political order in the Golden Horde seems not just to have collapsed but to have collapsed completely. Under what circumstances did both Canıbek (d. 1357) and Berdi Bek (d. 1359) really die? Could they have fallen victim to the Black Death, as had Grand Duke Simeon several years earlier? It is hard to be sure, but what follows the death of Berdi Bek is the utter and complete collapse of political stability in the territories of the Golden Horde.

Until 1359, it appears that there was an orderly, stable, well-functioning political system in the territories of the Golden Horde. After 1359, with the collapse of centralised authority, the only word one can use to describe what is going on in the territories of the Golden Horde is 'anarchy'. We see in the sources a succession of dozens of names in competition with one another, such as Qulpa, Nevruz, Xizr, Temür Xoca, Ordu Meliq, Kildi Beg, Murad, Pulad, Aziz, Abdullah, Hasan, and many, many others. Although the historiography is not clear on this, it is clear that while some of them are Chinggisids, others are tribal leaders vying for control of the Golden Horde in the west, so the ulus of Jöchi also known as the White Horde. (As is well known, the term 'Golden Horde' is a later term, probably first used in the 16th century, which becomes the most widely-used appellation for this state in modern scholarship.) At the same time, figures from the eastern Blue Horde would also vie for control over the White Horde.

How can we explain the mechanism by which the Black Death had such an impact on the Golden Horde? The explanation for this lies in the system for orderly succession, which forms the basis of the political organisation of the Golden Horde. As noted above, the system of collateral succession formed the original basis of the method for determining succession among the first generations of Chinggisids after the death of Chinggis Khan. (Did the system of four ulus beks also underlie the earliest quriltays choosing the successors to Chinggis Khan? We will never know.) In succeeding decades, it is clear that the same system of a khan plus four tribal leaders was involved in choosing and removing the Chinggisid khans of the Golden Horde. The most famous of these tribal leaders was Emir Noğay (d. 1299), though he was certainly not the only tribal leader about whom we have knowledge based on the sources. As waves of bubonic plague swept across the territories of the Golden Horde—but especially beginning in 1359—the political system of the Golden Horde was disrupted. It appears that with the death of Berdi Bek—which coincided with a period of a number of years in which the Black Death was very active in the territories of the Golden Horde in the late 1350s–early 1360s—orderly succession became impossible. Trying to acquire objective, current information about the proper genealogical order of succession between Chinggisids was probably a hopeless task, since if one died before becoming khan, his successors could lose the right to become khan. But
who knew who was alive and who was dead? Each of the tribes also had its own internal leadership, which must have faced the same crisis of leadership as the Chinggisids. As a result, with the breakdown of the political order, one person after another became selected and raised as khan, and either died or was overthrown. It is possible that the four chief tribes could no longer come together and function as a council of state. If the true power of the khan rested in the marital relationships between the khan and his offspring and the tribal leaders and their offspring, then this system was also disrupted for a long period of time.

As a result, the western ulus of Jochi (the White Horde) fell deeper and deeper into anarchy. For some reason, the eastern ulus of Orda (the Blue Horde) seems to have been affected less by the Black Death (possibly because it was more nomadic), or else it simply was fortunate to have avoided the worst effects of successive waves of bubonic plague. Another possibility is that it experienced bubonic plague earlier and had already begun to recover demographically. What we can see is that they were in a position to dominate the western territories until those territories would begin to recover themselves in the mid-15th century.

In contrast, even though Grand Duke Simeon and other members of the ruling elite also died of the Black Death in Moscow in 1353, we cannot say that Muscovy and the other Russian principalities collapsed into anarchy. Quite the opposite. Since the basis of the state was estates, not genealogy, the foundation of the Russian principalities was not undermined. To the extent that depopulation characterised the Russian principalities from the second half of the 14th century until the later 15th century, the response was a centralisation of political authority in the hands of fewer individuals, culminating ultimately in the 'gathering of the Russian lands' under Ivan III (r. 1462–1505) [see especially the discussion in 11, pp. 37–38]. This meant an increasingly stronger Russian state confronting a number of khanates in the 15–16th centuries, which were much smaller and weaker than the earlier Golden Horde prior to its collapse in 1359.

**Bubonic plague as biological warfare**

An episode connected with the arrival of the Black Death in Kaffa is often cited as the earliest example of the use of biological weapons in human warfare. After reaching the land of Özbek and striking the cities of the Golden Horde, Yersinia pestis finally reached the Crimea, where the Italian commercial centres of the Crimea became the point of transmission of the Black Death to the Middle East and Europe. Italian merchants had been expelled from Tana (Azaq) in 1343, and they were besieged in the fortified city of Kaffa in 1343 and again in 1345–1346. According to one of the best known sources on the Black Death in Kaffa, the Historia de Morbo by Gabriele de’ Mussis [see 26, pp. 45–57; and the revised translation in 16, pp. 14–26, especially pp. 17–18, 20], countless numbers of Tatars ('Tartars') and Saracens became afflicted in 1346 with an illness that resulted in sudden death. Large portions of these provinces, kingdoms, towns, and settlements were soon stripped of their inhabitants. The illness spread among the Tatars while they were holding under siege the Genoese colony of Kaffa (modern Feodosiya) in Crimea. At that time, Kaffa also included Italian merchants who had fled Tana, an Italian colony on the mouth of the Don River. Unexpectedly, thousands of Tatar soldiers began to die with the sudden swelling of the armpit or groin followed by a fever. Although the Tatar soldiers soon abandoned their siege, they began to place the corpses onto catapults and launch the bodies of their comrades who had fallen victim to the disease into the Genoese fortress of Kaffa. The Italians tried to dump as many of the bodies as possible into the Black Sea, but the rotting corpses filled the air with a stench and poisoned the water supply. Through their strong resistance, and perhaps due to the weakened state of the blockading army, the Genoese were able to lift the siege. Many Genoese then fled to Constantinople, taking the infection with them. I have outlined elsewhere the equally catastrophic effects of the Black Death on Anatolia and have proposed that the rise of the Ottoman Empire can

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35 On the development of a biological weapon programme by the USSR utilising smallpox and other biological agents (including Yersinia pestis), see [10].
be explained as a consequence of the Black Death [see my 'The Rise of the Ottoman Empire: The Black Death in Medieval Anatolia and its Impact on Turkish Civilisation' 51]. By 1347, the plague had reached Italy and Egypt from Constantinople. Soon the Black Death was raging throughout Europe and the Middle East.

**Economic crisis**

The sudden demographic crisis experienced by medieval European society had profound economic consequences [for an overview of these consequences, see, for example, 14, pp. 23–38; 22, pp. 255–280; 27, pp. 39–57; 18]. David Herlihy differentiates between short-term and long-term effects of the Black Death. He sees the short-term repercussion as a shock which was very disruptive for regular economic life and interrupted routines of work and service. Not only did the positions of those who died in a wide range of jobs and professions remain unfilled because of the deaths of the holders of these positions, others fled the town to the safety of the countryside—as in Boccaccio’s Decameron—because people felt that they had no better option for saving themselves. This led to many towns being emptied of their population either because of the death of the population or flight. Those who remained behind sometimes refused to carry out their jobs, choosing instead to enjoy what they could of life before their turn to die arrived.

In the countryside, as described by Guillaume de Machaut in 1349, because of a huge loss in the population (according to him, ninety-nine out of one hundred), there were not enough people remaining to tend to large farms, nor could sufficient labourers be found even at many times the pre-plague salary. Fields went untended; harvests remained ungathered, and herds were left untended, resulting in feral herds.

The high rates of mortality led to a sudden increase in the demand for certain professions. Gravediggers came into high demand. It is possible that prior to the arrival of the Black Death, gravediggers in Florence may not have been paid, whereas after the arrival of the Black Death, this was a paid job for which there was a high demand. Physicians were also in high demand to treat the ill, as were clergy to perform the rituals for the burial of the dead. As these professions were also losing many highly-trained members to epidemic disease, their ranks were joined by those who were less well-trained or not trained at all. The Black Death similarly cut short the careers of many skilled artisans and craftsmen whose ranks needed to be replenished. Over the longer term, the skilled professions needed to bring in new members at a higher rate than before the Black Death, since the average length of one’s career was now shorter. The rise in wages was a part of a general period of inflation, with grain prices rising until they finally begin to diminish after 1375 or 1395. Meanwhile, as wages rose, agricultural rents fell. Herlihy suggests that cheap land was substituted for expensive labour, leading, for example, to the expansion of pasturage at the expense of cultivated fields.

How might we apply these insights into the economic impact of the Black Death on medieval Europe to the history of the Golden Horde? We may safely assume that the sedentary regions of the Golden Horde also experienced a similar fate. The report estimating that 85,000 people were dead in the Crimea suggests that the other towns of the Golden Horde also suffered shock from high rates of mortality. We have direct reports of other cities being struck, such as the report on the wave of 1364 originating in Saray [31, p. 57]. The kind of abundant detailed information available for medieval Europe is simply not available, however, for the Golden Horde. Yet there are some intriguing pieces of indirect evidence which fit the same pattern as for medieval Europe.

I have noted that flight from cities was a common response to outbreaks of plague in Europe. While in the Golden Horde we do not have direct evidence of flight, the curious case of Gülistan may pose indirect evidence for disruption caused by the Black Death. Mellinger

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30 I refer the reader to Herlihy, The Black Death and the Transformation of the West [27, p. 40 ff.] for a more complete discussion and references to the sources.
believes that two types of Golden Horde coinage, the first minted in Saray in the year 746/1345–1346 (and continued from 752/1351–1352 to 754/1353) and the second minted in 749/1348–1349, reflect the havoc caused by the Black Death in the Golden Horde. He also suggests that the establishment of Gülistan as a mint site in 752/1351–1352 might have been a response to plague (a conclusion which both Mellinger and I have reached independently from each other) [see 36, pp. 153–211, especially pp. 178–180]. In such a case, Gülistan, which literally means 'Rose Garden' (and the name of a popular romantic epic perhaps first translated into Turkic in the Golden Horde)\(^{37}\), could be seen as a refuge parallel to Boccaccio’s refuge in the countryside away from Florence.

The shock of the waves of Black Death in various years would have meant that, as elsewhere in Europe, the tending of fields, the harvesting of crops, and the taking care of herds could have been neglected. This would have affected the food supply of the urban population and perhaps of the nomads as well. It should not come as a surprise, therefore, that there are many reports of famine in this period in the Russian sources [see the table in 31, pp. 58–61]. In the towns, we can also expect that there would have been a need for more gravediggers, as well as pressure on healers and Muslim clerics. The number of craftsmen and artisans would have diminished greatly, too. While we do not have direct evidence for this, the fact that Volga Bulgārian ceased to be written as a literary language after 1358 (see below) suggests that the people who knew that language, or the scholars or clergy who could write the texts for the grave markers on which these inscriptions were written, or perhaps the stone carvers who would physically carve the stone grave markers were no longer in adequate supply. Perhaps with the demand for labour, which was in short supply, there were other urgent tasks which were tended to instead, or perhaps wages rose too high for people to be able to afford grave markers.

At the same time, it is not clear whether a comparison of the Golden Horde with medieval Europe is more apt, or whether a comparison with medieval Egypt would be more appropriate. In Europe, high wages resulted in cheap land and an increase in capital investment, as in oxen and seed being provided to agriculturalists to make it more attractive for labourers to cultivate the land. In contrast, medieval Egypt had a centralised landholding system with absentee landlords living in the cities. The Egyptian system could not adapt to massive depopulation and continued in crisis, while in England the localised rural landholding system had fully recovered by 1500 [see 18]. Was the Golden Horde system more like a centralised landholding system with absentee landlords, or was it a more localised landholding system? This is a question which requires further investigation.

Although we expect inflation, there are not many direct sources for this. Future researchers may be able to reconstruct the history of prices in the territory of the Golden Horde over the course of the 13–15th centuries, with a view to understanding the impact of the Black Death on prices. This will prove notoriously difficult, however, since the most abundant data is for the Italian colonies in the Crimea, where the markets—which were subject to influences from all over the Mediterranean—showed tremendous seasonal variation. According to Balard, more is known about the grain trade after 1350, which makes it more difficult to evaluate the price of this commodity before and after the onset of the Black Death [on the wheat commerce in the Black Sea region and elsewhere, see 13, ii, pp. 749–768]. The idea of inflation in the territories of the Golden Horde is, however, supported by the numismatic evidence. I have proposed, with the assistance of my colleague Leonard Nedashkovsky, that the lighter standard for the silver dirham introduced as a part of the monetary reform of Toqtamış in 782/1380–1381 (which was first put into effect in the Lower Volga region) can be considered direct evidence of inflation in this period [see 45].

\(^{37}\) This work is known from the translation by Seyf-i Serayi (a native of Saray) produced in Mamlūk Egypt in 1391, see [56].
We should not forget that one of the big differences between the states of Western Europe and the Golden Horde is that, even though it had significant amounts of agricultural exports to the Italian maritime republics, the territory of the Golden Horde was home to vast herds of horses, sheep, and other livestock, which were tended by nomadic herders. It is certainly a principle that nomads are less susceptible to epidemic disease (though not immune to it), which is why we should not be surprised that after the collapse of the urban centres of the Golden Horde (see below), there were still strong nomadic confederations. At the same time, if Western Europe is to serve as a guide, the decline in the rural agricultural population would have meant that less land was cultivated. This could have led to a greater exploitation of formerly-tilled agricultural land by herds of animals tended by nomadic herdsmen, or by local sedentarists, for whom it was less labour-intensive to tend to herds of animals than to cultivate large fields now laying fallow (see below).

**Social crisis**

There is no question that in medieval Europe the Black Death created a major social crisis the likes of which had not been seen since the 6–8th centuries. As the ravages of the Black Death continued, people stopped treating the sick and dying as human beings. The sick were treated 'no better than dogs' or were sent to pesthouses. There was a fear of transmission of disease from corpses, and local administrations punished those who hid the sick. The dead became an overwhelming crisis, since towns and communities had difficulty dealing with the large numbers of dead or even the expense of digging their graves. The diminishing number of clergy meant that it was more difficult to offer the dead a proper burial. The numerous corpses ended up being treated no better than goat carcasses. In the longer term, the fact that in some parts of Europe the demographic structure of the population changed meant that an unusual number of younger persons and older persons were left alive. This meant that the ratio of dependents to productive workers increased, putting additional pressure on the main providers in the family. Clearly some children must have been orphaned, while some elderly must have been left without family members to care for them.

It is nearly impossible to document this range of issues for the territories of the Golden Horde. It is clear, as with the report from the Crimea, that there were large numbers of dead. The 'weaponisation' of the dead by the Mongols (see above) seems to fit with the notion of corpses being treated like goat carcasses, but of course this may reflect more on Mongol military tactics than on their becoming inured to the death of civilians around them. As noted above in the section on the economy, the end of gravestones with inscriptions in Volga Bulgarian could also be linked to the inability of the Muslim population in the Middle Volga region to properly bury its dead in the way it had been accustomed. At a higher level, namely the level of the elite, the anarchy in the traditional political system of the Golden Horde meant that the lines of the ruling families and the family lines of the tribal leadership were disrupted, as we see in the sources (see above).

**Urbanisation and deurbanisation**

Although medieval Europe experienced a substantial decline in its population as a result of the Black Death, we do not speak of the deurbanisation of medieval Europe, even though it appears that many villages were abandoned following the Black Death [see 58, p. 52; and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abandoned_village]. Clearly villages, towns, and urban centres were characteristic features of Europe’s economy based upon a sedentary way of life and agriculture. In the Eurasian steppe zone, however, it is clear that before the modern era this zone was not characterised by villages, towns, and urban centres; rather this zone was characterised by pastoral nomadism. Urban centers were characteristic of the Crimea, Khwarezm, and the Middle Volga region, but the grasslands of the steppe, in which nomadic confederations dominated, probably...
could not afford sufficient security for the establishment of agricultural settlements. It is only with the expansion of the Russian Empire in the modern period that we see the complete agricultural colonisation of this zone.

I argue elsewhere that the establishment of the Mongol World Empire created a secure environment for merchants to travel across Eurasia. This is very clear from the account of William of Rubruck, for example [37]. The Golden Horde also provided security for the trade network known popularly in modern times as the 'Silk Road'. The communication network of the Mongol World Empire (cam) required a regular network of manned stations for changing horses [see 38, pp. 103–107]. Merchants also had a need for regular stations or caravanserais, too. This probably led to the development of a series of towns along transportation and trade routes. With the ever-increasing volume in trade, the Golden Horde élite beginning with Batu Khan began to establish fixed cities at the southern and northern edges of the annual migration route of his flocks, Saray Batu and probably Ükek, respectively [see my article: 38]. Saray Batu and later Saray Berke became important political, commercial, and cultural centres. An important description of various urban centres in the Golden Horde in the 1330s is provided by Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, less than a decade before the initial outbreaks of bubonic plague on the territories of the Golden Horde in the early 1340s. With the increase in the export of grain to the Italian maritime republics, there was an expansion of agricultural production, probably including the steppe zone around Ükek, thanks to the security provided by the Golden Horde. This necessarily meant an increase in the number of agricultural settlements in this zone. Nedashkovsky also studies the towns established in the region around Ükek (a suburb of present-day Saratov) [6; 39; 5]. The expansion of settlements in this period can also be seen from a map of settlements established in the 13–14th centuries offered by Egorov [pp. 232–233 (maps are between these pages)].

Given the paucity of sources for Golden Horde following the outbreak of the Black Death, we can only state that there is direct and indirect evidence for the Black Death visiting Khwarezm, the Crimea, Saray, Volga Bulğaria, and more generally the towns and cities of the Golden Horde, as noted elsewhere. It is difficult to be more specific, since our sources do not offer any more information about a wide range of settlements, towns, and cities in the steppes zone. It is clear that settlements, towns, and cities continued to exist in the traditional areas of sedentary habitation. In the Middle Volga region, however, we do see that 70 years after the apparent decline or demise of Volga Bulğaria ca. 1358 (judging by the end of the Volga Bulğarian inscriptions, see below), the Khanate of Kazan was established almost 100 km to the north of the site of the town known today as Bulgar. It is quite possible that this is a case of the abandonment of the site of the former Volga Bulğarian town as a political centre for the region. It is not to be excluded that the reason for this was that it was somehow 'marked' as a place of death. In this case, it would be comparable to the settlements abandoned in medieval Europe.

In the steppe zone itself, we can probably speak of destruction and deurbanisation, too. The great 17th-century Ottoman traveller Evliya Çelebi offers us a survey of the towns he visited during one of his visits to the territories of the former Golden Horde in 1664 [25, vii, p. 473 ff.; 24, vii, p. 368 ff.]. He often repeats that Toqtamış had leveled whichever town he was describing at the moment [25, vii, pp. 479, 485, 488, 490, 492, 522, 566; 24, vii, pp. 371, 376, 378, 380, 402, viii, 23]. In his account, Saray (probably Saray Batu, given its proximity to the Caspian Sea) is still not very developed (hâlâ o kadar imar değildir) and is a poor town of 9,000 ill-fated houses of wood with (thatched) roofs of rushes and reeds (hepsi dokuz bin tahta, saz ve kamış ile örtülü uğursuz evlerden ibarettir). Moreover, they speak so many different languages that they must communicate through interpreters, which also suggests that many of them had arrived there only recently [25, vii, pp. 479–480; 24, vii, p. 372]. We also learn from his description that significant numbers of nomads or semi-nomads live among what Evliya Çelebi refers to as the 'ruins' (harabeler) of this region. The general impression one gets is that—con-
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considering that this is a period of time in which the population has already recovered significantly—it is not a robust urban population. Even if we may question at times the reliability of Evliya Çelebi’s description, the extent to which the urban tradition of this region declined compared to the time of the visit of Ibn Battūta in the 1330s or indeed was disrupted is certainly a topic which merits further study based upon the later sources.

Population pressure and migration

With the substantial depopulation across the territories of the Golden Horde (which may not have been uniform, of course), we can see several phenomena related to the movement of people to areas which were suddenly depopulated, or at least politically and militarily weakened. The first example can be the expansion by Lithuania to the south as far as the Black Sea. As Pelenski has demonstrated (though without mentioning bubonic plague), Lithuania expanded its territories dramatically in the 2nd third of the 14th century. It expanded into Belorussia and five Ukrainian lands (the conquest of Chernigov in three stages beginning in 1345, Siveria, the conquest of Kiev and the Kievan land by 1361–1363, Pereyaslavl following Kiev, and major parts of Podolia in the first half of the 1360s) [41, pp. 303–320, especially p. 308]. Lithuania scored a major victory over the forces of the Golden Horde at the Battle of the Blue Water (Sinyaya voda) in 1362 [41; pp. 309–311]. Lithuania even established control over the northern coast of the Black Sea under Witold (r. 1392–1430) [41, p. 318]. This territorial expansion corresponds to the period of the ravages of the bubonic plague, which certainly led to substantial depopulation and political instability in the period which Pelenski calls the 'Time of Troubles' in the Golden Horde following the death of Canıbek Khan. It is possible that the Black Death may not have affected Lithuania as profoundly as it did the territories of Russia and the Golden Horde39. This is a topic meriting further consideration.

It is also possible that the territories of the eastern half of the Golden Horde (so the Blue Horde) were not affected as profoundly as the western territories (so the White Horde), or possibly that the eastern territories began to recover more rapidly. The now-weakened Golden Horde begins to experience a series of attacks from the east as Urus Khan and then later Toqtamış lead campaigns against the territories of the western half of the Golden Horde [for a discussion of the sources for this section, see my works 54, pp. 179–204; 3, pp. 690; 50, pp. 113–114; 48, pp. 16–17]. Let us leave aside for the moment the question of the origins of Toqtamış. As I have argued elsewhere, we see from a later source that when Toqtamış playing the role of de facto or de jure ruler in the western territories in the 1380s and part of the 1390s, he is supported by a confederation of four ‘ruling tribes’ consisting of the Şirin, Arğın, Bārn, and Qıpçaq. It is significant that these four tribes migrated to this territory at the end of the 14th century along with Toqtamış. The same four tribes will later form the basis of the xanates of the Crimea, Kazan, and part of the xanate of Kasimov. In order to appreciate the significance of this information, we should consider that according to one source the four tribes of the nomadic ‘Great Horde’ of the 15th century were the Qıyat, Mangıt, Sicivut, and Qongrat. If we may consider the nomadic Great Horde to be the last remnant of the earlier Golden Horde (more accurately, the western White Horde) and its direct continuation, then these four tribes (the Qıyat, Mangıt, Sicivut, and Qongrat) must also have been the earlier tribes of the western territories of the Golden Horde (so the White Horde). This allows us a second example of population moving to an area depopulated by the bubonic plague [cf. 35, pp. 170–171].

The third and final example I would suggest would be the later movement of Kipchak Turkic-speaking population into the Middle Volga region. If we may take the Volga Bulğarian inscriptions as any indication, the dominant population of the Middle Volga region spoke Volga Bulğarian, which belongs to the Western or Bulğar branch of the Turkic languages whose sole

39 Benedictow suggest that the Black Death may have spread more slowly in the Baltic region, see [15, pp. 209–210].
modern relative is Chuvash. I have noted elsewhere that it is also possible that Volga Bulgārian served the purpose of a 'religious' language for speakers of Kipchak Turkic languages and perhaps even speakers of Turkic languages belonging to other branches of the Turkic languages [53, pp. 157–163]. (We will never know for sure.) The fact that over the course of the 15–16th centuries, we see the rise of a strong Kipchak Turkic-speaking population, based upon the Kipchak Turkic language (Old Kazan Tatar) used in the gravestones from this period and the official diplomatic correspondence of the Khanate of Kazan, we can see that there was an in-migration of Kipchak Turkic population, probably including nomadic Noğays. Not only would this be our third example of a population moving into a region depopulated by bubonic plague, it can also serve as an example of the phenomenon, described by Herlihy, of the expansion of pasturage at the expense of cultivated fields. Of course, any nomadic population moving to the Middle Volga region eventually sedentarised.

Cultural and technological regression

As I have argued elsewhere, I believe that we see the end of several Turkic literary languages in the mid-14th century because of the Black Death. At the far eastern edge of the territories of the Golden Horde, around Lake Isıq-köl, there was a community of Christian Turks using the Syriac alphabet to write funerary inscriptions. The gravestones of the Nestorian grave sites around this site record that an outbreak of plague took place there in 1338–1339 [for a description of these inscriptions and further bibliography, see 57, pp. 94–107]. During these two years, there is an unusually high number of gravestones, with some of the gravestones recording that the person buried there had died of plague [see 9, pp. 84–109, 217–221, 303–308, especially 305–305; 21, pp. 129–130; 11, pp. 31–38]. There is a second peak in the number of gravestones in 1341, which probably reflects a second wave of plague, even though this fact is not mentioned in the gravestones [This is pointed out by Chwolson: 20, pp. 39–40]. I have proposed that the fact that the Syriac Turkic inscriptions largely disappear after this period is a result of plague [see my 'The End of Volga Bulgārian': 53, pp. 157–163, especially pp. 161–162]. The corpus described by Xvol'son for the years 1226–1373 included at least 37 inscriptions for the period of 1338–1339, while for the period of 1342–1373, there was only one recorded for 1347, after which the next and final inscription is from 26 years later [see 9, p. 306]40. According to Thacker, the earliest of these inscriptions dates from 1186 and the last from 1345 [57, p. 99]. Teker more recent finds into account, Klein states that the gravestones date from 1250–1342, except in Almalıq (along the Kazakh–Chinese border in the region of Taldıqorğan), where the last inscriptions are from the 1370s [29, pp. 213–223, especially p. 214].

The second language to disappear as a result of the Black Death was Volga Bulgārian, a Western Turkic language whose sole surviving relative is Chuvash. Volga Bulgārian is known from the inscriptions on gravestones in the Middle Volga region from the 13th century [on these inscriptions, see 44; 8]. On the relationship between Volga Bulgārian and Chuvash, see also 43, pp. 13–123; 42]. The earliest inscription in Volga Bulgārian in the city of Bulğar itself dates from 1271, while the last ones date from 1356 [4, p. 120]. In addition to inscriptions in Volga Bulgārian, there were also funerary inscriptions in a Standard Turkic dialect, which may be considered as a precursor of the modern Kazan Tatar language in the Middle Volga region [see 7, pp. 5–15]41. In a parallel to the situation a number of years earlier near Lake Isıq-köl, there is a peak in the number of gravestones with inscriptions in Volga Bulgārian and Standard Turkic in 1357 and 135842. After 1358, there are no new inscriptions or any other text written in Volga Bulgārian, with only a limited number of inscriptions in Standard Turkic in the years following

40 A large portion of the corpus is undated.
41 For a map of the distribution of both kinds of inscriptions, see [8, p. 21].
42 These eight inscriptions are: [44, 1357: nos. 24, 25, 52; 8, 1357: no. 23, 1358: nos. 24, 25; 7, 1357: nos. 16, 17]. Cf. [8], in which no. 26 is read as '1361?', while the same inscription is read in [44, no. 26] as '1353-1354'.
this date [see, for example, the two inscriptions dated 1382 and 1399 in 7, nos. 18, 19]. There is furthermore a general decline in the number and variety of gravestones in this region after 1358 [see the discussion in 4, pp. 120–126].

I will offer one final example, namely the disruption in the literary language of the Golden Horde after 1358. The last work in the literature of the Golden Horde was the Nehec ül-feradis. Already in the 19th century, Şihabeddin Marjani described a manuscript of the Nehec ül-feradis (now lost) copied in Saray in 749/1358. That manuscript attributed the work to one Mahmud born in Bulğar, who found refuge in Saray, and whose family name (nisba), Kerderi, linked him with the city of Kerder in Xwarezm. Another manuscript says that the author died three days after 25 March 1360. The manuscript edited by Eckmann et al. and completed on 6 Cumâdâ I, 761/25 March 1360 indicates the various sources on which it was drawn, and finally refers to the author as Muhammad b. Muhammad b. Xusrev el-Xorezmî [17, p. 95; 40, p. 309. See also 34, p. 8]. After the death of this author in 1360, we do not see another literary or religious work produced in the language of the Golden Horde, only funerary inscriptions. Instead, we do not see new literary or religious works until those written in Chaghatay and produced in Central Asia in the early 15th century.

All of this may be taken as evidence to suggest that, as is the case of the Latin literary language in Europe, bubonic plague led to technological regression disrupting the development of multiple Turkic literary languages in the territories of the Golden Horde [I have argued this in my article: 49, i, pp. 501–507].

*Increase in religiosity*

The next result of the Black Death which I will consider here is increased religiosity. People living in the time of plague were frightened by the arrival of plague as an indication of God’s displeasure with them. They concluded that they were poor Muslims and sought to atone for their sins. Some people gave away their possessions or performed pious acts. This was equally true of the Muslim Turks of the Golden Horde. As noted (above), a work of Islamic Turkic religious literature was produced in the Golden Horde in 1358 (a plague year) with the Arabic title Nehec ül-feradis and bearing the Turkic subtitle Uştmaxlarnıŋ açuq yoli, meaning ‘The Clear Path to Heaven’. This work is a handbook of the Islamic religion, with the title suggesting that if one reads this book (and, perhaps, we might add, if one writes such a book), one is guaranteed entry to heaven. Why else would a devout Muslim be concerned unless there is clear evidence of God’s impending punishment? [For parallel evidence from Anatolia, see 51, p. 268]. It also appears that this work was also copied just before the author himself died. I would argue that the production of such religious literature and its copying were pious acts performed to regain God’s favour in order to ward off disease. This is buttressed by the subtitle of the work: why else would they be concerned with getting to heaven? There is at least one parallel example to this in Anatolia as well, namely Süleyman Çelebi’s early-15th-century religious poem in honour of the birth of the Prophet Muhammad (mawlid) entitled Vesilet ünnecat or ‘Path to Salvation’.

There was yet another consequence of the Black Death for religion and religiosity, namely the dramatic strengthening of the relationship between the ruler and the religious class. Of course, it is the case that earlier rulers, such as Özbek Khan, already had a close relationship with the religious élite [28, ii, p. 482]. Later, upon the collapse of the Golden Horde state, the clear lines of succession in the dynastic and tribal leadership, as well as the four-bey system, were disrupted. Many individuals competed for the right to be elevated as xan. From this time on, descent from Chinggis Khan was no longer sufficient to guarantee political legitimacy. The leaders of Sufi orders, which had been active throughout the 13–14th centuries, were now in a

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43 See my forthcoming articles on the Turkish mevlid tradition and its later history among the Muslim Turks of the Russian Empire.
position to offer Islam as a second source of political legitimacy. The Black Death ushered in a new era in which Chinggisid political leaders were now allied even more closely with Islamic religious leaders. Individual Sufi shaykhs offered candidates for khan Islamic legitimacy to supplement their Chinggisid descent. In return, a candidate for xan, once successful, could offer the Sufi shaykh who supported him and his order tremendous prestige and, as in Central Asia, wealthy estates. In this regard, the Black Death was certainly a factor in the dramatic increase in the importance of Sufi orders after the second half of the 14th century.

Rise in population after the Black Death

Even though the Black Death evidently contributed to large-scale depopulation in the territories of the Golden Horde, eventually the population would begin to grow again. In Europe, this recovery was certainly in evidence by the second half of the 15th century. For example, Cohn notes a surge in the number of surviving publications (incunabula) in Europe in the 1470s, which we may take as a possible reflection of the rising population in this period [see 27, p. 11]. Perhaps we can see the foundation of the Khanate of Kazan in the late 1430s, the Crimean Khanate in the 1440s, the Khanate of Kasimov in the 1450s, and the Siberian Khanate in Tūmān at the end of the 15th century as indirect evidence of sufficient recovery of the population to make governance of isolated regions of the western territories of what was once a vast state possible. After all, when Uluğ Muhammad moved north to Kazan, he needed to also take a certain number of forces with him, which would only be possible with a rise in the population. We need to look for more evidence of a rising population by the mid-15th century in the territories of the Later Golden Horde. The Kipchakisation of the Middle Volga region must also be seen as a result of Kipchak Turkic speakers migrating into the region after the reversal of the decline in population (see above), though we may certainly expect that the decline in the nomadic population was less severe compared to the decline in the sedentary population.

Conclusion

It is clear that the primary sources for the territories of the Golden Horde in the 14–15th centuries do not provide the kind of detailed data on the Black Death and its political, economic, social, and cultural consequences which we find in the ample supply for Europe. Even the Middle East has much more detailed information than we can find for the territories of the Golden Horde. Nevertheless, I hope that I have been able to show that the political, economic, social, and cultural transformations in these territories from the mid-14th to the mid-15th centuries are consistent with what we might expect to find in a territory and population living through successive waves of bubonic plague. Regarding some of the consequences, I rely more on speculation than hard data, to be sure. It is my firm conviction, however, that once we become aware of the Black Death and its well-documented consequences for Europe and the Middle East in this same period, it becomes possible to find some direct and substantial amounts of indirect evidence for studying the shadow cast by the Black Death over this state and its population. If we take these and other theorised consequences to be an agenda for research, I believe that future researchers will be able to marshal much more evidence in support of the consequences outlined here.


Chapter X.
The Break Up of the Ulus of Jochi

§ 1. The Time of Troubles in the 1360s and 1370s

Il'nr Miggaleyev

The Time of Troubles in the 1360s and 1370s was one of the longest of its kind. In this period, unlike in the 15th century, pretenders to power fought for the control of the capital and not their individual yurts. This Golden Horde period is one of the most popular subjects for discussion among historians, and it continues to be of interest to experts.

The Chinggisid states entered a period of political and economical turmoil towards the middle of the 14th century. A struggle for power between the numerous descendants of the golden family gathered pace. Groups of influential emirs supported the various pretenders to supreme power. Chinggisids killed their brothers' families in their power play. Even grandchildren of Chinggis Khan started to kill one another. A good example is the killing of the families of Ögedei and Chagatai by the Jochid and Tolui alliance. These entrenched political challenges were accompanied by economic issues, epidemics and climate change. Central Eurasian political borders changed considerably over the course of a few decades. Former economic and political centres declined and came to an end. These changes had a negative impact on trade across Asia and transcontinental trade between the Far East and Western Europe and North Africa. The Asian trade crisis also adversely affected domestic trade, causing unrest among the population.

The transcontinental trade route went through many states. It is understandable therefore that an unstable political situation in one state could have a negative effect on world trade as a whole. Instability in one state resulted in political and social crises in others, because craftsmen and merchants as well as other social groups depended on trade. Given the fact that the population of the Golden Horde, especially in its central regions, was involved in trading, it is easy to see how problems with the flow of goods affected the whole country.

However, the instability of the states where the Chinggisids ruled in the 14th century was caused by political motives. These included struggles for power between various lines of the ruling dynasty, the interference of the court and individual emirs in the internal affairs of the country and the elections of heads of state, the increasing strength of regional rulers and desire for separatism, and, finally, the struggles of indigenous peoples against their conquerors (for example, in the Yuan Dynasty) and wars between states.

The population in the Golden Horde was more homogeneous. Most people spoke a Turkic-Tatar language and followed Islam. However unlike other Chinggisid states, the Golden Horde had many representatives of the golden family, descendants of Jochi's numerous sons (some sources mention 40 sons, but there is only reliable evidence for Jochi having had 15 sons [for more details see 5, p. 60]). In the end, representatives of two dynastic lines remained: the Tuka-Timurids and the Shibanids (other lines if they continued to exist, for example, the Orduids, were very few in number, and the question of the existence of other branches of the Jochi family tree remains open to debate).

The khan's court in the Golden Horde became increasingly powerful. Emirs (particularly the atalyks, who were responsible for bringing up young princes [for details see 16, p. 93]) in the khan's immediate circle had influence over the khan as well as over decisions of state-level
importance. Of course, a strong ruler would be required for the state to be run well in such conditions. As the Time of Troubles in the 1360s and 1370s showed, the khan in the Golden Horde could retain the power only with the support of strong emirs. Should a suitable opportunity arise, they would then be able, in effect, to seize power. This happened to Mamai and Edigü.

By the middle of the 14th century the Ulus of Chagatai in Central Asia broke up into separate dominions: Moghulistan and Transoxiana [11, p. 217]. The ruling Hulagu clan was absorbed into the Hulagu Empire. As a result it disintegrated into several states warring with each other [10, p. 245]. In the middle of the 14th century, large anti-Mongol rebellions took place in China, leading to the fall of the Yuan dynasty in 1368 [15, pp. 129–132]. Emirs of the Delhi Sultanate waged wars against each other and the Sultan [1, pp. 71–74]. The above-mentioned states in which these situations developed were active participants in world trade. The caravan trade was adversely affected as its northern routes traversed the Ulus of Jochi. The decline in caravan trade had a detrimental effect on the state coffers.

However, the Time of Troubles was caused by the disappearance of the ruling Batuid dynasty. Their direct descendants were murdered by the Khan Berdebeck [13, pp. 129, 211, 214]: ‘He killed his relatives and oghlans for fear that they would question his reign’ [14, p. 108]—is how 16th century Lower Volga Tatars recorded this turning point in the history of the Golden Horde. However, the central government was still very strong. That it continued to function was due to Muhammad Öz Beg Khan's political reforms. All the same, pretenders to the throne in Sarai gradually grew in number. The khans who ruled after Berdi Beg tried to eliminate their rivals in an attempt to put a halt to the Time of Troubles and the dissipation of the state. Toktamys was eventually successful in doing this.

There were many pretenders to the throne during the Time of Troubles. We know of 23 Khans according to written sources [12, pp. 390–391, 406; 13, pp. 106, 130, 146, 207]. Numismatic data suggests there may have been even more, but these sources require more detailed study, as do the theories put forward by numismatists. Necessary work includes analysis of the stamps used and a correlation analysis with other sources.

According to Russian chronicles, the ‘Great Troubles’ as the Russians called that Time of Troubles, started after Temir-Khoja, when the Emir Mamai stirred up a revolt. ‘Temir-Khoja sat to reign on the fourth day, and on the seventh day of his reign his tumen, Mamai, took his kingdom, stirring up a revolt in the Horde’ [6, p. 11]. As a result, a number of pretenders to the throne, among them Abdullah, Kildi Beg and Murat, entered the political arena [8, p. 327].

The emirs of Sarai lost control of the country after Mamai's attack, and other emirs from the provinces, who were just as powerful, interfered in the election of the khan. As a consequence, the tatar emirs split into two groups—supporters of Khan Mamai, and the rulers of the left hand (‘wing’) (the Kok Orda). Shibanids and Sarai emirs participated in the struggle.

Kulna, Nawrus, Khidr, Temir-Khoja, Ordu Meliq, Kildi Beg, Murat, and Abdullah ruled after Khan Berdi Beg for short periods. Subsequently there were a number of simultaneous pretenders to the throne [for details see 3, pp. 22–43]. Emir Mamai played the leading role from the beginning of the 1360s until Toktamys came to power. The Left Wing did not interfere in the affairs of the capital before the reign of Urus Khan: only tsareviches of the Left Wing actively sought supreme power.

Mamai was not from the Chinggisid dynasty, but he served as a beklyaribek under Khan Berdi Beg and married his daughter [12, p. 389]. He recognised the first khans up to Kildi Beg, and it appears he admitted that the latter was ‘Janibek’s son’. He opposed Khan Murat [7, p. 233] and exiled him from the capital because of his poor treatment of emirs from the White Horde. Mamai declared a certain Abdullah as khan. He would appear to have been from the Batu dynasty, but of a different lineage to Khan Öz Beg.
There was a violent struggle between the pretenders to the Sarai throne. Abdullah could not remain in the capital for long, either. Mir-Bulat, Aziz Sheikh, Tulunbek Khanum, Urus and Kaganbek ruled in Sarai successively. Mamai seized the capital a number of times, but could not maintain control over it for long. In fact, the capital appears to have turned into a sort of buffer zone, and the declaration of a new khan in Sarai ceased to have significance. In 1370 Mamai replaced Abdullah with Muhammad-Bulak [9, p. 86]. After Muhammad-Bulak, Mamai ruled on behalf of his wife Tulunbek Khanum [2, p. 476], Khan Berdibeck's daughter [12, p. 389].

Hajji Cherkes, Kaganbek, Urus and Arabshah were among the pretenders to the throne who could make a statement by, for example, conquering the capital or minting coins. As we know, the Time of Troubles ended when Khan Toktamysh came to the throne. By 1380, he had restored political stability over the whole of the Ulus of Jochi.

From the mid-1370s, there was a renewal of the ideology of unification of the Ulus of Jochi—the rise of the Golden Horde as in the time of Khan Öz Beg—among Tatar emirs. Moreover, this ideology led to the name 'Uzbeks' being used to describe the population of the Left Wing. The former khans of the House of Batu, though popular and authoritative, had no direct descendants. There were no powerful Jochid clans in the Ak Horde (the main part of the Ulus of Jochi). The source material does not allude to any, at least.

Kök Horde tsareviches and the Shibanids had every right to rule the Ulus of Jochi, so emirs of Sarai and other cities in the Volga Region were prepared to support the descendants of Jochi's other sons. The ideology began to win over Mamai's associates.

Mamai, the Sarai emirs, the rulers of the Left Wing and the Shibanid ulus all wanted the country to unite. The ruler of the Kök Horde, Urus Khan, also wanted to 'unite both uluses' [13, p. 211]. Toktamysh, the future khan, flew the 'flag of ascension' to promote the ideology of bringing the Golden Horde back to the 'golden age' of Öz Beg Khan's rule [13, p. 191]. According to 'Chinggis-name' by Ötemish Hajji, 'by the grace of God Toktamysh Oghlan displayed a royal farr, so Urus Khan's nökers and other people despite themselves sided with this aforementioned oghlan' [14, pp. 113–114]. He was one of the pretenders to the throne in the 1370s, but failed. After a defeat in the winter of 1378, he sought refuge with Aksak Timur [for more details see: 3, pp. 54–55], who helped him return to Desht-i Kipchak. However, they never were allies.

As soon as Toktamysh came to power, the emirs of the Golden Horde 'came of their own accord and humbly became his nökers ... The city of Sarai had neither a khan nor a sultan ... Toktamysh became khan by pronouncing a khutbah in his name' [14, p. 118]. Al-Asqalani reports that 'in 782 AH Chinggisid Toktamysh Khan occupied the land of Desht, and the khan who had ruled (it) for 20 years was killed' [12, p. 452]. Toktamysh defeated Urus Khan and his sons in the east of the country and Mamai in the west [4, p. 191]. This was the end of the Time of Troubles that lasted from the 1360s to the 1370s. However, it presaged major upheavals to come.


1 Other khans may also have ruled in the late 1370s (Telyak according to Russian sources, and Kunak Bey, according to Latin ones, for example). A research paper by the famous scholar A. Ponomaryov entitled 'The Forgotten Agreement between Khan Kunak Bey and Genoa (28 November 1380 / 29 Shaban 782)' that was written on the subject of that khan and registered to be presented at an international conference 'Foreign Archive Documents on the History and Culture of Tatars', which took place on 1–2 October 2014 in Kazan. Unfortunately, it was never given due to the author's sudden death before the conference. When I last met Andrey, he showed me the Latin copy of the agreement which clearly stated 'Tatar Emperor Kunak Bey'. We hope that this agreement will soon be published.
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In 1380, Toktamysh Khan was able to establish control over the entire Ulus of Jochi and began implementing a number of reforms [for more details see: 7, pp. 63–84], primarily economic ones. The issue of succession to the throne was addressed as he struggled for power. The Tuka-Timurids were to hold power. The grandeur of the Golden Horde and the Jochid dynasty became a political doctrine. The unification of the country by Toktamysh Khan should be viewed as a policy of the Jochid aristocracy aimed at bringing the Golden Horde back to the untroubled times of Öz Beg and Jani Beg. Toktamysh's popularity suggests that his national ideology appealed to the interests of Golden Horde society.

The territory, political institutions, and army were divided among ulus emirs during the Time of Troubles. Power had been largely concentrated in the hands of Mamai, as well as the rulers of the Left wing (Kök Horde) and the Shibanid Ulus. Having united the country, Toktamysh proceeded to establish order. Toktamysh was able to appeal to the entire society of the Ulus of Jochi with the ideology of a united and powerful country. His reforms, as well as policies both domestic and foreign, suggest that Toktamysh and his associates had a well-developed program for restoring order in the country. Having subordinated the rulers of borderline areas, Toktamysh 'kept those whom he found worth keeping, sent back those whom he found fit to guard the frontiers, and exterminated those who were of no use to him' [30, pp. 132–133]. Toktamysh 'showed royal favours' [31, pp. 113–114] while being a gifted, valiant, and fair ruler [30, pp. 132, 135]. The people were tired of disturbances, so the call to restore political stability and bring the country back to the untroubled times of Öz Beg and Jani Beg evoked a ready response, and 'the entire Jochid Ulus demanded Toktamysh Khan' [30, p. 150].

Back in the Time of Troubles in the 1370s, Toktamysh said to Kaganbek, 'the black man, Mamai, usurped the authority over the Ak Horde' [31, p. 117]. One of Toktamysh's key programmes was to restore Jochid power across the entire Ulus of Jochi. According to the ordinance of Öz Beg Khan that a black-boned man must not rule the state, Toktamysh appealed to his famous predecessor, whom he admired immensely. This is why an increasing number of emirs and oghlans came to support him, 'detachments marched to him one by one, and a great number of people joined him within a short time' [30, pp. 131–132]. 'The kingdom and rule of Toktamysh Khan shone brighter every day' [30, p. 152] after he had defeated his opponents, and 'he flew the flag of ascendency' [30, p. 191].

The majority of the elite, as well as common people supported Toktamysh Khan's policy and wanted to centralise the country's government, since the ulus system of administration had proven to endanger the state's unity in the Time of Troubles. A weak central administration afforded the uluses an opportunity for separatism, which ulus emirs had demonstrated in the Time of Troubles.

Those opposed to Toktamysh argued against the policy while striving to preserve the former ulus system. The key representatives of this group are mentioned in Toktamysh Khan's letter to Jagiello [3, pp. 16, 21, 37].

Both the advocates of Toktamysh and his opponents belonged to the same clans. For instance, Edigü's brother Isa-Bek was an outstanding supporter of Toktamysh, while Edigü criticised him. This means that Toktamysh's ideology was not accepted by everybody. This evidently resulted from his domestic policy of limiting the authority of ulus emirs and ruling clans.

In addition to regulating the country's interior, Toktamysh implemented an active foreign policy. Through his foreign policy Toktamysh intended to bring the Golden Horde back to the international arena. In the West, Lithuania and the Principality of Moldova became satellites of
the Golden Horde. It also established amicable relations with the Mamluks [1, p. 15] and the Ottoman state in Western Anatolia [34, p. 610]. Toktamysh established amicable relations with all neighbouring states, including those in Transcaucasia and Moghulistan. Since Chinggisid states had dissolved, trade routes had to be adjusted. The smooth operation of the northern route of the Silk Road, leading through the Golden Horde, required the restored presence of Tatar authorities both at the borders and in the neighbouring countries. However, new powers emerged at the borders. First, a serious attempt was made to enhance the northern route of the Silk Road. The powerful Timurid state was being formed. It spread beyond the confines of the former Ulus of Chagatai since Timur claimed Khwarezm. This step belonged to the Golden Horde and eventually led to a confrontation with Toktamysh [29, p. 456]. Timur came to lay claim to the land of the House of Hulagu, triggering an outright conflict with Toktamysh. The interests of Toktamysh and Timur clashed in the north-west of Iran in 1385.

Quite naturally, Toktamysh responded to Aksak Timur's intense expansion through conquest, with measures to protect the interests of his state. He chose active defense in the form of establishing military blocs and conquering buffer states, in order to prevent Timur from enveloping the Golden Horde's territory. Even though an issue of psychology, manifested in personal antipathy, contributed to the confrontation between Toktamysh and Timur, the antagonism was primarily caused by political and economic reasons.

Timur's control over Central Asia and Iran made the southern route more beneficial in terms of trans-continental trade. The westward and northward expansion of Timur's Empire also upset the balance of power, which historically did not favour the establishment of a new state like the Empire of Khwarezm Shahs in the pre-Chinggis time. Therefore, Toktamysh also applied the ideology of uniting 'the Chinggisid World' under his control to his international policies. Unlike his predecessors, he tended to present himself as a descendant of Chinggis Khan rather than a Jochid. It was also an ideological confrontation similar to the one when disturbances within the Golden Horde were being suppressed. This time Toktamysh's international opponent was a representative of the 'black bone', emir Timur, who illegally claimed the Chinggisid legacy, the houses of Chagatai and Hulagu. The policy proved efficient. A number of regions in Iran declared Toktamysh their ruler and referred to him as a legal Chinggisid ruler in khutbahs during his war against Timur. His policy also appealed to the rulers of Moghulistan and Iranian regions.

In 1385, Toktamysh and the ruler of Tabriz Ahmad Jala'ir entered into a treaty of friendship [28, p. 360]. Hardly had they signed it, however, when Timur inflicted a crushing defeat on Ahmad Jala'ir. Toktamysh decided to take action and obtain control over the Transcaucasian areas of the Jalāyirid state [9, sheet 357]. In particular, the Golden Horde controlled Shirvan [11, p. 60]. Cities subordinated to the Golden Horde included Shamaki, Shaberan, Mahmudabad, Gushtasp, and Baku [4, pp. 484–487; 10, p. 59; 11, pp. 45, 74; 27, pp. 319, 322–326; 32, pp. 157, 163, 165, 166, 173; 33, pp. 337–338].

The Tatar army established control over the northern part of the Jalāyirid state and the city of Tabriz [2, p. 88; 28, p. 360; 30, pp. 97, 109, 151]. Toktamysh 'pillaged many a country, destroyed cities and lands but partly restored them for themselves ... having finished the pillage, especially in the land belonging to Tamur Beg (Totamikh) (Toktamysh—Author) returned to Tartalia' [28, p. 340].

Toktamysh established control over the territory of the Jalāyirid state which had Timur had not conquered yet. He devastated the part which the Central Asian Emir had been able to occupy. This suggests that the Transcaucasian campaign of Tatar troops was meant to keep Timur away from the Golden Horde's boundaries. The deliberate pillaging of the lands controlled by Emir Timur shows that Toktamysh was already acting as an opponent of Tamerlane's expansionist policy.
Nevertheless, Timur attacked Tabriz and Nakhchivan when the Tatar army had left [2, p. 88; 29, p. 392]. Of course, Toktamysh did not leave Timur's offensive on Tabriz unnoticed. He dispatched troops immediately. They reached the Samur River but were defeated by Timur's forces [30, p. 110]. However, Timur did not want to aggravate his conflict with the Golden Horde and released the captives. This did not prevent him from winning back the Jalāyirid territory from Toktamysh and advancing up to the borders of Shirvan.

Emir Timur implemented a dual-track policy and sent ambassadors to declare that there was an agreement between him and Toktamysh and that it was unreasonable to 'stir trouble' 'because of a bunch of fools' [30, pp. 110, 152–153], meaning Ahmad Jalal'ir. Emir Timur thus pretended to be at war with the Jalāyirids only. After that Timur continued the war against Ahmad Jalal'ir and conquered Georgia, which was on friendly terms with the Golden Horde.

Toktamysh chose not to leave Timur's offense unnoticed. He evidently developed a plan against Timur's expansionist policy to prevent his army from advancing into Golden Horde proper. To achieve this purpose, he began to expand the alliance into an anti-Timur coalition with other states [29, p. 457].

Toktamysh resolved to open another front, this time in Central Asia, closer to the heart of Timur's Empire. Thus, he entered into an agreement with Emir Qamar-ud-din of Moghulistan. In 1387, the parties began an open confrontation on that front [30, p. 98]. Having conquered Tashkent, Qarshi, and a number of other cities, the troops of Toktamysh besieged Bukhara and Timur's capital Samarkand [30, p. 154]. However, Timur was able to gather considerable forces and drive back the allied troops. Timur pursued them to the Golden Horde Khwarezm and ruined Urgench (today's Kunya-Urgench, Turkmenistan), enslaving all its citizens [30, p. 155].

Toktamish attempted to save Khwarezm by embarking on a new campaign in the autumn of 1388 [8, p. 55; 30, p. 156; 15, p. 60; 16, p. 121; 21, p. 218; 26, p. 141]; but the Tatar troops 'faced with snowfalls and rainstorms heavier than the human memory had ever seen' [8, p. 56]. Still, Toktamysh 'conquered his (Timur's—Author) far city but could not defeat him and returned to his ulus' [16, p. 121; 18, p. 139; 26, p. 141].

Timur found himself in a difficult situation and failed to defeat Toktamysh. He was faced with the threat of losing everything and his new state being ruined. At seeing Chinggisid Toktamysh invade Central Asia, Muluk Sardabar and Hajji Beg rebelled in Khorasan and came over to Toktamysh [5, p. 106; 6, p. 523]. They began to mint coins and declare the name of Toktamysh in their khatbahs [6, p. 523]. Inga Tyurya also supported Toktamysh [5, p. 125].

However, Timur was able to hold his ground and even launch an offensive, fighting back Central Asia and restoring his power over the Iranian territories as well as conquering Shirvan [30, pp. 124, 187] and those cities of the Golden Horde which belonged to the Kök Horde. Timur embarked on a campaign to the inland Tatar territory immediately afterwards. It ended with a major battle on the Kondurcha River in the summer of 1391, in which Toktamysh suffered a defeat by Timur 'resulting from his great emir's inclination towards Timur Guran' [3, p. 37; 30, p. 209].

Timur turned back following the victory. His scattered army pillaged and set fire to the Golden Horde's land, enslaving the population. Toktamysh took shelter in the middle reaches of the Volga, on the northern fringe of the Bulgar ulus, and, 'having regained calm, gathered his troops and called for help to his people, who did help him' [30, p. 470]. Toktamysh Khan had fully restored his power over the Golden Horde by the summer of 1392. Toktamysh wanted to take revenge and thus proceeded to form an anti-Timur military bloc. According to Ibn Taghrībirdī, it included Tatar Khan Toktamysh, Ottoman ruler Bayezid, Mamluk Sultan Barquq, Emir Burhaneddin of Sivas, Kara Koyunlu ruler Kara Yusuf, the Jalāyirids, the ruler of Mardin, and the Turkmen emirate [35, pp. 282–290].

Toktamysh confronted Timur again in 1394. This time it happened at the Caucasian border. Having gathered a large army [15, p. 65; 20, pp. 160–161; 21, p. 222], Timur incurred into the Golden Horde. The enemies came to blows again on the Terek River in April 1395, which
battle lasted for three days [16, p. 159; 29, pp. 442, 448, 454, 466; 30, p. 207]. Toktamysh Khan held the initiative for the first two days, and the first day of the battle nearly ended with Timur being captured. However, the commander of the right wing defected from Toktamysh before the third day [29, pp. 465–466], bringing about an overthrow of the Tatar army. Defeated, Toktamysh 'went into the woods near Bulgar' [30, p. 178].

Timur proceeded to exterminate Golden Horde cities systematically. Russian chronicles report that Timur 'crossed the entire Tatar land' [13, pp. 247–248]. The cities destroyed included Sarai al-Jadid, Major, Hajji Tarkhan, Azak, Ukek, and many more. Timur's army spent over a year ruining the cities of Golden Horde and exterminating its population. However, the resistance did not stop, and as a result 'Timur's troops grew weak and dispirited' [30, p. 185]. Therefore, Timur hurried to leave for Iran via the Caucasus in the spring of 1396. He declared Urus Khan's son Koirijak Oghlan, who had been in his service for a long time by that moment, khan of the Golden Horde—by assigning to him 'a detachment of brave Uzbek warriors' and the khan's insignia, he 'made him the khan of the Ulus of Jochi' [30, p. 178]. However, Koirijak Oghlan was unable to hold power for a long time and was killed [30, pp. 212, 214]. No coins of his are known, which suggests that his 'rule' was brief.

In addition to Timur's army killing the population, in late 1395, a severe famine seized most of the country. Various diseases began to spread. The plague outbreak, which did not end until 1405, was especially dreadful. Many citizens left the country in search of escape [29, p. 470].

The anti-Toktamysh group blamed Toktamysh Khan for every defeat. Their leader was Emir Edigü, whom they had sent to Timur as his guide. Temür Qutlugh being the official khan of the group, Emir Edigü was the de facto ruler. The alliance of Edigü and Temür Qutlugh with Aksak Timur had always evoked mixed feelings amongst the people of the Golden Horde. The dastan about Edigü was actually composed to justify his deeds. However, Edigü severed his relations with Timur and declared a revenge war. He drove back Toktamysh [14, p. 130; 16, p. 167; 19, p. 219], who retreated to the Lithuanian frontiers and called to his vassal Vytautas for help [14, p. 130; 15, p. 71; 17, p. 457; 23, p. 88; 26, p. 149]. Vytautas and Toktamysh lost the battle on the Vorskla River on 12 August 1399 [12, p. 352; 17, p. 458; 22, pp. 166–167; 24, p. 129; 25, p. 93]. Toktamysh lost any power over the Golden Horde and his in Western Siberia, on the northern edge of the Shibanid ulus, where he was able to stay until 1406.

Temür Qutlugh died immediately after the Battle of the Vorskla River. Shadi Beg became the Khan of the Golden Horde. He finally dealt the last blow to Toktamysh and won back the previously lost territories in the Caucasus, essentially implementing the same policy that Toktamysh had applied. However, Edigü removed him from the throne to prevent any accretion of the khan's power. Edigü attempted to rule with the help of servile khans, who eventually came to confront him [30, pp. 133–134, 193]. After the death of Toktamysh, his sons led the anti-Edigü group. Nearly all of them died in the struggle. Toktamysh's sons who ascended to the throne were Jelaleddin, Kerim-Berdi, Kepek, Kadir-Berdi, and Jabbar Berdi. Edigü's struggle against the sons of Toktamysh lasted for the whole second decade of the 15th century. In 822 AD (18.02.1419–16.01.1420), Toktamysh's son Kadir-Berdi killed Edigü [29, p. 533].

A number of khans made further attempts at restoring the Golden Horde. However, the fact that a number of political groups fought for power suggests that intra-elite disputes were both heavy and deep. The ideology of restoring the country's grandeur and bringing back the times of Khan Öz Beg remained a dream for many khans in the tumultuous 15th century.


Chapter X. The Break Up of the Ulus of Jochi


§ 3. Struggle for Power in the First Half
of the 15th Century

Roman Reva

After Emir Timur’s troops left the Golden Horde in 1396, the opponents of Toktamys led by Edigü confronted him. Temür Qutlugh and Edigü banished the Shibanid Janta who had declared himself khan, from the Tyumen Ulus, thereby adding Southern Siberia to the territories under their control. In 797 AH, Temür Qutlugh and Edigü were able to subvert Kuyurchak, thus conquering Sarai with the intention of obtaining control over the remaining part of the Ulus of Jochi as well. Toktamys resisted, trying to win back supremacy, and pitted his strength against Temür Qutlugh in 798 AH, but suffered defeat and had to retreat to Lithuania. In the following year, 799 AH, Toktamys made another attempt to win back a part of his former domain with the help of Vytautas. He managed to occupy Crimea and besiege Kaffa. Then Vytautas and Toktamys’s allied troops crossed the Don and fought in the Volga Region. In 1398 (800 AH), Toktamys was able to conquer Sarai and sent letters to all his former uluses, demanding money and troops. However, he suffered another defeat by Temür Qutlugh and Edigü and had to take shelter in Lithuania again.

In 1399, Temür Qutlugh requested Vytautas to turn Toktamys over to him. Vytautas refused and waged war on Temür Qutlugh, intending to enthrone his ally in the Orda again. The enemies met on the Vorskla River and engaged in negotiations, which Temür Qutlugh dragged on until Edigü appeared with a large army. When he had arrived, the famous battle (12 August 1399 = 10 Dhu‘l-Hijjah 801 AH) commenced, in which Temür Qutlugh’s forces were victorious. Chasing the retreating army, his troops reached Kiev, devastating most of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and returned home with a ransom of 3 thousand rubles from Kiev.

Temür Qutlugh and Edigü controlled most of the Golden Horde after the Battle on the Vorskla. However, Temür Qutlugh soon died under mysterious circumstances. Edigü replaced him with Temür Qutlugh’s cousin Shadi Beg. At first, the new khan merely pursued the advice of his beklyaribek, who was essentially the de facto ruler of the country. There is numismatic evidence that Edigü and his appointee controlled nearly all regions of the Orda, except for Rus‘, during the reign of Shadi Beg. The economy returned to normal there.

In the meantime, Toktamys did not give up on his attempts to win back power over the state. He retreated to the east of the Golden Horde following one of the battles, while a son took shelter in Crimea, expecting support from the local emirs. Edigü soon re-conquered Crimea, and Toktamys’s son fled to Kaffa. However, Edigü and Shadi Beg occupied the city in 806 AH.

Toktamys carried on his diplomatic activities to obtain military support against Edigü. For instance, in Rajab 807 AH (= 3/1/1405–1/2/1405) ‘an old nöker of Toktamys Khan, who had been wandering the steppes in poor condition and confusion, arrived’ at Timur’s court in Otrar. Toktamys asked forgiveness for his previous deeds, assuring that he would remain an

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2 To begin with, I would like to express immense gratitude to my like-minded friends I. Mirgaleyev, V. Gulevich, Zh. Sabitov, A. Kazarov, A. Bragin, F. Yermolov, and L. Dobromyslov for their valuable consultations on this work.

3 Shadi Beg, son of Qutlu Beg, grandson of Qutlugh Temüür, cousin of Temül Qutlugh.
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Eternal servant slave to Timur the Lame. Edigü had become one of the most dangerous rivals of Tamerlane, too. Aksak Timur realised that a conflict between him and Edigü, who had been gaining power rapidly, was inevitable. In this case Toktamysh and Timur had common interests, or rather a common enemy to neutralise. Tamerlane 'forgave' Toktamysh and even 'promised' him that 'I, God willing, will re-conquer the Jochid Ulus and grant it to him' (Toktamysh—Author) after the campaign against infidels which he was going to embark on. Having entered into a pact with Toktamysh, Tamerlane tried to take advantage of Edigü: 'He sent a messenger to tell him that... he loved him and forgave him if he had sinned against him, that he wanted to be his friend; to become related with him he suggested marrying his grandson off to one of his daughters. They say that Edigü replied to him that he had lived with him for twenty years and had been the one whom he trusted most of all, that he knew him and his tricks too well, that there was no deceiving him, and that he realised that the reasons were only meant to beguile him. And if they were to truly become friends, that could only happen in the [battle] field with arms in their hands... ' [49, p. 144].

The Struggle over Khwarezm in 808–810 AH

Khwarezm and Sygnak, which were among the most important uluses of the Jochid state, were lost to the Timurids in the late 14th century following a series of Timur the Lame's campaigns. Timur appointed Emir Musike vicegerent of Khwarezm.

Timur died on 17 Sha'ban (8/12) 807 AH (=18 February 1405). His numerous heirs engaged in a struggle to rule the Timurid Empire, which many tribal leader viewed as an opportunity to rise to power. The Timurids faced three rivals in the struggle over Khwarezm: the Kara Tatars, the Jochids, and the Jochikasarids. The Kara Tatars were the first to seize power over a part of Khwarezm. Timurid Emir Musike chose to retreat to the Timurid Empire. The Kara Tatars did not rule Khwarezm long as they decided to return to Rûm, from where Tamerlane had resettled them to Transoxiana.

Edigü took advantage of the disturbances in Khwarezm. In Rajab 808 AH (23/12/1405–21/01/1406), he conquered Urgench, then advanced towards Bukhara and, having devastated its suburbs, returned to Khwarezm. He appointed Emir Anka to rule the region and set off for Desht.

Edigü's appointees continued to control Urgench after his departure, while adherents of the Jochikasarids occupied the remaining part of Khwarezm. On the holiday of Ramazan (1/09/808 AH = 18/02/1406), they declared Pir Muhammad to be king. He was the son of Lukman, grandson of Tagay Timur, who had come there when Shakhrukh had defeated him. In 810 AH, Pir Muhammad returned to Mazandaran in an attempt to win back his father's legacy [109, pp. 85–93]. His supporters minted coins in Khwarezm (in Khivaq?) from 808 to 811 AH.

The Death of Toktamysh

When Edigü departed for Khwarezm, Toktamysh took the opportunity to defeat his army which had been left to defend Desht. However, Toktamysh had to retreat to Siberia after six months. Having returned, Edigü sent an army led by Shadi Beg and his son Nur ad-Din against him. Toktamysh fell in battle near the Tobol River in January 1407 (VII–VIII/809 AH).

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4 Importantly, 'Taizi Oghlan, one of the descendants of Ögedei Khan, Bash Timur Oghlan, and Chekre Oghlan of the clan of Jochi were present' in Timur's retinue during the reception [143, p. 189]. Timur needed Ögedei's descendant for further military operations against China. We believe the presence of Jochids to be indicative of the following intentions.

5 Tamerlane was preparing for a Chinese campaign.

6 Tagay Timur, the Ilkhan Ruler of 1336–1353
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Shadi Beg's Flight

The economy gradually returned to normal in the territories controlled by Edigü. The following mints made large-scale coin issues in the name of Shadi Beg: Bulgar, Crimea, Kaffa, Azak, Orda, Sarai al-Jadid, Hajji Tarkhan, and Khwarezm. There is numismatic evidence that some mints employed well-trained experts, while others relied on the local workforce. Nevertheless, the resumption of coinage at a mass scale, regardless of the quality, suggests that the market needed to be filled with coinage.

Edigü implemented the policy of mass Islamisation among his non-Islamised subjects. One of the reasons for Edigü's mass proselytism, according to V. Trepavlov was that he 'faced the need to legalise his power in the Jochid state, his supremacy over the Jochids. Not belonging to the dynastic aristocracy, the beklyaribek had to prove his superiority over it. It was significantly easier to provide evidence of descent from a caliph who ruled a thousand years ago than claiming kinship with Chinggis Khan' [144, p. 87]. It would be appropriate to recall that Edigü traced his genealogy to saint preacher Khoja Ahmed Baba-Tukles who descended from the first caliph Abu Bakr.

After Toktamyshev, powerful as he was, had left the political arena, Khan Shadi Beg resolved to remove Edigü from power. Edigü took a rigid approach to restoring the vertical structure of power demanding complete observance of both the Islamic law and the Yasa. Shadi Beg, who was used to living a life 'of pleasures and delights' and believed himself to be the legitimate ruler of the state, was dissatisfied with his subordination to Edigü. He decided to exterminate Edigü secretly at the end of 809 AH. The khan's plan was immediately revealed to Edigü and he chose to act decisively to capture Shadi Beg. However, somebody warned the khan in time. He was left no choice but flee to Shirvan which was once also governed by the Jochids too. The current ruler of Shirvan, Emir Sheikh İbrahim, who recognised Tamerlane's suzerainty as we have already seen, not only joined none of the parties formed by Timur's descendants fighting for his legacy after his death but conquered Tabriz in 808 AH. Now that the ruler of the Golden Horde, still a valuable figure despite his flight, was in the Shirvan Shah's state, Sheikh Ibrahim decided to take advantage of the situation. In order to prevent Shadi Beg from moving, Sheikh Ibrahim declared him ruler and had coins bearing Khan Shadi Beg's name minted in Derbent from 809 to 813 AH. The coins of Derbent, Baku, Shamakhi, and Qızılağac all were minted in Shadi Beg's name. Edigü sent ambassadors to Shirvan, demanding Sheikh İbrahim to hand over Shadi Beg, but he refused.

Following the flight of Shadi Beg, at the very end of 809 AH, Edigü replaced him with Pulad, son of Temür Qutlugh, his grandnephew. Most probably, this took place in the Crimea, because Pulad began to mint coins of his own in Kaffa that year. The issue had the following legend: 'Pulad the Just. May his reign last long!' The coins bore neither the title 'khan' nor 'sultan.'

Relations with the Russian uluses.

Having overthrown Toktamyshev and winning back many uluses, Edigü enthroned the perfectly obedient Khan Pulad. He then continued to restore the formerly monolithic state and

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7 Shadi Beg's Bulgar coins dating to 805–806 AH reveal high calligraphy skills. However, the engravers of the Bulgar coins after 807 AH were obviously less masterful. Coin of that mint produced in the last years of Shadi Beg's reign bear no dates and are essentially imitative. This suggests that Edigü probably lost control over Bulgar in 807, so further coinage was minted by different engravers.

8 Shadi Beg's Khwarezmian coinage did bear the mint's sophisticated design of the 14th century. It is important to note here that Khwarezm suffered a series of invasions by Timur, which had a devastating effect on the region. Even though coins were minted sporadically in the name of Timur and his appointee Mahmud in Khwarezm in the 790s–early 800s, it was not until Timur's last years that the urban life was partially restored due to his emir Musike.

9 Toktamyshev's adherents also minted coins. However, it appears that old, anachronistic, or imitative stamps were used for coinage in that case.

10 Pulad may not have undertaken the enthroning ritual that year.
could not help looking towards the Russian principalities, 'the Tsar's uluses,' and the Russian princes whose involvement in the affairs of Orda differed greatly. We could name several examples from complete subordination of Russian princes to silent disobedience and resistance to Edigü.

The biography of Prince Semyon Dmitrievich of Suzdal and Nizhny Novgorod is illustrative of the subordination. After the Moscow princes had ousted him from his vôtchina [patrimony], he took shelter in the Orda for several years where by serving the powerful, he hoped to return his lands. On 25 October 1399, Semyon Dmitrievich along with Tsarevich Yentyak (Jantakh ?) occupied Nizhny Novgorod. They had to leave the city soon for fear of the approaching Moscow troops. The troops were led by Vasily's brother Yury Dmitrievich, who undertook a three months' campaign to the Middle Volga, resulting in his occupation of Bulgar, Zhukotin, Kazan, and Kremenchuk [17, pp. 125–126].

As we have seen, Temür Qutlugh forced Jantakh out of the Tokmak (Tyumen) ulus between Tamerlane's first and second campaigns against the Orda. Since Russian chronicles report Semyon Dmitrievich to have been in Temür Qutlugh's service, it is possible that Jantakh recognised the khan's supreme power, while his service to Shadi Beg is beyond doubt. In 1403, Shadi Beg and Edigü sent Yentyak to Moscow as an ambassador [91, p. 232]. A. Gorsky finds it probable that Yentyak acted with Edigü's approval in 1399 as well [17, pp. 125–126].

In 1402, Semyon Dmitrievich of Suzdal arrived in Moscow and concluded peace with Vasily Dmitrievich. On December 21, Semyon Dmitrievich died. 'This prince suffered many a misfortune and many a trouble in the Orda and in Rus' during his life, and he had to fight for his vôtchina for eight years straight by serving four tsars in the Orda, the first being Toktamysh, the second Aksak Temir, the third Temir Qutlugh, and the fourth Shadi Beg, marching his troops against the Grand Prince of Moscow to win back his vôtchina, the throne of Novgorod' [91, p. 232]. This was an example of the destiny of a prince deprived of his vôtchina. What did other rulers of Russian uluses do?

When the supreme ruler of the Ulus of Jochi was replaced, Russian princes were expected to accept a yarliq from the hands of the new Great Khan to rule their lands. However, the majority of princes took a wait-and-see approach during the struggle for power between Toktamysh and Edigü until the winner was clear. The situation was essentially different for those princes who wanted to obtain the right of princedom 'vacated' due to the death of a ruler who had been approved by the Orda. In this case his heirs hurried to the Orda in a bid to outrun their potential rivals and take the right to 'their' vôtchina from the Sarai ruler. For instance, Prince Fyodor Olgovich of Ryazan went to see Shadi Beg following the death of his father Oleg Ivanovich on 5 July 1402. 'And the tsar granted him his vôtchina and dedina [the land of his grandfather], the grand principality of Ryazan, his ulus' [83, p. 188].

In the summer of 1407, Princes Ivan Mikhailovich and Yury Vsevolodich had an audience with Pulad, both claiming the Grand Principality of Tver. Ivan Mikhailovich obtained the yarliq, while Yury Vsevolodich was kept in the Orda. In September of the same year, Pulad issued a yarliq for the Principality of Pronsk to Prince Ivan Vladimirovich.

Realising that he could only bring the Russian lands to submission one by one, Edigü devised a scheme to dissociate the Russian forces, as well as causing conflicts between Russian princes and Lithuanian dukes. He resorted to various forms of false information. Edigü gathered an army and told each of the parties that he was going to march 'against their common enemy'.

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11 According to the 4th Novgorod Chronicle, Semyon and Yentyak occupied Nizhny Novgorod in 1395 [81, pp. 379–380].
12 If Edigü had approved the 1399 campaign against Nizhny Novgorod indeed, it is only natural that Vasily Dmitrievich would not have recognised his appointees.
13 Yury Vsevolodovich was allied with Moscow at that time.
As suggested in letter, it seemed logical that the blow was to be struck upon Lithuania, which had been allied with Toktamysh for many years.

Having deceived Grand Prince of Moscow Vasily Dmitrievich\(^{14}\), Edigü invaded his territory in December 1408 (VII/811 AH). In his Moscow campaign, Edigü was accompanied by princes Timur, son of Temür Qutlugh, Buguchak, Tengri-Birdi, Pulad—all the three were children of Tektatiya, son of Urus Khan—and other powerful emirs from different parts of the state. Vasily Dmitrievich, who had not gathered an army by that time, went to Kostroma, leaving his uncle Vladimir Andreyevich and brothers, Andrey and Peter, in Moscow. Edigü camped in Kolomenskoye. Seeing no enemy, he instructed his troops to plunder the nearby land. Edigü sent Tsarevich Tengri-Birdi, his son Yakshibey, and Prince Sayit-Ali-bey with thirty four thousand Tatars after Vasily Dmitrievich. In addition, he sent Tsarevich Pulad and prince Yerikli-Birdi against his former appointee, Ivan Mikhaylovich, in Tver, instructing him to 'attack Moscow with cannons, and tufengs, and arquebuses, and crossbows'\(^{[83, p. 209]}\) However, the news came from the Orda that a tsarevich, having found out that Edigü and his army were not there, tried to capture Khan Pulad and declare himself the ruler of the state.

Edigü had initially intended the siege of Moscow to last long, planning even to spend the winter there. However, he had to raise the siege after only a month and hurry to the Orda with a ransom of 3,000 rubles to help Pulad Tsar.

In 1409, Edigü sent Vasily a charter and, apparently, 'the tsar's yarliq', from Pulad approving Vasily as the Prince of Moscow: 'There is a reverence to Vasily from Edigü, and many a reverence. When the reverences arrive thus will the Tsar's yarliq...'\(^{[95, p. 167]}\). In the charter, Edigü presented his reasons for the anti-Moscow campaign:

1. 'We heard that you had the children of Toktamysh; so we waged war on you'.
2. Ill treatment of the tsar's (Edigü's) ambassadors and merchants: 'merchants, ambassadors of the tsar come, and you laugh at the ambassadors of the tsar, and the merchants too, and they suffer grave offenses in your land'.
3. Failure to send a tribute to Edigü's appointees: Temür Qutlugh, Shadi Beg ('ruled for eight years\(^{15}\)'), and Pulad ('even third year at reign\(^{16}\)')
4. Failure to come for a yarliq approving the prince: 'He did not come himself, neither did he send his son, brother, or senior boyar'.

This episode suggests the attitude of the Grand Prince of Moscow to Edigü and his appointee. Having obtained the the grand principality yarliq from Toktamysh in 1389, Vasily found it unnecessary to seek approval from Edigü and his 'tsars'. During Toktamysh's struggle for power against the protégés of Edigü, he preferred to stay out of the domestic disturbances of the Orda. Yet, it is likely that his preference was with Toktamysh\(^{17}\). Vasily's failure to pay the tribute for many years,

\(^{14}\) In 1408, Vasily Dmitrievich asked Pulad for troops for the Lithuanian campaign. His request unfilled, and he confronted Vytautas on the Ugra River on September 1, where they stood 'for many years' without combat until they finally 'concluded peace as was the ancient custom and went away' [Complete Collection of Russian Chronicles, 11, p. 205]. Though Vasily Dmitrievich was warned that Edigü was preparing to start a campaign against him, Edigü assured him that it was Vytautas whom he was going to wage war on. In fact, Edigü sent a similar message to Vytautas, claiming that it was not he but the Grand Prince of Moscow with whom he was going to fight. He used his letters to drive a wedge between the Grand Princes: 'if the two of them fight against each other, their troops will become fewer, if they do not die completely, and they will be exhausted, and it will be an opportune time for me to wage war on whoever I like, and nobody will resist me' [83, pp. 206–207].

\(^{15}\) 802–809 AH.

\(^{16}\) The letter was written in 811 AH, which confirms the fact that Pulad took the throne in 809 AH.

\(^{17}\) The highly illustrative episode when Edigü's people attempted to occupy Nizhny Novgorod, which was controlled by Moscow, in 1399 showed Vasily Dmitrievich yet again what an effect Edigü's complete victory would have.
as mentioned by Edigü, merely means that the tribute was not paid to his appointees. It did not mean that Toktamysh was deprived of either the tribute or other forms of aid.

The Last Year of Pulad

In the meanwhile, the period of internecine feud in the Timurid Empire was over. Having defeated all of his major rivals, Shah Rukh, son of Timur, became its sole ruler. On 16 Sha'ban (VIII) 812 AH (= 22.12.1409), he returned from Transoxiana to Herat, where 'nökers of Pulad Khan, Emir Edigü Bahadur, and Emir Aise\textsuperscript{18}, who had the power over Desht-i Kipchak, came.' Having presented their gifts, he requested 'that an improvement of their mutual relations and agreement should take place' [143, p.192]. Edigü realised that he had to pay for occupying Khwarezm and hurried to conclude peace with the winner of the recent struggle for power which had lasted for about five years. He was anxious to prevent the newly consolidated Timurid empire from waging war on him. Wanting to enhance his alliance with Shah Rukh, he married his daughter to Shah Rukh's son, Muhammad Juki Bahadur\textsuperscript{19}. The alliance was concluded enabling most of Khwarezm to remain part of the Jochid State for about three more years.

In 1410, Edigü along with Pulad waged war on the 'coastal cities'—that is, the countries of Azak and Crimea. In Azak, or Tana, Edigü and Pulad's troops ruined numerous buildings, killed many Venetians, and capturing the consul. The Genoese Kaffa paid a vast ransom. A new vicegerent was appointed to Solkhat [27, pp. 172–190].

Toktamysh's Children

The children of Toktamysh separated up following their father's death in 1407. The eldest of them, Jalal ad-Din, accompanied by his brothers and part of the army, moved to Rus', apparently to Moscow, ruled by Vasily Dmitrievich, and came over to Vytautas of Lithuania in 1408. Kibek and Toktamysh's other children preferred to settle in Sygnak, which was under the control of emirs appointed by Timurids. Toktamysh's children in Lithuania (three sons of his are mentioned) and their troops settled not far from Kiev. Shortly before the Easter 1409, one of the brothers, apparently Kerim Birdi, was tried in court or punished at the insistence of the Lithuanian authorities in Troki. Jalal ad-Din along with another younger brother went to Grodno to ask Vytautas for assistance in seizing the power over the Orda. On 15 July 1410 Jalal ad-Din joined the army of Vytautas in the Battle of Grünwald (Battle of Tannenberg), in which Jagiello and Vytautas's troops defeated the Teutonic Order. After the victory, Jalal ad-Din was given the army he needed to achieve the purpose that he had been pursuing for years.

Khan Timur

Pulad Khan died in the winter of 1410 (VII–X/813 AH). His brother Timur\textsuperscript{20}, married Edigü's daughter, took the throne. However, Timur had no intention of being a puppet for the powerful Edigü\textsuperscript{21}. Encouraged by Edigü's numerous enemies, Timur refused to appoint the famous emir his beklyaribek. Nearly all his former adherents, oghlans and emirs, immediately betrayed the disfavoured official in favour of the new khan. For the first time in years, Edigü was excluded from the supreme authorities in the country which he had pieced together painstakingly. He resumed correspondence with Shah Rukh at the end of 813 AH, writing: 'I am a slave to His Majesty, prepared to execute every order of his. My hope for His Majesty's grace consists in his maintaining the same course to lift the veil of misunderstandings and open the

\textsuperscript{18} Of Isa, Edigü's brother?

\textsuperscript{19} Fasih Khawafi, 812 AH: 'The daughter of Emir Idku named Hanum, of the Manghit tribe, was brought for mahdumzade Ghiyath al-Din Muhammad Juki Bahadir, may his life be eternal, to marry her' [154, p. 154].

\textsuperscript{20} Just like Pulad, Timur was Edigü's grandnephew.

\textsuperscript{21} Coins by Timur minted in Orda and dated in 812 are known. It is possible, however, that old stamps were used for them.
gate of friendship, kindly opening and paving the way of mutual contacts and correspondence, which is the (only) way that enables sincerely faithful people to act, without regarding the words of people who seek benefits for themselves' [143, pp. 192–193]. The self-deprecat ing style of the cunning Edigü as well as his mention of 'people who seek benefits for themselves' suggest that Edigü had begun to lose ground in the Ulus of Jochi. He had experienced an outright conflict with Emir Timur and lost the position of beklyaribek by that time. Most of his subordinates had come over to the khan. It is possible that the once-omnipotent beklyaribek was testing the waters, in the even that he should need shelter. Edigü controlled an ulus with loyal people near the Yaik and the Emba, but he could not withstand an attack by a large army. The periphery of Desht seemed the best place to hide. Adjacent to it were Shah Rukh's lands of which Khwarezm was the nearest. He went there at the beginning of 814 AH. This was clearly the moment when he needed another descendant of Jochi to declare him khan as opposed to Timur. It is entirely possible that the embassy of Edigü requested the Timurids to hand over Chekre, son of Akmyl. The emirs Agac-bahadur and Gazan, sent by Timur to capture Edigü, attacked him on his way back to his ulus. Defeated, he retreated to Khwarezm, where he withstood a siege by Timur's commanders.

After six months the besiegers learnt that Jalal ad-Din had defeated Timur Khan and plundered his orda, and that Timur Khan was approaching Khwarezm. Jalal ad-Din's messenger brought to the emirs besieging Edigü a proposition to take his side. Having received no reply, Jalal ad-Din realised that he would have to confront both Timur and Edigü. In order to neutralise the latter while weakening Timur's army, a new messenger was sent to instruct the emirs that they could raise the siege and go home provided that Edigü set free the sister of Jalal ad-Din, Edigü's wife (Janike), as well as their son Sultan-Mahmud and recognised Jalal ad-Din to be his khan by minting coins bearing his name and declaring it in khutbahs. Emir Ghazan, who was married to another sister of Jalal ad-Din, was prepared to come over to his relative. Emir Dekne (Tegene, the head of the Shirins?), married to Timur's sister, was opposed to the idea. At that moment Khan Timur arrived at the besieging army's camp. Ghazan occupied Denke with drinking, and devised a plot to kill Timur and persuaded the emirs to take Jalal ad-Din's side. When Jalal ad-Din realised what had happened, he empowered Ghazan to act on his behalf. After that, the propositions received from Jalal ad-Din were sent to Edigü, who executed them with full obedience. Ghazan concluded peace with Edigü on behalf of Jalal ad-Din. After raising the siege of Urgench, the emirs set off for Jalal ad-Din's residence but met with Kajulai Bahadur, who had been sent to help the besieging troops. Most probably, it was after discovering that Timur was dead and his troops had come over to him that Jalal ad-Din resolved to finish Edigü off. Having learned that the siege had been raised, Kajulai claimed that he was able to defeat Edigü on his own as his troops were more numerous than those of the former beklyaribek. However, Edigü resorted to a stratagem and was able to defeat Kajulai's army and capture about a thousand people. He sent them to Urgench, ordering locals to guard and maintain the captives. The instruction was one of the reasons why Edigü eventually lost Khwarezm.

Events in Bulgar

The Bulgar princes (there is archaeological and numismatic evidence that Bulgar, Juketau/Zhukotin in Russian chronicles—and, later, Kazan were the power centres of the ulus) recognised Edigü's suzerainty.

22 It appears that at that moment the numerous oghlans in Edigü's retinue who had been waiting to take the throne betrayed him. We have already mentioned some of them, namely the children of Toktatiya, Uru Khan's son: Tengri-Berdi, Buguchak, and Pulad. It is beyond doubt that the list is not full. Edigü never forgot their treachery. Later, in moments of success, he gave preference to other princes of the blood, who belonged to less noble branches of the Jochid family tree and owed their ascendancy to him personally and not their descent from a once-regnant parent or brother. As an exception, Edigü was the beklyaribek of Toktamys'h's grandson for a short time.
In 805 AH (1402–1403) the Bulgar ulus began to mint coins bearing the name of Shadi Beg. At that time the Middle Volga region often suffered raids by various knights of fortune. The Bulgar ulus was not only subjected to constant pressure by the Russian lands but periodically conquered by Siberian rulers. For instance, in 812 AH (1409–1410) Pulad's Bulgarian coinage was replaced by that of a certain Khan Mahmud, which lasted until 813 AH.\footnote{It is possible that all the coins were minted in 813, including using Pulad's old reverse stamps.} We are inclined to identify the issuer as Shibanid Mahmud Khoja, son of Kaganbek and grandson of Ilbak [164, pp. 374–375, ##9, 10; 16, pp. 39–42; 104, pp. 56–58].

\textit{Jalal ad-Din, Son of Toktamysh}

Jalal ad-Din began his return to the Ulus of Jochi by conquering Crimea in 1411. He had conquered the capital ulus by the winter of 1411–1412. All the the Right wing uluses recognised Jalal ad-Din's supremacy within that year.

After leaving Khwarezm in 1412, when most of the Golden Horde's elite demonstrated non-recognition of his power, preferring to be ruled by a 'Chinggisid by nature,' Edigü decided for the time being to observe the provisions of his peace agreement with Jalal ad-Din. Having met Chekre, whom he had summoned to the Timurid Empire with the intention that he should 'occupy the throne' of the Ulus of Jochi, he chose to postpone Chekre's installation on the throne.

Jalal ad-Din sent messengers to every part of the state, demanding manifestations of subordination. Those rulers who supported Edigü openly had the toughest time. The Grand Prince of Tver obtained a yarliq entitling him to rule from the appointees of Edigü (whom Jalal ad-Din viewed as an usurper) and even provided him military support for his Moscow campaign. As the result, 'a furious ambassador' arrived in Tver in 1412, demanding Ivan Mikhailovich come to the Orda. A trip to the Orda for an audience with the son of Toktamysh bode no good for the ruler of Tver. Ivan Mikhailovich undertook a series of self-defense measures. The first thing he did was to attempt to capture his brother Vasily Mikhailovich of Kashin, a potential Grand Prince of Tver. Although he was able to occupy Kashin, Vasily Mikhailovich fled to Moscow. Ivan Mikhailovich then turned to Vytautas, Jalal ad-Din's patron, and concluded an alliance with him. In this way Ivan attempted to protect himself against unavoidable punishment by the tsar.

The Russian princes who did not swear allegiance to Edigü and his appointees openly found themselves in a very different situation. They all came under the protection of the 'legitimate' tsar in the Orda. Jalal ad-Din issued yarliqs to Daniil Borisovich and Ivan Borisovich of Nizhny Novgorod, Vasily Mikhailovich of Kashin, Ivan Vasilyevich of Yaroslavl, and Toktamysb's loyal adherent Vasily Dmitrievich of Moscow, who came with great riches and many noblemen.

Having used every pretext to postpone the audience, Ivan Mikhailovich of Tver had to face Jalal ad-Din, too. On 15 August 1412, he set off for the Orda in ships on the Volga River. The bishop and many people came to say goodbye to the prince as it was commonly believed that he was going to be executed. Ivan Mikhailovich took his time. His Volga voyage from Tver to the Orda took him over 72 days. He was fortunate in finding a new khan on the throne.

\textit{Kerim Birdi and Qibaq}

The children of Toktamysh apparently began to quarrel when their father was alive. It is thus natural that they separated after his death. In October 1412, Qibaq killed his brother Jalal ad-Din. Another of the brothers, Kerim Birdi, took the throne. Kerim Birdi bore a grudge against Vytautas for his humiliation when along with Jalal ad-Din and another younger brother (Jabbar Birdi?) they hid from Edigü's troops in Lithuania in 811 AH. Therefore, he chose to ally with Moscow and negotiate Edigü when enthroned. This is why Edigü did not enthrone Chekre until Kerim Birdi's flight. Kerim Birdi lay no claims to Bulgar, which was controlled by Edigü and Chekre\footnote{This is the reason why no Bulgar coins by Kerim Birdi are known.}, but launched an offensive against the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Vytautas responded by enthroneing
Qibaq (variants of his name: Muhammad, Toktamyshe Bedzabul = 'Qi)Beg Oghul' [124, p. 71]) and pitting him against his brother. Kerim Birdi did not rule the Thronal seat of Ulus for long. Coinage suggests that his power spread to Sarai, Hajji Tarkhan, and Azak. In March to April 1413, Qibaq was able to defeat and exile Khan Kerim Birdi with the help of Lithuania [97, pp. 91–93].

Clearly the Golden Horde's power elite split up into four parts at the very beginning of the 15th century, resulting to a division in the formerly united state. They can be described as follows: the Russian uluses (principalities) existing as semi-independent units. They were halfway towards separating from the empire and becoming fully independent states. Then there was the Shibanid (anti-Tuka-Timurid) part which acted primarily in the Left wing of the state. There was also the pro-Toktamyshe part and, finally, the anti-Toktamyshe part, led by Edigü. The Orda's Russian lands controlled by Lithuania were special since both the Tatar and Lithuanian rulers regarded them as their domain, while the latter paid a tribute to 'their own' khans for the lands. More forces competed for power in different parts of the Jochid Empire. However, they were either defeated or assimilated by the above parts and never became centres of power. While the former two parts are easy to outline in terms of both human resources and geographic confines, the latter were initially distinguished only in terms of elites. Nevertheless, they aspired from a geographical point of view to have power over the entire territory of the state. The anti-Toktamyshe part remained more or less integral until 1410, including not only Temür Qutlugh's relatives but the majority of the descendants of Urus Khan and others. However, a rift in this part followed Timur's enthronement subdividing it into anti-Edigü and pro-Edigü fractions. The anti-Edigü elite later joined the pro-Toktamyshe part (they were Christian nomads and therefore opposed to Edigü's policy of mass Islamisation). The other part remained against both Toktamyshe and Edigü. By 1413, the pro-Toktamyshe part had split into two parties: anti-Lithuanian, led by Kerim Birdi, and pro-Lithuanian, controlled by Qibaq. There was no unity among the Russian uluses either. While some of them were controlled by Lithuania, others became increasingly subordinated to the Grand Principality of Moscow formed later Muscovite Rus'.

*The Loss of Khwarezm*

The Timurids took advantage of the confusion in the Ulus of Jochi resulting from the struggle for its throne, as well as Urgench citizens' discontent with the policies of Mubarak Shah, Edigü's son to whom his father had entrusted the administration of Khwarezm. They were able to conquer Khwarezm following a series of battles and negotiations at the end of 815 AH (13.04.1412–02.04.1413). Mubarak Shah fled to his father. Emir Shahmalik was appointed Timurid ruler of Khwarezm in the early 816 AH25.

*Qibaq*, son of Toktamyshe.

As has been mentioned above, Vytautas made a major contribution to Qibaq's enthronement, since he wanted to neutralise anti-Lithuanian forces in the Horde. Qibaq's power was established in Azak, Orda, Sarai, Hajji Tarkhan, and Bulgar as soon as 816 AH. In the summer of 1413 ((II–VI / 816 AH), Qibaq attacked Crimea and besieged Kaffa but retreated on the Pentecost (12 June 1413 = 12/3/816 AH). Qibaq and Kerim Birdi engaged in a number of battles before 817 AH, resulting in Qibaq's death.

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25 Shahmalik, formerly the emir of Samarkand, remained the emir of Khwarezm until his death in 829 AH, after which his son Nasir ad-Din Ibrahim was appointed a ruler.

26 His name appeared on coins in the following versions: 'K-b-k', 'K-i-b-k', 'K-b-a-k', 'K-i-b-a-k'. We can assume that it was pronounced as 'KibEkm' with the vowel 'i' in the first syllabus and a stressed long vowel (something between the Russian 'A' and 'E') in the last one. We will spell it traditionally as 'Qibaq' with regard to the above.
Chapter X. The Break Up of the Ulus of Jochi

Chekre, son of Akmyl, son of Mengasir, son of Abai, son of Öz Timur, son of Tuka Timur.

Tsarevich Chekre already was in Aksak Timur's retinue in 1404. He served Emir Hudaydat, son of Hussein for some time after the death of Tamerlane. Then Sheikh Nur ad-Din, son of Sari Böke, became his patron. In approximately 810 AH (08.06.1407–26.05.1408), Chekre joined Aba Bakr, son of Miran Shah, grandson of Timur. In 814 (25.06.1411–12.04.1412) Aba Bakr permitted him to return to his homeland within a retinue of six hundred horsemen to take the local throne. After leaving Persia and crossing Georgia, Azerbaijan, and the North Caucasus, 'he came to Great Tataria under the protection of a high official named Edigü, who had sent him an offer to take the throne' [161, p.33]. As soon as Chekre joined Edigü, he had to accompany him in his Siberian campaign, which lasted over a year. After their return in 1413, they conquered Bulgar and went to Edigü's land on the Yaik River. Learning about the confusion between Kerim Birdi and Qibaq, Edigü found it a good opportunity to enthrone Chekre and declared him khan in 816. Chekre lost the first battle against Qibaq but was able to oust the enemy.

Chekre ruled part of the state in 816–818 AH, winning and losing battles and moving frequently within the country. Issues of coins bearing Chekre's name are vivid illustrations of the situation: Azak, 816 AH and 817 AH or 818 AH, also undated [131, pp. 22–38]; Ordu Muazzam, 816 and 817 AH; Sarai, no date; Bulgar, '717' (wrong date: 817 or 818 AH), also undated; Hajji Tarkhan, 817, 818 AH, also undated; Bik-Bazari, 818 AH [105, p. 88]. It most likely that the relations between Chekre and Edigü were severed in 818, as the latter chose new favourites that year.

Jabbar Birdi, son of Toktamysh.

Having found out that his ally Qibaq was dead, Vytautas could not let his enemies control the Orda. He decided toenthrone Toktamysh's next son, Jabbar Birdi. This tsarevich was involved in Qibaq's army during the battle against Kerim Birdi which was to prove fatal to the latter. Then he came to Lithuania. Jabbar Birdi was crowned in Wilno. The troops of Lithuanian Tatars, as well as Lithuanians, commanded by Marshal Radziwill, were assigned to him. With their help, Jabbar Birdi was able to occupy the throne of Sarai as early as 817 AH. However, he had to confront both Chekre and his brother Kerim Birdi. Chekre along with Edigü conquered Hajji Tarkhan, Sarai, and other parts of the country in the same year 817 AH. Meanwhile, Jabbar Birdi managed to defeat his brother Kerim Birdi and kill him. In late 818 AH, Jabbar Birdi finally defeated Chekre, who fled for life. Therefore, by the beginning of 819 AH, Jabbar Birdi had gained control over most of the Golden Horde.

Ghiyath al-Din I and Sayyid Ahmad I

Members of the anti-Lithuanian coalition who lost their leader after the death of Kerim Birdi, enthroned his son Sayyid Ahmad I in 1416 (819 AH) [106, pp. 48–60]. In the same year, Jabbar Birdi disappeared from the historical arena under mysterious circumstances. It is possible that he was killed. Having lost his protégé, Vytautas enthroned Ghiyath al-Din
I,\textsuperscript{33} son of Tash Timur, in 819 AH, but he was killed by Sayyid Ahmad I. Sayyid Ahmad maintained his father's policy by allying with Edigü against Vytautas. In 819 AH, he undertook a campaign against Lithuania and conquered Kiev, which he devastated on 13 July 1416 (17/5/819 AH).\textsuperscript{34} However, Sayyid Ahmad I soon vanished from the historical arena.

_Dervish, son of Alty Kurtka, son of Mamki, son of Mengasir, son of Abai, son of Öz Timur, son of Tuka-Timur._

The khan \textsuperscript{98, pp. 159–164} was enthroned by Edigü to whom Dervish remained faithful until death, being wholly dependent on him. Dervish’s first coins were minted in Sarai and dated 818 AH. In 820—early 822 AH, Dervish and Edigü controlled most of the Golden Horde, including Crimea.\textsuperscript{35} However, Dervish died in 822 AH (18.02.1419–16.01.1420). It is interesting that Edigü wrote a letter to Vytautas, suggesting that they should give up the policy of constant confrontation. Willing to preserve his influence on the Golden Horde’s domestic affairs, Vytautas helped Bek-Sufi come to power without any resistance from Edigü. In the state of ‘truce’ between Vytautas and Edigü, Bek-Sufi recognised the latter to be his beklyaribek.

_Kadir Birdi, son of Toktamysh_

Other groups were discontent with the situation. This is especially true of Toktamysh’s son Kadir Birdi and the emirs who had been in opposition to Edigü for years. They declared Kadir Birdi khan and began an armed confrontation with Edigü, resulting in the death of both leaders in the same year 822 AH. To prove that Kadir Birdi’s reign was short, coins bearing his name are quite rare. They were minted in Bulgar, the only mint presently associated with the issuer \textsuperscript{[68, p. 122].}

_Bek-Sufi, son of Bektut, son of Danishmand, son of Tuka-Timur_

Bek-Sufi as the oldest representative of the Crimean Tuka-Timurid branch was apparently a compromise solution for Edigü and Vytautas\textsuperscript{36} representing the territories adjacent to Lithuania. Like his father and uncle, faithful adherents of Toktamysh \textsuperscript{126, pp. 63–74}, Bek-Sufi was a loyal servant to Jalal ad-Din, who entrusted him part of the Crimean Peninsula after conquering it. He was declared khan in 822 AH. Since assuming the Supreme Throne was neither desirable nor possible for him, the ruler’s reign was confined to the Crimean part of the Ulus of Jochi, which he controlled from 822 to 824 AH. European travellers refer to him as ‘the Emperor of Solkhat’, in contrast to ‘the Emperor of the Tatars’, who ruled the remaining part of the state \textsuperscript{52, p. 442}. Bek-Sufi died around September 1421 (IX/824 AH), triggering a fierce struggle for power over Crimea.

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\textsuperscript{33} Orda Muazzam is known to have minted coins on behalf of Ghiyath al-Din for a short period in 819 AH. The stamp used for the coinage is related to that used by Khan Sayyid Ahmad I which replaced it.

\textsuperscript{34} Johann von Posilge described the devastation of Kiev on 13 July 1416 (17/V/819 AH) as follows: ‘The great khan of the Tatars waged war on Duke Vytautas because he had enthroned another khan against him, as he had inflicted grave damage on the Prussian Land ten years earlier with the same khan, leading him in his army. They did not take any measures in relation to the declared war, because the great khan of the Tatars embarked on a campaign against Duke Vytautas with large forces after that, and [they] inflicted grave losses on Kiev in his land and around [it], so the Poles had to come and help the Lithuanians’ [166, p. 364] (translated by S. Polekhov, Moscow).

\textsuperscript{35} Coins of the following issues bear the name of Dervish: Sarai, 818 AH and undated; Sarai al-Jadid, undated; Ordu Muazzam, 820 AH and undated; Orda, undated; Hajji Tarkhan, 820 and 822 AH and undated; Bik-Bazari, 820 AH and undated; Saray-Jük, 820 AH and undated; Azak, 821 AH and undated; multiple Bulgar coins, undated; Crimea, bearing the name of Emir Edigü, 822 AH and undated \textsuperscript{98, pp. 159–164}.

\textsuperscript{36} According to a 1418 report by Dlugosii, Vytautas viewed Bek-Sufi as a candidate to the khan’s throne \textsuperscript{156, p. 194, link 63}. 
In fact, Bek-Sufi anticipated Crimea's separation as a semi-state within the Empire. Being merely a product of an agreement between Vytautas and Edigü, he preferred to keep what he had rather than press his luck to get more.

Muhammad

Major events took place in 822 AH. Khan Dervish, Kadir Birdi, and Edigü left the political arena. Bek Sufi became the ruler of Crimea. The emirs in the central ulus enthroned Khan Muhammad. At the present time it is unclear who was the 'Khan Muhammad' who ruled most of the state in 822–826 AH. His possible identities could be:

1. (Ulugh-)Muhammad, son of Hasan, son of Jine, son of Tulak-Timur, son of Konchak, son of Sarichi, son of Öz Timur, son of Tuka-Timur.
2. (Hajji-)Muhammad, son of Ali, son of Beg Khwandi, son of Ming Timur, son of Badakul, son of Jochi Buga (Shingum), son of Bahadur, son of Shiban.
3. (Küchük) Muhammad, son of Toktamysh
4. (Kichi-)Muhammad, son of Timur, son of Temür Qutlug
5. We do not know the Islamic name of Hudaydat Khan, son of Ali, grandson of Jine, cousin to Ulugh Muhammad, Ghiyath al-Din I, and Devlet Birdi. Assuming that his Islamic name was also Muhammad, he is another candidate.

Most probably, several khans named Muhammad ruled different parts of the state at the same time. As has already been mentioned, several competing groups had formed. It seems impossible that they supported the khans of other groups. A more realistic version is that they tried to enthrone appointees of their own. Edigü's children (in particular his son, Mansur) apparently declared Haji Muhammad [125, p.53] or Muhammad, son of Timur, to be their khan. On the other hand, the rival party elected either Küchük Muhammad, son of Toktamysh [108, p. 89], or Ulugh Muhammad. It is still unclear which of them is the Muhammad Khan who ruled in 822–826 AH (1419–1423) or whether reports concerning two figures were mistakingly assigned to the same name. Nevertheless, there is numismatic and chronicle evidence that Muhammad Khan was the ruler of the Golden Horde from 822 to 826 AH. In 822 AH, Hajji Tarkhan and other mints in the Ulus of Jochi began to issue coins bearing the name 'Muhammad Khan.' On the first day of Rabi II 823 AH (15 April 1420), when his main camp was in Crimea, Khan Muhammad issued a yarliq to Tuglubai and Khidr.

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37 All the three figures—Vytautas, Edigü, and Bek-Sufi—were elderly at that time. After so much frenzied action, they were inclined towards compromise, trying to retain what they already had, especially when facing new, young and vigorous rivals.

38 Bek-Sufi entered the historical arena much earlier. He first appeared in Jalal ad-Din's retinue in the Kaffa Massaria in 813. 9.01.1411 (14/9/813 AH): the eksenij issued to the ruling sultan, son of Toktamysh (Jalal ad-Din), who conquered Solkhat 13.01.1411 (18/9/813 AH): the eksenij issued to Beksufl Oghlan... Amount; 2,170 aspr [77, p. 165]. Then, in 821 AH [77, p.162]— reported for 1418 (821) by Joannis Dlugosii, 'Grand Duke Vytautas of Lithuania made Beksub Uhlan the emperor of the Tatars'. Bek Sufi's coinage in Crimea, dated 822 AH and bearing the name of Edigü, is attributable to a short period of peace between Edigü and Vytautas. 'In 1419, Edigü sent to Vytautas an embassy proposing peace and concluded an alliance with him' [10, p. 276]. See also Edigü's letter to Vytautas [80, p. 225].

39 For more details on the events in the Ulus of Jochi in the first decade following Edigü's death see: [108, pp. 80–104].

40 'Küchük Muhammad' (Muhammad the Younger), in contrast to Qibaq whose name was also Muhammad.

41 If the Muhammad whom we are trying to identify stood in opposition to Vytautas's supporters, as well as the fact that after the Muhammad's death in 826 AH Mansur, son of Edigü, took the side of Khan Ghiyath al-Din, son of Shadi Beg, it appears preferable to identify 'Muhammad Khan' of 822–826 AH as the Shibanid.
Muhammad Barak, son of Kuyurchak, son of Urus Khan, son of Badik, son of Timur
Khoja, son of Öz Timur, son of Tuka-Timur.

In 822 AH, Muhammad Barak Oghlan fled to the Timurids in Samarkand to take shelter with
Murza Ulugh Beg, son of Shah Rukh. After remaining for a while and receiving assistance and
people, Barak embarked on a campaign to conquer the Ulus of Jochi in the same year. It should be
noted that Barak belonged to the line of Uruskhanids who had supported Emir Timur since his wars
against Toktamysh. As we know, in 797 AH Tamerlane enthroned Barak's father Kuyurchak. How-
ever, Temür Qutlugh and Edigü soon replaced the khan. Thus, Tamerlane's son Shah Rukh and his
grandson Ulugh Beg, the ruler of Samarkand, who wanted to enhance their influence on the neigh-
bouring state, naturally supported Barak in the struggle for supremacy in the Ulus of Jochi. In fact,
Barak led the non-aligned clan.

In 824 AH, the claimants to power were initially Muhammad, Bek-Sufi, and Barak. How-
ever, Bek-Sufi died, and Muhammad, Barak and Devlet Birdi, who came to rule Crimea at the
end of the year, continued the struggle. It ended in 826 AH with Barak triumphant.

Devlet Birdi, son of Tash Timur
The same forces which had once supported Bek-Sufi enthroned this ruler. They were, in
fact, the pro-Lithuanian party. He remained in Crimea in 824–826 AH and had to confront both
Muhammad, the ruler of the Throne Ulus, and Barak. Moreover, Devlet Birdi ruined his rela-
tions with Vytautas. After finding out about Barak's defeat of Muhammad in 826 AH, Devlet
Birdi took the chance and went to Desht in order to claim the 'throne of Sain'. He spent the
whole year 827 AH fighting against Barak.

Hudaydat, son of Ali, son of Tulak-Timur, son of Konchak, son of Sarichi, son of Öz Timur,
son of Tuka-Timur.
The tsarevich, a cousin of Ulugh Muhammad and Devlet Birdi, was enthroned by his ad-
herents, most probably following Bek-Sufi's death. He suffered a defeat at the hands of Mu-
hammad Barak in 825 AH. Throughout his 'regnal' period Hudaydat did not achieve any signif-
icant accomplishments. In 1424, he attempted to conquer Odoyev but was defeated and fled.
His wives were captured. One was sent to Vytautas and the other to Vasily Dmitrievich in
Moscow. The last reference to the tsar's name was in connection with the above events in a
letter dated 1 January 1425 (11/2/ 828 AH). Subsequently his name was to disappeared from
the historical sources.

Ghiyath al-Din II, son of Shadi Beg
He was the leader of the pro-Edigü party. This Jochid was first mentioned as a khan in
1421 (824–825 AH), when he arrived in Tana with his vizier Bazar Oghlan. After Barak had
killed Haji Muhammad, Mansur, son of Edigü, joined him in 826 AH. Ghiyath al-Din con-
quered Bulgar and, later, other parts of the state. He conquered Sarai in 828 AH, only to be
ousted by Ulugh Muhammad's troops in 829 AH [108, p. 94].

Ulugh Muhammad, son of Hasan, son of Janai, son of Tulak-Timur, son of Konchak, son
of Sarichi, son of Öz Timur, son of Tuka-Timur.
As has been mentioned above, this khan might be the 'Muhammad Khan' who ruled Desht
in 822–826 AH. He appears in Vytautas's main camp in 826 AH, intending to embark on a
campaign to conquer power. He took advantage of Devlet Birdi's absence in 827 to occupy
Crimea. According to Vytautas's letter to Paul von Rusdorf, the state had six rulers at the
beginning of 828 AH 42. One of them, Hudaydat, soon retreated from the political arena. Mu-
hammad Barak defeated both Devlet Birdi and Ulugh Muhammad but had to face Ghiyath al-
Din in the same year.

42 The letter mentions Hudaydat and Ulugh Muhammad. Three more figures are relatively easy to iden-
tify: Devlet Birdi, Muhammad Barak, and Ghiyath al-Din. It remains to be seen whom Vytautas meant when
Chapter X. The Break Up of the Ulus of Jochi

In 829 AH, Ulugh Muhammad left Crimea for Desht and Defeated Barak, as well as Ghiyas al-Din, who soon died. Ulugh Muhammad came to control the centre of the state. However, Devlet Birdi returned to Crimea, willing to conclude peace with Vytautas. Barak ruled the eastern part of the state, as well as part of Khwarezm and Sygnak. Mansur, son of Edigü, entered his service. Ulugh Muhammad remained the ruler of the central part of the Ulus of Jochi in 830 AH. In addition to him, four rulers controlled different areas of the state. Devlet Birdi ruled Crimea While trying to establish control over the eastern uluses of the state, Muhammad Barak attacked the offending joint troops of the Timurids in Sygnak region. He won the battle, plundered Transoxiana and Turkestan, but retreated at the end of the year. In 831 AH, Devlet Birdi conquered the central ulus and began to mint coins in Hajji Tarkan and Sarai. However, he died in the same year. Ulugh Muhammad acquired nearly the whole state. For some reason, Muhammad Barak killed Mansur. Learning that Mansur was dead, the latter's brothers, Ghazi and Nawruz, fled to Muhammad, son of Timur (Küchük Muhammad43), who had been declared khan following the death of Ghiyas al-Din. At the end of the same year, Barak fell in battle against Küchük Muhammad44.

In 832 AH, Ulugh Muhammad controlled most of the state, 'Crimea and the adjacent regions' [142, p. 534]. However, he had a new powerful rival, Muḥammad, son of Timur, who ruled the east of Desht-i Kipchak.

Vytautas, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, who had been a reliable ally to Ulugh Muhammad, died in October 1430 (II/834 AH). Švitrigaila Algirdaitis became the Grand Duke45. After learning of Vytautas's death, the Qongirat leader Aydar, who was then in Ulugh Muhammad's service, raided Lithuania in October 1430. Camping near Mtsensk, he captured voivode Grigory Protasiev by deception. However, Ulugh Muhammad, who was allied with Lithuania, 'reprimanded Aydar and did not praise him for that. He released Grigory with honour and gifts' [85, p. 9]. An ambassador of the new Grand Duke of Lithuania visited Ulugh Muhammad. The new ruler of Lithuania and Ulugh Muhammad entered into an alliance treaty. Ulugh Muhammad issued a yarliq for Podolia to Švitrigaila. A war between Poland and Lithuania, the latter supported by the Teutonic Order and Ulugh Muhammad's troops, broke out in 1431 [156, pp. 176–181].

Sayyid-Ahmed II, son of Bek-Sufi

We believe that this Jochid was enthroned by the same emirs of the Golden Horde who had supported Devlet Birdi (deceased in 831 AH), and, previously, his father. In the summer of 1432, Ulugh Muhammad waged war on the new pretender for power and defeated him. On 14 August 1432 an official of the Teutonic Order reported to his authorities that the khan (Ulugh Muhammad—Author), having defeated the enemy and captured him, sent him (Sayyid-Ahmed—Author) to Švitrigaila [156, p. 182].

A coup d'état was attempted in Lithuania on the night of 1 September 1432. Švitrigaila Algirdaitis, the leader of the Orthodox Christian party, was replaced by Sigismund Kęstutaitis, who advocated for an alliance with Poland. According to the letter of 3 September 1432 (8/I/ 836 AH), besides Švitrigaila's boyars, 'lord Said Ahmad Beksubovich' (dominus Sydachmath Bexubowitz) also fled with Švitrigaila during the coup d'état.

Ulugh Muhammad continued to support Švitrigaila for the entire winter and spring of 1432–1433, until the early summer of 1433. He sent his son Mahmutek and sons-in-law Aydar and Elberdei with troops to aid Švitrigaila and even expressed his willingness to personally speaking of the sixth ruler. It was either Tuka-Timurid Muhammad ibn Timur or a Shibanid—Mahmud Khoja ibn Kaganbek, Mahmud ibn Haji Muhammad, or Jumaduk ibn Sufi.

43 To 'Muḥammad Junior'.

44 Probably Sultan-Mahmud, son of Edigü, the brother of Mansur, whom Barak had killed [125, p. 56].

45 He was dethroned by Sigismund Kęstutaitis.
support the Grand Duke, if necessary [156, p. 177]. However, the Tatar troops who came to the 'aid' of Švitrigaila in the summer 'devastated Kievshchina and the Seversk land instead of participating in battles' [156, p. 180]. Švitrigaila quarreled with Ulugh Muhammad and helped Sayyid-Ahmed II win back his power.46

In April 1434, Švitrigaila wrote that Sayyid-Ahmed's army was coming to help him. Sayyid-Ahmed provided military support to Švitrigaila until the war ended in 1438. His troops regularly inflicted severe defeats on the Poles. 'In November 1436 Švitrigaila reported to the Grand Master that Sayyid Ahmad had finally defeated Ulugh Muhammad and subjugated the Orda' [156, p. 182].

Ulugh Muhammad came to the city of Belyov for the winter at the end of 1437. 'He was ousted from the Field, from the Great Orda by his brother Kichi Ahmet (chronicle variant: Kichi Mahmet') [85, p. 63]. Vasily Vasilyevich sent troops against him under the command of Dmitry Yuryevich Shemyaka and Dmitry Yuryevich Krasny. Ulugh Muhammad's army won the battle.

According to Giosafat Barbaro, Ulugh Muhammad ruled the steppes of Tataria until 1438. During this time he was residing in the steppe at some distance from Rus' and Nawruz, son of Edigü, was his commander. A dispute arose between Nawruz and Ulugh Muhammad. Nawruz went to Küchük Muhammad They joined forces against Ulugh Muhammad. They passed Astrakhan and went around Circassia towards the Don River [138, pp. 140–142]. Once defeated by Sayyid Ahmad and now pressed by Küchük Muhammad, Ulugh Muhammad had to find a new place for himself.

Ulugh Muhammad and his descendants eventually settled on the Middle Volga. Initially, Ulugh Muhammad and his son Mahmudek continued to present themselves as khans of the Golden Horde, and Tatar tsars, but gradually became khans of the Kazan vilayet.

*Horde of Sayyid Ahmad*

When Ulugh Muhammad went to the northern part of the state, two Jochids were the only competitors for the remaining land west of the Volga: Küchük Muhammad, the ruler of the Great Horde, and Sayyid Ahmad II. The Horde of Sayyid-Ahmed II spread from the Dnieper to the southern Cis-Azov Region and the Don. The Great Horde covered the territory from Crimea to the steppes of Kazakhstan. It was Küchük Muhammad and Sayyid Ahmad to whom Vasily Vasilyevich of Moscow sent messengers, vykhod tribute, and other payments to the Orda.

46 As mentioned above, both Devlet Birdi and Ulugh Muhammad represented the pro-Lithuanian forces of the Orda, but Devlet Birdi became increasingly independent in his policies and eventually came into conflict with Vytautas. The latter needed Ulugh Muhammad to secure his standing in the Horde since it would be dangerous for the Lithuanian State to rely completely on Devlet Birdi. Ulugh Muhammad did not fail to meet the expectations of Vytautas. He remained a reliable ally both to him and his successor Švitrigaila for the first two years of the latter's reign. However, after the Lithuanian palace coup in September Ulugh Muhammad faced the choice: Who should he support, Švitrigaila or Sigismund? Since he had previously entered into a treaty of alliance with Švitrigaila, it seemed reasonable to help him. However, in the event of Sigismund's victory, Ulugh Muhammad would definitely have to confront a new powerful rival enthroned by the victor. Most of his subjects would inevitably join the new rival, as he knew from experience that they always took the side of the more powerful party. Therefore, Ulugh Muhammad decided to wait for a while. The aid he had promised to Švitrigaila was delayed for reasons 'beyond his control'. Ulugh Muhammad corresponded with both parties to the conflict. When Ulugh Muhammad's troops finally made it clear that they were not going to fulfil their obligations as allies, Švitrigaila resolved to rely on the other pro-Lithuanian wing of the Orda. This was all the more convenient because their leader Sayyid Ahmad Küchük happened to be nearby. Ulugh Muhammad received from Švitrigaila that which he had fearfully expected of Sigismund. Sayyid Ahmad II gained power by draining Ulugh Muhammad's human resources.

47 Having attained the commitment of Nawruz, Küchük Muhammad actually consolidated the clan as anti-Lithuanian and pro-Edigü. It will be referred to as the Great Horde below.
in the early 1440s [156, p. 184]. The Lithuanian rulers paid taxes on Russian lands to Sayyid Ahmad and his successors, Girays.

The Orda suffered a series of defeats in its waning years. Clearly fortune was turning away from Sayyid Ahmad, and many of his former subjects began to serve other rulers. Sayyid Ahmad was captured and spent his last days imprisoned in Kaunas. Paradoxically, Horde of Sayyid Ahmad was founded on that part of the Golden Horde society which we previously referred to as the pro-Lithuanian clan. As events unfolded, Sayyid Ahmad supported the part of the Lithuanian elite which was losing power rapidly. As a result, his Horde became the bitterest enemy of the Polish-Lithuanian state which had to undertake great efforts and enter into negotiations with its neighbours to annihilate the very force to which it had given rise. Sayyid Ahmad supported the Orthodox party of Lithuania. As a result of numerous joint military operations, the Orthodox Lithuanian army virtually merged with the Tatar troops within Sayyid Ahmad's Horde. After defeat, a certain part of the Horde did not ally with either of the winning parties but remained non-aligned, while preserving major bases in the Dnieper and Don regions. According to V. Trepavlov, the remnants of Sayyid Ahmad Horde formed the foundation for the Zaporizhian and Don Cossacks [146, pp. 55–56].

(Küchük) Muhammad, son of Timur, son of Temür Qutlugh

This ruler was declared khan after the death of Ghiyath al-Din II between 829 and 831 AH. His beklyaribek was Ghazi, son of Edigü. Küchük Muhammad became the sole ruler of the eastern part of the state after Barak was killed, forcing the Urus Khanids out towards Moghulistan. Ghazi exerted pressure on the Shibani part of the Ulus of Jochi but was killed by the local emirs.

In 834 AH, Küchük Muhammad 'sent an army against Khwarezm from Desht, which devastated the land' [143, p. 212]. So Timurid's Emir Ibrahim, son of Shah Malik had to take shelter in Kyat and Khivak. Shah Rukh sent several emirs who ousted the enemy troops.

Küchük Muhammad turned his attention to the Left wing of the state, trying to overthrow Ulugh Muhammad. The eldest of Edigü's descendants, Nawruz, came into conflict with his khan and joined Küchük Muhammad. In fact, Küchük Muhammad consolidated the forces to which we have been referring as the pro-Edigü party.

Küchük Muhammad and Nawruz defeated Ulugh Muhammad, forcing him out to the northern part of the state, by the end of 1437. Küchük Muhammad came to control the territory from the Trans-Yaik Nogais to the Don. In 1438, he approached Tana, or Azak. The city's authorities presented novenas to Küchük Muhammad, his mother and Nawruz. According to Giosafat Barbaro, the tsarevich was 22 and Nawruz about 25 at that time. Küchük Muhammad quickly conquered Crimea.

Thus, the former 'pro-Lithuanian' forces came to control of the whole western part of the country in the 1440s, while the other part was ruled by the 'anti-Toktamysh's-children' party, led by the Manghits. However, circumstances had changed dramatically by that time. The 'pro-Lithuanian' forces were at war with most of the Lithuanian-Polish State. Thus Casimir had to form a new Tatar union led by Hacı Giray, to combat Sayyid Ahmad. In the east of the country,

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48 The Turkic-speaking Christian, primarily Orthodox, population joined the pro-Lithuanian and anti-Edigü party. Sayyid Ahmad II became its head in the early 1430s. During the civil war in Lithuania, Sayyid Ahmad supported the Orthodox pro-Russian party, attracting more Christians into his troops. Towards the end of its existence, Horde of Sayyid Ahmad developed into a Turkic-Tatar-Russian conglomerate. It fought against the Polish party in Lithuania, in particular in the name of Orthodoxy.

49 Timur died in the late 814 AH. Assuming his wife, Edigü's daughter, was pregnant at that time and did not give birth until 815, Muhammad, son of Timur, must have been at least 26 years old at the beginning of 1438 (second half of 841 AH).
Abul-Khair consolidated the entire Ulus of Shiban under his rule. Ulugh Muhammad's descend-
ants controlled the Bulgar ulus.

New political centres emerged against the backdrop of the constant struggle for power be-
tween different clans in the first half of the 15th century, causing the Golden Horde to dis-
solve into separate khanates.

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Chapter X. The Break Up of the Ulus of Jochi

§ 4. Factors and Peculiarities Contributing to the Disintegration of the Ulus of Jochi

Vadim Trepavlov

In the first half of the 15th century, the Ulus of Jochi entered a phase of irreversible decay, and new states began to form in its place. Reasons for these processes can be traced back to specific features in the political and social-political development of the state during the preceding century. The Ulus of Jochi in its golden age was a medieval empire with a rigid hierarchy for governing provinces and subdued populations, an efficient and harmonious mechanism that was able to quell any signs of unrest. All this required rulers to maintain great numbers of officials. Frequent wars at the borders, internecine feud and rebellions by the aristocracy required an efficient combat-ready army. This was a heavy burden on the country's population.

In the second half of the 14th century, however, the Ulus of Jochi faced difficult problems and had to undergo changes in order to meet the requirements of that time. What were the main features of this 'challenge'? Soviet historiography tended to attribute the collapse of the Golden Horde to increased separatism among some feudal lords, whose striving for power had divided the country into hostile provinces. The mechanism of this process has been clearly identified by historians. According to them, the main conflict took place between rulers of economically and politically self-sufficient uluses and groups of nobility who, attempting to seize the central regional administration and influence the Golden Horde's domestic and foreign policies, proposed their own candidates for the khan's throne. All this led to the erosion of central authority and a reduction in foreign political activity which, in turn, resulted in the increasing separatism of the nomadic nobility, for whom military campaigns were the main source of income [3, pp. 297–299; 5; 6, pp. 172, 173; 22, chapter VI, VII].

This approach was further developed in later studies of the historical role played by the nomadic elite during the final phase in the Ulus of Jochi’s development [see: 10, pp. 140–168; 20, pp. 346–348].

Nevertheless, social factors do not seem to be the only reason for the crisis. Exaggerating the importance of these factors leads to a paradoxical conclusion—the power of the central authorities weakened due to the separatism initiated by feudal lords, whose main goal was to seize the Sarai throne. But separatism can hardly be the only explanation for the Jochid Empire's decay and the strengthening of centrifugal tendencies in it.

First of all, we must focus upon natural factors. The most important of these was the sudden drying up of the western areas of the Eurasian steppes in the 14–15th centuries, which has been studied by geologists, geographers, and historians [See, for example: 12, pp. 77–105; 19]. The aridisation of the climate in Desht-i Kipchak led to decreased rainfall and winters with little snow. This led to the gradual encroachment of sand onto previously rich and green pastures. At the same time, the level of the Caspian Sea began to rise, and its waves flooded a large part of the Volga Delta and many settlements situated at its periphery, coming close to the cities of the Lower Volga Basin. According to the Italian geographer Marino Sanuto (1320), 'sea level was rising by a hand every year, and many good cities have been destroyed.' Hardest hit by this were not so much the nomadic districts of the Ulus of Jochi, but areas of farmland, which undermined the economy of the Golden Horde.

At the same time, both Western Europe and Eastern Europe underwent a severe demographic shock. Favorable climatic and living conditions brought about population growth. This was also stimulated by political stability in the territory of the Golden Horde, as well as the emergence of large cities and numerous settlements. The deterioration of natural conditions led to increasingly frequent periodic food crises. Famine drove people to the cities, where they might have even had to sell their own children [18, pp. 231, 235]. High population densities in
Chapter X. The Break Up of the Ulus of Jochi

The cities of the Volga Region, Crimea, and Khwarezm turned out to be a breeding ground for disease.

The bubonic plague was the most terrible of these. By the middle of the 14th century it had struck Desht-i Kipchak several times, literally mowing down the population, especially in the overcrowded cities. A Russian chronicler wrote about this great pestilence in 1346: 'God sent the plague upon the Besermens, and the Tatars, and the Armenians, and the Obez, and the Jews, and the Fryaz [Italians], and the Circassians, and all living there near the eastern land, in the cities of Ornach, and Astrakhan, and Sarai, and Biezdież, and many other cities, for there is nobody there to bury the dead' [16, Vol. 5, pp. 225; Vol. 15, pp. 76–77]. We do not rule out the possibility that the 'black death', as it was known in Western Europe, is tied to the disappearance of the Bulgarian elite, who had preserved the ancient Oghur language. We know that this was the sacred language of epitaphs in the 14th century, since after the 1360s this tradition disappeared [25].

This was an especially heavy blow for the Ulus of Jochi. According to Ibn al-Wardī, an Arab historian, geographer, and contemporary to these events, an epidemic of plague took place 'in Öz Beg's land', which 'depopulated villages and cities'. He confirms that up to a thousand died in the Crimea daily; the total number of dead Crimeans amounted to more than 85,000 [18, p. 530]. According to this data, consequences of the 'black death's' march through the Golden Horde were catastrophic. The decline of urban life in the Lower Volga region began at that very moment.

The crisis in trans-Asian trade also contributed to economic decay in the Ulus of Jochi. Products such as spices, silk, cotton, gems, crops, and slaves were brought to Europe by a famous trade route that started in China and partly passed through the Golden Horde [15, pp. 60–91]. This flow of valuable goods enriched middlemen, laying the foundation for the wealth of Desht-i Kipchak cities. State revenues from trade duties, as well as the wealth of the many service professions depended on trade. This included caravanners, guides, guards, owners of caravanserais, craftsmen, etc. Moreover, many workshops produced goods for sale and processed semi-finished products. All of these were very responsive to the slightest changes in commercial activities.

The decline of international trade started in the early 1340s and reached its peak in the second half of the 14th century. There were a many reasons for this, among them being: the liberation movement directed against the Mongol Yuan dynasty in China; the unstable situation in Central Asia and Moghulistan; the plague; turmoils in Anatolia after the collapse of the Ilkhanate, as well as an outbreak of hostilities between major Mediterranean trade powers—Genoa and Venice. All of this led to restrictions on the movement of goods between the East and West, thus undermining the position of the Golden Horde's cities. It was not until the late 14th century that people could finally see a way out of the crisis, which brought international trade back to life [11, pp. 60–63, 300–303].

Of course we can not ignore socio-political processes that contributed to the decline in urban life. During the hundred years it existed, the Ulus of Jochi not only went through a formative period, but also achieved a high level of social development. Many flourishing provinces, especially the Crimea, Khwarezm, and Moksha, were not in need of a united state, preferring to remain isolated. This desire for decentralisation found support among semi-independent vassal states, where there was always a strong preference for succession from the Golden Horde. This trend was most vividly observed in Rus' and Bulgaria. Powerful central authorities were able to keep the trend toward disintegration in check for a long time, and the state system was quite strong. But under unfavorable conditions it began to quickly transform and collapse.

In written sources the increase in the power of both ulusbegs and the owners of feudal estates—iqtas and suyurgals—is observed. Their economic power came from advanced cattle-breeding and agriculture, as well as shared state taxes and other kinds of income. Significant
judicial and administrative power provided them with the necessary political leverage in territories under their control. Moreover, in the second half of the 14th century, many influential feudal lords became tarkhans—that is, owners of land holdings exempt from taxes and obligations [23, pp. 124–134]. The capital city nobility and officialdom also enjoyed respectable incomes thanks to the collection of taxes and duties resulting from well-developed domestic and international transit trade, and the handicraft industry.

In the 14th century, begs (emirs) began more frequently to convert their uluses, as well as cities and nomad encampments, into semi-independent territories. On the one hand, minor feudal lords and cities that had been the backbone of the khan's power fell increasingly under the control of influential begs and ulusbegs: they saw in this the only means of counteracting the influence of unfavourable natural and social factors. On the other hand, these groups began to lay claim to rights enjoyed by the central authorities in order to put into service for themselves the Horde's treasury and armed forces.

Simultaneously, the majority of emirs were fighting among themselves for the Sarai throne. This clearly demonstrates that the forces of inertia aimed at the centralisation of the state were still great. However, there were groups of people in outlying regions—Bulgaria, Crimea, Siberia, and the Blue Horde—striving to concentrate and preserve power within their holdings, but they were unable to gain the upper hand until the early 15th century.

Since the beginning of the preceding century this category of subjects had been growing ever more noticeable by the decade. Several factors influenced this situation.

The ethnic consolidation of Turkic nomads in the Golden Horde had come to its end by that time. The turmoil brought by the Mongol conquest and the removal of the former Kipchak elite from power gave way to a peaceful and stable life in a powerful and rich empire. In the territory of the former Cumanian 'Wild Fields a strict and severe regional system was established that divided the population by tens. The government of the Horde did not allow free movement from one ulus to another in order not to destroy the subtle organization of their tax and military mobilisation systems. For decades, a relatively quiet life without war or famine had favourable demographic consequences. The populations of steppe tribes increased, they divided and branched out, so that their begs gained more and more subjects. In the nomadic world, this meant that social significance and political influence of the non-dynastic nobility increased.

The first signs of this phenomenon appeared during the rule of Khan Toqta (1291–1312), when non-noble officials were appointed to high positions. The same processes took place under khans Öz Beg and Jani Beg. After the death of Jani Beg, tribal leaders began to act as independent subjects in matters of state policy, who were capable of competing with the power of the khan.

The specific features of economic development in the Golden Horde and the formation of self-contained economic provinces undoubtedly served as incentives for begs to enter the political arena. This phenomenon has long been noticed by historians, but it is usually interpreted as a basis for separatism and disobedience to the central government. Nevertheless, under certain conditions, reliance on the resources of provincial uluses could contribute not only to separation from Sarai, but also to pressure on the government or manipulation by it.

Surprisingly, the 'black death' seems to have helped the begs assume power. It primarily struck places with crowded sedentary populations. In the context of weakening and decreasing urban upper classes who had, at one time, dominated state management, it was representatives of a different social segment—the aristocracy of the nomadic steppes—who partially occupied their positions.

Crises among representatives of the House of Jochi—that is, amid mass executions of hereditary princes, presented yet another excuse for non-Chinggisid begs to come to power.
Khans, surrounded by hostile and scheming relatives, often preferred to rely on supporters with whom they had no dynastic ties.

The Ulus of Jochi remained united as long as the political power (the khan and his administration) and economic ties were preserved. The struggle for the khan's throne among several Chinggisids became the justification for an explosion of centrifugal forces: each claimant had a right to rule and relied on his supporters' numerous troops. It is possible that this struggle was caused by the breaking of the principles of succession to the throne against the backdrop of mass mortality among the population, including the nobility. The deterioration of natural conditions, a decline in agriculture and cattle-breeding, the loss of trade and craft work, the reduction of tax revenues and spoils of war from the Volga Region, problems with monetary circulation, the undermining of the influence of the central authorities, by which some ulus leaders became more powerful as they strove to control the levers of central power—all of these were characteristic of the escalating crisis. It was for these reasons that the existence of the empire was inevitably threatened.

In the 1360s, an internecine war began in the Ulus of Jochi. The khan's throne, which had become an object of struggle between the various aristocratic groups from Sarai, the White Horde and the Blue Horde, passed from hand to hand many times. From 1359 to 1380 there were at least 17 khans in the Sarai, some of which held the throne several times. Historians know a little about most of them except, for instance, their names engraved on coins they issued. And these historians even today still argue about their historicity and the sequence of their reigns [see, for example: 4; 5, pp. 190–192; 14, pp. 88–99].

A long period of decay had begun, the collapse of a unified state was approaching. The unfolding internecine feud brought with it a deterioration of financial conditions and a deepening recession in trade and handicrafts production. The threat of attack prevented regular operation of caravan routes and, consequently, the import of raw materials and the export of handicrafts was interrupted. As agriculture declined, settlements in the Volga Region grew increasingly desolate. The practice of surrounding capital cities with walls was introduced. Rulers of Rus', Bulgaria, Khwarezm, and other uluses took advantage of the weakened central government to strengthen their independence. Thus, in times of internecine feud, regions in which development was stable became objects of struggle among khans who wished either to collect taxes or wage retaliatory campaigns in them. This shattered the daily routines of local populations, who began to protect their land against self-proclaimed rulers of the Horde. The clearest examples of this were the emergence of the Sufi dynasty in Khwarezm; the de facto independence of Bolgar under Bulat Timur (1360–1366), Hasan and Muhammad Sultan (1370–1376); and the war between Mamai and Prince Dmitry Ivanovich of Moscow [2, chapter 6; 13; 14, pp. 88–99; 21, pp. 119–123; 22, pp. 183–184].

Meanwhile, the desire to unite the country and revive its greatness did not lose its historical inertia. These interests were expressed by Khan Toktamysh (1380–1396), who relied on the aristocracy of the Blue Horde and Sarai. Having defeated his enemies, including Mamai, he not only captured the khan's throne, but also consolidated the central government's rule over the uluses by putting down separatism in Rus' and other regions (the devastation of Moscow and Bulgaria in 1382). After a while, however, all of these reforms eventually resulted in persecution of the clan aristocracy, the removal of its members from power, and the suppression of rebellious provinces; this led again to discontent and open protest against increased centralisation. Moreover, Toktamysh's illusory desires to restore the now decrepit Horde's former military glory led to military catastrophes during wars against Timur (1391 and 1396).

It is quite possible that the collapse of the Ulus of Jochi was simply a stage in the course of natural processes, but some political figures were not willing to accept this. There was still a small chance of preserving the state's integrity. New attempts to restore the stability of Ulus by means
of successful governmental, ideological and economic reforms (through reinforcement of centralisation, monetary reform, and promulgation of Islam), which were initiated by beklyaribek Edigü, a talented commander and diplomat [1, pp. 797–804; 8; 9; 17, pp. 178–195, 227–229; 24] had a temporary stabilising and pacifying effect on the Golden Horde. His reign under so-called khans was marked by a series of victories in foreign policy such as the defeat of Grand Duke Vytautas of Lithuania in the Battle of Vorskla in 1399 and the siege of Moscow in 1408 were especially outstanding).

Nevertheless, his efforts were in vain. The end came in 1419, when Edigü was defeated and died in a battle against rebellious Jochids. The collapse of the Ulus of Jochi was inescapable. This epoch is metaphorically described in the Tatar dastan ‘Edigü’:

... A dark day dawned upon the earth.
The throne created by Chinggis
Became the throne where blood was spilled.
The palace of the Khan disappeared from sight.
The ruined lands were emptied.
Azhdarkan, Kazan and the Crimea
Became independent ils.
The Golden Horde broke apart [7, p. 240].

But even after the collapse of the Ulus of Jochi its historical destiny was fulfilled: a rich culture was preserved by the Tatar people who had managed to live through this period. Post-Golden Horde khanates emerged on the territory of the Ulus of Jochi, where ethno-political and culturally-enlightened traditions peculiar to the Horde survived.


Chapter XI.
The Later Golden Horde Time

§ 1. The Jochid Ulus in the 15–16th Centuries: the Inertia of Unity

Vadim Trepavlov

In the history of many peoples of Eurasia, the period of the 15–17th centuries was marked by the collapse of the Ulus of Jochi and the formation of new states in its place. It is evident that the institutional links between the parts of the former Golden Horde at that time were arranged in a specific system. This system was based on the three factors: the inertia of the former unity in the collapsed Ulus of Jochi; the royal prerogatives of Jochi's family not being limited to specific post-Horde yurts and capital residences; the relative ethnic homogeneity of the population in the vast space of the Desht-i Kipchak and certain neighbouring regions.

Historians have already expressed similar opinions. For example, M. Usmanov wrote about the unity of the ruling House of Jochi on the entirety of the former Golden Horde territory, which was the reason why Crimean Khans were invited to Kazan, and why Kazan princesses married into the Giray dynasty and Nogai princesses married the rulers of Kazan [19, p. 43].

D. Iskhakov believes that the khanates had a relatively similar state structure with the yurts of ruling tribes, and the representatives of these tribes could freely move from one khanate to another to settle in the territory of their family domains [6, pp. 7–9].

A. Gayvoronsky sees attempts at restoring the unity of the Horde in the active policy of the Crimean Khan, Mengli Giray towards his Tatar neighbours and rivals. His main success in this endeavour came when he defeated the Great Horde in 1502, annexed part of its territory and took the population to Crimea [1, part II]. However, his son Mehmed Giray was unable to further expand this policy, as he was killed by the Nogais soon after capturing Astrakhan in 1523. Afterwards, the claims of Crimea to the primacy in the former Golden Horde became purely nominal.

I. Zaitsev convincingly demonstrated the close cultural ties between the Volga region khanates, the Crimea, the Nogai Horde, and Central Asia. He showed that 'despite the political collapse, the post-Horde states represented a single cultural space linked by common traditions, language, science, literature and education' [4, p. 33].

We should stress that this is attributed to inertia and the remnants of a united statehood, because in reality there were no noticeable centripetal processes in the successor states of the Golden Horde. However, it is possible that there existed an amount of nostalgia for the days of the Horde. A number of sources allow us to conclude that the height of stability in the great power that came during the reigns of Öz Beg and Jani Beg was considered a 'golden age'.

Perhaps today's historians tend to overemphasise (or modernise) interstate relations, including the borders between the yurts of the 15–16th centuries. There is an established view in historiography that the Ulus of Jochi had a clear division into two wings with mysterious, 'floating' colour-coded designations that are difficult to attribute. Sources describing the events of the 13th century (William of Rubruck, Rashid al-Din) indicate that there were two independent khanates and khans. However, there is no clear picture for the following century. The begs of

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1 It is likely that this interstate (and supra-state) paradigm of relations somehow also included the former Chagatai Transoxiana after the removal of the Chagataid Ulus Khans from power by Tamerlane and the subsequent restoration of the power of Chinggis Khan's descendants by Muhammad Shaybani.
the right and left wings continued to exist, but it is not clear how far this affiliation relates to the division of the state in real terms.

The writings of the Turkic chroniclers of the 16–17th centuries (Abu al-Ghazi, Kadir Ali Bek, Ötemish Hajji, the anonymous authors of Daftar-i Chinggis-name) contain virtually no mention of the winged territorial structure. The only exception is the chronicle of Ötemish Hajji, where he wrote that Chinggis Khan had given to Sain–Batu the Right wing along the Itil River and to Idzhan–Orda the Left wing along the Syr Darya River; and also told a story (closer to a legend) about the division of differently coloured yurts between Chinggis Khan's grandchildren, the sons of Jochi [20, pp. 92, 93]. However, in the writings of the same Ötemish Hajji, the relationship between the rulers and people of the 'wings' does not in any way resemble the coexistence of two neighbouring states.

It appears that at some point in the history of the Ulus of Jochi, there was a time when the division into 'wings' had become a nominal abstraction designating the rank of tribes and their leaders. Perhaps this change should be associated with the extreme strengthening of the 'right wing' of the state in the first half of the 14th century. This process appears to have started under Khan Toqta who, in 701 AH (1301–1302), issued a yarliq to Bayan to reign in the Left wing [12, p. 68]. This was followed by an attempt at joint action by Öz Beg and Bayan against the Hulagu dynasty, the overthrow of Mubarak, the Khan of Sygnak (who tried to break away from Sarai), the reign of Tini Beg, the son of Öz Beg, in Sygnak, the yarliq of Jani Beg to Chimtay and the military support provided by the latter in the struggle for Sygnak... [for more details, see 18, pp. 147–158]. The nominal principles of seniority of left over right and the priority of descendants of Orda Ichen over those of Batu were disregarded in this situation. The de facto unification of the state's territory under the supremacy of Sarai rulers took place. This is illustrated by the struggle of the eastern aristocracy for the capital on the Lower Volga in the second half of the 14th century. Later, in the 16th century, when eastern Jochid monarchs began to look quite powerful, amid the total collapse of the Right wing khanate; foreign observers (Iranian) had the impression that the main throne of the Jochi dynasty was located in the eastern part of Desht-i Kipchak: 'Kasim Khan [Kazakh—Author]... became the King of Desht... Haqq Nazar Khan, the son of Kasim Khan, took the throne after his father and is now the ruler of Desht' [17, p. 212].

Russian contemporaries, who lived closer to Tatar holdings and undoubtedly knew more about this matter, did not report the Horde's unity over such an extended period. In the chronicle lists of the 'Horde's Kings' compiled in the second half of the 15th century, the last of the khans is referred to as 'Zedi-saltan' [8, vol. 23, p. 168]—that is, Jalal al-Din bin Toktamys, or 'Zedi-saltan Bulkhartan' [8, vol. 28, p. 143].

Naturally, the Crimeans had their own views on the continuity of power and promoted their own succession of rulers. In 1506, while attending the feast of the King of Poland and Grand Duke of Lithuania Alexander Jagiellon, the envoys of the Crimean khan recalled the traditional ties between Lithuanians and Tatars by citing the names of the predecessors of their ruler Mengli Giray: 'Toktamys, Cheledgin, Perberdi, Kebek, Keremberdi, Kaderberdi (all were distorted names of the sons of Toktamysh—Author), Magmet Silehmat (that is, Ulugh Muhammad and Sayyid Ahmad—Author), Azhi Kgiray, Mordovlat (Nur Devlet.—Author), Mendi Kgiray' [24, p.

2 In earlier Russian texts, Jalal ad-Din, who died in 1413, is called the Green Sultan. It is probable that 'Bultarkhan' is a distorted name of the eastern Jochid khan Abul-Khair, who died in 1468. 3 Of the two khans with similar names in the corresponding period—Ulugh Muhammad and Küchük Muhammad—it more than likely refers to the former. The charters of the Crimean Tsarevich Ahmed Giray to Polish King Sigismund I in 1511 and 1514 contain references to the times of 'Grand Duke Vytautas and...Tsar Toktamys and...the great Tsar Mahomet', and mention 'our forefathers and grandfathers Tokmamys (sic—Author) Tsar and the great Mahmet Tsar' [13, sheets 371, 538]. 'The Great Mahomet—Mahmet' is evidently a translation of the name, or sobriquet, of Ulugh Muhammad.
Therefore, neither the protégés of Edigü from 1400–1410, nor the Khans of the Great Horde, the descendants of Küchük Muhammad, and certainly not the rulers of breakaway regions of the Horde in the Middle Volga area and across the Volga were considered legitimate monarchs. For Bakhchysarai politicians, from the mid-15th century, the legitimate power in the Horde was in the hands of Hacı Giray (‘Aji Kgiray’) and his descendants.

The independent states that emerged in the territory of the Ulus of Jochi were usually designated as 'yurts' in Turkic languages, while in Muscovite and Lithuanian sources they were called 'hordes'. We can identify a chronological divide in historiography, after which the Russian designation of the Ulus of Jochi as 'the Horde' was replaced by 'Hordes' in the plural. This is a charter of the treaty between Ivan III and his brother Prince Boris Vasilyevich of Volotsk, from 13 February 1473: 'As for the Hordes (instead of the former term "the Horde"—Author), brother, we, as the Grand Prince, know and understand what they are. And you do not understand what the Hordes are… And if I do not give to the Hordes, I will not take from you' [3, p. 226]. Such phrases can be found in contractual letters between the princes made in the 1470–80s. Moreover, these documents already leave no doubt about the multiplicity of the Tatar yurts ('knowing the Hordes', 'deal with the Hordes', 'I do not give to the Hordes'), as it does not coincide with the genitive singular form of 'not deal with the Horde' (as in the previously quoted charter 1473).

However, some documents from the same period contain phrases referring to a single 'Horde': 'As for the Horde, we, as the Grand Prince, know and deal with it, and you do not deal with the Horde…, and if I, the Grand Prince, do not pay tribute to the Horde, I will not take it from you' [3, p. 279—treaty between Ivan III and Prince Mikhail Andreevich of Vereya and Beloozero, dated 1482; see almost the same on p. 333—treaty between Grand Prince Ivan Vasilyevich of Ryazan and his brother Fyodor, from 1496]; 'And if you send it to the Horde, send it after discussing it with us… and without discussing it with us do not send it to the Horde' [3, p. 297—Moscow and Tver treaty of 1484–1485]. But this appears to be a rote repetition of clichés elaborated during the previous decades, prior to 1473, or (less likely) as a designation of the Great Horde (among other yurts) as the recipient of the tribute.

The agreement between the sons of Ivan III, concluded at his request in 1504, enumerates the Tatar states that were considered as independent by Russians: 'tributes to the Hordes, including Crimea, Astrakhan, Kazan, and to Tsarevich townlet…' [3, p. 366; also see the Wills charter of Ivan III made the same year: p. 362]. Therefore, the Khanates that had emerged by that time were the ones of Crimea, Kazan, Astrakhan and Kasimov; the Nogai Horde was considered a 'Cossack' entity without any specific status; and in this period, Moscow had no relations with the Siberian (Tyumen) Yurt or the Kazakh Khanate [for more details, see 2, pp. 165–167; 23, pp. 212, 223].

However, the interstate division of the post-Horde space was to a certain degree relative. One indicator of its relative nature is the status of ruling dynasties. Not a single Khan in Kazan, Hajji Tarkhan, Chingi-Tura, Sygnak, or Uzbek and Kazakh nomadic camps designated his geographic location. In the eyes of his subjects and outgoing official documents he was just the 'Khan', and not the Khan of Kazan, Tyumen, etc. The Girays are the only exception. Their pompous titles with enumeration of subordinated territories and peoples, on the one hand, indicates an obvious imitation of the Ottomans but, on the other hand, demonstrates the aspirations and unrealised ambitions of this peripheral branch of the House of Jochid. Other rulers in the former lands of the Ulus of Jochi felt that their affiliation with the 'golden clan' of the Chingisids provided sufficient grounds for declaring their monarchical prerogatives, without any reference to a particular capital city and moreover to the community of subordinated subjects ('Uzbek', or 'Kazakh').

Amid all the nostalgic reminiscences, the degradation of the Golden Horde's statehood was accompanied by the gradual and inevitable fading of the ruling family's charisma. The
Chinggisids shared the fate of many royal houses: soon as a dynasty loses the throne, its monopoly on power is no longer recognised. The period of the late 14th century to the first half of the 15th century was clearly transitory, when the Chinggisids began to lose their state power and being a descendant of Chinggis Khan ceased to play a key role in real politics.

This transition manifested itself in various ways. First, there were 'gurgan' (son-in-law) dynasties when, in order to gain access to the throne, it was sufficient to become related to the 'golden clan' through the female line.

Secondly, the non-dynastic aristocracy among the begs of Turkic tribes, who were almost invisible in politics until the mid-14th century, forced their way to power (see above). During the 15th century, the phenomenon of growing social authority of tribal leaders took shape in the form of a permanent institution of karachi begs, the leaders of major Els, who constituted an indispensable advisory body to the ruling Khan in the late Golden Horde, Crimean Khanate and Kasimov Khanate.

Thirdly, the rule was carried out on behalf of powerless Chinggisid puppets. Many of them were so unremarkable and insignificant that they are not even known to historians. Their only purpose was to sanctify and justify by their sacred person and silent presence the absolute power of the actual ruler.

This institution of 'dummy' khans existed in the western part of the Right wing of the Ulus of Jochi (‘Mamai Horde’) in the 1360–70s. In the 1390–1410s, the Golden Horde was ruled on behalf of its powerless monarchs by beklyaribek Edigü. In the mid-14—early 15th centuries, this phenomenon spread to the Ulus of Chagatai and Timurid state, where puppet representatives of the Chinggisids were enthroned by local emirs. A similar phenomenon was later revived in the Khiva Khanate, where it received the characteristic name 'khanbazi' (playing khans).

However, at the same time, the recognition of the nobility and the hierarchical seniority of the 'golden clan' was preserved everywhere, even after it no longer had supreme power. For example, 'tore' are well-known among the Kazakhs. The House of the Ottomans also recognised its nominally junior status in relation to the Chinggis dynasty (in particular, to the Crimean Khans, their vassals). However, this in no way manifested itself in everyday political practice. The memory of the royal rights of the Chinggis line emerged during the Bashkir revolts in the late 17th and the early 18th centuries. Along with the Turkish sultans and Kalmyk taishas, proposals to take the Bashkirs under their authority were received at that time by Crimean and Kazakh khans as well as Kuchum Sons, Tsareviches 'living the Cossack way of life'.

The memories of unity and kinship of all the Jochids persisted for some time in the post-Horde expanse and sometimes manifested itself in unexpected situations. For example, Mengi Giray officially called not only the Kazan Khan Muhammad-Emin, who lived, according to the Crimea ruler, 'on top of his state' (in the Russian translation) but his own worst enemy, Ahmed from the Great Horde, his brother—that is, an equal monarch. However, he did so only after the death of the latter when communicating with the Polish King [14, p. 29; 15, p. 108]. However, Jochi himself remained in historical memory as merely a genealogical link between his father and his sons. Indications of Jochid unity are extremely rare (for example, see the reference to the traditional ambassadorial ties of 'Jochi's children'—that is, the descendants of Jochi, with Moscow, in the charter sent by Shaybanid Khan Abul-Fath to Ivan III [11, p. 33]; or the comment by Crimean Khan Saadet Giray on the Astrakhan monarch Hussein: 'With him, we are the children of the same father' [13, sheet 895 (896)]—the common 'father' (ancestor) for these representatives of different branches of a huge clan could be, obviously, only the eldest son of Chinggis).

In the minds of those who lived in the Turkic-Tatar yurts, the notion of the former centre of the single state consecrated by the image of Batu (Sain Khan), the second son of Jochi, had been preserved. Capturing the headquarter of the Great Horde Khan was regarded by his victorious rivals as the acquisition of the holy Sain's throne. The extract below how in the 15—early
16th centuries the Jochids interpreted their success in the struggle against the Great Horde: 'God gave me the happiness to take the throne of Sain by killing the son of Timer Kutlu' (Tyumen Khan Ibrakhim to Ivan III in 1494 on the defeat of Khan Ahmed in 1481); 'The golden throne of our father (ancestor—Author), Tsar Sain, is in our hands' (Tsarevich Ahmed Giray, the son of Mengli Giray, who defeated the Great Horde, to King Sigismund, 1514) [10, p. 46; 13, sheet 539]. Eastern chroniclers believed that the main merit of the Manghit beg Waqqas (the second quarter of the 15th century) was the fact that he 'twice won the throne of Sain Khan' for his patron Abul-Khair Khan, after which the name of Abul-Khair was read at the beginning of khutbah, minted on coins, and he 'adorned the throne of Sain Khan' [7, pp. 67, 155]. All the aforementioned thrones/headquarters/capitals (Khan's residences) were in different locations, which indicates how relative this concept was in the ideological constructs of the late medieval Desht-i Kipchak.

Perhaps the common symbolic value for the entire Jochid family was also retained by the dynastic necropolis (quruq) near the city of Saray-Jük on the Yaik River.

However, for all the relics of the Golden Horde's unity, one cannot fail to see the increasing trend towards the distancing of the post-Horde states from one other. The process of disintegration turned out to be stronger. Various local yurts saw the emergence of local khan dynasties, which viewed their holdings only as their own property without any relation to the collapsed common power of the Jochid dynasty. For example, after the representatives of the Great Horde came to power in Kasimov, the Girays claimed their dynastic rights to the khanate, declaring that earlier 'our family was in Meshchera' and now 'it is not our family that is the sovereign of Meshchera' [16, p. 378]. The Russian ambassador was instructed to fend off expected similar claims by Crimeans to Kazan by saying that 'originally, Kazan was not their yurt, but Kazan had its separate tsars' [16, p. 696].

Messages sent by the Turkic aristocracy in the 16th century repeatedly designate the yurts by eponyms, usually bearing the names of the sovereigns who started the ruling dynasty in a particular yurt. If in the 13–14th centuries the eponyms represented the historical figures of a relatively recent past (Jochi, Berke, Öz Beg) who were equally important for all parts of the Empire, in the later period, these became individuals who, firstly, had long ago passed away and, secondly, had operated within fairly local spatial limits.

For example, some sources repeatedly refer to the Crimean Khanate as 'Tsar Toktamysh's yurt', that is, a holding of the descendants, heirs and dynastic successors of Khan Toktamish; the Astrakhan Khanate is called 'Tsar Temir Kutlu's yurt', that is, by the name of Khan Temür Qutlugh; the Kazakh Khanate is called 'Tsar Urus's yurt' and 'Kazakh Tsar Barak's yurt', that is, by the name of the Golden Horde and Kök Horde Khans Urus and Barak.

With regards to the Kazan Khanate, such a designation can be found in the form of 'Alibay and Altybay yurts' (the names of the begs that ruled in the first half of the 15th century [see: 9, pp. 47, 82]) and 'Tsar Magmet Kiray's yurt.' The latter designation was made in the following context. In 1552, 'the whole Kazan land', without consultation with Moscow, invited to its throne the Astrakhan Tsarevich Yadgar Mohammed, who lived with the Nogai. Murza Ismail pointed out in a letter to his patron and ally, Tsar Ivan IV, Nogai, in particular, that such an invitation was illegitimate in principle and the Kazan people had no right to make decisions about their throne, because the 'yurt was not theirs, it was Tsar Magmetkiray's yurt' [10, p. 105].

This is a clear reference to Crimean Khan Mehmed Giray I, who reigned from 1515 to 1521. It is likely that due to his ties to the local dynasty through his mother and his wife Nur-Sultan, he considered the Kazan yurt his hereditary possession. In any case, this is what his letter to the Astrakhan Khan implies: 'Kazan was our yurt, and now he (Grand Prince Vasily III of Moscow—Author) put in charge there a sultan of his own (a reference to Khan Shah Ali—

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4 The origin of the Giray clan from the Toktamysh is disputed.
Author) [22, p. 85]. It is worth noting that the Kazan nobility shared this interpretation. After the death of Khan Muhammad-Emin (end of 1518), an embassy ‘from all the Kazan people' arrived at Bakbchysarai with an appeal to Mehmed Giray: ‘...Kazan is your possession, choose one of your children or brothers and send him to us so that he becomes our Tsar' [13, sheet 796].

In the early 1520s, a similar appeal to Mehmed Giray was even received from the Kazakh begs, mired in their quarrels and feuds: ‘...All these Kazakh princes with their entire army swear allegiance to me and want to serve me, and they sent a man to me with that message' [13, sheet 865 (866)]. However, this was an isolated episode in the relations between Crimea and the eastern yurts.

All this reflected the process of formalising and consolidating a new type of land holding by individual aristocratic groups (including families, and—later—dynasties) that began in the Golden Horde in the 14th century [see: 21, pp. 111, 112, 135–138].

The conquest of the neighbouring yurt was no longer regarded as a restoration of some unity but as a unification of independent possessions. ‘Our yurt has become an entire yurt with your yurt (Crimea—Author)… Saint Tsar Ahmat', wrote in 1487 the Khan of the Great Horde Murtaza b. Ahmed to Crimean Tsarevich Nur Devlet [15, p. 108], evidently recalling the Great Horde's conquests of Crimea in 1471 and 1476. Although they introduced the phrase ‘Great Khan of the Great Horde' to their title in the early 16th century, members of the Giray dynasty also subsequently began to include Crimea in their title 'The Great Khan of the Great Horde' along with 'the Great Horde.' Consequently, here there was not only the claim to control the entire Ulus of Jochi ('the Great Horde'), but also a reminder that the Great Horde had been conquered in 1502. The fact that these two possessions were perceived as separate after 1502 is evidenced by the oath of the Crimean ambassador given to Alexander Jagiellon in 1506 on behalf of Khan Mengli Giray 'with all his sultans, brothers and sons, and with all his ulhans and princes, all his murzas and all the people of both (sic!—Author) Hordes of Trans-Volga and Perekop who are his subjects (italics added—Author)' [24, p. 53].

However, after defeating the Great Horde, Mengli Giray still included it in the group of his possessions. But in other similar cases, a junior ruler dependent on the victor was appointed to the conquered yurt (Jani Beg was a protégé of the Great Horde Khan Ahmed in Crimea in 1476; Bahadur Giray that of Crimean Khan Mehmed Giray in Astrakhan in 1523; in some respects, this was also the case of Muhammad-Emin, who was brought to the throne of Kazan by Ivan III after Muscovite voivode-s captured Kazan in 1487).

The collapse of the Ulus of Jochi was also accompanied by corresponding ethno-cultural processes. The ethnic consolidation, the formation of the Golden Horde Tatar nationality can clearly be observed in the 'Right wing' of the Ulus with its well-developed urban civilisation, powerful centres of the old sedentary culture (Bulgaria, Crimea and Moldova), and lively inter-regional connections. However, this process was interrupted first by the plague and later by wars and the migration of nomads from the east. The ‘Uzbeks' of the Left wing, or rather the carriers of archaic social and cultural norms, firmly held onto their tribal system and stimulated renewed tribalisation in the western part of the Ulus of Jochi. Its successor states (Kazan, Crimea, Siberia and possibly the Astrakhan Khanates) saw the formation of local ethnic communities based on the earlier relatively unified Tatar ethnicity of the Golden Horde.

Among the most important consolidating factors was the preservation of former socio-political structures, a clan-based system that united military and service class nobility, as well

5 The ambassadors lured the Khan with promises of considerable growth in the number of his subjects and warriors: ‘We have twenty thousand of our fathers' children and with the Cherekis and Mordan the number is countless'. It is a well-known fact that Mehmed Giray sent his younger brother Sahib Giray to reign in Kazan. The people of Kazan appealed to Crimea with a similar request after the death of their Khan Safa Giray in 1549.
as a common religion, Islam. The Muslims of the Golden Horde (which seems to refer primarily to the aristocracy and nomads) were united not only by the mere fact of their adoption of Islam, but also through the special institution of the Sayyids. It is no coincidence that in a number of post-Horde Khanates, the Sayyids as the heads of the local Muslim clergy traced their genealogy to a common ancestor who lived at the time of the Ulus of Jochi [5, p. 21]. However, from the 15–17th centuries Islam did not play a significant role in real politics, remaining an official ideology without preventing internecine conflicts.

§ 2. The Great Horde

Vadim Trepavlov

In historiography, the name 'the Great Horde' is attributed to a part of the 15th century Ulus of Jochi located in the south of Eastern Europe. It was actually the southern area within the right wing of the Golden Horde, remaining under the control of the 'central' (Sarai) government after the newly formed khanates had broken away. It is hard to determine the exact date when the Great Horde came into existence. We can refer it to the event most convenient for research—the accession of Küchük Muhammad in the steppes of Eastern Europe in 1438, the dynastic cycle of whose reign, along with his descendants made up the history of the Great Horde from 1438 to 1502.

The Russian expression 'the Great Horde' is undoubtedly a borrowing of the Turkic Ulug Ordu, which was 'the original Tatar name of the Golden Horde', the Ulus of Jochi [20, p. 193].

The Turkic names used both in the Horde and in neighbouring Turkic dominions were phrases that included the term takht (throne) and the following terms repeatedly occurred in chronicles and diplomatic correspondence: Takht Eli, Takht Memleketi, Takht Vilayeti. All of them are translated roughly as the 'Throne Domain', the 'Throne Region', or the 'Capital Region'.

In Polish-Lithuanian sources, the 'the Great Horde' was always called the Trans-Volga Horde. However, the Great Horde had in fact lost the Trans-Volga camping grounds. Most of its population had to move to the Right Bank of Volga, to pasture cattle or grow crops in Ciscaucasia, the Azov Sea region, and the Northern Black Sea region around the third quarter of the 15th century due to a conflict with the tribes of the Manghit yurt in the Yaik-Emba interfluve (later known as the Nogais), who had gained strength by that time.
Chapter XI. The Later Golden Horde Time

The administrative structure of the Great Horde was mainly derived from the management system of the unified Ulus of Jochi and repeated it in many ways. However, the historical circumstances of the 15th century led to a simplification and curtailing of the once extensive government mechanism.

The Horde was led by a monarch bearing the title Khan. There were several in the late 15th century. Khans preferred living in their nomadic camp and not in cities; all sources report camps to have been their only residence. At the turn of the century, another title emerged in the Horde—qalga, the declared heir to the throne. In the hierarchy of power, a qalga was followed by beklyaribek (ulug beg). The Manghits, descending from the Golden Horde beklyaribek Edigü, monopolised the position in the Great Horde. The khan, qalga and beklyaribek made up the triad of supreme rulers of the yurt.

The composition of the Great Horde ruling elite is often designated in the sources by an expression 'uhlans princes'—that is, oghlans and begs. Oghlans at that time were members of the House of Jochi, not belonging to the family of the ruling Khan (male members of that family were titled sultans). The meeting of oghlans and begs addressed the most important issues of state. There is evidence in diplomatic letters that the khan made decisions after holding a discussion ('rada') with his noble compatriots: '...we have summoned all the uhlans and princes and held a rada', '...we and the uhlans and princes, having discussed that matter, decided to do it', '...our uhlans and princes told our father...', etc. [22, pp. 125, 138; 22, pp. 84, 88].

The available data on public officials in the Great Horde is scarce. Khan Sheikh Ahmad sent to the Crimea as ambassador 'Molzozoda, a great molna, son of Ahmad', who wrote letters on Khan's behalf in his own hand [16, p. 354]. Apparently, this 'molna' (mawlana, meaning a learned theologian) also acted as the chief superintendent of the Khan's headquarter (orda-bazar). The list of Lithuanian awards to the attendants of Sheikh Ahmad provided for payments to 'Abdulla, marshal of Khan Sheikh Ahmad' [23, p. 430].

The essential element of the Horde's bureaucracy known as the darugha (the vicegerent of a city or region, typically with a sedentary population) is only mentioned once. In 1470, Ahmad Khan was being set up against Ivan III during the negotiations with the Poles by 'Prince Temir, Ryazan darugha, etc.' [15, vol. 18, p. 224]. Apparently, that officer was in charge of the affairs related to the Grand Principality of Ryazan, in the same way as a Moscow darugha was attached to the court of Ulugh Muhammad [see: 15, vol. 12, p. 15].

The Muslims of the Golden Horde (which seems to refer primarily to the aristocracy and nomads) were united not only by the mere fact of their adoption of Islam, but also through the special institution of sayyids. It is no coincidence that in a number of post-Horde Khanates, the head of the local Muslim clergy traced their genealogy to a common ancestor who lived at the time of the Ulus of Jochi [9, pp. 105–107; 10, 11, pp. 205, 206]. Sources on the Great Horde documented the sayyids and hadjis as heads of ambassadorial missions to neighbouring countries [22, pp. 138, 178; 25, p. 88]. As stated in a letter by Khan Sheikh Ahmad, among the Horde men taken prisoners in Moscow at different times there were 'a sayyid, and priests of the Horde' [22, p. 181].

It appears that the Great Horde had no rigid system of administrative and territorial division. By analogy with other nomadic states, we can assume that there were areas in the Khanate assigned to certain tribes (els). This is only reliably known only about the Manghits, whose yurt lay within the Horde. In the times of Ahmad Khan—that is, in the 1460–1470s, it was governed by beklyaribek Timur, with his permanent camp stationed there.

The Tatars of the Great Horde had their summer pasturing ground near the Don and winter ones in the Volga-Don interfluve. The composition of the herd was typical for Eurasian nomads. We know it from Giosafat Barbaro’s description of the arrival of Küchük Muhammad’s people.

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6 The marshal (marszałek) in the Polish-Lithuanian state was a royal court official performing the functions of the master of ceremonies and judicial duties.
to Tana in 1438: 'First came the herds of horses at sixty, one hundred, two hundred or more in a herd; then came the camels and oxen, followed by small stock'. The Italian diplomat gives flattering epithets to the Tatar cattle, like 'marvellous big bulls', 'tall shaggy double-humped camels', 'huge sheep on tall legs, with long hair and such tails that some weigh up to 12 pounds each', [1, pp. 142–143, 149].

Many sources give credit to the agriculture in this nomadic society, despite its secondary and supportive role in the economy. The Great Horde's croplands were situated on the banks of the Dnieper tributaries Oryol (Orel) and Samara, and on the Kuma River, in the steppes adjoining the Pyatigorye area [see: 16, pp. 113, 119, 149]. Any crop failure or disruption of ploughing caused by enemy raids put the Tatars in a very difficult situation, giving rise to social tension and conflicts over migration routes.

In addition to animal husbandry and agriculture, the Tatars produced handicrafts ('In the army, they have artisans like weavers, blacksmiths, gunsmiths and others, and they generally have all the necessary crafts' [1, p. 147]). Hunting, too, was important for subsistence ('The Tatars are excellent hunters with falcons and have many gyrfalcons... they hunt deer and other big game' [1, p. 148]).

Like any nomadic formation, the Great Horde needed trade with its sedentary neighbours. And like most khaganates, khanates and hordes, it marketed the products of animal husbandry. A significant item of income was the slave trade. Until the end of Khan Ahmed's rule, Muscovy maintained tributary relations with the Horde. It is unclear how noticeable the flow of funds in the form of tribute (toll) was in the Horde's economy. In any case, its role was reduced to nothing when Ivan III stopped paying [3, pp. 160–163].

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Küchük Muhammad, son of Khan Timur ibn Temür Qutlugh (1410–1412), began his ascension to power in the eastern steppes. He had close connections to the numerous and powerful Manghit children of Edigü. Members of the family served him as beklyaribeks. It is known that Edigü’s son Nur ad-Din married his daughter off to would-be Khan Temür, father of Küchük Muhammad [14, p. 99]. She was probably the latter's mother.

Eastern chroniclers note that Küchük Muhammad was very young when enthroned. When he came to the Don in 1438, the Venetian consul of Tana sent Giosafat Barbaro to the Tatar prince with gifts and testimony of obedience. The messenger was brought in front of Küchük Muhammad, who sat leaning on the shoulder of his beklyaribek. Barbaro wrote: 'The Tsarevich was about 22 years old, Nawruz—about 25' [1, p. 142].

It appears that Küchük Muhammad took up the race for power on emerging from boyhood. We believe that he was encouraged to act when Nawruz, Ulugh Muhammad's beklyaribek, sided with him. In accordance with his status, Nawruz commanded the Horde's army, and he took a significant part of it with him. Barbaro writes with certainty that Nawruz left for 'Tsarevich Kizim Ahmet' 'taking along the men, who wanted to follow him' [1, p. 141].

The sources do not mention any reasons for the rift between the beklyaribek and the khan. But the chronicles note that Ulugh Muhammad was displeased with the powerful Shirin nobleman Beg Tegina. In 1432, the camp of Ulugh Muhammad was the site of the famous dispute about the rights to the Grand Prince yarliq between Vasily II Vasilyevich of Moscow and his uncle, Yury Dmitrievich of Zvenigorod. Confident of his mighty influence, Tegina firmly promised Yury a successful resolution of litigation, but the Khan took the side of the Prince of Moscow. Outraged, 'Tegina of Shirin opposed the Tsar and wanted to depart from him, because at that time Mahmet (Ulugh Muhammad) was attacked by king Kichi Ahmet (Küchük Muhammad)' [15, vol. 12, p. 16].

The 14-year-old 'Tsar' presumably set off to Sarai at the instigation of the defectors led by Nawruz. Until then, he had resided somewhere in the east or in Hajji Tarkhan, the yurt of his
grandfather Temür Qutlugh. The first battles did not bring victory to either of the sides. Eventually, the 'Elder' and 'Younger' Muhammads came to an agreement on the division of subordinate territories. Ulugh Muhammad retained the Volga region, while Kuchuk Muhammad received the Crimea [17, p. 180]. Obviously, it is more likely that the Khanate was divided into wings: one Khan obtained the right western wing, from the Don to the Danube, and the other Khan gained the left eastern wing, from the Don to the Caspian Sea [2, pp. 17, 33].

The confrontation was finally resolved in 1438. It might be that the power shift took place without bloodshed. Ulugh Muhammad broke down facing the growing danger from his younger cousin, who was gaining power. Barbaro observed an impressive picture of the mass migration of Küchük Muhammad’s people to the Don, and he wrote about the outcome of the struggle for the throne: 'Ulugh Muhammad ... after Kezim Ahumet (Küchük Muhammad) had come to his land, seeing that he cannot fight him, and left the Horde together with his sons and his other people' [1, p. 150]. Finally, he managed to settle in Kazan, and the Middle Volga region was thus no longer part of the Great Horde.

There is no data on the Horde’s domestic history during Küchük Muhammad’s rule, with the one exception of a chronicle entry dated 1440: 'That autumn, Tsar Mahmet of the Great Horde killed Mansup, his grand prince of the Horde, and many Tatars were then killed in the Horde' [15, vol. 12, p. 30]. This clearly refers to an uprising led by the beklyaribek. Mansup is, of course, Mansur b. Edigü. However, since Mansur had been killed by Khan Barak thirteen or fourteen years before, it can be assumed that the chronicler received the news of the execution of Mansur’s brother, 'grand prince' Nawruz, who had entered into conflict with Küchük Muhammad. Not too long before this, this beg brought his numerous armed men to the young Khan and accompanied him in the struggle for power. Perhaps, over time, the absolute power of Nawruz started to press upon the Khan, and he decided to get rid of the Manghit nobleman along with the 'many Tatars' who supported the bey.

On the whole, Desht-i Kipchak saw some stability in the 1430–1440s. In the east of the former Ulus of Jochi, beyond the Yaik River, was the land of the mighty Abul-Khair, to whom the Manghits generally pledged allegiance. The Lower Volga and the steppes of Ciscaucasia were possessed by Küchük Muhammad. The Horde of Sayyid-Ahmed was roaming beyond the Don. We see no major conflicts between them, other than that both Khans claimed the Crimea and the steppes along the Siverskyi Donets. In 1434, Vasily II of Moscow, in a treaty with Dmitry Shemyaka, reminded how he 'had sent his ambassadors to the Khans Kichim Agnet (Küchük Muhammad) and Sidi Ahmet (Sayyid Ahmed)' [5, p. 116]. This means that the Muscovites recognised the delicate balance of power in the steppes and the legality of the two neighbouring Khans.

Küchük Muhammad died in 1459, leaving the Khanate to his sons, Mahmud and Ahmad, if not in a blossoming, rather then in flexible condition capable of competing with the neighbouring yurts for supremacy in the lands of the former Golden Horde, if not prosperous.

Some undated coins of Khans Mahmud and Ahmad have come down to us. The coins were minted in the name of Mahmud in the cities of Ordu Bazar, Bek Bazar, Qırım al-Mansur, Hajji Tarkhan, Ukek and Bulgar; in the name of Ahmad in Beg Bazaar and in Hajji Tarkhan [7, pp. 39, 40].

In Russian sources, Mahmud is known for a single reason. In 1460, he tried to besiege Ryazan but ran up against opposition and retreated, suffering heavy losses. Some chronicles transcribe the khan’s name as Ahmut (which may be confused with Ahmad), but in the Typographic Chronicle he is called 'Tsar (Khan) Mahmud' [15, vol. 24, p. 184]. Mahmud’s escort during this campaign included beklyaribek Timur and his brother Din Sufi (Tensufui) [15, vol. 5, p. 272; vol. 20, p. 271; vol. 23, p. 156]. Later Timur was to become a close ally of Ahmad Khan, and Din-Sufi would inherit his high rank.
Historians characterise the relationship between Ahmad and Mahmud as a struggle for power [for example, see: 4, p. 544; 6, p. 84]. The fatal landmark after which Mahmud was unable to defend his superiority was probably his defeat by the Crimean Khan Hacı Giray. In 1465, the Horde Khan set out to attack the Russian lands and made his way towards the Don. He was unexpectedly attacked there by the Crimeans, who 'beat him and took over the Horde.' The campaign plans had to be left behind, the forces of the Great Horde turning to hold off the attack: 'and they started fighting amongst themselves' [15, vol. 24, p. 186]. Mahmud managed to drive away Hacı Giray but after that dropped out of active politics. He died soon after. His son Mahmud received from Ahmed the appanage of Hajji Tarkhan and eventually became completely subordinate to the khan (following a brief conflict with him).

Having gained strength, the Great Horde initiated active contacts with neighbouring and distant monarchs. After a long break, the Khan's envoys appeared in Istanbul. We know of two messages to Sultan Muhammad II (Mehmed Fatih), sent by Mahmud (dated 10 April 1466) and Ahmad (dated May or June 1477). Around 1475–1477, Mehmed Fatih, in his letter, informed Ahmad of the conquest of Kaffa and the Turks' campaign against Moldova. In form, it was a typical syuyunch (news of a victory), but the underlying message held a warning to the Great Horde to stop hostilities with Mengli Giray, who was the Ottoman protégé in the Crimea [18, p. 244].

The rivalry between the Great Horde and the newly-formed Crimean Khanate began as soon as the first of the Girays had established his power. Ahmad acted quite carefully in regard to the Crimea, waiting for an opportune moment when certain forces had formed within the Khanate on which the Great Horde could rely. The opportunity presented itself in the summer of 1466, when the sons of the deceased Hacı Giray started fighting for the throne. Tsarevich Nur Devlet asked Ahmad for a yarliq for the Crimean yurt. Obviously, he was trying to give legitimacy to his rule by means of this characteristic Horde procedure. The flattering request implying the recognition of the Great Horde Khan as the supreme sovereign was gladly satisfied by Ahmad without delay. The yarliq turned Crimea into his feudatory domain. However, the local noblemen had no wish to obey the ruler, Takht Eli. As a result of many intrigues and after the outbreak of an armed struggle in Crimea, Nur Devlet was dethroned. Mengli Giray was proclaimed khan.

Ten years later, Ahmad made another attempt to incorporate the Crimea into his sphere of domination. At that time, the discord among the local begs was so deep that some of them decided to resort to the help of the Great Horde. The leaders of the Shirin Eli, Aminek and Hajiike, happened to be in opposing camps. Hajiike and Abdullah, leader of the Baryn Eli, brought Tsarevich Janibek (b. Ahmad?) from the Horde, but they were fought off by the army gathered by Aminek. Having waited until in the summer of 1476 the Crimean army led by Aminek went to Moldova by order of the Ottoman Padishah, Jani Beg rushed to the peninsula ahead of a large army given to him by Ahmad and started looting. Aminek hastily returned but, facing the preponderance of the enemy’s forces, took refuge in the fortress. Jani Beg became Khan instead of the dethroned Nur Devlet (who had managed to briefly take the throne in that turmoil). In fact, a short-term union of the two khanates took place. In 1486, Murtaza b. Ahmed wrote about those times to Nur Devlet, who lived in Kasimov that Ahmad made something like 'our yurt has become an entire yourt with your yurt' [16, p. 69].

Nothing is known about the rule of the Great Horde appointee, but his position was very precarious. Jani Beg asked Ivan III if he could settle in the lands of Muscovy in case he had to leave Crimea. By the spring of 1478, Nur Devlet, who had regained power, sent ambassadors to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

Relations of the Great Horde with the Polish-Lithuanian state, patronising the hated Girays, evolved initially as hostile, but later they seemed to form a coalition partnership. The confrontation with the Muscovite state pushed Ahmad and King Casimir to form a military alliance. In 1470, ambassador Giray the One-Eyed came from Krakow to the Horde, proposing
a joint attack on Rus'. But the King was distracted from forging an anti-Moscow coalition by the conflict with Hungary, and the next round of negotiations with the Great Horde took place in 1479–1480.

Initially, relations of the Great Horde with the Muscovite state evolved traditionally, based on the two-century tributary relationship (so-called 'yoke') of the Russian lands with the Ulus of Jochi. In the 15th century, visits of the Grand Princes to the Horde gradually became a thing of the past, and contacts between the two countries were maintained through ambassadors from the 1440s. The Muscovite rulers explained the regular mutual visits of ambassadors not by the payment of toll or obtaining yarliqs (which was indisputable for the neighbours), but by the long-established practice 'from the fathers, grandfathers and great-grandfathers' or by the geographical proximity of the lands [see: 16, pp. 4, 10].

Chronicles report a fairly active exchange of ambassadors in the 1470s. The visit to Moscow of Ahmad’s envoy Bochuki in July 1476 with a demand to Ivan III to appear 'before the Tsar in the Horde' was the most illustrative [15, vol. 8, p. 183; vol. 12, p. 108]. It is not a mere coincidence that the account of this mission immediately follows reference to the war between Ahmad and Mengli Giray. It seems those historians who saw a connection between these events have a point: namely, Ahmad’s desire to restore the former Golden Horde statehood, to gather under his rule the separated yurts and make the Russian tributaries come to the Horde to pledge obedience and obtain yarliqs [3, p. 162; 13, p. 34].

If indeed it was so, then Ahmad played the wrong card. The Muscovite state was on the rise and became increasingly tired of the duty to collect the toll for the khan. During the rule of Ivan III, it ceased to pay the tribute. Recent studies show that it was a long and gradual journey for Moscow to be released from its tributary duties. In the 1440–1460s, the toll was sent to the Horde with long intervals, and finally ceased to be paid in 1471 [3, pp. 153–162]. This explains the relatively frequent visits of Ahmad’s ambassadors to Ivan III: the 'Tsar' demanded the proper tribute bequeathed by his ancestors.

The culmination of the escalating conflict was the so-called 'Great Stand on the Ugra River' in 1480, which is the most well-known and thoroughly studied episode of Russian-Horde relations in the 15th century. The autumn and winter of 1480 Ahmad spent in a fruitless and impotent stand on the bank of the Ugra River, a tributary of the Oka, against the Muscovite army of Ivan III, not daring to attack the Russians and waiting in vain for the allied Polish army. At the end of the year, the Khan led the exhausted and famished Horde army back home to the south and dismissed the men to their uluses.

The outcome of the 'Ugra Standoff' was interpreted by the Tatars and the Poles in a significantly different way than the Muscovite version. Ahmad’s son, Khan Sheikh Ahmad, in a letter to Alexander I Jagiellon, dated 1497, cited as the reason for the Horde army’s retreat the perseverance of the Khan’s retinue recommending against warfare because the Poles had failed to arrive: 'The Khan, our father, being angry with Ivan, got onto a horse, but your father, the King, did not come that year. Our uhlans and princes told our father: "Ivan is both your subject and King; the other King did not come that year, and you should go back..." So they took my father's reins and returned him. And then our father was taken by God' [22, p.125].

Maciej Stryjkowski in his chronicle explains the failure of the campaign as being down to the beklyaribek’s greed and intrigues. The 'Trans-Volga Tsar' stood on the Uhrae river, waiting for news from King Casimir; in the meantime, the Muscovite prince sent rich gifts to the 'hetman, Tsar’s prince Timur'. Timur persuaded the Tsar to retreat. The Khan followed this advice, and 'then Timur the hetman stabbed Khan for the gifts of the Grand Prince' [21, p. 284].

In all other sources, the death of Ahmad is described quite differently. In January 1481, the Siberian-Nogai troops routed Ahmad’s main camp, and the Khan himself was killed by the Nogai murza Yamburgurchi b. Waqqas [8, p. 122; 15, vol. 6, p. 232; vol. 12, pp. 20, 23; vol. 18, p. 268; vol.
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19, p. 39; vol. 25, p. 328; vol. 39, p. 268. Some chronicles state that Ahmad was killed by Khan Ibak of Tyumen, who led this campaign [15, vol. 26, p. 274; vol. 28, p. 315; vol. 33, p. 124].

The Tatars of the Great Horde, being left without a ruler, roamed the steppes under the gaze of hostile neighbours. Beklyaribek Timur managed to escape unscathed from the Siberian-Nogai raid. Taking Ahmad’s children with him, he went to Crimea to Khan Mengli Giray. Timur was undeterred by the fact that Mengli Giray belonged to a hostile camp (the Crimeans had sided with Moscow against the Horde and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth). The Horde refugees found shelter and well-being in the Taurida peninsula. The Crimean Khan decided to host the beklyaribek, powerful in the not so distant past, and treated him with due respect. But ‘Ahmad’s children’, Tsareviches Murtaza and Sayyid Mahmud, were not attracted by the lot of honourable dependents in Bakhchysarai. After a while (probably two or three years), Sayyid Mahmud together with Timur returned to the Great Horde. Timur occupied his former high position. But Mengli Giray managed to take Murtaza hostage, having seen through the re-emigration plans of his ‘guests’. In retaliation to the fugitives, the Khan’s squad headed north ‘to drive away what was left of the Horde’. Having gathered the men of the Great Horde throughout the steppe, the new Khan Sayyid Mahmud with the chief beg decided to go and rescue Murtaza. The first task was to find out whether there were Turkish troops in the Crimea. When it became clear that there were no Turks, the Great Horde’s cavalry advanced upon Mengli Giray. Murtaza was released, and the Khan himself secretly fled from his army and urgently called the Ottomans to his aid. The Horde did not wait for the Sultan’s soldiers to come and hastily retreated home [15, vol. 8, p. 216; vol. 12, p. 217; vol. 28, p. 318; 16, p. 53].

Having returned to Desht-i Kipchak, the Horde finally engaged in the restoration of its statehood. Murtaza and Sayyid Mahmud shared the Khan's throne. The texts of Muscovite origin first mention the brothers in the charter of Ivan III sent to V. Nozdrevatov, an ambassador in Bakhchysarai, in June 1484 [16, p. 43]. In August of the same year, Murtaza informed King Casimir: ‘First, Ahmad Khan was the only Tsar, and now we are two Tsars together with my brother Sayyid Mahmud...’ In another letter, he emphasised his legitimate monarchic rank: ‘...you should regard me like you regarded Ahmad Khan...’ [24, pp. 98, 99]. However, both this and his other messages dated 1484 imply conflicting relations within the Horde. Murtaza repeatedly said that he had no idea where his brother and co-ruler as well as the chief beg Timur were at the moment [24, pp. 98, 100].

Eventually, Murtaza broke up with his brothers completely. His place on the throne was occupied by Sheikh Ahmad; Sayyid Mahmud reserved his position as a co-ruling khan. Murtaza had to demonstratively separate from his relatives ('moved away from them... into the field', as worded by Casimir) and ask for a residence permit in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania [24, p. 144].

After the death of the skilled politician Timur (between 1484 and 1486), who had restrained the Tsareviches’ ambitions, quarrels broke out in the Khans’ family, and Khans began to replace each other with amazing rapidity. Sometimes, it may be difficult to understand the co-regency combinations, because there would be no single sovereign until the end of the Great Horde’s history [for more details, see: 19, chapter 9].

At the turn of the 15th–16th centuries, the Great Horde began to plunge into turmoil. The collapse of its already primitive statehood was clearly manifested by the increase in the number of simultaneously ruling dynasties. What is more, there is little evidence that they had any territorial disputes. Each khan ruled over the inherited group of ulus people and did not claim absolute supremacy (which, however, did not prevent violent conflicts).

The main foreign policy challenge for the Great Horde at the last stage of its history was the relationship with the Crimean Khanate. Beklyaribek Timur, whose daughter married Mengli Giray, was leading an autonomous policy towards Bakhchysarai. Mengli Giray thought highly
of the Manghit nobleman and apparently regarded him and his co-tribesmen as a counterbalance to the powerful Shirins and Baryns gathered around the Girays’ throne.

In the mid-1480s, the tension in Horde-Crimean relations decreased slightly, but soon the feud was renewed. In September 1490, the Horde’s embassy on behalf of the Khans Sheikh Ahmad and Sayyid Mahmud, as well as ‘grand prince Manghit Azika, in the name of all Karachi and the good men’ made peace with Mengli Giray. When the Crimean Khan, believing in the sincerity of the Horde khans’ intentions, disbanded the Tatar soldiers ‘to arable lands and crops,’ the joint Horde and Manghit army invaded the peninsula and plundered uluses of one of the noblest Baryn el. Then the attackers moved to the north to spend the winter at the Dnieper estuary. Ivan III, respecting the partnership with Mengli Giray, rejected Hajjike’s proposal of ‘brotherhood’ with the co-rulers of the Great Horde because of their enmity with Crimea [16, pp. 108, 160, 161].

In a response raid in the winter of 1490/91, the Crimeans managed to steal many horses from the enemy, ‘cutting the enemy’s legs’ [16, p. 105]. The combat capability of the Horde declined dramatically. The Crimean Khan wanted to consolidate the success by another campaign and obtained the janissary troops from the Sultan for that purpose. In addition, the Horde was continuously threatened from the north by the growing power of Moscow. In 1491, after negotiations with the Turkish vicergerent of Azov, the Great Horde ceased hostilities.

Face-to-face confrontations gave way to backstage politics. ‘Ahmad Tsar's children' did not send official ambassadors to Bakhchysarai but operated through the ever-present merchants, who were instructed to communicate to Mengli Giray their intention to form an alliance with him, provided that break with Moscow; the Khan regarded these assurances as a pack of lies [16, p. 218]. He was right. At the same time (in 1495), Sheikh Ahmad in his correspondence with King Casimir revealed his true approach to his southern neighbour: ‘What you should know is that we have no other enemy, except Mengli Giray’ [22, p. 97; 25, p. 75]. Reconciliation between the two 'post-Horde' states was no longer possible. However, peace was not what Mengli Giray strove for. At the end of the 15th century, the looming collapse of the Great Horde was quite evident. The Crimean troops began entering the steppe, not to fight with the Horde’s men, but rather to plunder the defenceless uluses and take captives.

The relationship of the Great Horde with the Christian Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (in particular with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania during its division) evolved in a much closer and warmer way than with any of the Muslim countries. The Lithuanian-Muscovite border disputes and clashes continued, and Casimir IV still regarded the Tatars of Takht Eli as allies in his fight against Ivan III. In 1482, the Grand Duke informed Mengli Giray that the King 'presently, does not want peace with me, but sent messengers to the Horde to raise my enemies on me', meaning the sons of Ahmad [16, p. 29]. Two years later, the co-ruling Khans Murtaza and Sayyid Mahmud accepted another embassy from Krakow led by Stret. In his message to the King, Murtaza assured that no harm would be done to his lands [12, columns 348, 349; 16, p. 43]. When Murtaza had quarreled with his brothers, Casimir invited him to live on his land, 'and we would not deprive you, our brother, of our bread and salt' [22, p. 144].

Both Moscow and Bakhchysarai watched this diplomacy warily, rightly sensing the danger to themselves. Ivan III and Mengli Giray agreed to catch the Polish-Lithuanian and Horde’s ambassadors in the steppes [16, pp. 202, 210] in order to prevent the hostile coalition's operation. The Crimean Khan angrily reproached Alexander Jagiellon, who had replaced Casimir, for exchanging embassies with the enemies of the Crimea, for which he received replies with journeys into history, reminders of the traditional Lithuanian-Horde relations and the proximity of Tatar encampments to Lithuania and so on.

In fact, these relations were far from being trouble-free. One of the Horde’s ambassadors had been detained in Lithuania for several years, while another did not receive the appropriate diplomatic status. After all, Alexander, son of Casimir, behaved towards the Great Horde in a
more detached and cautious way than had his late father. In addition, the situation in the Horde discouraged any close coalition with it. The co-ruling Khans of the declining state, who were continuously quarrelling among themselves and frequently replacing one another, were losing their appeal as allies for Lithuanian politicians.

In the late 1501 or early 1502, it occurred to Khan Sheikh Ahmad and Beklyaribek Tawakkul that their alliance with Lithuania was not beneficial at all. The Moscow ambassador was pleased to report from Crimea in the summer of 1502, that ‘...Khan Sheikh Ahmad is in discord with the Lithuanian Tsar’ [16, p. 418]. The Horde’s leaders intended to persuade Moscow into the anti-Crimea alliance, promising ‘to break up with Lithuania’ [16, p. 384]. However, Ivan III did not wish to break up the established relations with Mengli Giray for the sake of this dubious acquisition and informed Mengli Giray of the Horde’s embassy.

In contrast to the Polish-Lithuanian monarchs, the Dukes of Moscow had no plans to form a coalition with the Great Horde. Quite the opposite; the Horde, roaming along the southern frontier, posed a constant threat to Muscovite lands. Therefore, the efforts of Russian diplomacy were focused on creating anti-Horde alliances by involving the Crimea, Kazan, and the Nogais as well as using the ever increasing number of Serving Tatars in Rus'.

The Great Horde was in a state of profound crisis by the beginning of the 16th century. A period of unrest and wars had exhausted its herds of horses, decreased its flocks of sheep, and upset its agrarian system. Famine broke out in the nomad camps. The Khan's Ordobazar was roaming the steppe in a chaotic manner. Sources describe the co-ruling khan's location one day near Astrakhan, another day in the North-East Caspian Sea region, then at the Don River and its tributaries, then at the Dnieper. In 1500–1501, the main aspiration of Khan Sheikh Ahmad (not shared by his brothers) was to cross to the Right Bank of the Dnieper, even if it would be the Lithuanian or Ottoman lands, just to have a guarantee of subsistence and security. The mass migration of nomads to neighboring countries vividly indicated the collapse that the country was approaching. The impoverished Tatars were leaving their unsuccessful Khans and rushing to the protection of more reliable patrons.

In May 1502, Mengli Giray, leading the Crimean cavalry, marched against the Great Horde. Every now and then, the army encountered migrants along the way: ‘...many people go to him (Mengli Giray—Author) to Perekop’, 'an ulus from the Great Horde, and that ulus heads off to Perekop' [16, p. 419]. The attackers knew that Sheikh Ahmad had quarreled with his beklyaribek Tawakkul, and only about twenty thousand Tatars remained under his command now. The last battle in the history of Takht Eli took place at the confluence of the Sula River and the Dnieper7 around 15 June 1502, which Sheikh Ahmad lost completely. The Khan fled, the victor gaining his treasure along with the Ordobazar. The uluses of the Great Horde Tatars were now also under his allegiance, and Mengli Giray planned to relocate them to the south, closer to the Crimea.

This is usually considered to be the end of the history of the Great Horde (although later there were some futile attempts to revive it). The lands west of the Volga, which used to belong to the Horde, were divided between the Crimean yurt and the newly formed Astrakhan yurt; the banks of the steppe rivers were populated by increasingly numerous free Cossacks, who wanted no rulers; and the eastern lands had long been occupied by the Nogais.


7 For the establishment of the battle location and date see: [2, pp. 79, 111, 112].
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§ 3. The Astrakhan Yurt

Ilya Zaitsev

The Astrakhan Khanate was one of the states which appeared after the collapse of the Golden Horde, with its capital in Hajji Tarkhan (Russian: Astrakhan). According to the traditional view, Hajji Tarkhan was founded in the 13th century. This city, as Ibn Battuta wrote, received its name after a Turkic hajji, a godly man who settled on this site. The sultan granted this place to him without any taxes (i.e. made him a tarkhan—Author), and it became a village. Then it grew larger into a town' [16, p. 301; 21, pp. 496–497]. Hajji Tarkhan of the Golden Horde was destroyed in the winter of 1395–1396. This city is usually associated with the settlement on Shareny Bugor as part of the large Golden Horde complex on the Right Bank of the Volga River, a little higher than today's Astrakhan (it has been almost completely washed away or destroyed due to current construction projects). Shortly after the city was captured by Timur, it was abandoned, but in the 15th century it already existed as a relatively small but important trading town.

The bulk of its population was formed on the basis of Turkic tribes (the Kipchak group). In ethnic and linguistic terms the population was heterogeneous, albeit small (by the middle of the

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8 For city names see [28, pp. 607–632].
15th century, there were around 10,000 inhabitants in Astrakhan, or perhaps a little more). Along with Turkic-speaking dwellers, it is possible that Persians, Armenians, and Russians lived there during different periods of its history. The ethnic basis of the later Astrakhan Tatars was formed by descendants of the old Turkic population and the Nogais (later also by the inflowing Turkic population from the Middle Volga Region).\(^9\)

In the first half of the 15th century, the city repeatedly passed from one Chinggisid khan to another, as numerous children of Chinggis Khan aspired to rule in the Ulus of Jochi. The founder of the new Astrakhan on the site of the city destroyed by Timur, was Temür Qutlugh (the son of Temür Malik, whose father was Urus), who controlled this area after Timur left in 1396. Nogai murzas of the 16th century viewed Astrakhan as 'Temir Kutlu's yurt.' The city's relationship with Temür Qutlugh (descendants of Tuka [Tuqay] Timur) is emphasized not only in the later writings of the Tatar historians but in works by Central Asian authors [17, p.373]. Temür Qutlugh's heir Shadibek, under whom the unification of all former uluses of the Jochi house occurred for the last time in the history of the Golden Horde, minted coins in Astrakhan since 805 AH (1402/1403). They already contain the name 'Hajji Tarkhan al-Jadid', meaning 'new.' For the next few years, the city passed from hand to hand. Local coins were minted by Toktamys'h's son, Jalal ad-Din, along with Pulad, the son of Shadibek; the latter's uncle, Timur Khan; another son of Toktamys, Kepek; Chekre; Dervish; Küchük Muhammad; Ulugh Muhammad; Devlet Berdi (the son of Tash Timur and the uncle of Hacı Giray and others [2].

The Astrakhan khanate was formed on the basis of the domain of emir Hajji Cherkes, who ruled the town in the second half of the 1360s—mid-1370. There is no consensus among historians on when the khanate was formed. The date of creation of the independent state has been estimated at 1459–1460, 1465 or 1466. It is more likely that it emerged in the 1450–1470s. The city was one of the centres of the Great Horde, being part of the 'Namagan yurt' (the appanage of Namagan, the second name or sobriquet of Khan Timur, the son of Temür Qutlugh, as well as his grandfather Temür Malik). We can only speak of an independent state starting from 1502 (the destruction of the Great Horde by Crimean khan Mengli Giray). Astrakhan succeeded to the Great Horde politically. It is no coincidence that the diplomatic documentation (ambassadorial books) which record the relations between Moscow and the newly formed state appear only towards the beginning of the 16th century. It is obvious that before Grand Prince Vasily Ivanovich of Moscow ascended to the throne (1505), there existed only 'Horde' notebooks (books in which the development of relations with the Great Horde was recorded). On 11 June 1508, Moscow released Nogai murza's ambassador Jan Muhammad, and 'the grand prince released that... person... together with Aztorokan ambassadors' ['Aztorokan' meaning 'Astrakhan']. If they were released from Moscow at the beginning of June, they had presumably arrived there at the end of spring. This is the first Astrakhan embassy in Moscow documented by sources. It is interesting that the idea of a special pass charter for ambassadors allowing them to pass freely through Russian cities and Kazan was documented in the Horde notebooks of the Grand Prince's chancellery [10, p. 76]. This may indicate indirectly that the so-called Astrakhan notebooks did not exist at that time yet. On the other hand, the archive of the Ambassadors' Bureau contained 'Books of Astrakhan from summer 7016 until the summer 7025 under grand prince Vasily Ivanovich of All-Rusya, on the stay of tsar Obdyl-Kerim in Astrakhan' [8, p. 106]—that is, they were kept from 1508. It is, therefore, quite possible that the special books reflecting the development of Moscow-Astrakhan relations appeared that very same year 1508 (possibly after June).

It was at the beginning of the 16th century that Moscow started treating Astrakhan as an independent state. Two volumes of the Sofia collection of the Russian National Library still contain an entry beginning with the words 'Names of the Tatar lands...', which is actually a list of different Islamic countries. The 'Tale of Temir-Aksak' (from the beginning of the 15th century) served as the

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\(^9\) It is noteworthy that a 'Kazan quarter' existed in Astrakhan up to the 19th century [3].
source for that entry, since this tale includes a list of lands conquered by Timur. The copy of 'The Tale...' was composed taking into account the political realia of the beginning of the 16th century when the entry 'Names...' was being created. The copy contained a supplement list of the names of Tatar lands that the source did not contain. The list of these names, along with the Great Horde, Crimea, Azov, Kazan, the Kalmyks, the Nogais, Sarai, 'the Shibans' (Siberia), also included 'Vastorokan' [4, pp. 253–254], referring to Astrakhan.

Finally, another piece of evidence proving that the Khanate was formed at the beginning of the 16th century and not earlier is represented by a wills charter of Ivan III. Ivan died on 27 October 1505, leaving a will in which he included the payment of a 'vykhod' [tribute] amounting to 1,000 rubles to Astrakhan, along with Crimea, Kasimov, and Kazan [1, p.362]. This wills charter by Ivan III is dated no later than 16 June 1504. This supports the fact that Vasily Ivanovich 'concluded a peace treaty with Yury Ivanovich'; the 'vykhod' and other payments to Astrakhan are also mentioned [1, pp. 365, 367, 369]. As shown by S. Kashtanov, the will was drafted at the beginning of November 1503 (before Prince Ivan Borisovich of Ruza died), and the final version was drafted after the latter's death on 28 November [5, p. 200]. There is no doubt that at that time Hajji Tarkhan was an independent yurt and, as the Orda's successor state, had a right to its portion of the tribute. Nevertheless, it is difficult to say how large that portion was. The typical pominki amount at the beginning of the century could have been smaller (for instance, 500 rubles).

The borders of the Khanate to the North spread approximately to the area of present-day Volgograd, although at some point the Astrakhan lands might have been even higher, near Uvek (within the territory of present-day Saratov). To the South, the natural border was the Caspian Sea (probably the sea coast up to the Kuma River). In the West, the frontier could have stretched up to the upper reaches of the Don (it is possible that for a while Crimean Yurt was bordered by the Mius ('Molochna') River. It is more likely that on the Right Bank of the Volga the reign of Astrakhan was confined to a narrow strip of the riverside. The eastern (Nogai) border of Astrakhan lands lay in the Buzan delta [2, pp. 243–248; 26, pp. 171–178].

Astrakhan Khanate, as well as the Kazan and the Crimean Khanates, was ruled by the representatives of a single family—the Jochids (descendants of Jochi, son of Chinggis). A dynasty of descendants of the Golden Horde Khan Temür Qutlugh formed in the Khanate. Scanty and fragmentary sources make it impossible to fully reconstruct the khans' reign. By referring to the available records (mostly, to the ambassadorial books on the relations of the Grand Principality of Moscow with the Crimean Khanate and the Nogai Horde), we can present this succession as a table [Zaitsev, 2010, p. 110].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Name of the Khan</th>
<th>Presumed Dates of Reign</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abd al-Karim ibn Mahmud</td>
<td>1502 (1508?)–1514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Janibek ibn Mahmud</td>
<td>1514—summer of 1521 (not later than 15 August)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hussain b. Jani Beg</td>
<td>October 1521 at the earliest—?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaikh Ahmed bin Ahmed</td>
<td>?–? (between 1525 and 1528)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kasim b. Sayyid-Ahmed</td>
<td>—summer of 1532 (interrupted)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam Giray b. Mehmed Giray</td>
<td>1531 (not later than May)—1532 (not later than January)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aq Kübek b. Mortaza</td>
<td>summer of 1532—1533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abd ar-Rahman b. Abd al-Karim (qalga—'Abli-Saltan' b. Husein)</td>
<td>1533—not earlier than the end of October, 1537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dervish Ali b. Sheikh Haydar</td>
<td>October 1537—summer of 1539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abd ar-Rahman b. Abd al-Karim (second reign)</td>
<td>summer of 1539–1543 (?)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Name of the Khan</th>
<th>Presumed Dates of Reign</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aq Kübek b. Mortaza (second reign)</td>
<td>1545–1546</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yamgurchi b. Birdi Beg (interrupted) (qalga: Takbildi)</td>
<td>1546–1550 / 1551–1554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dervish Ali b. Sheikh Haydar (second reign) (qalga: his son Jan-Timur?; then Kazbulat b. Devlet Giray)</td>
<td>1554–1556</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For nearly all of its history the Astrakhan Khanate remained dependent. The Nogai Horde, the North Caucasian Principality, and the Crimean Khanate acted alternately as its suzerains. The khans often changed as a result of bloody invasions and upheavals involving foreign forces. Fragmentary data mean we can assume that the line of descendants of Ahmed b. Küchük Muhammad was supported by the Kabardians and the line of Mahmud sons by Nogai. The two branches of the dynasty relied upon different ethno-political forces and were closely allied with them.

During the reign of Temür Qutlugh, Astrakhan paid tribute in favour of Edigü's son Nur ad-Din (karasnap) in the amount of 40 thousand altyn: 'an altyn per hut, and for Nogai selling horses, an altyn per horse, three coins per cow, one coin per sheep' [quoted according to: 11, pp. 47, 80–81].

The Crimean raids on Astrakhan (by Mehmed Giray in 1523 and Sahib Giray in 1546) were the most devastating. According to Remmal Hoja, the last campaign was provoked by Yagmurji (Yamgurchi) having taken the throne in Astrakhan. He captured a commercial caravan travelling from Kazan to Crimea. He ill-treated merchants, complained to Sahib Giray, and the latter, outraged by the interference with the trade between Kazan and Crimea (for he reigned in Kazan in the first half of the 1520s, and trade with Crimea, which was very important for Kazan, was well-known to him) began preparations for a full-scale march against the city. Full mobilisation was announced for the Astrakhan campaign. The khan's letter (yarlıq) stated that 'no-one can stay in this land, and all the people, or the army (halk) shall place themselves on a war footing (sefer aiagyn edyub), and if anyone does not stand by the khan immediately near Or Agza (Perekop), his property shall be plundered, and his head cut off'. The khan's Divan was postponed, and letters were sent all around informing that if a man aged between 15 and 70 had not joined the troops, he would face a severe penalty of death (myuhkem siyaset). The Crimean troops on the march numbered from 200 to 1000 tyufenkchi (fighters armed with tyufen according to the Ottoman model), while the khan's forces were as numerous as 10,000 (including bey divisions). The clans' contribution was believed to have reached 250,000. After the Crimean troops forced the crossing of the Don (the only major obstacle on their way) in a day, the city's fate was sealed. Astrakhan was captured thanks to field artillery and tyufenkchi detachments. Yagmurji fled, and some of his retinue were captured and taken to Crimea with a promise that no harm would be done to them [25, pp. 97–105; 7, pp. 399–405].

At the end of 1549, or in early 1550, the city was captured by Moscow Cossacks for some time. In 1551, Pyotr Turgenev, Ambassador of Moscow in the Nogai Horde wrote: 'And the Turkish tsar sent his envoy called Chevush to Ismail Murza this spring. They say, Lord, the message was like that: 'in our Busurman books, Dei, it is written that the time of Russian Tsar Ivan has come, and his hand is high above the Busurmans [Muslims]. Dei, I have also suffered a grave offense by him. The field, Dei, and all the rivers he has taken from me, and the Don, and the city of Ozov. He has taken away all of my possessions. In Azov his Cossacks take tribute from Azov and do not let people drink water from the Don... And his Cossacks, Dei, have occupied Astrakhan and committed such atrocities. And the Tsar Ivan's Cossacks have taken both banks of the Volga

10 His son, Baki, sought refuge in the Nogai Horde even before Moscow troops had captured the city.
River from you and your power, and they are fighting against your uluses, and Gorodok Cossacks have come to your uluses and waged war on them, and Tsar Dervish of Astrakhan has been captured. And is it no shame on you, Dei, if you cannot stand up for that? [Russian State Archive of Ancient Acts, fund 127, inventory 1, item 4, pp. 39–40]. There is another source confirming that the Cossacks occupied the city. Nikita Sushchev, Ambassador of Moscow in Lithuania, who came to the Grand Prince of Lithuania in early 1553 (departing from Moscow on 15 January), brought the following message: 'Three years have passed since Astrakhan was captured by our Tsar's Cossacks, and Tsar Yamğurçı of Astrakhan left Astrakhan for Cherkasy, but from Cherkasy he sent a prayer to our Tsar and asked our Tsar to rule that he be placed again to rule in Astrakhan. And our tsar decreed that he be placed again to rule in Astrakhan, and now the tsar rules Astrakhan on the orders of our Tsar and is always guided by our Tsar. [14, pp. 375–376].

The relations of Astrakhan Khanate with the Grand Principality of Moscow before 1550s were quite friendly since the two countries had a common enemy—Crimea (Astrakhan had inherited the conflict with the Crimean khans from the Great Horde). Prior to 1551, Astrakhan residents arriving in Moscow came together with the Nogais. A dedicated Astrakhan Dvor in Moscow is mentioned as having existed in 1552–1557. However, there is no information on its location. It appears to have been pulled down after the conquest of the city: Tsarevich Ibak brought from Astrakhan in 1558 ‘was given accommodation’ in Rozhdestvenskaya Street ‘at a farmstead’ [20, p. 53].

After the conquest of Kazan in 1552, Moscow developed a plan to acquire control over the entire Volga Trade Route. Ivan IV justified the fight against the Astrakhan Khanate in 1554 by the breach of agreements on the part of khan Yamgurich and an insult made by the Muscovite ambassador. The justifying idea was supported by the ‘Tmutarakan’ legend (the mythical identification of Astrakhan with Tmutarakan, which was Prince Vladimir had given to his son Mstislav as an appanage). In April 1554, a military expedition was sent from Moscow to Astrakhan (voivode Prince Yu. Pronsky Shemyakin ‘with comrades’—about 30,000 people). Hajji Tarkhan was conquered without a fight on 2 July, ‘there were few people in the city at that time’ [9, p. 242]. Yamgurich fled to Tyumen in the North Caucasus (he was married to a daughter of a Kumyk ruler in Dagestan). Khan Dervish Ali, who had lived in Moscow for a long time, became the head of the city. Vicegerent P. Turgenev was left with the khan with a small military camp (‘to stay for a year’, as the sources put it). A yearly tribute was levied on Astrakhan. Data concerning its amount varies. The Astrakhan šert (a kind of an agreement oath) has been estimated at 1,000 rubles in cash and 3,000 fish, ‘and they shall collect this tribute themselves and every year send it to the great Tsar and his children and heirs to Moscow as long as God wants the universe to exist, with their envoys, and give back whatever Russian slaves, whether bought or captured, without hiding anybody’ [Manuscript Department of the National Library of Russia, Collection of Pogodin No.1490, sheets 86–86 reverse.; Russian State Archive of Ancient Acts, fund 181, inventory 1, item 49, sheet 180]. Another source describes the tribute in a different way: ‘ten thousand horses a year, and twenty thousand sheep, and thirty thousand sturgeons and belugas’ [14, p. 450]. In the event of the death of Dervish, the šert prescribed Astrakhan residents to apply directly to the grand prince.

However, Dervish Ali soon became inclined towards an alliance with Crimea, and sent P. Turgenev away from the city. In summer 1555, G. Kaftyrev, the head of Streltsy, and F. Pavlov, a Cossack ataman, re-captured Astrakhan again, after it had been abandoned by the khan and its dwellers. Dervish was soon brought back and exempted from the tribute for a year, and L. Mansurov was left in the city as a representative of Moscow. Thus, a diarchy formed in the city. Soon Dervish, in alliance with Nogai murza Yusuf's children, besieged Mansurov in his residence, a

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11 Or 40,000 altyn (3 kopecks each), which makes 1,200 rubles.
kind of small fortress. Mansurov managed to escape. In March 1556, Astrakhan was again attacked by Streltsy headed by I. Cheremisinov along with Cossacks commanded by M. Kolupaev. Cossack ataman [chieftain] L. Filimonov had previously launched a campaign. Having come to the city in summer, the voivodes again found no-one: 'the tsar had fled from Astrakhan and burned down the city' [15, p. 37].

Part of the Astrakhan nobility managed to escape to Crimea and the Ottoman Empire. An Astrakhan tsarevich was taken 'alive' by the Moscow troops in the Battle of Molodi on 30 July 1572. Muhammad, son of Dervish-Ali, lived in the Ottoman Empire in the early 1570's, receiving an allowance from the Sultan. In register No. IV of so-called Registers of Important Affairs (Mühimme Defterleri) there is a short, 3-line record from 23 Jumad I 967 AH (20 March 1560) on the payment of thirty akçe to the sons of Dervish Ali who were taking refuge in Turkey [see: 22]. As I. Novosiltsev wrote in 1570, 'Magmet tsarevich, son of Dervish Ali of Astrakhan, is staying with the Sultan of Turkey, and he is living in the Urum town, and he is not let out of the town, nor is he allowed to come to the Turkish Olaf' [12, p. 89 (389)]. The same source mentions certain 'Astrakhan Semyon Murza and Tenim Tereberdeev with comrades who first ran from Astrakhan to Azov' [12, p. 67] and then took an active part in the Astrakhan campaign of Ottoman and Crimean troops in 1569.

Supporters of Yamgurchi also happened to be in Istanbul. Selim II's response to the letter by Devlet Giray was written in Muharram 976 (June—July 1586). The khan informed him that he was ready to start a military campaign to win Astrakhan back. The first half of the letter dealt with his preparations for the Astrakhan campaign. The second half was dedicated to the complicated relations of khan Devlet Giray with other khans of the Giray dynasty. In particular, the Padishah promised him to expel some especially ardent defenders of the Astrakhan khan Yamgurchi to Algeria [see: 22].

Crimea was unable to put up with the conquest of Astrakhan and Kazan for a long time. Moscow actually offered a ransom to take the Volga khanates under its jurisdiction in addition to the previous amount of tribute. After a long period of resistance Crimea agreed.

As in other Jochid states, the qalqa (an heir of the khan, usually his son, brother or nephew) was the second most important person in the Khanate. The nobility consisted of sultans, oghlans (uhlans), begs and murzas (according to Russian sources, in 1554 they numbered at least 500). Many of them were owners of appanages. It is beyond reasonable doubt that the institution of karachi beys existed in the Astrakhan Khanate. The Qongirats were the dominant clan group under the Astrakhan khans. Manghits also lived in the Khanate. Most likely, the structure of the power elite of the khanate was organised in the manner traditional of the Jochid states of the 15th to 16th centuries: four ruling classes (the specific set of clans varied), to which the Manghit clan was later added. It is fair to assume that the classification structure of the Astrakhan Manghit branch was similar to those in other khanates (with their qalqa, nureddin, common begs and murzas). The dependent tribute-paying population was referred to as black people. After annexation, the 'murzas and Black Tatars' who remained in the city were assigned to service and had to pay a yasak. They were known as yurt or house people. Those who remained in the steppe under the rule of the subjugated princes acquired the name of 'kochevnye' [nomads]. The latter soon left the historical stage. It is most likely that slave labour (probably Slavic and Caucasian captives) was widely used. Sources also mention Astrakhan clergymen—'mullahs, and akhunds, and seyyids, and abyzes.' In 1554, they numbered about 3,000.

The Astrakhan Khanate had close cultural contacts with Central Asia, Iran, the Ottoman Empire, and the land of Desht-i Kipchak. These ties were based not only on commercial interest but religious unity: Hajji Tarkhan was situated on one of the traditional routes of Central Asian

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12 There exists quite a common assertion in historiography that descendants of the Astrakhan Khans fled to Central Asia, founding their own Janid dynasty (Ashtrakhanids) there. About the real links between Temür Qutlugh's descendants and the Ashtrahanid dynasty see: [17].
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pilgrims heading for Mecca. Astrakhan residents themselves also did hajj, and their ties with Mecca were not severed even in the first years after the city's annexation by the Muscovite state. Muslims began to settle in the now-Russian town of Astrakhan and enter Russian service. In 1561, Nogai Bey Ismail asked Ivan the Terrible for a certain slave named Tabich, who served in Astrakhan: '... and he fasts and observes namaz, and his religion is ours,' Ismail wrote.

It is probable that during the period of independence the Islamic clergy were active in carrying out missionary work east of Astrakhan, disseminating and promoting Islam and the Muslim faith among the Kazakhs. In the early 16th century ulamas from Haji Tarkhan extirpated paganism among the Kazakhs [18, p. 106]. As in other cities of the Golden Horde, Hanafiyyah was dominant. However, Shafiites and Malikites were also present. In Astrakhan they were also aware of classic works on Islamic law (fiqh), including those by Hafiz-ad-Din Nesefi (deceased 1310 or 1320). It is unmistakable that most Muslims in the Lower Volga Region professed Sunni Islam, while the presence of Shi'a Muslims is highly probable as well (owing to the proximity of Safavid Iran). On the whole, the Astrakhan Khanate was probably in the same position as the Golden Horde had been in the earlier period: the city itself was a stronghold of Islam, while the steppe and the surroundings of the city were poorly islamised. Sufism was also represented in Haji Tarkhan. The Yasaviyya tariqa might have been initially widespread in Astrakhan. The Naqshbandiyya was probably the most popular tariqa at later stages. The Kubrawiya fraternity was also famous. As in Central Asia, Crimea and Kazan, there were sheikhs (ishans), the most honoured and respected persons, religious authorities, tariqa leaders.

Literary and historical works were created in the city: Sharif Hajjitarkhani, a poet and a writer born in Astrakhan, wrote 'Zafer name-i Vilayet-i Kazan', a book about the unsuccessful Russian campaign against Kazan in 1550. Undoubtedly, Astrakhan had a historiographic tradition of its own. Astrakhan residents Baba Ali and Haji Niyaz, informers of Ōtemish Hajji, for their time were well-educated people. The latter, probably a merchant 'famous for his wealth', spoke to Ōtemish Hajji about the era of wars between Berke and Hulagu, and he elaborated the story with his comments concerning the places where these events had taken place. Haji Niyaz is mentioned as 'Khoneyaz' in a letter by Moscow diplomat Kubensky (October 1500). His brother Ak-molla ('Akhmolna') was also a trader: he cooperated with other Astrakhan merchants to trade in Moscow and probably spent some time there in custody. Ablez Bakshi (a Moscow prikaz official, who was in charge of translations from Tatar and other eastern languages) allegedly wrote a letter to 'Khoneyaz.', He suggested that khan Abd al-Karim move forward to the Don to watch for the Moscow ambassador and guests. If he captured the diplomat and merchants, Khoneyaz would be able to exchange them for Ak-molla [13, pp. 333–334].

We can assume that there were written records on the Golden Horde history in the khanate. Presumably, there was a strong oral tradition connected with Astrakhan itself, which might include it in the general course of history. Most likely, classical works of Muslim historiography (such as the those by Rashid ad-Din) circulated in the city and enjoyed wide popularity. However, no Tatar historical works dedicated to the history of Haji Tarkhan, although they undoubtedly existed, have survived. Abd al-Jabbar al-Nijgaruti al-Hajjitarkhani's 'Astrakhan History' unfortunately fails to cover the khanate period in the history of the city [19; see also: 23]. At the court of the Astrakhan khans there were calligraphers (bakshi) who were in charge of business and diplomatic correspondence as well as, presumably, book copying. A calligrapher-bakshi of khan Abd ar-Rahman, member of the embassy to Moscow in 1540, is mentioned in Russian chronicles13. Haji Tarkhan was also familiar with classic works of Arab and Persian literature (e.g., 'Shah-nameh' by Firdousi), works on mathematics, geography, and astronomy. Pagan vestiges did not disappear with the advent of Islam in the city.

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13 The use of this word suggests that the Astrakhan chancellery was not yet fully Islamised.
No authentic Muslim manuscript from Hajji Tarkhan written before its annexation by the Russian state is known to us. Several manuscripts have come down to us from the time of Russian Astrakhan. They fall into the following two categories: manuscripts written by a member of the city Muslim community of his own accord and within the community and those written by Astrakhan Muslims on the orders of Christian missionaries. Books by Astrakhan Muslims include both copies of purely religious works for practical use (treatise on the abolished and abolishing Suras of the Quran) and secular ones (poetical divans and individual poems, Ali’s 'Yusuf and Zuleikha'), which are mostly historical ('Dastan-i nasl-i Chinggis-khan', 'Shajara-i turki', 'Tarih-i Nadit'). The situation is very traditional: Koranic research is represented solely by works in the Arabic language, while Farsi was used for a wider scope of genres (ethics, poetry, history). Turki was nearly confined to the 'secular' sphere of poetry and arts [3, pp. 206–210].

In the 14th century, Hajji Tarkhan became a major trade centre on the Lower Volga, where the great caravan route enabled Mediterranean trade with the East. The development of trade in Hajji Tarkhan was probably most intense when it came to North Azerbaijan, Azak, and Black Sea ports. The Lower Volga Region and Hajji Tarkhan had very close connections to Khwarezm. It is worth noting that at the beginning of the second quarter of the 14th century a number of caravanserais emerged simultaneously on the trade route from the lower reaches of the great river to Central Asia—on the Ustyurt, which ceased to function in the 1370s as a result of Timur's devastating attacks on Khwarezm. Timur's campaigns in 1391 and 1395 clearly had a considerable impact on another direction of Astrakhan's trade—the Azak route. This route connected the Iranian part of the Caspian Sea (through Astrakhan and Azak) with Kaffa and then with inland of the Ottoman Empire. The major products traded along this route were silk and spices. At the end of the 15th century, spice trade from the east through Astrakhan (primarily from India through Shamakhi and Baku) was still very important. During the entire period of its history up to the Russian conquest, Hajji Tarkhan was a major centre for the slave trade. Slaves were sold to Crimea, Kazan, Central Asia, and Iran. After the city was annexed by the Muscovite state, Russian slaves continued to return to their motherland for a long time.

Astrakhan's economy apparently consisted of two components: transit trade and the export of local produce [2]. The main products of Astrakhan's economy were fish and salt, which were sold both to Volga cities and probably, to a lesser extent, Caspian countries. Salt in the city's suburbs was produced from lakes (deposited salt); it was generally taken out of the water with shovels, dried in the sun, and then loaded onto transport. It could be kept for a long time in mounds. However, over with time it hardened and the rocks had to be crushed with axes and iron bars.

Fishing was a long-established practice in Hajji Tarkhan. Almost all Russian fishery terms used in the lower Volga regions are of Turkic origin, suggesting that they were borrowed by Russian fishermen from the local population (Tatar terms are very frequently used, for example, in describing an uchug [trap net]). Sturgeon breeds (starred sturgeon?) (probably the Zodiacal Pisces) are even depicted on one type of coin from Hajji Tarkhan from the 14th century. Sturgeon fishing was practiced three months a year—from the end of May to the end of August. Fish was salted on the spot, loaded onto vessels and shipped upstream the Volga River. The range of export fish seems to have been less varied. Russian documents mostly mention sturgeon, beluga, and starred sturgeon. The majority of terms regarding fish salting are also of Turkic origin which leads us to assume that fish was salted in Hajji Tarkhan in much the same way under khans. It was also common to dry fish (sometimes it was used instead of bread). It is likely that in the first half of the 16th century trap nets belonged to Hajji Tarkhan aristocrats. Some of the trap nets in the arms of the Volga delta and its shallows belonged personally to the khan.
Astrakhan had to import crops. The city apparently suffered constant crop shortage leading to frequent famine among the locals.

Cattle breeding was always very important for the Khanate's economy. Fazlullah b. Ruzbihan Isfahani wrote, 'Many riches, fat sheep, horses, camels, and other valuable goods are supplied from Hajji Tarkan.' And it is for good reason that the Tatar proverb has survived: 'Ачтар-къанда съйр бар аъчана, кил-килъ мън аъчана' [24, p. 63] (In Astrakhan a cow [costs] one coin, [and if] you move away, [it's already] a thousand). It is possible that gardening, vegetable cultivation, and hunting played a certain role in the Khanate's economy. However, their part does not seem to have been very significant (it is very likely that horticulture was well-developed in Astrakhan when it was ruled by khan). Russian proverbs of the 17th century state that Astrakhan was famous for its watermelons: 'Astrakhan for watermelons, and we for beggars'.

It is safe to suggest that there were khan and qalga (qalgalyk) domains in the Khanate. The latter was only allowed to be used by the qalga. Peasants living in the qalgalyk land, as well as that of the khan, worked there at a rate of 1/10. No data is available on beiliks in Astrakhan like in Crimea and Kazan, but it is most likely that they also existed there. It is very likely that clergyman and religious teachers owned land (hojalyk). Some of the croplands must have been common property. It is most likely that there was an institute of soyurgal in Astrakhan (conditional military feudal land owning, a right to collect rent for a certain time—a tax which had earlier been paid to the khan).

Throughout its centuries-long history, the city remained the major cultural and commercial centre of the Lower Volga region.

1. Duxovny'e i dogovorny'e gramoty' velikix i udel`ny'x knyazej (Wills charters and charters of the treaty of grand and appanage princes of the 14–16th centuries). Mosco—Leningrad, 1950.

\(^{14}\) An approximate equivalent of the Russian saying: 'beyond the seas a calf costs half, but the shipping is dear'.

§ 4. Ulug Ulus (the Crimean Khanate)

Vladislav Gulevich

The Crimean State emerged in the first half of the 15th century. Its history from the 16–18th centuries is relatively well-studied. However, the origin of the Khanate remains vague in the context of the general history of the Golden Horde, of which the Crimean Peninsula was part for two centuries.

Despite a number of dedicated works [21, pp. 436–447; 70; 17; 11, pp. 117–168], the borders of the Crimean tumen have still not been determined. Indirect sources have enabled
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scholars to outline them as follows. The Crimean Peninsula was divided into the following three provinces: 'Crimea' with its centre in the city of Solkhat, 'Azak' with a centre of the same name, in particular including the city of Kerch, and 'As' with its centre in the city of Qırq Yer [10, pp. 286–287]. That is, the Crimean tumen covered the northern steppe portion of the peninsula, forming a narrow wedge that crossed the centre towards the Black Sea shore with the cities Kaffa and Sugdea on it. There is evidence that its northern limits did not stretch beyond the Konka River (Konskie Vody), since the late 15th century the Great Horde migrated 'between the Don and Crimea' in the basin of the Orel, Samara, and Ovechyi Vody River on the Left Bank of the Dnieper [50, no. 19, p. 64, no. 24, p. 88, no. 29, p. 113, no.34, p. 140, no. 64, p. 301]. The location of its eastern borders near the Volga city of Ukek [19, p. 131, note 4; 44, p. 178] raises doubts. The mechanism uniting territories without a common border could only be used with a strong central power. The system requires contacts between two territories within the same tumen, in particular financial. However, Crimean coins account for as few as 0.2% of finds pertaining to Jochid coinage in the territory of Ukek [35, pp. 16–26]. It is thus more likely that the eastern border passed somewhere between today's cities of Mariupol and Azov. A number of Lithuanian and Polish sources [39, pp. 120, 125; 73, no. 3428, pp. 329–330; 92, p. 60; 46, no. 93, pp. 171–172; 2, no. 199, p. 362; 3, no. 14, p. 84] indicate that the vast Dniester-Dnieper interfluve was part of the Kiev voivodeship in the 15th century, meaning that the western border of the Crimean tumen passed along the Left Bank of the Dnieper.

The Crimean Khanate did not emerge in an empty space. Having conquered Crimea and the North Black Sea Region in the 13th century, the Tatar-Mongols realised that the region offered natural, social, political, economic, and other opportunities to preserve the customary lifestyle. The comparatively mild climate, enough space for camping grounds, and relative isolation from the steppe favoured traditional nomadic economy and made it easier to ward off enemies. Since a nomadic economy could not provide for enough handicraft even for domestic use, trade with sedentary population was vital to it [63, p. 228]. Arable farming as well as the peninsula's ports enabled the conquerors to not only obtain additional products but raise considerable income from transit trade in the Crimean part of the Silk Road. A mint opened in Crimea quite early [9, pp. 61, 63, 64], which is indicative of well-developed trade relations and a need for coins to maintain them.

Not far from Crimea lay another region with similar conditions, to be later known as Budjak. Uniting the territory of the Lower Danube, the Prut, and the Dniester with Crimea ensured control over trade routes leading to the Balkans and Byzantium. This is why the talented and artful Jochid Nogai (†1300), the ruler of the first Tatar semi-state that was separatist to Sarai, with its centre on the Lower Danube, wanted to keep the Crimean Peninsula. He used its resources to defend his domain, not to gain power in the Horde [57, pp. 132, 163, 178, 180].

The Time of Troubles had weakened the Golden Horde greatly by the end of the 15th century. The authority of the Khan had decreased. The frequent change of Tatar rulers offered hope to representatives of side Chinggisid branches that they could take the throne. This is why a certain Oghlan Bekbulat attempted to declare himself the Khan of Crimea in 1386. He ultimately found a compromise with Toktamys, receiving an ulus of his own in the middle reaches of the Don [42, p. 96] and the right to issue coins of his own [30, p. 491]. Bekbulat occupied Sarai by betraying the Khan in the Battle of the Kondurcha River in 1391. However, Toktamys obtained control over Crimea the following year and had the traitor executed [32, pp. 145–149].

The idea of having a legitimate Crimean ruler appealed primarily to the Tatar elite, which viewed it as an opportunity to settle in the peninsula and make use of all its benefits. It was in that period that the Shirin tribe, led by Ruk Timur, the father of Tegene Bey, who was to play a major part in the establishment of the Crimean Khanate, and Baryn, the second most important clan in Crimea, settled there. In 1392, another relative of the khan became the Crimean ruler—
Oghlan Tash Timur, the grandfather of Hacı Giray, the would-be founder of the Crimean Khanate. He also issued a coin of his own [47, pp. 312–315; 25, pp. 142; 20, p. 463–464] while ruling on behalf of Toktamysh [31, pp. 119, 125].

Tash Timur was a Chinggisid from Tuqay Timur's clan. Fleeing from Tamerlane in 1395, Tash timur was forced to flee the Crimea and cross to the Right Bank of the Dnieper [72. p. 200; 53, pp. 121, 179]. It is unclear what happened to Tash Timur then, but his children and grandchildren took shelter in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

Having survived the devastating invasion, forced out from the central part of the Golden Horde, Toktamysh spent a couple of years trying to gain a footing at least in Crimea, relying on its resources against the puppet khans of 'the new Mamai', or Emir Edigü. He had to flee to Kiev and take shelter with Grand Duke Vytautas of Lithuania following another defeat in 1397. In 1399, they suffered a defeat by Edigü and Khan Temür Qutlugh in the Battle of the Vorskla, after which Crimea was part of the domain of different Horde khans for nearly fifty years.

Thus, being remote from the central part of the Golden Horde in the 15th century, Crimea had legitimate rulers recognised by the khans' authorities of its own from the late 14th century and even became a resource base in a struggle against the khans' governments.

The first five years of the 15th century under the control of Emir Edigü and his Shadi Beg were marked by stability in Crimea. All of its fourteen mints were active for the first time in a long period [8, pp. 193–194]. However, the Golden Horde soon slipped back into disturbances. It was torn apart by sons of Toktamysh and Edigü's appointees fighting for power. Rulers of the Horde were replacing each other in quick succession: Jalal al-Din, Kerim-Berdi, Kepek, Jabbar Berdi, Dervish, and Kadir-Berdi, each reigning only for a brief time.

In 1419, Edigü realised that it was impossible to indirectly control Crimea, of strategic importance but distant as it was from the Horde's centre. The emir thus had to approve as the Crimean ruler Tash Timur's son, Khan Bek-Sufi, referred to as the Emperor of Solkhat due to the location of his main camp in documents from Genoese colonies [86, p. 25, fol. 76vº, p. 27, fol. 80vº; 94, p. 442]. The new ruler issued a coin bearing the title 'Sultan son of Sultan Bek-Sufi Khan' [65, p. 387], thereby emphasising his succession to power over Crimea. He recognised the authority of the Khan of the Horde and put his name on his money.

Bek-Sufi died in the early autumn of 1421. His brother Khan Devlet Berdi, approved by Khan Muhammad of the Horde, became the new Crimean ruler with support from the local Tatar nobility [94, p. 442]. The two rulers arrived at the following compromise: Devlet Berdi was to recognise the power of the Golden Horde; two vicegerents were to rule Solkhat, one appointed by the Crimean Khan and the other by that of the Golden Horde. The latter was expected to ensure that tributes went to the 'Great Khan's' treasury. Devlet Berdi was also expected to represent the Golden Horde in international relations in the peninsula, which he did in the form of numerous embassies between Solkhat and Kaffa. As Devlet-Berdi's right to control Crimea was recognised, it enhanced the trend of succession to power within the same clan, representatives of which built strong connections to the local Tatar elite, in fact turning the Crimean tumen into an inherited ulus.

For unclear reasons, Ulugh Muhammad removed Devlet Berdi from power in late 1432. However, in January 1424, with his approval he was reinstalled as ruler for a second time. It was a forced step for Ulugh Muhammad, who needed a reliable rear in the east of his domain while Khan Muhammad Barak was pressing him in the east. However, in late winter of 1424 Davlet Berdi decided to compete for power over the Horde. Crimea passed from the hands of Ulugh Muhammad to those of Devlet Berdi and back many time until 1428, when sources ceased to mention the latter.

The changes following the death of Grand Duke Vytautas of Lithuania in 1430 affected the Golden Horde greatly. Duke Švitrigaila, the Polish king's brother, came to rule in Lithuania. A war broke out between them in 1431, also engaging the Tatars of Ulugh Muhammad, who supported Švitrigaila. A coup in Lithuania in the autumn of 1432 brought about a new ruler,
Chapter XI. The Later Golden Horde Time

Vytautas's brother Grand Duke Sigismund of Lithuania [40]. In the summer of 1433, Ulugh Muhammad denied aid against Sigismund to Švitrigaila. The infuriated duke provided assistance to Bek-Sufi's son, Khan Sayyid-Ahmed II, who was in his court. Sayyid Ahmed engaged part of the Horde's elite to split the Horde of Ulugh Muhammad and conquer his domain on the Right Bank of the Dnieper. Their confrontation lasted until the autumn of 1436, when Sayyid-Ahmed II defeated his enemy, forcing him to retreat northward to the city of Belyov and later to Kazan.

In the war between Švitrigaila and Sigismund, the latter supported by the Poles, Sayyid-Ahmed II took the former side and he dealt them a crushing defeat in 1438 [79, pp. 549–550]. The Khan was later able to rectify his relations with Sigismund and supported his son against Casimir IV [84, pp. 111, 113, 116]. Sayyid-Ahmed II ruled over the territory from the Left Bank of the Dnieper to the Right Bank of the Don, including Crimea, which had become part of his Horde. He was the fourth representative of his clan to rule Crimea in less than fifty years.

Among Sayyid-Ahmed II's emirs, Aydar, the leader of the Qongirat tribe, and Tegene, the head of the Shirins, were old enemies. In the winter of 1441–1442, Tegene Shirin and a representative of the Baryns agreed with the Lithuanian ruling elite to assist Hacı Giray, who was to become the Crimean ruler. In the second half of spring of 1442, Hacı Giray became the fifth ruler over Crimea to represent the same clan and the founder of the Crimean Khanate. Hacı Giray was born in Lithuania [33, p. 64], most probably in the late 14th or early 15th century. At a mature age he was the viceroy of the city of Lida [43, p. 160], where he 'ate bread and salt' until he became the khan of Crimea [1, no. 102, p. 119]. Apart from him, Sayyid-Ahmed II's family lived in Lithuania, so its ruling elite had a choice of potential Crimean khans. The first abortive attempt, the so-called Solkhat War, came in the summer of 1441 [86, p. 35, fol. 45vº]. The new Polish king Władysław III supported the Lithuanian assistance to the would-be Crimean ruler. Hacı Giray's first Crimean coins are dated 845 AH (22 May 1441–12 May 1442) [91, pp. 244–246].

The Khan whom the Lithuanian-inspired coup brought to power, viewed the Crimean ulus not just as his appanage but as a sovereign state. The Genoese called him Emperor, while Sayyid-Ahmed II remained Great Khan despite his defeat by Hacı Giray in July 1442 [86, p. 36, fol. 103; 93, p. 122, note 457]. Hacı Giray's external policy was based on protection against claims to his power laid by Sayyid-Ahmed II and the Great Horde, which emerged in the late 1430s as a de facto successor of the Ulus of Jochi, and a tight alliance with the Polish-Lithuanian ruler. In domestic affairs the Khan's ambition was to weaken, at the minimum, Kaffa as the centre of Crimean Genoese colonies if not obtain full control over it. To achieve this purpose, he primarily developed alternative trade routes from the North Caucasus, the main supplier of slaves for Ottoman and Egyptian markets, around Kaffa, via Qırq Yer to the port of Calamita [88, pp. 135–149], which belonged to the Principality of Theodoro. Active trade items Tatar crafts, mainly for military use flowed through Lviv: like sabres, bows, arrows, and sagadags [74, no. *745, p. 94].

It is likely that in late 1447 or early 1448 Hacı Giray lost his power under unknown circumstances and did not win it back until 1449. In 1452 he managed to defeat Sayyid-Ahmed II. Sayyid-Ahmed II's Horde ceased to exist following another crushing defeat in 1455. The ruler surrendered to the Lithuanians and died in captivity. The enemy's defeat did not lead to the expansion of Crimean possessions. Maintaining close friendly contacts with both the Polish king and the Lithuanian ruling elite, Hacı Giray gave some tribute payers to Prince Semyon Olelkovych of his own accord [71]. Yet, the Khan continued to exert pressure on Kaffa, extorting gifts for his relatives apart from tributes [77, no. 22, p. 88]. Their relations were not rectified.
until 1456, which happened with the mediation of the Khan's ally Prince Olobey, the ruler of Theodoro.

The relations with the Great Horde were not exclusively hostile. Coins by Hacı Giray dated 1454–1467 account for 11.3% of all finds from the village Kamenny Bugor, while those by the local rulers Ulugh Muhammad and Kūčhūk Muhammad made 18.7% and 15.0% respectively, which is indicative of intense trade [26, pp. 29, 37, 70]. In 1456, Khan Mahmud was able to occupy Crimea and subvert Hacı Giray for a short period [54, no. 161, p. 252], but the latter overthrew his enemy near the Don in 1465 [41, p. 151; 80, p. 398]. This defeat discouraged the Great Horde from interfering with Crimean affairs over ten long years. Even when Hacı Giray's sons began to fought for power following his death in August 1466, the Horde chose not to invade Crimea.

The death of Hacı Giray came unexpectedly. Since the Khan had not named a successor, his sons began a struggle for power. Three claimants declared themselves rulers at once. The eldest son Nur-Devlet eventually became Khan due to Mamak Shirin's support.

The new Khan continued his father's policy to establish a close alliance with Casimir IV but failed to overcome internal differences within the Crimean aristocracy. In the spring of 1468, part of the discontented beys declared the khan's brother Keldysh to be the ruler. However, it was Mengli Giray, nominated by Mamak Shirin and supported openly by Kaffa, which provided him with weapons and funds, who won the struggle for power. Mengli Giray affirmed all of the city's privileges and reduced the tribute that it was to pay, paving the way for a strong alliance between them. The Genoese were to guard the Khan's brothers, while some of the subordinate Tatar aristocrats went to their prison.

Mengli Giray adopted a policy of alliance with Casimir IV, Theodoro, and Kaffa. Being preoccupied with the struggle for the Czech and Hungarian crown and believing the Crimean Khanate to be weak and ill-organised, the Polish King relied on an alliance with the Great Horde, which viewed as a check on Moscow. Ivan III of Moscow became an alternative union to Casimir IV by establishing diplomatic relations with Mengli Giray in 1472 [50, no. 1, pp. 6–9]. Yet, the key power in the Black Sea from 1453 was the Ottoman Empire, which was to determine the Khanate's further development.

Infighting between the Khan and Eminik Shirin, son of Mamak, brought about an acute confrontation with the Tatar elite. In the spring of 1475, Mengli Giray was forced to seek shelter in Kaffa. Following an abortive attempt at conquering the city, Eminik asked the Turkish Sultan Mehmed II for assistance, and in the early June 1475 Kaffa surrendered to the Turks. The Turks were able to conquer all settlements on the southern coast of Crimea within several months. Mengli Giray was captured by the Ottomans but swore allegiance to the Sultan and remained in the Crimean Khanate's government.

The Khan became a vassal to the Sultan, but this dependence was rather artificial. Several Crimean Khans replaced each other in 1475–1479 without being influenced by the Turks. For instance, Khan Janibeg, presumably the son of Sayyid-Ahmed II, ruled in 1476–1477, enthroned by Beys Hajike Shirin and Abdullah Baryn. In 1477–1479, Nur-Devlet and his brother Aydar ruled different parts of Crimea simultaneously [13, pp. 172–191]. Both sought support from Casimir IV but did not prevent Eminik Shirin, with the aid of the Turks, to make Mengli Giray Khan again in late 1478 or early 1479.

As Mengli Giray occupied the throne again, a new epoch in the history of the Crimean Khanate began. The alliance of Crimea and Moscovy against Casimir IV and the Great Horde was restored as soon as April 1480 [50, no. 4, p. 16]. Khan Ahmad of the Great Horde was killed in January 1481. Mengli Girey burned down Kiev in September 1482 after Casimir IV failed to meet his expectations in terms of ending Turkish dominance in Crimea [12, pp. 54–66]. From that moment Crimean rulers relied on the Ottoman Empire while being ruled by their own interests in relations with Moscow, Krakow, and Wilno.
However, the chief threat to the Giray dynasty had not been eliminated. In 1485, the army of the Great Horde invaded the Crimean interior and defeated Mengli Giray. The Turks and Nogais helped repel the attack [41, p. 216; 56, p. 123]. Seeing the Crimean Khanate having gained strength, Khan Murtaza of the Great Horde attempted in 1487, to draw over Nur-Devlet, who had settled in the Muscovite state, ruling the Kasimov Principality, to his side [50, no. 19, pp. 68–69; 45, p. 121]. The Horde undertook another invasion of Crimea in the autumn of 1490 [50, no. 28, p. 108]. It was not until 1502, when Mengli Giray defeated Khan Shig Ahmad, that the Great Horde was neutralised [6, pp. 127–136] and the danger to Crimea reduced.

The Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania proved to be weak and not prepared to withstand systematic raids by the Crimean Tatars on their territory, which became regular in the second half of the 1480s [14, pp. 83–102]. They did not stop even when the Lithuanian government agreed to pay tribute on Russian lands [15]. The organisation of anti-raid defence proved inefficient [82; 83; 87; 78]. In their campaigns, the Tatars not only penetrated deep into Ukrainian territory, but even into Belorussian and Polish lands.

In the meantime, after the defeat of the great Horde, the loss of a common enemy began to weaken the Crimean-Muscovite union. Mengli Giray's increased power and marriage to Nur-Sultan, the wife of the Kazan Khan [4], whose sons Muhammad-Emin and Abdul Latif had confronted Moscow many times [66, p. 55–68] stirred Crimea's interest in the Kazan Khanate. King Sigismund I the Old of Poland took advantage of the situation. He persuaded the Khan into an anti-Moscow alliance in 1507 [89, no. 85–90, pp. 303–315], which was again confirmed in 1513–1514 [89, no. 143, 145–146, pp. 416–418, 420–423]. Yet, this did not protect either Poland or Lithuania from Crimean attacks, which were beginning to affect Moscow as well (1512, 1513, 1515). The Polish-Lithuanian as well as Muscovite states had to largely confine their defence to passive measures. While the 'Great Abbatis Line' ensured governmental defense of Moscow, the Polish-Lithuanian rulers shifted the burden onto magnates and service people in borderline areas, who soon gave rise to the powerful group known as Ukrainian Cossacks [28, pp. 26–33].

In the last years of his life Mengli Giray de facto retired from active duties. His eldest son Mehmed Giray, enthroned in April 1515, ruled the Khanate. The state that he inherited had expanded greatly on the Right Bank of the Dnieper, up to Azov.

It was Mehmed I Giray's ambition to restore the Golden Horde but with its centre in the Crimea. Two successful campaigns, in 1509 and 1510, against the Nogais, whose defeat in 1519 finished the history of the Kazan Khanate, favoured the purpose. In the spring of 1521, Mehmed I Giray was able to put his enthroned brother Sahib Giray in Kazan, enabling the brothers to launch a successful offensive against Moscow in the summer. This encouraged the Khan to embark on an even more ambitious campaign against Astrakhan, which surrendered without a battle in the spring of 1423. Yet, he was never able to fulfill his daring plans since Nogais tricked the Khan and his son Bahadur Giray out of the city and killed them, after which they invaded Crimea and devastated it completely [55, pp. 23–47; 66, pp. 77–88; 68, pp. 118–150; 90].

In the autumn of 1523, the Crimean beys elected the Khan's eldest son Gazi Giray to be the ruler. However, his father Saadet I Giray, enthroned with the sultan's help, replaced him in the following spring. He showed an orientation to the Ottoman Empire while ending the conflict with Astrakhan and proposing peace to Moscow. The situation was complicated. Infighting among the Khan and the beys had been incessant since the reign of Mehmed I Giray, and the Khan's struggle for power against his son Islam Giray was tearing Crimea apart. The war between them lasted until 1526, leaving them too drained for international affairs. Two major campaigns against Lithuania and Moscow in the spring and autumn of 1527 failed [69], escalating the conflict between the uncle and nephew. The struggle for power flared up again in 1528, leaving Saadet Giray no choice but to turn to King Sigismund I the Old for help.
Despite another truce between the uncle and nephew in 1531, Saadet Giray was forced to put down a Shirin plot and again battle Islam Giray, who also requested assistance of the Polish King. The Khan's campaigns against his enemy's allies near Cherkasy in the spring of 1532 failed [23, pp. 76–96]. In May of the same year, the Khan voluntarily gave up the throne and left for Istanbul [67, p. 107].

Islam Giray was declared the new Khan. However, Khan Sahib Giray of Kazan came to power with the Sultan's help after several months. Scheming beys continued to tear Crimea apart. The Khan promoted the Mansurs and the Sejeuts as an opposition to the omnipotent Shirins and Baryns. However, dual power de facto existed in the Khanate. Sahib Giray led several wars against Islam Giray from 1534. Their confrontation ended in August 1537 when the Nogais killed Islam Giray. In fact, the Crimean internecine feud engaged all the neighbouring states. While Islam Giray relied on the alliance with Moscow, Sahib Giray preferred to join the Polish-Lithuanian state or the Ottoman Empire.

Even though the khan's relative Safa Giray reigned in Kazan from 1435, the imperial ambitions of Crimean rulers never came true. Sahib Giray preferred active plunder campaigns rather than capturing territories. For example, in 1538 he joined the Turkish campaign against Moldova, in 1538 against the North Caucasus, in 1538–1539 against Lithuania, with which he concluded peace in 1540, in 1541 with Moscow, in 1542 and 1544 against the North Caucasus again. In 1545, he conquered Astrakhan, and in 1548 defeated the Nogais, who had been raiding Crimea to avenge for the Astrakhan campaign. In 1551, however, he refused to provide the Crimean army for the Sultan's war against Iran, triggering his removal [81, pp. 450–451]. While Sahib Giray was out of Crimea, Devlet Giray along with Turkish troops landed in the peninsula. The Crimean nobility went over to his side, which slaughtered Sahib Giray's entire family and killed him in the fortress of Tamán, leaving the new Khan Devlet I Giray formally uninvolved.

Devlet I Girat reigned until 1577. His rule was the golden age of the Crimean Khanate. Being a gifted and efficient Khan, he was able to control the Crimean aristocracy, using its energy for a war outside Crimea. The eastward and south-eastward expansion of Moscow (the conquest of Kazan and Astrakhan in 1552 and 1556) disturbed the Khan, motivating him to implement a tough anti-Moscow policy. The Crimean army launched campaigns against Moscow nearly every year. The Khan personally led seven of them: in 1552, 1555, 1562, 1564, 1565, 1571, and 1572. Aside from the Khan, Crimean Tsareviches led the army in 1558, 1563, 1568, 1570, 1573. The Muscovite government responded with campaigns in the summer of 1555 and 1559. The latter was outstanding because the Moscow and Ukrainian joint troops raided the Crimean interior and even landed on the Crimean coast of the Black Sea [27].

Moscow attempted to establish an anti-Crimean union and twice offered King Sigismund II Augustus of Poland to join it, in 1556 and 1558. However, Krakow did not trust Ivan IV, realising that the Ottoman Empire was sure to support Crimea against the alliance [51, no. 35, p. 548, no. 37, pp. 576–578; 62]. Indeed, Istanbul found Moscow's successful activities in the Lower Volga Region disturbing because they could affect the balance of powers in its confrontation with Iran, threatening the Turkish Azov and the Crimean influence on the North Caucasus while severing communications with Central Asia. In the summer of 1569, Sultan Selim II launched an extremely ambitious campaign against Astrakhan, intending to dig a canal between the Don and Volga. Devlet I Giray also joined the Turks. Understanding how difficult it would be to fulfil the plan, he refused to lead the campaign. It was a total failure, and the Turkish-Tatar army suffered heavy losses [76].

The Khan was able to avenge for his defeat after three years by occupying and burning down Moscow in the spring of 1571. After that Devlet I Giray demanded Ivan IV restore the Kazan and Astrakhan Khanates. Yet, the Tsar only agreed to restore the latter, which the Crimean ruler found unsatisfactory. Devlet I Giray's achievements were all reduced to nothing after his crushing defeat in the Battle of Molodni in August 1572, when the enormous Tatar-
Turkish army was nearly completely exterminated. It was the last large-scale campaign of the Crimean troops to Moscow's domain [37, pp. 175–262]. The defeat was so heavy that it took the Crimean army almost twenty years to prepare for another attempt a raid on the Muscovite inland. However, Devlet I Giray did not lead the further campaigns. He died in June 1577 to be replaced by his son Mehmed Giray, known as the 'Fat'.

The beginning of Mehmed II Giray's rule was marked by two campaigns against Iran in 1578 and 1579. The former, commanded by the Khan's brother, qalga Adil Giray, began successfully but ended with a severe defeat. The Khan led the latter campaign on his own and was able to get abundant plunder in Shirvan. However, like many preceding Khans, Mehmed II Giray had to face domestic problems. Failing to become qalga, the Khan's younger brother Alp Giray complained to the sultan and received support not only from him but from the powerful Shirins. Two more Iranian campaign took place in 1580 and 1581. While the former was relatively successful, the Tatars suffered a defeat during the latter, causing the Khan and his beys to participate in a third campaign in 1582. Displeased, the Sultan tried to remove Mehmed II Giray in 1583, who responded by setting up a blockade of Kaffa. The beys stayed true to the Khan, but the Crimean mufti denied support to Mehmed II Giray, thus determining his fate. In May 1584, janissaries commanded by Islam Giray, son of Devlet I Giray arrived in Crimea on Turkish ships [85, pp. 458–459]. Seeing the sultan's cannons support the claimant to power, the Tatar aristocracy took his side. Mehmed II Giray tried to flee but was caught and strangled.

The beginning of Islam II Giray's reign was traditionally marked by a struggle for power. Having ensured the support of the Nogais, the deceased Khan's eldest son Saadat Giray conquered Bakhchysarai and was declared khan. Islam II Giray fled to Kaffa to take shelter with the Turks. He asked the sultan for help. Qalga Alp Giray defeated the Nogais and forced them out of Crimea. Islam II Giray died in March 1588 without having achieved any prominence.

The Crimean Khanate became increasingly backward in military and technical terms from the 1430s. The Crimean army was unable to withstand an open confrontation with troops in possession of fire arms in the 1470s. The Muscovite state kept expanding, approaching Crimea despite constant raids by Ukrainian Cossacks [29], which became a major danger for Bakhchysarai. Moscow was nurturing a plan to conquer Crimea, in which it relied on the Khan's brother Murad Giray. Intermecine feud among the Khan's numerous offspring and different bey groups aggravate the situation. Ottoman invasion in Crimea's domestic affairs grew tougher. For example, when Islam II Giray died, the sultan did not take into consideration the Crimean situation in appointing his younger brother Gazi Giray Khan despite the claims of his elder brothers Alp Giray and Müberek Giray [85, p. 471].

Gazi II Giray, known as the 'Storm' proved to be a powerful ruler capable of checking disturbances in the Khanate. He announced amnesty and invited his exiled brothers back to Crimea. This opportunity used Safa Giray. The more intimidating Murad Giray, who tried to get a reign on the Lower Volga and in the East Caucasus, died in 1591 [18, pp. 191–192]. The long-fought intermecine war in the Nogai Horde enabled Crimea to regain composure. Feeling apprehensive about Moscow's expansion to the Caucasus, in 1591 Gazi II Giray launched a large-scale campaign, which ended in failure. The Khan devastated the periphery of the Muscovite state in 1592. By that time Bakhchysarai had given up the idea of restoring the Kazan and Astrakhan Khanates, so the Tatar campaigns against Moscow, Hungary, Wallachia, and Moldova served the interests of the Ottoman Empire rather than the Crimean Khanate. In 1594, the Khan concluded peace with Moscow, which lasted for a relatively long period due to generous payments.

The late 16—early 17th centuries were characterised by Crimea's active involvement in Turkish military campaigns. In 1594 and 1595, the Tatars provided assistance to the Turks in the Balkans. Another Hungarian campaign took place in 1598. A third one followed in 1602. Campaigns to the Ukrainian lands were unceasing. The chronicles report major offensives in
1605, and 1606 [7] while mentioning that smaller-scale ones were incalculable. In 1596, Gazi II Giray lost power for a short time following a coup initiated by the vizier. Yet, he re-took the throne after his visit to Istanbul, while his brother Fatih I Giray fled after several months of ruling. He tried to come to power by force in the following year but failed and asked his brother for forgiveness. However, the Khan had Fatih I Giray along with his sons and adherents executed. He suppressed another Shirin plot in 1601. Gazi II Giray died of plague during his Caucasian campaign in December 1607. Having inherited the throne, his son Toktamys Giray found no support with the sultan and was killed by Mehmed III Giray, son of Saadet II Giray, after several months. Thus, the Crimean Khanate entered the 17th century in a state of disturbance.

The first half of the 17th century is an eventful chapter in the history of the Crimean Khanate, marked by the Khan's attempts at reforming the state and achieving independence from the Ottomans. They had to reckon with the Nogais, who were their enemies and mainstay alternately. The Khan's authority remained weak, unstable, and was characterised by the frequent rotation of rulers. In particular, the new Khan Salamat I Giray, appointed by the sultan, reigned slightly longer than two years (1608–1610) and never rose to prominence. The Khan's foster son Jani Beg Giray succeeded to the throne.

Jani Beg Giray relied on the Ottoman Empire. His reign was marked by major wars engaging the Crimeans on its side. Abundant plunder from the Poles defeated near Cecora in 1620 compensated for the disastrous anti-Kyzylbash campaign of 1617–1619, from which only two out of ten thousand returned. The Nogai leader Kantemir, the founder of the Budjak Horde [36, pp. 99–100; 49], who was de facto independent of the Crimea and directly subordinate to Istanbul, became the sultan's favourite in the Khotyn War against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1621. The Khan was removed in 1523. The authoritative Mehmed Giray, son of Saadet II Giray, replaced him on the throne.

Mehmed II Giray cooperated with his pragmatic brother Shagin Giray to introduce major transformations. He not only reduced the influence of beys by referring to the principle of single rule but curbed Ottoman interference with Crimea's domestic affairs. To achieve this, the Khan concluded an alliance with the Zaporizhian Cossacks, established contacts with Iran, and even defeated the Ottomans near Kaffa. His multiple refusals to participate in the anti-Iranian campaigns fueled the sultan's rage. The Turks attempted to subvert him by bringing Jani Beg Giray back to Crimea. Zaporizhian Cossacks led by Hetman Mykhailo Doroshenko came to help the Khan in 1628. However, during the battle the Hetman died, and Mehmed III Giray was forced to flee [75; 61]. He was killed in 1629 while trying to win Crimea back. Jani Beg Giray reinstalled on the throne and ruled until removed again at the sultan's order in 1635.

Being frequently replaced, the Khans were unable to entrench their power and became increasingly dependent on Istanbul's moods. The new Khan Inaet Giray, son of Gazi II Giray, who ruled in 1635–1637, also refused to participate in an anti-Iranian campaign, concluded an alliance with the Zaporizhian Cossacks in 1637, and tried to confront the Ottomans but was defeated and killed. The reign of Bahadıır I Giray was brief as well. He managed to oust the Nogais from Crimea but soon died in 1641. The first reign of the following Khan, Mehmed 'Sufi' IV Giray, lasted from 1641 to 1644. Famine caused by drought and crop failure motivated the Crimean beys to demand new campaigns against Moscow, but the Khan denied their requests because Istanbul did not want to quarrel with it. An offensive against Poland in the early 1644 failed completely. The sultan removed Mehmed IV Giray in the same year. Islam Giray took his place.

Having come to power, Islam III Giray was able to direct the Crimean beys' energy externally. Raids on the Muscovite state followed in 1644 and 1645. King Władysław IV of Poland was willing to wage war on the Ottomans and planned of an anti-Crimean, at least defensive,
alliance with Moscow, which was concluded in 1647 [36, p. 326–357]. However, it did not withstand the rebellion of B. Khmelnitsky and the war against Poland, in which the Tatars were involved on a large scale. The Muscovite Tsar won control over the Ukrainian lands in early 1654, which brought about dramatic changes to the geopolitical situation in Eastern Europe and had a shocking effect on Crimea. Moscow's forces, which had only been a threat to the Khanate in the Cis-Azov Region and the Caucasus, was approaching the Crimean borders. Islam III Giray died in June 1654, and Mehmed IV Giray was reinstalled.

Mehmed IV Giray's second reign lasted for twelve years and was marked by a confrontation with Moscow because of Don Cossacks raiding Crimea [22, pp. 291–311]. The Khan concluded an alliance with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, but Crimean Tatars and Ukrainian Cossacks preferred to avoid direct combat against each other [60, p. 5]. The support of Hetman Vyshovsky proved beneficial as he got out from under the Tsar's subordination and defeated the Moscow army in the Battle of Konotop in July 1659 [5]. However, the Sultan removed the Khan in 1666 following his refusal to help the Ottomans against Austria, and Adil Giray succeeded to the throne.

The appointment of Adil Giray is illustrative of how the Ottomans bluntly ignored Crimean custom and law. His father was believed to be the son of Fatih I Giray, which remains unproven. The Khan's lack of popularity and confrontation with beys caused the Shirin mutiny, which was suppressed with the help of the Ottomans. The Khan joined Hetman P. Doroshenko against the Poles and concluded a treaty of peace with the Muscovite state in 1670, thereby defeating Istanbul's claims to Right-bank Ukraine. The Ottomans had to tolerate the Khan until the war against Venice ended in 1669. However, his removal followed in 1671, when the Turks enthroned Selim I Giray.

Selim I Giray reigned four times: 1671–1678, 1684–1691, 1692–1699, and 1702–1704. In spite of his being a loyal ally to the Turks, he was removed following the failed Chyhyryn campaigns of 1677–1678. The peace treaty with Moscow was signed in Bakhchysarai in 1681, during the reign of Khan Murad Giray, who ruled in 1678–1683. As the Eternal Peace of 1686 was concluded, entitling the Muscovite state to control Zaporizhia, the Crimean Khanate faced the open threat of clashing with it not in faraway lands but at its own borders. Two Crimean campaigns followed in 1687 and 1689. Though they were essentially a failure for Moscow, the Crimean army of Selim I Giray did not dare meet them in battle, but awaited the enemy in Perekop. Tsar Peter I's campaign against Azov in 1695 was another wake-up call for Crimea. Failing to occupy the fortress, Voivode Sheremetyev was still able to conquer the towns Kyzy Kermen, Eski Tavan, and Aslan Kermen on the Dnieper [38, pp. 28–52]. The success was enhanced in 1696, when the troops of Tsar Peter I conquered Azov and founded the city of Taganrog. The Treaty of Constantinople, signed in 1700 [38, p. 375], abandoned the so-called 'pominki' tributes, which Moscow had been paying to the Crimean Khanate from 1474 to 1685 [64, pp. 116–123, 137–139, 240–258]. In the opinion of S. Faizov, these 'pominki' can be characterised 'as a ransom tribute'[58; 59, pp. 54–55].

Having lost part of its territory and income, permanently facing the threat of Moscow army invading the inland of the Crimean Peninsula, the Crimean Khanate entered the 18th century. The first quarter of the century proved the inability of the Khanate for self-organisation when confronted by the danger of losing its statehood. The Khans' authority remained weak and completely dependent on the degrading Ottoman Empire. Bakhchysarai saw eight rulers within the short period from 1699 to 1724, among whom Qaplan Giray came to power three times, his regnal years being 1707–1708, 1713–1715, and 1730–1736. However, the personalities of Crimean Khans nearly lost their importance as they could not influence the destiny of their fate, which the Ottoman and Russian Empires came to use as collateral damage.

The treaty of 1700 prohibited Crimean Tatars from conducting raids. The Turks were willing to preserve peace and suppressed Tatar offensives, which yielded nothing but a mutiny
in 1702–1703 [48]. Crimea's hope that Peter I would lose the war against Charles XII never came true, and in 1710 Istanbul resolved to declare war on the Tsar. The Treaty of the Prut, signed in 1711, obliged Russia to return Azov to the Ottomans. Besides, Russia was to transfer Zaporizhia to the Ottoman Empire under the Treaty of Adrianople, dated 1713.

However, it was merely a provisional succession. The Russo-Turkish war of 1735–1739 proved the Crimean Khanate to be incapable of defending its territory. The Russian army occupied Kilburun, Ochakov, Azov, Taganrog, Prekop, and Bakhchysarai. Khan Qaplan Giray abandoned his subjects and hid in the mountains. Yet, being generally successful from the perspective of the Russian Empire, the war ended with the disadvantageous Treaty of Belgrade of 1739, which postponed the clearly approaching end of the Crimean Khanate.

A new fortification system along the Russian Empire's southern border, consisting of 140 redoubts connecting 18 fortresses, known as the Ukrainian Line, was completed in 1742. The loop was tightening around the Crimea. In May 1759, the resolution was taken in Saint-Petersburg that Crimea was to be separated from the Ottoman Empire and declared independent 'forever.' It became executable as the new Russo-Turkish war broke out in 1768–1774. It was officially triggered by Khan Qırım Giray's invasion of the Ukrainian land, which was the last, and failed, raid of the Khanate. The Khan was defeated and soon died. The Russian army re-occupied Crimea in 1771.

Şahib Giray was appointed khan, this time approved by commander V. Dolgorukov and not the Sultan. Empress Catherine II recognised him and even appointed her representative to the Khan's court. On 1 November 1772 the Crimean Khanate and the Russian Empire concluded a treaty of friendship and alliance, declaring the Khanate independent. By obtaining Kerch, Kinburn, and Yeni-Kale, Russia ensured full control over the Crimea. The situation was documented in the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, dated 10 July 1774, under which Istanbul recognised the independence of the Crimean Khanate, which thus turned into a buffer area between the two Empires. The Turks tried to provoke a Tatar rebellion and landed in the Crimea. However, the Khan's brother Şahin Giray, supported by Russian troops, was declared the new Crimean ruler following a struggle for power.

Şahin Giray spent a long time in Europe and had received a good education. Being both intelligent and industrious, he spoke several languages. The Khan ventured to eradicate the former state structure, in which he persevered with cruelty. His ambition was to enhance the Khan's power and strengthen the state, primarily by harmonising the financial system and forming a regular army. Preliminary measures included a census, introducing a fixed tax for all citizens as well as recruitment according to the Russian model, and confiscating land from the clergy. It was a bold, even revolutionary attempt at reforming the state.

However, the Crimeans viewed Şahin Giray as a Russian puppet. His cardinal reforms aroused opposition among the clergy and beys, whom Russian troops in the Crimea prevented from rebelling. Nevertheless, when 'Khan' Selim III Giray, appointed by Istanbul, landed on the coast in December 1774, a rebellion broke out. It was suppressed by Russian troops. Several tens of thousands Greeks and Armenians were moved from the Crimea to the Cis-Azov Region following the incident. This heavily affected Crimea's access to foods, triggering a new rebellion. The Khan was forced to seek protection with the Russian troops in Kerch [24]. The Khan's brother Bahadur Giray initiated another rebellion in 1781. It flared across the Crimean Peninsula in the summer of 1782, and Şahin Giray was again forced to seek shelter with the Russian troops. Bahadur II Giray was declared Khan and requested recognition from Istanbul and Saint-Petersburg but met with refusal. Moreover, Russia sent an army to support Şahin Giray.

The constant Crimean disturbances caused a shift in the mood of Russia's capital, which initially did not intend to annex Crimea as it did not seem reasonable. However, the series of rebellions and large expenses to maintain Şahin Giray's power motivated Catherine II to order 'to think about annexing this peninsula.' The annexation order followed on 14 December
1782. Şahin Giray abdicated in February. On 8 April 1783, the Empress published the manifesto under which the Russian Empire annexed the Crimean Khanate. Two months later, on 10 June 1783, the Ottoman Empire recognised it, and the Crimean Khanate ceased to exist. Those Crimean Tatars who did not want to live under the Russian government had an opportunity to move to Turkey. Şahin Giray moved from one Russian city to another for some time until he went to Turkey as well in 1787 to be sent in exile to Rhodes and strangled there at the Sultan's order [34].
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§ 5. Vilayate Kazan (The Kazan Khanate)

Anvar Aksanov

As a result of the centrifugal political processes occurring in the Golden Horde in the mid-15th century, its uluses became autonomous, and independent khanates were formed. Historical sources and historians do not give an unambiguous answer to the questions: who founded the Kazan Khanate? When and under what circumstances was it founded? According to one version, it was founded in 1437–1438 by Ulugh Muhammad, who had been dethroned from Sarai's throne, according to another version—by his son, Mahmud, in 1445. Notably, in recent years most researchers have tended towards the second version, as this opinion is reflected in a greater number of sources. However, all this information is of later origin (beginning from the 16th century) and comes from official Moscow circles, that is, it is not verified by any independent sources. And
the version suggesting that the Khanate was founded by Ulugh Muhammad is known to the researchers mainly from 'The Kazan History', the author of which was criticised for providing unreliable information. However, the Kazan chronicler was not alone in his judgments. The notion that Ulugh Muhammad was the first Kazan Khan is recorded in the Tatar historical tradition as well [23, p. 96; 24, p. 45; 48, p. 207]. In addition, contemporary chroniclers, beginning from the end of the 1430s, narrate about Ulugh Muhammad’s campaigns against the eastern and southeastern outskirts of the Muscovite state, which is indicative of the khan's presence in the Middle Volga region [5, pp. 139–142].

When analysing the problems of establishment of the Kazan state, we should also take into account the political traditions of the Ulus of Jochi, introduced by its founders and complying with the socio-economical structure of the nomadic state. In winter, the khan’s main camp was set up in the south, in the Lower Volga region, where the major city was Sarai, and in summer it moved to the north, to the Bulgar area. That is, since the time of Batu Khan's reign, Bulgar was a seasonal capital of the Golden Horde [15, p. 450].

At the same time, in the 1420s Kazan started being called New Bulgar (Bulgar al-Jedid) [15, p. 468; 26, p. 900]. This means that in the hands of Ulugh Muhammad and his descendants Kazan could be the centre of the Ulus of Jochi, as important as Sarai was, and if the policy was successful, even the centre of the united Golden Horde. This also explains the stance of the 15th century chroniclers, who, unlike later authors, did not mention the emergence of the Kazan Khanate at the end of the 1430s due to the fact that the contemporaries of those events did not consider the arrival of Ulugh Muhammad in the Middle Volga region to be the foundation of a new state. They viewed it as return of the khan to his Northern possessions in the circumstances of yet another 'Great Troubles'. However, as further events show, Ulugh Muhammad did not refuse to fight for the southern uluses, and in the first half of the 1440s, he reinstated his power in Desht and in the Crimea, and in 1445 he subordinated the Grand Principality of Moscow [12, p. 63; 41, p. 146; 46, p. 179]. Thus, in the memory of contemporaries Ulugh Muhammad remained a khan of the Golden Horde. His descendants failed to keep their hold on the south, but they retained power in the northern uluses of the Golden Horde, the most important of which was the Kazan Yurt that was inherited by Ulugh Muhammad's eldest son, Mahmud. Moreover, Mahmud inherited from his father peculiar sovereignty—the title of 'free Tatar Tsar', which was a sufficient ground for Kazan people to get control over the lands lying far beyond the Bulgar Ulus. Thus, the history of the Kazan Khanate started in the territory of the Middle Volga region and the Western Cis-Ural Region. By its status it was a heir and part of the Golden Horde, but by its territory it was a new political entity.

This is why it is possible that the political goals of the first Kazan khans did not differ much from the ambitions of the Crimean, the Great Horde and Shiban Chinggisids’ khans who were striving for power in the late Golden Horde. This is also proved by the charters of Metropolitan Iona, created between 15 December 1448 and 31 March 1461. It is noteworthy, that neither in the titles nor in the body of the charters Khan Mahmud and his Prince Shahtyak are mentioned as Kazans, although the message itself was sent to Kazan where the addressees stayed. Instead, in the title of the first charter Mahmud was named 'Tatar Tsar', and in the title of the second charter Shahtyak—'Caesarean' or 'Tsarevniy'. And only a note in the margins specifies that this was about the Kazan Tsar. Further, while addressing Mahmud, Job uses the epithet 'Great' several times, 'your great name and state', 'your great power', 'great power', 'by your great state and grant' [45, pp. 154–155]. In the context of the existing political culture, this epithet indicated the khan's superiority over other bearers of this title. It was frequently used by the later Jochids of the Golden Horde who wanted to dominate in the Horde. For example, Sahib Giray called himself 'Great' (العظم, al-azym) [51, pp. 919–920]. The khans of the Great Horde were also considered to be great (ulug) [21, p. 826]. As we can see, Khan Mahmud was taken exactly for the khan-tsar of the Golden Horde.
Besides, in the charter Mahmud was called a 'free tsar' for four times. Seemingly, this characterises him just as an independent ruler. However, it should be taken into account that in these documents this word is used together with the epithets 'Great' and 'Tatar'. Therefore, in our case the phrase 'free tsar' could mean even more flattering evaluation of Mahmud's status, associated with his superiority over other 'tsars' of the Golden Horde. Considering the peculiarities of the medieval political system, the total, though very often just nominal, co-subordination of all rulers, only the supreme 'tsar', that is the ruler of the entire Ulus of Jochi could be 'free' (including the Russian ulus, as well). Thus, during his trip to the Horde to obtain a yarliq, I. Vsevolozhsky addressed Ulug Muhammad as a 'free tsar' [28, p. 96].

It is for a reason that the title of the metropolitan charter says 'to the Tatar Tsar' instead of 'to the Kazan Tsar'. Most probably, such significant terminological replacement occurred due to Khan Mahmud's political ambitions, who, just like his father, aspired to be the 'tsar' of all Tatars of the Golden Horde. However, Job probably understood that other khans also laid claim to dominate in the Horde (hence this marginal note 'to the Kazan Tsar'), but in this message, in order to successfully settle his trading affairs in Kazan, he acknowledged the superiority of Mahmud over the rest of Jochids. Moreover, this was in compliance with the policy of the Grand Principality of Moscow that payed a tribute to Kazan as recognition of the Golden Horde khans' rights of inheritance.

However, such assessment corresponded to the actual state practice: during the years of his reign, Mahmud not only established political stability that ensured safe trading for merchants from different countries, but also spread his power over new territories. The Khanate's sphere of influence included the Vyatka land and Great Perm [11, p. 292]. At the same time, after the defeat of Veliky Novgorod in 1456, Moscow's sphere of interests essentially expanded and got closer to the Vyatka land and Great Perm. While fighting for the 'consolidation' of 'Russian' lands, the grand-ducal power needed silver so badly (which was mostly received from fur trade), that it got involved into a conflict with the Kazan Khanate, which was powerful at that time.

In 1458–1459, the Moscow troops made two campaigns to the Vyatka land and entered into a beneficial agreement. In 1461, Vasily II headed a campaign against Kazan, but the Kazan ambassadors, upon arriving in Vladimir 'made peace' [35, pp. 275–277]. However, in 1462 the newly-appeared Great Prince, Ivan III sent his voivodes to the lands of the Kazan Khanate, what is more, they not only went round the Cheremis lands of the Khanate, but, going down the Vyatka River, went up the Kama River to as far as the Great Perm [39, pp. 46, 90]. This competition became one of the crucial reasons for the 1467–1469 Kazan-Moscow war, in the course of which Moscow failed to win over the Vyatka land and the Great Perm [35, p. 280; 13].

The Moscow Chronicle of the 15th century has an important notice, which helps to outline the geographical and ethnic borders of the eastern uluses of the Kazan Khanate. The voluminous article 'O Pervoi Kazani', that is, 'About the War with Kazan' (1467–1469) describes Khan Ibrahim's troops as follows: 'Indeed gathered the Kazan Tsar Obreim (Ibrahim) his troops against them, with all his lands of Kama, Tsiplinsk, Kostyatsk, and Belovolozhsk and Votyatsk, and Bashkir...' [35, p. 282]. Only the most remote, eastern uluses of the Kazan Khanate are listed here. The mention of the Sylvensk (Tsiplinsk), Ostyatsk (Kostyatsk), Belovolozhsk (basin of the Belaya River) and Bashkir lands means that by 1469 the territory of the Kazan Khanate spread as far as the Ural. This means that by that time quite a large part of the northern uluses of the Golden Horde appeared to be under the power of Ulugh Muhammad's descendants.

The conciseness of historical data does not allow to give a detailed description of the initial stage of the Kazan Khanate. Quite often another important problem is ignored by historiographers, namely, the serious disagreements in the sources, which cover this topic. Thus, there are contradictions as to how the chronicles represent the 1467–1469, 1478 and 1487 wars with the Kazan Khanate. The official Moscow chronicles confer victorious, religious and all-Russian character to 'The First Kazan War'. According to those chronicles, residents of all Russian lands
took part in this war. It was aimed at the protection of the Orthodox faith and ended with the victory of the Grand Principality forces. Non-official chronicles represent the events of 1467–1469 as an unreasonable war initiated by Ivan III personally and ended with the defeat of his troops [1, pp. 4–8].

The conflict of 1478 is represented with as much contradiction. However, this time totally opposite viewpoints of the same event are found within an official chronicle. Contemporary chroniclers of these events described Ibrahim's campaign against the Vyatka land as successful. According to them, the Kazan Khan subordinated the Vyatka land. However, they did not mention the results of the retaliatory expedition of the Grand Principality troops against Kazan. Meanwhile the later official scribes said that Khan Ibrahim had not conquered a single town, and the retaliatory campaign of the Moscow forces was a success [2, pp. 25–27].

S. Solovyov pointed out to the deviations in the sources regarding the Vyatka campaign attempted by the Kazan troops, but ignored the differences in the interpretation of the retaliatory expedition of the Muscovites. Therefore, the scientist did not make any unambiguous conclusions regarding the first episode, but, characterising the campaign against Kazan, he accepted the later version of the official chronicle and thought that 'Ibrahim had sent his men with bows and petition to the Grand Prince and made peace in all his lands' [50, pp. 67–68]. It should be noted, that many historians of the generations that followed ignored the discrepancies in the chronicles completely and presented those events relying entirely on the latest official information [52, pp. 43–44; 9, p. 124; 8, pp. 36–37; 10, p. 121; 11, pp. 297–298; 19, pp. 138–139; 7, pp. 213–214].

A similar historiographical situation was created with regard to the following episode of the history of the Kazan Khanate. There is an opinion dominating among historians, which was formed under the influence of official chronicle information. According to it, as a result of the 1487 war, Kazan became dependent on Moscow and had to participate in the Russian-Crimean coalition. Notably, only the extent to which Khan Muhammad-Emin was dependent on Ivan III was in question: some historians believed that Kazan only entered into the international channel of the Moscow policy [14, p. 71; 8, p. 43], others spoke about the establishment of Moscow protectorate [52, pp. 47–51; 9, p. 205; 10, p. 197; 17, p. 76].

However, attention should be paid to the fact that there are considerable discrepancies in the descriptions of the 1487 events even in the official chronicles. The majority of scribes assume that the Kazan Khanate, being a part of the princely possessions, in the course of a revolt withdrew from Moscow, and then, as a result of the campaign of the Russian voivodes, returned under the power of Ivan III. According to other official chroniclers, in 1487 'Kazan was conquered', and Ivan III took possession of Kazan thereafter [6, pp. 90–98].

Notably, the researchers did not pay due attention to the information preserved in diplomatic documents. Just before the campaign against Kazan, on 4 March 1487, in his charter to the Crimean Khan Mengli Giray, Ivan III had written, that to keep his promise to Mengli Giray, he would provide support to Muhammad-Emin [47, p. 59]. After the successful campaign, an embassy was sent from Moscow to the Crimea to notify of the actions against the Great Horde and of the decision to grant Muhammad-Emin the Kazan throne. A separate message was sent to Tsarina Nur-Sultan, who married Mengli Giray after the death of the Kazan Khan, Ibrahim. The Grand Prince instructed his people to let Nur-Sultan know that Ilkham had been captured and her son Muhammad-Emin had ascended the Kazan throne [47, p. 59].

S. Alishev noted that Ivan III wrote to Mengli Giray and Nur-Sultan, 'persuading them into a closer cooperation against Poland and Ahmad's Children' [8, p. 42]. At the same time, the first charter indicates that the Grand Prince acted at the request of the Crimean couple, and the second letter represents 'a report' about the successful fulfillment of 'the friendly request'. Thus, the diplomatic records present the Kazan campaign as an act of military assistance aimed at strengthening
allied relations. Similar assessments have been preserved in non-official chronicles and other ambassadorial documents [40, p. 210; 16, pp. 275–277; 42, pp. 50–51; 25, p. 33; 47, p. 199; 44, S. 492 rev.]. The diplomatic interpretation is neither consistent with the picture of the rebels' repression nor with the concept of the submitted kingdom ('Kazan conquest'). The researchers presented the 1487 events without paying attention to the fact that the sources give different interpretations of the situation [52, pp. 47–49; 9, p. 203; 8, pp. 41–42; 19, pp. 141–142].

In order to understand the sources, one should take into consideration that an important factor of inter-state relations of that period was the fight for 'the Horde heritage'. After Ahmad's death in 1481, apart from his heirs, Crimean khan Mengli Giray and Shiban khan Ibrahim (Ibak) laid claims to the Supreme Khan's post. The Russian sovereign who skilfully leveraged the contradictions between different Tatar rulers in order to protect himself, focused on the Crimea that, just like Moscow, was interested in the fight against the Polish-Lithuanian state and the Great Horde. But Kazan's Khan Ilkham was likely to lean towards the alliance with Shiban Khan Ibrahim.

At the same time, the Crimean Khan, after marrying the widow of Kazan's Khan, Nur-Sultan, had an opportunity to strengthen his positions in the Middle Volga region. Mengli Giray petitioned for military assistance from Moscow for his stepson, Muhammad-Emin, who fought for the Kazan throne against his stepbrother, Ilkham. In these circumstances, in 1482, Ivan III, with support from Mengli Giray, started to fight against Ilkham. As a result of the ongoing war, in 1487, Ilkham was given away to the Kazan authorities, and the Khanate joined the Russian-Crimean alliance.

That said, one cannot agree with the opinion that in 1487 Kazan was occupied by Moscow troops, because the messages of Crimean Khan Sahib Giray to Ivan IV clearly states the opposite [44]. Besides, almost all Russian chronicles and other sources lack a description of any military assault of the city, which indicates that Sahib Giray was right. Only the Ustyug Chronicle specifies that 'during all the days (of Kazan's siege—Author), the Tatars were fighting outside the city', and 'the Tatar Prince named Olgaza (Ali-gaza) did a lot of damage to the Grand Prince's forces' but eventually, 'the Tsar and Tatars were exhausted, and the Tsar was forced to leave the city and surrendered into the hands of the Grand Prince's voivodes' [39, p. 50, 96]. This means that the siege of the city ended up not in a successful assault, but in Ilkham's surrender and acknowledgment of Muhammad-Emin's power, for this military campaign had been organised to support him.

There is inconsistency between the words of official chroniclers about the 'Kazan conquest and execution of the rebellious Kazan princes and oulans (oghlanis)' [37, p. 153; 36, p. 278; 28, p. 217] and Polish documents of that period, according to which the rebellious leaders of the Kazan aristocracy were not executed but left the Khanate's capital and continued their fight against Muhammad-Emin and the Russian-Crimean influence [47, p. 84; 42, p. 21]. Consequently, the idea that the 1487 Kazan siege ended up in the military conquest of the city, execution of the Grand Prince's enemies and submission of the Khanate, is a sort of ideological concept, which emerged in the official Moscow circles. Meanwhile, taking into account the data of independent sources and the peculiar political situation that existed in the late Golden Horde, one can only speak about signing a treaty of peace on the terms of which the Kazan authorities accepted Muhammad-Emin and changed the foreign policy's direction.

Thus, the longstanding opposition of Ibrahim's heirs in the circumstances when the division of spheres of influence occurred in the post-Horde space, weakened the Kazan Khanate. Muhammad-Emin's government had to not only give up their claims to the Vyatka land, but in 1489 it had to provide military aid to Moscow to help submit this land. Ivan III's position in the North Cis-Urals strengthened. By the mid-1480s, he had submitted several Vogul princes, and by 1505 established a local administration over the Great Perm [39, p. 99]. On
the other hand, the eastern and southern uluses of the Kazan Khanate found themselves in the zone of opposition against the strengthened Nogai Horde. At the end of the 15th century, Shiban and Nogai rulers arranged a number of large-scale intrusions into the Khanate in order to release the Kazan Yurt from the Moscow-Crimean alliance [16, p. 277; 47, p. 146; 42, pp. 50–52; 37, pp. 321–339; 27, columns 330–372; 34, pp. 208–215; 28, pp. 223–246; 29, pp. 259–268; 32, pp. 356–375].

However, in the beginning of the 16th century, the situation began to change. In 1502, the Great Horde fell under the pressure of the Crimean Khanate and its allies [22, p. 120]. In 1503, the Muscovite state, having conquered Lithuania, completed the accession of Chernigov, Smolensk and Novhorod-Siverskyi lands. Thus, the recent allies proved to be such a success in this fight that turned into neighbouring states and began to compete with each other. In addition, Ivan III kept on strengthening his positions in the North Cis-Urals, which raised concerns not only in the Kazan Khanate, but also in other Tatar khanates.

In 1505, right after vicegerent Ivan III was approved in the Great Perm, a Tyumen Sultan organised a campaign to those lands. It is symptomatic that after the chronicle article about the Tatar attack on Great Perm, there follows a story about demolition of Russian merchants in Kazan and Muhammad-Emin's attack on Nizhny Novgorod [39, p. 99]. As we can see, the actions of the Siberian Shibanids and the Kazan authorities were agreed. Notably, Nogais, who supported Shibanids and participated in the campaign of the Kazan Khan against Nizhny Novgorod, played an important part in this situation [37, p. 338; 27, columns 372–373; 28, pp. 244–245; 31, p. 259; 32, p. 375]. Thus, in 1505, Muhammad-Emin turned on a dime in the Kazan foreign policy.

In response, Moscow carried out a large-scale campaign against Kazan. It was organised by the newly-appeared sovereign Vasily III in 1506. The chroniclers were unanimous regarding the fact that the Grand Prince's troops suffered a devastating defeat near Kazan, after which there started complicated negotiations, which lasted for many years [37, p. 339; 27, column 375; 32, p. 376; 34, pp. 215–216; 33, p. 566; 346, pp. 297–299].

After Muhammad-Emin's death in 1518, the Kazan authorities tended to enter into an alliance with Moscow again and set Shah-Ali, a protégé of the Grand Prince, up on the khan's throne. However, Vasily III's government, taking advantage of this situation, tried to legally secure unequal relations with the Khanate, which, most probably, appeared to be one of the crucial reasons for the unpopularity of Shah-Ali's regimen and break-up of the peaceful relations in 1521 [2, pp. 21–22].

However, the Crimean khans, laying claims to the Kazan Yurt since Muhammad-Emin's death, played a crucial part in all this. In 1521, Khan Mehmed Giray not only set his younger brother Sahib Giray up on the Kazan throne, but also covered this shift in power by a large-scale intrusion into the Russian state. The establishment of the power of the Crimean dynasty in Kazan led to a direct military and political confrontation with Moscow, which lasted, with minor breaks, until the Kazan Khanate was conquered.

Only once, after a large-scale war, Vasily III's government managed to entrust the Kazan authorities his protege Jan-Ali who was supported in 1532 and dethroned in 1535 by the same representatives of Kazan aristocracy. Therefore, Jan-Ali was dethroned rather because of the weakened influence of Moscow after Vasily III's death, and not as a result of the fight for power between different groups of the Kazan elite, as this was described by our predecessors [52, p. 95; 49, p. 65; 19, p. 109; 10, p. 188; 20, pp. 73–74]. In the course of peaceful negotiations, which were held between the 1520–1540 military clashes, the Moscow party sought to establish patronage relationship, meanwhile the Girays insisted on 'brotherhood' relations. The parties failed to find a compromise in this key issue [44, S. 416–425, 487 rev.–493 rev.].

Thus, all truces occurring during those years only delayed the next war. Usually, Russian chronicles attributed the initiative of peace negotiations to the Kazan authorities, but this was rather caused by the peculiarities of medieval representation. From the point of view of ancient
Russian scribes, the initiators of the conflict who do not stick to the 'truth' are always the first to make peace. However, the muscovites were also likely to need time for recovery, especially after unsuccessful campaigns. Besides, we know about the internal political problems and military conflicts on the western and southern borders of Rus', which distracted their attention from Kazan.

In the second half of the 1530s to the beginning of the 1540s, after the restoration of Safa Giray's power, the Kazan authorities, taking advantage of the political instability in Moscow and the Russian-Lithuanian war, made a number of raids upon the outskirts of the Russian state [28, pp. 291–292; 30, pp. 106–107; 32, pp. 436, 440; 38, pp. 24, 27; 18, p. 338]. The Nogai and Astrakhan Tatars participated in these raids in an alliance with the Kazan people [25, p. 35]. As a result of the cooperation with Nogai Tatars, 'The Manghit Yurt' emerged in the territory of the Kazan Khanate. Its income partially went to the Nogai Horde [17, pp. 26, 145–148, 163]. However, we should not exaggerate the importance of plundering raids upon Rus', speaking of their structure-forming function for the economy of the Khanate, because even Russian chronicles make it possible to outline the territorial and chronological limitation of Kazan raids. Besides, the Kazan Khanate was a state with developed craft production and arable farming, and slave trading did not play a major role there. It is symptomatic that in 1551, after signing the agreement on release of Russian captives, many of them refused to go back to Rus' as they had already become full-fledged members of the society and converted to Islam [18, p. 382].

Since 1545, Moscow enhanced its military-diplomatic actions in the East. The official chronicles speak about the beginning of 'a new victorious war' under Ivan IV's leadership [30, p. 146; 32, p. 464; 38, p. 46]. However, it is important to understand that this is an opinion of chroniclers who knew the result of this opposition, and, therefore, combined the 1545–1552 campaigns into one war aimed at conquering the Kazan Kingdom. The course toward conquering Kazan and the Khanate's final liquidation was charted in 1547 when Ivan IV was crowned, blessed by the Metropolitan to conquer 'barbarian languages' and for the first time headed a campaign against Kazan [30, p. 150; 32, p. 469; 38, p. 50]. Ivan IV's adoption of the tsar title was an important ideological step on the way of conquering the Kazan Khanate: in the eyes of the Russian society, this equated the status of the Moscow sovereign with the khans of Kazan and Astrakhan and justified his claims to the eastern lands. Taking over the tsar title meant approval of the foreign programme aimed at fighting for the 'Horde heritage', that is consolidation of the Ulus of Jochi under the power of Moscow. It was in 1547 that Ivan IV began to personally head campaigns against Kazan. Therefore, the approval of conquest plans should be considered within the context of Ivan IV's coronation.

Traditionally, just like the chroniclers, historians paid more attention to Ivan IV's third campaign against Kazan, underestimating the scale and significance of the preceding two expeditions under the tsar's leadership. And it is important to understand that the way the 1552 events were covered was due to their fateful nature. The stories about Kazan's conquest are more informative, they give much space to ideological passages and detailed description of the events. However, if we put aside all the details and compare the 1552 campaign with the military expeditions of 1547–1550, it becomes clear that the scope of the previous campaigns did not come short of the march-off of the Moscow forces in 1552.

In the campaign of 1549–1550 as many voivodes participated as in 1552 when Kazan was conquered, a little fewer names were listed in the lists of noble families for 1547–1548. However, in the first two campaigns of the tsar against Kazan, besides Shah-Ali, the Astrakhan Tsarevich Yediger participated. All these expeditions included a regiment with artillery and battering rams [43, pp. 112–115, 120–124, 133–138].

When describing the 1549–1550 campaign of the tsar's troops against Kazan, many historians, just like official scribes, did not mention the fierce military actions and stated unfavourable weather conditions as the cause of the failure. However, a number of textually independent data
(reports of Kh. Sherifi, A. Kurbsky, who compiled the chronograph and was the author of 'The Kazan History') speak about a retreat of the Grand Prince's troops as a result of large-scale clashes, which led to great losses on both sides [3, pp. 114–118]. We believe that the 1547–1552 campaigns had one common goal—the conquest of Kazan, which means that the decision on the military submission of the khanate was taken not later than in 1547.

The first two expeditions under Ivan IV's leadership were failures, therefore, they were not broadly covered in the chronicles. The guarantee of victory in 1552 was the implementation of the Sviyazhsk construction plan, on the basis of which the Moscow forces carried out ongoing military operations in the region. This resulted in the submission of the Taw yağı (Hill Land) and devastation of other uluses. Most probably, Shah-Ali's activity aimed at the disruption of the military potential of the khanate was an important factor, as well. During his third period of reign in Kazan (August 1551–March 1552), he managed to liquidate many enemies of the Moscow authorities, and in March 1552, while leaving the throne, he ruined the fortress cannons, took out of the city arquebuses and gunpowder [38, p. 70]. In addition, finally, Shah-Ali captured and drove to Sviyazhsk 84 Kazan princes and murzas, leaving the khanate not only without important political figures, but also without major military commanders [30, p. 175; 31, p. 474; 32, p. 491; 38, pp. 70–71, 169–170]. There is no doubt that the fall of Kazan was also caused by internal strives encouraged by the military-diplomatic and financial influence of Moscow.

Using various literary techniques, chroniclers compared the 1552 campaign against Kazan with the military victories of the Old Testament prophets over pagans, and with the Battle of Kulikovo and staying on the Ugra. The conquest of Kazan was compared with the most important events of the world history: with the Babylon conquest of Jerusalem and the fall of Constantinople in 1453. That is, the conquest of Kazan in the minds of Russian scribes meant getting rid of the centuries-long Tatar threat, the triumph of Orthodoxy and obtaining the tsardom—the beginning of a new period of the Russian state [4, pp. 5–10].

Despite the fact that official ideologists associated the war against Kazan, first of all, with the protection of Christians against the infidel yoke and with the need to spread Orthodoxy, there is an idea found in the sources that the submission of the khanate could have economic benefits as well. Besides, according to the extant information, it is difficult to identify all the factors which caused the development of the events, because mostly the data of Russian authors was preserved, which is the reason for the description being one-sided.

At the dawn of Moscow state, in the second half of the 15th century, independent chronicle writing developed intensively, which can help verify some official reports. Meanwhile, the events of the first half of the 16th century are well presented only by official chronicles. During this period, as the united Russian state was getting stronger, independent chronicle writing was being ousted. Therefore, researchers, while evaluating the Moscow-Kazan relations, were guided, to a greater extent, by the data provided by the Kremlin Chancellery, very often ignoring their subordination to the political-religious ideology, well-reasoned with the help of various allegories. Moreover, even in those few cases when independent information was preserved, the official reports appear to lack credibility. The representation of Ivan IV's second campaign against Kazan is just a case in point.

One way or another, the Moscow government increased taxes and carried out military, administrative and church reforms in the course of this war. Only owing to the mobilisation of huge resources, untypical for that period, he managed to conquer Kazan, the fall of which opened a way to the annexation of other Tatar yurts. For five years after Kazan had been conquered, the central part of the former Golden Horde happened to be under Ivan IV's rule—these comprised the Middle and Lower Volga regions and some adjacent territories. This means that in this context the fight for domination in the Horde was won by Moscow, and 'the Kazan war' appeared to be the culmination stage of this confrontation.
Chapter XI. The Later Golden Horde Time


15. Izmaylov I. Bulgarski ulus: Bulgar i drugie e'miraty' (Bulgar ulus: Bulgar and other emirates) // Istorija tatar s drevnejshix vremen v semi tomakh. Vol. 3. Ulus Dzhuchi (Zolotaya Orda)
Chapter XI. The Later Golden Horde Time


46. Sabitov Zh., Yakushechkin A. Kto by'l xanom v Kry’mu v 1456 godu? (Who was the Khan of the Crimea in 1456?) // Kry'mskoe istoricheskoe obozrenie. 2015. No. 2. Pp. 175–185.
§ 6. 'The Meshchera yurt' (Kasimov Khanate)

Bulat Rakhimzyanov

One subjective result of civil war in the territory of the future Russian State during the second quarter of the 15th century was the formation of the Kasimov Khanate in 1445 on conjoined lands of the Ryazan and Moscow Principalities. This khanate arose only because of the hostile and uncompromising environment within the Grand Duke of Moscow's house, and the frequent exchange of grand princes. A detailed analysis of the data in the treaties and wills belonging to Grand and appanage princes from 1481–1553, which has been extrapolated into the second quarter–middle of the 15th century [6, p. 284, p. 275, p. 367, p. 362, p. 417, p. 419; 44, p. 461; for more details see: 41, p. 57–61], allows us to conclude that the Kasimov Khanate was the result of a kind of ransom that Grand Prince Vasily of Moscow had promised to Khan Ulugh Muhammad in 1445 after Russian troops were defeated near Suzdal. The charters explicitly mention that 'vykhod' (tribute) collected from the Grand Principalities of Moscow and Ryazan were transferred to the Kasimov, as well as to the Kazan, Crimean, and Astrakhan Khanates, and to the Great Horde. It follows, therefore, that the Kasimov Khanate was quite a substantial financial burden upon the citizens of Russian principalities. From the perspective of the Moscow Principality, the formation of this khanate was not a matter of free will. During the first years of its existence, it was a reminder of Moscow's defeat, a little piece of Tatar territory on Russian land. The disintegration of the Golden Horde resulted not only in the break-off of its most prominent cultural areas and the formation of independent khanates, but it also served as a catalyst for the birth of special Tatar entities in the developing Russian state [for more details, see: 41, pp. 47–65].

Two distinct periods have been identified in the historical development of the Kasimov Khanate. The first period, which began with the creation of the Khanate in 1445 and the fall of the Kazan 'yurt' in 1552, is characterised by the role played by the Kasimov Khanate as a dynastic counterweight to Kazan and the Crimea. That is why the Moscow government was extremely interested in the existence of this 'nursery of khans', and especially as it related to the Kazan throne. The second period lasted from the fall of Kazan until the actual elimination of the Kasimov 'tsardom' in the middle of the 17th century. It was characterised by the fact that, as a political entity, it gradually became an anachronism; during this period the Russian administration took methodical steps to 'dissolve' the Kasimov 'appanage' in Russia. The first period is especially interesting from a scholarly point of view. During this stage, the Kasimov Khanate acted quite autonomously in regard to internal affairs. A change in the geopolitical situation in
Eastern Europe, in conjunction with the Muscovite State's conquest of Kazan and Astrakhan Khanates, led to a sudden change in the Kasimov Khanate's political situation. The Kasimov Khanate began to more closely resemble an appanage principality; it quickly lost its territory and what remained of its sovereignty. Following the Time of Troubles, Kasimov became nothing but a desolate provincial backwater that was rarely mentioned in the pages of chronicles and razrjadnaja knigas.

Sultan Kasim, the first ruler of the town of Meshchera, the future city of Kasimov, who ruled from 1445–1469 in Kasimov Khanate, is mentioned only once in sources after 1462—that is, in 1467 [28, p. 118; 26, p. 187; 27, p. 152; 24, p. 132, 149; 25, p. 274]. That year Khan Halil died in Kazan. Due to the general confusion that resulted in matters concerning succession to the throne, some nobles in the Kazan Khanate proposed electing Tsarevich Kasim, who was living in Meshchera, to the Khan's throne. Ivan III decided to accept this proposition, and provided Kasim with strong military support. The Grand Prince hoped to be able to influence the affairs of the neighboring state through the loyal Tsarevich of Kasimov. However, the campaign was a failure, and Kasim had to return to the town of Meshchera, where he spent the last years of his life.

Kasim's son Sultan Daniyar (1469–1486) was also actively made use of by Moscow, but for military purposes: together with the Grand Prince, he participated in a campaign against Novgorod in 1471, during which he actively proved his loyalty to him [26, p. 192; 27, p. 162; 28, p. 130]: together with other Russian troops, he held the border along the Oka River in 1472 from attack by Ahmed, the Great Horde Khan [24, p. 151; 26, pp. 31–32, 195; 27, pp. 174–175; 28, pp. 149–150]; in 1477 he participated in the final fall of the Novgorod Republic [38, pp. 18–19; 9, p. 13; 24, pp. 259–260; 26, p. 207, 213; 27, pp. 185, 191; 28, pp. 172, 179]. Moscow confined his participation, however, to military service with the Kasimov Tatars. In all probability, Daniyar died in 1486 [6, pp. 318, 321, 325, 328].

Kasim and his son Daniyar, the first two rulers of the Kasimov Khanate, were descendants of Ulugh Muhammad. When Daniyar died in 1486, this dynasty was no longer represented on the Kasimov throne. The next ruler of Kasimov, Nur Devlet, although related to the previous rulers, (they were all Jochids and descended from the same branch of the dynasty—from Tuqay Timur), was not a direct descendant. The government in Moscow appointed rulers arbitrarily without worrying about maintaining a unified dynasty of khans and sultans in Kasimov. Only occasionally (quite rarely) were the rulers close relatives (usually a father and son, or sometimes brothers). It is likely that this happened when the deceased ruler had direct heirs. In all the other cases, of which there were many more, rulers of Kasimov were appointed in accordance with the plans of the Moscow government. But it is impossible, even symbolically, to speak about a single Kasimov dynasty. It simply did not exist.

The Crimean dynasty—that is, descendants of the first Crimean Khan Hajji Giray—was represented in Kasimov by Khan Nur Devlet, (who ruled from 1486–1490) and his sons, Sultans Satalgan (1490–1506, not continuously) and Janay (1506–1512) [for more details on the rule of the Girays in Kasimov, see: 41, pp. 118–138].

Nur Devlet—the son of Hajji Giray and the brother of Mengli Giray, who at that time ruled over Crimea—was a powerful weapon in Moscow's foreign policy arsenal against the Crimean Khanate. He could lay dynastic claims to the Khan's throne, and it was used as leverage to pressure the Crimean Khanate, thus forcing Mengli Giray to act in accordance with the Grand Prince of Moscow's wishes. It wasn't, therefore, absolutely necessary to put Nur Devlet on the Crimean throne. It is interesting that despite Nur Devlet's opposition to the current Crimean ruler, Mengli Giray, the very fact that Meschera yurt belonged to the Crimean dynasty was regarded positively, even though it created problems for the Crimean Khan.

The military significance of the Kasimov Khanate to the Russian state during the reign of the Crimean dynasty is also hard to underestimate. Located on the border, the Kasimov Tatars'
marvelous military cavalry served as a shock force in the struggle against both the Great Horde and the Kazan Khanate. Between 1486 and 1512, the main forces of the Kasimov Khanate were directed to helping Mengli Giray defeat the Great Horde. In 1502, the Kasimov Khanate played an important role in its fall. Frequently, Kasimov's rulers, along with the state's ruling elite, did not remain long on the territory of a subordinate 'appanage', choosing, instead, to spend their time at the border with the Horde of 'Ahmad's Children' and the Kazan Khanate.

Some facts indicate a certain degree of independence among Crimean immigrants in Kasimov, and that Meshchera's status among states in the late Golden Horde was rather ambiguous. Apparently, khans and sultans received one-time payments for each military campaign or action in which they took part [46, p. 300]. Perhaps this is the way, therefore, we should interpret the 'notation' presumably written by Fyodor Karpo in 1492: 'So many times did the Grand Prince send Tsar Nurdoulat to the field to fulfill the Tsar's duties because of Mengli Giray, and so many times did he send Tsarevich Satalgan, the son of Nurdoulat, along with the Russian army, and so many Tatars and Russians were rewarded, for the deaths of them 'polskie' [field money] are paid' [43, vol. 41, p. 370]. The Grand Prince entrusted the job of recouping expenses and losses related to the campaign in the Field in August of 1492 not to specially appointed officials, but to his ambassador to the Crimea, (which in itself was quite significant), who, along with his diplomatic responsibilities, had to act as the Tsar's financial agent within the country.

Diplomatic correspondence contains interesting data on the status of Meshchersky yurt. Meshchera (the Kasimov Khanate) and Kazan (the Kazan Khanate) were often regarded by other Turkic rulers (who never reigned either in Meshchera or Kazan) at the end of the 15th and beginning of the 16th centuries as equivalent 'entities'. This indicates a certain similarity in their status [43, vol. 95, p. 11–15]. It was an attempt to present Kazan, Kasimov and the Moscow leadership as 'equivalents' [43, vol. 35, pp. 530–531; for more details see: 41, pp. 134–135].

The Girays' rule left a significant mark on the history of Meshchersky yurt. Even five years after the last dynasty ceased to reign in Meshchera, in 1517, the Crimean khan Mehmed Giray treated it as his own 'yurt'—"Throughout the ages this yurt has belonged to us' [43, vol. 95, p. 377]. This is what he said to the scribe Mitya Ivanov, the ambassador's clerk. The Girays regarded Kazan in the same manner [Ibid, vol. 95, pp. 679, 696]. The Crimean nobility regarded the Kasimov Khanate in a similar way: in 1516 the Crimean mirza Bakhtiyar wrote to Ivan III: '... you yourself know very well that Meshchera yurt belongs to my Tsar (our emphasis—B.R.)' [43, vol. 95, p. 251]

The Shirin Clan, which occupied the highest position among the other four clans in Meshchera, ensured that their superiority was respected. According to legends, it was the Shirins who had conquered Meshchera some time in the past. The Meshchera princes' genealogical record contains information containing the statement that 'the Shirin Prince, Bakhmet Useinov, came from the Great Horde to Meshchera, conquered it, and settled there' [4, p. 75]. In conjunction with a change in dynasties, the Shirins, having marched towards Meshchera, initiated, in essence, a local war against Moscow [43, vol. 95, pp. 377, 520]

Mehmed Giray described the general attitude in the Crimea towards the Kasimov Khanate in the first quarter of the 16th century thus: '... if our kin will not be ruling in Meshchera, we will not be at peace with it' [43, vol. 95, p. 380]. Besides all of this, there was the indisputable fact that Meshchera belonged to Moscow, that it was a 'votchina' [patrimony] of the Moscow Grand Prince: in the agreement of 1494 between the Grand Prince of Moscow Ivan Vasilyevich (Ivan III) and Grand Duke of Lithuania Alexander Kazimirovich, the latter admitted that Meshchera was a votchina belonging to Ivan Vasilyevich [6, p. 330]. See also: [43, vol. 35, pp. 127, 130]).
The Crimean political elite regarded the yurt in Meshchera as another Tatar estate to which certain Jochid ancestors had hereditary rights. The yurt was situated on Muscovite state territory, and the Grand Prince was technically its ruler. At the same time, however, it was considered a Tatar yurt. For the Crimeans it was the hereditary land of the Shirins and their suzerain—the Crimean Khan. Indeed, this Muscovite yurt became a home-away-from-home for Crimean feudal lords, a colony of sorts where they could simply spend the night or remain permanently, where they might receive material support or an opportunity for military service in Moscow. This Tatar enclave, like other such 'towns', became an integral part of the steppe system of 'yurt-appanages', the link between the Tata political world and Moscow.

The defeat of the Great Horde in 1502 by the Crimean Khan Mengli Giray led to a 'vacuum' in the steppe which, in turn, triggered a conflict between two former allies, Moscow and the Crimea [49, p. 554]. The alliance between Moscow, the Crimea and Kazan broke down. The Kazan Khanate, the weakest link in the triangle, became a breeding ground for intrigue and struggle between pro-Moscow and pro-Crimean factions among the local nobility.

After the death of Sultan Janai, the last representative of the Crimean dynasty in Kasimov, Moscow chose Sheikh Auliyar for the throne of Kasimov. He was the son of Sultan Bakhityar, a Jochid from the Great Horde. He was also the nephew of Ahmed, the Great Horde Khan, and therefore a descendant of Chinggis Khan [5, p. 39] (for a more detailed account of Sheikh Auliyar's lineage, see: [3, part 1, pp. 224–244]). In the Crimea the appointment of Ahmed's descendant to the Kasimov throne was regarded with hostility: '...The children of Tsars Ahmat and Makhmut are our enemies, and you, our brother (Vasily III — Author) call them your enemies when you write to us about them, and yet you gave the Meshchera yurt to Tsarevitch Sheikh Auliyar, one of the children of our enemy, and bestowed too much honor upon him' [43, vol. 95, p. 296].

In terms of foreign policy, Kasimov yurt was of both symbolic and practical value: the choice and appointment of a new khan to the throne was often the subject of diplomatic negotiations, and definitely influenced relations between Moscow and its Tatar partners. One of Moscow's main tasks during the latter half of the 15th—first half of the 16th century was the creation of a favourable balance of power with Tatar states that had come into being after the disintegration of the Golden Horde. Moscow efficiently manipulated the Kasimov throne as a means to accomplish their own foreign policy goals.

Sheikh Auliyar presumably died in 1516 [8, p. 42]. He ruled over the Kasimov Khanate from 1512 to 1516. Sheikh Auliyar was remembered by his contemporaries and historians most importantly as the father of two khans who left a huge mark on the history of Meshchera and the Kazan Khanate. These were Shah Ali and Jan-Ali Khans.

In 1505 Sheikh Auliyar's son, Shah Ali was born. In 1516 a second son was born in the family, Jan-Ali. That same year Sheikh Auliyar died, and his eldest son Shah Ali became the ruler of Kasimov Khanate.

A dynastic change in the Kasimov Khanate was an important and very sensitive factor of Eastern European international relations in 16th-century. One American researcher, O. Pritsak, proposes that 'only now did the Chinggisids of Kasimov become puppets of the Moscow rulers, thus transferring to them the dynastic charisma required to establish a new state body' [51, p. 580]. This was, in essence, an open challenge to the Crimean Khanate which, after the Great Horde's defeat, considered itself 'Tsar Toktamysh's yurt'—that, the direct successor to the power of the Golden Horde. Within the framework of the post-Golden Horde Desht-i Kipchak territory's legal norms, this seemed quite legitimate. But, in terms of economic and military potential, 16th-century Muscovy was already close to becoming the strongest member among them. At the same time, Muscovy's actual position contrasted sharply with its formal status in terms of post-Golden Horde 'legal norms', since the Muscovite monarch did not belong to Chinggis Khan's dynasty.
In 1518 Khan Muhammad-Emin died in Kazan [26, p. 263; 27, p. 266]. The ramifications of this were many. With the death of Muhammad-Emin, the dynasty of Ulugh-Muhammad, which had held the Kazan throne by right of conquest, came to an end.

The pledge Kazan had made in 1516 that 'no Tsar or Tsarevich may be chosen to rule over Kazan without the Grand Prince's knowledge' gave the government of Vasily III 'legal' grounds for interfering in Kazan affairs. Thus, Tsarevich Shah Ali of Kasimov was nominated to the throne even though he had no actual claim to it, except for the fact that he was a member of the Jochi-Chinggisid family, which in this case was a mere formality.

Born and raised in Muscovite Rus', Shah Ali was only 13 years old. The Muscovite government hoped to use him to influence internal politics in the Kazan Khanate and bring it under its influence.

But the Crimea strongly protested this appointment. Prince Appak, the Crimean ambassador to Moscow, expressed the Crimean Khanate's position during a reception with Vasily III saying: 'Since olden time, the Tsars of the Horde have been the enemies of our Monarch, but now you have sent a Tsar from that yurt to Kazan' [43, vol. 95, p. 661].

Relations between the Grand Prince and Shah Ali during his first reign in Kazan were regulated by šart charters [27, p. 266; 28, p. 32]. His main obligation, as well as that of the Kazan government, was to protect the interests of Moscow's subjects residing in Kazan. The Kazan government also made a separate commitment to waive their right to independently choose a khan.

The Kasimov Tatars occupied themselves, as they usually did at specified times, with guarding the eastern borders of the Muscovite state [43, vol. 95, p. 376, 379].

In addition to pro-Moscow feudal lords, there was a Crimean group in Kazan that was dissatisfied with Russia's presence there. The pro-Crimea group established communications with the Crimean court and conspired against Shah Ali. In the spring of 1521 Sahib Giray and his contingent of 300 men [43, vol. 95, p. 678] approached Kazan. The city surrendered peacefully.

On 10 July 1530 troops from Moscow—the infantry, cavalry, landing troops and artillery—united and fell upon Kazan from all sides. Russian troops were victorious. Due to active steps taken by Muscovite ambassadors in Kazan, protests erupted against Safa Giray, and eventually he fled.

The Khan's throne in Kazan was free. Charters signed by the new government in Kazan clearly demonstrate that it was ready to obey the Grand Prince, provided that he not appoint Shah Ali, but his younger brother, Jan-Ali, as their ruler [27, p. 277; 28, p. 57]. Thus, the Kazan Khanate was re-established as a protectorate of the Russian state. This did not, however, last long: on 5 September 1536 an internal coup took place in Kazan. 'Tsarina Kovgorshad (Gäwhärşät) and Prince Bulat and the entire population of Kazan betrayed Grand Prince Ivan Vasilyevich and murdered Analey (Jan-Ali) Tsar, whom great Prince Vasily Ivanovich had given them as Tsar of Kazan' [27, p. 291; 28, p. 88]. This is how the coup was briefly described in the Voskresenskaya and Nikon Chronicles. Pro-Moscow supporters who were unhappy and did not accept this abrupt political coup left Kazan. Jan-Ali's reign ended tragically. He ruled Kazan from 29 June 1532 to 25 September 1535. Prior to that, he had ruled in Kasimov from 1519 to June 1532.

From June 1532 to early 1536, the Kasimov Khanate remained without a khan. We have the usual information about this: '...And from Astorokan there came Kazan envoys, some who were already in the Crimea, and others from the Crimea were visiting the king; and our Monarch's Gorodets Cossacks ambushed them and beat them, and about 50 of them were captured alive and brought to our Monarch' (1536) [43, vol. 59, p. 54, 117]. Most of all during this period, the Kasimov Tatars harassed the Nogais: they captured their cattle, intercepted Nogai envoys to Kazan, and took prisoner Nogai subjects, whom they then held, quite often, in Kasimov [11, part 7, pp. 240, 249, 250, 320, 321, 308, 314, 229, 340, 341]. It is possible that some
prisoners could have settled at a later date in the Kasimov Khanate, thus becoming subjects of the Kasimov Khan and the Grand Prince [43, vol. 95, p. 640]. Some of Kasimov's residents were themselves captured by the Nogais and imprisoned for a long time [11, part 7, p. 243]. Besides military action, the Kasimov Tatars took part in Russian diplomatic affairs: they were hired to guide ambassadors to Eastern countries, and sometimes were sent alone with charters or to conduct negotiations [11, part 7, pp. 233, 279, 290, 291, 298, 254, 307, 257, 259].

Based upon the previous description, we see that Kasimov Khanate's status as a vassal state is quite evident: the Khanate was left without a master, which didn't prevent the government in Moscow from using its residents for their own purposes. But a khanate without a khan makes no sense. In fact, Russian rulers actually needed not the Kasimov Khanate itself, but the Kasimov Khan's title (Sultan) in order to nominate him to the Kazan throne.

According to some historians, since the 1530s the Grand Princes of Muscovy had gradually begun to interfere in the internal affairs of the Kasimov Khanate by introducing into it administrative elements loyal to Moscow. A permanent representative with the rank of okolnichy was known to have been in Kasimov since November 1542.

In March 1546, Khan Shah Ali was again elected to the throne in Kazan, but he lasted only 1 month [28, p. 149].

In May 1551, a major campaign was launched against Kazan. On 24 May, the fortress of Sviyazhsk was founded at the mouth of the Sviyaga River in the territory of the Kazan Khanate. It became, in essence, an outpost for the Russian advance to the East. Later, the Muscovite government blocked the waterways around Kazan and virtually paralyzed life in the city. Following a political coup in Kazan, power was transferred to proponents of peace with Russia. A delegation was sent to Sviyazhsk to invite Shah Ali to take the throne. Again (for the third time), he becomes the Kazan Khan.


So, representatives of the Golden Horde's dynastic line in Kasimov, the brothers Shah Ali and Jan-Ali, ruled Kazan as khans on a number of occasions. As is indicated in the Russian Chronicles, Jan-Ali ruled Kazan from 1532 to 1535, while Shah Ali ruled three times 'at the will of the Monarch', from 1519 to 1521, in 1546, and in 1551. During these four reigns Moscow exerted a varying degree of influence over Kazan. This meant that the politics of its (Moscow's) henchmen also varied: in some cases they acted rather harshly, while in others they had to find a balance between different political forces. Overall, both Khans were obedient puppets of Muscovy, and during neither reign were there a single case of 'disobedience' to the Grand Prince.

For the Khans themselves, ruling the Kazan throne was considerably more prestigious than presiding over the Kasimov Khanate, so they attempted to hold it, despite the fact that this was often associated with mortal danger. But even with their help it was impossible to bring Kazan, like 'Gorodok' (Kasimov), to the level of dependence sought by Moscow: Jan-Ali was murdered in Kazan, and Shah Ali was expelled from it three times. The Kazan Khanate was conquered by the power of Russian arms, and the Kasimov Khanate contributed to its own decline [for more details on the Golden Horde dynasty in Kazan and Meshscheria, see: 41, pp. 138–167].

Rulers in Moscow made active use of the Kasimov Khanate as a 'carrot and stick' against their Tatar allies and opponents. Kasimov successfully combined two functions: it could be employed as a kind of military shield that protected Muscovy's southern border, and as a means for applying diplomatic pressure on the Grand Prince's 'foes' [50, p. 179].
Following the conquest of Kazan, the Kasimov Khanate, while existing de jure, became, in fact, a regular administrative part of the Russian state: it consisted of several uyezds. Its unique character quickly disappeared. In fact, it was no longer a khanate, and it would be incorrect to refer to it during this period, from the middle of the 16th century, (approximately 1626), to the middle of the 17th (for more details on the dates, see [2, pp. 274, 277–278, 396–398]) as the Khanate of Kasimov. Its actual political status evolved over time. At that point, this ethnopolitical organism more likely resembled an appanage principality, in which a rapid loss of territory and sovereignty was underway [7, p. 198].

Following the Russian State’s conquest of the Tatar Khanates, who were the successors of the Golden Horde, the geopolitical situation in the post-Golden Horde territory of Desht-i Kipchak and in Eastern Europe in general changed dramatically (for more details on the geopolitical situation in Desht-i Kipchak in the 13–16th centuries, see [40]). The Russian authorities gained possession of the former khan's domains, including the ruins of Sarai—the 'Tsar's place'. After the conquest of Kazan and Astrakhan, Ivan IV began to use the title of 'Tsar of Kazan' and 'Tsar of Astrakhan' in order to be recognized as Tsar during diplomatic negotiations. The ruler of Muscovy stood on a par with the Girays, the sovereign Crimean khans.

In that complex international situation, the Kasimov Khanate became a trump card in Muscovite foreign policy; its existence was used in the diplomatic game with the Crimea and, especially, with the Ottoman Empire. It could be said that the Kasimov Khanate filled the vacuum left by all the Islamic states conquered by Russia. To all the accusations made by its foreign opponents about the oppression of Muslims, the destruction of their principles, customs, and faith, Muscovy could boldly point to the existence of an Islamic 'state' whose inhabitants were free to practice their faith and maintain their traditional ways right in the middle of Orthodox Russia. Moreover, after capturing Kazan and Astrakhan, Muscovy was faced with new problems, including conquests of the Urals and Siberia, and then maintaining relations with the Kazakh khanates. This is attested by the fact that later sultans and khans from the Siberian and Kazakh steppes 'reigned' in Kasimov.

Shah Ali died on 20 April 1567. The death of Shah Ali left the Muscovite government again faced with the problem of who could be appointed the governor of Kasimov (Shah Ali died childless at the age of 61). The decision was made to appoint Sultan Sain-Bulat, a relative of Shah Ali. Unfortunately, it is not clear when exactly Sain-Bulat was appointed the governor of Kasimov. Apparently, this happened either immediately after the death of Shah Ali in 1567, or somewhat later—but before 1570. In 1570 Sain-Bulat was already a Kasimov khan.

In the summer of 1573, Sain-Bulat converted to Christianity and was given the name Sim-eon. After that Sain-Bulat was deprived of the town of Kasimov and the Kasimov 'Tsardom'.

He had a brother (either a cousin or second cousin) Mustafa-Ali, the son of Sultan Abdul-lah. So Mustafa-Ali became the next governor of Kasimov. It is difficult to determine when the change of reign occurred. It happened either immediately in 1573 or, as suggested by Velyaminov-Zernov, in 1577 [3, part 2, p. 27], or possibly in 1584, the year that Boris Blagov, Moscow's envoy to Constantinople, was supposed to declare to Sultan Murad that in Kasimov 'the mosques are owned by a Muslim called Mustafaley' [45, vol. 7–8, p. 262]. He was the governor of Kasimov until approximately 1590 [2, p. 274]. In the mid 1570s, representatives with the rank of okolnichy were replaced in Kasimov by people with the rank of 'osadny golova', an act that indicates the declining importance of the town.

After the death of Mustafa-Ali, the Muscovite government appointed Uraz Muhammad, the son of Kirghiz-kajatskij (Kazakh) Sultan Ondan and nephew of Kirghiz-kajatskij Khan Tevkul, as the 'Tsar' of Kasimov. Boris Godunov granted Kasimov to Uraz Muhammad on 20 March 1600 [28, p. 28]. The newly appointed 'Tsar' of Kasimov was only 28 years old [3, part 2, p. 451]. He 'reigned' until December 1610.
The death of Uraz Muhammad was followed by a period of interregnum in the Kasimov 'Tsardom', which lasted from 1611 to 1614. Uraz Muhammad was the only representative of the 'Kazakh' dynasty who ever sat on the throne of Kasimov. The next Siberian dynasty was the last in the history of the Kasimov political entity. Its first representative was Arslan, the son of the Siberian khan Ali, and grandson of Kuchum Khan. Arslan became the governor of Kasimov on 6 July 1614. He ruled until 2 April 1626 [2, p. 274].

Arslan was married to Fatima, the daughter of Sayyid Ak Muhammad, who was the grandson of Sayyid Bulyak. She lived much longer than her husband. Khan Arslan died in 1626 [2, p. 274]. The death of Arslan b. Ali brought about the final liquidation of the 'Tsardom' although, in fact, it had long ago ceased to exist as a Tataр 'yurt'. From that moment, most Tataр tsars and tsareviches were supported by tributes levied from the local population under the 'kormlenie' system or from their estates; and, those relying on the 'kormlenie' system were clearly in the majority [2, p. 396]. Sayyid Burhan, Arslan's son, remained the Tsarevich of Kasimov, but was not proclaimed 'Tsar'. There were quite a few 'Tsareviches' without possessions in Muscovite Rus' at that time: one has only to think about the Siberian Shaybanids.

Thus, during the 17th century the Russian state significantly strengthened its foreign policy position. Amid the rise of Muscovy, the role played by the Kasimov 'Tsardom' as a trump card in the diplomatic struggle with the Ottoman Empire became less important. The very existence of the 'Tsardom' became an anachronism, and its final abolition was only a matter of time. The scope of authority of the Kasimov 'Tsars' was gradually narrowed, with a Moscow-appointed voivode becoming the main power broker. The voivode fully controlled the activities of the Kasimov governor, who was not allowed any contact with foreign Muslims. In the middle of the century, the Kasimov Tsarevich was baptized, having retained the title of sovereign 'ruler' of Kasimov. All this was part of a systematic policy pursued by Muscovy to completely eliminate the last signs of autonomy in the Kasimov 'Tsardom' (for more details on the second stage of the development of the Kasimov Khanate, see [3, part. 1–3; 48; 39; 2; 42]).

There is no doubt that the Kasimov Khanate was a product of the collapse of the Golden Horde. Established as a Horde Ulus within the territory of the emerging Muscovite Rus', it quickly became a vassal of the Grand Prince of Moscow. Its governors were de facto vassals of the Grand Prince of Moscow and the Muscovite Tsar, and played virtually no independent political role.

However, we should not exaggerate the dependence of this Khanate on the Russian State. In the 15th–early 16th centuries, the Russian principalities—that is, the successor states of the Golden Horde, as well as Muscovite Rus', which arose upon their foundation, were characterised by a complex system of relationships dominated by interdependence. That is why, even in 1517, the Kasimov Khanate, although part of the 'votchina' of the Grand Prince of Moscow, could be regarded at the same time by the Crimean Khan Mehmed Giray as his own 'yurt'. Some information indicates that the Kasimov and Kazan Khanates had equal status. At the same time, no one questions the important role played by Kazan in the system of late Golden Horde states.

It cannot be excluded that in the Tataр world the ruler of Kasimov, who had never ruled any independent Tataр khanates before ascending this throne, was still named 'khan'. In Russian sources, however, such rulers are only named 'tsarevitschs' ('sultans'), thus stressing the 'inferiority' of the Meshschera yurt as a vassal of Moscow.

Overall, the Meshschera yurt could be regarded as a state entity of the Volga-Ural Tataрs, in which ethnic communities such as the Kasimov Tataрs and Mishar Tataрs that exist to this day were formed.


Ot srednevekovy'x tatar k tataram novogo vremeni (e'tnologicheskij vzglyad na istoriyu volgo-ural'skix tatar XV–XVII vv.) (From the Medieval Tatars to the New Age Tatars [ethnological perspective of the history of the Volga-Ural Tatars of the 15–17th centuries]). Kazan, 1998, 276 p.
9. Milyukov P. Drevnejshaya razryadnaja kniga official'noj redakcii (po 1565 g.) (The most ancient razrjadnaja kniga of the official version (until 1565)). Moscow, 1901. 314 p.


Tatar states in the south of Western Siberia were the heirs of the previously existing possessions of the Shibanids, which were parts of the Golden Horde. They were formed by a Batu edict for his younger brother Shahin after the end of the western Mongolian campaign, about 1242–1243. Their northern part was called the ‘Siberia Land (Sir)’ or the ‘Siberia and Ibir Oblast’, bordered, probably, by the west bank of the Irtysh River and managed by the Horde judges, whose control, apparently, was established under Öz Beg Khan [3, p. 91; 7, p. 281; 9, pp. 106–107]. The references in sources to the ‘Siberian Land’ and the actual location of the khanates in the south of Western Siberia determined the researchers' choice of ‘Siberian Yurt (khanate)’ as a common name for the late medieval states of Shibanids. This name is convenient from the standpoint of the analysis of the local state's single line of development, although it does not consider the real, including geographical, changes in the system. In addition, names
such as the ‘Siberian Tsardom’ or the ‘Siberian Yurt’ are typical only of Russian sources; moreover, for the first time the title ‘Tsar of Siberia’ was granted to Qutlugh, the son of Ibrakhim (Ibak) in 1505–1506 [5, p. 264].

Unfortunately, the sources have not preserved the endonyms of late medieval Siberian Turkic-Tatar states. With only circumstantial evidence, it is reasonable to call the hereditary possessions of the Siberian Shibanids located approximately in the same territory by the names of their largest urban centres, which served as temporary capitals in the far north of these lands. During the Great Troubles, since the 1370s, Chimgi-Tura (‘Singui’ of the Western cartography, Tura of the Eastern and Tyumen of Russian sources) goes in the first place here. This city was the formal centre of the Siberian land, as it is evident from the chronicle information about Toktamysli’s murder (‘in Siberian land, near Tyumen’) [27, p. 236]. The significance of this city is also underlined by (under the ‘Shehr-i Tura’) its capture by Haji Muhammad Shibanid Khan in the 1420s. [21, p. 65]. During the summer-autumn of 1430, another Shibanid, Abu’l-Khayr Khan, made Chimgi-Tura the residence of the ‘state’s throne and the centre of God’s grace’ [19, pp. 143–144]. Based on this, we can speak about the formation of the Turan (Tyumen) Khanate, that was situated on the ‘very edge of Desht-i Kipchak’, that was called Tyumen in Muscovy, and Tura—in the Eastern sources [2, p. 102; 34, p. 259, 261]. Term ‘Turkian khans’ used by A. Velidi Togan in connection to Shibanids of Western Siberia is also close to this. That said, with the names ‘Tura’ or ‘Tyumen’ the chroniclers meant both the name of the city and that of the ‘land’—that is, a separate state [for example: 34, p. 261], which is listed as ‘Tyumen the Great’ in the Anthony Vid’s map, 1537.

The titles of local rulers in the available diplomatic correspondence is also virtually unknown, although Ibrakhim Khan, under which the Tyumen Khanate reached its peak, often is referred to as the ‘Nogai Tsar’ or the ‘Shiban Tsar’ [24, p. 203; 33, p. 29]; the second title is used in relation to his brother and the successor Mamuq [24, pp. 242–243]. The Russian list of ‘Tatar Land Names’ uses the concept of ‘Shibans’ [14, p. 253] (analogues of which are also known in a later time in the form of ‘Siberian Saltan Ishiban’) to refer to the Shibanid possessions in Siberia [8, p. 170]. Seyfi Çelebi also uses the concept of ‘Shuban’ (a distorted form of ‘Shayban’) to refer to the Tura khanls [34, p. 259]. Thus, at the first stage of the existence of Western Siberia’s late medieval Turkic-Tatar states, it is necessary to speak about the Tyumen (Turan) Khanate (I would venture to suggest that the mentions of the Turan Vilayet or the Chimgi-Tura Vilayet point to the name of the Khanate as a whole, rather than a separate administrative-territorial unit in its structure).

The Tyumen Khanate with its centre in Chimgi-Tura existed in the period from the 1420s to the middle of the 15th century. For the Shibanids of that time, the Tyumen lands were the northern periphery of the vast steppe lands; their priority was the struggle for the adjacent Syr Darya and Volga regions, which expressed their aspiration for power in the major parts of the former Ulus of Jochi as an impetus for the all-Horde unity. More so because it was strengthened by the Sarai throne’s occupation by some Shibanids during the Great Troubles. These trends were typical of Haji Muhammad’s and Mahmud Khoja’s policy in the 1420s, during whose reign Chimgi-Tura was under the control of hakims of the burkuts [19, pp. 143–144] who could inherit the power of the Horde time judges. A. Velidi Togan, according to Ötemish Hajji, indicates that Mahmud Khoja together with clans of the Turanian Vilayet fought against Tumens of the Qungrats and Saljiuts [4, p. 40]. This fight could be carried out only during the period of 1429–1430, when Burkuts headed these clans. After the victory, the Khan ‘united the whole country around him’—that is, most likely, the northern periphery of the Ulus of Shiban, which led to his further confrontation with a new challenger—Abu’l-Khair Khan. After his accession in Chimgi-Tura and the victory over Mahmud Khoja in 1431, he united all the Shibanid possessions under his rule into a single Uzbek Ulus in the Eastern Desht-i Kipchak. Besides, he also
replaced the administrators in the Chimgi-Tura Vilayet, where the representatives of Tarkhans, Durmans and Naimans became darugas, that is, Khan's vicegerents [19, p. 16].

Activities of the following khans can certainly be attributed to the Tyumen throne: Abul-Khair (1429–1446, and then—up to 1457 as part of the Uzbek Khanate as Tyumen Yurt under the rule of Haji Muhammad Mahmudek's and Sayyidek's sons), Mahmudek and Sayyidek (1457–1468, the dates are restored only by indirect sources), Ibrakhim (Ibak) (1468[9]–1494[5]), his brothers Mamuq (1494[5]–1497) and Agalak (1497–1505[7]), and Qutlugh, son of Ibak (1505[7]–1510s). In many cases, the new rulers began their careers during their relatives' rule, mainly, by performing military duties. This was particularly typical for Abul-Khair during Jumaduk Khan's rule or Mamuq—during Ibrakhim's rule. In any case, khans used the help of relatives in the military sphere. However, the implementation of foreign policy was impossible without the support of local clans and tribes, whose elite, represented by begs, beys and bahadurs, was part of the quriltai or karachi begs council at the Khan's court. A wing system is fixated during military councils and the army formation. The system, apparently, experienced a period of stagnation, as the wing position of clans could be changed, and members of the same clan found themselves in different wings, which was associated with the loss of political status. In the conditions of disintegration of the common Horde space under Abul-Khair, the rituals and forms of behaviour had largely been focused precisely on leaders [39, p. 26] whose role was constantly widening. The main spokesman of the steppe elite interests could be the beklyaribek who was under the Khan, and who, under Abul-Khair, moved out from Kyyats, Burkuts and Manghits. During the rule of the subsequent Tyumen khans, all the famous beklyaribeks were only from Manghits (Nogais), which allowed Ibrahim to be named as the ‘Nogai Tsar’, for example. In addition, a control body such as the Divan maintained its existence and was supervised by the representatives of the Uighurs and Kushchis during the reign of the same Khan [19, pp. 97–98].

Under the last three governors since 1495, the representatives of the Taybugidi Begs dynasty, who were most likely from Burkuts, held a significant place in the management system of the Tyumen Khanate. During their rule, the Siberian Land, the princes of which after the 1483 Russian campaign paid tribute to Moscow, united with Tyumen. Taybugids began to control the Siberian Yurt from Isker (Siberia, Kashlyk) on behalf of Tyumen's Shibanid Khans. The Siberian chronicles suggest that their departure could be associated with Ibrakhim Khan's murder by their hand [29, p. 118]. However, the lack of any mention of further conflicts between the Tyumen Shibanids and Isker Taybugids makes us treat this version more cautiously. At the same time, begs or princes could not act as independent rulers because of their political status in the Chingissid world, which allows for considering them as beklyaribeks under Tyumen khans. Apparently, with this caveat in mind, there is no reason to allocate the ‘Isker Principality of Taybugids’ as a separate stage in the history of the Siberian state [23, pp. 17–23]. That is all the more so because, at the moment, there is no reason to talk about the Ishim Khanate of Taybugids or the separate Ishim Yurt [38, p. 110–112], whose history is reconstructed only by indirect references in the late Siberian chronicles. Another argument in favour of this would be the use of the title ‘Siberian Tsar’ in 1505–1506 (7014) with regard to Qutlugh, for who it is indicated that he ‘cometh from Tyumen’ [5, p. 264] (that is, the suzerain of Taybugids with the appropriate title was in Tyumen). This time period coincides with the finding of Taybugids in Isker, but the title of the Siberian Tsar was assigned to the hereditary Tyumen dynasts of the Shibanids. In 1563/4 (7072), this title belonged to Murtaza, another son of Tyumen Ibrakhim Khan [11, p. 63].

In circa 1505, Agalak Khan and his nephew Qutlugh had a conflict, which resulted in the Khan leaving with some of his relatives, led by his cousin Ak-Kurt, to Nogais and in the attempts of the latter to take over Kazan or the Meshchera town through the diplomatic correspondence with the Grand Dukes of Moscow [17, pp. 62–68]. The 1510s start a period of Time of Troubles, when many 'Shibanets' left for the steppes for unknown reasons, which made the
Tyumen khans exit the foreign policy arena. Although, back in 1525, Paolo Giovio wrote: 'The lands further north from Kazan serve as a residence to the Shiban Tatars (Sciabani); they were strong due to their number and vast herds [10, pp. 28–31], which favoured the preservation of the Shibanid lands there. It was not until the 1530s that they came under the control of the Manghit Bey Sheikh Mamai, the grandson of Ibrakhim Khan, the son of his daughter. Qutlugh's brother, Murtaza, who in the second half of the 16th century, apparently served as the Tyumen ruler, could have also been by his side [6, pp. 164, 181; 30, pp. 130–131]. In all likelihood, the elder son of Sheikh Mamai, Murza Khan, in 1536 tried to return Tura to him, which at the time was under the reign of Ugric princes [6, p. 157; 30, p. 155]. Given the departure of Tyumen Shibanids to the Central Asia and Nogai steppes, the Taybugids found themselves separated from their suzerains, who apparently practically stopped intervening in any issues regarding local policy. It was exactly what allowed Yediger Beg and his brother Bekbulat to start a separate correspondence in 1554 with the Tsar of Moscow, Ivan IV, who had taken Siberia 'by the arm'. It could also be the time when the 'Taybugid legend' was created in Isker, which served as an ideological substantiation of the power of non-Chinggisids in Siberia [16, pp. 9–21]. All in all, this legend and the exaggeration of the real power of Siberian princes were of significant interest to not only the Taybugids, but also to the Moscow authorities, for whom the vassalage of these rulers was a crucial factor in the further annexation of Siberia. The emergence of the Moscow daruga led to the response raid of the Shiban Tsarevich into Siberia in 1556 [26, p. 276]. It was most likely one of Murtaza's sons (Ahmed Giray or Kuchum), who were brought up at Sheikh Mamai's court and later on were supported by his sons.

As a result, the Moscow authorities, Tyumen Shibanids, leaders of the Nogai Horde and the Siberian princes started lengthy negotiations, which lasted from 1557 to 1563. In 1563, Yediger passed away, his son found himself in Moscow, and 'the Siberians... took in a Tsarevich to Siberia' [25, p. 370]. The historiography pictures him as Kuchum, however, the letter of 22 September 1563 from Ivan IV to Ismail Beg states: 'At the moment, Ahmed Giray Tsarevich is in that yurt' [Russian State Archive of Ancient Acts, f. 127, inv. 1, file 6, s. 118–188 reverse]*; which means that the throne was taken as per seniority. Soon after that, the son of another Siberian beg, Bekbulat, turned up in Bukhara and visited the local sayyid, where the influence of this political centre of Middle Asian Shaybanids in the period of consolidation of the Siberian Khanate ended. As a result, from 1563 to 1582, the Shiban khans, Murtaza and his sons Ahmed Giray and Kuchum, sat in a specific order on both the Tyumen and Siberian thrones. The independence of the Siberian Khanate on Middle Asian Shaybanids, reigning in Bukhara, is not actually traced in sources [37, pp. 44–45]. The role of the Abdullah II, the Khan of Bukhara, as well as his trade and Islamic entourage, was limited to two Islamic missions, making decisions for some trading issues, the Khan's attempts to arbitrate in the disputes between Kuchum and the Nogai murzas and some small gifts in the 1590s.

With the enthronement of Murtaza ibn Ibrahim and his sons Kuchum and Ahmed Giray ca. 1563, supported by the Nogais, the state eventually takes on the name of the 'Siberian Tsardom' ('Siberian Land') in the Russian chronicles and diplomatic sources. It related to the transfer of the formal capital centre from Chimgi-Tura to Îsker (Siberia) and the significant expansion of the state territory. The title used in relation to Murtaza, Kuchum and his son Ali in the Russian diplomatic correspondence was 'the Siberian Tsar'. Although, in the 1578 letter from Khan-Mirza, the son of Urus, to Moscow, Kuchum is still titled as the 'Tyumen and Siberian' Khan, which evidently shows the two-sided nature of his possessions [31, pp. 268–269]. Notably, 'Tyumen' was mentioned foremost, which emphasised its special status, whereas Kuchum himself was known as the Khan of Tūrān or the owner of the Tura Region. In fact, both the European drafts

* The author expresses his gratitude to V. Trepavlov (Moscow) for providing a copy of this document, which disclosed an earlier unknown part of the Siberian history.
Chapter XI. The Later Golden Horde Time

and the 16th century maps of Muscovy and Tataria show 'Tumen' as a city and a separate land more frequently than 'Sibe(y)r', which also reflects the idea of two existing lands. In the context of this issue, D. Iskhakov correctly noticed that the 1597 letter of Russian Tsar Fyodor Ivanovich to Kuchum Khan states: '... after your grandfather, Tsar Ibak, princes of the Taibugid dynasty were in the Siberian state...' [12, p. 190]. Hence, back in the late 16th century, the dyaks of the Posolsky Prikaz considered the Tyumen and Siberian Khanate as one state, although the perception of the local rulers and their eastern relatives did not change substantially, the only change was in the clan of the Isker beklyaribeks.

Thus, the assignment of the name in the form of 'Siberian Khanate' marks the second stage of the local sovereignty existence. That said, this title showed rather the Russian perception of the local sovereignty, while for the eastern authors the Tūrān Khanate (Tūrān) still continued to exist. Just like previous years, the Khan's power was largely dependent not only on the support of the Nogai and Middle Asian troops, but also the local murzas and princes, who managed various sized yurts within the Khanate. As members of the group of the 'best people', they signed foreign policy agreements along with the ruler.

The reasons for Kuchum's defeat and the gradual retreat to the south during the period of 1582–1598 involve numerous aspects. They include the traditional mounted steppe battle tactics, which turned out to be ineffective in rebuffing the attacks from Russian river troops of Cossacks, the fast turn of many local Ugric and Siberian Turkic-Tatar leaders to the Russian side, and the specifics of the situation in foreign policy. In the latter case, given the Kalmyk invasion of the Kazakh steppes and the simultaneous wars between the Middle Asian Shaybanids, Kuchum failed to garner support from the allies from Bukhara or Altyuly. The fact that Kuchum kept the title of Khan after having lost the capital might be associated with the Shibanids, as well as a substantial part of their subjects, following the nomadic or semi-nomadic lifestyle and the capital acting only as a temporary administrative and tax centre that first and foremost provided control over the northern lands and fur trade. In fact, the Khan's main camp (the Ordu Bazar led by the Bazar prince during the reign of Ibrakhim) moved towards it only in the summer, which is typical of the Golden Horde khans' lifestyle.

The symbols of khan power, which for the first Tyumen Khan, Abul-Khair, were the throne, the royal yurt and the robe, as well as perhaps the mobile (field) throne and the colours, could also be associated with the general Horde traditions. The Tyumen throne was a relatively new attribute of the local rulers. Therefore, the throne of Ulus of Jochi, which is referred to in the sources as 'the throne (chair) of Sain Khan', that is Batu, had a special meaning for the Tyumen rulers [19, pp. 143–147, 155, 163; 30, p. 46]. It gave the Khans Abul-Khair and Ibrakhim opportunities to have an even more active influence on the post-Horde world and secured his claims to restore the unity of its substantial part under the leadership of the Tyumen khans. For the Siberian Khanate during the reign of Murtaza, Kuchum and Ahmed Giray, these objects included the state stamps of various shapes and status, their alternative in the form of a tanga of the dynasty of khans under the Kuchumoviches, in some rituals they could use a drum; in addition, the Russian sources mention a so-called 'Siberian crown' (a battle helmet of Kuchum Khan of eastern manufacture) [12, pp. 195–196; 35, pp. 196–197].

The history of the Siberian Khanate (yurt in the Russian sources) should not be ended with the loss of Isker in 1582 or even the death of Kuchum Khan in circa 1601. This time period marks only the beginning of the third stage in the history of local sovereignty, which was developing along with the inclusion of the Siberia Khanate lands in the Muscovite state. The duration of this period is still debatable. Even the sons of Kuchum, Ali, who was captured by Russians in circa 1608 and remained 'the Siberian Tsar' up until his death in 1649, and Ishim (Ish-Mohammed), who was apparently believed by Russians to hold this title in 1616 [37, pp. 62–83], were definitely considered as independent rulers. Both Ali and Ishim were acknowledged as khans by some eastern authors as well; however, Abū al-Ghāzī considers Kuchum the
last Khan of Turan, whereas in other sources the title of the last Khagan of Siberia is given to Ishim [1, p. 276]. It is necessary to take into account the fact that up until the 1660s Kuchum's sons continued to control a part of the Siberian Khanate lands in the Cis-Tobol River Region. The territorial authority in the 1660s was granted to Ishim's grandson, Kuchuk, even in the draft of the entire Siberia, created on the order of Tobolsk voivode P. Godunov. Apparently, they could be elected as khans by the local Turkic-Tatar tribes. The fact that this title is not mentioned in the Russian sources and that Kuchum's sons are merely referred to as 'tsareviches' is reflective of only the Russian diplomatic point of view, according to which Moscow Tsars were the rulers of Siberia. Not until the failure of the 1660s uprisings, the disappointment of the representatives of local tribes in Kuchum's sons and the final departure of the latter to the steppes did the Siberian Khanate cease to exist even as a political illusion.

**Territory, Borders, Population**

Estimation of the territories and borders of the nomadic political formations poses a monumental challenge, especially in the context of the Late Middle Ages. The challenge is escalated by the claims of the Tyumen and Siberian khans for substantial steppe territories and their close political relations and kinship with the Nogai Horde leaders, which resulted in hazy internal borders between these polities. Depending on a specific situation in the Tyumen or Siberian Khanate, the borders became easily penetrable for nomadic groups of the neighbouring states.

The sources most precisely estimate the lands of the Shiban dynasty founder, the substantial part of which were assigned to his descendants as well. They were described in detail in the early 17th century by the Khan of this dynasty, Abu al-Ghazi: 'The Yurt you will live in will be between my yurt and the yurt of my older brother, Ichen. In the summer, you will live on the eastern side of Yaik, along the rivers of Irgiz-suvuk, Or, Ilek to the Ural mountains; whereas in the winter you will live in Ara-kum, Kara-kum and along the Syr River—by the creeks of Chuy Su and Sary Su'; in addition, Shiban received the region of Korel [2, p. 104]. Hence, the main camping grounds of the dynasty lied in a broad band in the Southern Cis-Urals and Western Kazakhstan, as well as partially in the steppe districts of the northern and more urbanised districts of the Central Kazakhstan, although there is a possibility that this description shows the late realia. I. Mustakimov brought to notice the fact that, according to 'Tawarikh-i guzida–Nusrat-name', the following tumens (lands and people) were given to Shiban Batu: Dzhulat Cherkes in the Caucasus (North Ossetia), Kara Ulak (Moldova, Wallachia or Bulgaria), Qırq Yer (Crimea), Jankent (a city in the lower reaches of Syr Darya), Küidei (Western Siberia or North Kazakhstan) [22, p. 242]. The first three lands were definitely lost by Shiban's descendants back in the Horde period, especially since the camping grounds of Shibanids at the time could be repeatedly redistributed by the Sarai khans. For these reasons, V. Kostyukov's opinion about the territorial changes is quite fair: '...the circumstances make us estimate the geographical borders of the Shibanid lands very cautiously and in the most general manner' [13, p. 216; including the analysis of historiography on the matter]. Abu al-Ghazi's description reasonably reflects the situation, which was created by the end of the period of Great Troubles and remained during the entire Late Medieval period, when the Syr Darya region and Western Siberian lands became the foundation of power of the Shibanid khans. That way, the Tyumen and Siberian lands were only the northern (summer) camping grounds for the representatives of this dynasty. The majority of them, though being the local Khans, sought to reserve the winter camps in the more comfortable south, which was also important for selling Siberian furs and providing the Khan and his entourage with handicrafts.

The sources do not contain a definite answer to the question on how far north and east from these steppe lands the power of Shibanids extended. Clearly, the borderline districts to the south of Western Siberia must have been used as a convenient recreational (as expressed by V. Kostyukov) zone for the accumulation of forces and a shelter in case of a failure back in the Horde period. The lands of the Southern Trans-Urals and the forest-steppe Cis-Tobol River
region, which contain archaeological records of this period, could have also been used for the same purposes. During the reign of Abul-Khair and Ibrakhim in the 15th century, the northernmost point was Chimgi-Tura.

In 1483, the Russian voivodes conducted a campaign against the Pelym Principality, in the course of which 'the voivodes of the Grand Prince marched along the Tavda River through Tyumen to Siberia' [28, p. 49]. The scribe meant that the Russian troops walked past the Tyumen Khanate, in other words outside the limits of its north-eastern border, which was apparently located right along the Tavda River with the 'Siberian land' lying further east. It allows us to determine a nominal, according to the Russian scribes, border of Ibrakhim Khan's lands. That said, in the 1480s Tyumen Khan Ibrakhim also controlled the lands in the very south of the former Shibanid lands in the Aral Sea region, which means he truly was a 'Shiban Tsar'. It is also confirmed by the fact that 'many people, having separated from the Ibak Khan, came from the creek of Syr for him [Muhammad Shaybani Khan]' [19, p. 26]. So, the Tyumen Khanate can be roughly localised as being situated between the rivers of Ural, Syr Darya (in its lowest riches), Tura and Tavda, although the eastern borders remain unidentified. It was not until 1495 that the Siberian land was included in the Khanate, which extended the borders to the midstream of the Irtysh and Ishim Rivers. The question of the level of influence the Tyumen khans had on the Ugric principalities in the taiga, which, given the fall of the Horde, gained independence thereby allowing the Russian voivodes to intervene in the Siberian affairs, remains unsolved.

The territory of the Siberian Khanate during the reign of the grandsons of Ibrakhim, Kuchum and Ahmed Giray, is localised by S. Tataurov and A. Matveyev, according to the archaeological data. It required the detection of borderline fortresses, the cultural layer of which contain ceramics specific to the Khanate population of the second half of the 16th century. Clearly, the policy was to a substantial extent oriented to the construction of fortresses with small garrisons, which could help both to defend it from the external intrusion of Kalmyks and to control the local population. As a result, the Khanate's borders were expanded significantly, more than they were during the period of the Tyumen Khanate. It was in many ways due to the brothers Ahmed Giray and Kuchum being greatly concerned with the domestic policy issues, including the Islamification of the population, which was supposed to promote the creation of a unified state ideology and culture. By then, Islam, under the influence of the representatives of Sufi tariqas from Central Asia, had been known in Siberia for almost four centuries, but even the active Islamification of the Golden Horde period probably touched upon only the political elite of the local states. As a result of the Khan's policy, the borders of the Siberian Khanate reached the inflow of the Irtysh River into Ob, the midstream of Tura and Tavda in the north, the lowest riches of Tom, a tributary of the Ob River, in the east, Chany lakes in the Barabinsk forest-steppe, the lowest riches of Irtysh, the Ishim-Irtysh and Ishim-Tobolsk interfluves in the south and the upper reaches of the Iset River in the west [18, pp. 74–76].

That said, the western parts of these lands definitely included the lands of the Tyumen Khanate. Beyond these borders, the northern taiga zone was home to the Khanty and Mansi Khanates, the majority of which were economically or politically dependent on the Siberian Khanate. The hardest challenge is to determine its south-western borders, where it bordered with the Nogai Horde and the Kazakh Khanate, since it was a residence of kindred tribes, with who, with some rare exceptions, it had an alliance. G. Samigulov proved in a well-argued manner that almost all the lands along the Tobol and Miass Rivers and their tributaries were under the power of the Siberian khans [32, pp. 126–130], which did not stop the Nogais from nomadising during the weakening of the Siberian Khanate even along the Iset River. Yet the so-called 'camping grounds of Tsars' of Kuchum were located along the Tobol River at the steppe and forest-steppe boundaries. In addition to that, the Successor of Ötemish Hajji states that Kuchum supported his father Murtaza in the fight for Transoxiana, while their lands were located in the Otrar region of the Syr Darya River [21, p. 65]. It is confirmed to some extend by the legend of
Siberian Tatars, where Murtaza is mentioned as the Khan of Great Bukhara [20, p. 192]. Kuchum did not lose control over all the lands as a result of his defeats in the 1580s: the western and especially southern lands of the Siberian Khanate remained under the control of the Khan himself, as well as his descendants, which cannot make the latter 'vagabond Tsareviches' or 'Cossacks'.

Thus, the rulers of the Tyumen and Siberian Khanates sought to maintain control over the steppe lands along the Syr Darya River and, at the same time, were expanding their lands in the south of the Western Siberia through both the inclusion of, for instance, the Siberian land and reinforcement of the power over the Ugric Khanates in the taiga.

The situation with the territory and its borders gets extremely complicated with the active foreign policy of the Tyumen khans as well. Abul-Khair and Ibrakhim conducted campaigns against the Volga River region lands of the Great Horde, while participating in the fight for the 'chair of Sain Khan'. The first of them was collecting taxes from the Bulgars and eventually conquered the significant part of the Central Asia, having expanded the lands of Shibanids, whereas the latter had a group of Kazan aristocrats by his side, which gave him a right to be titled the Kazan Khan. Throughout almost the entire period of his brief reign, Mamuq Khan was also seated on the Kazan throne, whereas Agalak and Ak-Kurt, while being with the Nogais, tried to take the Kazan throne through the diplomatic negotiations with Moscow. The Cis-Ural region was attacked with campaigns by the khans Qutlugh and Murtaza, and in the 1570s these lands suffered from the campaigns of Siberian troops led by Kuchum's son, Ali, and the main commander, the Khan's nephew, Mametkul Atyulyovich. Even after the loss of the capital, Kuchum continued to claim yasak from the territory of the Cis-Ural region. Currently, the question on the Volga region and Cis-Ural region lands of the Tyumen and Siberian Khans clearly does not have a definite answer.

Given the significant size of the Tyumen and Siberian Khanates, which included the steppe, forest-steppe and forest territories, the population groups and the specifics of their economy, that included all types of animal farming and agriculture, as well as the crafts, hunting, particularly on fur-coated animals, and also the domestic and foreign trade, varied. The specific aspects of origin, crafts and lifestyle were evidence of separation of the 'best people' from the yasak population. It is crucial to understand that the use of contemporary ethnic names towards the population of these khanates is not exactly right and could modernise the historical situation. When not accounting for the dependent population of the Khanty and Mansi Khanates, the Turkic-speaking groups of the Tyumen and Siberian Khanate population were marked by two levels of identification that was reflected in the written sources. At the first level, they identified themselves with a particular tribe or clan. The list of these political units is the most prominent in Abul-Khair's entourage, which included representatives of the clans of Burkut, Durman, Karluk, Khongirad, Kurlaut, Kushchi, Kiyat, Kytai, Manghit, Naimans (with the Ukrash-Naiman subtribe), Tubai, Tyumen, Uighur, Uishin, Utarchi, Chat and several other [19, pp. 16–17]. Some of them are definitely associated with the Siberian territories and the lands of Shibanids [22, pp. 235–244; 13, pp. 52–58]. As for the Siberian Khanate, this list can be restored only basing on the tribes mentioned in the context of Russian inclusion of Siberian territories both as a part of the troops of Kuchum and his sons and those who turned to the Russian side: Ayaly, Myakotin (Bikotin), Synryan, Tabyn, Tersyak, Chat, and others. Some of them consisted of the Turkified Ugrians (Tersyak, Bikotin). But the question about the connection of the 15th century clans with similar structures of a later period (for instance, the Tabyn were clearly related to the Uishins) remains unsolved. In addition, both the Tyumen and the Siberian Khanate included a significant number of people from Kazan, the Nogai Horde and Central Asia. At the second level of identification, from the perspective of an external observer, the local groups were definitely identified with the 'Uzbeks' in the 15th century and the ethnic estate group of Tatars in the 16th century, the representatives of which formed the aristocratic class. They included the 'Shiban Tatars' ('Shibans') and the 'Tyumen Tatars'. It is
obvious that the connection with certain rulers of the local states was an important aspect for evaluation of the ethno-political picture of the region. Back in the 17th century, some of the groups, residing in the territory of former Tyumen Khanate, were called as Turalinians or the Turan Tatars [36, p. 19], which is also evidence of retaining the historical memory of the Turan Khanate.


§ 8. Tatar Political Structures in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania: the 'T’ma' (Tumen) of Jaholdaj

Ilya Zaitsev

The name 'Jaholdaj t’ma' appears in the yarliq from the Crimean khan Mengli Giray sent to the King of Poland and Grand Prince of Lithuania Sigismund (July 2, 1507), which says:

'They gave us ... the Kursk t’ma with yields and tributes, with lands and waters; the t’ma of Jaholdaj son of Sarai, Milolub, with tributes and yields, with lands and waters; Muzhech, Oskol, Starodub and Bryansk with all their yields and tributes, with lands and waters...' [2, p. 5; 12, p. 150; 14, p. 557]. The 't’ma of Jaholdaj son of Sarai’ is mentioned in a similar context in a yarliq from Mengli Giray dated 1513 [14, p. 595]. As is well known, the Russian word t’ma' was adapted from the Mongolian term 'tumen'. Tumens were military administrative districts capable of providing ten thousand battle-ready warriors. Mongolian authorities often divided settled and nomadic populations into tumens. Tumens were, in turn, divided into thousands, hundreds and tens. This decimal system was introduced by the Mongols in lands they conquered that had a settled population. It was particularly in evidence in Rus’ after the empire-wide census carried out in the late 1250s. However, it is likely that the division into t’mas' was fiscal not military in nature. In other words, it was a base for the tax system, not for mobilisation.
Over time, this word came to signify both the territorial unit and the tax collected there. Apparently, the latter meaning was intended in reference to the Jaholdaj 't'ma'.

The time of its formation has not yet been precisely established. In Kuczyński's view (later shared by B. Spuhler, B. Grekov, and A. Yakubovsky) [5, p. 418], is that the Jaholdaj 't'ma' was formed after 1438, when some of the Tatars who had accompanied Ulugh Muhammad left the khan and, led by a certain Jaholdaj Saraevich, settled in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. In approximately 1440, its outlying areas acquired the status of a fiefdom. In exchange for the granted lands Jaholdaj was obliged to protect Lithuania from Tatar raids. Thus, according to Kuczyński, Jaholdaj's lands were equivalent to the Kasimov Khanate, which was formed at almost the same time [16, pp. 184–185]. F. Petrun (with whom contemporary Ukrainian historians agree), considered the Jaholdaj lands to be a Tatar fiefdom which later became part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The Duchy's rulers were gradually transforming the Tatar nobility into common landowners [9, p. 177; 13, pp. 171–172]. A Nasonov saw no reason 'to assume that Tatars became local feudal landowners on the border between Lithuania and the Muscovite state other than as part of the policy of these states', and he believed that 'feudal landowners could not have settled on the border if it were not a part of government policy' on the part of the Lithuanian princes and, with regard to Kasimov – the Moscow Grand Princes [8, pp. 28–29, appendix 2]. Modern Polish historians (for example, Dariusz Kolodziejczyk) believe that this territory was assigned by Vytautas to Ulugh Muhammad himself when he sought refuge in Lithuania. After he resumed his struggle to take the throne, the lands passed to his confidant, Jaholdaj [14, p. 562].

However, as a study by F. Petrun showed, the yarliq of Mengli Giray that mentions the 't'ma' refers back to an original document from the late 14th century—a yarliq given to Vytautas by Toktamysh before the battle of the Vorskla River (1399). This original document mentions the word 't'ma' [9, p. 177]. Therefore, the 'Jaholdaj t'ma' must already have existed by that time. This means that Jaholdaj Saraevich, after whom the 't'ma' was named, could have been the grandfather of the Jaholdaj whose name is mentioned in the Lithuanian Metrica twice between 1440 and 1486 (although, strictly speaking, these may refer to two different people). S. Kriczynski identified this elder Jaholdaj as Jaholdaj Bek, who was a member of the Golden Horde court when treaties with Venice were made in 1347 and 1358. He might subsequently have moved to Severia with either Kyat Mansur, an ancestor of the Glinskys, in 1380, or with Toktamysh in 1397 [10, p. 147, 150, appendix 26]. A 'Jaholtaj' is mentioned in two yarliqs sent by Jani Beg (1347) and Berdebek (1358) to Venetian merchants in Azov as one of their advocates [6, pp. 115–118, 121]. A. and V. Grigoriev believed him to be a vizier in Jani Beg's court [6, p. 163].

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15 Compare with the above-mentioned yarliq of Mengli Giray of 1513 [Kolodziejczyk, 2011, p. 595]. Compare with the yarliq of Mengli Giray of 1514: 'We hereby inform you that our forefathers, tsars, and our father Mehmmed Giray, the tsar went, spurring their horses, to the Lithuanian land, to the Grand Duke Vytautas, to the King and to Grand Duke Casimir, arriving there as guests and being received with great honour and kindness. And, following the ancient tradition, the Russian lands with towns and settlements, volosts and 't'mas, with lands, waters and yields were written down, nothing being excluded from those yarliqs which had been written out in favour of the Grand Duchy by the first tsars'. Compare with the yarliq of Sahib Giray (1535): 'Our forefathers and my father Mehmmed Giray, the tsar went, spurring their horses, to the nobles of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, to the Grand Duke Vytautas and the King and Grand Duke Casimir, arriving there as guests and being received with great honour, and in the ancient tradition the Russian lands with towns and settlements, volosts, 't'mas and all the yields were written down' [quotation from: 12, pp. 106, 108–109]. However, K. Averyanov has put forward a different interpretation of the word 't'ma' ['tumen'], based on the reference to five Nizhny Novgorod 't'mas': 'the term "t'ma" should be interpreted as a small administrative territorial unit similar to a volost, located on lands that were predominantly inhabited by non-Russians and which maintained a degree of independence regarding the governance of their internal affairs' [1, p. 39].
This means that we cannot trace Jaholdaj’s origins precisely. Based on the date when the 't'ma' was formed, S. Kuczynski argues that he was the brother of Ulugh Muhammad's confidant Usein Saraev, and that their father was Sarai, son of Urasakh—a figure who is mentioned in a late 15th century Moscow Chronicle in relation to the year 1408 [7, p. 260]. A. Nasonov wrote frankly, 'Unfortunately we do not know if Jaholdaj lived in the era of Lithuanian domination and if he was a descendant of the Golden Horde that settled on the land bordering Lithuania. It is also unknown whether his name is of ancient (pre-Lithuanian) origin, which it is related to the military, administrative or financial activities of a certain person' [8, pp. 28—29, note 2].

The Jaholdaj 't'ma' appears to have included the upper course of the Oskol, the Siverskyi Donets, and the southern part of the Desna River basin including the towns of Muzhech (which lay between modern-day Sudzha and Oboyan), Miloljubl (a volost where the modern-day districts of Belgorodsky, Yakovlevsky and Prohorovsky in Belgorod region are now found) and Oskol (what is now Stary Oskol in Belgorod region) [10, p. 148]. Analyzing the language of the Mengli Giray yarliq, F. Petrun concluded that the Jaholdaj 't'ma' was the same as the Kursk 't'ma', because Kursk was destroyed in 1278 and all mentions of it after its destruction were made 'in memoriam' [9, pp. 176–177, 186].

On the rights afforded to it as a vassal possession (about which admittedly we know nothing) the Jaholdaj existed until 1497, when it was dismantled. Prince Roman Jagoldaievich (Jaholdaievich)17, a descendant of the first owner of the fiefdom, 'had one daughter, and she was married to Prince Yuri Borisovich Vyazemsky, and Prince Roman bequeathed his estates to his daughter' (The Russian State Archive of Ancient Acts, f. 389, op. 1, d. 6, s. 138 rev.–139) [quoted in: 3, p. 150; 10, p. 145]. After Vyazemsky went to serve under Grand Prince Ivan in approximately 1494, his estates were confiscated and passed to the Lithuanian Grand Prince, Alexander. After 1497 the territory of the former Tatar fiefdom was divided between Kiev boyars—relatives of Roman Jagoldaievich via the female line, and soon after (in 1503) passed to Moscow. As A. Bakhtin notes, 'The political status of the Duchy or 'T'ma' of Jaholdaj is open to debate as sources do not allow us to deal precisely with this issue. However, it goes without saying that it was a Tatar state structure' [4, p. 153].

2. Akty', otrosyashhiesya k istorii Zapadnoj Rossi, sobranny'e i izdanny'e Arxeograficheskoyu komissiiy (Acts related to the history of Western Russia, collected and published by the Archæographical Committee). Vol. 2. Saint Petersburg, 1848.

16 There are extant formulary versions of travel tarhan charters from the Metropolitan bishop Jonah to the Kazan Khan Mahmud and Kazan Prince Shaptyak Saraevich about the market of metropolitan goods—furs. It is possible that Shaptyak was a brother of Ussein (Husein) and Jaholdaj [11, pp. 154–155].
17 Jaholdaj had another descendant, Roman Jagoldaievich's brother, Zinovy [10, p. 145, 148].
§ 9. Tatars in the Balkans

Tahsin Gemil

Dobruja (south-east of modern Romania) and Budjak (south-west of modern Ukraine) are geographically a continuation of the broad plains formerly called the Kipchak steppes. Tatars reigned over these territories up to the end of the 14th century. In the History of Seljuqs (1424), a work based on reliable sources, Yaziji Zadeh Ali wrote about northern Dobruja that it had been under the reign of the Golden Horde since the latter half of the 14th century: 'There were 2–3 Muslim towns and 30–40 Turkic nomadic campsites in Dobruja most of the time'. The same author provides interesting information about Budjak and the more eastern territories during the reign of Berke (1257–1266): 'Lands from the Crimea and Moldavia to the vilayet were for a long time Islamic territory. There is a mosque of <Berke khan> in Moldavia which was later turned into a pigsty by the unfaithful' [51, pp. 234–235].

The territory between rivers Prut and Dniester, including Budjak, was conquered by the Moldavian state approximately [Black Bogdania] in 1370. The famous traveller Ibn Battuta, upon visiting Dobruja in 1330, wrote: 'We finally reached a small town known as Baba Saltuk, where the land of Turks ends... There are completely empty steppes stretching between Baba Saltuk and the first Byzantine vilayet. It takes 18 days to cover it on foot' [22, p. 331]. The town of Baba Saltuk is known today as Babadağ village situated in the north of Dobruja. In the 13–14th century, during the Golden Horde period, Dobruja was by no means fallow land [13, p. 191; 25, p. 610]. At the end of the 13th century Emir Nogai moved to Dobruja, to the city of İshakçı [35, pp. 49–63]. In the middle of the 14th century, on June 22, 1368 at the Yeni-Sala fort in Dobruja the King of Hungary Louis I granted a Tatar merchant with a document that read 'dominus Demetrius princeps Tartarorum' [14]. Romanian historian N. Jörg translated it as
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'Tatar Khan Te<period>mur' [26, p. 264]. Other Romanian historians located this Tatar ulus in Budjak [40, pp. 274–278].

From the 1280s, European sources began to refer to 'the Danube Skythians (paristrion skydon). Tatar troops successfully protected the borders of the Golden Horde from any attacks from the Balkans [40, pp. 174–177]. In the middle of the 13th century during the reign of Berke Khan, missionaries from Central Asia brought Islam to Dobruja. The names of these Muslim missionaries have been preserved to our time in the names of some towns of Dobruja: Babadağ (Baba Saltuk/ Muhammad Al-Bukhārī), Măcin (Baba Machin), Isaccea (Baba Iskhak), Tulcea (Baba Tulchi/Kulchi).

When the Ottomans visited Dobruja for the first time, in the late 14th century, they found a Muslim community of Tatars there. After the destructive invasion of Amir Timur in the Volga Region in 1395 many Tatars fled to Dobruja and Rumelia [20, pp. 342–344]. Aktau, one of the former senior emirs of Khan Toktamysh, participated in battles on the side of the Ottoman Empire after leaving the khan. Judging by the evidence of Ottoman and Byzantine historians of the 15th century, there were about 35,000 Tatars there. During the Battle of Nicopolis (1396) they joined the Ottoman front, thus significantly influencing the outcome of the battle [9, p. 40, 50; 6, p. 75; 19, p. 158]. In the 16th century, 'The Tatars of Aktav' were featured in official documents as warriors serving the Ottoman state [18, p. 87]. During the reign of Sultan Mehmed I (1413–1421) Tatars from Anatolia were moved to Rumelia [36, p. 110]. Some of them settled in Dobruja. In 1417, Dobruja fell under the reign of Ottomans for 460 long years.

In the 15th century, the region known as Budjak was situated within the Moldavian state. However, the number of Tatars living there was insignificant. In the 15th century the Moldavian state had 'Tatar slaves' in their possession [2, p. 7–14]. At the end of the same century this expression began to disappear from official records. In about 1370, Moldova, supported by Poland and Lithuania, put an end to the Golden Horde domination over the territory between the Prut and the Dniester. As a result of these wars, the city of the modern Republic of Moldova, Orhei, the Costești village, and two adjacent prosperous Tatar cities were destroyed, while the inhabitants were killed or enslaved [34, pp. 197–200; 38]. Apparently, the expression 'Tatar slaves' has existed since then.

Since the end of the 15th century Tatars started to move back to the territory of Budjak. Although they were not large in number, they were mentioned in European sources as brave warriors serving the Polish king and the Moldavian voivode [27, p. 73]. In 1484, due to the joint efforts of the Ottoman Sultan Bayazid II and the Crimean Khan Mengli Giray I, Budjak became dependent on the Ottoman and the Crimean states. The Ottoman Sultan conquered Kilia and Akkerman fortresses with the surrounding areas, while the Crimean khan acquired Căușeni and Dubăsari and their outskirts [23, p. 1253; 43, p. 225–238]. The Tatars settled here. Many Tatars lived on the land between the fortresses of Kilia and Akkerman [36, p. 132]. The Tatars who settled in Budjak obeyed the Crimean khan. So, unlike Dobruja, Budjak became a joint Ottoman–Crimean possession (condominium). According to a Polish source from 1502, the Ottoman sultan summoned the Volga Tatars to Budjak and promised the taxes from Akkerman fortress and slave trade to the Crimean khan. This fact may be regarded as an indicator of increasing strategical significance of Budjak. Due to the weakening and then the complete disappearance of the Golden Horde, part of the Volga Tatars were drawn into the migratory flows. Budjak and Dobruja became attractive territories for the Nogai Tatars who roamed between the Yaik (the modern Ural River) and the Don River. These territories have been populated by the Tatars since ancient times. Permanent increase of Tatar population in Dobruja was described with concern in European sources since 1512–1514, primarily in Polish sources. In 1521, Dobruja Tatar troops of twenty thousand warriors led by Hanzade Saadet and Himmet Girays were sent to assist the Ottoman troops mustered not far from Edirne [41, p. 175].
In 1538, as a result of cooperation between the Ottoman Sultan and the Crimean khan, the joint Ottoman-Crimean property in Budjak was extended (after the conquest of the Tighina/Bender fortress and its surroundings). Judging by official Ottoman documents, Budjak and Dobruja, which were subordinated to the Ottoman khan in the 16–18th centuries, along with the Danube district were part of the Silistra sandzhak called Silistra-Ochakov since the late 16th century. For many years Budjak comprised the following regions: Akkerman (which later became a sandzhak), Bender, Kilia, Izmail crossing, Sarata/Tatarbunary; Tomarova or Timurabad (Reni), Dubăsari, Kartal district. Over time the names and borders of some districts were changed. Famous regions of Dobruja: Silistra, Dobrich, Hajioglu Nazarjik, Balchik, Mangalia, Karasu/Sakarya, Babadağ, Harsovo, Machin, Isaccea, Tulcea.

From 1546, the Crimean khan Sahib Giray resettled many Nogai tribes to Budjak and partly to Dobruja. At the same time, as Muscovy extended its borders, the Nogais were forced out of their former territories and up to the latter half of the 18th century their tribes had to constantly move to the west, especially to the territories of Budjak and Dobruja. The main tribes were the following: Mansur, Orak, Kassai, Mamai, Or-Mambet (Mehmet), Jemboylyk, Jedisan, Jetishkul, Kungrat, and others.

By moving Tatar tribes to Budjak and Dobruja the Ottoman government accomplished its own political and economical goals. Budjak and Dobruja were suburban territories and they had to grow stronger economically as new nomads kept coming there to settle. At the same time Tatars troops from those regions could be used as political or military weapons against Romanian principalities, Poland, and even the Crimean Khanate. The Crimean khan also found resettlement of numerous Nogai tribes from the peninsula to more remote territories rather useful.

Dimitrie Cantemir, Moldavian prince and scientist of Tatar origin, reports that in 1568 30,000 Tatars were living in Budjak. The decree of Sultan Ahmed I dated 1608 stated: 'Several years have passed since the five-thousand Crimean and Nogai Tatars from Akkerman, Bender, and Kilia crossed Ochakov and the Dniester River and found motherland in their steppes'. A diplomatic report dated 1618, sent from Istanbul to Paris, stated that 15,000 Tatars were living on the western bank of the Dniester River, while an Ottoman traveler Evlia Çelebi, who was in the same province at the same time, reported about 200 flourishing Tatar villages.

In 1691, famous engineer, general, and spy L. Marsigli counted 300 Tatar villages. In the middle of the 18th century, consul Ch. de Peyssonel found 500 Tatar villages on the same territory. Since the 17th century, Budjak had become too crowded for new Tatars. So the Budjaks started to pasture their cattle on outlying territories, especially Moldavian lands. A large number of complaints about it were found in the Ottoman Archive. Nevertheless, up to the latter half of the 17th century both the Crimean khan and the Ottoman padishah neglected these complaints. During this period the Ottoman sultan used the Budjak Tatars as a counterweight to the

18 The name 'Tighina Crossing' is mentioned in Moldovian records of the 14–15th centuries. We believe this name remained from the Golden Horde Tatars. The Vlachs called this fortress Tighina[8, p. 630–631].
Zaporozhian Cossacks, who were used by Poland as a political and military weapon. Even Mirza Kantemir, the headman of the Mansur tribe, was a sandzhakbey of Silistra at first, and then, in 1620, he was appointed as the beilerbey of Ochakov. The army of Kantimir pashah, mainly consisting of Dobruja and Budjak Tatars, was so strong that it managed to defeat the Crimean army in 1624 and won the respect of Poland, Wallachia and Moldova, until Kantimir was executed in Istanbul in 1624 [49, pp. 50–99].

In the latter half of the 17th century, Budjak was extremely overpopulated. In response to persistent complaints of Moldavian and Wallachian beys, the Crimean Khan Mehmed Giray Sofu IV (1641–1644; 1654–1666) decided to move part of Nogai Tatars from Budjak to the eastern bank of the Dniester in 1665. However, the Nogais resisted and asked the Ottoman sultan for help. In September 1666, Al-Hadj Halil-aga, messenger from Istanbul officially offered the Budjak Tatars Ottoman citizenship and a chance to settle on the territory of Akkerman, Kiliya, Izmail, Bender, and Sarat. In other words, the Tatars of Budjak were no longer subordinate to the Crimean khan and became citizens of the Ottoman Empire. To be more precise, Budjak Tatars became subordinate to the beilerbey of Ochakov. The objections of the Crimean khan resulted in his removal from the throne. Moldavia and the Crimean Khanate were deeply involved in the problem called 'the native land of Halil pashah'. The Nogai Tatars had a significant reason for switching patronage to the Ottomans—the overpopulation of Budjak. Budjak Tatars were a topic for discussion in Carlowitz. The sixth clause of the Ottoman-Polish treaty signed on November 24, 1698 required the Tatars who had crossed the border of 'the native land of Halil Pashah', to return to their previous lands.

Taking advantage of the war of 1710–1711, the Nogais crossed the border of Budjak and officially settled in the new area on Moldavian lands. However, this territory soon became insufficient. After the middle of the 18th century, some Nogais from Budjak migrated to the eastern bank of the Dniester River to Russia under the influence of Russian propaganda. Some of them migrated to the south of the Danube, to Dobruja [27, p. 251]. However, Budjak was still densely populated by Tatars. The lifestyle in the 18th century changed drastically: in comparison with the 16th century, Tatars now chose a settled way of living.

The migration which started in 1783 after the annexation of the Crimea inevitably affected Budjak, particularly Dobruja. Tatars moved further into the Ottoman territories. Judging by numbers, 30,000–100,000 Crimean migrants took refuge in the Ottoman Empire that year [16, p. 78]. According to the Ottoman-Russian treaty signed in Bucharest on May 28, 1812, Budjak was to be passed to Russia, while the Tatars living there were given 18 months to leave Budjak: they were to be replaced by Christians citizens of the Ottoman Empire [32, p. 363–364].

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§ 10. Tatars in the Muscovite State

Andrey Belyakov

Before addressing the place of the Tatars in the 15–17 century Muscovite state, it is worth mentioning that in most cases during this period, the very term 'Tatar' referred more to a religious denomination than ethnicity. Practically all Muslims were considered to be Tatars. For example, in 1602, Prince Hans of Denmark, the groom of Tsarina Xenia Godunova was met in Novgorod by 'the newly freed, newly baptized Crimean, Nogai, Turkic, Kizylbash, and Arip Tatars' [72, p. 308]. In some cases, the Circassians, and the Sarts (the settled population of Central Asia) were also included in the ranks of Tatars, and the serving Modrvinůs practicing Islam were gradually integrated with Serving Tatars in the late 16–17th centuries [6, inv. 1, file 1443; inv. 2, file 1; 7, inv. 1, file 471]. Therefore, as we can see, the name 'Tatars' frequently applied to representatives of a whole range of peoples that were not in any way related to actual Turks. In the frame of this research we shall speak only of the Turkic peoples residing in the territory of the Muscovite state.

All in all, they can be divided into five categories. The first includes the Tatar tsars and tsareviches, or the descendants of Chinggis Khan through his eldest son, Jochi. We shall refer to them as the Chinggisids, even though another name—the Jochids—is in fact more appropriate. The second category comprises representatives of ruling clans that were not attributed to the Chinggisids and therefore had no rights to the royal title (Nogais, Taybugids), as well as the top members of the el system of Desht-i Kipchak (Manghits, Yashlavskys (Suleshevs), Kulyukos). The third category covers representatives of regional elites, represented by princes and mirzas. The fourth—and most numerous—group comprises ordinary Serving Tatars (Cossacks in the Russian sources of the 15–17th centuries). And finally, the fifth and final category is the dependent Turkic population.

Chinggisids.

Currently, the first group—the Chinggisids—is the most thoroughly researched of the five [28; 30; 31; 32; 33; 77]. It is worth mentioning here that the desire of certain rulers to surround their thrones with the nobility of their dependent states is not a Russian invention. In fact, history offers numerous similar examples, yet it still seems that the Russian tradition came into being thanks to the Horde's influence. At qurultays, Russian princes were far from the only ones to comprise the bulk of the crowd, made up of the rulers of peoples subjected to the khan [45, p. 131]. During a later period, Muscovite ambassadors witnessed a similar phenomenon at the
court of Persian shahs [62]. At present, we have been able to identify 215 representatives of the golden line ('altan urug'—another name for the Chinggisids) in the Muscovite state of the 15–17th centuries. They were natives of the Great Horde (4 individuals), Kazan (18), Astrakhan (44), Crimean (20), Siberian (89), Kazakh (7) and Urgench Khanates (4), the Sharmanshans (2) (according to A. Zaitsev, they are not a part of the Chinggisids [43]) and the Orlans (the Ulans from Russian sources) (25). The origins of two people has yet to be established. In total, there were 157 men and 58 women, with 118 (95 men and 23 women) who emigrated (were captured), and 97 (62 men and 35 women) who were born in Russia. It must be noted that among those born in Russian lands there were many who died in infancy or in early childhood, and were never listed in chronicles or other official documents.

Initially, the status of the Chinggisids was significantly higher than that of any of the Rurikids. The position of each of the tsareviches as a collective suzerain was superior to that of the Grand Prince. These circumstances changed when Moscow started to recognise its power and began pushing for a unilateral break of tribute relations with the weakening Horde. Moscow began inviting Chinggisid Cossacks with the entirety of their troops to participate in specific military operations. After receiving the agreed amount for service, the tsarevich left the borders of Russian princedoms, meaning that in certain cases tsareviches could be treated as noble mercenaries. This improved the authority of the Grand Prince of Moscow in his own eyes and in the eyes of his subjects and rulers of adjoining states. It is very likely that the invitation of tsareviches was somewhat influenced by the Polish-Lithuanian experience, as the Chinggisids were successfully used for the purposes of these states somewhat earlier [16, p. 149–153].

The process of ‘inviting’ tsareviches began to function when the dissolution of the Golden Horde into a number of independent states, whose ruling dynasties were feuding with each other, started picking up speed. Losers in the fight for the throne could only find refuge in the Nogai Horde, Lithuania or Moscow, or leave entirely for Central Asia. The frequent choice in favor of Moscow was stipulated, among other things, by the economic crisis taking place in the steppe, caused by the shift of principal trade routes in the first half of the 16th century [46, p. 117–120]. Inevitably, this was a major blow to the status of the Chinggisids. After that, only certain individual representatives of a specific clan, those who were able to receive true royal power, could be spoken of as having an invariably high position. The status of the rest was based on tradition only. Their exclusive right to the title of khan (tsar) in Desht-i Kipchak was recognised, but at the same time they were frequently used as sham rulers, or tsareviches were turned into a tool of political pressure (a destabilising factor of sorts) in relation to their neighbours.

Muscovite Rus' completely ceased treating the Chinggisids as its suzerains. From that point on, the departing tsareviches were recategorised into a group of serving princes, although they still possessed a very high status.

It remains unclear precisely when all Kalitiches started being considered as having a higher status than any serving Chinggisid, but with a certain degree of certainty this can be conjectured as starting in 1557 (the seniority of distribution of Chinggisids and Kalitiches in regiments). Yet this probably indeed was occurring even earlier. It cannot be ruled out that the formation of such perceptions was supported by the baptism in the early 16th century of a number of Kazan tsareviches, and their inclusion in the Grand Prince's family through marriage (Peter Ibragimovich, Fyodor Dolgolyadsky) with the women of the line of Ivan Kalita [19; 21].

The internal hierarchy of the Serving Chinggisids formed gradually. Initially, this depended on the presence or absence of the royal title, seniority within the clan, as well as the territory, from which the tsar or tsarevich received his income. Cities that could be ranked based on a hierarchy (Kasimov – Kashira – Zvenigorod – Yuryev-Polsky – Andrey’s Townlet the Stony – Serpukhov) were the most prestigious, followed by palace volosts (Surozhik, Khotun) which were difficult to rank. The existence of another criterion can be assumed which initially had great importance and
influenced the making of decisions about the grant of a city or volost—the availability and strength of the military troops of a specific Tatar tsar or tsarevich. Another significant factor, political expediency, that could make certain adjustments in the general ranking, also cannot be discounted [28].

Based on their own ideas of seniority, Moscow authorities developed a hierarchy of Serving Tatar tsars and tsareviches. As we have already mentioned, starting in 1557/58, the Chinggisids were regularly appointed as nominal voivodes of active army regiments [68, p. 72; 70], which allowed them to be ranked. The regular count of regiments in sequential order of seniority was made the basis of this system. However, only the top Chinggisids in Russia were incorporated in the offered rankings. As a whole, they can be divided into several categories: 1) serving individuals, owners of their own military troops; 2) serving individuals who did not possess their own military detachments; 3) children of the first and second categories who died before participating in military actions, or for any reason did not serve in a regiment; 4) honorary captives; 5) exiled individuals; 6) political pensioners; 7) oghlans (ulans).

In the latter half of the 16th century, the status of Serving Chinggisids was approximately equal to the status of noble natives in Western Europe. For example, the former Magister of the Livonian Order, V. Fürstenberg; the Bishop of Yuryev Gartman, or the Prince of Denmark Magnus. Even if they were taken prisoner, they were not considered as foreign enemies, but rather native serving men in temporary disfavor. The model of relations, similar to the one used for foreigners voluntarily entering the service of Ivan IV, was applied to them. The forms of their maintenance were also similar [79, pp. 57–58]. They were close to representatives of the ‘golden family’ in the sense that at some time or another they had possessed true sovereign power in their state, or had grounds to claim it as their birthright. The status of the arriving Russian-Lithuanian princes, as well as Nogai and Crimean mirzas, Kalmyk taishas and Kabardin princes was incomparably lower. However, in a number of cases their material maintenance was in fact significantly better.

As it concerns this ‘love’ for the Chinggisids, a particularly vital role was played by the idea of a ‘true sovereign’ formed in the ‘Royal Genealogy’, according to which the individual visited by representatives of adjoining ruling families can be considered as such [65, p. 103, 572, 591, 650, 655]. Therefore, for each Muscovite tsar (grand prince), any of Chinggisids who arrived on his name were of the greatest importance. Yet the interest of the authorities in the Chinggisids was not constant, and as a group were only mentioned at certain decisive stages. More frequently, whenever grand princes (tsars) were replaced.

In the middle of the 16th century, the system of the use of Serving Chinggisids to increase the prestige of the Orthodox Christian tsar was developed to its final form. Tatar tsars and tsareviches attended soirées in the embassies of foreign states, and participated in military campaigns. Their use as nominal regimental voivodes was the most obvious sign of this system, which can most clearly be seen during the Polotsk campaign of 1563 [15, pp. 119–154; 47]. The baptised tsareviches participated in court ceremonies, and in a number of cases held senior state positions (such as Michael Kaybulovich, who possibly at some time was the head of the Zemsky Boyar Duma [71, pp. 206, 215, 216, 219, 221, 224–226, 228], and Simeon Bekbulatovich, who was the nominal ruler of Moscow). However, the level of independence of representatives of the ‘golden family’ when it came to making certain decisions at that time had been reduced to zero.

The fact that the author of ‘Kazan History’ considered Shahghali b. Shayex Allahiar to be the image of a perfect vassal ought to be recognised in its own right. Readers of this work see a devoted servant of Moscow rulers, a heroic vassal, a wise, perspicacious and hardy individual who supported the interests of the Muscovite state to a much greater degree than the Russian voivodes, sycophants and traitors easily bought by Kazan residents [34, pp. 27–38].
Yet by the end of the rule of Ivan IV, representatives of the 'golden family' had already exhausted their functional reserves, and to a certain extent were already a burden to the tsar. This resulted in the 'liquidation' of the Kasimov Tsardom and, possibly, put an end to the policy of gifting cities. After that, they were merely married off to the scions of noble Moscow families. The marriage of Simeon Bekbulatovich was an exception, but in this case, the tsar married his own in-laws to each other.

In the 17th century, further developments in the status of the Chinggisids took place. Still, they were genetically related to the events of the 16th century. For example, the relationship between Michael Fyodorovich and the Chinggisids was most likely still under the certain influence of their kinship. After all, he was distantly related through marriage to the Kasimov tsarevich Arslan b. Ali, and through Ivan the Terrible, they were second cousins. The son of Arslan, tsarevich Sayyid-Burhan was on several occasions offered to convert to Orthodoxy in exchange for his marriage to the daughter of Tsar Michael [81, p. 106], but this plan never came to action. But still, another meaningful event took place that is rather difficult to explain: the tsar's own aunt and childhood nurse, Irina Nikitichna Godunova, bequeathed her votchina in Moscow uyezd to the tsarevich.

It is worth mentioning that in the 17th century, the positions of serving Chinggisids and Nogai mirzas, or descendants of Edigu, were becoming even closer to one another. Their names, along with statements of their 'podennyj korm' [per diem wage], manorial and annual monetary salary, as well as gifts on the occasion of their conversion to Christianity, are regularly encountered in the same reports of the Posolsky Prikaz. At the same time, while the amounts of manorial and monetary salaries of tsars and tsareviches were higher than those of mirzas (2,000 quarters and 200 rubles, as opposed to 1,300 quarters and 200 rubles), the gifts for conversion to Christianity and the daily allowance of some noble mirzas were even more significant. After converting to Orthodoxy, both the former and latter were included in the list of baptised foreigners, and received the title of princes. However, the former mirzas had a certain crucial advantage: the change of faith gave them the opportunity to make a successful career, primarily in the court. Over time, some of them received the titles of boyars and became owners of some of the largest land holdings, such as Princes Urusov and Yusupov. However, tsareviches did not have to fight for their rights to anything; they enjoyed a high social and material position due solely to their ancestry, even though soon this would all turn against them in a horrible way. When during the reign of Peter I they were lumped together with the rest of the nobility, they would be unable to truly fight for their well-being; the only thing they had energy for was entering into marriages with the relatives of wives of Moscow tsars. But these marriages could ultimately either help them to strengthen their positions at court, or completely undermine their position in case of a wrong choice. This is what happened in 1718 when the Siberian tsarevich Vasily Alekseyevich got mixed up with the case of tsarevich Aleksey Petrovich, the son of Peter I, and paid a hefty price for his decision [51, p. 80; 52, p. 70–71].

Based on their status, the Muslim Chinggisids continued their integration with the serving foreign-born of Western European origin, and it can be observed that both had the same legal status, forms of material allowance, identical benefits for departure and change of faith. Yet there are still certain differences worth noting. First of all, these include certain specific forms of gift giving to the Chinggisids caused by the greater degree of their economic dependence on the Moscow sovereign, as well as the status of serving tsareviches. Yet despite the immeasurably higher position of representatives of the Golden Line in relation to serving foreigners, the latter sometimes received a significantly higher material allowance. One may assume that economic and other expedient issues were taken into account here [60].

G. Kotoshikhin wrote: 'Even the royal tsareviches of Siberia and Kasimov have converted to Christianity. Their position is higher than that of the boyars, but they do not visit and participate in any duma because their states and themselves have been in a subjected position since
the war a short time ago, and it is not a custom to do so; also, they are feared. And their service is such: when the tsar goes to church during a holiday, they support his arms, and they go to pay homage to the tsar every day. They are given large manors and votchinas, and they are married to boyars’ daughters after taking them with large dowries and their manors and votchinas; and those for whom their manors are not enough, receive an additional allowance from the tsar every month’ [49, p. 27].

All in all, this is true; the ‘honor’ of the Chinggisids was higher than that of any representative of the Moscow nobility. In the summer of 1679, the only case of mestnichestvo with the involvement of tsareviches was recorded. A boyar, Prince Michael Alekseyevich Golitsyn, was unsuccessfully fighting for this position with a Siberian tsarevich, Grigory Alekseyevich. At that time the prince refused to participate in the sacred procession because of the Siberian tsarevich, and was discovered in brick sheds at the bank of the Moscow River, hiding between bricks. In the opinion of scholars, this case was the last drop that foretold of the abolishment of the institution of mestnichestvo [82, no. 1687, p. 207; 83, p. 188].

In any event, during the reign of Aleksey Mikhaylovich, the status of the Serving Chinggisids underwent a Renaissance of sorts. By that time, the military importance of their courts had been reduced to nothing, so in this respect their status was identical to that of the Russian nobility. In the latter half of the century, in some cases they failed to provide sufficient troops from their manors, and at a certain point, their maintenance lost all meaning. They all lived in Kasimov or Yaroslavl, and almost never appeared in the capital. But this was when another metamorphosis took place. The Moscow Tsar aimed to restore the traditions of the past, primarily from the times of Ivan the Terrible, as he understood them or might have imagined them based on specially prepared extracts from chronicles, records and ambassadorial books. Still, it was impossible to completely restore these age-old circumstances, not to mention Aleksey Mikhaylovich had his own opinion about this problem. Therefore, the decision was made to encourage all present Muslim tsareviches to change their faith. At the same time, this was also intended to show all Muslims the seriousness of the expansion of Orthodox ideas in Russia.

After that, they became regular attendees of palace diplomatic, religious and court ceremonies, and moreover, the Chinggisids were again appointed as nominal regimental voivodes. However, this was only an imitation of the past that could not deceive anyone [55, p. 129]. But Aleksey Mikhaylovich likely paid no attention to this fact. For him, it was important to feel like the tsar of tsars, the true heir of Constantine the Great and Solomon, the sole true ruler of the only truly Christian state, in whose hands God had left the fates of the infidels. Therefore, one might say that the religious aspect ranked rather high in these circumstances. This was when the practice of using the Chinggisids, described by G. Kotoshikhin, finally took form [49, p. 27]. This message paints a rather precise picture of their position, as its author was a podyachy of the Posolsky Prikaz, which administered supervision over the Chinggisids.

Palace records contain a significant number of mentions of baptised Tatar tsareviches [38; 39; 40; 41; 42], as they had become the mandatory entourage for practically all daily palace ceremonies. They also participated in receptions of foreign ambassadors on a regular basis. Still, more or less, this happened during the previous epochs as well. But their participation in the coronation ceremony was likely an invention of the latter half of the 17th century.

The abolition of mestnichestvo in 1682 had no significant impact on the position of tsareviches: they still continued to perform all their court functions. Only one case is known where a Chinggisid was placed in command of a large governmental agency. The Kasimov Tsarevich Ivan Vasilyevich was ordered to head the Mining Prikaz (also known as the Mining Chancellery) from 1705 to March 1713 [61, pp. 100–101]. Then everything changed after the case of Tsarevich Aleksey, in which the Siberian tsarevich Vasily Alekseyevich was mixed up as well. After being tortured, he was exiled to Arkhangelsk in 1718, where he soon died, after which his manors and
votchinas were returned to the treasury. In the same year, his children were ordered to call themselves Princes, not Tsareviches. The only son of the Kasimov Tsarevich Vasily Araslanovich, Vasily Ivanovich, died childless and preserved his right to the title to the end of his days [33; 52, pp. 74–75]. From that moment on, Chinggisids had completely merged with the Russian nobility. The path that was 300 years in the making reached its end.

**Ruling families not attributed to the Chinggisids, and the elite of the el system.**

When speaking about the second group of Tatar nobility, it must be pointed out that far less is known about the characteristics of their residence in the Muscovite state [76]. However, we can still make certain conclusions. Just as in the case of the Chinggisids, two principal forms of material existence have been categorised: the allocation of vast manors from royal volosts, or the granting of ‘podennyj korm’ [per diem wage]. When they converted to Christianity, they were gifted a hereditary princely title, which along with the remnants of their former name (patronymic or family soubriquet), was their main manner of being marked. Such newly baptised people rather frequently, particularly at the early stage, were mentioned as regimental voivodes. But this category of nobility requires further research of its subdivisions, where the main criterion is the place of their origin.

**The Nogais.** Members of the flourishing Edigü clan are regularly recorded in Russian documents from the middle of the 16th century. Some of them came to Russian lands for a short time to participate in specific military campaigns, and others left to live there forever. We are primarily interested in the second category.

It must be stated straight away that the position of the Nogais was always significantly inferior to that of the Chinggisids and natives of Crimea and Siberia (including natives of Nogai descent). This might perhaps be mostly related to the sheer number of representatives of the clan, but there were still exceptions. The most distinctive of them all is the Romanov mirzas.

Following their defeat in the struggle for power in the Nogai Horde, on 24 October 1564, mirzas Ibrahim and El, children of Bey Yusuf b. Mussa, came to Moscow along with the ambassador Michael Kolupaev. Between October 1564 and July 1565, they were placed in the Romanov uyezd. As a result of a fight with the oprichnik Roman Pivov, in 1570 Ibrahim escaped to Poland, then travelled to Crimea, finally surfacing in the Lesser Nogai Horde. At the same time or perhaps a little earlier, brothers Aydar and Ali, children of mirza Qutum b. Sheikh-Muhammad, emigrated to Russia and were also placed near Romaniv [76, pp. 333–334, 342–345]. Apart from manors, Nogai mirzas received a fixed monetary allowance from the Romanov uyezd profits; in 1584, this amounted to 380 rubles, as well as 500 rubles for the maintenance of a Tatar troop of 225 warriors [13, no. 307, pp. 298–299]. Later on it was slightly increased [57]. Initially, the Nogais were recorded in the Posolsky Prikaz, including their court-related affairs, while the Romanov mirzas most likely did not have court immunity from the very beginning. In 1616–1617, Serving Tatars were removed from under the authority of the Romaniv mirzas. Then in 1621 this military troop was restored, but the profits from the trading quarters of the town of Romaniv were taken from Yusupov and Kuchumov mirzas and transferred to the Posolsky Prikaz [73, p. 89–90]. It is clear that what was being referred to was not the seizure of profits, but the degree of participation of the mirzas in their collection. After that began a period of the gradual decline of Romaniv Tatars; mirzas started to decline accepting manors and instead switched over to allowances. The Yusupovs were making careers at court, while the Kuchumovs had already dropped out of the historical picture by the end of the 17th century [36; 37]. As far as common Tatars were concerned, they were gradually converting to Christianity [3, inv. 1, 1668, file 22, part 1].

The Sheydyakov Princes managed to achieve the highest position in 16th century Moscow, but at present, we know neither the precise time nor circumstances of their exodus. However, from 1571 to 1580, Prince Peter Tugaevich Sheydyakov, a participant of almost every campaign in the Livonian War, headed the Great and Front Regiments. For several years he
was mentioned as the Namestnik (viceregent) of Pskov [66, p. 240, 251, 277, 306, etc.]. Following the example of N. Karamzin, V. Trepavlov writes that Prince Peter was a member of the Campaign Duma of Ivan the Terrible [76, p. 328]. However, this is most likely not the truth. During this period, the Sheydyakovs were instead recorded as serving princes. V. Trepavlov presumably identifies Vasily Sheydyakov with Tursun Muhammad b. Sayyid-Ahmed, who in 1564 arrived to ask to be accepted into the king's service. Afanasy is regularly mentioned from 1574 to 1598 as a regimental voivode, and in 1577–1580 as the Namestnik of the town of Yuryev-Livonsky [76, p. 329]. Presumably, a different Nogai native was Prince: Ivan Kelmamevich Kelmametev, who was mentioned among the Oprichniki starting in 1571. He was the spouse of one of the daughters of Malyuta Skuratov, and died on 15 July 1573 [48, pp. 44–45]. His father or grandfather was likely Kel-Muhammad b. Alchigar b. Musa. In the 17th century, the Urusov Princes rose to prominence in the world, becoming members of the Duma and attaining the status of boyars and royal in-laws. Furthermore, conversion to Orthodoxy was a mandatory condition for any successful career. Yet most likely, baptism alone was not enough, as the correct matrimonial policy and personal qualities were also of great importance.

**The Taybugids.** We know of just a single example: the capture and transportation to Russia of Sayyid-Ahmed (Seydyak, Seytyak) b. Beq-Bulat [31, pp. 386–399; 56, pp. 466–467], a Siberian prince from the clan of Taibugids and competitor of Kuchum for supremacy over Siberia. In his new home he held a position close to that of the Chinggisids, and was granted a manor in Novgorod uyezd and appointed to the post of a regimental voivode [69, p. 932]. He was granted vast manors, yet left no male heirs, thus ending his line forever.

**Crimean mirzas.** At the turn of the 15–16th centuries, a brother in law of the Crimean Khan and Kasimov Tsar Nur-Daullet, Prince Sivindiyuk-mirza, the son of Madyk (Yumadyk) lived in Moscow along with his military troop [12, pp. 156, 170, 191]. It is worth taking into account that after the return of his sister, Tsarina Kuratai, to Crimea he remained in Russia. We know that in 1514 he was captured by Lithuanians in the Battle of Orsha, and also that he died in captivity (in Torki) in 1538. His origin has yet to have been established.

Kanbar Mamalaev moved to Russia in the early 16th century, and was first recorded in July 1507 in the advance regiment in the Lithuanian campaign. In September 1507, Kanbar-mirza was also mentioned in the advance regiment in the campaign against 'Lithuanian places', along with Tsarevich Sheikh-Auliar b. Bakhtiyar [66, p. 38]. Subsequently, his son Magmet (Ak-Muhammad) and grandson Urazli (Uraz-Ali), who converted to Orthodoxy and became Prince Ivan Kanbarov (Kambarov), were known in Russia. They also held prominent positions in the Muscovite state. Prince Ivan Magmetev, son of Kanbar, died on his way to Poland during the ambassadorial mission of 1570 and, as it appears, left behind no sons [66, pp. 209, 211, 220, 221, 226, 229, 231; 59, p. 94; 35, pp. 266–267]. V. Trepavlov offers the following genealogy: Uraz-Ali b. Ak-Muhammad b. Kanbar b. Mamsai b. Mansur b. Edigü. [76, pp. 323–324].

Members of the Yashlavsky family (the Suleshev Princes), one of the numerous branches of the Kipchak el, are considered the most notable representatives of all Crimean mirzas in Russia. During the 16–17th centuries, the Suleshevs were one of the most influential Crimean clans and regular Russian amiyats (trusted persons among the Crimean nobility in charge of relations with Moscow). During the Crimean dynastic crisis of 1584–1588, one of the clan's members, mirza Yansha (Yansha-pasha), moved to Moscow. Yet another dynastic crisis was brewing in Crimea, and the mirza (the ambassador in Russia) decided not to risk his life and stay in the new country. His genealogy can be mapped out as follows: Yansha-pashas – Sulesh (Suleyman Ishan) – Magmetsha (Muhammad-Ishan). In the autumn of 1591, the mirza was sent to Novgorod to participate in the Swedish campaign. The fact that his name is recorded immediately after the serving tsareviches is notable. Just like them, Yansha warranted a pristav [accompanying officials] [66, p. 460]. He is known to have had two sons, Yury and Vasily.
It appears that Yury Yansheyevich Suleshev was baptised as early as in the 16th century, after which he married a Kabardin princess named Maria Mamstryukovna Cherkasskaya. After his conversion to Orthodoxy, the former mirza became a prince, and was evidently granted the position of a stolnik. However, the first mention of his services is attributed only to January 1605 [75]. During the Time of Troubles, he first supported Vasily Shuysky, then was a member of the 1st and 2nd Opolcheniyes. He also went on to directly participate in efforts to undue the consequences of the Time of Troubles. His origin, familial connection and conversion to Orthodoxy allowed him to make a successful career and successfully compete with Moscow boyars [82, no. 995, 996, 1117, 1140–1142, 1326]. In February 1615, Yu. Suleshev was promoted from a chashnik to a boyar. In 1618/19–1622/23, 1625/26, 1627/28–1629/30, he headed the Sysknoy Prikaz; in 1627/28–1629/30, 1632/33–16335/36 – the Razbojnyj Prikaz, and in 1632/33–1633/34 – the Prikaz of Tribute-Paying People. From 1623–1625 he performed the duties of the Tobolsk voivode. He was frequently a participant of numerous court ceremonies. For example, in 1634, when Patriarch Joasaphus was assuming his position, Suleshev 'led the donkey' ridden by the new spiritual leader (re-enacting Jesus Christ's entry into Jerusalem) [75].

Vasily Yansheevich Suleshev converted to Orthodoxy during the rule of Michael Romanov. Before that, it is evident that he had been known as Mamets (Muhammad-Ishan), like his great-grandfather, and afterwards he became a prince and a room leader of stolniks. In 1625/26 he became a kravchey, and from this moment on we see Vasily, unlike his brother who had extensive military and administrative experience, exclusively in court positions. From his marriage with the daughter of Ivan Fyodorovich Basmanov, Fetinya, Vasily Suleshev had two sons, Ivan Vasilyevich and Ilya Vasilyevich, who died in infancy, after which the line was broken off [75].

Another noble Tatar native who moved to Russia in 1585 was a representative of yet another influential Crimean family—the Kulyukovs—Pashay mirza Kulikov. His son Ablay mirza, born to the daughter of Astrakhan serving tsarevich Abdula b. Aq-Kobeq, is known in Russia. In 1619/20, Ablay was voluntarily baptised, after which he became a stolnik, Prince Boris Pashayevich (Pashaymurzin) Kulikov [1, inv. 1, 1619, file 4, 7; 1621, file 12; 2, inv. 1, 1622, file 1, sheet 92]. Almost nothing is known about his life. Apart from information on the marriage of the prince and the size of his land holdings in the Palace Records, he was only mentioned one other time. On 17 May 1624 he participated in the reception of the ambassadors of the Kizylbash (Persian) shah Abbas Rusan Beg (Urusan Beg) and his suite. He was among the sovereign's stolniks in the Golden Chamber, and wore white. Later, at the feast given in honour of the ambassadors in the Palace of Facets, the prince served food at the tsar's table [21; 38, p. 685, 691]. This gives us reason to assume that, but for his early death, Boris Kulikov could realistically be expected to have had the same career as the Suleshev brothers.

There is reason to believe that these were far from all Crimean natives. The Razrjadnaja Knigas mention two more mysterious princes: Mavkin Mikhail Umar [66, pp. 91, 97, 98, 102, 105, 115, 116] and Teukechev Ivan Movkoshevich [66, pp. 176, 193]. However, additional research into their history is required. They were possibly representatives of the local (Kazan) nobility.

Regional nobility. At present, we can only speak of the Russian regional Tatar nobility on the territory of Eastern Meshchera, and also the conquered Kazan, Astrakhan and Siberian Khanates. Currently, a certain volume of material related to this issue has already been collected. If it is generalised, we may safely state that Moscow for a long time demonstrated a pragmatic attitude towards the status of the non-Orthodox population residing in annexed/ conquered territories if it was loyal to the new authorities. In these circumstances, the local elites could for a long time maintain their privileges, including those related to the management of the native populace [29; 58; 78]. Otherwise, the regional elite was either physically eliminated
or forcibly removed to remote areas of the state, such as the Novgorod Lands, which frequently served in this capacity.

During the baptism of the 16th century, this category of Tatars was granted the dignity of princes and included in the royal court. For example, the list of Oprichniki of Ivan the Terrible in 1573 included ‘Prince Ivan Seitzov of Gorodets’ with a significant allowance of 200 rubles [74, p. 55]. It appears that he was from the clan of Kasimov sayyids, or the Shakulovs.

Other Tatar names can also be found in the list of Oprichniki of Ivan the Terrible: Prince Ivan Alikeyev, and Prince Ivan Yanchurin [74, p. 56]. At present, absolutely nothing is known about their origins. Prince Ivan Tevkelevich (Tevkelevich, Tevkelev), known from 1558/59 to 1574, was appointed to posts up to the first voivode of the Advance Regiment. There are also mentions of him receiving the position of an oruzhnichy. Later, he fell from grace and was ultimately executed [48, p. 80]. This was possibly the son of the Kazan prince Tevekel Murtaza mirza or his grandson, captured in 1545 [64, p. 146].

Over time, this list may be significantly expanded, but currently there is no research being conducted in this area.

At present, the regional elite of Meshchera of the 16–17th centuries is the most thoroughly studied [9; 10; 23; 24; 25; 29]. However, they belong to a discussion in more detail in the next section.

*Serving Tatars (Cossacks).*

When addressing the institution of Serving Tatars in the Russian state of the 15–17th centuries, we must come to terms with the fact that we still know little about it. It is no secret that the knowledge of its number is more than approximate [27; 17]. The ideas behind the campaigns they took the most active part in, as well as their role on the battlefield, are also known to a certain degree as well [25, pp. 160–195; 28, pp. 165–258]. But as far as their internal organisation is concerned, practically no studies have ever been conducted to illuminate this topic.

During the respective period, Serving Tatars are recorded in practically all uyezds of the European portion of Russia where manorial agriculture was practiced. Based on absolute numbers, there is also a whole other issue on the significant regional variation of this service class group. The largest numbers were recorded in Meshchera (the Kasimov, Shatsk, Kadom, Temnikov, Alatorsk, Arzamas, and several other uyezds). A significant number of Tatars also resided in the Romaniv, Yaroslavl, and Novgorod uyezds, and were likewise present in the Kazan and Svyazhsk uyezds. However, due to the loss of archival evidence, counting their true numbers is beyond complicated. Currently, the data for Meshchera, Romaniv and partially Novgorod are the most informative for our purposes. We are choosing not to address the organisation of the Serving Tatars of Western Siberia. This region had its own characteristic features, explained among other things by the relatively late occurrence of the institution in Siberia, while the European portion of Russia was already suffering a crisis at the hands of the Islamic cavalry [78].

All Serving Tatars in Russia can be tentatively divided into several groups. First and foremost were the military troops of noble Tatar natives. Here we mean the serving Chinggisids [28, pp. 165–258], Nogai mirzas residing in Romaniv [36; 57; 76], as well as certain other Muslims, around which relatively large military troops were formed that as a rule were comprised of their tribesmen. At present, it appears that we can speak of the Siberian prince Seytyak (Sayyid Ahmed b. Bekbulat) [26, p. 32], and the Ikrym (?) native Sivindyuk mirza Madykov (Yumadykov) (the brother-in-law of the Crimean and Kasimov khan Nur-Daulet) [12]. There were likely other troops in the 16th century as well, yet we are currently unable to separate them from the overall, undifferentiated group of Serving Tatars. The second group is made up of Tatars who lived in territories annexed to Moscow (Meshchera, Kazan, Astrakhan, Siberia), and the third group comprises Tatars settled as relatively small enclaves in native Russian territories [8; 72].
The first category gives rise to the smallest number of questions at the moment. Initially, these troops used to have complete autonomy, yet pristavs of the Grand Prince were still assigned to them. They were recorded for the first time in 1477 [66, p. 19; 67, p. 23]. A. Khoshkevich attributes the appearance of the institution of pristavs strictly to 1533 [80, p. 306], but D. Iskhakov moves this date a little further, to 1555 [44, p. 197]. Their functions are currently not entirely clear. It is logical to assume that they were responsible for general supervision, the coordination of activities with the Grand Prince's army, as well as fulfilled the role of intermediaries in a certain sense during Tatar interactions with the Russian populace. In the early 16th century, their degree of autonomy decreased. Gradually, they were included in the ranks of regiments, although never entirely [30, pp. 36–37; 66, pp. 36–37; 67, pp. 87, 90–91].

In August 1508, Russian leaders of Tatar troops were recorded for the first time as representatives of the junior command level from urban boyar children [50, p. 214]. By the middle of the 16th century, the practice of appointing Chinggisids as nominal voivodes to the active army had been brought to its peak. From that time forth, the troops of any Tatar tsar or tsarevich were assigned to the regiment they 'commanded', while the system of pristavs and heads was also maintained. It is likely that these changes were not related exclusively to the necessity to incorporate Serving Tatars in the Russian army, but rather reflected the evolution of armed forces of the Muscovite state, during which its former, more localised forms were replaced.

Initially, all Tatar regiments were divided into two components based on their origin—either from the mirzas or the Cossacks. Mirzas were the descendants of clan nobility, while the Cossacks were representatives of common Tatars. It should be noted immediately that such separation denoted solely a person's origins, and not their military aptitude or property status. The latter aspect was somewhat more complicated, yet as an issue it reaches beyond the scope of this work.

This system was preserved until the turn of the 16–17th centuries when the troops of the Chinggisids began to shrink in size, causing Russians to take their place. Starting from that moment, it is appropriate to speak of their provision of tribute-paying people from their manors. Yet the data available to us allows for the assertion that the circumstances were more complex, and the tribute-paying people of the Chinggisids had been there even as early as the late 15th century [22]. The Tatar tsars and tsareviches were also no longer appointed as nominal regiments heads, or sometimes even participated in campaigns themselves. At the same time, the institution of the Romanov mirzas was also undergoing certain troubles, which we mentioned earlier.

As far as territories with a majority Tatar population that at some point or another became part of the Muscovite state are concerned, the main factor was the degree of loyalty of the local population to the authorities in the capital. In cases of a peaceful or relatively peaceful transition under the power of the new suzerain, as we wrote about previously, the Serving Tatars and, first and foremost, their formal leaders maintained their former privileges for a long time [58; 78]. This also had a notable impact on their internal organisation. At present, the group of Serving Tatars in the Temnikov uyezd has been studied best. The Yenikeev Princes were at the head of the Tatars here, and the mirzas residing in the area were for the most part their distant relatives. Certain mirzas who collected income from the Mordvin belyaks (a tribute-paying group and, it appears, the principal clan and tribe unit, similar to that of the Bashkir tribes/clans, whose settlement territory as a rule corresponded to the later voistots) became 'personal' princes. In these cases, a prince is not a title but a position with a status close to that of a voistot, but granted exclusively for life with the right of its transfer after death to the eldest person in the clan [29].

We know what the status of the Yenikeevs was from the book about the Campaign against Polotsk dated 1563: 'The Temnikov people of Prince Yenikey with their allies and their people' [47, sheet 27 reverse p. 40]. This work presents us quite an interesting situation, as Prince Yenikey is recognised as the unconditional leader of the Temnikov Tatars, while in the meantime other mirzas have their own military units which were not directly subjected to Yenikey. This model
becomes even more complex due to the Mordvins, who from time to time provided tribute-paying people out of their own numbers to participate in wars. However, some members of the ethnicity became professional warriors (the Serving Mordvins), so their pastures were converted to manors and they were relieved from state tributes. For that reason they were frequently referred to as the tarkhans. They went to serve along with the Tatars, and rather quickly merged with them under the umbrella of Serving Tatars [7, inv. 1, book 471; 63].

The absence of such a formula in terms of the Serving Tatars of other uyezds does not mean they did not possess a similar organisation. At least, the Kadom Tatars were noted to have had combat kholops in the early 17th century, but they were 'set free' by order of the Tsar [4, inv. 9, no. 1084, column 1, sheet 4, 76]. We can assume that said order was issued thanks to the tsar's desire to take care of Serving Tatars. The constant splitting of estates between all heirs led to the overwhelming majority of mirzas struggling to provide for combat kholops at their own expense. There is reason to believe that this edict also applied to all Russian regions. As we have already mentioned, at the same time (around 1617) all Tatars were taken away from the control of Romaniv mirzas. Using the same document, we can also judge about the possible number of such troops (standard number of combat kholops in service). With 164 chet, 13 peasants and 9 landless peasants, it was possible to escort a serving man on horseback with a saadak [Russian horseback archery] and one more man on horseback with a saadak [4, inv. 9, no. 1084, column 1, sheet 4]. However, a manor of 30 chets [quarters], two peasants and one landless peasant could provide one serving man on horseback with a saadak [4, inv. 9, no. 1084, column 1, sheet 5]. At the same time, one particular feature of the Yenikeev clan regarding active participation in the events of the Time of Troubles [18; 10], was that 'pursuant to the royal edict, they serve based on special charters with their court, and not together with the town, and act as voivodes in the regiment' [4, inv. 9, no. 184, column 5, sheet 139].

Still, let us return to the 16th century. It can be stated that during the entirety of the 16th century and at least in the early 17th century, the heads of the Yenikeev family were a kind of hereditary and continuous 'second' voivode in the town and uyezd. Indeed, whether it was the first or second voivode position is the subject of dispute. However, it is obvious that someone appointed from Moscow exercised general control, and the local Orthodox population was subjected to him as well. The Tatars, and to a certain degree the Mordvins, were undoubtedly under the control of the Yenikeevs. But the latter had one important advantage when compared to the arriving voivodes: they resided in the area on a permanent basis and therefore better understood local affairs [29, p. 66]. We must stress that the components of the material allowance of the Yenikeevs strongly reminds of the forms of allowance of the serving Chinggisids and Romanov mirzas. Let us also pay particular attention to the income of the clan and the characteristics of inheriting the title of prince. From the documents we know that princes Kugush, Tenish Kugushev and Yenikey Tenishev had 'from time immemorial' owned the profits from the Temnikov tavern. However, around 1553 they were transferred to the Kasimov tsar, the former Kazan Khan Shayex Allahiar, and it appears after his death they were transferred to the new Kasimov tsar, Sain-Bulat b. Bekbulat. However, following the petition of prince Yenikey Tenishev in 1570, the tavern was returned to him and his son Sabbaq [11, pp. 225–226]. It can be assumed that the income from the tavern belonged to the family members or were given them as 'otkup' ['Otkup' is a system of collecting taxes from the population in which the state, for a fee, transfers the right of their collection to private individuals] as early as in the 17th century [6, inv. 1, file 1130].

The profits from Temnikov customs collections also belonged to the clan. They were recorded up until the end of the 17th century [6, inv. 1, files 4, 6, 16, 111, 1143, sheet 9; file 1577, sheet 2; 14, no. 193, p. 161]. At that, there is an interesting trend noticeable in their distribution. Initially, they used to be divided between all members of the clan, but starting from a certain point, the list of claimants became restricted to a strictly defined range of people and their heirs
[6, inv. 1, file 111]. To collect customs duties (the documents record one kind of duty, but a very important one for this region—the stamp), the customs office kept representatives of beneficiaries of funds [6, inv. 1, file 1443, sheet 9]. This fact indicates that the Yenikeevs received the entire sum of customs duties, similar to the Chinggisids in Kasimov. In Romaniv, the Nogai mirzas were only allotted a strictly fixed amount from the town's income [57; 13, no. 307, pp. 298–299]. The stall duties from the Temnikov market also belonged to the Yenikeevs [14, no. 193, p. 161].

The Temnikov uyezd was somewhat different from its neighbors; in the Kadom uyezd we do not find the presence of a regional leader. The Kadom Tatars were also not the subjects of the Temnikov princes, even though the composition of mirza clans in both uyezds was practically identical. A characteristic feature of the Alatorsk and Arzamas uyezds is that Serving Tatars settled there on two separate occasions, the first of which was in the late 16th century. However, during the Time of Troubles, the area was greatly depopulated, and in the first third of the 17th century, another wave came to reclaim the land. That being said, in both cases the natives of the Kadom and Temnikov uyezds [63], escaping from the lack of land (or rather the lack of forests, for wild-hive beekeeping had been the foundation of the region's economy for a long time, and the size of ploughland was frequently insignificant [29, p. 67–68; 7, inv. 1, book 471]), resettled to these territories.

A typical feature of the Kasimov Tatars was that they were divided into two regiments—the Tsar's (Shigaleev) Court, and Seitov Regiment. At that, the Tsar's Court was, so to speak, more aristocratic. There we see far more princes and imeldeshes (in this case, the foster-brothers of the Serving Chinggisids) [24; 25]. These regiments appeared thanks to the tradition, according to which the courts of the overlapping dynasties of the Kasimov Chinggisids maintained their integrity and were not given over to every Tatar tsar or tsarevich gifted with income from the town, but acted instead as independent serving corporations. The basis of the Tsar's Court comprised the descendants of Serving Tatars who had belonged to the Kazan and Kasimov tsar Shahghali b. Shayex Allahiar; the Seitov Regiment comprised the Serving Tatars, who had lived in the town before the arrival of the Astrakhan dynasty (1516) (Great Horde and Crimea).

Another important fact worth noting is that before the fall of the Kazan Khanate, not a single case of the use of Meshchera Tatars (with the exception of the Tatars of the Kasimov Chinggisids) in military actions was ever recorded. The courts of the Kasimov Tatar tsars and tsareviches were the only exceptions, which can probably be explained by the fact that Tatars predominately had to serve on the border. This was its own sort of guarantee of the region's well-being [29, pp. 63, 65; 9; 6, inv. 2, file 1; 7, inv. 1, book 471]. The newly annexed territories were in need of development. Moreover, they had been settled by the Mordvins a long time ago, where each and every man could, if required, become a warrior. Starting from the mid-16th century, the region was moved deep into the interior. Due to the difficulties in management of this enormous, though sparsely populated uyezd, it was broken down by dividing it into independent uyezds (the Insar, Saransk, Kerensk uyezds, etc.). Ever since, the Meshchera Serving Tatars participated in practically all wars waged by the Russian state in the 16–17th centuries.

Now we shall discuss the changes recorded with respect to the organisation of the Meshchera Serving Tatars in the first half of the 17th century. The principal information is contained in the desyatnyas of the Temnikov, Kadom, Kasimov, Arzamas, and Alatorsk uyezds [4, inv. 9, col. 184, sub-col. 5]. At first glance, everything was as it has always been: the Tatars were divided into mirzas and Cossacks, and the corporation as a rule divided the service in half. At that, the composition of the halves with respect to the number of mirzas and Cossacks, as well as the size of manorial allowances and annual monetary gifts, were approximately the same. Still, something new was taking place. Formerly, the Serving Tatars who had converted to Orthodoxy for different
reasons, left the ranks of their serving corporation, and now the situation was changed. It is possible that the old practices were maintained, but nonetheless we now see a newly-baptised warrior in each half (sometimes one per uyezd corporation) [4, inv. 9, col. 184, sub-col. 5, sheets 39, 48, 75, 164, 177, 197, 200]. This allows for the assumption that these people performed certain special functions, but as for what they were, now we can only guess. Still, we must note in particular that such newly-baptized warriors were always in the ranks of the Cossacks, and never the mirzas. At that, they had relatively high manorial allowances (200–350 quarters), but not always the highest among the Cossacks. Possibly, their functions included being the eyes and ears of the Orthodox commanders. Let us tentatively refer to them as the 'commissars'.

During the same period, another position appeared that had never been met with before among the Tatars – a yesaul. Only Cossacks had ever been appointed to the post. At present, they are known to have existed in Kasimov and in Kadom [4, inv. 9, col. 184, sub-col. 5, sheet 72, 182; col. 184, sub-col. 1, sheet 23]. However, this does not mean that they did not exist in other uyezds. The significant variety of manorial allowances (150 and 300 quarters) stands out in particular. They obviously could not have held senior positions among the Cossacks, or be the assistants (deputies) of the corporation's head. However, they could very well perform certain other functions while serving the Russian heads. In any event, it appears that this position was not considered honorable and desirable for the Tatars and, primarily, the mirzas.

It ought to be recognised that the Tatar cavalry in the first half of the 17th century was gradually losing its former importance. As early as in the 1630s, the Meshchera Tatars were gradually moving on to become reiters and even soldiers [4, book 44, sheet 44 reverse – 45, 89rev. – 90, 184, 205, 230, 534]. But the mass transition started somewhat later, more towards the middle of the century. In 1658/59, a considerable portion of the Kadom Tatars were transferred to the ranks of reiters. However, this did not lead to an increase of their wealth. In the reports submitted by them in June 1673, many of remarked that for many years they had not been issued either a manorial allowance or monetary salary. The income from tiny manors, and extremely irregular monetary salary and spoils of war were the priority means of subsistence for them and their families [5, inv. 2, files 1673, 2100, 2137]. The following observations are of particular interest. In the 1630s, primarily princes and mirzas for the most part became reitars. In the second half of the century, we start to see more common Tatars among the reitars. It can be assumed that the attitude towards the level of service prestige in foreign regiments underwent serious changes within several decades among the Serving Tatars. There is every reason to believe that other Meshchera Tatars were transferred to the ranks of reitars. Based on the needs produced by the Russian-Polish war of 1654–1667, starting in late 1656 the government started transferring the majority of the manorial cavalry to regiments of the new order [54, p. 22].

Therefore, we must state that the organisational structure of Serving Tatars in the Russian state of the 15–17th centuries to this date remains largely unclear, and even the well-known facts are often difficult to interpret. However, even now we may claim that the Tatar cavalry was not a foreign element in the Russian army, but was rather successfully integrated into it. All changes that took place within it were to a certain degree reflected in the Serving Tatars. Therefore, the study of the institution of Serving Tatars is impossible if detached from the study of the Russian army as a whole.

When addressing Serving Tatars, we ought to pay particular attention to the confessional policy of Moscow with respect to Turkic peoples. This matter had for a long time been dominated by a pragmatic approach; the most important thing was for the non-Orthodox population to perform the duties imposed on them well. However, starting in the 1620s, a trend began towards the forcible resolution of the 'Tatar question'. We must make immediate note that such ideas were born solely in church circles, while the secular authorities made every effort to settle similar urges, albeit not always very successfully. Only in the 1670–80s did the state join in this process. Still, even then it was unable to resolve the problem entirely [20].
Chapter XI. The Later Golden Horde Time

The Turkic dependent population.

Currently, we must admit that this category remains entirely unresearched. The best we can do is merely to state its existence. Its size was small, and we know that when its members were under Russian landlords, they were quickly baptised. On the other hand, the captive Europeans captured by the Tatars could also convert to Islam. Therefore, any researcher studying this topic faces numerous problems. First and foremost, they involve the fragmentary nature of the data and their wide dispersion among archive storage facilities and funds.

* * *

We have now examined all currently known categories of the Turkic population in the Muscovite state of the 15–17th centuries. At that, we have established that its members were known to have lives in absolutely all strata of society. The degree of influence of the Turkic component on certain aspects of the state has yet to be thoroughly studied, but it was undoubtedly there. Naturally, such influence was far from uniform or constant in all strata of society and all spheres of activity. However, in order to better understand what influence was actually exerted, what is chiefly required is the further comprehensive study of the Turkic peoples of Russia. And so far, little of this type of work has been completed.

2. RGADA. Fund 134 (Snosheniya Rossii s Khivoj) (Russia's relations with Khiva).
3. RGADA. Fund 150 (Dela o vy'ezdax inostranczev v Rossiyu) (Files of arrivals of foreigners to Russia).
4. RGADA. Fund 210 (Razryadny'j Prikaz) (The Razryadny Prikaz).
5. RGADA. Fund 1122 (Kadomskaya prikaznaya izba) (Prikaz Izba of Kadom).
6. RGADA. Fund 1167 (Tennikovskaya prikaznaya izba) (Prikaz Izba of Tennikov).
7. RGADA. Fund 1209 (Pomestny'j Prikaz) (The Pomestny Prikaz).


44. Iskhakov D. O t srednevekov'yj tatar k tataram novogo vremeni (From the medieval to the modern-age Tatars). Kazan: Master Line, 1998. 267 p.
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§ 11. The Manghit Yurt (the Nogai Horde)

Vadim Trepavlov

The Nogai Horde was the most expansive of the states which emerged upon the disintegration of the Golden Horde. At the time of its greatest might, in the first half of the 16th century, its borders in the east and south extended till the upper reaches of the Tobol and Nura Rivers, ran along the Sary su River and then followed the Syr Darya up to the Aral Sea. For a long time the Volga formed the western boundary. As time went by, however, the Nogai Horde inhabitants
started developing the Volga Right Bank pasture lands as well. In the 17th century, the Nogais were settling down across the Black Sea region and North Caucasus, leaving the native Trans-Volga steppes. The northern limits of the Horde can be defined only tentatively. Up to the middle of the 16th century, it included a larger part of the present-day Bashkiria.

A common epithet of the medieval Nogais was the word sansy’z (innumerable). In Rus’ and Europe there existed the steady notion of an enormous population of Nogai Horde, the most populous land among the neighbouring states: ‘their number was similar to the sand in the sea’. 'Like the sea was our people', the Nogais themselves asserted through the words of their poet Şal-Kiyiz Tilenşi Ulı [3, p. 87; 5, p. 238; 10, p. 48]. The size of the Horde's population can be approximately calculated by a widely used method: the numerical strength of the army, known from the sources, is multiplied by 4 or 5. It is believed that upon full military mobilisation, some 3/4 or 4/5 of the total population of the nomads—women, children, feeble old men and horseless poor—stayed at home. Based on this proportion, it may be assumed that by the mid-16th century the Nogais numbered from 900,000 to 1,000,000 people. Later their number began steadily to decrease [for more details see: 11, pp. 493–499].

At the end of the 14th century in the interfluve of the Yaik and Emba Rivers, the Manghit Yurt emerged. This was an area of nomadic migration of the Turkic tribe of the Manghits, headed by powerful beklyaribek (chief military commander) Edigü. At that time he managed all the affairs of the Golden Horde on behalf of powerless, in all ways obedient to him Khans. The tradition of Edigü's influence was so strong that after his assassination in 1419 the position of beklyaribek was reserved for his family. In eastern Kipchak dialects this title was reproduced as ulubey (or more often as just bey).

The reins of power in the Manghit Yurt were taken by Edigü's son Ghazi. He, 'by his father's example, became the leader of the nation and tribe, and brought the aimag and the tribes under the hand of his rule'. This caused discontent amongst the nomadic nobility, who by that time had grown unaccustomed to severe individual authority. The bey 'elongated the hands of pressure', 'stretched out the hand of oppression and coercion, stepped out of the circle of fairness and left the broad path of mercy' [6, pp. 141, 390]. In 1428, he was killed by the rebels.

From 1428, Abul-Khair, the Khan of so called nomadic Uzbeks, became the most powerful ruler in the Eastern Desht-i Kipchak. He appointed Edigü's grandson, Waqqas, as his beklyaribek. By virtue of his position, the latter commanded the army of the Khanate and participated in all major military campaigns of 1430–early 1440s. The Manghits belonged to the Right wing of the Uzbek Khanate. At the same time, the Manghit yurt was not overshadowed by other uluses subordinate to Abul-Khair. The autonomy of the Manghit territories of the Waqqas period revealed itself in their confrontation with the Great Horde, in which Abul-Khair did not take any noticeable part. Engaged in wars with the Timurids, the ruler of the nomadic Uzbeks did not interfere in the affairs of his western subjects and did not inhibit the autonomous existence or gradual strengthening of the Manghit yurt.

Polish chronicler Maciej Miechowita recorded that 'Okkas, an extraordinary warrior and servant of the Great Khan... was killed'. After that 'his sons separated from the main Transvolga Horde and settled down nearby Sarai castle (that is Saray-Jük—V. T.) some seventy years before the current 1517. Soon afterwards, they grew extraordinarily, becoming in our times already the most populous and largest Horde'. According to this source, this event is approximately dated 1447 'or a little earlier', as the writer noted [7, pp. 92, 93, 171].

Manghit rulers of the latter half of the 15th century began to demonstrate the policy, the origins of which go back Edigü: The Manghits needed a Khan for the sole purpose of sanctifying their growing political influence. Furthermore, having once received from an obedient Chinggisid the beklyaribek position, the Manghit mirza became its owner for life, irrespective of whether the sovereign, who had conferred the title, was alive or not. It is true, though, that
there existed one mandatory condition: beklyaribek in any case should be 'listed' under a sovereign, whoever that may be.

The personality and authority of Abul-Khair, who died in 1468–1469, had bonded the Uzbek state over the course of forty years. No-one was willing to obey his successors. Leaders from various parts of Desht-i Kipchak agreed to unite to topple the dynasty: Khan Ibak (Ibrakhim) of the Tyumen Yurt; Jani Beg, a long-time opponent of Abul-Khair and one of the founders of the Kazakh Khanate; Manghit beys Abbas and Musa (together with the inseparable brother Yamgurchi). The son of Abul-Khair, Sheikh Haydar, was overthrown and killed. Desht-i Kipchak was left without a sovereign. However, a beklyaribek could function only under a Khan, and therefore a partnership with a Chinggisid ruler was expected from Musa (it was him, who came to the forefront, pushing back his uncle Abbas).

Judging by the scarce information, it may be assumed that 'Uzbek-Kazakh' Khan Jani Beg was the first of such rulers. When in the late 1460–early 1470s, his brother-in-law Giray became the sovereign of the Kazakhs, Jani Beg was regarded as a co-ruler of the former, though apparently not possessing much authority. By the traditional scheme, the junior co-ruler received in governance the right or West wing. Manghit nomad camps and territories, with their center in Saray-Jük, were located in the west of the former Uzbek, and presently Kazakh Khanates. Saray-Jük also became one of the residences of Jani Beg. This fact can be viewed as an indication of the formal subordination of the Manghit Yurt to the new Khan.

Jani Beg died around 1473. Unwilling to see the strengthening of another dynasty, which could pose a threat to the growing autonomy of the Manghit Yurt, the latter’s leaders did not pledge obedience to the next tandem of the Kazakh Khans, the Giray's son Burunduk and Jani Beg's son Kasim. The sources, narrating that time, call Musa the 'master of the Kipchak steppe' and the 'emir of emirs' of Desht-i Kipchak [6, p. 103; 12, p. 274].

The notions of the ‘Nogais’ (a people) and ‘Nogai’ (a territory) started to appear in chronicles from the late 15th century. The Eastern texts usually designate the domains of Musa as the Manghit aimag, el and ulus of the Manghits. At one time, after the Timur's invasion of Ulus of Jochi in 1391 and 1395, Edigü made use of the Khan power crisis and managed to bring together enormous masses of the Golden Horde population in his area behind the Volga. Stable and secure life in the Transvolga steppes, it may be assumed, continued to attract nomads also later in the first decades of the 15th century. Gradually families and whole communities of numerous tribes assembled in the nomad territories controlled by the Manghit bey. These nomads fought together against Toktamysh children, joined Abul-Khair in campaigns against the Timurids, battled against Sheikh Haydar and Kazakh Khans. Major wars and natural disasters almost did not affect the Manghit Yurt. By the end of the 15th century, already the third or fourth generation of its people was inhabiting the steppes between the Volga and Emba Rivers. Common historical destiny and political interests made them realise their one commonality.

The word Nogai became the indicator of this. All the nomads subordinate to the Manghit bey, regardless of their tribal affiliation, started being referred to by this name. From now on, the Manghits themselves, as well as the Naimans, Karais and dozens of other tribe became known as the Nogais. In the sources the Manghit Yurt received a second name—the Nogai Horde.

There is still no unified opinion about the origin of this ethnonym. Already back in the 18th century an assumption was made that it stems from the name of the powerful ruler of the Golden Horde of the late 13th century, Nogai. This talented politician and military commander acquired all the power in the state and even appointed Khans. Historians supposed that later on descendants of Nogai's subjects formed the Nogai Horde. This guess, based only on the similarity of the names, was supported by N. Karamzin. The great authority of the 'father of the Russian historiography' turned it into an indisputable truth. From then onwards Nogai and the Nogais became strongly linked in historical works.
In actual terms, this explanation seems to be rather doubtful. Nogai died in 1300, while the 'Nogai' name for a people appears in documents only after the end of the 15th century. The Nogai domain (Yurt) was situated in the Black Sea region, in present-day southern Ukraine, Crimea and Moldova, far from the future nucleus of the Nogai Horde in the Yaik river, in the west of Kazakhstan. The medieval Nogais themselves and their descendants in their historical narratives did not mention Nogai, considering other historical figures as their ancestors and the first rulers.

There are other etymologies as well. Actually, the very word 'Nogai' represents Turkicised Mongolian nohoi (a dog). This name was borne not only by the Golden Horde Tsarevich, but by other people as well, including those of the royalty. It was probably one of these who became the eponym for the whole nation and the entire Nogai state. Kara-Nogai, the Khan of the eastern part (Left wing) of Ulus of Jochi of the second half of the 14th century, seems to be the most probable 'candidate'.

There are several more versions of the origin of the word 'Nogai': from the Mongolian nagan (green, grass as an indication to a live stock raising, nomadic life); directly from nohoi (a dog), either as an insulting nickname, or a symbol of friendship and fidelity, or a legendary ancestor animal. The Nogais themselves in the 19th century drew the name of their people from the expression neungai ('be damned!') which was allegedly addressed to newly converted Muslims by their tribesmen who remained pagans.

By the beginning of the 16th century, Musa had already become a fully independent ruler, although nominally of a lower rank in comparison with neighbouring Khans. The prestige of the lands under his rule began gradually to increase. If in the documents of the third quarter of the 15th century, the 'Nogais' are represented as a certain abstract territory across the Volga, then at the end of the Musa reign the Nogais' Horde is already ranked equally with other Turkic territories. An 'article' (list), entitled Names of the Tatar Lands, was compiled at that period in Rus', where the 'Nogais' were mentioned alongside the Great Horde, Kazan and Astrakhan Khanates and the Siberian Yurt (Shibans) [4, p. 253].

Nevertheless, the nominal rank of the territories, subordinate to Musa, was immeasurably lower than that of even the most feeble and insignificant possessions, governed by the Chinggisids. The population of the Manghit Yurt was regarded in neighbouring countries as 'Cossacks', i.e. castaways who cut themselves off from the native ulus communities, as an amalgamation which cannot fit in with the traditional scheme of the state power structure. For this reason Musa, his kinsmen and followers initially still faced the task of finding a convenient, obedient sovereign. The Manghit nobility nearly decided in favour of the Uzbek Tsarevich Muhammad Shaybani (Abul-Khair's grandson), who had successfully fought against the Timurids and Kazakhs and later on founded his own Uzbek Khanate, but circumstances prevented the implementation of this plan. Ibak, the Khan of Tyumen, became the next and more fortunate candidate to the throne. In the Russian sources he is called the 'Nogai Tsar'. This title denoted not the ethnic or tribal affiliation of the Khan, but the core composition of his army and subjects. In actual terms Ibak could dispose at his own discretion of only a limited population and the modest resources of the Siberian Yurt proper. As for the Nogais, they formed only a nominal part of his Khanate, although they dictated to him the political strategy. In January 1481, the Siberian-Nogai army routed the main camp of the Great Horde Khan Ahmed, with the latter himself being killed by brother mirza Yamgurchi.

Musa died around 1502. His numerous sons started a struggle for power. The Nogai Horde weakened and found itself on the verge of a split. As a result, the Nogais totally lost the war which broke out with the Kazakhs.

At the end of the 15th and the beginning of the 16th centuries the main forces of the Kazakhs were engaged, first, in the campaigns against Transoxiana, conquered by Muhammad Shaybani, and then in repelling Uzbek incursions from Transoxiana. In 1510, Shaybani was
crushingly defeated and killed by Shah Ismail Safavi. The threat from the south had disappeared, and the Kazakh rulers, Burunduk and Kasim, had the opportunity to address the problems of the western borders. They had no desire to lose their Right wing with the populous Manghit Yurt.

The initiative of the war with the Nogai Horde belonged to Kasim Khan. After the death of his father and uncle, Jani Beg and Giray, he at first was subordinate to Khan Burunduk. Gradually, however, he secured his grip on the influence and power and began to govern without co-rulers. Correspondingly, it was he who had thereafter potential rights to the Manghit Yurt.

The Nogais avoided quarreling with the Kazakh Khanate which now was monolithic and powerful. Eastern chroniclers report that the Manghits together with the Kazakhs took part in Kasim's campaign against Tashkent and Turkestan. Engagement of the large Nogai cavalry in military actions sharply increased the Khan's prestige in the eyes of his neighbours. However, the occasional engagement in wars with the Uzbeks by no means implied any intention of the Nogai leaders to relinquish their independence achieved after decades of intrigues and battles. In 1519, Kasim decided to assert finally and firmly his hold over the Nogais. This was particularly pertinent, as the Kazakh Khan suffered a defeat in his Tashkent campaign. To continue the struggle for Turkestan pasture land and towns, he needed to control all the subjects, close and remote ones, true and alleged, like the Nogais.

The course of the military action is not known, but the Nogais obviously suffered a crushing defeat. The territory of the Nogai Horde became subordinate to Kasim. There is practically no information about his policy there. In fact, it seems that many Nogais still remained on the left side of the Volga, but the majority of the Manghit nobility moved westward, to the Crimean domains. Having lost control of its Yurt, it became demoralised and irreversibly fragmented. In such a state it had nothing else left than to survive through the troubled years under the protection of Khan Mehmed I Giray or try to develop closer links with the Kazakh sovereign. Apparently, Kasim also had no aim of further embittering the defeated Nogais and tried to demonstrate an amicable attitude towards them. Stories have been told that the Khan married his daughter to one of the most high-blooded Manghits, Sheikh Mamai, the son of Musa. The Nogai Horde capital Saray-Jük became one of the main camps of Kasim Khan. He took the city as if assuming the baton from his late father, Jani Beg, and uncle, Burunduk, both of whom had lived there in the old days. It was in Saray-Jük that Kasim passed away and was buried in 1521.

Tahir, Kasim's nephew, became the new ruler of the Kazakhs. Almost in no time after he ascended the throne, everything which his great uncle had achieved and conquered, began to collapse. Having learned about the death of the mighty Khan, the Nogais regained their spirit. Children of Musa and nephews (Mamai, Sayyid-Ahmed, Sheikh Mamai, Yusuf, etc.) managed to gather nomads, scattered about the right-bank pasture lands and inspire them to take their revenge. Tahir proved to be absolutely incapable to putting up resistance. Under the onslaughts of the Nogais, the newly immigrant Kazakh population started to reel back quickly to the south-east, while the Khan himself fled to Moghulistan. Sources clearly explain Tahir's departure, together with his two thousand subjects: 'Because of the Manghits' rebellion, Uzbek-Cossacks could no longer stay in Desht-i Kipchak' [13, pp. 134–135]. Now it was the Kazakhs' turn to be engulfed in confusion and disintegration. The Nogais used to regularly burst into their nomad camps and take revenge for their recent defeats. Several Kazakh Sultans lost their lives in battles against them, while Kasim's son Haqq Nazar was taken (as prisoner?) to the camp of one of the mirzas.

After Tahir's retreat to Semirechye, the endless expanse of the Eastern Desht-i Kipchak was left defenceless in front of the Nogai troops. Musa's sons and nephews restored their supremacy over the Trans-Volga and Trans-Yaik steppes. From the 1520–40s, the domination of the Nogai Horde in the Eastern Desht steppes was already so obvious and indisputable that its opponents had no force or resolution to confront it at length.
One of the results of their military victories was that the Nogais were able to decide about the Kazakh throne. The latter was granted to Haqq Nazar, since he was also a formal suzerain of the Nogai Horde, obedient in every way to his Manghit patrons.

* * *

The Nogais were typical nomadic stock-breeders, with no knowledge or affection for the urban life. Their only credibly known town was Saray-Jük on the Yaik river, which was left over from the Golden Horde times. The nomads’ regular tributes to beys and mirzas were paid in kind: live stock and stock-breeding products, furs, honey, etc. Arable farming was embryonic and was limited to small crop areas of millet in the Yaik valley. Crafts had a domestic nature, satisfying only the needs of the nomadic stock-breeding. To obtain bread, metal items and cloth, the Nogais conducted intensive trade with neighbouring countries. The active exchange of goods was facilitated by the location of the Nogai Horde on the old caravan routes from Central Asia and Persia to Eastern Europe.

In the second quarter of the 16th century, under beys Sayyid-Ahmed, Sheikh Mamai and Yusuf, the Nogai Horde played a significant role in the international relations of Eastern Europe and Deshti-Kipchak. They actively intervened in the policy of the Volga Region and Siberian Khanates and often came into conflict with Crimea which tried to subjugate it to its influence.

The struggle between various groups of the Nogai nobility had intensified by the middle of 1550s. Many mirzas expressed concern about the eastward advance of the Muscovite state, conquest by Tsar Ivan IV of the Kazan Khanate (1552) and establishment of his control over the Astrakhan Khanate (1554). Bey Yusuf led the opponents of the pro-Russian line. In 1554, he was overthrown and killed by his brother Ismail, who demonstrated pro-Russian sentiments. The internecine feud continued for several years. Armed conflicts caused disruption of the established system of nomad migrations. This led to mass loss of live stock and, as a consequence, mass starvation among the population. In the course of these events a large number of the Nogais died of hardship and plague epidemics or resettled in neighbouring states.

Moscow regarded Ismail as an ally and rendered him assistance on a number of occasions by delivering foodstuffs and dispatching Streltsy regiments for protection against enemies. By the end of the 1560s, Ismail had established himself in power, while his defeated adversaries had fled to neighbouring countries. Having found himself in the foreign policy isolation, Ismail relied only on the support of Ivan IV. In the agreements concluded between them (sherts), the Bey acknowledged the hierarchic seniority of the Tsar and pledged to be his faithful ally. However, contrary to the widespread historiographical opinion spread, he did not opt for Russian allegiance, and neither did the Nogai Horde become a part of the Muscovite state.

Ismail's successors would recognise the seniority of the Russian Tsar, and then enter into conflicts with him. Weakened by feuds and economic devastation, the fragmented Nogais, however, no longer represented any significant force. Ismail's son, Din-Ahmed bey saw his task in rebuilding the Horde after the Time of Troubles and, therefore, tried to get along peacefully with both the Muscovite state and the Crimeans. However, the fear of Russia, which was consolidating its positions in the Volga Region and further to the east, sometimes forced Din-Ahmed to act against it. His military units took part in the incursions of the the Crimean Khan Devlet Giray I into Rus' in 1571 and 1572. They attacked the 'ukrajnas', ravaged border settlements and drove local dwellers away into captivity. Succeeding to Din-Ahmed, his brother Urus took a resolutely anti-Russian position.

To counteract the nomads, the Moscow government began the construction of fortresses at the main Nogai passages across the Volga River—Samara (1586), Tsaritsyn (1589), and Saratov (1590). Indignant Urus taken Moscow Ambassadors as hostages and demanded to demolish the new towns (together with the just built Ufa). However, he had neither the resoluteness, nor force to insist on this. He perished in one of the strifes in 1590. In 1590s, the Nogai Horde
was again plunged into the Turmoil. The clans of Din-Ahmed and Urus beys began the struggle for power over the nomad territories and the subjects.

* * *

Specific features of the nomadic economy and political system led to isolation of individual uluses. A strong social stratum of mirzas, the Nogai nobility, was formed during the 16th century. Under the influence of the changing political conditions, relying on the self-contained economy of own nomad territories, the mirzas turned out to be susceptible to separatist sentiments. The split-up of the nobility was also influenced by dynastic feuds. Part of the Horde population led by mirza Qazi migrated in the middle of the century to the steppes of the north-western Caucasus, where in time an autonomous domain was formed—Ulus of Qazi or the Lesser Nogai Horde. Descendants of ulubey Sheikh Mamai (so called Alti-Uli), who migrated into the territory of Central Kazakhstan, were an offshoot of the Main (Great) Nogai Horde.

In the last quarter of the 16th and beginning of the 17th centuries several negative external factors were simultaneously superimposed on the domestic disintegration processes. The westward migration of a part of the Oirat tribes (Kalmyks) began at that time. On their way from Western Siberia to the Volga the Kalmyks passed through the main territory of the Nogais, partly ousting and partly subjugating them.

Cossack raids became more frequent. In 1581, the Volga Region Cossacks destroyed the Nogai capital Saray-Jük and then started settling down in the center of the Nogai nomad territories, along the banks of the Yaik river.

The Kazakh Khanate became stronger. Along with the waning supreme authority of beys, some tribes of the Nogai Horde opted in favour of subordination to Kazakh Khans, who thus were expanding their dependent territories in the western direction. During the 17th century, the former area of the main Nogai nomad migrations was divided among the Yaik Cossacks, the Kalmyks, who had roamed from the east, and the newly-formed Junior zhuz of the Kazakhs.

The downfall of the Kazan and Astrakhan Khanates and the rapid strengthening of the Russian state disrupted the balance of forces, established in Eastern Europe during the 15th and first half of the 16th centuries after the disintegration of the Golden Horde. The Nogais were faced with the necessity to decide on their future orientation towards one of the two opposing hegemons of the region, Crimea or Russia. The nobility of the Nogai Horde were split into a pro-Crimean and a pro-Russian parties. This split was further enabled by the intrigues of Moscow and Bakhchysarai and their struggle with each other. This circumstance also made it more difficult for the Horde government to control the entire territory of the disintegrating state. There were repeated attempts at revenge (this was evidenced by return migrations back to the Volga left-bank areas and talks with Bukhara authorities on the reconstruction of Saray-Jük). As a result of external blows, however, the Nogais eventually lost their former nomad territories and became wanderers.

In the middle and second half of the 17th century, they gradually began to settle within the limits of the new Kalmyk Khanate, principalities of North Caucasus and domains of Girays, that is along the whole steppe belt between Crimea and Russia. Having lost the single center, the nomads formed several ulus entities, Hordes. The largest and most lasting of them happened to be Yedisan, Cedişkul and the formation in Budjak (North-Western Black Sea area).

* * *

As shown above, the Nogai rulers bore the title of bey (ulubey). It is a late Eastern-Kipchak form of the common Turkic word Beg. In the Turkic political entities of the 14–16th centuries Beg (Bey) was a synonym of the Arabic-Persian word Emir and the Mongolian Noyon. All these terms denoted affiliation with the nobility, positioned a rank lower than the dynastic ruling aristocracy. In different regions and periods Bey could also mean either a clan elder (for Bash-
kirs and Kazakhs), or a tribal chief, nominally representing the tribe before the Khan (the Crimean and Kasimov Khanates), or the highest official, after the Khan (the Golden Horde, Uzbek Khanate), or just 'superiors' in a broad sense.

All the tribes of the Nogai Horde were initially led by Beys, above all of whom stood the Bey of the Manghists. In addition, there were 'service' beys at the court of the supreme ruler. The paradoxical situation in which the suzerain held the same title as lower-level subjects, demanded that ways be found to differentiate the Manghit leader.

The Nogai nobility addressed the head of the Horde, using the expression Bey Hazrat, that is 'Prince Majesty' in the medieval Russian translation. In Russian texts the name of beklyaribek Idegäy (Edigü), the forefather of the Manghit-Nogai beys, is usually accompanied by the words 'Grand Prince' (ulube). In the translations of Nogai documents Sayyid-Ahmed was also called 'Grand Prince', while the position of bey itself was referred to as 'Grand Princedom'. The Nogai messages to neighbouring sovereigns most vividly demonstrate the distinction of the supreme beyship (though practically all such addresses are extant not in original, but in translations). The rather modest formulation that 'of the biggest amongst the princes is Sid Ahmad's princely word' in 1535 simply revealed the seniority of Sayyid Ahmad over other beys. Urus, who took the position of the chief bey in 1578, used a more extensive introduction: 'of the Manghit sovereign from Prince Urus' (1578, 1581). In this case, the title outlines the territorial and ethnic limits of his rule. 'Manghit' here is a synonym of 'Nogai', as the same Urus in 1579 declared to the Russian ambassador: 'In the Nogai land, I am the Prince and the Sovereign of all the Nogai lands'. The verbal entourage of Ismail Bey in his letter to Ivan IV in 1560 was more pretentious: 'of all the Tatars sovereign, from Prince Ismail' [9, file 5, s. 4 reverse, 190 reverse; file 8, s. 230 reverse; file 9, s. 152 reverse; file 10, s. 86 reverse].

Neither the beys themselves, nor their Russian partners, however, had any illusions with regards to the real scope of power 'in the Nogais'. Beys would ascribe to themselves the most pompous titles at the times, when their Horde was in a relatively stable state, powerful and influential. The apogee of power is considered to have appeared during the reign of Sayyid-Ahmed and Sheikh Mamai, that is the 1530–40s. Sheikh Mamai even borrowed the designation for his throne (bab-i ali) from the Ottoman Sultan. The Russian translation of his charter of 1548 reads: 'of the Sublime Porte sovereign and overlord, from the warrior and pious Prince Sheikh Mamai' [8, p. 245].

The close blood relations in the core of the ruling clan of Edigü conferred a patriarchal appearance to the ties among its members. Despite the very varying degrees of consanguinity with the bey, the mirzas regarded him as the 'father and uncle'. Thus, he formally held the position of the senior in the clan, the patrimonial elder and the patriarch of the Nogais. As for his neighbours, in their eyes he wanted be seen as an absolute sovereign: the words of Urus about him being the sovereign of all the Nogai lands have already been quoted; in the same tirade he characterised the mirzas as 'my serfs (kholops)'. In reality, however, a bey had practically no means whatsoever at his disposal to force his kinsmen—mirzas to obey his will. In 1611, in response to the Russian Government's suggestion to send the Nogai troops to help against the Poles, and to mobilize 'not only hunters, but also other slaves' (that is, to compel by force), Ishterek bey answered frankly that 'their Horde is free... those, who want to, will go, but no one can be sent by force'. At that time Ishterek could threaten disobedient mirzas only by his possible migration, as a 'Cossack with his ulus', and an appeal to God and the Russian army for help. As for the mirzas, they recognised his authority 'for the sake of old age' (that is, his seniority in the clan—Author), and 'as long as he...was strong with his ulus people' [1, p. 21; 9, year 1647, file 1, s. 48]. As soon as a mirza acquired his own strong and populous ulus, he began to pursue an independent policy. This phenomenon existed as a trend in the 16th century and fully revealed itself at the beginning of the following century, in the period of the disintegration of the Nogai Horde.
The most important political matters were decided upon not solely by a bey, but in council with the most powerful aristocrats. Such issues, in particular, related to general Horde military activities, relations with foreign monarchs, international alliances and coalitions.

All other states, which emerged in the place of Ulus of Jochi, were governed by monarchs from the branched clan of the Chinggisids / Jochids. The elite of the Nogai Horde, however, did not belong to that clan, and the Nogai leaders did not dare lay claims to the Khan title. In principle, there existed one more way to establish the monarchic status, by means of the formation of a powerful state and successful wars, which would compel neighbours to recognise any rank that the Nogai rulers would choose to adopt. Judging by certain signs in the sources, such an attempt was undertaken in the Nogai Horde in the late 1530s. Having routed or intimidated their neighbours, the Nogais decided they had the right to establish a pyramid of power, similar to the governance structure in independent Khanates. Bey Sayyid-Ahmed in his charter to Ivan IV announced his intention to take Khan's position. In the charter he named both the successor to the throne — Qalga and the chief military commander — beklyaribek. No-one in the adjoining states, however, recognised these claims: the leader of the Horde continued to be a 'Grand Prince', and not a Khan. The Beys had to submit to this.

The Nogais had to invent their own titles for positions. They had not formed a legitimate Khanate and officially had no right to set up the administration appropriate to a Khanate. In 1537, while shaping the system of governance, they instituted a position, analogous to beklyaribek — nuradin, head of the Right wing. The Left (eastern) wing was headed by kekovat. These titles come from the names of Edigü sons. The vicegerent position of Taibuga (named after the founder of the Siberian Begs dynasty) was also established in the Nogai Horde in 1580s for the purpose of governing the resettlers from the Siberian Khante, routed by Yermak.

In order to justify the legitimacy of the Manghit leaders rule, their court entourage compiled a fantastic version of the Edigü clan origin from caliph Abu Bakr, the father-in-law and successor of the Prophet, through the holy preacher Khoja Ahmed Baba Tukles, who lived in the 14th century. In Islamic Nogai society, such legitimation of 'princedom' was both acceptable and sufficient.

The epic aura of the founder of the dynasty of the Manghit-Nogai beys continued to cast its glow on his descendants as well. Among the Kazaks, the descendants of Edigü were regarded as aristocrats, the 'white bone' (ak suyak. This had a literal explanation: Edigü's ancestor, Baba Tukles was born to a woman, who had become pregnant after tasting a white powder, prepared from a magic skull [2, pp. 272, 273].

The religious-genealogical combination with the ancient origin of ancestors raised the prestige of the Nogai dynasts in the eyes of own people, but did not add to the image abroad. The election and proclamation of the 'Grand Prince' was carried out by the Nogais themselves. The extant sources do not have a detailed description of this process. There is only some information about the principle of 'enthronement': 'And they were chosen to the Nogai reign by murzas among themselves by rank and majority, and sat on the throne in the Nogai Horde' [9, year 1641, file 5, s. 27]. As the main argument, the candidates for 'enthronement' put forward the thesis 'I am the oldest'. In actual terms, however, each bey sought to secure power for his sons.

Nevertheless, the Nogais could not just reject the age-old procedure, whereby the legitimate right to power belonged to a Khan from Chinggisids. The fictitious descent from the first caliph still did not provide the grounds for assumption of the Khan's throne. After all, a bey officially was not an independent sovereign, and that title was granted at the behest of a higher ruler. For this reason, up to and including Ismail (that is, up to 1550s), there was a practice in the Nogai Horde to invite and proclaim a fictitious, puppet Khan. The names of such 'rulers' are met very rarely in the extant sources, as they had no influence whatsoever in the Horde. Their only task was to sanctify with their silent presence the real authority of the Manghits' leader.
Chapter XI. The Later Golden Horde Time

In the second half of the 16th century, the beys Din-Ahmed, Urus, Uraz Muhammad and Din-Muhammed apparently ruled already without puppet monarchs. At the beginning of the 17th century, however, the practice of sanctions to 'princedom' from foreign sovereigns was restored. Now it was the Russian Tsar, who by his charter affirmed election of a new bey by mirzas, and the Astrakhan voivodes designed a solemn ceremony of his induction. In 1600, the newly elected Ishterek together with the most noble mirzas was asked to come to Astrakhan to receive Letters patent (zhalovannaja gramota) from Moscow. Upon arrival, the Nogais learned that they were to commit an act of genuine enthronement—elevation to the Khanate. The voivodes came up with the idea of the mirzas lifting Ishterek on a felt cloth, the same way the Chinggisids had been proclaimed Khans in independent nomadic states—the Golden Horde and the Tatar Khanates. The mirzas began to wonder: 'They said they were not aware that he, murza Ishterek, was to be elevated to the rule on his mantle... And this had never been done before since the times long past'. After a day-long deliberation, however, they agreed, and for the first time in the Nogai history an ulubey was 'lifted on a mantle' [9, year 1641, file 5, s. 32–33]. In 1622, the next and the last bey Kanay accepted this ceremony without any objections.

The Turkic and Slavic rulers realised the power of the Nogai Horde, and up to the early 17th century had not aspired to encroach on the sovereignty of its leaders. Within his nomad territories, ulubey carried out the administrative functions typical of any independent nomadic ruler. After council with the nobility, he would announce annual routes of the movement of herds and people, designate locations for settlement of subordinate uluses, and confirm the inheritance rights of mirzas to the subjects, the 'ulus people'. By tradition he retained the duties of the supreme military commander, since in former times the bey (beklyaribek) was also the head of the armed forces of the Khanate. However, in the course of formation of the administrative system the Nogais, as mentioned above, established their own analogue of the military commander—beklyaribek, the nuradin, head of the Right wing.

A bey, was also obliged to provide his people with a comfortable existence, or at least a means of acquiring wealth. The nomads often achieved that by raids on settled neighbours. The Nogais, however, preferred to use peaceful methods of barter trade and the collection of traditional periodical payments, known as 'Manghit revenues', from the Kazan and Astrakhan Khanates and, probably, the Siberian Yurt. Having become dependent on Russia, the leaders of the Horde relied more and more on the 'sovereign salary', money payments and gifts from Moscow. The ability of the bey to arrange for the inflow of these revenues was one of the criteria of his competence. More than once, the Nogai leader asked the Tsar and dyaks and voivodes not to send gifts directly to mirzas bypassing him, the Bey, saying 'I would myself give that royal salary to my brother and nephew, and children'. Since 'all of them request from me treasures, and I have no treasury, and have nothing to give them. And that makes me feel greatly ashamed'.

Even in the conditions of rigid financial dependence on Russia, there still existed a limit, beyond which even an obedient bey of the 17th century would not transgress. The function of distributing internal Horde privileges had a principled importance. In 1630, a rumour reached ulubey Kanay that a certain Nogai named Atei had allegedly received a tarkhan charter (exemption from taxation) from the Russian Tsar. Kanay immediately notified Michael Fyodorovich that such a situation was incompatible with his, Kanay's, rank, saying that 'as soon as, Sire, this man acquires (tarkhan—V. T.) status, and my reign comes to an end' [9, year 1617, file 3, s. 11–12; year 1630, file 3, s. 19–20, 59].

The court of the ruler of the Nogai Horde represented a combination of several bureaucratic agencies with administrative offices, dealing mostly with financial matters. As of the beginning of the 17th century, however, the ulubeys already had to rely only on close relatives and several clerks. All other structures had disappeared during the turmoils. In general, institutions of governance in the Nogai Horde developed extremely inconsistently. Having reached its apogee by the middle of the 16th century, the administrative structure of the Horde entered
a phase of a crisis. It began to diminish and become simplified. In the course of the disintegration of the Horde, the scope of powers of the central authorities began progressively to shrink and by the end of the second decade of the 17th century, there was nothing left.


§ 12. The Domains of the Shibanids in Central Asia

Denis Maslyuzhenko

The most detailed description of the domain of Batu Shiban's youngest brother was made in the early 17th century by his descendant Abu al-Ghazi: 'The Yurt you will live in will be between my yurt and the yurt of my older brother, Ichen. In summer you will live on the eastern side of the Yaik, along the rivers of Irgiz-suvuk, Or, and Ilek to the Ural mountains; whereas in winter
live in Ara-kum, Kara-kum, and along the Syr River—by the creeks of Chuy Su and Sary Su' [1, p. 104]. To that end, the dynasty spent winters in the lower reaches of Syr Darya. I. Mustakimov brought light to the fact that according to Tawarikh-i guzida–Nusrat-name, the Jankent tumen (a city in the lower reaches of Syr Darya) was granted to Shiban Batu among other things [17, p. 242]. T. Sultanov believed that the territory between the Ili and Syr Darya Rivers and the cities of Otrar, Sygnak, Jand, and Sayram passed to descendants of Orda-Ichen during the reign of Shiban's son Bahadur (not until the late 1240s) [22, p. 218]. However, this opinion is not evidenced by any sources, neither is the opinion that the cities in the middle of Syr Darya belonged to Shiban's domain. Abu al-Ghazi points out that Pulad's sons Ibrahim and Arab-Shah (Arapshah in the Russian Chronicles) spent the winters of 1370s at the Syr's mouth [1, p. 105]. Now, it is hard to trace the history of these domains of the Shibanids during the Golden Horde period. In the 1380s, these lands were ruled by emir Timur. However in the late 1420s, after Barak Khan's death and during the struggle between the Shibanids, the lands to the north of the Aral Sea between Emba and Sary Su belonged to Jumaduk b. Sufi, in whose troops Ibrahim Abul-Khair's grandson, the future Uzbek leader, was then serving [3, pp. 42–44]. Thus, despite some possible casualties during the Timurids' reign, the Shibanids preserved their domains in the Aral Sea region and the lower reaches of Syr Darya, which later served as their base for further expansion into Central Asia.

The expansion of their Syr Darya domain began during the reign of Khan Abul-Khair in the north, in Tyumen (Tura) (1429–1468 [9]). The Uzbeks, as the nomads of the Eastern Desht were known, including of the Shibanid's domain, often raided Khwarezm. For example, in 834, they were defeated by the emirs of Shakhrukh [10, p. 378; 30, p. 112]. According to Fasikh Khavafi and Samarkandi, the raid of Khwarezm by the Uzbeks headed by Abul-Khair can be dated 839 (27.07.1435–15.07.1436) [28, p. 214]. The list of its participants shows that the main forces of the Uzbek tribes were involved. It resulted in the conquering of the city, but such reasons as 'the dampness of the air in Khwarezm' (according to Kuhistani, the 'possibility of plague and heat' [14, pp. 149–152]) as well as the large approaching army of the Timurid Shakhruh, the ruler of Samarkand and Khorasan, made them leave the city. Tawarikh-i guzida–Nusrat-Name says that at the age of 24 (840/16.07.1436–5.07.1437), that is the year after the raid, the Uzbek Khan was granted Khwarezm by Shakhruh and he made his own state in Deshti Kipchak [23, p. 117].

Not all of the steppe nobility was satisfied with peaceful coexistence with their neighbours due to the fact that they received a major portion of the spoils of war in military campaigns. By 844 (2.06.1440–6.06.1441) Samarkandi reported about another raid of the Uzbek troops, but he points out, 'now and then some of the Uzbek troops became Cossacks...' [10, pp. 378–379]. Only after Abul-Khair had defeated his rival and relative Khan Mustafa in 1446 at Atbasara, Ishim's tributary, he 'decided to spend the winter conquering Sygnak.' During that raid in the autumn of 1446, Bey Waqqas became beklyaribek [14, p. 159]. As a result, Sygnak, Ak-Kurgan, Arkuk, Suzak, and Uzgend recognised the Uzbeks as their rulers. Control over Suzak was delegated to Sultan Bahtiyar, the Khan's cousin and the vanguard head; and control over Syngan was delegated to Oghlan Mana (a descendant of Tangut, Jochi's son), whereas Uzgend was granted to Waqqas bey. Syngan became the formal capital of the Uzbek Khanate of Abul-Khair, who spent most of his time in his nomadic camp. During the reign of Abul-Khair, the huge Uzbek Khanate was regarded as the property of the Khan's family, moreover, it was divided into separate Chinggisid uluses, including the Tyumen Yurt, which made it possible for Abul-Khair to hold the title of Khan-i-Buzurg [14, pp. 159–160]. Many Turkic-Mongol political and everyday traditions of the Mongol and Golden Horde period were restored in the Uzbek Khanate [13, pp. 121–138].

In the 1450s, Abul-Khair interfered in the internal wars between the Timurids from Transoxiana and made raids on Bukhara and Samarkand. In 1451, he supported Abu-Said's (one of the Timurids) claims to power, which led to the defeat of Timur's nephew Mirza Abdallah
and the Khan's marriage to the daughter of the grandson of Timur, the ruler of Transoxiana, Ulug Beg (died in 1449). After the defeat at Sygnak against the Oirats (Kalmyks) in 1457 and the conclusion of a painful peace, the Khan's authority diminished to some extent. Different territories in Khwarezm, with its centre in Urgench, passed to Mustafa, who was Abul-Khair's ally in his fight against the Kalmyks [3, pp. 64–65]. Despite this fact, the cities situated on the Syr Darya as well as the lands in Desht-i Kipchak remained under his control until his death in 1468/9.

Abul-Khair's policies in Central Asia became the basis for the formation of new domains belonging to the Shibanids in Central Asia. Their flourishing occurred in the subsequent period during the Uzbek (Bukhara) and Khwarezm (Urgench, Khiva) Khanates. The history of these states is an integral part of the fight for Central Asia among the Shibanid branches, emirs from the Timurid dynasty, Kazakh and Mongol khans, as well as the Iranian Safavid shahs. The recurrent and changing alliances between the parties contributed to constant military threats that had a negative impact on the local economy. The necessity for control over city crafts and trade increased the occurrence of migrations in the steppes and wars. The religious conflict between the Central Asian Sunnis and Iranian Shiites as well as the ethnopolitical and economic battles between the politically dominant Uzbek nomads and the numerous Chagatais supporting them, sometimes including the Mongols and mixed groups of Sarts and Turkmen, were additional factors in the struggle. As they were moving to the south, the Uzbek Shibanids gradually became estranged from their steppe-relatives in the post-Horde area, which resulted in a growing gap between their political interests, though the Turkic language remained dominant in court rituals and literature. Some steppe traditions were imported to the urbanised regions of South Transoxiana, for example, the division of tribes and clans into the Right and Left wings, which affected the distribution of roles at the court. Uluses and yurts in the khanates were not only granted to the Shibanid sultans and atalyks but also to emirs from the most influential tribes who depended on their troops. They were both a pillar of the khan's power and a potential source of separatism in the case of a weak ruler. The political traditions changed under the strong Islamic influence, especially regarding the law and the economy, however, Chinggis Khan's Yasa was still in effect [21, pp. 82–83; 12, p. 22; 19, p. 200]. Though ties with the rest of the post-Horde states grew weaker, their continuance was based on the common ancestry of the ruling dynasties of the Chinggisids, their occasional diplomatic relations, as well as the unity of the Islamic space and the common trade interests of merchants. In the first case, this can be seen in the history of the creation of the 'Chinggis name' by Utemish-khadja, whose informers were both the Shibanids (Ilbars Khan from Khiva) and the Tuka-Timurids (the last Khan of the Great Horde Sheik Ahmed and the ulugbek of the Astrakhan Khan, Abd al-Kerim) [11, pp. 48–49]. His travels were made easier because of the remaining trade routes between different parts of the Golden Horde. For example, during the capture of Kazan in 1552, a large number of Bukhara merchants were in the city [18, p. 130]. Islamic ulamas from different city centres (Hajji Tarkhan, Turkestan, Transoxiana, Khwarezm, Khiva) were collectively carrying out missionary activities among the Kazakhs. Moreover, the major hajj route from Central Asia to Mecca passed through Hajji Tarkhan [8, pp. 182–183].

With the support of the Timurids in 1470, Abul-Khair's descendants were able to retain the lands in Turkestan along the Syr Darya, with the centre in Sygnak. However, Abul-Khair's successor Shaykh Haydar did not manage to rally the forces of all of the Uzbek tribes to fight against the coalition comprised of the Tyumen khans of Sayyidek and his nephew Ibrahim, the Kazakh khans Girey and Jami Beg, the khan of the Big Horde Ahmed, the son of the Uzbek khan Ediger Berke, and the Nogai murzas Abbas, Musa, and Yamburgurchi [14, p. 19]. He died in 1471 and Abul-Khair's descendants lost control over the larger part of the territory. The lands there were divided between the allies; this included the lands in the lower Syr Darya, which were given to the Schibanids—Ibrahim and Berke.
From among Abul-Khair's descendants, the new leaders became the children of his first son Shah-Budag—Muhammad Shaybani and Mahmud Sultan. While their uncle was still alive, they were taken away to Hajji Tarkhan according to a decision by the council of karachi-begs. During the siege of the city by the troops of Ibrahim, Ahmed, and the Nogai Beg Abbas, Shaybani and his brother launched an assault with a small troop on the camp of the Tyumen Khan [14, pp. 20, 98–100]. The group largely consisted of representatives of the clan of kushcha, who were the ancestors of Atalyk and Kukeltash at the time of the founder of the dynasty Shiban.

This event marked the beginning of the protracted fight of the Sheybani Khan against the Tyumen and Kazakh rulers for the return of the lands of his grandfather. The figurehead in this fight was Muhammad Shaybani, though he was the leader of a large union of Shibanids which included his brother Mahmud, the sultans Alike, Hamza, and Mahdi from Bakhtiyar b. Hizr Khan's family, as well as Abul-Khair's sons (from Ulugh Beg's daughter) Kotxkunju and Suyunch Khoja, and some others [14, p. 101]. Their encampments were in the vilayet of Turkistan, which was ruled by mirza Sultan-Ahmed b. Abu-Sayyid Timurid. The Shaybanids' did not have many troops, which precluded them from carrying out a successful foreign policy. The attempt to conclude the traditional Shibanid alliance with the Nogai leader and the potential beklyaribek Musa, supported by Shaybani's rise to the khan's place, the joint victory over the Kazakh khan Burunduk, and the wedding between Suyunch-Khoja and Musa's daughter, resulted in failure. Muhammad Shaybani was forced to return to Sygnak vilayet (previously conquered from the Kazakhs) [14, p. 104] with his relatives, occasionally making trips to Khorasan. The union with the Manghits was important for all subsequent Uzbek khans, both because of the current political tradition, and because of the winter stays of some Manghit beys 'near Chegadai' [24, p. 107], where they could be relied on against the Timurids, Kazakhs, or in internal clashes.

In the 1480s, the ruler of Samarkand Sultan Ahmed invited Shaybani Khan to fight against the Mughal Khan Sultan-Mahmud, who ruled in Tashkent, but as a result of court intrigues, Shaybani and his brother entered into a contract with the Mughals [14, pp. 109–110]. Afterwards, they gathered their people from the Durmans, Kushchi, Uighurs, Naimans, Dzhurkuns, Mings, Chaghatails, Badzhkirs, and Aces, which were in Bukhara, and returned to Turkestan. Some of these tribes and clans were present in the court of Abul-Khair Khan during the period of his occupying the throne in Chimgi-Tura. With the support of the Mughals, Shaybani retained the land along the Syr Darya and the cities of Sygnak, Arkuk, and Uzgendom. The loss of these territories to the attacks of the Kazakhs of Burunduk Khan and the local emirs and beks of Manghits in 1486 commenced the fight of Shaybani Khan for rule of the Timurid lands. In this fight, the Shibanids continued to periodically use the help of Sultan-Mahmud Khan, who even gave the important border vilayet Otrar to the khan, after arranging a great iraj and putting the royal robe on Shaybani [14, pp. 29, 114, 117]. Already in 1488, Shaybani took over Turkistan, and using it as a military base, launched a long struggle against the Timurids over Transoxiana.

After the deaths of the sons of Abu Sa'id Mirza, the former leader of the Timurids, in 1494/5, and the strengthening of the power of Babur mirza, Muhammad Shaybani subdued the vilayets of Yasa and Sabran, then again began to summon his relatives, who were hiding from the Mughals and Babur. In the context of the ongoing strife of the Timurids in 1499–1500, Shaybani Khan robes the vilayets of Qarshi and Kesh, then took over Bukhara, where his brother began to rule. In 1501, together with the Mughals, he captured Samarkand from Babur [14, pp. 124–126; 9, pp. 78–80], which later became one of the capitals of the new state of the Shibanids. Over the next two years, they conquered towns and fortresses along the Syr Darya and the Amu Darya and made a campaign to Khwarezm. Already in 1505–1507, the Khan took over Urgench, Balkh, Herat and some cities of Khorasan [22, p. 293]. As a result, as the head of the Uzbek Khanate, Shaybani controlled a huge area of Central Asia from the Syr Darya to
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Central Afghanistan and Iraq. It was divided into separate vilayets and regions under the rule of numerous close relatives from among the descendants of Khan Abul-Khair and Bakhtiyar as well as loyal emirs from the Uzbek tribes [14, p. 127].

In May 1507, in the mosque of Herat, a khutbah was first proclaimed in the name of the new ruler Shaybani Khan, ‘which even formally terminated the existence of the Timurid dynasty’ [6, p. 5]. Almost 60 years previously, a khutbah was proclaimed in the name of Shaybani’s grandfather’s name, Abul-Khair, after his capture of the ‘Sain throne’, which led to the minting of coins. But Shaybani went ahead and announced a currency reform which included the unification of the type and rate of currency. This was designed to strengthen the government and the economy, indicate the coming period of stability, and become the basis for increased trade. The new title of the ruler was fixed on the coins: ‘Imam of his time, the vicegerent of [Allah] the Merciful’ [6, pp. 53–57]. R. Pochevsky believes that when Shaybani took the Khakan title, he ‘proclaimed himself the supreme ruler of all the land on which once stretched the power of the descendants of Chinggis Khan. Accordingly, taking over Transoxiana should not be regarded as the seizure of the possessions of the Chagataids, but as the first step towards the revival of the Empire’ [19, pp. 198–199].

In the same year, the Khan’s successor was announced—his son, Muhammad-Timur-bahadur [22, p. 302]. During the next campaign to Khorasan in the spring of 1508, Badi al-Zaman, the last Timurid, was expelled. At the same time, the Khan declared a gazavat to the Kazakhs and led active military operations against them; in 1509 he suffered a crushing defeat by Kasim Khan. At the same time, the Khan redistributed the ownership. He took Turkestan away from Kotxzunju, Bukhara from the son of Sultan Mahmud Ubaydallakh, and the land of Hisar from Hamza and Mahdi, thereby offending his relatives [14, pp. 133–134]. The defeat and dissolution of the army, squabbles with his relatives, and the loss of their support undermined the foundations of the state. In the summer of 1510, Shaybani robbed the district of Kerman, which was part of the government of Shah Ismail I, the founder of the Safavid dynasty in Iran. This led to the widening of the conflict, the retreat of the Uzbek troops and the defeat and death of Shaybani Khan at the walls of Merv in Khorasan in November 1510 [30, pp. 156–157].

After that, contrary to the will of the deceased, Suyunch Khoja b. Abulkhair was proclaimed as the new Khan. His policy of seeking an alliance with Shah Ismail aroused the indignation of his relatives. The choice of the son of Abul Khaïr as Khan is quite understandable, however. First, he and his brother Kotxzunju were among the oldest members of the ruling family, and secondly, in terms of them being on the former territory of the Timurids, it was important that they were the grandchildren of Ulugh Beg mirza. The dissensions allowed Babur to restore power over Transoxiana in alliance with Ismail [22, p. 302]. The Shibanids were forced to retreat to the city of Isi (Turkestan). However in 1511–12, Ubaydullah and Jani Beg (the grandson of Abul-Khair from the side of Khoja Muhammad) inflicted a defeat on Babur near Bukhara and battled with him in Herat, and in 1512 Suyunch-Khoja Khan and other Shibanid troops defeated the Mughal Khan Sultan Sayyid [14, pp. 212–213; 30, p. 152]. During the khan’s joint operations with Ubaydullah and Jani Beg Khan, Babur was also defeated with the troops of Ismail—who had come to support him—in Samarkand, and then Ubaydullah, Timur Muhammad, and Jani Beg continued the struggle for Herat [30, pp. 157, 160]. In the same year, Kotxzunju was also proclaimed a khan, and his brother remained in that position and pursued an active foreign policy. In particular, in 1513, he defeated the Kazakhs, stopping their further attacks [14, p. 132]. Simultaneously with them, the ruler of Bukhara Ubaydullah became khan. According to the assumption of T. Sultanov, Kotxzunju was the senior khan [22, p. 303], thereby securing a particular political tradition which existed in the time of Abul-Khair.

Under these conditions, part of Khwarezm remained in the hands of the Shiites of Shah Ismail, who appointed his darugs Hivake, Urgench, and Wazir there. The qazi of the latter city along with local Seyyids swore to Khan Ilbars b. Berke b. Yediger in 1511. The latter was
proclaimed Khan by part of the Uzbek families with the active influence of the Uighurs and the Naimans and the support of Manghit Bey Musa during the lifetime of Abul-Khair in around 862 AH / 1457(8) [24, p. 102]. The eldest son of Yediger, Berke, previously served as the leader of the Uzbek armed forces and even made trips on his behalf to Transoxiana and the Chagatai ulus [1, pp. 106–109]. In the early 1470s, Berke, who wintered at the mouth of the Syr Darya, was killed by Shaybani as one of the participants in the defeat of Uzbek Khan Shaikh Haydar, which created conditions for further rivalry between the two related dynasties. Berke had three brothers—Abulek, Aminiek, and Abak. The first two became khans of the Nogai beklyaribeks; their encampments likely remained in the territory of the Manghits, including in the Aral Sea region. In 1511 Ilbars and his brother Bilbars, along with loyal clans, arrived in Vazir. Three months later they seized Urgench [14, pp. 436–438]. These events caused a significant outflow of Uzbek tribes from the steppe zone. Additionally, in the 1520s the brothers led the oghlans of Abulek Khan and Aminiek Khan to Urgench with the remaining tribes, as a result of which they were able to expel the Kyzylbashs of Shah Ismail from other parts of Khwarezm [1, pp. 113–114]. After the death of the Shah in 1524, Ilbars subjugated northern Khorasan, as well as the Balkans and the Mangyshlak, where Turkmens lived.

Thus, in the 1510–20s, two Uzbek Shibanid states were formed on the territory of Central Asia. The first had centres in Herat, Samarkand, and Bukhara, and was ruled by the descendants of Abul-Khair (they are sometimes called the Abulkhairids in literature), while the second, centred at Vazir and Urgench, was ruled by the descendants of Yediger. They all belonged to the same Shibanid dynasty, whose representatives controlled the Tyumen Khanate in the very north of Dasht. Due to the presence of several khans and difficulties in the handover of power, a more stable environment in the first dynasty was only formed with the beginning of the sole rule of Khan Ubaidullah in 1533, under whose rule the capital of the state was finally moved to Bukhara, though staying in the city was non-obligatory for the khan. In literature, this state holds the fixed name, the Bukhara Khanate, although in the sources it was called the Uzbek Khanate, Uzbekistan [22, pp. 309–310], and in one of the documents, 'Shayban land of the Bukhara king' [20, p. 9]. As a result of the enmity of the descendants of Yediger back in the mid-1520s, the oghlans of Abulek Khan appeared in Bukhara. At the same time, the capital of the neighbouring state was finally transferred from Vazir to Urgench, and the state itself became known as the Khanate of Urgench. From 1525 and until the suppression of the Khan's power, all of its rulers came mainly from the descendants of Aminiek Khan. They eliminated the power of the remaining children and founders of the state, Ilbars and Bilbars. In Vazir, Khan Avanesh b. Aminiek killed Sultangazi b. Ilbars and sixteen of his relatives. The escaped children of the Vazir ruler were taken to Bukhara, where the oghlans of Bilbars soon joined them [14, pp. 440–442].

Under their influence, in the late 1530s, the Bukhara Khan Ubaidullah seized Urgench, giving it to the control of his son, Abd al-Aziz and the descendants of Ilbars, who, however, were unable to retain the city [14, pp. 439–440]. These hostilities were just one of the bouts of clashes between the rulers of Bukhara and Urgench; meanwhile, Bukhara was a stronghold for many exiled descendants of Yediger. By the early 1530s, the nogoais again started to winter camp in the former Kazakh encampments on the Syr Darya, which allowed the rulers of Bukhara and Urgench to turn to them for help against the Kazakh khans. In fact, these Nogai leaders were the main link between the Central Asian and Shibanid late-Horde world. In 1535, they formed an alliance with the khan of the 'Khorazm Yurt—that is, Urgench, and a year later, with the Khan of Bukhara and the Mogolistan ruler Abd ar-Rashid. Unions were traditionally secured by the marriage of Nogai beys' daughters with representatives of the Merv, Bukhara, and Tashkent Shibanids [24, pp. 204–205]. Such marriages were an important political factor in the following years. The Nogai also tried to use them. Thus, Sayyid-Ahmed b. Musa bey tried unsuccessfully to enlist the help of Khan Ubaidullah in the struggle for Astrakhan in 1535 [8, p. 122].
After Ubaidullah's death in 1539, the united state of the Shibanids in Transoxiana disintegrated. In fact, in the 1540–1550s, there were simultaneously two rulers—Abd al-Aziz b. Ubaidullah in Bukhara and Abd al-Latif b. Kotxunju in Samarkand [22, p. 306]. In fact, throughout the 1550s in the Bukhara Khanate, there was a civil war between the Abulhairids in which representatives of the neighbouring Tyumen khanate (the figures of Murtaza and his son Kuchum) could also become involved [16, p. 65]. This explains the presence of Bukhara people in further events in Siberia in the time of Kuchum. The situation was complicated by the ongoing conflict with the Kazakh, Kashgar, and Moghul sultans, the most successful against which was the son of Khan Suynuch-Khodji, Barak (Nawrus Ahmed Khan) in the middle of the 1550s [14, p. 394]. An important factor was the fact that the permanent encampments of the Nogai nomads of Sheikh Mamai's descendants (Ali-Uli) were formed on the Syr Darya from the end of the 1540s; they were the descendants of the grandson of the Tyumen Khan Ibrahim from the female line of Sheikh Mamai. It is reasonable to assume that it was them who helped Murtaz, the grandson of the same Tyumen governor, and his son Kuchum in the fight for Otrar; the two enjoyed the considerable support of the powerful clan of Sheikh Mamai. An important trade and diplomatic route, which connected the Volga region with Transoxiana, passed through the steppe that they controlled. At the same time, the daughter of Ismail bey was married to the ruler of Khwarezm, and the daughter of Kasim b. Sheikh Mamai was the wife of the Khan of Bukhara. The capital of Khwarezm, Urgench, was also a haven for runaway Nogai aristocrats, who in the early 1550s prepared attacks from the city on the possessions of Yusuf bey. In 1563 a similar role was played by Tashkent, where Ismail bey was attacked by Sheikh Mamai's descendants, who were supported by Khan Baba bin Barak [24, pp. 269, 309; 26, pp. 81, 83].

Under these conditions, Abdullah (the future Khan of Bukhara, Abdullah II) joined the fight for the throne of Bukhara; he was the son of Iskandar Khan b. Janibek b. Khoja Muhammad. Abu-al-Ghazi thought that when Khoja Muhammad married the daughter of Kudzhash mirza (Haji-Ahmed b. Gazi b. Edigü), the former spouse of Berke, she was already pregnant, and all of the descendants of the Khan were actually members of the house of Yediger [1, p.110]. In the early 1550s, Sultan Abdullah only ruled the small town of Kermin in the south of Uzbekistan, and he had few military forces. In the first half of the 1550s, he fought to capture the Kasbijskij and Nesefskij vilayets on the Left Bank of the Amu Darya, and also made a campaign against Bukhara [29, pp. 135, 138–145]. According to V. Bartold, in 963/1555–1556, the sultan was forced to flee from his ancestral lands. Only in 1557, a year after the death of Uzbek Khan Nawrus Ahmed, and with the direct support of the leader of the Sufi Tariqa Nakshbandij Muhammad Islam (Khoja Jubairi), Abdullah finally took over Bukhara, and—with the help of the Sufis—never lost the control of it. In 1561, he proclaimed his father Iskander the supreme khan of the Uzbeks. Prior to that, such a title was given to the ruler of Balkh, Pir Muhammad, Abdullah's uncle. The whole period of the Bukhara leader's reign is characterised by incessant wars with other members of the dynasty, especially the rulers of Tashkent—Barak Khan and his son Baba—for the unification of all Uzbek land, which ended only in 1582 after the death of the latter [4, pp. 487–488; 14, p. 394]. Only in 1583, after the death of his father Abdullah, he took the throne of Bukhara, where he remained until 1598. According to V. Bartold, while proclaiming him the Khan, he 'completed the old Mongolian ritual of raising the khan on a piece of white felt, but the four corners of the piece were not held by the heads of the nomadic clans, as it was required by nomadic traditions, but by the heads of the Bukharian dervish orders' [5, p. 184].

The khan paid considerable attention to the submission of his relatives, especially in Tashkent, as well as to the wars against the Kazakhs and the Safavids, which were waged on two borders of the state and significantly depleted its resources. For the preparation of the annual military operations in the Uzbek Khanate, an earlier tradition of the kuruks was restored—the khan's pastures or reserves were allocated for the assembly and review of the troops [7, pp. 143–
In the fight against the Kazakh Khan Khak-Nazar, Abdullah II was the leader of a military alliance which included the Nogai beys Din-Ahmed and Urus and the Siberian Khan Kuchum. In 1586, the khan even tried to attract Bey Urus to participate in the war for Urgench, though he was unsuccessful [24, pp. 373, 379]. After the death of Khak-Nazar by a former ally of Baba Khan in 1580, the new Kazakh leaders—Shigai, father-in-law of the Siberian khan Ahmed-Giray and Kuchum, and Tavvakul, became the proteges and vassals of Abdullah II. In the 1590s, Kuchum apparently often relied on Sheikh Mamai's descendants (Altı-Uli), which allowed Khan Abdullah to intervene in matters involving Nogai-Siberian relations. In addition, as a result of the losses of Kuchum, many of his former allies left to the Bukhara Khanate [27, p. 23]. The relationships between Bukhara and the Nogais continued to be supported by the nomadic Altı-Uli in the Syr Darya and the Emba—that is, in the former possessions of the Shibanids at the time of the Horde, the many marriages between the daughters of Manghit aristocrats and the sultans and khans of the Bukhara ruling family, as well as the dependence of the economy of Nogai on the caravans of Transoxiana. These caravans carried not only fabrics to Nogai, but also bows, swords and other metal items [8, p. 124].

Abdullah II tried to capture Kwarezm and the Urgench Khanate three times in the 1590s. He made Haji Muhammad Khan (Hajim) flee from there to the Safavids. Although generally, the rule of Hajim in the Urgench Khanate from 1558 to 1602 was characterised by the end of internal unrests. It was this Khiva leader who was asked to help Ottoman Sultan Selim in the reconquest of Astrakhan from the Russians [8, p. 182]. His son Arab-Muhammad was forced into hiding in the 1590s with the Nogai mirza Kuchuk b. Muhammad [14, pp. 446–448: 1, pp. 142–152; 24, p. 376]. At the end of his rule, Abdullah had a conflict about reconciliation with the Safavids with the son of Abd al-Mumin, who was the leader of the war party and led the military action in Khorasan. This provoked a great invasion of Kazakh troops headed by Tawakkul and a defeat of the ruler of Bukhara [14, pp. 394–395]. In 1598, after the death of Abdullah II, his son became the new Bukhara ruler. He was killed after 6 months, in June 1598, as a result of a conspiracy of the Uzbek emirs from the entourage of his father. Traditionally, this event ends the story of the Shibanid rule in Bukhara, although 'Tarikh-i Kipchaki' reports on the rule of Pir Muhammad Khan bin Jani Beg in Bukhara and on his war against the Kazakh ruler Tawakkul [14, p. 395].

Only in about 1601 with the support of the kuriltai of Uzbek clans, there was a change of dynasty in Bukhara. The aristocracy of individual cities tried to receive Shibanid rulers from other branches. In particular, the son of the Siberian Khan Kuchum Kanay was invited to rule in Sawran [15, p. 183–184]. However, in general, representatives of the dynasty of the Tuka-Timurids, which were called the Ashtarkhanids, were in power [2, p. 88; 22, p. 309]. Apparently, they arrived in the Bukhara Khanate in the period of the Uzbek unrest in the 1550s from the Nogai Horde, where their formal leader Yar-Muhammad was a henchman of bey Yusuf. His eldest son Jani-Muhammad was married to the sister of Abdullah II and together with his brothers took part in the Bukhara campaigns against the Kyzylbashes in Khorasan [2, pp. 88–92; 25, pp. 379–383]. In the history of the formation of the dynasty, related in its roots to Hajji Tarkan, there is a curious episode which indicates the desire of Abdullah II to expand his lands to the Volga and Yaik at the peak of the flourishing of his state in the middle of the 1580–90s, as well as to rebuild Saray-Jük and, with the influence of the Tuka-Timurids, recapture Astrakhan [25, pp. 384–385].

The death of Abdullah II led to the return of Haji Muhammad Khan to Urgench; the cities of the khanate were distributed to be ruled by his sons and closest emirs. The khan's power here, apparently, was weak, due to the multiplicity of the khan's family and the desire of these relatives for independence, but the name of the ruler of Khiva was read with khutbah, and there was coinage with his name, also [22, p. 315]. Despite the significant influence of Urgench, the formal political centre from the beginning of the 17th century was Khiva, which resulted in the consolidation of the Khiva Khanate name in the literature. After the death of Hajim, his son,
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Arab-Muhammad, came to the throne (1602–1623). At the end of his rule, he was faced with the outright separatism of several of his sons, twice he undertook campaigns against them, in the last one he was captured and blinded [14, p. 448–449]. After that, his son Esfandiyār, with the support of the Iranian Shah Abbas I, took over Urgench, where he became the ruler (1623–1642). Reprisals were carried out against the Uzbeks, particularly the Uighurs and Naimans, and their place was given to the Turkmens. The remaining Uzbeks went to Transoxiana to the Manghits and Kazakhs. Despite this, in the late 1620s, Altı-Uli, whose leader, the grandson of Sheikh Mamai, Sheikh Muhammad, was brought up at the Urgench court, considered the possibility of being ruled by the Khiva Khan Esfandiyār [26, p. 90]. The new leader of the Urgench Uzbeks was another son of Arab-Muhammad, Abu al-Ghazi, the future famous chronicler, who, as a supporter of his father, was forced to turn to hiding in Bukhara and Samarkand, as well as with the Kazakh Khan Ishim. In 1643, he was proclaimed Khan in the Aral vilayet with the support of the local Uzbeks. In 1645 he took over Urgench, where he ruled until 1663, making significant internal economic and political reforms designed to strengthen the power of the Uzbek tribes and to undermine the power of the Turkmen [14, pp. 447–453; 1, pp. 167–173]. Strengthening the state allowed the Khiva dynasty to pursue a more active foreign policy, including attacking Bukhara for the first time. In 1663, because of an illness, the khan gave supreme power to his son Anush, who, in 1687, after the defeats at Bukhara, was blinded by the Khwarezmian emirs. In the period from 1687 to 1695, the state was ruled by the sons of Anush—Khudaydam and Ernek. According to T. Sultanov, after the death of the latter, the dynasty of the Shibanids in Khiva was cut short [22, pp. 315–319]. However, the book 'Firdaus al-Iqbal' by Munis indicates six more khans among the descendants and relatives of Hajji Muhammad, the last of which, Yadgar Khan b. Anush, was the Khiva Khan to 1714 [14, pp. 454, 564]. After his death, the throne was occupied by a descendant of the Ilbars from Bukhara, Shergazi Khan, who ruled until 1728. Only after his death, influential tribal leaders from the Manghits and Kongrats began to invite khans from the Kazakh steppes, and the power of the Shibanids in Khiva was ended.


7. Dmitriev S. Sredneaziatskie kuruki v e`poxu Shaybanidov (po materialam XVI v.) (Central Asian Quruqs During the Shaybanid Reign [Based on the 16th Century Data]) // Tyurkologicheskij
§ 13. The Kazakh Khanate

Alexander Nesterov

The Kazakh Khanate held a special place among the states which emerged after the collapse of the Jochid Empire. At the same time, its emergence and early development was an integral part of the ethnopolitical processes taking place in Eastern Desht-i Kipchak in the 15–16th centuries, all of which were a direct consequence of the Golden Horde's collapse. At the same time, it should be emphasized that the Kazakh Khanate lasted much longer than any other late Jochid state (until the early 19th century) and became the basis for the Turkic Kazakh ethnos. It should be noted that it is impossible to talk about the precise ethnicity of the population of the Kazakh Khanate (just as it is impossible to pinpoint the ethnicities of both the State of the Nomadic Uzbeks and the Siberian Khanate). The population of these political entities represented a mixture of Turkic tribes and ethnic groups, including some ethnic groups of non-Turkic origin, united under the power of various branches of the Jochid dynasty.

The formation of the Kazakh Khanate was directly connected with the process of the formation of the Uzbek Khanate, itself lead by Abu'l-Khayr Ubaiddullah Khan. Moreover, the Kazakh Khanate's rise was also directly related to the activities of Khans Jani Beg and Giray. There are several theories on the origins of these Khans, all of which either map their ancestry from Orda Ichen, Jochi's eldest son, or Tuka-Timur, the thirteenth son of Jochi. But the majority of sources say that Jani Beg and Giray were the descendants of Tuka-Timur. For example, Abu al-Ghazi Muhammad Khan in his 'Genealogy of the Turkmen' wrote: 'Chinggis Khan had a son called Jochi Khan, whose son was Tuka-Timur, whose son was Uz Timur, whose son was Hodja, whose son was Badakul Ughlan, whose son was Urus Khan, whose son was Koirijak Khan, whose son was Barak Khan, whose son was Abu Said but went by the sobriquet Jani Beg Khan. And Jani Beg Khan had nine sons as follows: Irandji, Mahmud, Kasim, and after him followed Itiq, Janish, Kanabar, Tenish, Usuk, and Juak' [1, p. 157]. Mahmud ibn Wali reported in his work 'Bakhr al-asrar' that 'some of the descendants of Tuka-Timur Khan, for example Giray Khan and Jani Beg Khan, whose fathers' names will be mentioned in detail in the list of names of Tuka-Timur's khakans [descendants], left the circle of submission and obedience [to Abul-Khayr Khan] and preferred to leave their motherland' [4, p. 352]. Muhammad Haidar Dughlat wrote in 'Tarikh-i-Rashidi': 'At that time Abul-Khayr Khan was ruling in Desht-i Kipchak. He caused many troubles for the Sultans of Jochid origin. Jani Beg Khan and Giray Khan fled from him to Mughulistan. Esen Buqa Khan hosted them with great pleasure and gave them the districts Chu and Kozy-Bashi, both of which
formed the western border of Mughulistān. While they were flourishing there, the Uzbek ulus then fell in a state of disorder following Abu'l Khayr Khan's death; this caused great troubles. The majority [of Abu'l Khayr Khan's subjects] went to Giray Khan and Jani Beg Khan, so that there were about two hundred thousand [people gathered] around them. They thus gained the name: the Uzbek-Kazakhs [Uzbek Kazak]. The Kazakh sultans then started reigning in 870 (1465/1466), but Allah knows better.' Thus, the actual establishment of the Kazakh Khanate, headed by the descendants of Tuka-Timur, took place after the collapse of the State of the Nomadic Uzbeks, during the period when internecine feud between the Jochid sultans and khans, pretending to Abu'l-Khayr Khan's legacy, started in Eastern Desht-i Kipchak.

Researchers have no common opinion about the time and place of the formation of the early Kazakh Khanate. One may note the point of view of M. Abuseitova, according to whom the Kazakh Khanate was formed as an independent political entity only at the turn of the 16th century. The departure of Jani Beg and Giray and subsequent return from Mughulistān was just one episode in the struggle for power in Eastern Desht-i Kipchak and represented just one stage in the formation of the Kazakh Khanate [2, p. 40]. However, according to tradition, Giray Khan is considered the first khan of the Kazakh Khansate; Kazakh historiography dates his reign to the period between 1459–1473, while 1465 was commonly accepted as the year in which the Kazakh Khanate was formed [3, p. 89]. However, it is clear that it would be an exaggeration to speak of an independent Kazakh Khanate in Eastern Desht-i Kipchak before 1468—the year of Abu'l-Khayr Khan's death and return of Giray and Jani Beg from Mughulistān. The history of Jani Beg Khan's movements is equally mysterious and unclear. The dates of his reign are traditionally considered to be 1466–1480, but at the same time it has been noted that after 1474 his name is not mentioned in sources. Thus, one can state with certainty that the Kazakh Khansate was forming only after 1468 in the eastern part of Desht-i Kipchak, concurrent with the Tyumen Khanate's own reinforcement of its independence under Sayyid Ibrahim Khan. One can assume that during this period the rulers of the Kazakh Khanate saw themselves exclusively as the lawful successors of the khans of the eastern part of the Jochid state, not as independent rulers having no relation to the traditions of the Golden Horde.

The 1480–90s was a time of fierce fighting by the Kazakh Khans for cities situated beyond the Syr Darya River—such as Sygnak, Suzak, among others—which had served as the centres of the State of Nomadic Uzbeks under Abu'l-Khayr Khan. Abu'l-Khayr's successor, Muhammad Shaybani Khan, was the main adversary of the Kazakh Khans. In 1500, he conquered the Timurid possessions in Central Asia and became the founder of a new Shaybanid empire, the Uzbek Khansate centralised around the cities of Samarkand and Bukhara. Through military conquests, Jani Beg Khan and Giray Khan's successor, Giray Khan's son Burunduk Khan (about 1480–about 1511), managed to subjugate the territories near the Syr Darya River to his rule. Consequently, the territory of the Kazakh Khansate was extended, and from that time on it included the historical capitals of the state of Abu'l-Khayr Khan, further enhancing the prestige of the Kazakh Khans.

In 1511, Burunduk Khan was dethroned by Jani Beg Khan's son, Kasim Khan, who ruled in the eastern part of the Kazakh Khanate. The dethroned Khan left to Transoxiana and died in Samarkand. The overthrow of Burunduk Khan led to the final removal of Giray Khan's descendants from power in the Kazakh Khanate, and power was consolidated under the branch of Jani Beg Khan.

The reign of Kasim Khan (1511–1518/1521/1523) became a golden age for the early Kazakh Khanate. He succeeded in subjugating a number of cities in modern South Kazakhstan and expanding his possessions in the regions on the coast of the Caspian Sea (Kasim Khan subjugated the city of Saray-Jük, the historical capital of the Nogai Horde). The territory of Semireche, previously a part of the Chagataid Ulus, became part of the possessions of the Kazakh Khanate. The state of Kasim Khan meanwhile became one of the most important political entities in Eastern Desht-i Kipchak.
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The exact date of Kasim Khan's death is still open to question. Various sources point to a period between 1518 and 1524. According to V. Trepavlov, 1521 is closest to the real date of death of Kasim Khan [6, p. 161].

Kasim Khan's death eventually led to feuding within the Kazakh Khanate; Kasim Khan's son and successor, Mamash Khan (1521–1522/1523), was killed during this feud. Tahir Khan (1523–1533), son of Adiq Sultan, replaced Mamash Khan on the throne and extended the possessions of the Kazakh Khanate into the lands of modern Kirghizia; in this period, the main political interests of the Khanate were related to Mughulistan, as control of the cities on the Syr Darya River had been lost. However, the years of Tahir Khan's reign saw a weakening of the Khanate. For example, during the period of Buydash Khan (1533–about 1560), sources (Muhammad Haidar Dughlat) speak of 'the complete disappearance of the Kazakhs', itself related to the fact that the Khanate was divided into several dozen uluses, of which no less than five rulers bore the title of khan.

One of Kasim Khan's sons, Hakk Nazar Khan (about 1538–1580), became the unifier of the Khanate. His activities were related to wars in the eastern part of the Khanate while the reign of his ally, Shaybanid Abdullah II Khan, is marked by the flourishing of the Shaybanid state in Transoxiana. Essentially at this time the Kazakh Khanate became a vassal khanate of the Shaybanid state (along with the Balkh Khanate and the Siberian Khanate). This state of affairs remained during Shigai Khan's reign (1580–1582) as well.

Subsequent events show that the Kazakh Khanate completely lost its ties with the legacy of the Golden Horde, with the exception of its dynastic traditions. In the early 17th century, the towns situated on the Syr Darya River were claimed by the rulers of the Kazakh Khanate once and for all. The Kazakh Khanate was then divided into Zhuzes under Tawke Khan (1680–1715). Each Khanate was governed by one of the branches of Jani Beg Khan's descendants. And then since the 1770s, the Kazakh Khanates became dependent on the Russian Empire. And finally in 1847, the power of the Khan in the Kazakh Zhuzes was abolished and the territory of the former Kazakh Khanate was integrated into the Russian Empire.

Chapter XII.
The Political Development of the Tatar States in the 15–18th Centuries

§ 1. The Legal Culture of the Tatar States in the 15–18th Centuries: the Heritage of the Golden Horde and Islamic Institutes

Roman Pochekaev

After the collapse of the 'steppe empires', including the Golden Horde, the material component supporting the level of legal culture was destroyed. Most of all this is evident in the fact that what had been elements of a unified legal system in the Turkic-Tatar states succeeding to the Golden Horde were now independent legal systems co-existing within a single governing entity. One feature of the legal development of the descendants of the Golden Horde was the fact that they chose different paths. Some of the entities which developed in regions, which had already adhered to Islamic traditions for a long time (even before the Mongol conquest), became states in which Sharia law predominated. These were the Kazan, Crimean, and Astrakhan khans. Others which mostly represented nomadic state formations, began to base their legal system upon the rules of traditional law. These were the state of the Shibanids, the Nogai Horde, and the Siberian Khanate [24, p. 43]. The coexistence of the above legal systems in the Turkic-Tatar states of the 15–18th centuries allows us to regard them as the rightful heirs of the national identity and laws of the Mongol Empire and the Golden Horde, and thus link them to the same unique manifestation of the Turkic-Mongol nomadic legal culture.

The fact that the Turkic-Tatar states were political heirs of the Golden Horde, as well as the fact that most of them (except for the Nogai Horde) were ruled by the descendants of Chinggis Khan and khans of the Golden Horde, predetermined their adherence to the use of sources, principles, and specific norms of imperial law in these states.

Firstly, this is due to the retention of the very institution of khan power. Furthermore, Chinggis Khan's descendants preserved the monopoly on this title in all Turkic-Tatar states throughout the period under consideration [see: 1, p. 27]. The rulers of the Nogai Horde—Edigü's heirs—and the Siberian Taybugids were the exception. Nevertheless, they also enthroned puppet kings during different periods of time. It is not a mere coincidence that Russian chronicles repeatedly refer to the title 'Nogai khan' [see, for example, 27]. The monarchs of the post-Horde states emphasised their succession to Chinggis Khan in official acts. One of the brightest examples of how the 'charisma' of the Chinggisid dynasty continued to be the source of supreme power is the fact that khan yarliqs in the 16–17th centuries would appeal to Tengre—the ancient Turkic deity. This, according to the official imperial ideology, bestowed power upon Chinggis Khan and his heirs. It is noteable that the Crimean khans of the middle of the 17th century, Mehmed Giray IV and Islam Giray III (who were Muslims and, according to some data, even claimed the title of caliph—the ruler of all the righteous), appealed to both Tengre and Allah in their messages [35, pp. 80, 87, 115, 123, 135, 142; see also: 5, pp. 87–88].

Having inherited the charisma of Chinggis Khan from their direct predecessors—Jochid khans of the Golden Horde—the monarchs of the Turkic-Tatar states also inherited their prerogatives in various spheres. Firstly, it affected their legislative activity reflected mainly in the issuing of edicts—that is, khan yarliqs.
However, some types of yarliqs disappeared, as they were simply not required any longer. For instance, the functions of yarliq laws, which had existed in the Golden Horde and other Chinggisid states in the 13–15th centuries, gradually became a part of Sharia legislation in the Crimean Khanate. Thus, the law in Crimea was based on Sharia norms, and judicial decisions were made by qadis and were recorded in special books—Kazasker Sacae [2; 3; 4]. Moreover, khans of the Turkic-Tatar states lost their monopoly on issuing yarliqs. Thus, a Turkish author of the 17th century, Hüseyin Hezarfen noted that not only the Crimean khans but also their heirs and co-regents—Qalga-sultan and Nureddin-sultan—had the right to issue yarliqs [20, p. 266]. Indeed, a number of yarliqs issued by both khans and persons who bore the title of sultan have survived to the present day. For instance, edicts by Mehmed Giray Sultan, Adil Giray Sultan, Fatih Giray Sultan, and even one khan daughter—Mehri Sultan Hani. Such edicts were called tarkhan yarliqs or soyurgal yarliqs—that is, letters patent (zhalovannaja gramota) [33, pp. 21, 36, 43–45, 53, 55]. V. Smirnov mentions a curious document in legal terms—a charter (yarliq?) of Baht Giray Sultan with the seal of his father Bahadur Giray Khan [29, p. 380]! Russian archives contain information indicating that even Nogai beys who were not Chinggisids by origin also issued 'eryqys' [see: 30, p. 523]. In 1549, after the death of Safa Giray, a quriltai was held in Kazan. At that quriltai the participants (beklyaribek Prince Mamai, ulans, mullahs, hafizes, princes, sotniks and desyatniks) adopted and signed a document which was sent to the Crimean Khan Sahib Giray. This document was called a yarliq which, in our opinion, is evidence that the quriltai of 1549 took upon itself the functions of the supreme government with the right to issue corresponding acts before the new khan's enthronement (this very document contains a request to send the new monarch to Kazan) [see: 9, p. 140].

Another phenomenon associated with yarliqs in the Tatar states is worth attention: this refers to the fact that the Chinggisid khans and other rulers of the post-Horde states (yurts) were granted yarliqs by the foreign monarchs who were not descendants of Chinggis Khan and, therefore, had no official right to issue yarliqs. There are at least six such documents: the yarliq of Turkish Sultan Mehmed II to Crimean Khan Mengli Giray of 1473 [7], the yarliq of Ivan the Terrible to Siberian Prince Ediger of 1556 and three yarliqs issued again by Ivan the Terrible to the Nogai mirzas in 1557–1561 [23, pp. 242–243, 334], as well as the yarliq of Boris Godunov of 1600 appointing Kazakh Sultan Uraz Muhammad to the position of the ruler of the Kasimov Khanate (note that the texts of the two yarliqs—those of Ivan the Terrible of 1556 and Boris Godunov of 1600—were not preserved, but the fact of their existence is mentioned in the sources) [31]. Undoubtedly, the issuing of these acts were extraordinary in nature and reflected the special relations of the Ottoman Empire and the Muscovite state with the late-Horde Chinggisid states.

Other elements of the 'Chinggisid' law appeared in Turkic-Tatar states occasionally and were of short duration. An example of this was the attempt to restore the 'tamga tax' in the Crimean Khanate in the middle of the 17th century. As we know, tamga (the trade tax) was one of the most 'beneficial' and actively used state tributes in the Mongol Empire and the Golden Horde. However, with the strengthening of the Islamic law, tamga was actively displaced as the Islam zealots considered it to be one of the most negative manifestations of the 'Chinggisid' legal heritage which was hostile to Sharia. As a result, by the middle of the 17th century tamga was cancelled in Crimea. The 'tamga tax' was restored by Khan Bahadur Giray I at the beginning of his reign (1637–1641) [29, p. 380]. This caused huge discontent amongst both his own subjects and the Turkish suzerain. Probably, despite the fact that the Khan sought the replenishment of his treasury when introducing this tax, the Ottoman authorities considered it as an attempt to demonstrate independence and return to 'Chinggisid' imperial aspirations, especially since the other actions of Bahadur Giray I gave reason for such suspicion [for more details see: 6, pp. 242–248]. The introduction of this tax caused pressure from the Ottomans and unrest among
the population of the Crimean Khanate. Thus, after about 20 years Islam Giray III, one of the closest successors of Bahadur Giray, had to cancel the tamga tax [29, p. 386].

The Khanates, which never fell under such strong foreign influence, retained the traditional tax system which had existed since the time of the Golden Horde. Thus, in the Kazan Khanate, until its decay, traditional Golden Horde taxes continued to exist, in particular, the 'yasak' [36, p. 683]. A similar situation was observed in the Tyumen Yurt and the Siberian Khanate, where the fiscal system was organised according to the Golden Horde [12, pp. 76, 85]. The right to collect tamga in the Nogai Horde belonged not only to supreme rulers, the beys, but also to the individual mizrahs [22, p. 55].

The imperial legal regulation of land relations also underwent significant changes. Such forms of land tenure as iqta, indju, soyurgal and others, which existed in the Chinggisid states in the imperial period, became almost obsolete. Their abolition was the result of several factors. On the one hand, the imperial land relations of Turkic-Mongol origin were replaced by Sharia norms which clearly regulated the land tenure institutions. As a result, even the 'Turkic-Mongol land tenure terminology was replaced with the Arabic one: in particular, such terms as 'mulk', 'mev-kufe' and others came into use in the Crimean Khanate. [14, pp. 56–58]. On the other hand, the role of the tribal nobility significantly increased in the post-Horde states. Its representatives had initially possessed lands by right of indju and soyurgal. This was conditional ownership, that is, the owners could dispose of the land only if they served the Khan. Eventually, these owners 'put down roots' in their ownership and made them (de jure or de facto) the family hereditary appanages. As a result, the previous forms of land tenure in the post-Horde states became hereditary beyliks [15, pp. 79–89; 26, pp. 83–84; 36, pp. 682–683] or patents to mizrahs who retained the status of serving land owners until the fall of the Crimean Khanate. The same happened in other Turkic-Tatar states, for example in the Kasimov Khanate [15, pp. 91–99; 16, pp. 48–49; 26, pp. 79–82]. However, the khans would sometimes recall the Chinggisid legal ideology according to which they were the supreme land owners in their states. They thus made attempts to deprive representatives of tribal aristocracy of the ownership they used to consider as hereditary. Thus, according to the Voskresenskaya Chronicle, Kazan Khan Safa Giray in 1541 'collected yasak from many princes and gave it to Crimeans' [21, p. 295; see also: 36, p. 683]. However, only powerful and mighty monarchs allowed themselves to take such decisive actions. Those who had no real power were in danger of displeasing the nobility, losing their thrones and, perhaps, even their lives.

As noted above, Islam had existed in a number of areas which were a part of the Golden Horde. They then became the core of the Turkic-Tatar states in the 15–18th centuries, long before Öz Beg Khan adopted it as the official state religion of the Golden Horde. Thus, Islamic law was by no means something new for the Turkic-Tatar states of the 15–18th centuries, but rather represented a natural part of their legal culture.

Among the distinct features of Islamic law (the Sharia) in the post-Horde states, we should firstly mention its more significant role among the sources of law compared to the Golden Horde. The strengthening of Sharia was in many ways related to the decay of the central power and the system of Imperial law. This was something which could only be done by the powerful khans of the Golden Horde in the 14th and the beginning of the 15th centuries. At the same time, the role of the Islamic clergy, which was a part of the administrative structure of the Jochid Empire since the reign of Öz Beg Khan, gradually increased and was strengthened with the weakening of the Imperial power-state institutions.

Thus, it is no accident that in the post-Horde period not only members of the Khan's family, nobles and military commanders, but also representatives of Islamic clergy participated in the Khan's enthronement ceremony, which was held as the traditional quriltai. In addition to taking a traditional vow of steppe, the monarch, who ascended the throne, swore on the Quran
and had to be approved by the head of the clergy. This practice was applied in Kazan, Kasimov, and other Turkic-Tatar Khanates [see, for instance: 11, pp. 79, 84–85; 36, p. 676].

In future, khans and rulers would always consult Sayyids and other influential representatives of the clergy who would often use their authority to seal the decisions of sovereigns, thus ensuring the effectiveness of their execution. In the last years of the Khanate's existence, Kazan Sayyids were often the first advisers to the khans—that is, the heads of Khanate's government. The role of the Sayyids in the Kazan and the Kasimov Khanates was so strong that they were not only the spiritual leaders of the local Islamic population, but also commanded forces. Contemporary scholars even suggest that the Kasimov Sayyid also performed the functions of the Beklyaribek [26, pp. 71, 74–75]. In the Crimean Khanate the Sayyids played the role of the main qadi—that is, the supreme judges under Sharia law. In the Khans' charters and letters, their names were often written before the names of sultans from the Giray family [11, pp. 23, 119–121, 127]. We also have knowledge of the judicial functions of the Sayyids in the Siberian Khanate of the Kuchum era [10, p. 164; 12, p. 77].

International treaties of the post-Horde States were often concluded according to the tenets of Islam and support of the Islamic clergy. Thus, for instance, Nogai beys and murzas of the 16–17th centuries often appealed to their Islamic faith in negotiations with Moscow sovereigns (though likening rather than opposing it to the Christianity of the Moscow princes). Moreover, agreements with Moscow were sealed by an oath on the Quran [22, p. 36; 30, p. 565]. From the late 15th to beginning of the 16th centuries, Kazan Sayyids personally participated in negotiations with Moscow authorities and drafting the conditions of international agreements [11, pp. 81–83]. The role of the clergy was also great in the foreign policy of the Crimean Khanate: for example, in 1659, Khan Mehmed Giray IV notified Tsar Aleksey Mikhaylovich that he had consulted his scholars who 'said that the agreement was broken by the Muscovites' [quote according to: 28, p. 26].

However, from time to time, the rulers of the Turkic-Tatar khanates tried to limit the influence of the clergy and came into conflict with their Islamic advisers. The very fact of such conflicts shows a significant influence of the Islamic clergy since its representatives could afford themselves to confront the monarchs. The outcome of such confrontations varied. Thus, for example, during the reign of Kazan Khan Safa Giray, two Kazan Sayyids were executed by the Khan himself, and one—by his successor Shah Ali [11, pp. 84–87]. On the other hand, Crimean Khan Murad Giray, who tried to implement judicial reform and replace the Sharia court of qadi with the customary Turkic-Mongol tore, was forced to concede in a dispute to Vânî efendi, a prominent representative of the clergy, and give up his intentions [25; 29, p. 248].

Presenting themselves as defenders and disseminators of the faith, the Turkic-Tatar rulers not only patronised the religious leaders, built charitable institutions and financed them, but also waged holy wars (gazavat). Moreover, a 'holy' war could also be declared on other Islamic states, provided the court theologians confirmed that the enemies were apostates and thus were even more dangerous than the 'infidels'. This is how the Crimean Khans and Sultans justified their attempts to restore the former borders of the Ulus of Jochi, after regaining the Kazan and Astrakhan Khanates from the Muscovite state. They presented their actions as a struggle against the enemies of the faith, as well as their military actions against the Persian Kyzylbashes. Vassalage in relation to the Ottoman Sultans, who were also the caliphs, and execution of their will were sufficient justification to declare any war against the enemies of the Turks as gazavat [see: 8, pp. 88, 104, 108]. Of course, such policy was not an invention of the descendants of Chinggis Khan and their rivals—the rulers of the Turkic-Tatar states from other dynasties: it had been used by Islamic rulers since the first centuries of the Islamic era. The fact of its adoption by the Chinggisids only shows their understanding of the changed situation and the almost complete integration of the Turkic-Tatar states in the World of Islam.
A special role in the legal culture of the Turkic-Tatar states was played by judicial activity that became a prerogative mainly of the Islamic jurists. It is well known that Sharia courts functioned in the Golden Horde along with the Imperial dzargu courts as an official judicial authority since the 1320s, that is, since the time when Öz Beg Khan declared Islam the official religion in his subject territories. This time the actual abolition of dzargy courts led to the increasing role of the qadi courts which not just coexisted with the official Khan's courts in the post-Horde states, but simply superseded them and became the main judicial authority.

Thus, for example, almost all of the judicial activity in the Kazan Khanate was performed by Islamic theologians [see: 34, pp. 182, 185; 36, p. 689]. Some indirect source information suggests that Sayyids had judicial prerogatives in the Kasimov Khanate [11, p. 112].

The most detailed information which has survived is about the Sharia courts in the Crimean Khanate, including both the narrative sources (chronicles and historical works of Crimean and Ottoman origin) and the official acts (the Khan's yarliqs and the Kazasker books—the Sacae). Analysis of these sources allows the conclusion that the scope of jurisdiction of the Islamic judges was quite vast.

According to the Kazasker Sacae of the 17th century, the Sharia judges were in charge of land disputes, matrimonial (marriages and divorces) and probate cases and disputes, matters relating to purchasing and liberation of slaves (serfdom acts), matters of custody and guardianship, donation of waqfs [2, pp. 48, 50; 4, pp. 74, 75–76]. It is known that since the 16th century texts of the Khan's yarliqs had been included into the Kazasker Sacae [17, pp. 111–112; 33, p. 270], although it was not the only change of Khan's judicial and other authoritative decisions relating to the increased importance of the qadi court. In the early 17th century, Khan Salamat Giray I could still issue yarliqs with recommendations to qadis (including the Kazasker) [3, pp. 68–69], though at the same time and especially later the tables turned: Khan's decisions depended on the judges who passed their verdicts according to the Islamic law. Thus, for example, the decision of Salamat Giray to liberate his servant had to be officially recorded in the Kazasker Sacae. Similarly, the Khan's previous decisions on matters within the scope of the Sharia remained in force only after being confirmed and recorded by the Kazaskers [4, pp. 74–75, 77; 18, p. 77].

It should be noted that the judges of the Sharia courts in the Turkic-Tatar states (particularly, in the Crimean Khanate) apparently received their salary from the state. This prevented them from abusing their power in terms of determining the arbitrary cost of their services. Thus, during the reign of Khan Jani Beg Giray, kazasker Mustafa set fixed prices for the services of qadis and hakims [5, pp. 44, 54]. Thus, the Sharia system of justice in the Turkic-Tatar states was organised better than, for example, in the Central Asian Khanates of the same time. The qadis did not receive any salary and compensated by extorting litigants in the form of fines, special fees, etc. [see: 19, p. 102].

Land regulations in the Turkic-Tatar states underwent significant changes compared to the Golden Horde. As mentioned above, the types of land tenure typical of the Turkic-Mongol Imperial state formations were superseded in the late-Horde states by the traditional Islamic land law institutions. For example, in Crimea there existed Khans' domains, privately owned mülks, communal ownership of land, as well as such specific types of ownership as hodzhalyks—that is, the ownership of hodzhas [5, p. 48; 14, p. 56]. Finally, waqf property occupied a significant place in the land law relations of all the Turkic-Tatar states [14, p. 55; 25, p. 76; 36, p. 681].

Changes to the tax law of the Turkic-Tatar states were also significant. By the middle of the 13th century, the Mongol conquest resulted in the destruction not only of the executive office, but also of the tax system of the occupied Islamic states: Islamic fiscal institutions were superseded and replaced by institutions adopted by Mongol rulers from Uighur and Chinese legal practices [see, for instance: 32, p. 92]. However, while Islam was regaining its dominant
position, Turkic-Tatar monarchs managed to reach compromises by maintaining existing taxes, but giving them new names in accordance with their Islamic analogues. Thus, for example, the former 'yasak' (qalan) chargeable in the Golden Horde corresponded to 'kharaj' chargeable in accordance with Sharia, and 'ushr'—that is, desyatina, replaced the corresponding Mongol tax called 'tagar', etc. [see: 13, pp. 235–236; 19, pp. 90–95]. Of course, not every tax could be so easily substituted. For example, the 'zakat' charged under the Sharia had no counterparts in the Turkic-Mongol Imperial law. Similarly, as mentioned above, it was illegal to levy tamga under Sharia law. Similarly, as mentioned above, it was illegal to levy tamga under Sharia law. In such a way, the tax system of the Turkic-Tatar states is another example of how Islamic law became the predominant legal system. It gradually replaced both the institutions of the Golden Horde (Imperial) law of the Chinggisids and the customary law of the Turkic-Mongol tribes, which was applied throughout the existence of the Tatar states—the successors of the Golden Horde.


Chapter XII. The Political Development of the Tatar States in the 15–18th Centuries


§ 2. Tatar-Russian Relations in the 15th Century

Anton Gorsky

By the early 15th century, a structure dominated by two large states occupied the place which used to belong to more than a dozen independent lands on the political map of Rus': the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which had its territorial core in Lithuania, but also included several Russian lands (Kiev, the main part of Chernigov, Smolensk, Volyn, Polotsk, and Pinsk) and the Grand Principality of Moscow, including the major part of the Northeast Rus' (former Suzdal land). Along with them, Ryazan, Novgorod and Pskov lands (all of them dependent on Moscow), as well as the Principalities of Tver and Yaroslavl in the Northeast Rus' continued to exist. By that time, only two out of three attributes indicating the dependence of Russian lands on the Horde (the approval of princes by the Khan, paying tribute and military assistance obligations) remained. These were the issuing of yarliq on governing and the making of vykhod [tribute]. The Moscow princes were obliged to pay 7000 rubles a year for their reign. The Russian lands, included in the Lithuanian state, continued to pay tribute to the Horde as well [4, pp. 273–275, 293; 16, pp. 58–61].

Given the situation, where Emir Edigü became its actual ruler after Timur had defeated the Horde, the Great Prince of Moscow Vasily Dmitrievich stopped paying taxes. In Moscow it was considered normal when a Khan (the Russian equivalent of Tsar) had real power. That
said, Vasily was trying to avoid direct conflict. Moreover, the Horde troops were involved in the wars against Lithuania of 1406–1408 as allies. At the end of 1408 (after they had not been paid tribute for 13 years), Edigü organized a military campaign against Moscow. The Horde ruler was unsuccessful in taking the capital. However, his troops did ruin a large part of the lands of Vasily I. Afterwards, the Muscovite state and the Horde remained at war until the overthrow of Edigü (1411). After the sons of Toktamyshev had come to power, the situation changed, and in 1412, Vasily Dmitrievich even visited the Horde. However, after 1414, when Edigü came back into power, the conflict flared up again: Edigü supported the claims of Suzdal princes to Nizhny Novgorod, which had been given to Vasily by Toktamysh in 1392. After Edigü was killed (1419) and the situation in the Horde had stabilised by the second half of the 1420s, the traditional (tributary) relations were renewed. Circa 1423, Vasily I apparently received a yarliq for his son Vasily from Ulugh Muhammad Khan, who had been exiled from the Horde by his enemies. He was living in Lithuania with the Great Prince Vytautas [3, pp. 119–140].

In 1431, the 16-year-old Grand Prince Vasily Vasilyevich and his uncle and rival Yury Dmitrievich went to the Horde on their own initiative to see Ulugh Muhammad Khan to ask him to resolve their dispute on who would reign. Thus, the 'Tsar' of the Horde was still considered to be a legal suzerain of the Russian princes. On the other hand, the Khan's decision, which in 1432 had confirmed the status of Vasily as the Grand Prince, was actually ignored by Yuri, who then seized the Moscow throne twice—in 1433 and 1434 [16, pp. 249–252].

In the late 1430s, the division of the Horde into two parts—headed by Khan Kuchuk Muhammad and Khan Sayyid-Ahmed—led to changes in the manner of paying tributes. Moscow acknowledged both rulers as 'Tsars' [9, no. 38, pp. 108, 111, 113, 116]. The latter document—the yarliq addressed to Ivan III by Ahmed, the son of Küchük Muhammad, (1480) stated that the Khan had required the payment of 120,000 altyns, that is 3,600 rubles, from the Grand Prince (see the edition of the yarliq on the earliest copy: [6]). It actually came to a half of the 7000 tax the Moscow princes had been obliged to pay until the early 1430s [9, no. 29, p. 74]. Apparently, Kichi Muhammad and Sayyid Ahmad were paid one half of the entire fixed sum of money each. Moreover, after the Horde of Sayyid Ahmad had collapsed in the 1450s, the size of tribute paid to Küchük Muhammad, and later to his sons, did not return to its previous maximum of 7000.

Banished from the Horde in 1437, Ulugh Muhammad tried to settle in the bordering Russian territories, which led to a conflict with Vasily II. At the end of 1438, the Khan defeated the Moscow troops in the upper reaches of the Oka River, near Belyov. Next summer, Ulugh Muhammad had almost reached the walls of Moscow. In 1444, he tried to settle down into the lower reaches of Oka, in Nizhny Novgorod. In summer 1445, the troops of Ulugh Muhammad defeated the Moscow's army near Suzdal, and the Grand Prince Vasily himself was taken prisoner, but released after he had promised to pay a huge ransom. Then the Horde of Ulugh Muhammad left for Kazan, where his son, Mahmutek, became the ruler of the Kazan Khanate. These events, as well as the overthrow of Vasily II by his cousin Dmitry Yurievich Shemyaka in the early 1446, put a stop to the tributary relations between Moscow and the Horde of Ulugh Muhammad and his sons. In 1447, the Kazan Khan Mahmutek became an ally of Dmitry Shemyaka against the newly rethroned Vasily II [3, pp. 143–146].

By the late 1440s, Moscow had stopped paying tribute to the Horde of Sayyid Ahmad. Perhaps, in 1449, Küchük Muhammad sent Ivan, the son of Vasily II, a yarliq on governing of the Grand Principality. As a result, it started the raids of the Sayyid-Ahmed's Tatars on the Moscow lands (in 1449, 1451—that year the troop led by the Khan's son came up to Moscow, 1455, 1459), which ended after his Horde had collapsed in the second half of the 1450s [3, pp.146–148, 153–154].
In the 1450s, a vassal principality was created within the lands of the Moscow princes, which was headed by the son of Ulugh Muhammad, Kasim, who had joined Vasily II. Its centre was the Gorodets Meshchyorsky situated at the River of Oka. Then it was renamed Kasimov, after Kasim. Correspondingly it became customary to refer to the corresponding political institution the 'Kasimov Khanate', led by the Chinggisids appointed by the Moscow princes (this practice existed until the late 17th century). There is a theory, according to which its foundation was one of the conditions under which Vasily Vasilyevich had been released from captivity by Ulugh Muhammad in 1445 [17, pp. 26–27; 15, pp. 54–61]. The initial state support for Kasim in the Grand Principality of Moscow was probably intended to be an integral part of the ransom for Vasily. However, he was moved to the Gorodets Meshchyorsky only in the middle of the 1450s, when the obligations of the Grand Prince, given to Ulugh Muhammad, had long since been invalidated [10, pp. 171–172].

Three years after Ivan Vasilyevich had come to the throne (1462), the Khan of the Horde himself took part in a military campaign against Moscow (for the first time since the reign of Toktamysh): in 1465, a similar attempt was made by Mahmud, the son of Küchük Muhammad. The military campaign was brought to naught, as the Crimean Khan Hacı Giray attacked Mahmud at the Don River and defeated him [12, p. 186]. Most likely it was the inclusion of the Yaroslavl Principality by Ivan III into his possessions, without the authorization of the Khan, in 1463. This led to the anger of the ruler of the Golden Horde [3, pp. 131–132].

In the late 1460s, the Grand Principality of Moscow had been waging war against the Kazan Khanate for several years, and it even had been launching attacks on it. Initially, the military campaigns by the Moscow troops against Kazan were not very successful. However, at the end of 1469, they were able to conclude peace on favorable terms [2, pp. 36–95].

In a situation where the Horde had actually fragmented into several political institutions, the 'central part' between the Don and the Volga Rivers has been defined in sources as the Great Horde since the 1470s. Its ruler was considered to be the suzerain in Russia [13, pp. 277, 291, 292, 299, 302, 303, 308]. The use of this term, in conformity with the earlier times, starting from the 1430s, was noted only in the latest Nikon Chronicle of the 1520s, and represents an obvious retrospection. It is traditionally believed to be a translation of the Tatar Ulugh Orda—'the Great Horde' [2, pp. 7–8]. However, in Rus' Ulugh Orda was translated exactly as 'the Great Horde' (since the 16th century this definition was included in the title of the Crimean Khans and is mentioned in the translations of their messages which survived as a part of ambassadorial books on relations with Crimea [19, pp. 19, 21, 27, 29, 70, 75–77, 80]. However, the Horde of Ahmed's children is defined in the ambassadorial books as big; [18, pp. 119, 157, 170, 214, 255]). Moreover, the adjective big was not frequently used in the meaning of 'large'. The word great was usually used for this purpose. One of the most wide-spread meanings of the lexical element big was an adjective in a comparative degree meaning 'having a higher position', 'major' (it is denoted by the modern Russian word 'bolshiy', stressed on the first syllable) [21, columns 147–148; 20, pp. 289–290, 384–386]. Most likely the name 'Ból' shaya Orda' [Bigger Horde] appeared in Russia when the collapse of the Horde became obvious and they needed to detach the 'main parts' of the state from less influential ones [7, pp. 123–125]. It is thus noticeable that this term and the reference to the Hordes in plural appear in the chronicles (since 1473) simultaneously [9, no. 69–70, pp. 226, 228, 231, 236, 238, 240, 244, 246, 249; 4, pp.165–167]. Both reflected the striving for accommodating themselves to a new political situation in the steppes of Eastern Europe.

In the summer of 1472, Ahmad, the Khan of the Great Horde, organised a military campaign against Moscow. Ivan III troops met their enemies at the Oka River near the city of Aleksin. Ahmed did not dare cross the river and returned to the steppe [13, pp. 297–298; 2, pp. 146–181]. Most likely the reason for such behavior was that the Moscow prince had managed to crush the rebellions of 1471 in Novgorod: Ahmed had supported the claims of the Polish
King and the Grand Prince of Lithuania, Casimir IV, to rule the Novgorod Republic. Thus, in this connection, the campaign in Novgorod, initiated by Ivan III, was considered as opposed to the will of the suzerain [see: 3, pp. 156–158].

The campaign of 'the Tsar himself' had serious consequences: the majority of Moscow representative believed that it was necessary to stop the dependency relationships with the Great Horde. Firstly, it manifested in them ceasing to pay the tribute: by 1480 it had not been paid for 'the ninth year' [14, p. 265], that is exactly since 1472. Moreover, Ivan III started negotiations with the Crimean Khan Mengli Giray, who was an enemy of Ahmed. Initially their relations were those of between 'friends and brothers'. Paying any traditional tributes, dating back to the times of the Horde unity, was absolutely unnecessary in this case. In 1480, they concluded the Moscow-Crimean treaty where both contracting parties named their 'common enemies', Ahmed and Casimir [18, pp. 1–25].

As for the Great Horde, Ivan III had been sending and receiving ambassadors to and from it for some time, trying to avoid a military conflict. However, in 1476, when they had not paid taxes for more than five years, an ambassador of Ahmed brought a demand addressed to the Grand Prince, according to which he had to pay a personal visit to the Horde to see him (which was unheard of in the years since Toktamysh) [13, pp. 308–309]. Ivan III disobeyed him, and so a conflict became inevitable. Ahmed organised a new campaign against Moscow in 1480, after concluding an alliance with Casimir IV. The opposing troops spent two months on the opposite banks of the Ugra River, the left tributary of the Oka River, which was the border between the Muscovite and Lithuanian states. The Grand Prince was surrounded by people who were ready to acknowledge him as the 'Tsar'. However, the prevailing view was against it. In November, with onset of cold weather, Ahmed went home and his attempt to restore the Horde power over the Grand Principality of Moscow was unsuccessful [11; 1; 2, pp. 216–266]. The death of Ahmed at the hands of Siberian Tatars and Nogais in January 1481, put an end to these plans forever.

Consequently, the Muscovite state, which has been called Russia since the late 15th century, became independent of the Khan of the Horde between the years of 1472 and 1480. As a result, Ivan III was given the title of 'Tsar' (this was mentioned for the first time in 1474 in a diplomatic document, after the first campaign of Ahmed was repulsed [8, no. 78, pp. 133, 135]). This was equivalent to the title of the rulers of the Horde and the post-Horde Khanates, although no crowning ceremony was held either under Ivan III or Vasily III.

In subsequent years, Ivan III continued to maintain an alliance with the Crimean Khanate, in order to counter the Great Horde, where the sons of Ahmed were struggling for leadership. Fulfilling the promises made to Mengli Giray, the Grand Prince sent his troops, mainly consisting of the Kasimov Tatars, to the Horde three times—in 1487, 1490 and 1491. However, it did not result in any serious military conflicts [3, p. 179].

Ivan III pursued a policy of interference in dynastic struggles, in his relations with the Kazan Khanate in the 1480s. In 1487, the Moscow troops conquered Kazan, Khan Alegam was taken prisoner and Muhammad-Emin, son of the Kazan Khanum, the widow of Nur-Sultan, came to the Crimean throne. A year earlier, the Khanum had married the Crimean Khan Mengli Giray, an ally of Ivan III [2, pp. 280–293]. The Kazan Khanate was dependent on the Muscovite state for two decades. In particular, the Kazan troops took part in a military campaign against the Great Horde in 1491. Ivan III also maintained diplomatic relations with the Nogai Horde and the Siberian Khanate [18].

In the early 16th century, when Moscow was waging war against the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and at the same time against the Livonian Order, relations with the Great Horde worsened. In 1501, Khan Sheikh Ahmed (Ahmat's son), acting as an ally of Lithuania, headed towards the Upper Don. Mengli Giray, an ally of Moscow, also came there and the Moscow
troops moved there to assist him. However, no battle took place. Mengli Giray returned to Crimea and Sheikh Ahmed ravaged the cities of the North, which had just been won back from Lithuania by the Moscow troops. In this situation, in winter 1501–1502, Ivan III decided to acknowledge his dependence on Sheikh Ahmed in a formal way as a diplomatic trick. An ambassador from Moscow brought collected tribute to the Khan. The goal was to break the alliance between Lithuania and the Great Horde. At the same time Moscow urged Mengli Giray to organize a military campaign and strike a decisive blow against the Great Horde. In May 1502, the Crimean Khan finally set off and in early June conquered the Horde of Sheikh Ahmed in the area of the Dnieper tributaries, Samara and Sula. The fugitive Khan sent an ambassador to Moscow with an offer: Sheikh-Ahmed asked Ivan III for a throne of the Astrakhan Khanate in exchange for him breaking the alliance with Lithuania and setting neutral relationships with Crimea. This appeal received no reply, and in the winter of 1503–1504, Sheikh Ahmed took refuge in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania [3, pp. 181–184].

The collapse of the Great Horde created a new configuration in relations between the young Russian state and the 'post-Horde' political institutions. The Crimean Khanate became the main one of them. By that time, relations between Moscow and Crimea had become a dialogue between equal partners (with elements related to the recognition of a higher international status of the Crimean Khan as a bearer of the title of 'Tsar', see: [23, pp. 186–205]). This resulted in conditions for the start of a struggle between Russia and the Crimean Khanate for influence on other states, formed from the ruins of the Horde.

11. Nazarov V. Sverzhenie ordy'nskogo iga na Rusi (The overturn of the Horde’s yoke in Rus’). Moscow, 1983. 64 p.
§ 3. Tatar-Russian Relations in the 16–18th Centuries

Ilya Zaitsev

Russians and Tatars (more generally, the Slavs and the Turks) could not but imprint in their minds and arts dissonant images of each other as they were immediate neighbours for centuries. We should try and shed some light on these images, as well as trace the dynamics of changes in the mutual impressions where possible. Historical chronicles, manuscripts, folklore, and, especially, proverbs and sayings can be useful here. The latter probably offer a better insight into their affinity, reciprocal claims, and rejection of each other. It is clear that we should not attempt to identify a stable and unchangeable image of a people as seen by representatives of the other nation. Undoubtedly, these views could vary significantly depending on historical circumstances, from the image of an enemy to that of a friend.

The issue concerning the name of the Tatars, the eschatological sense of their emergence, was especially topical in the context of concepts introduced by Russian scribes in the 13th century. In this connection, the text that opens the story about the Kalka River battle (Laurentian Chronicle, sheet 153) is especially illustrative. On the one hand, 'nobody clearly understands who they [that is, the Tatars—Author] are'. On the other hand, 'wise men, who could read books, knew it' [3, p. 89]. This fragment shows clearly that in facing an unknown nation, the Russian chronicler tried to identify its place in the common world landscape first of all, for which purpose, it was necessary to identify the ancestor of this nation among the sons of Noah. The definition of this people's place in this picture depended on it. They could be identified as Ishmaelites (Ishmael's descendants, eventually fitting into the picture of the Biblical history) or 'impure people'.

Only 15 years had passed before Russia had to actually deal with the new people. An episode on an attack on Vladimir by Batu's troops appeared in the aforementioned Laurentian Chronicle. In describing these events, the chronicler emphasises that the sons of the Prince of Vladimir refused to participate in the fighting, which the author did not criticise. The analysis of this event and its interpretation in later manuscripts can lead us to the conclusion that in the second half of the 13th century, an invasion was considered to be God's punishment for human sins, according to which perception, scribes modeled the behaviour of their characters. Refusing
to resist is interpreted not as cowardice, but as true Christian humility before the Lord's punishment. Tatars in the 13–14th centuries were a real 'scourge sent by God' in the Russian collective consciousness. Works by Serapion of Vladimir can serve as examples. He was an Orthodox cleric, whose manuscripts reflected the reaction of his contemporaries to this event. Apparently, the point of view according to which the Tatars were considered to execute the God's punishment was generally predominant and eliminated the perception of the Tatars as a nation. Anyway, hostility towards them appeared much later. As it seems to me, it was essential that the Russians were facing pagans. Probably, before the 14th century, representatives of Russian priesthood hoped that their missions among Tatars would be successful. It should be emphasised that these hopes were not entirely groundless. It is sufficient to mention the Sarai bishopric, the patronage of the church, yarliqs to Metropolitans, conversion to Orthodox Christianity by Tatars, the formation of a new class, Serving Tatars, etc. After the Horde adopted Islam, the confrontation escalated (although the baptisms of immigrants from the Horde continued). Now the hostility spread to the religious sphere. It should be mentioned that reconciling Christianity and Islam was an impossible utopia at that time. Consequently, the settlement of the conflict did not seem highly probable. In the 15–16th centuries, refusing to fight against Tatars was considered to be a reproachful act. At the same time, in connection with this new perception, the behaviour of historical personalities appearing in manuscripts, was reviewed and corrected [16, p. 193].

The changes in the images of Tatars in the Russian collective consciousness during the 15–16th centuries were traced in detail by A. Amelkin. He found out that already 'The Tale of Mercurius of Smolensk' presented 'images of the enemy...different from those previously presented in the 13–14th century biographies of saints. This difference was partly due to the influence of folklore traditions, and partly due to changes in ideas about the enemy towards enhancing the negative features. Tatars were viewed as a cultural and historical community of a different kind that stood in opposition to Russia.' In the Russian collective consciousness of the late 15—first half of the 16th centuries, 'the Tatars, being used as an instrument of punishment, were compared to an irrational, destructive, and faceless uncultured power. Their cunning and desire to change the way of life of those indigenous peoples who they conquered was emphasised' [1, pp. 7–8]. At the same time, there are the traces of a Russian-Tatar synthesis, a dual perception of the Tatars and their assessment can be found in records dating back to the 16–17th centuries, after which this view has been expressed in different ways up to our days. For example, the author of the 'History of Kazan', a rather mysterious work of the second half of the 16th century, while generally sharing the traditional Orthodox views of his time, portrays the inhabitants of Kazan in contrasting ways. Sometimes he sympathises with them, and sometimes he presents them as antagonists of the Russian state [18, p. 199]. According to Ya. Solodkin, the author of this composition, 'whoever lived in Kazan for 20 years, ... could have developed sympathy for its residents. He saw the real state of affairs from within, and that made him portray these people in a way different from the traditional one' [18, p. 206]. According to A. Amelkin's research, even Batu Khan 'had features of a wise and formidable tsar' in Russian literature of the first half of the 16th century [1, p. 9].

1 By the way, a similar attitude was expressed by Little Russian dumas of the 16–17th centuries. The Turks and Tatars, who were regarded as identical in the Ukrainian folklore, were both adversaries of Ukraine acting in concert. The Tatars, according to the dumas, were God's punishment for disrespect for parents, the clan, fellow townspeople, and the gromada community, as well as for the failure to observe of fasts and rituals [6, pp. 77–78].

2 See also [27].
According to G. Sabirzyanov, ‘the roots of animosity, defining the attitude of the current feudal-noble establishment of Russia towards the Kazan Tatars, can be found in the three decades after 1521, when the khans of the Crimean dynasty were dominating in Kazan’ [17, p. 21]. However, there were no national-racial conflicts in the relations between the two nations but only political and religious ones in the 16th century.

The biographies of Peter and John of Kazan led A. Amelkin to the following conclusion: ‘The ethnic aspect of the issue does not matter for the hagiographer. A Russian prisoner from Nizhny Novgorod and a citizen of Kazan converting to Orthodoxy and serving the Grand Prince are absolutely equal to him’ [1, p. 10]. It was not ethnic but religious and political issues what dominated the relations between the Russians and the Tatars in the late 15—first half of the 16th centuries. The religious and political aspects were much more important than the ethnics.

Russian proverbs of those times would be an excellent source for us, but these were not recorded until the 17th century [see: 19]. In one of the earliest records, we find a huge number of proverbs and sayings somehow related to the Tatar theme. This proves their importance and significance in the Russian consciousness. They fall into several groups. It is beyond doubt that those implying a negative estimate prevail. ‘There are many unclear Crimean songs, and we don't care’ [19, p. 74]; ‘A messenger from Crimea is like a cockroach appearing from smoke’ [19, p. 92]; ‘Living in Crimea is like living in a bag in smoke’ [19, p. 101]; ‘The time for the Tatars to attack Russia hasn't come yet’ [19, p. 136]. ‘We won't swear allegiance to the Tatars unless one can put one's hands and back at the same time’ [19, p. 154]. ‘Azov does not have a hundred eyes, and Crimea is not curved, 'Azov is glorious, Smolensk is terrible, and Wilno is wonderful’ [19, p. 76]. A great number of them reflect the differences between the ways of life typical for both great nations, from the Russian point of view: 'The Tatars never stop eating meat' [p. 143], meaning that there are no fasting periods in Islam and presenting the Orthodox interpretation of the Uraza. There are many rather neutral proverbs, where the Crimean and Tatar themes are just an excuse, an instrument to illustrate themes that are important to all people: 'As great at home as the khan in Crimea' [19, p. 82], 'Women's minds are like Tatar bags' [19, p. 103]. 'If the bow-string is torn, the Tatar won't fight' [19, p. 143], emphasising the importance of archers to the Tatar army. On the other hand, there are very friendly proverbs showing the relative nature of ethnic, religious and state values, and absolute morality: 'I would live even in the Horde, the main thing is to live well' [19, p. 104] (variant: 'Living in the Horde is good as long as things are well' [19, p. 148], 'Devil is taken away by the damned Turks' [19, p. 152], 'The Turkish tsar is an enemy of Russia' [19, p. 154], 'The Turkish took off their trousers and the Russians whipped them' [19, p. 167], 'Bear, eat up the Tatar without blinking an eye' [19, p. 160], 'Klim is greasing a cart, he is going to Crimea to buy turnips' [19, p. 120].

This dual perception of the Tatars and dependence of the image and the esteem on the period of time when the proverb spread can also be seen in sayings, which still exist in the Russian language. On the one hand, there is this Russian proverb ‘An uninvited guest is worse than a Tatar,’ which is still used, although in the 17th century they used the variant ‘An uninvited guest is better than an invited one' [19, p. 127], which clearly bears no ethnic implications. On the other hand, we can see sympathy or even a friendly attitude towards the Tatars demonstrated by the authors of medieval literary works and opinion essays.

3 In I. Erofeev's opinion, in the first half of the 15th century, there were no signs of animosity between the Russians and the Tatars yet, though the situation changed after 1475 [6, p. 85].

4 It is interesting to compare the proverb with reports by Ottoman traveller Evliya Çelebi, describing Or (Perekop). The local buza seems to have been more famous than others: 'Local specialties include a strong millet drink, or the excellent Tatar buza... Tatars come to Or on horseback even from places lying at a five-day's distance from it to drink Or buza; after drinking it in excess, they get drunk and sing the song 'Kalalai ve bolalai.' The latter meaningless phrase might be a real refrain from a Tatar song (e.g., bolalai might be a corrupted 'bolagai,' meaning 'naughty').
The religious background of these interrelations appears obvious in folklore. Apparently, comparing Tatars to pigs was an old and traditional identification. This comparison is undoubtedly related to the prohibition of eating pork in Islam. It can be found literally everywhere, beginning with Russian children's teasers and ending with strong convictions applied to state building and ideology. Most likely, this idea is typical of the Russian attitude towards Muslims in general (Tatars of different kinds within the empire, and primarily the Turks abroad). In his 'Journey to Erzerum', A. Pushkin described his encounter with Cossacks carrying their comrade who had been injured in a battle at Sagan-Lu near Kars: 'Are there many Turks?', Semichev asked. 'The swines are many, Sir,' answered one of them. By the way, it was wrong of G. Sabirzyanov to identify the following saying by country boys from B. Mozhaev's 'Men and Women' as 'an echo of false historiography, pseudo-science': 'You, bare-headed Tatar, get out of my way' [17, p. 36]. I am afraid it has nothing to do with science. Most likely, this is an echo of the different nations' ideas of each other, whatever bias they may demonstrate. The epithet bare-headed had a clear origin. Apparently, it is related to the Muslim custom of shaving one's head. This epithet is very common and can be found even in Tatar texts written in the late 19—early 20th centuries, where it appears as a nickname of a Tatar among Russians (Ğ.Tuqay's feuillet 'Confessor Revived,' first published in the Yalt-Yult magazine, no. 43, 1912) [20, p. 112].

The Tatar was also identified as a prince. The identification was used by V. Lenin (in his article 'Letter on the National Issue'). However, this idea was also reflected in Russian literature aside from this oddity. In N. Leskov's 'The Enchanted Wanderer', Ivan Severyanovich hid from the police behind the Tatars' backs, begging, 'Save me, princes! You saw everything, the fight was fair...' [10, p. 427]. I refer once again to the feuilleton by G.Tuqay. Ğabdulla parodies a dialogue between a gendarme and a Muslim. 'Prince, go and pray, the mullah is crying.' 'I can't, I have to sell my goods.' 'Well, move along, you bare head' [20, p. 112]. And here is an excerpt from a conversation between an old second-hand bookseller and a Tatar clothes man (set in the pre-revolutionary Moscow): 'Prince, he says, will you give me back the money?' [7, p. 73].

Where does this nickname come from? I think that the stable connection, whether real or alleged, between a significant part of the Russian nobility and the Jochid aristocracy, which is reflected in aristocratic pedigrees in terms of prestige, is a logical explanation.

N. Leskov allows us to gradually arrive at the opposite end of the evaluation spectrum. The protagonist of the same work described the Tatars as follows, 'It is customary for them to call all Russian men Ivan, women Natasha and boys Kolka. It was the same with my wives, although they were Tatar, they were recorded as Russians because I am Russian, so their names were Natasha and the boys' Kolka. It goes without saying that this is very superficial because they had received no church sacraments and I did not consider them as my children.

(1) What do you mean? Why didn't you consider them your children?
(2) Because they were not baptised nor anointed with myrrh [10, p. 433].

This paragraph demonstrates very clearly that in the Russian common consciousness in the first half of the 19th century religious affiliation determined the ethnicity and, eventually, even affected the feelings of kinship. As for the Tatars described by Leskov (most probably, Kazakhs or Turkmen), their ethnic affiliation was determined not by religion, but by belonging to a certain clan or family. A Russian's wife was Russian, too.

The self-identification of Ivan Severyanovich is very interesting in this regard. 'If people cross themselves and drink vodka, they are Russians' [10, p. 447] (some combination of 'ethnic' traits connected to religious ceremonies and foods). Religion dominates: having no idea what

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5 The fact that it is related to foodstuff prohibitions (most evident and eye-catching in daily communication) is also clear if we analyse the attitude of Russians towards Jews. See, for example, Alexander Pushkin's writings ('The Story of the Village of Goryukhino'): '... the madmen sneered at the Jewish coachman and exclaimed mockingly: 'Jew, Jew, eat a piggy's ear!...' [15, p. 65].
the religion of a man is, makes 'living in the steppe dangerous'. A Chuvash, encountered by the main character, had a more concentrated view on ethnic-religious affiliations. According to him, 'A Tatar has no God, he eats horsemeat. I have a God [...]; the Sun is God, and the moon is God, and the stars are Gods... everything is God'. Remarkably, Jesus Christ, Virgin Mary, and Saint Nicholas are all Gods [10, p. 446]. It is interesting that, according to sociological surveys, the ethnic identity of the Volga Tatars is actualised, firstly, through their mother tongue, secondly, through their knowledge of their culture and history and feeling part of it. Religious aspects do not prevail in their self-identification [22, p. 196].

Now we are going to dwell on the image of the Russians in Tatar folklore and literature. I should note of course that it is impossible to exhaust the subject within this section. Therefore, my observations should be regarded as merely the first approach to this topic.

It is interesting to note that the Tatars also had ethnic definitions based on the outward anthropological signs, as did the Russians. For example, the Crimean Tatars called all Russians 'sarı Ivan,' meaning 'red-haired Ivan' [11, p. 60]. By the way, the word 'sarı' can be found very frequently in Crimean papers concerning Slavic slaves (for example, in a hücet). The use of a specific personal name for representatives of a social or ethnic group was also very wide-spread in various languages (compare with the Russian 'Fritz' and 'Hans' for Germans, 'Ivan' for Russians, or the Turkish 'Mehmetlik' used affectionately to refer to soldiers). Moscow horse traders in the Horse Market near Serpukhovskaya Zastava in the 19th century, mostly gypsies, who also had many Tatar words in their vocabulary and had been under the cultural influence of Tatars, also adopted this approach: 'There were times when they called every man "Frolka" for some reason' [2, p. 127]

Let us have a closer look at the international stereotypes reflected in the Crimean medieval historiography. 'The Story of Khan Islam-Giray III' by the khan's historiographer Hajji Mehmed—a Crimean author, an official at the khan's chancellery, later a qadi, also known under the pen name Senay with the nisba Kırcımlı—provides extensive data on this subject. The author finished writing this work, composed at the request of Sefer Gazi aga, a vizier of the khan, in August 1651 (apparently it was begun after 1648) [24]. Senai uses the term 'dog' for the infidels (he uses the words of Persian origin 'seg', 'segler' in their plural form instead of 'it' or 'kepek', which are common in the Turkish language. He rhymes them with 'begler', that is, princes, which he uses for the Polish gentry [24, p. 17]), often calling enemies 'küffar', that is, simply infidel, or 'melain', meaning damned). In general, the chroniclers did not scruple to rhyme ethnonyms with derogatory epithets when speaking of other peoples. Thus, they called Cossacks 'stubborn, obstinate' (kazak—akk), Russians 'those who bring misfortune' (rus—menhus), Kalmyks 'created with malice' (kalmuk—bed mahlük) [24, p. 62].

Let us have a look at the proverbs. Some of the proverbs of the Crimean Turks (Tatars) of Dobruja, Romania deal with the Russians: Úrústan dost bolmaz domuzdan post (tur. Rustan dost olmaz domuzdan post) 'You cannot be friends with a Russian as you cannot make a fur coat from a pig'; Úrusman dos bolsan baltan katında bolsun (tur. Rusla dost olursan baltan yanında olsun), 'Being friends with a Russian is like being on the cutting-edge of an axe' [25, p. 93].

Very illustrative are proverbs of the Crimean Tatars such as 'Kazakı zatrafsı bitmes', that is, 'The Russian tomorrow never ends.'

On the other hand, others reveal a critical attitude to their own people:Tatarıng akla sönünda kelir ('The Tatar brain turns up late [in the end]'). There is an almost exact equivalent in the Russian language: 'Russians are truly wise, in hindsight'.

This combines both points of view: the Russians are bad, but some Tatars are even worse. The last Crimean khan, Şahin Giray remained a negative character in the memories of Tatars.

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6 Probably, it is somehow related to the fact that Florus and Laurus were considered to be the patrons of livestock, including horses, in Russia.
There is a characteristic proverb of the Crimean Tatars that has come down to us: 'Kamchi boyunda kazakka biz met iderim, Shagin Girey hanga hismet itmem' that is, 'I'd rather serve a Russian as tall as a whip than Khan Shahin Giray' [14, p. 55 (no. 484)].

We can see that in their traditional insults against Russian the Tatars used the same elements. 'Tatars and Russians live in harmony now, and the Russians no longer use any offensive language towards the Tatars, as they did about forty years ago. However, sometimes Russian coachmen scold a Tatar by calling him a dog, if he fails to make way for their carts. In such case, the Tatar murmurs softly, dongus 7 and thinks to himself, 'You, al-kafer8'.

Thus, the dynamic changes in mutual perceptions of the Russians and Tatars concerning each other are reflected in the religious continuity and the development of religious policies in Eurasian empires—the Golden Horde and its successors. Shamanism spread among the Mongols under Chinggis Khan and remained popular for a long time after his death, while some Mongolian tribes (the Naimans and the Keraites) professed Nestorian Christianity. Meanwhile, there were many Muslims serving Mongols at the early stage of the westward Mongol expansion. Chinggis Khan himself and the first generations of his descendants, including the Jochids, were rather tolerant when it came to faith: political loyalty to the ruling dynasty was much more important than a common religion. The conquests were not followed by religious repressions: it was politically reasonable to make representatives of all religions equal within the empire. In the beginning, Shamanism was typical for the representatives of the Chinggisids, being regarded as a prerequisite for belonging to the dynasty. At that time, the religious affiliation of the governing Chinggisid was rather his personal choice than a public confession. It was not impossible for a pagan to replace a Muslim khan. A significant part of the population of the Ulus of Jochi remained non-islamised, while traditional Mongol norms and customs prevailed in the state structure, administration and records management. It was not until the time of Öz Beg that Islam became not a matter of choice but the religion of the dynasty, that of the state. Meanwhile, the acceptance of Islam at the state level was not followed by repressions against non-Muslims and the church organisation. Already in 1257, a population census was conducted in Russia, initiated by Khan Mengu [12, columns 474–475]. Its main purpose was fiscal, that is, to organise the collection of taxes. The church was granted an exemption. This policy continued until the 14–15th centuries.

The Muscovite state, which is believed to have been the successor of the Empire of Chinggisids, did not demonstrate an essentially new attitude towards representatives of religious minorities, that is, primarily towards Muslims as the largest group among them. Researchers noticed long ago that, although the Russian state proclaimed itself the embodiment of an Orthodox kingdom on Earth, the protector and guardian of Orthodoxy as the true Christianity since the late 15th century, and especially in the 16th and 17th centuries, neither the state itself, nor its church made any attempts to convert Muslims to Christianity and did not carry out any systematic missionary activities9. Historians offered various explanations for this: as the consequences of the lack of sources on this subject, at least before the 18th century (Josef Glazik10); the specific course of formation of the Muscovite state and the Russian state as a pre-modern empire,
Chapter XII. The Political Development of the Tatar States in the 15–18th Centuries

which did not fit into the common rules of colonial empires (Andreas Kappeler), the perception
of Muslims as foreigners rather than non-Orthodox Christians (Heinz-G. Nolte), specific fea-
tures of the Byzantine-Orthodox attitude of showing understanding towards followers of non-
Orthodox beliefs, which is a specific model of Orthodox religious-cultural pluralism (M.
Dmitriev)\(^\text{11}\). It seems to me that it would be more reasonable to speak of the Eurasian continuity
of religious-linguistic integration, which was most remarkable during the Horde and Russian
periods of Eurasian history.

In the late 13—14th centuries, non-Orthodox Christians (Jews, representatives of other
branches of Christianity, and Muslims) started to serve Russian princes in family, trade and
other spheres. Their presence in Rus' often required conversion to Orthodoxy, while their status
varied. In most cases, this occurred when a person married or entered into service. In 1302,
Fyodor Mikhaylovich, Prince of Byelaazyorsk married the daughter of Tsarevich Ilbasmysh. In
1317, Yury Danilovich married Konchaka, Öz Beg Khan's sister, baptised Agathias [12, column
528; 13, column 108]. The first case when a Tatar entered the service of a Moscow prince was
recorded in 1318, when Tülä-Büğa left the Horde for Moscow, in order to serve Yury Danilo-
vich [9, p. 10]. Most likely, the majority of the new Christians were Muslims at the moment of
their conversion. Conversion to Orthodoxy naturally necessitated the creation of special texts
regulating the procedure of Christening. Indeed, from the 14th century the so called Procedure
for Conversion to Christianity started spreading, according to which the conversion took place:
'The Procedure for Conversion of Jews', 'The Procedure for Conversion of Those Baptised in
Heresy', and 'The Procedure for Conversion of Saracens.' They were based on Greek texts,
which had been translated into Slavic languages starting from the 13th century. The first Slavic
procedures for conversion to Christianity appeared in Serbia at the turn of the 13th century,
namely in the Serbian edition of the 'Kormchaia Kniga' ('Book of the Pilot'), which was brought
to Russia in 1262. The structure of the Muslim conversion procedure represented the pro-
nouncement of a series of curses of various elements of the Islam dogma (both real and imagi-
nary ones), and only the mention at the beginning of the text that this action was to take place
in the church, at the place where baptism was performed, in front of the baptismal font, indicates
that Christening was to follow the curses. This procedure is known from Greek manuscripts
written in the 12th century, while in the Slavic tradition it appeared in the same Serbian version
of the Kormchaia Kniga. When the original Russian version was compiled on the basis of the
Serbian and ancient Slavic versions in the late 13th century, the procedure was not included.
Nevertheless, as new canonical compilations were made in the 14th century, the conversion
procedure for Muslims became part of the Kormchaia Kniga and consequently the Book of
Needs (its most ancient copy dates back to the late 14th century). It should be emphasised that
according to M. Korogodina, the editor of the Russian Procedure in the Book of Needs not only
relied on the early Serbian translation from Greek but referred to the Greek text where clari-
fication was necessary [8, p. 100].

It is essential that in some cases the Russian text of the Procedure in the Book of Needs
turned out to be more detailed than the original. For example, the Serbian version contains the
following phrase: 'Damn Alim, Muhammed's son-in-law and Apoupikert', that is, Ali, the real

\(^{11}\) P. Chaadayev, followed by V. Solovyov, emphasised this feature of Orthodoxy (lack of external
social activities, including missionary work) in contrast to Western Christianity. For P. Chaadayev, East-
ern Christianity preserved the purity and asceticism of Byzantium but had lost the political freedom; it
was subordinate to political power and thus did not become the yeast of social life. The preservation of
the canonic truth was the prime task of the Orthodox East; organisation of church activities under the
guidance of the single and definitely independent spiritual authority was the prime task of the Catholic
West' (V. Solovyov, 1883) [see: 4, pp. 166–169].
son-in-law of the prophet, the husband of his daughter Fatima and Abu Bakr as-Siddik (the first righteous caliph and Muhammad's father-in-law). In the Russian version of the Book of Needs, this curse reads as follows: 'Damn Alim, Muhammad's son-in-law, and Hasan and Housen and his sons, and Apouikier.' The name of Abu Bakr was distorted beyond recognition to Aputiker in the Russian, Chudov version of the Kormchaia Kniga: While another article of the edition, present in the Greek and Serbian originals, did not mention his name 'Apopukrij Sadokijskij' at all. There was no enumeration of Muhammad's sons in the Serbian version, nor in the Russian one, on which it was based. Nevertheless, it is present in some of the Greek copies [8, 101]. The Book of Needs also contains other individual readings, which were not typical of the Serbian and early Russian versions of the Kormchaia Kniga. This means that, for some reason, the Russian editor of the Procedure in the Book of Needs decided to extend the Procedure, while the Greek was primarily meant for Sunni Muslims ('Apopukrij Sadokijskij') to Shiites. It is difficult to say why this happened in Rus', but it is evident that the initial text was adapted to the Russian conditions and circumstances.


§ 4. Tatar Yurts and the Ottoman Empire

Ilya Zaitsev

Diplomatic relations between the Ottoman Empire and the Golden Horde began in the 14th century. However, the earliest example of correspondence between the Golden Horde and the Ottoman Empire that we are aware of is the original of a letter from Khan Ulugh Muhammad addressed to Sultan Murad II (Topkapi no. 10202) of 14 March 1428. The document was written in the Chagatai language. It was found by A. Kurat in Topkapi Palace archive and published by...
him in 1937 [75] 12. J. Pelenski regarded this document as a Kazan text. He commented, with justification, that there may be objections to including this letter as a Kazan document, since the message was written when Ulugh Muhammad was still on the throne of the Golden Horde, i.e., before he had become the first ruler of the new Kazan Khanate. However, the fact that 'the Kazan Khanate was founded by dissident elements of the Golden Horde and Ulugh Muhammad became the first khan of the new Tatar state allows us to consider this yarliq as being at least a borderline case' [90, p. 14] 13.

A text is written on the reverse of the sheet. It would appear to have no relation to Ulugh Muhammad's letter. It is a copy of a Fateh-name 14 by Murad II about the conquest of the fortress, Güvercinlik ('Pigeon House') 15. It was written in Arabic in 831 AH and sent to Egypt to Beg Akbuga [76, p. 7] 16. A period of 831 AH corresponds to a period between 22 October 1427 and 10 October 1428. The name Güvercinlik is a Turkish calque of the Serbian word 'Golubac', the name given to a fortress situated on the Right Bank of the Danube River east of Belgrade [73, p. 106] 17. Ottoman troops conquered the fortress twice. The first time was in November 1427, when Golubac was voluntarily ceded to the Turks by the commander of the city, Jeremiah, instead of being handed over to the Hungarians as was provided for by the treaty between the Serbian despot and King Sigismund 18 [65, p. 430; 69, pp. 163–164; 20, pp. 220–221; 11, pp. 300–301]. According to Tarsun Bega's Tarih-i Ebülfeth, the city was conquered for the second time in July 1458, by Mahmud Pasha's troops [67, p. 81a] 19. The final conquest

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12 This publication, as the publisher itself acknowledged, was 'realised within a brief period of just over three weeks' and contained inaccuracies. For amendments to this edition that specify the textual discrepancies and conjectures, see [62, pp. 144–145]. More reliable editions: [76, pp. 6–36; 63, pp. 609–626; 40, pp. 53–61], appendix; amendments to the text and translation, as well as a description of the document's outward appearance, see: [41, pp. 237–239]. For conjectures on A. Kurat's edition, see [30, p. 188]. For the Russian translation of the published letter by A. Kurat, 1940, see [32, pp. 28–34]. An almost complete copy of the 1940 edition (which did not reproduce the text and commentary) was published in 1996 by A. Melek Özyetgin. However, it is valued much less highly than A. Kurat's edition [88]. For a description of the appearance and specific features of this document, see also [102, pp. 214–215]. See also [14, pp. 49–50].

13 J. Pelenski's use of the term 'yarliq' in relation to Ulugh Muhammad's letter appears to be incorrect and results from A. Kurat's inconsistent approach to the classification of Golden Horde and post-Horde documents. 'As regards yarliqs, this term refers to mandative letters (nameler) written by Golden Horde, Crimean and Kazan Khans addressing rulers of foreign lands. This term [yarliq] also applies to letters patent (yazilar) issued by Khans to their subjects or anybody else' [76, p. 3; 45]. On the other hand, A. Kurat was absolutely correct in applying the terms 'letters' or 'messages' (bitikler) to documents from the Khan that were addressed to Turkish Sultans, for instance [76, p. 4; 45]. In using the terms 'yarliq', 'message', 'letter', etc. I fully follow the definitions given by M. Usmanov, except where I quote other authors.

14 For information on the Ottoman fateh-name, see [78, pp. 192–196].

15 The fortress is called by the same name in the Ottoman takvim (calendar chronicle), the so-called list A [98, p. 24], as well as an Ottoman document of 1487. See. [66, p. 180] (Ve bir dahi Güvercin-lik karşısında Varadan adlı insârîlîk vardur). A slightly different spelling (Gügercinlik) is given in the Ottoman defter of 1549/1550, see [85, p. 13r.]. For details on the transformation of kef-i farsi into the sound 'v' in live pronunciation, see [34, p. 34].

16 For an abridged text of the document, see [61, pp. 201–202]. This source also reproduces the reply to Murad.

17 For information on the medieval city, see [10].

18 Sigismund (15.II.1368–9, 1437) was the son of Charles IV, King of Hungary (1387–1437), King of Germany (1410–1437), King of Bohemia (1419–1436) and the Holy Roman Emperor (1433–1437). For information on him, see [57, p. 122].

19 Hüseyin dates the capture of Güvercinlik and the defeat of the Serbs and Hungarians at the fortress to 831–832 AH (1427/29) [50, sheet 169a, 171a]. The historian also dates the capture of Jan-owasa to the same year. Hüseyin also mentions another 'Gügercinlik', probably in Iran [50, sheet 143a], although it is more likely to have been a town in the sanjak of Hûdavendigar [83, p. 90 b.6].
of Golubac made the city a strategically-important border fortress. Its citizens guarded Ottoman ships in the river and protected the city itself from raids by Hungarians and Hajduks [18, p. 159]. The fortress was besieged by Sigismund's troops from the beginning of 1428 until June of that year. Fierce battles were waged around the city. With an unexpected raid, the sanjak-bey of Vidin and Sinan-Bey inflicted considerable losses on the Hungarian troops [87, pp. 151–152]. Clearly, the original *fateh-name* refers to the first conquest of Golubac by the Ottomans, meaning it was written after November 1427 when the Turks conquered the city.

Ashraf Sayf-ad-Din Barsbay was the ruler in Egypt at that time. His reign lasted from 1422 to 1438. Murad II exchanged embassies and letters with him. A letter to Murad Barsbay dated 10 Zul-hijj 831 and the Mamluk sultan's reply have been preserved [61, pp. 195–198; 58, p. 389]. The fall of Güvercinlik and the defeat of the Hungarians in 1428 was a reason for the Ottomans and Mamluks to maintain contact. In 1430, an Ottoman messenger brought a message to Egypt about the Turks' conquest of Thessaloniki [58, p. 389]. Apparently, Akbuga, to whom Murad II's *fateh-name* was sent, was the emir of Barsbay, the 'inspector' of Upper Egypt, whose full name was Akbuga Jamali [58, pp. 46–47, 149]. He was called 'the emir of true believers' and 'the pillar of the state and faith' in the text of the *fateh-name*. In any case, the text of the *fateh-name* appears to have ended up on the reverse side of Ulugh Muhammad's letter after it had been received in Istanbul, i.e. the original of the khan's message was reused in the sultan's chancellery. It is not quite clear why a copy of the *fateh-name* was placed on the reverse side of the letter from Ulugh Muhammad. It is hard to imagine that it was done for lack of writing material. However, there would appear to be no direct connection between these documents except the year of writing (1428).

The text of Ulugh Muhammad's letter has not been fully preserved: some parts have been damaged by moisture and are illegible. In his letter to Murad II, the khan deals with the history of Ottoman-Horde relations: 'Our former brother Khans and your fathers, the sultans of the vilayet Rûm, and our elder brothers sent one another ambassadors, exchanged gifts and greetings, traded through merchants and maintained good relations. Then, our brother Toktamys Khan and your great grandfather Gazi Bayezid Beg, according to the good old custom, exchanged ambassadors, gifts, greetings and, living in friendship and harmony, were granted the Lord's mercy' [76, pp. 8–9, 161–165; 41, p. 54, text in the appendix]. This document testifies 'not only to the exchange of embassies between the Sarai khans and the Turkish sultans in the 1320–30s, but also reports that such contact was made under Sultan Bayezid and Khan Toktamys on the eve of Timur's military campaigns in the Volga Region and Asia Minor, i.e. when the Sarai khans and the Turkish sultans were interested in creating an anti-Timur alliance. It is also clear from the letter that the correspondence between the Turkish sultans and the Jochids is based on an earlier tradition' [46, p. 128]. Indeed, Ulugh Muhammad's words on the ancient links between the Ottomans and the Horde are most likely 'not merely declarative in nature, but documentary' [46, p. 132, fn.]. The impetus for continuing official contacts was the common foreign policy interests of the two states in the late 14th century. M. Safargaliev suggested that a rapprochement between Toktamys and Bayezid

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20 In the 17th century, Golubac was an ordinary judicial and administrative district (kasa) in the sanjak of Semendire, Budin Eyalet [94, p. 227].
21 His name was specifically mentioned in the heading of the *fateh-name*. The letter's title calls it (the letter) *name-i humayun* (the august message).
22 The date corresponds to 21 September 1428.
23 Thessaloniki was conquered by Ottoman troops on 13 March 1430 [87, p. 152].
24 Writing another text on the reverse side of a document is known to have been diplomatic practice. For example, a letter by an Azov dizdar to Moscow in 1521 was written on the reverse side of a charter by the Kaffa sanjakbeg Muhammad [Russian State Archive of Ancient Acts, fund 89, inventory 1, item 1, sheet 146]. However, both texts in that instance were originals. In our case, the reverse of the original was used to create a copy of another document.
may have occurred in 1394, when Toktamysh was looking for allies against Timur. 'There is no
direct indication of this, but indirect data suggest that such an alliance was possible' [36, p. 418].
More detail can be provided based on this proposition. In 1394, the Egyptian Sultan az-Zahir
Barquq hosted ambassadors from Toktamysh in Damask: Bayezid and Burkhan ad-Din Ahmed,
the ruler of Sivas. Tagri Birdi, a Mamluk historiographer recorded an account of their meeting:
'The ambassadors of Toktamysh Khan, the ruler of the Kipchak (Kıfcak) land, arrived there to offer
an alliance against Timurlenk. The sultan accepted their offer. The ambassadors of the Ottoman
sultan Yildrym Bayezid, the ruler of Asia Minor, came after him, reporting that he had sent
200,000 warriors to help az-Zahir, and he would be waiting for the sultan's reply so that he could
act accordingly...' [96, p. 148; 16, pp. 95–96] Barquq accepted these offers with gratitude. It may
have been in Damask in August 1394 that the first official meeting between representatives of
Toktamysh and Bayezid took place. There, the representatives of four countries discussed the pros-
pects of a war against Timur25.

The defeat of Toktamysh in 1395 and the catastrophe of 28 July 1402 (the battle of Ankara),
brought a temporary halt to the development of relations between the two states. Both the Ottoman
Empire and the Golden Horde were suffering serious internal shocks, as a result of which diplo-
matic contacts between the two countries lost their relevance. Nevertheless, according to inform-
ation from two of Timur's court chroniclers, Sharaf ad-Dīn 'Alī Yazdī and Nizam ad-Din Shami,
along with Byzantine historian Laonikos Chalkokondyles, a part of the Horde headed by Emir
Aktau fled to the lower reaches of the Dnieper after being defeated by Timur at the Vorskla River
in 1397. Then they most likely went west and reached the Ottoman possessions on the Danube in
1398. Aktau was forced to enter into negotiations with Bayezid, as a result of which the refugees
settled on the southern Danube and in the Balkans. It was possibly this group that plundered Varna
in February 1399. However, soon after, Bayezid changed his mind and arranged a bloody massa-
cre of Tatar leaders. This could only have provoked resistance from the Tatars. Those who sur-
vived were resettled around Edirne27.

Unfortunately, we have no information regarding the development of Ottoman-Horde diplo-
matic relations in the early 15th century. In one of his early articles, T. Halasi Kun dated
Ulugh Muhammad's embassy to Murad in Adrianople to 1424 [62, p. 143]. This would appear
to be erroneous. In February 1424, after visiting several cities in Asia Minor, Murad received
ambassadors from neighbouring powers in Ephesus [12, p. 73]. There is no source information
of which I am aware that states Ulugh Muhammad sent an embassy to Murad in 1424. Ulugh
Muhammad's letter appears to be a first official message intended to restore diplomatic relations
after a long interval. The reason for this hiatus would appear to be the renewal of the alliance
between Toktamysh and Timur at the very beginning of the 15th century.

It is clear from Ulugh Muhammad's letter that there were two routes by which embassies
were exchanged between the two countries. The first route went over land through the Black
Sea Region steppes and Wallachia. The second went via the Black Sea: 'We did not send a

25 According to works by Ibn al-Furat, al-Maqrizi and Ibn Hoshba al-Asadi, Toktamysh's embassy
arrived in Damask on 26 March 1394 (23 Jumada I 796 AH, a Thursday) or, as per al-Asqalani and al-
Ayni, on 20 Jumada I of the same year (that is, on 23 March) [44, pp. 356 (363), 428 (442), 445 (448),
450 (453), 531]. The negotiations, therefore, had been held there before August 28th, when the Sultan
moved to Aleppo.

26 A special report by Ezher Muhammadi was dedicated to this event at the 13th Congress of the
Turkish Historical Society. The scholar, however, called it a 'triple' alliance, as he did not include the
Sivas ruler. See [82, p. 136]. Incidentally, the following lines have remained in a divan by Kadi Burhan
al-Din (1345–1398): 'İki âlemde Hak'a sığınmış // Tohtamış ne ola ya ahsah Temur [100, p. 5]. Trans-
lation: 'In the two worlds (this and the other world), we set our hopes upon the Truth (that is God), what
are Toktamysh or Aksak Timur (to us).' These lines by the poet were of interest to A. Krymsky [6, p. 73].

27 That is a reconstruction of the events based on reports by Chalkokondyles, Badr al-Din al-'Ayni
and the chronicles of Shami and Yazdi. See [59, pp. 77–92]. See also [2, p. 155; 60, pp. 13–14].
person to you, thinking that if we did, Aflak would not let him pass. We knew that you had sent a man to us by sea. What happened for him not to arrive?' [76, pp. 8–9, 161–166; 40, p. 54; 41, p. 239].

European diplomats at that time were devising plans to create an anti-Ottoman coalition involving Asian states. One of the main roles in this potential alliance was given to the khans of the Ulus of Jochi. The idea of engaging the Kipchak khans in the anti-Ottoman alliance already had its own history by the early 15th century, as European states, in particular Byzantium and Venice, had made similar attempts in the 1380–90s [92].

In autumn 1411, before Sigismund (1387–1437) and the King of Poland met, the Polish delegation in Rome asked (Anti)Pope John XXII to declare a crusade on the Tatars. However, Sigismund's ambassadors convinced the Pope that such a campaign would be a fatal error. Sigismund believed the Tatars were the natural allies of European countries against the Ottoman Empire. Wladyslaw was prepared to share Sigismund's views: in 1412, when the Tatar khan's ambassadors arrived in Buda to offer the Polish king an alliance against all of his enemies, he, like Sigismund, accepted the offer. At the beginning of 1412, Sigismund sent ambassadors (Nicholaus de Geretz) via the Genoese city of Kaffa to Khan Jalal ad-Din, Toktamysh's son, who ruled between 1411 and 1412. They invited him to join the anti-Ottoman league with Byzantium, and received an affirmative response [95, p. 591].

The list of gifts (litterae donationis) given by Sigismund in Nad'sombat on 6 February 1428, contains a description of the mission of two Hungarian ambassadors (the recipients of the grant) to Asian rulers with the aim of concluding an alliance against Turkey. This document is kept in the Hungarian National Archive (Magyar Országos Levélútár, Diplomatikai Levélútár: 100.445). The ambassadors' names were Miklós Szerecsen (Nicolaus Sarachenus) and Josza Török (Iosa Turcus). Nicolaus Gerecz (one of Sigismund's ambassadors) was taken prisoner by the Turks in Nikopol and spent 12 years in captivity. After being freed in 1408, he entered Sigismund's service. He may have been called Sarachenus because he had been held prisoner by Muslims. When he returned to Hungary from captivity, a Turk, later christened as Josza Török, joined him on his way back. He also entered Sigismund's service and carried out diplomatic commissions on behalf of the monarch with Nicolaus Sarachenus [54, p. 273].

Among other things, the document stated: '...Yoz a Tereq was sent to Prince Mahomet, the lord of the Tatars of the Horde, as our messenger; the prince was also planning to attack the vile Turks, so he (i.e., the ambassador) brought us the reply we wished to hear...' [71, pp. 10–13]. Mahomet, 'ruler of the Horde Tatars', who received Sigismund's ambassadors was, according to L. Tardy, Ulugh Muhammad [97, pp. 18–19]. However, L. Tardy was working on the basis that the embassies mentioned in the manuscript were sent in 1428 (i.e. the year the copy of the manuscript itself was written). Not so long ago, Agoston, using the original archive document, showed that the copy mentioned not Miklós Girosh mission to Karamania in 1428 but Sigismund's ambassadors to Kara Yuluku, the ruler of the Ak-Qoyunlu Turkmen state in 1419 [54, pp. 273–274]. Thus, Sigismund's embassy to 'Mohammed, the ruler of the Horde Tatars' (that is, Ulugh Muhammad) took place between 1419 and 1428. Stromer von Reichenbach estimated Terek's embassy to Ulugh Muhammad took place between 1419–1423 [95, p. 596]. Since Muhammad's accession to the throne took place in late 1421, as estimated by M. Safargaliev, we are able to narrow down the period in which the diplomatic mission could have taken place. Yoz a Tereq visited Ulugh Muhammad and received a satisfactory response to Sigismund's offer before 1423. In this light, it becomes clearer why the sultan's chancellery linked Ulugh Muhammad's correspondence to documents about military actions against Sigismund, and why there was a copy of a fateh-name

28 Iflak/Aflak—Wallachia.
29 Byzantium was trying to use Timur as a counterbalance to the Turks.
30 This was the view held by N. Jörg [70, p. 406] and, later, L. Tardy.
Chapter XII. The Political Development of the Tatar States in the 15–18th Centuries

dated 831 (late 1427–1428) reporting the conquest of the Serbian fortress Golubac (Güvercinlik) on the reverse side of the khan’s letter to Sultan Murad II.

According to the Tati Treaty between Serbian despot Stefan and Sigismund concluded in May 1426, Đurađ Branković (Stefan’s nephew, Vuk’s son and Lazar’s maternal grandson) was acknowledged as the heir to the Serbian throne. According to the treaty, Belgrade and Golubac were to be passed to Sigismund if Lazarević died without leaving any male heirs (which, considering the state of his health, was an obvious consideration). If Đurađ had no heirs, the Serbian lands would also pass to Sigismund. In essence, signing the treaty meant the Serbians accepted a Hungarian diktat in return for assistance in defending themselves against the Turks. Serbia, which was considered the sultan’s vassal state, entered the anti-Ottoman coalition³¹.

On 19 June 1427, Despot Stefan Lazarević died after hunting with a falcon. Đurađ Branković was anointed to rule as was expected. He ascended the throne without notifying Sultan Murad II. Branković went to Golubac, and it was the voivode of Golubac, Jeremiah, who placed his hand and weapons on the anointed ruler to acknowledge Đurađ’s rights.

Meanwhile, the Ottomans, unhappy that their vassal state was getting out of hand, sent a powerful expeditionary corps against Serbia. On 3 September, the Ottoman army headed by Isabeg besieged Novo Brdo. Murad himself set out to help Isa’s corps. Kruševac was soon captured. In this critical situation, Branković started to fulfil the promises of the Tati Treaty, relying on Hungarian assistance against the Turks. It is likely that in September or even late October 1427, Belgrade was handed over to Sigismund. Golubac was to be next. However, Jeremiah, the voivode of the fortress, intervened by demanding 12,000 ducats in order to hand the fortress over to the Hungarians. Most likely, this was the amount he had paid the despot for the right to rule the city³². Jeremiah presented a document as evidence, but the king questioned the authenticity of the seal and the amount of the payment. Caught in the crossfire between the Turks and King Sigismund, and seeing that it was pointless to negotiate with Sigismund, Jeremiah made a similar proposition to the sultan and obtained his consent. As soon as winter came, Jeremiah surrendered Golubac to the Turks without a fight. The required sum of money had apparently been paid. Until May 1428, there were almost no changes in the situation around the fortress: Đurađ maintained peace with the sultans and diligently paid the kharaj. Nevertheless, the situation became more complex when Sigismund interfered, leading 30,000 Hungarian troops in a siege of the fortress’s Turkish garrison at the end of April 1428. Until June 1428, when the opposing sides concluded a three-year truce with the assistance of Sinan-Bey, the Golubac’s Turkish garrison was besieged by Sigismund’s Hungarian troops from the direction of the Danube River and the open field and suffered frequent bombardments [69, pp. 163–164; 33, pp. 54–55; 20, pp. 220–221; 11, pp. 300–301; 9, pp. 338, 106, 108; 39, pp. 71, 90–92, 96, 99, 101].

It is possible that Istanbul was afraid of Ulugh Muhammad’s participation in Serbian-Hungarian events, or, on the contrary, they were considering the possibility of engaging the khan, who had spent the winter on the Dnieper (the Ozu), according to his letter addressed to Murad, in military actions on the Danube. Unfortunately, we cannot be sure.

Europe’s plans to engage Islamic states in an anti-Ottoman coalition included Mamluk Egypt, and Venice sent two ambassadors to the Egyptian sultan to prevent the renewal of friendly relations between Egypt and the Ottomans. The foreign policy of Ulugh Muhammad was quite expansive. As Al-Ayni reported on 21 April 1429 (that is, one year after the letter to Murad II had

³¹ For more details on the treaty, see [91].
³² Turkish historian I. Uzunçarşılı explained the nature of these twelve thousand ducats in a similar way (as a debt of the town vicegerent or a kind of a redemption sum). Sigismund allegedly even paid the money, but the fortress passed to the Ottomans [99, p. 407] (compare the unfortunate misprint—831 AH—1425 ! ibid.).
been written), his ambassadors arrived in Egypt bearing a gift and two letters (in Arabic and Mongolian, written in the Uighur alphabet) [44, p. 502; 93, p. 158]. It is possible that J. Schiltberger, who mentions Ulugh Muhammad's embassy to the Mamluk sultan on the occasion of his daughter's wedding, was included in this very embassy to sultan al-Malik Barsbay [52, pp. 36, 46]. Unfortunately, the results and true purposes of these embassies are ultimately unknown. It is not clear just how real Ulugh Muhammad's 'anti-Ottoman' position actually was. The scarcity of sources does not allow us to provide a definitive answer to this question. No papers on the relations between Ulugh Muhammad and Turkish sultans in the subsequent period are known to have survived to the current day. This is most likely attributable to the fact that the formation of the Kazan Khanate brought about changes in Ulugh Muhammad's foreign policy interests. The Ottoman Empire did not play the main role in his foreign policy. Initially, this place was occupied by the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and then by the Principality of Moscow.

Ulugh Muhammad began developing relations with Grand Prince Vytautas of Lithuania in the first half of the 1420s. In 1424, ambassadors of Ulugh Muhammad arrived to Vytautas, and on 1 January 1425, Vytautas wrote the Grand Master: '... We report to you that the Tatar state is split into two and divided. So, there are six rulers there now who are struggling for power. One of them, Mahmet, is with us. The rest live in different places, as their lands are great and expansive' [3, pp. 189–190].

At the end of January 1429, Grand Prince Vytautas of Lithuania and Russia, King of Poland Władysław (Jagiello), King Sigismund of Germany and Rome, and representatives of the Pope, the Byzantine emperor, the King of Denmark, the Grand Master of the Teutonic Order in Prussia and Livonia, the Ruler of Moldova, minor Russian and Lithuanian princes, dukes of Mazovia and others all gathered in Lutsk. The congress sat for approximately two weeks, with the main issue on the agenda being the all-European struggle against the Turks [43, p. 139]. According to some dubious information, the Perekop Khan was also present at the congress [51, p. 60]. A. Krymsky believed that this was Hacı Giray, 'a recent vassal of Vytautas, and an enemy of Turkey' [26, pp. 43, 177]. The presence of Hacı Giray at the congress as the Crimean Khan was unlikely, as at that time, Ulugh Muhammad was the khan of Crimea and the Jochid lands. Vytautas wrote in a letter to the Livonian Order dated 9 September 1429 (shortly before the congress): 'Our friend, Tsar Mahmet, wrote to us that he now possesses the entire state and the Horde, and offered us a lasting union through his ambassador' [36, p. 486]. Most likely, the khan did not attend the congress personally, but it is entirely possible that his representatives were present. The question of Moldova was at the top of the agenda. Sigismund, who had heard that King Alexander was interacting with the Turks, asked Jagiello to begin the partition of Moldavia or order Alexander, as his vassal, to stop negotiations with the Turks and aid the Emperor in the struggle against them. Sigismund was conducting negotiations with the ambassadors of the Order to establish a special branch on the Danube River as a permanent military colony to fight against the Turks, although this idea was never brought to fruition [43, p. 145]. The Emperor formally requested Jagiello and Vytautas help him against the Turks. Jagiello gathered a detachment (mainly consisting of immigrants from Russia, which was met with much discontent there), but having joined the King of Moldavia, it did not wait for Sigismund's forces and returned to Lithuania [3, p. 233]. In August 1430, the Perekop Khan stayed in Vilnius personally for the coronation of Vytautas, but this event never actually took place [43, p. 151].

Correspondence between the Khan and the Livonian Order is an important source of the history of the policies of Ulugh Muhammad regarding Eastern Europe. The fate of these materials, collected by Gennig and stored in the Königsberg archive, is unknown. Most likely, they were not preserved, similar to the materials from this collection used by N. Karamzin while

33 Prussian commanders noted in their report from the conference in Lutsk (15 January 1429) that the burgomaster of the town of Kassan sought the patronage of Vytautas at the conference, and A. Babashev considered this related not to Kazan, but to the Kashin prince [3, p. 201, note 23].
working on his 'History of the Russian State'. They were not found among the copies of documents from the Königsberg Archive in the Russian State Archive Of Ancient Acts (F. 147). The only source are paraphrases of letters of Švitrigaila and Ulugh Muhammad, for example, a very unclear German translation of a letter by Ulugh Muhammad addressed to the Grand Master of the Livonian Order dated 1433 (Secret Archive no. LXXVII), in the monograph of A. Kotzebue [25, pp. 168–169] and the work by N. Karamzin. A. Kotzebue, who worked in the Königsberg Archive in 1813, had this document at his disposal, as well as the letters of Švitrigaila addressed to the Grand Master of the Order, containing unique information on the participation of Ulugh Muhammad in Lithuanian internecine feuds. N. Karamzin used copies sent to him and the Minister of Internal Affairs O. Kozodavlev by the Expedition of Baltic Nobility [23, p. 357].

Ulugh Muhammad entered into an alliance with Švitrigaila, who together with the Order was fighting against Jagiełło for the throne of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and it appears that at the beginning of 1431 he swore a šert to him. On 9 May 1431, Švitrigaila wrote to Livonian Master Paul from Smolensk that his ambassador, 'the austere knight Peter, voivode of Novgorod, has returned from the Tatar khan with the assurance that the khan wishes to maintain friendly relations with him and his administration, and that he is ready to provide him with troops and even take part in battles personally if necessary. He confirmed his words with a promise in writing, as many previous khans had also given to the representatives of Švitrigaila. He also sent to him four noble princes, including his father-in-law, to confirm their friendship, and released voivode Gregory Protasyev, voivode of Mtsensk, and many other prisoners' [25, p. 94]. According to N. Karamzin, Švitrigaila's letter (apparently a more accurate version) read as follows: '...we sent our boyar Mikhail Arbanass to Tsar Mahomet in the Horde, and then we sent Pan Ivashka Monividadovich to the Horde again, asking the tsar for help. Mikhailo Arbanas came to us in Smolensk on the same day as Kuntur's servant Klmodok: Tsar Mahmet told us through Mikhailo, "If I promised to stand with you, my brother Grand Prince Švitrigaila, I will keep my word in full. I sent twelve thousand men to help you this winter, brother, headed by many princes, but when they reached Kiev they had to turn back; it was snowing so heavily that they could not go further. Now, my brother Grand Prince Švitrigaila, I am sending my elder son Tsarevich Mamutyak, my son-in-law and right hand Prince Aidar, and another son-in-law, Prince Elberdey, with many men... and in my decree I have a yarliq: if these men are not enough, I can come myself and bring all my people..."' [22, p. 334].

On 13 December 1432, the Master of Livonia reported to the Grand Master of the Order that he had heard from Švitrigaila's servant Yushka that the Tatar Khan had sent Švitrigaila 'his son-in-law and 20,000 warriors, adding to them 50,000 'Wallachians' and another 50,000 warriors headed by the voivode of Kiven (Kiev?). These forces are to act together against the Poles' [25, p. 153; the Secret Archive no. LXXI]. The strength of the troops sent by Ulugh Muhammad was clearly overstated by Švitrigaila, but the report about the number of 'Wallachians' sent is interesting in and of itself. Wallachia and Moldova played an important role in the anti-Ottoman plans of European monarchs. The Wallachian ruler Mircha (1386–1418) paid kharaj to the Turks for the first time in 1394 and then in 1415, but he remained independent. However, Alexander Aldea (1431–1436) was forced to start sending prisoners and making annual payments to the Ottoman Empire in 1431, meaning a year before the khan supposedly sent troops (the

For information on the documents of the Königsberg archives used by Karamzin, see [23, pp. 357–358].

Secret Archive no. XXI. Mtsensk voivode G. Protasyev was captured through the deception of Ulugh Muhammad's son-in-law Aidar nearby Mtsensk in October 1430 [17, pp. 43, 44, 227].

Mahmudek, the successor of Ulugh Muhammad in Kazan.

For the etymology and correlation of forms of wallach-vlach-woloch see: [19, pp. 61–85; 24, pp. 5–17].
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beginning of Wallachia's vassalage) [68, p. 124]. Švitrigaila suggested to the Roman Emperor through his messenger S. Roth that he marry the Moldovan voivode's daughter to draw him away from a union with the Turks and Poles. The emperor agreed and expressed his gratitude for the prince's intention to help him in his struggle against the Turks [25, p. 203]. Naturally, the participation of Wallachians in Ulugh Muhammad's military operations, if this indeed ever took place, could not have gone unnoticed by the Ottomans. It is not clear to what extent the actions of the khan with regard to Turkey's vassal were authorised by the Ottoman Empire itself.

The letter of Ulugh Muhammad to Murad II dated 1428 testifies to friendly relations between the two states. But it is also clear from the letter that relations between Ulugh Muhammad and Wallachia were rather tense: 'For the past one or two years, we have been coming to the Ozu River to spend the winter'. We did not send a person to you, thinking that if we did, Aflak would not let him pass... Let us know how best to get rid of those infidels serving Aflak who are between us' [76, pp. 8–9; 40, pp. 54–55; 41, p. 239]. It is possible that there were common military operations between the Ottomans and Ulugh Muhammad against Wallachia, which resulted in the country becoming a vassal of the Empire, and in 1432 the khan might have sent Švitrigaila a number of Wallachian troops (vassals of the sultan and thus allies of the khan) as aid, meaning

On 6 January 1433, commander Ludwig Lanze (an ambassador of the Grand Master to Švitrigaila) forwarded the German translation of the khan's letter to Švitrigailato, the Grand Master from Veitvisk. According to A. Kotzebue, the contents of the letter are, 'most likely due to a lack of knowledge on the part of the translator, completely incomprehensible. One can only hope to guess from it that Khan Mahmet intended to come personally to help Švitrigaila, or to send him his military commanders and allies. All the Grand Prince needed to do was to say immediately what kind of assistance he needed, and Mahmet and his troops were ready to set off. And the khan also ordered Prince Michael of Kiven (Kiev?) to appear before him [25, pp. 168–169; Secret Archive no. LXXVII]. Lanze also wrote in a letter addressed to the Grand Master from Lukelin dated 11 February that 'the Tatar khan sent five princes [Ulaen], his close relatives, and 10,000 warriors [Bogen]', with whom Švitrigaila was planning to advance on Lithuania that winter [25, p. 169; Secret Archive no. LXXVIII]. On 11 April 1434, Švitrigaila reported from Vyazma that the khan's ambassador had come to notify him that the khan and all his troops had set off for Kiev oblast [25, p. 192]. On 24 February 1436, Švitrigaila wrote to the Grand Master from Kiev that the Tatar khan himself had come to help him, and his camp was standing near Kiev [25, p. 220], but on 29 November of the same year he said in a letter from Lutsk (Secret Archive no. CXVI) that everything was going well, and that the Tatar khan Sedahmet, who was his friend and ally, had defeated Mahmet and subjugated the Horde, and promised him help in the near future [25, pp. 223–224]. The defeat of Ulugh Muhammad by Sayyid-Ahmed in 1436 and by Küchük Muhammad in 1437 ended in his flight to the borders of Russia towards Belyov. The subsequent events (the Battle of Belyov, the formation of the Kazan Khanate, the battle at the Saviour Monastery of St. Euthymius and the capture of Vasily II) are beyond the scope of this work (they are described in Russian historiography in detail, so there is no need to retell them here) [17, pp. 81–83, 101–108].

The collapse of the Golden Horde as a single state led to the formation of new, independent political entities in its outlying areas—the Kazan Khanate (1438 or 1445), the Crimean Khanate (approximately 1441), what is known as the Kasimov Khanate (1452), as well as the Astrakhan Khanate (approximately 1502). The main successor to the Golden Horde was the

38 See also [79, pp. 65–81; 80, pp. 81–95].
39 The Dnieper.
40 uhlans.
41 An article by B. Florya also focuses on relations between the Horde and the states of Eastern Europe during this time [see 48].
Great (or Greater, i.e., the largest of all) Horde (Taht Eli—i.e., the Throne Possessions, as the state was officially called). Most likely, the Ottoman Empire established diplomatic contacts with some of them in the 1450s (it appears with the exception of Kasimov and Kazan). The Great Horde and Crimean Khanate were the most significant, but the documents of diplomatic exchange between the khans of the Great Horde and Ottoman sultans have clearly reached us in an incomplete form. The letter of Khan Mahmud to Ottoman Padishah Mehmed II dated 10 April 1466, and mentioning some 'important affairs' which had prevented the khan from sending people to the sultan earlier, was chronologically the first. This document, which was a reply to an Ottoman embassy to the Horde, appears to be an attempt to form an alliance with the Ottomans against a third party, most likely the independent Crimea [15, pp. 84–86]. The answer to this message did not make it to our days. Further documents in the Horde-Ottoman diplomatic exchange date from the second half of the 1470s, when the situation in the region changed significantly (in 1475 the Ottomans conquered the southern coast of the Crimean Peninsula and concluded a vassalage and protectorate treaty with the Crimean Chinggisids). These are two messages from Khan Ahmed to Mehmed II (881/1476–1477 and 882/May–June 1477), and an undated text by Mehmed II written between July 1475 and April 1477 [15, p. 92].

Since then, the position of the Great Horde was defined not only by the conflict with the increasing power of the Crimean Khanate, but with the Ottoman Empire as well, which stood behind the Khan. Moreover, the Muscovite state was also an ally of Crimea. It is possible that in the 1480s, after the death of Khan Ahmed and the onset of turmoil in the Horde, the Ottomans did not maintain direct contact with the Chinggisids of the Great Horde. Indirect testimony to this fact is the letter of Mengli Giray to Bayezid (1486), reporting a crisis in the Throne Possessions and the Crimean khan's intention to inform the sultan of those events [15, p. 93].

Meanwhile, 'brotherhood and amity' had reigned in the relations between the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Horde, 'from the great Tsar Batu'. The khan had high hopes for this alliance. After temporarily losing contact with Lithuania, Khan Sheikh Ahmad asked Prince Alexander of Lithuania who had ascended the throne of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in 1492, and in 1501 had become the King of Poland as well, to inform him about the power dynamics, adversaries and allies of Lithuania in the mid-1490s. Alexander was in no hurry to restore contacts with the Horde, which had been interrupted by the death of Ahmed, Sheikh Ahmad's father; ambassador Tagir was detained in Lithuania for eight years, and Kojak, Sheikh Ahmad's brother, was never acknowledged by the Lithuanian prince [49, p. 153]. In 1497, Sheikh Ahmad took the initiative to once again revive Horde-Lithuanian relations. The embassy speaking on his behalf, his brother Kojak and princes Hacı Giray and Aega offered to help Alexander in the fight against Crimean Khan Mengli Giray. Lithuania's reaction was rather restrained and cout-and-mouse; in 1498, Sheikh Ahmad reproached Alexander for breaking his promise to fight against Crimea together [49, p. 153].

Meanwhile, the difficult international position of the Throne Possessions and the serious turmoil inside the dynasty were intensified as a result of an acute environmental crisis: crop failure and loss of cattle had placed the state in danger of ruin. In summer 1498, Muscovite messenger in Wallachia Boris Odintsov reported to the Grand Prince: 'And now, sire, Khan Mengli Giray received news from the Horde, from Sheikh Ahmad. People say that the Horde is very hungry and poor. They also say that the Cherkases came to the Great Horde and defeated many Tatars of the Great Horde' [38, p. 255]. The khans' attempts to reach the fruitful areas of the Kuban was resisted by the 'Cherkases'. Mengli Giray himself wrote to Moscow that he was preparing a military campaign against the Horde to take place the following winter (the time of the greatest fodder shortage in the steppe), and that 'Ahmat's sons are ready' [38, p. 263].

42 For information on the events of 1500–1502, and in particular, several factors behind the Crimean victory, see [14, pp. 49–51; 15; 101, pp. 253–258].
At the end of November 1500, voivode of Kiev Dmitry Putyatich was sent as an ambassador from Lithuania to Crimea, with an aim of talking Mengli Giray out of an alliance with Moscow. However, the Lithuanians ultimately failed to obtain the support of the khan.\footnote{The voivode- left on 23 or 27 November \cite[pp. 154, 161].}

According to a translation of the verbal message of Mengli Giray to King Jan Olbracht of Poland preserved within the so-called Zagreb Code, the situation in the Trans-Volga Horde (as the Poles called the Great Horde) could be described as very severe, as discord and famine dominated there \cite[p. 175; 81, pp. 97–99, no. 33].

According to Mengli Giray, in summer 1500, the Horde was planning to graze its cattle between the Don and the Dnieper, meaning on the territory formally belonging to the Crimean khan and situated far from the Horde's own camping lands \cite[p. 301]. The Horde thus faced a very serious problem: this step, which was vitally important to the Horde, was fraught with the threat of confrontation with Ottomans—the suzerains of the Crimean Khans. Nobody doubted that Mengli Giray would refuse to yield to the Horde, and in this complicated situation, Sheikh Ahmad, one of the sons of Khan Ahmad, decided to turn to the Turks directly to obtain permission first-hand. In August 1500, letters from Mengli arrived in Moscow containing the following information: 'An ambassador from the Tsar of the Horde Shih-Ahmet called Kuyuk came to Shahzoda\footnote{That is, to Mehmed, the son of Sultan Bayezid, vicegerent of Kaffa.} in Kaffa, saying bid us to head to the Dnieper River; there it is bad for us to camp, as many of the Nogais and the Cherkases wage war on us. You should also bid us to camp by the Dnieper, but you do not bid us to camp by the Dnieper, and we need to camp there'. And Shahzoda replied, 'These are not my lands and waters, they belong to the free man Tsar Mengli Giray; if you are a brother and friend of Tsar Mengli Giray, you are my brother and friend, too; I do not bid you to camp by the Dnieper, that is a matter for my father' \cite[p. 321]. According to I. Kubensky, the heir of Bayezid gave Kuyuk the following reply: 'I do not bid you to camp by the Dnieper, that is a matter for my father, Tsar Mengli Giray. The lands and water by the Dnieper belong to Mengli Giray' \cite[p. 323]. The Ottomans, who stood by their stake on Mengli Giray, did not want to change the situation in favour of the enemies of the Crimean Khan.

The socioeconomic crisis in the Throne Possessions led to the flight of the population from the Horde's uluses to Crimea (this also occurred in 1465, when the victory of Hacı Giray on the Don resulted in significant population outflow from the Horde to Crimea). In August 1500, Ivan Kubensky reported to Moscow: 'There came, sire, from the Horde to serve Tsar Mengli Giray Ebaga Uhlans and his brother, the sons of Chenbulat Uhlans, and Giray Menglishik's son Kitay. About three thousand people came with them, and they were famished and poor. They say the Horde in Pyati-Gory is under the control of the Cherkases; famine and chaos prevail there, and relations between the tsar and his brethren are not peaceful' \cite[pp. 322–323]{38}. In I. Kubensky's message delivered to Moscow in October 1500, the Muscovite observer repeated this information: 'They say the Horde in Pyati-Gory is under control of the Cherkases, and famine and chaos prevail there' \cite[pp. 332–333]{38}.

In autumn 1500 the flight from the Horde to Crimea continued to develop. According to I. Mamonov, 'Molzozoda the big molna of the bazaar of Ahmad's Children,' that is, the head mullah of the headquarters of Ahmed's descendants, came to Mengli Giray \cite[p. 354]{38} and reported to the khan that Sheikh Ahmad was going to launch a joint military campaign in Crimea with the Grand Duke of Lithuania the following spring ('we will cross the Don on blue ice now,' that is, Shih-Ahmet was going to spend the winter of 1500/1501 on the Don). He was also trying to get around Crimea concerning nomad encampments on the Dnieper River. This time, Sheikh Ahmad decided to send the ambassador directly to sultan Bayezid to ask for permission to camp on the opposite bank of the Dnieper in the field near Bilhorod. But 'the Turkish sultan did not bid Sheikh Ahmed
to camp there, and sent the ambassador away without honours’ [38, p. 354]. Relations between the khan of the Horde and the padishah were clearly not successful or productive, meaning the

Mengli Giray declared the mobilisation of all warriors over the age of 15 years of age in the peninsula within 15 days; the conscripts ‘were to have plenty of armour and victuals’. The Crimean Khan hurried to secure the support of Bayezid. As reported by I. Mamonov, ‘Mengli Giray... the Tsar said... that he had sent a man to Sultan Bayazyt, and the sultan of Kaffa had sent a man to his father Sultan Bayazyt; the Tsar said that Shih-Ahmet wants to go in their direction to the Dnieper River. And the Turkish sultan sent a charter to the Tsar: the Horde and Tsar Sheikh Ahmad are heading toward you, but you should not fight against them alone. You should find out who they are and what their strength is, and notify me. If the Horde crosses the Dnieper, I will send my troops against them from Bilhorod, and you could then march against them from your side’ [38, pp. 356–357]. The third charter of I. Mamonov read: ‘Things are bad in the Horde now, although they have sworn to the Lithuanian duke. They had to come to the Don River because Murtoza is in Tyumen now and Prince Azika is with him, and Tyumen and the Cherkases are enemies of the Horde, and the Horde is worn out; that's why nobody is ploughing there. According to rumours, sire, Sheikh Ahmad did not want to come here, but the people did not want to be under the Cherkases, so along with Sheikh Ahmad they headed for the Don’ [38, p. 358].

In August 1501, the troops of Mengli Giray faced those of Sheikh Ahmad at the mouth of the Tikhaya Sosna River on the Don. However, no combat followed. Himself facing the problem of horse fodder shortage (‘the horses are tired, and we have run out of fodder,’ ‘now we are weary, and our horses are very weary as well, and we are hungry’), Mengli Giray was in no hurry to start a fight against an enemy which, while significantly weakened, was nonetheless still strong. ‘Sheikh Ahmed, our enemy, is in a bad state... and they are now in a very bad state, and on foot and unclothed,’ the Crimean Khan wrote to Moscow describing the situation in the Horde [38, p. 368].

Meanwhile, on 17 June 1501, King Jan Olbracht of Poland died, and on 23 October Grand Duke Alexander of Lithuania accepted a union with Poland and affirmed it by swearing an oath [28, pp. 143–145]. Sheikh Ahmad used the lull after the standoff at the mouth of the Tikhaya Sosna River to continue contact with Lithuania. Ambassador Dovletek was sent to Alexander to ‘ask for Kiev’ [49, p. 155].

In autumn 1501, following a fruitless standoff on the bank of the Don, Mengli Giray knew that the Horde would have to spend winter ‘at Ust Semi, near Bilhorod’. The Crimean Khan wrote the following lines in a message to Ivan III: ‘And I ordered to set fires so they would have no place to spend winter; my army is ready’ [38, p. 377]. But scorched-earth tactics were far from new elements of warfare on the steppe. Back in the 1480s, Mengli Giray recommended vicegerent of Kiev Ivan Khodkevich burn down the Samara and Oryol as the camping area of the Great Horde (‘one should make a fire near the Oryol or the Samara before the spring comes’) [37, p. 24; 27, p. 327].

The Crimean Khan obtained cannons, ten cannon shooters and 100 warriors from the sultan in Kaffa.

After stationed for 40 days near Kaniv, Sheikh Ahmad headed to Chernigov, where his brother Janay had died [49, p. 156]. The flight from the Horde was speeding up in the meantime; people were fleeing to Mengli Giray even on foot, together with their families, wives and children. According to information from I. Mamonov, famine and fear prevailed in the Horde’s lands, and livestock was dying off: ‘They say many people wanted to flee, but they had nothing to flee on. There is much disorder, and they say people are in a bad state and wandering separately’ [38, p. 381].

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45 Tumen Shamkhalate in Ciscaucasia, and not the Siberian Tyumen.
46 Hajjike.
47 It should be ‘Oryol’.
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Looking for a way out, Sheikh Ahmad tried to conclude a peace treaty with Moscow, but failed. The Moscow-Horde negotiations during an exchange of embassies in December 1501—March 1502 turned out to be fruitless [49, p. 156]. Voivode Stefan of Wallachia was ready to join the coalition between Moscow and Crimea against the Great Horde, which had been weakened by famine and turmoil [38, pp. 384, 414].

In winter 1502, the Horde was camped on the Left Bank of the Dnieper near Kiev, with the unusually cold winter having completely exhausted Sheikh Ahmad. His defeat was only a matter of a few days. Someone from Sheikh Ahmad's circle at one point appealed vainly to Lithuania: 'We are between two wars; we will have to wage war against either Mengli Giray or the villain Ivan... If you do not come quickly with troops, we will not be able to endure these two wars' [49, p. 156].

In early May, the ambassador of the Crimean Khan told the Grand Prince of Moscow on behalf of Mengli Giray: 'The present days are usually harvest time, and skylarks build their nests, but the winter is unusual now. When Azi Giray Khan conquered the Horde, the winter was like this; except for that one, I cannot recall such a winter' [38, p. 414]. It is interesting that Mengli Giray compared the situation in 1465 (when his father Hacı Giray defeated the Throne Possessions) with the situation in winter–spring 1502. Indeed, the son acted as if according to his father's scenario, thus guaranteeing his own victory.

In spring, the flight from the Horde to Mengli Giray continued, and in May, Sheikh Ahmed stood at the ‘Turpach Voda’ and the Sula [38, pp. 416–417]. Famine in the Horde's lands can be juxtaposed to the favourable situation in Mengli's camp near the Kobyla Voda: 'God has given us a lot of fodder; for a month or two we do not expect that we will turn back from him [from Sheikh Ahmad—Author]', he wrote to Ivan III. Soon, Mengli's optimism was justified, and the Horde collapsed under his attack.

After the rout in summer of 1502, Crimean Khan Mengli Giray wrote to his ally, Grand Prince Ivan of Moscow: 'My man has come from Astrakhan recently... Shih-Ahmat, Prince Bagatyr and Ablekerim's brother came to Astrakhan, and they left on friendly terms with each other, and a man was sent to Prince Seit-Mahmut. The Nogais sent a person to Sultan-Ahmed mirza and talked to him' [38, p. 445] 48

Sheikh Ahmad was trying to create a coalition including the Nogais and representatives of the Astrakhan dynasty, who were dependent on the Nogais [35, p. 39]. The Russian ambassador in the Crimea Alexey Zabolotsky reported, 'And regarding Shih Ahmat, sire, news has come to Mengli Giray that Shih Ahmat has united with his brothers and his uncle Tsar Ablekerim and the Nogais; he is planning to attack Mengli Giray' [38, p. 451]. However, Sheikh Ahmad did not have enough forces to accomplish that [38, pp. 456–457].

Given the situation, he apparently decided to gain the diplomatic support of the Ottoman Empire, evidence of which can be found in Moscow diplomatic documents. 'They say that Shih-Ahmat sent his ambassador to Constantinople to the Turkish sultan', Zabolotsky wrote to Moscow [38, p. 451].

48 The reading of this extract suggested by the publishers of the text needs a correction. The entire phrase should instead be read as follows: '(Shih) Sheikh Ahmad arrived in Astrakhan. Tsarevich Bagatyr and the brothers of Ablekerim came out and welcomed him...'. 'The brothers of Ablekerim' were mentioned later in the proceedings of the failed embassy mission of Ivan III to Mengli Giray with I. Beklemishev (late February 1503): '...and your man told you about Tsar (Shih) Sheikh Ahmad', the Grand Prince wrote to the Khan, 'that as if he was joined by Tsarevich Bagatyr, and the brothers of Ablekerim (Italics added—Author), and the Nogais, and that they want to go against you: and this winter our people came to us from Astrakhan, Kopil and his men; and they say that Tsar Shih Ahmad and Tsarevich Khozyak are in Astrakhan and are to stay there to spend the winter; and that they do not have many of their own people, only some five hundred men, but Khozyak Tsarevich has many people, and that Khozyak Tsarevich wants to come to us, while Bagatyr Tsarevich wishes to see in Astrakhan either Sayyid Mahmut Tsar or Sheikh Ahmed Tsar; and they do not want Ablekerim in Astrakhan' [38, p. 416–456].
This is fully confirmed by Ottoman sources. In what is known as the 'Notebook for writing down good deeds, honours, sendings, etc.' (Defter-i müsevvedât-ı in'âm ve tasaddukaat ve teşrifât ve irsâliyât ve 'âdet ve nukeriye Gayrûhû vâcib-i Sene Tis'a ve Tis'a Mie) dated 909 AH (26 June 1503–13 June 1504), there is a record of expenditures for the month of Muḥarram ul-Haram for Sheikh Ahmad's ambassador named Muhiddin (Be-cihat-i Muhiddin, Kaasıd-i Şeyh Ahmed Han) [55, p. 300]. A total of six items were recorded. He received the following: 1) 5,000 [akçe] in cash (nakdiye); 2) broadcloth, velvet, gilded silk from Bursa, and a robe; 3) a groom's robe made of scarlet velvet from Bursa (Câme-i mûnakkâş-i Bursa), as well as the traditional Âdet ve nukeriye Ga, and received state allowances ('Âdet ve nukeriye Ga)

Furthermore, he was granted the following: 4) a silver dish; 5) two lari cups (Kadeh-i Lârî; from Luristan – ?)50, 6) woven velvet from Bursa (Kadîfe-i rişte-i Bursa) and 7) two pieces of peshaveri (Pêşaverî)51 fabric. Everyone in his suite (their number is unknown) received a robe made of red fabric and a robe made of peshaveri fabric (Câme-i pêşaverî, sevb). Sheikh Ahmad's ambassador came to the capital of the Ottoman state accompanied by another Horde diplomat, the ambassador of Sheikh Ahmad's brother and qaqa Kojak. His name is not stated in the document. The gifts for Sultan Kojak's ambassador were more modest: 3,000 in cash, a groom's robe made of speckled velvet manufactured in Bursa, a lari cup, two pieces of woven velvet from Bursa (Kadîfe-i rişte-i Bursa), and two pieces of peshaveri fabric. His suite were given red robes (Câme-i krmzî, sevb) and received state allowances ('Âdet-i Hazînedârî i — 1,982), and rewards established for messengers ('Âdet-i Çaşûşi — 4,040).

It would have been natural if the fall of Sheikh Ahmad had affected his relations with Başyezid in a negative way. As we saw from the materials of the Moscow-Crimean ambassadorial exchange, the sultan did not favour the khan. However, a comparison of the amounts of payments to the ambassadors of Sheikh Ahmad and Kojak with those to the ambassador of Khan Mengli Giray52, Lütfi, who also visited the capital of the Empire that month, reveals that the payments to Lütfi were almost equal to those received by Kojak's nameless ambassador. Muhiddin also received much more from the court. Lütfi got the following: 3,000 in cash, a patterned came from Bursa (Câme-i mûnakkâş-i Bursa), as well as the established governmental allowance and a payment to the messenger ('Âdet-i Hazînedârî ve Çaşûşi — a total of 4,500) [55, p. 301].

Most likely, the differences in payments for Sheikh Ahmad and Mengli Giray's ambassadors were determined by the status of the diplomat. Lütfi was rather a messenger (he brought a letter from the khan and a gulam prisoner) than an ambassador, which is why his rank equaled that of the ambassador of Kojak Sultan. Our assumption is indirectly confirmed by the indication of the amount of payments received a little later (in Jumada al-Alkhir of 909 AH) by servants (nukeriye) of Mengli Giray: only 1,000 [akçe], a patterned came from Bursa (Câme-i mûnakkâş-i Bursa), as well as the traditional Âdet-i Hazînedârî ve Çaşûşi amounting to only 250 [55, p. 328].

As we can clearly see, the defeat of the Horde in summer 1502 did not demoralise Sheikh Ahmad entirely: some rulers continued to take his opinion into consideration. Ivan III, in response to Mengli Giray's request for help against Sheikh Ahmad, promised his support. However, the Grand Prince of Moscow did not seem to be deeply invested in the outcome of this conflict. What interested him was rather Mengli Giray's plans concerning Lithuania.

Meanwhile, the inhabitants of Astrakhan behaved like barbarians towards both the Moscow ambassadors to Kaffa, as well as the ambassadors of the Shahzade thereof, despite friendly relations with the Ottomans; they were robbed, and many Turks were beaten to death [38, p. 462].

49 Câme, in the broad sense of the word, is any kind of cloth put on the back; a cloak [89, p. 255].
50 At least, it was written as such in the text. This raised natural questions on the publisher's part [55, p. 300].
51 Most probably, the word denotes such things as a 'rag, cloth, kerchief, napkin' [4, p. 307]. Thus, perhaps, here it means simply some kind of a kerchief.
52 Mengli is referred to as 'the Khan of the Tatars' (Hân-i Tatarân).
In 1503, Sheikh Ahmed, apparently having lost any hopes of uniting the anti-Crimean forces, sent ambassadors to Ivan once again with a request to 'obtain' Astrakhan for him in return for his rejection of a union with the king. He asked Ivan for this service for the first time in 1502 (before October) [38, pp. 435, 482; 23, pp. 189, 307–308, note 527]. But Sheikh Ahmed did not wait for the help of Moscow, and instead besieged Astrakhan with Sultan-Ahmed mirza at the beginning of July 1503 (when his ambassador was in Istanbul). 'Relations with Tsarevich Bagatyr and Tsar Ablekerim are good,' wrote Ivan III to Mengli Giray in Crimea in August of the same year [38, p. 486]. In September 1503, Moscow's ambassador in Crimea I. Oshcherin was instructed to talk to Mengli Giray in private: 'I [Ivan III—Author] want, with God's help, to conquer Astrakhan for him [Sheikh Ahmad—Author] for your great good, so that you, my brother, and your yurt will have no trouble from him [38, p. 489].

Sheikh Ahmad preferred to attempt gaining the understanding of Bayezid II to the prospect of obtaining Astrakhan with the help of the Grand Prince. In August 1504, Mengli Giray wrote to Ivan: 'In autumn, Tsar Shih Ahmet and his brothers, Khozyak and Khalek, and the tsareviches arrived in Kiev from Nogai; then they left Kiev for Bilhorod, and then wanted to visit Bayezid Sultan. When Bayezid Sultan heard that Shih Ahmet and his brothers were coming, he sent his pasha to tell them, 'You must go back the way you came; we do not know you. Tsar Mengli Giray is our friend and brother; we are friends of Mengli Giray's friends and we are enemies of Mengli Giray's enemies. You, enemies of Tsar Mengli Giray, may not enter our country'. So he spoke. And the sultan's men escorted him as far as Bilhorod, and drove them away from Bilhorod. Since the beginning of winter, our sons were in Novyj Gorodok, and they, having heard of Sheikh Ahmet, pursued him... And Sheikh Ahmet, Khozyak, Halek, and the Alchin Taktamyshe, eight of them, arrived in Kiev. The Kievan voivode Dmitry caught them and took them to Vyshgorod' [38, p. 509].

The flight of Sheikh Ahmad and his brothers to Bilhorod in search of assistance from the sultan was a risky undertaking. It is possible that the brothers invoked the long-standing friendship between their father and Mehmed II Fatih, although this unlikely had any effect on the Ottomans's heart. Turkey would never replace the familiar and pleasing Mengli Giray with any of Ahmed's sons, whose behavior was hard to predict. That is why Istanbul decided to remain

53 This refers to Kojak; not the name, but the clan affiliation of Toktamysh. He was an Alchin (compare to the 'Alchin place' in the Golden Horde, similar to 'Aydar place' for the Crimean Khan [42, p. 36]). If these fragmentary pieces of information are collated with tradition, which connects Astrakhan with the beklyaribeks (amir al-umara) of the Golden Horde, being the descendants of the Qongirat tribe (which found reflection, for example, in the works of Munis [see: [Bregel, 1982, p. 369]]), then it turns out that it was the Qongirats who represented the chief clan group under the Astrakhan Khans. Apart from them, members of the Alchin and Manghit clans were also living in the Khanate. The Astrakhan Prince Tinish was an Alchin [21, pp. 115–117]. The Alchins were an old clan of the Horde, the members of which were beklyaribeks (for example, the beklyaribek of the Great Horde Temir ibn Mansur wrote to Casimir the following: '... and there is a born servant to the tsars, the Alchins have held this place since the tsars' forefathers, there is a great man' [27, column 357]).

54 According to Bartoshevich, Kiev voivode- Prince Dmitry Putyatich died the same year in 1503. Another Dmitry Putyatich was the ambassador to the Ottoman Empire in the 1470s and died during the embassy [55, pp. 149–150].

55 The boastful tone of Mengli's letter to Ivan in which he wrote that the Turks called him 'friend and brother,' was not justified. An analysis of Mengli's messages to Turkey and the reply letters to Crimea demonstrate instead that the Sultan could not have possibly perceived of them this way. While back in 1469 Mengli Giray indeed called the Sultan his brother, without explicating his name and putting a detailed date on the document, later on the correspondence of the Khan demonstrates an utter decline of his significance in the eyes of the addressee: the square tamga disappears, the Khan's signature becomes even more submissive ('Your servant Mengli Giray') with the date being less and less specific, and later even disappearing entirely [8, pp. 130–132]. The tone of the letter was a demonstration of the power of the 'older brother,' ready
indifferent to the requests of Sheikh Ahmad, and neutral to the current situation without making any abrupt moves. In essence, Turkey let events develop without its participation. It was not in the least concerned with the feuds of the Chinggisids. The risky undertaking of Ahmad's son came to no great end.

According to M. Miechowita, the story of Sheikh Ahmad was slightly different. At the beginning of winter 1500, summoned by King Jan Olbracht of Poland and Grand Duke Alexander of Lithuania to fight against Mengli Giray, the khan approached the Lithuanian borders with 60,000 warriors and more than one hundred thousand women and children. Unfortunately, that winter turned out to be extremely severe: unable to bear the cold and famine in the steppe, Sheikh Ahmad's wife, in conspiracy with Mengli Giray, fled with the main part of the Horde troops to Crimea. As a result of the loss of warriors, extreme cold and attacks by Mengli, Sheikh Ahmad 'was annihilated and fled with three hundred horses to Bayazet, the Turkish Emperor. When he arrived in Byalygrod on the Black Sea, which means White Castle, he learned that on the order of Emperor Bayazet he was to be taken prisoner. This led him to quickly flee back with fifty horses and travel to the fields near Kiev. The ruler of Kiev, who had found out about him from his scouts, had him surrounded, captured and sent to the Lithuanians in Wilno. He fled several times, but each time he was run down, captured and taken back' [31, p. 65]. However, soon afterwards at the Seim in Brest, the khan was solemnly received by Alexander, 'who went out to meet him a mile from the city. The Poles in Radom then decided to send him back to Tataria across the Volga with a few thousand lightly-armed warriors. In order for his return to be more comfortable and more acceptable to his countrymen, they sent Kazak Soltan, the brother of Shahimet, ahead of him'. The khan arrived on the opposite bank of the Volga, but soon, 'when going to Lithuania to send warriors, he was caught again by the Lithuanians at the instigation of Mendliger, the Emperor of Perekop, and confined in the Kaunas Castle near the Baltic Sea' [31, p. 66]. In his treatise, composed before 1514 and first published in 1517, Mehoivius wrote of the khan as a prisoner in Kaunas [31, p. 65]77.

Sigismund Herberstein repeats Miechowski's narration almost word for word. However, he omits a number of details, and includes some other differentiations from the 'Treatise on the Two Sarmatias'. Sheikh Ahmad came to Lithuania to enter into a treaty with Alexander against Mengli Giray. The Lithuanians, 'as was their habit', delayed the war longer than they were supposed to. Meanwhile, the wife of the khan and his troops, tired of the famine and freezing conditions, asked Sheikh Ahmad to leave the king and mind his own affairs. But the khan would not listen to his persuasions, and his wife and part of his troops deserted him and went over to Crimean Khan Mengli Giray. The latter, on the prompting of Sheikh Ahmad's wife, defeated his troops. The khan and about 60058 horsemen were forced to flee to Alba on the Tiras River [that is, to Akkerman, or Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi—Author] 'Hoping to obtain help from the Turks, being close to running into an ambush, he followed an alternative route and arrived in Kiev with only half of his horsemen, where he was surrounded and captured by the Lithuanians and taken to Wilno [on the order of the Polish king]. The king met him there, received him with honours and took him to the Polish Seim'59...; there they decided to wage war on Mengli

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57 As it is known, Miechowita confused Sheikh Ahmad with Sayyid-Ahmed, who had indeed been confined in Kaunas some decades before that [31, p. 91, note on p. 240], so the name of the Kaunas fortress here is most probably part of Sayyid-Ahmed's biography.

58 As Herberstein's commentators note, the Latin text contains the ambiguous 'sexingentis'. According to Miechowita, as we have seen, the number of horses (that is horsemen) that fled with the Khan was 300.

59 The Seim in Brest, where the King stayed from 8 February to 15 March 1505 [7, p. 344]. According to Stryjkowski, Alexander solemnly welcomed Sheikh Ahmad at the Sejm in Brest; sitting with
Giray.' The Poles were gathering their troops very slowly, and the khan, having been deeply insulted, started thinking of taking flight, but was caught and taken to Troki Castle four miles away from Wilno. Sheikh Ahmad enjoyed respectful treatment, but still remained under house arrest [7, pp. 182–183]. On 30 December 1517, Herberstein and the Khan had dinner in Trakai Castle together. At dinner, according to Herberstein, 'he spoke to me though an interpreter about various affairs, calling the tsar his brother and saying that all rulers and tsars were brothers to one another' [7, p. 183 (344)]60.

The story of Mehovius about Sheikh Ahmad was reproduced by Blaise de Vigenère61 without significant changes [5, pp. 83–84], as well as Bernard Wapowski [74, pp. 47–48]62.

It appears that relations between Alexander and Sheikh Ahmad were quite friendly in 1505. For example, that year the king granted privileges to Pan Jan Zabrzeziński, the 'supreme marshal' of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania 'at the request of our brother, Trans-Volga Tsar Ahmat' [1, p. 152 (no. 698)]. However, a complication caused them to quickly deteriorate.

In 1506 the Tatar suite of Sheikh Ahmad was partially turned into slaves and partly ransomed (bailed out) by Lithuanian Tatars63. In this regard, the following question arises: were these actions meant to be punitive for the khan's misdeeds, meaning for his attempt to flee, or relations with a third party? It is possible that the change in relations between the authorities and the khan was indeed determined by other circumstances. On 19 August, 1506, Alexander died in Wilno [28, p. 148]. The death of Sheikh Ahmad's protector could have changed his status in Lithuania significantly, as

Grand Duke Alexander II of Lithuania tried to exert pressure on Mengli Giray using the fact that Ahmed's children were in his hands. Ivan reassured the khan, reminding him of the fate of Sayyid-Ahmed: 'For Lithuania does not have the custom of releasing captives once they are caught' [38, p. 552]. Sheikh Ahmad gave a speech to justify himself in front of the noblemen and King Alexander at the Seim in Radom in 1505, and was released to the Trans-Volga (Nogai Horde) up to the Caspian Sea to seek help against Crimea and Moscow [Bielski, 1830, p. 79; Stryjkowski, 1978, pp. 577–578]. 'Chinggis-name' by Ötemish Hajji says that the khan then returned to his ulus, Astrakhan ('came to his wilayah Hajji Tarkhan') [47, p. 41a].

In 1506, lords of the council reassured Mengli Giray in a letter of the Lithuanian embassy to Crimea: 'You, Your Majesty, write to us in your edicts mentioning Shahmet Tsar and his brother Khojak Sultan, but regarding the movements of Khojak Sultan, Your Majesty will understand from the yarliqs and the embassies of our sovereign, your brother. Regarding Tsar Sheikh Ahmet, we have always advised our sovereign, and do so now, that Tsar Sheikh Ahmet shall not be allowed to do you any harm' [29, pp. 123–124 (no. XIX)]. At the same time, the lords of the council of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania expressed their anxiety in a letter to the lords of the council of the 'Polish Crown' regarding the health and activities of Sheikh Ahmad and his circle: 'We also remember Their Graces of Sheikh Ahmad, Trans-Volga Tsar, and his son, and his people, and the Nogai Tatars, so that they can be healthy, safe and sound [29, p. 128 (no. XXI)].

| him in a rich tent, he conferred knighthood on many Poles, Lithuanians, and Tatars, with the Khan also taking part in these rituals [28, p. 454]. |
| Miechowita's commentators believed this to have taken place in the spring of 1517 [31, p. 240]. |
| Blaise de Vigenère is the author of the compilation memorandum on Poland and its neighbours written and printed in 1573 in Paris for Henry Valois, elected King of Poland. The story has been dated to 1500. |
| The story has been dated to 1501. |
| [1, p. 172 (no. 730, Description of the Trans-Volga Tatars who were bailed out)]. See also [1, p. 197 (no. 772, Description of the Tatars distributed among different households)]. Thus, a certain 'Ahmet Uhlàn' ransomed the envoy of Kojak Sultan 'Vsein' (that is, Husein) and others for a hundred kopas. |
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The prisoner khan was first and foremost a means of deterrence for Lithuania against its southern neighbour, the Crimean Khanate. In 1509 (28 October), Sigismund⁶⁴, in response to an embassy of prelates and lords of the parliament of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, speculating on the advisability of extraditing Sheikh Ahmad to Crimea, asked another question: 'I wonder, if he were not turned over, what the following actions of Tsar Mengli Giray would be like in the summer?' [29, p. 144 (no. XXVIII)] Meanwhile, Sheikh Ahmad sent ambassadors to the king, asking him to send embassies to his mother and brothers, who were in the Nogai Horde. Sigismund wrote the following to the lords in said letter: The same ambassador Abdullah who had been sent to us by Sheikh Ahmet told us that our ambassador and he had been sent to his mother and his brothers the Nogais. Then, if you find it necessary, you should find those who would go in our interests. But those things with which he must go should be kept secret so that Tsar Mengli Giray does not hear of them, so that later the final evil is not worse than the first. Just as during the reign of King Alexander of glorious memory, when you sent old Vasily Glinsky with (?) to Tsar Sheikh Ahmet, as he was still in his tsardom, and then when Khojak Soltan was released, all those embassies and matters fell into the hands of Mengli Giray. That is why we have to meet, so that this matter may be finally completed regarding the Perekop ambassadors. As we see, it would not be very good if they attacked the Nogai, with whom we are bound by friendship, for I would not be interested in seeking friendship elsewhere [29, pp. 145–146].⁶⁵

Yet the very existence of Sheikh Ahmad still disturbed Crimea, even though he had been in Lithuania for so long. A letter from Crimean Khan Mehmed Giray (Mengli Giray's son) to Ottoman Padishah Süleyman Kanuni, written in spring 1521, focused on his fate: 'Our old oppressor and enemy, Khan of the Throne Possessions Sheikh Ahmad, has been detained by the King⁶⁶. The khan then reported that he was concerned the king might release Sheikh Ahmad in case of hostile actions [77, p. 487; 72, p. 113].⁶⁷

In Lithuania, the khan was officially considered not a captive, but instead a 'guest' of the king, a status which did not allow him to receive any granted lands in Lithuania. Sheikh Ahmad's long stay in Lithuania most likely weighed heavily on both the Lithuanians and the prisoner himself. It was useless to keep the khan in captivity and complete military inactivity, as the longstanding threats to Crimea therefore became less and less persuasive (threats must be supported by evidence, otherwise they mean absolutely nothing). On the other hand, if Sheikh Ahmad were to be released, Lithuania would have had no more levers of influence (except for perhaps his relatives held hostage) or guarantees of his peaceful attitude towards Lithuania, which was therefore also hostile to Crimea. In any event, in the early 1520s, Lithuania resigned itself to the necessity of releasing the khan⁶⁸. The khan was released to his homeland in 1527, and apparently died soon after⁶⁹.

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⁶⁴ Sigismund (Polish: Zygmunt) I the Old (1467–1548), King of Poland from the Jagiellon dynasty from 6 December 1506 to 1545, Grand Duke of Lithuania (from 20 December 1506 to 1544).

⁶⁵ Thus, Sigismund specifically insisted on the strictest secrecy of the embassy, as the previous ones (of special significance for us is the embassy of Sheikh Ahmad's brother Kojak) were captured by the Crimeans.

⁶⁶ This name of the Polish monarch (and also of the Polish and Ukrainian lands) was quite widespread in Ottoman, Crimean, and Central Asian sources (e.g., see [47, p. 41a, p. 96—translation], see also the excursus by V. Grigoryev [8, p. 133]. For example, Evliya Çelebi used the name 'Korol [King]' country to refer to the Ukrainian lands, which were in Polish possession [53, pp. 197, 214, notes 80 and 311]. See also [86, pp. 115–162].

⁶⁷ For amendments to the translation and additions to the description, see [84, pp. 262, 269].

⁶⁸ It appears that this was also indirectly related to the changing situation in Crimea (the death of Crimean Khan Muhammad Giray during the Astrakhan campaign, the Nogai invasion of the peninsula, a brief occupation of the throne by Gazi Giray, and the Ottoman interference staged by Saadet Giray).

⁶⁹ For more details, see [15, p. 110–113].
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After the collapse of the Throne Possessions and the death of Sheikh Ahmad, the spectrum of Ottoman interests in the post-Golden Horde space narrowed significantly. After creating a kind of buffer territory in the form of the Crimean Khanate between his own possessions and the remote northern lands, the Ottomans left the role of intermediary in diplomatic relations with the successors of the Golden Horde to the Crimean khans, while in turn remaining absolutely indifferent to their fate.


10. Ћирковић С. Голубац у средњем веку. Пожаревац, 1968.


33. Радонић J. Западна Европа и Балкански народи према турцима у првоj половини XV века. Нови Сад, 1905.
37. Sbornik Muxanova. Saint Petersburg, 1866.
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76. Kurat A.N. Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivindeki Altın Ordu, Kırım ve Türkistan Hanlarına Ait Yarlık ve Bitikler. İstanbul, 1940.


$\S$ 5. Relations Between Tatar States and the Polish-Lithuanian State

Dariusz Kolodziejczyk

On 11 April 1241, the Mongol army commanded by Batu Khan destroyed the Hungarian troops at the Sajó River, thus forcing King Béla IV of Hungary to seek refuge in Croatia. Several months before, feeling apprehensive about possible Polish-Hungarian cooperation, the Mongols decided to strike a simultaneous blow against the Poles, and a second Mongol army invaded Poland. On 9 April 1241, shortly before the Battle at the Sajó River, the Polish troops and their German allies suffered a crushing defeat near the city of Legnica; the Polish Prince Henry II, the Pious, was killed by the Mongols [38, p. 83–93]. It is only natural that Polish historiographic tradition presented the Mongol invasion of Eastern and Central Europe in 1236–1242 as a disaster, although the Mongols were actually of some interest as potential allies against the Sarmatians. Polish Franciscan Benedict participated in the Pope’s mission to the Mongols in 1245–1247, which was headed by Giovanni da Pian del Carpine [36, pp. 84–86, 90–91]. Surprisingly, the Mongol invasion provided Polish rulers with the opportunity for south-eastward expansion, which began in the following century. Although the nomads undertook two more predatory incursions into Poland in the 13th century, in 1259 and 1287, they did not remain long; human and economic losses there were quickly restored. Still, the Mongol invasion ruined once and for all the political structure of South Rus’, which had been previously weakened by intra-dynastic struggle. In the 14th century, the lands of the Southern Russian principalities, whose rulers were vassals to the khans, became an arena of struggle between the declining Golden Horde, (especially after Jani Beg Khan’s death in 1357), and the expansive powers to the west and north—that is, Poland and Lithuania. The Golden Horde rulers did not resist the conquest of Galician Rus’ and Western Podolia (1340–1366) by King Casimir III of Poland, or the conquest of Eastern Podolia and Kievshchina by Grand Duke Algirdas of Lithuania (1362). The latter conquest apparently took place under an agreement with beklyaribek Mamai, a high-ranking official and the de facto ruler of the Ulus of Jochi from 1361 to 1380. He believed Algirdas to be his ally against Moscow and against domestic opposition within the Golden Horde. The terms of the apparently earliest Lithuanian-Tatar agreement, in which Mamai let Algirdas rule Southern Rus’ in exchange for taxes, are illustrated by the fact that even forty years later Podolia was still paying taxes (tributus Thartharorum) to the Tatars; the succeeding Horde Khan Toktamys mentioned in a yarliq sent to Algirdas’ son and heir, Grand Prince of Lithuania and King of Poland, Jagiello, in 1393 that ‘the collection of tribute from countries (or people) who look

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70 The study was supported by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of Poland (National Program for the Development of Humanities).
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at us (that is, belong to us)’ (büzge baqar əllerning çıqışların çıqarub) is a prerequisite for maintaining our ancient friendship [32, pp. 55–57; 17; 28, pp. 5–6; 16, pp. 186–203].

The nature of relations between the Golden Horde and Lithuania, which had been united with Poland since 1386, after Jagiełło had been elected to the Polish throne, changed after 1395: when Toktamysh lost his throne as a result of Tamerlane's invasion, he had to seek sanctuary in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The once magnificent monarch who claimed to be Lithuania's suzerain became a refugee asking for help. Grand Prince Vytautas, who held autonomous power in Lithuania according to a treaty with King Jagiełło, decided to restore Toktamysh to the throne of the Golden Horde by dethroning Temür Qutlug, Aksak Timur's appointee. According to Vytautas' grandiose plan, he would become the actual suzerain of the Golden Horde and thus the most powerful monarch in Eastern Europe. A Russian chronicler, recalling his plans, attributed the following utterance to Vytautas: 'Let us go capture the Tatar lands, defeat Tsar Temür Qutlug, conquer his kingdom and divide his possessions, money, and estates, and make Toktamysh Tsar in the Horde and in Kaffa, in Azov, in the Crimea, in Astrakhan, and in the Horde beyond the Yaik, across Primorye, and in Kazan. It will all belong to us and our Tsar will rule there' [12, p. 172; 4, pp. 381–382]. But on 12 August 1399, the Lithuanian-Tatar army led by Vytautas and Toktamysh, which also included Polish knights, was utterly defeated at the Vorskla River—a left tributary of the Dnieper—by troops belonging to Temür Qutlug and his emir Edigü. Although Toktamysh never returned to the throne of the Golden Horde and died in Siberia several years later, his numerous relatives and followers still relied on Vytautas' help and remained at his court. Some of them settled in the Grand Principality of Lithuania, and are still known there as Lithuanian or Lipka Tatars [18, p. 765].

One of Toktamysh’s sons, Jalal ad-Din, took part in 1410 in the battle of Grünwald between Polish-Lithuanian and Teutonic troops, and in 1412 he ascended the throne of the Golden Horde with Vytautas' help. Several years later Toktamysh's sons, due to their infighting, lost the chance to consolidate power in the Horde: in the 1420s Vytautas himself supported another Chinggisid candidate, Ulugh Muhammad, who had settled in Kazan at the end of his life after many years of struggle for the throne. Thus Vytautas laid the foundation for a separate khanate, which existed until 1552.

Vytautas also supported Haci Giray, a young Chinggisid whose father had arrived in Lithuania as a follower of Toktamysh, and who was possibly born in the Lithuanian city of Trakai. After Vytautas’ death, Haci Giray was able to establish self-rule in the Crimea where, in 845 AH (1441—1442), he began to mint coins, thus creating a separate khanate within the territory of the Golden Horde. Until his death in 1466, Haci Giray had friendly relations with the Polish king and Grand Prince Casimir of Lithuania [28, pp. 11–16]. Even in 16th-century correspondence between Crimean Khans and Lithuanian-Polish Jagiełłons, we still find mention of the legitimate theme of 'ancient friendship' based upon the memory of the Vytautas help afforded to Toktamysh and his sons and later to Haci Giray. Often in this correspondence they recall that the exiled Chinggisids 'they had been guests of Lithuanian noblemen and the Grand Prince Vytautas, they were always his guests' [...] [28, p. 595]. In yarliqs sent to Jagiełłons, the Crimean Khans confirmed that Russian lands were granted to Vytautas by Toktamysh in return for his hospitality, although in the 16th century this was purely fiction, as the lands 'granted' were beyond the control of the Crimean Khans. Curiously, Crimean Khans descended from the Girays viewed Toktamysh as a legitimate ancestor, although their bloodlines were not that close: in 1454, with the help of Casimir, Haci Giray actually defeated Toktamysh's grandson, Sayyid-Ahmed, who remained a Lithuanian captive until his death [28, p.13].

In the 1470s, a struggle broke out in Eastern Europe over hereditary ownership of the Ulus of Jochi between, on the one hand, Ahmed, the grandson of Temür Qutlug, whose state is referred to in modern historiography as 'the Great Horde' and as 'the Volga Horde' in medieval Lithuanian sources and, on the other hand, the ambitious son of Haci Giray—the Crimean Khan
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Mengli Giray. At the beginning, it seemed that Mengli Giray would maintain friendly relations with Vilnius, but Grand Prince Casimir displeased the Crimean Khan by entering into an anti-Moscow agreement with his rival Ahmed. In response to this, in 1474 Mengli Giray entered into an alliance with Ivan III [14; 2]. As a result, the Crimean Tatars devastated the lands of Lithuania and southeastern Poland many times over the course of 30 years, as they did in 1498.

The Jagiellons failed to derive any benefits from the alliance with the Great Horde. In 1480, when Khan Ahmed came to the Ugra River to attack Moscow with the Lithuanians, Casimir failed to muster an army. Thus, his Tatar ally returned home empty-handed. In 1501, this scenario was repeated when Sheikh Ahmad, Ahmed's son and successor, waited in vain in the steppe for his Lithuanian ally: Grand Prince Alexander the Great, Casimir's son, was busy securing the Polish throne after the death of his brother Jan Olbracht. Having spent a severe winter in the Dnieper steppes, Sheikh Ahmad's army was completely destroyed by Mengli Giray's troops at the Sula River in July 1502; the surviving warriors and their families were conquered by the Crimean Khan. After a series of unsuccessful attempts to gather a new army, Sheikh Ahmad arrived in Kiev, where he was arrested by his former ally and exiled to Vilnius. He was not released until 1527, and spent the last year of his life on the throne of the Astrakhan Khanate [6; 28, pp. 577–578].

Paradoxically, the collapse of the Great Horde eased tensions in relations between Lithuania and the Crimea. Mengli Giray was no longer afraid of the coalition between Lithuania and the Great Horde, but the arrest of Sheikh Ahmad became an important subject of concern in Vilnius' relations with the Khan, who feared lest his sworn enemy be released. Although Mengli Giray did not need Moscow as an ally against the Great Horde anymore, Moscow's plans to subdue the Kazan Khanate began to worry the Khan, who considered himself the legal heir of the Ulus of Jochi. All these reasons led to changes in alliances and a rapprochement between the Crimea and Lithuania. Even after several years, Mengli Giray still avoided taking sides with either Vilnius or Moscow: he concluded a peace treaty with Sigismund in 1507, and with Vasily III in 1508, at a time when Crimean horsemen continued to devastate the lands of both neighbors. Finally, in 1512, Mengli Giray agreed to send his grandson, Jalal ad-Din, to Wilno as an honorary hostage, and the Polish-Lithuanian side agreed to send 15,000 golden coins to the Khan every year, one half from Lithuania and the other half from Poland, so that, in return, he would maintain the 'ancient friendship' and wage war on Moscow and other of the Jagiellon enemies. In 1513–1514 the exchange of peace treaties between the Khan and King Sigismund took place both in Poland and Lithuania, even though they were ruled by the same monarch [28, pp. 37–49]. Although Mengli Giray died the following year, his son and successor Mehmed Giray renewed the union, and in 1515 Tatar-Lithuanian forces cooperated to invade Moscow's outlying territories. Following a temporary crisis in Crimean-Lithuanian relations in 1518–1519, the union and peace were renewed in 1520, and King Sigismund, who was then at war with the Teutonic Order, observed with relief the Tatar military campaign against Moscow in 1521, in which a Lithuanian contingent also took part.

The annual 'pominki' [tributes], which the Polish-Lithuanian side sent the Crimean Khan, albeit on an irregular basis from 1512 until almost the end of the 17th century—the last being in 1682—were regarded in Wilno and Krakow as voluntary payments for military aid against Moscow and other royal enemies; in the Crimea, however, they were considered tributes. In the Khan's correspondence they were mentioned as 'gifts' (bölek, hedayat, pişkes) and 'treasury' (hazine), although sometimes as 'taxes' (vergû), or 'tribute' (harac), and even as annual tribute (cizya), which was to be paid by non-Muslim subjects to Muslim monarchs according to the Quran. For example, in 1521 Mehmed Giray rejected Sultan Suleyman's invitation to the Tatars to attack Poland, arguing that 'some time ago the Polish King sent his ambassador to this humble servant (that is, to the Khan) and, so that his country would not be subject to raids, promised to
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pay an annual tribute (cizya) of fifteen thousand florins (golden coins); we took a vow (yemin) and made peace with each other [7, p. 55; 28, pp. 59, 445–446, 497–499, 504–506].

Judging by the previous example, paying such 'pominki' to the Tatars also played an important role in Polish-Ottoman relations. For Islamic lawyers, it eased legitimisation of the 'eternal peace' that had bound Polish kings and Ottoman sultans since 1533. Although it was useful for both sides, that is, political cooperation between the Jagiellons and the Ottomans against the Habsburgs, such perpetual peace between Muslim and Christian monarchs was prohibited by Sharia unless the Christian monarch agreed to pay tribute. Although Polish kings refused to pay tributes to the Sultan, they sent payments to the Crimean Khan, whom the Ottomans had considered their vassal since 1475. It was not by chance that an article on the tradition of yearly gift-giving to the Khan (âdetler) as a condition for maintaining peace was included in all charters of the treaty sent to the Polish kings by the Ottoman sultans between 1553 and 1678. Only the Treaty of Karlowitz (1699) revoked this article. It prohibited Tatar raids on the territory of Poland even if the King were to refuse to send the pominki [27].

The death of ambitious Mehmed Giray, who from 1521–1523 had for a time united the main part of the territory of the former Ulus of Jochi, and the resulting internal struggle for succession in the Crimea caused the Polish-Lithuanian court to change its policy. Sending gifts to the Crimea was suspended; in 1523 Lithuanian troops set fire to İslâm Kermen, a town situated in the Lower Dnieper Region; in 1527 Sheikh Ahmad was released from captivity and ascended the throne of the Astrakhan Khanate, reconciling with the Nogais against the Crimea. The Polish-Lithuanian court supported claimants to the Crimean throne, most of all Islam Giray who, from 1524 until his death in 1537, struggled for the throne against Saadet Giray and then against Sahib Giray. Naturally, these steps led to further Tatar incursions, but the khans could not react forcefully enough due to infighting, and even the siege of Cherkasy by Saadet Giray Khan (1532) ended unsuccessfully [15, pp. 151–198].

Both the policy of the Ottoman Porte, which had been at 'eternal peace' with Sigismund since 1533, and the opportunity to create a new alliance against Moscow, which appeared after the death of Vasily III in the same year, influenced reconciliation between the King and the Khan. The peace treaty and alliance between Lithuania and the Crimea were renewed in 1535, which affected the anti-Moscow campaign of the same year: Gomel and Starodub were conquered by the Lithuanians, and the power of the Girays in Kazan was restored. In the late 1530s, Khan Safa Giray of Kazan tried to establish a broad anti-Moscow alliance that would include Poland, Lithuania, the Crimea and Kazan, but his attempts failed just like others had in 1506 and 1514–1516 [9; 3; 13; 11].

Although King Sigismund subsequently reconciled with Moscow, he also continued the peace with the Crimea: in 1542 the Lithuanian ambassador, Venelovas Mikalojaitis, the author of a famous description of the Tatars that was published in Latin in 1615 under the pen name Michalo Lituanus, went to the Crimea [5, pp. 14–25]. Kazan, Wilno, and Krakow also continued to exchange ambassadors: in the Polish Archiwum Skarbowe there are reports on the arrival of Saf Giray's embassy at the Sejm in Piotrków (1544), as well as on the arrival of Regent Söyembikä's embassy on behalf of her son, Ötemish Giray, in Krakow in the spring of 1551 shortly before the fall of the Kazan Khanate [19, sheet 104–105; 20, sheet 88 reverse–90 reverse, 94–118. This data was first discovered by V. Trepavlov, to whom I am grateful for the information; see 13, p. 96].

In the mid-16th century, the presence of the Ottoman Empire in the Northern Black Sea Region became more evident. In 1538 the Ottomans captured from the Crimean Khan the castle of Jan-Kerman (Ochakov), which had been built in 1494 by Mengli Giray; in 1551 they removed Sahib Giray from the throne, whom they suspected of attempting to gain greater independence from the Ottoman Porte. The new Khan, Devlet Giray, began his reign with a raid on Lithuanian lands, during which he conquered and burned down Bratslav. But he soon reconciled with the King, as he realised the threat posed by Ivan IV's campaign on the Volga.
Although the alliance between Crimea, Poland, and Lithuania was renewed, this did not prevent Kazan’s, Astrakhan’s, and the Nogai Horde’s obedience to Moscow between 1552 and 1556. Crimean-Lithuanian relations soon deteriorated once again due to Cherkassky elder and Cossack leader Dmitry Vishnevetzky’s activities: he continually attacked the Tatar-Turkish borderlands.

Although both the Poland-Lithuania State and the Crimean Khanate were at war with Moscow, it is hard to speak about any kind of coordination of military activities during the Livonian War of 1558–1583. There were reasons for this lack of military cooperation: talented diplomats from Moscow managed several times to conclude truces with the Crimea; part of the Tatar forces, which were forced to take part in Ottoman campaigns against the Habsburgs (1566) and the Safavids (1578–1583), were absent; there were disagreements between the Tatars and the Turks during the Astrakhan campaign of 1569, as witnessed by the Polish ambassador Andrey Taranovsky, who was invited to join the campaign as an observer from an allied country. Although the Tatars were concerned about the expansion of Moscow in the Volga Region, they were also afraid of Ottoman hegemony as threatening the self-government of Crimea.

In 1569, shortly before the last Jagiellon died, the personal union between Lithuania and Poland was replaced by a real one. Some time earlier, Sigismund II Augustus separated Ukrainian provinces from Lithuania and joined them to the Polish Crown in order to break the Lithuanian opposition. Thus, Lithuania lost its common border with Crimea, after which the Crimean policy of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was shaped first and foremost by the Polish chancellery and Polish hetmans.

The reign of Gazi II Giray (1588–1596 and 1597–1607), one of the most outstanding Crimean Khans, coincided with the 15-year Ottoman-Habsburg War (1593–1606), in which the Tatars took part and crossed Moldova almost every year on their way to the Hungarian front. The interests of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Ottoman Porte, and the Crimea collided in Moldova. But when the armies of both, or more accurately, all three sides met near Cecora in 1595, they reached a compromise and established de facto joint ownership of it for several years, placing Ieremia Movilă on the Moldavian throne [31, pp. 142–146; 28, pp. 111–112, 512]. Although the Khan always blamed the Polish King for Cossack raids and delinquent payments of pominki, and the Polish side blamed the Tatars for devastating the Ukraine, their relations were still relatively peaceful. During this period, Polish ambassadors travelled to the Crimea; they composed valuable reports on the inhabitants of the peninsula and rituals at the Khan's court: Marcin Broniowski (travels in 1578, 1584, 1587, and 1591–1592) and Lawryn Piszczynski (1601–1603) [26; 1; 33]. It should be emphasized that, even though many Polish authors depicted Tatars as savage and murderous thieves in their popular works, and that while Polish kings presented themselves in their correspondence with the Popes as the defenders of Christian Europe from the infidels, the Crimean policy of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was, in fact, pragmatic and revealed a profound knowledge of Tatar society and culture [37, pp. 233, 239; 29].

In the early 17th century, at the beginning of the Polish intervention in the Muscovite state, Tatar raids on Muscovy recommenced. Although A. Novosilsky thought that these raids proved the existence of a Crimean-Polish alliance against Moscow [10, pp. 50–55], other authors have pointed out that the Tatars were carrying out raids against Poland at the same time. Their raids against Russia should not be explained by the existence of a political alliance, but by the desire to take advantage of Moscow's weakening defenses [35, pp. 159–162]. D. Liseytsiev claimed that if there was any alliance at that time, it was between the Khan and Vasily Shuysky [8, pp. 265, 269–271, 278]. It goes without saying that as the years progressed during the Time of Troubles, the Tatars began to worry about the increasing hegemony of Poland in Eastern Europe; in 1614 Khan Canibek Giray decided to conclude a treaty with Russian Tsar.
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Michael Romanov [10, pp. 83–84]. It is remarkable that the standard formula for military cooperation against Moscow, which is present in all peace treaties exchanged between Crimean khans and Polish-Lithuanian monarchs between 1507 and 1609, disappeared from documents issued by khans after 1609—only to then reappear in documents belonging to the Polish-Crimean alliance concluded in 1654 [28, pp. 126, 498–500].

The second decade of the 17th century brought about tension not only in Polish-Crimean, but also in Polish-Ottoman relations. It was caused by Cossack raids in the Black Sea area, by the intervention of Polish magnates in Moldova, and by the secret support of the Habsburgs by King Sigismund III of Poland at the beginning of the Thirty Years’ War. Tatar warriors supported the Ottomans during the Polish-Ottoman War of 1620–1621, and Khan Jani Beg Giray was personally involved in the Khotyn campaign organized by Sultan Osman II (1621).

After the Battle of Khotyn ended with a renewed truce, internal fighting for the khan's throne began between Jani Beg Giray and the allied brothers Mehmed Giray and Shahin Giray: the latter were temporariloy striving to gain the support of the Polish king, the Zaporozhian Cossacks and even the Persian Shah, Abbas the Great [22, pp. 29–31, 36–38; 28, pp. 133–135]. The conflict for the Crimean throne weakened the Khan's power while enhancing the role of Kantemir, a Manghit bey who, with the help of the Ottoman Porte, strengthened his own autonomous power among the Nogais of Budjak. Invasions by Kantemir's Budjak Horde in the 1620s resulted in heavier human losses on the side of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth than the Crimean Tatar invasion had. It was not until 1628 that Jani Beg Giray got the throne back with the support of the Ottoman Porte, and exiled Mehmed and Shahin Giray from Crimea; in 1637 the Ottoman Porte executed the rebellious Kantemir bey. Fearing repression from the new Crimean khan, the Budjak Nogais even strove to accept Polish protection, but this did not occur due to their mutual distrust of one another [28, pp. 147–148].

Although the internal crisis weakened the Crimean Khanate's international position, and increasingly subordinated the khans to the Ottoman sultans, it did not stop Tatar invasions into Poland. The weakened khans were simply not capable of guaranteeing peace. Under these conditions, after the defeat of one of the Tatar raids near Okhatov by the great hetman Stanisław Koniecpolski on 30 January 1644, the Polish-Lithuanian Senate decided to stop giving gifts to the khans, and the hetman and King Władysław IV started planning an alliance with Moscow aimed at the destruction of the Crimean Khanate and the partition of its lands between Russia and Poland. In 1645, the King developed a plan: he wanted the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Russia to support Venice in its war against the Ottoman Porte. But all of these military plans fell apart due to the Seim's resistance. It is very ironic that the Ukrainian Cossacks, to whom the King had once promised Venetian currency for taking part in the war, instead of striking a blow against the Crimea, united with the Tatars in 1648 and began a huge rebellion against Poland. According to the Treaty of Zboriv, which was concluded in 1649 between the Polish King and Khan Islam Giray III, who acted as the Cossacks' protector, the latter gained significant autonomy, while the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had to recommence giving gifts to the khan [24, pp. 131–190; 23; 28, pp. 154–161, 954–963; 34]. Attempting to weaken the Cossack-Tatar alliance, the Polish court sent a mission to the Kalmyk nomads in 1653, suggesting that they should conquer Crimea with the support of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth [30].

The Treaty of Pereyaslavl in January 1654, under which the Cossacks accepted the patronage of the Russian Tsar, brought about a dramatic shift in Crimean policy and Crimean-Polish relations. Wary of Russian hegemony in Eastern Europe, Islam Giray III and his brother and successor, Mehmed Giray IV, concluded a military alliance with King Jan Kazimierz, which lasted until 1666. These allies even planned to restore the Golden Horde, and the Crimean Khan sent emissaries to the Volga Region and Siberia to provoke an anti-Russian rebellion among the Tatars and Bashkirs. But these plans weren't very realistic. During this
period, the Crimean Tatars helped the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth not only in their struggle against Russia, but also against Sweden; their participation in the second Northern War (1655–1660) led to the activation of diplomatic contacts with Sweden, Brandenburg, and even Denmark. The widespread use of Crimean clothes, weapons, and horse harnesses among the Polish gentry, as well as the use of the Polish language in the Crimean chancellery's diplomatic correspondence are evidence of Polish-Tatar cultural ties during this period [25; 21; 39; 28, pp. 163–174, 237–239].

The partition of the Ukraine between Poland and Russia established by the Truce of Andrusovo (30 January/9 February 1667) angered not only the Cossacks, but also the Tatars, who were apprehensive of an alliance between their Northern neighbors. In 1667, the Tatars and the Cossacks carried out a joint military campaign against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which ended with the compromise Treaty of Pidhaitsi (16 October). But soon the Ottoman Porte, freed from war against Venice after the conquest of Crete in 1669, and having resolved to activate its policy in Eastern Europe under viziers from the Köprülü family, became involved in the conflict. The Ottoman-Polish War began in 1672 with the conquest of Kamianets-Podilskyi by the Turks, and lasted until 1676. Then, after a short break, during which the Turks and Russians struggled for the Ukraine, the war resumed in 1683. But this time the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was part of a broad anti-Ottoman coalition that included the Habsburg Empire, Venice and, beginning in 1686, Russia. Crimean Tatars took part in Ottoman military campaigns, but the khans suggested many times that an agreement be signed between the parties: at first they feared that the increasing influence of the Ottoman Porte in Eastern Europe could limit the Crimea's autonomy. But later, after Ottoman defeats in the war against the coalition forces, they feared that Russia would conquer the Crimea.

The Treaty of Karlowitz (January 1699), in which Tatar diplomats did not participate, forced the Khan to give up traditional gifts, and prohibited Tatar raids on Polish lands. The Ottoman Sultan guaranteed that the Khan, who was not considered a sovereign monarch in the text of the treaty, would abide by these conditions. Thus, in the 18th century, the weakening of the Crimean Khanate's and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth's positions on the international arena limited the ability of both powers to establish direct contacts and carry out independent active policies; Russia's annexation of Zaporizhia also led to the geographical 'distancing' of Poland and Crimea. Wary of Russian expansion, the Tatars relied increasingly on the patronage of the Ottoman Porte, while the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth's foreign policy was paralyzed by the presence of Russian troops and the constant confrontation between supporters and adversaries of a Russian orientation. Despite this, the Poles and Tatars made attempts to cooperate against the Russian Empire: for instance, from 1709-1714 Stanislaw Leszczyński's followers supported Khans Devlet Giray II and Qaplan Giray, and from 1768-1769 Khan Qırım Giray supported the Bar Confederation. After the Turkish-Russian war of 1736–1739, during which Field Marshal Münnich burned down Bakhchysarai, Khan Salamat Giray II not only restored his ancestors' palace, but also tried to revive a Chinggisid tradition: in 1742 he sent a 'yarlıq' to the Polish king consisting of seven articles of a new peace treaty [28, pp. 202–203, 1001–1008].

International contacts between Crimea, Lithuania, and Poland that dated back to the 15th century were interrupted by Russia's annexation of the Crimean Khanate in 1783, only a few years before the last partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.


19. Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych (Warszawa), Archiwum Skarbu Koronnego, Dział 2 (ra-chunki poselstw), sygn. 1.

20. Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych, Archiwum Skarbu Koronnego, Dział 2, sygn. 4.

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30. Kołodziejczyk D. Tibet in the Crimea? Polish embassy to the Kalmyks of 1653 and a project of an anti-Muslim alliance (in print).


§ 6. The Heritage of Chinggis Khan's State on European Maps of the 15–18th Centuries

Igor Fomenko

To avoid drowning in a sea of graphic materials or simply listing the sources, which alone can go on for dozens of pages, we will focus only on the hallmark cartographic materials.\(^{71}\)

As a rule, foreign authors who wrote about Russia before the 16th century received only second-hand information on Muscovy and various Tatar Kingdoms, relying on data from literary sources, annals, documents and oral tales. This is how Maciej Miechowita, Paolo Giovio, Paolo Campani, Johann Fabri, and others worked. 'Notes on Muscovite Affairs' by Sigismund von Herberstein presented one of the first descriptions of the country by an eye-witness. Nevertheless, no matter how frequently various European guests visited Muscovy, their stereotypes of the Tatar-Russian state remained generally unchanged.

The 15th century. Let us refer to the graphical language to discern what knowledge about the far-away, mysterious Tartary the Europeans depicted in their medieval maps. It is worth mentioning that portolan charts, the most accurate cartographic materials, are important sources for the 15–16th centuries (see. Fig. 1*).

The sea maps of the 15th century produced by workshops under various European map-making schools show the principal Golden Horde cities of the Black Sea region. The most important place names are accompanied by miniature flags with the Jochid tamga seal and stylised city icons. The territory attributed to the flags with the Jochid tamga seal coincides with the borders of the Golden Horde traced in written sources. The western-most point is the town of Vicina, a large harbour in the lower reaches of the Danube, and the eastern-most one is Tana (Azak). The Golden Horde city of Azak is marked on portolans with the greatest number of flags in the Northern Black Sea region, along with various designs of the Jochid tamga seals. This indicates that the city was a vital hub both for regional and international trade. In addition, states that had vassal relations with the Jochid dynasty can be traced by flags bearing the Golden Horde tamga seal. All Golden Horde cities marked by miniature flags were administrative centres, at the least [10].

Let us examine a round copper map of the world—the Planisphere of Stefano Borgia (1440/1450—17th century) from the Vatican Apostolic Library [12, Table LVII (Borgiano XVI)]. The planisphere, which served primarily as a wall-mounted ornament, includes one of the first mentions of the ethnic name of Tartary. The miniature image shows a nomadic city in the Middle Volga region (Left Bank), which may have been the residence of the Golden Horde khan. Tents interspersed with carts form a square, with a stream flowing in the centre and unharnessed horses grazing nearby. The miniature images depict the day-to-day lives of nomads. Next to the nomadic camp there is a text that, with slight alterations, can frequently be seen in the cartography of the 16th century in the same place: «Kingdom of Great Tartariya: when the Tatars move to a place, they hitch bulls and other pack animals, and search for a place with good grazing pastures. Their city consists of multiple tents, carts, etc.»

The 1448 planisphere of Andreas Walsperger, a Benedictine monk from Salzburg [37, pp. 31–32], also shows one of the early placenames related to the name 'Tartars'. The state of the 'Tartar Empire' is located above the Koman Kingdom in the Middle Don region. On the Right Bank of the Don (apparently, Brother Andreas mixed up the rivers), there is a city with a text next to it: 'Sarai is the capital of Tartars, where the Emperor lives'. In the Middle Volga region in the land of Cumania there is a large miniature painting of a city enclosed by a fortified wall,

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\(^{71}\) Data from cartographic sources (placenames, legends and texts) is presented in the text in italics.

* See Fig. 1–7 for the article in the color insert.
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with a commentary next to it: 'This city (Sarai al) is the Jedit of the Tatar Batay, where the Great Khan died'. It is worth mentioning that the name of the Golden Horde khan mentioned in the 1448 map is the only one I have ever encountered in cartographic legends known to me.

Some portolans demonstrate the vassal relations within the Golden Horde. For example, the 1482 sea map by Jaime Bertran places a figure of the ruler sitting on pillows, with a curved sword and a round shield with a tamga seal on it, with an inscription that reads 'The King of Tartary' next to him. To the East, there is a much larger image of a ruler holding the scepter and orb, known as 'La Gran chan Amperator de 'Tartaria' [36, no. 1–2. Pl. 19].

On an anonymous mid-15th century planisphere from Modena (the 'Modena Anonym') [41, H. 358], in the Great Tartary, close to the North, next to the green hills, there is an enormous royal crown denoting the place where Temujin was elected khan with the title 'Chinggis' bearing the following note: 'In 1187, the First Tartar King was crowned here'.

Let us refer to the world map of 1459 produced by Fra Mauro in Venice (kept in Biblioteca Marciana) (see Fig. 2). This map is unparalleled in the 15th century in terms of geographic scope and actual ideas about the Earth. Later on it served for Epigonos during a long-term period as an important guide in compiling geographical maps of Asia.

Fra Mauro provided a well-grounded explanation to the sources which helped create this wonderful cosmography, placing it where traditionally outstanding geographers placed the border between Europe and Asia—in a bend of the Tanais-Don River. The author undoubtedly used Ptolemy's materials, evidence from Eastern merchants, Russian sources and notes of European travelers. The map was made by the order of the Portuguese monarch, Afonso V. It is worth mentioning that before this masterpiece of medieval cartography, no roads were shown on European maps. Fra Mauro depicted the roads that connected Russian regions and cities—another argument supporting the idea that the monk received information from travellers who had been there. Particularly, the information was provided by the 'Surozh guests', that is, Russian merchants who traded with the Italian posts in the North Black Sea region.

The Venetian cosmography contains the ethnonym 'Tartary' in the names of regions where cartographers previously depicted Alania and Cumania (the southern Russian steppes) in the interfluve of the Dnieper, Don and Volga. This map also shows the city of 'Tartaria' below the mouth of the River Medveditsa which flows into the Don. So far, this city has not been located due to insufficient archaeological study of the region.

Much space is allocated on this map to the capital of the Golden Horde (it is named on the map 'LORDO DE SARAY', which is translated literally as 'Sarai Orda')—'Sarayu', this is for the record about scientific debates as to the actual number of Sarais, but, according to the map there were more than one.

The miniature of the first capital of the Golden Horde—the city of Sarai—on the map by Fra Mauro is significantly inferior to the Sarai enclosed with a mighty fortified wall that artist Andrea Bianco deservedly called 'Grando'. Close to 'Saray Grando', there is a miniature of a luxurious burial vault accompanied by an epitaph that dates back to the events of 1395:

'Tatar burial vault: which contains 18 burials performed at Tamerlane's will. They are very much alike, as depicted in this picture. And he ordered that only Tatar leaders be buried here'. And the way the mausoleum is depicted on the map, just like it was originally, is again indicative of the high quality of this cartographic historical source and the information that was used to create this tabula.

The famous 1459 Cosmography includes a large miniature painting of the burial vault for Mongol Emperors—'SEPULTURA IMPERIAL' which is worth seeing. The explanatory text next to the tomb contains a comment: 'This luxurious and amazing burial vault was constructed

72 This, undoubtedly, refers to the funeral complex where 'prominent Tatars' from the Toktamyshev's army who were defeated by Aksak Timur (Tamerlane) in the battle by the Kondurcha were buried.
to bury noble people and is located in the Mountains named Altai. And only Chinese Emperors and their descendants are entitled to be buried in it.

The 1459 map is also valuable because the author placed two capitals of the Golden Horde on the Left Bank of the ‘Edil’ (Volga): the ‘Sarai’ on the Left Bank of the ‘Kara Sarai river’ where it joins with the Edil, which corresponds to the city of Sarai Batu, and ‘Sarai Grando’ (Sarai al-Jedid). The map depicts a third Sarai as well—‘Sarai of Kalmuks’ located on the Right Bank of the Volga (see Fig. 2).

Let us also mention one more city with the root ‘Sarai’ in the name, that is ‘Saray-Jük’ city, located in the lower reaches of the ‘Yaik River’ and surrounded by water in all directions (see Fig. 3). Sarai Jukeb was an important trading centre of the Golden Horde, the burial site of several rulers of the Golden Horde, and beginning from 1490 it became the capital of the Nogai Horde. According to the miniature on the 1459 map this is a large and thriving city, enclosed by a high defensive wall with numerous round fortress towers. ‘Sarayzuch’ could be accessed by a stone bridge on the river that surrounds the city. Most probably, by the time the map was compiled Saray-Jük had already been restored after being destroyed by Tamerlane’s troops in 1395.

There is a nomadic camp next to Saray-Jük, marked by a miniature painting of an unharnessed two-wheel cart with a yurt on top of it; there is a comment next to it about the people that lives here, that is ‘amazobi’73, this gentilic is used by Fra Mauro to mark nomads: ‘Amoxobi are those whose carts are also their homes’.

There is a text above the city ‘Amon’ (which is by no means located on the banks of the blue Nile) saying about lands of Tatars and mentioning the cities ‘Sarais’: ‘Thus, one can say that from this river Yak-Sart, there begins (the land) Scythia, and (the region) Chagatai, Urgench, Lesser Sarai, Great Sarai, and beyond the Edil, and the Tais and the Ozu (Dnieper – Author), and all these are seemingly Scythians, or Tatars’.

Close to the luxurious miniature of the city of ‘Otrar’, which, according to a legend, is located on the ‘boundary with a desert’ there is an 8 lines text saying about the last campaign of Tamerlane to China: ‘On his way to China, Tamerlane and his troops reached this place. But a cruel winter fever stroke him down and inflicted a death blow, and forced him to turn his troop around in the mid of his way and return to Otrar where he (Tamerlane) died, and his troops were dismissed’.

The lands of the Kazakh Khanate are mainly located in the three major regions which are marked on the map as ‘Chagatai’ and ‘the Chagatai Horde’ (in the South); ‘Urgench’ and ‘the Urgench Horde’ (in the North-East) and ‘Scythia in Asia’ (in the North) (see Fig. 3).

The legend about Chagatai, or ‘Lordo de Çagatai’, which is located to the south of Termichi nearby the city of ‘Orgaça’, tells the European reader the following: ‘This honourable and wealthy kingdom was founded during old times by Urgench descendants. They founded in this beautiful place a noble and powerful city surrounded by rich pastures; the boundaries of the kingdom in the west are Kandak and Sarai, in the south—the Baku sea or the Caspian sea; in the north it shares its borders with Russia, and in the east it adjoins Persia. But Tamerlane destroyed this city and its signoria, and carried over the metropolis itself to another place where another Urgench was founded. Tamerlane brought masters from Tabriz to perform construction works in the city’.

Not far from the estuary of the river ‘Yak-Sart’ the city of ‘New Urgench’ is depicted on the map, which was mentioned in the legend about the ‘Chagatai Kingdom’. Close to ‘Orgaça nuou’, at the bottom of it there is the following note: ‘This is the new Urgench that was founded by Tamerlane, and it was built by famous master-builders brought there by Tamerlane from Tabriz’.

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73 ‘Amaksobi’ is the name classical authors gave to the Sarmatian tribes that inhabited the Dnieper area. Pliny (Plinius) the Elder, particularly, wrote that Amaxobi was one of the Aorsi tribes.
But, unfortunately, the design of this study does not allow us to consider this tabula in detail, getting absorbed in this valuable information stated on its graphical margins.

The 16th century. On the 1505 planisphere by Nicoló de Caverio [27, Map no. 26], a ruler sits on a low throne in the middle of the Golden Horde, marked as 'Tartaria' on the map, in a luxurious red and blue tent, above which a red two-pointed flag with a golden tamga flies. This is the sole anthropomorphic image on the map, which testifies to its particular importance.

With the weakening of the Mongol Empire and the Golden Horde state, the image of the ruler of Sarai on maps gradually grows smaller, and his title also changes—the word 'Emperor' is removed. The aggressive image of a 'Tartaro' armed with a sword can be seen in the Northern Black Sea region on the navigation map in the 1512 sea atlas of Maggiolo Vesconte, as well as on the portolan of another representative of the famous Genoese map-making clan of the second half of the 16th century, Maggiolo Giacopo [39, pp. 88–89; 38] (see. Fig. 4).

When describing countries and peoples far removed from the cartographic centres of Europe, authors made wide use of the works of antiquity (Strabo, Plinius, etc.). Therefore, a paradoxical situation frequently arises—both the antique and medieval names of the same country are often included in a map. The popularity of the Geography of Claudius Ptolemy continued to grow, and by the middle of the 16th century various European printing houses had published numerous editions of this work.

Let us examine several important cartographic appendices to Ptolemy's 'Geography', paying particular attention to the 'Tartar' onomatology.

On the map of Italian monk Marcus Beneventanus (Rome, 1507), who used the map by Nicholas of Cusa as a guide [25, pp. 18–19], the westernmost branch of the 'Tartar' peoples—'Perekop Tartary'—was located on the Eastern bank of the Dnieper. On the world map by Johannes Ruysch (Rome, 1508) [26, tab. XXXII] the lands beyond the 'Polar Circle' are known as the 'Dark Province', and to the east of that lies 'Great Tartaria'. To the south of the North Pole are Muscovy, 'Russia Alba' (the Right Bank of the Dnieper), 'Kazan', 'Strakhan', and the 'Land of Tartaria' (between the 'Euxine' and the 'Hyrkanian Seas'). On a 1513 world map (Strasbourg) [26, tab. XXXV], entitled 'The Hydrographic, or Sea Map', 'the land of Tartaria' is placed in the foothills of the North Caucasus, in the Middle Volga region and on the Left Bank of the 'Ra river' (Volga). All of Western Siberia is called 'Tartaria'. The 1515 map by Gregor Reisch, the prior of the Carthusian monastery in Freiburg [26, tab. XXXVIII] is very schematic. It is noteworthy that the cartographer paid particular attention to various 'Tartaries' in 'Asia': 'Perekop Tartaria'; 'Cuman Tartaria' (Middle Volga Region); 'Raven Tartaria' (West Siberia); 'Tartaria Torquesten' (East Urals); 'Tartaria the Most Affluent Süm' (East Siberia); and 'Tangut Tartaria' (Northeast Eurasia).

In 1516, the cartographer Martin Waldseemüller produced and published his famous 'Sea Map ('Carta Marina...') on 12 pages [2, pp. 119–121], from which, despite its numerous archaisms, Europeans were able to obtain at least some information on the mysterious Tartary, which was almost unknown to them. Most notable for our topic is the 3rd page of the first row, which depicts 'Russia Alba' and a significant portion of Asian Russia, stretching to 65° E [7, pp. 3–5, Table 1]. Waldseemüller received information on the lands shown on the map from the works of Odoric of Pordenone, Giovanni da Pian del Carpine, Marco Polo and other travelers.

Beyond the 'Riphean Mountains' spreads a boundless 'TARTARIA' consisting of numerous 'regiones'. Along the eastern slope of the 'Riphean Mountains', north to south, the following regions are located: 'Mordvanii' with the legend: 'Here, in this region, live the people known as the Bilers, and they are the vassals of the Tartars'; then follows the region of 'Great Bulgaria'; in the lower reaches of the Don (Left Bank) the country of 'Kazana' can be found, and above it—the land of 'Nagaj'. In the land of 'Nagaj', between the 'Tanais' and the 'Ra', on a low throne in a tent with a sword in his hand sits 'the great nomadic ruler over great emperors, the Tsar of Kazana and the Emperor over many peoples.'
Beyond the Volga, which flows across the entirety of Russia diagonally from the Caspian Sea to the Baltic, crosses Lake Ilmen and flows into the Gulf of Finland, above the Caspian Sea, called 'The Sea of Abah, or the Salty Sea', spreads the vast land of 'Cumania'. In the East, beyond the 'Yaksar' river, lies 'Saracen Tartary'; 'The Land of the Bisermens' and 'The Kingdom of the Kangits' lie above it. In the centre of 'Tartary', among tents spread over the graphic field of the map, there is a frame with a traditional legend on the lifestyle of the 'Tartars': they do not live in cities, but travel with their herds, and their food is milk and meat.

In the 16th century, the Italian school of cartography held the leading position in the world, primarily due to its maritime maps. In 1525, the cartographer Battista Agnese produced a map of Muscovy based on first-hand information. This is 'The Map of Muscovy based on statements received from the Ambassador Dmitry (Gerasimov) himself' [8, p. 213]. The map was created as an appendix to a book on Muscovy and Tartary by Bishop Paolo Giovio. The source of information was the interpreter (in the title of the map, the 'Ambassador') of Grand Prince Vasili III (see Fig. 5).

The ethnonym 'Tartary' appears seven times on the relatively small map, as well as one image of 'MAGNUS TARTARUS OCCIDENTALIS', 'The Great Ruler of East Tartary' is shown in three-quarter profile sitting on a throne. He is wearing long robes, with a tall headdress on his head and a scepter in his right hand—one of his insignias. Behind the ruler, one can see a tent city spread in the 'desert', with only rhumb lines running through it. The map shows 'Perekop Tartaria' (located between the estuaries of the Dnieper and the Don); simply 'Tartaria' without any attribute (between the lower reaches of the Dnieper and the Don); 'Asian Tartaria' (on both banks of the Volga); 'Tartaria' (located above the only 'Tartar' city on the map—'casanum tartarum'); opposite 'Kazan of the Tartars', across the Volga, live 'the Shaybanid Tartars'. Up the river (probably the Kama) is located the land of 'nogai tartar', and the seventh 'Tartaria' can be found in West Siberia, where 'MAGNUS TARTARUS' reigns.

Let us examine a map of Muscovy by Anton Wid [13, map no. 39–41]. The artist from Danzig produced this map based on materials provided by the fugitive Moscow voivode and okolniczhi, Ivan Vassilyevich Lyatsky [24, pp. 64–68]. In 1542, Wid created the manuscript, and the famous engraving by Frans Hogenberg date back to 1555. The placenames on the map are bilingual: Latin transliteration of the Russian placenames and their duplication in Cyrillic. To the North of 'Kosaki Orda', in the watershed area of the 'Deyk' (Yaik) and the 'Volga', the camping grounds of the 'Nogai Horde' are shown; the Nogais, as a European lover of historical geography can see, have the most numerous flocks of sheep and herds of horses in Tartaria. 'The Perekop Horde' is located in its traditional place in the Crimea; their flocks graze further to the north, reaching the source of the 'Sosna River'. The following commentary is placed next to the armed figures of the Perekop Tartars: 'These Tartars are the bitter enemies of Christians'.

The persistent Russo-Lithuanian conflict was the cause of the 1526 ambassadorial mission to Russia of Sigismund von Herberstein who had the instruction of the Austrian Archduke Ferdinand. The map 'Moscovia Sigismundi Liberi Baronis in Herberstein Neiperg et Gutenhag MDXLVP' (1546) [24, tab. XI] (1546) that had been intended as an appendix to his book was produced 3 years before the production of the 'Notes' by Herberstein. It was produced by a famous engraver, Augustin Hirschvogel who worked with Herberstein to a great effect in 1546 and 1547 [6, ed. I, pp. 6–8]. This small map depicted the following peoples: the 'Nagai Tartars', the 'Cheremis people', the 'Mordva people', the 'Circassian people', and the 'Pyatigorsk Circassians'.

One of the best representatives of the Italian school of map-making of the Renaissance period is Giacomo Gastaldi. His contemporaries bestowed on him the epithet 'excellentissimo cosmografo Piamontese'. In 1548, he created 'The New Map of Muscovy' [6, ed. I, map no. 4].

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74 In the Late Middle Ages, the Volkhov river was conflated with the river Ra, as in this case on the 1516 map of Martin Waldseemüller.
The eastern and southeastern portions of the map comprise the region 'Kuriapatsor' (in the North Caucasus), the area of 'Tartacosia' to the East of the Maeotic Sea, and above it 'Circasia' and 'Alania'. On the Right Bank of the La Volga fl., the following regions are located: 'Qipchaq' (above Astrakhan); 'Palistra' (in the Middle Volga Region); and 'Kabata' close to the city of 'Cassan'. On the Left Bank of the Volga, the region 'Chagatai' is located (close to the estuary); to the north are located 'Shambanid Tartars' (see Fig. 6).

The works of the famous Flemish geographer and map maker Abraham Ortelius were of utmost importance for the development of historical geography. His 'Theatrum Orbis Terrarum' was extremely successful. The work comprised 70 maps on 53 pages. From one edition to another, the book's size increased, and it became the first systematic compendium of maps. Among the maps published by Ortelius was a 1562 map of Muscovy that was republished without revisions until 1612, as well as a map of East Asia—'Tartary, or the Kingdom of the Great Kham' [14, tab. 46–47].

The author of a map of Muscovy, or to be more precise, a 'Description of Russia, Muscovy and Tartary', was Anthony (Antonius) Jenkinson, an illustrious diplomat and merchant who represented England's Muscovy Trading Company at the court of Ivan the Terrible. It is remarkable that the Kazan Khanate was shown as a part of the Muscovite state, while the Astrakhan Khanate was still shown as independent, even though Jenkinson was aware of the conquest of Astrakhan by Moscow, which he mentioned in his literary work. In the North from the region of 'Kondor' to the land of 'Bajda' stretches the region of 'Samoyed'; the middle portion of the map, up to the 'Volga', is occupied by 'Russia'; in the South, from the region of 'Mordva' to the area of 'Boghar' (Bukhara) is the ethnynym 'TARTARI', and to the south of the 'Samar River'—'NAGAIA'. These areas are dotted with tents and nomads grazing camels. The geographic accuracy of the territory shown on the map where Anthony Jenkinson travelled in 1557 while leading an expedition in search of trade routes to Bukhara and Persia [5; 4] is rather high, which was partly achieved by establishing the latitudes of individual places. Below the region of 'Bayda', to the right of the large 'Chinese Lake', the source of the Ob river, there is a note regarding miracles that took place in mysterious 'Tartary'. The commentary to the miniature image is placed within a rich cartouche complemented by a corresponding picture. The viewer can see how an impressive armed column surrounded by numerous flocks of sheep and herds of camels moves down the Eastern slopes of Mount 'Imaus'. The commentary says: 'These rocks have the likeness of men, and also of camels and other animals carrying various loads, as well as small livestock. Once upon a time, in a distant age, this was a horde with people engaged in livestock breeding, and grazing small and large cattle; however, once by some magic they all turned to stone and became rocks while maintaining the likeness of humans and animals. This amazing transformation took place about 300 years ago'.

The map 'Tartary, or the Kingdom of the Great Kham' was created in Antwerp in 1570 [14, tab. 46–47]. It is preceded by a historical ethnographic text. Below are some excerpts that are typical of the established ideas of Europeans about the 'Tartars', as well as the sources of their knowledge. 'Those whom we call Tartars comprise a great number of peoples who live on an enormous territory. Since Tartary currently stretches from the East Ocean or Mangico, its lands spread from the Northern Ocean to the Southern reaches of Sinam, a portion of India, and go beyond the Ganges, the Sakos, the Oxus [...], the Caspian Sea and the Maeotian Swamp; in the West, Tartary borders on Muscovy, which once was completely occupied by the Tartars and had representatives in its cities. In ancient compositions, Tartary was known as 'Asian Sarmatia', as well as 'Scythia' and 'Serica' (a territory that currently roughly corresponds to that of China). Its horrifying name was first heard in Europe in 1212. In their language, 'ordy' means 'a multitude'. And although they live in different provinces, at a great distance from each

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75 From the time of Claudius Ptolemy, Mount Imaus had been identified with the Urals; later it was associated with the Altai, Tien Shan and the Himalayas.
other, they have much in common in their customs and lifestyles. Their build is squat; their appearance is squat; their eyes are deep-set and narrow; their beards are horrible; in all other respects their bodies are powerful and their spirit is brave; they kill horses and other animals and use them for food, but they do not eat pigs... Sigismund von Herberstein provides information on the Tartars, their customs and traditions. Also see Antonius Bonfinius and his commentaria Hungarica, and M(arco) Polo the Venetian, who lived among them (the Tartars) for a long time. On their origin, read Matthew of Miechow; (the work of) Hayton of Corycus; the Saracen history by Celo Curione, and the writings of the Jesuit Jacob of Navarre. The information on the Tartars offered by Nikephoros in Book 18, Chapter 30 would be good to have as well. The texts placed on the map abound with data that date back to traditional antique and medieval authors and contain numerous legendary and mythological themes.

On Ortelius's 1570 map, the domain of the 'Great Khan' includes the following lands and peoples: 'Astracan', 'Kazan', 'Turkestan', 'The Kingdom where ... the number of tribes reaches 900, Maveranahr (Transoxiana), Chagatai, Samarkand', 'Charsian', 'Istigias', 'Takalistan', 'Kamul', 'Tartar', 'Chiusa'.

The Taimyr Peninsula is shown as the place of residence of two Israeli peoples lost in ancient times, the 'tribe of Dan' and the 'tribe of Naphtali', which in the state of the 'Emperor of Tartary' are also called 'hordes'. The placement of Judaic peoples in the Scythian Desert is an indispensable tribute to medieval ideas on the vassals of Antichrist, the peoples of Gog and Magog. Thus, 'hordes' are basically placed in the North.

The neighbors of the Judaic 'hordes' are the 'Cheremiss Horde', the 'Turbonim Horde', and the 'Horde of the Merkits', as well as: The Usezucanorum horda, 'the Kazan Horde', 'the Bashkir Horde', 'the Siberian Horde', 'the Tsardoms of Tabor'; 'the Land of Chiorsa', and 'Bargu'. Next to each 'horde' (apart from the Judaic and Cheremis hordes) there are miniature images of tents—indicators of nomadic camps.

In the so-called 'Wroclaw Jenkinson' [9, p. 12]76, in the area of 'Tartary', to the southwest of 'the Chinese Lake', in the area of 'Tumen', 'Nagaia' and 'Cassakia', near a miniature of a nomadic camp surrounded by numerous flocks of sheep and herds of horses and camels, there is a commentary in a cartouche, describing the way of life of the people who live there: 'The residents of the Tyumen region, the Cossaks and the Nagais, are Mahometan Tartars who live in communities. And wherever they go, they take with them their numerous wives, whom they value. The Tartars are people who eat horse meat, but from some horses they also obtain milk. They also eat fruits growing on trees. They do not have any money in circulation. These people are partial to practicing magic and to conjuring evil spirits. If any enemy threat arises or the skies are darkened due to a storm, they convene a council meeting in order to pass a decision regarding the omen or the enemy threat. And then one of them (a priest or shaman), using spells, herbs, roots and (special) stones, demonstrates his art in interpreting various signs.”

For the engraved map of the Detecum brothers, 'A New Description of the Northern Regions, Including Muscovy, the Ruthenes, and the Tartars, as Well as the Tartar Hordes Surrounding These Lands...' (before 1572) [20], 77 an unknown author compiled materials of outstanding travellers, and map-makers of the first half of the 16th century: Sigismund von Herberstein, Ivan Lyatsky, Gerardus Mercator, Anthony Jenkinson, Giacomo Gastaldi, Olaus Magnus, and Master Caspar Fopellius.

To the southeast of the 'Chinese Lake', in the region of 'Yugoria' and 'Cassakia', next to the miniature of a nomadic camp, we can read the following commentary with a generalised characteristic of the Tartar ethnicity: 'The Tartar people have always been known for their warlike attitude and led a nomadic life, and it is divided into Hordes'. The most important of them are: 'The

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77 The only known copy in the world.
Chapter XII. The Political Development of the Tatar States in the 15–18th Centuries

Horde' in the land 'Bulgaria'; 'the Horde' in the land of 'Cassakia'(the southeast of Lake Telentskoye); 'the Horde' in the area of the Middle Ural; 'the Horde' in the region of 'Nagaj'(between the Volga and the Yaik); 'the Horde' in the upper reaches of the 'Yaik'; 'the Horde' in 'Turkestani'.

An explanatory commentary is placed for a European viewer between the Yaik and the Volga, next to an image of a nomadic Horde: 'In the Tartar language, a horde means a group of people who comprise one community. And this community (the Horde) constantly leads a nomadic life, moving from one region to another'.

The map offers a lot of information on past wars and wars contemporary to the authors of the map. Below are the notes pertinent to the topic under examination. In the Northern Azov Region, in the area of 'the Crimea': 'The Crimeans are Mahometans; they raid the Muscovites, with whom they are always at war'.

Above the city of 'Kazan': 'In 1551, the Tartar Kingdom of Kazan was defeated and included in the realm of the Emperor of Russia'.

Close to the city of 'Astrakhán': 'In 1534, the Astrakhan Tartar Kingdom was subordinated and annexed to the Russian Empire'. As we can see, the map makers are ahead of true events by 1–2 years.

Near the town of 'Malyj Khorasan': 'Here is the town of Khorasán that is located in the Persian Kingdom; in 1558, it was seized by the Tartars'.

17th Century. The Europeans still associated 'Sarmatia Prima', or 'European Tartaria', with wildness and barbarism, as well as a scale of territory that was very difficult to describe. During this period, the image of the Tsar of Tartaria completely lost its aggressive features. On the portolan of Aragonian map-maker Placido Caloiro et Oliva, dating to the early 17th century, the 'King of Tartaria' in the Black Sea region is the vassal of the 'Great Turk' [40, p. 172.]. Unlike the other 'tsars', armed with swords and shields, the Tartar ruler sits on cushions in the lower reaches of the Volga and holds a cup instead of a curved sword.

Let us look at the map of 'Tartaria' [18], produced in the early 17th century by Jodocus Hondius, a famous Flemish map maker and engraver. The territory of 'Tartaria' ('Muscovy' is its western border portion) on this map is an island separated from the rest of the world, this way map makers separated themselves from dangerous neighbours. In the North, it is washed by the 'Northern Sea, the Sea of Nyaren, that is, the Calm Sea, the Russian Sea, the Tartar Sea, which is covered in ice'. In the East, 'Tartaria' is bordered by the 'Pacific Sea'. In the South, 'Tartaria' is separated from the ancient civilizations of the East by the 'Great Chinese Muros'—that is, a wall, and seas of sand: 'the Desert of Lop', 'the Desert of Muks', and 'the Black Desert', as well as a belt of various 'hordes'—'the Kalmuk Tartars', 'the Nagay Tartars', 'the Trans-Volga Tartars' and the 'Perekop Tartars'.

The map goes with a narrative in French, written by Peter van der Berg (Peter Montan), a geographer from Amsterdam, specifically for this map. 'Tartaria' spreads to the North along the great steppes of Scythia. It is populated by the Tartars, who are famous for the moderation and antiquity of their people. It is said that they descend from Abraham and have never served anyone, despite the wars Alexander the Great, Darius, Cyrus, Xerxes and other powerful kings and peoples have fought with them. In the past, they served only one Khan, or Lord, but now their kingdom is divided, and it is ruled by numerous princes. The name of their country originates from the River Tartar; we call it the Magog, but the local people call it 'Mungul' according to the name of the country that borders it from the North. Tatar is bordered with the Chinese Kingdom in the East, with India in the South along the Ganges and the Ouxus, and with the Caspian Sea and Poland, as well as Muscovy, in the West, and with the Arctic Sea in the North.

The first king of the Tartars was called the Kangi, or the Khama, but Paul Venet calls him 'the Kinhin'. His son's name was 'Ekuxam'; the third king, whom some also call Batu, was named 'Zaykham'; the fourth was known as 'Temur Kutlu or Tamerlane', and he captured the Turkish emperor Bayazet, chained him in gold chains and carried him in a cage around Asia [...].
Most of the country's (Tartaria) territory is a desert, sad and uncultivated [...] .

Tartaria is divided into two parts, namely, the European part and the Asian part. The European part is known as 'Little Tartaria'; the Kingdom of 'the Perekop Tartars' is located there. It occupies the portion of European Scythia located between the Rivers Borysthenes, Psel and Desna that run into the Borysthenes, the small river Tanais that is usually known as the Donets, and the Tanais proper, as well as the Maeotian Swamp and the Pontos Euxinos...

Earlier the Scythians ruled there [...], but since the Tartars came from Asia and settled there, the land became known as 'Tartaria', and it was given the name of 'Little' Tartaria to differentiate it from 'Great Tartaria' located in Asia [...].

The Great or Asian Tartaria is divided into five principal parts, namely: desert Tartaria, Chagatai Tartaria, the Tsardom of Turkestan, the Tsardom of the Great Master of Kanten (the Emperor of China) and Old Tartaria'.

'Desert Tartaria' is located between the rivers 'Tanais', 'Volga', and 'Jaxartes' and the 'Tapir', 'Sebiy' and 'Imaus' Mountains. 'It covers a portion of Asian Sarmatia and most of Scythia, located between the Imaus Mountains. It is divided into numerous Hordes, among which the following are the most important: The Trans-Volga Horde, also known as 'the Horde of Bulgar Tartars', the Kazan, Nogai, Tyumen, Shilban, Cassak, and Astrakhan Hordes, the latter of which is also known as a 'Tsardom', and the Bashkir Horde. All of them are named after cities. Their residents, who once used to be free, are now the subjects of the Muscovite Tsardom, with the exception of the Tyumens, who recognise the power of the Great Kham Katyan [...].

The last portion of Tartary is Old Tartary, located between the Paropamis and Serik Rivers, or the Chinese Kingdom and the Northern Ocean, and the Strait of Anián. It is called Old Tartaria because the very name of the Tartars originates there [...].

It has numerous provinces, or hordes, and their names are almost unknown to us. Learned scholars believe that the countries of Ung and Mongul are in fact the Gog and Magog mentioned in the Holy Scriptures'.

A European reading about the Tartars could also learn that 'the nature of these people is cruel, wild and savage [...] The Tartars always ride, they do not use carts during a war, they own numerous strong horses, they have no cities that they would need to use their armies to protect [...].

They always hide their wives. Following the call of nature and the example of the ancients mentioned in the Bible, they are allowed to have several wives. Each (of the Tartars) has numerous children and concubines; the more wives they have, the more they love them, and their marriages are happy. They do not strive to marry rich brides or women of rare beauty or those coming from a noble house. Frequently, their noble princes marry slaves they have purchased [...].'

The following is said about the armour of the Tatars: 'They wear long robes without folds, suitable for fighting and riding. During a battle they wear large, long, pointed white 'klobuky' (caps) that shine so brightly that they bring terror to the hearts of their enemies even though they do not wear helms...In addition to the texts, the Hondius map provides a sketch of the 'Tatar' way of life: tents, cattle, a saddled horse, as well as warriors armed with lances.

The 1613 map of 'Muscovy, or White Russia' by Gessel Gerard Gerrits is mostly based on authentic Russian 16th-century drawings [16; 3, 258]. A portion of the Latin text on the reverse side of the 1614 re-engraving is directly related to our topic: 'Some Asian peoples who live in the Tartar steppes and travel as a part of their hordes are also under the rule of the Grand Prince of Muscovy: the Zavoloch and Kazan Tartars, the Nogais, the Shaybanids, the Cossaks, and the Astrakhan Tartars, who used to have their own state, as well as the Bashkirs'.

78 It is considered that if the map of Muscovy used by Herrits was drawn by Tsarevich Fyodor Godunov, who had access to Russian official secret maps, including the 'Big draft', then the map of Herrits was a kind of a remake of the lost 'Big draft' plan.
Chapter XII. The Political Development of the Tatar States in the 15–18th Centuries

'The Latest Map of Russia created by Isaac Massa' [21], a Dutch traveler and map-maker, was published in 1636. It also contains a Tartar onomasticon. The land stretching from the Volga to the source of the Ob is called 'Tartaricae Pars', and this 'portion' includes the following territories and peoples: 'the Tungus', 'Samoyeda', 'Bayda', 'Obdora', 'Sibiriya', Lukomorye, Yugoriya, the Piebald Horde, Kazan, Kolmaks, Bulgaria, the Nagaj Horde, Kolmaks', and 'Astrakan'. To the West of 'the Astrakan land' roam 'the Nagayski'; to the South of the Wild Field, above the Maeotis, lies 'the Crimea, or Perekop Tartary'.

In the vast territory of the European 'Tartaria', the European map-makers traditionally marked 'The Tartar Triad', remnants of the Golden Horde: 'The Siberian Kingdom', 'The Astrakhian Kingdom' and 'The Kazan Kingdom' [32].

'The General Map of Ukraine, or the Demonstration of Lands Depicted According to New Data...' by Johannes van Keulen (the second half of the 17th century) [23, f. 18] offers us the following material on 'The Little Tartaria. The state of the Krymchaks, or the Crimean Tartars or the Perekop Tartars', is limited to 'the Tauric peninsula'; in the North of this state, there is the sentry settlement of 'Or/Perekop'; in the South, a huge moat ('Fossa') is shown that connects the Karkinits Bay with the Sivash.

On the 1665 Volga map by Adam Olearius [15], on the Left Bank between the towns of 'Sorato' and 'Zariza' there is a large miniature that depicts the lifestyle and customs of the residents of this steppe land, the Nagais and the Kalmyks. The artist shows how the nomadic tribes move their tents using camels; what they wear; what fruit their land gives (miniatures of impressively large watermelons and melons, which were exotic to Europeans); how their tents look on the outside and on the inside, and how the hearth is arranged.

The Tartar onomasticon on the 1688 map 'White Russia, or Muscovy' [30, f. 25] by Guillaume Sanson is comprised of: 'The Crimean Tartars' and 'The Nogai Tartars'. The camping grounds of the latter group are located in the area of 'Little Tartaria' (the northern shore of the 'Maeotian Swamp'). 'The Circassian Tartars' are placed on the map between the Don and the Kuban. 'The Mordovian Tartars' are located between the towns of 'Moruma' and 'Alater'. And from the northeastern shore of the 'Mar Caspio' to the region of 'Tinguit' begins the territory of the 'Great Tartaria'.

A map by Nicolaes Witsen, a close associate of Peter I, is a graphic supplement to his work 'Northern and Eastern Tartaria' published in Amsterdam in 1692. It was based on the Russian cartographic materials. Witsen's map is the first true printed map of Siberia, and it exceeds even the Russian drafts of the period in the amount of information provided [42].

The following inscription stretches through entire Siberia: 'The Entirety of the Muscovite State Together with Great Tartaria'. 'The Circassian Tartars' occupy the Left Bank of the Terek river; 'the Shafkali Tartars' inhabit Dagestan; 'the Bashkir Tartars' live to the east of Saratov; 'Nagai Tartars' travel between Tsaritsyn and Saratov, on the Left Bank of the river; 'Ufa Tartars' spread from the Kama river up to Saratov; 'the Great Tartary' stretches from the Selenga and the Orkhon to the 'Eastern Ocean' and from the Amur to the Great Wall of China.

The 18th century. During the reign of Peter I, Russia made a decisive step forward in the sphere of cartography. By the end of the previous century the Siberian Prikaz had accumulated several hundreds of pages of drafts, and in 1696 the government took it upon itself to create a new map of Siberia. Edicts were sent to all Siberian towns for the voivodes to make separate plans of towns and areas that would later be brought together in a single draft by Semyon Remezov, a draftsman and researcher of the territory. In 1701, he compiled the first Russian handwritten atlas of Siberia (only 1 original and 2 handwritten copies are extant) comprising 24 maps and called 'The Drawing Book of Siberia' [11, s. 23]. The 23rd page of the book is the first Russian ethnographic map of Siberia. It depicts the borders of the settlements of the tribes in detail; the places of residence of each ethnicity are colour coded. In 'Great Tartaria' 87 different nations were mentioned! [11, s. 23, pp. 143–144]
The European maps of the Enlightenment period, like three hundred years before, continued to call Russia 'Muscovite Tartaria'.

'The New Geographic Map of the Great Kingdom of Muscovy, Representing its Southern Portion' by Nicolao Visscher was produced in Amsterdam in 1706 [33, f. 5]. On the map, the area in the Volga Region from Nizhny Novgorod to Astrakhan is called 'Muscovite Tartaria' and comprises by: 'The Kazan Tsarstvo, or the Kingdom of Kazan', 'the Duchy of the Bulgars', 'the Astrakhan Tsar, or the Kingdom d’Astracan', which also includes the lands of 'Golden Horde, or Horde d’Or', bounded by the Akhtub and the Yeruslan rivers.

In the Volga Region, the map marks the lands of the 'Mordvin', the 'Meadow or Plain Cheremises', the 'Mountain Cheremises', the 'Kalmuks' (one can see sketches of camping grounds between the Irgyz and the Samara); the 'Orlokouri Horde', and the 'Lands of the Grand Nagay', which include the lands of 'Memak' on the Right Bank of the Yeruslan River (the largest number of nomadic tents is shown in the Great Nagai lands); in the lower reaches of the Volga (the Right Bank), the 'lands of the Grebensky Cossacks' are marked, and the 'territory of the Astracan Tartars, or Nogays', are located below that.

Attention should be paid to the 'Map based on scientific works to show countries inhabited by the peoples, like the Turks, Tartars, Hungarians, Poles, Swedes and Muscovites...' by Nicolas de Fer. It came out in Paris in 1711 [29]. The region of our interest extends along the basin of the 'R. Volga', from the 'Kama River' to the estuary of the 'R. Iaick' [see Fig. 7].

The regions marked on the map are the following: the 'Kazan Tsar' with the metropolis 'Kazan'; the 'Bulgar Kingdom with its eastern part occupied by the Kalmyk Tatars'. The historic centre of the 'Royaume de Bulgar' is 'Belorje, or Bulgar'. The name 'Bulgar' has an interesting introduction, which was definitely induced by Russian sources. The 'Orlokouri Horde, or the Olgars, who are part of Great Tartaria' inhabit southward of the 'Irgyz' River. This nomadic community was named after the Kalmyk Khan Kho Orluk, who destroyed the independent state of Nogai Horde in 1634. The 'Kalmik Horde of Lapassan Prince' roam between the rivers 'Dungit' and 'Ruslan'. The region between the Volga and Yaik Rivers are marked with a dotted line and highlighted as a separate independent state entity. This proves a strong status of the land called 'The Great Nagais, or the Tartar Nogais, or the Nomads', which is actually the 'Astrakhan Tsar', that is the western part of the Manghit Yurt. The city of 'Serachick', a former Nogay metropolis, the reader can see in the mouth of the river 'Iaick', it is located on the tabula at around 46° north.

The 'Horde' defined as 'Separate' roam to the south of the gentilic 'Great Nagais'.

Here, on the map of the early 18th century, the viewer can also see the trace left by the great medieval state the 'Golden Horde'. Even three hundred years after its collapse, the Golden Horde still takes its place, though it is graphical, where the heart of this powerful Empire used to be.

On the 1714 'General Map of Russia' by Henri Chatelain [31], 'Samogesia, or the land of the Samoyeds', is located in Siberia, to the west of the Yenisei, as are 'Kondoria', 'Obodria', 'Lukomorye', the 'Painted Horde', the 'Tyumen Tartars' and the 'Barabinsk Tartars'.

'[The Map of] South Muscovy according to the materials provided by Guillaume Delisle and corrected by geographers Reynier and Joshua Ottensam in Amsterdam' [34] was printed in Amsterdam in 1720 and, judging from the toponymy, based on Muscovite materials. A significant number of Russian place names on the map are given in Latin transliteration.

Attention should be paid to the east part of the map called 'Muscovite Tartaria' and its population, without 'crossing' the 'Volga R.' to its Right Bank, from the North to the South. The list of Tatar ethnology is as follows: 'The Meadow or Plain Cheremises', 'the Tsar of Kazan, or the Kazan Kingdom' with its metropolis centre 'Cazan'; 'the Duchy of Bulgar', with the centre in 'Bulgar ou Beloje' (the region 'Duche de Bulgar' includes 'the Ufa Steppe' and 'the Field de Buchzar'); 'the Tartar Bashkirs'; 'the Great Nagais, or Le Grand Nagay'. In this region the 'Orlokouri Horde', 'the land of Pepovitits Girk' and 'the land of Mamak' are located. In the centre
of the 'Le Grand Nagay' nomad territories, the khan's main camp called 'the Urg camp' and sketches of six tents are marked. Moving southwards along the map and we see the nomad territories of 'the Kalmyk Torgauts'. In 'the Zetir valley' in the basin of the River of 'Irgyz' there are four marks of the nomad territories: the 'Nomad Territories of Ayuka Khan. The leader of the Kalmyk Torgauts, peoples subjected to Russia'. European followers of historical geography could see five tents on the map, the largest one belonged to the khan.

'The Astracan Tsardom, or the Kingdom d' Astracan' spread southwards. On the map issued in the Amstel River region, on the lands of 'the Kingdom d' Astracan', we can hear an echo of a once powerful state, the Golden Horde. By source of the River of 'Ruslana, or Rustana, or Gerusland' eastwards of the 'Salt Lake' there is a place name 'the Golden Horde, or Horde d' Or, the state that used to be very powerful here'; next, an artist made five sketches of nomadic camps, which clearly proves that nomadic way of life was preserved in these lands, and so was the legacy of the Golden Horde.

The boundless 'Field, or Mamai Steppe', where the 'Kalmuks Lavassan' nomadise, spreads southeasterwards of the 'Golden Horde' region, in the area of the 'Lake Samarly', from the 'Akhtuba River' to the 'Boshoj River' and 'Narin Sands'. Eleven images of the tents, nomadic camps, mark places of their nomad territories; the largest one belongs to the khan.

A massive archaeological site called 'The Ruins of Sarai, or Tsarev town' is depicted not far from the mouth of the river Akhtuba ['Achtsobs ou Achtopska Ustga']. Nomad territories of the 'Great Nagais' are situated southwards of the desert 'Sables de Narin', the 'Ustg Mountains' and the 'Chabdersab Valley'. The region where the 'Grand Nagai' roam frames the North-west and the North of the 'Caspian Sea' with its 'nomadic fringe'.

Johann Baptist Homann worked for Peter I and therefor was provided with Russian materials for mapping the 'Tartaries'. In 1725 in Nuremberg he prepared 'The Latest General Map of the Entire Russian Empire, Showing a Great Portion of the Globe, from the Arctic Pole to the Sea of Japan and the Northern Borders of China, as Well as the Road Recently Taken by the Tsar's Ambassadors from Moscow through All Tartaria to the Great Chinese Empire...' [17]. It is worth mentioning that this map was the first one to include the name 'Russian Empire' instead of the 'Muscovite State', the designation common in Europe. Russia's borders were shown in accordance with the Treaty of Nystad.

In the South, the Russian Empire shares a border with 'Little Tartaria', 'the Circassian Tartars', 'the Aral Duchy', numerous tribal unions of the 'Nomadic Kalmyks', 'the region of Naydo' and 'Chinese Tartaria'.

Let us assess several maps dated to 1723–1788 from 'The Universal Geographic Atlas of the First Geographers Guillaume Delisle and Philippe Buache of the (French) Academy of Sciences...' published in Paris in 1789 [28, ff. 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120]. The sheet no. 116 is the 'Map of Tartaria... 1766'. The title of the map is devoted to the steppe dwellers' way of life and decorated with miniatures of tents and domestic scenes. 'Little Tartaria' (the Northern Black Sea region) is dominated by the 'people of Nagai'; the lands of the 'Little Nagais', also known as the 'Black Nagais' or 'Black Tartars', are included in the 'Domain dependent on the Tartar Khan' (the watershed area of the Don and the Kuban); the 'Kuban Tartars' are also marked on the map, as is 'Asian Russia, or Russian Tartaria', divided into 'gouvernems' in the west and 'provinces' in the east.

The borders of 'Tartaria' stretch from the 'Don River' to the 'Kamchata Sea, which is also called the Sea of Lama'; 'Independent Tartaria' (from the Aral Sea to the Gobi Desert) includes the 'Yelyui Kalnuks', the centre of whose camping grounds is shown on both sides of the 'Ili River' in the form of tents. 'Independent Tartaria' also included the territories of Middle Zhuz, or 'Cossack Horde' (on the banks of the Syr Darya River). Furthermore, the map depicts the 'Tyumen Tartars'; the 'Tatartups' (Northern Caucasus); 'Great Tartaria' stretches from the 'Kara-Kalpak' to the 'Gilyak' people, below the southern border of Russia; 'Chinese Tartary'
from the Khalka Region to the Amur River; and the centre of 'Tartarie Chinoise' is located in 'Urga, or the Field'. The text to miniatures of tents is the legend: 'In this place or close to it was Karak(ar)jun, the capital of Chinggis Khan'. The north and the north-east of 'Muscovite Tartaria' are bathed by the 'Mer de Len' and the 'Mer d'Amour' with a correct coast line—a sign that the authors were familiar with Russian drafts of Siberia.

A remarkable map of the Northern Black Sea region, created in 1772 by Rizzi Zannoni [35], shows the Russian-Turkish border established after the Russo-Turkish war of 1735–1739, equipped with a fortified line built in 1740 for protection from the Nogai and Ochakovo Tatars, stretching from the Ivanovskaya Fortress on the Right Bank of the Dnieper to the Old Arhangelskaya Fortress (22 fortifications!). The map also shows the numerous camps of the Ochakov, Budjak and Nogai Tatars. The following are marked on the Left Bank of the Dnieper, in the 'Land of the Nogai Tatars': the 'Yuguri Horde' (to the north of the Konskie Vody); the 'Ivak Horde' (the upper reaches of the Krynya River); the 'Teliak Horde' (the upper reaches of the Ak Suyub River); the 'Kijjiit Horde' (the middle of the Kara Derezi River); the 'Nogai Yambuluk Horde' (the upper reaches of the Kara Derezi River); the 'Kangly Argakhly Horde' (to the west of Lake Kuru-Gelyu); and the 'Hadji Keray Horde' (in the basin of the Heyan Derezi River).

On the Right Bank of the Dnieper, in the 'land of the Ozyu-Kala Tatars' (the Ochakovo Tatars), are the following: the 'Mir-Ali Horde' (opposite the Boguzin Fortress); the 'On-Chadyr Horde' (the upper reaches of the Rumili Derezi); the 'Kazai-Mirzy Horde' (close to Lake Kuk-Kuyu); the 'Yagy Zapezakly Islam Keray Horde' (the middle of the Tana-Idel River); the 'Krotovyakly Horde' (the source of the Salkan-Dere River); the 'Istra Horde' (opposite the Stepanovskaya Fortress); the 'Tatar-Medzhet Horde' (opposite the Geremoleskaya Fortress); the 'Geneviz Horde' (the source of the Tuzla River); the 'Kevi Camp' (to the north of the confluence of the Gramokleyka and the Ingul Rivers); the 'Irkan Kangly Horde' (opposite the Bogoyul Fortress); the 'Alakh-Mirzy Horde' (to the northeast of Ochakov); the 'Ismail-Mirzy Horde' (near the source of the Olyu-Kagalnig River); and the 'Nogai Yedsany Horde' (at the source of the Urmany-Idel River). Near this nomadic camp is the largest miniature of a nomadic city, in the centre of which is the Khan's tent surrounded by several (12) smaller tents topped with crescent moons to make it clear for the Western audience what religion these nomadic communities adhere to. The lands of the 'Budjak Horde' stretch to the West of the lands of the Ochakovo Tatars, across the River of Olu-Teli Gelyu.

Let us examine a unique map of Siberia, 'The New Geographic Description of Great Tartaria' of 1730 [19], created by a map maker who had lived an unusual life. The Swedish officer Philip Johan Tabbert von Strahlenberg was captured after the Battle of Poltava in 1709 and remained in Tobolsk from 1711 to 1723, when he was released after the Treaty of Nystad. His work was based on Russian materials. Russian place names are given in Latin transliteration. The engraving of the title of the map shows not the stereotypical European spelling, 'Tartaria', but its Russian version, 'Tartaria'!

The sheer number of place names on the map had not been previously seen in the Western European map-making tradition. The borders of the 'Kazan Kingdom' and the 'Astrakhan Kingdom' are shown. Siberia is called the 'Siberian Kingdom'. There is no doubt that official titles of the Russian rulers were also reflected here.

Middle and Central Asia are called, as usual, 'Great Tattaria'; in the west its borders are the lower reaches of the Volga and the 'Astrakhan Kingdom', and in the east, the estuary of the Amur. The lands and peoples who live in 'Great Tattaria' are as follows: The Eastern portion of the Astrakhan Kingdom, the Kabder Tribe, the Yaik Cossacks, the Kara-Kalpaks, Karakum, Arakum, the Cossack Horde, the Djelchekly Tribe, the Djuss Tribe, the Qongirat Tribe, Turkomania (the northern part), the White Turkmens, the Karderi Tribe, the Djamakayu Tribe, the Mingastagan Tribe, Turkustan, the Yelyui Kalmyks (the upper reaches of the Irtysh), the Djungar Kalmyks, the Wild Kirghiz Wild Tatars, the Karagan Tribe, the Irtysch Steppe or Desert,
Chapter XII. The Political Development of the Tatar States in the 15–18th Centuries

the Kankagai People, the Teleut People, the Land of Kumanda, Mula Goya, the Karanguzagan Steppe or Desert, the Altai Steppe of Tala, also known as the White Valley, the Province of Kamul, the Mungals, Khalka, Mungalia, the Waterless Gobi Deser, also called the Khamo Desert, the Tola Desert, the Mongol Desert, Nivkhiya, Nivkhi Kartzin, the Land of the Gilyaks, the Yupi Taffars, the Targuzins, and the Zakhar Naiman Mungals. Next to each name of a nomadic tribe the artist placed miniatures of tents.

In the European part of Russia and the adjoining southern regions are inhabited by the following peoples: The Wild Voguliches, the Sirayens (Great Perm), the Permyaks, the Votyaks, the Cheremis, the Kazan Tattars, the Mordvins, the Yukan Tribe, the Tirsu Tribe, the Singran Tribe, the Salgat Tribe, the Djagatay Tribe, the Buchzar Tribe, the Bigatin Tribe, the Ayuygul Tribe, the Zelyur Tribe, the Kataysk Tribe, the Nazarmamuly Tribe, the Kipchaks, the Great Nogais, the Mamai Steppe, where the headquarters of the Kabdersay Tribe is located (in the land of the Great Nogais between the Akhtuba and the Yaik), the Kuban Tartars, and the Little Nogais (steppes of the North Azov Sea Region). The Kara-Circassians live near the Kulikovo Field! As far as I know, this is the first mention of this particular placename in cartography.

The map contains information on the foundation of the capital of the Golden Horde ‘Tsaritsa, or Tsarev town was founded when the Tattars left Hungary’. Here an inquisitive Swede tells us about the construction of the capital of the Golden Horde. Recall that after Ögedei Khan had died in December 1241, the Mongols, led by Batu Khan stopped their western campaign and moved back eastwards in March 1242.

Around 80 versts away to the south, on the Left Bank of the Akhtuba River, images of three small squares marking an archaeological site, ruins of another Sarai, are depicted with a commentary next to it ‘Ruins of the Shere Sarai Town’. In 1745, the Russian Academy of Sciences published ‘The Atlas of Russia Comprising 19 Special Maps Representing the Russian Empire Along with Neighbouring Lands’.

Sheet No. VII shows ‘Little Tartaria with the Bordering Kiev and Belgorod Guberniyas. This Map Also Includes the Lands near the Dnieper, Don and Donets, as well as the entire Crimea and parts of the Kuban and the Black Sea. Established on the aforementioned triangle created between Kiev, Ochakov and Azov and based on accurate information on the flow of the Rivers of Dnieper, Donets and Don’.

Sheet No. IX demonstrates ‘The Kingdom of Kazan with the neighbouring provinces and a part of the Volga. It contains most of the Kingdom of Kazan and nearby places along the Volga and the Kama Rivers. This map is established on the triangle between Moscow, Kazan and Astrakhan, and it is also based on accurate information on the Volga received from the Geographical Department’. [1, s. VII, s. IX].

I would like to end this brief cartographic survey with Russian maps reflecting historical legacy of one of the great medieval states, the Golden Horde. The placenames ‘Great’ and ‘Little Tartariya’ that were invariably included in the maps of Europe until the early 19th century indicate that the memory of the Empire of Chinggis Khan and its successor states had not been erased by implacable time.

The glow from the extinct light which was the powerful Golden Horde state, makes its way to us through the centuries reflected and falsified in maps, covered with centuries-old patina of ‘graphic mirrors’, in which time imprinted. Nevertheless, such a valuable historical and ‘geopolitical’ source as an old map, accumulating various knowledge and vision of the lands and peoples in it, covered with political touch of motivated customers and executors reflecting their mentality, introduces the reader to the medieval history of Eurasia. And the information that fits a limited area—a relatively small sheet of paper or parchment—is kind of ‘source of salt of the Earth’, the significance of which cannot be overestimated.
1. Atlas Rossijskoj, sostoyashhij iz devyatnadczati special`ny`x kart, predstavlyayushhix Vserossijskuyu Imperiyu s pogranichnymi zemlyami, Geograficheskim i novejshim observaciym, s prilozhennoyu pritom General`noyu Kartoyu Velikiy vseya Imperii, staraniem i trudami Imperatorskoj Akademii Nauk (The Atlas of Russia, comprising nineteen special maps representing the Russian Empire with bordering lands, composed in line with geographic rules and the latest observations, having also attached thereto the General Map of the whole Great Empire, by the efforts and labours of the Imperial Academy of Sciences). Saint Petersburg, 1745. 20 sheets of maps. State Historical Museum (SHM); GO-172.
9. Fomenko I. Novoe opisanie severnykh Regionov, vklyuchayushya Moskoviyu... Yan i Lukas Dutekumy' (A new description of the Northern Regions, including Muscovy... Jan and Lukas Datekums) (1562–1572). Moscow, 2010. 52 p.


Conclusion.
The Golden Horde and Tatar Yurts in World History

Vadim Trepavlov

In the 13th century, as a result of long-lasting wars led by Chinggis Khan and his heirs, the Mongol Empire was formed. Similar (based on fundamental parameters) structures of imperial and local administration as well as financial systems were formed throughout the tremendous space occupied by the Mongol Empire. In this sense, we can speak about a Pax Mongolica—a sphere of political domination and influence by the Mongols, or more precisely, of their imperial statehood. A polyethnic multicultural system was formed—one of the first in world history, allowing the process of elementary globalisation to proceed (as described earlier in M. Favereau's foreword). However, unlike other well-known Paces in history, a common cultural space was not formed. This may possibly be explained by the extremely short (half-century) period of time allotted for the existence of a unified Eke Mongol Ulus. Moreover, the Mongol Empire's impact upon the culture of neighbouring states was also comparably low (with the possible exception of the transfer of some Chinese inventions, brought by merchant caravans to different corners of the continent).

Traditional norms of state formation, organisation of the economy, and cultural standards— inherent in nomads and applied by the Mongols in the initial period of the Empire's creation—proved to be the most resilient in its steppe territories—the Native yurt (Mongolia) and the Ulus of Jochi (the Golden Horde). The same cannot be said about the Uluses of Chagatai (in its Transoxianian territories) and of Hulagu. Sedentary civilisations incorporated into the Chinggisid Empire already had their own developed statehood and culture, and thus the conquerors' governance was realised through the local authorities (Rus', Uighuria, the land of the Yenisei Kirghizes, and others); otherwise, the newcomer-Mongols absorbed the administrative systems themselves.

It is important to remember that during the first decades after Chinggis Khan's death, his authority as the founder of the Empire and status as a sacralised ancestor regulated many aspects of relations inside the Empire. The worship of the Eke Mongol Ulus' creator at first helped retain the political structures and ideological constructs consecrated by Chinggis Khan. However, with time, different forms of political, economic, and cultural conceptions gradually began to take shape following the natural development of social processes in the Ulus' khanates in addition to the acculturation of Central Asian migrants within the conquered lands. Powerful traditions which had already existed in the subdued countries prior to their conquest nevertheless gained strength in the Ulus' khanates. The ruling elites were thus forced to adapt to local conditions. The Jochids and Hulaguids both adopted Islam and its orientation towards the urban-Islamic officialdom and merchantry; the Yuan emperors sinicised both the court and the whole state, basing tax collection, provincial division, and the administrative apparatus on traditional Chinese forms.

The Jochid Ulus existed in a relatively more multidimensional civilisational space than did the Chinggisid khanates in Central Asia, Iran and China. The fact that the supreme power relied not only upon qualified bureaucrats, but also equally upon hundreds of thousands of ordinary steppe-dwellers—the bulk of tax payers and the core of the army—who stuck to the customary and prestigious nomadic way of life, gave this state a peculiar status and gave birth to the coexistence of nomadic and sedentary traditions and institutions. Depending on the various political peripeteias, economic transformations, and natural cataclysms, the local sedentary-agricultural civilisational substratum (mostly fueled from Khwarezm, but also partially from Crimea and the former Volga Bulgaria) would periodically either increase its weight in the state or lose leverage, essentially ceding ground to nomadic norms of life.

Similar to the process of Sinicisation in the Yuan Empire ('the Ulus of the Great Khan') and Iranisation in the Hulaguids' state, the 'matrix' of pre-Mongol forms of statehood inherent in the
Eurasian region was also revived in the Golden Horde. In this respect, we can find additional meaning in Al-Omari's remark that 'the land gained victory over the natural and racial features of them (the Tatars), and they all became like the Kipchaks'. The multiple-century legacy of the Oghuzes and Kipchaks became even more noticeable in the structure of the Jochid Ulus.

The confusion incurred by the Mongolian conquest and ousting of the former Kipchak elite from power yielded room for a peaceful and stable life in the powerful and rich state. In the territory of the former Cumanian 'Wild Fields a strict and severe regional system was established that divided the population by tens. The government of the Horde did not allow free movement from one ulus to another in order not to destroy the subtle organization of their tax and military mobilisation systems. For decades, a relatively quiet life without war or famine had favourable demographic consequences. Steppe tribes multiplied in number, divided themselves, and branched out, and their begs (emirs) acquired more and more subjects. In the nomadic world, this meant that social significance and political influence of the non-dynastic nobility increased. The power of beg-leaders of tribal unions (els) were gradually becoming stronger. This was not only caused by the favourable economic and demographic conditions arising due to the growth of the nomadic population of the Jochid Ulus from the second half of the 13th–first half of the 14th century, but also due to the crises and repressions in Batu's dynastic House during Toqa's rule and the beginning of Öz Beg's reign. At this time, the Jochids, in their struggle for power, lost the support of their kinsmen and other members of the dynasty, and instead found it among the nomadic Begs. Thus, this category of the Tatar aristocracy was being implemented into the circle of the ruling elite.

Temporary periods of peace between the traditionally competing Jochids and Hulaguids as well as the adoption of Islam as a state religion by the people of the Horde stimulated the penetration of Persian and Oghuz-Seljuq elements of statehood into the Golden Horde.

This penetration was also contributed by the Turkisation of the royal court and bureaucracy. Together with various external borrowings into imperial and Horde culture (see I. Vásáry's article in this edition), this Turkisation strengthened multicultural diversity within Jochid society.

The Golden Horde now departed from its original path as a remote provincial appanage granted for governance to one of Chinggis Khan's sons, and transposed into an independent, powerful empire which decided the fates of neighbouring countries and peoples for nearly two centuries. Its impact upon the history and civilisation of Eurasia proved to be long-lasting, multi-valued, and demanding of detailed and objective inquiry.

The question regarding the various forms of the Golden Horde's historical and cultural legacy has been discussed by scholars for a long time. At first, the idea about the existence of such an inheritance was expressed by those belonging to the school of 'Eurasians'—that is, Russian historian-emigrants. However, the majority of them did not conduct scrupulous historical studies, but rather reflected more generally upon the historical path of Russia. Therefore, the 'Eurasian' idea emerged (and for the most part continues to exist) not as a historiographic theory, but as a historiosophic concept still awaiting meticulous inquiry of the factual materials.

The general scheme of the Eurasian idea boils down to the historical succession of great continental empires—the Turkic Khaganate, the Mongol Empire, and the Russian Empire—which objectively transferred to each other the function of 'gathering' nations living within common borders. If we rely on this interpretation, Russia (and sometimes the USSR is added) stands as heir to the great unifying mission previous Eurasian superpowers had attempted to fulfill.

There have been multiple attempts to define various features of the civilisational connection between Russia and the East. As a rule, borrowings from the Golden Horde of the 13–15th centuries and earlier Turkic states represent a bright indicator of this connection. It follows that indisputable examples exist—the connection can be seen primarily in Russian aristocratic titularies and social terminologies (khaqan, tarkhan, etc.), in the financial system of medieval Rus', in the organisation of the coachman service, and others. However, some authors overemphasize the scale of Eastern borrowings, with some, for example, suggesting that Russian manors and the Zemsky sobor have a Tatar origin (J. Pelenski).
The methodology of defining such borrowings was first formulated by G. Vernadsky: if some phenomenon or institution did not exist in pre-Mongol Rus' but was recorded during the 14–15th centuries, it then meant that they emerged in the Tatar period and could have been borrowed from the people of the Horde. The risk of this method of analysis is apparent. But, by using it, Vernadsky managed to determine a range of positions within economic, political and military spheres of Russian life where Asian prototypes were clearly seen. Based on the same methodology, Ostrovsky and Halperin also examined the influence of the Golden Horde upon Rus'. However, in order to fully apply this approach, it is necessary to know whether the observed phenomena existed in the Golden Horde, and if yes, what form they took. Nevertheless, applying this approach is still difficult to accomplish due to the inadequate research on the history of the Golden Horde.

The issue regarding Russian-Horde relations and the Horde's influence upon medieval Rus', explored by the Eurasian thinkers, constitutes just one part of a wider circle of debate—questions on the common historical, statehood, and cultural legacy for the peoples of Eurasia.

All throughout the territories of the former Mongol Empire, already after its fall, the legacy of Mongolian domination and corresponding influence of its imperial institutions and establishments was preserved for a sufficiently long time. Let us name, as examples, states possessing this influence in descending order—the political formations of the Great Steppe and Central Asia; Iran; the Muscovite state.

In the Steppe and Central Asia, this influence was facilitated by the inalterability of the population in addition to the prevalence of Chinggisid dynasties in other relatively nearby places; within Central Asia itself, another addition to the above mentioned factors was also a peculiar renaissance of the imperial system under the reign of Timur, who, as is known, set a goal to restore the Eke Mongol Ulus (he first seized power in the Ulus of Chagatai, conquered the former Ulus of Hulagu, destroyed the Ulus of Jochi, and later died during the campaign against Ming China—that is, the recent Yuan Empire). In Iran, the Mongolian heritage overlapped the old traditions of the early Turkic (Oghuz-Turkmen) tribes who had great political influence in the Middle East. In the Muscovite state, an incentive for the preservation of the Mongol (in this case, Golden Horde) legacy was a necessity of governing the former Horde subjects, now annexed by Russia, with the help of Tatar administrative approaches.

The Golden Horde had a developed and branched system of governance. It developed and changed shape perpetually throughout nearly the entire three centuries of the state's existence. Beginning with the introduction of the Mongol Empire’s traditional institutions in the conquered Desht-i Kipchak, the Jochids made efficient use of the administrative traditions of the conquered people and neighbouring states. A complex system of governing bodies and positions as well as a hierarchy of central and local offices was established.

Historians traditionally express a strong interest in the Jochid system of governance for several reasons. Firstly, the system turned out to be so fixed that it long outlived the state that created it and continued functioning (in general terms) in the filial post-Golden Horde khanates and hordes. However, this did not happen in the former uluses of the Mongol Empire in China and Iran.

Secondly, the system of governance in the Golden Horde objectively had a significant impact upon Russian principalities. The study of the history of Rus' in the 13–14th centuries, therefore, would appear to be insufficient without taking into account this factor; and in fact, an entire school studying these Eastern features of Russian statehood and culture emerged in the region's historiography.

And thirdly, the nationhood of the Ulus of Jochi demonstrates a quite rare historical example of a long-term, conflict-free coexistence over a large territory between subjects belonging to different economic spheres (nomadic cattle herders and sedentary farmers), adhering to different religions, and speaking different languages.

The Chinggisids shared the fate of many royal houses: as soon as a dynasty loses the throne, its monopoly on power is no longer recognised. The Chinggisids began losing power in the late 14–16th centuries, and descent from Chinggis Khan ceased to play a decisive role in real policy-making. This transition manifested itself in various ways. 'Gurgan' (son-in-law) dynasties
emerged once, in order to gain access to the throne, it was sufficient to become related to the 'golden family' through the female line. As was mentioned above, the path to power was paved by the non-dynastic aristocracy—this included the begs of Turkic tribes who had been nearly invisible in politics up until the middle of the 14th century. During the 15th century, the phenomenon of tribal leaders' growing social authority took shape in the form of a permanent institution of *karachi begs*—leaders of major Els (as a rule, there were four Els)—which constituted an indispensable advisory body to the ruling Khan in the late Golden Horde, Crimean Khanate, and Kasimov Tsardom. Governance could also be carried out on behalf of powerless Chinggisids—puppets. Many of them were so unremarkable and insignificant that they are not even known to historians. Their only purpose was to sanctify and justify by their sacred person and silent presence the absolute power of the actual ruler.

As a result, the legal authority of the Great Yasa was losing its significance, and it was now observed in states occupying the territory of the former Mongol Empire with different degrees of formality. New codes of laws were compiled by the Kazakhs in the 16th century ('Касым ханың қасқа жолы') and the Oirats in the 17th century ('Их цзэз').

It is meaningful to also note the role of the Golden Horde in the formation of Eurasia's ethnic culture. The ethnogenesis of many Turkic peoples originated with the populations of this state's various provinces. The Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Nogais, Kumyks, among others, are mentioned in documents of the post-Horde epoch. The origin of present-day ethnic communities denoted with the ethnonym *Tatars* can also be said to have emerged in the Jochid Ulus.

In the second half of the 15th century, sources began to mention the Free Cossacks. The situation in the 1460–1500s, when the Golden Horde had already fallen and the Great Horde was quickly approaching collapse, turned out to be favourable for the formation of Cossack communities in the southern steppes of Eastern Europe. At this time, these communities almost completely consisted of Tatars, and moreover, Tatars from the Great Horde. The Cossacks of this period were a marginal group of the steppe people who could nominally be viewed as subjects of the Horde but were behaving more and more independently.

Therefore, the question of the historical role of the Golden Horde and its significance in world and Eurasian civilisation is an incredibly complicated one. However, formidable difficulties arise for historians when studying this vast circle of questions. It is well known that directly created in the Golden Horde chronicles, acts, and other documents were practically not preserved. Almost all known texts about the Golden Horde were written outside of it—often thousands of versts away from the Horde and by people who had never visited it. Given these complexities, there is a need to combine and coordinate the efforts of scholars from different disciplines: Orientalists, historian-Russicists, archaeologists, and others—from both Russia and other states.

This collective monograph is one such example of international cooperation. Based on the analysis of diverse sources, researchers from different countries have offered their own vision of complicated and controversial aspects of the history of the Golden Horde. We hope that the reader has gained sufficiently coherent and extensive information about the development of the Golden Horde, its relations with neighbouring countries, and its role in global policy-making of the 13–14th centuries.

In many ways, this monograph became possible thanks to the successful work on the Golden Horde problems by Tatarstan scientists. In recent years, the Usmanov Centre for Research on the Golden Horde and Tatar Khanates at the Sh. Marjani Institute of History of the Tatarstan Academy of Sciences has played a more noticeable role as coordinator of this scientific direction. In short, the scholarly measures carried out by the Centre and Institute (including conferences and discussions) and published periodicals as well as issued monographs and collections on the Golden Horde have thankfully led to the fruitful cooperation between many colleagues from the scientific centres of many different countries.
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